A Measurable Morality

So then it is a question to existence itself. Should existence be? The question of ought cannot be decided because 'nothing' has no opinion on the matter. So it is a choice. Exist, or not. Not existing will result in nothing. When there is nothing, there is no morality, no good, no evil, nothing. It is the “decision” or “insistence” of existing that creates a situation of morality. Continue to exist for the next second, or cease to exist.

So instead of starting with morality as relying on the fundamental “ought”, the fundamental of morality is what “is”. The question of whether to exist or not. If an existence exists, that is the fundamental step of what we might call “good”. For without existence, good cannot exist. For anything that exists, existence is the first fundamental step of being good.
...
Taking existence as being good, we can finally calculate an objective measurement of what “ought” to happen
...

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.
2. Any existence which lowers overall existence is evil.

1 life * 10 hours = 10 unique life expressions.
…
10! * 1 hours = 3,628,800 unique potential life interactions

Meaning, while the unique life expressions are the same, the potential existence of what those unique life expressions dwarfs that of the single individual

Bob Ross requested some of our long term posters here to give their view points on an "objective" morality.

However, I also sort of get the notion that you may be saying the first good is existing, and 'the good' is thereby distinct from existence itself. So perhaps I am wrong on #1.

Another way of thinking about key point #1 (that I described) that I just thought of, in terms of what I am thinking you are saying, is that existence is identical to 'the good'; but re-reading it I suspect I may have misunderstood and you are merely predicating the property of 'goodness' to existence

1. Existence is the good; and
2. The good/right action is the one of which its consequences maximize the good.

I am interpreting, so far, your use of 'time ticks', probability, and the like as merely measuring units and tools for maximizing the good.

Wouldn't morality be in the end a subjective issue? Something that either is right or wrong, is usually something that a subject has to decide.

For example, do you think the morality I've posited is objective or subjective?

The question of “ought” means that there is some reason behind the decision, a fundamental that ultimately drives why the outcome should happen.

The problem with morality has been finding that fundamental.

Well, assuming I have understood you, I think you are looking for an objective answer.

Predication seems closest. The idea of good here is foundational. The fundamental question of what should be is the question of existence itself. Should there be anything, or not? In a universe of nothingness, if a lone atom appeared, should that exist or not? The question of "should" of course cannot exist with there being something. Meaning the foundational claim of morality is not what "should" be, but what is. The "should" of morality only comes afterwards. What should be as I note later, is the expression of that material existence. Thus the foundation of morality is "is", and then logically leads to "ought".

The idea of good here is foundational. The fundamental question of what should be is the question of existence itself.

Should there be anything, or not? In a universe of nothingness, if a lone atom appeared, should that exist or not?

In a universe of nothingness, if a lone atom appeared, should that exist or not? The question of "should" of course cannot exist with there being something. Meaning the foundational claim of morality is not what "should" be, but what is.

The "should" of morality only comes afterwards.

is ‘goodness’ grounded in some mind(stance)-independent feature in reality (i.e., is it objective) or not? Is there a moral fact-of-the-matter that makes ‘existence good’--or is it just good because you believe it to be, desire it to be, or something similar?

Would you agree that the fundamental question of ‘what should be’ is separate from the foundational ‘idea of good’?

This seems like any other normative question to me: is there a moral or normative fact-of-the-matter that you are using to determine the answer to “should there be anything, or not?”?

Imagine there actually is nothing: no universe, no world, no you, no me, etc. This wouldn’t change the fact (if it is a fact) that ‘it is wrong to torture babies for fun’; and it seems like, just upon my initial read here of your quote, that morality is about what is foundationally because the foundational claim of morality is what is: is that correct? It seems like you are saying that it would be perfectly unintelligible whether ‘it is wrong to torture babies for fun’ if nothing existed.

For example, I think it is perfectly intelligible to say "nothingness should be, rather than there being something": remove the linguistic limitations (e.g., nothingness should be still seems to linguistically presuppose existence, etc.) and I think it is clear that one can intelligibly convey that nothingness is morally better than existence, even if I don't actually agree with the proposition.

1. What is moral is what “should” or “ought” to be done.
2. Many arguments believe morality is human-centric. Why “ought” this be the case?
3. There is nothing inherent in looking at humanity that shows it “ought” to be.
4. There is nothing inherent in any other identity, race, thing, species etc that “ought” to be.
5. This leads down to the true question of foundation for morality: “Why “should” existence be?
6. Looking at existence, it cannot be destroyed. It simply “is”. There is no “ought” or “should”.
7. Looking at what is, we can come to a conclusion of what “ought” to be. Existence is good.
8. This conclusion is a choice, not forced. Existence could very well one day “not be”. But since existence “is”, and we are composed of what “is”, we act with the will of existence “to be”.

The organism has goals and purposes which it either meets or fails to meet. Human cognitive-affective functioning, including our moral oughts , are elaborations of the basic normative oughts characterizing living self-organization.

Can we have some explication of how that connection obtains?It feels intuitively sensible to me, but I can;'t enumerate any kind of necessity between our function and morals - which may just be my failing, hence asking for a hand

“Rudimentary understandings of right versus wrong are essential to sustaining patterns of coordination. Deviations from accepted patterns constitute a threat. When we have developed harmonious ways of relating-of speaking and acting--we place a value on this way of life. Whatever encroaches upon, undermines, or destroys this way of life becomes an evil..centripetal forces within groups will always operate toward stabilization, the establishment of valued meaning, and the exclusion of alterior realities. It is not surprising, then, that the term ethics is derived from the Greek ethos, the customs of the people; or that the term morality draws on the Latin root mos or mores, thus affiliating morality with custom. Is and ought walk hand in hand.”

Let me put forth an argument that life is centered around a central ‘ought’. What distinguishes living from non-living things is that the latter predict and maintain a pattern of interchange with an environment under continuously varying conditions. This means that their function is normative in character. The organism has goals and purposes which it either meets or fails to meet. Human cognitive-affective functioning, including our moral oughts , are elaborations of the basic normative oughts characterizing living self-organization. Moral oughts are designed to protect and preserve certain ways of life.

For cognitive beings like ourselves it is not existence which is moral but intelligible forms of social interaction. The use of truth-apt propositional logic is one particularly narrow way to attempt to achieve moral intelligibility, at the expense of a more expansive and effective understanding of the moral.

Ken Gergen puts it this way

Form this vantage, for a living thing it is not existence which is good but self-consistent functioning. For cognitive beings like ourselves it is not existence which is moral but intelligible forms of social interaction. The use of truth-apt propositional logic is one particularly narrow way to attempt to achieve moral intelligibility, at the expense of a more expansive and effective understanding of the moral.

Deviations from accepted patterns constitute a threat. When we have developed harmonious ways of relating-of speaking and acting--we place a value on this way of life. Whatever encroaches upon, undermines, or destroys this way of life becomes an evil..centripetal forces within groups will always operate toward stabilization, the establishment of valued meaning, and the exclusion of alterior realities.

This again is nothing more than self-interest. This is not an argument for why humanity ought to even exist apart from its own desire from the reasoning you've given.

This isn’t self-interest, its shared interest, which is not simply the sum of selfish drives.

To say we prefer coherence over chaos is a kind of circularity. The sense of identity disintegrates in chaos and incoherence, so of course we perceive existence as ‘good’.

Then what if two separate cultures or civilizations want different things? Are we saying the victor is in the right?

. I'm saying existence is the foundational good

The question or morality starts from, "should" there be something at all, and arrives at the conclusion that it is the wrong question to start with. The answer is "there is something instead of nothing". We cannot even ask the question, "should" something be, without there first being something. That's the foundation. In the case of material existence, what "should" be, starts with "what is".

. We cannot say, "should" they exist, because that would imply some other existence that dictated that they should or should not be

But if there is no existence, there is nothing to dictate such a thing.

Hopefully I clarified it earlier, but such a question of "should" cannot be asked without there first being a foundation of "is"

This is like asking, "Should oneness exist". It is the base upon which we use to discuss if we should add or subtract one.

The issue of what should be done, or morality, is the addition and subtraction of existence. To add and subtract without existence is impossible.

For example, I think it is perfectly intelligible to say "nothingness should be, rather than there being something": remove the linguistic limitations (e.g., nothingness should be still seems to linguistically presuppose existence, etc.) and I think it is clear that one can intelligibly convey that nothingness is morally better than existence, even if I don't actually agree with the proposition. — Bob Ross

Certainly, its perfectly intelligible to say such a thing. But is there a reason behind the claim? I'm very open to someone claiming this as long as they can back it.

Isn't the point that morality grows out of a sense making process?

I’m sure there are plenty of people out there who still believe in quaint notions like ‘foundational good’. I wouldn’t say they are simply wrong. I would say that if you delve into the presuppositions such a notion relies on you recognize that what appears as eternal is only eternal within the context of a relative cultural context.

P1: If there is something instead of nothing, then there should be something.

P2: there is something instead of nothing.

C: TF, there should be something.

I say "there should be an apple on that table" and you go "ahhh, but there has never been an apple on a table, and we cannot even ask the question 'should there be an apple on that table' without there first having been an apple on at least one table!".

. We cannot say, "should" they exist, because that would imply some other existence that dictated that they should or should not be

I don’t see why this would be true. The question ‘should they exist’ is despite whether there is anything that could exist more fundamentally than them: it could be the case that there is nothing more fundamental than a quark and it be immoral that they exist—no?

just like how I can validly ask ‘should this baby have been tortured for fun’ even if there is no actual way in which reality could have been such that the baby wouldn’t have been tortured for fun. What is is despite what ought to be.

Likewise, it seems like you are saying existence dictates what is good, which would imply that it is not itself predicated as good but rather is identical to 'the good'. It seems to be a standard of morality for you, but then you also say it isn't because there is nothing factual which makes it 'the good'. I am sort of confused about that.

You seem to be saying that what should be the case is tied to what is actually the case.

I totally agree that normative judgments cannot exist without something factual to judge about, but I am failing to see how the normative judgments themselves are grounded in something factual, including how existence is non-subjectively good

By my lights, something that ought to be the case is a separate consideration from how things are currently arranged or how they exist.

To me, if ‘existence is good’, I would say that is true subjectively and if it is not, then I am not sure how that is the case (yet).

You are essentially saying (as far as I understand) that we need something to exist to create prescriptions, therefore there is a true moral judgment that states ‘existence is good’. In other words:

I don’t think it is true that ‘existence is good’ because morality presupposes existent entities: I just don’t see how that inference is being made.

My point is not to make a case for nothingness being good: I am merely pointing out that, to me, it isn’t incoherent to claim this because I don’t see why normative claims presuppose that existence is good.

The first issue I have is you are claiming ‘existence is good’, where ‘is good’ is predication, and do not seem to offer any account of (1) why it is good nor (2) what goodness actually is.

I know you don’t like ‘isms’, but I am being careful not to attribute claims which are not directly implied of your view. If I do make that mistake, then please let me know.

I'm heading out for the holidays and won't be online again until Monday at minimum next week. Sorry Bob if this didn't address everything, but I'm out of time. I look forward to answering more questions then!

I am assuming you affirm #1 and #3, but I am inquiring about #2. You still have not provided what ‘goodness is’ in the sense of what those moral properties subsist in or of or are reducible to. E.g., is goodness identical to ‘well-being’, ‘happiness’, ‘existing’, ‘psychological approval’, ‘societal approval’, ‘conative emotions’, etc. ?

If you claim ‘goodness’ is identical to ‘what should be’, but where do properties of ‘what should be’ subsist in or of? E.g., are they identical to ‘well-being’, <...>, etc.?

Moreover, I think ‘existence is good’ is pretty vague: is it ‘existing is good’, ‘preserving existence is good’, or/and ‘creating more existence is good’ (I’ve read you claiming things similar to all three)? For now, I will continue using ‘existence is good’ because the worry I am expounding isn’t really contingent on getting that clarification.

If the property of goodness is being predicated of ‘existence’, then ‘the good’ is not ‘existence’ because it is not identical to it: so what it is?

Thank you for your patience Bob. I'm back from vacation!

Goodness is simply material existence and its expressions. It has nothing to do with culture, intention, emotions, and would be whether humanity had opinions about it or not.

It is the end result we come to when we ask the question, "Why should X exist?" This is because it all reduces to the ultimate question of "Why should anything exist?"

This leads us with the binary of existence, or non-existence. I cannot justify non-existence as what should be without there being existence to make the justification. I cannot justify existence without there being existence to make the justification.

I cannot justify non-existence as what should be without there being existence to make the justification.

If it helps to see where we are going, simply see if you can justify that non-existence is preferable to no existence at all. If you cannot, then what I've stated is the only alternative, and what we have to build on.

I would like to point out that the answer to this is subjective (by my lights) and if it isn’t then I would need to know how you know that moral properties subsist in something mind-independent and what that is.

1. It is entirely possible to affirm that ‘nothing should exist’ without presupposing that anything exists, and I am not sure why you think this is false. Saying ‘nothing should exist’ entails that there shouldn’t be anything, and this certainly does not presuppose anything existing.

Just because we cannot claim “nothing should exist” without accepting a contradiction it does not follow that there are any moral properties which are reducible to existence nor that any exist (mind-independently) at all.

I don’t think this is good epistemology: if you have two exhaustive options, A and B, and A cannot be justified as true, then it is not justified thereby to affirm B as true. B needs support for why it should be regarded as true or A needs to be demonstrated as false.

It is not subjective because it is necessary to avoid a contradiction in the question of morality, and necessary for morality to exist.

Yes, the moral property is, "There should be existence"

A. Morality exists
B. Morality does not exist

I had concluded this long ago, and it suddenly came back to me. This is 'the choice'. Do you decide that morality exists, or not? If not, then we are done

Why P2 and P1 are true is irrelevant to my point, as I can grant those: this argument has no metaethical claims in it. I am almost certain now that you are conflating normative judgments with metaethical judgments.

I would say, if I accepted this as a moral subjectivist, that the shorthand ‘something should be’ and ‘nothing should be’ are both moral statements which express something subjective and when evaluated relative to myself I do believe that ‘something should be’ and do not believe ‘nothing should be’.

Avoiding contradictions, as a normative judgment, is not necessarily a judgment that expresses something objective. For example, by contrast to my view, I accept that ‘one ought to abide by the law of noncontradiction’ but I reject that that judgment is expressing something objective.

You have to provide an argument for why I should accept not ‘there should be existence’ but that that moral judgment is expressing something objective.

This is too vague: what do you mean by ‘morality exists’? That there is at least one true moral judgment? That moral judgments are propositional? That they express something objective?

I had concluded this long ago, and it suddenly came back to me. This is 'the choice'. Do you decide that morality exists, or not? If not, then we are done

This seems like your argument collapsed into moral non-objectivism

Bob, this has nothing to do with the argument. I'm not conflating anything. When the author is not using vocabulary that you then introduce, then you say the author is not meeting the standards of that vocabulary you have introduced, you are committing a straw man fallacy. I am not using metaethical or normative claims in the argument.

For the clarity of the conversation, lets us also understand 'subjective' in the normative view, not your own interpretation. Meaning a subjective moralist would be one who believes that what is moral is based on one's personal benefit, or even collective subjective culture

"Does objective morality exist?" If you say no, then of course we're left with either subjective morality or existential nihilism.

The argument is not proving that objective morality exists. Its simply proving that all moral questions boil down to this binary, and proving what objective morality must be if it does exist

To enter the discussion, you do not have to agree that objective morality exists, you simply have to assume it does. If it does, what logically would it be, and how would it build? So going forward in this discussion, simply assume objective morality exists. We really can't continue to discuss until that happens. Don't worry, it doesn't mean you agree with it personally, we're just exploring the logical consequences if this is the case.

My argument is that within a binary argument in which one option must be false while the other is true, proving one option as false necessarily makes the other true. If an objective morality exists, then this is the binary we are left with.

My point here is not to argue that there is an objective morality or argue against a subjective morality. Its taking an objective morality as assumed, then logically piecing together what that would be if true. Go with that and I think we'll have some fun exploring this Bob.

It is a choice between moral nihilism and moral objectivity.

I believe that subjective morality also descends into moral nihilism, but lets not have that discussion here. I think we're having that discussion in another of your threads.

If we need to revisit at some point whether we need to see if a subjective morality can exist as a viable alternative, I will gladly revisit it. Its just out of the scope of the argument at this time and not what I really want to explore at this time.

With all due respect, you are though! It doesn’t matter what terms you call them. At the end of the day you are claiming that “morality is objective” without providing any justification for it; or the justification you have given doesn’t prove it is objective

1. Good is what "should" be.
2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.
3. If there is a reason for something, that reason may also have a reason for why it 'should' be.
4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?
5. As this is a binary, only one can be correct.

Note on 4: You seemed to imply that number 4 wasn't a given. I'll walk through it.

Lets say I say, "I should help a person in need." Why? "Because I want to alleviate their suffering." Why? "Because suffering is bad." Why? I could go on like this for some time, but at one point there will be the question, "Why should they exist?" We can give a lot of human reasons why they should exist, but this again will drill down into, "Why should humanity exist?" We can give the reason, "We like existing," but we're not asking a personal opinion.

We're asking why it should be beyond our own opinions. We're looking for the calculus of the universe. Gravity does not need our opinions, it is a measurable and repeatable event. Same with the question of morality. What measurable and repeatable event can demonstrate that humanity should exist? The question of 'should' is not a human one. It is an existential one.

Of course, this then leads into the question, "Why should a calculus exist? Why should there be anything measurable?" Whatever the answer there, we finally get into the prime question, "Why should anything exist?" To simplify this further, we get down to the idea of an Aristotelian atomic existence versus the idea of complete nothingness. Should there be something, or nothing? At this point, there is no other reducible option, nothing prior to reference. For without answering this question first, no other 'should' question has an answer. It is the base to build the house, the floor for our legos. :)

With that, I attempt the next set.

6. Attempt to claim that 'nothing' is what should be.
7. If it were the case that nothing should be, and it were possible to find a reason, this reason must exist.
(I'll rewrite the above to be clearer, but kept the original for reference)
7 Revised: If it were the case that nothing should be, there must be a reason.
8. There can be no reason to explain why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' if there is nothing.
9. Therefore it is not possible to claim that it is good for nothing to exist through any reason. This leaves the binary that existence is what should be.

9. Attempt to claim that 'something' is what should be.
10. If it is the case that existence should be, there needs to be a reason behind it.
11. For there to be a reason, there must be existence.
12. Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be. It is the prime reason upon which all other moral questions are built upon.
13. Thus, "Should existence be?" The answer is yes. If it is not, then nothing should be and there is no morality. But this leads to a contradiction.

2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.

4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?

We're asking why it should be beyond our own opinions. We're looking for the calculus of the universe.

8. There can be no reason to explain why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' if there is nothing.

12. Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be. It is the prime reason upon which all other moral questions are built upon.

2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.

Three things:

1. If someone claims that ‘there should be <...>’ and that it is just an upshot of their emotions, then they have no reason for it. What is incoherent with that under your view?

2. The chain of reasons has to stop somewhere, so the very foundational reason will have no reason; and that foundational reason may very well be a claim like ‘because there should be <...>’. In fact, this gets your point 12 in a lot of trouble:

3. This seems incoherent with point 12. You say, on one hand, that every claim of ‘something should be’ has a reason underpinning and then claim in 12 that ‘existing should be’ is valid yet has not reason underpinning it: “Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be.”--but ‘existing should be’ is the foundational claim of your theory, and it has no reason for it because allegedly existence doesn’t have a prior reason for it.

4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?

I don’t see why this is the case. Moral realists can just have to ground the normative claim in a moral fact. For example, I could say that ‘I should not eat children’ is true because there is a Platonic Form that dictates such and that would be the end of the chain of reasoning. I don’t need to further ask “why exist?” to ground why “I should not eat children” if it is made true by a moral fact. This is unnecessary.

We're asking why it should be beyond our own opinions. We're looking for the calculus of the universe.

This is exactly the problem with assuming moral realism without explaining it: what calculus of the universe determines what is morally right or wrong? You seem to think it is “to be or not to be, that is the question”...but what makes this a calculus of the universe and not just a human existential question? The way gravity behaves is clearly rules or laws in the universe, but asking “to be or not to be?” does not seem (by my lights) to have an analogous correlate.

8. There can be no reason to explain why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' if there is nothing.

This is a non-sequitur: the reason can exist and be true that nothing should exist. The fact that the reason must exist has nothing to do with whether or not that reason is valid such that nothing should exist.

Yes, it does have to stop somewhere. But a reason does not have to have a prior reason. I'm saying the ultimate reason is, "It is". This is by necessity as there is nothing prior, nor nothing to negate 'what is'.
…
You would be absolutely correct if all reasons had an underlying reason. I'm noting that we reach a point in which there is no underlying reason, but a foundation. Recall we are assuming morality exists. So if this is the case, and we've reached a foundation, that is what we build upon.

I would say that's a reason. "I should help the world because I feel like it" is a reason. The point is I could then ask, "Why should your feelings matter?" In other words, asking the reason behind the reason.

I could just as easily say, "I should eat children because God tells me to." A claim does not make it so. But you make a good point in the fact I have not explicitly stated a "true reason"
…
So in your example of Plato's forms, I could say, "What's the proof behind Plato's forms?" But lets say that it is true. Plato's forms DO exist. I then would ask, "Why should Plato's forms exist?" Do you see the chain now?

Because we're doing a test. We're saying, "If morality, or what 'should' be is apart from humanity, what logically would that be? We must first define it, only then can we apply it. To say that morality exists apart from human opinion but leave it without what that would entail means we don't know what we're talking about.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

But why think that all normative claims need a reason? Why can’t “existing should be” just have no reason?

What if someone just says “well, if you can have no reason for why it is, then I don’t need a reason for why it should be”: what’s the symmetry breaker here?

I think this missed my point, although I see what you are saying. You claimed all chains of reasoning boils down to “should existence be, or not?”...but my example clearly, if platonism were granted as true, that this is not true. The point was not that platonism is true, it is that if there are moral facts, then the chain of reasoning for a normative statements ends at the fact that makes it true, and not necessarily “should existence be, or not?”.

This doesn’t explain how this is a calculus of the universe: your answer seems to be that we just assume it. I guess this just boils down to me granting it for the sake of the conversation, so let’s just move past that point.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. In fact, I am glad you wrote this because that is way more precisely what I was trying to convey then what I was saying! (:

First, as I requested, please stop using the term normative so that this stays simple and clear. We're not talking about any claim, but "moral claims". A moral claim involves 'should'.

'Should' requires a reason. If there is no reason, then there is no 'should'. If there is no 'should' there is no objective morality.

Platonism's truth has nothing to do with whether it should be. For example, someone kills a baby. I can claim they should not have killed a baby. But its still true they killed a baby. When we say something 'should' exist, we say it that it is preferable that it be versus not be. So we can ask, "Why should Platonism exist?" To answer why Platonism or anything else should exist, we really have to answer the question, "Why should anything exist?" first.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. In fact, I am glad you wrote this because that is way more precisely what I was trying to convey then what I was saying! (: — Bob Ross

We are in agreement then! We can then agree the only logical conclusion is that nothing should not be. Assuming an objective morality, the only thing we can start with then is that something is what should be. With that, we can move onto the next points.

I asked why do normative “moral” claims need a reason and you said because “if there is no reason, then there is no ‘should’”: why?

This seems to imply that I cannot assert “one should not torture babies” without an underlying reason; but I clearly can, no?

No. Again, I think you missed the point: if platonism were true, then “I should not torture babies” does get reasoned down to “why should anything exist?” or “something should exist”: it is true in virtue of a Platonic Form.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are noting that whatever moral claims may be true they are not useful to the subject if the subject doesn’t think they should exist; and then you are applying that to existence itself: “to be or not to be?”. But, crucially, it can go the other way around just as easily: “one should help the sick” implies that “one should continue existing”--in this case, the former is not true in virtue of the latter but actually vice-versa.

But, crucially, it can go the other way around just as easily: “one should help the sick” implies that “one should continue existing”

I think you may have misread my response there: I disagree with you that there is a contradiction in A B C argument you have.

Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

Why even use the word 'should' at that point?"

So for example, "Platonism is True because of A. It should exist because it is necessary that Platonic forms exist, and there is no other possible option." If of course there are other options other than Platonic forms, then the chain continues. If you're not seriously demonstrating Platonic forms are the foundation of 'should', just understand we're using "Platonic forms" as an abstract X for a thought experiment about the foundation of 'should' to help you understand the chain.

But we're not talking about what one should do at this point. That's a few steps away. We're just talking about the foundation of good if morality is indeed objective.

I never claimed that there was a contradiction.

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form.

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically).

Sure, you can then start a new chain of reasoning by questioning why that platonic form should exist, but this example violates your claim, no?

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically).

You said that “there should be nothing” entails a contradiction, and you presented that ABC argument for it; and I was noting that your argument did not succeed in demonstrating a logical contradiction in positing “there should be nothing”.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form.

If there is no objective morality, then there is no 'should' for anything

One can do anything. But should they?

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form. — Bob Ross

Can you prove that it is?
…
You're making an abstract thought experiment into a concrete proof.

If I can continue to ask why should Platonic forms exist, and that reason lies beyond Platonic forms, that is the continuation of the chain, not a new chain. A chain only ends when you arrive at a foundation.

This is the intention I'm trying to convey. If "One should help the sick, one should exist." "Well why should the sick be helped?" Because they should live. "Why should a person live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of, "Why should anything live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of "Why should anything exist?" You're looking up higher for the answers to the questions of why a castle should be built a certain way without first asking the question of why a castle should be built at all.

If it is the case that nothing should exist, then the reason, "Nothing should exist" should not exist. Thus the conclusion. It is a contradiction for there exist the reason, "Nothing should exist".

You may have forgotten the assumption that we're currently making. That is that an objective morality exists. This means that there is some foundation for 'should'.

I am saying that one could decide that they should do something without any reason to do it.

My point is not that Platonism is true, my point is that moral facts are true in virtue of them corresponding to a state-of-affairs that exist mind-independently

And this I think is the true disagreement: the chain of reasoning ends once sufficient reasons are provided for justifying the claim, not when one gets to a foundation.

“one ought not torture babies” is that there is a mind-independently existing state-of-affairs which makes that sentence true. Therefore, if they demonstrate sufficiently that there is such a state-of-affairs, then thereby the statement is true and that is the end of the reasoning and justification for that claim.

There’s no need to ask “but should I exist?”. As a moral realist would put by denoting sentences in quotes vs. states-of-affairs in non-quotes, if one ought not torture babies, then “one ought not torture babies”.

Yeah, I see what you mean, but that has nothing to do with any chain of reasoning, from a moral realists’ perspective, for why one ought to do anything.

I get that you are conveying that we can ask further morally loaded questions beyond “should I torture babies?” and if they are more fundamental than “should I torture babies?” and they conflict, then we would presumably go with the more fundamental one.

So if ‘I shouldn’t exist’ is true and ‘I should go stop that person from torturing babies’, then perhaps I would just kill myself instead of stopping them; and you seem to be just trying to ask “what’s the most fundamental question of morality?” and concluding: “it is to be or not to be”. Is that what you are saying?

So it seems like you are presupposing that there must exist something, which is implied by morality being objective

If I am even remotely close here to the argument, then I would say that the flaw is that the current reality is what dictates what is objectively wrong, and so if there was a state-of-affairs such that there should be nothing, then “there should be nothing” would be true and there would be no contradiction.

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

That's the definition of a foundation Bob. When there are no more questions and reasons to be given, you have a foundation. That must be proved.

Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere.

So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why

If I asked, "Why should babies even exist? If they don't exist, they can't be tortured." what would be the answer?

We're not talking about moral realism. We're talking about the logical conclusions one has to reach if an objective morality exists.

I don't understand what you mean by 'current reality'. There is either existence, or there is not. The question is should there be existence, or should there not. To say something should, is to have a reason why A is preferable to B.

This is a hypothetical again. No if. Is there, or is there not a state of affairs in which there should be nothing?

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

(Me) It is because the very nature of objective morality contradicts your position, unless you are contending with my outline of its nature.

(You) I already outlined it, and you dismissed it as “abstract”; but that is not a valid counter. Either objective morality is like I described or I am misunderstanding it and you have a different view of it.

Sure, if that is what you mean by “foundation”, but moral judgments are made true by a state-of-affairs which exist mind-independently; and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself.

and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself.

Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere.

This makes no sense to me. If you claim that every moral claim boils down to the Hamlet question and I explain that your assumption of objective morality entails that it boils down to a state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) (as per the nature of morality being objective), then I have demonstrated your claim to be false.

So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why

That reason is that it corresponds with a state-of-affairs that exists mind-independently in reality—that’s where the foundation of the justification of the moral claim would come from, which can’t ever be existence itself: a state-of-affairs is an arrangement of existent things.

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact.

I am not arguing against moral realism, we are presupposing it. That’s what it means for morality to be objective: moral realism is true. If you don’t want to import that term, then just swap out ‘moral realism’ in my responses for ‘objective morality’: I am using them interchangeably.

Your claim is that there is a contradiction with this, and there isn’t. I am using a hypothetical because that’s the game we are currently playing: if I grant moral is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “nothing should exist”, then nothing should exist. This hypothetical invalidates your claim that “nothing should exist” results in a contradiction. I don’t need to go beyond the hypothetical to prove that.

Life/biology is the measure and meaning of all things.

How does it contradict it Bob? I missed or misunderstood what you were saying then.

Why is it that the state of existence can never be a moral judgement grounded in the relevant state of affairs between existence and nothing existing?

The objective judgement would be the true decision between whether there should be existence or not right?

And we're talking about the arrangement in which there is at least one existence, or no existence

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact. — Bob Ross

Why is it necessarily the case?

There's a very good reason I'm not using the term moral realism. It might not be true. At least, many of the tenants and contexts of it. When speaking about a foundation we should not be concerned where we are going. We're just concerned about noting the foundation first. If that is solid, we build from there. We might end up in moral realism, or not. We're starting super small first, so we assume nothing beyond it.

Lets take it in the reverse case. "if I grant morality is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “something should exist”, then something should exist."

So far I've presented that its logically impossible for a reason to exist that existence should not exist. If you think this is wrong, then you must prove that there exists a reason that existence should not exist. If you can't, then we go by what we have remaining: logic.

If they express something objective, then they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality.

If they are true in virtue of corresponding (adequately) to a (mind[stance]-independently existing) state-of-affairs in reality, then the chain of reasoning for why any given moral judgment is true ends at that state-of-affairs—which violates your point that all chains of reasoning bottom out at “to be or not to be?”

My point is that all chains of reasoning (about morality) do not bottom out at “to be or not to be?”.

If “one should exist” is a moral judgment which expresses something objective, then there must be a state-of-affairs (which exists mind-independently) that makes it true, which is not the case with your logical argument.

Philosophim, you said we are presupposing ‘objective morality exists’. You can’t presuppose that and say moral realism might be false in your view

This is why I was wanting to dive into metaethics so I could understanding what exactly the nature of those objective moral judgments are under your view. Instead, we skipped passed it to try and make headway.

Please remove any vocabulary like state-of-affairs in your next reply so I can understand your point. As it is, I can request that as the OP. Feel free to keep any of your own vocabulary in your head, but translate it down to the language of what we're covering because you're not at where the argument is, you're somewhere else I don't understand.

Yeah Bob, I don't know what you're talking about. Please remove your own language and try to say what you want to say using the language I've put forward.

If something existed that noted 'nothing should exist' then that existence should not exist.

But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.

ts very existence would be a contradiction

The problem is that you haven’t given any vocabulary for this, because you haven’t engaged your theory in anything related to the nature of moral properties and judgments, so there’s nothing for me to translate to.

For example, what is the nature of an objective moral judgment under your view?

But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.

This does not follow: why would this be the case? It is a non-sequitur, by my lights, to say ‘If the existence should not exist because nothing should exist, then nothing should not exist’.

The nature of morality is what 'should' happen. That's where we've started. As I examine proposals of what should be, I ask, "Why should that reason be?" until we chain all the way down to the basic question. "Should there, or should there not be existence?" That's really all there is to it at this point.

An objective moral judgement would be a moral judgement that can be logically concluded on no matter the difference in subjective viewpoint
…
This is something that cannot be rationally agreed upon by all people.
…
So, for a moral judgement to be objective, its 'should' must be rationally proven despite one's subjective viewpoint.

But if that existence should not exist, then 'nothing should exist' becomes 'nothing should not exist'.

This does not follow: why would this be the case? It is a non-sequitur, by my lights, to say ‘If the existence should not exist because nothing should exist, then nothing should not exist’. — Bob Ross

Because you're forgetting the first assumption:

1. There is an objective morality

Remember, we're not proving that an objective morality exists. We're stating, "If there is an objective morality, what must its foundation be?" And when we examine this down the chain of 'should's' we are left with the foundational question, "Should there, or should there not be existence?" This is a binary assuming that there is an objective morality. Meaning if one side is false, the other side is necessarily true. If both are false, then there is no objective morality. But that's not what we're looking for. We're saying, "IF, there is an objective morality, which way should the binary logically swing?" I hope that clears it up!

An objective moral judgement would be a moral judgement that can be logically concluded on no matter the difference in subjective viewpoint
…
This is something that cannot be rationally agreed upon by all people.

Firstly, although I am trying not to import my definitions, this is not what objectivity with respect to morality standardly means, and this would, within standard terminology, be a form of moral subjectivism.

You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment.

Secondly, just to go with your terms here, if all you mean by objectivity is that there is a consensus amongst rational agents, then if your argument for ‘there should be nothing’ being logical contradictory is true then this would be an objective moral judgment by your terms.

1. There is an objective morality

This is where I am not following: how does stipulating morality is objective entail that a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction? How does it entail that ‘nothing should exist’ becomes ‘nothing should not exist’? I am not following.

You are just subjectively stipulating that what one should do is what is rational, and then calling ‘objective’ whatever can be reached as a consensus by people committed to that subjective moral judgment. — Bob Ross

No, I'm just assuming you'll grant me rationality and logic are the best tools we have to measure reality. This is not an assumption I spelled out, but maybe I should have. If you want me to go into the question of whether we should or should not use logic, I can go into that as well. I leave that to you to decide if that is important at this stage or not.

Not a problem, I'll try again. If this is good, I'll likely edit the OP to make things clearer as well.

E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.

2. Rationality and logic are our best tools at identifying and reflecting reality as accurately as possible.

3. An objective morality would be a morality of what should happen that cannot be rationally or logically countered.

My point is that your moral judgments are subjective if they are true relative to the subjective moral judgment that one ought to be rational. But, then again, you seem to be defining objectivity in a manner where it is exactly that.

Thank you, but I still don’t see how you making that inference. Here’s the part I am referring to:
E. Assumption: There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
F. If that is the case, then according to the reason that nothing should exist, that reason should not exist. Thus a contradiction.

This is the part I need a syllogism from you about, not the rest. This is the crux that I don’t get at all. I don’t see how a reason which justifies its own non-existence entails a contradiction (whether that be metaphysical, logical, or actual). Can you please give me an argument or elaboration for this part?

I just want to note, so far, this is a subjective moral judgment; and is the underpinning of all your moral judgments, thusly making them subjective as well.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view?

Again, the measure and meaning of all things is the property of subjective consciousness. The world in the absence of subjective consciousness is utterly meaningless.

The world in the absence of subjective consciousness is utterly meaningless.

We can revisit this later. For now, I do not believe that one should be rational is a subjective moral judgement. But we have to get the base down first before we build to that. :)

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason [s]should[/s] [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
…
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.

A contradiction is clear if the assumption of X assumption leads to its own negation

If you still don't see it, can you point out why A does not negate itself?

According to your definition of subjective, everything is subjective Bob.

Please use the definition I've put forward for now. It doesn't mean I'm right, it just makes sure we're on the same page. We can discuss which definition should be used after we get through the meat of the argument first.

What do you mean by “rationally or logically countered”? If make a syllogism that is logically valid which contains a moral judgment, is that moral judgment thereby ‘objective’ under your view? — Bob Ross

If you can prove that it is so, then yes. Rationality and logic are the best reflective tools we have about reality. It is in my view, the only way we can meaningfully assess it. Meaning if you have an argument that is air tight rationally and logically, which means it cannot be contradicted by reality in any way, you have an objective moral judgement.

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

It is false that if a reason exists that it should exist, which is what you said in this point 2. When I convert, to try to be charitable

7. if A should exist, then it claims that A should not exist.
…
9 But if A should not exist, then it cannot assert that it should exist.

A doesn’t claim that A should exist, it claims that A should not exist. I think you are trying to infer this from point 2 (as far as I can tell), and 2 is just false or, when converted, a mere tautology that cannot be used to support the antecedent of point 7 (being that it is also false).

P1: If one should eat babies, then they should find babies to eat. [p ? q]
P2: One should eat babies. [p]
C: One should find babies to eat. [q] {Modus Ponens}

This is a logically sound and valid argument, and according to your own concession the contents of which are then objective.

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

This is still incorrect: the claim is that if there is a reason that everything should not exist, then there is a reason that everything should not exist.

“There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue.

9. Because A cannot assert the truth of its own premise, or contradicts itself, it cannot exist. Therefore 2 is contradicted, and there cannot be a reason for why everything should not exist.

The truth of its own premise is that it shouldn’t exist, not that it should and should not exist.

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', [then] there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

“There must <...>” is the same statement as “There should <...>”: same issue. — Bob Ross

Now I'm confused. Didn't you just have an issue with me swapping 'should' and 'must' earlier? I agree you had that right. What should exist is not the same as what must exist.

Almost, but not quite. We're assuming if 'everything should not exist', there must be a reason. Its not an identity.

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason [s]should[/s] [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction

The hypothetical in the top quote is just using ‘must’ in a non-normative ‘moral’ sense to indicate that if there is a reason, then there is a reason

whereas the assertion in the second to top quote is that there simply must/should be a reason, not that if it were to exist, then it would exist.

It was identity in your point 2:

2. There must be a reason that everything should not exist

When reformulated, this just tautological:

2. For there to be a reason that everything should not exist, some reason should [has to] exist [such that everything should not exist].

If you are conveying, instead, that “if everything should not exist, then there must be a reason” then that is not taulogical, but that is not equivalent to point 2 (you made).

So if the truth of its own premise is that it shouldn't exist, but it must exist if it is to claim that it shouldn't exist, we're left with a contradiction

This is the part I'm not understanding. Can you clarify? What does must/should mean?

Correct, that's not the same as what point 2 is saying. Its an odd thing that I agree with practically everything you're stating yet I can't understand the overall point you're trying to make. :) We're almost there I feel though, so please keep trying.

3. If B is true, then B should not exist. B -> !B

No contradiction. You conflated B with “B should not exist”. Those are separate propositions.

Any measure you could speak of is a meaning, and all meaning is created and the property of a conscious subject, and/or collectives of conscious subjects. Measures and meanings are not lying around on the ground of an orchard like so many fallen apples. The source is subjective consciousness in its individual form or its collective. Perhaps, I am missing something here in your objection, please enlighten me.

4. For B to be true, it must not contradict itself B = B && B != !B

6. Because it is moral that 'nothing should exist' the reason should also not exist

7. But for 'Everything should not exist' we have a reason that does exist, that should not exist.
8. But if the reason should not exist, then it is immoral for the reason to exist. Thus B is false. !B
9. if the reason should not exist, then 'Existence should not exist' should not exist either. !B <-> !A

I think I am beginning to understand what you are trying to go for, which is, if I am not mistaken, that morality itself contains a ‘moral’ judgment that ‘the reason must/should exist’ if it is to have ‘moral’ signification and then you are trying to demonstrate that this contradicts B. Is that sort of right?

‘B != !B’ is, even when conjoined with ‘B = B’, a tautology that is not equivalent to the law of non-contradiction

This one is more of a question than a critique: is ‘moral’ signifying anything special here?

So then, its not an ontological necessity that if an objective morality exists, that it conclude 'Existence should be.' Its more that such a morality seems so at odds with itself and with our general sense, that it doesn't fit

For example, I don’t see how morality, if it were ‘objective’, would be ‘at odds with itself’ or that it ‘doesn’t fit’, in principle, if A were true.

1. What is the nature of moral properties?

2. What is the nature of objectivity? I am assuming you mean “that which can be rationally agreed upon”.

I am assuming you mean “that which can be rationally agreed upon”.

3. What is the nature of an “objective moral judgment” or a “moral fact” to you?

I will say, to be totally honest, I think your position is a form of moral subjectivism (; You are a comrade in disguise....

If the objective morality that exists is "Existence should not be," it doesn't matter, that's what it is. I'm not debating that. Just like if the real morality is "Contradictions should be encouraged in life". If that's what it is, that's what it is.

What I'm noting is that if it is, according to itself, it shouldn't be.

For now? Morality is the analysis of what should or should not happen. Keeping to what should or should not be is moral, while going against the precepts is immoral.

The nature of objectivity is a rational deduction that persists despite differences in subjective experience.

The nature of subjectivity is a rational or irrational conclusion that relies on one specific subjective experience.

The guidance of objectivity is the understanding that there are certain conclusions which are apart from our desires or personal viewpoints. Meaning an objective conclusion has the potential to violate everything we wish and stand for.

The default child-like state is to believe that one's perspective is unalienably correct, and reflective of reality. Objectivity is meant to raise a person's thinking beyond this, while subjectivity is its contrast and reminder to be conscious of our own limitiations.

What is rational is to connect information together in such a way that is reflective of reality.

It is a judgement that accurately reflects reality.

What I'm noting is that if it is, according to itself, it shouldn't be.

What’s really wrong with this, in principle, though? It doesn’t even seem incoherent to me.

Literally anyone will agree with your definition here of morality, but I want to dive deeper: what are the properties themselves? Not what is morality, but what are the nature of moral properties?

So how many convergent subjective analysis constitute an objective one then, in your terms? Is that how it works?

I can get on board with that, but why do you think there are moral judgments that exhibit this kind of objectivity (viz., that there are moral conclusions which are despite our desires or viewpoints)?

Which leads me to: what states-of-affairs in reality are morally relevant, then? What out there are we able to access that is of moral signification?

This entails that when you affirm that morality is objective that there are moral judgments which are made true in virtue of reality, and are not made true in virtue of our pyschology—so what is it, then? Platonic forms, naturalistic empirical inquiries, etc.?

I don’t think there is anything in reality that tells us what we ought to do, so it does not matter how much a rational agent reflects accurately about reality: the normative or morally relevant information comes from within, not without.

I mean its incoherent, and therefore likely not going to be the objective morality if it exists.

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged.

The conclusion is, "Existence should be."

None of these reasons mean that there is an objective morality, but they are reasons I think its worthwhile to search for one.

1. There are universal moral decisions across cultures. Why? What's the underling fundamental that causes that?

2. We are moral to animals. Some animals even show signs of morality

3. There are various other contradictions and debated issues with many versions of subjective morality. That tells me that over the eons we've spent studying it, we haven't come up with an acceptable solution.

4. There is great value to having an objective morality. Such an understanding can bridge cultures, religions, and further the understanding and progress of humanity.

5. Humans are made out of matter. I do not see us as separate from the universe, but very much a part of it.

I find it odd that suddenly morality pops up and its only a human condition. I believe there is something underlying this beyond just evolution that allows morality to express itself through us.

None of these reasons mean that there is an objective morality, but they are reasons I think its worthwhile to search for one.

But first we have to build up what morality actually is when it gets to the human level.

This entails that when you affirm that morality is objective that there are moral judgments which are made true in virtue of reality, and are not made true in virtue of our pyschology—so what is it, then? Platonic forms, naturalistic empirical inquiries, etc.? — Bob Ross

So far? "Existence should be" As I noted earlier, its time to read the rest of the OP.

Why is it incoherent? I think we both agree it isn’t internally incoherent, but why is it externally incoherent?

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged.

This is circular...but, then again, so is all fundamental reason and logic.

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.

P2: Moral facts are ways reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.

1. Your proof no longer works for “existence should be”, because there is no contradiction.

Or what makes it objectively true in your view?

Hey Bob, for some reason I completely missed that you had replied to this. Came in to review it and saw it luckily!

If I don't know if "Contradictions should be encouraged" is real, I can follow the logic to realize it contradictions itself, so then in conclude contradictions should probably not be encouraged.

This is circular...but, then again, so is all fundamental reason and logic. — Bob Ross

Circular logic is self-confirming. This is self-contradicting.

Morality is a choice between two potential realities. Of course reality as it is right now does not tell us how it should be, because we're not evaluating a change in reality by either comparing to the past, or evaluating a change for the future. Only when we think, "Well, what if we change reality to include X, would that be better?" are we discussing morality. P1 only regards the present therefore does not regard morality.

If there is an objective morality, this is the only way tor it to be rationally coherent.

Take the idea that if it is true that "Existence should be" is the foundation for an objective morality, lets have fun thinking what that would entail based on the OP.

1. I don’t see why it is internally incoherent for moral realists people who accept there is objective morality to affirm that “there should be nothing” if that particular theory accepts that it is a moral fact that “there should be nothing”.

I don’t really understand your idea of morality being objective, and I think a lot of our disagreement is due to the murky waters here.

So, let’s say “there should be something”: does this simply mean that “existence is preferable to non-existence” or does it mean that “we must create as many existent things as possible”?

(2) this seems to contradict common-sensical moral intuitions (which perhaps isn’t relevant to your point) in the sense that it seems to be a sort of biting of a bullet (e.g., we would have to force people to procreate, etc.).

"Everything should not exist" leads to the fact that, "This statement of morality should not exist" and seems quite irrational, we're going to assume the more rational choice.

therefore encouraging and preserving existence should be the fundamental goal.

No, that's a bit far of a jump ahead. It would really help at this point if you avoided any sense of human morality and just went along with the fundamental building up of morality. We'll get to human morality, no worry.

For now, what do you think about my evaluation of expressed existence? Also, did you get to the example of the submarine in the ocean? Let me know what you think Bob.

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.

2. Any existence which lowers overall existence is evil.

When existence A collides with existence B, something happens. That something is an existence, but a fleeting one. How each individual material reacts when an interaction happens with another material existence would be the expression of each material existence
…
If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.

a. Expressions of existence which can yield more potential expressions of existence are better than those that cannot.

b. Expressions of existence which destroy material existence, or those that lesson the number of possible expressions of existence would be considered evil.

Let us take a situation in which a submarine has crashed to the bottom of the ocean. There is no communication with the outside world, no way for the submarine to recover, and everyone on the submarine will die. No one will ever discover what happens on the submarine, as it will be crushed by gravity into a pulp. There are currently 10 people aboard the ship. There is enough air for 1 person to breath for 10 hours. An explosion could happen which would kill 9 people and leave one alive. Which is more moral, 1 person living 10 hours, or 10 people living one hour?
…
Meaning, while the unique life expressions are the same, the potential existence of what those unique life expressions dwarfs that of the single individual. Meaning that it is equal material existence, but more potential existence for ten people to live on hour that 1 person live for ten hours.

You say it is irrational…but I still don’t see why.

Encouraging or mandating? This is what I would like to know. Is it morally permissible in your view to not create more existence when there is an opportunity to?

What you do evaluate morally if there is no subject? What if a rock had the ‘opportunity’ to create more exist by interacting in a partular way but ‘chose’ not to? Well, obviously, this makes no sense because the rock doesn’t ‘decide’ anything, so why consider what would be better morally for the rock to do?

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.

This seems to be mandating the creation of more things.

If I have to kill 20 people in my lifetime in legitimate self-defense and I never contribute to the creation of more life and #2, then wouldn’t it follow that I am evil?

Likewise, if we could calculate out that force castrating 10% of the population, let’s say convicts, would total net increase the amount of people or lives, would this then, under your view, be righteous?

What counts as ‘existence’ here? Just things that are alive? What if I am constantly destroying rocks, is that lowering the overall ‘existences’?

Likewise, I don’t think your ‘material’ vs. ‘expressional’ existence answers my above question.

Likewise, I don’t think your ‘material’ vs. ‘expressional’ existence answers my above question.

When existence A collides with existence B, something happens. That something is an existence, but a fleeting one. How each individual material reacts when an interaction happens with another material existence would be the expression of each material existence
…
If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.

This makes it sound like more collisions equals better: but this is just chaos, pure chaos, then, no?

But, wouldn’t it be better, if “If more existence is better, than more expressions of existence are also better.” and more existence is better, to cause the submarine’s parts to collide, by way of explosion, with as many things as possible so as to maximize the odds of expressions of existence?

But can we take the idea that existence is better

But can we take the idea that existence is better
— Philosophim

I don't see how we can do that..

6. Looking at existence, it cannot be destroyed. It simply “is”. There is no “ought” or “should”.
7. Looking at what is, we can come to a conclusion of what “ought” to be. Existence is good.

8. This conclusion is a choice, not forced. Existence could very well one day “not be”. But since existence “is”, and we are composed of what “is”, we act with the will of existence “to be”.

Im not seeing a connection between (6.) and (7.). We can only conclude that it is from (6.).

so I'll post a revised version for you to check out and poke at

The idea is that we don't know if there is an objective morality. If there is though, I find all moral questions boil down to needing the foundation of "Should existence be" or "Should nothing be"?

all other moral questions are moot

This isn't an easy answer because we're talking about what people should do. But we're not there yet! I know, its a big change in thinking. That's the point. An objective morality shouldn't need people.
…
Its about preferable states.

No mandates yet! We aren't to consciousness yet. Just states of existence.

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.

For a very simple start, lets have universe A, and B. A has two atoms (Aristotelian for simplification), while B has 3 atoms. Comparing the two, which is better according to our foundation? Universe B

Taken to a more human level for a minute, lets imagine that a world with magical unicorns ends up being the most existence.

First, lets define pure chaos.

Remember, we're examining morality in this case within particular constraints. In comparing the two situations with the following constraints, we see it is more more al for the 10 'people' to survive for one hour than 1 person to survive for 10 hours.

My initial thought was 'that's incoherent' but i reflected a few minutes and I actually think this is very, very reasonable and a problem not-oft dealt with.

all other moral questions are moot
— Philosophim

Do you mean by this, that they are ipso facto immoral given that being is immoral?

I would understand the claim 'nothing should exist' as better repped. by "existence shouldn't be".

But if existence itself shouldn't be (as an objective moral claim) we are already too far gone to make a comment on it. We exist :)

If it is F that nothing should exist, and something SHOULD exist, how can we get to a moral agent from 'something'?

And this lands you, at least prima facie, in a super counter-intuitive moral position. That’s my worry. Sure, it could still be true and be super counter-intuitive; but no one is going to accept that we have create as many things as we can.

I don’t see how B is better. I get that 3 is better than 2 if #1 (that I quoted above), but this makes me question how you derived that more existence is better from existence is good: could you elaborate?
This may just be the ambiguity in “existence is good”. What does it mean for existence itself to be good? Are you just saying “existence is preferable to non-existence”?

Like, in number? What constitutes “most existence”? Number of “material” and “expressive” existent entities?

So this section, I don’t think, answered my worry: isn’t this kind of pure chaos you described the best possible reality in your view? This, again, goes against all moral intuitions I have (: You are advocating for the good being destruction and construction alike.

My point is that the real elephant in the room, which needs to be addressed before discussion which of the two options you gave is better, is that no one will agree that the best option is to blow up the entire submarine, let alone that it is an option at all. You seem to be saying it is not only a validly morally permissible option, but it is, in fact, the best option.

For existence to be good, it means there should be existence. So yes, it is preferable to non-existence.

Its not something I feel that's proven, its more of a consequence of the foundation.

For example, lets say we had a world of 2 existence versus a world of 3 existence, but 1 of those existences in the 3 world could annihilate all existence permanently. Over the course of time, the annihilation would cause an overall decrease in actual and expressed existence than in the 2 existence world.

There are a few points I've muddled out and I'm not completely sold on it yet. I definitely want to hear your thoughts on the matter here as this is new.

To be clear, only over an infinite period of time and space. In a finite period of time and space, order will generate overall more existence.

No, blowing up the submarine and killing all the people onboard before an hour passes is not more moral. For now, just focus on the example given to see if it works within the limitations presented. Don't worry about where this is going until we see where it is first.

Although I still do not have a firm grasp on your ethical theory, I do commend you for your creativity; as this is very outside of the box! One of the many reasons I enjoy our conversations...(:

So, ‘X is preferable to Y’ does not entail, by my lights, that ‘there ought to be as much X as possible’. If I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice cream, there is no entailment here such that I should create as much vanilla as possible.

To be clear, only over an infinite period of time and space. In a finite period of time and space, order will generate overall more existence.

I don’t see why this is true. Over interval [1, 50] years a chaotic world will have more ‘new identities’, ‘parts’, and ‘relations’. Order produces a system where things do not sporadically get created: if we only procreate when we are financially stable vs. whenever we want for whatever reason we want, then the latter will produce more existent entities (and relations and what not) than the former. Chaos will always be better in your view.

Sure, if we are just asking which is better under your view and everything else being equal, then 10 for an hour is better. This is not the pressing issue with the theory though.

To avoid this overlap, we should not use 'should' and 'preferable' together to avoid an emotional connotation.

Recall that chaos means anything can happen. Which could mean that in 50 years the range between nothing happening vs everything happening exists.

Comparing the internal interactions of existence of a single cell to a rock, its pretty self evident which one has more interactions and potential existence.

To avoid this overlap, we should not use 'should' and 'preferable' together to avoid an emotional connotation.

This doesn’t really address the issue though, unless you are conceding that ‘existence is not preferable to non-existence’ or that preference is irrelevant.

Recall that chaos means anything can happen. Which could mean that in 50 years the range between nothing happening vs everything happening exists.

Not quite what I mean. I am saying that in a world with maximal existent entities, chaos between them is always better than order. Chaos, itself, does not entail that nothing might happen: it is the complete disorder and confusion of what exists as it relates to other entities that exists.

By analogy, I am saying a room full of furniture, people, electrons, etc. in a state of continual collisions and disorder is going to be better than where everything is arranged according to specific guidelines (i.e., order) because there is more ‘expressive existences’ in the chaotic room vs. the orderly room. You seem to be noting, with this response, that the existence of the entities in the room may randomly disappear or they may stop interacting with each other.

Sure, but you are basically just saying “more complexity is better”; but, then, a highly complex computer or AI would be higher prioritized and better than a newborn baby.

Likewise, an adult Lion, by your own standards, has more “interactions and potential existence” than a newborn human baby: are we supposed to say it is better to have adult Lions than human babies?

Likewise, I am not sure that a newborn human baby is more complex then unalive ecosystems.

As I am reading through your response, I think it is worth us slowing down a bit and discussing the actual formulas you are deriving and using to make these calculations. Initially, I was just trying to point out the severe counter-intuitiveness to the ethical theory, which I still think is applicable, but I think you are more interested in the formulas themselves.

For example, on the one hand you seem to deploy a ‘atom-for-atom’ formula (such that an entity with more atoms is better than one with less); while, on the other, you seem to deploy a ‘potential-for-potential’ formula (such that an entity with more potential to act is better than one with less); and, yet another, is that you seem to compare potential for act-potentials as well (e.g., baby is better than a lion when considered as a fully developed adult).

Sorry for the delay Bob. I had to take a break from the forum for a few days to handle other things, but I'm back.

1. Existence is the smallest bit of identifiable material possible.

1. In most cases, having more potential expressions of existence allows a greater existence to ultimately be expressed.

2. Where possible, the elimination of one existence's actual and potential existence should be avoided.

Existence is the smallest bit of identifiable material possible.

In our case, its quarks. But maybe in the future it will be something smaller. So the examples here are 'atomic' comparisons, but are simply an abstract for, 'the smallest existence'

A particle is...a collapsed wave function. But what in the world does that mean? Why does observation cause a distended mathematical function to collapse and a concrete particle to appear? And what decides the measurement’s outcome? Nearly a century later, physicists have no idea.

1. Existence is the smallest bit of identifiable material possible.

I don’t think ‘existence’ is quite the word you are looking for (unless I am just misunderstanding), as the term refers to anything that ‘is’. #1 here refurbishes the term to only refer to the most fundamental and primitive entities.

With respect to PEB, what are you grounding/anchoring the span of potential expressions for comparison between ‘candidates’? (E.g., are you calculating it in terms of total net relative to the ultimate outcome? Are you calculating it in terms of the immediately foreseeable outcome? Are you anchoring it in the present or future?)

I also noticed that you said “in most cases” and not “in every case”: so, is PEB just a general principle as opposed to an absolute one?

2. Where possible, the elimination of one existence's actual and potential existence should be avoided.

I get what you are saying; but this doesn’t seem moral to me at all. This will absolutely lead to biting a ton of bullets in ethics; and same with PEB (and EB).

In our case, its quarks. But maybe in the future it will be something smaller. So the examples here are 'atomic' comparisons, but are simply an abstract for, 'the smallest existence'
— Philosophim

Good ol' atomism, eh? The problem is, quarks, whatever they are, are not ‘identifiable material’ or ‘particles’ as such. From an article on the nature of particles:

The idea is that we don't know if there is an objective morality.

Therefore, if we are assuming an objective morality exists, the only claim which does not lead to a contradiction to its claims is "Existence should be".

Basically if "Existence should not be" is true, all other moral questions are moot.

Where should we search for that? Morality is a broad term: it can mean conformity to a set of rules of right conduct.

Now, about your logical scheme ... I have some difficulty following it. What does "everything should not exist" --or its opposite for that matter, "everything should exist"-- mean? How and where can this be applied to? And what does this have to do with morality? (Morality comes in only in step (4).)

Isn't that another way of asking 'is there a reason for existence?'

Isn't that another way of asking 'is there a reason for existence?'
— Wayfarer

No, its really just asking the question, "Should there be existence?"

In other words your are asking if there is (or was) an original plan for the creation of the Universe.

Still, you don't define what you consider as "moral". This makes it difficult to engage in a quest on the subject of existence. For one thing, it raises the question, "Moral in what sense and for whom"?

They mean the same. 'Should there be?' is just another way of asking 'is there a reason for?'

Here we are, trying to re-invent philosophy on the basis of hair-splitting distinctions.

If I am understanding correctly, then it sounds like you are just calculating total net 'identities' in reality over time

where preferably it is calculable closest to the last point in time.

This doesn't seem moral to me and there are plenty of examples where this is just morally counter-intuitive and immoral.

Ah good. I had hesitated to use that word as I wasn't sure it fit.

While the smallest time tick would be the most accurate, it may be impractical to do so.

Based on, 'Existence should be," do you have something in our approach so far that doesn't seem moral.

You just seem to be noting I can do all of them, but I want to know, in your formula, are you determine the right thing to be based off of a span of 1 year, 1 minute, most forseeable future, etc.?

I would say, in this case, you have just setup a moral framework where the most entities existing is best and your conclusions aren’t that particularly off; it is the idea that this is objective that is wrong, but I have been granting it for the sake of seeing where this goes.

I would say, in this case, you have just setup a moral framework where the most entities existing is best and your conclusions aren’t that particularly off

You just seem to be noting I can do all of them, but I want to know, in your formula, are you determine the right thing to be based off of a span of 1 year, 1 minute, most forseeable future, etc.? — Bob Ross

Ok, this would be human morality. We'll get there soon.

But why do you see it as wrong?

Life is a high concentration of existence and considered more moral in comparison to an equivalent number of atoms in a rock.
…
Now in a case in which the rock would be destroyed or the one cell would live, in this comparison alone the life would be considered more moral and should continue to exist over the rock

Something I've been noting is you seem to be using morality as a means of comparative elimination.

Does this mean all single cell life should become multicellular? No. Just like the possibility of atoms forming into molecules doesn't mean all atoms should form into molecules

Wolves serve as a check to ensure too many sheep do not form, eat all the grass and plants in an area, and result in a mass extinction event.

But why do you see it as wrong?

You have not given a clear analysis of what the property of goodness is (i.e., what is good?) nor why it is objective.

You just seem to be noting I can do all of them, but I want to know, in your formula, are you determine the right thing to be based off of a span of 1 year, 1 minute, most forseeable future, etc.? — Bob Ross

Ok, this would be human morality. We'll get there soon.

It isn’t, though: I am talking about the formula used for non-life and life here.

An atom-to-atom comparison is not going to land you with life > non-life. E.g., a 1,000,000 ton rock has more atoms than a single-cell life and a (human) baby—so your conclusion would then be, when in conflict, to preserve the rock over the baby.

Something I've been noting is you seem to be using morality as a means of comparative elimination.

I am using comparisons and counter-factual examples to demonstrate how the conclusions of this theory are severely morally counter-intuitive.

Does this mean all single cell life should become multicellular? No. Just like the possibility of atoms forming into molecules doesn't mean all atoms should form into molecules

Why not? You seem to be saying it is objectively right/good for more identifiable entities to exist, and ‘upgrading’ from a single-cell to multi-cell seems better relative to that.

Likewise, it doesn’t make sense to say you are maximizing existence when you also believe that that matter is all that exists and cannot be created or destroyed: that entails existence itself is always equal—rather, what it exists as changes.

But if you are just doing an atom-for-atom comparison, it may turn out that a big sheep may need to be preserved over a small, feeble wolf.

Likewise, if you are considering how to maximize how many existent entities are there, then you would have to do more than an atom-to-atom comparison and consider the foreseeable consequences of keeping the sheep vs. the wolf and pick the one that seems to maximize your goal here.

I think we are both missing each others points, so let me slow down and ask one question: are you not saying that, in principle, the entity with more atoms is (morally) prioritized higher over one with less?

No. I'm talking about a system with the greatest existence, material, expressed, and potential would be considered the more moral reality.

Now compare to the four atoms that can potentially combine into molecules. Disregarding what is equal to the five molecules, we have 1 formation into a 2 atom molecule, and each individual atom bumping into that molecule and each other. 3*2*1 = 6. Multiply this four times as each atom can combine into a molecule, so 24. We can have the potential of two molecules forming out of the four, so 2 existence molecules, and one potential bump between them * four atom combinations = 12

With this fundamental, perhaps we can build something. If is is the case that existence is what is “good”, we can logically conclude a few points.

1. If existence is good, then more existence is better.
2. Any existence which lowers overall existence is evil.

Mainlander, and the Gnostics would dispute this metaphysical claim.

I apologize, I must have misunderstood you then.

What is the difference between ‘existence’ and ‘material’: I thought the latter was a sub-type of the former. Same with expressed vs. existence.

This is still counter-intuitive: it is entirely possible that the maximal expressed and material existences is entities which are not alive.

For example, it is entirely possible that when forced to choose between saving a robot and a baby, you will have to save the robot (because the material and expressed existences is higher in the former over the latter).

Likewise, so far you seem to be saying we can just make up a time frame to use for their comparisons, but then it becomes utterly arbitrary.

Likewise, if you consider potential expressed and material existences, then this also has weird consequences; e.g., a hurricane may end up, if it runs its full course, producing much more expressed and material existences than a newborn baby--but obviously everyone is going to say that we should stop hurricanes and preserve the rights of babies. Yours would choose to preserver the hurricane over the baby (if in conflict).

That's very fair, and honestly where I thought the questioning would go first. The material existence is an atomic existence which is the combination of all possible expressions it can manifest when met with another material existence. An expression is the manifestation of a material existence in a unique way based on its situation and difference with another state. This state could be itself (Perhaps a singular existence has a bit of a warp or vibration to it over time) or what we can actually observe, its relation to another material existence.

To see if its unintuitive, why don't you create an example that you're thinking of try to calculate it out. The problem is you're trying to intuit some complex math. You can't. Its well documented that we suck at it as human beings

But really, remove ALL ideas of intelligence and especially human morality now, because you have to learn the base calculations first.

But for now, I'll answer this one in a way where you can see yes, sometimes saving the robot would be better.

Humanity is facing a crisis that cannot be solved with human minds alone. In 51 years, humanity will be wiped out if it isn't solved. So they created a robot that has spent the last 50 years calculating a solution to their problem. It has done it! With this it will save humanity. Unfortunately the building its in is on fire, and wouldn't you know it, someone left their baby there too. You have just enough time to save either the robot or the baby. The moral choice is clear. By saving the robot, you save humanity. By saving the baby, you doom humanity. Saving the robot results in more overall existence.

Do you disagree with this as a function of measurement?

1. Assume we have an objective morality, and it is a fact that a particular hurricane is worth more than a babies' life.
2. We're put in a situation in which we can't just save the child, but the child must die.
3.We have a magic gun that can stop the hurricane in its tracks. But doing so will cause horrible things to happen.
4. I want to save the baby despite all of this.

Does my want make it moral to save the baby? Of course not.

it would be wrong to end the hurricane to save the baby. This isn't unintuitive either. We send people all the time to die in wars to preserve entire countries

So, let me make sure I am understanding: ‘material existence’ is really just ‘fundamental entities’. As an entity could exist ‘materially’ (in your sense of the term) but not materially (in the standard sense of being tangible), correct? E.g., a wave could exist ‘materially’.

My point in bringing it up was that you seem to imply that existence was a separate category altogether from material existence, but I think, if I am understanding correctly, it is just a broader type: a generic type.

I think you are trying to inadvertently drown me in calculations, when it is perfectly reasonable to infer the calculations generally from the example. Philosophim, no one can count the exact atoms in a mountain vs. a baby.

Philosophim, you’ve twisted the example in your favor! (: I was talking about all else being equal. If we are factoring in, like you said, (1) the quantity of material existences, (2) the quantity of expressive existences, and (3) the total net potential for both; then a highly complex robot (like terminator) is factually morally better, and thusly preserved over, a 2 month-old (human) baby. No extra factors: all else being equal.

It loses it’s moral meaningfulness and potency if we are talking about a mountain vs. a rock.

The only thing I will say about this is that you are admitting the theory is counter-intuitive. This doesn’t mean it is wrong, just that virtually no one is going to agree that you should save a robot over a (human) baby. People generally hold life to be more sacred than non-life.

Do you disagree with this as a function of measurement?

I believe you stated before that we use whatever time frame we want: I disagree with that. If you aren’t saying that, then what time frame, in your calculations (for whatever it is you are contemplating), are you using? You can’t seem to give a definite answer to that. This is not contingent on analyzing the moral worth of life.

Correct. My point is you just bit a bullet. No one is going to agree with you that we should preserve a hurricane over saving someone’s life; let alone that we should preserve a hurricane at all.

The difference is that hurricanes are always bad, and there is no reasonably foreseeable consequence that would make keeping a hurricane good.

You are saying that in the case that the hurricane has significantly more material and expressive existence, as well as more potential for both, than the two people; then, all else being, equal, the hurricane should be preserved.

See this is the level we should currently be at in this conversation! Carefully looking at the base in which we're building something from. Let me clarify what I'm talking about here. We're talking at the abstract level.

I'm just noting how the math functions work. In algebra for example we can add or subtract as much as we want from both sides of the equation and X stays the same.

x = 1
x-1 = 1=1

The point I'm making is that when setting up a moral calculation, you can objectively set whatever time you want.

existence * 1 second
existence * 1 minute

That's all. I'm asking you whether taking the total existence and multiplying it by time is a good measure of calculating existence over that course of time

For now, that is all I have; as the rest of your response is about things you asked me not to indulge in yet (;

A consequence of realizing that existence is calculated over time, is that optimally we want the most existence possible over time. The longer the time continues at X level, the better the long term existence.

Constant and consistent rates of morality are the most valuable. Anytime there is no foreseeable limit to its end, this will always be a more valuable existence than a 'spike' of existence. Thus I could murder someone for a quick spike of existence, but then we would lose the constant rate of that person's life. This is almost always a net negative.

Spikes of existence that don't negatively impact steady and constant sets of existence. Explained above with the murderer. But if I want to go have a party with friends, the existence spikes up and is a good thing.

What do you think about what I've written here. Don't think about humans yet! :) Does what I'm saying make sense from what we've built in a world without humans so far?

It seems like you are saying that the best action to take is the one that maximizes material and expressive existences in the longest foreseeable future, is that right?

Spikes of existence that don't negatively impact steady and constant sets of existence. Explained above with the murderer. But if I want to go have a party with friends, the existence spikes up and is a good thing.

I don’t understand this one. So if I go in my garage and do a whole bunch of useless nonsense but technically it produces expressive existences and I don’t harm anyone doing it, then that is better than if I had done one productive thing that produced less expressive existences?

Assuming my responses here are accurate (to what you are conveying), then, yes, I think I understand and still think this is going to lead to all sorts of counter-intuitive conclusions; but I am waiting until we get to your analysis of a reality with life in it first (;

It sounds like you are holding straight up act-consequentialism, but I could be wrong.

Ah, you've made an unknowing contradiction here. That which is productive is something that is useful and good. If you go into the garage and produce something with overall less existence, then it is not as good as if you could have produced something with overall more existence. That which produces more positive existence is more productive than that which does not

Thank you Bob, you truly are a great thinker and once again I am delighted to have someone of your caliber to speak with! I know its a lot to ask and yet you patiently have awaited these points.

I don't believe it is. For one, act-consequentialism is about maximizing human good, whereas this is about maximizing existence. Lets call it existentialism. :)

Excessive anger and the destruction of things for one's own pleasure. This is different from anger, which is a natural emotion that can be channeled for a productive outcome. Wrath is about destruction for destruction's sake. It does not care about the end result beyond its own satisfaction. This destroys community in society, and violates the core precepts of existential morality.

The hypothetical here, to carve it out even more precisely (to avoid confusion), is that working in my garage making model airplanes has more moral worth than me working on a cure for cancer, under your view, IF my productivity in the former is greater than the latter. No?

Same to you, my friend! I always enjoy our conversations, and I commend your creative thinking. It truly is a rare skill and gift in this world (:

Not that semantics matters, but ‘act-consequentialism’ is not the view that one should maximize human good (as that’s a form of utilitarianism) but, rather, the analysis of what is right or wrong in relation to which act has foreseeable consequences which maximizes the desired goal.

I think the main issue I see with your view, at its core, is that it is about creating more identifiable entities in reality and not producing better conditions for life

So what exactly counts here? You say material and expressive existences, but the more I think about it the more hazy those conceptions really are (to me). If by material existence you mean fundamental entities, then we don’t know of any. Atoms aren’t fundamental, and neither are quarks; and, even if they were, counting those should be roughly equal in a destroyed society vs. one in perfect health.

This segues into another worry I have, which is that it is not clear what kinds of identifiable entities you are wanting to consider morally worthy of obtaining: is it any?

If, on the other hand, we extend our definitions to be more colloquial, by just claiming material is whatever is the most fundamental within the context (the most primitive building block in the context) and expressive as the interactions between those materials, then I am not seeing how a healthy society has more expressions of existence than a destroyed one.

As a clear example of what I mean, imagine an organism which had superior neural networks, and consequently processing power, than a human but wasn’t capable of having a mind—i.e.., a super-computer made out of organic material like what we are comprised of, but no mind. It very well may be the case that this super-computer non-subject is capable of much more expressive existence than a human being—e.g., perhaps for every 10 years of a human’s activities (of expressions), the super-computer non-subject organism produces 10x that in sheer neural network power of computations. According to you, this super-computer is morally worth more, all else being equal, to a human being.

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation.

Material existence is fundamental existence. So for example, lets say that it was possible that an 'atom' could be erased from existence and never reformed again. This would be evil, as all further expressions and potential would be eliminated permanently. Fortunately for us, we have not yet discovered the fundamental building blocks of the universe, nor are we able to destroy said blocks. Even then, if some destruction of fundamental existence were needed prolong the rest of fundamental existence, it would be a necessary sacrifice.

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation. — Bob Ross

It would be a difficult calculation for sure. I don't have all of the answers Bob,

All else being equal, 26 lego blocks in a pile is equal to the amount of lego blocks when they are used to make a lego house (out of them), but the latter has more identifiable parts because there’s more to identify (e.g., the pile is just a pile of blocks, but the house is made of blocks, has walls, perhaps a window, is a house, has a roof, etc.). If you just mean that the best world is one with the most of a building block, then, all else being equal, the pile of lego blocks and the house made out of them are morally equivalent (and, not to mention, how many kinds of building blocks are there?): it is not more virtuous or morally correct for a person to advocate for their to be a lego house instead of just a pile of lego blocks. If you mean, instead, identifiable entities, then the house is better; but, now it is ambiguous what you mean by ‘identifiable’: this concept could easily explode into triviality.

As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case.

Another way of thinking about this problem, is that of a simplified example. Take a piece of paper: now, all else being equal, me tearing it in half creates more identifiable entities in reality (because there are now two pieces of paper instead of one); and, thusly, under your view, is seems as though I am obligated to do this, all else being equal, because the goal is to maximize identifiable entities.

In terms of the destruction vs. construction, let’s take an example. Imagine a tree in perfect health vs. a tree burnt to the ground: what makes the former have more identifiable entities, all else being equal, than the latter? The molecules and atoms are probably about the same, and identifiable relations (i.e., ‘expressions’) between the parts is roughly equal. So what so you?

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation. — Bob Ross

It would be a difficult calculation for sure. I don't have all of the answers Bob,

As an external critique, I think it should be obvious that a human adult has more moral worth than a hurricane in every reasonably inferred scenario.

As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case.

If it is in isolation from any other consideration, that a tree merely burned to the ground vs it would be alive, the expressed existences aren't even close. A guideline as I've mentioned is that life, per molecule, is a much more condensed set of existence over time than non-life. So alone, it is not the case that the dead and burnt tree has the same overall existence of its continued life and possible reproduction.

If you don't know why, think of all the chemical interactions in even just one cell of the tree. Think of its continued interactions with the soil and air that it breaths. Much more is going on per atom per second than ash on the ground and carbon in the air.

My apologies if I'm a little slow in responding, my other 'first cause' thread has been very busy lately so more of my time has been spent answering multiple queries.

It is not valid to sidestep the hypothetical by mentioning it is impractical, improbable, or to introduce new variables—and, I would argue, this is all you did in your entire response.

As an example, my hobbyist example demonstrates, contrary to your response (as I think you brought up irrelevant points if we are agreeing that all else is equal), that, all else being equal, building model airplanes in one’s garage is morally better than trying to find a cure for cancer IF the former is done more productively than the latter because the former will produce more identifiable entities than the latter in this case.

Your response completely ignored ‘all else being equal’, and also mentioned or alluded to the probability and practicality of the hypothetical: all of which is irrelevant.

In terms of the paper example, I don’t see how this doesn’t increase expressions of ‘existence’. Remember, you even agreed that material ‘existence’ is irrelevant: we don’t know what fundamentally exists.

Likewise, if you are claiming that “more existence is better”, then it plainly follows that two pieces of paper is better than one all else being equal.

Again, material existence doesn’t matter; and expressions of existence are just identifiable entities and their relations. So I don’t see how there are more relations and identifiable entities in a healthy tree when compared to the ashes of a burned down tree. I am not saying you are wrong, I just don’t see it:

But in net total they have similar amounts of identifiable entities and relations thereof. What I am trying to express to you, in an nutshell, is that there are an infinite amount of identifiable entities and relations thereof; so they are effectively equal.

If, on the contrary, you are prioritizing the evaluation of or just evaluating relations produced from movement, then I see your point.

But Bob, you stated that the one was done more productively than the later, so its not equal. My point is the example is too vague. What do you mean by "all else being equal" when you then also say one is more productive than the other?

Did you not understand my confetti example vs paper as a tool example?

If I needed confetti, it would be better to tear the paper into chunks. If I needed to print a document, it would be better for me to keep it whole. If I destroy all of my paper for confetti, I will be unable to print a document when I need it. And if there's not cause for the confetti, it most certainly would have been a waste.

Likewise, if you are claiming that “more existence is better”, then it plainly follows that two pieces of paper is better than one all else being equal. — Bob Ross

Again, what does this mean Bob? I need clearer examples of what you're noting is equal here.

No, they are not infinite. In each case we have a finite amount of matter that makes up that tree as well as time. Ash nor the tree will exist forever.

Either I have not been thorough enough on the patterns of the building blocks leading up to this point, or you misunderstood or forgot the conclusion already established.

When someone posits a hypothetical with “all else being equal”, they do not mean that the variables at play are equal: they mean that there is a specified set of variables, or conditions, within the hypothetical and everything else that could be said of the hypothetical comparison should be considered equal.

That the one is more productive than the other is a variable within the hypothetical comparison, and it is exactly what is needed to demonstrate my point.

Did you not understand my confetti example vs paper as a tool example?

It completely missed the point, and sidestepped the issue.

P1: More existence is better than less.
P2: Cutting a piece of paper in half, all else being equal, creates more existence than leaving it in one piece.
C: TF, cutting a piece of paper in half, all else being equal, is better than leaving it in one piece.

It is probably just me, but I think your view as evolved since your OP and some of your terms have not been clarified adequately.

1. Is ‘material existence’ denoting fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities in reality? Or perhaps something else?

2. Is ‘expressive existence’ denoting the relations between fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities in reality?

3. Is more generic, fundamental, identifiable, or concrete entities better when you say “more existence is better”?

It is not subjective because it is necessary to avoid a contradiction in the question of morality, and necessary for morality to exist.

This is a metaethical claim, and what justification or argument do you have for it? Avoiding contradictions, as a normative judgment, is not necessarily a judgment that expresses something objective.

I typically think of values as being arbitrarily asserted, so, it is more natural for me to make the claim, "It is possible to claim that existence is net good without contradiction," than to prove, like you appear to have done, that existence must be good if morality exists at all.

I have 2 more similar arguments: It appears that only living beings have the experience of "good" and "bad" (this observation is so fundamental, you might actually define life as being those things which have preferences).

The second argument comes from evolution/game theory. It seems to be necessarily true that those moralities which are good at propagating themselves will become more common, and those that are less good will not propagate themselves. I like to call this "God's morality", because assuming that God made the world the way he likes, then God likes moral beings to try to propagate themselves and their morality. This is the morality that WILL BE.

The second argument leads me to the idea that morality is enlightened self-interest. I am composed of several parts, including a body, mind, and "heart". I am also a cell within a social body, and I am incapable of propagating myself into the distant future by myself. So, it makes sense that I ought to take care of each of my parts: take care of my bodily health, educate my mind, try to find (or assert) the good, try to do good to my social unit, etc. This train of thought leads roughly to the standard morality that most people would recognize.

I had to think about this one a while, as part of this conversation with you is learning what needs to be said and what is irrelevant in a discussion about this.

What does "more productive" mean? Give me an example please. Demonstrate the variables that are equal, then the variable that demonstrates more existence than the other.

It definitely wasn't intended to. I'm just trying to figure out what you're thinking about with this comparison. Are you including the purpose of a piece of paper?

You cannot think top down. You need to build up to complicated examples because it just causes confusion and a misunderstanding of how everything builds up otherwise.

One pattern I see that I need to point out is the pattern of exploding complexity. when we upgrade to chemical reactions, then life, then people, then society. One point that might help you is you can think of each as a factorial explosion in math. An atom is 1X1. Multiple atoms are 2X1. A molecule is 3X2X1. By the time we get to something like life, molecular existence is such an irrelevant factor compared to factor results at the conscious level. When you're talking about a human decision being something like 20X19X18...including atoms as a consideration is insignificant.

So, lets just address the cutting of the paper issue, which is essentially molecular separation, and for now, keep it in the molecular factor. This is good question, because I haven't done this before.

Again, lets return to something simple. Lets start with molecules of paper. We have a situation in which right now 1 molecule alone, 2 molecules are together, and 3 are together. When they are together, there is a different type of expressed existence than merely "touching". We'll call it a bond. Let's calculate the total existence as it is now.

6 molecules + 1 bond in the two molecule and (assuming linear bonds for simplicity) 2 bonds on the 3 joined molecule. So 9 expressions total.

If two fundamentals express in such a way as to create a new identity between the two; two atoms become a molecule for example, that is a new expressed existence that will respond differently than the expressed existence of the two atoms in their singular state.

1. The foundation. This is the base thing in itself.

2. The expression. This is how the foundation exhibits itself within reality at any one snapshot of time.

3. The potential. This is the combination of what types of expression are possible within the next shapshot of time.

If noncontradiction is not an objective stance, then there is no logic.

Your distinction between normative and metaethical confused me.

I had to think about this one a while, as part of this conversation with you is learning what needs to be said and what is irrelevant in a discussion about this.

No worries: I can relate to having an idea and finding that it is harder to convey to the audience (or a specific audience or individual) than (originally) expected.

Also, I apologize for my belated response: I have been busy and am trying to catch up on my responses.

Productivity is being used in the sense of ‘having the quality or power of producing especially in abundance’; and the hypothetical is that IF a person is being more productive at creating model airplanes than finding a cure to cancer AND they can only do one or the other AND one is analyzing what is good in terms of the production of concrete entities in reality (such that more is better), then that person should (in a moral sense) choose to create model airplanes over finding a cure for cancer.

All I am including is what I included. IF ‘more existence is better’ THEN it is better to have two pieces of paper rather than one. That’s it. In isolation, is two pieces of paper better than one in your view?

You cannot think top down. You need to build up to complicated examples because it just causes confusion and a misunderstanding of how everything builds up otherwise.

I honestly can’t think of a simpler example than whether or not two pieces of paper is better than one, all else being equal. It cannot get simpler than that.

One pattern I see that I need to point out is the pattern of exploding complexity. when we upgrade to chemical reactions, then life, then people, then society. One point that might help you is you can think of each as a factorial explosion in math. An atom is 1X1. Multiple atoms are 2X1. A molecule is 3X2X1. By the time we get to something like life, molecular existence is such an irrelevant factor compared to factor results at the conscious level. When you're talking about a human decision being something like 20X19X18...including atoms as a consideration is insignificant.

This just entails that it is impossible to actually calculate what is better or worse in any practical sense; but I digress.

It is not molecular separation: it is one piece of paper vs. two. If you insist in that we must analyze it in terms of molecules, then I will insist that we must analyze it in the smallest possible ‘particle’, which is a ‘fundamental entity’ (i.e., material existence),

Everything that we know of is expressed existence then, correct?

1. The foundation. This is the base thing in itself.

This is impossible for us to know.

2. The expression. This is how the foundation exhibits itself within reality at any one snapshot of time.

This is all of known reality, and always will be.

3. The potential. This is the combination of what types of expression are possible within the next shapshot of time.

How are you anchoring this part of the calculation though? Is it the very next snapshot, the foreseeable farthest snapshot, the total net, etc.?

Productivity is being used in the sense of ‘having the quality or power of producing especially in abundance’; and the hypothetical is that IF a person is being more productive at creating model airplanes than finding a cure to cancer AND they can only do one or the other AND one is analyzing what is good in terms of the production of concrete entities in reality (such that more is better), then that person should (in a moral sense) choose to create model airplanes over finding a cure for cancer. — Bob Ross

That's fine then, yes. But as I've noted, make sure you make explicit the other outcomes as well. For example, if the person works on cancer and saves billions of lives, but is more productive working on model planes and saves no lives, this is not all else being equal.

All I am including is what I included. IF ‘more existence is better’ THEN it is better to have two pieces of paper rather than one. That’s it. In isolation, is two pieces of paper better than one in your view? — Bob Ross

Not necessarily. Its because we're tearing a piece of paper into two, not creating two equal sizes of paper.

I have not made this explicit enough. Working out the math from an atomic level all the way up to humanity is outside of my purview. I do not have the time, interest, or mathematical skill to calculate things to precision

Good. My only point is that that is incredibly counter-intuitive to predominant ethics: pretty much everyone who studies ethics will agree that trying to find a cure for cancer has more moral worth than working on model airplanes even if one is more productive at the latter than the former.

If our unit of measure is ‘a piece’ and ‘more pieces is better than less’, then two pieces of paper are better than two.

The only way for you to deny this, under your theory, is if you explicate clearly what unit of measure a person should be using to calculate “more existence is better”; and you have still as of yet to clarify it.

My point was not that you need to calculate every minute detail: it was that, in principle, it is impossible for you to; and, thusly, your theory is useless if you insist on demanding these calculations to determine what is right or wrong.

The second is: if the unit of measure is ‘material existence’ (which is whatever fundamental entities exist) and one cannot have knowledge of ‘material existences’ (which by your own concession in your conversation is true) and one needs to use those units to calculate what is right/wrong, then it is impossible for them to calculate what is right/wrong—full stop.

Perhaps this entire discussion needs a summary again, as your latter points seem to wholly miss the mark. This is not normally like you, so I feel that the discussion needs a recentering if this is the case.

If our unit of measure is ‘a piece’ and ‘more pieces is better than less’, then two pieces of paper are better than two.

The only way for you to deny this, under your theory, is if you explicate clearly what unit of measure a person should be using to calculate “more existence is better”; and you have still as of yet to clarify it. — Bob Ross

Have I not listed the three unit types, fundamental, expression, and potential?

"A piece" is not an accurate description of the existence. A piece is a generic summary which can vary in size and shape.

Firstly, we have no knowledge of fundamental entities; and stipulating something which is clearly not a fundamental entity, such as an atom, can help clarify what you would do to make moral calculations ideally but does not clarify how you are making the calculation in actuality.

To be honest, my understanding so far is that you are not using, in actuality (as opposed to ideally), fundamentaly entities to arrive at these general patterns because, by you own admission, you can’t. So, then, you are only using expression and potential entities—and, consequently, fundamental entities are useless for moral calculation in actuality.

To be honest, my understanding so far is that you are not using, in actuality (as opposed to ideally), fundamentaly entities to arrive at these general patterns because, by you own admission, you can’t. So, then, you are only using expression and potential entities—and, consequently, fundamental entities are useless for moral calculation in actuality.

Ok, let’s start with expression entities: you seem to use molecules to represent this type, but how are you determining which expression entity to factor into the moral calculation? You seem to just arbitrarily pick one for the sake of example.

Let’s take the paper example to illustrate the problem: a piece of paper and a molecule are both expression entities. By your own admission, anything comprised of, that originates out of, fundamental entities is an expression entity; so, by your own lights, the piece of paper is an expression entity, comprised of a bunch of smaller expression entities—namely molecules. You seem to arbitrarily favor the molecule over the paper itself; but the paper is an expression of molecules, among probably other expression entities, thusly making it also an expression entity.

Hopefully it is clear that, as you have defined it, a piece of paper is an expression entity: it is comprised of, something that arises out of, fundamental entities: it is an expression of fundamental entities. A molecule is also just like it in that sense: the paper arises out of, is an emergent property of, the molecules.

First, it is unnecessary to know specifically what a fundamental entity is, only that it is.

Staging is the idea of setting up a scope of what is morally being calculated to simplify the situation for general moral inquiry.

The key for me is "What is an identity"? And I think its having attributes that have unique results when interacting with another existence.

Implicit in my notion of identities is grouping. Every atom, even of the same element is different from another atom in some very small way. But I can't very well be looking over the minute individual make up, where each proton and neutron is located as well as the exact place of each electron in orbit can I? And for general discussion and physics, we don't. Hydrogen atoms in a general sense work a particular way. This is a change of staging. There is a limit down that we go in each stating to make calculations when we're talking about atoms in particular.

This becomes a new foundation, though not a material foundation, but a foundational identity. Now that I've worked through it, perhaps it needs to be pointed out with some name. So: Material foundation, expressions, material foundation combinations into new identities, and these new identities follow the pattern of material foundation by being foundational identities.

I'm not really favoring the molecules over the paper.

If fundamental entities are morally relevant to calculations, then one must have knowledge of the specific ones at play within the context being morally evaluated; or if fundamental entities are not morally relevant to the calculations, then they are useless for making moral calculations.

To be charitable, I think what you are trying to convey is that what is morally relevant for moral calculations is expressions of fundamental entities but not the fundamental entities themselves. In other words, moral calculations are always about expressions, and not fundamental entities. If this is the case, then we are in agreement; and you have chosen the second line of thinking (above)(i.e., that they are useless themselves for moral calculations, since you need to know nothing about them to make the calculations).

It is not at all clear to me within a ‘staging’ (i.e., a context) that calculating, for example, it in terms of molecules is better than calculating in terms of atoms; and it seems like which one a person chooses will have a huge impact on the results of those calculations.

Implicit in my notion of identities is grouping. Every atom, even of the same element is different from another atom in some very small way. But I can't very well be looking over the minute individual make up, where each proton and neutron is located as well as the exact place of each electron in orbit can I? And for general discussion and physics, we don't. Hydrogen atoms in a general sense work a particular way. This is a change of staging. There is a limit down that we go in each stating to make calculations when we're talking about atoms in particular.

That’s why I went with pieces of paper, but you resorted to a much harder, smaller entity to calculate—namely, molecules.

This becomes a new foundation, though not a material foundation, but a foundational identity. Now that I've worked through it, perhaps it needs to be pointed out with some name. So: Material foundation, expressions, material foundation combinations into new identities, and these new identities follow the pattern of material foundation by being foundational identities.

By ‘foundational identity’, are you referring here to just the smallest ‘building block’ one is willing to consider within the context? Otherwise, I didn’t really follow this part: a foundational entity is a material entity under your previous definitions.

I'm not really favoring the molecules over the paper.

Yes, you absolutely are! You refuse to calculate it with pieces of paper; instead, you insist on using molecules. If you used pieces of paper, then my conclusion would inevitably follow.

To be charitable, I think what you are trying to convey is that what is morally relevant for moral calculations is expressions of fundamental entities but not the fundamental entities themselves. In other words, moral calculations are always about expressions, and not fundamental entities. If this is the case, then we are in agreement; and you have chosen the second line of thinking (above)(i.e., that they are useless themselves for moral calculations, since you need to know nothing about them to make the calculations). — Bob Ross

Your are correct Bob! Well said.

And to measure morality, or existence, we need to follow the same pattern of manageability.

This unique approach is why its also difficult to have discussions with other people on this as such a formulative level. People have a top down approach ingrained in them. Changing this thought process is difficult, and people generally shy away from difficult thinking. Not you though Bob, for which I am happy. :)

1. Material existence is the building block of existence. How they interact in relation to other existences is an expression, or how it exists. The addition of all possible expressions is potential existence. This is the sum total of any one fundamental existence.

2. I would then demonstrate the fundamental combination using Aristotelian atoms. I still think this is a good and relatable introduction, feel free to disagree if you think its not.

3. I would then explain how the creation of new identities acts like a new fundamental existence with its own expressions of existence which come about only in combination. These fundamental existences create new actual and potential expressions that their parts alone cannot do.

4. We establish the pattern that creating new fundamental identities results in more existence than base material 'bumping' and existing in isolation alone. We establish the pattern that the ability to combine and uncombine creates more potential existence than only combining into one big thing.

6. Demonstrate that life is a series of self-sustaining chemical reactions. Chemical reactions eventually burn out with the material there, but life seeks out its own homeostasis. In theory, effective life will extend its chemical reactions indefinitely which, molecule for molecule, will outlast any regular chemical reactions that are destined to burn out. This elevates life's existence into a whole other section of staging.

7. Finally introduce how intelligent life creates the most potential and actual expressions of existence out of individual lives, and introduce societies. At this point, we have the established building blocks and general patterns of existence to apply to the scope of humanity and society.

That is to make sure the scope did not involve the implicit human use for paper.

Yes, using a 'foundational identity' is a poor choice of words. I think a 'scope's origin', 'staging origin' etc. would be a much better way to describe it. I wanted to use a calculation of the foundation to establish a pattern of scope and origin, so these are much better words that describe what we're doing here. What do you think?

I'll clarify. If you had 10 sheets of equal sized paper, and you were wondering whether to destroy one sheet or add one sheet to it, that's a different scope. When you divide a sheet of paper in two, you are simply doing molecular separation. Same as if we could merge all ten sheets of paper into 1 large sheet. That's molecular bonding. And as noted, its the combination and separation of molecules at this scope.

All the things we can do with paper are out of the scope. "Paper" can simply be replaced with "Abstract molecule combination and bond breaking."

And to measure morality, or existence, we need to follow the same pattern of manageability.

In that case, I think your original counter to my paper analogy is invalid: using ‘pieces’ as opposed ‘molecules’ of paper is more manageable, and thusly my conclusion still holds.

I think you should use an example that uses ‘atoms’ as a selected, base expression entity; and demonstrate how, from there, one ends up with the particular conclusion you are looking for. This sidesteps any epistemic concerns about ‘material entities’ and demonstrates exactly what you are doing when determining these general patterns.

I think you need to clarify the terminology first. By my lights, you were using ‘fundamental’ in the sense of ‘material’ this whole time and not a contextual base: it may be worth it to semantically call them different things, or slap a different adjective on one of them, to avoid ambiguity.

I would also suggest explaining what, ideally, the contextual base should be for one who is abiding by this ethical theory; so far it is not clear what that is.

Hmmm...I would like to explore this more; because I am not seeing it. I am assuming by ‘fundamental identities’ you are no longer referring to ‘material identities’.

Firstly, ‘results in more existence’ is, again, ambiguous. According to your view, it is equally true that existence cannot be created or destroyed which prima facie contradicts your claim here.

Secondly, depending on what you mean by ‘more existence’, I can get on board with materially bumping < expressions; but it entirely depends on what you mean specifically as opposed to notionally.

Thirdly, it seems like a false dilemma to compare “one big thing” (exclusively) against the ability to recombine: it seems perfectly plausible (to me) that a thing is comprised of smaller things, and that larger, united thing contains, thusly, smaller things that can recombine. I don’t see why I need to choose one or the other.

Ok, so I don’t think 6 demonstrates that life > non-life; and 7 (here) doesn’t entail intelligent life > unintelligent life. Perhaps this is what you are going for; not sure.

Using pieces of paper with the calculation has nothing to do with whether or not a human being is the one that tears the paper.

E.g., I could ask “is it, all else being equal, better to have two or one pieces of paper” and, within this context, you could choose a plethora of different types of entities as the ‘base entity’ (e.g., atoms, molecules, paper, etc.); so I am not entirely sure what you are going for here.

You did it again: chose to use molecules instead of the paper. Just like you can say cutting paper is molecular separation, I can say it is really atomic separation. This gets us nowhere.

It is manageability combined with relevant accuracy. I noted a while back that when we use a staging level as a base, what is reasonably relevant is one step up, or one step down.

Paper is just a combination of molecules one step down (unless there's another name for a 'particle' of paper)

I do think fundamental entities are an important part of the overall theory for certain invented scenarios

. Why I feel like their needs to be an adjective there is to separate it from a purely subjective identity

While atoms may combine with molecules, they also have the potential of unbonding and becoming just atoms again. That is overall more existence then if such bonds were permanent

So atoms can combine, uncombine, recombine, etc. They are not permanently locked in thus losing potential existence.

You just need clarification. "Is it better to have two pieces of paper of equal mass or 1" is different from, "is it better to divide a mass of paper into two smaller pieces".

I apologize for the belated response! I have not found the time to respond adequately until now.

It is manageability combined with relevant accuracy. I noted a while back that when we use a staging level as a base, what is reasonably relevant is one step up, or one step down.

Ok, so, correct me if I am wrong, you seem to be going for calculating ‘more existence’ in terms of the nearest scientific measuring unit of a thing: is that correct?

Paper is just a combination of molecules one step down (unless there's another name for a 'particle' of paper)

Unless I am correct above, then I don’t see why you would choose to use molecules rather than pieces of paper; nor mass of the paper. It isn’t always clear what “one step down” really is.

For example, take water. I could say that 2 Liters of water is more existence than 1; or I could equally say 100 molecules of water is more existence than 50. There’s no clear “one step down” here.

Ok, a piece of paper doesn’t qualify then; but, it really doesn’t take away from my point: cutting a piece of paper cleanly into two pieces retains the molecule count and (total) mass. So it is an morally indifferent action under your view?

If so, then you need to clarify (I think) better in the OP what you mean by “more existence is better”, because it clearly isn’t “more ? better”.

I do think fundamental entities are an important part of the overall theory for certain invented scenarios

The problem is that it is all-too conjectural. Neither of us know the nature of fundamental entities other than they are the smallest parcel of reality: they may not even be analogous to atoms combining; and, on top of that, it serves no legitimate purpose to your calculations.

While atoms may combine with molecules, they also have the potential of unbonding and becoming just atoms again. That is overall more existence then if such bonds were permanent

I don’t see how this creates more existence; because, again, I don’t know exactly how you calculating this: it is also very vague so far.

How do you calculate the comparison between expressions and potentials?

1. Is it better to have two pieces of paper of equal mass or 1?

2. is it better to divide a mass of paper into two smaller pieces than not to?

3. Is it better to combine two pieces of paper into one big piece of paper than not to?

I still think it is perfectly reasonable to analyze it in terms of non-scientific units (e.g., is better for there to be one potato or two?); but let’s go with that for now.

I think it may be beneficial for us to distinguish the unit of measure from the unit being measured. A ‘liter’, ‘gram’, etc. are units of measure, whereas a ‘molecule’, ‘atom’, etc. are units being measured.

I think a way we can sidestep this whole issue of which unit to measure, is to only use discuss what unit of measure to use. The unit of measure does need to specify a unit being measured (viz., a gram of paper is a gram irregardless of one thinking of the paper as simply ‘a paper’ or ‘a glob of molecules’).

However, the cost of this is that it also sidesteps most of your means of calculating ‘more existence’; as you have focused heavily on the (actual and potential) relationships between UCOM and very little has been said of UOM.

If you still would like to evaluate ‘more existence’ in terms of UCOM, then I simply have failed to grasp why you insist on calculating in terms of ‘UCOMs one step down’ as opposed to uses the entity as a whole: why do you prefer calculating in terms of a thing’s composed parts instead of itself?

You seem to agree with me that there are some legitimate cases where one should use the thing instead of its parts (e.g., ‘one potato or two?’) but I failing to see why you keep insisting on using its parts in other cases (e.g., why use molecules instead of the paper?). If you could please elaborate on this, then that would be much appreciated.

I am still finding it unclear what principle you are using to decipher when to to use what UOM, but, if I may, I think I can serve a solution: if more existence is better than less, then whatever UOM, and (not to mention) what measuring tool, is most precise is ideal; however, whatever is practical will prevail, which is really just the most precise tool and UOM available in any reasonable manner, because we haven’t created such an ideal tool (yet or perhaps ever, although we would strive towards developing it if your theory is adhered to). If this is something you agree with, then I think we have resolved my confusion about UOMs.

The two main issues, in summary, I would say, is that (1) “existence” is an entirely too vague an idea in your theory (thus far, I believe it to be roughly equivalent to complexity and not being)

(2) there is not an ounce, if I may be so bold, of proof that more existence being good is not good as a matter of subjective dispositions.

Nevertheless, if one accepts that “more existence is good”, and understands that “existence” refers here to “complexity”, then it is clear and correct the project which you are working on by denoting ‘material’, ‘potential’, ‘expressive’, etc. ‘existences’ and your conclusions seem pretty, by-at-large, accurate relative to that project.

The more I have thought about it, your theory starts from bottom-up but, although it is important and necessary to start with that approach, requires an up-bottom approach to determine an ideal state of reality.

On this, our theories actually converge; however, we diverge in that for you the balance is just a means towards what is good (which, in turn, for you, is the greatest complexity of being) whereas, for me, the balance (i.e., harmony) is what is good. I say that not to derail our conversation into a comparison of theories; but I have just grown to see the similarities in our views that I had not seen before and wanted to share (:

Here's a good question: how does your theory handle suffering?

Its not complexity per say, its about more existence measured in identities and potential per material existence. Higher morality is often times going to be more 'complex' as a result
…
As noted, its not complexity per say, but the existence of the highest number of identities and potential existence over a period of time

To my mind you have a different way of viewing subjectivity then most would take, but I have little disagreement with your overall view in how we understand the world.

For life to have its full potential, suffering should be minimized where possible as it prevents life from acting as fully as it could.

I find this peculiar and a bit confusing. The same amount of existence is there irregardless; so how is it really ever more, other than by the waive of a magic wand?

The ideal state of anything for you appears to be the most complicated possible arrangement of entities and composition thereof.

By common standards both in metaethics and colloquial discourse, a moral judgment is objective if it is stance-independent and, subsequently, a moral theory is a form of moral realism or, colloquial, of “objective morality” IFF it describes what is stance-independently wrong and right; and the justification you gave for it being objective was merely that any rational agent would agree or, if I remember correctly, that it is internally incoherent to posit otherwise.

For life to have its full potential, suffering should be minimized where possible as it prevents life from acting as fully as it could.

This doesn’t seem to imply that it is wrong, though, to torture someone in a manner where they do not benefit from it. For example, it seems quite plausible that in some situation allowing a person to torture someone else would actually total net increase potential existence by “unlocking” the full creativity and potential of the perpetrator.

Because two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom next to each other are not the same as water.

While including the observation that sustaining this over time is more more existence overall then something which concentrates too much and causes collapse

I generally understood your view of subjectivity to mean the fact we could not ever understand the thing in itself and were therefore 'subjective' in any attempts to capture it. I agree with the portion about being subjective beings, or 'subjects', but do not find that to be what 'subjectivity' describes. We can handle our attempts to define things concurrent with things in themselves objectively or subjectively. But, the act of being a being or a subject which can attempt to attribute identities that are concurrent with things in itself is not 'subjectivity' as usually understood

While you may believe the moral theory is subjective

and I do agree that parts of this discussion must be subjective as we do not have the means to elevate certain points to testable objectivity,

realized that a subjective form of ethics gives people wiggle room. It allows most people to rely on intuitions, and we can rely on a general good in society that usually keeps things together.

If our intuitions tell us its wrong, we need a VERY good reason and clearly proven means to say, "This is still objectively true despite our moral intuitions".

So in your case where you invent a scenario that goes against both of our moral intuitions, you need to present a much more specified and provable argument for it to be taken seriously.

Lets examine your scenario more closely and I think we'll see its not an objective scenario

First, what does it mean to "unlock potential?"

Second, is this the 'only way?'

Third, is this proven or assumed?

Different existence isn’t more existence.

Being is just what is in the sense of the whole; and the whole is not increasing when you combine two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. It is a transformation of parts of the whole into different stuff.

I think we are in agreement, then, that your ideal state is the most complicated actually possible state of arrangements of entities in reality with the addition that this state is self-sustaining. I think that amendment covers your concerns here.

1. I wasn’t referencing my view of ‘objectivity’, because it is irrelevant to my earlier point (about your view lacking evidence and argumentation for it being, in principle, about objective morality). I was using the standard definitions in metaethics and colloquial settings.

All moral theories, and all epistemic theories, rely fundamentally on intuitions: that isn’t unique to ‘subjective moralities’. However, I agree that, under ‘subjective moralities’, it is entirely possible for one person to be right that something is wrong (that a normal person would intuit is wrong, such as “torturing babies for fun”) while another person could be equally right that the same thing is right—since the proposition is indexical.

So in your case where you invent a scenario that goes against both of our moral intuitions, you need to present a much more specified and provable argument for it to be taken seriously.

Absolutely not! That was a basic, reasonable hypothetical akin to any hypothetical you will find in normative ethics; and, as such, you need to be able to respond and contend with it without trying to shift the burden of proof on the opposition.

That’s like you asking me: “In your theory, how does it handle the 5 vs. 1 trolly problem?”, and my response is “the scenario you have invented needs to be presented in a much more specified and provable argument to be taken seriously”

First, what does it mean to "unlock potential?"

It meant, in the scenario, that Dave, through experience, increases his abilities to torture people which is used in the field. Without it, arguably, he will not perform as proficiently in his work nor will he do it as creatively and skillfully as he could have.

On top of that, the avoid any derailments, I stipulated that Billy has only an hour left to live, so it isn’t like Dave is significantly inhibiting or decreasing Billy’s overall potential

Second, is this the 'only way?'

Not a valid question in this case. The question is “in this scenario, would Dave be doing anything immoral by torturing Billy?”.

Third, is this proven or assumed?

Doesn’t matter: it is assumed as proven. That’s the whole point of hypotheticals (:

With respect to your treatise on emotions, I think it derailed the conversation

If hydrogen and oxygen had no potential to combine into water, that would be much less existence in the world. For one, life as we know it would be impossible. So its a fact that there is more existence in the universe that hydrogen and oxygen can combine into water.

Thus it is by no means an empirical conclusion, but a logical one.

It is an attempt at building something objective, though this can only be proven with exploration.

I would say intuitions are generally what spark disagreement. An objective morality, if discovered, would transcend intuitions.

"Your intuition is objectively wrong, and here is rationally why."

Our intuitions that the Sun circles around the Earth my exist, but they are objectively wrong.

Taking into consideration that the person does not know the value of the human beings on the tracks, and the statistical likelihood that any one person is going to equal or surpass the impact on existence that 5 people will in total, you should change the track to hit the one person every time.

No, that's a much more defined problem. In fact, I can answer that now.

b. You cannot exclude the consideration of alternative ways of 'unlocking potential', or at least give me a reason why.

c. We need to start simple and work our way up to complex problems.

Give me some credit Bob, I'm not trying to dodge. :)

Second, is this the 'only way?'

Not a valid question in this case. The question is “in this scenario, would Dave be doing anything immoral by torturing Billy?”. — Bob Ross

No, a completely valid question when using the theory of existence. Its a theory about measuring existential gain and loss.

"This man will now be able to extract information from an enemy better than he would not have been able to before."

It wasn't intended to derail, only explain some initial thoughts I had when I first started this theory years ago. This theory is not a carefully concocted theory that I've spent years mastering. Its a baby. With babies you like to talk about some of your feelings about them sometimes. But to be fair, you're probably more interested in the theory then my feelings about it. I'll try to keep the commentary down and just focus on the points. :)

Appreciate the conversation as always Bob!

“More existence” is not synonymous with “more entities”, and you seem, so far, to be confusing the two (with all due respect). When you denote something with “more existence”, that is more of Being, not more beings.

Why is this important? Because, if you are claiming “more entities is better”, then your argument is about finding maximal complexity and number of beings; whereas if you are claiming “more existence is better” then your argument is about the increase of Being itself.

Perhaps my analytical mind is overcomplicating this, but I genuinely can’t tell which claim you are intending to make; and so far it seems like you intend to provide an “ontological” analysis but then provide an “ontical” one.

By proof, I just mean an argument which provides reasonable evidence for, that hopefully I will find sufficient to conclude that, your position at least validly purports that “more existence [or entities] is better” is objectively true.

Thus it is by no means an empirical conclusion, but a logical one.

I would never, nor should anyone ever, demand your to prove via solely empirical tests that morality is objective because that is impossible: metaethics is, and always will be, philosophical. This does not, however, mean that no proof can be provided; nor that metaethics is not a science.

It is an attempt at building something objective, though this can only be proven with exploration.

There is never going to be a way for you to explore your way into proving that “more existence [or entities] is better”: that is a prize sought after in vain—for ethics, at its core, will always be arguments from reason without a definitive scientific test that can be performed to verify it. Viz., you will never run into a phenomena that “more existence is better”, nor any test of phenomena that renders it (definitively) true.

"Your intuition is objectively wrong, and here is rationally why."

This is impossible. Your “rational why” is predicated off of intuitions as well. You are shooting yourself in the foot by trying to argue with an inuitionless perspective.

Our intuitions that the Sun circles around the Earth my exist, but they are objectively wrong.

That they are objectively wrong is based off of intuitions of the (overwhelming) evidence that the earth revolves around the sun; and not some sort of epistemically inuitionlessly obtained “objective truth”.

Taking into consideration that the person does not know the value of the human beings on the tracks, and the statistical likelihood that any one person is going to equal or surpass the impact on existence that 5 people will in total, you should change the track to hit the one person every time.

What about the 5 patients thought experiment? Is is moral for the doctor to kill and dissect one innocent, healthy person to save 5 terminally ill patients?

I think my example is just as defined, I think you are just fully appreciating that everything else is equal.

I think that if you understand that it is invalid to ask “what other ways could one save the people that are tied to the tracks besides pulling a switch (and condemning one party to death or letting one party die)?” then you can understand that it is invalid to ask “what other ways could Dave practice torture without torturing someone?”. You are inadvertently trying to smuggle new variables into the equation

It all starts with the idea that "Existence is better than no existence". What is existence? What 'is'. Matter, thoughts, concepts, etc. But how do we separate existences into discretes?

If "Being" is existence, then "Beings" are just descrete identities within existence. Meaning that from my definition, more discrete identities is equivalent to more existence

"Existence is good." I'm not
sure "Existences" are innately good;

it is the fact that they are part of the glob of existence which is what makes them good

I think the best that I can argue is that if there is an objective morality, "Existence is good" must be at the base of it all.

Intuitions are subjective, while facts are objective.
…
Let me define intuition. Intuition is a strong feeling that bends us for or against a decision/conclusion.

If I intuit that eating meat that's been on the counter for 2 days will be fine, food poisoning will demonstrate that intuition to be wrong.

think we can both agree that 'truth' is something outside of knowledge. A fact however, is objective. No matter my personal viewpoint or opinion on the matter, it still stands.

No question-dissect the first lizard and save the others if there was no chance of failure or complications.

The next scope after individual human beings is society.

They key difference is whether the doctor respects the agency from the human being involved. Volunteering your life is fine, but taking it against your will is not.

We are sacrificing a life for...what?

What value is returned?

Why is torturing good?

"If we torture this man 1 hour prior to his death, we absolutely will save five lives."

If you can't quantify it, then we can't answer it according to the theory.

This current example just needs to be made more clear and other questions implicit in the example need to be solved first.

What value does being a better torturer give?

What is the moral value of human emotions?

How does torturing a dying man help with getting information from a soldier who wants to go back to his family?

This is one of the first questions people will ask who are not familiar with the trolley problem.

I'm asking you for the limitations of the thought experiment.

It all starts with the idea that "Existence is better than no existence". What is existence? What 'is'. Matter, thoughts, concepts, etc. But how do we separate existences into discretes?

You conflated them again. “existences” here refers to beings, and ‘existence’ refers to Being.

If "Being" is existence, then "Beings" are just discrete identities within existence. Meaning that from my definition, more discrete identities is equivalent to more existence

The first sentence I have no quarrel with; but the second doesn’t follow. More discrete identities equals more beings, and definitely not more Being.

I am thinking of Being as a substance: that substance, by my lights, is not increasing when you are able to meaningfully separate, through identity, two different things upon one emerging from the other. Are you claiming to the contrary?

"Existence is good." I'm not
sure "Existences" are innately good;

By my lights, your whole analysis or ‘increasing existence’ is actually ‘increasing identities’; so it is confusing me that you are saying that you are unsure as to whether existences (beings) are good.

Then, what makes more beings good? Is, somehow, more beings directly correlated to more Being? Is that the idea?

I think the best that I can argue is that if there is an objective morality, "Existence is good" must be at the base of it all.

This is, if I remember correctly, because you think it is internally incoherent to posit that non-existence is good; but I don’t think it is.

Intuitions are subjective, while facts are objective.
…
Let me define intuition. Intuition is a strong feeling that bends us for or against a decision/conclusion.

I was meaning ‘intuition’ in the philosophical sense: an intellectual seeming. If by ‘intuition’ you mean ‘a gut feeling’; then I rescind my earlier comments about it. Inuitions, in your sense, are useless to epistemology.

However, this does not negate my original point, which used my sense of the term, that epistemically all knowledge is predicated on intuitions (about evidence); so the proof that the earth revolves around the sun being a fact is predicated on some set of intuitions—being that it is epistemic.

No question-dissect the first lizard and save the others if there was no chance of failure or complications.

I disagree with that.

The next scope after individual human beings is society.

Why? That’s entirely arbitrary.

They key difference is whether the doctor respects the agency from the human being involved. Volunteering your life is fine, but taking it against your will is not.

Why? How would it, total net, in society, decrease “existences”?

We are sacrificing a life for...what?

Dave is torturing Billy to practice torturing.

What value is returned?

Dave is better at torturing people, and this increases the “potential beings/existences” he is capable of.

Why is torturing good?

That just begs the question: I am asking you whether or not it is immoral for Dave to torture Billy in this scenario. I am surprised you are going to such extents to avoid answering.

o be completely transparent with you, I think you already know that most people would automatically say “no, it is immoral for Dave to torture Billy, because it is does not respect Billy’s rights” without needing any further elaboration; but I think you equally recognize that your theory doesn’t afford such an easy answer....

...because the deciding factor, by-at-large, for you in this scenario is going to be potential existences. Quite frankly, I think you are committed to saying it is morally permissible and obligatory all else being equal (but I don’t want to put words in your mouth).

"If we torture this man 1 hour prior to his death, we absolutely will save five lives."

I understand that you want me to add in something like “and Dave will only have been able to torture an evil captive effectively in order to save millions of lives from a terrorist attack with the practice he got from torturing Billy”; but I am not going to do that.

Right now, the scenario is claiming Dave will increase overall, all else being equal, potential “existence” (as you put it) because he has a new skill, and is better at it.

If you can't quantify it, then we can't answer it according to the theory.

This doesn’t make sense. You are saying that you cannot answer if Dave is acting immorally when he tortures Billy for practice; when answer should be an emphatic “yes”.

What value does being a better torturer give?

Originally, I was saying it would help him as a member of a government agency; so presumably to save lives by torturing captured opponents. However, to keep this really simple, let’s say it is just for its own sake. Dave is practicing torturing people for the sake of being better at it; just like how one can practice basketball for the sole sake of getting better at it.

Have either of you read Process and Reality by Alfred North Whitehead?

Then, what makes more beings good? Is, somehow, more beings directly correlated to more Being? Is that the idea? — Bob Ross

It is the above idea I'm trying to get at.

I agree it is not incoherent if an objective morality does not exist.

But we've gone over that and agreed to disagree on this for now. I appreciate you humoring me as if it were so. This means that even if what we're exploring here sounds viable, you get full rights to say, "Eh, but its just a theory." :)

I believe there is a clear distinction between reasoned and deduced conclusions versus intuitions.

Why? Do you disagree because it doesn't make sense for the theory, or do you disagree because it clashes with another theory?

What value does being a better torturer give?

Originally, I was saying it would help him as a member of a government agency; so presumably to save lives by torturing captured opponents. However, to keep this really simple, let’s say it is just for its own sake. Dave is practicing torturing people for the sake of being better at it; just like how one can practice basketball for the sole sake of getting better at it. — Bob Ross

Sure, this one is a little more defined and straight forward. What we need to do is establish the worth and value of human emotions, where I did prior in terms of actions. Self-improvement alone is simply for the emotion of self-satisfaction. There is no other value in honing a skill if one's goal is simply to hone a skill. Taken in comparison of emotion vs emotion alone, one person's satisfaction is not worth another person's horror. Add in bodily degradation and cell damage, and torturing another person for pleasurable self-improvement is definitely not moral. Finally of course there are several other ways to improve one's ability to torture that do not inflict unnecessary harm on another individual.

There is no other value in honing a skill if one's goal is simply to hone a skill.

Taken in comparison of emotion vs emotion alone

Emotions which compel us to decrease societal cohesion or hurt other people for fun compel us to lower existence.

Mhmmm, “its just a theory” is a comment only a person who doesn’t know what a theory is says as a cop-out: not my forte. But I get your point.

There’s a clear distinction, but they are not distinguishable in the sense you want it to be. Induced, abduced, and deduced conclusions all rest on intuitions. You cannot escape intuitions epistemically: there’s no such distinction whereof one concludes something without the aid of an intuition. Again, I mean “intuition” in the sense of an “intellectual seeming” and not a “gut feeling”.

In terms of your theory, I see how sacrificing one for five overall increase “existences”. However, it seems very immoral, by way of an external critique based off of moral intuitions.

Also, I would like to mention that, if you accept it in the case of lizards, then I don’t see why you don’t accept it for humans: it is basic consequentialistic calculation you are making here.

In other words, the universalization of such a principle as “one ought to sacrifice one to save five” leads to an overall worse world (by way of external critique); but if it is a better world (according to your theory) then it simply seems as though you have blundered somewhere.

There is no other value in honing a skill if one's goal is simply to hone a skill.

It increased potential existence, which, according to you, is a valid moral consideration.

Taken in comparison of emotion vs emotion alone

Firstly, as said above, it is not a comparison solely of the worth of emotions: it is a comparison of actual and potential existence in terms of the consequences of which action one takes.

Secondly, emotions are irrelevant themselves to your theory: what is good, according to you, is “more concrete entities”. You evaluate this in terms of actual and potential concrete entities.

Likewise, many kings historically have committed series atrocities, but total net increased “existence”. This is the problem with pure consequentalism: it only cares about maximizing the goal (in this case, goodness) by way of an outcome.

Because we have human society, and human society is a greater existence than the individual as I noted. Think analogously to your body. If we could destroy a toe to save a foot, that seems good on its own. But if a side effect of saving the foot by destroying the toe was that the person went into a life long coma, that wouldn't be the correct action. Yes, the foot survives, but the greater part of the body, the consciousness, dies.

The problem is this word "universalization". The only universal is, "More existence is good"

What could the person have been doing instead of torturing the victim?

That which creates better harmony, to use your terms, is going to be more existent that one which puts unnecessary stress on the body and lowers its health.

Did they create more existence through those atrocities?

Wouldn't society have been better off if the kind enacted policies which grew and supported people?

We know that monarchies as a form of government do not create the kind of robust, wealthy, and happy societies like republics for example.

If the toe had a mind of its own (and was a person), then, no, I don’t think it would be moral to cut it off to save the body. The problem with your analogy is that the toe is inert and lifeless; while the individual is a life.

I understand, however, that, according to your view, sacrificing one for the sake of saving the many, all else being equal, is good (because it leads to a maximal quantity of the “entities”); but, as an external critique, that seems immoral (to me).

The problem is this word "universalization". The only universal is, "More existence is good"

All I meant, is that “one ought to sacrifice on to save five” as a principle is leads to a worse world (by my lights).

You are just too consequentialist for me (;