An example where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
"Today is Tom's last day on earth"
If said by a doctor on a deathbed, It is simply a statement of fact, an "is"
If said by a mafia boss to his hitman in response to "Forgive Tom" , it's equivalent to "You should kill Tom"
( You can imagine the mafia boss handing a loaded gun to the hitman )
Here is a case where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
Why ? It is the context which allows us to determine the "ought" given a descriptive statement issued with confidence or from an authority in the present in refrence to the future.
TLDR : Descriptive statements can function as commands
If said by a doctor on a deathbed, It is simply a statement of fact, an "is"
If said by a mafia boss to his hitman in response to "Forgive Tom" , it's equivalent to "You should kill Tom"
( You can imagine the mafia boss handing a loaded gun to the hitman )
Here is a case where we can derive an "ought" from an "is"
Why ? It is the context which allows us to determine the "ought" given a descriptive statement issued with confidence or from an authority in the present in refrence to the future.
TLDR : Descriptive statements can function as commands
Comments (101)
:up:
I think the confusion, Sirius, may be that various metaethical debates, and the depiction of Hume's Guillotine, incorrectly depict them as "ought" vs. "is"s--but the english language has many examples of ought statements which aren't, in-themselves, moral statements.
Also, inferring "You should kill Tom" from "Today is Tom's last day on earth" is just an inference from colloquial speech: technically, one cannot logically nor coherently derive, all else being equal, the former from the latter. It is only with context in colloquial speech, where we use words very imprecisely, that one could infer this: so I wouldn't even say this proves, philosophically, that one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.
Im all for questioning authority.
You ought to (X)!
You must (Y).
Why? Hmm :chin:
Its raining hard. You must wear a raincoat, my beloved child!
But whyyyyyy? :fear:
However, adding an If clause to the sentence radically changes the energy of the statement from a command or assertion to something more propositional, debatable, even broadly scientific.
(IE. If your want to see photosynthesis happening live, you must look into a microscope at plant cells).
So then we have: If you dont want to get soaking wet, you ought to have some protection from the rain.
To which the philosophical and daring child might answer:
But what is the nature of wetness? And who (or what) is asking this question? :nerd:
You summed it up perfectly.
Whether the "ought" we derive is correct or not is a seperate question. I am only addressing the claim that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is"
Hume's distinction goes beyond morality. Normative commands don't need to be related to morality.
Nevertheless, addressing your concerns. Your objection only holds for those who are moral realists, who believe mind-independent moral standard is given and we can judge what is right or wrong in reference to it.
But a moral irrealist would simply tell you, moral statement are mind-dependent (non-objectivists) or moral statements are not truth apt (non-cognitivists) or moral statements are all false (errror theorists ).
The usage of "ought" for general normative statements is correct, since Hume wasn't only concerned with moral statements.
I don't see a problem with using colloquial language. In the philosophy of language, we don't look for a perfect language anymore. All we do is explore how language works in real life, following the example of Wittgenstein, who reminded everyone to let philosophy leave everything as it is
As for imprecise language, didn't Wittgenstein say it is friction that allows to walk ? A smooth floor would not allow us to walk. The fact is language is imprecise, but it works.
There is no technical issue here. It's not like l have uttered nonsense.
It doesn't have be like that. We can have conditions that the person issuing declarative statements must satisfy some objective moral criteria.
Criterion : The poor need some of our money
A poor child comes to you and spreads his hand saying, "I am starving" , you can derive the implication from his statement, "You should give me ( a poor child ) some money" . He is not just stating a fact, "I am starving" , he is begging for help and expecting you to be a kind person.
My point was to show, our language does allow declarative statements to function as normative statements simultaneously
I completely agree that this we can and should contextually interpret such things as requests. One hundred percent. I have made the point myself. But there is a difference between the illocutionary utterance (the declaration) and the interpretation whereby that utterance gains normative force. The request itself does not have that normative force. This is precisely where the "gap" occurs.
But do I have a moral duty to help the poor child? Suppose I'm a sergeant and my platoon is in an urban firefight and this poor injured kid comes out of the shadows begging for help. It's not clear to me that I should drop everything and help the kid.
I believe this rests on a mistaken notion of how language works. Why do we interpret sentences the way we do ? What forces us to derive conclusions ? The non-linguistic practices and contexts. That's it.
Language itself is normative. It doesn't need a force, nor does it depend on rules, for rules would require further interpretation ad infinitum. There are no gaps to be fulfilled. The wrong and right inferences from a statement depend on the community of language speakers.
Language can be used to make normative statements.. Stating that language is normative is overreaching. Normativity describes a standard of behaviour. To the extent that behaviour and language do not necessarily coincide, language absolutely is not normative.
But the problem is the same old one: There's an implied hypothetical between "I command you to" and "you ought to," namely "You ought to do this IF you want to keep your kneecaps intact" or some such. It's perfectly possible, though unlikely, that the hitman could reply, "I'm OK with broken kneecaps," in which case we haven't managed to derive a pure "ought" from an "is." This example certainly clarifies that the ought-is problem is logical, not psychological. Since just about no one wants to be injured in this way, the command has a lot of psychological force -- but no logical entailment without the "if" premise,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-following/#NormCond
"According to a prominent line of thought, the notion of correctness involved in the seemingly platitudinous claim that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application is intrinsically normative. On this reading, meaning facts are normative factsthey not only sort the applications of expressions into correct or incorrect, but also prescribe how expressions ought to be applied. They issue semantic categorical obligations that bind speakers in determinate ways; the justified applications are precisely those that fulfil these semantic obligations"
Keeping the above paragraph l quoted in mind
Take this example
"This is a pencil" implies "This ought to function like a pencil"
If it doesn't, then the first statement is wrong.
With the same line of reasoning, if you claim "murder is wrong" , but you cannot derive "murder should be wrong" , then your first statement is false
Why ? Wrong comes equipped with "ought not to do"
Hmm. Saying that a meaningful expression inherently contains its own context of correct application is "normative" is not the same kind of normativity which applies to behaviour, at least not trivially so. A meaningful expression could "rightfully" be interpreted to mean "this man must be executed," but the agent is still free to disregard this claim. The disregarding would be an example of real normativity overriding this "semantic normativity". Which doesn't seem normative to me at all in any kind of significant or "meaningful" way.....
There is another thread on when philosophy becomes affectation. This makes me think of that.
Quoting How to derive an ought from an is
The "Is" is the utterance of the words, a fact. The "Ought" is the obligation.
The usual response from those who like Hume's guillotine is that there must be a slight of hand somewhere in the argument. I don't think there is any such prestidigitation. it's just that we do in fact commonly place ourselves under obligations.
The promise example avoids the quibbles and side issues of authority and ethics.
There's a vast literature stemming from Searle's paper. Further, Searle was a student of Austin, to whom is making reference, if obliquely.
Thats true, but Hume was only interested in the fact that one cannot derive a prescription from an indicative statementnot that one cannot derive a normative fact. My only point before was that, in metaethics, it is about moral statementsbut perhaps I mischaracterized your OP as having to do with that.
The problem is that it is leading to ambiguity that is convincing you that you have successfully derived a prescription from a description, when you havent. What is happening is you are converting an imprecise sentence into its underlying meaning: a prescription (like you should kill) cannot simultaneously be a non-prescriptive claim (like today is Toms last day on earth).
If you doubt this, then try and make a syllogism that concludes you should kill Tom is derivable with today is Toms last day on earth without simply making the latter an encrypted or ambiguated version of the former.
Another way of thinking about it is imagine that you heard someone tell you today is all you can eat taco day!. Now imagine, unknown to you, that within that area of the world (you were in) that it really was code for you should kill. Now, it should be clear that a purely descriptive statement has no prescriptions in it: they are categorically different. For a person who knew the lingo and knew that it was code would simply convert it in their head: they wouldnt be legitimately deriving an ought from an is. You are just noting that we can codify sentences.
Determinism is true. So folk cannot be responsible for their criminal actions. Thus, we ought not punish folk for their criminal actions.
We punish people for their actions. Ergo determinism is false.
1. You ought make whatever the Godfather says should be true, true.
2. The godfather says today is Toms last day on earth"
3. You ought make today is Toms last day on earth" true.
4. You should kill Tom.
Thing is, there is nothing ambiguous about "today is Toms last day on earth". It's not open to an alternative explanation - unless it's Major Tom, talking to ground control - but that would be an utterly different context, not a case of ambiguity. It isn't a case of "converting an imprecise sentence into its underlying meaning".
I think we can be confident there is no chance of anyone in the room with The Godfather misunderstanding.
The fact of the obligation implies the obligation, not the utterance. The utterance is secondary. The real statement of facts is:
Jones borrowed five dollars from Smith.
Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.
The verbalizations memorialize the normative force, they don't create it.
This negates the OP and does not suffice to win my proposal (in the response you quoted of me), since they were claiming that your #2 is a description that is itself a prescription. Your argument is perfectly valid exactly because the prescription are being derived from other prescription, and not #2.
I.e., You should kill Tom. is being derived from the prescription #3, which is derived from the prescription #1 with the supplement of the empirical fact (which is not a prescription) #2. The OP is in disagreement with you, as they would have to argue #2 can be itself derived as a prescription:
Banno, you didn't derived an ought from an is.
So was he? Wed have to agree with Searle that the full force of the expression I hereby promise excludes any reference to a description of mental states. But then how shall we describe the difference between the sincere and the deceptive promise-maker? The performative expression is identical, the intention (if Im allowed that word) is not. Searle says that this makes the relation between promising and obligation . . . very mysterious, but I dont see why. Insincere, deceptive people are common. What sets them apart from genuine folk are their intentions or mental states. Are they really promising? Yes, no, and maybe all seem like possible answers.
In a way, though, none of this is central to the ought-is problem, which, if we follow Hume, is strictly a logical one. It is also much deeper than a simple question about entailment. The more closely we look, the more we realize that were interrogating the very meaning of ought. Does a true ought have to be categorical, in Kants sense that is, without any if premise? To my mind, Kants thoughts about this are still the gold standard, but thats enough for now.
Take: "The glass is fragile, if you drop it, it will break."
We can expand this to "based on all my knowledge of the glass, observations of past glasses, etc. and my knowledge of how the world works more generally, glasses ought to be fragile. If you drop this glass, it ought to break."
That is, fact statements can be seen as statements about what "ought" to happen (what would be the "correct" outcome) if our model of the world is correct. We can, and are, frequently wrong about "is" statements, which only makes this more plausible. Then, consider Hume's attack on induction. This seems to require that a great majority of "is statements," really reflect something like: "if induction is valid, and given x observations, y ought to occur." That is, they are statements about the correctness of possible future observations given our model of the world. This would seem to expand to all of Hume's "matters of fact," but not his "relations of ideas."
That aside, it seems like we can make plenty of factual statements related to morality anyhow. "If poverty was alleviated more human flourishing would occur," is a fact statement. "Flourishing is good for the individual," is likewise a fact statement. I would tend to agree that the facts of the matter that can ground and drive on the development of morality are "out in the world," and that these principles tend to get instantiated in human institutions.
Well, there is absolutely no problem in making fact claims about the values human institutions instantiate from what I can see. It might be hard to make the argument that they are, indeed, instantiating those values through historical processes, but that doesn't preclude such an argument being successful. That being the case, morality can be described in an "is" sense completely separate from the "oughts" that institutions impossible on individuals.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That the glass will break might be an extrapolation deriving from observing something that occurs so often that you can predict a likely outcome - but there is nothing "correct" about the outcome; the glass breaking is just a state of affairs that will likely obtain that is, technically, totally disconnected from our knowledge. The "ought", then, is not really supported by our understanding of glasses.
In other words: our model of the world is rooted in states of affairs, one of which is the glass potentially breaking. To say that the glass ought to break is contingent upon our abstract, perhaps even mathematical, knowledge of glasses. So, to call the likely outcome "correct" if confirmed makes no sense even in the context of a model because such a state of affairs is just that: a likely outcome. You could, however, say that our prediction was accurate and validated our model of the world if the glass breaks. But there is no real, tangible correctness there.
I think you have what I was intending flipped around backwards. It's not the observed outcomes that can be correct/incorrect, it's the models that ground our "is statements." That is, "if my 'is statement' is correct, x ought to happen." If x does not occur, it casts doubt on the "is statement," not the outcome that occured. "Is statements" can certainly be correct or incorrect, e.g. "Barack Obama is the current President," is an incorrect"is statement."
This gets to the whole idea of prediction as a way of vetting suppositions about states of affairs and causal transitions between them.
But since Hume thinks cause is just constant conjunction, "is statements" to the effect of "gasoline is combustible," would always be on thin ice anyhow. For Hume, such a thing wouldn't be a claim about a single state of affairs, but rather a claim about [I]all[/I] states of affairs involving gasoline and combustion.
Quoting Bob Ross
The post is about your misuse of "ambiguity'.
But that has no impact on the derivation - which commences with an "is" and finishes with an "ought".
If your claim is that here is an implicit ought in (1) then you seem also to be reiterating objection 2 from the article. Yes, you ought to keep your promises - that's a fact about what a promise is - and a mere tautology.
So the mistake here is to confuse direction of fit with type of statement. An "is" statement can set out an obligation.
Kant's imperative, as a preference for consistency, has my sympathy. But folk seem to think it goes further than mere tautology, and of that I am suspicious. I don't think it much help in deciding what to do. But that's a different story.
Yep. "fragile" tells us how to act towards the parcel - if you work for Qantas, it tells you to use it for basketball practice. "Is" statements can tell you what you ought do.
I am confused, because you proved my point. What the OP was claiming is clearly false when you explicate it unambiguously, which is exactly what you did.
I wasn't saying that all colloquial speech is very imprecise but, rather, that it seems as though the OP's conclusion is due to the confusion with the ambiguity in the colloquial speech (they were deploying). Saying "today is tom's last day on earth" does not entail whatsoever that "one ought to kill tom". After explicating it clearly, one can see that more work has to be put into the argument to get that prescription (which you demonstrated, I would say), and from there is it clear that no ought is being derived from an is. I think we may be in agreement: I agree that not all colloquial speech is confused nor ambiguous.
That is the whole point about promising. It is a voluntary binding of the is and the ought. It isn't trivial. It is the voluntary human enaction which bridges the is-ought gap. Not language. The entire concept of normativity is not just to identify, but to actualize. You can derive completely different oughts from virtually identical is statements just by the addition of one statement.
Tom sees a child about to be hit by a bus.
Tom has only one day left to live.
Tom ought to push the child out of the way, sacrificing himself.
Tom sees a child about to be hit by a bus.
Tom has only one day left to live.
The child just contracted a deadly new form of avian flu that will decimate the population.
Tom ought to let the child die.
The linguistic argument assumes that conditions can be exhaustively elaborated, which is misleading. Even when they can the statements apparently logically entail, it isn't linguistic, it is just a fact of historical consensus about fundamental behaviours. Yes, "promise" implies a binding of behaviour to language. That doesn't mean that language entails behaviour. It doesn't.
The first is to derive from a single premise:
a)
Premise: This is a red car
Conclusion: Therefore, this is a car
The second is to derive from more than one premise:
b)
Premise: If John is a man then John is mortal
Premise: John is a man
Conclusion: Therefore, John is mortal
So now let's consider obligations:
c)
Premise: One ought not murder
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder John
d)
Premise: If John is innocent then one ought not kill him
Premise: John is innocent
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not kill John
Perhaps you want an argument of these forms:
e)
Premise: Murder is Y
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder
f)
Premise: If murder is Y then murder is Z
Premise: Murder is Y
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder
I don't think either e) or f) can ever be valid. But so what? Why isn't c) or d) sufficient?
There seems to be this implicit claim that if "one ought not murder" cannot be derived from "murder is Y" premises alone then it cannot be true. What justifies this claim?
Okay, so there is an outcome within the parameters of the model that validates an ought if it occurs. But this ought is totally contingent on the veracity of the "is statements" that make up the model. Thus, they must be grounded in reality if they wish to reflect reality - and in the case of morality must likely also be universalizable. Saying merely that "flourishing is good for the individual", for instance, could contain myriad interpretations as to what constitutes flourishing depending upon which "facts" you start with, and how broad your scope is.
Quoting Michael
Quoting Michael
I think the issue is not that it cannot be true, but rather that such an "ought" is up for debate if it isn't supported by a relevant fact. I mean, if we cannot say that killing that might constitute murder is wrong in a way related to a reality outside of us, then how can we say that one is definitely behaving morally by not killing John? Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling? I could just as easily claim that we ought to kick dogs and it would be equally as supported as your assertion one ought not kill John, but people wouldn't consider that morally acceptable. You might couch the "ought" in a concept of innocence in (d), but that concept of innocence is, naturally, theoretical and somewhat subjective.
You could, of course, shore up your statements with plenty of compelling reasoning and by appealing to some basic shared principles concerning innocence, but it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that).
So, I think you are right. I also think your position is inherently weaker but far more reasonable when it is expounded upon than hoping for some more mystical, direct is-ought connection - as much as that pains me to write.
edit: I mean that the moral status of the ought is up for debate, not its trueness
The realist will claim that that one ought not murder is a fact about reality, much like that an electron is a negatively charged particle is a fact about reality.
Quoting ToothyMaw
That's a different question. It might be true that one ought not murder even if knowing this doesn't compel me to obey. Perhaps I just don't care about what I ought or ought not do. Perhaps I enjoy doing things I shouldn't.
Meta ethics isn't concerned with what we actually choose to do.
Might we consider that history is the arbiter here? How many morally loaded ideas have fallen "on the wrong side of history," and become widely anathema? General opinion against child marriage seems to have gained enough ground, at least in the West, to constitute and global moral fact. At least certain forms of racial and sex discrimination seem to be headed in the same direction. The idea of "noble birth," has been consigned to the "dust bin of history."
This is what we might expect if the principles that undergird moral facts are "out in the world," but must be objectified in our morality and institutions through historical processes in the same way that scientific facts are assimilated as a historical process and built into paradigms.
I know. Are you saying you are a realist and thus that your claim that one ought not murder is a moral fact? It sounds more like you are just adopting a pragmatic way of going about it that appeals to concepts like innocence and obligation and not actual fact hood.
Quoting Michael
Yes, meta ethics doesn't concern what we actually decide to do, but one's meta ethical view either does or does not make valid whatever normative efforts one puts forward. If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it? You need to define the space in which you are working in when applying morality, and that means at least a lightweight meta ethical exposition.
I'm simply questioning the assertion that if one cannot derive an ought from an is then any claim of obligation is false.
Perhaps "you ought not harm another" is simply a brute fact about reality, much like "electrons are negatively charged particles" is.
Quoting ToothyMaw
If by "what reason do I have to follow it" you mean something like "why should I believe you" then maybe you shouldn't believe me if I can't prove it.
But whether or not I can prove it and whether or not you should believe me is a separate issue to whether or not it is true.
If realism is correct then something can be both true and unprovable.
Quoting Michael
Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people. That isn't the same as proving it per se, but it certainly constitutes providing evidence. That is mostly all I would ask for to really ground an ought statement in reality.
And if there is evidence, ought I not believe you? I mean, if realism were true, maybe some facts would exist that couldn't be proven, but these facts could be used to form reasonable explanations for other moral considerations. Shouldn't we also pay attention to those explanations that are most logical, reasonable, etc.? Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts".
Asking why its wrong to harm people is like asking why electrons are negatively charged. There is no answer; some things are simply fundamental, brute facts. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere.
Quoting ToothyMaw
One such brute fact might be it is wrong to harm people.
Quoting Michael
I agree. I also believe that to be a brute fact. But for the purposes of discussing the is-ought divide, I feel obligated to mention that we don't have the kind of philosophical or scientific certitude in the area of morality that we have elsewhere.
I think that you as well as I are certain people should not be harmed, and that also explanations do have to end somewhere. I just like to discuss meta ethics as it is really interesting to me.
This will likely to be very incomplete reasoning, but Ill give outlining my current idea of metaethics a best shot:
First, consider that all ethics results first and foremost from what one oneself wants to obtain in the future given a) that one as agent is compelled in an ontologically fixed manner to optimally minimize ones own present and future suffering (a premise which I grant can get very complex when looked at in detail) and b) that one is not alone in the cosmos as an agent described by (a) but that, instead, all coexistent agents in the cosmos are likewise described by (a).
Any conceivable end, or telos, that satisfies (a) given (b) will then be that which is good for oneself. One can of course envision more than one such possible future state of being. Yet some such envisioned future states of being will be unrealizable and, thereby, false. Pursuit of such a false state of future being will not minimize ones own suffering but intensify it, thereby being a wrong notion of what is good. To pursue such false ultimate telos would then be to do what is wrong, or else bad, for oneself.
Here tersely outlined, (a) given (b) is first off taken to be an objective fact. Addressing just this part, one then gets into the riddle of how no matter what one does one can only be in pursuit of the good. Next addressing that telos which, ideally, perfectly satisfies (a) given (b), one can again likely obtain more than one conception of what it might be. Given that these alternatives will be mutually exclusive, were any one alternative to in fact be fulfillable as a telos/goal in principle, it would then be the objectively true good, with all other alternatives then necessarily being objectively false, hence wrong, hence bad goals to pursue. Here, then, some things one could do to satisfy (a) given (b) will be objectively good (for they approach the objectively true telos just specified) and others will be objectively bad (for they approach objectively bad teloi at expense of the objectively good telos). Furthermore, because of (b), that which is the objectively good end to pursue for yourself will then likewise be the objectively good ends to pursue for all others.
Indulge for the moment that the dictum of liberty, equality, and fraternity for all serves as a steppingstone toward one conception of what this objectively good, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this telos 1
Also indulge for the moment that, as an alternative to this trajectory, the dictum of Its good to be the absolute ruler over everyone and everything other serves as a steppingstone toward another conception of what the objectively true, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this telos 2.
The two will be mutually exclusive and thereby contradictory: one cannot gravitate toward both at the same time and in the same way. One will be objectively good and the other thereby objectively bad. If one were to figure out which of the two just mentioned teloi is the true objective good, one then would furthermore figure out an existentially fixed (though non-physicalist) is via which oughts can be established.
Next, take the ought that people should not be unduly harmed.
Were telos 1 to be objectively truehence, an existentially fixed telos that is actualizable in principle and that awaits to be fulfilledthen it would substantiate the just addressed dictum rationally, thereby making the proposition that people should not be unduly harmed an objectively good ideal/goal/telos to pursue, for it as such satisfies closer proximity to telos 1. However, were telos 2 to be objectively true, then people should not be unduly harmed would be unproductive to bringing oneself into closer proximity to telos 2thereby signifying that this ought is an inappropriate and thereby bad ideal/goal/telos to pursue.
At core issue would be, not so much what most people deem to be good or bad (hence, current normality) but, instead, which ultimate telos specified is actualizable in principle and which is not. The former will be the right telos to pursuewhat some in history have termed the Goodand the latter will be the wrong telos to pursue.
All this as an exceedingly terse outline of how I so far approach the issue of metaethics. And, of course, none of this makes any sense in a world wherein no teleological processes (and, hence, wherein no teloi) occur.
And, as a reminder, metaethics isnt about prescription but about description. If telos 1 were true, it would justify the given ought. If telos 2 were true, it would not justify the given ought. The issue, again, is which conceived of ultimate telos is true and thereby conforms to what in fact is.
Disregarding that this might not apply to, say, Jihadists, this sounds pretty reasonable. But many people also feel compelled to reduce others' suffering, too. Or they might have any number of moral convictions.
Quoting javra
I'm sorry, what? How can a state of being, even unrealizable and future, be false? Maybe it doesn't satisfy (a) given (b), but it is a state of affairs, not a proposition or something. You could say that a certain state of the universe, or being, could not possibly come to fruition, so therefore it would not be moral to pursue it, however, which you don't quite say here:
Quoting javra
But who is to say for sure that pursuing a false state of being is truly sub-optimal? Maybe one genuinely believes that climate change is a hoax and one will not be affected, and thereby believes that they are justified in being extravagant in their usage of fossil fuels. This harms other people, but not so much the individual in the short term.
Now that I look at what you are writing some more, you don't differentiate between "future states of being" of the individual with everybody's states of being, and I don't buy that what is good for everyone is always good for the individual.
Quoting javra
Presupposing (b), and thus (a), is true to support the argument that purports that there are true or false, or moral or unrealizable, future states of being that we should avoid or pursue, and thus that any realizable end that satisfies (a) given (b) is moral - even if to differing degrees - is circular. So yes, if (b) is true, (a) is too. But why is (b) true? And, once again, even if (b) is true, why is what is good for the individual good for everyone or vice versa?
Quoting javra
What does this mean? People definitely don't always pursue the good. Are you talking about why under many ethics people are always obligated to pursue the good?
Quoting javra
Why would a satisfactory telos be an objectively true good? Your telos is based on a shaky presupposition - that what is good for the group is good for the individual, or that (b) is true in the way you claim. And who are the bad goals bad for? The group, or the individual? You didn't really differentiate between the two.
Quoting javra
I disagree. What about holding slaves? Even if (b) is true, slaveholders kept slaves for their own benefit, and that doesn't disagree with your argument as far as I can tell. They just did what benefitted themselves, and I'm sure the slaves tried to do what benefitted themselves too, or at least as much as they could, given the circumstances.
The more I think about your argument the more I think you defined (a) too narrowly. There are good goals other than minimizing one's own suffering - but they are more nebulous than your (a), and you seem to have defined (a) in such a way that you could extrapolate such a goal to everyone, as (a) is pretty much true for everyone. But is it really the only relevant consideration?
By the way, what does all of this mean for the pre-existing, intensely religious people that care more about eternity than about minimizing pain on the Earth? According to you, and, given their beliefs are incorrect, they are being serious immoral pursuing such a state of being. It would be a moral obligation to convert them away from religion or to elsewise pacify them.
Quoting javra
Okay, I don't think your assertion that the "is" you have provided is justified. You just assumed (b) was true and then that what is good for everyone is good for the individual. It ends there as an assumption, and I don't think it is even existentially fixed, really.
Consider a population of people existing merely to serve a dictator. Is what is good for the dictator (staying in power) good for the people? This dictator could implement some grand, moral telos like liberty, equality, and fraternity for all that would benefit everyone, but why? He largely just wants to hold power, and preventing the people from, say, organizing, will serve his needs and be to the detriment of everyone else. Even if the people rise up and overthrow the dictator to implement some sort of new government, many people will likely be harmed in the process. This might be the right telos - liberty, equality, and fraternity for all - the people pursue by overthrowing the dictator, but it is most certainly not to each person's benefit when manifested; the suffering of each person is often not minimized even when implementing a good telos in practice.
Quoting javra
All I'm reading is: if it sounds like it jives, it jives.
Quoting javra
So we should choose between the options available to us according to which ones can be actualized with guidance from a set of principles that are objectively good because they minimize each person's current and future suffering.
I think a case could be made that you could reduce the net suffering of a population this way, but I think my examples show that a good telos might still not be the best thing for each individual. It would probably be impossible to take into account enough variables to implement anything even remotely ideal outside of the current good stuff we have going in many areas.
Honestly, the morality you are outlining sounds more like the philosophy of a race of aggressive aliens trying to take over the universe and less like something any normal philosopher or person would take on, partly because it is a little too self-assured, and partly because there is only one good way to go about doing good: what the analysts tell us to do.
I mean, the pieces might fit, but will we like what we see?
Lots of questions and issues. Thank you for them. In my defense, I did mention that the post would likely be wanting of sufficient justification and only a rough outline, or something to the like, this in my posts opening sentence. Also, its not intended to be about morals, which are prescriptive, but about meta-ethics, which is purely descriptive.
Quoting ToothyMaw
Ill for now only try address this issue of truth and falsity as these pertain to teloi, aka, aims/goals/ends one pursues in hopes of fulfilling said aim/goal/end as a future reality.
Any proposition regarding future states of affairs can either evidence itself conformant to the reality of what will be and thereby true/right/correct or, otherwise, to lack conformity to the reality of what will be and thereby be false/wrong/incorrect. For instance, the proposition that the sun will rise again tomorrow can either be true or false, as will be evidenced in the span of the subsequent 24 hours.
If this is generally agreed upon, then: teloi are not propositions (at least not normally) but will nevertheless hold the same general property: either they can be accomplished, as one consciously or unconsciously believes they can when they are actively held, or they cant. Take a hypothetical madman who aims to jump so high as to land on the moon and who proceeds to so jump on account of this goal being actively held. Wed label him a madman because we know that this goal he momentarily holds is unrealizable in principle, and believe that a sane person should know better than to hold such an aim. The stated aim here does not conform to the reality of what can be. It is a false hope, so to speak. And, in so being, it is then a fully fictitious, and hence false, presentation of what will be given the invested effort and means.
Regardless of aimfrom that of scratching ones nose to that of interstellar travel, etc.the aim could either be realizable in principle or, else, it might not be. Any unrealizable aim will then be pure fantasy concocted by our imagination, devoid of any reality in terms of being an end that is actualizable given the invested effort and means. In this sense alone, the unrealizable aim/goal/telos will then be false, deceptive, for although one aims X one will never obtain X even in principle. However, if the aim toward X conforms to the reality or fact of Xs obtainment upon given effort and means, then it will be true that X can be obtained given the required effort and means: making the telos/aim/goal true in this sense alone.
What I was saying, however, goes beyond this. But on seeing the many complexities and misunderstandings you find in what I previously wrote, Ill leave all that for some other time. All the same, let me know what you think of what I've just written if you disagree. But again, there are more valid senses to truth and falsity than those that strictly apply to propositions.
The point here is to show how an ought statement follows from an is statement. That's what Searle does.
It would be no defence, on being accused of reneging on a promise, to say "Oh, yes, I made a promise, but I did not undertake an obligation!"
Languge does entail behaviour, because language is behaviour.
Yes, dumb mistake. Just replace meta-ethics with morality and my post hopefully makes sense.
Quoting javra
Okay, so we have propositions about what will be that can be true or false. But that isn't the same thing as saying that future states of being or of the universe are false, and a relevant telos is a goal with what I would presume to be a state of being as its end - something that I now grant can be false when referenced against what is actually possible - even if fictitious, and not to make a proposition true. But I get what you are saying now.
Awesome. It's good to know. Thanks.
Apropos, what would your take then be regarding this generalized proposition: every "ought" translates into "an optimal means" of actualizing some future "is" (i.e., some conceived of future state of being that can in the future become reality) which is desired.
Of course this in part leads into the question of "desired by whom"; still, as a statement of fact all the same, do you find reason to object to this just offered proposition being true?
I'm sure you can appreciate that this is not always true in terms of normative values. There are certainly situations in which harm (for instance to prevent harm) is warranted, morally. Sometimes, it's called for morally. So you have to add further objects to the statement to justify it. To my mind, that precludes it from being brute.
I would ask, I suppose, what about that statement sets it aside from the need for justification?
There is some X such that "one ought not X" is objectively true because it is a brute fact that one ought not X.
This meta-ethical position need not then address normative ethics.
I think i can lay out here (to the point that we need not actually go any further) why this makes no sense to me:
Facts are derived from states of affairs. We agree there.
"One ought not x" (or any other behavioural command) is a thought, not a state of affairs. It's literally just the language enunciating a thought.
I cannot take a thought to be a state of affairs, which are necessarily mind-independent (in my understanding).
So, if you're seeing that statement as a state of affairs, we're just not talking about hte same thing as so we couldn't be wrong or right by each others lights :)
You should look up the use-mention distinction.
"The cat is on the mat" is a sentence. That the cat is on the mat is a state-of-affairs.
"One ought not harm another" is a sentence. That one ought not harm another is a state-of-affairs.
How? You've not addressed my reason for it not being one. I also, again, do not think we can get any further if you see that as a state of affairs, rather than a thought with no external referent, which is necessarily true, whether it could be construed as a state of affairs as well or not - it certainly doesn't refer to anything external to the mind.
You said:
Firstly, "one ought not x" is a sentence, not a thought. Specifically, in this case, it is a written sentence.
Secondly, I'm not saying that "one ought not x" is a state of affairs; I'm saying that that one ought not x is a state of affairs. Note the lack of quotation marks; it's important. Again, see the use-mention distinction.
Quoting AmadeusD
It doesn't refer to anything that exists external to the mind, but as I have been at pains to explain, something doesn't need to exist for it to be a state of affairs. That Santa doesn't exist is a state of affairs.
I covered this. It's the linguistic representation of a thought, not a state of affairs. If your position is that a sentence is necessarily representative of a state of affairs, i find that bizarre and hard to grasp.
No, i understand the distinction you're making. Perhaps you're not groking my objection - support that it is a state of affairs, rather than a falsity.
You clearly don't understand the distinction.
"The cat is on the mat" is the linguistic representation of a thought, but that the cat is on the mat is not the linguistic representation of a thought; it's a state of affairs. Note the difference that removing the quotation marks makes.
I do. I'm sorry, but i'll need to pull away if this gets adversarial.
It makes no appreciable difference unless you're quoting a particular instance of speech. The cat is on the mat refers to something outside of the utterance/quotation/sentence. It is referential. The quote marks literally make no different to the substance of the statement. Whether it's spoken, or thought, it is the same statement making the same reference.
That it has no quote marks around it, doesn't change it's actual content, and merely it's source. But even then, ultimately, the source is a thought about something.
"One ought not x" is only referential if you have a state of affairs to refer to. In this case, you haven't established it. You end up on 'brute fact' but i don't accept that position, so, as i actually began this part of the exchange - we have no further to go on this journey together.
Quoting AmadeusD
Situations in which a greater harm is avoided?
That reinforces, rather than contradicts, the brute fact.
That was not my contention. They could be equal, but considered less or more justified on either side.
They could also be inverse. Causing a greater harm, to prevent a lesser harm to a less deserving target (Israel/Hamas comes to mind.. )
Harm is not, in brute fact, amendable to judgement. It just is a fact that we experience harm. And can cause it.
That aside (i mean to say, please respond to this next question separately, rather then within your answer to the above):
How do you take claims of desiring harm? Either due to mental illness, or lets say some BDSM proclivity? Is that an except, or is there some reason this doesn't fit the definitions your using?
Obvious special pleading.
Vehemently rejected. It was a direct response to your claim that proportionality has somethign to do with establishing the fact. It doesn't on my account, and i'm not ignoring, but rejecting the crux of your claim that proportionality matters.
As I said above, it doesn't refer to anything that exists external to the mind, but as I have been at pains to explain, something doesn't need to exist for it to be a state of affairs. That Santa doesn't exist is a state of affairs.
You seem to be suggesting that something is a state of affairs if it is (or was? or will be?) a physical thing. Realists reject this assumption. There are non-physical states of affairs; that Santa doesn't exist, that 1 + 1 = 2, that certain arguments are valid, that it is irrational to believe in something if the evidence suggests otherwise, etc. Moral realists argue that that one ought not harm another is another such non-physical state of affairs.
That is a physical state of affairs.
In any case, it's plain to see that your reliance on the brute fact isn't something i accept, and so we can't come to terms.
Santa's non-existence isn't a physical thing. By definition it's the lack of a physical thing.
Santa doesn't exist even if nothing exists. There are states of affairs even if there is no physical world; indeed, if a physical world doesn't exist then that a physical world doesn't exist is a state of affairs.
And I had other examples too: that 1 + 1 = 2, that certain arguments are valid, that it is irrational to believe in something if the evidence suggests otherwise, etc.
I understood your response to be that, if i claim that using harm (level 2, lets say) to prevent harm level 6, this would support the brute fact of 'one ought not harm'.
I provided that the concept of justification can render that irrelevant. The brute facts remain:
1. We exist
2. We can be harmed
3. We can harm others.
4?????? (this is where i'm not seeing any work being done)
5. One ought not harm.
We don't need (4). (5) isn't derived from (1) - (3); it's brute (much like you have taken (1) to be brute).
If nothing existed, that would be a state of affairs that included Santa not existing. Though, that would require 'soemthing' no notice that ffact, which is fairly much incoherent if nothing exists.
And you've done nought to show otherwise. It's just your belief.
Exactly. There are states of affairs even if there is no physical world. Something can be a state of affairs even if it does not "correspond" to something that physically exists. Therefore, your claim that if obligations do not "correspond" to something that physically exists then we have no obligations is a non sequitur.
(5) isn't a judgement; it's a fact.
That's the answer to
Demanding a justification for a brute fact is... incongruous. Indicative of a misunderstanding of brute.
But there are folk here who demand a justification for the chair they are sitting on, as if it were justifications all the way down instead of turtles.
Do we have to just rely on brute disagreement to resolve, at least in terms, the conflict?
Well, that's right. The mooted brute fact is it is wrong to harm people. At issue is whether this is to be accepted as it stands, or if it needs to be grounded in some other proposition.
So, do you think it true?
And if you agree that it is true, do you do so as a result of other considerations, or does it appear to you to stand on its own?
Compare "This sentence has five words". Presuming you agree that it is true, are there some other statements that imply its truth, or does it stand on its own?
Or "The acceleration due to gravity is 9.8m/s/s". Sure, we can add sentences specifying how we measure acceleration. But leaving aside rules for interpretation, that gravity accelerates objects at that rate is just a brute fact...
To be sure, there are folk here who adopt an antirealist view and will argue that there is no acceleration without that interpretation, but i somehow don't think that's you. I might be wrong.
As I understand the position, I would agree that's not me. But i'm young in this - so that may change, or be revealed as I go.
Quoting Banno
I note that verification is what gives this statement veracity. You could have noted a different rate, and been wrong, in the face of the verification of the rate you've noted. You're right in that there is a rate of gravitation acceleration, as a brute fact, and if we're wrong, that doesn't change the fact of it. But,. that we note it at THAT rate, is a custom. Our scale could just be something different. Borders of London could be different too. But hte difference is, the rate of acceleration remains what it is without that conventional rate-signifier. London does not exist at all without the convention.
Quoting Banno
My immediate intuition is yes, but I'd need to do more work to identify what they are, and may end up conceding.
Quoting Banno
I do not. I believe 'wrong' must be established as an actual criteria, rather than just a word to be referred to in relation to harm. Why is it wrong? Because it's harm? That's tautological.
That many people ascribe wrongness to harm doesn't do much for me. Still just extends convention. There is nothing in my experience of the world that indicates harm is wrong, ipso facto so I, at least, require some further grounding of it's wrongness with reference to the world.
I think many moral truths are facts, but I'm skeptical (and nervous) about justifying them with these kinds of analogies. Interested as always to hear your thoughts.
Do you have a suggestion of how to justify a moral 'fact'?
Sure. Analytically, verification is other folk, or the same folk at other times, testing and agreeing with the proposition. I don't see any prima facie reason that could not be done with a moral brute fact.
Yeah, there's a way in which "one ought not do harm" is tautological if harm is just what we ought not do. There'd be work here in sorting out harm in a way that pays out.
Direction of fit, again, in addition to ambiguities and hedging and so on. I'm piggybacking on that term, which was used b y others; my main interest here is that there seem to be true moral statements, and that for some of those it is odd to demand a justification. Talk of brute statements is a bit strong, and probably pulls in too much baggage. How about "hinge"? At least it has different baggage...
Ok, i think we've probably come to terms here then. Thank you :)
That works for me.
I was afraid someone would ask me this! The question has occupied me throughout my life, and I dont know the answer. But since youve only asked for a suggestion . . . I suggest that facts about values are to be found in a different world than, say, scientific facts. I also suggest that we dont arrive at moral facts using the standard philosophical questions, such as What ought I to do? or even What is the good? The world of values is, perhaps, one of spiritual recognition, more like being in love than achieving knowledge.
Gadamer is a philosopher who might also have good suggestions. He emphasizes the importance of tradition in talking about values, since its unrealistic to expect every single person to have a transcendental, mystical experience of the Godhead! No more would you expect everyone to prove general relativity for themselves. Its often appropriate and necessary to take someone elses word for it. Gadamer uses the metaphor of a well to describe the world of values, which is at one and the same time the soil, source, and water of life, but which is not knowledge in the strict sense. Invoking the importance of both tradition and non-strict-sense knowledge are of course like poking a hornets nest for some philosophers . . . So, a final word from Jean Grondin, who writes a lot about Gadamer: To recognize that thought has limits is not to silence it, but to allow it to better apprehend itself and to open itself more easily to dialogue.
No algorithms for deriving moral facts. Only heuristics, and then only if you have time.
There's just making choices, something that one can become better at with age.
Hence, virtue ethics.
Thanks for introducing me to a new word!
Yes, there's a difference between having the courage of your convictions and being convicted beyond the shadow of a doubt that you're right and They are wrong.
I'm presuming the tanks are empty. The horse could not possibly pull that many full tanks.