Reason for believing in the existence of the world
I have been asked by Reply to Ludwig V in another thread, if I believed in the existence of the world, when I am not perceiving it.
My answer to that question was, when I am not perceiving the world, there is no reason that I can believe in the existence of the world. I may still believe in the existence of the world without perceiving it, but the ground for my belief in the existence is much compromised in accuracy and certainty due to lack of the warrant for the belief.
He kept asking me if I believed in the existence of the cup, when I was not seeing it. My reply was, I do believe in the existence of the cup when I am perceiving it, but when I am not perceiving it, I no longer have a ground, warrant or reason to believe in the existence of it.
I asked him what is his reason for believing in the world when he doesn't receive the world, but he never gave his answers to my questions. Instead this is what I got in his post to my reply.
Quoting Ludwig V
I would still like to hear his own account on the reason for believing in the existence of the world, when he doesn't perceive it.
To see what other folks think about this issue, I have opened this thread asking what is your reason to believe in the world, when you are not receiving it? Or do you claim that you have no reason to believe in the existence of the world when you don't perceive it? I would like to see the logical and epistemic arguments laid out for the reason for believing in the existence of the world.
My answer to that question was, when I am not perceiving the world, there is no reason that I can believe in the existence of the world. I may still believe in the existence of the world without perceiving it, but the ground for my belief in the existence is much compromised in accuracy and certainty due to lack of the warrant for the belief.
He kept asking me if I believed in the existence of the cup, when I was not seeing it. My reply was, I do believe in the existence of the cup when I am perceiving it, but when I am not perceiving it, I no longer have a ground, warrant or reason to believe in the existence of it.
I asked him what is his reason for believing in the world when he doesn't receive the world, but he never gave his answers to my questions. Instead this is what I got in his post to my reply.
Quoting Ludwig V
I didn't realize that your question to me was in the context of Hume. You did drop a hint, but I didn't pick it up. My fault. That does change things. However, your sketch above is an abbreviation of his argument, which does not reflect what he thought he was doing.
Hume was happy to employ sceptical arguments against the idea of "hidden causes" or "hidden powers", as he refers to them. But he was scathing about what he calls "pyrrhonist" (radical sceptical) arguments. Not that he thought that they could be refuted; he just thought they should be ignored. His argument about association of ideas, habit and custom was intended to provide, not a refutation, but a basis for ignoring such arguments. He relies on past experience, for example, as a "full and complete proof" when he argues that a naturalistic explanation of a supposed miracle will always be more plausible than the supernatural one. As Austin says in Sense and Sensibilia "There's the bit where you say it, and the bit where you take it back".
So I agree that there's no deductive argument for positing that things you don't perceive continue to exist (A). But there is a considerable weight of (reasonable) evidence against it. In my opinion, it is at least enough to put the burden of proof on the your idea that things cease to exist when not perceived - the contradictory of A. Curiously enough, there's no deductive argument for that, either. Stalemate. In another discussion, we could ask each other what's next, but perhaps that will do for now.
I would still like to hear his own account on the reason for believing in the existence of the world, when he doesn't perceive it.
To see what other folks think about this issue, I have opened this thread asking what is your reason to believe in the world, when you are not receiving it? Or do you claim that you have no reason to believe in the existence of the world when you don't perceive it? I would like to see the logical and epistemic arguments laid out for the reason for believing in the existence of the world.
Comments (1098)
So if I am unconscious, the world disappears? Does this mean that if I am unconscious and my girlfriend is conscious, it still exists? Or is the world she sees a different world to the one I see?
Or is it only the case that the world vanishes if no one at all is looking?
Or is this arguing from solipsism?
Quoting Corvus
If you are typing this and asking others for opinions, aren't you committed to the existence of the world?
Are our beliefs in the existence of the world or objects based on some logical reasoning? or is it just all groundless, habits and customs to believe in these things?
Quoting Tom Storm
As I am typing this, I am perceiving my surrounding objects and the world around me vividly. So yes, I am believing in their existence for sure. But I don't have any reasons to believe in anything else in this world I am not perceiving.
Is it possible for you to be not perceiving the world while you are still alive? Would this be when you are asleep? But don't things still wake you up? Are you not in some way perceiving the world even when you are asleep?
Once, when I was lucid dreaming, meaning aware I was asleep, I took a picture with my smartphone to see if when I awoke it would be on my phone's gallery.
It wasn't.
But I definitely took a picture and left a message. It remains in my mind, and now in yours. But neither of us can access it physically, here and awake, that is. So what does that mean?
Quoting Corvus
Perception is not based on logical inference. So, if your reason for not believing in the existence of a cup because you're no longer perceiving it, then your reason is not better or more sound than believing in its existence while it's in front of you. And the reason for this is well-articulated by many metaphysicians. You could be mistaken in your perception.
If you're looking for the logical grounds for believing in the existence of the world, then what better way than your own thoughts in refusing to believe. Someone, like you, who refuses to believe in objects not existing is the best, surest reason for believing there's something. You exist.
So what are your reasons and proofs for believing the world exists, when you are not perceiving it? What is the ground that says, something isn't real? How do you tell something is a simulation, rather than real?
When one is alive, and perceiving the world, of course, one believes in the existence of the world, because one has the ground for believing in the existence of the world. But when one is dead, or asleep, there is no longer perception for the individual. Therefore could it be the case that there is no reason for the individual to believe in the existence of the world? Would you say that one should believe in the existence of the world, when one is dead or in deep sleep?
It sounds like you had a real vivid dream, which felt to you like real life happening. When you woke up, and tried to verify if it was a real life event or not, it was just your dream event. So, could it mean that we might all be dreaming right now? How do we tell the dreams from the real world, or real life events from the dream events?
So what are our perceptions based on, if not on the logical inference?
Quoting L'éléphant
I don't have to refuse or agree to believe. But could I not just say I don't have a reason to believe, when there is no reason to believe? I don't deny my existence when I am awake and perceiving the world, because if I didn't exist, then the perception would be impossible.
But then again, when I am asleep, I don't have a ground to believe that I exist. Do you have reason to believe that you exist, when you are in deep sleep? If yes, what are the reasons for your belief? How can you think about the reasons that you exist while in deep sleep?
Occam's razor, for me. It is a simpler model of the world that the world always works one way, than a model of the world that it works one way when I'm looking and another way when I'm not looking.
Corvus, I want to share with you some notes from Kelley Ross, when he finished his dissertation. My aim is not to force you to believe on the existence of the world, but to see another prospective in its prism. Ontological Undecidability
Ross states:
He continues:
But he admitted:
But, if we are not directly acquainted with the real objects of experience, and they exist, then the real objects of experience are separate from us.
Hello Javi. Thanks for your quotes from the article, and points. It is very helpful, and interesting. It is interesting that the author of the article sees Kant's Thing-in-Itself as objects beyond human understanding. Once upon a time in the past, I too, was looking at the concept that way.
Would it make Kant an idealistic dualist? The dualist who thinks that there are two different worlds i.e. Phenomena and Noumena. It is also an idealistic world view because the world is in the mind of the perceiver i.e. without the perceiver, the world doesn't exist? Would this be the right interpretation for Kant?
Quoting javi2541997
The point of the OP was not that I don't believe in the existence of the world when not perceiving it, or trying to deny the existence of the world as such. But I was trying to see what the logical grounds are for our belief in the existence of the world.
This epistemic problem has been dogging the philosophers from the ancient times, and in the modern times Hume and Kant as well. They have been propounding and analysing the issues in their work extensively. But I was wondering, if the old problems regarding the scepticism have been sorted out with some concrete resolutions in recent times and even now as we are discussing the issue in here, or is the problem still hanging in the air with the same controversies as long before in the history of Philosophy from the ancient to the early Modern times.
Is our belief in the existence of the world based on some logical evidences and reasonings based on the perception? Or is it by inductive reasoning? Or would it be just habits, customs or animal instincts?
You are correct in that you have no immediate reason a posteriori to believe in the existence of the world in the absence of perception. It is still the case you have mediate reason to believe a priori, in the existence of the world, iff youve a set of cognitions from antecedent perceptions. And it is impossible that you do not insofar as youre alive and functioning, so ..
The logical and epistemic arguments for a priori justifications has been done, and is in the public record. They serve as explanation for not having to re-learn your alphabet after waking up each morning, given that you already know it.
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Quoting Corvus
Everydayman doesnt bother himself with believing in so obvious an existence, any more than he bothers himself with doubting the non-existence of it.
For the philosopher or the scientist, it is quite absurd to suppose either of those merely believe in that existence the ignorance of which, for them, is impossible.
Which begs the question .who else would even wonder about it?
But can the world be the object of a priori knowledge? When you say precedent perception, could it be memory? Doesn't memory tend to be unreliable for qualifying as a ground of infallible knowledge or justified belief?
The fact that someone is living and functioning doesn't mean that the folk have infallible ground for the existence of the world, does it? All he might be interested in his mind could be the football results on TV, or his stag night plans with his pals in coming weekend. These are the people whom Hume calls the "vulgars" in his Treatise. They would not even understand what the question or issues are with the scepticism regarding the external world.
As you said, most folks in ordinary daily life don't bother or care about the reasons to believe in anything. They just do.
Quoting Mww
Some folks seem to think, why is this issue important or significant? I think it is interesting and significant because perception is perhaps the most important thing in leading a meaningful and trouble free life. Not just for human beings, but even for the animals on this earth.
Suppose that if a dog cannot tell the difference between a cat and tiger, and when he saw a tiger, if the dog chased the tiger barking thinking it was a cat, then he would be eaten fast by the tiger, and no longer exist. But the matter of fact is that, even a dog would perceive the tiger, and know the imminent danger, and run away as fast as he could hiding for his own safety.
For human beings, if you drive a car when you are not perceiving the road ahead of you, believing that it exists even if you are not perceiving it, and keep on racing away into a river, then that would be a disaster. When you don't perceive the road ahead of you, you simply say to yourself, you no longer have reason to believe there is a road ahead of you, and get out of the car, and take a taxi home. Wouldn't it be a more rational thing to do?
Quoting Corvus
Regrading this question, Kelley Ross states: The question then is why the thing in itself remains in the theory. To subsequent generations it has seemed that Kant ends up with a precarious, paradoxical, and perhaps even incoherent dualism between things in themselves and the phenomenal objects produced by synthesis. The thought here, however, is that Kant was right to retain his dualism. It is one indication of how delicate is Kant's balancing act in the equation of "transcendental idealism" and "empirical realism" that it is the "realism" of the latter that even those sympathetic with Kant have trouble taking seriously.
Quoting Corvus
If you want to be precise about it, as you are typing, what you perceive takes the form of a temporal flow. The world around you and your surrounding objects are not perceived simultaneously but in temporal succession. It is only via recollection that what has immediately passed is retained such that it can appear as co-existent with what is immediately presented. to you. If we had to rely only on what we are actually perceiving in this moment with no access to memory, we would not recognize objects and patterns. The world ( including the I) would be a meaningless series of isolated nows with no sensible content. There could be no persisting objects nor processes. Your belief in the simultaneous world around you while typing, and your belief in your own immediate existence, is no more justifiable that the belief in anything else.
On the other hand, one could argue that what is irreducibly valid is the temporal structure of retention, the present, and anticipation, forming a moving zero point of perception. There is indubitable evidence for a past as well as a present, because the past persists inside of the present. If there is is no perceived past there is no perceived present. We could call this moving zero point a transcendental ego.
But didn't even Neitzsche believed that the ultimate knowledge of the true reality was impossible to achieve? In that sense, wasn't he also a sceptic? Although his Philosophy is more tuned for Value, Freedom and Taste oriented, would you not agree that you can only come to true value, freedom and taste via the true knowledge? In that sense, you must define what truth is, and also have the verified ground for your belief that your knowledge of the world is free from error, prejudice and uncertainty?
Quoting Vaskane
How do you prove that the artist is not dreaming or imagining on the contradictions, perceived world and universe?
Quoting Vaskane
But you don't have to die to stop perceiving the world or not to have any reason to believe in the existence of the world. You can have a good night sleep instead of death, and you can have all that with some sweet dreams as bonus while in sleep too. Death sounds too morbid and needless if you are not 100++ years old yet, doesn't it?
I think it is a quite good article on Kant. Lately I wanted to read some new and different commentaries and views on Kant, instead of the traditional interpretations on him. Seemingly there are hundreds and thousands of commentaries and papers on Kant's philosophy from the time after Kant's death to even now. It just tells us how influential his philosophy has been.
Quoting javi2541997
It seems an interesting view on Kant. I am not an expert on Kant myself, but am interested in learning more on his philosophy with on-going readings and discussions on the topics.
Quoting Corvus
Nietzsche didnt doubt ultimate knowledge of a true reality, which is what skepticism entails. Rather, he considered that quest a nihilistic aim, an attempt to stifle and freeze living becoming. For. ietzsche, question s like whether a. external world can be justified misses the point, which is the world is not a container with furniture, but a process of endless transformation.
I have read about this from a neurology paper, and was agreeing to its point fully. But then my memory is vivid and fresh enough to catch up that momentary pasts and render into the legitimate perception. In that sense there are the parts of memory which could be regarded as perception. It is only when long time interval has passed, the contents of memory goes stale or fade away resulting in total loss of the past cognitive perception.
Quoting Joshs
This sound like the mental state some Buddhists try to achieve in their meditation practices. I read that they try to achieve selfless mental state by focusing on the internal concepts or the teachings of Buddha in the text.
Hume would say that you are looking through the wrong end of the telescope when demanding a warrant for accepting the existence of the world:
From this point of departure, the skepticism you are entertaining requires embracing a world of experience before withdrawing from it as a thought experiment. The absence encountered is the result of your subtraction.
"a nihilistic aim"? Doesn't it sounds like a contradiction? When nihilist has aim, doesn't he stop being a nihilist? What was the reasons for him doing that?
I wasn't demanding a warrant for accepting the existence of the world, but was asking the reasons for your accepting the existence of the world. i.e. Why do you believe the world exists, when you are not perceiving it?
Heck, the world might not be continuous, but even claiming this stops way short of saying that nothing exists. Of the latter claim, we have virtually no evidence.
This was what the ancient and the medieval people believed and supported, and anyone saying against it was punished by law too.
But it has been turned around by Copernicus and Galileo totally and incredibly. So what looks seemingly like the case, and supported by the majority is not always the truth.
Hume is saying that reason does not do that acceptance in the sense of a series of formal statements or a priori set of conditions. The belief in the world's existence is prior to any doubt.
Could you prove why the belief in the world's existence is prior to any doubt on behalf of Hume? Do you believe he is justified in saying that? i.e. why reason doesn't do that acceptance in the series of formal statements or a priori set of conditions - I think we need detailed elaboration on this assertion.
No, but irrelevant, because the question was, can it be believed the world exists without perception of it.
Quoting Corvus
Ehhhh .thats for the psychologist. For the metaphysical philosopher, perception is mere appearance, an as-yet undetermined affect on physiology by something, and from which there is no memory as a determined thing.
Quoting Corvus
Every belief is justified, and no empirical knowledge is infallible, so it would seem memory drops out of consideration for either. A priori knowledge, on the other hand, is infallible, but does not obtain its certainty from memories of things, but from the necessity of principles.
But were talking about believing in the existence of the world, which already presupposes it. We should be discussing belief in the continuation of such existence, rather than existence itself.
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Quoting Corvus
In which case, we shall always disagree, in that you are doing empirical anthropology and Im doing cognitive metaphysics. This irreconcilable dichotomy reduces to the impossibility for qualitative judgements such as meaningful and trouble-free life, being derivable from ontological predicates, such as existence.
Now, there is the domain or paradigm where the subjective condition is pleased or disturbed .certainly a qualitative judgement if there ever was one .given the mere sensation of something, but with respect to the original query, re: can the existence of the world be believed without perceiving it, these judgements, being purely aesthetic in nature, have no say regarding objective necessity.
Quoting Corvus
.then you are not driving the car. Youre merely the payload in a projectile.
It's rather the opposite, funnily enough.
The world looks and feels flat, but there is much more evidence to support the claim that it is round, but most of the evidence we use to support this claim comes from experiments which go beyond immediate conscious perceptions.
So, your own example is an argument against your own OP.
The proof you are asking for presumes there is a priority to "reason" that Hume does not accept:
So, this question of proof could be asked of your proposal. What is self-evidently given such that it provides the grounds for believing or not believing our experiences? Upon what grounds is your doubt more than a subtraction from what is given to you?
Apologies for not reading the thread and perhaps repeating what's already been said. As far as Im concerned, "the reason for believing in the exisrence of the world" is that there aren't any compelling grounds to doubt the existence of world. :smirk:
Nietzsche believed any attempt to nail down truth as a repeatedly producible self-same thing, foundation, ground or telos, destroys meaning and value.
The first thought that occurred to me was: Why would we need a reason to believe the world exists? Reason suffers when such unreasonable demands are put on it. Such doubt only arises when reason is abstracted and treated as if it were independent from our being in the world.
:100:
We never stop perceiving the world. Gravity is a constant reminder. Biology never turns off. These worldly constants are always in our perceptual space and can never be not perceived.
Reason itself can be unreasonable when it naively takes for granted unexamined presuppositions. For instance, what sorts of suppositions are at work in positing that the existence of a thing requires its pre-existence with respect to our engagement with it?
Maybe the Earth only turns round when we look at said evidence and is flat the rest of the time? :nerd:
That sounds like a statement from misunderstanding existence from motion.
Anyway, the earth rotating the Sun was purely found out by the Mathematical deduction, not empirical observation.
So you are interested in questions about perception and reality in case the road or a building vanishes? Or in case animals in the jungle suddenly fail to recognise each other and get eaten? How would you demonstrate that something like this has ever happened or will happen? I think that question might be more significant than whether reality is 'really real'.
There are endless things we can't be certain about, but, as I said, I wonder what is the point of speculating? How do we know that the world wasn't created 10 minutes ago, with all of us holding implanted memories? How do we know we're not living in a simulation? Is solipsism true? You can think your way in any direction, tie yourself in knots of doubt and speculation. Why do it though, when that old quotidian seems to just keep rolling along?
My example was against your point that you would rather take a more supported and seeming option rather than a less supported and unlikely option. The OP was asking what your reasons to believe in the existence of the world are, while not perceiving it.
:chin:
Anything is possible.
:victory:
Uhh... I'm not sure about that. Unless the proof started with:
"Let there be astronomical observations equivalent with the empirical observations we have made....
You cannot observe the earth rotating around visually sitting on any point on the earth. :)
Yeah, you can, from anywhere within sight of a Foucault pendulum.
See, trouble is, you are not paying attention. You do your philosophy then try to squeeze everything in to it.
"It is still the case that you have mediate reason to believe a priori, in the existence of the world, iff youve a set of cognitions from antecedent perceptions." -
When you said that, it sounded like you were treating a priori and the existence of the world as the same league of perceptual knowledge. But you are denying it, putting them as "irrelevant.
"in the existence of the world, iff youve a set of cognitions from antecedent perceptions."
Yes, they have similar meaning, in which case implying memory? No?
"For the metaphysical philosopher, perception is mere appearance, an as-yet undetermined effect on physiology by something, and from which there is no memory as a determined thing
The visual memory content is also appearance? No? If you see the images from your past events in your memory, are they not perceptual contents?
"Every belief is justified, and no empirical knowledge is infallible, so it would seem memory drops out of consideration for either. A priori knowledge, on the other hand, is infallible, but does not obtain its certainty from memories of things, but from the necessity of principles."
There are unjustified or groundless beliefs too as well as justified ones? No empirical knowledge is infallible? Again there is infallible empirical knowledge too? - such as I have hands (waving, seeing and verifying)? What would be some examples of infallible a priori knowledge? Folks like Kripke have denied validity of a priori knowledge saying that all knowledge is a posteriori. Even all the mathematical knowledge is acquired by experiential learning.
"But were talking about believing in the existence of the world, which already presupposes it. We should be discussing belief in the continuation of such existence, rather than existence itself."
But isn't there also the possibility that all your past perception of the existence of the world could be an illusion? Why should you rely on the past memory of the world in order to perceive the present world's existence? Does existence have to be always continuing - for how long? Surely existence could be temporary, momentary and fleeting?
"In which case, we shall always disagree, in that you are doing empirical anthropology and Im doing cognitive metaphysics. This irreconcilable dichotomy reduces to the impossibility for qualitative judgements such as meaningful and trouble-free life, being derivable from ontological predicates, such as existence."
That points were for the folks who were asking for the point in asking the questions on the reasons for the existence of the world. Just to say, it might not be all meaningless task if the pragmatic points are what they are drawing values and points from any activities.
" .then you are not driving the car. Youre merely the payload in a projectile."
My point was why do you believe in the existence of the world when you are not perceiving it, but you would stop driving a car, when you don't perceive the road ahead of you.
You are confused again between the actual earth and the pendulum. :roll:
Really? Fascinating. Thank you for your effort writing the substantial post on Nietzsche in conjunction with the topic. I have not been reading him for a while, but will get back to it sometime in the near future for sure. I think he is a great writer.
Hence you cannot accept the evidence of the Pendulum, and refuse to think about it in a serious way.
Here's the physics in detail. It's down to you now to explain where this goes wrong and give an alternative account.
Or concede that the Earth rotates.
Your ball.
Quoting Tom Storm
As my favorite psychologist, George Kelly, wrote:
You seem to have habit of confusing tools with the object to be observed. Anyhow we were not talking about the pendulum at all, but the visual unobservability of the actual earth rotating round directly while being located on the earth.
Please read the relating posts again. was saying he couldn't observe the earth rotating round while he was asleep / not perceiving. I said he is not supposed to, as it is natural not able to observe the earth rotating around while sitting on any point an earth visually.
Does it sound like we were talking about the pendulum? It had nothing to do with morals or refutations either. It was just a simple reminding.
As I pointed out, your philosophy protects itself against counter examples. But we can trace back the thread of this conversation.
You said: Quoting Corvus
and:
Quoting Corvus
The Foucault pendulum shows these two statements to be wrong.
So you are obliged to reconsider the point from Manuel, to which was replying:
Quoting Manuel
and
Quoting Manuel
The account that the word continues when one is unconscious is simpler and explains more of our observations in more detail than your alternative.
Yes, things in the external world change, disappear, and new objects appear on the earth. It is the reality, but we may not perceive them directly or realistically because they may be happening slowly, or while we are away to some other parts of the world etc.
But the OP is not about the actual existence of the world itself, but it is more about our reasoning for believing in the existence of the world.
Why do we believe in something that we are not seeing? Would it be the memories, imagination or intuition or indeed logical reasoning that make us believe in the existence of the world?
There are many cases where when we don't perceive something, we immediately stop believing in their existence. it is about trying to find out what are your reasons to believe the existence of the world or objects when not perceiving them.
I will tell you my personal story. I went to a house that I used to live in when I was a young child. I have not been in that area for many years. One time I was near the area for some other work to do, and thought about the house and the little alley way that I used to play with other guys in there. I was nostalgic of the time, and was actually going to the house and the wee alleyways, and see how it would be after so many years.
I still believed that the house would still be there, but I was not sure. When I actually went there, the house had gone along with all the houses nearby, and there was no more the little alleyway that we used to play in. They demolished the whole area, and built gigantic shopping centre buildings all along, and I could not find the old house or anything similar to it anywhere near it.
My belief in the existence of the old house was proved wrong. I thought to myself, well I should have no ground in believing what I am not perceiving in the world, and that is a rational and coherent way to think.
You suddenly brought the pendulum into the discussion out of the blue saying that, I was not paying attention, and it is problem. And I was just saying, No, that is not the case, and explained the situation logically. :)
You are not paying attention. Your account has been refuted.
The Earth moves, and does so even while you are asleep.
But the moment and I was talking, it was about the actual earth we all are standing, sitting and lying on, not the pendulum.
Frankly this thread is a manifestation of 's question concerning affectation.
If things can vanish when they are not perceived, what about people?
Quoting Corvus
But our reasoning leads to views about the nature of reality.
Quoting Corvus
All my immediate relatives are dead, as are a good number of my friends. I occasionally dream they are still living. Sometimes I imagine that the world I knew 30 years ago is still here and I can resume conversations with the long departed. Did those people ever really exist? Did those conversations ever happen?
Stretching it too far. Hope it is not your projection defence mechanism activation.
Indeed, you have.
I am confident that you turn off the gas and lock the door before bed, just in case untoward things happen while you are asleep.
In that way, your account is an affectation.
I'll leave you to it.
You are the one who crashed into this thread with the pendulum claiming untrue statements without even knowing what the point of the discussion was. Please read your posts again. It really seems like a serious case of projection defence.
My affectation thread will subsume this forum, eventually.
But your example of the Earth being round has less immediately perceivable proofs, than the argument that the Earth is flat. The latter is much easier to believe, because the world feels that way. But once we introduce reason to the equation (of which only a part of it is in experience) then we can see much more and better evidence suggesting the Earth is round, of which of course we know have evidence beyond doubt.
Your question about how do we know if the Earth exists if we are not perceiving it is much less evident than the belief that the Earth exists absent us. It only appears more evident if you ignore the great amount of evidence that is not immediately available for conscious experience.
If fact, what you seem to be getting at goes way beyond Berkley or Kant or any other idealist. Very few of them say that the world does not exist if we are not perceiving it. They take it for granted.
What they question is the conceptions we should make about the world absent people, but never denying that the world exists, in some manner or other.
I'm sure there are exceptions, but they are very rare.
Isn't doubting part of reasoning? Isn't it natural for reason to doubt when there is not enough evidence or ground in believing something?
Wasn't Berkeley an idealist who believed the external world doesn't exist at all? I understood that Idealists believe the world is perception, and there is no material existence in the world at all. I am not sure if Kant was an idealist. Wasn't he a dualist, and realist in the sense that he thinks that the external objects enter into our sensibility for us to perceive them. We can perceive the objects which are in our senses, but there are objects that are not in our senses, which we don't know or perceive, but do exist (Thing-in-Itself).
I am not denying any existence or the world, or anything like that. I was simply asking (the OP) what is your reason to believe in the existence of the world when not perceiving it?
But they are not exactly what we call perceptions in epistemic sense, are they?
Any relevant quotes on that point from Nietzsche?
Better yet, how can we know that the entire universe, along with all our memories and "evidence," wasn't created an hour ago? And how can we know that our sense of certainty re certain deductions and logical truths isn't simply the result of a malfunctioning cognitive system?
I think such considerations can, occasionally be useful in philosophy. For example, when considering if the multiverse actually fixes the Fine Tuning Problem, such a thing might be relevant since such universes might be part of the set of mathematically describable universes and outnumber "law-like" universes. Another example would be Plantinga's argument about grounding our beliefs when we have no good reason to suspect that our cognitive equipment is set up to find truth (Donald Hoffman makes a similar argument, although in favor of idealism instead of God).
However, in general I think such radical skepticism is pretty goofy. Saint Augustine's "Against the Academics," is a pretty good takedown of this way of thinking. Or as Jay Bernstein says in his Hegel lectures: "who doubts everything is real except for their own perceptions? Someone experiencing psychosis."
But if you want a completely logical way to ground the empirical sciences, you can always try Hegel's Greater Logic if you haven't. It creates a bridge between first principles and the world of observation, and it shows how the external world exists through this. Whether you find the argument convincing or not sort of requires going through it though. It's like an 800 page thought experiment.
The OP was not claiming the world doesn't exist. It was seeking the reason for your believing in the world when not perceiving it. Reason is not a being of its own. It is rational methodology of thought.
Incorrigibly, it already applies to all my posts.
That's funny, I've used Occam's Razor to come to the opposite conclusion: the simplest explanation to explain the Hard Problem of Consciousness and the correct interpretation of QM is to assume matter doesn't exist.
Interesting you mentioned QM. In QM there are theories saying that some states, objects or entities only come to existence when observed externally.
Sure, and one of the popular interpretations of QM is the Many Worlds Interpretation. I agree with Bernardo Kastrup that positing the existence of huge numbers of universes popping into existence all the time is a huge violation of Occam's Razor. Why don't the people who believe in the MWI just believe in idealism instead?
No. Memory content is representation of cognized things. Appearance is neither representation nor cognition.
Quoting Corvus
Over time, yes, but belief in general, each in and of itself in its time, is nothing but judgement, justified by and grounded in, the relations between the conceptions contained in it. Any discursive judgement may be falsified, but only but another with different relations, in succession, and not by itself.
Quoting Corvus
Not if perception is strictly a non-cognitive operation. If it is the case perception is nothing but a physiological effect of real things on specifically adapted receptive organs, there is no administration of it by the intellectual system, hence no judgement can be made on it, which would preclude whether or not it is illusory.
Quoting Corvus
I dont. I rely on my senses for perception of things in the world, but I possess nothing that can perceive existence. I understand what you mean, but going only by what you wrote ..makes no sense.
I maintain there is reason to believe the world exists when Im not perceiving it, which is all I ever meant to comment on.
Good point. :chin:
Fair enough. All I wanted to see was the philosophical arguments for believing in the world when not perceiving it. But the peripheral arguments, perspectives, and information stemming from the main point too, are interesting and useful in learning, even the negative ones.
Cool. I know you saw mine, scattered in the two threads where this has come up.
Because the mwi interpretation is simpler by some metrics than other interpretations - namely, it has fewer postulates than most of its competitors. It literally takes fewer bits to describe many worlds in QM than, say, Copenhagen.
Well, this notion of craving for self-sameness as nihilistic and life-denying is discussed by Nietzsche in terms of the ascetic ideal in his Genealogy of Morals.
Yup. Folk use meaningful language not created by themselves to arrive at philosophical 'positions' that quite simply cannot take account of that much.
Your question does not answer mine. Is reason an activity that exists while nothing else does? Is that activity something that can be known without reference to beings? I doubt that.
In the way Hume frames the knowledge of causes, he distinguishes between making judgements through deduction using logical propositions and other ways of learning about them. The 'reasons' you are waiting for have nothing to do with learning. As far as the intellect goes, it is interesting that both Plato and Aristotle viewed the indifference to learning causes of beings to be a misologos, the hatred of reason.
I would say I have to two main reasons why I think there is a world:
1. My experience of things strikes me as I am really in a world experiencing those things; and
2. Experience (and especially perception) presupposes a world in the first place.
I used to have similar views to you on this: I thought that since all we have is experience, then how could be possibly know anything about what is categorically beyond it? Without being able to probe around or use an instrument on whatever lies beyond our experience, which we obviously will never be able to do, how do we know how what we experience relates to what actually exists (beyond it)? It seems entirely possible that what exists beyond our experience could operate and be completely different than what we experience. So far so good!
But...the question you have to ask yourself is: doesnt experiencing something imply that there is a something which you are experiencingeven if it appears or is presented within your experience as different than what really is? Likewise, doesnt perceiving (which is the act of experiencing constructed representations) presuppose that which is being perceived (i.e., represented)?
I find it incredibly plausible that I exist and I am experiencingbut this presupposes a world in which I am and am experiencing.
So, thats point #2, but what about #1? Why think that the world is very similar to what we experience? Honestly, I dont think we should. I dont think, for starters, time exists in the world as it is in-itselfbut you asked about why one believes in the world (when one is not perceiving). I am a phenomenal conservatist; so, in a nutshell, I think that one ought to trust their intuitions (intellectual seemings) about evidence until they have good reasons to doubt them. So, for me, when I am walking around and living, all the evidence seems to me to point to me existing as an organism in a very natural world. If it strikes you as if you are just consciously experiencing phantasms, then you should hold that until you have good reasons to doubt it. I can try to present some worries with that intuition if you would like.
No, I think that believing in the existence of the world, during deep sleep, is what turns pleasant dreams into nightmares. And believing in the world when one is dead seems to be impossible.
Ordinary observation. Or if you want a more formal word - empiric.
Quoting Corvus
Perception is conscious activity -- not in deep sleep. So, if you're asleep, you're not making a judgment like "I don't believe the cup exists when it's not in front of me." Let's settle on that. You're awake, and you're making a claim that you don't have a reason to believe an object exists when you're not looking at it. This is you admitting that you exist.
I suppose it is possible to some degree that the world i'm perceiving is an illusion of some sort and it probably is in some way, but i still believe regardless of the uncertainty in this one; that at a minimum a world does exist. For certain at least one world exists and i'm somewhere in the middle of it. If this weren't the case then i wouldn't be experiencing anything at all. Experience is the subjective litmus test for existence, and every existence contains a world, or itself is a world no matter how big or small, long or short lived.
To believe in the world in the first place i must first experience the world, that would provide me the necessary evidence (not proof) to conclude that indeed, it appears that a world does exist apparently out there beyond myself. Alternatively, if somehow i was never exposed to an external world (brain in a vat, no external access situation), i would still have my inner experience, which tells me something about existence. Existence is true, it's happening now, and here. I feel, therefore i think i am. This is either the anthropic principle or something close to it maybe.
It's interesting to note that people when placed in sensory deprivation tanks, after a sufficient amount of time the brain begins to starve for sensory stimulus, then it goes on to hallucinate, and some people hallucinate entire realities like in a dream. It's also interesting to note that when at least the average person dreams, their brain automatically assumes it's all real, and perfectly normal, even when impossible things are happening.
The brain can't tell the difference between a self-generated world and an exogenous one. We almost always automatically believe the world that we are presented with, real or not. It appears that we are 'programmed' to believe in something, no matter what.
No probs mate. But what is your proof that what you are seeing, and going through in your life is not a long vivid dream or some realistic illusion or hallucination?
:cool: :ok:
:pray: :blush:
This seems a very unfairly asymmetrical question. Why would someone need proof that it's not a dream, but not need proof that it is a dream?
I was reading a paper on Nietzsche's metaphysics and epistemology last night, and apparently he was very much into Kant's TI in the beginning. The paper was saying that to Nietzsche, art was a form of perception, which gave him therapeutic comfort from the unbearable world.
Your own opinions and views are most appreciated, but there is no reason why you shouldn't agree to, or follow the historical philosopher's views, ideas and systems, if that is what you do synchronise with in the ideology.
Quoting Captain Homicide
What is the "more reason" in detail that entail the belief?
I doubt it too. But reason is cunning enough to be able to speculate the non-existence of the world without it being part of the world, couldn't it?
For Hume, I think he put reason as "slave of passion", which cannot give us the absolute certainty on our demand of accurate knowledge. Wasn't he then falling into the sceptical arguments, and then concludes that the nature of human mind comes first, which forces us to believe in the external world? I am not sure if he meant it with all his true honesty. It sounded like he wanted to avoid trouble being an extreme sceptic at the time of history and the society he lived.
Interesting post from you Bob. :up: By all means, I do look forward to reading your further presentation on the points that you have in mind.
Can you control or decide what and how you dream during deep sleep? I thought it is impossible for one to control, think, decide in one's dream. Isn't the content of dream totally random in nature, and you have absolutely no control over it?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
hmmm... The problems of death seem still to be a mysterious topic. Are the dead totally really dead? I was under impression, they are dead physically, but might not be dead in soul. Might not be dead doesn't mean they are alive either. It just means we don't know.
For instance, I have some books on Kant, and when I see the books in my bookshelf, I feel still Kant is not dead. But he is dead. So he is both dead and not dead. When I take out one of his books, open it, and read it, really I feel he is alive and speaking in front of me standing at times. So when one is dead, is it a total death? or just a physical death? No one alive had been dead, so no one can verify on these points. And we are not even able to know the living others' minds. How could we suppose to know the dead's minds and their beliefs?
I think you are missing the point of the question. It was not about "someone need proof on his belief", but it was about asking "whether 180 proof had proof on his belief". The question was put forward for more detail only because of the fact that he kindly has responded to the OP with his initial answer.
Which passages are you referring to?
The thought experiment about Solipsism is, of course, endlessly relevant because it can't be disproven. As far as I know, there's no sequence of experiences or observations one could have to prove this isn't all a figment of your imagination, or a virtual world full of NPCs created to keep you entertained and docile, or any number of other infinite fake-world ideas.
First, let me ask you for a brief elaboration of your own view: what is 'experience' if it is not of something, under your view? That way I can provide some worries I may have with your intuitions and evidence.
Quoting Corvus
Heidegger had an interesting take on Nietzsches thinking about art. He said for Nietzsche art was the means by which the will to power opens up and supplements the possibilities of moving beyond itself.
Does that mean that when observation is not operational, do you stop believing in the existence of the world during the time of no observation? If you keep believing in the existence when the observation stopped, what is it that forces you into the belief?
Quoting L'éléphant
How do you know the admission is true, not mistaken or unfounded? From whose point of view is the admission being performed, and proved?
I suppose there are many alternative worlds existing out there to believe in too. I asked ChatGPT for type of the alternative worlds available for us. So, the traditional earth bound world is not the only world existing out there. But then would you have to decide on which world is the real one, which are fake and bogus worlds?
Type of Alternative Worlds - from ChatGPT
"The concept of alternative worlds often appears in various contexts, including philosophy, science fiction, and speculative thought. Here are a few ways in which the idea of alternative worlds is explored:
1. **Multiverse Theory:**
In theoretical physics and cosmology, the multiverse hypothesis suggests the existence of multiple universes beyond our observable universe. These universes may have different physical constants, laws of physics, or even entirely different compositions.
2. **Parallel Universes:**
This idea is often explored in science fiction. The concept of parallel universes suggests the existence of multiple, coexisting realities that may differ slightly or significantly from our own. Choices made in one universe might lead to different outcomes in another.
3. **Alternate Realities and Dimensions:**
Some speculative theories propose the existence of alternate dimensions or realities that exist alongside our own. These dimensions might have different rules, properties, or even be entirely inaccessible to us.
4. **Philosophical Thought Experiments:**
Philosophers have often used thought experiments to explore the idea of alternative worlds. For example, the "possible worlds" theory suggests that there are many ways the world could be, and our reality is just one of those possibilities.
5. **Virtual Reality and Simulations:**
In the context of computer science and technology, the idea of simulated worlds or virtual realities explores the concept that our reality might be a constructed simulation rather than an independently existing, "real" world.
6. **Literature and Art:**
Many works of literature, film, and art explore alternative worlds as a creative and imaginative exercise. These worlds can serve as a backdrop for exploring different social, political, or existential themes.
Whether in the realms of science, philosophy, or fiction, the exploration of alternative worlds often serves as a means to question, understand, or escape the limitations of our own reality. It's a rich and diverse topic that spans multiple disciplines and continues to capture the human imagination." - ChatGPT
How did you manage to perceive the unperceived cup first place, which caused your belief and memory on the unperceived cup?
Quoting Throng
Most of our beliefs can be unfounded and groundless. But we could try to figure out which beliefs are groundless and which are warranted by evidence beliefs. This is partly what the OP is about suppose.
Treatise of Human Nature Part IV. p.188 - p.218
Hume denies reason's ability to warrant us with belief in continued existence of the world when not perceived. He says it is "imagination" which does it.
Solipsism sounds controversial, but then the alternatives don't sound much better, do they?
If you look closely, realism is also a type of scepticsm, because there are many things that they don't know about, and cannot prove either as true existing or non-existing, for example afterlife, God and souls.
:up:
1) Is there a defeater of the belief in an external world?
Answer: there is no defeater. Solipsism is merely a logical possibility, and possibility is insufficient to defeat a belief.
2) Is belief in an external world rational?
Answer: yes, because it is an undefeated properly basic belief. It is basic, because it is not grounded in other beliefs. It is "properly" basic, because it was caused by a mechanism that would necessarily produce this true belief.
Typical objection: this doesn't prove ~solipsism is true.
Response: Yes, but that's because solipsism is logically possible. See #1.
Ok fair enough. Quite disappointed on your "vulgar" nature of response in hysterical tone. Enjoy your own recommended readings yourself.
Isn't experience always about something? I used to think that way, but maybe you have idea on experience in general, or experience which is not about something. What would it be from your idea?
Obviously you have not seen them getting asked, and giving out their replies. That doesn't follow that they don't make claims on these issues. Other possibility could be that they don't make claims on them because they don't know?
And please bear in mind, Afterlife, God and Souls are not necessarily spiritual concepts. They could be just metaphysical and epistemic concepts, which I meant and implied.
It is? Your title implies it's about everyone who believes the world exists. I suspect I'm not the only one who thinks so.
Plenty of people who believe in Jesus and Santa and ghosts think the world exists.
I have been repeating myself about 1000 times so far this topic is asking for logical ground / reasons for believing in the existence of the world. Not presuming or claiming on anything. I have been just responding on the individual posts some were excellent, some misunderstood, and some almost insane hysterical tones which are nothing to do with the topic or the truth.
But we can learn from confusions too - how human minds work for different people, and we can notice the backgrounds of their ill intentions and negative motive for the aggressive responses, which has nothing to do with philosophy or the OP. It is all being noted, nothing goes missing or wasted. :)
Do you suggest that the external world is an inborn (a priori) concept?
Interesting approach
It's not an a priori truth in the traditional sense, because its falsehood is logically possible. I'm simply saying ~solipsism is a rational belief.
I don't understand your reaction. I read @180 Proof's contribution as a reasonable response, which was located in the philosophical tradition. I found it helpful.
Yeah, okay.
Ok. I see. Good argument on your original post, I think. :up:
I thought his using the word "ailing" in his reply was not a good manner in public writing.
"He read my words at face value, he must have I'll intent, negative motives, he's so aggressive!"
Maybe, corvus, I didn't have any negative motive and I just read your words for what they were. You don't need to jump to conclusions about me or my motives in a situation like this.
If you're not talking about me, there's no need for you to mention that at all. I'm being gaslit here
This remains true even if the world never physically existed. When one no longer is perceiving objects, then it would be the case that these objects have utterly ceased to exist in every sense (besides memories of them) when these objects are mere projections from one's own mind.
The only path to the actual truth is to continue to hypothesize possibilities until they are conclusively proven to be definitely false. Both belief and disbelief tend to short-circuit this.
I see. I think this is just a turn of phrase.
Maybe it is used different ways where you live, but here where I live, if one describes someone as ailing, then it is seriously rude. :roll:
Yeah, this sounds interesting. I will do some reading and search on Heinlein's Fair Witness (never heard of the name before), and have some contemplation on it. Will get back to you if I have any points to discuss or ask.
Quoting PL Olcott
Wow, yeah, this is what I believe too. :up:
So I told him what I thought and felt about the post, and that is all there is to it. I don't dwell on it :) Thank you for your concern and care. Much appreciated.
I agree with you. :up: It would be pure boring for sure, if everyone had same views on everything. :wink:
That I don't know. I don't know why there is something rather than nothing, but when I see the cup I no longer believe it because I know it in the qualitative sense. Hence, when I don't see the cup, I believe in it if I think of it. Since the knowledge I now recall was irrevocable to me when I saw it, I can only believe in it when I remember it. One can argue, What about hallucination? What about dreams? In that case it goes without saying that my perception was delusional and my belief is wrong, but provided the cup repeatedly affirms itself to me each time I have a coffee, I can only believe in it, but only while I remember it..
But if you accept that experience is about something, then why don't you accept that there is a world? I am confused.
Could it be the case there is something rather than nothing, because you perceived something rather than nothing?
Quoting Bob Ross
1. For experiencing something, you don't need the world. But you need a world. There are many worlds that you can experience, but a world you experience doesn't have to be part of the world. A virtual world in computer games, or an imaginary world in your mind or a poetry or novel, or a place in a painting or film, are they part of the world? I am not sure if they are.
They exist in totally different ways and in different forms, which have nothing or little to do with the physical world we live in. But before that, what is the definition of the world? Do you include all the particles and molecules in the universe into the world? Or with all that plus all the astronomical objects in space? Or is it just the earth we live in? I mean the thing called the world itself is too vague for us to know if all those other abstract worlds and multiverse and parallel worlds are part of it or not.
With above points in mind, to experience a virtual world in a computer game, do you need the world as a precondition for the experience? Are we certain that the virtual world is part of the world we are not sure what it is in actuality? In what way a virtual world belongs to the world we live in, and why is it the same or part of it? Is the galaxy part of the world? The blackholes? The space? A place you saw in your dream?
2. I don't think you need the world to have experience logically and epistemically. To begin with, experience without something is again a vague concept. It includes all the mental and physical interactions with something, and something here can be anything (because you excluded something, and just specified "experience" on its own). Why should the world be presupposed for experience, when we don't even know what experience we are talking about?
I don't know how to simply upvote your reply.
It's possible, but unless that thought occurs to me, there's no belief in that regard at all. There isn't a continuous belief, let alone object permanence. We can't cross that hurdle. That's why the question doesn't actually make sense.
There doesn't seem to be any reason to assume a continuous enduring substance at the time of perception, and my completely unreliable lay-understanding of physics suggests we don't really know what matter is, so I'm going with, there are properties in the universe like charge, mass etc, but no underlying identity that possesses those properties. Things certainly appear as we perceive them, of that there's no doubt, but I see don't the causal link between qualia and the 'real world' (apparently, that's a hard problem), so I can't argue that a 'real world' exists.
Saying 'real world' implies the 'other than myself'. In that sense me and the world are co-defining - me vs not me. That suggests there is no 'me' or 'a world' in any unitary sense, but 'both' are apparent in the same interaction.
This assumes perception is the inter-active cause of the world and vice versa, and consciousness is emergent in that sense, not from a prior existing universe, but in absolute immediacy. IOW, I don't pre-exist a world that I cause via perception, or vice versa.
The cause of the interaction remains a mystery, but cause inherently implies duration, which in turn implies a continuous substance.
And so on and so on...
This is only true when one assumes that reality is not simply a projection from one's own mind.
When observation is not operational?
Sometimes the way you say things makes it a bit harder to provide an explanation. But yes, if I'm not now seeing the cup I saw in the sink earlier (because now I'm sitting in the living room), I still believe that it's in the sink unless someone else took it from there.
Nothing forces me to believe in this. It's the theory of object permanence. We naturally believe that objects continue to exist when we aren't looking at them due to our experience with the tangible world beginning at birth. Again, this supports the idea that observation is not based on logical thinking. While logic can help demonstrate that things exist, it cannot make us believe that things exist because this latter idea is developed in us overtime.
When you said, your perception is based on observation, it sounded more intense and purposeful perceptual activity than simply saying "seeing" "visualising" or "perceiving". Observation also sounds like scientific monitoring, inspecting, surveying and examining with visual aid instruments such as microscopes, telescopes and binoculars.
When you observe an object using one of these instruments, and see something that wasn't there when seeing with naked eyes, you tend to be forced to believe in the existence with more assurance, because let's say, you were observing the Moon with a telescope at night, you will see the crates on the Moon. When you see the Moon with the naked eyes, there are no crates visible on the Moon. But because you are using the telescope to see the Moon, and the crates are visible. From the telescopic images and the details that you read about the Moon, now the existence of the crates on the Moon is something that is factual knowledge that you observed, experienced and verified.
So next time when you see the Moon with your naked eyes, and it appears as a shiny round gold coloured smooth object in the sky, you are forced to believe that the Moon has loads of crates on the surface in reality. That is what I meant by when your observation is not operational to imply the mechanised purposeful and motivated act of perception.
So your belief in the existence of the crates on the Moon is based on your memory of the observation and the information about the Moon you read. I suppose you have not been to the Moon yourself. :)
And you keep believing in the existence of the crates on the Moon, even while not seeing or observing the crates on the Moon. As you say this type of observation is conscious and meditated activity, and affords you with a firm solid warrant and ground for the belief in the existence.
As I made clear in the OP, I am not denying the existence of the world at all. I am interested to see the arguments and logical reasoning on what reason or ground our belief in the existence of the world is based.
Could it be only reasoning? Or could it be some other mental events and activities? Or as Hume says, could it be our customs, habits and instincts to believe in the existence of the world?
Quoting L'éléphant
There is a difference between your cup in the kitchen and the existence of the world.
When you say X exists, exist is a predicate of X. It is describing the state of X as existing.
All descriptions imply more information on the subject it describes. You say that you believe in the existence of the cup in the kitchen, and there is no logical reasoning involved in your statement, claim or belief of the existence, because you saw it. Your belief is based on your memory of seeing it, and what else could it be? Your natural instinct to believe in something when you see something?
I am wondering if your memory and the natural instinct could be an infallible ground for beliefs and knowledge. Because all memories tend to fade away through time, and what we call the natural instinct sounds vague. Are we all endowed with the same natural instinct? Does it work infallibly all the time in all cases? How accurate is it in warranting our beliefs? All these questions arise naturally.
And the predicate Existing and Exists is carrying more implications. When X exists, it exists in a location and space and time. So you can ask where the cup exists? The answer would be "in the kitchen". Further questions such as "When does it exist in the kitchen?" is possible. The answer would be "This morning." There is always the possibility that these answers and facts could be all false. As you indicated, what if someone moved it away to the dishwasher? Or the cup was broken and put out in the bin. There are possibilities of these happenings with the cup. Do the answers to the further questions have solid firm ground for accurate information attached to the predicate "Exist", and the statement "The cup exists?"
But when it is the case of the existence of the world, there are more ambiguities. You say "The world exists." Why is it true that the world exists? You say "It exists because I observed it."
But what did you actually observe? Was it the whole world? Does it include all the molecules, and particles in the universe? Does it include all the countries on the earth? And the oceans? The sky? The stars? The galaxies?. You say "No. I see the streets, cars and some patch of sky, the walls of my house and my room and the kitchen". Well it is not the whole world is it? What does the world mean?
Where does the world exist? You say "In the world." Does the world exist in the world? Is it not a tautology? When has it been existing from and for how long? From a long time ago? 46 billion years ago? Are you sure it is the time it has been existing? Is it just a guessing time of existence for the earth? What about all the stars? The sky? The space?
There are lots of contradictions, tautologies and mysteries with these possible questions and answers regarding the existence of the world, which don't quite make sense or add up.
We come to a conclusion. Then is it even possible to say that "The world exists." in a logical sense? Is our belief in the existence of the cup justified?
Yeah I see your point. I don't deny the world existing in common life as Hume put it. But when I think about it further and deeper, the world becomes more mystery in its definition.
Things definitely exist. People exist too. But not for long. When I reflect on the things in the world and the people I knew, through time they have all gone and changed. They are totally different from what I used to know before, and it will keep changing and disappearing.
I am not sure what objects must be included in the definition of the world either. All the countries on the earth. and the oceans and sky? There seem to be more than that in the world such as all the celestial objects in the sky, and all the molecules and particles in the vegetables and forests ... etc etc? I mean are they the world? I am not sure.
And all the people living on the earth and me, are we part of the world? Or are we the aliens from another universe temporarily visiting the earth? We are in the world, but that doesn't mean we are the world. If you make coffee and pour into the cup, is it cup? or coffee? Something is in the cup, doesn't mean it is the cup. We are in the world, but we are not the world surely.
But the people in ordinary life don't care about these things at all, and they just keep living. So why are we thinking about these issues? Isn't it what Philosophy about? Wonders about the world, life, perceptions and thoughts. If some says it is not, then what is Philosophy in their minds?
It involves other aspects of cognition the development of which are a prerequisite to our being able to engage in logical reasoning. For example pattern recognition:
Would it enable us to extend our scope of the visual perception of the world?
I was trying to figure out how much of the contents of the earth I was perceiving at any given time from my own geographic location. I was perceiving the road in front of my house, the hill across the field, a few housing estate with the houses, some shops, the passing cars and pedestrians on the paving blocks, a patch of the sky, and the front and back garden in my house. The total objects in the space I was observing would be perhaps 0.000000000000000000000000000000000000001% or even much much less of the whole earth. I was not sure if my perception of the real time vision would actually be counted for as a legitimate perception of the world in any sense at all be it logical, epistemic or physical perspective.
Why should I believe in the existence of the world? By the way, what is the world? Do any of the other humans have a different scope of direct visual perception of the world purely using the sense organs i.e. the eyes and not using any technological and instrumental perceptual aids? This question just prompted me, but I don't know what the answers are, offhand. Do you?
If this reasoning is true, would it be the case that all the folks who claim to believe in the existence of the whole world with confidence and certainty have been hallucinating and delusional all their lives? Or is that reasoning false? What do you say to that?
You keep using the world to imagine the scenario that it does not exist.
Quoting Corvus
What is a 'logical legitimate perception? The Humean presumption that we have experiences prior to reasoning renders the idea unimaginable. From that perspective, the answer to your question, 'is there a reason to believe in the existence of the world?' is no.
But we do not need an answer to that to do anything else beyond the question. That is in contrast to philosophical questions that are concerned with how we inquire into the nature of beings.
I am minded of the scene in the Odyssey where dead souls in Hades can speak for a short while if blood from a living person is poured into their cup. You imagine a visitor who demands to know why the soul does not speak when no blood is offered.
Could you please point out which part of the world scenario doesn't exist? :)
Quoting Paine
It means sensory perceptions which are logically verified with reasonable warrant, and justified as valid knowledge. Most sensory perception in daily life can be unclear, fleeting and unjustified due to lack of focused attention, justification and warrant for certainty and accuracy.
Humean reason is either demonstrative reason or inductive reasoning which are like inferencing, so his definition of reason seems narrower and much limited capacity than the other Philosophers such as Kant.
Do you then agree that Hume's view is correct? In my opinion, Hume's premise that the belief in the existence of the world existed before the question has been asked, can be valid, but would he not agree that the belief requires justification and proof, and even if it were justified and verified belief, the external world is subject to constant and unpredictable changes through time? And does the belief that existed prior to the reasoning have 100% warrant for absolute accuracy too?
And according to Hume, reason keeps asking and tries to ensure more accuracy and certainty on the knowledge it is inspecting, but the more it reflects, the less accurate, and less certain the knowledge and beliefs becomes due to the nature of the external world - changing and fleeting. But that is the nature of human reasoning, so why does he deny the point of reasoning for justification of the beliefs on the existence of the world? Doesn't it sound like a contradiction?
Should he not have said that for more accuracy and certainty of the belief on the existence of the world, on-going reasoning is needed accompanied by new up-to-date sensory perception on the world when and wherever possible, which will provide us with more justified belief on the existence?
Quoting Paine
Maybe the soul wanted a nice glass of red wine instead of blood? :)
OK, there is no reason to believe in the existence of the world. Fair enough. I missed your answer No because it was in the small letters.
Hume makes clear on the logical reasons why our belief in the external world is unfounded and unjustified.
1. All we see is impressions of the external objects and bodies in the world. When we see a tree, the shape, size of the tree changes as we move around the tree. The tree remains the same, but our perception of the tree changes as we move closer, farther and around it. All we see is the impression (sense-data) of the tree, not the tree itself.
2. When we press our eyes with our fingers and see the tree, the tree appears in double image. The tree is one, but the image we see is two. Which is the real? The tree is real, because it is the object we see, and it is a tree at all other times when we don't press our eyes. Our perceptions can be false at times.
3. Therefore, all we perceive is the impression of the external objects in the world, not the real objects and bodies themselves. We cannot say the impression of the object is same as the object itself, because they must be different entities in nature.
It only takes a grain of sand to know the world.
That sounds poetic metaphor.
It's more than that. It's actually a philosophical nuance of realism.
Suppose Camus and Sartre wrote great novels for expressing their philosophical ideas in them.
I don't know. Accessibility comes to mind -- they want their works to be more accessible to their readers than writing nonfiction (which was peer-reviewed, academically, and published in journals). The cafè writers, as they're known, I guess.
This is exactly my point: you cant claim you are experiencing if there isnt something which you are experiencing. Whether or not I or everyone exists in that world which you experience is, at this stage of the argument, irrelevant. Perhaps I misunderstood your OP, but I thought you were arguing that you dont believe in any world at all: is that incorrect?
So, I agree that it is entirely logically and actual possible that what you are experiencing is not whatever reality is in-itself; but this doesnt negate the fact that you are experiencing something, and that something, relative to you, is the world. It the only world you will ever (probably) know. Any conjecture that there are other realities is predicated on the knowledge you have of the reality that you experience.
That physical world is the world for you: irregardless of whether there is some other world out there.
If you are talking about from the perspective of a video game character (that hypothetically is conscious), then I would say that the data and rules by which they are governed is separate from themselves and is what they are experiencing; and that is the world for them. They would never, presumably, know that they are in a simulated game.
Of course we cannot derive from logic that we need something to experience to experience in the first place: but that is true of virtually everything since logic only pertains to the form of the argument.
Epistemically, I think that experience itself presupposed that which is being experienced.
I am not so sure if having experience is strong evidence for the existence of a world or the world. Because experience is an abscure concept, which is a private mental event.
You may claim that you have experience of something, but how do I know that something was not your fantasy, imagination or dreams?
The OP does not deny the existence of the world, but it is asking for the reasons for believing in the world's existence. This is a classic philosophical topic which has been discussed since the ancient Greek era. But OP is most intimately related to Hume's argument and possibly to Kant's Thing-in-Itself as well. (There have been debates on TII whether it is noumena which is unknowable, or is it possible phenomena which is unknowable but conceivable).
So it is not some meaningless topic created by an ailing guy needing a cure like claimed in his post.
The main aim of the OP is how different reasonings are between the traditional philosophers and currently living people in terms of scepticism regarding the existence of the world, and how some individuals perspectives can be different from the others, and trying to learn more about the scepticism in line with Epistemology and Metaphysics topics.
Quoting Bob Ross
You are correct. Logic doesn't tell you anything. But we apply logical thinkings into these abcure issues trying to come to more certain conclusions. Until we apply the logical thinking with the contents, Logic is not a Logic. ( You might recall that I have been claiming that in the other threads i.e. Logic needs contents to operate as a Logic.)
Quoting Bob Ross
I think experience is too abscure, and private mental events to qualify as the objective ground for the existence of the world or a world. We are looking for more objective reasons than personal experience for the evidence i.e. you may claim that you have experienced something therefore that something must exit, but why should I trust that claim? The claim is lacking objectivity.
ps: abscure = abstract and obscure
Hume displays a slightly faulty way of understanding sensation. He thought that we sense the world to be in a specific condition (like a state of existence) at one time, then we sense another condition at a later time, but in reality sensation always occurs over a period of time, and we sense activity in that time, a world of change rather than a state of existence. The 'state of existence' or the specific condition of the world at a point in time, is a conceptual product derived by the mind, not the senses.
This is an important difference because if one looks at an area at one time, then looks away, and looks back in the same direction later, all the sameness which one sees must be a product of the mind rather than a product of the senses which are sensing activity, change, and not unchangingness. Our conception of "the world", or "a world" is therefore based in this idea of the temporal continuity of sameness and not directly supported by sensation. It is only the mind reviewing empirical information which produces this idea of "the world".
Because of this way that "the world" is produced, it is logically impossible to deny that the world exists when one is not looking at it, or sensing it, because this would be self-contradictory. "The world" itself, as a concept, is a concept of something not sensed in the first place, so it has no reliance on sensation. And, since the concept is produced to account for the reality of the unchangingness which is not sensed, and is understood to continue through time while not being sensed, it would be contradictory to say that this unchangingness which is not actually sensed in the first place, requires being sensed to be real.
The proper approach then, to deny the reality of "the world" is to demonstrate that the idea is flawed. This would mean showing that the temporal continuity of sameness which the mind projects onto the world is somehow a flawed principle. Hume takes the reverse perspective, assuming that we sense the sameness (when we really sense activity), and then he argues that change to the world must be justified by the mind. But in reality a temporal duration of change is what is directly sensed, so it need not be justified, and the idea that there is "a world", something which remains the same with an identity of being the same thing, "the world" over a period of time during which change is being sensed, is what needs to be justified.
Oh, you dont. I agree with you there: I would say it just seems like I am not dreaming, but, at the end of the day, I cannot definitively prove that I am not.
If you go that route, and just say solipsism is true, then it doesnt really, for practical purposes, explain the data of experience very well: it seems as though you arent dreaming, although sometimes you are, and that you are an organism in a world (outside of you).
Strictly speaking, if you accept that your conscious experience is representational, then you could derive, like Kant, that in order for their to be a determination of the empirical self there must be objects outside of that self which are real; but the hard skeptic can still go further and ask whether those intuitions (in the Kantian sense of the term) are fabrications or not.
I see. I just dont see how one could definitively prove there is a worldit is just the best explanation of what one is experiencing.
This is an impossible task, because all the direct knowledge we have of anything is a part of that personal experience that you mentioned: you are asking for that which is impossible to attain.
Just so.
Quoting Banno
That's funny. I said the same thing with respect to the thread on empirical normativity. Which goes to show you that consensus forms an integral component of cognition.
Sounds like another case of projection defence mechanism. :smirk:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Good point and interesting analysis. Any relevant quotes from Hume?
I agree. We are trying to see the arguments either to prove, disprove or the question is illogical itself. The conclusions will only be evident from good arguments. But still I felt bringing experience to the argument sounded too solipsistic.
And the main topic OP is not to prove the existence of the World. But trying to see the arguments on the reasons for believing in the existence of the world when not perceiving it.
Quoting Bob Ross
Science seeks objective knowledge, so does Philosophy too. For the course of achieving the possible objective truths, they apply reasoning, observations, critical analysis on the data and issues. It is not total impossibility although challenging at times.
Think about what this says. "Prove that there is a world". Whatever doubts exist with respect to the existence of the world likewise exist with respect to any proofs which you might append to that. As to believing in the world when not perceiving it, you are always perceiving something. So just because you don't continue to see the back of something when you move to the front is no warrant to believe the back disappeared. If you are completely unconscious, having no cognitions of any kind, it is just as likely that you have ceased to exist as has the world. In fact, the former seems more likely.
Not sure if this poster has read even single book on Philosophy in his whole life. Sounds like just making random statements on nothing.
Because I said you are never not perceiving the world?
If you have anything constructive to add to the topic, I would advise you to read at least on Hume or Kant, and bring your own arguments on the points rather than emotionally lashing out to people, please. That would help.
I don't think you had a least manner or proper arguments on the topic from your postings to be fair.
How is anything I said emotional?
Like I said, you are never not perceiving the world. If your mind is operating, it is "in touch with the world". The fact that I don't see it when I close my eyes does not surprise me, nor should it. Just because you don't continuously see "exactly the same set of things" doesn't mean that "the world" has in anyway ceased to exist or become dubious. You are just continuing to perceive it in a different way.
No one would agree with you, if you insist that you were interested in this topic and tried to ask or bring your arguments for the thread going on, when you were quoting those posters who are evidently not interested in this topic, and making smirk comments which aren't directly related to this topic. It wasn't helpful, and was clearly unnecessary. That was my impression. If I was wrong or misunderstood you, I do aplogise.
So far you are the only one I hear. As far as I can see, I am bang on topic. It isn't like it's some abstruse tangent. It's literally the title of your post. If you want to dispute the reasoning, fine. If the thought of what I said upset you, I am sorry. It wasn't intended to be rude in any way.
edit. I see this has gone down before. At which time you said you weren't responsible for making someone leave the discussion. Funny how your attitude changes when it is "your" discussion.
Given this, there is no way that you will be able to understand Austin. You've just got the perception stuff far too embedded in your thinking. It's a bit sad that you have been so mislead, but them's the breaks.
You do know that the world continues while you sleep. Right up until you try to do philosophy.
So I might leave this conversation there.
Banno
There is a difference between having no logical ground of believing in the existence of X, and the actual existence of X. Please think about it carefully again. Leaving is fine. It just confirms you ran out of the ideas for the arguments. What can anyone do about it?
Quoting Pantagruel
How does this relates to the OP?
That clear things up?
I don't claim to understand Austin. Austin is still in my reading list.
I feel your writing style is not clear, and definitely not proper. Please bear in mind the fact that your quoting randomly the posters in the thread, who has shown their negativity on this topic previously , and making obscure remarks which is not relevant to the discussion appeared unclear in your motive.
I have never come across poster like that before.
OK, to me this is not a big deal. We are only communicating with language, and language cannot reveal everything in the situation. I saw your out of the blue message (which is not even addressed to me) quoting the posters who showed negativity to this topic previously, and with your surreptitious comments which seemed not related to the topic gave me impression that you had other motive than engaging in the topic in positive manner.
I notice that it was your 1st post in the thread, and it would have been better if you kindly explained what your points in your 1st post was about. I mean those quotes you did, was it necessary? I am still not sure how the quotes are relevant apart from smirk sounding about something I don't understand. What would Austin say about your message?
What is that got to do with the reason that you believe in the existence of the world? Could you elaborate please?
"I am sorry for having disturbed your (dogmatic?) slumber. I will let you get back to your ideas now."
~The World
See? You are avoiding / hiding away from the issue. It was the 1st message you posted gave the impression, and then it snowballed into what sounded like a series of emotional explosion. If you had genuine point on the topic, I would presume you could give a good substantial exposition, which clearly you seem lacking.
Quoting Pantagruel
This type of message only make the writer sounding like a vulgar who claims reading 1000s of books but with his hands not with the brain in Hume's term.
I would say that, in terms of just evidence for the existence of the world, doesn't it at least seem like you are in an external world?
Yes, I am. I am in the world. Sometimes the world is in my mind, when I am imagining it.
But Hume would say, no mate, when you close your eyes, you don't see the world.
Do you still believe that the world exists? If yes, what is the reason that you believe in it when you are not perceiving it?
What about, for starters, the seeming object permanence (of things)? That seems to suggest, at least, that there is an external world.
Object permanence sounds like a psychological term. I must admit I am not familiar with the concept. Could you perhaps elaborate on it?
My intention of the OP run was, to investigate more on Hume's account of his skepticism on the External World, and then go to Kant, and see what Kant has to say about skepticism from his Ti, TD and TII.
Then looking at Husserl and Phenomenology accounts of the world view. The final part was going to look at the Epistemic account of the world with the digitally extended perception under Embodied Cognition. That was the plan. Not sure how well it will progress now, but whatever the case, it was all for self learning, while exchanging views and ideas with the others. :)
Because no matter how many times I do the experiment things are always there when I open my eyes again just as I left them when I closed my eyes. If I have something in front of me, I can close my eyes, yet still feel it when I touch it.
I don't know what you are looking for: there is no logical or any other kind of proof that the world exists. In fact, there are no proofs other than logical or mathematical proofs, there are only inferences to the most plausible explanations. It seems to me that the most plausible explanation for the invariances we see everywhere in nature is that they have their own existence independently of perception.
What more are you looking for? What is the point of this wild goose chase?
That thought's gonna keep me up at night...
I think Hume would say, things do exist, but when you are not seeing them, why do you believe them to exist? What is the ground for the belief that they exist when they are not perceived.
So your premise "If nothing exists behind me," sounds unfounded.
Yes, this is the point. When you close your eyes, you still believe the things exist. You are even touching them with your hands, claiming, wow these things exist, you are not even seeing them.
Hume is asking you what make you to believe in the existence of the things that you are not seeing.
Hume doesn't think reason does it, and he concludes that human instinct and nature, namely imagination forces us to believe in the things while not perceiving them. He seems to think its psychology rather than reasoning make us to believe in the world when not perceiving it.
What would be Darwin's explanation?
Quoting Corvus
I did a term paper on Hume, way back in the day. If you could provide a reference to where he says this I'd be interested, because I don't recall anything like that.
What Hume did argue, is that we could not perceive causal relations between events. But that's a different matter.
Ok, fair enough :ok:
Ok, thanks for your explanation.
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting Wayfarer
"we may well ask, what causes us to believe in the existence of body? But 'tis vain to ask, whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (Treatise 1978: p.187)
He doesn't ask you directly, but he raised the issue, and even if he says "'tis vain to ask", he keeps on analysing the issue extensivey.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, that is a different topic, but similar in the principles.
But hey, you won't find any purely deductive disproof of solipsism either.
Sure, I find Hume's argument interesting, which I am going to read further. Whether he was denying the world or not, is not really important for me at all.
It is also interesting to look into more on the concept of "the world" and "existence" and dissect them further. Questions such as, is it logically correct in saying "The world exists."? What does the predicate "exist" entail? What is the definition of the world?, arise as the secondary issues.
Might be interesting how that even came to be a question.
Quoting Corvus
What do you want me to do, quote all the places where Hume is wrong?
Look at his Treatise of Human Understanding Bk 1, Sec 4, part 2 where he discusses the skepticism in regard to the existence of body, for example. The issue is stated as the continued and distinct existence of body. He proceeds from his earlier described premise, that sensation produces "impressions", and says "...they convey to us nothing but a single perception... ", p189. What I argued is that this is a simple misrepresentation. The senses do not provide us with any individual impressions like that. There is a multitude of senses active all at the same time, and time involves duration, so what the senses are sensing is itself activity, not single perceptions. The 'activity' which the senses are actually directed toward, then gets misrepresented by Hume, as what occurs in between the distinct instances of single perceptions, making a temporal succession of instances of perceptions, the sensations of single perceptions.
The problem is that Hume has actually reversed the roles of sense and mind here. The senses actually provide us with a continuity of activity, extended in time, which is only broken by turning one's attention away from the world being sensed. But Hume represents the senses as producing "single", distinct and individual impressions, which are already divided into discrete units, instead of properly representing the senses as providing the fundamental continuity of activity, which is only broken by the mind imposing interruptions to the continuous act of sensing. Notice in the following quote, how he begins from the assumption of a multitude of individual "impressions" provided by the senses, rather than the continuous activity which the senses actually provide us with.
[quote=Hume, Treatise of Human Understanding, p191] First, That, properly speaking, tis not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses ; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present.[/quote]
Check this reading group: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13614/reading-group-humes-of-skepticism-with-regard-to-the-senses
As I read Hume all he was doing was pointing out that inductive and abductive reasoning are not deductively/ logically certain; a move against rationalism.
[quote=Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B519]It still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.[/quote]
Bear in mind that in the context, Kant was addressing his philosophical predecessors, including Berkeley, who famously stated esse est percipe, and Descartes whose cogito argument stated that knowledge of one's own being was the foundation of all certain knowledge. I think they were the kinds of sceptical challenges he was referring to.
As is well known, to rebut this scepticism, Kant argued that knowledge is not grounded solely in sensory experience (empirical knowledge), nor exclusively from logical reasoning (rational knowledge). Instead he shows that the understanding is a function of the unavoidable way in which the mind structures the stream of sense-data according to the categories which are innate to the intelligence. Referring to "a priori" (knowledge that is independent of experience) and "a posteriori" (knowledge that is dependent on experience), Kant claims that space and time are not solely objective in nature, but rather grounded in the forms of intuition which are inherent in the structure of cognition. Accordingly he claimed that while we can never know objects as they are in themselves we can know them as they appear to us (the phenomenal world). But I think it's fair to claim that this does not reduce empirical knowledge to illusion or fantasy. Kant was an empirical realist, but not, in today's terms, a scientific realist, because he would obviously dispute the tenet that the objects of knowledge are truly mind-independent. But the distinction between Kant's transcendental and Berkeley's subjective idealism is quite a subtle matter. I think Kant's might be described as being a kind of 'qualified realism' - that what we see really is there, but that it's also inexorably dependent upon the eye with which we see it. That 'things conform to thoughts' was the Copernican revolution of Kantian philosophy.
My take is that the subjective nature of time and space are the cornerstone of the framework. But I don't think he claims that these are 'merely' or 'only' subjective, in the sense of being peculiar to the individual. Rather that they are grounded in the human mind, so, if you like, a kind of 'universal subject' rather than an individual ego. This is where Kant's 'transcendental apperception' is significant ('experience both of the self and its objects rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are the conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced'). It's an antidote to the kind of hyperbolic objectivity that science is inclined to foster (many argue that it culminates in a kind of hyperbolic subjectivism, although I don't agree with that.)
//ps// and also Hume's scepticism should be mentioned which was principally scepticism of the knowledge of causal relationships. This was the subject of Kant's answer to Hume which is a unit of study in its own right.//
Kant says that the World is totality all appearances in the universe (CPR, Antinomy of Reason), therefore it belongs to the subject of Cosmology. It is illogical to say "the World exists." Because pure reason cannot grasp totality of all appearance in the universe.
I am not sure where you read Hume from, but it doesn't sound as if there is any truth at all in your points. Therefore I will give it a miss on that. :D
I have a few commentary books on Hume, and all of them have substantial amount of writings on the topic i.e. Hume's scepticism on the External World. In fact there are a few books devoted to Hume's theory on the External World e.g. by H.H. Price.
Personally I do feel that, Hume's Scepticism on the External World is the most interesting part of his Philosophy, and it has a good amount of arguments and proofs in it. It is not just a 2 line google search results amount as you claim.
Just to give you simple hint or summary of his arguments and proof, his Treatise Hume devotes a full section called "Of the Scepticism with Regards to Senses" to discussion on the Perception of the External World. He divides his arguments into 2 parts. One from the Vulgar(Ordinary People)'s point of view, and the Philosopher's point of view for the other.
He argues that the ordinary people believe in the existence of the external world when not perceiving it, and it is based on the idea that the objects have distinct existence from perception. Because objects have distinct existence without perception, the vulgars (ordinary people) believe that the objects have continued existence while not being perceived. And because the objects have continued existence, it is also distinct in existence (i.e. exists without perception)
But in Hume's system for an object to be distinct, it has to be the perception of the object, because all objects are impressions. Nothing can be perceived without impression, so the distinct object in existence must be an UNOWNED floating impression. But it is impossible for impressions to be unowned or floating logically. Hence from Modus tollens,
If CE then DE
not DE
therefore not CE
It follows that the vulgars' belief in the existence of the external world is false.
He goes on proving Philosopher's belief in the existence of the external world, and concludes that the belief cannot be based on reason, but imagination. There are extensive arguments and proofs why this is the case.
Therefore your post seems to have been based on false information of you readings or your misunderstanding on Hume.
:up: Interesting points. I am going to go over Kant's view on Scepticism too, after Hume. This post seems giving me insight and guidance where to look in Kant's sea of works. Thanks. I will read your post with attention, and will get back to you if I have any point to add, ask or criticise. :D
No, doesn't have to be all, but more the merrier of course. But this is good. It gives me good guidance where to look. I am grateful. Thanks.
:up: :pray:
Ehhhh, maybe. Ill have to back check that. But theres a more exact exposition of why not. See A592/B620 for the groundwork, if youre so inclined.
Sure, I feel this is one of the interesting points in CPR. Will have read and thoughts, and get back for further discussions and clarifications.
Arguments do not prove anything; they are merely consistent (if valid) with their presupposed premises.
This means that belief in the existence or non-existence of the external world is based on reason, but the premises that reasoning, whether for or against, is based on cannot be certain and are themselves based on abductive speculation (imagination). None of which disagrees with Hume, so it looks to me like it is you who misunderstand Hume.
Do you believe in the existence of a universal subject?
Quoting Brihadaranyaka Upani?ad
Your post sounds like as if you have not read anything on Hume and any messages in this thread with attention. What does Hume say about the way our beliefs arise for the continuous existence of the external world?
Our belief in the external world and causation are habitual based on the experienced reliable presence of objects and invariance of objects and the observed constant conjunction of events.
What do you think he says?
You have not even understood the question. The question was not about the external world, but was about the CONTINUAL existence of the external world (when not perceived).
If we have no reason to believe in an external unperceived world then we have no reason to believe in an external perceived world.
And you haven't told me what you think Hume says about it. If you are unable to present his arguments in your own words you could try quoting him directly.
The issue then is that the proof is only a tool to prove God. He does not see in the outside world anything that he himself could not have generated. The only idea that must come from an outside source is his/our idea of God:
Later on the sixth meditation, we see the simple argument that if there were something in my mind causing the perception of the, materially false, outside world, I would be aware of it. Not being aware of it, it must be the case that it comes from outside. However in earlier meditation he speaks about a possibly unknown part of the mind:
and Though these possible unknown parts of his nature would not affect the imagination, he claims. There is no reason prima facie that some unknown part of the mind would not affect it, but defining the mind as at least things that I am conscious of, it can't be the case. As SEP puts it: Quoting Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
That alone proves the outside world, be it things or an evil or good god. When it comes to a physical world, Descartes' approach is not without trouble, as is explained in the following SEP article.
The article Descartes Theory of Ideas and the Existence of the Physical World by ?ahabeddin Yalçin might be useful. Also SEP's article on that part of Cartesian philosophy.
The belief in the existence of the hypothetical planet Vulcun comes to mind. Sometimes even the Scientist believe in the non-existence of the contiguous external objects when not perceived.
Good point. :up: Thank you for your post, and welcome to TPF.
No thanks. I am out.
Only so many liberties we can take with words before gibberish takes over.
No, it is about how our mind and belief works, and how even Science use our belief in non-existing existence and observations as a methodology at times for finding and exploring the universe.
Your rushed and senseless judgement on the point seems to be based on misunderstanding and ignorance on the topic. All the best.
I have edited and updated my answer on the Cartesian proof to be more complete.
Thank you. :cool: :pray:
I was reading B446/A420 and B448/A421 in CPR for the part, where Kant says that the World is totality of all appearances in the universe, therefore it is beyond the grasp of Reason. The topic of the World is, therefore subject of Cosmology.
That's an 'interesting' thing to say, given the fact that Hume himself clearly admitted having no clue about belief...
...and he was right. He didn't.
Hume's writing can be deceptive in Treatise, and it can be tricky to pinpoint what he was actually trying to say. But I am sure he describes the way our belief in the unperceived existence of external world generates. I will update on it with the relevant quotes from his Treatise in due course.
Nah. He said it plainly. He said he had no idea and you say otherwise about him...
I'll take his word over yours.
Sure. Fair enough. If you say,
1. This is what you said.
2. But this is the evidence(s) which prove(s) against what you said.
3. Here is the list of the counter evidence(s) E1, E2, E3 ...En, or the supporting quotes (from Hume, Kant or whoever titles of the works, year of the publishing, page of the quotes etc).
4. Therefore your conclusion, claim or point is wrong.
5. And this is what I claim to be the case, truth, point and proofs.
And when I go through all the points submitted in the counter proofs and evidences with close investigations, and were thought to be correct and logically agreeable, then of course, I would be happy to agree with, and concede the counter arguments and proofs as the case, truths or reasonable. I fully welcome, and do appreciate the counter arguments in that form.
But if the counter arguments are in the form of mindless and groundless nonsenses forwarded by folks such as , then I could only interpret them as their meaningless and futile efforts for wasting time. :)
All well and good, but why would you invoke the antinomies of pure reason, especially with respect to cosmological ideas, when the question was only ever to do with believing something?
Even to change the initial ask regarding perception and belief, to one of the illogic of appending existence as a predicate, still only involves understanding and has no need or call for transcendental ideas and whether or not they abide with dogmatic proofs.
Youve went and done made the World a cosmological idea for which there is no possibility of any experience, but it started out as a mere totality of possible appearances, any one of which may be a experience.
So what .were just moving here? Weve left the original query and its offspring aside? Fine by me, but you outta warn whoevers left.
Quoting Mww
Isn't it a case that we went to invoke the antinomies of pure reason due to your queries - "how that even came to be a question?"
The statement "The world exist." should it not be dissected for the legitimacy and rationality ?
If it is even irrational or illogical to utter the statement, then belief in the existence will be proven to have no ground either.
Quoting Mww
Not me, but Kant seem to have had the idea. I was just a messenger.
Quoting Mww
This was just Kant's idea. Doesn't mean he has the final words. It was just something to put aside along with the main query to bear in mind how the concepts involved in the topic could be diverse in the directions.
You will see how Husserl had totally different his own concepts of the world, and existence from Kant's in his Phenomenology.
Hume's own words below. Granted, they are not the admission I was looking for, but they are spot on regarding the OP, and a difference between your report/dependency of/on Hume and Hume. I found that curious...
I think got this right. For my part, I dont think his writing deceptive, as much as just disagreeing with the way he uses his conceptions, which follows from how other philosophers use the same ones.
In the case of the dilemma of existence, on the other hand, which he names as such in T.H.N., it isnt the dilemma itself thats disagreeable, but rather, it is the principle he claims as ground for it, insofar as if the principle is inappropriate or misconceived, the dilemma disappears and with it the disagreement. Or, maybe, which is usually what happens, the dilemma just changes its clothes.
Quoting Corvus
Yes, it should, if one wishes. But it remains whether the legitimacy and rationality can even be addressed by transcendental ideas, and as you can read for yourself in A424, it is just the epitome of a sceptical method in which nobody wins. I think the question as to the illogical appending of existence as a predicate to an empirical conception is properly addressed elsewhere in the text.
In addition, the impossibility of a certain method of belief does not follow from the denial of certain predicates, which makes this ..
Quoting Corvus
.false, if the uttered statement is the world exists, insofar as the logical legitimacy in accordance with rules, is not the same as a belief, which is nothing but a judgement based on the synthesis of conceptions, regardless of rules.
While were here, the rule is you cant synthesis an empirical conception, re: the world, with a transcendental conception, re: existence. To do so is the ground of illegitimacy, in the form of a mere sophism or, .a miserable tautology .. But to believe the condition of a thing, that rule is not evidenced in the mere synthesis of conceptions, hence is not illegitimate in that way.
So it is that once World as you use the term is understood as a cosmological idea, it becomes just as illegitimate to believe in its existence, as it is legitimate for Everydayman to believe in the existence of the plain ol world of appearances. Kantian dualism run amok, nest ce pas?
Yes, I agree that he has points in his claims. Hume's writing style is clear to follow, but he definitely says different things on the same point in different parts of his books, which can give impression perhaps he was trying to be elusive in what his definite position is on being labeled as an extreme sceptic, academic sceptic or just speculative armchair philosopher. Or maybe he wanted to be all three.
Quoting Mww
Here is a youtuber (He has a PhD in Philosophy of Science.), who claims there is no actual world in this video. I have been saying exactly the same things as his arguments somewhere in this thread.
I thought the video interesting in coming across the same arguments laid out by this youtuber philosopher. Just goes to show how the topic can be philosophically rich, deep, diverse and has many aspects of perspectives.
I read that Enquiries had been written after his Treatise to give his mitigated opinion on his scepticism propounded in Treatise. I recall that was what some of the later commentators such as H.H. Price says of Hume's scepticism.
Price points out that Hume reduced the amount of writings on his skepticism in Enquires, and it is regrettable that Hume had done that i.e. Hume could have added more details and depths into his arguments on this theory of Scepticism regarding Senses and External World. If he had done that, he could have firmly established himself as a great philosopher in Theory of Knowledge, Scepticism and even in Phenomenology.
What I read in Treaise gives the impression of Hume sounding sceptical, but even in Treatise, he keeps writing in the tone of undecided manner in siding between scepticism or common sense philosophy. He even says "this vain to ask whether there is a body or not in the external world."
I find his individual sentences in the writings of Treatise and Enquiry clear and in accurate for his points, but the way he put down, as if he is agreeing with the extreme scepticism in one part of the books, and then would deny what he said previously sounding mitigated sceptic, and in some other parts he sounds like there is not point even asking the question on the belief in the existence of external world. That is difficult to grasp, and challenging if not deceptive to find out or pinpoint. Maybe it was his intention to be not fully committed to one way or the other, appearing to be remaining elusive on taking sides on either scepticism or common sensical philosophy.
Ok, here is Hume's account of the way our belief generates for the existence of continuous existence of the external world (bodies).
In Treatise, Hume clearly says that the belief in the contiguous existence of bodies emanates from the faculty of imagination, not by the senses or reason. The faculty of imagination triggers the belief by the properties of our impressions namely, constancy and coherence.
Constancy of impression in the perception of the tree is, that which gives the impressions of the tree resembling as constant shapes in each of the perceived impression. The perception of the tree comes into the mind as the same constant shape of the tree, never in the shape of a table or chair or cup.
"I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observed in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. An easy transition or passage of the imagination, along the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception. It is therefore very natural for us to mistake the one for the other.[5]" (T. 1.4.2.35 / pp.204)
Coherence of impression are the continuous impression of the same object, when not perceived, but due to the resemblance and temporal connectivity of the impressions, the perceiver can invoke his belief that the object was the same object that he perceived even after extended time of not perceiving it.
"Bodies often change their position and qualities, and after a little absence or interruption may become hardly knowable. But here it is observable, that even in these changes they preserve a coherence, and have a regular dependence on each other; which is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation, and produces the opinion of their continued existence. When I return to my chamber after an hour's absence, I find not my fire in the same situation, in which I left it: But then I am accustomed in other instances to see a like alteration produced in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. This coherence, therefore, in their changes is one of the characteristics of external objects, as well as their constancy." (T. 1.4.2.19 / pp.195)
When Hume sees the fire burning in his chamber, he receives the impression of
ABCDEFGH
But when he makes trip to outside and come back to the chamber, and see the fire, he gets
XXXXXIJKLM ..Z
X = unperceived impressions
A - Z (except X) = perceived impressions
XXXXX is the impressions unobserved while Hume was out the chamber. For Hume they are the beliefs in the existence of the contiguous unperceived fire stimulated by the impression H, the last impression he perceived before leaving the chamber. The impression H invokes the idea of coherence in Hume's impression from the temporal relation which gives the ground for belief that I is the consecutive impression of the fire.
This explicatory idea is from Hume on Knowledge by Harold W. Noonan, and I was trying to reiterate from my own understanding of his explanation. I hope it makes sense.
Husserl ian phenomenology is not at all concerned with what does or doesnt exist.
Kant basically laid out a distinction of phenomenon and noumenon. Phenomenon are and noumenon are of negative use only, not positive.
None of this has anything much to do with scientists speculating on actual perceived data. A discrepancy in our understanding leads to conjecture and some are better/luckier than others when it comes to getting more accurate interpretations of said data.
It is likely an obsession with the idea of pure knowledge that has led you down this cul-de-sac. Finite abstractions (such as in mathematics) are items of such pure knowledge. Do they map onto the world we perceive 1 to 1? Impossible to say. Does that mean the world does not exist.
Also, what do you actually mean by exist?
Sure, Husserl has totally different concept on the world. He is a Phenomenologist of course. It is interesting to explore how the concepts of the world are different from the individual thinkers. That's the whole point.
Yes, everyone knows Kant's phenomenon and noumenon. Depending on the commentators of Kant, the interpretations are different. Bring some relevant quotes with arguments, if you want make your own points.
Quoting I like sushi
This sounds too pre-judgemental and dismissive without relevant through arguments or evidences. Why should anyone take this point seriously?
Quoting I like sushi
Again it sounds lacking logical thinking and objective evidences on the claim. Please watch the Youtube video above, if you haven't done so already. Please bear in mind that this thread is exploratory rather than declarative.
Quoting I like sushi
That is another interesting concept I am going to explore in this thread.
Sounds like a case of Immaterial idealism. Could it be a Berkelean?
I simply asked what you mean by exist.
I think it is perfectly reasonable to believe in the existence of a planet if certain pieces of data point to its existence. That some believed observed such phenomenon needs verification that failed and the idea was dismissed.
They do not. Many think he meant noumenon as some other world.
Why? How?
The concept "exist" is not a simple term. One can write a PhD thesis with it.
Not sure if it is meaningful to ask simply, and answer simply on it.
Quoting I like sushi
You still fail to see the point. The video about the planet Vulcan was to show you how Hume's account on human belief in unperceived objects could be applied as an alternative methodological basis by the Scientist. It was not about Science, and it was not about data, it was not about the world. It was about the Humean account of belief.
There are Kantian scholars in both far end of the poles on the interpretations i.e. the traditionalists vs. revolutionist. Obviously you are asserting the one sided view only, as if it is the only fact or reality while totally ignoring and being oblivious of the other end of the interpretations.
When one is like that, I have serious doubts on the fact, that if he would even know what he is asserting to know on his side that he has been asserting to be the case.
Well, you seem to try to assert some points in your messages, but they don't seem to have flow, or supporting arguments or evidence in logical and reasonable manner, form or writeup. They sound like some personal opinion type of statements lacking informational depth or points.
Sure, that was in my plan anyway. I will do some related readings on the concepts. I was looking at the book by Colin McGinn called "Logical Properties", and he is discussing about "Existence" in a whole chapter dedicated to the topic. It looked interesting.
I am also interested in further analysing the concept of "The World" and "Belief" too. Along with "Existence", there seem to be good amount of philosophical discussions on the concepts which will help in understanding the topic "Reasons to believe in the existence of the unperceived world" in purely exploratory attempts, rather than declaration or presumption on anything.
Quoting Corvus
On the particular point I was making it is quite clear in his own words. He literally states only in the negative sense. He was trying to be very, very precise which (in various other areas) did cause rise to differing interpretations.
The point of Noumenon is very important to the use of the term existing.
In simplistic terms what exists is open to experience. It is a mind-numbingly obvious thing Kant stated really. That which cannot be known ever is not even a that we can refer to in the first place. The term noumenon is (somewhat ironically) a grasping at the impossible (of negative use only NOT something that positively contributes as it is no it or that and so on ).
Look forward to seeing what you mean by the words you use.
I always come up with all of these things on my own from scratch. I am merely using my own system of categorically exhaustive reasoning to examine the boundary conditions of the problem.
Of every category that can possibly be there are no categories where the world does not exist.
How can you not perceive the world if you are conscious?
And, if you are not conscious (sleeping or unconscious in any way), then no question can be is raised as to whether you believe anything or not.
Quoting Corvus
The question should be rather posed the other way around: Is there a reason why not to believe in the existence of the cup anymore? It may have been stolen in the meantime, but why would that be more probable than still existing? But even if it is stolen, wouldn't it still exist?
So, as I see the thing is that you do have reasons --in fact, a lot-- to believe that the cup still exists.
If all of what seems to be physically manifest reality is actually merely a projection from one's own mind then when the perception of an object ceases to exist the object also ceases to exist because its only existence was one's perception of it.
Categorically exhaustive reasoning
The only correct path to truth is to consider every possibility categorically. By doing this categorically we compress an infinite list of possibilities into a finite sequence of short lists of categories.
Any supporting quotes from CPR for these points?
Quoting I like sushi
It sounds interesting. But need more elaboration and explanation.
Quoting I like sushi
No one claimed that existing objects are non experienceable. But a suggestion was that experience alone is not enough ground for belief in the existence of the unperceived world. Would you agree?
Quoting I like sushi
Could you please clarify this statement with elaboration? Thanks.
Can you define your concept of the world? For instance, what colour is the world?
Are you sure what you are perceiving is the world? What is the world?
The point is not to do with being conscious or not. The point is, what is your ground / reason for believing in the existence of unperceived world / object.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
For not to believe in the existence of the cup anymore, if you have a likely reason for the cup's non existence, it it natural to doubt on its existence of course. But here the point is that, you are not given that reason. The only given situation is that the cup is not perceived because you are not seeing it, or you cannot see it.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
What are your reasons believing in the cup still keep existing as the cup, when you are not seeing it anymore?
"The world" is simply every direct experience of what appears to be any physical sensation from any sense organ. This is opposed to and contrast with purely analytical knowledge held within the mind.
But isn't that a case of solipsism? Does it mean that someone who lost sensibility in his sense organ has no world? Therefore he doesn't have the world, but also without the world, he doesn't exist anymore in the world?
Isn't objectivity one of the properties of the world? There is no point talking about someone's closed private world as the actual objective world, is there?
[Reason for believing in the existence of the world]
When we look at the most extreme of all possibilities: AKA solipsism, and we confirm that even in this case the world does exist, then we know that the world does definitely exist.
Which did you know first, the video or Kants cosmological idea?
Ive adjusted my response: you are correct in that there is no reason to believe in the existence of the world when not perceived, under two conditions. First, iff perception is taken as Hume intended, and second, iff the world is taken as a transcendental idea.
I seriously doubt anyone thinks along those lines these days. Doesnt make you any less correct, or the dialectic any less interesting, but perhaps does question the relevance.
I will wait for you to address the terms you use
B310-B312 | A254-A256
So, you've said a lot since I last posted. I wonder if you saw Hume's answer to the question you've posed?
You asked: What reason do we have to believe in the world(external objects/things) if and when we're not perceiving it(them)?
According to Hume, either our perception of fact and/or our memory thereof are reason to believe that the world exists even when we're not perceiving it.
Yes because within the hypothesis that the world is a projection from one's own mind it does actually cease to exist while no longer perceived.
OK. But I think you are stretching the issue or digging into it too much and that you are getting too conceptual about it, arriving finally at impractical conclusions. Conclusions that are also very difficult or even impossible to agree with or argue about.
You had only to examine and evaluate my arguement. If you don't agree with it or are questioning it, just present a counter-argument or questions about it. Explain why it is wrong or ask why it is so. Otherwise, there cannot be a dialogue.
Quoting PL Olcott
The relevance of the reality of the existence of such a fist does naught to reduce sensation of pain.
We undoubtedly tweak how we view the world through an intricate web of cultural indoctrination that it necessary to operate in said world. Solipsism is a very poor position to start from if you have no intention of bringing scepticism into play.
Of course. If I didn't, I couldn't interact with it. I would be in a coma. Even if you are sleeping or under drugs or hallucinating you interact with the world: a simple noise can affect your dreaming or what you are thinking.
Quoting Corvus
This is too vague a question. It has to be put in some context because the world --even as philosophic subject-- can have different meanings. And it's a question for a topic of its own.
But for the sake of the current discussion, I believe that we must restrict the meanings of the term to be the physical universe, also called the physical world.
Quoting Corvus
Of course it has. I commented on your saying "when I am not perceiving the world, there is no reason that I can believe in the existence of the world". Isn't perceiving directly connected with consiousness? Can I perceive without being conscious? And vice versa: isn't consiousness a state and ability to perceive?
Quoting Corvus
This sounds as a Cartersian argument. Of course, you can doubt the cup's existence or non existence.
I don't see however what this has to do with my saying that you have no reasons to believe in its non existence ...
Quoting Corvus
I guess you mean the cup is not perceived by you, not that it is not and cannot be perceived in general. Well, the existence of the cup, the tree, the world certainly does not depend on whether you are perceiving or can perceive them or not. Their existence -- reality in general-- depends on the common aggreement of people that they exist. But even so, even if you are not currently perceiving them there's is no reason to believe they ceased to exist, for you and everyone else.
(It goes w/o saying of course that we are not talking about things that are expected to cease to exist after a certain period of time.)
At this point, I'm just wondering it by "you" you mean "we" or "everyone". That is, questioning the existence of the world if no one perceives it, that the words exists in our minds only, etc. These are of course classic questions that divide whole systems and schools of philosophy.
Quoting Corvus
This is what you are asking since tjhat start of your description of the topic. And, for one more time, I countered it with the question: "What are your reasons for not believing in the cup inexistence anymore?". One has just to think which of the two is more reasonable.
Anyway, since I see that this can go on for ever, I believe it is better to end it here. I hope you agree. :smile:
Exactly. This is what I'm saying. Too conceptual. :smile:
In fact, totally theoretical. Moreover, I can't even see how it applies to your "if I don't perceive it, it doesn't exist" principle.
I only came across the video a day or so ago. I thought it was an interesting video, because the presenter has Phd in Philosophy of Science, but rejects the existence of the actual world, and he talks about why there is no actual world. The argument is reasonable, which is similar to one I had.
This thread has become not just Hume or Kant's views and arguments on the topic i.e. the world, existence and beliefs, but also general survey of these concepts. So, yes we were discussing Kant and Hume when someone raised the issue with them, I was responding to them while exploring the concepts and also the title "What are your reasons and grounds for believing in the existence of the unperceived world / object?"
There is a clear difference between "the world" and "the external objects" too such as cups or trees. The world is still undefined concept. And trying to have some sort of agreed object concept of the world would be ideal for the discussions too. Some folks seem to think they are all the same, but I feel they are all different, but I have been trying interact with the same level of perspectives rather than rejecting their points on the basis of being irrelevant.
That hypothesis is not one of the conditions by which I would affirm the thesis.
What I meant was, if you believe in what you are perceiving is the world, but the world is actually including all the celestial objects, microbiological molecules as well as all the countries on the earths, the planets .... etc etc, then are you not in some sort of illusion that you are perceiving the world, when what you are thinking of the world is, perhaps your rooms, kitchen, a patch of sky outside your house, some roads and streets, which are perhaps less than trillionth of a dust in size compared to the actual world?
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Exactly and absolutely ! Hence I asked you the previous question, which you appeared to have answered with confidence i.e. when you are conscious, you obviously perceive the world. Are you really perceiving the world? Or have you been perceiving less than a trillionth of a dust in the size of the world?
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I don't see how being conscious is enough to perceive all the objects around you. Being conscious could mean simply being awake without particularly perceiving, feeling or thinking about anything. For perceiving something, of course you must be conscious, but you also need to apply your intentionality to the object you perceive.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
You are saying that you believe in the existence of the unperceived object, but still not giving any reason or ground for the belief.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
If you are totally open minded about all the possibilities that can happen to the unperceived existence, be it a tree, or a cup you have seen before, then you don't have reason (or you have less reason - depending on the situations) to believe it is still existing while not perceiving it.
Think of a case that a long time (a few years) has passed since you perceived the object, then you might not even be sure if you actually saw the cup or tree or not. Your memory will fade away, and you have every reason to doubt the credibility of your own memory too. So it would be rational to have the doubt on the existence of the unperceived object or world.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
But you have not answered any of the questions from the agreed point of view. Most of your answers seem to have been based on the subjective concept of the world. Therefore we have not moved much forward from where we started. :)
Do you actually mean that there is no reason or do you just mean that the reasons given are inadequate?
The latter was the answer. But there would be the cases where the extreme inadequacy is similar or identical to nothing.
Then let's start with something that I'm sure most will agree with and work backwards; when we see a cup we see a cup.
The next step backwards many will accept is that seeing a cup is reducible to or an emergent phenomena of brain activity.
Do you disagree with the claim that we have a brain and that brain activity is causally responsible for us seeing a cup?
But the question was what is your belief in the existence of the cup when not seeing it i.e. if you have gone away for a few hours or even days, but you think about the cup (maybe the cup was gold plated on the handle with some messages from your friend which was a present), do you have reasons to believe the cup is still existing as it was when not seeing it? If you do, what makes that belief justifiable?
We need to work backwards from the common denominator (seeing a cup) to find out where our disagreement starts.
So you believe in the existence of your brain even though you don't ever see it? Then you clearly have reasons for believing in the (continued) existence of something that you cannot see. Why is it a stretch to extend this reasoning to other things, like the wider central nervous system, your eyes, the light that stimulates your eyes, and the cup that reflects the light?
At what point does it suddenly become unreasonable to believe in the existence of something that cannot be seen, and why there?
Ehhh .its defined well enough as a concept, but Id agree its not well-defined as an object. Problem is, and hence the notion of transcendental illusion, and .as you made mention, one of the antinomies of pure reason ..it is generally treated as an object, thereby the existence of which there would be sufficient reason to believe even if not perceived.
But the world is not an object; it is merely a euphemism for the totality of possible appearances, from which follows theres no reason to believe in the existence of it, DUH!!!! because it doesnt, but there is reason to believe in the totality of possible appearances the conception world represents.
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Quoting Corvus
I missed that clue, for which there is no excuse.
This is a belief in different type, nature and form on its foundation.
The cup that I am not seeing, but believing in its existence or not, is based purely on the visual perception, when seeing. When not seeing, it is based on the other beliefs and reasonings.
They are different type of cases.
How do you define objects separate from concepts?
Quoting Mww
What is the reason? :)
I'd hazard a guess that you believe in the existence of a brain that you cannot see because its existence is part of a parsimonious theory with explanatory and predictive power, and that you believe it is reasonable to believe in a parsimonious theory with explanatory and predictive power?
Well, the same is true for the cup; the (continued) existence of a cup that I cannot see is part of a parsimonious theory with explanatory and predictive power, and so it is reasonable to believe in the (continued) existence of a cup that I cannot see.
Furthermore, presumably you believe that your brain behaves (more or less) according to the physical laws as described by our best scientific theories? Well, such theories also include laws against creation (and destruction) from nothing, and that things don't simply change apropos of nothing acting upon them (whether internally or externally). The claim that cups just come into and out of existence depending on the direction we face (or depending on whether or not our eyes are open) is contrary to many of the physical laws as described by our best scientific theories.
It seems like special pleading to believe in the existence of your brain but not in the existence of a cup that you cannot see. It is reasonable to believe in either the existence of both or the non-existence of both. So I think you need to either accept materialism or commit fully to idealism.
Great points :up: I will think it over, and will get back to you for any points or questions. Thanks. :pray:
Hmmmm most obviously, I suppose, objects are separated from concepts by definition, when the former is conditioned by space and time, but the latter is conditioned only by time, each being defined accordingly. Metaphysical theory-specific distinctions might be something like objects are determinable from sensibility, concepts are determined from understanding, defined accordingly. Another way phenomena represent objects perceived, concepts represent objects merely thought, again, defined accordingly.
In such case where an object is itself a concept, re: the predicate in an a priori cognition, that object separates from concepts generally as a matter of relation, or, more precisely, judgement. Here, though it isnt so much a separation by definition as of belonging.
The problem with definitions is that there arent any that perfectly relate representations to each other, except those for mathematical objects.
I didnt notice you added to your comment.
The reason to believe in the totality of possible appearances the world represents, even without immediate perception, is .experience. Given experience, the negation of reason to belief, is a contradiction.
Before answering the last question, I consider that we must ask ourselves about the conditions for a statement like "I, Jhon, exist" to be true. If we assume that it is true, wouldn't it be equivalent for a future in which I am in fact already dead? That is to say: "I, John, exist" and "John existed" would be equivalent in the future, and if we accept the first statement as true we must necessarily also accept the last statement as true.
What does this mean? That neither perception nor self-awareness can establish the truth conditions for objective discourse. And this means that for the statement "I exist" to be true, the perception of myself is not a sine-qua-non condition of its truth and objectivity. Non-perception would be essential and a sine-qua-non for true and objective discourse.
And is not what we call the "external world" the domain of Non-perception, as what is not me, as the other, even as another subjectivity other than mine? This being said raises the question of the reasons for believing Whether or not the external world exists is a petitio principii as long as we expect that the answer [whether affirmative, negative or inconclusive] can be true or false.
We give reasons for something to be true or false. And we hope that in a debate those reasons are valid no matter who utters them. If another person presents our reasons that we consider valid, we must necessarily say that they are also valid. Hence the truth about our existence or the existence of the "external world" does not necessarily depend on whether we perceive it or not. And on the contrary, the conditions of truth and objectivity seem to presuppose a world beyond my perception.
Assume for the sake of argument that only your mind exists (i.e. metaphysical solipsism is correct).
Assume also that you believe in the existence of a mind-independent material world.
It is both the case that there isn't a world beyond your perception and the case that there is an objective truth (and which incidentally is contrary to your beliefs).
Mind-independent truths do not depend on the existence of mind-independent things.
If the question is about the existence of the "external world" necessarily the truth of the affirmative answer depends on mind-independent things. But the question lies in the conditions of truth and objectivity. These conditions, as stated above, cannot depend on perception. In this sense, if "existing" says something about me then it can only be true on the condition that my existence is also something non-perceptual.
If your existence just is the occurrence of your perceptions then your existence isn't non-perceptual.
Yes, you can call it an illusion. This is what a lot of Easter polosophies assert. But I never liked this term that is used to actually mean our personal, subjective reality, i.e. how each of us view reality. The term "illusion" actually means misconception, false or misleading idea or impression of reality, etc. If we are fully conscious and not under the influence of alcohol, drugs, etc., I cannot call an illusion my view of the world in that state. This is my reality. I live with it. (Well, most of the time.) Otherwise, we have to call everything that exists for us an illusion. Can you live with it every moment in your life? Even if you consider and believe it to be true, it's a totally useless belief, it can't help you at all, since you can't do anything about it. So it is much more practical I believe to consider the --indisputable for me-- fact that the world and reality is what we consider, believe the world and reality, It's an agreement, a contract we make with life. Those who can't do that are in a big trouble. :smile:
Quoting Corvus
Ha! This is playing with litreral meaning of words and phrases. When I'm saying "I perceive the world" I certainly don't mean I perceive every atom in it! I mean "the part of the world that I am able to perceive." Come on, this is more than obvious.
Quoting Corvus
Same as above. Of course it is not enough. Perceiving is becoming aware of and identifying something by means of our senses. I am aware of a big part of what my senses can receive. (They are receiving more than I can be aware of.) Ir also depends on my attention, i.e. where I direct my mind and thoughts to ot leave them to be directed to.
Quoting Corvus
By "unperceived" you mean "never having been perceived" or "not being currently perceived"?
Anyway, I don't have to give a reason for believing that something exists if I don't have any reason why it doesn't. So, we come back once again to the non-ending issue of opposite views of the same thing. It's like the two sides of a coin, only that mine is heavier! :smile:
If the coin falls on its head, I have no reason to doubt about or prove that the other side is tail, do I?.
Quoting Corvus
It depends on the object.
Quoting Corvus
This is basically true. But it's you who have insisted to go on! :smile:
And I don't complain. I enjoyed the trip. :smile:
You seem to be arguing that both (1) and (2) are true:
1. "things external to my perception exist" is true only if things external to my perception exist
2. "I exist" is true only if things external to my perception exist
(1) might be true (even a truism) but (2) is a non sequitur, and the claim that (2) is true because (1) is true is also a non sequitur.
All we can say a priori is that:
3. "I exist" is true only if I exist
You are not taking into account the conditions of truth and objectivity. For the statement "This perception exists" to be true, it requires, so to speak, an impersonal and non-subjective space of validation. Which would have been demonstrated in the example of the future statement. Therefore, ontologically, perception is one more thing among other things in the impersonal and non-subjective world. That is to say, we cannot doubt the existence of the "external world" more than our own perception.
I think you're being ambiguous with your use of the term "external world", and this is open to equivocation. Consider again my example above:
1. Only my mind exists
2. I believe in the existence of a mind-independent material world
My belief in the existence of a mind-independent material world is objectively false, but only my mind exists.
Is there an external world in this situation?
If you assume that only your mind exists, you can no longer ask about the existence of the external world, you have already closed the way to answering that question. You would want to say that "you only know that your mind exists." But this knowledge already presupposes conditions of truth and objectivity. With which we return to my argument.
I'm showing that there can be an objective truth about what does and doesn't exist even if there isn't an external world, and so your claim that an external world is required for there to be an objective truth about what does or doesn't exist is false.
If only my mind exists and if I believe that a mind-independent material world exists then my belief is objectively false and it is objectively true that a mind-independent material world doesn't exist.
Quoting JuanZu
What's a "space of validation"? It certainly seems very different to what most mean by "external world". Most mean something like a collection of material objects extended in space, behaving according to some set of physical laws, with our perceptions being a byproduct of these processes. It's certainly not a truism that this is required for "this perception exists" to be true.
You are not showing, you are hypothetically assuming that there are truths about the existence of which their truth does not depend on the external world. But those are hypothetical assumptions. Therefore it cannot be admitted as an argument.
What I claim is that any statement you make about your existence presupposes conditions of truth and objectivity. Otherwise you would have to give me an example of a truth about the existence of something that exists only on the basis of your perceiving it. You will not find it, because the meaning of that truth will always be impersonal just as the objective content of "I, Michael, perceive" is equivalent to that of "Michael perceives."
Thus, if the conditions of truth and objectivity are impersonal [because if I say that you perceive I would not be wrong, I am something that you do not perceive] then your existence is a "property" that can only be validated by going beyond the perception. Therefore your existence is no more true or false than that of the world and the things that we also say "exist."
Which doesn't require an external world. If only my mind exists then it is objectively true that a mind-independent material world doesn't exist (and even if I believe otherwise).
Quoting JuanZu
My perceptions depend on my existence, therefore awareness of my perceptions validates my existence -- and I am aware of my perceptions.
How exactly would I "go beyond" my perceptions anyway? It's really not clear to me now if you're arguing for external world realism or nihilism.
It requires it since there are no better reasons to affirm your existence than the existence of the world.
Quoting Michael
It depends on your existence being a non-perceptual "property." And being unperceived is, curiously, something that characterizes the "outside world." That is, your existence is in a certain sense already an exteriority.
Arguing that the existence of an external world is the best explanation for my existence is different to arguing that objective truths depend on the existence of an external world. I'm arguing against the latter, not the former. I can (and do) accept the former.
I think the opposite: it begs the question how the world can continue to exist independently of the self (or selves).
They depend on the "external world" as a non-perceptual exteriority where the non-perceived occurs. There is no value that objectivity and truth is worth that does not exceed the order of the perceptual towards the non-perceptual. Something is true even if I am no longer alive to perceive it, be it the truths of physics, mathematics, etc. Thus, if the statement "I perceive therefore I am" will ever be true, it is only on the condition of a non-perceptive world on which being in this or that way is based [since when we say the truth of a thing we say what it is] Isn't this our relationship with the world? Isn't this the relationship of the perceptual with the non-perceptual? But the most important thing is that my existence cannot be excluded from that exteriority since we could not even know that we exist.
That doesn't mean it depends on an external world.
Mathematical truths, for example, do not depend on the mind-independent existence of matter, energy, space, or time.
Or maybe you mean something else by "external world"? You haven't been clear.
I am not talking exclusively about material objects. You can, if you want, consider numbers, logic, ideas, theories, etc., as Non-material objects or ideals [or as a kind of materiality that is not reducible to physicalism]. But the important thing is that its existence along with mine cannot be reduced to perception. There is an outside of perception and consciousness that bases our knowledge about things, including, obviously, our existence.
I'm not a Platonist. I don't believe that non-material objects or ideals "exist". As such I'm not a mathematical realist; I'm a mathematical antirealist. But even mathematical antirealists can believe in the objective truth of mathematics (in the sense that we might all be wrong).
The argument holds regardless of whether you are a Platonist or not. And I claim that this argument that I have presented is not false. I claim is true, even if I am no longer around to perceive it or be aware of it. Objective truths are founded in a world beyond consciousness and perception. Otherwise we fall into the ontological version of the liar paradox [if we claim that perception exists just because we perceive ourselves].
If Platonism isn't true and there is an external world then the external world is exhausted by matter, energy, space, and time.
If mathematical truths depend on the existence of an external world and if Platonism isn't true then mathematical truths depend on the existence of matter, energy, space, or time.
Mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of matter, energy, space, or time.
Therefore, either Platonism is true or mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of an external world.
The pain is conclusive proof that the fist exists.
Pain can be caused by things other than fists.
Truth itself
That the world exists (an abstract concept) is verified to be true (also an abstract concept) on the basis of anything that appears to be any physical sensation (not merely an abstract concept).
But what isn't verified is that there is more to the world than those physical sensations.
No. If you are not a Platonist, mathematical objects may depend on or be nothing more than objects emerging from brain processes. And a physicalist will have to demonstrate that. The conclusion you reach is false. But my argument holds. If we are not Platonists we can say that truths depend on a world beyond the perception that guarantees their possibility. We can, if we are not Platonists, say that we are only talking about physical and chemical processes that occur in the brain and that a mathematical truth is based on these processes. Processes that we do not precisely perceive when we think about those truths. The unperceived appears again. As I have said, the important thing is to understand this world as exteriority beyond perception towards non-perception as a condition of possibility of any objective truth, including the truth about our existence.
What makes you think that? From what we can tell, the universe existed long before sentient life or "selves" came into existence. Why would things like stars, galaxies, elements, fire, radiation, and everything that makes up what we call the physical world be contingent upon organic sentient life?
Mathematical (and other formal) truths have nothing to do with matter, energy, space, time, or Platonic entities. Yours is a false dichotomy.
"All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument.
The above statement is objectively true and does not depend on the existence of an external world. Its truth has nothing to do with matter, energy, space, time, my brain, your brain, or a hidden realm of immaterial, magical entities that is somehow able to attach itself to our thought processes.
Do mathematical truths have nothing to do with matter and energy? I agree, that's why I'm not a physicalist.
If the example you have given is a truth, it is only a condition that its meaning is the same, for example, when another person says it; or even if both have already died and it is encrypted in a text. It is something that belongs to the essence of truth, to be valid beyond subjectivity and perception.
Thus, a truth, this time a truth about existence, our existence, if it is a truth, in order to be that, a truth, has the condition of not being reducible to perception and consciousness. If it is not reducible to this, this means that its nature reaches and is situated in the exteriority of the non-perceivable [World, texts, words, other people, etc.].
Those who doubt the existence of the world fall into an ontological version of the liar's paradox.
Physicalism is a position regarding what sorts of things exist.
Your claim here suggests that you think that a statement can only be true if it "corresponds" to something that exists, and so that if a true statement is about something non-physical then it must correspond to some non-physical thing that exists.
This is a mistaken view. Not all truths depend on the existence of something.
No. I claim that the essence of objective truths cannot be reduced to either perception or subjectivity. If there are truths it is of condition of this excess with respect to subjectivity. A truth can be about something physical, about mathematical, linguistic, sociological, economic objects, etc. But for it to be true it must exceed the order of perception and subjectivity. Even if it is a truth about subjectivity itself I.E I perceive, therefore I am.
Youre doing more than that: youre claiming that objective truths depend on the existence of an external world, but this is false.
If only my mind exists then it is objectively true that nothing other than my mind exists (even I were to believe otherwise), and this objective truth cannot be reduced to either perception or subjectivity.
Objective truths do in fact depend on an external world, a world that I have defined as a non-perceptual exteriority beyond subjectivity that also encompasses subjectivity. And this includes truths about subjectivity. A statement like "It is true that only my subjectivity exists" is a contradictio in adjecto. And we deduce this from the conditions so that a statement, whatever it may be, can be true. And these conditions imply that a truth to be in effect a truth must exceed the subjective order, just as the truth exceeds the order of opinion [doxa], to take an example.
I have no idea what this means.
My use of the term is what I believe is most common.
But rather than split hairs over the meaning of external world Ill be more specific with my claim:
Some objective truths (such as those of mathematics) do not depend on the mind-independent existence of matter, energy, space, time, or abstract objects.
Since the appearance of subjectivity described as interiority separated from the world, we have called the external world as that which is not subjective, that is not a perception and that it is in its being to exist independently of perception, as an exteriority. I have deduced an external something, which also implies non-perception in its being, and also its being independent of perception, and also its exteriority, taking as a resource the question about objective truths..
When I say that there is an object on the table and that the name of this object is "apple", these are facts. I'm telling the truth.
When I think about why is it called "apple", how to describe it, what is its nature, why apples exist, etc. I'm getting into concepts. These are not facts. They are subject to interpretation. So, we cannot call them "truth".
***
From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/facts/
Facts
"Facts, philosophers like to say, are opposed to theories and to values (cf. Rundle 1993) and are to be distinguished from things, in particular from complex objects, complexes and wholes, and from relations."
Concepts vs. Facts
https://teacherthompsonblog.wordpress.com/2016/01/24/concepts-vs-facts/
"A concept is an abstract idea generalized from particular evidence; a fact is something that is known to be true, or a thing that is indisputably the case. To compare, a concept is something that can be understood, and a fact is something that is usually memorized."
Teaching Facts, Skills, Concepts, and Morals: Whats the Difference?
https://people.ucsc.edu/~ktellez/facts-skills-con.html
[i]"Teaching Facts
Teachers help students learn factsthat is, verifiable pieces of specific information. Facts take a variety of forms, including definitions, names, dates, and formulae."[/i]
[i]"Teaching Concepts
Teachers are generally most concerned with conceptual learning because it helps learners to understand why. Concepts are distinguished from facts in that they are a much broader, deeper type of knowledge."[/i]
Concepts vs. Facts
https://sapeter.wordpress.com/2011/01/30/edu-6526-concepts-vs-facts/
"A concept is an abstract idea generalized from particular instances or evidence, so involves an inductive process or thought (Sheuerman, R.). By contrast, a fact is something known to be true, its a piece of information. To oversimplify the difference, facts are memorized where as concepts are understood."
Concepts vs Facts
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XivCupQuIik
[i]"Understanding the name of a bone is a fact. Understanding what it does in the body gets into a concept."
"You got to memorize bones, muscles, organs, tissues, a lot of it. But if you simply memorize and don't understand the
function of it the comprehension of the actual concepts it's a lot of wasted learning."[/i]
That is outside of the scope of the original question.
In one sense or another the world
Whenever we are dealing with phonetic or symbolic encodings of semantic meanings we are dealing with abstractions. When we are looking directly at an apple the visual sensation of this apple is not an abstraction. The entirety of reality is sensations and abstractions.
The two theories of truth: correspondence deals with sensations and and coherence deals with abstractions. AKA the synthetic versus analytic divide.
If a cup doesn't exist before I turn my head and look at it, why is it a cup that comes into existence? Who not a land shark? Or tomato? Or neutron star?
If something doesn't exist until I turn my head and see it, it seems a bizarre coincidence that the things that did not exist but come into existence happen to be perceptible with my eyes. Or are we suggesting many other things also come into existence that are not perceptible with any of my sense organs, and I only perceive those that happen to be perceptible with my sense organs?
Why do I need to turn my head for something that does not exist to come into existence? Why dont things pop into existence in front of my eyes as Im staring at a blank wall?
I doubt anyone has ever perceived a bullet that killed them. How is it they died if, not perceiving the bullet, it could not have existed?
If something that exists goes out of existence because Im not perceiving it, then comes into existence again at a later date when I perceive it, why would it appear different, as though it existed throughoit that period of time?
All of these questions are easily answered if things exist whether I perceive them or not. They are not easily answered, particularly not all of them, if things do not exist when I do not perceive them, but do exist when I do perceive them. The laws of physics makes sense if things exist whether I perceive them or not. The laws of physics do not make sense if things do not exist when I do not perceive them, but do exist when I do perceive them.
I don't perceive Santa. Does he exist?
Quoting Patterner
Dreams? Hallucinations? A VR headset?
Quoting MichaelYes, yes, of course We can come up with many different scenarios that are not the topic under discussion. I believe the topic is physical things in the real world.
How do I know that I am perceiving a physical thing in a real world and not just dreaming or hallucinating or being tricked by an evil scientist who has my brain in a vat and is stimulating my visual cortex with nanomachines?
This question seems relevant to the discussion.
It is by definition impossible to detect the difference between reality and a perfect simulation of reality.
If the simulation is less than perfect then there may be tell-tale signs.
If (for example) reality is a projection from one's own mind, then one might see signs of this.
Sure. But if one had only ever experienced a poor simulation of reality and never experienced reality then one wouldn't know that one was experiencing a poor simulation of reality and not experiencing reality.
Perhaps in reality grass is red and the Earth has two moons.
The things we see when we dream and hallucinate are not mind-independent, and don't continue to exist when we don't see them, whereas (many believe) the things we see when we are awake and not hallucinating are mind-independent, and do continue to exist when we don't see them.
We can tell that it is not a poor simulation.
Detecting the subtle difference between a very excellent simulation and a perfect one might prove very difficult. If my understanding of Zen Buddhism is correct then this is the primary focus of Zen.
Well, if here were not, why would we have three distinct terms for them?
And that pretty much sums up this thread: failure to pay attention to how words function.
Regarding Demon/Matrix scenarios, my default position is that things are exactly as they seem. If anyone thinks my disembodied brain is wired up and being fed a simulation, I'd be interested in the evidence. I don't expect there is any.
How do you know?
Don't you think that might be asking a little too much? It seems to me that Ockham's Razor suggests it's fairly reasonable to chop off the evil scientist as unparsimonious.
How so? Maybe this is exactly what a poor simulation is like. Perhaps in reality grass is red and the Earth has two moons.
If it was a poor simulation we would never be having this conversation because it would be common knowledge that everyone would know.
I know that there's a qualitative difference between the experiences I consider dreams and the experiences I consider wakefulness. I presume that the things I experience when I dream are not of external world objects. I then wonder if perhaps that the things I experience when I'm awake are also not of external world objects. I then further wonder if there are external world objects at all.
I don't see how this follows.
Ockham's Razor is a useful heuristic, not an objective measure of metaphysical truth.
If we keep seeing the guy that changes the light bulb of the Sun changing its light bulb then we would know that the Sun is not a giant star millions of miles away.
Okay? I don't see how this answers the question.
If we keep seeing the guy that changes the light bulb of the Sun changing its light bulb then how would we know that we are experiencing reality and not a poor simulation (or vice versa)?
I posted 2x quotes from Treatise of Hume, and also added some explanations to them on how the belief arises on the existence of the External Word / Bodies.
Quoting creativesoul
I agree with you points, although personally I feel also our memory and inductive reasonings in some degree play part working with imagination for invoking beliefs in the existence of unperceived existence.
Paul Russell seems to suggest the above part of Hume's Scepticism links to Hume's theory of Religion i.e. The proof in existence of God later in Treatise. (The Riddle of Hume's Treatise, 2008 OUP, pp.168, Paul Russell)
Its a silly question.
Not at all. We know that the simulation of a giant star millions of miles away is a very terrible simulation.
The Truman Show
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt14675964/?ref_=nm_flmg_t_36_act
I think that at the end he saw them turn the lights off that were the stars in the sky.
:clap: :100:
_____________________________
"Empirical judgments, in so far as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; they, however, in so far as they are only subjectively valid, I call mere judgments of perception. All of our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception: they are valid merely for us, i.e., for our subject, and only afterwards do we give them a new relation, namely to an object, and we intend that [the judgment] is supposed to be also valid for us at all times and precisely so for everyone else; for, if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments about the same object must also agree among one another, and thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else but its necessary universal validity."
Kant, Prolegomena (4, 298; 51).
_____________________________
Is there not in all philosophy and science an intention of truth, of objectivity, of universality of discourse? Therefore, isn't the skeptic's doubt a gesture in a certain sense that is anti-philosophical and anti-scientific? Doesn't it necessarily fall into the liar's paradox? Doubting the world would be like cutting the branch on which I am sitting, waiting for the tree to fall and not the branch.
Was the answer to your question clearly stated in those quotes? If not, if not, then what's the point of qouting the question? Why answer like that? Normally when one quotes a question, they offer an answer.
Quoting Corvus
Hume's problem of induction seems to apply here, if one places value upon it in this situation.
I'm not a Hume fan, so.
I certainly know that the universe existed long before me. I also know that there is no good reason to doubt by thinking that there will no longer be one after I cease to exist. If there are some words written by someone that - after reading them - cause you to doubt any of that, I suggest you use that fact as a reason to commit them to the flames.
OK
I'm going to remind you of what I said before:
You're begging the question, assuming that the world you have experienced your entire life isn't a simulation, and so claiming that a poor simulation would look different to the world we currently experience.
I added some explanations for the quotes, because different people might interpret the original quotes differently. You asked the question, and I offered the answers with the quotes and added explanations. If you read any academic papers or commentaries, that's what the authors do. They don't simply copy and past the quotes, and assert the quotes says it all. They always add their interpretations. You could have agreed or disagreed with the interpretations.
Quoting creativesoul
Hume didn't just doubt, but offered the arguments on why people believe in the existence of unperceived objects or worlds. If you certainly know the universe existed long before you and, and also you know that there is no good reason to doubt by thinking that there will be no longer after you cease to exist, then Hume was explaining how your beliefs arise in your mind. I think Hume is one of the greatest Philosophers in history.
You claimed that the point of Noumenon is very important to the use of the term "existing". I think this is a substantial and interesting statement. If you could explain why and how it is, and from what evidences and premises that claim has originated, then that would help.
At the present moment, we don't have any of your premises or arguments on your claim. We just have a statement.
It sounds a signifikant admission. :)
Quoting Mww
Yeah, I was wondering, if the world is not an object, but just a mere concept, then could it be A priori? Because all the livings seem to know their environments pretty well, or get used to it fast for finding food and necessities for their survival as soon as they are born. No one really teach them saying - this is the world for you.
What Hume meant by that would be, do that to the silly comments and words. :nerd:
Present what you mean by the terms you use. I can wait.
Until then bye bye :)
Is there any reason or evidence to suspect that neither is the case?
Are you suggesting that the reason we believe in the veracity of our experiences is simply that we have no good reason to believe them false? Believing them accurate is the "default" position that should be assumed unless presented with evidence to the contrary?
Perhaps the default position should be to remain agnostic?
Quoting MichaelYes. Are you suggesting we believe otherwise without reason or evidence?
Why can I assume that my experiences are accurate without reason or evidence but can't assume that my experiences are inaccurate without reason or evidence?
Why is the default position that experiences are accurate?
You certainly [i]can[/I] assume that your experiences are inaccurate without reason or evidence. By all means, have at it. But I will advise caution. While dreaming, you may believe the boulders rolling down the hill toward you will kill you. But when they kill you in your dream, you will simply wake up into the real world. (There may be rare cases where someone dies in reality of a heart attack, brought on by the anxiety of what is happening in the dream. But boulders in a dream have never killed anyone in reality.) You can assume the boulders in what I call reality are as powerless to harm you as the boulders in what I call a dream are, and ignore those that are rolling down the hill toward you. In which case, you will no longer be part of the conversation about how to determine what is objectively real, as opposed to what we choose to believe without reason or evidence.
Only if you're right and our experiences are accurate. If you're wrong and our experiences are inaccurate then we might just wake up.
No, the skeptic's doubt is the way toward truth. This is because we tend to accept statements propositions, etc., as true without proper scrutiny. We often accept conditions such as authority, convention, usefulness, efficiency, as indications of truth. Then these ideas, which we accept not because they've been shown to be true, but for some other pragmatic purpose, become entrenched into our methods, techniques, etc., as habits. The skeptic sees the need to inquire into all these principles which form the basis of these habits, to distinguish good from bad.
Doubting the world is not like cutting the branch which one is sitting on, it is to question whether it is correct to assume that I am sitting on a branch. The difference is that doubting precedes action, and therefore it is very useful in preventing mistaken action, but you portray it as a mistaken action. That's a false representation of the skeptic's doubt.
So far, every time I have slept, I have awoken. Its just how things work with humans. So any dream Ive ever had that did not end while I was still asleep ended when I woke up.
Sometimes, I have woken up because of what happened in a dream. Boulders crashing down upon me, for example. Thus ending the dream.
Sometimes, while dreaming, I have woken up because of things that happened in the real world. A loud noise, for example. Again, ending the dream.
Occasionally, I have been aware that I was dreaming as I was dreaming. Sometimes, that knowledge caused me to wake up.
None of those things has ever caused me to "wake up" from what I call reality into what some might call a higher reality. Nothing else has ever caused me to wake up from what I call reality into what some might call a higher reality. You may be suggesting that death in what I call reality will wake you up to a higher reality. While I am not going to encourage you to test this idea, I ask that, should you die before I do, and discover that you are correct, you try to send a message to me. I would be most interested to learn that you are correct.
This is a real life example on why I don't believe in the existence of the rusty barbecue rack which has been sitting in the corner of the garden for months anymore.
I put it in the bin, and the bin was emptied by the collection truck a few days ago. Although I have not seen the bin being emptied (because the collection truck comes at 6am in the morning, when I am asleep), I know that's what they do. And someone brought the bin into the place where it usually sits in the garden.
So, my belief that the rusty barbecue rack doesn't exist anymore is grounded by my imagination and my inductive reasoning that the binman must have emptied the contents of the bin into their truck as they normally do, and took it away to the recycle centre as they normatively do.
Without the ground for the belief, I would still believe, or be unsure about in the existence of the rack, which is not there anymore in reality.
So why would anyone believe in the existence of the rusty barbecue rack or anything in existence blindly or by faith? That doesn't sound right or reasonable at all, and his belief is definitely is groundless and wrong too.
:up: :100:
If not certain or unsure about anything, then don't hesitate to doubt until obtaining the evidence for ye or ne - that is what Hume would say. I think it makes sense, and Hume is a genius.
Simply put, all concepts are from the understanding, hence always arise a priori. But it isnt enough to class all conceptions as a priori when their application is more informative, that application depending exclusively on the theory developed to prescribe it.
-
So the garbage man taking the BBQ rack away was sufficient reason for you not to believe in its existence? Theres your transcendental illusion for ya ..because the rack isnt in this space at this time, it isnt in any space at any time.
YIKES!!!!
It takes at least 100 years for the schools of philosophy to be formally understood and accepted as the true philosophy.
The new age trends keep get forgotten, and abandoned by the interlocutors and followers, but the true philosophical issues get discussed, and rise repeatedly after the centuries and centuries of time.
There are only two aspects to reality
(a) Abstract ideas kept in the mind.
(b) What appears to be physical sensations from the sense organs.
If there are any examples of (b) then this proves that the world exists
even if the world is mere a projection from one's own mind. If your
fist hurts this proves that your fist exists at least as a projection from
your own mind.
That's not the kind of world that the OP is asking about. It's clearly talking about something like a world of mind-independent material objects. The very first sentence of the OP reads: "I have been asked ... if I believed in the existence of the world, when I am not perceiving it" and later mentioned being asked "if I believed in the existence of the cup, when I was not seeing it."
Pain isn't proof that fists exist when not being perceived.
It seems to me that you are asserting that your "I" is coming from "It", and it is not from your "thought", but from the "certain blind faith."
Isn't it what you meant?
That is a wrong assumption. I did read "The Birth of Tragedy", and some other books. I felt they are more literature than philosophy, so packed them in.
If I were a blind, then I would try to see the light. Blind sounds boring, bland and pointless, and blind. According to Plato, maybe we are all blind, but that is the whole point of philosophy - to see the light.
You can presume that, yet that was not stated.
I took the question to mean: Of every possibility that can exist are their
any of them where the world can be definitely proven to exist?
If "the world" is construed to include projections from one's own mind
then yes, otherwise no.
It is impossible to detect the difference between a perfect simulation of
reality and reality itself because "perfect simulation" means that no discernable
difference exists.
There are other variations of this same theme. Brain-in-a-vat, et cetera.
In the Matrix Deja Vu indicated a glitch in the matrix, thus not a perfect
simulation. In Hindu Maya the glitch seems to be detectable on the basis
of discovering that things in the world are too closely correlated to one's
thoughts held silently within the mind. In other words one finds that one
is subconsciously controlling aspects of the world.
She forgot to tell him that the binman has taken away the rusty barbecue rack?
I never said it was hard to understand. I meant that it read like Literature (like a Shakespear or Stephen King), rather than Hume or Kant.
The sour grapes needs some logic and reason to tell the world that it tastes nice and worthwhile eaten.
The world will not accept the sour grapes' points or conclusions unless it is offered with evidence and logic in well formed form of argumental dish.
Quoting Vaskane
In case of sour grapes, it doesn't take long to tell the sourness suppose :)
What does Nietzsche say about "the world"? What are his concepts for "the world", and "existence"? Any definitions or comments from him on that? Or interpretations?
Quoting Vaskane
Nietzsche is an interesting thinker and a great writer for sure. If you open a new thread for Nietzsche reading group, or any Nietzschean topics you feel interesting, then I would start reading Nietzsche again, and join the discussions.
Have you ever wondered why it is so intractable?
Some great philosophy was done in the middle of last century, when Austin and Wittgenstein and others, instead of looking for the answers to such questions, looked at the background against which they were being asked.
What grounds do you have to doubt that you are now reading this post? How could such a doubt make any sense?
I am sorry but your post does not justify your comment at all. It is a question that been posited as early as we know (Ancient Greece) and it has had some satisfactory answers to some but not for others. If your criticism is that there is no definitive answer, you might as well throw out most of philosophy.
You hardly need grounds to doubt anything, that is the point of doubting.
Good idea. Now you are getting it.
Quoting Lionino
In what way can you doubt that you are reading this question?
Notice that your reply puts the lie to that doubt.
I would be more interested in this conversation if you actually stated a clear argument rather than smirkly saying "I am getting it" by my obviously comedic statement of throwing out philosophy.
Quoting Banno
I cannot doubt that it appears to me that I am reading the question. I can only doubt whether this question I am reading comes from the real world and not from a projection of my mind à la brain in a vat that is the whole point of OP.
You are under no obligation to participate.
Quoting Lionino
Good. So, contrary to what you said before, there are things that it makes no sense to doubt.
Good, you just happened to ignore the phrase that comes after it.
Quoting Banno
I am only under the moral obligation of seeing through the hope of this leading anywhere beneficial for me. The hope dies the longer it goes on.
Not at all. There are now in your world, some things you can doubt and some things that it is silly to doubt. I'll count that as progress.
So now the question arrises, what to doubt and what to believe?
Quoting JuanZu
Isnt it precisely the intention to objectivity that lends itself
to skepticism? Since Descartes the modern formulation of the subject-object relation depends on a gap that courts doubt.
I don't think this is right: the statement is valid, but in that abstract generic form is not truth apt. It needs to be given content in order to be true or false.
I see now that you are not interested in having a discussion as you have nothing to contribute yourself besides pretending to be smarter than you really are on an anonymous forum.
Quoting Banno
I would suggest reading a few philosophy books if you want to come up with philosophical views of your own. I already have mine, I am just not here to discuss them. If the existence of the outside world is such a silly question, write your thesis on how Descartes or Hume were big idiots and you got it figured out and send it to Harvard for your automatic doctor degree.
Have a look at Austin: Sense and Sensibilia and When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
Cheers.
That would be the case if we talked about truth as correspondence. But for me, correspondence and adequatio are forms of thought by which it becomes frustrated, leading it to skepticism. And yet I claim a meaning of "objectivity" that is discovered by the impossibility of closure of the subject in the monad. This impossibility is what grounds the theoretical activity of the subject and forces him to be oriented to an other (which is also the world), including himself as another in the case of self-knowledge.
The skepticism that questions the "external" world (as if we were not already world) would be, in a certain sense, the closure feigned by the subject in the absolutely immanent monad. A subject who believes he can distinguish himself absolutely from something else that he calls the "external world."
A splendid juxtaposition. Says much with few words.
Do you think a further distinction can be made between real and unreal abstractions? Would you agree, for example, that arithmetical primitives, such as the natural numbers, are abstractions, but that they are real, and that the same could be said of logical principles, such as the law of the excluded middle, and other abstracta. But that there are also abstractions that are unreal, meaning they don't refer to anything over and above the content of speech or thought - for example, fictional characters or imaginary numbers. I say this, because I resist the idea that abstractions are the constructions of the mind. Such things as logical and arithmetical proofs can only be grasped by the mind, but they are not therefore the products of the mind (or at least, of our minds) - they are not thoughts, but when they are perceived they appear as thoughts (to paraphrase Bertrand Russell).
Coherent versus incoherent.
Quoting Wayfarer
Good example now I know exactly what you mean.
Quoting Wayfarer
The way that I address this is that the value of PI was entailed by the concept of round at least at the point in time that the first caveman looked up and saw a round full Moon.
My example was to show that mathematical truths are discovered thus not created.
Quoting I like sushi
It was "you" who raised the question with the claim that the point of Noumenon is very important to the use of the term 'existing'. So I have a justified belief that you have the definition of Noumenon and the concept 'existing' in order for you to come to the conclusion / proposition you raised.
I can see what you mean roughly by your claim, but the claim has no premises, arguments or the points on why and how you came with such a claim. If you elaborate your claim with the missing elements and information, then I could come back with my ideas on the points.
:up: :cool:
Quoting Vaskane
Thanks :) I was reading Philosophy with German initially, but then I realised English is better language in that there are more translated and originally authored books in English in all subjects under the sun, than in any other language. Plus English is easier language to learn than German.
I am still wondering on the aphorism, whether it was "blind faith" or "it" is telling you that you are thinking. I am also not sure what "it" means. "It" usually denotes some object.
And yes, I think translation of any original text into another language will render loss of some original meaning inevitably. But then all reading is inevitably interpretation in some sense.
As promised I thought over your points on the belief in the existence of the brain compared to a cup.
Brain is a biological organ, just like the other organs the human body has. Its main function is not just having mental events, but keeping the body alive. Brain controls all the biological functions happening in the body. When it comes to mental events, all we know is that the relationship between the brain and mental events are causality. Nothing else.
If you look into the brain, then you won't see anything that resembles or makes sense about any mental events. Because it is just a lump of tissue, blood vessels and neural cells.
We have no idea why and how the brain works in terms of any mental events. But neurologists have mapped out which part of the brain is linked to what type of mental events. And the injuries or problems of certain parts of the brain cause certain types of problems in the mental events or operations.
Because of this fact, it would not be meaningful to say, because we believe in the existence without seeing it, that explains our belief in the existence of an unperceived object or world.
The belief in the existence of the brain is purely based on the educated information or guess.
But belief in the existence of unperceived objects is based on, according to Hume, our imagination and memory of the perception. They are totally different types of beliefs.
Depending on the situation, the belief in the existence of a cup or barbecue rack in the garden can change i.e. if you threw out the rusty barbecue rack in the garden in the bin, and saw the bin getting emptied into the collection truck, then you have a reason / ground to believe why the barbecue rack doesn't exist anymore in your garden.
But there is no way, reason or ground to believe that one's brain doesn't exist as long as the person is alive, and the belief is based on purely educational information.
This is the limitation of Materialism. They can tell us what mental events are caused by the brain activities, but that is all there is to it. Nothing more, nothing else. It is too obvious mental events are caused by the brain, because upon the removal of the brain, there are no mental events. On the injuries to certain parts of the brain, there are always certain types of mental events problems are noticed. Nothing more.
Idealists have their problems too. They are imprisoned in their own mental space locked up, and think that whatever is projected into the wall of the mind is the objects themselves or the content of the world. This view has its points too, but it falls into solipsism. There are definitely material objects out there, and the world exists separate from the mind. But to show that it is objective knowledge rather than dogmatism, we need more arguments, evidence and proofs.
If we accept the definition that every knowledge is justified belief, then scepticism is a methodology to obtain the justifications. If one rejects scepticism, then one is rejecting the methodology for justification allowing possibility for mistaking groundless beliefs, superstitions and dogmas for knowledge.
Until then nothing I have said has any relevance because I have literally no idea what the OP is saying.
Last time I am asking.
Give an account of PRECISELY what you are asking for.
Doubting is not thoughtless action. Doubting starts with observation and investigation, then reasoning, and then conclusion for either action or non-action.
If you have adopted a proper scepticism as your methodology for knowledge, you would have inspected the tree and turned away looking for a tree with the solid sound branches to sit on that needn't cut and is concrete enough to support your weight, before you climbed up onto the unstable tree, and sat on the rotten branch.
So, it sounds like you have asked something that you have no idea what you were asking for.
If you read the OP, and some discussions in the thread, I would imagine that you would know what it is about.
The World meaning what?
Exist meaning what?
1. All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs
2. "All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument
I'm not saying that (1) is objectively true; I'm saying that (2) is objectively true.
It is objectively true that (1) is valid, and this does not depend on the existence of an external world; it certainly does not depend on the existence of spacetime or any material object, and I would even say that it does not depend on the existence of any abstract object (à la Platonism).
Objective truths do not depend on the existence of anything (except in the obvious case of something like "X exists").
Well, what I say about the skeptical subject is said fortiori for what he thinks is his act of doubting. That is, I claim that skeptical doubt is already rooted in a decision or an assumption I.E. the clear distinction of the subject and the world. And in that case it would not be a coincidence that methodological skepticism finds its formulation from an "undoubted" subject (Descartes).
I stated this in the previous messages to Mww, but will say again. Kant says that the world is not a legitimate object of perception, because the totality of appearances in the world is incomprehensible by reason. The world is a subject of cosmology, and he lists 4 antinomies regarding the world in CPR.
Due to this view, Kant believes that the proposition "The world exists." is a form of subreption caused by hypostatisation.
:ok:
Quoting JuanZu
You apparently consider Kant to be a proponent of this latter kind of objectivity. But doesnt Kant s thinking, in its own way, lead to skepticism? Doesnt he retain a gap between the thing in itself and our concepts?
Could you tell us what is your criterion for being conscious and unconscious? What do you mean by you are conscious? and unconscious?
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Isn't the point of philosophy to get you out from the illusions by adopting and applying the rational sceptical methodology in perceiving truths?
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Thank you for your opinions and interactions. But our journey for the truths is never over. Because according to Heidegger, we are all "auf dem weg sein." - existence on the road.
..I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion{1} arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate{2} (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception .
One mans mental masturbations, re: Leibniz, et al, ca1712-14, is anothers epiphanic paradigm shift.
But in that case, are you not committing yourself into the dark chamber of solipsism? If you say, the world is not an object, but a concept, and the predicate 'exist' is logical rather than real, then wouldn't Kant say you are an idealist with extreme solipsism? If the world is a concept, and it resides in your mind only, then it suddenly transforms into a mental dildo, rather than presenting into you from outside as a physical existence, where all the livings and objects co-exist struggling and enduring.
Quoting Mww
Didn't Kant revolt against the rationalist crowds such as Leibniz, Wolf, Spinoza opposing to their innate ideas only knowledge, trying to establish a new system of Metaphysics adopting Hume's empiricism thanking him for awakening Kant from dogmatic slumber?
Of a sort, perhaps. On the other hand, if late-Enlightenment transcendental philosophy stands as a legitimate, albeit speculative methodological system, every human thinking subject/moral agent resides in the same chamber, which implies it is the default modus operandi of the human intellect in general, from which follows ..how dark can it be? Besides, given the overwhelming commonality in human thought that were all fundamentally the same between the ears gains credence. So if we all happen to be solipsists, big deal, right?
Quoting Corvus
Hell, that guy can say anything he wants about me. If he said that, Id say, imitating my ol buddy Col Jessup .you damn right I am!!!!! Seriously though, I should hope hed call me a transcendental idealist, insofar as I have not drank the real for merely logical predicate Kool-Aid.
Regarding solipsistic mentality though, it is foolish of me to deny to any cogent rationality a mind as functional as my own, just as it is foolish of that mind to think to know me as well as I know myself. It never should be a matter of capacity, which is granted, but of accessibility, which is denied.
The record shows Kant had high esteem for Wolff generally, but only for Leibniz or Spinoza in the pre-critical era, for both of whom he established refutations of, or in your words, revolted against, their respective primary theses in his critical era, the former in CPR, the latter in CpR and Lectures on Metaphysics.
Still, in order to relate how all that is the case, one would need an equal exposure to all those guys, which I dont have. Secondary literature tells me so, is all I got, plus the few-and-far-between direct references in the relevant Kant texts.
Kant was apparently a proper Prussian gentlemen, in that he didnt blast the guys he disagreed with, re: Schopenhaur regarding Hegelians, but made no bones about praising those with whom he did agree. It was left to the reader, intended to be an academic peer, to fathom who he was refuting by his arguments but without being always named.
Regarding dogmatic slumbers, care is advised in the subtlety of the expression, in light of this .
. This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles à priori
.which implies it is his slumber that is being critiqued, not what quality of the slumber it has.
This is by far the greatest philosophy group that I have ever been in.
I can now outline an answer to this.
I experience. Objects of experience vary. When I am not experiencing any object (ie. Unconscious and not dreaming) I do not seem to cease to exist as I am existing again upon waking.
If I am able to hold a belief in anything I necessarily must attach said belief to some form of existence. I cannot believe in something that I am unable to have any inkling of - such is beyond me (non-existent).
There is no thing-in-itself. Such is a limit of human understanding (the ONLY understanding we have or can ever have). The horizon is an ever shifting item that will forever remind us of our limitations.
In more day-to-day terms people do not question existence of most things because they are too busy interacting with said things.
In terms of knowledge, what is known remains known with set limits too. A clearly set out abstract realm possesses Truths but non-abstract (day-to-day things) are always subject to some level of scrutiny as our certainty within experience had limits.
I can question this or that World because I cannot hold it all at once. I can question gravity but in day-to-day life I simply pay it no direct attention, just like I pay no heed to my legs moving when I walk.
There are countless perspectives to look at. What remains pretty clear overall is that to believe is the existing world is a rather bizarre way of putting things. The answer (just like the no one around to hear a tree question) depends on the approach and meaning of hear within the context given. The sound waves exist but with no ear to hear it can be argued that there is no sound quite reasonably. To extend this to the totality of existence just leads me to ask why anyone would bother to do so?
The task Kant set himself was to ask What can we know before experience?
We can talk of what we know not of what we do not.
We can never talk of what we can never know.
Those are not the same. The first does not say we cannot in the future. The second points at (for want of some non-existent term) some inexplicable limitation that is not even possible to outline as a shadow on the wall.
Do you think he came to a reasonable conclusion on that? I'm not done with CPR - and it's so dense, i'm asking this question without a preconceived possible answer.
Was Kant a solipsists? No. he said the world is not a concept. The world is a subject of cosmology i.e. physics, and a part of the universe. So he was not a solipsist. Some says he was a transcendental idealist, and some says he was a transcendental realist, but not a solipsist. Neither was Hume.
Quoting Mww
The problem is, that if you say the world is a concept, then you cannot say the world exists. Because concepts don't exist as the physical objects do. All existing objects have properties and essence. What are the properties and essence of your world as a concept? And one applies concept to the perceived objects for experiencing. How do you apply the concept of the world to the world, when your world in physical form doesn't exist?
Quoting Mww
Yes, solipsistic mind is anti-scientific, because it lacks objectivity.
Can we know something without experience? What was his verdict?
Did you not claim that Noumenon is important with the concept of 'existing' in your previous messages? I did a few quotes from your message for that.
Noumenon is the objects of the intuition, not perception. So it doesn't exist and is inconceivable.
I was wondering why you were keep bringing up Noumenon in relation to 'existing'. I was expecting your explanations on that point, because it was you who made the claim.
Quoting I like sushi
But we can guess, infer and imagine.
I am quoting your message again where you made the claim. I have been asking you to clarify and explain what that meant. :nerd: :pray:
""All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument" is true, just as "all bachelors are unmarried" is true; that is, it would seem to be a tautology. I'm not sure what the word "objectively" is doing there, but it does suggest that there must be some state of affairs that acts as a truth maker. What makes tautologies true if not some fact or facts about language use, and is not language use an external world phenomenon?
To be sure facts about language use are not material objects, but language use itself is dependent on the existence of spacetime just as material objects are. You might object that facts about language use are not necessarily dependent on spacetime, but then facts about material objects are not necessarily dependent on spacetime either.
That is a great mistake. English must be among the worst languages to read philosophy in, especially compared to German with its wonderful accuracy. One obvious example being the absence of kennen X wissen distinction. Not to bring up the essential ser X estar in Iberian Latin languages. English depends almost wholly on the abuse and semantic deturpation (an example right here!) of French vocabulary in order to express more complex concepts.
By what measure? By whose standard? Id never be so bold as to call him, or deny to him, anything he wasnt on record as calling himself, re: a dualist, at least with regards to empirical determinations. He called himself other things in regards to other considerations, which dont concern us here.
Quoting Corvus
You realize that every word represents a concept, right? The fun part is figuring out that world, while an empirical concept arising from understanding alone, as do all concepts, doesnt conform to the rules by which experience is possible given such empirical concept. Reason now intercedes, and because world is a valid concept, but does not lend itself to a synthesis with phenomenal representations, hence can never be an experience, becomes an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea. That world is a subject of cosmology has to do only with how Kant uses the term, and he means by it only its relation to the regressive series of empirical conditions, re: that which we do experience as objects in the world, to the unconditioned totality of all possible things in the world, which makes the world itself, unconditioned. For Kant, then, world and Universe are pretty much the same thing, or, rather, reason must treat them as the same kind of transcendental idea.
Quoting Corvus
Correct, according to the very specific tenets of a very specific metaphysical philosophy. The world doesnt exist; things which can be phenomena for us necessarily do exist, and those things are conceived as belonging to the manifold of all possibly existing things, the totality of which is conceived as represented by the word world.
Beauty doesnt exist, yet there are beautiful things. Justice doesnt exist, yet there are instances of that which is just. Morality doesnt exist, yet there are instances of moral agency. You get the picture.
Quoting Corvus
I dont. I apply the concept of world as the representation of the totality of possible existences. I, as most regular folk, use the word conventionally as a matter of linguistic convenience. Which is fine, insofar as most regular folk arent doing philosophy when we speak conventionally.
Real physical objects, irrespective of how they are represented, when predicated with the pure category existence, or one of its derivatives, is a separate and entirely distinct problem, having its relation, not with pure reason, but with understanding and the logic of judgements.
I meant in terms of popularity ( number of the speakers in the world) and the availability and price of the books on the subject. For accuracy, you are correct.
I have not come across any of Kant commentary books describing Kant as a solipsist. But from my own view he was anything but a solipsist. What is the proof Kant's solipsism?
Will be back with the other points :)
To me, this is basically the key to understanding your point/Kant's point. As long as we're sure the term, in this context, isn't trying to do the work of it's every-day definition, there's no difficulty.
Doesn't it imply that then you don't know what the world is? How could you logically say "the world exist." when you don't know what it is?
But before that, how can the world be a concept, when it renders no meaning, or definition?
I think that's a little misleading. A priori truths are those you know by dint of reason alone, 'prior to' or not requiring validation by experience (e.g. mathematical proofs). A posteriori facts are known by experience gained through observation and are not necessarily universally true but contingent on real-world conditions. For example, knowing that "the sun rises in the east" is an a posteriori fact because it is based on observation.
The world is just shorthand for everything that is. Although I think the question does the world exist? is a nonsense question.
But doesn't math still need empirical sensibility to work? The need work together to produce knowledge i.e. synthetic apriori. e.g. 5+7=12, "5+7" itself doesn't contain 12, but comes from sensibility.
Yes, this seems what Kant had been trying to say in CPR.
Yes, we seem to agree at this point. :cool: :up:
Ok, fair enough. Will think on it, and get back to you if there are any points to add or ask. Thanks. :cool: :up:
If you care to say what languages you speak/understand, I may be able to give some suggestions. If you don't want to for privacy reasons or any other reason, that is fine.
If 'world' and 'everything' are synonymous, and things exist, then why would we say the world does not exist? If you narrowly define existence as pertaining only to things which can be objects of the senses, and since everything cannot be an object of the senses then, in that sense, it might make sense to say the world does not exist; but then all we would be saying is that the world does not exist for us as an object of the senses.
I think he more or less found something more interesting to look at. The journey was more important. The question was kind of futile in the same sense that asking Does the world exist?.
Quoting Corvus
We can imagine only what we are capable of imagining. Beyond that well you get the idea (or rather not!) which is the entire - obvious - point.
Quoting Corvus
Well, no, not really. That makes it sound like it is comprehended. The thing-in-itself is an illusionary term just like talk of square circles or upside down trouser memories. You know this though I believe so baffled why you are asking?
What is the quote? Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.
It relates to what exists in the sense that we can convince ourselves, or fool ourselves, about the knowledge we possess. This in turn frames what we mean by existence. Kant clearly demarcates between Rational and Empirical.
For myself, I find the entire idea of existing fruitless if one expects a conclusive answer. We are limited. We are able due to limits. What is directly in the minds eye is up for scrutiny and we are able to ask questions of it. What is not in the minds eye (conscious focus) is accepted.
We are roused from our slumber by existence when focus is shifted - and it is constantly shifting to some degree or another.
Sorry, perhaps i'm just frazzled but I can't quite grok what this is in response to?
I understand the term to signify the sheer existence of a thing as distinct from its existence for us. We cannot know what that existence is because anything all we can know is what a thing's existence is for us.
So, what we perceive are things as they exist for us, but we can say that it is reasonable to believe that we are precognitively affected by things in themselves (including what we are in ourselves) such as to give rise to the perceptions of things as appearances. In terms of our scientific understanding, we can investigate and analyze how things affect us such as to give rise to perceptions, but this investigation and analysis is still possible only in terms of how things appear to us, and the sheer existence of things, of ourselves and how it all interacts need not be the same as how it all appears to us.
How so? Sensible objects are those perceived by sense. Numbers are not perceived by sense.
Which is necessarily nothing to us. Hence it is non-existent.
We talking about something existing based on human experience because, frankly, that is all we have and therefore all there ever is for us. It is a subtle obviousness easily missed.
It is not that we do not know what we cannot know - which is contrary! We cannot even refer to what we cannot know in any meaningful way.
Of course there isnt one. What is irrefutable, is the fact Kant writes most importantly on the critique of reason in its various forms, all of which belong to a subjective entity of some specified kind. If your entire raison detre, as demonstrated by your philosophical catalog, concerns the individual rational subject and his abilities, then you are writing with respect to each and every instance of that subject, for and by itself, which in turn, approaches the concept of solipsism. The clues are in the catalog.. the metaphysics of morals, the metaphysics of ethics, the metaphysics of natural science.
Solipsism has a varied history, so best be careful with the concept generally employed.
Quoting Corvus
More than that. It is that there is no world, as such, of which to know. It isnt that you dont know the world because youve never perceived it, but you dont know the world because it isnt ever going to be a perception. Pretty simple, innit? If it is impossible to know each and every single thing a world might contain, how is it possible to know the world as it is? Hence, the unconditioned reason seeks but never finds.
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Quoting Corvus
The fundamental example of the dreaded transcendental illusion: saying something about something, when the warrant youre using to justify the claim, doesnt. The reconciliation of the illusion, is dont say a thing exists when it is impossible to know what it is. This is the converse of the logical necessity, that all that can be known a posteriori, is that which exists.
The critique of reason is not a denial of its abilities, as demonstrated by: I can think whatever I please ., but rather, it is an exposition on its methodological limits, re: .provided only that I do not contradict myself .
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Quoting AmadeusD
Part of the whole critical deal is to expose the errors in doing just that, bearing in mind none of this works under the tenets of a different theory.
Do you mean by "just that" the act of trying to use terms in their incompatible context? Just for clarity - Can't be sure if you're decrying that, or my delineation between contexts lol
It doesn't follow that because something is "nothing to us" that it is non-existent. In any case the in itself is not nothing to us except sensorially; we do generally tend to think that things have their own existences independently of us. The fact that we (obviously) cannot determine the total or absolute nature of that existence does not entail that it is "nothing".
You say we cannot refer to such things in a meaningful way, but that is just your opinion; it seems obvious to me that we can refer to such things apophatically as indeterminate existences or indeterminate aspects of things the aspects of the natures of which we can determine only via being sensorially affected by them.
Yeah, sorry. A judgement is the synthesis of conceptions. A cognition is the synthesis of judgements. The use of one judgement authorizing only this cognition cannot be used to justifying any cognition not related to it. What were dealing with here, then becomes a judgement used to authorize a cognition regarding sensible objects, cannot be used to authorize cognitions on non-sensible objects, which are concepts. Or, ideas.
No no no. You misunderstand, I promise!
We know the world via space and time (a roughshod paraphrasing of Kantian Intuitions). We can only speculate on the canvas of these intuitions. Beyond is meaningless/nought.
You cannot imagine something you cannot imagine - by definition. This follows the same principles. The existence of some otherly, wholly incomprehensible item is the very same manner of word play. Just to be clear this is not as stating something currently beyond our ken, that may always remain beyond our ken BUT it a possibility of perception directly or indirect via instrumentation (microscopes, telescopes, etc.,.).
This is an assumption. I am unaware of our ability to think in an atemporal way and with complete disregard to space.
I don't believe I misunderstood what you were saying, I simply disagree.
Quoting I like sushi
It seems rather it is you that misunderstood what I was saying; It should be obvious that I was not claiming that we can imagine the unimaginable, but we can certainly imagine that something unimaginable may exist, or that things might have their own existence independently of our perceptions and understandings of them, and that an unimaginable form of existence may be very different than our perceptions and understandings lead us to believe about the form of existence the things we perceive appear to have.
Quoting I like sushi
Again, it is not a matter of being able to imagine a non-spatiotemporal existence, but of being able to imagine that there may be such, despite our inability to conceptualize it.
And there is the key word! If it does not exist for us then in what capacity are you actually using that term. Think about it.
I do not see any importance in speculating how we can point at something we cannot point at.
Thanks, yes no problem. I have picked up a few different languages in the schools when my father worked in different countries such as Japanese, Indonesian, English. German was my 2nd foreign language in the high school. My the other main language is Korean, but now English is my main language because all the people around me are English speakers, and I am most comfortable communicating with them in English. Reading Philosophy in English got quite comfortable too.
Philosophy is a tricky subject even with my 2x primary languages (English and Korean) due to the abstract concepts the subject employs. Do you speak other languages than English yourself? What are they?
Yeah, most people think that way, but I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper, or ears hear the sounds asking by someone, or see some external objects such as 5x apples and 7x oranges, you don't carry out the math. Just to emphasise the sense input is important in all mental process.
OK, I am not denying, but trying clarify your points. It is interesting to see different points from the traditional commentary book opinions.
Quoting Mww
So, it was illusions on their part, when the vulgars were shouting jumping up and down saying why on earth you doubt and ask for proof of the world existence. According to you, the world doesn't exist. It has never existed. There was no reason to believe in existence of the world. Kant proved its non-existence 300 years ago in his CPR. Is that correct?
Yep, provided one accepts the tenets of transcendental philosophy.
That is not to say the world cannot be thought. Obviously it can be thought, given its ubiquity in human dialogue.
So, it is a linguistic illusion. Languages are neither logical, nor rational of course.
No word is ever spoken that isnt first thought. To call it a linguistic illusion presupposes the actual nature or source of it. The simplest nature or source, I guess, for this kind of illusory use, is plain ol misunderstanding.
Quoting Mww
Quoting Corvus
It was a logical conclusion from the premises.
So there are no blind mathematicians?
The distinction between rational and sensible is not one you are able to overturn
No, unless he was taught by non-blind teacher.
Just like that, yep. Although, technically, I suppose, the nature of these illusions is illicit judgement, whereby the conclusion doesnt follow from the premises. But that depends on the nature of the judgement. A simple judgement, re: the world exists, is illicit on the one hand because existence adds nothing to the conception of world, and on the other, it is false insofar as world is not even a thing that exists.
I agree with this. There is no blind mathematician from birth unless he has been taught by someone.
:cool: :up:
If that were the case, synthetic a priori cognitions would be impossible, from which follows the entire ground of transcendental philosophy fails. So while it may be the case we usually dont think 5 + 7 without perceiving the objects that represent that activity, we can still think the relation intrinsic to one quantity adjoined in a progressive series with another. Numbers do nothing more than represent the quantities, but do nothing whatsoever to illustrate the relation between them, which must be thought.
One shouldnt mistake rote classroom instruction, for innate human intelligence.
I know what you are trying to say, and it is all over in the textbooks too. But that is the part I don't agree with. There are the tribe people who live in the jungle all their lives hunting and foraging for food, and never come across mathematics in their whole lives. They don't know what numbers mean, never mind math. Experience and education must synthesise with A priori to yield knowledge.
Yeah, but ya know what? It is more than likely any one of those guys, upon experiencing the impossibility of lifting the basket off the ground, will know a priori, that theres too much in it. And youre right, in that he wont care about the math, until he wants to know how much is too much.
Which is sorta why theres math at all. Because we want to know how things relate to each other, or, maybe more importantly, how they relate to us. The uneducated or inexperienced doesnt have reason to care.
So what is the boundary of our imagination? How do you define the line between possibility and impossibility of imagination? Do we all have the same capability for imagination?
Wouldn't he only know there are too much fishes in the basket, when he tries to lift it first? :) Just by looking at the basket, he would only be able to guess. But most importantly before all that, he must see the basket with his eyes to know, it is the basket which belongs to him.
In this case, thats what I meant, yes. But it is a possible scenario where he already knows about the things in the basket, and because he knows that, he knows its too heavy to lift before the failed experience of trying to lift it. It isnt when he knows from experience in one time, its what he knows without it in another time.
Peruse the section in CPR on pure/impure a priori knowledge, A2/B3.
Whadyamean belongs to him? Maybe its his ailing grandmothers basket. Or the guy whose wife he just stole and hes feeling sorry about it.
Sure, here is B3 from CPR.
"By the term knowledge à priori, therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only à posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge à priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge à priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, Every change has a cause, is a proposition à priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience." - CPR B3
If we look at, "5+7", it is not a knowledge, proposition or anything on its' own. It is just a sense data. To the tribe man who never saw numbers, 5+7 would appear some mysterious symbols. And what was too heavy basket for him would be too light for his friend who trained in the gym for weight lifting.
It is only when you see the sense data and applied A priori and synthesise, you get the answer 12, which is a synthetic a priori knowledge. Would you not agree?
"5+7" is the simplest example for the demonstration. The logic will be more obvious if we look at the complex Calculus, Trigonometry or Geometry proof examples.
Ahh, but my good man, you initially made no mention of 12. All you stipulated was 5 + 7, in which .
. That 7 should be added to 5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5 .
.the mere thinking of a union of quantities is very far from construction a mathematical proposition, from which follows .
.. but not that this sum was equal to 12.
.which is a mathematical proposition.
. Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are always judgements à priori, and not empirical, because they carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience .
The propositions are always a priori constructs; the proofs for them, on the other hand, are always empirical.
Intuitions (Kantian).
Note: I suppose we may have some other faculty yet to be unearthed.
Naturally, which is why the average public often accuses philosophy of being word salad. Most of the times it is not word salad, but it looks like it most of the time.
You say reading in English got comfortable for you. I am not really sure how the philosophical scene is in East Asia or in languages like Japanese or Korean. Thinking that your native language is Korean, don't you think you would benefit from reading in it, even with less material published in it? And for that I will quote Nietzsche like Vaskane did:
Likewise, how could the English language, alien, communicate to you in the same way that Korean, transporting concepts to you since a child, does?
Otherwise, I, like everyone else, also read philosophy articles written in English, as many important scholars of philosophy today write in English on peer-reviewed journals. But when it comes to classics, I believe that Korean has translated more in philosophy (Kant, Plato, Leibniz) than you could ever consume.
The question is tricky to answer. At least some grounds remain for the realist. For instance, when we close our eyes we are not perceiving a void, we are not perceiving the otherworldly, or are not not perceiving, but are staring directly at the back of our eyelids. The eyelids, as amazing as they are, cannot block all light (which is of the world) so it cannot be the case that the world vanishes upon closing ones eyes. Even when we sleep our senses are dutiful sentinels, and only in extraordinary instances and interventions can they be numbed (anaesthesia, for example). That his senses point outward is indicative of the relationship between a perceiver and the objects of perception. Plus, other observers or recordings can confirm that our coffee cups remain when we are not viewing them. So there is plenty grounds.
So the question ought to be inverted. What are the grounds for believing that we are perceiving nothing, perceiving the extraterrestrial, or perceiving nothing at all?
Quoting I like sushi
Useful for whom? The fact that you do not see any importance in what you think of as speculating about how we can point at something we cannot point at and that you frame the question that way says more about you than anything else. I don't see the question as being concerned with pointing at anything at all.
If you disagree then I simply do not use language in the same manner you do.
That would be impossible.
You seem to be talking about the possible existence of something due to sensible evidence.
If I come to you with a piece of paper with evidence saying that what is written on the paper outlines some object beyond of sensory appreciation, and this paper has nothing written only it, would you accept this as evidence of some object wholly beyond our ken. You would not I expect.
The proposition of a-thing-in-itself needs greater context. Without context there is nothing to talk about. We may as well argue for the existence of God - therein lies the very same issue. The definition/labelling of some object does not render it real.
If we are talking about existence as something separate to real then we need to demarcate.
I am more in favour of absconding from the whole mess tbh and much prefer the phenomenological approach (Bracketing Out).
The piece of paper you are shown is evidence that the piece of paper exists.
As the piece of paper hasn't existed since the beginning of time, we know that something created it, even though we may not know what created it. The piece of paper is evidence that something existed at a prior time even though what that something was may be unknown to us.
IE, the piece of paper is evidence of something that existed at a prior time that may well be wholly beyond our ken.
It just is the context; it justifies the representational nature of human intelligence, under which every other context is subsumed.
Propositions have bivalent values either true of false. 5+7 itself is not a proposition until you add "="
and come up with 12. 5+7=12 is a proposition.
Why did Nietzsche renounce Kant?
As you have suggested, intuition implies connection to knowledge, and indeed it is faculty for knowledge. Not imagination. Imagination is a faculty of its own. The nature of imagination is its freedom from the other mental faculties.
Quoting I like sushi
What does Kant say about it?
Yep, a mathematical proposition, to distinguish the principles of its origin.
Quoting Corvus
Which is why the distinction in principles. Mathematical propositions cannot be bivalent, because they cannot be false, because they are grounded by the principles of necessity and universality.
Weve diverted from transcendental ideas, to distinctions in judgement. Was there a point in doing that? Did we just move on? Get lost? Lose interest?
I tried reading Philosophy in Korean which is my native language, but it was actually more difficult to understand. I think problem is the translation.
Quoting Lionino
I have been using English since middle school times in the American High school in Indonesia, and have been reading in English for many years, and worked with English native speaking people, so it became like my main language now. It is not still perfect, but I would say it is par with my Korean.
Quoting Lionino
Yes, almost every book in English has translated copy in Korean, and Philosophical academic interest in Korea is very high. There are people who are interested in the Western Philosophy, also Eastern Philosophies and Religious studies such as Buddhism. There are many seminars and study groups in the country with ardent passion and enthusiasm. There are internationally well known scholars such as the late JG Kim (USA), and a few working and teaching in Europe (UK and Germany). Here is the Korean Prof. H. Chang (Cambridge University UK ) presenting his paper on Realism.
There are many Youtube channels run by Koreans with Philosophical topics, which I watch sometimes.
This is a youtube channel run by a New Zealander working in Korea. He seems specialising in the continental philosophy. He has many Korean followers.
No no, I was just responding to your points. :)
Not exactly anti-realism, but more to do with Academic Scepticism?
The point is not that we stop perceiving or not perceiving anything at all. But rather, how can we be sure about what we perceive is real or truth?
Or when we are not perceiving the objects we have been perceiving, due to not being present in front of the objects, what are the grounds for us keep believing the unperceived existence?
Understandable. Nietzsche was an atheist.
Yeah, you said so yesterday, I think it was.
Probably my fault for branching off, in that I think your I feel that you don't even think of 5+7 until your eyes see the numbers on the screen or paper, doesnt hold true.
Or I just misunderstood. Dunno.
No probs. I don't have perfect memories. I am sure no one does :D
This thread is for any topic or issues which one feels related to the concepts "the world", "existence", "belief" or "reasons / grounds / justifications for knowledge" from their own ideas, or any of the historical philosophers' perspectives. It is not a declarative or presumptuous, but exploratory thread, to which, hopefully, some form of conclusion would be heuristically emerging from the discussions.
I mentioned a few reasons why wed keep believing in the existence of the world. For one, we never stop perceiving it. But also, there is no reason to do otherwise.
Its why I ask the question. If you never stop perceiving the world, what are the grounds for doubting the existence of the world?
My perception of a world in my mind is the effect of some prior cause, on the assumption that my perception hasn't spontaneously caused itself.
This prior cause was either i) external to my mind or ii) internal to my mind.
As there is no information within an effect as to its cause, it is therefore logically impossible to know the cause of an effect just from the effect itself. This means that it is also logically impossible to know whether the cause of my perception of a world in my mind was either external or internal to my mind.
As it is logically impossible to know whether anything exists external to my mind, it also follows that it is logically impossible to know whether or not anything that may exist external to my mind continues to exist when I stop perceiving a world in my mind.
Existence of God and proof is another interesting topic which is related to the topic of this thread.
Why do you believe in the existence of God? Or why not? How the existence of God differ from the existence of the world? or unperceived world?
Quoting Vaskane
Did Nietzsche thought God had been alive and existing before? But died suddenly or gradually?
Or did Nietzsche think that God had never existed at all?
Some say Zarathustra was the new God whom Nietzsche tried to depict as in "Thus spake Zarathustra", but not sure if it was.
But do you keep perceiving the world while you are asleep? Are what you perceive always what you think you perceive? Was there any room for doubts, illusions or mistakes in the contents of your perception?
Quoting NOS4A2
For the above reasons.
But could you not say that your perception is caused by your sense-data? i.e. the sense perception of the external world?
I was not using Kantian terminology for imagination.
Quoting Corvus
Nothing I can recall?
If we werent perceiving in our sleep we wouldnt wake up when our alarm went off. Our senses have evolved to wake us even in the deepest sleep. At any rate, I see no coherent reason why any of it should be doubted.
Think of the cup in your OP, the one you cannot be sure exists when you are not perceiving it. If you and someone else were sitting around the cup, and you look away, but the other person sees the cup has not moved or vanished or blinked out of existence, are you right to doubt the existence of the cup?
I know that at this moment in time I perceive a world in my mind, and assuming that nothing happens without a reason, there must have been a prior cause for such a perception.
This prior cause was either i) external to my mind or ii) internal to my mind. But because there is no information within an effect as to its cause, it is logically impossible to know whether the cause of my perception of a world in my mind was either external or internal to my mind.
If the prior cause of my perception of a world in my mind was external to my mind, then we can say that the information from whatever was external to my mind passed through my sense-data, where sense-data can be thought of as an interface between my mind and whatever is external to my mind.
However, perception, world, internal, external and sense-data should all be thought of as figures of speech rather than literally existing, and as figures of speech only exist in the mind as concepts.
If the prior cause of my perception of a world in my mind was external to my mind, though this is logically impossible to know, then yes, there would be a causal chain going back in time of which sense-data would be one link in the chain.
Ehhhh .thats ok.
If you were perceiving the world while you were asleep, then you wouldn't need the alarm clock to be awakened by it. The fact that you set the alarm clock to be awakened by it proves that you don't perceive the world while asleep.
Quoting NOS4A2
While I look away, I wouldn't know if the cup exist, and I wouldn't know what the person would be doing either. The person could have looked away too, fell asleep, or walked out the room. Anyway, how can I believe in the existence of the cup when I am not seeing it, and base my belief in the existence of the invisible cup relying on the other person's perception, which is totally inaccessible to me?
Would you not agree that figures of speech can be confusing, and is illogical?
If you do not wish to that is fine.
Note: do not ask which part because none of it said anything to me.
I think someone on this forum mentioned some time ago that they chose to distinguish between real and exist in terms that a unicorn can exist but it cannot be real. The thing-in-itself is neither of these as it is just an empty term that can neither be conjured by imagination nor experienced in reality.
Because Kant was too subtle?
Quoting I like sushi
I often mention that the number 7 is real, but that it only exists as an intellectual act, and not as a phenomenal object. Unicorns on the other hand are creatures of the imagination but they neither exist, nor are they real, in any sense other than having a common cultural referent (that is, an image with which we are all familiar.)
Quoting I like sushi
[quote=Emrys Westacott] Kant's introduced the concept of the thing in itself to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the thing in itself as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble.[/quote]
Yes, figures of speech can be confusing, but as figures of speech are an inherent part of language, figures of speech and the confusion they bring is unavoidable.
For example, when you wrote in your OP: To see what other folks think about this issue, I have opened this thread asking what is your reason to believe in the world, when you are not perceiving it?, the phrases "to see what other folks think" and "I have opened this thread" are definitely figures of speech. I would argue that words such as "world" and "perceiving" are also figures of speech.
As regards language being logical, there have been attempts to found language on logic, but seemingly unsuccessful. For example, Frege. As the Britannica article on Frege's Revolution notes about Frege, Frege attacked Locke's idea that ideas exist independently of words. Frege proposed that the meaning of a sentence, the thought it expresses, is a function of the structure, the syntax, of the sentence. The thought it expresses is not determined by the speaker or hearer of the sentence, but is determined by the logical structure of the sentence, where an individual word has meaning because of its context within the sentence of which it is a part.
However, Frege's logical language is contrasted with ordinary language, which as the Britannica article on the Ideal Language wrote about an ideal language:
In analytic philosophy, a language that is precise, free of ambiguity, and clear in structure, on the model of symbolic logic, as contrasted with ordinary language, which is vague, misleading, and sometimes contradictory.
The fact that a word such as "world" has created so much discussion and disagreement is because it is a figure of speech, and as a figure of speech is open to multiple interpretations.
In what way, was he so?
Actually, the thing-in-itself is both.
. The estimate of our rational cognition à priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere
Quoting I like sushi
No problem.
Yes, good point. Here is the summary from ChatGPT on the problems of OLP.
"1. **Circularity and Conservatism:**
- Critics argue that OLP can be circular in its reasoning. It sometimes relies on everyday language to define philosophical concepts, but this can lead to a conservative stance, where it merely reflects and reinforces existing linguistic practices rather than challenging or transcending them.
2. **Inadequacy for Complex Topics:**
- OLP may be criticized for its perceived inadequacy in dealing with complex philosophical problems that require more abstract and formal analysis. Some argue that it is better suited for addressing everyday language use rather than tackling deep metaphysical or epistemological questions.
3. **Failure to Address Non-Linguistic Aspects:**
- Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to focus heavily on language and linguistic expressions, potentially neglecting non-linguistic aspects of human experience. This limitation can be problematic when dealing with issues that go beyond language, such as emotions, sensations, or certain aspects of consciousness.
4. **Limited Cross-Cultural Applicability:**
- OLP has been criticized for its cultural specificity, as it is primarily based on the analysis of English-language usage. Some argue that the insights gained from studying ordinary language may not be easily translatable or applicable to languages and cultures with different linguistic structures and philosophical traditions.
5. **Development of Later Wittgenstein's Thought:**
- The later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, often associated with OLP, are complex and open to different interpretations. Some critics argue that later Wittgenstein's ideas are not a unified and coherent system, making it challenging to pin down a clear and consistent account of OLP.
6. **Neglect of Ontological Questions:**
- Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to be more focused on linguistic and conceptual analysis rather than engaging deeply with ontological questions about the nature of reality. Critics argue that it may sidestep important metaphysical issues.
7. **Evolution of Analytic Philosophy:**
- As analytic philosophy evolved, many philosophers moved away from the strictures of OLP. Analytic philosophy developed new methodologies and approaches, which led to a decline in the influence of OLP in mainstream philosophical discourse." - ChatGPT
If I see a broken window, as nothing happens without a reason, I know that at a prior time something broke it. I may never know what broke the window, in that it could have been a bird or a stone, but I know something did. I can name this unknown thing "something", enabling me to say "the window was broken by something".
It is also the case that this word "something" can be replaced by other words such as "thing-in-itself" without affecting the function of the sentence. So I can equally say "the window was broken by a thing-in-itself".
So what is this "something" or "thing-in-itself" referring to? In language are many words that don't refer to one particular concrete thing but do refer to abstract concepts. For example, in the expression "I can imagine a house", the word "house" is not referring to one particular concrete thing but rather is referring to the abstract concept of a house. Similarly, in the expression "I can imagine a thing-in-itself", the word "thing-in-itself" is not referring to one particular concrete thing but rather is referring to the abstract concept of a thing-in-itself.
I can imagine a thing-in-itself as I can imagine a house, not as one particular concrete thing but as an abstract concept. As a "house" isn't an empty term then neither is a "thing-in-itself" an empty term.
:up:
You can say what you like, but depending on the ground of the determinations by which you say anything at all, re: how you understand things in general, and in particular from transcendental philosophy, you cannot say with legitimacy the window was broken by a thing-in-itself.
.. Suppose now, on the other hand, that we ( .) have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself; and that, according to the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding, the principle of causality has reference only to things in the first sense .
While the broken window is that which ends up being the something that caused your perception, that alone is not sufficient to inform you of the cause of the window being broken.
So in saying what you do here, merely reflects that you have not learned to take things in two senses in accordance with this particular methodology, from which follows the sense of a thing by which it can be causal and the sense of it in which it cannot. Which is fine; it is speculative metaphysics writ large, after all.
What does it matter where it comes from?
Its fine, though. One inclined to much prefer the phenomenological approach, as you admit, isnt likely to be persuaded by finespun transcendental arguments, regardless of their authors.
Quoting RussellA
So then which world is real, Appearance or Thing-in-itself? Or are they the same world?
Im not sure how that proves youre not perceiving the world. If you werent perceiving the world you wouldnt hear the alarm clock.
Even so, if youre not perceiving the world, what are you perceiving? Are you perceiving nothing? Are you not perceiving? Or are perceiving something other than the world?
You would know because the person would tell you that it did not disappear when you looked away. If you did not trust him, he could film the cup while you looked away, and you could review the video after and see that it had not moved. There are a number of experiments one can do find out the answer. Now you have evidence proving to you that it had not disappeared, and zero evidence that it did. Given this, is it reasonable to doubt the existence of the cup when you were not looking at it?
Should you not say that you were disturbed by the alarm clock, which woke you up involuntarily from your sleep, rather than you perceived the alarm bell ringing from the clock?
Quoting NOS4A2
When you are sleeping, I would say you were not perceiving the world, because you would have been unconscious during the sleep. Your brain would have shutdown from your normal perception taking rest. Maybe you might be having dreams in sleep, but no perception on the world for sure. If you were perceiving something in the world in your sleep, then it is likely you weren't in deep sleep, or you weren't asleep at all.
Quoting NOS4A2
If you accept that your perception is caused by the external object, but for some reason, the object you were perceiving is invisible from your sight, then you have no perception because you don't have the object causing your perception anymore. In that case, it would be rational to have no belief in the existence of the object or the world.
We are not saying why you cannot doubt, or can doubt with all the evidence the other person produces to you with the films and videos what have you. We are saying, the cause of your perception is not existing anymore, therefore you have no perception of the object, therefore you have no reason to believe in the existence of the object or world.
Context.
If you are talking about phenomenology this is incorrect. Phenomenology is not directly concerned with what is or is not real as it is a proposed method of exploring experience.
Quoting Mww
Try me. Just because I am familiar with one perspective does not mean I adhere to it with fanaticism. I view all popular philosophical positions are tools rather than doctrines to live by.
Yes, that's true, for the Phenomenologist, the real world is external to our consciousness, according to the SEP article on Phenomenology:
[i]In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: literally, appearances as opposed to reality.
Realistic phenomenology studies the structure of consciousness and intentionality, assuming it occurs in a real world that is largely external to consciousness and not somehow brought into being by consciousness.[/i]
On the other hand, the only world the phenomenologist knows is the world as it exists within these experiences, and these experiences are real to them. Could one perhaps say that the world as they experience it is real to them?
Ehhhh .Im not finding much joy in the iterations presented here, so I might not be the one to ask.
FYI, that didnt come up as a link. Was it supposed to? Was mine the only machine where it didnt?
Your moderators move of some of the comments on here, to a different place on the forum. Usually that shows up as a clickable link, colored letters, underlined, and all. So a guy doesnt have to cut and paste.
Ahhh so it was just my machine. Its a clickable link now. Not that Im anxious to partake in reinventing the wheel.
Thanks.
Where there's a wheel there's a way :-)
We do actually say that for everyone. I will just assume you are wrong then. Bye
I never believed that squirrels can live in houses. I have seen a few of them in the garden sometimes. They are very fast, and agile. They quickly do their business and disappear into the woods.
I believe that animals might have beliefs in the existence of the world too. If they do, what would their beliefs be like?
How do you prove the world that you perceive is real?
What kind of argument do you want me to present?
Note: I find no need to prove it to myself.
OK, let's see it this way. Are sure all your sense organs are perfectly accurate?
How do you know they are? Or perhaps they are not?
Tell me what you are seeing as real in front of you.
Everything I perceive before me is real in one sense - including illusions and delusions. In another sense if I see a flying elephant that is not actually there (everyone else denies it is there) then the elephant does not exist but is real for me - unless I am being gaslighted. I can form an image in my head no one else can experience, yet it is real to me only. What is real to me comes to me through experience of how well my understanding maps onto my collective experience.
Recall I referred to the obsession some people have with certainty right at the start of our interaction here? Knowledge is limited. I feel like this is why you are probing? We know things because we can doubt them.
1. Real can mean physical existence. You are not just seeing something, but you can also touch grab feel use manipulate transfer and throw out physically.
2. Real can also mean genuine, not bogus, not look alike, not copy of the genuine.
3. Real means actual, not dream, not hallucinating, not illusion.
Quoting I like sushi
What do you know about the flying elephant in your mind?
Quoting I like sushi
Probing helps us understand how our mind works, why we have beliefs on certain things and not, and the nature of doubting etc.
If you have a thought spell it out. It gets kind of boring talking in riddles.
And which particular version did you have in mind when you asked the question?
Again, cut to the chase please.
It appears to me that playing this silly game is Corvus' whole point with this thread. Why would he want to cut to the chase?
Only thing I have done was responding to your request.
Then I was asked to cut to the chase,
Quoting I like sushi
and then pops up with a senseless comment that this is a silly game.
You have not even answered my question. Quoting Corvus
Now who are playing a silly game?
You are effectively asking me what I know about how I perceive anything. Right back at you. You can perceive what you perceive so tell us all what you know about what you perceive perhaps?
Frankly I find it to be a ridiculous question BUT given that you asked it I imagine if you answer it it may shed light on where you are going with this.
If you are able to recall, you claimed that you do actually say that the world you experience is real. in your post in this thread.
My questions was, how do you know it is real? It is a classic epistemological question. Maybe to it could have sounded like a silly game. But if you have read any book on Epistemology, you cannot deny that it is one of the central topic of the subject.
Why do you twist it as facile question? If it were a facile question, why did you keep on responding asking more questions?
If you are able to recall, it is not me who dragged you into this thread. But it was you who participated in the thread from your own Will.
It is beyond belief that you seem to be in total oblivion that my question was against your claim. The question would have never been put to you, if you hadn't made your claim. Philosophy is all about claiming, asking and probing on the metaphysical issues . If you renounce that, then I don't see your point of doing philosophy.
Now, how do you know what you perceive is real? If you answer your own question it might help, unless you find it meaningless?
It appears that you were trying to clarify the concept of real before giving out more of your answers, but unfortunately you were interrupted by .
I think the concept of Real is vague in philosophical uses, and it is interesting to clarify the uses with our epistemic claims. I was expecting you to choose any concept you feel relevant and come back with your answers to my question - what do you know about your flying elephant?
I know that it is there. I also know that my experience is limited. I generally have little reason to disbelieve what I experience. What I believe is real for me is real for me and may or may not relate to what you believe is real for you.
In a more broader sense I know via what Kant called Intuitions. Even with abstract items like numbers they are only known as abstracted from our appreciation (for want of a better term) of the spaciotemporal.
What about you? If you see an elephant flying in the sky how do you know about it?
For me, I also can see a flying elephant, when I try to imagine one in my mind. It does have a pair of wings, and flies above the clouds like a hang glider. The image is vivid and feels REAL to me.
But I am not sure if I can claim the flying elephant in my mind is real.
Because it is unreal, and I was seeing the UNREAL object which was made up in my imagination.
I was going to claim that we see real objects as well as UNREAL objects too. My flying elephant in my imagination is UNREAL.
Your saying that you see a flying elephant and it is real to you, is a self-contradiction.
Because the flying elephant was an unreal object to you and to the world. You were seeing an unreal flying elephant.
Just to point out your saying that your flying elephant is real, which is unreal was denying the principle of consistency A=A. You were saying A = Not A.
Different uses of terms. Nothing more. No contradiction. It is a real thought not an unreal thought what would an unreal thought be?
Equating truths has necessary limitations. For my consciousness and experience I have no idea what my limitations are so application of truth in the existing world is an overreach.
If I said the elephant does not exist and does exist then that is different. I used real as a relative function of personal experience. I can imagine something and you have no idea what it is. It is possible for you to imagine similar things. Imagining something is a real experience, just as seeing a tree with your eyes is a real experience. How this maps onto what is existent is another matter and kind of what Kant went into in a deep way in terms of investigating what can be known prior to experience.
That is not the only thing Kant was writing about. He wrote about wide variety of topics.
If Real is taken to be existence, then it relates to the problem of belief in the existence of the world, and also Kant's paralogism. I thought this was obvious.
After all you brought in the term 'Real' in your claim. I just thought we could clarify on what you were claiming about.
This seems a totally useless meaning to ascribe to 'real'. It doesn't delineate anything except that you, rather than another person experience something.
It would have no use, in this case. It is self-evidence that we do not share experiences. It is their comparison resulting in consistency or deviation that matters, and helps us delineate what we can rely on from what we cannot. I suppose, for an idealist this doesn't matter though so I could be barking up the wrong tree.
In COPR this was the initial question. Of course he wrote other books
Quoting Corvus
False. You asked me the question using that term regarding my seeing an elephant flying (not imagining one flying). What is sensible to me is real to me unless I recognise an illusion. What is a delusion is obviously beyond my examination (because a delusion is believed).
Quoting AmadeusD
We share an approximation of experiences. If we did not we would be nothing much to each other.
What about a rainbow? We all see them yet they are not there. The illusion is an objective one though, so whilst we can say it is not real in one sense (being an illusion) we share a common experience of it.
Yes, but it is patently obvious they are different experiences. "real for me" loses meaning as it can just be used to defend any erroneous claim by declaring yourself deluded.
I'm unsure that's true. Is there not actual sun rays actually refracting through actual moisture?
There are people who cannot see a rainbow.
? What are you talking about? If you are deluded you are deluded. You do not choose to be deluded. If you are pretending to be deluded you are lying.
Your incredulity aside - yes - that's exactly the scenario I am point out renders the use of the term 'real for me' absolutely unusable. Someone lying can just claim 'Well, it's real for me!' and you have no recourse.
This is a little like saying Canada does not exist because I have never been there. Merely heresay.
Scepticism only makes sense to a certain degree.
It is absolutely nothing like saying this, but incidentally that example also affirms, as an example, that using the term 'true for me' would be useless precisely because you could make such a stupid claim, and then just say it's true for you so no one can criticise. You've never seen it, so - wahey, no Canada. Absurd.
I try to be precise. Corvus replaced perceived with imagined and now you have replaced real with true.
If I see a flying elephant I would probably assume it is some kind of holographic projection when the reality is that it is a genetically engineered creature that looks very, very much like a flying elephant. It could just be a hallucination. Either way the experience is real for me.
If you find that impossible to take onboard I doubt we have anything much more to say to each other on this topic. Such is life :)
Then be a good sport; replace it with real and respond to the objection.
It remains with either term. It is not true OR real in any meaningful way. Which was precisely what I outlined
Honestly, there is nothing here to talk about bye :)
Ooof. Well thats a move I guess.
A move I reject but thats fine. Theres clearly daylight here and youre now just plum not engaging while claiming theres no daylight. Wild
How can you imagine a flying elephant without seeing it? Your point was that either you were seeing or imagining a flying elephant, and it is REAL. My point was that ok, I am not denying your seeing it or imagining it, but it must be UNREAL. Who is right here on the basis of common sense, logical and epistemological view?
Was just pointing out, what you claim as Real in your perception might be Unreal. Due to the nature of our sense organs, we sometimes perceive Unreal objects.
What you see and claim to know is necessarily limited.
But what if it is not? Of course if I said to you I saw a flying elephant you would question my mental faculties but maybe I actually did and there are genetically modified elephants flying around somewhere.
Well if you are talking 100% from your subjectivity only, then you cannot communicate with anyone apart from you. We are searching for some degree of objectivity. That is what philosophical discussions are about.
Now you are being an extreme sophist.
100% subjectivity is pretty much where we all begin. We are not given a manual about how to perceive reality or what reality is.
We call it a nonsense.
Quoting I like sushi
You can begin wherever you like, but if anyone will agree with you is another matter. No one is quibbling about how or what you see in your perception, but claiming it is REAL would be regarded as a fallacy or illusion.
No. I think there are fallacies in your claims.
Anyway, this is just degenerated into pointless back and forth so I am out. Bye :)
I am not sure on other cases, but I am only commenting on your case, because your claim was found to be groundless.
Quoting I like sushi
Indeed it is pointless to dip into this and that threads in the forums for exchanging light hearted negative comments without any interest, enthusiasm or good arguments for the topic. It would be waste of time on you and the others too. All the best. :grin:
Or, if one is not a solipsist, then one believes an external world exists (contraposition).
For the hyper-skeptic, only the existence of a variety of thoughts is certain, whatever they all may be.
Some indications:
We sometimes discover new things; things previously unknown, unthought, unexperienced, uninvented.
We're sometimes wrong about things; what, then, made us wrong, but whatever is indeed the case?
We can't do just anything, whether trying to "will" it so or not; extra-self imposed limitations.
Non-solipsists:
We agree on any number of things, a rather large number; when to be at work in the morning; where the local grocery store is; this is English; ...
? mostly adapted from earlier posts and other posters
Great summary :up:
But when one believes in the existence of the world, but says there is no justified belief in the world when not perceiving it. What would you class the position?
Hence, we try to seek justification on our beliefs and perception.
But point here is, can belief be justified properly? Belief is a psychological state, which cannot be justified rationally in nature.
Or are some beliefs also epistemic when justified? But if it cannot be justified, then it can't be. How do we justify our beliefs rationally?
Disingenuity.
Why? Under what ground?
Why do you believe in the existence of the world, when you are not perceiving it?
Do you have logical explanations for your belief?
The only thing I have ever known myself to exist on/in, is the world. It would be far more unlikely that at times i'm not perceiving it (unconscious ,whatever..) it has disappeared, than it would be that I am simply not perceiving it because my senses are not trained it.
I suppose the other thing is, in what scenario are we not sensible of the world in one way or another? A deprivation tank still provides a temperature etc... It's just aligned so closely with homeostasis its hard to tell. It hasn't actually removed stimuli entirely.
Why would you believe something for which you believe you have no justification for believing? Sounds like the definition of stupidity to me.
Everything I experience gives me reason to believe the world does not depend on my perception of it. Perhaps you believe it doesn't give you such reason; if so, I can only conclude that you are a fool.
To a stupid, everything sounds and looks like stupid.
Quoting Janus
You don't seem to have understood the question. Do you believe in absolute accuracy on everything you experience?
To immaterial idealists, the world is just perception. When they are not perceiving the world, they don't believe it exists. But to the realists, they tend to believe the world keep exists even when they don't perceive it. Beliefs are psychological state. You either believe something or not with or without reasons. But are there beliefs that need rational justification? Or do we tend to believe in something due to our nature as Hume wrote?
Quoting AmadeusD
I suppose it depends on the definition of the world as well. Yes, the definition of the world, the concept of existence, and the nature of belief.
If we define the world as the totality of the whole universe, then what we have been seeing was tiny particle amount of the world. In that scenario, are we qualified even to say we have been perceiving the world at all? This is just one scenario.
The underlined would suggest: Yes! But we must be humble about it to a very high degree! Not that this is news lol
What does the "absolute accuracy" in regard to experience even mean? Perhaps you are looking for some absolute certainty? It's a fool's errand, a dimwit's folly. See if you can dig your pointless hole even deeper; should be fun to watch. :rofl:
Well, whenever you return here, all you ever keep shouting is that whatever you read is fool and dimwit. How could anyone help you? :lol:
You need your argument for the statement. Without the argument, it would be just a passing suggestion. I cannot agree or disagree with your point without seeing your arguments for your claim.
Or if your definition of the world is, all that you perceive in your daily life, then you are seeing the whole world. But then a question arises, is your definition of the world objective?
I am mainly interested in seeing different arguments on the topic, and forwarding my counter arguments if and where necessary. The conclusion is up to each individuals.
Philosophy is all about arguments. The conclusions are for each individuals.
Not for me. Philosophy is about how you orientate your values, then come the arguments. My view is that people often settle on beliefs that appeal aesthetically, then a lot of post hoc rationalization comes into play. I also think the most interesting part is why people are drawn to certain arguments. Arguments don't necessarily speak for themselves, they often speak to the biases of those who hold them. Which is why what convinces X may not convince Y.
It is not ideal, not morally good or even practically possible to force down a value of someone to the others. No matter how right the value was, it would be meaningless and counter productive endeavour / exercise for all those involved.
Arguments are intellectual and logical dialectic efforts looking to come to the answers in the middle or end of them heuristically, and they are one of the traditional methodologies of philosophy.
Well, I believe in calling a spade a spade, and it is not I who is looking for, or in need of, help. In any case, by all means carry on going around in your silly circle, it may be useless, but at least it will most likely provide a few laughs along the way, for others if not for you.
I agree. But I'm not sure people always consciously do this. They tend to use arguments as surrogates for value systems. A classic example of this is presuppositional apologetics for Islam or Christianity. But this is a digression.
My primary question when faced with arguments about whether the world is real, or if am I in a simulation, or if matter an illusion and idealism is the correct ontology - is what is the significance? Is there anything in my life I would do differently? Almost always the answer is no.
The way that you keep resorting to the lowly languages and mention of laughs, whenever you appear here just seems to indicate you might be looking for either some help or attention. It just appears to demonstrate that you are not into a sound philosophical discussions.
:rofl: Stop it...you're killing me!
Yes, some do. I don't see a point doing it.
Quoting Tom Storm
The scepticism on the world was one of the historical philosophy themes. In the ancient times, they used to take it seriously, and some of them stopped judging on all things. But nowadays? We just use the topic to practice and study philosophy. If anyone gets irritated with the topic nowadays, then he hasn't read a single book on philosophy or misunderstood the topic or question. That is how I would see it. :)
Read some philosophy books, and learn instead of wasting time. :)
I understand but I would say that is a bit harsh. I have heard a number of distinguished philosophers criticize the idea - people like John Searle, Hilary Lawson, Susan Haack, Richard Rorty. I'm not a philosopher, so I am not immersed in the traditions. But it would be fair to say that there are differing schools of thought about what is worth pursuing and the temptation to write off the schools we disagree with as ignorant or 'not genuine' philosophy is probably unhelpful. (I'm not saying that you are doing this.)
You're too generous, Questioning the reality of the world has been sufficiently done to demonstrate that it is not in any conceivable sense good philosophy, and Corvus, who is obviously a philosophical neophyte, is doing it, but I don't think she or he is open to learning, and so will most likely double down and continue ad nauseum.
I agree. Some people do seem to become fixated on these sorts of questions and can't imagine how others are not. I remember my philosophy tutor (I studied it very briefly) saying, 'there's no solution to hard solipsism, so let's move on to some philosophy ' Always made me laugh.
:lol: Nice one!
I was not saying that you were doing that either. Well actually if you think this thread was all about solipsism, then you might have been :D, and as someone quite rightly commented recently here, where you and @Janus belong to, should be Netflix.
Quoting Corvus
I don't find anything philosophical from your writings and messages, sorry. Please use the forum "Lounge" for all your postings which are not philosophical in nature. Thank you.
My engaging in any type of philosophical discussion with yourself, or @Janus would be just total waste of everyone's time. So, all the best.
1) This is called feedback.
2) Having different views on 'what philosophy is' is kind of the point of philosophy, or any kind of dialogue.
It may well be the case that you want to encounter only views that you like or are able to appreciate. You would not be alone there.
Quoting Corvus
Well it hasn't been a waste of my time so this statement is wrong. I find your views interesting. If you do not wish to engage with a member just ignore them. Most members employ this strategy here.
If you read all my posts, you would realise that I welcome genuine philosophical arguments, criticisms and refutations based on logic and reasonings, and I always try to present the same to the serious interlocutors.
But in the case of @Janus, he has never been sincere or serious from my memory. He has no arguments, but just throws abuse and debasements on the thread itself, or one's philosophical points. So, your point in the quote is incorrect and unfounded.
Quoting Tom Storm
Apologies if I mistook your true intention. The fact that you were communicating with @Janus in supportive manner towards him could have sent out the impression that you were just here to accompany and assist @Janus for his disrespect for the thread.
If you were not, then there was misunderstanding obviously. I hope you would understand the situation. I do appreciate your explanation on the situation. Thank you.
Justified yes (evidential), proven no (purely deductive). ? different
Quoting Nov 25, 2023
Quoting Corvus
By "properly" do you mean deductively, with logical certainty?
Metaphysics that have survived (this far, sort of, in corners of academia at least), are just that. For some proposition, p, if attainable evidence is compatible with both p and ¬p, then we strand there. And we're venturing into metaphysics. Not particularly informative, like a difference that makes no difference (though Bateson used that phrase differently).
So, taken together, pragmatic safety, those novelties, our errors, annoying constraints, our agreements, stuff like that (taken together), give us anti-idealism if you will. But not as a matter of mere deduction. Observations, evidence, experiences, linguistic practices, life, and rationality too. Ethics involve an extra-self world as well.
Besides, there are some pitfalls in thinking that axiomatic logic can derive particulars of the real world by itself (logicing). Such logic is non-ampliative, derives what's contained in axioms, however complex to prove, and that's it. Hence it can be extended with modal logic. Knowledge of the real world needs the real world to stand on, if you will.
Have a good weekend. Grabbing a JD#7 on the rocks.
Sure. Good point. :up:
Quoting jorndoe
to denote in any possible way that you feel relevant i.e. logically, epistemically, intuitively, phenomenologically ....
If you recall from the previous messages in this thread, the thread is not about one single topic, or declarative, but it could be from any angle and is exploratory. Therefore, one can discuss the topic from sceptic, realistic, idealistic, metaphysical, physical, psychological or conceptual point of view, and I will try to engage in the discussion from the level or point of view. This point of the thread seems to have been totally misunderstood by the folk like , who keeps saying and distorting the thread as attempting to deny the existence of the world.
Quoting jorndoe
The concept of the world is such a historic and rich topic in the history of philosophy, if we even look at the very beginning in ancient Greece, Thales was the first man ever asked what the world is made of, which started the philosophical tradition.
The question of what is the world, what is the world made of is still unanswered to this day, and only Metaphysics can deal with such topics along with the sciences such as Physics and Cosmology.
Although the OP says, "Reasons to believe in the existence of the world", I have said numerous times that we could approach the topic from the conceptual perspective initially such as asking and discussing the concept of "the world", "existence" and "beliefs".
The terms "the world", "existence" and "beliefs" are interesting philosophical concepts even from just a definitional point of view. As you suggested, the concepts can be abstract and multi subject in origins such as physics, psychology, semantics, logic and metaphysics.
Quoting jorndoe
I was reading "On the Plurality of Worlds" by David Lewis over the weekend, and in the book Lewis was discussing Modality of possible worlds, and it was interesting. Indeed, the book made me think about the concept of the world in terms of various different types of possible worlds, and their nature of existence.
You are correct in saying that actual knowledge of the world requires the actual world's existence. That was also Lewis' point in the book. Everything existing belongs to the actual world, but there are possible worlds which also belong to the actual world.
"The world we live in is a very inclusive thing. Every stick and every stone you have ever seen is part of it. And so are you and I. And so are the planet earth, the solar system, the entire Milky way, the remote galaxies we are seeing through telescopes, and (if there are such things) all the bits of empty space between the stars and galaxies. There is nothing so far away from us as not to be part of our world. Anything at any distance at all is to be included. Likewise the world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient Romans, no long-gone pterodactyls, no long-gone primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the past, nor are the dead dark stars too far in the future, to be part of this same world. Maybe, as I myself think, the world is a big physical object; or maybe some parts of it are entelechies or spirits or auras or deities or other things unknown to physics. But nothing is so alien in kind as not to be part of our world, provided only that it does exist at some distance and direction from here, or at some time before or after simultaneous with now." The Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis pp.1
With all the possible worlds in the world, I was thinking about the unknown world. There is a world which is unknown to me, and there must be one for you too. I believe in the existence of the unknown world.
The unknown world includes everything that is unknown to me such as the world of past, future, all the places I have never been, outer space, galaxies, the world of spirituality, the world of other people. All the worlds of other people are unknown worlds to me, because I cannot access their minds and perceptions. And my world must be an unknown world to all the others for the same reason.
The belief in all the abstract items which have not been justified or verified is totally valid, when the belief has been deducted from the unknown world. It would have been impossible to have the belief under the category of the actual world.
One's actual world is the logical premise for unknown worlds, because one must first know the actual world that he sees and perceives to be able to deduct their unknown worlds. Without the former, there is no latter. The former is the necessary causal relationship with the latter.
Therefore my reason to believe the world is my perception of it. My perception, recollection of the memories and being conscious of it is also the proof of the existence of the world.
The perception of the world, and thoughts about it (by the aboutness of my thoughts for the world) is also the base of my deduction for the unknown world, which includes the totality of the world which is not visible and accessible to my physical world.
Quoting jorndoe
Thank you. Hope you had a great time. Later~
Good question. They are invisible and inaudible, because they exist beyond our bodily sensibility. However, they can be felt or measured and read by the means of the instruments.
Weird, when fascists were known to be quite the environmentalists.
What I meant is calling someone a Fascist for saying animals are not alive is weird, as Fascists were more environmentalist than any Capitalist or Socialist of their day (and most of our day).
Quoting Vaskane
Stop using the Cartesian plane right now!, you don't want to be a Nazi, do you?
Quoting Corvus
I don't know if anyone has already made this point, but this reminds me of Descartes's. "I think, therefore, I am." He uses something non-physical, such as thoughts, to prove something physical, himself. Therefore, even if he is mistaken in what he thinks he is (he may not realize that he is a brain in a vat), he cannot be mistaken in thinking that he exists, in whatever form. Maybe this could apply to any object because we can only see objects due to them reflecting light, so we can use a non physical thing, light, to prove a physical thing, the object. We can still say that maybe we can misinterpret what the object looks like, if we are colour blind, or are not seeing it properly for some reason, but we cannot deny it exists at all. For us to see anything, light must reflect off a physical object. Even if you are in the desert and seeing a mirage, what you see is still the result of light waves being reflected off physical things, if only air particles. I think this makes sense .
Descartes' certainty of knowledge comes from his doubting. Without doubting, no knowledge. Whenever there is a reason to doubt, don't hesitate to doubt before coming to conclusions.
It must had been a philosophical methodology for acquiring truths for him.
Quoting Beverley
I think, therefore I am. I am, therefore the world exists. Yes, it seems to work.
Quoting Beverley
What we are seeing is the reflected light, not the object itself, and it does give possibility of illusion with the visual perceptions. Therefore scepticism comes handy even in the practical life let alone philosophy. Yes, it does make sense.
You were seeing light being reflected off the book. You would only see light directly from the object if it was luminous, meaning that it emits its own light. The filament of a light bulb is an example of a luminous object; it emits its own light. This light then bounces off the book to your eyes, enabling you to see an image of the book.
Objects can absorb, emit, transmit and reflect light. When objects absorb light, they dont necessarily absorb all waves of the visible light spectrum, they reflect some. So, for example, if you turned on your light to read your book, and you looked down, and the cover of your book looked blue, this would mean that your book cover had absorbed all the waves of the visible light spectrum, apart from blue. (absorbing red, orange, yellow, green, indigo, violet, and reflecting blue light waves back to your eyes) Since your book is not transparent, you cannot see the light inside, you only see the light reflected from the outside, in this case, blue.)
(reflect = something bounces off the surface, absorb = something goes inside, emit = something moves back outside after being inside, transmit = something passes through)
An object that looks black absorbs all the waves of the visible light spectrum and does not reflect any light waves. (We can only see a black object because it contrasts with the light around it. Therefore, when you read the text of your book, you are noticing the lack of light compared to the light around it) Actually, what usually happens is, when light waves are absorbed, the energy is transferred to the electrons of the atoms, and they increase in energy levels. In some objects, so much energy is absorbed that there is excess energy, which is then emitted out again in the form of light. These objects are described as being luminous objects, and they are where visible light originates from, like the Sun, or the filament of a bulb.
The red side of the spectrum includes longer waves, which are less energetic than the shorter blue/indigo/violet waves. When electricity flows through the filament of a bulb, it transfers excess energy to it, and hence, the filament begins to emit that energy in the form of light.(and heat etc) At first, less energy is emitted, as less electricity has transferred energy to it. At this stage, the filament will emit the shorter, less energetic red light waves. However, after time, more energy is transferred from the electric current and the filament will glow orange and eventually blue/white. At this stage, it is emitting the shorter, more energetic blue waves as well.
But what I was trying to say (before I ended up writing rather a lot about light waves!) was that if we can see images of objects, there MUST be objects/physical things around us, that are either emitting their own light, or reflecting light emitted from other objects. This would seem to prove that there are objects around us.
Hopefully this all makes sense, and I haven't over complicated things :/
Great post. Thank you for your substantial post on the light and wave reflection mechanism for visual perception. It is a good argument with no complication at all.
Yes, things exist, and we know they exist by perceptions. As soon as we open our eyes in the mornings, the world appears to us in our sights.
Some sceptics would demand to prove the world exists, because it might not. They were the extreme sceptics who believed that things don't exist. the world doesn't exist, and if it did, we cannot know or prove that they exist. Of course, their claim is wrong. Things and the world exist.
But the academic sceptics would say that the world exists, but what are the grounds for our belief in their existence? or How do we justify our belief in existence? So it is not total denial of the existence or knowledge, but attempting to find out the nature of our belief in the existence.
Do we believe in the existence of the world and objects by just visual perception alone? Or do we need more than what we see to believe in the continued existence of the world and objects in the world?
I thought about this a lot when I first found this forum. I walked around with this in my head for a few days. I even made a whole Word Doc of notes on my thoughts. Then I realized that I couldn't post anything until I had been accepted into the forum. Now I have, here are some of my thoughts:
If we are concerned with the 'ground for' your belief, then I assume what you are looking for is some justification.
Firstly, if you are justified to believe in what you can perceive in front of you, then doesnt it follow that if you have never perceived the world not existing, then it is not justified to believe in that?
(At this point, I tend to have an argument with myself to see what holes there are in my reasoning. This was the result)
You may then argue, 'But arent you then relying on memory? I mean, maybe you did perceive the world not existing, but you just cannot remember it, and, as we all know, memory is unreliable."
Perhaps, but it doesn't seem logical that you would forget something as significant as the world not existing. Therefore, it seems more justified to believe that this never happened. Furthermore, if you cannot trust your memory, then you cannot trust your memory of what you perceived in front of you just now, or any time, or that perceiving something in front of you ever even happened.
"But," you may say, "you can trust it at the moment it happens."
Hmm, but the moment it happens, it becomes the past, and then you are relying on memory, which cannot be relied on.
"But what if memory gets less reliable the further into the past something is," I hear you say.
Well then, how can you tell how far into the past something is if you cannot rely on your memory? Something may seem to have happened recently, but you just forgot that it happened a long time ago, and therefore it cannot be relied upon.
"Okay but, what if you experienced nothing, but you were so traumatized by it that your brain blocked it out?" you may say.
In this case, there is no world, but you are unaware of that. Therefore, as far as you are aware, you have never experienced the world not existing, and your reason for believing in the world is justified.
Is that enough justification?
Just a small correction: Descartes says that he is distinct from his body. So he uses instead his thoughts (mental) to prove something mental, himself.
I'd forgotten about that. But, if he believes he is distinct from his body, then isn't he only thoughts? What else could he be?
Okay, you've got me thinking now. So, is it just his belief that he is the res cogitans? How did he know he wasn't simply the thoughts?
In the same way that it is just Kant's belief that existence is not a predicate, or Plato's belief that universals are real, yes.
Quoting Beverley
The mind basically amounts to every mental operation, or rather, the things that hosts these mental operations. So the mind contains the thoughts.
What if there is no container?
I will first say what it means for Cartesian philosophy. As far as I know, he does not directly address the question of the vessel of thoughts, but from his philosophy, we have things such as atributes, modes, and substances. Thought would in fact be an attribute of of the thinker. He says in a letter to Regius:
Quoting Descartes
The SEP interprets that attributes and the substance are in fact the same thing, only different in our understanding:
Quoting SEP
According to the fragment, thought would be the as the thing. Reading Descartes however we would not fully agree with that, reading even the material that the SEP quotes to support such a statement:
I don't think it makes sense to consider duration to be the same as substances.
We would think instead that an attribute is something that emanates from the substance. As he says that extension and divisibility is of bodies, thought is of the thinker, along with other things, such as feeling and intuition. So attribute would not be used much differently from its everyday meaning: something that composes and characterises X, but does not subsume X there is no substance without duration, but duration is not substance.
What it means outside of Cartesian philosophy. Bertrand Russel's criticism of Descartes touches on the definition of "I". Some people retort that the "I" can simply be defined as the thoughts themselves, but from there we have other issues. I have written a bit about it, though of course not in English. I have Google Translated it:
[*] 2.2.1.2.If it is infinite, I would have infinite thoughts, but I don't have them; perhaps it was therefore an infinite stream of thoughts with limited memory, this stream plus the limited memories, which may be part of the thought and therefore part of the stream itself, would be the external structure. But how does one thought become the next?
[/list]
[*] 2.2.2.Another being, therefore another being exists besides me, thought, and this being could be identified with 'I', which thinks "I think, therefore I am.".
[*] 2.2.3.Another thought, which implies that something must have thought it, and so on infinitely. However, this infinite stream of thought can be identified with 'I'. (Only if the thought that caused the other are the thoughts in my memory, if not, it cannot be identified with me)
[/list]
[/list]
[*] 3. I am an external structure. But what attributes does this external structure have?
[/list]
However, even more directly and simply, the initial objection is I am 'I think, therefore I am.', and I think, therefore, if the agent is thought, it could not say I think nor I exist, as it would only pass to exist as soon as thought itself ceased, resulting in a paradox. If thought is something that occurs instantly, thought could not be experienced, as it would cease to exist as soon as it concluded.
One answer to this would be, if I am a pure stream of thoughts, finite or infinite, how can I think about my own existence and therefore see it without it first ending, and then ending my existence? It follows that I can only see part of myself, and then identify I think, therefore I am. with pure infinite current retroactively changes the only possible statement of I think, therefore I am. to I think, therefore part of me exists.. However, every part is included in a whole, and establishing the existence of a part establishes that of the whole, therefore I think, therefore part of me exists. implies I think, therefore my whole exists., which would just be I think, therefore I exist..
In short, it is possible to identify thought with the agent himself. And in this case, it implies that I am an external structure, or that I am a pure stream of thoughts, and those thoughts themselves would be something other than I think, therefore I am..
I have not checked the translation. If you are interested, I will do it if there are any confusion to be cleared up.
Whoa. Theres some serious paralogisms you got goin on right there.
Well done, I must say.
Not so sure about what the conclusions might be, but thats ok.
There is but energy in the forms of frequencies and vibrations not all of which we experience. Objects are energy forms in the way of manifested objects because that is the way we experience given energies. Our given apparent reality is a relational fact, relative only to the biology perceiving it, in other words, energy affecting biology, biology being effected, and projecting apparent reality, a biological readout, not unlike that of a calculator.
Hmm... Are you saying that our experiences are not part of the real world? Sure, they might be existentially mind-dependent, yet aren't (also) minds part of the world? :chin:
Experiences are the effects upon biology of the energies around us, we do not experience the reality of this, we experience its effects, and this is what is called apparent reality. In a sense, no the mind is not of the world, it observes the objects of the world; just as you experience your body to be in the world. You do not experience your mind. You experience what comes into and goes out of the mind not the mind. Apparent reality is a sum of biological reactions or a biological readout. We don't experience what is, we experience how what is affects and alters our biological natures.
Certainly it is. (Only that I would say, "a recurrent question".)
We do not experience what is real, we experience what is, as it affects us altering our biology. Apparent reality is a biological readout. It is a melody if you like, played upon us by the energies that surround us, the melody is that of apparent reality. These effects upon us are experiences, understandings, and meanings of what it is to be affected. We are an emergent manifestation, as are our understandings.
But a sceptic might say, how can I be 100% certain that my beliefs, memories and awareness are accurate? There are possibilities that the beliefs, memories and awareness could be wrong.
The mitigated sceptic would say that he is not denying the existence of the world, but he is not sure if the awareness, memories and beliefs of your perceptions could be somewhat different or wrong from what you took to be the case. He would then ask to prove that your belief, memories and awareness are 100% free from the possible illusions and errors.
And there is another issue, which the sceptic might demand you to clarify, and that is the definition of the world that you claim to believe in to exist i.e. does the world that you believe in to exist, include the whole universe with all the celestial objects such as the stars, planets, the blackholes, the galaxies, comets and also the all the micro biotic entities such as molecules of all the plants, animals, fishes in the sea etc plus all the people in the world, and the countries on the earth as well your town that you live in ... etc, or is it something totally different from all these?
Does this mean that what exists beyond our biological sensibilities doesn't count as the part of the world? Should only the objects which are possible to be experienced by the biological senses be the world and part of the world? Is that your point? If it is so, then we might have to drop all the scientific knowledge as non-reality which belongs to not this world, but in some possible world. That would be a strange world.
There is what is called apparent reality, and there is what is called ultimate reality. Apparent reality is your everyday reality, while ultimate reality is the energies in the forms of frequencies and vibrations, this is a place of no things, just energy. Apparent reality is biologically dependent, it is how these energies at least some of them, affect us by altering our biological natures. This is what we call experience,
meaning, and the manifestation of objects, remember, ultimate reality is a place of no things. Those energies that we don't experience, for us do not exist, though I imagine some affect us without our being conscious of them.
I just read the translation and it surely butched some 40% of what I wrote, but the meaning can still be understood partially.
I am not sure if it is clear from the g-translated text, but the conclusion ultimately is that there is not just "thoughts", but there is something thinking that thought at least, and that something can be defined as an external structure, and that external structure can be, in basically all cases, defined as "I". So, I think therefore I am does hold in Cartesian philosophy and can still hold outside of it.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Right. The use of 'the' is just an idiom (with the butchered meaning of the word instead of the real meaning) in English, see.
What is "a place"? Is it some location on the earth such as town, city or a well-known location, or a house, building, temple or even church?
What do you mean by "no things"? What are they in actuality?
Is the world devoid of objects in the absence of a conscious subject, a part of the actual world? How could a conscious subject access or understand the world, if the conscious subject is absent from the world?
It looks to me like you are throwing the baby out with the bath water. Some forms that energy can take are highly stable on the scale of human lifetimes. Energy in such stable forms (and particularly macroscopic agglomerations of such energy in stable forms) is what we conceive of as physical things. Might it make more sense to refine one's notion of things, rather than try to do without a notion of things altogether?
For a biological entity there are things in its apparent reality, but apparent reality is an emergent manifestation particular to that biology. If you wish to experience a different reality alter your biology. The world, the cosmos plays biological life as its instrument, and the melody played on this instrument is apparent reality. So, for life forms there are things, but in ultimate reality there are no things, things/objects are biologically dependent. As Tesla is famous for saying if you wish to understand the world, think in terms of energy, frequencies, and vibrations. Apparent reality is emergent in this sense, its composition is the reactions of biological consciousness to these energy frequencies and vibrations. It is not unlike a dream world, a world relative to life's biological nature. People talk sometimes of the possibility that life lives in a simulation this is correct, its own simulation, biological reaction is how we are the world.
Non sequitur and contradiction, energy is a thing.
Quoting boagie
Isn't the biology here a thing?
If you mean to say that the "objects" we see are mere appearances produced by our brain, when we receive sense-data, then there is nothing novel about that noumenon, phenomenon. But where does the sense-data come from? From objects. Obviously objects are also made of energy, but then your argument becomes simply a sequence of analytic statements from your semantic game, non-informative as a whole.
Think of the philosophical quote that subject and object stands or falls together, which means that apparent reality is dependent on the relationship between them. Energy in the forms of frequencies and vibrations processed through a biological subject produces apparent reality, for the subject is not the energies, which are now manifested as objects in the dream world of biology. If you wish to experience a different world, simply alter your biological nature, perhaps with drugs and/or meditation. In the absence of a conscious subject, nothing can be known, nothing is experienced, and the apparent world is biological reaction dependent.
In the absence of a conscious subject there is no world, as there is no subject. The world is subject and object in relation, experienced as meanings to the biological subject. Meaning is never the property of the object/energy, it is the property of a conscious subject only, which the subject then bestows on a meaningless world, thus giving it meaning significance. Apparent reality is a biological readout, a biological simulation, we do not experience what is, we experience the effects of what is on our altered biological natures.
Biology is an energy form, a form that recognizes other energy formations, through being altered by those energy forms. We do not experience many energy forms, or at least we are not conscious of them, though they may affect us in ways unknown. Just as there are no colors or sounds in the real world, so too, there are no objects in the real world, simply energies in the forms of frequencies and vibrations. Apparent reality is the experience of biology, a melody played upon biology by the energies that surround us, a melody only life forms hear/see. Experience is meaning, and the property of the biological subjects, it is never the property of the object energy form. The conscious subject then bestows his/her meanings upon a meaningless world, through its biological readout, its reactions to these energies is precisely what meanings are. Biology/body is a thing, but the mind is not, and you experience your body as an object in the physical world the same way you experience all objects in the physical world. It is a bit like a dream world, a biological simulation, a biological readout, it is not delusion it is the biological reaction the experience of being altered by energies. Only in what is called apparent has things/objects, through biological readout of one's altered biology. What is called ultimate reality is a place of energy, a place of nothing--no-things.
That is not what the word 'biology' means. Biology is the study of living beings.
"We do not experience many energy forms"
The only form of energy we do not experience is the strong gluon force, and maybe the weak force WZ if you don't count radiation as part of it.
"Just as there are no colors or sounds in the real world, so too, there are no objects in the real world"
That does not follow.
"simply energies in the forms of frequencies and vibrations"
Frequency is a concept that by itself already evokes the concept of vibration. I am not sure whether every form of energy may be described as vibration (wave), but I doubt you are either.
In any case, these two books will blow your mind:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
https://physics.info/
Try to get beyond text book definitions sometimes, all energy is in motion, all things have frequencies and vibrations. Tesla, " If you wish to understand reality, think in terms of energy, frequencies and vibrations." That is not what biology means you say, but, biology like everything else is energy. There are a great many energy forms we do not experience, our biological senses both enable and limit our conscious experience of all energies. Thanks for the reference materials.
One just has to realize that if all there is energy, where do all these THINGS come from, there must be something happening here. There in fact is no separation between subject and object, it is only in our attempts to understand our reality, that we talk as if there was a separation. Relativity, and relationship make it one, and reaction is the process of belonging, to being the world, not being of it. I do not try to do without things, just trying to explain how they come about in a greater reality of energies representing no things, ultimate reality. Apparent reality, our everyday reality, is a biological readout, apparent reality is how energies alter our biology to give us experience, meanings and knowledge. Meanings are the understandings of our altered biologizes relative to our survival and general well-being. Apparent reality, our everyday reality, is a bit like life's dream world and particular to life itself.
Thanks Lionino, don't be a stranger!!
I would advise you to stay away from any drugs or medication induced experiments with your minds. You will end up being dependent on them, and eventually you will be damaging your biological and mental health.
Excellent advice. The point was however, that to alter one's reality one need only alter one's biology, different biologizes different realities.
Everyone knows that human perception is bound by the biological sense organs. There is nothing new or interesting in that point.
But if you induce some kind of drug or medication based changes in your mind, then you will have uncontrollable and unexpected hallucinations, rather than an accurate perceptual understanding of the world.
It would be like keep shouting "The world is dark." with a dark sunglasses on. What's the point in that? Take off your sunglasses and see the world again with your bare eyes.
You've never been stoned, have you? My point has been that apparent reality is biologically dependent. Why on earth if all is energy, frequencies, and vibrations, and we have the examples of there not being any color or sound in the real world, do we assume that objects are any different than sound or color? It is all energy, what makes objects manifest?
I heard some folks saying that they get stoned for listening to the music in order to hear more details in the music, and some saying that they get stoned for having sex in order to increase the sensuality etc, but it just sounded like fooling their senses, which will result in self harming themselves.
Quoting boagie
OK, you have a point in saying that our senses are the only gate for perceiving the world, which is also for the ground for the sceptics assertions for their sceptic claims on the existence of the world.
But I don't quite see your point on saying that it is all energy. There are more than energy in the world. Don't you see the sky, the stars, clouds, sun, the mountains, hills, rivers, sea, the roads, buildings, houses, cars and the people? They are not all energy. They are the physical objects in the world, with which you interact in your daily life.
Energy is only energy when the resource has been directed, converted or read, in order to actually being used with the device to exert, process, activate motions, heat or sounds.
The entity such as waves and vibrations are not energy on its natural form before the modifications and processed for the emanations of the power, force, heat or sound. It entails the claim that "everything is energy." is invalid.
Quoting Corvus
But the energy is just trapped in the matter, and can be released. All matter in the universe contains a lot of energy and is in the end equivalent to energy via E=mc2. I am surprised by the above statement, I thought this was at least since a hundred years a majority view that the universe consists only of Energy/Information and that all visible or invisible matter is just a manifestation of that energy.
Regarding getting stoned, one should not really have a passionate opinion on something one has never tried. As far as your understanding of energy goes, you need to read some more science. You are not just contradicting me, SO RUDE --lol!! You are contradicting the science of physics.
Welcome back to TPF. :D I don't think we spoke before. Glad to catch you.
Quoting TheArchitectOfTheGods
I think you have been hibernating too long from the real world :D
Energy is capacity for work. (The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (MacMillan 1967) It is potentiality not actuality until you have applied into the physical objects, device or existence.
So until the resource of energy is somehow detonated (like in the example of E=MC square), it is just a potential resource of power, action, explosion, heat .... etc etc. You cannot possibly call a litre of gasoline as energy, until you filled it into the car and drove away. The force which caused the movement of the car by the engine is energy, not the oil, vibration, wave ... whatever.
If you had some deductive reasoning skills, then you can know most things by the reasoning alone without having to try it for yourself. :)
Quoting boagie
I am sorry if you felt insulted by my rudeness. I apoligise in full. But also why not consider if you have been over sensitive as well? Feeling insulted too easily by unfounded causes can be the evidence of something irrational or psychological unbalance lurking underneath the unconsciousness, for example, from bad experience of childhood memories, or unfulfilled wishes of some sort?
Science of Physics? All science is just the objects for the Philosophical analysis and investigations. If their claims are not in the form of Logic, then toss them to the bin, or commit them into the flames, as Hume said. :)
FUCK YOU SHAKESPEAR!
khaaa ... hear the uncontrolled emotional explosion? :lol: Calm down.
Passive-aggressive asshole that you are!
Well say whatever you want. They are just the reflection of yourself.
I have reported this guy to moderation already. I would suggest that you do the same if you see fit. To me, he has nothing to contribute at all, just illiterate shit-flinging.
Quoting Corvus
I think he is referring to rest mass energy. I have seen the former concept being criticised by physicists several times, so I can't really comment on it, I don't know much relativity.
Thank you Lionino. Yeah, a strange guy he was. There was no need for throwing childish tantrums in the public forum against what is supposed to be a witty banter. He wasn't a philosopher at all to allow himself opening his temper like that in public for absolutely nothing.
It didn't bother me at all. Truths sometimes faces mindless challenges :D We live and learn. Happy new year to you and yours my friend.
Not to beat a dead horse, as he has been banned, but what did he even mean by that?
Shakespeare has been dead for almost 400 years.
"All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players. They have their exits and their entrances; And one man in his time plays many parts."
As You Like It, Act 2, Scene 7, Shakespeare
Damn, do you take care of this squirrel?
Both.
When it comes to propositions, the ink down on the paper is, but the propositional content represented by it is not. But a physicalist will say that there is only the ink down on the paper, and that any content represented by it exists as chemical reactions in our mind. Obviously, if the state of affairs that that fact talks about is about the physical world (and for physicalists that is the only state of affairs there is), the fact would be physical too.
So for physicalists, facts are physical or there are no facts; otherwise it would depend on whether you are talking about the type or the token, or whether the guy you are asking is an idealist, or what the fact is talking about.
So the physicalist has to claim that in a mindless -sorry!- brainless universe, facts still exist. That, to me, seems absurd, but the physicalist can say that an old Encyclopedia Brittanica book still contains facts, even if all the brains in the universe suddenly ceased to exist. OK, but what about a universe next door to us where there are no brains and there never have been, yet on a remote planet in that universe, an erosion pattern just happens to spell out (in English), Pi = 3.14... (the erosion pattern even includes the ellipsis). Is the physicalist going to say that that erosion pattern constitutes a fact in that universe? How, exactly, does that work?
And if so, and if there are countless intelligent beings in the multiverse speaking countless languages, then every erosion pattern on every world is a fact, since it's bound to refer to some fact in some language. That is an absurdity.
But if the materialist claims that my erosion example is not a fact, what about an erosion pattern in this universe that says Pi = 3.14...? Is that not a fact? What if I wrote down Pi = 3.14...? THAT, they would have to concede, is a fact, but how is that different than the erosion pattern? If facts are physical, it doesn't matter HOW the fact came about, it's still a fact.
It seems like some form of superstition. A couple of days ago in one of the new thread here, the OP was claiming that he witnessed the actual wave of gravity with telescope, and it must be the physical existence of spacetime. It sounded like some religious beliefs of some cult folks claiming the earthquakes and hurricanes are act of the angry God or something.
Quoting Lionino
We are not denying the existence of physicals or substances, but they themselves are not facts or minds.
Quoting Lionino
Wittgenstein said in TLP "The world is the totality of facts.", and it sounds interesting. It also sounds a kind of Solypsism. It cannot be said, but it presents itself. One's perception of the world is limited by one's knowledge of the facts of the world that one knows. The facts includes certain possibilities, impossibilities and logic that operates in the world. Could the facts one knows about the world he faces, and lives in, be the ultimate reason to believe in the existence of the world?
I think there's an element of ambiguity here. For some, the word "fact" means "true sentence". For others the word "fact" refers to the aspect of the world that true sentences correspond to.
So for some "it is raining" is a fact if it is true.
For others "it is raining" is true if it refers to a fact.
The physicalist who says that there are facts in a brainless universe is just saying that the world exists and has certain features even if there's nobody around to see them or talk about them.
And I'll add, arguing over whether or not a fact is a true sentence or the thing that true sentences refer to is a meaningless argument. Just so long as you make explicit what you mean by "fact", use it however you want.
"The physicalist who says that there are facts in a brainless universe is just saying that the world exists and has certain features even if there's nobody around to see them or talk about them."
I don't think they're saying just that. The physicalist says an encyclopedia volume is full of facts, right? However you want to define facts, the book is chock full of them. Many many more facts than a book with nothing but blank pages.
Now, all brains disappear. Did the facts in the book disappear? How could they, under the materialist worldview? There was no physical change to the book.
OK, now suppose before all the brains disappeared that a person had set up a machine to produce random books. All brains disappear and the machine hums along. Through a fantastic chance, it spits out a volume of Encyclopedia Brittanica. Is that encyclopedia volume also chock full of facts?
It's full of true sentences about mountains. It's not full of mountains.
Quoting RogueAI
What do you mean by "fact"? Do you mean "true sentence" or do you mean the thing that a true sentence describes?
Is that what the physicalist means by "fact"? Or do they mean the thing that a true sentence describes?
They're going to have to say that a science textbook is full of facts! How can it not be?
They can say that a science textbook is full of true sentences that refer to facts.
That seems a little wordy. Why wouldn't they just say that a science textbook has a lot of facts about the world?
I bounced it off ChatGpt:
"For example:
"Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level." This is a true statement about the physical world and qualifies as a fact because it accurately describes a well-established property of water."
Is there a problem with that?
Maybe they would, but they don't have to.
Or maybe they use the word "fact" to refer to both true sentences and the things that true sentences describe, and so whenever they say something about facts it is important to understand which meaning they are using at the time.
You're getting too confused by ambiguous language, so just forget the word "fact" entirely.
Physicalists claim that for all X the sentence "X exists" is true iff it describes some physical feature of the world, and that many of these physical features of the world would continue to exist even if intelligent life were to die out.
Well let's imagine a hypothetical physicalist:
1. In a brainless universe there are no true sentences; books simply contain ink printed on paper
2. Everything that exists in a brainless universe is a physical object (or process)
Is there a problem with this position?
I think so. At time T, a book is said to contain true sentences. At T1, all brains disappear. Also at T1, no physical change happened to the book. But at T1, the book no longer contains true sentences??? How did they disappear? Are true sentences not physical things? If true sentences are physical things, how did they disappear without a physical change happening? If they are not physical things, what exactly are they?
At T[sub]1[/sub] the ball is someone's property. At T[sub]2[/sub] everybody dies. Nothing physical has changed about the ball but it is no longer someone's property.
At T[sub]1[/sub] the ink markings are a true sentence. At T[sub]2[/sub] everybody dies. Nothing physical has changed about the ink markings but they are no longer a true sentence.
There's certainly a sense in which we can say, of the above, that property and true sentences "cease to exist" if everybody dies, but there's also a sense in which the things which were property and were true sentences continue to exist even if everybody dies they're just no longer property or true sentences.
Again, this is down to the ambiguity of language. Clear up the language and there's less of an issue.
Unless you want to argue that the concept of property disproves physicalism? I think that may over-interpret the physicalist's claim, but I'll leave it to a physicalist to comment on whether or not being someone's property is a physical state of affairs.
I think that's a big problem for materialism.
Quoting Lionino
I think Lionino is right, which is why I was using "fact". But "true sentence" works just as well. The materialist claims a "true sentence" is a physical thing. What else could it be? But when all brains disappear, all true sentences undergo a change: they are no longer true. All changes are physical, so the change from "true sentence" to "sentence" has to be a physical change, but nothing physical happened to all the true sentences. The only thing that happened was all brains disappeared.
The materialist can avoid all that by simply claiming that the truth of a sentence is dependent on a brain (also whether something is someone's property), but isn't that a little like what an idealist would say? That truth is mind-dependent? Except, instead of mind-dependent, it's brain-dependent. But how does that dependence work exactly? How does this system of neurons and chemicals inside a skull confer something like "truth" onto a collection of ink markings? What does a purely physical account of that process look like? And is "truth" physical? What else could it be? What is truth made out of? How heavy is it?
Why? Is the below a big problem for materialism?
At T[sub]1[/sub] the ball is someone's property. At T[sub]2[/sub] everybody dies. Nothing physical has changed about the ball but it is no longer someone's property.
This seems to highlight a problem with superveniance rather than a problem with physicalism more broadly. You have a similar sort of problem when a detective can tell that a cup of coffee has been recently prepared because its heat varies from that of the general environment. Information is essentially relational, it does not exist simpliciter.
K2 becoming the tallest mountain after Everest is hit with a meteor or atomic bomb seems like something that is certainly describable in "physical terms." The relationship of mountains' height to one another is a physical relationship, in the same way that a coffee cup having a higher temperature that the ambient environment is a physical relationship between the cup and the environment. The problem is with the idea of supervenience, and perhaps with the idea of discrete objects existing as fundemental ontological objects in the first place. In a universe composed of one universal process, it doesn't make sense to talk of superveniance.
That said, physicalism has commonly been defined in terms of superveniance and causal closure. If you remove these, particularly if you move to a process metaphysics, it starts to be unclear exactly what claims physicalism makes outside of the trivial "everything that exists is physical and only real things have real effects."
The conventions around what constitutes facts versus states of affairs versus events versus propositions in contemporary metaphysics involves a lot of hair splitting. In general though, facts are the bearers of truth values. They are not abstract entities like propositions, but are rather the concrete entities that propositions are "about."
So, a science text book would (hopefully) be full of true propositions that describe facts, states of affairs, and events. It wouldn't contain facts or events themselves, although obviously the way the word "fact" is often used [I]would[/I] allow us to say such books are full of facts.
TBH, I am not sure if these distinctions are necessarily useful. How you define truth has a lot to do with how we might view propositions. If truth is conceived of in terms of "accuracy of a description" then truth = fact, since something is always a complete description of itself. Propositions are descriptions of facts, but there can also be facts about propositions.
Really, a modern Porphry needs to come along to write an Isagoge to sort this sort of thing out.
I actually deleted that comment because I recognise that mountain height isnt the best example. I think my previous comment about property is more pertinent.
Is "truth" a physical thing? Is "belonging to" a physical thing? They have to be, right? So, we have two physical things: "ball" and "belongs to so-and-so" (or "truth" and "sentence"). And somehow those two things become attached or combined. But only when a lump of meat in a skull is involved! How does that work? Why is a brain necessary for that?
So the ball loses "is someone's property" and gains "was someone's property".
Well, you can see gravitational waves insofar as you observe them by checking the spatial distortion that they cause. Maybe that is what they were getting at but I did not see that thread. Not sure what the connection is with what I said though.
Quoting Corvus
For someone who defends physicalism, they are.
Quoting Corvus
I would say no because those facts could be a fabrication of the mind.
I don't know if this makes a difference. The relationship the ball (physical) stands in to people (physical) has changed due to the death of all people (a physical change). It only looks different at first glance because physicalism itself tends to have a sort of cryptodualism built into it, such that mental events, which are presumably ultimately physical if physicalism is true, are seen as somehow "less real." Thus, concepts like ownership can seem "less real."
But I don't think this [I]has[/I] to be a problem. Physicalism just needs to let go of the flawed idea that everything can be explained in a way similar to mathematical physics. This is a sort of synecdoche by which one aspect of reality, that which is subject to quantification, is taken to be the whole.
If by fact you mean what ideas it represents, facts would only exists within brains (as ideas exist in brains), so no brains no facts; if by facts an objective state of affairs, facts would still exist in a brainless universe.
Quoting RogueAI
No, the physicalist would not say that, as you explained in your hypothetical scenario.
Quoting RogueAI
For us it is a fact because we interpret it as such. But for someone from Old Chinese kingdoms, pi=3.14 would not be a fact, it would a weird pattern on a rock. In a brainless physicalist universe, there would still be facts about the world, but these facts would not be represented anywhere because there is no conscious being to decipher what any symbol means.
Quoting RogueAI
It means something to someone. The facts exist within our minds (or brain); the ink on the paper is not a fact, but it is a physical part of the world, what OP asked.
But I don't see how any of that relates to Corvus' original question. The question was whether a fact is a part of the physical world, and I gave the purported answer according to several different worldviews and different definitions of the word 'fact'. The token is a physical fact of the world for sure, the type depends on the worldview, while what objective state of affairs the type represents is a physical fact of the world (but not if one is an idealist).
Do they? I think this is where you're over-interpreting physicalism. Physicalism, as I understand it, is the position that everything that exists is a physical thing. Balls exist and are a physical thing. I exist and am a physical thing.
Belonging to isn't something that exists, and so isn't something that needs to be physical for physicalism to be correct. If A belongs to B then A is a physical thing and B is a physical thing. There are just two things involved.
The notion that the belonging to relationship between A and B must be some third physical thing that exists seems spurious. And the notion that the belonging to relationship between A and B is some non-physical mental thing that exists also seems spurious.
Whereas before the issue was with ambiguous language, the issue now seems to be with reifying verbs. You're giving too much metaphysical import to language.
No. We just use the word "true" to describe a sentence that we understand as describing some feature of the world. There's no reason to treat "truth" as being some object that exists.
So let's do away with the word "true", like we did away with the word "fact".
Either a sentence describes some feature of the world or it doesn't.
I would agree with that, except when we hear the old X-Files tagline "The truth is out there" we all know what it means, and we all treat "truth" in that sentence as a noun. Under materialism, don't all nouns have to be physical?
Just because a word satisfies the grammatical role of being a noun isn't that it corresponds to some object that exists in the universe.
"Ghost" is a noun. The existence of the noun "ghost" doesn't disprove materialism. Ghosts don't exist.
But a noun is always a person, place, thing, or idea. Those are all physical things, in the materialist ontology. If a word is correctly being used as a noun, it has to refer to some physical thing.
Did you see the next sentence of my comment (I can't remember if I edited it in after)?
"Ghost" is a noun. The existence of the noun "ghost" doesn't disprove materialism. Ghosts don't exist.
Ghost can refer to an idea, which is a physical thing.
Ghosts don't exist. Therefore the word "ghosts" in the sentence "ghosts don't exist" doesn't refer to something that exists.
You're talking about fictional things: ghosts, Dracula, Sherlock Holmes, God, etc. Fictional things exist as ideas, otherwise, we wouldn't be able to intelligently talk about them. So under the materialist mindset, they are things. Brainstates, I guess.
Also, if a lawyer tells a jury, "You'll discover what the truth is when the trial is done" he's not talking about something like a ghost, is he?
If "ghosts" referred to something that exists then ipso facto ghosts exist. Ghosts don't exist. Therefore, "ghosts" doesn't refer to something that exists.
Quoting RogueAI
Like the noun "ghost", the noun "the truth" doesn't refer to something that exists.
Let's use Sherlock Holmes as an example. Does Sherlock Holmes exist as an idea?
Quoting Michael
What does it refer to then?
Nothing really. "Tell me the truth" just means "don't lie".
Quoting RogueAI
What does "Sherlock Holmes exists as an idea" mean? Does it mean "the idea of Sherlock Holmes exists"? And does this mean "we (can) imagine Sherlock Holmes"? I agree with this. But this does not entail that the name "Sherlock Holmes" refers to something that exists.
Like with the word "fact" your question abuses the ambiguity of language.
From ny physicalist perspective you are equivocating between an idea as instantiated in a brain, and what the idea refers to.
I thought that too, except "Sherlock Holmes" refers to something that seems to go beyond something that's just "instantiated in a brain". I mean, when you're reading Arthur Conan Doyle or Mary Shelly or Stephen King, are you thinking of brains? Don't the fictional characters take on a kind of existence in your mind?
Well, there are lots of ideas of ideas of Sherlock Holmes instantiated in lots of people's brains. But what seems to go beyond something instantiated in a brain?
Quoting RogueAI
No. Things can be represented with other things, such as ideas with written words. Typically we are thinking of things represented in our brains. Representations in our brains no more need to to resemble what is represented, than a string of letters on a page needs to resemble the landscape it describes.
Maybe they did. But whatever they saw, equating it to time or spacetime sounds bizarre.
Quoting Lionino
It would be a form of totemism in disguise for science. Seeing an eclipse, and saying that must a God annoyed at something. A similar logic.
Quoting Lionino
The fabrication of the mind is the world. No? I am sure when one dies, his world dies too, because he can no longer fabricate anything anymore.
Sure, we know that at least a world exists, the world being our mind. But we do not know whether there is an outside world (brain in a vat), that is usually what people talk about when we say the world exists or not.
Quoting Corvus
Sorry I can't understand, I think this sentence has some words missing.
Once you closed eyes and blocked your ears and nose, from the moment, your beliefs and inferences based on your memory of the facts, takes over on the existence of the world outside of you.
Quoting Lionino
Seeing wave of gravity and saying it is time or space time is like saying, an eclipse is God's facial expression. Just a metaphor or simile whatever you call it. :) Are you a French or Greek?
Isnt that like saying that we know an organism exists but we dont know if the organisms environment exists? If the organism is a self-organized system of exchanges with a world, then any line we attempt to draw between inside and outside is arbitrary. This is the way psychologists are beginning to think about the concept of mind. The mind is not the brain, it is the reciprocal interactions among brain, body and environment.
The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
Facts, for example, allow for the recognition of interest rates. Interest rates are arguably real while, at the same time, not regarded as physical objects. But neither are interest rates considered mystical, spiritual or immaterial. After all, interest rates directly affect the amount of money that accumulates in bank accounts. Interestingly, physical events such as hurricanes and war can affect interest rates; and so can non-physical situations such as panic and market conditions. Its perhaps best to say interest rates are facts, not physical (or immaterial) things.
Another example: Facts allow for the recognition of relations without the necessity of assigning physical (or immaterial) existence to them. The back door is to the right of the dining room table describes the relation of two physical objects to each other. Again, to the right of, is a relation and not a physical object; and yet it exists in the world. Its a fact, not a thing.
Now bring on the tooth fairy, but leave all your married bachelors at home!
A bit of a performative contradiction, no?
That would be a valid analogy, yes.
Quoting Joshs
Within Cartesian philosophy, the boundary is clearly drawn when the body and the mind are two distinct substances. What Corvus was making was a semantic argument of equating our minds with the world (or part of it), we know our minds exist, therefore we know that at least a part of the world exists thus the world exists. But the semantic premise for the whole brain-in-a-vat argument is that when we say "world" we refer specifically to the world outside of our minds that was the distinction I was trying to point out.
Quoting Joshs
Right, the way I think about it (and it is a really silly argument at face value) is that the simple fact that we can tell where we are being touched just by feeling it hints that our mind has extensionality (it is not a substance without dimensions, 0D). It is not just that the mind has the idea of extension within it and that some interaction with our organs causes some idea of spatial localisation¹, but that experience itself can be located with coordinates x,y,z we can isolate sight and smell and hearing to operations or projections of our 0D mind, but we can't do that with touch. Our mind would not just be a point of volume 0 in our "pineal gland", but extend everywhere where there is sense perception, from our scalp to the tip of our toes.
¹ In the everyday sense of the word.
Quoting Banno
Brain in a vat.
I'm not seeing how this relates...
You see, if you are a brain in a vat, then there are vats and brains.
That is, there is still an "external world".
Thoughts?
Quoting IEP
From a, b, and c, everything that I experience could be very well fabricated by my own mind, "floating" in the nothingness of existence that is beyond-my-mind.
This is the best I can do at 3:00 without posting the first three meditations of Descartes.
You can doubt anything; but you cannot coherently doubt everything.
But this is not the argument in this thread. That is specifically about not believing that something continues to exist, unperceived. A very silly argument.
Threads such as this are interminable because, even after being shown the way out of the fly trap, some flies will say "Nah, I'm good."
Many believe in the existence they don't perceive such as God, Souls, afterlife, the places they have never been but seen on the social media and people they have never met but heard of ... etc. How is it silly asking logical ground for the belief? It is silly if and only if you don't understand the question.
So you have no reason to believe in the existence of the things behind you? When you put the cup in the cupboard, you cease to have any reason to believe that the cup is in the cupboard?
That's not right.
I think it depends on how you define "doubt". If by doubt you mean "it is ?¬P", yes you need a foundation to doubt it; but if by doubt you mean "I don't know if", you would not need a foundation for doubting, in fact the very lack of foundation would justify your doubt.
I don't know if Canberra is the capital of Australia (P) because none of these terms are known to me, I don't know if P, but I can't say that ?¬P because perhaps it is ?P.
The way Descartes uses 'doubt' is more akin to the weaker statement.
Quoting Banno
The OP does look different from what I remember, perhaps it has been edited since my first reply.
Wouldn't that you don't know the meaning of "Australia" be the background for your doubt?
In that sense, yes. Then your original argument would have to go into more detail regarding what "foundation" exactly means. We can concede that every belief or every though requires a reason or justification, but then we either go into infinite regression or hit some groundrock, typically the law of identity and if we don't concede it, perhaps that belief/thought is the groundrock.
Word salad aside, if it is the case that "I don't know what Canberra is" is my foundation for doubt, do I need a foundation to state that? Isn't it an immediate assesment of my mental contents (aka knowledge)?
What do you think? Or is "I don't know what Canberra is" foundational?
What justifies believing "I don't know what Canberra is"? Isn't that question somehow inept?
There are many other things that can be discussed in the thread such as the world itself, God, Souls, places one never has been, people one never met ... etc. The building which stood across the road, but demolished for the new development, hence no longer existing etc.
There are lots of meat in the tittle of the thread for good classic and traditional philosophising too such as reasons (logical grounds), beliefs (grounded or groundless beliefs) and the existence of the world ... etc.
But you keep pointing out the cup and ask if there is point in the thread sounds some sort of obsession with the cup. That comment sounds very silly. I know the cup exists, but I can start doubting if there is a reason to doubt it does. Why is it silly to doubt whatever it might be, if one has a reason to doubt?
For the same logic, Why is it silly to believe in whatever it might be, if one has a reason to believe? Discussing on the nature of the beliefs and doubts and logical grounds for them is an interesting philosophical topic anyone would say, apart from you.
The claim from the OP is that when one is not perceiving the world, there is no reason to believe in the existence of the world. You put the cup in the cupboard. You are no longer perceiving the cup. Therefore, the argument goes, you have no reason to believe that the cup exists.
You put the cup in the cupboard. I ask you to hand me the cup. Do you get it out of the cupboard or do you say "I don't know where the cup is"?
It's a pretty simple example that shows the absurdity of ill-placed doubt.
Of course it's an interesting topic. These considerations deserve attention, as part of "Discussing the nature of the beliefs and doubts and logical grounds for them". This argument is central to this topic. Doubt should not go unquestioned.
You can justify that by saying that the symbol Canberra does not elicit any thought in your mind, but that is just equivalent to saying you don't know what Canberra is.
Quoting Banno
Beyond the circular justification above, it is close to a brute fact, somewhat similar to the cogito.
yep.
Quoting Lionino
Yep.
Comes in the main from Wittgenstein. See On Certainty.
The discussion in this thread, like all discussions, presupposes the existence of an "external" world in which the discussion is taking place...
Odd, don't you think?
You can argue the same thing about many philosophical beliefs. Every determinist acts as if there is free will, or rather, it does not matter to him, because if there is free will he is choosing to act as such, but if there is not, he is not concerned, as he is predetermined to follow this course of action.
This presupposition of the existence of the outside world is not needed for the discussion to happen, as the discussion could be a projection of the mind; but it is needed to believe that there is any point to having the discussion, which most of us certainly believe¹. If we don't believe that there is an outter world but yet are here talking, that would be a case of contradictory beliefs or cognitive dissonance.
I think the subject-matter is the same as the (mostly pointless) 11 pages of this thread, where the definition of 'atheism' is fought over.
It is not that the topic here states that there is no outside world, but brings to question whether there are any strong argument for the belief of the outside world. By that metric, we can still call into question the existence of the outside world while holding a weak belief that it exists which justifies our discussion here.
I am an atheist because I don't think there any convincing arguments for the existence of God, not that I don't think God exists (even if these two might collapse under some epistemologies).
1 Or is it? After all, what is wrong with interacting with the projections of our own mind?
Perhaps at the very least it presupposes that solipsism is false. It need not presuppose the existence of a material world (e.g. it allows for idealism), or that the world we experience is that material world (e.g. it allows for us being brains-in-a-vat).
But as philosophers we tend to want for something stronger than presuppositions, and so even solipsism is an open question.
Quoting Michael
I dunno. It seems to me that you should have difficulty in denying the existence of these words, even as you are reading them.
How can that be?
It seems to me that you must conclude that there is something more than just your thoughts.
But having established that there is something more than just your thoughts, we might press the argument further.
Novelty. We are sometimes surprised by things that are unexpected. How is this possible if all that there is, is already in ones mind?
Agreement . You and I sometimes agree as to what is the case. How is that possible unless there is something "external" to us both on which to agree?
Error. We sometimes are wrong about how things are. How can this be possible if there is not a way that things are, independent of what we believe?
Again it might be worth pointing out that philosophy is hard. Each of these points needs a PhD, if not a career, to be treated adequately.
I guess the upshot is that it is somehow quite implausible to question the existence of a world around you, whilst all the while participating in it.
Certainly more than my thoughts but possibly not more than my thoughts and experiences.
Quoting Banno
I can be surprised when I dream but it doesnt follow that the things I dream about are external to my experience of them. So its not prima facie necessary that the same isnt true of waking experience. It could be that dreams and waking experiences are two different modes of solipsistic existence.
Quoting Banno
It could be a shared hallucination. Were both brains in a vat being fed the same misleading sensory inputs. Or it could be that youre a figment of my imagination.
Quoting Banno
If solipsism is true but I believe that solipsism is false then my belief is in error. If solipsism and so mathematical antirealism are true then I still dont know the square root of pi. Other minds and an external material world are not necessary to be wrong or ignorant.
Your responding to me is not an argument for the world. It cuts all that rationalisation out, instead showing your participation in the world. PI §201, again.
Hence any doubt is infelicitous. We should then ask 's question.
Im not sure if I would. I just accept the existence of a material world and that my everyday experiences are of that material world as a matter of faith, even though there might be good reasons to believe otherwise, such as Bostroms simulation argument or the implications of Boltzmann brains being physically possible (and even likely).
But I wont pretend that this faith is more reasonable than the alternative view.
Then perhaps our only point of difference is, what reasons are to count as "good"...
:wink:
But there's a further issue we might consider, in that so many of the posts in this thread attempt to argue for the existence of the world from physics (without the maths).
That has to strike you as circular, doesn't it? Arguing from a description of the world to the existence of the world?
If you are convinced by Boltzmann to believe you are a Boltzmann brain, then the universe is pretty much as physics describes it, since that description - physics - is what Boltzmann uses to reach the conclusion that you are a Boltzmann brain...
And yet somehow the argument is seen as reaching the conclusion that the world is not as it appears...
The conclusion is that there is an external world that behaves according to the laws of physics but that we are most likely brains floating in a vacuum rather than embodied humans living on Earth. Part skepticism, part external world realism.
Of course, the problem is when you want to accept the veracity of physics but reject the implication that we are most likely Boltzmann brains. How would you resolve that apparent contradiction without resorting to special pleading?
I don't see a need to "resolve" the issue.
But if pushed I'd use much the same sort of argument I used against reincarnation - what is the "I" in "I have been reincarnated"... and what is the "I" in "I am a Boltzmann brain"? I am not a Boltzman Brain, nor am I the reincarnation of Cleopatra. I am Banno.
I am Banno and I am a Boltzmann brain are not in conflict.
You are Banno, and if our physics is correct then you are also most likely a Boltzmann brain.
Sure. That does not render Boltzmann brains true. Again, I don't see a need to "resolve" the issue; indeed, I don't see that it could be resolved.
There's plenty of insuperable philosophical issues, and it's easy to make up even more.
But, so far as this thread goes, if Boltzmann brains exist, that shows that there is a world.
(Edit: just to be sure, I'll maintain that the person to whom you are talking is not a Boltzmann brain, even if a Boltzmann brain is somehow imagining him...)
Sure. Same with brains in a vat.
Quoting Banno
Im not saying theyre true, only that if our understanding of physics is correct then its most likely.
If you want me to pick at this some more, I'd say that the conclusions reached by such arguments, especially in pop literature and in these fora, are overblown.
But yeah, sure. Cheers.
A bit more - again, the showing is what counts here - all this might well be the construct of a random quantum fluctuation... but if I don't go water the plants, they will die. It's what we do that counts, action over theory, meaning as use.
There might had been a situation where you put the cup in the cupboard of the shared kitchen dormitory in your university time. I wonder if you had ever lived in a dormitory of a university with the other folks sharing a kitchen. I had long time ago.
A cup can go missing in shared kitchen cupboard like that with other folks coming into the kitchen and grabbing whatever cup they see when they open the cupboard, make coffee and take it to their room. This used to happen often, and I had to look for an any free cup for making coffee for me.
If you were buying some coffee for yourself in a spar, and see new cups for a dollar or two beside the coffee jars in the shelf, then you might decide to buy them because you doubt if your own cup in the cupboard has been taken away by some other folks in the corridor, and you will never see it again. Yes, you might doubt if your cup exists or not. Why not?
In real life, people move things around, buildings and houses get demolished for new development, roads and grounds get eroded by heavy rains, trees get chopped off, people born, people die, people leave, the sun keeps rising and setting, and time passes non-stop. Nothing remains the same. Why should you stop doubting? If you don't doubt, that's not right.
Indeed, and this is what Berkeley said. Something that would exist independently of a perceiving mind is unverifiable. Because, if you check that such a thing exists, well, too late, you're using thought again. That is the powerful argument by Berkeley.
BUT it doesn't lead to a pure and insane subjectivism, as Berkeley himself noted (although Hegel showed it way better, according to me). Here is the condensed proof. If we can not have any knowledge about the external world, then we can't even say that this "external world" exists. So there would only be an "internal" world. But how could there be an "internal world" without an external one? So it means that our so-called "internal world" is not "just internal", "sadly internal"... It is the world itself.
(source: Brief Solutions to Philosophical Problems Using a Hegelian Method, Solution 2)
The point at the time of writing the post was logical ground rather than physical, ontological or epistemic ground for the doubt. If your ground for believing in the world is your perception (P), then
what is the ground for the belief when not perceiving the world? (¬P).
It wasn't about the existence of a cup, or any particular physical objects as such. It was rather about the the nature of our belief in the existence of the unperceived objects or world.
I would go as far as to say that, even if we outright deny the existence of the outside world, it is not a performative contradiction. You do not need to be agnostic about it to have consistent beliefs.
In the case that I think there is no world, it follows that I believe that everything around me is merely a projection of my mind (or simply is my mind). If I also believe that I am here discussing for a purpose, it could very well be that I believe that I am interacting with the very contents of my mind and, upon investigating them, I might arrive at a conclusion regarding the topic. Upon talking with you lot (aka investigating the contents of my mind), it could be that I change my mind and now believe that there is indeed an outside world, or it could be that I strenghten my previously belief that there is no world.
You can say it is an unhinged perspective, but so is solipsism, albeit there not being a logical contradiction in the view, remaining within the realm of possibility.
As to your points regardings agreement, novelty, and others, it might be that Michael has satisfactorily addressed them (not for me to decide, since the doubt (:razz:) is yours).
As as far agreement and disagreement goes, it can simply be that I hold two pieces of information in mind and I come to the conclusion that they contradict each other, and, since the mind is not perfect, it is fine to have two beliefs that seem to contradict each other as result of a lack of some information or some other imperfection.
If a mind progresses through time, it may use the information it holds as premises to reach new conclusions, hence novelty. From this explanation of agreement and novelty, we may realise our errors.
You may say "A floating mind that changes through time? This is fantasy.". And it is fantasy, because I just made it up, but I am just defending that solipsism does not entail contradiction. "But then time is the outside world!" Well, that is a question that I don't wanna tackle, but it could be.
So, when everything we ordinarily think, do and say flies in the face of those views, then holding to them by mere lip would be a performative contradiction, not a logical contradiction.
That the discussion in this thread pressuposes a belief in a real world outside our minds, my comment is a rebuttal exactly to that claim.
I would say that it might not logically presuppose the existence of a world, but that it does pragmatically presuppose it. No one really believes they are the only person or that there is no external (to the body) world; and anyone who consistently behaved as though they believed those things would likely be scheduled and put on medication for the protection of themselves and others..
:up: That is the topic, my faulty use of "logical possibility" was a display of a language addiction of mine.
Quoting Janus
I would guess so, but my illustration is to show that, if such a person were to exist, there would be no pragmatic contradiction:
Quoting Lionino
A solipsist may also be pragmatically justified in being cautious and not endangering others because, he may believe that, if he interacts (jumps) in such a way (off the) with the contents of his mind (bridge), his existence might cease. That surely raises the problem of how he came up with the conclusion that his existence might cease, as our belief in death likely comes from our intuition that there are other minds, and the association between consciousness and behaviour (unmoving dead body = no consciousness), and believing in other minds is contradictory (logically this time) with solipsism. But I would say that believing something without a reason is not a contradiction but rather a display of irrationality.
And I will quote myself: And it is fantasy, because I just made it up, but I am just defending that solipsism does not entail [this performative] contradiction.
Well yes, there are good reasons to doubt that the cup will remain in the cupboard. The point here is simply that your "when I am not perceiving the world, there is no reason that I can believe in the existence of the world" is not a good reason to think that the cup has disappeared from the cupboard.
Quoting Corvus
This had me puzzling. How do you go about buying coffee? There's the package on the shelf at the store, brightly labeled "Dark Roast". But when one is not perceiving the coffee, there is no reason that one can believe in the existence of the coffee. Hence there is no reason to believe the label on the package. Does one tear the pack open to confirm the contents? But when you drop it into your shopping bag, you again cease to have reason to believe in the existence of the coffee! LIfe becomes difficult, for both you and store security.
Object permanence develops in a wee babe, and for some disappears during undergrad philosophy courses.
Yep, I think that's right.
But there is a further step. There are far more batty brains than Boltzmann brain. But there is a further step. Supose you are a quantum fluctuation, having just popped into existence last Tuesday. The chances of you persisting into the next few seconds are vanishingly small. Chances are the world around you is ephemeral, and will disappear, or at the least not continue in a coherent fashion.
And yet for us, the world continues on in a regular and predictable fashion. Well, at least outside of dormitory kitchens.
And that is the argument from Batty Brains - that the world persists shows that it is very unlikely that you are a Boltzmann brain.
That seems to be how the argument goes.
That would be an invalid argument.
Assume that there are 1,000 short-lived Boltzmann brains, 100 long-lived Boltzmann brains, and 10 long-lived human brains. Most Boltzmann brains are short-lived, but most long-lived brains are Boltzmann brains.
From the Wikipedia article:
Most long-lived brains are batty brains. That yours is not a batty brain shows that on the balance of probability it is not a Boltzmann brain.
That the world persists shows that it is very unlikely to be a mere statistical aberration.
Yep.
Solipsism requires a particular picture of how things are, in particular of a "self" very different to the self that I have. It's a self that hides things from itself... somewhat mad.
It's just simpler to supose things to be pretty much as they appear, with other people and objects that persist over time when unobserved and surprises and occasional true statements and hopefully rarer errors.
So if you are reading this, you are probably not a Boltzmann brain.
Yeah, I know. there will be one Boltzmann brain somewhere that persists until it reads this sentence. But what were the chances of it being you?
You still there?
The more your read this, the less likely it is your are a Boltzmann brain...
Still there?
Best stop while you are ahead...
Hey, don't get upset with me - I'm just a statistical aberration....
Or the world is as it seems, and you needn't worry about it ceasing in the near future, and I really am being a bit of a dick.
Now what do you think? :wink:
There are 1,000 red balls with no green stripe.
There are 100 red balls with a green stripe.
There are 10 blue balls with a green stripe.
Your argument is that because most red balls have no green stripe then if my ball has a green stripe then it is most likely not a red ball. That is wrong. If my ball has a green stripe then it is most likely a red ball.
So:
There are 1,000 short-lived Boltzmann brains.
There are 100 long-lived Boltzmann brains.
There are 10 long-lived human brains.
Most Boltzmann brains are short-lived brains, but most long-lived brains are Boltzmann brains. Therefore if I am a long-lived brain then I am most likely a Boltzmann brain.
No, it isn't.
And your reply renders it even less likely that you are a quantum fluctuation.
Yes, it is. You claimed that:
1. Because most Boltzmann brains are short-lived then if I am long-lived then I am probably not a Boltzmann brain.
This can be generalised as:
2. Because most X are Y then if not Y then probably not X
Substituting in something else for X and Y:
3. Because most red balls have no stripe then if the ball has a stripe then it is probably not a red ball
My example above shows why (3) is false, and so why (2) is false, and so why (1) is false.
Solipsism is the denial that the human mind has any ground for believing in the existence of anything but itself, anything but itself is the (outside) world.
Quoting Banno
That sounds good to me. Time for lasagna and shake!
This is fun, since the longer this discussion continues, the less likely it is that you are a quantum fluctuation...
Sure. It's based in a very odd notion of "valid". And, for that matter, of "human mind".
It doesn't follow that I am most likely not a Boltzmann brain. It only follows that the probability that I am a Boltzmann brain gets smaller as the time increases. But due to the sheer number of Boltzmann brains, it is always the case that the probability that I am a Boltzmann brain is greater than the probability that I am not a Boltzmann brain.
:up:
Yep.
Quoting Michael
In an infinite space of infinite possibilities, there are presumably an infinity of non-Boltzmann brains, so I don't see that you have grounds for asserting that they are less common than Boltzmann brains...
But keep going. Again, the longer you persist, the more likely that you are an ordinary brain.
From the Wikipedia article:
In no case is there an infinity of non-Boltzmann brains. In some cases there are an infinity of Boltzmann brains.
To avoid the Boltzmann brain hypothesis you need to hope that either there is no cosmological constant or that the universe is a false vacuum.
But never as likely that I am a Boltzmann brain.
Maybe some time you will get lucky, and dissipate before the next reply...
Or maybe we will reach agreement that there is something quite specious about this argument...
The argument is valid:
1. There are far more long-lived Boltzmann brains than long-lived humans
2. I am long-lived
3. Therefore, I am more likely to be a Boltzmann brain than a human
Our current scientific theories suggest that (1) is true.
It would be strange to suggest that our current scientific theories are probably wrong simply because you don't like the conclusion.
Unless you have some actual evidence against either (1) or (3), your rejection of the argument is simply a matter of faith (as I said before).
It seems to me there is a problem with you being a Boltzmann brain and yet so predictable. Should we expect that if you are a BB? Where's the batty?
But it's not a belief. The world really exists. And it really exists precisely because there is nothing outside of ideas or perceptions. Since there is nothing outside those, there is no "outside" at all, and since there is no outside, the so-called "inside" is actually the world itself. So the world does exist. It lies within the idea itself. Idealism leads to realism and realism leads to idealism. It's a "loop".
See here.
All discussion is existentially dependent upon language use. Language use requires shared meaning. Shared meaning is existentially dependent upon a plurality of creatures drawing the same correlations between the same things(or close enough). Solipsism, and discussions about it, both depend upon a plurality of language users.
Where there has never been language use, there could have never been any discussion such as this one. It does not matter if one believes that or not.
There are an awful lot of "if"'s in the argument.
But we are not talking about whether there are any Boltzmann brains, so much as whether you are a Boltzmann brain.
And the chances of that continue to shrink.
So please, continue.
And it's always the case that the probability that I am a Boltzmann brain is greater than the probability that I am not a Boltzmann brain. Even if we were to continue this discussion for 1,000 years.
Quoting Michael
If.
And each time you reply, that chance shrinks, and not just a little bit, but by a truely extraordinary quantity.
All is grist to my previous contention:
Quoting Banno
I will continue to take the world as being pretty much as it appears.
Yes, and our current scientific theories suggest that the "if" is true.
Quoting Banno
And it's still always the case that the probability that I am a Boltzmann brain is greater than the probability that I am not a Boltzmann brain.
And you're welcome to do so. But it's a faith, not something supported by empirical evidence.
As if basing one's beliefs on empirical evidence were not an act of faith... If you are a Boltzmann brain, what are the chances of your having just happened to have imagined into being a world that exactly corresponds to the actual world? You happened to drop into existence in a way that allows you to realise you are a Boltzmann brain...
Pretty suspicious. Perhaps a good argument for solipsism...
Are you still there?
But this is not the world we experience.
I'm happy to treat this as a reductio; the persistence and predictability of the world shows that the Boltzmann brain argument is in error, even if it is not clear exactly what that error is.
And that is not a disproof of Boltzmann brain theory, so much as a rejection of mere quibbling.
Something like that.
There are, broadly speaking, four possibilities:
1. We are Boltzmann brains and our scientific theories are mostly correct
2. We are Boltzmann brains and our scientific theories are mostly incorrect
3. We are not Boltzmann brains and our scientific theories are mostly correct
4. We are not Boltzmann brains and our scientific theories are mostly incorrect
If our scientific theories are mostly correct then either (1) or (3) is the case, with (1) being most likely (as per those very scientific theories).
So one of these is true:
a. We are most likely Boltzmann brains (1 or 3)
b. Our scientific theories are mostly incorrect (2 or 4)
It is impossible for a human to not be a human.
And it's impossible for a Boltzmann brain to not be a Boltzmann brain, or for a horse to not be a horse.
What of it?
It's odd to me when one exclaims that they are more likely to be a philosophical tool for thinking than a human whose thinking and/or using the tool.
That's what.
It is a fact that our current scientific theories entail that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary humans.
It's certainly counter-intuitive, but then so is much of science. I won't claim that my intuitions ought take precedence over scientific evidence.
:smile:
:insert shaka:
Quoting creativesoul
That still does not defeat solipsism, what I said before to Banno applies to language too:
Quoting Lionino
Solipsism cannot be defeated with certainty, but it is defeated by plausibility. You say, "in the case that I think there is no world", but no one or almost no one thinks that due to its implausibility. The issue of solipsism only gets raised because we cannot be, as with many other things, absolutely certain it is not the case.
And given that there is a brain, the longer it persists the less likely it is to be merely a quantum fluctuation.
You are nothing if not persistent.
(See what I did there? )
Quoting Lionino
No, it doesn't, but it might reduce the solipsist to the status of a mere object of ridicule.
That is, in both these cases, as in the case of the existence of the world, there may be a point at which one's credulity is strained a bit too far. That point will be different for different folk, some of whom never participate in philosophy fora, some who treat it as an amusement and a very few who take it seriously enough to find themselves in an asylum.
So perhaps all up it is not unreasonable to take things at face value?
At the least, it makes it easier to buy coffee.
No, it is a fact that some interpretations of our current scientific theories entail that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary humans. It pays to remember that scientific theories, and science generally, only tell us how to make sense of how things appear to be to ordinary humans.
Solipsism is a philosophical idea. It is a language construct. Language constructs are existentially dependent upon shared meaning; shared meaning... more than one mind. It is impossible for solipsism to be true.
Quoting Lionino
Solipsism is a philosophical idea. All philosophical ideas are existentially dependent upon language use. Language use... shared meaning; shared meaning... more than one mind... solipsism... more than one mind.
But still more likely than not being a Boltzmann brain.
That whole thing radically changes what is usually meant by "mind' and "my".
I understand what it is to dream - the world around me is no dream. I understand what it is to imagine or fantasise - the world around me is no such phantasm. So if the world around me is somehow a construct of my mind, it is very different to other mental constructs.
So different that one might be tempted to call it "real"?
Are you still here?
Good.
I am.
They tell us how to make sense of how things appear to us. Whether or not we are ordinary humans or Boltzmann brains is the very question being considered.
Quoting Janus
Not just some, but the leading theories.
I wonder what more Janus wants? What more could he want?
I also feel absolutely certain that solipsism is not the case, but since it cannot be proven to not be the case, I cannot be absolutely certain.
Quoting Banno
That's all I want, and since it seems incoherent to want something unimaginable, you might also say it's all I could want.
Quoting Michael
If Boltzmann brains are random fluctuations, it begs the question as to how anything like that could make sense of anything, and thus how they could (in concert?) construct the whole edifice we know as science.
Also, if, as Boltzmann brains our remembered past histories are illusions, whence the shared memories that humans routinely experience? Can you make sense of that? How far back into the memories of the past before we, as Boltzmann brains, encounter illusion? Years, months, day, hours, a few seconds. The whole idea seems, however it might be supported by (the mathematics of?) some theories, absurd. Are not all theories interpretations? Are our memories of what we have learned of science and mathematics also illusions? If so, then how can we justifiably use them to support any conclusions at all?
Drop the requirement of proof and take it as a "hinge" proposition, not to be subject to doubt.
Quoting Janus
Yep. It's not as if, that the description is only as it appears to ordinary humans implies that the description is wrong... But that seems to be what some folk think.
You still there?
Damn.
:yikes:
:up: Yes, I think I do, but some are not satisfied with being unable to attain the unattainable.
See here.
This ignores the fact that some aspects of science are far more speculative than others, and that a binary distinction between mostly correct and mostly incorrect doesn't address the fact that Boltzmann brains are a matter of speculation and not observation.
When you are not perceiving the world, you wouldn't be asking the question where is my cup, would you? The question sounds absurd.
Quoting Banno
Again when you are not perceiving the world, you wouldn't be going out buying coffee either. Isn't it an absurd puzzling? The puzzle must be an illusion when you are not perceiving the world. Where does your puzzle come from?
When one is a hard idealist, and the world is just a representation in his mind, it would be hard to refute him. Indeed if what you see is a representation of the world, how do you know the real world?
If you are a part of the world, do you even exist yourself?
You're right that it's not a matter of observation (and perhaps that my binary distinction is imprecise), but it's wrong to suggest that it's as simple as speculation. Rather it's a consequence of our best understandings of quantum mechanics and thermodynamics.
So either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or our best understandings of quantum mechanics and thermodynamics is mistaken.
Given that the scientific evidence supports our best understandings of quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, the scientific evidence doesn't support the claim that we are not likely to be Boltzmann brains.
So what justifies your claim that we are not likely to be Boltzmann brains? Is it just "common sense" or "intuition"? Are "common sense" and "intuition" more reasonable than scientific evidence?
I'm not suggesting it is simple speculation, but it does depend on assumptions such as that the universe is eternal. Furthermore, science is hardly exhaustively covered by quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, and the best scientific case is for us being the result of biological evolution.
This isn't just an assumption. Rather:
That final sentence is what entails Boltzmann brains.
BB speculations are scientifically self defeating.
We only take such evidence seriously on the assumption that humans actually make empirical observations rather than experience phantasms occuring in a BB. Given the bigger picture, resulting from empirical observations considered more broadly, the evidence points towards us being the result of biological evolution. Do you think the majority of physicists would disagree?
Why? They're entailed by our best scientific theories.
Quoting wonderer1
See modern reactions to the Boltzmann brain problem:
The general gist seems to be:
1. our scientific theories suggest that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
2. we are not most likely Boltzmann brains
3. therefore, our scientific theories are mistaken
The point I am making is that, by this very argument, (2) is not supported by the scientific evidence. Rather it's something like "common sense" or "intuition" or "faith".
I'm then asking if it's reasonable to favour common sense, intuition, or faith over scientific evidence.
Of course, if you admit that we can sometimes be justified in believing that the scientific evidence is mistaken then you open yourself up to arguments for idealism or theism, as it would certainly be hypocritical, or special pleading, to argue that we must believe in an external material world because there is scientific evidence for it but that we must not believe that we are Boltzmann brains even though there is scientific evidence for it.
I think the difference you are trying to draw is between a voluntary and an involuntary construct. Our mind has many involuntary aspects to it that we know of, hallucinations, emotions, tiredness, belief you may reject some, but you can't reject all of these as involuntary constructs , so the distinction is not useful to tell the real from the mental.
Quoting Banno
That would be somewhat my argument against solipsism, but it works, in my view, because I redefine mind to exclude involuntary aspects. It works because it satisfactorily counters solipsism in its semantics. It does not defeat idealism or pan-psychism or open individualism or a blend of all those, because the world could still be fundamentally made of mind-stuff, or we and the world are the mind of god a la Spinoza; but it pretty much defines solipsism as very unlikely as soon as there is stuff that is not "my mind" aka a voluntary mental action. You may complain that that is not the way the word "mind" is used, but I don't write in English, I am just translating, so I don't have that concern. I don't write in Latin, but as an illustrative example ?n?mus means roughly "the rational soul", so I think we would agree that it implies a voluntary aspect, so surely there are things outside of my animus. On the other hand, m?ns can mean a bunch of things including the "faculty of understanding", surely there are things outside of my m?ns, but it can also mean "character", and in that case we don't know whether there is something outside of it as it is ill-defined.
Still it does not rule out the possibility that I am in fact some sort of Spinozean God imagining all this and not even realising it through some unknown convoluted mechanism, because it does not show the idea is logically impossible, but I reckon that any argument that explicitly has an ad hoc "unknown convoluted mechanism" may be discarded, as it is badly written fiction instead of philosophy, and it could be that upon investigation we realise that any possible mechanism is actually contradictory.
Edit: It does rule out the possibility if we keep the semantics of "mind" as everything that I am aware of, but then in the sense invented here the semantics of "mind" would be different.
That would be the case if it did defeat solipsism.
Quoting Banno
For sure it is not unreasonable. It is good to distinguish rational belief from practice. Many deterministic, physicalist atheists (broadly speaking) like me will rationally, based on evidence and logic and whatnot, conclude that there is no ultimate point to life since the universe will die one day and blah blah blah. Is there a point to living like that? Nope, because among other things I could be wrong.
Quoting creativesoul
The idea that all ideas boil down to language seems to suggest strong Whorfianism (improperly called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis), which is something that has been widely rejected. See: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/linguistics/whorfianism.html
Related: imagine a bright red apple, which one do you see in your head?
Quoting Janus
Agreed, we cannot be 100% sure of most things, or perhaps any. Though to rule something as less likely we need some successful arguments against it, I am pointing out that many of the arguments raised in this thread are not successful as they seem.
In any case, I remember this thread being about solipsism, but it seems the OP was edited to mean something more like object permanence and the problem of induction, or perhaps I misread the first time.
The OP was not edited at all. But due to misunderstanding of many folks in their posts (including Banno), there had been extra posts added by me for clarifying and broadening the OP into any possible exploratory discussions on the elementary concepts in the OP title as well as general epistemological, sceptic, ontological and logical issues in perception.
They are entailed by extrapolation of some scientific theories to a future universe we don't find ourselves in a position to observe. There are lots of theories outside of physics that have a lot of evidentiary support as well.
To quote Sean Carroll from The Big Picture:
Quoting Michael
I've been pointing out that there is science outside of physics, and on the basis of sufficient knowledge of the diversity of scientific findings we have reasons to reject 1.
Quoting Michael
I'd say it is human nature for us to favor intuition regardless of whether it is reasonable to do so. Regardless, I've pointed out that there are multiple lines of scientific evidence to consider, and one speculative extrapolation in physics doesn't provide a basis for dismissing the larger scientific picture that allows for the existence of this forum.
Quoting Michael
I'm a fallibilist and I haven't argued that "we must believe" anything.
1. If we are not Boltzmann brains then we can trust our scientific knowledge
2. Our scientific knowledge strongly suggests that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
3. Therefore, if we are not Boltzmann brains then we are most likely Boltzmann brains
There's certainly some "cognitive instability" in his position, too.
So it's back to what I said here. Either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or we cannot trust our scientific knowledge.
Quoting wonderer1
So which theories outside physics are evidence against the eventual heat death of the universe and/or the fluctuations/nucleations that will give rise to Boltzmann brains? And how do we determine which evidence is stronger?
Of course, one solution to all of this is to abandon scientific realism and favour instrumentalism instead.
I think number 1 is upside down, what Sean Carroll seems to suggest is that:
1. If we are Boltzmann brains, we cannot trust our scientific knowledge.
2. Our scientific knowledge strongly suggests that we are most likely Boltzmann brains.
3. Therefore, if we are indeed Boltzmann brains, we cannot trust our scientific knowledge.
4. If we are Boltzmann brains, we cannot trust that we are Boltzmann brains.
So from that, and that is me speaking, there are five options here:
A. If we are Boltzmann brains, we can believe that we are Boltzmann brains, but even if right we cannot be justified in believing so because our science is a random fluctuation, thus unreliable.
B. If we are Boltzmann brains, we can believe that we are not Boltzmann brains but we would be wrong.
C. If we are not Boltzmann brains, we can believe that we are Boltzmann brains and be justified in believing so if we believe our science is right, and we would be wrong.
D. If we are not Boltzmann brains, we can believe that we are not Boltzmann brains and be justified in believing so if we believe our science is right and we got in very low probability, and we would be right.
E. If we are not Boltzmann brains, we can believe that we are not Boltzmann brains and be justified in believing so if we believe our science is wrong, and we would be right.
So there are two scenarios where we are right and have justification, one being that we got lucky (unlikely). So it is not "impossible for a scenario like this to be true and at the same time for us to have good reasons to believe in it", it is just a very unlikely scenario. But the justification of something generally bears no weight on its actual truth-value, so "best response is to assign it a very low credence" is no good, as it is still possible that we are Boltzmann brains without justification, so I will settle for 50% chances, but I am willing to concede that number.
Quoting Michael
You posted this as I was finishing my post above. Enough brain-twisters for today.
I was presenting the inverse of his argument to show that his position suffers from that same cognitive instability.
His argument is if P, not Q (if we are Boltzmann brains, we cannot trust our scientific knowledge); you showed how {if not P, Q} (if we are not Boltzmann brains, we can trust our scientific knowledge) entails a contradiction. How does that show his position has the same issue? If anything, it entails his position is true: ¬?(¬p?q) ? ?(p?¬q).
That might be all that is problematic with this thread.
I don't think so. There is for me a clear difference to be made between the apple on the table and an imagined apple. That is, after all, why we have the language around imagination. Same goes for dreaming - if we could not tell whether or not we are dreaming, we would not have the word "dream".
There are lots of things of which we are certain.
The way I see it is that something should be thought to be less likely if it is less plausible in light of our experience, less consistent with that experience, and to my way of thinking solipsism seem way less likely, in fact improbable in the extreme, in light of that experience.
Which arguments in this thread do you see failing and on what basis do you assess them as failures?.
I think that would also be up to randomness, a Boltzmann brain with those specific theories would be magnitudes more unlikely than an ordinary Boltzmann brain. I didn't see what the memory question was.
Quoting Janus
That works in practical everyday life. But if we are to go by that, we would simply do away with the problem of induction, for one; we would do away with so many things that are still considered worthwhile in philosophy. Experience is not the goal to end all goals.
Quoting Janus
All the ones I rebutted to and that at the end of the discussion I did not acquiesce to the person's point.
The question wasn't addressed to you, but it was this: apparently the theory of Boltzmann brains entails that our memories are illusory, cannot be trusted; if this is so how could we trust our scientific theories, or even trust that we remember them correctly, or that they were ever really formulated? The other question was as to how distant do your memories have to be to be illusory: a year, a month, a day, an hour, a minute, a second?
Quoting Lionino
There is no "problem of induction"; Hume merely showed that induction is not deduction, that inductive inferences are no necessary. All we have to go on is experience, on what other criteria could we ever justifiably decide to place our faith? You might say logic or mathematics, but they don't tell us anything definite about things, except insofar as their pronouncements and predictions are found to obtain.
What are the "so many worthwhile things" you see in philosophy and why do think they are worthwhile? Is it just because they are still around, because some people are still arguing about them?
Quoting Lionino
You mean all the ones you, in your opinion, successfully rebutted? That isn't helpful at all and you should be able to cite at least one or two of those arguments and explain why you think they didn't stand up to your purported rebuttals. I suspect you think you rebutted them simply because they did not achieve 100% certainty.
I'm not assuming it. It's what physicists like Boltzmann, Eddington, Feynman, Sean Carroll, Brian Greene, and others say. I'm deferring to their expertise.
It's right there in that post you first responded to:
1. If we are not Boltzmann brains then we can trust our scientific knowledge
2. Our scientific knowledge strongly suggests that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
3. Therefore, if we are not Boltzmann brains then we are most likely Boltzmann brains
Obviously (3) is problematic. Therefore we must reject either (1) or (2). As I said in my above post, many prominent physicists accept that (2) is true (even if they want to avoid the implication), and so I defer to their expertise.
So, as I said earlier, either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or we cannot trust our scientific knowledge.
Also on this, the same argument I made to Banno earlier can be used.
Each of these is true (if our current theories are correct):
1. Most Boltzmann brains have inaccurate scientific knowledge
2. Most observers with accurate scientific knowledge are Boltzmann brains
Sorry, me no understand.
Quoting Janus
You are right, this wasn't addressed to me and I don't know the specifics, but what you are saying reminds me of the tidbits in this page about Sean Caroll. It seems the matter was discussed there to some extent, if that helps.
Quoting Janus
The problem of induction is that there is no reason to be sure that the future will be like the past, or simply that we can't derive a "will be" from a "has been". We agree on that?
If we do, according to your proposal that "something should be thought to be less likely if it is less plausible in light of our experience", the problem of induction dissolves. As all our experiences have told us that X causes Y, anything else is completely inconsistent with our experiences, so anything else is completely unlikely; therefore, we could expect from all the "Y was from X" that "Y will be from X". Science works that way and unlike many folks I for one don't think the logical positivists were crazy , but we are dealing with metaphysics.
I understand what you say about consistency with our past experiences, but in this one case I don't think it applies, since we are questioning the background of our experiences.
Quoting Janus
For the most part, yes, people who are just as smart as or smarter than me are still arguing about it. And for them it is profession, not hobby. So it leads me to conclude it is not something that we can brush aside easily.
Quoting Janus
Well, yeah, naturally if my opinion were otherwise I would have granted everybody's point and left.
For one, I think I pretty successfuly showed here that there is no pragmatic contradiction in being a solipsist and engaging in discussions about solipsism. But it is not even an argument against solipsism proper, it is more of a gotcha.
Another, the argument from language is bad, and my rebuttal was the same as the one for pragmatic contradiction. I think the user is drawing from Wittgenstein's idea of private language, but he doesn't really make an argument for it, he just states it.
Consider this strengthened argument:
1. If we are not Boltzmann brains then our scientific theories are true
2. One of our scientific theories is that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
3. Therefore, if we are not Boltzmann brains then the scientific theory that we are most likely Boltzmann brains is true
Do you see the problem with (3)?
That's a false dichotomy, and things aren't nearly that black or white.
There are areas in which I can and do trust my scientific knowledge with my life (and the lives of other people) depending on it. There are other areas of scientific knowledge in which I can't trust my knowledge to nearly the same extent.
Perhaps the most relevant question in this discussion is the extent to which you can trust your scientific knowledge?
FWIW:
Then to be more accurate: either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or we cannot trust the scientific evidence that entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains.
Quoting wonderer1
Which is why I asked the question: given that we have scientific evidence that entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, what justifies our claim that we are not most likely Boltzmann brains?
3 is a contradiction, hard to disagree with that. My point was more that you seemed to agree with Sean Caroll, because his argument was the opposite of the premise that you refuted by probability in the original argument. Sean's point is about justification.
What scientist makes the claim that we have scientific evidence that we are most likely Boltzmann brains?
Carroll pointed out the paradoxical nature of this:
1. Assume that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
2. Most Boltzmann brains do not have accurate scientific knowledge
3. Therefore, we most likely do not have accurate scientific knowledge
4. Our scientific knowledge entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
5. Therefore, our scientific knowledge that entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains is most likely inaccurate
6. Therefore, we are most likely not Boltzmann brains
He then uses this to reject (1).
I then simply offered an inverse of the argument:
1. Assume that we are most likely ordinary humans
2. Assume that we have accurate scientific knowledge
3. Our scientific knowledge entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
4. Therefore, our scientific knowledge that entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains is most likely accurate
5. Therefore, we are most likely not ordinary humans
I then use this to reject either (1) or (2).
The "cognitive instability" applies to both sides of the issue.
Several are mentioned in the Wikipedia article, e.g. Boltzmann, Eddington, Feynman, Sean Carroll, and Brian Greene.
https://chat.openai.com/share/96378835-0a94-43ce-a25b-f05e5646ec40
And don't ever ask it to do any engineering https://chat.openai.com/share/b5241b53-e4d8-4cab-9a81-87fa73d740ad
Who said that?
Never a good sign when one neglects to address what was written in lieu of something that was not.
Yeah, ChatGPT doesn't reason. It basically just repeats what it's read elsewhere. Sometimes it makes stuff up. I tried using it for programming once and it fabricated a function that doesn't exist.
Chomsky called it glorified plagiarism, or words to that effect/affect.
Those are people who have considered the possibility that we are Boltzmann brains. Not people who claim what you attribute to them. I already quoted Sean Carroll on the topic and it seemed pretty clear to me that Carroll doesn't make the claim that you are attributing to him. Do you agree?
An excellent phrase.
"The consensus amongst cosmologists is that some yet to be revealed error is hinted at by the surprising calculation that Boltzmann brains should vastly outnumber normal human brains."
They accept that the science entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains. They consider this proof that something is wrong with the science.
This is consistent with what I've been saying.
Either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or our science is inaccurate.
And I want to know what justifies the assertion that we are not Boltzmann brains given that the science suggests otherwise.
As for Carroll specifically, see Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad:
The science says one thing; he then suggests that it's irrational to believe it, i.e. that it's rational to reject the science.
What you put in quotes there was something that someone wrote on Wikipedia. Can you quote a physicist making such a claim?
Brian Greene
Sean Carroll
Sean Carroll (again)
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0611271
What is clear is that the physics is incomplete. Hence there remains good reason for Boltzmann scepticism.
:up:
Not sure if I would trust that.
Adding to the above, there's also Is the Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?:
Although it doesn't specifically refer to Boltzmann brains, the above is analogous to a Boltzmann universe, and as quantum fluctuations giving rise to a 14 billion year old universe is exponentially less likely than a quantum fluctuation giving rise to a several decades old brain, it stands to reason that evidence of the former is also evidence of the latter.
Somewhat of a coincidence, but that scientist wrote a paper that continues the work of the article I posted above.
That is not nearly as self defeating as a scientific hypothesis.
If we are Boltzmann brains then a calculation that shows a Boltzmann brain to be more likely than a regular observer has satisfied the above.
Your reasoning (or Vilenkin's) seems to beg the question.
Perhaps a different line of reasoning:
Borrowing from Tryon and Vilenkin, assume that any universe is itself a quantum fluctuation. Which is more likely; that we are a decades old Boltzmann brain or that we are an ordinary brain in a 14 billion year old Boltzmann universe?
I suppose the answer to that depends on what "surrounds" this universe. If it's an infinite and eternal vacuum then presumably there are an infinite number of Boltzmann universes and an infinite number of Boltzmann brains and so it is meaningless to say that one is more likely than the other.
We're just either a Boltzmann brain or an ordinary brain in a Boltzmann universe, with no evidence or reasoning to prefer either.
You think a quantum fluctuation universe is more likely than quantum fluctuation brains with false, consistent memories?
As an explanation for our observations, yes.
Hmm. The point is that the reasoning here is unstable - it remains equivocal, even for you, and downright dubious for others.
And what is the rational response in such circumstances? I don't think it is to conclude that you are a Boltzmann brain.
Also, I am pleased that you did not disappear in a puff of probability, as i had feared - both because it makes my view more likely, and because this discourse has some amusement value.
And again, again, it remains that there are no tight grounds for accepting the calculations involved. It is "cognitively unstable" - or if folk prefer simple language, there are no observations that settle the issue, and hence it remains mere speculation.
Exactly.
The same with us not being Boltzmann brains.
How so? There will be Boltzmann brains that have the same observations as ordinary observers; and in fact, there will be significantly (infinitely?) more Boltzmann brains that have those same observations as ordinary observers.
And around and around. Language on idle.
But still more likely than not being one.
Okay, show your math.
Yes, as I said, inductive inferences, unlike valid deductive inferences, are not logically necessary.
Quoting Lionino
I don't think so. All we have to go on in order to decide what is more or less likely to happen is prior experience, Is the Sun more or less likely to rise tomorrow? It's really not a question of deductive certainty at all.
Quoting Lionino
Questioning the background of our experiences is incoherent, since it presupposes the background of our experiences in the very act of questioning.
Quoting Lionino
For me, that is an argument from authority, which I don't accept, so we are going to disagree on this.
Quoting Lionino
Actually, I think the argument from language(s) makes solipsism most highly implausible. Did you invent the English language and write all the poetry and literature that exists without even being aware of doing it, using many words you don't even know the meaning of.
Did you invent all of mathematics and science, which use countless concepts and theorems you don't even understand, without being aware of having done so? What about all the other languages?
[quote=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boltzmann_brain#In_single-universe_scenarios]In a single de Sitter universe with a cosmological constant, and starting from any finite spatial slice, the number of "normal" observers is finite and bounded by the heat death of the universe. If the universe lasts forever, the number of nucleated Boltzmann brains is, in most models, infinite; cosmologists such as Alan Guth worry that this would make it seem "infinitely unlikely for us to be normal brains".[/quote]
The general principle is that the time between the Big Bang and the Big Freeze is finite. Therefore the number of normal observers is finite.
The time after the Big Freeze is infinite. The time required for a Boltzmann brain to form via nucleation is very large [math]10^{10^{69}}[/math] years in fact but still finite. Given infinite time anything that can happen within a finite time however large will happen an infinite number of times.
Therefore there are infinitely more Boltzmann brains of every variety that has a non-zero probability of forming; including those that appear to themselves to be normal observers than normal observers. Therefore any randomly selected observer is infinitely more likely to be a Boltzmann brain even one that appears to itself to be a normal observer than to be a normal observer.
This is the model that is best supported by the current evidence.
Less supported models are those that predict a Big Crunch or a Big Rip, each of which avoid the problem of Boltzmann brains.
Personally, I think it would be strange to argue that either the Big Crunch or the Big Rip must be correct, or that the time after the Big Freeze must be finite, or that the probability of a Boltzmann brain forming must be zero, simply because it must be that we are not most likely to be a Boltzmann brain.
1. The universe will succumb to the Big Freeze
2. The time between the Big Bang and the Big Freeze is finite
3. The time after the Big Freeze is infinite[sup]1[/sup]
4. The probability of a Boltzmann brain with experiences like ours forming via quantum fluctuation or nucleation within a finite time is non-zero
5. Given (1) and (2) the number of normal observers is finite
6. Given (3) and (4) the number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours is infinite[sup]1[/sup]
7. Given (5) and (6) we are infinitely more likely to be a Boltzmann brain than a normal observer[sup]1[/sup]
The current scientific evidence supports (1)-(4), and (5)-(7) are rational deductions.
If (7) is false then at least one of (1)-(4) is false. But which of (1)-(4) is it rational to reject for no other reason than that "(7) must be false!"?
[sup]1[/sup] [sub]If the time after the Big Freeze is finite but sufficiently large, i.e. many orders of magnitude greater than the time required for a Boltzmann brain to form, then although we are not infinitely more likely to be Boltzmann brains, we are still more likely to be Boltzmann brains.[/sub]
So, an argument from authority then? Even worse, it seems that they are not really saying what you seem to want them to be saying.
Interact? Why do you want to talk, share and communicate with your cup?
We are interested in perception and belief, not interaction.
Yes. I defer to what physicists say about what the scientific evidence entails, as is proper.
Quoting Janus
I dont want them to be saying anything. Im simply reporting on what they're saying.
See, for example, Big Brain Theory: Have Cosmologists Lost Theirs?
A straightforward reading of this is that cosmologists accept that our best scientific models, best supported by the scientific evidence, entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains.
Of course, like you and others they cannot accept the conclusion, and so believe that the scientific models must be wrong. Which is why, as I said earlier, either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or our science is incorrect.
But as explained by the simple argument here, avoiding this "absurd" conclusion is no easy task, as rejecting one of the premises contrary to the evidence that favours them simply to avoid the conclusion doesn't seem rational.
Are you familiar with The Relativity of Wrong?
It's hasn't been clear to me that when you say, "or our science is incorrect", that you recognize the relativity of incorrectness.
Then I'll make it clear: I'm not saying that therefore all science is completely wrong and that all the facts may be utterly different than what we believe them to be.
The argument here provides a more precise account: either (7) is true or at least one of (1)-(4) is false.
Whether (1) is true is unknown. As far as I know, the universe as we know it might end with a false vacuum decay tomorrow.
Yes, there are 4 major predictions: Big Freeze, Big Rip, Big Crunch, and vacuum instability.
With Big Freeze being considered to have the most evidential support.
Is the "absurdity" of (7) sufficient justification to reject the evidence that suggests that the Big Freeze is most likely?
My view is along the lines of Sean Carroll's. (Again, from The Big Picture.)
And yet there's the argument here.
You're claiming that the "absurdity" of (7) is sufficient justification to reject the evidence that suggests that (1), (2), (3), and/or (4) is true. Is that really rational?
It must be that the universe won't succumb to the Big Freeze, because if it will then we are most likely Boltzmann brains!
It must be that the time between the Big Bang and the Big Freeze is infinite, because if it isn't then we are most likely Boltzmann brains!
It must be that the time after the Big Freeze is finite (and sufficiently small), because if it isn't then we are most likely Boltzmann brains!
It must be that the probability of a Boltzmann brain with experiences like ours forming via quantum fluctuation or nucleation within a finite time is zero, because if it isn't then we are most likely Boltzmann brains!
You're welcome to do it. But then you leave room for sceptics, anti-realists, idealists, and solipsists to dogmatically reject whatever scientific evidence supports common-sense non-sceptical external world realism. You've set the precedent.
No. I am claiming 1-4 are insufficiently justified given the present state of scientific knowledge and my ability to distinguish well evidenced science from highly speculative science.
You're not just saying that.
If (1)-(4) are true then (7) is true. You're saying that (7) is false. Therefore you're saying that (1), (2), (3), and/or (4) is false.
You're dismissing some outcome on purely theoretical grounds irrespective of the strength of its evidence. Im asking if that's rational.
Nah, it's a matter of my understanding of the strength of the evidence.
So you're a cosmologist who understands the sigma level of each of (1), (2), (3), and (4)? I wasn't aware.
So, it seems to be exactly what I said above. The best evidence supports (1)-(4), and (7) follows. And his argument is that because (7) is just silly, we must reject (1), (2), (3), and/or (4) despite the evidence in their favour. It's a conceded dogma.
I'm asking if that's rational.
If it's rational to reject (7) a priori then it's rational to reject (1), (2), (3), and/or (4) a priori. If it's not rational to reject (1), (2), (3), and/or (4) a priori then it's not rational to reject (7) a priori.
We have a choice to make.
If we are Boltzmann brainsrandom quantum fluctuations will false memoriesthen it stands to reason that all our science is completely wrong because based on false memory. But since it is our science that (purportedly) tells us that we are Boltzman brains and that hence all our science is wrong, why would it be rational to believe such a self-eliminating conclusion? It is precisely this problem that you have so far completely failed to address.
Also, Caroll in your post above seems to be saying that it is only in the unimaginably far future that BBs will arise in any case, so, given that, why is it likely that we are BBs now?
I'm not saying that it is rational to believe that we are Boltzmann brains. I am simply explaining that our best scientific models seem to entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains. Therefore, either our scientific models are correct and we are most likely Boltzmann brains or we are not most likely Boltzmann brains and our scientific models are incorrect.
I'm then questioning the extent to which it is rational to reject some scientific model a priori when it is supported a posteriori.
No, you have it backwards, if we are BBs our scientific models are necessarily incorrect (assuming that it would even be possible for BBs to have scientific models, which is extremely questionable), as I already explained.
1. Our scientific models tell us that we are most likely Boltzmann brains.
2. If what our scientific models tell us is true then we are most likely Boltzmann brains.
3. If we are not most likely Boltzmann brains then what our scientific models tell us is false.
(2) and (3) seem quite straightforward.
Compare with:
1. John tells us that it is raining.
2. If what John says is true then it is raining.
3. If it is not raining then what John says is false.
I'm not ignoring it because I've never disputed it. If we are Boltzmann brains then our scientific models are almost certainly incorrect.
This doesn't refute what I said above:
If our scientific models entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, and if our scientific models are correct, then we are most likely Boltzmann brains. This is a straightforward modus ponens.
If our scientific models entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, and if we are not most likely Boltzmann brains, then our scientific models are incorrect. This is a straightforward modus tollens.
The probability of our being a normal observer is 100%. Here we are.
I'm not sure how (6) follows from (3) and (4). The Big Freeze has not happened. If (6) is rejected, then so too is (7).
What about all of the scientific evidence in favor of embodied cognition and/or against disembodied cognition?
It wasn't quite an argument. You asked me why I think something is worthwhile, I gave one of my reasons why rather, I agreed that what you said is indeed one of my reasons.
Quoting Janus
That is a possible argument against solipsism, that all the body of knowledge produced so far is generated/contained by/in my mind, and yet we struggled with Abstract Algebra 2.
But that is not what the person said, I didn't even understand what he said as it is not clearly written, so that is why I said it is unsuccessful; but there is nothing extraordinary about coming up with symbols for concepts, people make up conlangs all the time.
Quoting Janus
Questioning is a process that involves reason. Does it presuppose the outside world when we use reason? I don't think so.
Quoting Banno
4.9 impact factor is not horribly high. But that aside, single researcher, 2006... If I had more mastery over the subject I would feel more comfortable judging the content myself, but as far as layman in Statistical Physics goes, I would wager that I am getting outdated information.
No, but just think about it. To have strong empirical evidence of BBs fluctuating into existence would require gathering evidence from the future, and lots of it. I'm fairly confident that physicists aren't doing so. This is a matter of modeling based on theories which have important matters unresolved, not a matter of observations of the proposed processes (BBs) occuring.
Do you think you might have a naive faith in the reliability of modelling based on incomplete scientific understanding?
I get that, but if we are BBs then our scientific theories are incorrect; this is straightforward paradox, it has something in common with the "Liar' sentence.
If our scientific theories are correct, we are most likely to be Boltzmann brains.
If we are Boltzmann brains our scientific theories are incorrect.
Do you not see the problem?
You gave it as a justification for your belief.
Quoting Lionino
I don't know who you are referring to nor do I understand what you are trying to say in your second sentence.
Quoting Lionino
Reason is nothing without its basic presuppositions, which are not themselves arrived at, or justified by, reason.
Did you read the full paper? If so, do you think that you followed Carroll's reasoning well?
Quoting Michael
It would be a straw man to claim that your argument and psychologizing stand in for Carroll's perspective.
Is there something that you disagree with in Carroll's conclusion?
Boltzmann brains don't involve disembodied cognition. Cognition embodied much differently than ours for the most part, but not disembodied.
I am referring to this, which I referred to previously as "argument from language". Your argument is different from that because it includes language but does not use it centrally. I acquiesce to your argument, just like I acquiesced to one of Banno's arguments (though I had to steel-man it), but the post I was referring to was barely an argument which again is why I said the arguments given in this thread were thus far poor.
Quoting Janus
My belief that it is a worthwhile issue. It is pretty common sense: if several smart(er than me) people work on something, is it not rational to conclude that there is something to it? It is not an argument from authority because the authorities are not saying it is a worthwhile issue, it is their steady engagement of the topic that makes me incredulous that the issue can be brushed aside.
To assume that only my individual investigation of the matter can decide whether the issue is worthwhile seems to put my judgement above the judgement of people smarter than me, which I think is unwise.
Quoting Janus
And do we not come to understand the world through reason?
Just ditch this idea that minds can come from mindless stuff. It just creates problems. You're not a Boltzmann Brain, you're not a brain at all. There. Now we have cognitive stability.
If we are Boltzmann brains then our scientific theories are almost certainly incorrect.
Yes, I see the problem. But still, as I said:
If our scientific models entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, and if our scientific models are correct, then we are most likely Boltzmann brains.
If our scientific models entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, and if we are not most likely Boltzmann brains, then our scientific models are incorrect.
So, regarding the argument here, your claim is that we can dismiss (4) a priori?
You're begging the question.
The Boltzmann brain problem is that given that our scientific theories entail the eventual formation of an exceptionally large number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours, it is exceptionally probable that the Big Freeze has happened and that we are Boltzmann brains having the illusory experience of being normal observers before the Big Freeze.
I'm not denying that there are scientific models that avoid the Boltzmann brain problem. I'm simply explaining that, as per the words of cosmologists like Carroll, the current leading scientific model entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains.
I'm then questioning his suggestion that we can dismiss the conclusion that we are most likely Boltzmann brains a priori, as that then entails that we can dismiss some empirically well-supported scientific model a priori. For example, as per @RogueAI's comment above, one supposed solution is to dismiss (4) a priori. Is that really rational?
If there is an infinite multiverse and if every metaphysical possibility is realized in some universe then it would seem to follow that there are an infinite number of universes in which solipsism[sup]1[/sup] is correct, an infinite number of universes in which idealism[sup]1[/sup] is correct, an infinite number of universes in which common sense external world realism[sup]1[/sup] is correct, an infinite number of universes in which monotheism[sup]1[/sup] is correct, an infinite number of universes in which polytheism[sup]1[/sup] is correct, an infinite number of universes in which atheism[sup]1[/sup] is correct, and so on.
[sup]1[/sup] [sub]When considered as making a limited claim only about the nature of the universe in which they are an inhabitant.[/sub]
And given the cardinality of infinite sets, the probability that we are in one type of universe rather than some other empirically indistinguishable (to us) universe is equal.
So if it is rational to believe in an infinite multiverse in which every metaphysical possibility is realized, and if your metaphysics is a metaphysical possibility, then it is no less rational to believe in it than in any other.
Which would make all of these arguments rather pointless. You'd be as equally likely to be right as wrong, and either way entirely by accident.
As for whether or not it is rational to believe in such a multiverse:
Is it more rational to believe that this is necessarily the only universe? Is it more rational to believe that there are necessarily a finite number of universes? Is it more rational to believe that even an infinite multiverse necessarily only realizes some subset of all metaphysical possibilities? Is it more rational to believe that an infinite multiverse in which every metaphysical possibility is realized is less probable?
And even, would there not be laws that rule this multiverse? It is pushing the issue one step back.
Quoting Michael
There are four ifs there, so, giving equal likelihood to each, we end up with a 6,25% chance of being in an infinite multiverse in which every possibility is realized.
We are likely not in one, but if we are, then the same thing that applies to Boltzmann brains applies here: we have no reason to believe in any reasoning we do which bears no weight on whether it is true or not, but still.
That's not how it works.
Quoting Lionino
With Boltzmann brains there are a finite number of brains, with more of them having incorrect scientific theories than correct scientific theories, and so if we are Boltzmann brains then we are more likely to have incorrect scientific theories than correct scientific theories.
In an infinite multiverse there are not more universes in which we have incorrect scientific theories than correct scientific theories. Given the nature of infinity, there are an equal number of each universe, and so we are equally likely to have incorrect scientific theories as correct scientific theories.
Besides, this line of reasoning does not depend on scientific evidence at all. It is a priori reasoning: is it more rational to believe that an infinite multiverse in which every metaphysical possibility is realized is less probable?
Certainly, in relation to science or mathematics or any subject where much information has to be incorporated into a coherent understanding of the field. Not so much in relation to philosophy, which is potentially a pursuit for everyone, and the questions are naturally accessible to any intelligent and thoughtful person.
Is a question without a decidable or even satisfying answer worth pursuing? Perhaps is would be better, once one has become aware of and thought about such questions and their possible answers enough to realize they cannot be definitively answered, to move past them.
Quoting Lionino
I'd say we come to understand the world via the background presuppositions that underpin human life and reason itself and that understanding may be elaborated and augmented by reason. In any case is not the world presupposed in any attempt to come to understand it?
Quoting Michael
What determines what is metaphysically possible? Is it merely what is logically possible? Are they the same? is any possible universe governed by logic?
It is how powers of 2 work at the very least. But my point was not that there is a 6% chance, but that, differently from Boltzmann brains, there is no theory, understanding, or reasoning that tells us that we are most likely in such a multiverse. Surely, it is a possibility that we live in such a multiverse, but
Quoting Michael
how likely is it?
What I really want to ask is: what are the rules of the multiverse? Is it a multiverse where every possibility is realised in some universe? But when does it stop, or rather, what institutes every possibility? If we are admitting of a multiverse that is beyond things such as non-contradiction and excluded-middle, we have universes where the LNC applies, one where it doesn't apply, and infinite others for each one of the infinite truth-values. And how big is the infinity of truth-values? Is it as big as the set of natural numbers or the set of real numbers? There must be something that institutes that. It is just a very troublesome thought experiment, especially since we are wrestling with things that enable rational thoughts and pondering about scenarios where they would not apply.
Thanks for that. I'll take your word for that. I shouldn't get involved in some of this, I've neither the time nor the knowledge to be said to "know enough" to join in such discourse.
There's much of this stuff I outright reject due to some other commitments I have.
Proudly.
I'm stating the case. If you reject the brute fact that we are normal observers, then all bets are off.
How do you get from
"given that our scientific theories entail the eventual formation of an exceptionally large number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours"
to
"it is exceptionally probable that the Big Freeze has happened"
Quoting Michael
That's not the only possibility entailed by our scientific theories.
How long does instantaneous existence last? I've been chatting with Banno for over a decade. Jeep/Wayfarer too. Sam 26 even longer.
Seems to me the difference between and others here is that he is pretty convinced by the Boltzmann discussion, while the others are more comfortable acknowledging that it is interesting but very far form conclusive.
All nonsense. But a very fun idea.
You seem to misunderstand what I am saying. I don't believe that I am a Boltzmann brain or that I am most likely a Boltzmann brain.
I am simply explaining that, as per the words of the cosmologists who know better than me, our best scientific models entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains.
Therefore, either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or our best scientific models are mistaken.
Because we ought reason as if we are randomly selected from the set of all possible observers with experiences like ours, and the set of all possible observers with experiences like ours contains exceptionally more post-Big Freeze Boltzmann brains than pre-Big Freeze normal observers.
Quoting creativesoul
It's what cosmologists say is the most likely consequence of our best scientific theories. This is precisely why the Boltzmann brain problem is seen as a problem. It's not just some crazy hypothesis by some crazy philosopher.
See the argument here.
If we can dismiss the claim that we are most likely Boltzmann brains a priori then we can dismiss the possibility of heat death a priori, or we can dismiss the possibility of quantum fluctuations a priori, even though we have a posteriori evidence in favour of them.
So sure, something is fishy here, but there appear to be no good solutions.
In Carroll's argument, all the statements ultimately follow from 1, but 1 ultimately leads to a contradiction. In your argument, there are two assumptions, and the statements all follow from 1 and 2, 1&2 leads to a contradiction. You say you use that to reject 1 or 2, but if you reject 1, you go back to Carroll's argument. The only choice is then to reject 2.
Still, I feel there is something fishy with Carroll's argument or perhaps with the dichotomy of these arguments and I think it is in the phrase "most likely". I will try to put it rigorously some time later.
Quoting Michael
There is an infinite amount of Boltzmann brains though. And if your argument for the multiverse follows, the same can be applied for the Boltzmann brains. So Carroll is wrong and we are as likely to be Boltzmann brains with accurate as with inaccurate scientific knowledge. Thoughts?
Quoting Patterner
Unfortunately it is not nonsense but follows from our scientific theories.
Quoting Michael
Or perhaps we don't need to reject either heat death or quantum fluctuations, but just the possibility of quantum fluctuations generating a macroscopic object which is against our scientific theories but not as harshly so. And even if we don't want to do so, by your footnote here, it can be that the time after the heat death is neither infinite or sufficiently large to make it so that there are more Boltzmann brains than ordinary brains.
Which is why I keep saying: either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or our scientific theories are incorrect.
Quoting Lionino
Well, this ties into my rejection of an infinite past. Even though we can say that if the universe will last forever then the number of Boltzmann brains will increase to infinity, it must be the case that the time from the Big Bang to now is finite, and so that as of now there have been a finite number of brains (whether normal or Boltzmann).
Quoting Lionino
Yes, that would seem to follow if we allow for infinite "parallel" universes (as my reasoning against an infinite past wouldn't hold).
Quoting Lionino
This would be one solution. However, this still entails that we can dismiss some possible empirical fact a priori:
1. If quantum fluctuations can form macroscopic objects then we are almost certainly quantum fluctuations
2. This conclusion is silly/cognitively unstable
3. Therefore quantum fluctuations cannot form macroscopic objects
Of course, it may be true that quantum fluctuations cannot form macroscopic objects, but there's something less-than-rational about the suggestion that we can dismiss such a possibility a priori, especially given that "we are quantum fluctuations" isn't a contradiction.
An a priori but non-necessary truth is peculiar.
Perhaps the simplest solution is to reject scientific realism in favour of instrumentalism. The mathematics of quantum fluctuations are just a useful tool, not something to be taken so literally.
I am aware of the idea that, in an infinite amount of time, an infinite amount of matter will eventually be arranged in every possible configuration. I don't see that as a model/theory. It's just an idea. Something to contemplate. We can't test it. It's speculation. RougeAI has twice (that I've seen) asked:Quoting RogueAIThe answer is, you couldn't. A crazy large number of particles need to come together in exactly the right way at same time to make a BB. But, since there is infinite space for these infinite particles to be spread throughout, we can't know that that number of particles will ever touch even a single other particle.
There's the Lambda-CDM model which entails eternal expansion (and eventual heat death), and the energy-time uncertainty principle which entails quantum fluctuations.
Given enough time (which there will be with eternal expansion), quantum fluctuations can generate macroscopic objects, including human-like brains. And given enough time (which there will be with eternal expansion), the number of human-like brains generated from quantum fluctuations will outnumber the number of ordinary human brains that ever existed.
That is a true dichotomy. My point was that, as by Carroll's argument and your subsequent argument, the dichotomy dissolves as we have to believe that our scientific theories are incorrect which sounds fishy to me as I said because of the "most likely", and there seems to be some sort of self-reference involved in the argument too, as I will think more deeply about later, rejecting empirical theories a priori is always iffy.
Quoting Michael
Surely that is true. So your argument seems to be, there has been finite time T between now and the beginning of the universe, there has been finite Boltzmann brains, therefore we are likely to be a brain with incorrect scientific theories.
I don't know what to make of this, but it seems that you are restricting the pool of possible Boltzmann brains we could be by establishing the upper time limit as the time where the entity we are now lives in. I don't know how to feel about that, it seems circular.
Quoting Michael
This is what I mean about the whole thing being iffy.
Quoting Michael
How would that come into play with Boltzmann, especifically?
Quoting Patterner
Pretty sure that the size of space does not factor in it. If you take one m³ of space it will have the same density of particles popping in and out of existence as one cm³ assuming same conditions. So having more space increases the likelihood of a Boltzmann brain forming if anything.
Regarding the idea...
What would it take to even be able to physically reconfigure a normal human observer? All the necessary parts. What do all normal observers have in common such that that's exactly what makes them normal human observers? That's a matter of necessary elemental constituency and existential dependency. There's a bit of work involved there.
Or...
I don't know for sure, but my impression of Witt leads me to think that ideas such as Boltzmann Brains would count as bewitchment.
Given that the sheer number/quantity of particles necessary for reconfiguring me involves reconfiguring everything that I am existentially dependent upon(everything that effected/affected me either directly or indirectly), and I am a normal human observer.
Normal human observers have been affected/effected and/or otherwise influenced, whether directly or indirectly, by all sorts of things. Some of those things are external to us, some of those things are parts of us, some of those things are a combination thereof.
You'd need to recreate the entire universe according to a strict determinist(causal) account. Boltzmann Brains are supposed to come from that... aren't they? Do they presuppose that all it takes to recreate an observer is to recreate and rearrange just the biological components?
Talking as if memories are distinct entities, things that can be stored, seems mistaken to me. Without a tree there is no memory of one. Our memories of trees are existentially dependent upon trees, regardless of their meaningful content, regardless of their veracity. Our memories of trees cannot be reconstructed in any other manner other than series of physical and mental events from whence they emerged.
:up:
And not just the number and variety but also the complexity of the arrangement.
Yup. From what we have seen of quantum fluctuations, we know that's a possibility, given enough time?
First off, I don't know what you might be referring to with "really rational". As members of a social primate species go, (a social primate species which only began to develop literacy ~5500 years ago) I'd say Carroll is one of the more rational ones.
You see, there is empirical evidence we can intersubjectively consider, for a wide variety of scientific matters outside of physics. Carroll is certainly not ignorant of sciences outside of physics. It seems likely Carroll is inclined to consider The Big Picture.
I'm not sure how we could say we know that.
Both these sentences above are mere tautologies.
If we are most likely BBs then our scientific theories are most likely incorrect, which means that their entailing that we are BBs is most likely incorrect, the point being that we cannot coherently use scientific theories to draw the conclusion that we are most likely BBs. As far as I can tell, and in the absence of any cogent counterargument to this, that is the end of the story.
Quoting wonderer1Me either.
Quoting JanusNot [I]we[/I]. It's just me. The rest of you are false memories.
There are many memories of me, whether false or not, and you don't have hardly any of them.
That's just something programmed into my false memories.
How do you know that, or even how to understand what I am asking you, if all your memories are false?
Quoting Patterner
No, that is a false memory of some knowledge you imagined you had.
The consequence of this is that even though we have strong a posteriori evidence for some scientific theory we can rule it out a priori. That seems quite significant.
See the argument here.
Either we know a priori that the universe will not succumb to heat death and expand forever or we know a priori that quantum fluctuations do not happen (or that if they do happen that they cannot form brain-like structures).
Does that seem rational? Or is it just more rational than accepting the possibility that we are most likely Boltzmann brains?
One possible solution is to reject the premise that we ought reason as if we are randomly selected from the set of all observers with experiences like ours (and so that there is some third alternative to SSA and SIA). We accept that heat death and eternal expansion will happen, we accept that quantum fluctuations will form significantly more Boltzmann brains than normal observers have ever existed, but we don't accept that we are most likely one of these Boltzmann brains. Although I'm unsure how to justify this.
The thing is that virtual particles are not observed.
I tried looking up some educative articles on the matter but none of them were complete. If it is in your interest, you can try. In any case, the short answer is that you can have as many "particles" as you want, it is simply less likely the more particles you want to have.
Your objection is roughly that we need a great number of particles before making a brain, that is something that was discussed starting here.
I had already seen the argument and commented on it previously. I like to keep it simple. The Heat Death may be the most favored current scenario, and it may be more rigorously supported than the idea of random particles forming Boltzmann Brains. So I don't think the two necessarily go hand in hand.
If we were Boltzmann brains all bets would be off and none of our theories would have any support. I see that as a simple refutation of the idea. If you don't agree that's fine then we are not going to agree is all. Does it even matter whether we are Boltzmann brains or not? Would it change anything about how you live your life?
Well, we say that memories are stored. It is common parlance. It's a useful but very misleading analogy. I suppose what I'm getting at with this point is that it is as a result of how memories emerge and 'persist' that we can know it is impossible to reconfigure them without also reconfiguring everything that they are existentially dependent upon. That includes far more than just the biological material/structures of the human brain.
So, it's not even a possibility. Logical possibility perhaps, but what else would have to be the case in order for that to happen? It does not follow from the fact that we can imagine some possible world in which Boltzmann brains could emerge, that this world is that one.
Show that Boltzmann brains are not equivalent to normal human observers.
Quoting Lionino
is just a case of (simplified):
A: My mind is the collection of things I am aware of.
B: There are things in the world I am not aware of.
C: Therefore there are things outside of my mind.
Which is that there is scientific knowledge to be learned, the fact I don't have this knowledge implies there are some things that I am not aware of, therefore there are things outside of my mind. There is some X I am unaware of, X is outside of my mind, there are things outside of my mind. But this only works because the implication {unaware of X} ? {X outside of mind} is accepted, and it can be assumed only if we define my mind in such a way (A) to rule out the existence of some unknown-to-me part of my mind. A semantic argument therefore.
Which I said here:
Quoting Lionino
Furthermore, virtual particles are exactly the same particles as "normal matter" particles. Virtual particles are just normal particles that we artificially add to interactions when using a calculation method called perturbation theory.[/quote]If that person is right, then I don't see Boltzman Brains coming from virtual particles.
Wiki says this: If virtual particles did manage to form a BB, I have to wonder if the different mass would affect the brain's functioning.
Wiki also says this: If every particle in my brain suddenly got its antiparticle right next to it, would my brain continue to function? Would a brain formed by virtual particles, each of which is accompanied by its antiparticle, function for even the instant required, before the particles and antiparticles all annihilated each other?
But Brian Greene doesn't seem to be talking about virtual particles when he talks about Boltzman Brains. Like in this video:
https://youtu.be/gtlWS9TaCnQ?si=50MW6PmUcgQVq1jR
Could this be an implication of accepting the Kantian thing-in-itself in empirical world? Or does it mean just there are things that you have no experience of, therefore no awareness of them?
Not sure if B entails C. Because if you are not aware of the things in the world, then how do you know there are things outside of your mind?
Quoting Lionino
Yes, you have given out your reason for the conclusion, but I am not sure if a semantic argument would be enough evidence for the ground. Because your language reflects the content of your mind, but not the other way around i.e. your belief is not based on what you said.
Quoting Patterner
Perhaps, but the quote says "necessarily", which implies it might have the same mass.
These links are not bad though some do represent writer bias.
https://sites.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/Goodies/Boltzmann_Brain/Boltzmann_Brain.html
https://bigthink.com/hard-science/boltzmann-brain-nothing-is-real/
https://clearlyexplained.com/boltzmann-brains/index.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kn5PMa5xRq4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7pakDMnuMY
I, personally, don't think we are Boltzmann brains physically speaking, even though I am not completely convinced against solipsism as a metaphysical idea.
I think the Ding an sich is an epistemological being, not an ontological one.
Quoting Kants Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves
But that is the matter of whether the Ding an sich is ideal or double or monadic or material or whatever. Whether the noumenon is automatically an outside world, whether mental or physical, is another question. Since the very idea of noumenon assumes of a world besides the perception of a transcendental agent, it would make sense that without the noumenon there is nothing to perceive. I think the semantics of Vorstellung pretty much imply an outside world, so solipsism implies no Vorstellung. Coming up with a view in which there are things outside of perception and yet solipsism obtain seems to be a contradiction of the semantics of solipsism.
So to answer your question, yes.
Quoting Corvus
I think this is somewhat answered above. You could say you have mental objects which you don't experience (in the sense of perceiving), but I think that sentence is nonsensical.
Quoting Corvus
Naturally language reflects mind (to some extent at least). But it is a simple argument that, if we redefine the word mind, solipsism in our vocabulary can be immediately tagged as 'false' as soon as a quick introspection shows there are things in my mind whose origin I don't know whether these things come from the vat holding my brain, from idealism, I don't know. I believe a Roman philosopher would promptly accept that there must be things outside of his animus, as that is what the meaning of those words imply.
Edit: solipsism implies no Vorstellung.
Quoting LioninoThis, too. :grin:
Quoting LioninoI believe things are as they seem, until there is reason to believe otherwise.
And I think BBs are an absurd idea. I assume it will be proven impossible at some point. And I'm sure we'll never see a Boltzman anything, despite the fact that there are an infinite number of things other than brains that could be Boltzmanned.
Thanks for the links. I had only found one of them in my searches.
How could something be an epistemic being, if it is unknowable and has no physical referent? How could something be an ontological being, if it is unknowable? You wouldn't know whether it exists or not? Is it a being at all?
Quoting Lionino :ok:
If you accept the existence of the Kantian Thing-in-itself in Noumena, then that would be a proof of the existence of the outside world. No? Because Noumena exists in the physical or external world. It cannot exist in your mind according to Kant, or do you believe it does exist in your mind?
Some folks seem to believe that the Thing-in-itself exists in the mind. The only problem is, again they don't know what it is. Isn't it contradictory to say, it exists but it is unknowable? How do you know it exists, if it is unknowable? But then some folks believe that Thing-in-itself can be knowable if you tried to perceive it, i.e. via intuition and imagination.
But can knowledge come from imagination or intuition? It wouldn't be very accurate knowledge if it was from imagination and intuition alone without sensibility and reason. Or if you were a religious, then you could say, you experience Thing-in-itself via your faith.
Quoting Lionino
For example, what are they? What are the things that you find in your mind whose origin you don't know?
Having said all that, I can see the point that language is a significant factor in connecting self and external world. If there were no external world, how could one have acquired the language? How could one communicate linguistically with other minds at all? How could one make any semantic expressions about the outside world at all?
By epistemic being (odd phrase admittedly), I mean a being whose defining property is of epistemological nature. The Ding an sich is that which begets experience.
Quoting Corvus
Yes.
I am not persuaded by Kant's argument. But it basically runs that, because I have a temporal awareness such and such, there must be objects that allow/cause such awareness. Because of this awareness, solipsism is false; and that object would be noumenal or at least have a noumenal source. But I imagine that for Kant the noumenon is always outside of the mind, and to prove the existence of a noumenon is to disprove solipsism.
Solipsists would have to deny noumenons.
Quoting Corvus
I think the concept of noumenon is necessarily (semantically) outside of one's mind.
Quoting Corvus
For example, perceptions, hunger, pain.
Neither, overall, but...
Quoting Corvus
It is defined as otherwise. So thats incoherent.
Quoting Corvus
The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding.
So perhaps it (the argument of Kant) is not being adequately outlined.
It looks to be difficult to prove the existence of noumenon if not impossible. And logically, if a noumenon was proven to be existent, then would it be still a noumenon? Or a phenomenon?
Semantic proof may not be taken to be conclusive, because there would be a solipsist who claims that his noumenon is in his mind, and he visits there every night in his intuition. It would be difficult to disprove his claim.
Ok, was just trying to see the concept from a solipsist's point.
Quoting AmadeusD
Since this is not about interpreting Kant accurately, it was an attempt to see it from a solipsist's perspective. But would you say that your claim is the officially accepted interpretation of Nounmena and Thing-in-itself in Kant?
I have various commentaries on Kant by different authors, but the one I accept and follow is the commentary books by Graham Bird. His 2x books on Kant are my favourite, which are "Kant's Theory of Knowledge" and "The Revolutionary Kant".
I wonder what books and commentaries you are using for your readings or studies on Kant. But this issue in TI can be contentious and a new thread on its own.
Anyhow Graham Bird says there have been different interpretations on Noumena and Thing-in-itself in Kant, and he propounds the both concepts are same entities, which is opposite views of yours. But if you could present your arguments for your points with the source information, that would be helpful.
Aren't they the obvious sensations from your biological bodily workings telling your senses, that it needs food and something is pinching you, or why are you using your hair dryer too close to the skin? :grin:
Did you read the Multi-Layered Conception . paper linked on the previous page?
Not the paper itself (Is there a link for the full paper?). Just the quote. The following is the point I used to agree with, and still do. What is your own point?
Quoting Kants Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves
Didnt have one; just curious.
Quoting Corvus
Thats fine, provided proper account is taken for it.
I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common.
Ding-en-sich = The thing, simpliciter
Noumena = that same thing as perceived by something other than Human, spatio-temporal perception
Phenomena(of something) = the same thing in human perception only.
at any rate, the above conceptions work for reading the Critique. Most don't.
https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Noumena this page contains a fairly good overview of the disagreement around the concepts - but within Kant, they are kept separate**. Particularly, Palmquist, as a secondary source, I would take, but largely because (as discussed in this article) it is essentially aligned with Kant's actual writing. Not that that's the be-all-end-all, but I tend not to take much secondary material which expressly alters the plain meaning of the OG text on board. Might be something I'll get over. Very much smoething i've learned reading law.
** From CPR:
"if, however, I suppose that there be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali), then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). (A249)"
and
"But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumenon in a positive sense. (B307)"
(from the SEP Article )
Indeed. That was what I meant. When you said that my post was not adequately outlined, I was wondering then what is the right outline on the topic? Was there the officially accepted and verified outline on noumenon and thing-in-itself? No. There is not, and you agreed with that. In that case, every interpretation is more plausible, plausible or less plausible. No interpretation is wrong. If it was felt as wrong in someone's mind, that doesn't mean it is objectively wrong. It is not a matter of an analytic judgement. It is a matter of belief, understanding and opinion.
I have around 20 different books on Kant, and they all have somewhat different interpretations on the topic, but I found Graham Bird's books were more plausible, and were agreeing with my ideas, hence I kept on sticking with the books as the bible of understanding Kant's CPR. I don't have the book by Palmquist by the way.
Bird clearly says Thing-in-itself and Noumena are the same concept, and I agree with the point. Kant makes various different remarks on the concepts in CPR in various different places in the book depending on the context, hence it would be difficult to say, this or that is the correct definition of them. It really depends on what you are talking them with in what context and what arguments you are presenting with, which makes either more plausible, plausible or less plausible.
And whatever definition one comes up with, there will be someone who will disagree with it, and prove the definition is illogical, or come up with quotes from the CPR which says exactly the opposite.
It is not something that anyone could prove logically right or wrong, hence they are in the category of the antinomies. They are still very useful concepts, if one had some thoughts on epistemic, ontological or metaphysical ideas, and those concepts fit nicely for explaining or positing something which would be difficult otherwise to do due to the abstract nature of the arguments or ideas.
What would be the proper account in your opinion?
I was thinking about this today, and this idea came to my mind. If something is an existence, how can it be without ontology or epistemology? They go together. Without perception, ontology is not seen and not known. Without ontology, there is nothing to perceive. If something is an ontological being, then it must be also epistemological being for it to be qualified as an existence. If something is an epistemic being, then it must be also ontological being. If not, then it would be unknowable even whether it exists or not. No?
Because the point was ..
.we do not have to conceive of the something that underlies appearances as a material object. It might as well be considered as something that is immaterial and can only be thought .
.and because to conceive is a logical function of understanding, it follows that the something that underlies appearances, if considered as merely something immaterial and can only be thought, whatever that conception might be, cannot be phenomenon. And if not phenomenon, it is impossible for that conceived something to be an experience or a possible experience, which means there will be no empirical knowledge of it.
.. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which is absurd .
(Bxxvii)
My opinion on that account: the use of transcendental conceptions of reason, re: that which underlies appearances as immaterial or simply conceived as something, is what the critique was all about, that is, an exposition on what not to do. Or, technically, what reason has no warrant or entitlement to do, in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, which is all that appearances concern.
I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here.
I understand what youre getting at, but Im not able to see secondary sources who disagree with direct statements in the source as valuable personally.
From what I have heard there is no scholarly agreement on the (in)equality of noumenon and Ding an sich. Some are confident in their interpretation that they are absolutely distinct. But being that the problematic of Kant's language is that you don't know when something is being used as a synonym of a word or of another, as is the case with "object", I don't think we will ever know. Ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium.
The writer of Kant's Transcendetal Idealism on the SEP thinks they are clearly distinct:
It is possible some scholars merge the two because of:
Quoting Corvus
Using the terminology above and taking this:
into consideration, Kant proves the outside world by showing that some appearances are indeed phenomenons, and due to their causal relationship, phenomenons imply real world objects.
Quoting Corvus
Here we have things outside of my mind, at least a brain.
Quoting Corvus
I am trying to achieve natural curls.
It does have the meaning of 'having through the senses', which is contrary to how Kant uses it, but it also shows "given by the spirit", which is how some dictionaries define the (modern) word noumenon.
This sounds like the point I was getting across to RussellA in the other thread. But I am not sure if reason has no warrant or entitlement to do in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, because it is all that appearance concern. Reason still does warrant on all the appearances coming in via sensibility - in the case of the bent stick in the glass of water, some people think the stick is bent. But reason when applied to the appearance, tells them no it is the refracted light by the water which makes it look bent. It is not really bent.
In the cases of perception with appearance, but the perceiver still thinks or intuits on the unobservable objects, Kant tells us that is the limit of our reason. We then have to transcend reason, and employ some other mental faculties such as imagination, beliefs and faith to deal with the perception.
The cases of the unobservable physical objects exist in Scientific enquiries in reality. I think I have written about it before somewhere in the TPF. It is a planet called Vulcan. It is not observable in physical form in the sky, but with all the calculations of the movements based on the gravities of the other planets, there must exist this planet called Vulcan. This unobservable planet had been in existence for many years in the scientists calculated conjectures and imagination.
I am not sure if they have actually confirmed the existence of the planet Vulcan yet. But even the scientists don't rule out the existence of unobservable physical objects just because it is invisible. I am sure it is the rational induction of reasoning which has been applied in this case of believing in the existence of the object which has no appearance by the scientists.
Ok, we agree to disagree. That is fine.
Quoting AmadeusD
Thanks. I thought this thread had ended when it had around 600 posts. It disappeared for a while, but then it reemerged with the new points continuing the discussions. I wasn't following the batman brain stuff as I know nothing about it, but when Kant was being mentioned, I thought I could join again for a wee reading and discussing.
I agree with this. There is no such a thing as the officially accepted definition or interpretation of Ding-An-Sich and Noumenon even in the academic communities. Insisting that the one in SEP or some other internet site definitions are right, and the casual readers or students definitions and points are wrong, just because they are hobby readers and students has no logical ground for the argument.
Quoting Lionino
I think this is a good point. I could go with that. However, G E Moore proved the existence of the external world by waving his two hands - saying, "Here is one hand, and here is another hand." Seeing the hands and being able to wave them proves that there exists the external world.
I was reading "A Kant Dictionary" by H. Caygill last night, and it says, Noumenon is not a being or existence in Kant. But it is a boundary of human knowledge and pure reason for the limitation. Phenomenon presents us with the appearance to our sensibility, but not in full. It does so only to a certain degree, then there is a boundary that reason cannot handle due to the non appearance of phenomenon. The boundary and beyond of phenomenon is called Noumenon. In that case, it sounds like Noumenon is just part of Phenomenon where the appearance ends and beyond.
Quoting Corvus
Given that empirical knowledge just is experience** .
( to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience )
**translator-dependent, as we are all so familiar.
. Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and gives to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible. Reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the sole purpose of producing totality in the different series. This totality the understanding does not concern itself with; its only occupation is the connection of experiences, by which series of conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The object of reason is, therefore, the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding .
(A643/B671)
Quoting Corvus
Reason has nothing to do with appearances as such, as shown above, inasmuch as immediate relation to an object IS its appearance to sensibility alone.
Illusory or outright mistaken understandings relative to real things, is a function of judgement, not reason.
That reason has for its object understanding, and understanding has for its object experience, it does not follow that reason has to do with experience or empirical knowledge itself.
How can judgement function for arriving at rational conclusions, if it were severed from reason?
From Hume to Kant, they all agree on the connection theory that all the mental faculties operate on the basis of the causality between each and every mental functions and events. Reason can serve nothing useful or rational if it stood itself in the mind with no connections to experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement.
This point had been confirmed, upheld and propounded by William James 200 years later for establishing his Psychological Theories of Human Mind. Even this day and age, this perspective has not changed. Without the causal operations between reason and judgement, AI system would have no logical footings for their design ideas and operandi principia.
Judgement doesnt conclude, it synthesizes.
. Conceptions, then, are based on the spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. ( ) All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements.
(A68/B93)
. General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are, understanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly, treats in its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of understanding. (A131/B170)
So it is, in merely representing the higher powers of the overall human intellectual program, re: as a means to expose and enable discussions of it, a speculative tripartite logical system in the form of a syllogism, the order or sequential procedure of which understanding is the major, judgement is the minor or assemblage of minors, and reason is the conclusion.
-
Quoting Corvus
Just ask yourself .what did Hume say reason couldnt do? And if the major raison detre of CPR was to expose what reason can do, such that Humes philosophy was proved incomplete, then it is the case reason has nothing to do with experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement, which Humes empirical philosophy covered well enough on its own. It has to do with, not all those, but how the use of those in non-empirical conditions is not only possible but necessary, and they are so only iff it is the case synthetic, and altogether pure a priori cognitions are themselves possible.
THAT .is what reason does, and we call them ..waaiiiitttt for itttttt ..principles!!!!!
Why does it synthesise? What is synthesis for, if it doesn't offer conclusion?
Quoting Mww
I have a few AI book here, and all of them talk about the association theory of mental faculties in Hume and Kant. Of course reason has limitations for its capabilities, and that is what Hume and Kant professed. But it doesn't mean that reason has nothing to do with the other mental faculties.
Crap, I spoke too fast. Imagination synthesizes; judgement merely represents the synthesis. My badly stated shortcut, sorry. Productive imagination synthesizes conceptions, that is, relates the conception in the subject of a possible cognition, to the conception in the predicate, the unity of that relation is then called judgement.
Reason certifies the relation as logical iff it accords with the corresponding principles, by which we consider ourselves positively certain, re: knowledge, and illogical otherwise, by which we find ourselves negatively certain, re: confused.
-
Quoting Corvus
That each member of a system operates in conjunction with the others, does not make explicit any have to do with the other. Pretty simple, really: the engine in a car has nothing to do with the rear axle, each being specific in itself for purpose and function, but without both, the car goes nowhere.
:ok: Every mental operation is actually synthesis of the other mental operation and the sensibility. And human perception is not all automatic process. They must make efforts to perceive better in the case of perceiving tricky looking objects or the world objects with the scarce data due to the remote distance or the size of the objects which are difficult to observe.
In the case of the bent stick, initially it appears bent when it is not. It is a tricky case. Some folks wonder if the stick is really bent. This is due to reason has not been applied to their visual perception. Or they applied their reasons but not correctly. They synthesise into the wrong conclusions. Synthesis is the process of combining all the data available, but judgement concludes for the best validity or what appears to be truth with the available data with the help of reason.
Quoting Mww
The association theory of mind for Hume and Kant doesn't say different mental faculties are the same entities. It means they work together just like the different car parts working together to get the car running example as you presented. But you seem to misunderstand the association theory of mind. It doesn't say different mental faculties are the same. It says that they work together under the principle of causality.
What .so the associative theory of mind works like the relation of car parts, I understand the relation of car parts .obviously, since I presented it ..yet I dont understand the associative theory of mind which is just like it?
Didnt I mention that each member of a system works in conjunction with the others?
Maybe you did. Not sure. Anyway the point is that judgement needs reason for its proper operation.
Without reason, judgement will work. But without support of reason judgement will arrive at irrational conclusions.
Depends on what you think proper operation of judgement entails. Pretty sure I made clear, according to the original transcendental philosophy, it doesnt need reason.
Judgement needs conceptions for its operation, proper or otherwise, such operation being the functional unity in understanding.
It sounds absurd to say judgements only need conceptions for its operation. It needs more than conception to operate. How can you judge if the apple taste good without having eaten it? Just by conception of apple, it is impossible to judge if the apple tastes good.
How can you judge if the Eiffel tower is taller than the Tokyo tower without measuring the heights and comparing the measurements of them? Can you do that with just the concepts of the towers?
All and each sensation, depending on its mode of intuition, is represented by its own conceptions. The compendium of those conceptions, synthesized in an aggregate series of relations to each other, gives the cognition of the thing as a whole. For those singular sensations, by themselves, not in conjunction with other modes of intuition, only judgements relative to that mode of intuition, that sensation, are possible.
Sufficient to explain why not all possible sensations are necessary to judge an object, and, that each sensation manifests in a possible judgement of its own, in accordance initially with its physiology, henceforth in accordance with the rules implicit in the faculty of understanding.
Yet another example of the exceptionalism of North trans-Atlantic philosophy. Almost as good as the typical Quinean argument of "Well we (I) want it to be true so it is true". In Ancient Athens, there would be no disagreement, Plato and Diogenes would join forces in mockery.
Quoting Corvus
Voilà, another interpretation of the term.
Not quite clear what you are trying to say here. Could you give some real life examples, where you can make judgements with conception only without any other mental faculties associated?
Yes, there are many different interpretations even in the academic communities. Which one is the absolute true one?
All judgements having to do with things, are of conceptions only.
Quoting Corvus
I never said no other faculties were associated. In fact, other faculties must be, given the previous comments.
We will have to bring Kant back from the dead, but even then it is possible he would not be able to fully explain it, after all he failed to do in his several books. Denuo, ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium.
You could join the time travel thread, and travel into the 1700s. :nerd:
If you already have the concepts of things, why do you need further judgements on them?
What are there to judge with things?
Further? This implies concepts are judgements, when they are in fact only representations.
For why judgement is needed, when there are already conceptions, consult A67-76/B92-101.
It breaks the traditional meaning of judgement and concept. I am not sure if there is a point for insisting on the point apart from creating confusion.
Quoting Mww
If that is really what Kant said, then you, as a serious reader of CPR, should be in a position to criticise the point, rather than blindly accepting it, and worshiping CPR as if it were a bible. If concept were judgements, then is the Sun the Moon? Is a dog a cat? Is an apple a bucket? It just creates unnecessary and unacceptable confusions.
CPR is not a bible to be worshipped. It has to be interpreted and understood in the making sense way for the present days. If it is not making sense, it is not worth it. I try to read it making sense way. Someone said "To understand Kant is to transcend him." I think he was right in saying so.
For a few hundred years, it is, for all intents and purposes, the bible for critical human thought.
Quoting Corvus
Why wouldnt it? Knowledge has certainly evolved, but the human intellectual system, in whichever form that actually is . by which knowledge evolves, has not changed one iota in these few hundred years. Or even if a couple iotas, still not enough to make a difference. Given current education and peer review, Kant would understand qualia just as well as anybody these days.
Quoting Corvus
Nahhhh. To understand Kant is to think as if in his place and time. Work with what he worked with. You didnt read in that link, where the author said pretty much the same thing? That people are apt to misunderstand him because theyre using asymmetrical conditions in attempting to arrive at congruent conclusions. Sadly, Kant must be wrong because hes three hundred years old?
(Sigh)
Judgement is an act of judging. Concept is more close to definition. Judgement can have concepts in its content, and it is always in propositional form. That is what Bolzano said in The Theory of Science. I think that makes sense. If one says concept is judgement and they are the same, then it doesn't sound right logically. If that is what Kant said, then one should point it out as an absurd idea.
Anyways, ok, we agree to disagree. :) Worshipping Kant as if he is some God, and CPR is the bible is not a good philosophy. It is, rather, a religion in disguise of the philosophy. :grin:
While this is correct, do you see the fault in judgement in supposing it has been the case with respect to this conversation? And if theres no evidence for the case other than mere observation of the disparity in our respective comments, and even if that assertion never was directed towards this conversation in the first place, what purpose is served by stating the obvious?
But never fear; its ok. Its covered in the bible (of critical human thought):
(those finding themselves in a dialectic corner) must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance .
Your misunderstanding seems to come from thinking judgements are concepts, and judgements have no association with reasoning in the operation. If this is the case, what is the purpose of reason in CPR? What does reason supposed to be doing in the minds?
Good luck finding where I said judgement are concepts. If I didnt say it, what possible ground could there be for you to claim a misunderstanding of mine related to it?
Quoting Corvus
What operation? For this operation it doesnt, for that operation it does. Im not going to guess which one youre talking about.
It would be much helpful if you could / would just explain the unclear things in straight forward manner instead of keep beating around the bush.
If you traced back what you wrote, you just kept on saying that judgement has nothing to do with reason. But then now you seem to have changed your words talking about "the other operation.", and tell us you won't guess which one. It is not a straight forward way of discourse.
Yeah, ok. All my fault. Sorry.
Good luck.
Kant's TI was opposed and criticised by many of the other Philosophers after his time such as Nietzsche, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bolzano, Heidegger ... etc. His TI wasn't absolutely perfect. But then which philosophy is?
Quoting Mww
Thanks. To you too. :ok:
Quantum mechanics (QM) cannot explain everything, but it gives a lot of very good predictions. Unfortunately there is no way to understand it as traditionally physical, in the sense of particles controlled by forces through cause and effect. In the math a very distant object can be changed instantaneously by something happening here. That can't be due to forces because by the rest of physics, forces operate locally.
This makes it difficult to believe QM because no one can see how that can happen - but there are theories. One is that QM is just a bunch of formulas for prediction, but there is no real quantum world. That is a lot harder to accept now that we know that there is no traditionally physical universe. If the quantum world is not real, neither is our familiar physical world. This approach thus ends up in idealism - only the experienced observations are real. That is one alternative we might entertain but do not have to believe it - or anything else.
Other theories extend the physical world to include things we never thought were real, physical things, like for instance information. Another approach is that only the math is real - the physical world is part of the set-theoretcial universe and exists if sets do. None of these theories are particularly believable, but they are all possibilities worth exploring and some might be useful.
Secondly, the observed physical world is a structure created by our brains. People are not born being able to see in 3D - the incoming visual information is 2D. Sometime during infancy the brain creates neural structures that make this information appear to be 3D. This has to be done in the very unformed infant nervous system. Adults born blind cannot later after sight-restoring surgery learn to see in 3D - they see a very flat world. Seeing in 3D does not come from inference or reasoning of any sort. But evolution has found it useful for human survival and reproduction to produce our internal movies in 3D.
Plus 3D might not last as a physical framework either. Trying to cope with QM and relativity has produced non-3D models. A highly curved 2D surface seems to work reasonably well. But so does a universe existing in 10^400 or so dimensions which has some information structures that have good 3D approximations.
We don't have to believe in the existence of anything - doing so doesn't have much advantage - but exploring and entertaining the possibilities of competing theories - and developing new ones - can be useful to life.
An interesting post. :up: It is interesting, because it was unusual to read about the sceptical world view, which is based on, and coming from science and QM perspective, not some idealistic immaterialism. I used to have the idea (still do), when science especially physics and QM knowledge get mature and deepen to the limits culminating its level of knowledge in the domain, that would be a kind of views on the world and universe, rather than being absolutely certain about them. There are lot of points in your post to go over, mull over, reading up, and return for further discussions. Thank you for the great post. Welcome to TPF. :pray: :cool:
Him and hundreds of other people before him.
What does it mean to say that models are wrong? Wrong in relation to what? If a model is useless it is useless, which means it doesn't accord with experience. Newtonian mechanics is useful, albeit not quite as useful as Einsteinian mechanics in some contexts.
We don't know whether either of them are right, in the sense of true, or even what it could mean for them to be right beyond observations showing that the predictions that are entailed by them obtain.
It is simply the tired metaphorical dichotomy of map and territory. The territory is not the map, so it is "wrong", but some maps are better at guiding you around the territory than others.
Surely some Ancient Greek wrote something along those lines, and surely some Mesopotamian 2000 years before that said something along those lines too.
Some nations have relevance mania and need to make one or two things every one of their intellectuals said into a quote, an idea, a thought, a "law", a piece of content a meme , even if it is not interesting or true or original at all, so that they pretend more national merit than it is due. Think of how some Hindutvas claim that Indians invented most things in the world, but now imagine that with more cunning memetic tactics.
Welcome. Yes, it is. :)
"The logical ground for belief in the existence of the world can be approached from various philosophical perspectives, each offering different arguments and justifications. Here are a few key approaches:
1. **Empirical Realism**: Empirical realism is the view that the external world exists independently of our perceptions and experiences of it. This position is based on the idea that our senses provide us with reliable information about the world, and that we can trust our sensory experiences as a basis for forming beliefs about reality. From this perspective, the existence of the world is grounded in the evidence provided by our senses and the consistency of our observations across different perceptual experiences.
2. **Metaphysical Realism**: Metaphysical realism holds that the external world exists objectively, regardless of our perceptions or beliefs about it. This position is based on the idea that there is a mind-independent reality that exists independently of human consciousness. Metaphysical realists argue that the world has an intrinsic nature and existence that is not contingent upon our subjective experiences or interpretations of it.
3. **Inference to the Best Explanation**: Some philosophers argue for the existence of the world based on the principle of inference to the best explanation. According to this principle, we should believe in the existence of the world because it provides the best explanation for our experiences and observations. The existence of the world is posited as the simplest and most coherent explanation for the diversity and regularity of our sensory experiences.
4. **Pragmatic Justification**: Pragmatic approaches to belief in the existence of the world emphasize the practical consequences of adopting such a belief. From a pragmatic perspective, belief in the existence of the world is justified because it is necessary for successful navigation of our environment, interaction with others, and attainment of our goals and desires. Belief in the existence of the world is seen as a useful and necessary assumption for engaging effectively with our surroundings.
These approaches provide different justifications for believing in the existence of the world, ranging from appeals to sensory experience and empirical evidence to arguments based on metaphysical realism and pragmatic considerations. While each approach has its strengths and weaknesses, belief in the existence of the world is generally regarded as a foundational assumption of human cognition and inquiry, underlying our understanding of the natural world and our place within it."
I wonder if these views provide the solid enough grounds for the beliefs, or do they have some logical flaws in their views.
Now after some reflection, this argument appears to have a weakpoint that is what it means for ideas to have an "origin". By origin it would mean how the contents of my mind come to be, their cause that is. If I take a snapshot of my mind at a given moment, I cannot establish what the causes of {the ideas there} are without looking at a past snapshot, but then, the classic Humean question: what is the necessary connection between the idea at time t and at time t-1? Why can I trace the thought "I am hungry" to the subjective experience of hunger, but I can't trace the perception of a laptop to the experience of hunger, beyond a mere regularity?
I wasn't expecting that.
Quoting Gary Venter
Never heard of it.
Quoting Gary Venter
Hardly an original idea.
Is Santa Clause real? Is God real?
1. It was a question about if the existence of God and Santa are real. Not the ideas.
2. Does it make sense to say that for us to be able to imagine and understand it, it has to be real?
3. Does the world care if we can or cannot imagine or understand it?
Philosophy has become a classifying system for concepts and lines of reasoning, and all the branches the definitions and arguments could take. For instance there must be at least 20 types of panpsychism by now. New research, such as PhD dissertations, consists of following a line as far as it can go and then extending it in some way, probably by further splitting the track. Philosophy ends up having the same organizational structure as a book of chess openings.
ChatGPT has adopted the philosophical approach. Everything seems factual and devoid of evaluation, at least until the conclusion that "belief in the existence of the world is generally regarded as a foundational assumption of human cognition and inquiry, underlying our understanding of the natural world and our place within it," for which no support is provided.
Do you think the statement is lacking in support? I would think randomly polling people on the question would show general agreement with ChatGPT.
At the very least, it's fairly easy to prove that *most philosophers* are realists about the world
https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all
Accept or lean towards non-skeptical realism
79.54%
That may not satisfy the full sentence in question, but it's at least a start towards it.
Some physicists are now saying that physics does not support the existence of the quantum world, which the classical physical world is made of. All it does, and all we need it to do, is predict our observations.
I expect that most people would agree that acting like the physical world is real would would work well in practice.
I personally take a skeptical viewpoint that there is no reason to accept any theories about the reality of anything, including the reality of the quantum world and everything built from it. Still there are appealing theories about quantum reality, all worth entertaining.
This are real delusions.
Interesting point. :ok:
Quoting Gary Venter
ChatGPT seems to be ok for getting quick summarised info on the topics. But it is not for anything more detailed, deeper or serious source of info. What portion of the info from ChatGPT and all the online based description source would be reliable and objective knowledge in terms of the factual and verified truths is another matter.
The post was just asking you for clarification on your claims, which sounded confused and muddled. How can "asking for clarification" be delusions?
https://chat.openai.com/share/a3c86a67-ff27-4ec9-8ffa-ebc8fb95e01c
https://chat.openai.com/share/96378835-0a94-43ce-a25b-f05e5646ec40
https://chat.openai.com/share/b5241b53-e4d8-4cab-9a81-87fa73d740ad
https://chat.openai.com/share/f924090e-a7eb-4b67-9e62-389db1f6c87b
https://chat.openai.com/share/025521ed-ac2b-4156-bd15-e74053f66cba
https://chatgpt.com/share/239b3d25-6ec1-4268-af0b-609a47c25d2c
Philosophers often seem to quibble about definitions, when the definitions are unclear for the arguments. :nerd: But shouldn't the AI Knowledge Expert System be able to present with the correct definitions at the press of the button instead of quibbling about them? :D
Presenting someone with a correct definition will look like quibbling to a person who is using the word a different way. It's not like the AI described itself as quibbling -- don't forget the principle of untrustworthy narrator.
Sure, it can be done.
"That world is there before all belief." (Heidegger, Prolegomenon, GA20, p.295)
It's a funny metaphor in a way, because ordinarily we can know both map and territory.
Quoting SEP's platonism
If an SEP article about an unrelated topic seems to bring up skepticism about the outside world as an unproblematic analogy, it is unlikely that laymen would be justified in seeing realism as self-evident.
Relevant for the discussion surrounding solipsism and action:
Quoting SEP's Descartes' Epistemology