Convince Me of Moral Realism
With regards to my previous positive argument for moral anti-realism, I no longer accept it (thanks to the useful critiques by fellow moral realist members). I don't really have an argument for moral anti-realism other than I hold it as true because I don't believe there are any subject-referencing normative facts (i.e., normative facts that reference what 'one ought to be doing').
For those moral realists out there (e.g., [ I think some of them are ] @Banno, @Leontiskos,@180 Proof, @J, @Philosophim, @Michael, et al.), I would like to explore in depth your guys' moral realist positions.
Any and every moral realist position is welcome in this board, but please note that I want to dissect thoroughly the position; so if you are just looking to quickly spit out a short paragraph and then completely checkout from the conversation, please just don't post in the first place.
SHOW ME WHAT YOU'VE GOT! (Rick & Morty reference).
For those moral realists out there (e.g., [ I think some of them are ] @Banno, @Leontiskos,@180 Proof, @J, @Philosophim, @Michael, et al.), I would like to explore in depth your guys' moral realist positions.
Any and every moral realist position is welcome in this board, but please note that I want to dissect thoroughly the position; so if you are just looking to quickly spit out a short paragraph and then completely checkout from the conversation, please just don't post in the first place.
SHOW ME WHAT YOU'VE GOT! (Rick & Morty reference).
Comments (226)
Well Bob, the way to understand moral realism is to first go an account of what it is for anything to be real. I ask: is the pain you feel when someone deposits a spear into your kidney real? I argue that not only is it real, but value events, call them, like this are more real than any of your factual reals, which is something found on Wittgenstein's logical grid in his Tractatus. There is a reason Witt wouldn't talk about ethics, which is not so much that such statements are nonsense, which he famously holds to be the case, and more at the depth of their importance that would be trivialized by theory. He called value transcendental. Anyway, if that pain in your kidney is real, then pain qua pain, not as a concept, and not the "essence" of the pain, as when we would find license to "speak" what it is, which Witt denies is speakable, would have to be examined. So: apart from all that could be said of the pain, is there an existential residuum that remains after a reduction that suspends all that can be said? You see where this goes? Once all that can be said about this pain is removed from our consideration, and this includes everything Mill or Kant said, or evolution or a neurologist, and so on, is there something that remains standing, once these contingencies are removed, is there anything that is NOT a contingency, something stand alone about pain which is not reducible?
I argue that there is such a thing, which lies with Moore's claim that a moral Good or Bad is inherently a matter of a "non natural property." Of course, this is the very talk prohibited by Witt. But why did Witt write the Tractatus knowing full well he was speaking about the unspeakable? There are those that say it is meant to be a ladder to be used as a means to abandon all bad metaphysics. But he took ethics very seriously, saying the importance of the Tractatus lies in what is NOT said, and herein lies the case for moral realism: more real than real, this pain in the kidney; a Real that is in the "fabric of existence" itself, which is why it is both irreducible and and unspeakable.
And so, the moral prohibition against stabbing people with spears has this dimension of the real at its very core. And since all moral claims are essentially of the same nature, this example pf the spear in the kidney being only a radical example of what lies behind ALL moral issues.
Absolutely no rush! You always have thought-provoking positions; and, if I remember correctly, you hold some sort of moral realist position and thought it would be good to dive into it (and see if I am convinced by it).
Interesting. So, let me see if I am understanding you correctly. It seems as though you are advocating that either (1) moral facts are ingrained in or (2) inextricably tied to our primitive, basic biology (akin to feeling pain when getting stabbed in the kidney).
Would this be kind of like a hedonist view that the moral facts are identified with the primitive notions of pleasure and pain (or happiness and suffering)?
Am I on the right track?
It is a rare and beautiful thing when a chap changes his mind even a little as a result of discussion. I am inclined to say it is also a good thing to be swayed by cogent argument and to seek the truth. Truth is better than falsehood. and this is necessarily the case because a community of habitual falsehood speakers would have no use for each other's speech, and meaning and language would be lost entirely.
Now life can manage perfectly well without language, but whenever the question is raised, the question itself presumes that a truthful response will be forthcoming - whether it is raised in a philosophy forum or scrawled on a toilet wall.
So in general, I would suggest that morality is social value, and the sense of unreality arises because social value and personal value can and do conflict at times. No one complains that their own desires are unreal, it's always those values that conflict with them that might not be real...
I think close, yes, but the devil is in the terminology. When I observe the pain, it is not a biological description I am observing. Nor a moral fact. These are accounts that presuppose the pain actuality that presents itself for analysis in the first place.
As to hedonism, primitive notions of pleasure and pain, happiness and suffering, these terms are at least delivered from extraneous explanations, but once there, attending to the pain in the kidney, that is, literally IN screaming agony, one then asks then asks the question, how is it that this is NOT real? One needs a reality test, and this would require a nonproblematic example of what is real to be able to answer it, and what, in the matter of the real, is nonproblematic? and this is a hard question for the obvious reason that the real deeply ambiguous.
I hold that the only way to address the question of what is real, is to witness what is clearly free of ambiguity regarding its ontological status. We find Descartes useful, for his method was to do just this: discover what cold not be doubted and entirely beyond ambiguity. Though Descartes made the mistake of affirming the cogito as this, failing to first define being. I think, therefore I am? Well, what do you mean by the verb "am"? The Being question is begged, but the method sustains: what is absolutely beyond doubt? How about this agony in my kidney? I CAN certainly doubt the multitude of prepositions one can make about the pain dealing with categorical knowledge claims (the pain is really this or that or some other reference to a science category), for these are constructs ABOUT the pain; not the pain itself.
This is where Moore comes in. Pain, the qualia of pain, if you will, or the pure phenomenon of pain, does not belong to interpretative error because it is not an interpretation. It, if you will, screams reality!
And once again, the extreme example is only to make for poignancy. Ethics is at its core, about value, and value is the general term for this dimension of reality, only made clear by example--you know, fall in love, stick a needle in your eye, ice cream and ice picks to the groin, and everything else one can have amoral issue about. Something has to be at stake like this, or no ethics. And things "like this" are as real as it gets.
Are you saying?
People may experince pain and suffering. We ought not do anything which deliberately causes pain and suffering to others. Doing so is morally wrong and is thereby an objective moral fact?
Is that an ought from an is?
I agree re Descartes - I have generally held that 'I feel pain therefore I am' is a lot more explicit than thinking and 'aming'.
Right, and I think you get the idea. "I think" is frankly vacuous if plain thinking is going to be the ground for existence, because thought's purest form is logic, and logic is only about the form of propositions, not the content, making "I am" merely a formal concept. (I picked this insight up from Michel Henry's Essence of Manifestation.)
But this is/ought issue: It is quite right to insist that an "ought" requires and ought already in the "is" but this makes the is/ought a tautology, saying the ought itself is logically embedded in the is, thus, the moral insistence not to smash another's knee caps is part of the essence of the pain of having one's knee caps smashed. Pain entails the prohibition against causing pain. This is right.
However, this does not generate unproblematic conditions for moral decision making, for out moral affairs are entangled in complicated ways contextually with other facts, and this holds for our attitudes and predilections and beliefs in the world. The idea here is that there is this dimension of morality that grounds such things in the real, making our ethics real, if contextually ambiguous.
Hi Bob.
Facts are what has already happened and/or what is currently happening. Sometimes people speak in terms of states of affairs, the way things were/are, the case at hand, etc. Moral facts, states of affairs, cases, etc. are events involving situations where we judge whether or not someone should or should not do something or another, given some specific set of circumstances. That someone can and often does include ourselves. These are moral facts, state of affairs, cases, situations, etc..
Note here that I'm not using the term "moral" as a synonym for what counts as acceptable or as a means of assent or acceptance, so its compliment is not "immoral" but amoral... meaning not moral in kind. "Right" and "wrong" are the terms are used to express assent/dissent(moral judgment).
When promises are made, at least one person voluntarily enters into and/or creates a moral scenario, situation, case, etc. Solely by virtue of meaning alone, if I promise to plant you a rose garden tomorrow, then you ought have a rose garden tomorrow. That last statement is true because it corresponds to the fact that I promised to plant you a rose garden, and that's exactly what my doing so means. When we make a promise, we voluntarily enter into an obligation to make the world match our words.
There are moral facts as well as true moral statements and sound moral judgments.
I think that qualifies me as a moral realist.
:up:
I have no problem with this...except I dont see how it is a moral realist position: morality can have social value (and can conflict with personal value) without there being moral facts. Are you also arguing that those social values are moral facts?
I am with you here (or at least I think I am)! We cannot doubt our immediate experience, although we can certainly doubt conceptually what it truly exists in or of: I can doubt whether I am in a simulation or not, but either way I cannot doubt that I am seeing something right now.
But
I do not understand why the better explanation would be these are moral facts than these are deeply rooted sentiments, which are presumably biological, that can have heavy impact on our behavior. I dont see how these tell me what I ought to be doing as the subject: just because my body is biologically wired to enjoy falling in love and not sticking a needle in my eye it does not follow that those are morally good or bad things to be doing.
For example, imagine, that we discover that human beings on average, along with not liking being stabbed in the eye, really love torturing animals for fun: this seems to meet your criteria of something that would be factual morally good...but I am not seeing how it would be factual nor moral.
Let me explain it back to you and see if I am on the right track.
I think you are saying that state-of-affairs about promises made by persons (or organisms or subjects or something along those lines) are moral facts, because the promise is an obligation that is also a fact (a state-of-affairs)...am I on the right track?
Hard to remove one's perspective from scientific orientation that is ingrained in us through our education. Not many out there telling us how to analyze the world from a philosophical pov.
I did say that there are many explanatory contexts that can be brought to bear on bringing to light what pain and joy are. But a biological analysis doesn't rise to join with the experience and its content. The absurdity of attempting to do this, and in general to reduce experience to ready to hand paradigms, is clear if we let the matter itself make the case: stick my hand in a pot of boiling water and while the evidence is made clear to me regarding what pain is, proceed to tell me that how my biological wiring is producing this, or how pain was "selected" in the evolution of our bodies because it was conducive to reproduction and survival. You do see the radical incongruity of "reducing" what lies before me to an explanation like this.
Biological accounts and the like work, of course, in explaining common matters of contingency, I mean, ask me what a dentist is or a bank teller, and consulting a text would be entirely appropriate. But talk about ethics and pain is about what is Real, and reality is not something exhausted by references to something else. Biologists cannot talk about what is real because this is no more up their alley than knitting wool sweaters is, so I am not going to ask them what pain is AS SUCH, and this is where this is going. I look at pain as a geologist would observe a mineral deposit. What IS it? One has to first look and register its properties. A experience the pain and observe the prohibition to be at one with it.
And then, no one is saying there is a one to one correspondence between what one should and should not do and the realities of pain and pleasure (not to put too fine a point on it). This is a very important point: We are examining a dimension of our existence, NOT matching the chaos of our affairs to their Real counterparts that existentially address the each occasion of moral indeterminacy. That is absurd. The prohibition that is apriori joined at hip with our moral obligations does not sort out the massive oddities of our lives as some kind of metaphysical counterpart to whatever comes up. Again, pain, joy and all of the ooo's and ah's and ughs of our existence have this moral dimension such that when such a value is in play, we are not dealing with mere social constructs.
Nothing matters? That's great. Go live in a pile of sand away from society and the goods and services it produced by people who live and die every day for the opposite belief. Who also, as a matter of fact, maintain for you.
Got a phone or internet connection? Someone who believed in moral realism made that.
A car or drive on public roads? Someone who believed in moral realism made that.
Ever used a band-aid? Been to public school? Read a book? Watch a YouTube video? Eat anything beyond a poorly cooked hunk of raw animal flesh? Yup. Provided by a moral realist.
Every breath you take using our inventions is already a disqualification of your attempt at an argument. As far as rational minds should be concerned, it's a non-starter until you live as you believe.
Now, if right now you abandoned every modern invention and went to go live in the woods (not here btw- somewhere undeveloped) and live your truth, then, that's a starting position for an argument. Perhaps someone will find your bones next to a tree with a carving of your attempted non-philosophy and be in a compassionate enough state to take it as serious content. Not here.
[hide="Reveal"]Disclaimer: I wrote this post as an unposted draft some odd hours ago. It seemed personally aggressive at the time so it went unsubmitted. After thorough examination I conclude I am in fact attacking the art not the artist.[/hide]
Youre conflating nihilism and nothing matters sentiments with moral relativism. Im not a moral realist, and yet I believe strongly in moral progress. In fact I dont think its possible to achieve optimum social harmony until we jettison moral realism in favor of ways of ethical thinking that arent dependent on blame and culpability, which are presupposed by moral realism.
All your concerns target moral nihilism, not moral anti-realism. The former is a subspecies of the latter.
As a moral subjectivist, I have no problem valuing things and having adhering to moral principles and codes--they just don't correspond to moral facts.
Quoting Astrophel
No, were dealing with personal constructs, which to say that emotional pain and pleasure are inextricably bound up with the breakdown of our constructs to make sense out of the chaos of events. Moral emotions like anger and guilt express our struggles to cope with the changes in others and ourselves which take us by surprise, which force us to choose between a sweeping overhaul of our ways of understanding them and trying to put the genie back in the bottle by demanding conformity to our original expectations. Unfortunately most approaches to morality take the latter route.
Close. Promises are moral facts.
Can't argue with that.
But this goes to the very point I am trying to make: This embeddedness of our affairs in complexities that defy categorical answers makes the value dimension of our lives seem chaotic, and I agree that this is so. But this does not undo the nature of what is IN these entangled affairs. What is painful can be ambiguous, which is why the strong examples are revealing: there is no ambiguity in a sprained ankle qua outrageously painful event. That is no construct to work out in one's entangled affairs. The world "does" this to us.
This seems an odd argument. I dont have to believe in anything transcendent or foundational in order to appreciate comfort. Nihilism doesnt choose chaos and hardship, it merely accepts that there is no intrinsic meaning available to us. Theres a significant difference between 'there is no inherent meaning' and nothing matters.
Perhaps something unsaid in your question is that facts rely upon measurement in order to ascertain objectivity. After all, if we all agree that a thermometer measures temperature, and agree by observation on what that measure comprises, then we can arrive at an objective measure of the fact of, say, the boiling temperature of water. But then, what is objective also depends on what can be measured, and what can be measured depends at least on the act of measurement. And that is the basis of scientific realism, wholly quantitative in nature. So the question becomes: is there any measure of quality? (Robert Pirsig Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance comes to mind.)
:up: :up:
Is this objectively true?
Maybe we should listen to the ghost of Nelson Goodman and argue for moral irrealism: that there are incompatible different versions of value systems, and in any given context at least one of them needs to be taken so seriously as to be called 'moral'.
The general premises are something like:
1. The meaning of the word "ought" is such that the statement "one ought not X" is truth-apt (cognitivism).
We can defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, we agree or disagree with the claim that one ought not X, and agreement and disagreement only makes sense if the claim is truth-apt.
2. The meaning of the word "ought" is such that if the statement "one ought not X" is truth-apt then either a) for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false (error theory) or b) there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true (moral realism)
We can also defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact. As such, moral subjectivism is inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so it must be that if moral statements are truth-apt then either moral realism or error theory is correct.
3. It is not the case that for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false
We can defend this by arguing that there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support the claim that for every X the statement "one ought not X" is false, and that if there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support this claim then we are justified in rejecting it.
It would then follow that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true.
I think 3) is the weakest premise as any opponent could instead replace it with:
4. It is not the case that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true
And, like above, they can defend this by arguing that there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support the claim that there is at least one X such that the statement "one ought not X" is objectively true, and that if there is insufficient evidence or reasoning to support this claim then they are justified in rejecting it.
So if we accept an ordinary language approach that suggests that either moral realism or error theory is correct then we must decide which of the two is the "default" position absent any positive evidence or reasoning in either's favour.
Either it is the case that one ought not eat babies or it is not the case that one ought not eat babies. If you agree with the former then you're a moral realist; if you're an error theorist then you agree with the latter. Pick your poison.
Are there personal desire facts? "I like to breathe." sort of thing?
To the same extent there can be moral facts. "Societies like truthful communication."
There is a real difference between a pile of car components and an assembled car. A big difference and a vital difference, that we use words like 'structure' and 'function' and 'interaction' to get at.
At the level of living things, there is the same kind of structural interacting of parts that make a functional whole, but in addition, this functioning is reproductive; that is an organism has a functional relation to itself, and hence to the environment such that some environments are good for it and others are inimical. This is a differential self preserving relationship with the environment that is the root of what we experience as desire or need. Yeast needs sugar, and chooses to ingest it.
Humans need social nurturing as well as food and shelter. Parents need to love and nurture their children, and children need to be nurtured. Are you having any difficulty with the reality of these things I am saying?
That would work fine for which side of the road to drive on, and result in some aphorism like "When in Rome, drive according to the rules the Romans follow."
But ... "Speak roughly to your little boy,
And beat him when he sneezes;
He only does it to annoy,
Because he knows it teases." ... is patent nonsense, and incompatible with human flourishing, which is not infinitely adaptable, but finds some social environments inimical.
I am still not quite following where the moral facts come into play with your view. It seems like you are saying the moral facts are tied to the "Real" where the "Real" is pleasure and pain--but where exactly are these factually moral claims in reality? You said they aren't the pleasure and pain, but they are tied to them.
I see. So the problem I have is that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, so I wouldn't say they are even normative facts: it is a hypothetical imperative--i.e., it is a subjectively utterance of obligation. Moral facts are about obligations which are true independently of what a subject obligates themselves to do (viz., independently of what they decide to promise or not). What do you think?
Interesting, I would have thought it would be "is there any measure of obligation?"--but this doesn't preclude subjective obligations.
Unfortunately, I am unfamiliar with "moral irrealism", but I am all ears if you would like to advocate for it.
I appreciate your argument! Let me see if I can adequately respond.
I think I disagree with premise 2: just because "one ought..." is usually linguistically interpreted as a fact of the matter, it does not follow that they actually are. So I think moral subjectivism hasn't been adequately refuted, and its refutation is wholly contingent on that premise being true.
Likewise, the general problem I have with this sort of argument, which is really an intuition based off of ordinary language (that moral realism is true) is that it doesn't sufficiently explain what moral facts actually are nor where they subsist in or of. Without that, I think it is fairly simple to undercut this argument by noting that all of this linguistic moral realism can be reduced to moral subjectivism--viz., that it is just an illusion because there's no actual moral facts one can point to or even, in principle, explain how we would discover them.
The meaning of a word is its linguistic use. That's what Wittgenstein tries to show in his Philosophical Investigations. How can meaning be anything else?
As I said, the argument depends on an acceptance of ordinary language philosophy. If you reject ordinary language philosophy then the argument is going to be unconvincing.
There are facts about our psychology, but those arent normative facts. Reducing one ought to... to I believe one ought to... does not produce a normative nor moral fact, because it is purely subjective.
I can see why you would say this if by moral you are just talking about obligatory behavior and then it seems to follow that societies have implemented obligatory behaviors and those are factsbut I would say that there is a fact that societies have certain norms, but that doesnt entail the norm itself is a fact: those are two different things. I would say that societal norms are inter-subjective.
So, I would say these are normative facts, but not moral facts; because these type of normative facts do not, in-themselves, reference the subject (as opposed to the body) and thusly do not dictate what one ought to be doing. My body can have an ingrained normative fact such that my body must eat, but that doesnt tell me, as the subject, as a mind, what I ought to be doingit is entirely possible that the morally evil thing to do, for the sake of the argument here, is to eat.
That's not quite correct. The premise is that non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so that if ordinary language philosophy is correct then either moral realism or error theory is correct.
We then have to decide which of moral realism or error theory is the better "default" position.
Either moral realism, or it is not the case that we ought not eat babies.
Yes, but, as I said, I don't think it is a strong argument when it depends on ordinary language. It doesn't actually negate moral subjectivism, it just states "ordinary language is used in accordance with moral realism, regardless of whether moral realism is true or not"--and the italicized is what is missing in premise 2. I can agree with the fact that ordinary language aligns with moral realist positions while refraining judgment or even negating that moral realism is true.
My point in what you quoted was just a general worry I have, not with premise 2 but with the whole argument. It depends on accepting as true whatever is implied by ordinary language, and it provides absolutely no clarification on what the moral facts subsist in or of nor how we discover them. It just basically states that 'it seems as though moral realism is true based off of ordinary language, therefore it is true'.
To be clear, I'm saying:
1. Ordinary language philosophy is correct.
2. Moral non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are inconsistent with ordinary language use.
3. Therefore, moral non-cognitivism and moral subjectivism are incorrect.
4. Therefore, either moral realism or error theory is correct.
I am then saying that if there is no positive evidence in favour of either moral realism or error theory, and if we refuse to remain agnostic, then we must either assume moral realism or assume that it is not the case that one ought not eat babies.
Obviously if you reject the premise that ordinary language philosophy is correct then the argument will fail, but then what better theory of meaning do you have?
Easily. If I promise you something but dont mean it that is, Im lying this use is indiscernible (in that moment, and assuming a talented liar) from a sincere promise. So what makes the difference in meaning? Indeed, our aggrieved ordinary language response to such a situation, if it's revealed, is, You didnt mean it! So whats going on here?
You can say it is difficult to imagine what makes a moral fact true but arguably similar might be said for modal facts about possibility and necessity which do not seem to be about actual events in a way that is not totally disimilar to moral facts.
Can we make sense of regular facts when ultimately these might be made meaningful by perceptions? Phenomenal experiences are completely ineffable, immediate, incommunicable. Neither is there any clear, determinate, linear relationship between experiences and facts about the world. Their status isn't any better than the difficulty in characterizing 'should-ness'. Ultimately, because these things don't have clear, articulable foundations it makes it difficult for these things to be much more than about agreement. Moral realists happen to agree with each othet about this intuitive notion of shouldness which is either objective or we have some perception of which is about something objective. Is this much different from perception where we just have this immediate uncharacterizable information put before us and everyone just happens to agree about it? When we establish a fact that some people like schizophrenics are wrong about their perceptions, we can only do this because there is some agreement amongst many other people that those schizophrenics are wrong. But then what happens when the whole tribe is deluded? Everyone then suggests that magic, god, reptilian aliens are facts and the perceptual events underlying them are valid. All is this to say that facts about the world which we look at through perception ultimately come to the same difficulties of substantiation as moral facts do.
So what does this all come down to? Just scrap it all. If you want to scrap moral realism, scrap all realism. Objective "Truth" and "facts" in its entirety is a biological artifact that is constructed and enacted. These are essentially a product of a biological organism's metacognitive or perhaps metaperceptual abilities in the sense of being able to track its own predictions generated from its own biological architecture / functioning. The workings of these predictions are irreducibly complex as would be expected of a brain with trillions of degrees if freedom. That is not to say that there isn't a world that exists and has some structure, but its absolutely impossible to talk about this in a way that is objective. I have appealed to biology here but I am not pretending that what I say also isn't just articulating models which are idealized, depend on prior assumptions, depend on a mind, a brain. Nothing is to say that I cannot organize the world and predict things about it, just that it is not objective.
Obviously, this clearly isn't an argument for moral realism but it is an argument against the case that moral realism is inherently different to any other kind of realism. If you drop moral realism you should drop all of it. And most people are unwilling to do that it seems.
You're equivocating. When we say "you didn't mean it" we're not saying something like "the words you used didn't mean what they (ordinarily) mean". Instead we're saying something like "you weren't being honest."
Okay, forget the OL response, which isnt really important. The question remains, If I promise you something but have no intention of delivering that is, Im lying this use is indiscernible from a sincere promise. So what makes the difference in meaning? Unless youre wanting to say that there is no difference in meaning? So what would be the relevant difference between the truthteller and the liar, on this view? Im not sure myself; I think appealing to meaning makes more sense; but Im willing to be convinced.
Quoting J
My intention to lie is different from the use of my words in discourse. In the moment of my promise to you , I express my intention to lie, but the specific meaning of my lying words only emerges for me in the actual interaction with you as you respond to my words. It doesnt matter that you take my words differently than I do. For both of us, the interaction determines the use of our words.
Well, but that's just it -- you don't. We stipulate that your listener can't tell the difference. You may have the intention, but it's not expressed. BTW, I agree that we're going to need some appeal to intention as a way of explaining what's going on, but I'm not sure a hardcore OL proponent would.
Is the issue here that if we stipulate word use as strictly shared , then we have no way to explain hidden meaning and personal point of view? Wittgenstein certainly wouldnt claim that word use is identically shared meaning.
Lets take Ken Gergens social constructionist take on Wittgenstein:
Gergen makes room for lying by arguing that the liar is trying to navigate between two disparate discursive communities. The lie results from their being alienated from one community. The above quote, however, still is true of the liars words even though their interlocutor understands their sense differently than the liar intends them.
If one accepts ordinary language philosophy then the argument I presented might be used to support moral realism. A moral realist who doesn't accept ordinary language philosophy will offer a different argument.
The way I see it is that morality is real in the sense that once we create it -- or as it emerges organically from our social interactions -- it moderates our behavior as it is intended to. But it is real in an abstract sense, the way laws or speed limits are real. These things exist through a sort of consensus, or consensual understanding, and they aren't simply arbitrary as they have some kind of foundation in our nervous systems. When you feel shame, for example, you blush and you can feel it right down to your bones, it affects you physically. This isn't simply an imaginary or arbitrary phenonemon, and it's not merely about preferences or an intellectual exercise. We can't refrain from creating morality, and it is seemingly necessary to our existence and an unavoidable pursuit. Still, I'm not sure I'm able to make an argument for moral realism or how to get from an is to an ought.
There need not be an ought from an is. There need only be an ought.
Dont imaginary phenomena and fictive stories express themselves in terms of bodily feelings? Are you saying we are pre-wired physiologically for the reinforcement of certain moral attitudes? Or is it rather that such somatic manifestations are merely expressions of socially constituted preferences? ( We blush because we are embarrassed, we are embarrassed because we construe situations in a certain culturally and personally contingent way so as to feel shame) . Is there an intellectual
exercise which is not accompanied by appropriate affective tonality?
My problem with almost all attempts to establish moral facts.
That one believes in a state of affairs as such, doesn't make it the case. Flat Earthers be damned!
Are you suggesting that what is necessarily an opinion, not universally held, is a brute fact, with this statement?
No.
What statement?
"One ought not harm others". Its a judgment, not a state of affairs. But i've just realised we've been over this :cry:
Yes, we have. The moral realist will say that that one ought not harm another is a state of affairs.
I think we can make some ground between us here - I've never seen a similar claim. Granted, i'm likely far less experienced in exploring academic positions than you are - Can you outline how this claim is made?
I.e, what's the source of the state of affairs? I can only imagine (as previously mentioned) a supernatural origin for such a brute claim.
Additionally, what's your personal position on that claim (that it is a state of affairs)?
I'm not sure what you're asking.
Quoting AmadeusD
What do you mean by "supernatural"? If you mean "non-physical" then yes, the moral realist will accept that moral facts are not physical facts; a moral statement being true has nothing to do with the existence of matter, energy, space, or time. Some moral realists may believe in the existence of abstract moral entities (much like mathematical realists believe in the existence of abstract mathematical entities), but I don't think this is required.
Well, the statement, taken as a state of affairs, floats freely with no grounding. It references two states of affairs and then makes a judgment on them viz. That there are other's, and that other's can be harmed. Those are two states of affairs. The claim that one ought not harm those others who can be harmed isn't a judgement. So would I then be fine in simply concluding that this claim is nonsensical?
Quoting Michael
This doesnt get me anywhere unfortunately., I still see absolutely no justification for the claim unless one relies on revelation in some form.
I reject 1.
I am not quite sure what you mean by "theory of meaning" nor why I would need it for this discussion. Metaethics is about, among other things, whether there are moral facts--irregardless of what the signification of colloquial words mean. By moral fact, I mean a normative fact (and by 'normative fact' I mean a stance-independently existing prescription) that is subject-referencing.
Theories of Meaning
Quoting Bob Ross
The starting point of any metaethics is the question "what do moral statements mean?".
When I say "you ought not murder" am I saying something like "don't murder" (non-cognitivism), am I saying something like "I disapprove of murder" (subjectivism), or am I trying to describe an objective feature of the world (realism and error theory).
My example argument is that non-cognitivists and subjectivists misunderstand the meaning of moral statements: "you ought not murder" just doesn't mean either "don't murder" or "I disapprove of murder". When we claim something like "one ought not murder" we are trying to describe an objective feature of the world. As such, if there are such features then realism is true and if there aren't such features then error theory is true.
That's not a problem for me. Why does it cause you pause?
This doesn't get me anywhere unfortunately. I still see absolutely no justification for the claim unless one relies on revelation in some form. I can't figure out how a moral fact could escape needing to be tied to space and time, but that aside, even if granted, there's absolutely no moral force in the statement as-is.
I also just plum deny that it could be a state of affairs that a judgement on a behaviour is a fact. Seems counter to its definition.
So what's the difference between metaethics and metalinguistics?
Ethics first. Metaethics second. Meta ethics endeavors to think about behavioural codes. Not all codes are on equal evolutionary footing. Not all metaethics precede language acqusition. Some does. Prior to the ability to take note of, bring attention to, and/or subsequently begin discussing ethics as a subject matter in and of itself, we're already figuring out how we're supposed to act by thinking about our own behaviours at the time as well as the events that immediately followed.. We're already taking part in meta ethical endeavors. We just do not know it at the time we're doing it. The question neglects to keep our early years in mind.
Some creatures begin drawing correlations between their own behaviours and what else is going on around them at that particular time. That's the basic connection from which all others diverge. All things metaethical involve thinking about acceptable and/or unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. The question neglects the fact that we're already figuring out what's acceptable or not(acceptable/unacceptable behaviour) long before the ability to talk about and discuss things like the meaning of terms.
We're discussing that which existed in its entirety prior to our naming and describing it. We're thinking about the social norms, i.e., regularly practiced codes of conduct that influence each and every one of our worldviews, particularly during our early formative years. We were figuring out how we're supposed to act. We draw all sorts of correlations prior to and during language acquisition. Some are between our behaviours and what else was going on at the time(what immediately followed). Such experiences were and are meaningful to the language less creature under consideration.
Speaking of "meaning" and theories thereof...
All that to ground saying that there are better questions. What counts as "moral/ethical"?
And the true feature of the world in this case is that A society of murderers cannot exist. They die out.
Given the destructive nature of humans, it does seem to some that human extinction would be a great good.
Metaethics:
I have extended this line of reasoning to argue that moral sentences seem to be expressing a belief about the way the world objectively is. The sentence "it is wrong to eat babies" is closer in kind to the sentence "the cat is on the mat" than it is to the sentence "chocolate is tasty."
When we claim that chocolate is tasty we are expressing an opinion but when we claim that it is wrong to eat babies we are doing more than just expressing an opinion. We disagree about morality in a way very unlike how we disagree about the tastiness of certain foods.
As such, it seems clear that subjectivism (like non-cognitivism) misunderstands the meaning of moral sentences.
Therefore, either moral realism is correct or error theory is correct, and if error theory is correct then it is not the case that it is wrong to eat babies.
Do mathematical facts need to be "tied" to space and time? Or are there no mathematical facts?
Doesn't the universe seem to though? Space and the world itself is a chaotic, violent place. If there is no intrinsic meaning or purpose available to us- actually. Wait a minute. Is this a faux/proxy theist/atheist argument without either of us realizing it? "Intrinsic meaning" seems to imply, in your usage of it, something that could theoretically only come from intelligent design, no? Meaning, if you do not believe in intelligent design, you automatically are either a nihilist or moral anti-realist? Well that's naturally a pretty easy cookie-cutter argument to make of course.
But if we're looking beyond that- the idea that some form of morals ("right or wrong" as advanced intelligent beings or "progress and regress" as purely cellular beings in a larger scale of actual advancement or purpose or "value" not just simple one-time human observation of what seems to "work" in one man's lifetime levied against purported other lifetimes) might exist and proliferate the Universe and existence itself and we only begin to try to understand it, perhaps pay it lip service in the form of laws, codes, so-called "ethics", and best practices, what concrete proof could any man have against such a notion?
Quoting Tom Storm
Well sure, similar to how there's a significant difference between the state of a vehicle that has just drove off a canyon and the state of the same vehicle once it reaches the bottom of said chasm. I see little difference in the two states. Perhaps this is what differs our respective worldview(s).
In layman's terms: "doesn't one inevitably end up as the other?" :)
If you are saying moral subjectivists are misunderstanding the meaning of 'moral' language, then please let me know which part of my analysis of the terms is incorrect.
Normative facts are statements referring to stance-independently existing prescriptions; and moral facts are subject-referencing normative facts.
I think those 'meanings' are perfectly aligned with what you are trying to argue for with moral realism; but I don't see how linguistics is helping your case. Just because it seems as though there are moral facts because we colloquially express our norms in a moral realist kind of manner does not entail they exist whatsoever: it's a non-sequitur.
I outlined it in that post, which part did you disagree with?
Im not saying that there are moral facts.
I'll set out my argument as clear as I can:
1. All moral sentences assert that there is some objective moral fact
2. Either there is at least one objective moral fact or there are no objective moral facts
3. If there is at least one objective moral fact then at least one moral sentence is true
4. If there are no objective moral facts then all moral sentences are false
5. If at least one moral sentence is true then realism is correct
6. If all moral sentences are false then error theory is correct
7. Therefore, either realism is correct or error theory is correct
8. The sentence "one ought not eat babies" is a moral sentence
9. If error theory is correct then the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is false
10. If the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is false then it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
11. Therefore, if error theory is correct then it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
12. Therefore, either realism is correct or it is not the case that one ought not eat babies
Carrying on from this, one of these must be true:
1. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of spacetime
2. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of material objects
3. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of abstract objects
4. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of magic
5. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of God
6. Mathematical truths depend on the existence of [some other thing]
7. Mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything
8. There are no mathematical truths
I know that mathematical realists will say that (3) is true. Mathematical antirealists like myself will disagree. I can't even make sense of the existence of abstract objects. I certainly will say that (1), (2), (4), and (5) are false.
That leaves me with (6), (7), and (8). I'm unwilling to accept (8) and I can't comment on (6) because it doesn't really say anything.
So I must accept that (7) is true.
And if mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything then I see no reason to dismiss the claim that moral truths do not depend on the existence of anything.
Finally, as a passing consideration, "Santa does not exist" being true does not depend on the existence of anything. Rather, by definition, it depends on the non-existence of something (namely, Santa), and I don't think it makes sense to say that Santa's non-existence is itself the existence of something (such as an abstract object).
Now replace Santa with objective moral fact. Error theory being correct depends on an objective truth that does not depend on the existence of anything, and so an error theorist dismissing realism on the grounds that it depends on an objective truth that does not depend on the existence of anything is self-refuting.
You don't have to accept anything. But you ought to accept the truth, otherwise there is no reason or meaning to our discussion.
My "have to" is innocuous. I only meant that one would have to agree to some form of the categorical imperative in order to have the kind of motive you described.
And I was saying with my innocuous "ought to" only that this conversation has no meaning unless we are morally committed to truth.
But what is the problem here?
If I say I have a desire to do something, no one makes a fuss, but if I say I have an obligation to do something, it is problematic and someone will demand that I get it out of my pocket and show them.
So here I am, getting the obligation out of my pocket and showing you - that talk only works if you commit to truth and refrain from crying "wolf!" when there is no wolf. The game of lying can only get off the ground in a community of truth-tellers, because only when there are truth tellers does anyone have any reason to understand what is being said.
Nobody has to tell the truth, sometimes people don't want to tell the truth, but they always ought to tell the truth. It is when someone tells me I ought to do something when I don't want to do it that I start to get all sceptical, but if I cry wolf when there is no wolf, I might find that when there is a wolf, no one heeds my cry and no one comes to my rescue. What you ought to do matters to you, and stuff that matters is real.
And this is not a matter of convention, because an opposite obligation cannot function; lies become spam and we stop listening and responding. It is a simple fact that society, and civilisation is necessarily a cooperative affair and such mutual obligations are integral to every human society without exception.
What possible morals exist a priori?
How are you accounting for all of the exceptions?
I'm not saying that mathematical facts are moral facts.
I'm saying that mathematical truths do not depend on the existence of anything (whether material or abstract).
Therefore, it is fallacious to say that truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abstract).
Therefore, it is prima facie fallacious to say that moral truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abstract).
You need positive evidence or reasoning to assert that moral truths depend on the existence of something (whether material or abtract).
Moral truths are necessarily attendant to the world in which we live. They must refer.
If there is no intelligent alien life in the universe then the sentence "there is no intelligent alien life in the universe" is true, even though the phrase "intelligent alien life" wouldn't refer to anything that exists.
If one ought not eat babies then the sentence "one ought not eat babies" is true, even though the phrase "ought not" wouldn't refer to anything that exists.
I see no reason to believe your assertion that if obligation isn't a physical then then there are no obligations. You have yet to justify this assertion.
I won't convince you about moral realism, because you don't need it. :smile:
I will instead support you in your goal. Although you don't actuall need that either. But it's something I can do very easily and I have to take it out of my system. :smile:
As I understand it, "moral realism" --I don't like and never use this term-- is basically about making a list of what things are right and what are wrong. These things resemble very much the rules that every game has. One must follow them in order to play a game. Of course, because they are actually part of the game. And that's all there is to them. They can also be set in groups, as principles of acceptable and inacceptable behavior that members of the group are obliged to follow if they want to participate in a group. All that is of course acceptable.
I could also call them "recipes" of moral behavior. The Ten Commandments is an example of such a moral view of the world. It is an arbitrary and absolute way of defining moral behavior. There's nothing metaphysical or scientific about it. They are so absolute that they don't leave any room for deviating from or breaking them. Even when there can be hundreds of logical, plausible, well-grounded reasons why one is justified to do so. There's no doubt that killing is a crime, that it is immoral to kill. It is even illegal. You go to prison. But what about justified killing for self-defense or in wars? People normally don't go to prison for that. Nor are they considered immoral by the society. You can take every Commandment, one by one, and you can find all sorts of cases in which one is justifies to deviate from or break them. If not for anything else, because they refer mainly to the Jewish people and their old customs. Yet they are supposed to be followed by all Christians everywhere in the world. Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy. This is ridiculous. How can be expected to follow these "rules"?
So, can such a moral(ity) system be applied to life as a whole and with all its versatility and multifacetedness?
Of course not.
An moral (I prefer the term "ethical") system must be founded on a basic principle, based on which other principles can be formed and ethical behavior and acts can be determined, allowing also for judgment to take place, based on rational thinking and facts, i.e. considering the conditions under which acts take place.
But noting the issue youre outlining my question is - what moral facts could exist a priori? That is, without human knowledge of them?
The concept around geometrical facts ar least is that they exist whether we know about them or not right? We discover aspects of the material world.
What are we discovering when we come across moral facts?
Edit: sorry for post-comment additions - that isnt my assertion. My contention is it must refer to a state of affairs. Ought not isnt a state of affairs and so I cant see it to be either a fact or compelling morally to begin with. The states of affairs of that statement is that there are others and we can harm them.
You have to do more work to support the ought not and Im not seeing that work
No, that's normative ethics.
:up:
The sentence "angels do not live in Heaven" is true even though the words "angel" and "heaven" do not refer to anything.
Quoting AmadeusD
That we ought not eat babies. It's true even if we all believe otherwise (and even if we never consider it at all).
Quoting AmadeusD
We are discovering moral facts. You seem to be asking me to reduce moral facts to non-moral facts. Moral facts can't be reduced to non-moral facts. See Hume.
I do not agree. Its a fictional sentence referring to nothing and so does not carry truth (is my take).
Quoting Michael
What supports your contention that it's true?
I take your other response as a tautology and cant say much about it ?:halo:
Morality exists in the mind, only. It isnt discovered (is my position). See Hume :nerd:
Im kidding. Enjoying the exchange
I didn't give an actual definition of "moral realism", but just a raw, very simplified description, just enough to present my views. And what I said agrees with its actual definition, at least as given by the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad."
Please don't intervene except if you have something useful to say. I think I have told you that again.
The whole point of objectivism or realism is to go beyond decision-making altogether.
You misunderstand what that is saying.
Moral realism claims that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which are wrong.
Moral realism doesn't claim that these actions are right and that these actions are wrong.
One can be a moral realist and claim that moral sentences are truth-apt and describe objective features of the world without commenting on whether or not abortion is wrong.
This is the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics. Moral realism like non-cognitivism, subjectivism, and error theory is a theory in metaethics. Utilitarianism and deontology are theories in normative ethics.
My apologies.
As is typical with me sometimes, I packed way too many things in that post without enough connective tissue, so to speak. I understand what you are saying. I understand the distinctions between kinds of ethics, and what academia categorizes as moral statements(utterances of ought). I also understand that current convention divides all theories of meaning into two categories, both of which presuppose symbolism.
Do you disagree with my saying that all meta ethical endeavors share the same basic elemental constitution... thinking about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour?
What you claimed to be your problem has nothing to do with what I wrote. I've no problem at all with the statement you focused on. I agree that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, nor do they need to be in order for there to be moral facts and true statements and/or sound judgments about those facts. Facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so.
As I said, my position is that all facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour whether that be our own or others'. Hence facts that do not involve contemplating acceptable/unacceptable behaviour are amoral facts.
When one promises to do X, it is not a hypothetical imperative. It is the act of giving another the added additional assurance that one will keep their word(to make the world match their words).
Can you elaborate on this a bit? I note a distinction in a way that one could be 'telling the truth' that they believe something which runs counter to a fact of the matter.
But I can't see how this removes the element of 'truth' in a given fact (if established as such)
Quoting Michael
No it's not.
How do you respond to that?
I undestand what you say. Indeed, I ignored the part of "there are facts of the matter", which plays a role in moral statements. However, this does not change the main point of what I'm saying, i.e. saying this is bad and this is good, as objective statements, in an absolute way, as being the truth, etc. is like using rules, recipes of moral behaviour. Even if you restrict the statement "It is wrong to kill" by adding a condition like "if one is not under threat", it is still a moral rule. Even more statements of more specific nature, like "Greed is a vice", "Abortion is a bad thing", etc. act as moral rules.
As far as "normative ethics" are concerned, which you have brought up, the difference between normative statements and the above moral statements is that they are evaluations that are relative to some standard instead of being absolute. And I was certainly not talking about anything like that. Therefore your remark was out of point.
I understand: you are arguing that either moral realism is true or error theory is true. However, as I noted before, although intuiting what language is trying to express is important, you just bluntly presuppose that moral statements express objective facts at the outset (#1), which insufficiently precludes moral subjectivism.
I have to note that, because I am a moral subjectivist--so when my view is just subtly excluded from consideration, it makes me unimpressed with the argument (simply because it didn't address all available options).
:up:
:up: :up:
I prefer moral naturalism to "moral realism", Bob, because the latter concerns 'the meaning of moral statements about states-of-affairs' (semantics) whereas the former (a subset or kind of moral realism) more precisely concerns, in effect, 'defeasible reasons for moral statements about natural beings' (pragmatics). These 'moral reasons' are objective insofar as the functionalities or properties of natural beings to which they refer are objective. No doubt just as one can use mathematics or chemistry subjectively, one can also use 'moral statements about natural beings' subjectively; however, such unwarranted subjectivization (or relativization) tends to be incoherent and vacuous.
Anyway, simply put: (1) it is a fact of the matter that every natural being is inseparable from the natural world; (2) natural beings capable of normativity require reasons (i.e. facts/evidence-based claims) for doing things as a rule and for not doings as a rule; (3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e. obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such; (4) and in the normative framework of moral naturalism, (our) species' defects function as moral facts¹ which provide reasons² (i.e. claims (e.g. "I do this³ because² 'not to do this' can/will harm¹ her")) for species-members (us) to care for³ take care of³ (our) species' defects as a rule we give ourselves.
(NB: A rule itself does not compel compliance, however; 'following a rule' is usually a habit acquired through practice for which, at best, there is a compelling reason independent of that rule.)
[quote=Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 1]We can have reasons to believe something, to do something, to have some desire or aim, and to have many other attitudes and emotions, such as fear, regret, and hope. Reasons are given by facts, such as the fact that someone's finger-prints are on some gun, or that calling an ambulance would save someone's life. It is hard to explain the concept of a reason, or what the phrase 'a reason' means. Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favour of our having some attitude, or our acting in some way. But 'counts in favour of' means roughly 'gives a reason for'. The concept of a reason is best explained by example. One example is the thought that we always have a reason to want to avoid being in agony.[/quote]
re: Some of h. sapiens' defects (which are self-evident as per e.g. P. Foot, M. Nussbaum): vulnerabilities to
- deprivation (of e.g. sustanence, shelter, sleep, touch, esteem, care, health, hygiene, trust, safety, etc)
- dysfunction (i.e. injury, ill-health, disability)
- helplessness (i.e. trapped, confined, or fear-terror of being vulnerable)
- stupidity (i.e. maladaptive habits (e.g. mimetic violence, lose-lose preferences, etc))
- betrayal (i.e. trust-hazards)
- bereavement (i.e. losing loved ones & close friends), etc ...
... in effect, any involuntary decrease, irreparable loss or final elimination of human agency.
This sketch (influenced by Laozi, Epicurus, Spinoza, Peirce-Dewey, C. Rosset, A. Murray, D. Parfit, M. Nussbaum, O. Flanagan, P. Foot et al) supports only one type of 'moral realism', Bob, and rejects error theory / moral nihilism (etc) as well as all forms of moral supernaturalism (e.g. divine command theory).
I would say that moral realism is a three pronged thesis:
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism].
2. Moral judgments are expressing something objective.
3. There are at least some (or one) true moral judgment.
Making a list of things that are right and wrong is compatible with anti-realism as well (I would say).
I agree in the sense that a lot of common moral realist positions tend to be too deontological simply because they are not fully thought-out; but I dont think your critique actually targets moral realists (in general): there are plenty of moral realist that agree that:
So are you saying that the moral facts are events which are of acceptable or unacceptable behavior, but that acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior is non-factual? Because, then I think we may just be semantically disagreeing and (I would say) you are a moral anti-realist for the sake of the contemporary discussion of metaethics (although I could be misunderstanding).
With respect to promises, a promise is a subjective obligation that one sets out to do, which can be transcribed into a hypothetical imperativebecause it is not categorical. I dont have an obligation, prior to promising X, to do Xits not a moral fact that I ought to do X. Instead, I can say if I ought to help my neighbor, then I should make promises to do X in situation Y (or something like that) and then affirm the antecedent. If there are no moral facts (in at least the sense that I described), then every obligation is hypothetical.
Likewise, the obligation to fulfill the promise, if you are agreeing that the promise itself is not a moral fact, is also a hypothetical imperative. If I ought to fulfill my promises, then I must do X because I promised X. If I promise X but reject the antecedent of the former hypothetical, then I can rationally and legitimately promise X and not be obliged to do X. Without grounding it in a normative fact-of-the-matter, this is what is left (I would say).
Just to throw a curveball out there, Stanley Cavell makes the claim that it is our shared lives that are normative, in that we have (implicit) criteria to judge each other, which come from what we are interested in (as a culture), what matters to us as a society. So, our actions are not constrained by facts, but conformity. That is not to say that others judgment is our moral condition. A moral situation is just when we run out of rules and norms (the ought), in which case our responses dictate our character; we are morally obligated, responsible as a (real) fact of the limitation of knowledge.
Can we know what is best ahead of time? No. Does anything anyone decides or argues for have power over what we do? No. Nevertheless, we act and learn, excuse, refine, better ourselves, and these things are not individual, necessarily based on whim, emotion, irrationality, unintelligibilityit is real in that it matters and is subject to judgment. Those are facts of our human condition, but outside the realism/anti-realism distinction, which is just the desire to avoid our responsibility for our acts by making it about just doing what is right, what we ought tomade certain (apart from me) by facts.
:100:
What do you mean here by "responsibility"?
Legal responsibility?
No. I said, facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so. Facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). What has happened and/or is happening are matters of fact. Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'.
Quoting Bob Ross
I never said that that was even the sort of thing than can be a fact, of any kind. You seem to be consistently arguing against an imaginary opponent here. Utterances of ought are judgments, not facts. They can be true/sound. Facts cannot. Odd that you keep arguing against stuff I've not said nor does it only follow from what I have said.
A question...
Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?
Truth is correspondence between what's happened or is happening and thought, belief, and/or statements thereof. Facts are events(what's happened or is happening).
"Telling the truth" is actually a very misleading phrase or way of speaking, but it's for another thread. But yes, one could be telling the truth, if that means stating what one believes to be true, and say something that runs counter to what happened, is happening, or will happen but has yet to have done so.
Responsibility for what you say and do; to answer for it, to make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read by it, judged by it, held to it, make excuses for it, etc. That words not only do not stand outside of the circumstances in which they are spoken, but that an expression is an event that has an afterwards, to which you are tied.
Hello 180 Proof!
I appreciate your elaborate response, and hopefully I can adequately respond!
It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are advocating that concerns ...[about] species defects of natural beings is equivalent to moral concern/judgment because such concerns (about species defects) provide compelling reasons (independent of that rule which was formulated from them) for doing or not doing specific actions: am I on the right track here?
If I am, then let me expound some of my prima facie concerns. Firstly, I can see how species defects can provide compelling reasons to perform specific actions, and thusly help inform us of what we ought to be doing, but I am failing to see how those obligations are factual. For example, imagine you are explaining all the relevant defects of a specific human being (relative to the species) to someone else: once you get done, what moral fact has been exposed? You explain to me that this person has a disability, and I in no way can infer that I ought to help them from that (in and of itself): I must import some non-factual moral judgment that informs me how that I should help them (perhaps: be kind to others? Etc.). To me, I see species defects as certainly relevant to my moral consideration, but they seem to me to be non-moral facts that supplement the moral judgmentse.g., I say one should not smoke because it is unhealthy and one ought to be healthy, and it is unhealthy does not, in itself, inform me that I shouldnt do it.
Perhaps this is a difference in our views of facticity and morality: I would say that moral language signifies what one ought to be doing and facticity is about statements which correspond properly to reality [such that what it references about reality agrees with reality with respect to it]. What would you say?
In short: I am not seeing how natural analysis about species defects contains within it any statements which indicate what one ought to be doing and correspond to reality [such that...].
Which leads me to my second worry:
To me, you have explicated quite clearly here my worry that moral facts (i.e., moral reasons) are only objective insofar as their properties are about natural beings: but isnt there a gap between the way an organism may be (in relation to a standard organism within their species) and a normative judgment about how we ought to treat that organism? If there isnt, then I am not seeing it.
Alas, my final worry pertains to:
It seems as though, and correct me if I am misunderstanding, you consider mathematical facts (and similar areas of study) to be analogous to moral facts, such that if a moral reason isnt factual then neither is a mathematical reason: I think there is a difference between using mathematics subjectively and mathematics being subjective. Math has facts because the propositions correspond accurately to states-of-affairs in reality (of which I would ground it in our faculties of cognition); whereas, I dont see how that is the case with morality (especially if the moral facts are essentially only factual insofar as they are dependent on non-moral facts about species/organisms).
Let me know what you think!
I don't see how this is a form of moral realism, which I think you may be agreeing with me here. Facts about psychology do not entail the existence of moral facts. I think you described a form of moral subjectivism or perhaps a moral realist position called moral relativism (but I simply disagree with the latter).
Yes, but it seems like you are trying to imply that there are moral facts simply because there are people engaging in morally signified eventse.g., I think I ought to help a poor person and I do, thats an event, thats therefore a fact (under you view), and since it is an event about a moral act it is a moral fact. I am trying to explicate that this is no way implies that moral realism: a moral subjectivists 100% can agree with my example above.
Another way of thinking about it, perhaps, is that the act of being obligated subjectively to help a poor person is an event, but it is not a moral event because it stemmed from that persons psychology.
I apologize if that is the case: I must be misunderstanding you.
Ok, so what is the moral fact-of-the-matter then (under your view)? Is it just an event that has moral signification (such as my example of helping the poor)? What would it mean for an event to be moral under your view?
No. I only have an obligation to do X upon promising X if I am equally obligated to fulfill my promises.
:up:
I have no problems with that SEP article: I think it is a good outline of the landscape.
No. I'm clearly delineating, not implying, that all facts are events(what happened or is happening) and that moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'
Quoting Bob Ross
Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?
Okay. Good. Do you understand that I'm setting out the bit I bolded?
:up:
I do not recognize what I argued here in your 'paraphrase' above, so my guess is that you're not on the right track.
I don't see this either, which is why I did not make such an argument. If you're interested, Bob, go back and re-read the second paragraph (4 points), and then the parenthetical note on 'following a rule', and lastly the Derek Parfit quotation.
Even if we take natural language philosophy seriously, there is a nuance of natural language that seems to be missing in your analysis: Statements can be "objectively" true in one context, but false when that context is absent.
"One cannot move pawns backwards."
Is "objectively" true, but only in the context of playing a game of chess. Once that context is removed, it is objectively false: after all, I can move the piece backwards just as easily as any other direction. But note that the form of the sentence is no different than:
"One cannot transmute lead into gold."
Which is not dependent in its truth on any particular context.
So the question is, are the truths of moral statements context dependent or context independent? To satisfy a moral arealist such as @Bob Ross I think they must be context independent. But either way, the form in which the statements are posed cannot tell you that.
Do you believe in social realities? I can guarantee you behave as if you do. After all, nation, money, property, family, company, are all social realities, and it would be a difficult life indeed that didn't acknowledge any of them. So even if morality were "only" a social reality, that would still perhaps be a more formidable reality than you are giving it credit for.
And what if morality had a biological origin? Unlike say money, which is purely a social construct (yet can literally move mountains), what if morality is rooted in an elemental, biologically predisposed notion of justice (as it is, imho)? If so, would it count as "real"?
Ultimately I think the whole "is it real" question is just too vague. You have to specify what kind of "real" you are looking for. If you are talking about physically real (as the question tends to implicitly, and unjustifiably, slide towards), then no, of course morality isn't real. But then, there are more things in heaven and Earth, physicalist, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
You might have chosen a better example.
Yes, this is a very good point, and shows that the nuances of objective truth isn't quite captured by the "realism" in moral realism.
I've brought up mathematics before. Mathematical antirealists are not non-cognitivists, error theorists, or subjectivists; they believe in objective-like mathematical truths, albeit truths that do not depend on the mind-independent existence of abstract objects.
I'm not sure if there's a popular "ism" that is comparable to this in metaethics. Moral realism seems like it could include the moral equivalents of both mathematical realism and mathematical antirealism.
But what I was describing is not a fact about our psychology. That we are responsible for what we say and do is a fact of our position in the world and in relation to each other (even though we may not be held to it), which is real in the sense it has importance and power; it creates who we are going to be. A moral moment is when we do not know what to do and no one is in a better position to know what is right. The reality of that position does not make the fact of what I do next relative or subjective, though it might need to be individual and revolutionary (adverse to conformity).
If we mean objectively real like rocks and trees and carrots, then no, moral values are obviously not real in that sense.
As has been mentioned, there are many human conventions that are agreed upon and made real by virtue of our agreement. We agree that certain bits of paper with pictures and numbers printed thereon are worth a certain amount in economic terms. But the value of money is contingent and not real in the same way as rocks are real. And money can fall in value. If we want to argue that moral values are real in the way that conventions such as money, companies, and contracts are real, it would mean that moral values are also contingent, mind-dependent realities which are real only insofar as we agree to recognize them for utilitarian purposes. But this does not seem right and moral realists generally want something more than this as a basis for morality.
Some argue that moral values could be real in the way that mathematical truths are real. I am not a mathematician but I know that we have proofs in mathematics that cannot be disputed in the way morality can be. There dont seem to be any such proofs when it comes to morality. I cannot prove objectively or with logic that stealing or lying or murder are morally wrong. So morality does not seem to be like mathematics either, because moral assertions can be questioned in a way that 5+7=12 cannot be questioned. People can reasonably disagree about particular moral values but they cannot reasonably disagree about arithmetic. Therefore, I dont think moral values can be real in the way mathematical truths are real. So where does this leave us?
It has been by thinking about all this that I have come to agree with Hume who says that morality is based in our sentiments. Hume says:
In these sentiments then, not in a discovery of relations of any kind, do all moral determinations consist. . . . we must at last acknowledge, that the crime or immorality is no particular fact or relation, which can be the object of the understanding, but arises entirely from the sentiment of disapprobation, which, by the structure of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the apprehension of barbarity or treachery.
I feel that it is here, with our sentiments, that we get to some sort of bedrock. Our feelings, our sentiments seem to be about as real and as important to us as anything can be. If we think Hume may be right then we might want to ask where our moral sentiments come from. Perhaps answering this question could tell us something important about the sort of reality our moral values can have.
Moral facts, on Bob's view, cannot exist for they must be mind-independent(whatever they are), objective entities and given that all things moral directly involve unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour and all unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour is existentially dependent upon minds and contexts, then it only follows that there is no such thing as moral facts.
A large part of the problem involves the underlying dichotomies at work.
Haha, I did have a queasy feeling about it.
"One cannot transmute lead into gold using chemistry."
So, correct me if I am wrong, a moral fact is an event such that there is someone in that event that is considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior? Am I on the right track? If not, then please elaborate on that portion (of the quote above).
No, thats fine; but I am only not going to break that obligation (when push comes to shove) if I have obligated myself to fulfilling my professed obligations (promises): are you denying that?
Heres what was in bold:
What are you saying you are setting out to do? Setting out to denote how hard it is to nail down what counts as morally factual? Either way, you should be able to give a definition of what is a moral fact, no?
The reason I am thinking that, in your view, concerns about species defects of natural beings is equivalent to morality due to them providing compelling reasons is because of this portion:
And:
I dont know how to interpret this any other way: could you please elaborate?
For example, you say species' defects function as moral facts: wouldnt it be accurate to then say that concerns about species defects [of natural beings] are equivalent to morality?
I did re-read it, and found the same conclusion; so perhaps it would be useful if you could elaborate on what I am misinterpreting?
It seems as though you are saying that moral facts are equivalent, in function, to facts about species defects, but then saying that the obligation exists outside of those species defects.
If a moral realist were to demonstrate that there was a moral fact which was analogous to the above proposition, such that I just needed to understand the context of the words (within the language) being used (e.g., pawn) and it would be true that (1) it is factual and (2) true; then I would accept it. My problem is that I dont think there are any moral facts, period.
If I am understanding your concept of social realities correctly, then I would say that I accept them but not as objective: they are inter-subjective. It is not a fact that a 0.5-carat diamond should be worth $1500, but it is a fact that currently, the economy values a 0.5-carat diamond at $1500.
If moral judgments could be traced back to biological aspects of our species, then, prima facie, that would count as a moral realist position. I just dont think they can: I think it is entirely possible that I should resist my biologically wiring.
True. My moral fact I am looking for a normative propositions or statements that inform us what one ought to be doing which correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality (where reality is the totality of stance-independently, existent things).
But would you say that this fact of our position in the world exists mind(stance)-independently and has moral signification? I wouldnt. Having importance or power doesnt make something a fact.
Yes. The basic dichotomy I'm setting out and working from is moral and not.
Yes, I am denying that.
By virtue of promising, one already obligates themselves to make the world match their words(keep their promise). That's the whole point of promise making. If one does not already obligate themselves to keep their word, then they do not intend to make the world match their words, and hence they've not made a promise at all, for they did not believe what they said. They've just plain lied. The moral obligation remains regardless. The moral fact is such that one made a promise. True statements about that moral fact will correspond to it.
Hence, if today you promise to plant me a rose garden on Monday, then come Tuesday I ought to have one. That's true by virtue of corresponding to the relevant moral fact of the matter at hand.
No.
Yes, and I have repeatedly done so from the very beginning of this exchange.
While there may be some daylight between us in terms of reflecting on our interactions; the point that you're responding to here is largely what I was trying to get across throughout our interactions around moral realism.
If the context is what gives a moral statement its validity, I have no issue with that (and, to be fair, i expounded on this much more clearly in the exchange with Banno) - but I see the requirement for context in actualizing the validity of statement to implicitly confirm its subjectivity. And this may be that the bullet it bite is an extremely Kantian one of idealism, in some form, to support the idea that if everything needs context, nothing is objective.
I have work to do :lol:
Fwiw, for both of you ( @180 Proof ) i read the same ideas into the post/s.
I'm still seeing the same as Bob Ross in those passages.
Your problem just may be the terminological usage you've confined yourself with. Are you using the terms "moral" and "facts" consistently? If so, exactly what counts as "moral" and "fact"?
If that's the case, then the term "subjective" loses all its meaning and use because it loses the ability to discriminate between different kinds of things. Hence, it is best to abandon the dichotomy altogether, which is what I've done...
Interesting. As you'll have seen, It appears i must necessarily be heading toward that conclusion. But i will explore every alcove on the way down haha
Strictly speaking, everything ever thought, believed, and/or uttered comes through a subject, so in that sense, nothing thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise expressed/uttered is strictly objective. The dichotomy also fails in all the same ways as the internal/external dichotomy fails. That is, they are both inherently incapable of taking account of that which consists of both, and thus is neither one or the other. Truth, thought, belief, and meaning are all precisely such things. But I digress... that's another topic altogether.
Those dichotomies as well as a few others add nothing but unnecessary confusion/overcomplication to philosophy.
It has always appeared to me that 'objective' refers to the 'best of the lot' type of thinking rather than a strict entailment of necessity. That said, I am yet to find a convincing passage/chapter/paper that convinces me the gap between 'ding en sich' and my impression of it is such that It can't be a 1:1 match. That we can't know this seems inherent in sensibility - but I can't quite grasp that the gap is wide enough to matter (until imagination comes in, anyway - which may be the place in which the problem actually lies).
Well, I reject Kant's Noumena as well as phenomenalist approaches on the obvious grounds that drawing the distinction between the world and perception of it requires a comparitive analysis of both. By definition, we have no access to Noumena. By definition, all we have are our perceptions(Stove's gem). Hence, if that is the case, there is no way to know that our perceptions do not match up to the world, so...
Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating.
That's up... out of the bottle. Not down.
:wink:
Sorry, just to be clear, you're indicating a Kantian "We know we don't see things as they are" position is untenable (I suppose this entails the inverse also is lol)?
"One cannot move pawns backwards"
Is true within the context of the social practice of chess. Moreover, it is the social practice of chess that makes it true; without this practice, the truth of it loses its foundation.
So you are granting that if there was a moral statement true in, and because of, its social context, then this statement is a moral fact?
...and now do you not see that the context is important?
Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them.
Yes, that was my point
Quoting creativesoul
Gotcha; thank you :pray:
Don't thank me, thank the one I adopted that from... probably A.J. Ayer.
In fact, animals also exhibit moral behavior. Isn't the most natural explanation that it is instinctive?
Wouldn't it be incredibly odd if a highly cooperative species like ours *didn't* evolve instinctive sentiments that reinforce cooperation and discourage anti cooperative behaviour? If instead, all this was left to the uncertain vagaries of cultural transmission?
Look at the earliest moral claim of many (all?) children:
"It's not fair!"
In other words, "I have been treated unjustly". Are parents going around teaching their kids what is justice and how to identify injustice? I think not.
Quoting Bob Ross
You have a forebrain capable of overriding most any impulse. What of it?
I, too, strongly suspect that morality is inevitable as an evolutionary feature/consequence of our being interdependent social creatures.
Can you give an example that comports with what humans envisage morality to be viz. contemplated outcomes resulting in a judgement informing the decision to act with regard to other sentient beings?
I necessarily see instinct as separate to this. Though, determinism might trump me, if true.
This is a "philosophical" account of morality whose connection to lived reality is dubious at best. For a more reasonable approach see here
I agree.
The fact of it is not because of its import. The reality of it is the structure of our relation to ourselves and society following the limitation of knowledge (to answer independent of us). The fact is that what creates our moral responsibility is that our words and acts speak to who we are; that our responsiveness to others is a duty beyond trying to decide and be sure (know, be certain) what is to be done. So, although I dont understand the terms you are couching this in, I would say that, yes, our human condition exists apart from me and has significance because it is the possibility of the moral realm at all (and not just rules or impulse).
I take it you imagine the choice is that morality is either tied to something certain (the world, etc), or at least not me, because we are arbitrary. What I am saying is that moral choices are not arbitrary (necessarily) because they are tied to me (at a certain point, beyond societys ordinary norms and expectations).
@hypericin Agree with the above..
Not the whole way through it; but very interesting and I imagine a fairly colourful area to be discussed at -large.
Ok, but, like I said before, someone being in the event of making moral judgments (considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior) is not a moral fact in any meaningful sense. Literally every moral anti-realist position agrees that there are people considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior--the disagreement is about whether those considerations are about mind(stance)-independently existing morals. Your view, I think, just completely sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion.
I get that you define moral fact in a way such that a promise is one, being an event which has to do with considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior, but that, again, is just sidestepping the issue: is that promise, or that considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior, about something objective? It seems as though your use of moral facticity just doesnt find this question relevant, since someone can be considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior without unacceptable or acceptable behavior being itself objective.
I understand what you are saying here, and I dont think I would be saying anything new about my position on it by addressing it. So I am going to agree to disagree on this one.
If moral facts are just events where someone is considering what is acceptable/unacceptable to do, then it isnt necessarily the case that their judgment (conclusion they make) about what is acceptable/unacceptable corresponds to what mind(stance)-independently exists. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that moral facts exist in any metaethically meaningful sense of the term.
:up:
By 'moral' language, I mean language which signifies 'what one ought to be doing'; and by 'fact' I mean 'a statement which corresponds to reality such that what it refers to about reality is there'.
Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but I would say it is true because once one understands that we are talking about the game of chess, there are certain rules in place. I guess, to be technical, the rules themselves are inter-subjective, not objective (if that is what you are trying to get at). They are like money.
That one cannot move pawns backwards in the game of chess is true independently of what anyone thinks because it is a fact, but the actually rule that prohibits the action of going backwards with a pawn is inter-subjective. By analogy, imagine that a loaf of bread is $10. It being $10 is inter-subjective (and thusly non-factual: non-objective), but it is a fact that it is currently inter-subjectively valued at $10. These are two entirely different propositions; and I think you may be conflating them.
No. The moral (rule), like chess rules, are inter-subjective (at best); but if it is the case that we inter-subjectively agree on a moral rule, then it is a fact that we inter-subjectively agree on that moral rule: thusly, the moral rule is not a fact, but that we agree on it isthey two different propositions.
Moral judgments being biologically motivated does not mean that morals are biological.
I have no problem with this, I just dont agree that it is objective. I would say it is inter-subjective. Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective.
I dont think morality is completely arbitrary. I think that morality is either objective (exists mind[stance]-independently) or it does not (e.g., subjective, inter-subjective, etc.).
I dont even think that it is arbitrary when a person creates their own moral rules.
Okay.
Elaborate on what?
No.
Okay.
Sorry my precis isn't clear enough, Bob; but I don't get anything out of spoon-feeding you (or @AmadeusD) further. FWIW, I'll refer you again to 'the influences' on my moral naturalism:
Quoting 180 Proof
It's not that simplistic. I have no "access" to your parents and yet I know that they're different. Some things we understand rationally. The distinction between "analytic", "synthetic a priori", and "empirical" knowledge is central to Kant's philosophy.
It's been a while since I've read him, but I think his argument is that knowledge of noumena is synthetic a priori, whereas you seem to be arguing that because it's not empirical then it's fallacious?
Although I think modern science has discovered to an extent Kant's noumena; the fundamental particles of the Standard Model. They're the mind-independent things causally responsible for the subjective phenomena that we are familiar with.
So it is not a fact that Santa doesn't exist? I don't think it makes sense to say that Santa's non-existence is "there".
:lol: I feel like I just got kicked out of the cool kids table.
That response seems a bit harsh and unhelpful. I think I have demonstrated that I am dissecting your view with genuineness and intellectual honesty, and I am merely asking for basic clarification of what you are trying to convey. It seems like you are shutting down and unwilling to discuss your moral naturalism with anyone who doesn't immediately understand what you are saying in your first post.
With that being said, if you are ever willing to converse in further detail about it, then I am all ears! I enjoy hearing other metaethical theories.
"santa doesn't exist" is the same as it is false that "santa does exist": either way, it is conveying that the proposition "santa does exist" does not agree with reality. In your formulation, it could also be interpreted as an agreement with reality that santa isn't there. I see no problems with this.
It is a fact that "santa does not exist" because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that there is no santa in it, and this is true.
And the moral realist will say that it is a fact that one ought not harm another because what the proposition is referencing about reality is that one ought not harm another, and this is true.
At times it seems that you think of a fact as referring to something that physically exists, e.g. here where you say "[facts] correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality (where reality is the totality of stance-independently, existent things)," although this is inconsistent with what you're now saying about the fact of Santa's non-existence.
Santa's non-existence is a state-of-affairs, but not an existing thing. This assumption that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists is a false one, and so morality not existing (e.g. as some physical thing) does not entail that there are no moral states-of-affairs.
I think what you need to carry this through to what is commonly imagined as moral realism is the correspondence theory of truth. Attempts to bypass that with talk of the T-sentence rule or directions of fit only obscure the issue because the T-sentence rule accommodates both realists and anti realists.
If you want to argue that because moral statement M is true, then moral realism, go ahead and advocate correspondence. That position has weaknesses, though
The proposition "Santa does not exist" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that Santa does not exist.
The proposition "1 + 1 = 2" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that 1 + 1 = 2.
The proposition "one ought not harm another" is true because it corresponds to the state of affairs that one ought not harm another.
I'm not exactly sure what it is you want. If you want to say that a statement is true only if it corresponds to some physical thing, then I would dispute that. Santa not existing and 1 + 1 equalling 2 are not physical things, and yet they definitely are the case. The moral realist will say that that one ought nor harm another is not a physical thing, and yet definitely is the case.
So we're dispensing with talk of the T-sentence and directions of fit, right? We're now directly addressing this argument for moral realism:
1. premise: Correspondence theory of truth
2. Moral statement M is true.
3. because of correspondence theory, M corresponds to a state of the world.
4. therefore, moral realism.
Do you agree with that? Correspondence theory is not rooted in physicalism. It was first expressed during the "age of essence" by Aristotle. It's blind to ontological commitments.
Edit: except that if you're a physicalist and you endorse correspondence theory, then for you, true statements are going to have to refer to physical things (or things that reduce to the physical.)
I think of physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is physical. That's not the same as saying that every true statement refers to a physical thing. The sentences "Santa does not exist" and "1 + 1 = 2" are true but do not refer to physical things.
I think too many in this discussion equate "truth" with "existence". They are separate matters of enquiry.
Quoting frank
I think of moral realism as the thesis that moral propositions are truth-apt and (attempt to) refer to objective features of the world, and that some such propositions are true.
If a statement "corresponding" to the world just is that it refers to the world and is true, then sure, moral realism implicitly endorses the correspondence theory of truth.
Moral anti-realists may also claim that moral statements are truth-apt, so what you have left to distinguish your take on moral realism is that it says moral statements refer to objective features of the world. If you agree to that, we can put the whole issue of truth to the side and just talk about how statements refer, right?
Sure, although I don't know how statements refer.
:cheer:
I don't either.
True.
But what you quoted doesnt reference physical existence, it references existence. This includes any supersensible or platonic realms.
What I am saying is that it is a fact that santa does not exist because that statement agrees with reality. I never precluded the existence of facts about negations of propositions. It is a fact that it is false that santa exists because santa exists does not agree with reality: it being false does agree with reality, and thusly would be a fact.
Thats not what the agreement (between the statement and reality) is in this case: it is that there is a state-of-affairs such santa is not a part of any state-of-affair in reality. Of course, santas non-existence is not a state-of-affairs, him not existing agrees with the state-of-affairs in reality since there is no santa in them.
Its like saying theres no ball in this room. This is true iff there really isnt a ball in this room. It isnt true because the balls non-existence is a state-of-affairs in that room; it is true because the state-of-affairs in the room agrees with the statement the ball is not in this room such that there is no ball associated with them.
Existence and physical existence are two different things, and I understand you are targeting the latter; but I just want to clarify that I agree with the statement that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists and disagreeing with something is a state-of-affairs if it physically/tangibly exists.
Consider two scenarios:
Scenario 1:
Only my mind exists
Scenario 2:
Only my mind and your mind exist
The sentence "only my mind exists" is true in scenario 1 but false in scenario 2. If a sentence is true only if it refers to something that exists then it must be that something exists in scenario 1 that doesn't exist in scenario 2. But this clearly isn't the case. The only thing that exists in scenario 1 my mind also exists in scenario 2.
That nothing else exists in scenario 1 is a state-of-affairs, but not something that "exists". Therefore it is false to say that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists.
Quoting Michael
the absence of anything but that one mind exists in scenario 1.
In scenario two, this extends to "but those two minds".
While your example here is infinitely clearer than other attempts you've made, which i commend, I still end up with the answer "Not existing isn't a state of affairs". It's talking about a non-state-of-affairs. I would posit that in either case, it wouldn't even be possible to posit anything not existing or existing, beyond the items noted. That seems baked into the scenarios to me.
That may seem semantic to you, but doesn't to me, and that may be the difference.
Where do I start? Sigh...
All practiced usage of a term, any term, counts as a 'meaningful' sense(scarequotes intentional) of that particular term. Oddly enough, the term "meaningful" is superfluous here. All senses of all terms are meaningful to the practitioners.
I'm not alone in holding that events are facts. You insist that in order for me to be arguing in the affirmative for moral realism I must use the subjective/objective dichotomy as well as the mind dependent/independent dichotomy. That's not true.
"Being in the event of making moral judgements" is not something I would condone writing. That just IS categorizing thought, belief and/or behaviour as acceptable/unacceptable in some set of specific circumstances. It just IS practicing the application of one's moral belief/code. Moral judgments are not equivalent to moral facts. All moral judgments are acts. Not all moral events/facts are acts of moral judgment.
Hence, in short summary, the quote directly above contains a non sequitur followed by a textbook demonstrable falsehood.
True to a strong methodological naturalist bent, on my view, the simplest moral facts existed in their entirety - they emerged onto the world stage - long before our picking them out to the exclusion of all else with our naming and descriptive practices. They do not consist of language use.
Some events count as moral because they share the same basic common denominator that all moral things include. Morality, after all, boils down to coded of conduct. Ethical considerations, after all, are always about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. All things moral include that. There are no exceptions. There is no stronger justificatory ground. That all serves as more than adequate ground to discriminate between facts. Moral facts involve what I've been setting out. Non moral ones do not. That commonality makes all ethical considerations and all moral discourse count as moral.
What grounds your rejection of using the same common denominator to discriminate between kinds of events/facts/states of affairs/happenings?
It's irrelevant for different reasons. I've not used "moral fscticity". May I suggest you reread our exchange?
What you characterize as "sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion" I see as dissolving the issue by virtue of realizing that the problem is and always was the language use itself. The inherent inadequacy of the objective/subjective distinction seems like a novel consideration here.
You seem to find considerable difficulty accepting the facts for what they are when I'm saying stuff that you agree with. That's quite strange to me. What's the title of the thread again? What would a solution be like if not at least somewhat agreeable?
The last statement is phrased as though it is a conclusion. It does not follow what preceded it. It does not follow from the fact that I'm not using your preferred terminological framework that what I'm arguing does not make sense.
Are you claiming my mom is to my dad as perception is to reality(as Kant's Noumena/phenomena distinction)?
Which one is the parent in itself?
:wink:
You're saying that non-existence exists. That makes no sense. At the very least you seem to be using the term "exists" in two different way which I suspect is leading you to equivocate.
Quoting AmadeusD
If you want to say that not existing isn't a state of affairs, and if it is objectively true that nothing else exists in scenario 1, then you must accept that objective truth does not always depend on there being some corresponding state of affairs.
So whether non-existence is a state of affairs or whether objective truth does not depend on some corresponding state of affairs, it is the case that objective truth does not always depend on the existence of something, and so it is fallacious to claim that moral realism is false because it doesn't correspond to something that exists.
While I think probably yes I dont think its a lack of correlation with a state of affairs. Its a state of affairs which lacks some thing.
I see an appreciable difference there. You may not and Im unsure how to sort that out
Quoting Michael
Not really no. What Im saying is that in scenario 1. the entire scenario is caught by your mind. There is no sense of doesnt exist outside that so perhaps I mis-spoke there and used exist incorrectly. The state of affairs is that your mind exists. Nothing else.
The absence of say a cat isnt a state of affairs. But within the actual state of affairs the fact of no cat is evident. Unsure what precise wording I need there Im sorry. So the state of affairs there is only your mind includes there being no cat - so, to me, it can be referred to as existing that there is no cat but I concede it isnt objective because there is no cat to refer to.
"trees exist" is made true by the existence of something and "trees don't exist" is made true by the non-existence of something. As such, existence of something is not a prerequisite of truth.
In fact, "trees don't exist" is true even if nothing exists.
Objects don't need to exist for statements to be true. "Santa doesn't exist" is true. "1 + 1 = 2" is true. "The last ever human will die before the heat death of the Universe" is true. Dinosaurs once walked the Earth is true.
Yes sir ^^ @Michael
Quoting Michael
But they are not objectively true. I guess they must be relatively true in light of what does exist - exclusion. Hmm. Thanks for this,
If you consider what actually makes up the criteria of "objective" (and not just the picture), then what I am describing can be reasoned and intelligible (not "arbitrary"--"real" in that it matters, has impact), and not emotional or self-interested or intuitive (what you term, "subjective"). Moral choices are not like an "Inter-subjective" contract, and, by their nature, unlike science or math, they do not always lead to agreement, but are nonetheless subject to judgment just as other rational acts.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, it is the fact that it is dependent on me (that I am defined and held to my acts) that makes moral choices not subjective (as I take you to mean "arbitrary" or, not based on a fact).
Quoting Bob Ross
If you force a dichotomy it makes it impossible to take into consideration how things actually are (as does requiring a specific standard), as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Austin discuss. Again, the meat of what objective is would be the actual mechanics of how we judge based on what criteria.
The statement only my mind exists claims that reality is such that my mind only exists. This is true iff reality is such that there are no other minds.
The statement only my mind and your mind exists claims that reality is such that my mind and your mind exists. This is true iff reality is such that my mind and your mind are the only minds.
There clearly is something which doesnt exist in scenario one that exists in scenario two: your mind. Thats the differentiating factor.
I think you might be inferring your conclusion from that because your mind exists in both scenarios and one is false but the other is true, but thats not the propositions you gave. To make it match what you are thinking, you would have to posit:
my mind exists
my mind and your mind exists OR only my mind and your mind exists
Now, the former proposition is perfectly compatible with the latter two: with the ones you gave, they are incompatible because you didnt just claim my mind exists in the first scenario: you claimed it was the only one that exists.
This, in summary, is where the confusion lay: I was thinking you were saying us contemplating what is acceptable/unacceptable counts as moral facts when, if I am understanding you correctly now, you are not saying that. You are saying that something else is the moral facts, and they are emerged naturally through some process (like perhaps evolution?). If I am getting it right this time, then please elaborate on what those facts are. Is tied to well-being, harm and happiness, ingrained into our biology? Something else?
Fair enough.
I mean, I dont agree with your use of fact, but I am not trying to convince to use mine; I just didnt see how us contemplating what is acceptable behavior was a moral fact under your own terms; but now I see you arent claiming that.
I am not sure I am following this part yet nor what the property of goodness, wrongness, etc. are reducible to in your naturalist view. I would rather you elaborate more so I have a better grasp of what you are saying than start quarreling about how to discriminate between events and other events.
I am not following: are you saying I am disagreeing, or making it difficult, with what I agree with (about what you are saying)?
I am trying to evaluate your moral realist theory internally, and not externally from my view. I was trying to note that you dont have moral facts (in the contemporary use of the terms in metaethics) in your view since I thought you were saying they are equivalent to human acts of contemplating what is right and wrong.
If you dont agree with my use of fact, then that is fine. I am just not seeing what is a moral event/fact under your view which is not simply an act of us contemplating what to do.
You seem to have misunderstood what I was saying.
These are two different sentences with two different truth conditions:
1. My mind exists
2. Only my mind exists
The existence of my mind is sufficient for (1) to be true but insufficient for (2) to be true. Something other than the existence of my mind is (also) required for (2) to be true:
Only my mind exists iff a) my mind exists and b) nothing else exists.
(b) is a state-of-affairs but not something that exists. Therefore your claim that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists is false.
"Moral subjectivism" seems to be one of those terms that is hopelessly vague and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the fact that you affirm that there are true moral judgments, and that these judgments are universally applicable, would seem to move you out of the "moral subjectivism" category by most definitions of that term. In other words, your "universalism" forecloses "subjectivism," and moves you into what is clearly moral realism.
For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably. Therefore you are not a subjectivist. Moral subjectivism cannot achieve unchangeable universality, at least as commonly understood.
Quoting Bob Ross
So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies? Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day? This is what you are committing yourself to.
I don't read Bob as even intimating that this might be the case. All he's positing is that some judgement could be independent of him and still be subjective. That seems obvious. There are opinions on pieces of art i'm not even aware of. That's an independent-of-me judgement that is still subjective. And an addendum of inter-subject agreement about that wouldn't make it objective.
I don't read more than this into what he's saying. Can you lay out where you're squeezing your reading from? (I use squeezing for fun.. Not in any way a comment on your methods). If you don't want to, that's fine; I'm just curious :)
Quoting Leontiskos
In my case, I do think this, but i dont think it's a norm (beyond being 'the norm' for most people) or that it applies universally or unchangeably.
Can i be an anti-realist? :P
I think there are evolutionary reasons that our thinking is biased in ways that tend to make us successful as a social species. I don't see a reason to think such moral biasing (or similar biasing) of our perspective would bias our perspectives in all regards.
I see what you are saying now, and let me try to address it.
B doesnt have to be a state-of-affairs for my claim to be true. This is just another example of a negative claim: nothing else exists is just like your santa doesnt exist example. It is true because what it purports about reality agrees with the state-of-affairs in reality, such that there is no santa and there is no other minds that are in that state-of-affairs (of which we call reality). It is not that the negation of something existing entails that there is such a state-of-affairs of non-existence: it is that the state-of-affairs, which exist, agree with the proposition that X doesnt exist because it really isnt a part of those states-of-affairs. Go back to my ball analogy in the room, saying there is not ball in the room is true iff the state-of-affairs, which all exist, in that room are such that there is no ball in them; you seem to think that it would imply, instead, that there is a state-of-affairs that does not exist such that there is no ball.
I had a hypnogogic version of this occur to me this morning. Finally figured what i was trying to say....Which is essentially this. The claim something doesn't exist can be true, but it's only true in relation to a existing state-of-affairs which excludes the object in question. The thing not existing isn't the state of affairs. Does that comport with your take, or have i misread it?
I am not sure I understand what you mean here??
I took the following to mean, "If you drop moral realism you should drop all realism."
Quoting Apustimelogist
Perhaps I was misinterpreting you, but I was explaining that I don't see a good justification for dropping all realism, on the basis of the nonexistence of moral facts.
Well maybe "should" was too strong a word but I think similar kinds of skepticism as with moral realism can lead you to drop other realisms. Where to draw the line? Depends who you are I guess. It doesn't seem to me a big leap from dropping moral facts to modal facts which do not seem to be anymore facts about actual events as morality is. Dropping normativity in the context of morality does not seem such a stretch either from dropping normativity about beliefs all together which I am sure a lot of moral anti-realists would not find easy. I think the idea that there is no objective fact about what someone ought to do would also cover beliefs if it covers moral facts, ceteris paribus. I think there's probably other parallels too where some argument against moral facts might apply to other facts.
I guess there is no good well-defined place for deciding where you should stop in terms of skepticism though. Even the most stringent anti-realist I am sure will not give up everything.
Correct. The proposition "there is no ball in my room" is true iff the state-of-affairs in my room is such that it excludes the existence of the ball. @Michael appears to think, if I am understanding them correctly, that it being true is in virtue of a state-of-affairs which does not exist but makes it true.
That there is no ball in your room is a state of affairs.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different state of affairs.
There is one room but there are (at least) two different states of affairs.
If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different states of affairs.
Therefore, a state of affairs cannot be reduced to the the thing(s) that exist(s).
So, I just disagree with this. Those are referencing the same state-of-affairs, but noting different things that are not in that state-of-affairs.
The room in both cases is the exact same: the same couch, same chair, etc.; so why would noting there isn't A vs. B, assuming they both are not in the room, refer to a different state-of-affairs?
For any given state-of-affairs, there is an infinite amount of things of which their existence cannot be found therein and, thusly, can be predicated as "not there".
Then you're just using the term "state of affairs" differently to me.
Are you familiar with the distinction between truth makers and truth bearers? A truth bearer is a truth-apt sentence such as "the cat is on the mat." A truth maker is the condition that must be satisfied for a truth bearer to be true.
I use the terms "state of affairs" and "truth maker" interchangeably, but if you don't then I'll rephrase what I said above:
That there is no ball in your room is a truth maker.
That there is no elephant in your room is a different truth maker.
This must be the case otherwise it would be the case that "there is no ball in your room" is true iff there is no elephant in your room, which is of course false.
If your room is the only thing that exists then it is the case that a) just one thing exists and b) there are (at least) two different truth makers.
Therefore, a truth maker cannot be reduced to the thing(s) that exist(s).
Moral realists claim that some truth bearer "one ought not X" is true because a particular truth maker that one ought not X objectively obtains.
Their position has nothing to do with what does or doesn't physically (or abstractly) exist.
I am not incredibly familiar with the literature on truth-bearers and truth-makers, but I am aware of the basic idea. I would say that a truth-maker is not reducible to a state-of-affairs in reality, and I would take a necessitation approach by saying that a truth-maker is just that which necessitates something as being true or false (i.e., truth-apt); and I am going to say that ability or aptness for correspondence to reality is what makes a sentence truth-apt...truth-bearing.
I dont understand why this would be the case. I would say the truth maker of statements is the same for all of them: whether or not it has the ability to have correspondence with reality. So, to me, both of these statements have the same truth-maker, but they are truth-apt about different claims about reality. Am I missing something?
This seems odd to me, as you seem to be implying that the truth-maker, which is some sort of state-of-affairs that does not exist, is what obtains for moral statements (when they are facts). This seems like an appeal to non-existence to justify facticity.
I think it does though. Moral facts are usually grounded in divinity, abstract objects, or entities (and their relations to other entities) in the physical world. I dont know what it would mean to appeal to something that doesnt exist to make something true. Also, I dont see how truth-makers entail something is true but, rather, how they are truth-apt.
No, it isn't. The state of affairs is everything which is in the wrong. The exclusion is a necessary inference, but is not a state of affairs in itself. I'm not sure how you're conceptualising a negation as a state of affairs? Again, though, I have adjusted my notion of truth to include statements of this kind - but they refer to no object/s and so can't be a state of afffairs.
Quoting Michael
No. This is merely another inference from the actual state of affairs, which is only able to capture that which is, not that which isn't. Re: teh second quote there, they don't come into contact with what actually is and so have no truth-value.
If you don't accept that, fair enough - but it seems pretty clear we're not misunderstanding each other anymore which i think is good.
Quoting Michael
Also my understanding of the general claim there. However, i see a serious problem with this. That is tautological. If the position is that a claim is true by tautology, even if it obtains some way, i'm unsure how you could ever convincingly provide this to another person - A T-sentence includes a criterion for the P being found true.
I.e 'One ought not X, if (or IFF) Y". If 'Y' obtains, then P is true. But the sorts of claims which i'm gathering are considered moral realism rely on the speaker merely asserting the claim - and rejecting any further discussion of it, because they see it as self-evident.
So when we look at the "One ought not keep slaves" statement, there HAS to be a 'why' or 'in what condition' that obtains. And it's pretty easy to reduce the claim to 'because it causes suffering'. 'suffering it bad' 'bad is undesirable' 'undesirability is something to avoid' etc.. etc... And i mean here only to point out that the claims don't support themselves in any meaningful way unless you're a deontologist so can just immediately note a rights/obligations violation.
I just can't conceive of a moral statement being self-evident beyond it being (in practice) normative, like not murdering for instance.
But I reiterate, i think this discussion is now actually on decent footing instead of talking past one another or about different things.
I said that they're brute facts, not that they're self-evident. It is a brute fact that electrons are negatively charged particles, but it isn't self-evident.
Quoting AmadeusD
Why are electrons negatively charge particles?
Quoting AmadeusD
These statements are true:
1) there is no ball in the room
2) there is no elephant in the room
This statement is false:
3) there is no ball in the room iff there is no elephant in the room
Therefore, whatever it is that makes (1) true isn't what makes (2) true. This is the case even if the room is the only thing that exists.
Therefore, something other than everything that exists (the room) is a necessary truth-condition.
Therefore, not all truth conditions are things that exist.
Hmm. I'm not quite sure how you're using 'brute' here. The statement can be reduced to the activity of an electron in relation to other particles. It can be explained by other terms. This might just be relevant to the example, rather than your actual point thought, which i think is a fair point. I understand brute facts to be non-reducible where this is not. More below, though...
Quoting Michael
Does this actually establish it as a brute fact? I'm am fairly sure there is a reductive answer, but we may not know how to find it (i.e the process by which the BB caused those facts about particles to emerge may be beyond us). But, as with the above, this may only apply superficially, and so your point is still live, for sure. Or, i'm splitting hairs LOL. If you mean why, from a God's-eye view, then it's by necessity or something similar. Morality doesn't have this move open to it from my position. There is no God's eye view for morality, unless you actually think there's a God. I can't understand taking moral proclamations as representing any kind of fact, brute or otherwise. If one claims no faith, it's incoherent.
Quoting Michael
Yes, agree.
Quoting Michael
Yes, agree.
Quoting Michael
Yes. I've had to concede here, at least terminologically. I have been fairly clear that my conception of truth has shifted through this (and the other thread) exchange. So, it's mostly that I just had a keyboard fart and entirely misspoke in the part of my comment you've quoted - I apologise for that. I am no longer claiming that you cannot ascribe truth to the above statements. What I'm saying is they have no objective validity as they refer to no object, and are exclusive, not about a state of affairs.
So they may be true, in the logical sense, but they provide no value whatsover for evaluating some claim about what actually is. They are basically redundant statements. They are self-evident in the state of affairs; not for/of itself.
I realise this could be interpreted as mildly disjunctive, but i think it's coherent. If something isn't there to be spoken about, how can a statement about it imply anything actual? Can only be approached orthogonally.
'Santa does not exist' can't be objectively true because it refers to no object. It is inferred by the actual state of affairs only. The actual state of affairs (the sum total of that which is) doesn't include santa so it's necessarily true, but not objectively.
As far as moral claims go, they never even refer to an object. They don't refer to states of affairs, or exclude things from a state of affairs. They are judgements, plain and simple. Claiming it's brute is nonsensical to me.
It's arguably because of a decison made by a relatively uninformed Ben Franklin.
Why does something need to refer to an object to be objectively true? To be objectively true just means that it's true irrespective of subjective opinion.
If everyone believes that Santa exists then everyone is wrong because Santa doesn't exist.
Objective means with respect to the object rather than the subject.
If there is no object to refer, wheres the objectivity? The fact that Santa doesnt exist is a product of your subjective imagining that Santa could exist (well, thats one path).
But it doesnt refer to anything in the world. The objectively true thing is the state of affairs which excludes Santa.
Morality is the awakening of compassion through identification of one's self with the selves of others. With identification with others compassion arises, and one's self-interest is thought to be the collective self-interest of our common selves. It is a social process common to like kinds in nature, and serves well as a survival mechanism. Self-interest is what is acquired through this process of socialization through what is best for all like kinds of selves. This is determined through the experience of a meaningless outer world, the outer world's effect on the organism becomes meaning to the organism, which then bestows that said meaning to the outer world. The apparent reality of the organism is that of its experiences projected upon an otherwise meaningless world. Biology is the measure and the meaning of all things.
If that's what you mean by "objective" then I will use the term "non-subjective" instead.
Some truths are non-subjective, i.e. are true even if everyone believes otherwise.
The sentence "Santa does not exist" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that Santa does exist. If everyone believes that Santa does exist then everyone is wrong. "Santa does not exist" is non-subjectively true.
Moral realists claim that some sentence "one ought not X" is true, and is so even if everyone believes that one ought X. If everyone believes that one ought X then everyone is wrong. "One ought not X" is non-subjectively true.
The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of some particular physical or abstract object. The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" does not depend on the existence of anything. The non-subjective truth of "one ought not X" has nothing to do with existence at all.
Exactly like the non-subjective truth of "1 + 1 = 2".
It just is the case that 1 + 1 = 2 and just is the case that one ought not X, and if everyone believes otherwise then everyone is wrong.
I would agree(with this description of the position). But I do have a problem equating something which can be necessarily inferred from a state of affairs, to something which truly is malleable to opinion (that one ought not x). There is nothing that makes this true if no one believes it. I think thats probably a fairly comprehensible difference. I know that may not be your position - just giving my position on that, given we appear to have come to terms.
Quoting Michael
This seems, too, to be both a bit silly given the kind of claim it is, but more interestingly a stark difference - where the object can be inferred to not exist from a state of affairs we have some reason to take it seriously. In the moral realist case (and this seems plainly evident with a fellow such as Banno) the claim is made . And thats it. Its not inferred or exemplified or entailed by or understood in relation to anything which does exist. As much as it can be stated that its the way things are so to speak, that is incoherent as theres zero evidence for it let alone good evidence.
Its the norm. Thats it.
You can verify the equation. You cant verify a moral claim.
All you seem to be saying here is that you're not a moral realist. Obviously moral realists disagree with you; that one ought not X isn't malleable to opinion and there is something that makes "one ought not X" true if no one believes it: that one ought not X.
Quoting AmadeusD
The same is true of mathematics. It is true that 1 + 1 = 2 even though this has nothing to do with the physical existence of anything. There are some, i.e. mathematical realists, who explain this by positing the existence of abstract mathematical objects, but I don't think that this is required. Mathematical anti-realists can believe that 1 + 1 = 2 even if everyone believes otherwise.
And perhaps some moral realists explain moral realism by positing the existence of abstract moral objects.
Quoting AmadeusD
Some think you can verify a moral claim. Kant attempted to prove the categorical imperative using what he called pure practical reason.
But even if you can't, it doesn't then follow that moral realism is false. It is possible that a) there is some sentence "one ought not X" that is non-subjectively true and that b) it is impossible to verify or falsify this sentence.
There are plenty of truth-apt sentences that cannot be proven or disproven, e.g. "the universe was created by a transcendent intelligent designer" and "if Hitler hadn't killed himself then he would have been arrested."
As I said before, if your only objection is that moral realists haven't proven that there are brute moral facts then I won't object. My only argument here is to refute the suggestion that all brute facts must have something to do with physical (or abstract) existence.
Well yes and no - yes; thats right, but no I was attempting to explain why. Their claim of truth doesnt amount to anything.
Quoting Michael
Perhaps they do. I cant bring myself to ascribe a defence Ive never seen to them though. But more than this, you can verify that equation with objects. The equation works with any two objects you like. Morality isnt open to this verification. As stated.
Quoting Michael
I only really agree with this part (which seems the most important anyway).
Quoting Michael
I dont really think that works. Morality isnt maths. It talks about behaviour which are actual events in the world so I personally think there needs to be a connection. But thats an immature and undeveloped idea about it.
I should also be clear here Im
Merely discussing these positions. Not holding you to any of them. Your comments elsewhere seem to agree with my overall position.
Not what I said then or now.
The post you are responding to already addressed this claim (my emphasis):
Quoting Michael
I would suggest you read my response again: I don't see how anything you noted helped further the conversation.
Sorry it took me so long to respond. This gave me a lot to think about. :up:
I've got more mulling to do, but I agree with your penultimate sentence.
Your point about modality I find especially interesting, in that it seems that consideration of alternate possibilities (of past and future) is a rather important aspect of what our brains do. On the other hand, on the space-time block view that relativistic physics suggests, such possibilities are figments of our imagination. On the third hand, it seems rather undeniable that our imaginings of future possibilities (whether accurate or not) can play a significant role in how the future turns out (at least within the context of the suface of one tiny planet).
Still mulling...
Responsible to whom? Answer to whom? To make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read to/by whom? Judged by whom?
I don't understand how metaethics can be so neatly separated from normative ethics.
All ethics are, by their nature, normative, that's the point of ethics. How can there be any talk about ethics that is not normative?
There's a simple description of the distinction on the Wikipedia page for normative ethics:
Metaethics:
1. Moral propositions are not truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
2. Moral propositions are truth-apt (cognitivism)
3. All moral propositions are false (error theory)
4. Some moral propositions are objectively true (moral realism)
5. Some moral propositions are subjectively true (moral subjectivism)
Normative ethics:
1. Pleasure is good (hedonism)
2. Maximising happiness and well-being is good (utilitarianism)
3. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (categorical imperative)
Anyone? Myself included. Like if I make a claim and you question it; I clarify, or provide evidence, stand by my words, or rescind them, try to weasel out of the implications, etc. And we judge based on the criteria for a thing (or make it personal). Im not sure what to say as I dont know what the confusion or contention is.