Quantum Physics, Qualia and the Philosophy of Wittgenstein: How Do Ideas Compare or Contrast?

If my question appears too vague, I would like to offer the ideas of physics about the n nature of physical reality and whatever 'physics' may entail. This may be where the issues of what is metaphysics may come into play, in trying to understand the nature of ' reality'. I struggle with this area of thinking, but am not sure how many is my psychological issue or one of metaphysics. Ultimately, the dilemmas of human understanding may come down to the perspectives of human understanding and how may this be understood philosophically?

An odd feature of explorations of the 'nature' of 'reality' is that they've involved increasingly abstruse experiments, e.g. a tunnel deep under a Swiss mountain where very tiny fragments of the allegedly physical are hurled around at fantastic speeds.

This makes them not dissimilar in structure to 'reality television', which arrived for me 20 years or so ago when a non-representative portion of humanity was confined in an artificial environment and subject to unusual tests while under constant surveillance.

There are manipulators in both scenarios: scientists who observe, and producers who observe. They both edit and judge. We gawp at the outcomes.

Reading Wittgenstein has made me feel, for instance, that 'Reality is not what it seems' is one of those statements that won't stand up to much scrutiny, once unpicked, and that experiments under Swiss mountains or in confined tv studios are going to reveal only a highly stylised version of 'reality'. I like discovering that there's a blindspot in 'reality' that my eyes don't 'see' yet I do, as an example (see the excellent 'Sense and Sensibilia' thread), that under certain conditions physical systems may be particles-not-particles whooshing about in a lot of minuscule empty space, or that social class and nationality at birth probably determine where you'll end up in life. No, really. Maybe Nature does not wear a veil which we can tear away to reveal her true nature.

Reply to Jack Cummins
For me, applied physics or applying the scientific method, produces results that can be demonstrated again and again and again. Surely at some point that becomes 'reality' for most humans.
I don't think there is any choice, but to accept, that the sensory information we receive, comes from a source reality, and in the main, accurately reflects it. I think any philosophical or metaphysical projections from that reality or presupposition, have some value, but will always be unsatisfactory in comparison with the application of the scientific method.

I really enjoy Rovelli's youtube offerings on time, space and loop quantum gravity.
Quoting Jack Cummins

Rovelli, argues that ' Quantum mechanics teaches us not to think about the world in terms of "things," but in terms of "processes" instead.

But in that book, does he suggest that 'things' or 'objects' don't exist as a consequence?

Carlo also suggests (at least in my interpretation of his offerings about time,) that our notion of 'present' is absolutely individual. Almost like each human being experiences existence/reality, separately or perhaps even in a sense, solipsistically.
The idea that our reality is unique to each of us, sits fine with me, but the question of whether or not, at the largest scale of the universe, there is an existent 'objective reality,' is one of those thoughts that make my brain show me a picture of an off switch, as my only escape from getting trapped in a deadlock/livelock state.

Thanks for your reply, because the complex nature of subjective and objective aspects of knowledge and understanding are not simple at all. Each person may be 'unique', which may have some relevance, psychologically, but it does connect to wider aspects of objective factors. In the extremes of solipticism. the heightened sense of subjective understanding may be exaggerated. Equally, such states may be seen as of little importance in the context of objectivity.

This may have some bearing on philosophical pictures of the nature of 'reality', including those arising in quantum physics. It may end up with a dichotomy of realism, quantum physics and imagined possibilities. Alternatively, it may be that the underlying philosophy worldview is becoming so stripped back that all thinking comes back to the logistics of language. It is so questionable, especially in terms of minimalism and how philosophical analysis is stripped back to preclude or exclude ideas of underlying or 'hidden' views of 'reality'.

Reply to mcdoodle
It does seem that you are familiar with the different directions of philosophical thinking. It may come down to tunnel vision or opening up to wider forms of framing. As I see it, both the frames of quantum physics and the analysis based on Wittgenstein's ideas may be important and useful and , eas individual thinkers, each of us may be involved in this intricate juxtaposition of ideas and underlying constructs of the nature of 'reality'.

Reply to Jack Cummins How is this topic-question substantively different from the topic-question you had raised before?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11057/what-is-your-understanding-of-reality/p1

Also, why do you think 'quantum physics' has any more implications than (e.g.) 'miracles' or 'Euclidean geometry' for philosophical conceptions of 'reality'? :chin:

Reply to 180 Proof
Of course, there are overlaps with this area of thinking and the question of 'reality', but this thread was intended to be more specific, focusing on the contrast between Wittgenstein and quantum physics.

The reason why I am seeing quantum physics as of specific importance is because physics is essential as a foundation for thinking about the fundamental structure of life, including both matter and mind. If anything, even the question of miracles comes down to the essentials of physical laws, what is possible and what appears to be otherwise, as in the concept of the 'supernatural'.

Quoting Jack Cummins

I am raising the question of the nature of metaphysics and perception and how may the nature of 'reality' be understood in the most helpful way?

Metaphysics is like 'crafting conceptual prescription eyeglasses' (prior to (e.g.) microscopes & telescopes) by which reality in general – in the broadest sense – can be perceived (i.e. interpreted). As natural beings who are inseparable from nature, we can only perceive and know nature – the only aspect (surface?) of reality accessible to (our) nature-limiting, defeasible, abductive reasoning – insofar as parts cannot 'transcend' (i.e. encompass with sound reasons) the whole to which they constitutively belong. In sum (as I discern it), (1) "the nature of metaphysics" is both analoguous to map =/= territory (i.e. perception, conception, explanation) and to mapping aspects (i.e. a subset) of the territory with other aspects (i.e. a subset) of the territory; however, (2) "the nature of reality" is analogous to the territory unbounded.

Reply to Jack Cummins Yes, but as Witty emphasized that 'philosophy' is only a conceptually clarifying – linguistic nonsense untangling / exorcising – activity and not a theoretical science. I think he'd say 'quantum physics' is besides the point and 'reality' is a presupposition of certain language-games and not a sensible object (i.e. answerable question) for philosophical discussion – merely a confusion or misuse of everyday language. :eyes:

Quoting 180 Proof

Also, why do you think 'quantum physics' has any more implications than (e.g.) 'miracles' or 'Euclidean geometry' for philosophical conceptions of 'reality'? :chin:

Good point. Moving from Newtonian to quantum physics we are forced to replace the tool of ordinary language and analogies arising therefrom to "understand" or "picture" reality to a more sophisticated language, modern mathematics, wherein "real" accords more analogues with nature in its micro levels at least.

This "new" language demonstrates a preciseness the "old" language lacks.

As an old and probably extinct practitioner I have been able to glimpse things through mathematical descriptions that rival - surpass even - what I can describe using traditional language and analogies, although some would argue all of math is ultimately reducible to ordinary language. I suspect this is true.

Broglie-Bohm theory may connect "mathematical vision" with that encompassed prior to the mystics of QT. From a paper by G Hooft:

Discussions of the interpretation of quantum mechanics [1–20] seem to be confusing and endless. This author prefers to consider the mathematical equations that make the difference. Having the equations will make the discussion a lot more straightforward. Here, we reduce the theory of quantum mechanics to a mathematical language describing structures that may well evolve deterministically. The language itself is equally suitable for any system with classical or quantum evolution laws

Quoting jgill

... some would argue all of math is ultimately reducible to ordinary language.

I suppose, instead, the ultimate sense of any mathematical expression is contextualizable by ordinary language (à la later Wittgenstein). Btw, thanks for G'Hooft quote. :up:

Reply to 180 Proof
I definitely agree that Wittgenstein would see quantum physics as 'besides the point'. It is that aspect of his thinking was questioning really. In a way, philosophy is about untangling 'knots' and limited by language. On the other hand, I am inclined to think that quantum physics does stand as a very important aspect of metaphysics. I am not suggesting that it is more than a model because all descriptions are only representations.

Nevertheless, the quantum physicists' picture is so different from the Cartesian-Newtonian one. It does break down the boundary of the mind and body interface and allows more scope for agency of the person. It does seem like a foundation for a potential metaphysics, with the nature of metaphysics having been cast aside by many thinkers in the twentieth century, including the deconstruction of postmodernism.

I suspect that Wittgenstein wasn't interested in QM due to the fact that he considered it to have no metaphysical value. Remarkably, it has taken another fifty years of mathematics and physics research since Wittgenstein's death to "Ordinarize" QM and bring it back down to earth, in the sense of showing how many of QM's so-called "non-classical" properties arise through our ordinary concepts of epistemic uncertainty and linearity with respect to partially observed states of affairs.

As far as I am aware, the only truly "non-classical" property of QM is non-locality - but there are even shades of non-locality in problems of synchronized computation that aren't motivated by physical phenomena. For example, during the execution of an ordinary computer program, the OS recycles the memory addresses of old values for newly created values. From the perspective of the program that has no direct control over memory allocation, the new values and old values might look as if they are non-locally entangled.

Quoting Jack Cummins

It [quantum physics] does break down the boundary of the mind and body interface and allows more scope for agency of the person.

What about 'quantum physics' leads you to make these claims?

Quoting Jack Cummins

I am writing this thread based on reading 'The Wittgenstein Reader' by Anthony Kenny and 'Reality is Not What it Seems: The Journey Into Quantum Gravity' by Carlo Rovelli (2016). The specific issue which I am wondering about, although it may be comprised of many philosophy problems is the question of the nature of reality and what may lie beyond perception.

They’re an odd combination of books. I don’t think Wittgenstein had anything to say about physics, and would probably have demurred if asked. Philosophy and physics come at the issue from separate perspectives. A key point of philosophy, I would assert, is that it is grounded in rational contemplation of the human condition. It ought not to overly rely on science, except perhaps insofar as scientific discoveries impact the human condition. But Wittgenstein himself said that “even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.”

I think philosophy is not really concerned with the nature of reality in the sense that physics and cosmology is, and that a better way of expressing it would be concern with the nature and meaning of being. The difference in emphasis is that we ourselves are, of course, beings, whereas the objective sciences’ primary concern is what is amenable to objective analysis.

As for the philosophical implications of quantum physics, the philosophical implications are clearly profound, but they’re also perplexing - precisely because they concern problems of meaning, i.e. what do these discoveries entail or imply? That perplexity is easily exploited by the unscrupulous in pursuit of the gullible - ‘change your life through Quantum Healing Crystals’ or some such nonsense, and there’s a lot of it. But there’s also a genuine mystery there. The first generation of quantum pioneers to grapple with that, including Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, and Schrödinger, were highly philosophically sophisticated thinkers (probably in part because of European, as distinct from American, culture and education. See this brief article for a good account).

I’m not going to offer much comment on that, other than to point to the titles of three of the better popular books I’ve read about it - Quantum, Einstein, Bohr, and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality by Manjit Kumar; Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science by David Lindsey; and What is Real? The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics by Adam Becker. Notice that each of those titles refer to the debate about the nature of reality or ‘the soul of science’ - which comes into sharp focus in the 30-year debate between Neils Bohr and Albert Einstein (who advocated a staunch scientific realism). So whatever conclusions one may draw from those, don’t let anyone tell you that it’s been resolved or that the answer to that conundrum has been ‘worked out’ or ‘solved by more recent science’, because it’s not so. At the same time, it takes a lot of effort to get a handle on what issue is, and, as I said, it provides a lot of scope for obfuscation on that account.

So - keep reading up on it!

Quoting Wayfarer

Philosophy and physics come at the issue from separate perspectives. A key point of philosophy, I would assert, is that it is grounded in rational contemplation of the human condition. It ought not to overly rely on science, except perhaps insofar as scientific discoveries impact the human condition

If you think about the concept of duration in terms of the notion of extension in time or space, that is, as changes in degree of a fixed quality, then you have the basis of both mathematics and objective science. There could be no mathematical or empirical object, no calculations nor measurement, without this idea of self-identical repetition. Formal logic also depends on it. Husserl’s philosophy was built on showing how we construct the ‘illusion’ of extensive duration out of qualitatively changing moments of sense. For Husserl, this subjective structure of time constitution underlying the concept of object extended in space and time represents an apodictic science underlying the relative and incomplete empirical sciences.
While Heidegger and Derrida has much to critique in Husserl’s work, they kept his discovery that the extended object at the heart of logic, mathematics and the empirical sciences is an illusion, or more accurately, a constructed idealization. So not only do their philosophies not rely on scientific results, they show the empirical sciences what is hidden to them in their own naive assumptions.

Quoting Joshs

Formal logic also depends on it.

Formal logic depends on duration?

How?

Quoting Joshs

they show the empirical sciences what is hidden to them in their own naive assumptions.

When and where would that be?

Reply to Banno Quoting Banno

Formal logic also depends on it.
— Joshs

Formal logic depends on duration?

How?

The objects of logic to be compared are presumed to maintain their identity (endure) throughout the comparisons.

Reply to jgill

Quoting jgill

they show the empirical sciences what is hidden to them in their own naive assumptions.
— Joshs

When and where would that be?

This is how Husserl put it in 1935:

The supposedly completely self-suffi­cient logic which modern mathematical logicians [Logistiker]
think they are able to develop, even calling it a truly scientific philosophy, namely, as the universal, a priori, fundamental sci­ence for all objective sciences, is nothing but naivete. Its self-evi­dence lacks scientific grounding in the universal life-world a priori, which it always presupposes in the form of things taken for granted, which are never scientifically, universally formu­lated, never put in the general form proper to a science of essence. Only when this radical, fundamental science exists can such a logic itself become a science. Before this it hangs in mid-air, without support, and is, as it has been up to now, so very naive that it is not even aware of the task which attaches to every objective logic, every a priori science in the usual sense, namely, that of discovering how this logic itself is to be grounded, hence no longer "logically" but by being traced back to the universal prelogical a priori through which everything logi­cal, the total edifice of objective theory in all its methodological forms, demonstrates its legitimate sense and from which, then, all logic itself must receive its norms.

Quoting Joshs

The objects of logic to be compared are presumed to maintain their identity (endure) throughout the comparisons.

Ok.

That's a mess. Doubt that it would be worth trying to sort it out.

Thanks.

Quoting Joshs

While Heidegger and Derrida has much to critique in Husserl’s work, they kept his discovery that the extended object at the heart of logic, mathematics and the empirical sciences is an illusion, or more accurately, a constructed idealization.

Very interesting observation! There’s a passage in Manjit Kumar’s book I mentioned above which touches on a similar concept.

In the case of an atomic electron ‘orbiting’ a nucleus, a gamma ray photon is energetic enough to knock it out of the atom, and only one point in its ‘orbit’ is measured and therefore known. Since the uncertainty principle forbids an exact measurement of both the position and velocity that define the path of an electron or its orbit in an atom, there simply is no path or orbit. The only thing that is known for certain, says Heisenberg, is one point along the path, and ‘therefore here the word “path” has no definable meaning’. It is measurement that defines what is being measured. There is no way of knowing, argued Heisenberg, what happens between two consecutive measurements: ‘It is of course tempting to say that the electron “must have been somewhere between the two observations and that therefore the electron must have described some kind of path or orbit even if it may be impossible to know which path.’ Tempting or not, he maintained that the classical notion of an electron’s trajectory being a continuous, unbroken path through space is unjustified. An electron track observed in a cloud chamber only ‘looks’ like a path, but is really nothing more than a series of water droplets left in its wake.

i.e. ‘a constructed idealization’ ;-)

— Quantum: Einstein, Bohr and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality by Manjit Kumar
https://amzn.asia/aVPeoPp

Reply to Joshs Thanks for the 1935 commentary. Husserl and I share an ancestral connection: Karl Weierstrass. Husserl was temporally close the great mathematician, while I am one of about 35,000 descendants. Husserl may have been at a point in mathematics with little to no precedents while triggering the ideas of manifolds and categories in math.

But the 1935 commentary is babble somehow critical of abstractions in math and science, IMO.

An electron track observed in a cloud chamber only ‘looks’ like a path, but is really nothing more than a series of water droplets left in its wake.

I dabble with "paths" or contours all the time in complex analysis and find this statement valid but vapid. On a computer screen a path is just a sequence of points or pixels, or, more accurately, something identifying an underlying entity having no "body".

Quoting jgill

I dabble with "paths" or contours all the time in complex analysis and find this statement valid but vapid.

Taken out of context it looses much of ifs cogency but there’s a limit to how much of the original text can be copied here. It was in a chapter on the discovery of uncertainty and Heisenberg’s debate with Einstein about the interaction of observation and theory. When I read it, I was struck by Heisenberg’s observation that what appeared as a path was not what it seemed. And recall that the context was the discussion of what had hitherto been understood as the fundamental building-blocks of physical reality and Einstein’s rejection of the probabilistic nature of quantum theory (which he maintained throughout his career).

Quoting Wayfarer

Notice that each of those titles refer to the debate about the nature of reality or ‘the soul of science’ - which comes into sharp focus in the 30-year debate between Neils Bohr and Albert Einstein (who advocated a staunch scientific realism).

It's sort of ironic that after stipulating the relativity of simultaneity, Einstein would become a staunch realist. If he was not being outright contradictory, this indicates that he did not adequately understand the logical consequences of the relativity of simultaneity, in relation to "reality".

If reality is "what is", and what is, is conditional on the present time, then the relativity of simultaneity makes "reality" dependent on one's frame of reference. How could this be consistent with any form of realism?

Contrasting ideas?

Reply to jgill

Quoting jgill

Husserl and I share an ancestral connection: Karl Weierstrass. Husserl was temporally close the great mathematician, while I am one of about 35,000 descendants. Husserl may have been at a point in mathematics with little to no precedents while triggering the ideas of manifolds and categories in math.

Husserl’s early belief that the concept of cardinal number forms the foundation of general arithmetic was strongly influenced by Weieratrass. In a note from Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl wrote:

Weierstrass usually opened his epoch-making lectures on the theory of analytical functions with the sentences: "Pure arithmetic (or pure analysis) is a science based solely and only upon the concept of number [Zahl]. It requires no other presupposition whatsoever, no postulates or premises."

Reply to 180 Proof
One particular book which I read which speaks of the importance of quantum physics and the mind/body interface and agency in consciousness is 'The Quantum Self', by Danah Zohar. The focus is upon a less fixed nature of systems and life and a potential 'sea of possibilities. Zohar draws upon the understanding of processes by AN Whitehead and looks at the limitations of panpsychism. One summarised understanding of the nature of consciousness and matter is,
'Quantum- level matter...is not very "material, certainly not in any sense that would be recognised by Descartes or Newton. In place of the tiny billiard balls moved around by contact or forces there are patterns of active relationship, electrons and photons, masons and nucleons that tease us with their elusive double lives as they are now position momentum, now particles, now waves, now mass, energy_ and all in response to each other and the environment'.

It presents as a fairly intricate picture of reality and consciousness and causation, with consciousness as a subtle aspect in the weaving out of processes.

Reply to Wayfarer
Thank you for your post, because it gives plenty to reflect upon. My combination of Wittgenstein and quantum physics together may seem odd but it is based on the way in which I see Wittgenstein's approach to the problems of metaphysics and the limits of certainty. In a way, quantum physics sees beyond certainty, as in Heisenberg, as mentioned in your post. So, on one hand Wittgenstein does not seem to be looking for a metaphysical foundation beyond propositions there is a potential parallel in the way of a subtle and open view of processes and emergent consciousness, possibly in the understanding of the evolution of consciousness. It may be a missing aspect in Daniel Dennett's materialistic take on this.

Reply to Jack Cummins So it's not quantum physics itself that breaks down "the boundary of mind and body", as you say, but another New Age (mis)interpretation instead that seems to do the magic trick. Well Jack, IME, pseudo-science makes for bad philosophy. However, to each his own. Carlo Rovelli's highly expert and deeply thoughtful popularizations are, no doubt, excellent though.

Reply to 180 Proof
It is a whole spectrum of ideas and I know that at times I am a bit of a psychonaut. However, science and pseudo-science is debatable in so far as its connection to philosophy. That is because philosophy includes a mixture of speculation and empirical verification. Wittgenstein pointed to 'facts' and this may point to some kind of rigour in conceptual ideas.

There may be a need to strip away philosophical delusions and self deception in one's thinking. However, taken too far it might result in minimalistic reductionism and a redundancy of the philosophical imagination. This makes the nature of physics and the way it incorporates philosophy at the conceptual level a mixture of metaphysical speculation and empirically verifiable "truth' or 'facts'.

Quoting 180 Proof

Carlo Rovelli's highly expert and deeply thoughtful popularizations are, no doubt, excellent though.

Kastrup on Rovelli

Quoting Jack Cummins

It may be a missing aspect in Daniel Dennett's materialistic take on this.

Dennett says that there’s basically no difference between human beings and computers, that we’re ‘moist robots’.

[quote=Daniel Dennett] “I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?”[/quote]

Quoting Wayfarer

Philosophy and physics come at the issue from separate perspectives. A key point of philosophy, I would assert, is that it is grounded in rational contemplation of the human condition. It ought not to overly rely on science, except perhaps insofar as scientific discoveries impact the human condition. But Wittgenstein himself said that “even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.”

I think you have touched on the antithetical Frames of Reference that divide many of the posters on this forum : Empirical vs Theoretical (metaphysical) Philosophy and Theoretical vs Empirical (physical) Science. Adherents of those disparate worldviews find it difficult to communicate with their opposite number. They speak mutually unintelligible dialects of the same language*1, because they approach "Reality" from different directions (presumptions) as noted by Joshs in the quotes below*2*3.

I am totally ignorant of Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, but your quote seems to hit the same presumptive nail on its convictional creedal head. Ironically, those advocating Empirical Philosophy, typically define Metaphysics as religious nonsense. On the other head, I have asked several posters who seek empirical evidence to support philosophical conjectures, "why are you posting on a Philosophical Forum?" They are typically scornful of my references to Metaphysics and Essences, which apparently don't exist in their worldview, except as examples of Antiscience babble. So, where can we obtain a Babble-fish*4 to translate for us? Are you available for that multilingual job? :joke:


*1. There's a saying from the days of England's great war-time leader Sir Winston Churchill in which he describes the United States and his own country as being two nations "divided by the same language."

*2. "they show the empirical sciences what is hidden to them in their own naive assumptions." — Reply to Joshs

*3. " Its self-evi­dence lacks scientific grounding in the universal life-world a priori, which it always presupposes in the form of things taken for granted, which are never scientifically, universally formu­lated, never put in the general form proper to a science of essence"
Reply to Joshs

*4. What is the Babelfish ?
Adams' novel The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy features the Babel Fish, “probably the oddest thing in the universe” (Adams 60), which gives its host the ability to “instantly understand anything said…in any form of language”
https://www.scienceandfiction.fiu.edu/library-of-babel-fish

BABELFISH with optional BS detector (gas bladder)

Quoting Gnomon

those advocating Empirical Philosophy, typically define Metaphysics as religious nonsense.

That’s more characteristic of positivism, really. There is a school of thought called ‘constructive empiricism’. Constructive empiricism is a philosophical perspective on the nature of scientific theories proposed by Bas van Fraassen in his 1980 book "The Scientific Image." It contrasts with scientific realism in important ways. Scientific realism holds that science aims to give us true descriptions of the world, including unobservable phenomena. Constructive empiricists, on the other hand, argue that the goal of science is not to find true theories, but rather to develop theories that are empirically adequate.

Empirical adequacy, a key concept in constructive empiricism, means that a scientific theory is successful in accounting for observable phenomena. Constructive empiricists maintain that a theory can be empirically adequate without necessarily being true, especially in its claims about unobservable entities or processes. Therefore, they focus on how theories relate to what we can observe and test, rather than committing to the true existence of entities posited by those theories.

This stance has significant implications for how we understand scientific progress and the role of science in explaining the natural world. It suggests a more modest, but still rigorous, understanding of what science can achieve..

Constructive empiricism, while sharing the emphasis on empirical adequacy with positivism, doesn’t take such a hard line against metaphysics. Instead, it simply refrains from making metaphysical commitments about the reality of unobservable entities. Bas van Fraassen posited that science doesn’t need to make claims about the true nature of reality beyond what is observable; thus, it sidesteps many deep metaphysical debates, whilst not necessarily being dismissive of them. This is more of a suspension of judgment than a dismissal, reflecting a more open, albeit cautious, attitude towards metaphysical questions compared to the more dismissive view of logical positivism.

"Pseudo-science makes for bad philosophy."
~180 Proof

Quoting Wayfarer

Kastrup on Rovelli

Okay, so non-physicist Kastrup disagrees with physicist Rovelli's theoretical prediction from RQG. Big whup. In the article I see that Kastrup cannot refute Rovelli without the crutch of a fallacious appeal to incredulity that amounts to nothing more than an ad hoc "non-physical" stuff-of-the-gaps fiat. :roll:

[quote=Gnomon]I am totally ignorant of Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy.[/quote]
:up:

Reply to Wayfarer Better yet (since, for instance, planck-scale entities are not "empirical"): Hawking-Mlodinow's model-dependent realism.

[quote=Carlo Rovelli, Hegoland, pp. 159-60]
It is with sadness that every so often I spend a few hours on the internet, reading or listening to the mountain of stupidities dressed up with the word 'quantum'. Quantum medicine; holistic quantum theories of every kind, mental quantum spiritualism – and so on, and on, in an almost unbelievable parade of quantum nonsense.[/quote]
@Jack Cummins

Quoting 180 Proof

so non-physicist Kastrup

Non-physicist Kastrup’s first job was at CERN. He’s quite conversant with physics. But plainly you’ve missed the whole point of the article so I won’t labour it.

Quoting Wayfarer

Non-physicist Kastrup’s first job was at CERN. He’s quite conversant with physics.

:sweat: A "PhD in computer engineering" does not make one remotely as "conversant with physics" as a world-class, theoretical physicist like Carlo Rovelli. The article you provided, Wayf, illustrates Kastrup's deficit.

Quoting 180 Proof

Better yet (since, for instance, planck-scale entities are not "empirical"): Hawking-Mlodinow's model-dependent realism.

Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself. For how does MDR avoid collapsing into either George Berkeley's instrumentalism, or into naive realism?

When it comes to interpreting any theory T containing a set of observation variables O and a set of 'hidden' variables H, there are only two possibilities

1) T can eventually be rewritten as another theory T' that only contains O terms, such that the original variables H in T aren't considered to be hidden after all.

or

2) T can never be rewritten as a theory containing only O terms.

MDR comes across as decrying the metaphysical speculation that is inevitable in the face of theoretical uncertainty, and disguising this attitude as epistemological substance.

BTW, planck-scale entities are empirical - for why would they be proposed otherwise? Rather, their empirical meaning remains open and is relative to context, as is also the case for "molecules", "optical redness", "cats", "cars" and my dear old mother.

As the logical positivists discovered, there isn't a clear meta-theoretical distinction between O terms and H terms. For example, electrons are observation terms in the context of using an electron microscope, whereas in macroelectronics they are hidden terms in the sense of having indirect phenomenal relevance .

So did Hawking believe in mind-independent reality or not?

Quoting sime

Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself.

It is the natural outcome of relativity theory, when relativity theory is taken to be true. Relativity is a very useful category of theories which allow activities, events, to be looked at from different perspectives. Each perspective is assigned equal validity. But if we deny that there is anything real, or true, which would serve to provide the principles required to distinguish one perspective as better than another, assuming that equal validity implies equally true, and opt instead for other principles to make that judgement, we end up with model dependent realism.

those advocating Empirical Philosophy, typically define Metaphysics as religious nonsense. — Gnomon

Quoting Wayfarer

That’s more characteristic of positivism, really. There is a school of thought called ‘constructive empiricism’. Constructive empiricism is a philosophical perspective on the nature of scientific theories proposed by Bas van Fraassen in his 1980 book "The Scientific Image." It contrasts with scientific realism in important ways. Scientific realism holds that science aims to give us true descriptions of the world, including unobservable phenomena. Constructive empiricists, on the other hand, argue that the goal of science is not to find true theories, but rather to develop theories that are empirically adequate. . . .
it simply refrains from making metaphysical commitments about the reality of unobservable entities.

Thanks. I had never heard of "Constructive Empiricism". CE sounds like a good policy for Practical Scientists : "to refrain from making metaphysical commitments about the reality of unobservable entities". The old "refrain" of "shut-up and calculate" seems like a similar pragmatic attitude toward impractical scientists who dabble in the Meta-Physical aspects of Quantum Physics --- sometimes mis-labeled as "Quantum Mysticism"*1 --- but are actually "abstract" & "unobservable" entities & forces, and open questions about Being & Reality.

I made-up the descriptive term "Empirical Philosophy" to refer to posters on this forum, who do not "refrain from making metaphysical commitments". When they accuse me of avoiding the traditional referent of "metaphysics", from Catholic Metaphysics*2 (4th - 5th centuries AD) ; I typically point back to an even older antecedent of the term, in Aristotle's (5th century BC) encyclopedia of Nature. The section of his documents, that later came to be labeled "metaphysics"*3, was literally placed "after" the documentation about the physical world. And it discussed non-physical & abstract topics that distinguished Greek Philosophy from both Material Nature, and from Greek Religions. Philosophy is not a science of Things, but of Ideas. "Meta-Physics" is not about mysticism, but about the "unobservable", but inferrable, underpinnings of Nature.

I haven't been successful in convincing the "Empirical Philosophy" posters, such as Reply to 180 Proof, to look past Augustine & Aquinas to the man who literally wrote the book. Being a non-religious naturalist, Aristotle is harder to pin the "mystical" label on. So they mis-direct the thread toward a well-known taboo of science, in order to avoid dealing with the philosophical ideas I'm actually talking about. When I post about Quantum Physics, I'm referring to its philosophical implications, not to its physical facts. But it's easier to apply prejudicial Straw-Man labels, such as "New Age", than to argue non-empirical abstract concepts and "unobservable entities", such as those raised by the quantum pioneers of invisible subatomic physics. Such distracting labels don't prove anything, except blind prejudice. :smile:


*1. Quantum mysticism :
[i]Before the 1970s the term was usually used in reference to the von Neumann–Wigner interpretation, but was later more closely associated with the purportedly pseudoscientific views espoused by New Age thinkers such as Fritjof Capra and other members of the Fundamental Fysiks Group, who were influential in popularizing the modern form of quantum mysticism. . . . .
Physicists Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger, two of the main pioneers of quantum mechanics, were interested in Eastern mysticism, but are not known to have directly associated one with the other. In fact, both endorsed the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. [/i]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mysticism

*2. Catholic Metaphysics :
[i]The Marginalization of Metaphysical Thinking . . . .
The most powerful intellectual movement during the last two centuries has been the Enlightenment Project. The Enlightenment Project comprises both the view known as scientism, namely, that science is the whole truth about everything and that it is the ground of its own legitimation, as well as the program to transcend the human predicament by gaining complete technological mastery of the physical and social environment. It is a project that was originally formulated by French philosophes in the last half of the eighteenth century, was preserved by positivist movements in the nineteenth century, and has dominated universities in the twentieth century. . . . .
What room is there for metaphysics in such a view? The only version of metaphysics permissible is secular Aristotelian naturalism.[/i]
https://metanexus.net/catholic-metaphysics-wake-collapse-enlightenment/

*3. Metaphysics (Aristotle) :
The work is a compilation of various texts treating abstract subjects, notably substance theory, different kinds of causation, form and matter, the existence of mathematical objects and the cosmos, which together constitute much of the branch of philosophy later known as metaphysics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_(Aristotle)

Quoting Gnomon

I made-up the descriptive term "Empirical Philosophy" to refer to posters on this forum, who do not "refrain from making metaphysical commitments"

Sure, I get that. The key point about empiricism generally is 'only trust what you can see, touch and measure.' So in practise it usually amounts to a kind of 'scientism'. That Nicholas Capaldi essay you've linked seems to cover that (although haven't read it yet, but he's a mainstream scholar). At this late stage in life, I've accepted that I'll never read all of Aristotle's metaphysics, but I've come to appreciate some aspects of him through his modern interpreters.

That wikipedia article is unfortunate on Quantum Mysticism. There really is a subject matter there, but due to its nature, it is open to all kinds of misinterpretation and exploitation, as I already mentioned above. But, as the old saying has it, there would be no fools gold, were there no actual gold.

Quoting Jack Cummins

So, I am raising the question of the nature of metaphysics and perception and how may the nature of 'reality' be understood in the most helpful way?

In the most helpful way for what purposes? Is to gain a better intuition about what the world is made of? Then you should continue to read what physicists say about these things.

Is metaphysics about what physics says? Well, based on the meaning of the word, not entirely. One should at least be able to say, that whatever metaphysics you think is most persuasive, it should not go against what our best science predicts, or it is likely wrong.

Quoting Jack Cummins

This may be where the issues of what is metaphysics may come into play, in trying to understand the nature of ' reality'. I struggle with this area of thinking, but am not sure how many is my psychological issue or one of metaphysics.

In modern terms based on how the issue is talked about today, say "physicalism" or "realism" or whatever, there is indeed no sharp distinction between "metaphysics" and psychology, especially the more speculative side of it.

The issue here is that there is no agreed upon meaning of the term metaphysics, and I don't think such a non-contentious definition will ever arise.

Reply to Manuel
The blurred understanding of 'metaphysics' does seem to be the root of so much misunderstanding, ranging from transcendental idealism, realism and naturalism to materialistic reductionism. The problem is that no one perspective can be used in a fully explanatory way. Some argue for the claims of realism and materialism because they are evident to the senses but it does not rule out the intricate patterns and workings of processes, which work in systems and are often not visible directly.

Philosophy may unravel aspects of conceptual misunderstanding as a way of showing what appears to be nonsensical fabrications but, even so, a lot is not known. Ideas like 'God' may be used to fill the gaps and are questionable but gaps remain anyway. Quantum physics may provide new scope in the foundations of creative thinking about 'reality', especially the nature of 'fields' and 'energies' which are subtle in nature.

Reply to Jack Cummins

Often a lot of these debates in metaphysics are debates about terminology, as if saying the world is made of physical stuff or mental stuff is even clear or useful in any manner. Reductionism and eliminitavism may be rather different in the extreme view it tends to take, but I don't think it should be taken seriously.

QM can say some interesting things about the nature of the world, though one should be careful of extending the results of QM beyond its own field, which is (extremely) microscopic phenomena.

So far, most of the popular theories offer some quite wild speculations, like alternative universes or many worlds, or the argument that time may be emergent and hence not a fundamental part of the world. Maybe these theories are right, maybe they're wrong, I can't say.

But even if one of these is true, many of the problems of metaphysics remain as they were. Perhaps narrowing down what kind of metaphysics you are interested in, could help. Otherwise, the issue is too broad to tackle. Experience and physics though related in some manner, are perhaps too far apart to discuss fruitfully.

Quoting sime

So did Hawking believe in mind-independent reality or not?

Of course. "Mind-dependent reality" doesn't make sense except to idealists / antirealists (who tend to obey poison warning labels, not carry lightning rods in thunderstorms, purchase auto insurance and eat enough in order not to starve).

Model Dependent Realism is a dubious metaphysical proposition in itself.

AFAIK, metaphysical statements are not propositions. Also, MDR (which I raised in contrast to @Wayfarer's sketch of "constructive empiricism") is an epistemological criterion. The rest of your post seems besides the point.

Quoting 180 Proof

Of course. "Mind-dependent reality" doesn't make sense except to idealists / antirealists (who tend to obey poison warning labels, not carry lightning rods in thunderstorms, purchase auto insurance and eat enough in order not to starve).

The most famous western idealist George Berkeley wasn't a reality skeptic, precisely because his subjective idealism denied the status of the hidden variables of scientific theories as being representational. He was attacking representationalist materialism, and not the "model dependent realism" that is the narrow concern of a scientific theory under test.

I think that when talking about idealism, especially in the context of the philosophy of science, it should be interpreted more technically as referring to a strong form of instrumentalism in which both

1) The hidden variables of scientific theories are considered to be ontologically reducible to observation terms, even if the distinction between hidden variables and observation terms is considered to to be epistemically necessary in practice.

2) The meaning and existence of observation terms is considered to be ontologically dependent on perspective.

Ironically, Samuel Johnson demonstrated Berkeley's views when kicking a rock - for he demonstrated that his theoretical understanding of a rock's material qualities was ultimately in terms of his experiential perspective. Had he believed that the rock's theoretical properties were irreducible to his experiences, then he would not have believed that kicking a rock could prove it's material properties.

Metaphysical "propositions" are indeed propositions - but they are higher order propositions about theories, as opposed to being first-order propositions that are expressed by those theories.

Hawking indicated his disinterest in philosophy, which concerns these higher-order propositions, for his interest in physics, where I interpret his "model dependent realism" to refer to his view that the remit of physics is strictly in the analysis and testing of first-order physics propositions, as illustrated by his "world picture" analogy.

So it remains very unclear to me as what his philosophical views are, for his "model dependent realism" clearly wasn't meant to be a philosophical proposition, but only to express that as far as physics is concerned, philosophical questions are besides the point.

Quoting 180 Proof

metaphysical statements are not propositions

Could you talk a bit about why you think that?

Reply to flannel jesus Metaphysics proposes statements about 'reality in the most general sense'. Propositions are truthbearer statements with possible truth-makers; otherwise, without possible truthmakers, interpretations (e.g. critiques, criteria) or suppositions (e.g. counterfactuals, thought-experiments) are undecidable or prefered for reasons other than truth-value. As far as I can tell, metaphysics consists only of the latter – a kind of axiomatic concept-poetry – because 'reality in general' cannot be both an object (i.e. a fact that either is or is not the case) and 'the ground' of all possible objects. I find metaphysics, like each area of philosophy, useful (i.e. clarifying, insightful), not true itself (or theoretical).

Quoting sime

Metaphysical "propositions" are indeed propositions - but they are higher order propositions about theories, as opposed to being first-order propositions that are expressed by those theories.

Okay, this is where we differ: I think meta-statements are either interpretative or suppositional and only object-statements are propositional. To my mind, "theories" may be epistemic objects.

Quoting Wayfarer

I've accepted that I'll never read all of Aristotle's metaphysics, but I've come to appreciate some aspects of him through his modern interpreters.

Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics is itself something of a metaphysical conundrum that's worth exploring. Aristotle has expended much effort in the rest of the N.E. on exploring phronesis, practical wisdom that pursues eudaimonia. But it has occasionally nagged at him that theoretical nous is in some way a higher form of understanding, involving contemplation, and without necessarily practical outcomes. Book X doesn't resolve this tension, for he both says that (old Gutenberg version)

'...the Working of the Intellect, being apt for contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End beyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own...'

...and yet concludes that active 'Practice' is the key to eudaimonia. My tutor a few years ago, a practical man said, What do the gods talk about all day then? Do they exchange quadratic equations?. Aristotle is not a great explorer of the divine but he acknowledges it is there, and that human speculation and meditation are paths towards it.

Reply to 180 Proof
I wonder about the nature of 'theories' and how they stand in philosophy, especially in relation to propositions, which may be concepts rather than empirically measurable. Within science and, in support of theory, there is an emphasis on evidence based ideas. This is fair enough because ideas and concepts without evidence are questionable.

The issue which I see is the way in which evidence and argument come together in the construction of this because it may not be straightforward. It is here that the nature of propositions themselves may be flimsy because they are based on interpretative understandings and hermeneutic assumptions.
'

Reply to Wayfarer
As far as Dennett's understanding of qualia, it does seem that his idea of the 'user- illusion'of consciousness seems to omit reflective consciousness from the picture. It can be asked what is this? It may come down to the issue of intentionality and where this fits into the evolution of consciousness? In this way, it connects the problem of consciousness and determinism.

Dennett looks at the role of language but what he may fail to recognise is the way in which language itself may result in agency. Language may be the basis of metaphysics, even if the objective aspects are not about human understanding. In life, language and its creative elements may be an important way of enabling reflective choice and agency, central to human life.

Reply to Jack Cummins Get over Dennett. He's the poster boy for scientism and scientific materialism. It's scandalous that his output is regarded as philosophy, when by his own reckoning, anything that's ever been understood as philosophy has been dissolved by the 'universal acid' of Darwin's dangerous idea.

https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-illusionist

https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/books/review/the-god-genome.html

Quoting Jack Cummins

I wonder about the nature of 'theories' and how they stand in philosophy, especially in relation to propositions, which may be concepts rather than empirically measurable. Within science and, in support of theory, there is an emphasis on evidence based ideas. This is fair enough because ideas and concepts without evidence are questionable.

The concept of 'theoria' in ancient Greek philosophy, especially in Aristotle, held a different meaning to the modern understanding of 'theory.'

In ancient Greek philosophy, 'theoria' referred to a form of intellectual contemplation. It was about the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, focusing on understanding the fundamental principles and truths of the world. This contemplative approach was seen as a higher, more noble form of activity, often associated with the life of a philosopher or a sage. It was considered an end in itself, a way of achieving a form of intellectual virtue and, ultimately, happiness (eudaimonia).

This stands in contrast to 'praxis,' which was concerned with action and practical application. Praxis was about how knowledge and principles are applied in the real world, focusing on ethical and political action. It involved the practical aspects of living a good life, including moral choices and social responsibilities.

Thus, in Aristotle's philosophy and other Greek thought, 'theoria' and 'praxis' represented two distinct but complementary aspects of human life: the contemplative pursuit of knowledge and the practical application of that knowledge in everyday life. This dichotomy was central to much of ancient philosophy and has influenced various philosophical traditions over time. But it's very different to the modern attitude which is more instrumental and technologically and economically focused. That conditions a lot of the debates about the scope of theory, the limits of knowledge, and so on.

Quoting mcdoodle

and yet concludes that active 'Practice' is the key to eudaimonia. My tutor a few years ago, a practical man said, What do the gods talk about all day then? Do they exchange quadratic equations?. Aristotle is not a great explorer of the divine but he acknowledges it is there, and that human speculation and meditation are paths towards it.

[quote= 1177a11]But if happiness [??????????] consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [????], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation [?????????].[/quote]

I’ve become rather intrigued by the association of reason, virtue, and divinity in the ancient and medieval tradition, although it’s very difficult theme to find a summary account of. For Aristotle, reason (nous) was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other creatures possess. For him, discussion of nous is connected to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. Hence the connection with universals, on the whole lost to modern philosophy.

Quoting Jack Cummins

It is here that the nature of propositions themselves may be flimsy because they are based on interpretative understandings and hermeneutic assumptions.

What? :chin:

Reply to Wayfarer :up:

Reply to Wayfarer Y'know, sir, a minimum of intellectual integrity requires that you criticize Daniel Dennett by quoting those of his own words and arguments with which you take issue rather than vacuously parrotting polemical misteadings (at best) of his work disquised as "reviews". Apparently, Wayf, you've never read Dennett, have no intention of ever reading his books, and nonetheless keep on bashing him whenever his name comes up – your m.o. for at least the last fifteen years. :roll:

Quoting 180 Proof

parently, Wayf, you've never read Dennett, have no intention of ever reading his books, and nonetheless keep on bashing him whenever his name comes up

Part of my civic duty, I feel. The first I heard of Dennett was when he published a book called 'Consciousness Explained', which I suspected would be fraudulent, and indeed Galen Strawson called for him to be charged under Trade Practices for false advertising.

Reply to 180 Proof Although that said, you’re right, I will cease from commenting on Dennett henceforth. I’ve made my feelings clear.

Quoting sime

Hawking indicated his disinterest in philosophy, which concerns these higher-order propositions, for his interest in physics, where I interpret his "model dependent realism" to refer to his view that the remit of physics is strictly in the analysis and testing of first-order physics propositions, as illustrated by his "world picture" analogy.

So it remains very unclear to me as what his philosophical views are, for his "model dependent realism" clearly wasn't meant to be a philosophical proposition, but only to express that as far as physics is concerned, philosophical questions are besides the point.

I think you misrepresent Hawking's intentions sime. In "The Grand Design" he presents himself as having an adequate understanding of philosophical problems, and proposes model-dependent realism as a superior alternative to other philosophical theories. So he is not suggesting that philosophical problems are beside the point, he is proposing model-dependent realism as a solution to those philosophical problems.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover :100:

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I think you misrepresent Hawking's intentions sime. In "The Grand Design" he presents himself as having an adequate understanding of philosophical problems, and proposes model-dependent realism as a superior alternative to other philosophical theories. So he is not suggesting that philosophical problems are beside the point, he is proposing model-dependent realism as a solution to those philosophical problems.

I think Hawking misrepresents his own intentions, judging by the wildly different interpretations I have seen of MDR, for I've witnessed both realists and idealists defending MDR.

At the very least, its definition is too ill-defined to be distinguished from other forms of instrumentalism, or for allowing critical comparison against other epistemological stances such as positivism and Bayesian epistemology. Notably, MDR isn't mentioned even once in the SEP article discussing models in science.

MDR doesn't explain the relationship of theoretical models to their observational semantics and truth-conditions, neither does it give any guidance as to how and when to select a model among "equally good" alternatives, let alone for deciding what is a good model, and neither does it serve as an explanation for theory-change.

So what exactly does MDR solve?

Quoting sime

MDR doesn't explain the relationship of theoretical models to their observational semantics and truth-conditions, neither does it give any guidance as to how and when to select a model among "equally good" alternatives, let alone for deciding what is a good model, and neither does it serve as an explanation for theory-change.

So what exactly does MDR solve?

MDR has no provision for "truth-conditions". And that's what it solves, the need to define truth conditions.

Quoting Wayfarer

Kastrup on Rovelli

vs Rovelli on [s]Kastrup[/s] ...

He’s talking about Donald Hoffman…. does he get to Kastrup? I’m a bit dubious about Hoffman’s use of the term ‘reality’. I think his book should be called ‘The Case Against Realism’.

I don’t know if I agree with Rovelli’s argument that the subject is also a construct. The ego may be a construct but the subject is not only ego.

Interesting discussion, thanks…Curt’s channel has a lot of great content.

Reply to Wayfarer Yes, Hoffman rather than Kastrup. Sorry, I often mix-up antirealists. Anyway, I thought Rovelli's comments on "the subject" "ideas" "relations" "noumena / ultimate reality" etc would interest you. I agree with Rovelli that mentality is at least as constructed as non-mentality based on evidence from neuropathology and psychopharmacology how "the subject" (i.e. self-awareness & judgment) are easily modified, or impaired, by non-mental stressors (e.g. toxins, traumas).

Reply to 180 Proof It is of interest, and I think Rovelli's persona is appealing. But I'm dubious about his philosophical stance.

The question as to the subjective element of perception reminds me of this figure from John Wheeler's article Law without Law:



My argument is that empirical observation has an irreducibly subjective constituent, which is not itself disclosed in empirical observation. Put another way, a subject is always implicit in every judgement, even if the object in question is apparently 'mind-independent'.

Reply to Wayfarer As an anti-supernaturalist I can agree with your assumption without inconsistency.