A Case for Moral Subjectivism
With all the threads I have made pertaining to metaethics, I have settled on a metaethical theory called 'moral subjectivism', and this is a defense of that theory. Any critiques or contentions are more than welcome!
Introduction
This essay makes its case for moral subjectivism; that is, that moral judgments are (1) truth-apt, (2) some are true, and (3) they express something subjective. It outlines a positive case for the falsity of moral realism from an ontological is-ought gap argument and demonstrates the plausibility of moral subjectivism by providing positive cases for each prong of its thesis. Thereafter, it contends with common objections to moral subjectivism and sheds some rational light on the position.
Prerequisites to Metaethics
Before deriving the nature of moral properties and decipher the implications thereof, it is equally, if not more, important to clarify and outline the important aspects of its discussion (so as to efficiently work towards obtaining answers). The metaethical discourse around and about moral properties is such that it requires two main preliminary considerations: (1) a theory of truth and (2) a theory of moral predicationboth being theories which one imports into the metaethical dialogue and does not extract it therefrom. The former being a theory about what truth is, what the properties of trueness and falseness entail or imply, and what facticity is; and the latter being a theory about what moral language predicated to a subject (in a sentence) is supposed to express (fundamentally). Without carefully outlining both of these, it is nearly impossible to discuss any metaethical topics (such as moral realism vs. anti-realism, or moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism).
Brief Exposition of a Correspondence Theory of Truth
Within this essay, for intents and purposes of later metaethical considerations, a correspondence theory of truth is presupposed: truth is the correspondence/agreement of thought with reality, such that:
"falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not" (Metaphysics, Gamma 7, p. 107)
trueness is the property ascribed to statements of which what they allege of (refer to about) reality correspond/agree with reality with respect to that specific regard; and falseness is when the statements referent disagrees (or does not correspond) properly with reality. Objectivity is state-of-affairs which exist mind(stance)-independently and subjectivity is the 'states-of-affairs which exist mind(stance)-dependently' (where by 'state-of-affair' it is meant any 'arrangement' of existent entities in reality, which is not limited to spatial or temporal relations). Likewise, a fact is a statement which is true or, more precisely, a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality.
I will not linger on these points, although there is much one could contend with or discuss, because the dispute about this section is out of the scope of metaethics, and so any disagreement, albeit indirectly relevant to metaethics, is not a matter or concern hereof.
Brief Exposition of the Meaning of Moral Language
Moral language, according to my theory, signifies what one should find permissible, omissible, or obligatory, whereof, most notably, they are normative statements (judgments) that are subject-referencingit is not enough for a statement to be normative to be moral but, rather, it must convey, at least in principle, something which is binding to the subject (at-hand).
A moral fact, then, is a subject-referencing normative statement which corresponds to reality such that there mind(stance)-independently exists the alleged (normative) content of the claim. In other words, the moral statement corresponds to a state-of-affairs in reality such that what the statement purports about reality (i.e., those states-of-affairs) actually is the case. E.g., if one ought not torture babies for fun is a moral fact, then there is a state-of-affairs, which exists mind(stance)-independently, in reality such that one ought not torture babies for fun.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
The first major discussion about moral judgments is whether or not they are factual, and thusly whether or not they are real (where real is simply defined as something factual): hence moral realism vs. anti-realism. Anti-realism is standardly defined negatively as not moral realism, and moral realism is a three pronged thesis (at a minimum):
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].
The rejection of any of the aforesaid prongs of the moral realism thesis lands one in anti-realist territory: denying only prong-1 entails a form of moral non-cognitivism, prong-2 a form of moral subjectivism, and prong-3 a form of moral nihilism (aka: error theory). This essay will contend with prong-2 by providing an ontological is-ought gap argument against it.
Ontological Is-Ought Gap
The argument against prong-2 is as follows:
P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist.
P1 affirms a subtle and fairly intuitive notion that whatever the state-of-affairs are in reality (i.e., in the totality of existence) it simply does not inform us how they should bewhat should be the case is despite what is the case. However, if moral facts exist, then they are exactly that: states-of-affairs that inform us of how reality should bewhich entails that what should be the case is not despite what is the case. Therefore, P1 precludes the existence of moral facts as defined in P2. If moral facts cannot exist, then it is impossible for any true moral judgments, if they exist, to be expressing something objective and, thusly, prong-2 of the moral realists thesis is denied if the above argument is affirmed. It seems as though the moral realist must deny P1 to salvage moral facticity (from this argument), but this seems like an incredibly expensive maneuver: if states-of-affairs about reality can inform us how it ought to be, then it appears as though the question it is the case, but should it be the case? is not a universally valid question (which seems very implausible). Likewise, when one is presented with such a state-of-affairs that ground, objectively, a moral fact-of-the-matter called, lets say, M, they cannot, if P1 is false, validly ask it is the case that M, but should it be the case that M?. However, this seems like a legitimate question: just because it is the case that there is such a state-of-affairs that (allegedly) grounds a moral fact, it does not seem to follow that it should be that way or that another state-of-affairs would not have been better. Nevertheless, this is the bullet a moral realist must bite: some state-of-affairs are simply what should be, and they cannot be questioned further about what they should be themselves.
Objections: Answered
There are various objections a moral realist can make that are worth noting. One could, as mentioned before, bite the bullet and deny P1; one could deny the underlying theory of truth required for P2 and adopt an alternative theory (e.g., pragmatist account, coherentism, deflationary account, etc.); or one could deny what is sometimes called the direction-of-fit with respect to the statement and reality such that it is reversed: if, in P2, a moral fact has a world-to-statement direction-of-fit, then, at least in principle, they are not statements about reality but rather exist as informants of reality. The first objection has already been addressed and the second is out of the scope of this essay, but the third is worth addressing further. By direction-of-fit of a fact, it is meant as a specifier of the direction by which one should correspond the statement and reality. There are two options: a reality-to-statement or statement-to-reality direction-of-fit: the former implies that one attempts, in order to decipher the truth, to fit (or correspond) reality with the statement (such that a state-of-affairs in reality makes the statement true) and the latter implies an attempt at fitting the statement with reality (such that the statement is true if it agrees with a state-of-affairs in reality but isnt immediately made true by a state-of-affairs). An example of the former is a human desire: if one desires X, then it is true that they desire X and this is made true solely because of the state-of-affairs responsible for generating a desire for Xthere is no matching of the statement I desire X with reality but, rather it is just true in virtue of its own creation; whereas an example of the latter is I ran today 5 miles: that statement is true iff there was a state-of-affairs in the past (today) which contained one running 5 milesthere is a matching of the statement with reality, and the statement is not true in virtue of some process(es). The moral realist, who takes this route, will say that moral judgments are like the former and not the latter, and P2 is assuming the latter. To this, I deny the validity of a reality-to-statement direction-of-fit for anything: every proposition is true iff that statement corresponds to a state-of-affairs in reality and, as such, is made true only by matching with reality and never by some virtue of its own creation. Consequently, I desire X is true iff I actually desire X: it is not true in virtue of me stating or thinking it. There is simply no such thing as a fact of which its truthity is sui generis.
Another worthy objection, albeit a misapprehension, is that this is an argument from Humes is-ought gap and, consequently, objections are directed towards this argument by proxy of objections raised to Humes, or some neo-Humians, is-ought gap argument. It is imperative that the reader understands that Humes Guillotine is an epistemic argument which does not negate the possibility of moral facts but, rather, notes that one cannot validly, in logical form, derive an prescriptive statement from an indicative statement; whereas the argument set out hereon is far bolder, being a ontological argument, that contends with the notion of a moral facts being impossible in virtue of normativity and objectivity being two different ontological categories.
The last noteworthy objection is a misunderstanding stemming from the term reality and states-of-affairs: some moral non-naturalists will agree with my argument and merely add that it does not contend with their moral realist theories because they identify moral properties with supersensible, supernatural, or non-natural propertiesthusly, they have no problem admitting that the way reality is never entails how it should be. However, this misunderstands the deployment of the terms reality and states-of-affairs in this argument: it is not referencing nature, the universe, or the world but, rather, the totality of existenceand states-of-affairs is not referencing mere temporal nor spatiotemporal states within reality but, rather, is any arrangement of existent entities within reality. Consequently, for example, theistic and platonistic moral realist positions are not exempt from this argument.
A Case for Moral Subjectivism
Moral subjectivism is a three pronged thesis, which is equivalent to the moral realists thesis with the denial of prong-2:
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].
Each of these prongs must be defended, but, before that, a preliminary look into the view is in due.
Within moral subjectivism, the moral judgment is a belief which is the upshot of ones psychology and it is proposition which is indexicale.g., I believe one ought not torture babies for fun is a moral judgment, and the belief about the belief attempts to determine the truth of the claim: either I believe one ought not to torture babies for fun or I dont. In this manner, the proposition itself is not purporting that the moral judgment is about something factual in reality beyond ones psychology and, thusly, is not a moral fact: the belief that one ought not torture babies for fun is the expression of ones psychological state such that one disapproves of torturing babies for fun. Within this metaethical theory, it is technically invalid, unless it be a short-hand, to claim that one ought not torture babies for fun is cognitive, true, and a moral judgment because this is a factual statement which does not reference ones psychology: instead, it would have to be (technically) rewritten as I believe one ought not torture babies for fun. Now on to the defense of the thesis.
A Case for Moral Cognitivism [Prong-1]
Moral cognitivism is the metaethical position that moral judgments are truth-apt (i.e., propositional), and moral non-cognitivism is its counter-part. The argument that will be presented for moral cognitivism is from logical validity and intelligibility:
P1: If moral non-cognitivism is true, then If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi is not a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.
P2: If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi is a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.
C: Therefore, moral non-cognitivism is false.
If moral non-cognitivism is true, then moral judgments are not truth-apt; and if they are not truth-apt, then they cannot be used as propositions in logic. Consequently, it is perfectly unintelligible and invalid, under moral non-cognitivism, to place a moral judgment as an antecedent in an if conditional because the moral judgment lacks the capacity to be true or false. However, hypotheticals which contain moral judgments are perfectly intelligible, such as If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi, and, therefore, moral non-cognitivism must be false (and cognitivism true).
A Case for True Moral Judgments [Prong-3]
For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that we have good reasons to believe that some of the truth-apt (cognitive) moral judgments we have are true and thusly binding. The argument that will be presented for the existence of true moral judgments is from implicit action:
P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to lie down and starve to death.
P2: People do not lie down and starve to death.
C: Therefore, some moral judgments must be true.
Since moral language signifies what one considers permissible, omissible, or obligatory, it follows that any action a person commits implicitly concedes some moral truth. For example, if one makes themselves a sandwich and eats it, then they have, at the very least, implicitly conceded that they find it morally permissible or omissible to do so. If they find that all subject-referencing normative statements are false, then they cannot perform any actions, since none of them are permissible, omissible, or obligatorywhich leads no room for any decisive action. They would have to essentially lie down and starve to death if all moral judgments are false.
A Case for Moral Non-objectivism [Prong-2]
If moral judgments are truth-apt (prong-1) and some of them have to be true (prong-3), then in virtue of what makes them true? It cannot be something grounded in a fact (or facts), because we demonstrated (previously) that prong-2 of moral realism is false; so true moral judgments must be non-factual beliefs which are the upshot of ones psychology:
P1: If there are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective, then they must be an expression of something subjective.
P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective.
C: Therefore, true moral judgments must be an expression of something subjective.
Either something is an expression of something objective (and in virtue of that at least a candidate of being factual) or it is subjective; therefore, if prong-2 of moral realism is false and there are true moral judgments, then they must be beliefs of which are the upshot of ones psychology.
Objections: Answered
Various objections have been raised to moral subjectivism, and it is worth noting and contending with the major ones.
The first common objection is that common language utilizes truth-apt moral judgments as if they are expressions of something objective, and so, all else being equal, moral subjectivism seems false. I merely contend that, upon what has been stated hereon, it should be clear that if prong-2 of moral realism is false but prong-1 and prong-3 are true, then this is going to land one in moral subjectivist territory which will supersede any superficial linguistic interpretations of morality that conflict with it. For moral subjectivists, they are not expressing something objective when stating one ought not torture babies for fun because it is colloquial short-hand for I believe one ought not torture babies for fun [and that is an upshot of my psychology]. If a moral subjectivist is deploying those sort of moral judgments as if they express something objective, then they simply arent moral subjectivists (or they are confused).
The second common objection is that enforcing preferences (i.e., non-factual moral judgments) is unfair, wrong, and impermissible. I note two counter points: firstly, unfairness, wrongness, and impermissibility are morally loaded terms and as such beg the question (for if wrongness itself is tied to subjectivity, then it is perfectly unintelligible to imply it is objectively wrong to impose preferences on each other), and, secondly, moral realists typically dont even consistently nor coherently abide by such a principle (for the truth is that it is impossible to not impose some preferences on each other). With regards to the first, if the person is objecting with some sort of morally factual consideration, then I contest its existence in the first place; and if they are noting a preference they have, then they are defeating their own contention. With regards to the second, it is uncontroversial, even among moral realists, in axiology, as opposed to morality, that imposition of tastes is (1) necessary and (2) perfectly fair. For example, I always give the moral realist who is having a hard time agreeing with enforcing (some) preferences, in principle, on other people this scenario to demonstrate a point: imagine that I want to torture a baby for fun. Now, imagine that you (the moral realist I am discussing with) find me right before the act of torturing the baby and try to stop me. First, you say Stop! You shouldnt torture babies for fun!. I say Why?. You say Because it is a moral fact that you shouldnt torture babies for fun!. I say thats true, but I dont care about the moral facts.. Now we have not a dispute about morals but about values, and how are you going to justify and impose your valuing of the moral facts themselves on me without either (1) applying circular reasoning by invoking a moral fact or (2) just imposing your preference that people should care about the moral facts on me in virtue of you simply having that preference? I propose and suggest that you (the moral realist I am discussing with) will, at least implicitly in action, shove your valuing of the moral facts down my throat in this scenario and force me not to torture the baby, even though there is nothing irrational with accepting the truth of a moral judgment as factual while denying any worth to it; and, consequently, you will implicitly concede that it is permissible, at least with regards to certain preferences, to impose them on other people. I merely transfer the same thinking to morals as we both do to axiology: I impose moral judgments that I care enough about to warrant enforcing them, no different than how you (that moral realist) care enough about moral facticity to impose that preference on other people.
The third most common objection is that there is no moral disagreement if moral subjectivism is true, and this seems implausible. If I believe one ought not torture babies is a moral judgment which expresses something subjective, then it appears as though one person can affirm this proposition (validly) and another disaffirm it (validly): so what disagreement could possibly be had if there is no fact-of-the-matter to dispute? I contend that this is an invalid importation of a moral realists metaethical framework, of which is baked-into, implicitly, the concept of disagreement. There is still disagreement in morals even if moral judgments express something subjective and it is useful to have moral conversations: it just doesnt quite look the same under a moral subjectivists metaethical frameworkthe concept of disagreement looks different. When one affirms one ought not do X and someone else disaffirms it, then they can engage in a fruitful moral discussion thereof which looks something like the following:
1. One can try and tease out false beliefs that the other has about themselves. The other person may say I dont believe that I ought not do X but, under moral subjectivism (being that moral judgments are cognitive beliefs which are the upshot of ones psyche), that doesnt thereby make it true (even relative to themselves). Most people are really bad at psycho-analysis, and if one can tease out to the other person that they actually do believe that one ought not do X, then they have succeeded in their own goal of enforcing that preference.
2. One can latch onto higher prioritized moral beliefs that the other person has, and show that accepting that higher-prioritized hypothetical imperative logically or plausibly entails that one ought not do X. The other person may initially be against being obligated not to do X, but if one can get that person to agree to another hypothetical imperative and show that person that it is logically inconsistent or otherwise incoherent with that persons denial of the contended hypothetical imperative [that one ought not do X], then that person is forced to choose or reject both. Most likely, since the former is higher prioritized, that person will flip their position on the latter and one has succeed in their own goal of enforcing that preference.
3. One could dispute the supplemental non-moral facts. It could be that both people agree about the underlying moral judgments that one is using to commit themselves to I ought not do X but that the supplementing non-moral fact is disputed. This aspect of the conversation follows the normal realist discussion that a moral realist wants for moral judgments (just with respect to non-moral judgments), since there is a fact-of-the-matter about the non-moral facts.
4. If 1-3 dont work, then one may try other nuanced tactics, but, for brevity, I will not include them here.
5. The last resort, for moral realists and anti-realists alike, is violence.
For the moral realist to view moral subjectivist moral discussion as essential throw your hands up in the air is clearly a straw man of the position.
The final objection worth noting is one from sociology implications: if people were to behave as though moral judgments express something subjective, then this is worse for society than if they thought it expressed something objective. Firstly, I disclaim that this in no way contends with the truth of the matter about moral subjectivism: it is entirely possible for the position to be true and it to harm society. Secondly, I would contend that we already axiologically, which is more fundamental with respect to society than morality, behave this way. Everyone imposes there preferences to some extent on society, and axiology is commonly accepted as subjective. When someone says that they think society should operate such that one ought to tell the truth, this is a moral fact, and that they care so much about moral facts that they are prepared to shove it down peoples throats, no one bats an eye; but if someone says one ought to tell the truth because they care so much about telling the truth, there is an uproar. Thusly, the dangers of moral subjectivism on society is merely in its misapplication and misapprehension and is not inherent to the position itself.
Introduction
This essay makes its case for moral subjectivism; that is, that moral judgments are (1) truth-apt, (2) some are true, and (3) they express something subjective. It outlines a positive case for the falsity of moral realism from an ontological is-ought gap argument and demonstrates the plausibility of moral subjectivism by providing positive cases for each prong of its thesis. Thereafter, it contends with common objections to moral subjectivism and sheds some rational light on the position.
Prerequisites to Metaethics
Before deriving the nature of moral properties and decipher the implications thereof, it is equally, if not more, important to clarify and outline the important aspects of its discussion (so as to efficiently work towards obtaining answers). The metaethical discourse around and about moral properties is such that it requires two main preliminary considerations: (1) a theory of truth and (2) a theory of moral predicationboth being theories which one imports into the metaethical dialogue and does not extract it therefrom. The former being a theory about what truth is, what the properties of trueness and falseness entail or imply, and what facticity is; and the latter being a theory about what moral language predicated to a subject (in a sentence) is supposed to express (fundamentally). Without carefully outlining both of these, it is nearly impossible to discuss any metaethical topics (such as moral realism vs. anti-realism, or moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism).
Brief Exposition of a Correspondence Theory of Truth
Within this essay, for intents and purposes of later metaethical considerations, a correspondence theory of truth is presupposed: truth is the correspondence/agreement of thought with reality, such that:
"falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not" (Metaphysics, Gamma 7, p. 107)
trueness is the property ascribed to statements of which what they allege of (refer to about) reality correspond/agree with reality with respect to that specific regard; and falseness is when the statements referent disagrees (or does not correspond) properly with reality. Objectivity is state-of-affairs which exist mind(stance)-independently and subjectivity is the 'states-of-affairs which exist mind(stance)-dependently' (where by 'state-of-affair' it is meant any 'arrangement' of existent entities in reality, which is not limited to spatial or temporal relations). Likewise, a fact is a statement which is true or, more precisely, a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality.
I will not linger on these points, although there is much one could contend with or discuss, because the dispute about this section is out of the scope of metaethics, and so any disagreement, albeit indirectly relevant to metaethics, is not a matter or concern hereof.
Brief Exposition of the Meaning of Moral Language
Moral language, according to my theory, signifies what one should find permissible, omissible, or obligatory, whereof, most notably, they are normative statements (judgments) that are subject-referencingit is not enough for a statement to be normative to be moral but, rather, it must convey, at least in principle, something which is binding to the subject (at-hand).
A moral fact, then, is a subject-referencing normative statement which corresponds to reality such that there mind(stance)-independently exists the alleged (normative) content of the claim. In other words, the moral statement corresponds to a state-of-affairs in reality such that what the statement purports about reality (i.e., those states-of-affairs) actually is the case. E.g., if one ought not torture babies for fun is a moral fact, then there is a state-of-affairs, which exists mind(stance)-independently, in reality such that one ought not torture babies for fun.
A Case for Moral Anti-realism
The first major discussion about moral judgments is whether or not they are factual, and thusly whether or not they are real (where real is simply defined as something factual): hence moral realism vs. anti-realism. Anti-realism is standardly defined negatively as not moral realism, and moral realism is a three pronged thesis (at a minimum):
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].
The rejection of any of the aforesaid prongs of the moral realism thesis lands one in anti-realist territory: denying only prong-1 entails a form of moral non-cognitivism, prong-2 a form of moral subjectivism, and prong-3 a form of moral nihilism (aka: error theory). This essay will contend with prong-2 by providing an ontological is-ought gap argument against it.
Ontological Is-Ought Gap
The argument against prong-2 is as follows:
P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist.
P1 affirms a subtle and fairly intuitive notion that whatever the state-of-affairs are in reality (i.e., in the totality of existence) it simply does not inform us how they should bewhat should be the case is despite what is the case. However, if moral facts exist, then they are exactly that: states-of-affairs that inform us of how reality should bewhich entails that what should be the case is not despite what is the case. Therefore, P1 precludes the existence of moral facts as defined in P2. If moral facts cannot exist, then it is impossible for any true moral judgments, if they exist, to be expressing something objective and, thusly, prong-2 of the moral realists thesis is denied if the above argument is affirmed. It seems as though the moral realist must deny P1 to salvage moral facticity (from this argument), but this seems like an incredibly expensive maneuver: if states-of-affairs about reality can inform us how it ought to be, then it appears as though the question it is the case, but should it be the case? is not a universally valid question (which seems very implausible). Likewise, when one is presented with such a state-of-affairs that ground, objectively, a moral fact-of-the-matter called, lets say, M, they cannot, if P1 is false, validly ask it is the case that M, but should it be the case that M?. However, this seems like a legitimate question: just because it is the case that there is such a state-of-affairs that (allegedly) grounds a moral fact, it does not seem to follow that it should be that way or that another state-of-affairs would not have been better. Nevertheless, this is the bullet a moral realist must bite: some state-of-affairs are simply what should be, and they cannot be questioned further about what they should be themselves.
Objections: Answered
There are various objections a moral realist can make that are worth noting. One could, as mentioned before, bite the bullet and deny P1; one could deny the underlying theory of truth required for P2 and adopt an alternative theory (e.g., pragmatist account, coherentism, deflationary account, etc.); or one could deny what is sometimes called the direction-of-fit with respect to the statement and reality such that it is reversed: if, in P2, a moral fact has a world-to-statement direction-of-fit, then, at least in principle, they are not statements about reality but rather exist as informants of reality. The first objection has already been addressed and the second is out of the scope of this essay, but the third is worth addressing further. By direction-of-fit of a fact, it is meant as a specifier of the direction by which one should correspond the statement and reality. There are two options: a reality-to-statement or statement-to-reality direction-of-fit: the former implies that one attempts, in order to decipher the truth, to fit (or correspond) reality with the statement (such that a state-of-affairs in reality makes the statement true) and the latter implies an attempt at fitting the statement with reality (such that the statement is true if it agrees with a state-of-affairs in reality but isnt immediately made true by a state-of-affairs). An example of the former is a human desire: if one desires X, then it is true that they desire X and this is made true solely because of the state-of-affairs responsible for generating a desire for Xthere is no matching of the statement I desire X with reality but, rather it is just true in virtue of its own creation; whereas an example of the latter is I ran today 5 miles: that statement is true iff there was a state-of-affairs in the past (today) which contained one running 5 milesthere is a matching of the statement with reality, and the statement is not true in virtue of some process(es). The moral realist, who takes this route, will say that moral judgments are like the former and not the latter, and P2 is assuming the latter. To this, I deny the validity of a reality-to-statement direction-of-fit for anything: every proposition is true iff that statement corresponds to a state-of-affairs in reality and, as such, is made true only by matching with reality and never by some virtue of its own creation. Consequently, I desire X is true iff I actually desire X: it is not true in virtue of me stating or thinking it. There is simply no such thing as a fact of which its truthity is sui generis.
Another worthy objection, albeit a misapprehension, is that this is an argument from Humes is-ought gap and, consequently, objections are directed towards this argument by proxy of objections raised to Humes, or some neo-Humians, is-ought gap argument. It is imperative that the reader understands that Humes Guillotine is an epistemic argument which does not negate the possibility of moral facts but, rather, notes that one cannot validly, in logical form, derive an prescriptive statement from an indicative statement; whereas the argument set out hereon is far bolder, being a ontological argument, that contends with the notion of a moral facts being impossible in virtue of normativity and objectivity being two different ontological categories.
The last noteworthy objection is a misunderstanding stemming from the term reality and states-of-affairs: some moral non-naturalists will agree with my argument and merely add that it does not contend with their moral realist theories because they identify moral properties with supersensible, supernatural, or non-natural propertiesthusly, they have no problem admitting that the way reality is never entails how it should be. However, this misunderstands the deployment of the terms reality and states-of-affairs in this argument: it is not referencing nature, the universe, or the world but, rather, the totality of existenceand states-of-affairs is not referencing mere temporal nor spatiotemporal states within reality but, rather, is any arrangement of existent entities within reality. Consequently, for example, theistic and platonistic moral realist positions are not exempt from this argument.
A Case for Moral Subjectivism
Moral subjectivism is a three pronged thesis, which is equivalent to the moral realists thesis with the denial of prong-2:
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].
Each of these prongs must be defended, but, before that, a preliminary look into the view is in due.
Within moral subjectivism, the moral judgment is a belief which is the upshot of ones psychology and it is proposition which is indexicale.g., I believe one ought not torture babies for fun is a moral judgment, and the belief about the belief attempts to determine the truth of the claim: either I believe one ought not to torture babies for fun or I dont. In this manner, the proposition itself is not purporting that the moral judgment is about something factual in reality beyond ones psychology and, thusly, is not a moral fact: the belief that one ought not torture babies for fun is the expression of ones psychological state such that one disapproves of torturing babies for fun. Within this metaethical theory, it is technically invalid, unless it be a short-hand, to claim that one ought not torture babies for fun is cognitive, true, and a moral judgment because this is a factual statement which does not reference ones psychology: instead, it would have to be (technically) rewritten as I believe one ought not torture babies for fun. Now on to the defense of the thesis.
A Case for Moral Cognitivism [Prong-1]
Moral cognitivism is the metaethical position that moral judgments are truth-apt (i.e., propositional), and moral non-cognitivism is its counter-part. The argument that will be presented for moral cognitivism is from logical validity and intelligibility:
P1: If moral non-cognitivism is true, then If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi is not a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.
P2: If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi is a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.
C: Therefore, moral non-cognitivism is false.
If moral non-cognitivism is true, then moral judgments are not truth-apt; and if they are not truth-apt, then they cannot be used as propositions in logic. Consequently, it is perfectly unintelligible and invalid, under moral non-cognitivism, to place a moral judgment as an antecedent in an if conditional because the moral judgment lacks the capacity to be true or false. However, hypotheticals which contain moral judgments are perfectly intelligible, such as If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi, and, therefore, moral non-cognitivism must be false (and cognitivism true).
A Case for True Moral Judgments [Prong-3]
For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that we have good reasons to believe that some of the truth-apt (cognitive) moral judgments we have are true and thusly binding. The argument that will be presented for the existence of true moral judgments is from implicit action:
P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to lie down and starve to death.
P2: People do not lie down and starve to death.
C: Therefore, some moral judgments must be true.
Since moral language signifies what one considers permissible, omissible, or obligatory, it follows that any action a person commits implicitly concedes some moral truth. For example, if one makes themselves a sandwich and eats it, then they have, at the very least, implicitly conceded that they find it morally permissible or omissible to do so. If they find that all subject-referencing normative statements are false, then they cannot perform any actions, since none of them are permissible, omissible, or obligatorywhich leads no room for any decisive action. They would have to essentially lie down and starve to death if all moral judgments are false.
A Case for Moral Non-objectivism [Prong-2]
If moral judgments are truth-apt (prong-1) and some of them have to be true (prong-3), then in virtue of what makes them true? It cannot be something grounded in a fact (or facts), because we demonstrated (previously) that prong-2 of moral realism is false; so true moral judgments must be non-factual beliefs which are the upshot of ones psychology:
P1: If there are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective, then they must be an expression of something subjective.
P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective.
C: Therefore, true moral judgments must be an expression of something subjective.
Either something is an expression of something objective (and in virtue of that at least a candidate of being factual) or it is subjective; therefore, if prong-2 of moral realism is false and there are true moral judgments, then they must be beliefs of which are the upshot of ones psychology.
Objections: Answered
Various objections have been raised to moral subjectivism, and it is worth noting and contending with the major ones.
The first common objection is that common language utilizes truth-apt moral judgments as if they are expressions of something objective, and so, all else being equal, moral subjectivism seems false. I merely contend that, upon what has been stated hereon, it should be clear that if prong-2 of moral realism is false but prong-1 and prong-3 are true, then this is going to land one in moral subjectivist territory which will supersede any superficial linguistic interpretations of morality that conflict with it. For moral subjectivists, they are not expressing something objective when stating one ought not torture babies for fun because it is colloquial short-hand for I believe one ought not torture babies for fun [and that is an upshot of my psychology]. If a moral subjectivist is deploying those sort of moral judgments as if they express something objective, then they simply arent moral subjectivists (or they are confused).
The second common objection is that enforcing preferences (i.e., non-factual moral judgments) is unfair, wrong, and impermissible. I note two counter points: firstly, unfairness, wrongness, and impermissibility are morally loaded terms and as such beg the question (for if wrongness itself is tied to subjectivity, then it is perfectly unintelligible to imply it is objectively wrong to impose preferences on each other), and, secondly, moral realists typically dont even consistently nor coherently abide by such a principle (for the truth is that it is impossible to not impose some preferences on each other). With regards to the first, if the person is objecting with some sort of morally factual consideration, then I contest its existence in the first place; and if they are noting a preference they have, then they are defeating their own contention. With regards to the second, it is uncontroversial, even among moral realists, in axiology, as opposed to morality, that imposition of tastes is (1) necessary and (2) perfectly fair. For example, I always give the moral realist who is having a hard time agreeing with enforcing (some) preferences, in principle, on other people this scenario to demonstrate a point: imagine that I want to torture a baby for fun. Now, imagine that you (the moral realist I am discussing with) find me right before the act of torturing the baby and try to stop me. First, you say Stop! You shouldnt torture babies for fun!. I say Why?. You say Because it is a moral fact that you shouldnt torture babies for fun!. I say thats true, but I dont care about the moral facts.. Now we have not a dispute about morals but about values, and how are you going to justify and impose your valuing of the moral facts themselves on me without either (1) applying circular reasoning by invoking a moral fact or (2) just imposing your preference that people should care about the moral facts on me in virtue of you simply having that preference? I propose and suggest that you (the moral realist I am discussing with) will, at least implicitly in action, shove your valuing of the moral facts down my throat in this scenario and force me not to torture the baby, even though there is nothing irrational with accepting the truth of a moral judgment as factual while denying any worth to it; and, consequently, you will implicitly concede that it is permissible, at least with regards to certain preferences, to impose them on other people. I merely transfer the same thinking to morals as we both do to axiology: I impose moral judgments that I care enough about to warrant enforcing them, no different than how you (that moral realist) care enough about moral facticity to impose that preference on other people.
The third most common objection is that there is no moral disagreement if moral subjectivism is true, and this seems implausible. If I believe one ought not torture babies is a moral judgment which expresses something subjective, then it appears as though one person can affirm this proposition (validly) and another disaffirm it (validly): so what disagreement could possibly be had if there is no fact-of-the-matter to dispute? I contend that this is an invalid importation of a moral realists metaethical framework, of which is baked-into, implicitly, the concept of disagreement. There is still disagreement in morals even if moral judgments express something subjective and it is useful to have moral conversations: it just doesnt quite look the same under a moral subjectivists metaethical frameworkthe concept of disagreement looks different. When one affirms one ought not do X and someone else disaffirms it, then they can engage in a fruitful moral discussion thereof which looks something like the following:
1. One can try and tease out false beliefs that the other has about themselves. The other person may say I dont believe that I ought not do X but, under moral subjectivism (being that moral judgments are cognitive beliefs which are the upshot of ones psyche), that doesnt thereby make it true (even relative to themselves). Most people are really bad at psycho-analysis, and if one can tease out to the other person that they actually do believe that one ought not do X, then they have succeeded in their own goal of enforcing that preference.
2. One can latch onto higher prioritized moral beliefs that the other person has, and show that accepting that higher-prioritized hypothetical imperative logically or plausibly entails that one ought not do X. The other person may initially be against being obligated not to do X, but if one can get that person to agree to another hypothetical imperative and show that person that it is logically inconsistent or otherwise incoherent with that persons denial of the contended hypothetical imperative [that one ought not do X], then that person is forced to choose or reject both. Most likely, since the former is higher prioritized, that person will flip their position on the latter and one has succeed in their own goal of enforcing that preference.
3. One could dispute the supplemental non-moral facts. It could be that both people agree about the underlying moral judgments that one is using to commit themselves to I ought not do X but that the supplementing non-moral fact is disputed. This aspect of the conversation follows the normal realist discussion that a moral realist wants for moral judgments (just with respect to non-moral judgments), since there is a fact-of-the-matter about the non-moral facts.
4. If 1-3 dont work, then one may try other nuanced tactics, but, for brevity, I will not include them here.
5. The last resort, for moral realists and anti-realists alike, is violence.
For the moral realist to view moral subjectivist moral discussion as essential throw your hands up in the air is clearly a straw man of the position.
The final objection worth noting is one from sociology implications: if people were to behave as though moral judgments express something subjective, then this is worse for society than if they thought it expressed something objective. Firstly, I disclaim that this in no way contends with the truth of the matter about moral subjectivism: it is entirely possible for the position to be true and it to harm society. Secondly, I would contend that we already axiologically, which is more fundamental with respect to society than morality, behave this way. Everyone imposes there preferences to some extent on society, and axiology is commonly accepted as subjective. When someone says that they think society should operate such that one ought to tell the truth, this is a moral fact, and that they care so much about moral facts that they are prepared to shove it down peoples throats, no one bats an eye; but if someone says one ought to tell the truth because they care so much about telling the truth, there is an uproar. Thusly, the dangers of moral subjectivism on society is merely in its misapplication and misapprehension and is not inherent to the position itself.
Comments (64)
I always kinda figured youd end up here.
:grin:
Where is your head at these days? I would presume a Kantian with respect to ethics as well, so probably upholding his maxim of universalizability as an objective moral principle?
Oh, I been in the back of the room, keeping my head down, taking notes.
A Kantian with respect to moral subjectivism Ill admit. Ethics is more than that, I think.
Objective moral principle is like world peace. One can wish for it, visualize it, even figure out how to do it, but understands even if he does it, theres precious little reason to expect anybody else to follow suit.
:lol:
I see: are you saying you still adhere to Kant's ethics but with modifications to accommodate to moral subjectivism? Or would you just say you agree with only Kant's metaphysics that are not about ethics?
I think this is a fairly good OP. I think it improves significantly on your previous account. I am glad to see that you are trying to get away from the taste-based idea we discussed a few days ago. Your ability to revise your views is laudable.
I think this idea that the sphere of morality encompasses all acts is absolutely correct, and you are the first TPF member I have seen to explicitly accept this view. I also think your arguments for moral cognitivism are sound.
Quoting Bob Ross
This could be the central contradiction in your system. I think this commits you to the idea that there are objective truths which are not grounded in objective realities, which seems to be a contradiction. More concisely, "subjective truth" is chimerical (i.e. it is something which may seem attainable at first, but always fades into the horizon like a mirage). More on this. . .
Quoting Bob Ross
When one states, "I believe one ought not torture babies for fun," I would interpret that to mean, "I believe it is objectively true that one ought not torture babies for fun." After all, what is the "truth" of moral cognitivism if not objective truth? Isn't all truth 'objective' in this relevant sense?
Quoting Bob Ross
A non-factual moral judgment is not a preference. More, a preference is not a judgment of truth. To affirm a moral proposition is to make a judgment, not to have a preference. Preferences are not judgments and judgments are not preferences.
Quoting Bob Ross
This seems like a denial of cognitivism. Propositions which are true or false can be argued about in a straightforward way. Your five workarounds would be possible but not necessary on such a case.
A basic problem that I see in this account is the way that it founders on the subjective/objective distinction (which is not an ultimately coherent distinction in the first place). For the realist a truth, such as 12*12=144, is objective and subjective, in the sense that it is objectively true and yet it is always and only ever known and appropriated by an individual subject. Objective truths are known by subjects. For the moral realist it is the same. "Do not torture babies for fun," is an objective truth, known by a subject.
The related problem is similar. If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable. Offhand I can think of two kinds of subjective truths: truths known by a subject on the basis of private information; and truths made true by a subject's intentions. For example, "I enjoy pock-marked lilies," and, "Tomorrow I am going to wear my ugly Christmas sweater." The first sort cannot function as a universally binding moral truth because it is not universally known to all. The second sort cannot function as a universally binding moral truth because moral truths are not thought to be contingent on any human will. Apparently some moral subjectivists think certain instances of the second sort, such as the decree of a king, could function as a subjective moral truth. This is more plausible than any other account I can think of, but I haven't yet met anyone who takes the King's decree to be morally binding.
Logically, Prong-2.P2 is the heart of subjectivism and yet it receives no positive support or elaboration. You don't even say what a subjective, binding truth is supposed to be, or how it could work. Your argument is purely negative. Your disjunctive syllogism is something like, "A or B or C. We have good reasons to reject A and B. Therefore, C." The problem is that we also have good reasons to reject C.
Metaphysics is general, although Kants ethics, more inclined toward what he called empirical anthropology and the moderns call cultural or the stronger even more modern sociocultural, has some quite repulsive stuff regarding women, other races, etc., which was not so out-of-tune for his day. But on the other hand, human aesthetics, the ground of purely subjective moral dispositions, hasnt changed since his time, insofar as that requires the lapsed time of natural evolution.
Still, the crowd influences the individual; it does but it shouldnt and it wouldnt if the individual would just grow a pair. It is the growing which is the same for us these days as Kants moral philosophy espoused. It is the fact we in general are too weak to grow a pair, and that alone reduces practical moral subjectivist philosophy to junk.
Hello Leontiskos,
I appreciate your elaborate, substantive, and thought-provoking response! Hopefully, I can adequately respond.
I think the heart of our disagreement (and correct me if I am wrong) is twofold:
1. A lack of a positive account of pronge-2 P2 of the moral subjectivist thesis; and
2. The implications of true moral judgments expressing something subjective (e.g., is that even possible?).
So, I will try to address those hereon; but, first, let me address some (perhaps) less crucial points that I think are still worth mentioning.
I honestly havent (: . I think maybe my diction is just confusing to other people, because I take a preference to be synonymous with a taste--it seems like other people think the former is a superficial instance of the latter. If there is any confusion with my use of taste, then I am more than happy to replace it with the word preference.
:up:
Although I am unsure as to whether I actually revised my position like you think I did; I will say again that I am only in the interest of obtaining the truth, like you, and will happily concede any point if my contender provides reasons I agree with for disbanding from that point.
Alright, with that out of the way, let me first address #1.
Firstly, I do think it is a fair critique that I didnt expound incredibly clearly how the relation between truth and the subjective moral judgments workI did give some examples I didnt analyze them that thoroughly, so I will take a note to add that in later. I will likewise give an account here as well (in a little bit).
Secondly, the positive support for prong-2 P2 is the argument against prong-2 P2 of the moral realist thesis and the argument for true moral judgments in the subjection for prong-3 of the moral subjectivist thesis:
If one accepts that there are true moral judgments (and thusly that they are propositional) and that those moral judgments do not express something objective (which is derived from the is-ought ontological argument against prong-2 of the moral realist thesis), then the only option left is that they express something objective. Sure, this is a negative argument, in a sense, but either one has to deny that there are true moral judgments (or more fundamentally that they are not propositional) or that they do not express something objective. In the case of the former, they must find something wrong with the argument I gave in prong-3 of my thesis; and in the case of the latter something with the is-ought ontological argument I gave against moral realism. If they accept them, then, by my lights, they cant reject that moral judgments express something subjective because that is all that is left.
My point is that A, B, and C are exhaustive options; so one cant reject all three: they must bite a bullet somewhere if they dont want to accept C since they are accepting !A and !B.
My only point here is that if you believe that we have good reasons to reject C, then you cant agree with me that !A and !B: I think you will then have to contend with either the is-ought ontological gap argument or the argument I gave for there being true moral judgments if you want to reject C.
In terms of what good reasons we have to reject C, I dont think we have any; but let me respond to some that I think you were alluding to, which segues nicely into #2.
Your problem, and correct me if I am wrong, with moral judgments being true and expressing something subjective is that they seem to be incoherent or inconsistent with each other: if it is true, then that pertains to something objective, so it cant be expressing something subjective, right? Thats what I got out of your various responses on that matter, so if I am misunderstanding then please correct me.
My response is that the belief is the moral judgment and our beliefs about those beliefs are the facts about our psychology. Granted, I should have been much more explicit in my elaboration of this in the OP, and I will make a note to add a section in on that.
So
Under moral subjectivism, when taken literally, one ought not torture babies for fun is not true, not cognitive, and not a (valid) moral judgment but, rather, must be rewritten as I believe one ought not torture babies for fun. The latter is cognitive (being a fact about ones psychology), is true in my case, is a valid moral judgment.
For you, I would imagine, one ought not torture babies for fun is cognitive, is true, and is a valid moral judgment because its truth-maker is an objective feature about reality...I have no such analogous situation going on in my moral subjectivist theory: it is, afterall, at the end of the day, a moral anti-realist position.
I think this is the crux of the confusion slash debate we have about moral judgments: I think you are thinking of them in terms of a moral realists perspective whereas I am thinking of it totally differently (like the above).
So, to answer you question, truth is always absolute and expressing something objective, the difference between us is what the moral judgment actually is. For you it is sentences which at least validly purport facts which do not pertain to our psychology, where for me it is exactly that. Hopefully that helps clear things up, but let me if it doesnt.
So, going back, :
I wouldnt interpret it that way, I would say I believe one ought not torture babies for fun is a fact about their psychological state of mind such that they disapprove of torturing babies for fun. Adding in the objectively true seems to question beg to me.
Similarly:
Admittedly, I need to spruce up my terminology on this point in the essay, because I see how I made this part a bit confusing. By non-factual moral judgment, I just meant that the disapproval, the preference, which underlies the psychological fact that I believe one ought not torture babies, is non-factual (which is exactly why I call it a preference). Technically, saying they are non-factual moral judgments is contradictory to what I outlined above as a moral judgment (which is the belief, not the underlying non-factual preference). So, yes, I agree that preferences are not moral judgments, but I would say that moral judgments are the upshot of those preferences. I will add this to the essay in a little while (when I have time).
True. I am saying, as a moral subjectivist, that we are not subjectively coming to know or approach the limit of knowing what is wrong or right, because moral judgments are the upshot of our psychologynot some fact-of-the-matter beyond our pyschology...not some moral fact out there.
Thats true. I should have made this more clear in the OP: the truth is the indexical belief which is universal insofar as either one does indeed have the belief or they dont, thusly making truth absolute and expressing something objective (even though it is just a fact about ones psychology, which is an upshot of non-factual dispositions a person has).
I believe one ought ... is universal insofar as either it is true that the person being referenced by the indexical statement does believe one ought or they dont. However, the belief itself, being just an upshot of ones psychology, is not expressing something objective: it is not latching onto a moral fact out there.
I dont think there is such a thing as objective or subjective truth: truth is absolute, and it is the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity such that thought corresponds with reality. I take it to be two different claims to say truth is objective/subjective vs. this proposition expresses something objective/subjective.
I look forward to your response,
Bob
Here I would like to add a point about making distinction between 'subjectivity' and 'subjecthood'. It's an awkward distinction to make, but it attempts to distinguish between 'subjective' as in 'pertaining only to an individual' and 'subjective' as in 'pertaining to the state of being a subject', and to facts which can only be truly understood in the first person.
Quoting Leontiskos
This describes the subjective in the former sense. But what if those truths - like life-lessons or existential facts - that can only be understood 'in the first person'? Those that are not objective in the sense of corroborated by third-person measurement but real nonetheless?
Quoting Leontiskos
A valedictory for Joseph Pieper, the Thomist philosopher, said
'In order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort'.
Yes, but more precisely than (2), "P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective." It is precisely the non-objectivity that I am concerned with.
Quoting Bob Ross
It is entirely negative. It is a disjunctive syllogism, as noted above.
Quoting Bob Ross
My point is that rejecting A and B is insufficient when C is also implausible. C must be supported positively.
Quoting Bob Ross
[Important]
In your OP, in the section, "A Case for Moral Cognitivism [Prong-1]," you state something quite different. You give a moral proposition about driving drunk and claim it is truth-apt. If we are to argue about this moral proposition then it must be objectively truth-apt.
What you do here is pivot to instead talk about belief. "George believes such-and-such." This is not a moral proposition, but it is truth-apt and objectively true or false. Yet the subject of cognitivism (and binding morality) is moral propositions, not belief propositions.
This is the same sort of thing as the example I gave in my last, "Tomorrow I am going to wear my ugly Christmas sweater." This statement is true in virtue of the agent's intention. Your statement is true in virtue of the agent's belief. But neither is a moral proposition. Neither one pertains to normative judgments about actions "permissible, omissible, or obligatory." According to your own OP, mere statements about someone's beliefs are not part of moral language.
Quoting Bob Ross
No. As noted in your previous thread, I reject your exclusive distinction between what is moral and what is psychological. Beliefs are always psychological, as is the mathematical belief I set out in my last post. No one believes we have non-psychological beliefs. The truth of a moral statement regards the truth of a moral judgment, and statements about belief are not moral statements. The statement, "Jane believes one should not torture babies," is not a moral statement, it is only a statement about what Jane believes. Jane's statement, "One should not torture babies," is a moral statement, because it pertains to what is "permissible, omissible, or obligatory."
Note that if you claim that Jane's belief is "psychological" in the sense that it is grounded by one of her values, then the exact same question applies to that value. We must then ask if the value is truth-apt, and if so, if it is true or false. Only if the value is true can the moral statement be true (and therefore binding).
Quoting Bob Ross
Okay, good. Again, the key here is that preferences are not judgments and judgments are not preferences. The corollary is that truth-apt judgments cannot flow from non truth-apt preferences, unless the judgment is merely about the preference/belief (as explained above). Yet if it is merely about the preference/belief, then it cannot be moral in the sense you set out (pertaining to what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory).
Quoting Bob Ross
Statements about belief cannot be binding at all because they are not moral statements. They don't pertain to what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. Thus they are non-universal, but also non-binding by their very nature.
Quoting Bob Ross
And do you go on to say that the moral subjectivist believes that moral propositions express something subjective?
Best,
Leontiskos
I see the distinction you are trying to make, but I am not convinced that your second category does not collapse back into your first category. Presumably your second category is something along the lines of qualia. But the difficulty is that qualia can be understood through language. I can speak about the perception of red, and you will know what I am talking about given your experiences.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, but this is a rather rarefied point. Presumably this is what you mean by your second category? This illustrates the very difficult gulf between ancient ethics and modern ethics. I have not yet found a way to bridge it. I mostly attempt to speak to moderns through their own paradigm.
Also, the "subjectivists" on this forum don't seem to be saying at all what Pieper is saying. On a related note, "Situation ethics" is interesting, and has some similarities with Aristotelianism, but this too is not something I have seen promoted on these forums.
Quoting Leontiskos
I think it's a fundamental point, but one that has been lost sight of.
Agreed, but I am at a loss as to how to bring it back into sight.
Quoting Leontiskos
Consider the distinction between "an object of awareness" and "a subject of awareness". At least some specific objects of awareness can then be classified as subjective in the sense of "pertaining only to an individual". But would one then also classify the actuality of a subject of awareness's being (subjectivity in the sense of "pertaining to the state of being a subject") as a) strictly only an object of awareness sans any subject of awareness or, else, as b) strictly pertaining only to one individual (such that it is not an actuality equally applicable to all co-existent individual beings; i.e., such that solipsism is concluded)?
If yes, I so far fail to understand the reasoning to this. But if not, then one obtains a category of subjecthood - which, if absolutely nothing else, will include the attribute of being a subject of awareness - that is not deemed to be subjective in the first sense addressed. This such that the proposition of "all individual beings are subjects of awareness" can be deemed equally objective to the proposition "rocks exist in the world".
Were morality to have anything to do with suffering and its absence, for example, and were this to itself be included in the objective category of subjectood as just mentioned, then the truth of morality could be appraised as grounded in subjectood - and this such that it could be universally knowable in principle.
For example:
Quoting Leontiskos
The question in this case is whether, "Suffering is evil," is a subjective or objective truth. As noted above, I think, like 12*12=144, this is an objective truth known by a subject. The ontological reality of suffering differs in certain ways from the ontological reality of mathematics, but I think both propositions are objectively true.
(Again, I don't think the subjective/objective distinction ultimately holds up.)
Non-objectivity is subjectivity EDIT: (sort of); and I agree it is negative. However, my argument for moral judgments expressing something subjective is that (1) they are not expressing something objective (which was positively argued for) and (2) that there are true moral judgments (which was positively argued for): what else would be required, in terms of a positive argument, to affirm C?
In other words, affirming prong-1 and prong-3 while disaffirming prong-2 of the moral realist thesis is moral subjectivism: this entails that moral judgments are expressing something subjective because they exist, some of them are true, and they arent expressing something objective. You would have to contend with that even if you think we have good reasons to also reject moral judgments as expressing something subjective.
If I say either A, B, or C are true and A is false and B is false, then C must be true. If you turn around and say I also think C is false, then you are wrong about one of them being false. If you think C is false, then which of the other two do you think is true?
Thats fair. I actually edited this with my addition of an elaboration on how moral judgments express something that is subjective.
Thats the whole point of contention: moral subjectivism allows moral judgments to be beliefs.
I believe one ought not ... is the moral judgment under moral subjectivism and not one ought not.... It still meets my definition of moral signification because it is still a subject-referencing normative statement which expresses what one ought to find permissible, omissible, or obligatory.
Where did I say that in the OP? I need to revise that if I did.
I am not saying that we have non-psychological beliefs, I am saying that moral judgments are not expressing something objective: the belief we have, which is always pyschological, is an upshot of our psychology (in general)...it is an upshot of other beliefs, intentions, desires, etc.
Hmmm isnt Jane believes one should not torture babies refer to what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory? Seems to be to me, even if it is just an expression of what jane subjectively believes.
In this sense of value you are describing, I would say it is going to bottom out at something not truth-apt, although first and second principles (etc.) could be other beliefs and thusly truth-apt.
Correct. Judgments are beliefs.
I would say that it is the latter in my case, if I am understanding correctly. This is what I mean by the moral judgment (the belief) being an upshot of ones pyschology and not a moral fact out there.
Why? I believe one ought not ... is expressing something pertaining to what one ought to hold as permissible, omissible, or obligatory, no?
Moral judgments (which are beliefs about what one ought to be permissible, omissible, or obligatory under my view) are binding to the subject at hand. I cant say I believe one ought not torture babies and then in the next breath say but I dont believe that it is impermissible to torture babies: which one is it?
Yes. I am not sure what the contention was here: perhaps I am misunderstanding you. So prong-2 of my thesis is that they express something subjective: a sentence expressing something non-objective is to express something subjectivethey mean the same thing to me. Are you saying something could be non-objective and not subjective?...Actually, I see now: truth, under my view, would be an example of this (:
Perhaps I could revise it to expound more on how moral judgments expressing something non-objective entails it is expressing something subjective. To me, it seems like it is impossible for a statement to express something that is non-objective and non-subjective: truth, on the other hand, is an emergent property, so to speak, of statements relationship to reality and is beyond those bounds.
I'm in full agreement with what you've replied.
No, it refers to what Jane believes to be permissible, omissible, or obligatory. There is a crucially significant difference. From, "Jane believes X," one cannot infer anything about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory; just as from, "Jane believes 28^28=33.13*10^39," one cannot infer anything about mathematics. Therefore, "Jane believes X" (regardless of what 'X' is) is not about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. It is about the fact that an opinion is held, and has no bearing on the question of whether that opinion is true or false.
Quoting Bob Ross
Fair enough. I am limiting my involvement, arguing that C is false.
Quoting Bob Ross
Hmm, okay...
Quoting Bob Ross
All judgments are beliefs. Again, "12*12=144" is a judgment, but it is simultaneously a belief. To judge that something is true is at the same time to believe that it is so.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is equivocal. "I believe X" usually means, "I believe that X is true." You want it to mean, "I happen to hold belief X." You want it to be parallel to, "She believes X." But in the third-person case the ambiguity disappears, because there is no implication that the speaker (the "I") also believes/judges regarding X.
Quoting Bob Ross
Heh. Thank you. This turns out to be quite relevant. :wink:
Quoting Bob Ross
I am skipping these sorts of quotes because they just go back to the question about Jane.
Quoting Bob Ross
This goes back to that equivocation and I vs. She (and, in the first-person case, belief qua belief vs. belief qua judgment).
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Bob Ross
A moral judgment is not a statement about belief, it is a statement about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. It makes no difference that a belief ends up being about what is moral. If a statement is about [the fact of a belief being held] then it is not about [the specific determination or judgment that the belief contains]. I can say, "She believes X," without myself believing X, and there is a subtle (but precarious) manner in which something analogous also applies to the first-person case.
The other thing to note is that to judge that (no)one ought torture babies, is to judge that everyone is bound to not-torture babies (and not merely myself).
Quoting Bob Ross
And so what is the subjective thing that a moral proposition expresses?
Quoting Bob Ross
I do agree that truth bursts these boundaries. That was my point with the 12*12=144 example.
I think the crux of our disagreement about beliefs and judgments is as follows. Lets take the example of the proposition Jane believes X and call it Y.
You seem to think that X is the judgment and Y is the belief; whereas, I am saying that Y in relation to X is a judgment about X: the belief and judgment are intertwined such that one cannot have one without the other.
Likewise, you seem to be saying that Y does not entail truth about X, which is only true in the case that X is about something beyond out psychology. E.g.,:
If X in Jane believes X was vanilla ice cream tastes good, then I dont think you have a hard time seeing why your analogy to math fails. Some beliefs, which are also necessarily judgments, are not about facts out there in the world but, rather, are projections of our psychology. So I agree in the case of your math example, but disagree that it is analogous to morality because, well, thats exactly whats in contention in moral realism vs. anti-realism!
Likewise, if you are saying that Y is a belief which is not a judgment but X is a belief that is a judgment, then we can validly expand Jane believes X to Jane believes that Jane believes X which is either redundant or, and this one I am more inclined towards, it is now just a second order belief (i.e., a belief about beliefs) which has nothing to do with X itself.
Thats fair enough as well. I am more than happy to discuss why you believe C to be false and perhaps you will convince me.
I was just noting that I adjusted it as I said I would, and just wanted to let you know thats fixed now. However, does my refurbishment undermine my argument for moral cognitivism? I think probably for you, yes, and for me, not really (;
I am not sure I followed this part, to be honest. I would say that I believe X is a belief state of the subject at hand, which is a judgment about X. When I say I believe X I am thereby judging that X is true...you seem to be saying that it is a belief that isnt making a judgment but, rather, the judgment is in X.
I would say I believe X is a belief qua belief and qua judgment.
This would be true if I accepted moral realism. The belief is what makes the judgment true in moral subjectivism.
For example, lets go back to the Jane believes ice cream tastes good: does this belief not in virtue of its own judgment make it true? I think so. Sure, it is an upshot of also conative aspects of ones pysche, but the belief also factors in.
Thats true and expected under moral subjectivism: She believes X is indexical.
Yes, so this goes back to our dispute about subjective vs objective universalization: I find nothing incoherent with Jane believes everyone should not torture babies even though it is only true relative to herselfI would imagine you beg to differ on that one (;
Cognitive approval/disapproval, which is an upshot of other cognitive and conative aspects of ones psyche.
First, I agree with your pre-requisite to Meta-ethics section! Its good grounds to start and needed for the discussion. If I were to say one thing, it is to go back and clearly define what you mean by objective and subjective as well. Onto the discussion!
Quoting Bob Ross
In very simple terms, this doesn't work because you forgot the possibility of different states of reality. If we took a frozen snapshot of existence, or how things are, without any other comparisons; you would be correct. But if we have seen multiple states of existence, we can compare different states and claim, "That state of reality is superior to this state of reality."
Lets flesh out your statement so that its conclusion can be true.
P1: The way reality is at any moment, in isolation of any other consideration of other potential states of reality, does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be. This requires a consideration of states of reality in comparison to the current state of reality.
C: Therefore, if we consider a state of reality in isolation of all other potential states of reality throughout time, moral facts cannot exist.
And I would agree with this. But lets include other potential states of reality.
P1: The way reality is at any moment, in isolation of any other consideration of other potential states of reality, does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: But, if we include other potential states of reality, we can compare them to declare that one state is better over another.
P3: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: We do not have the criteria yet for "what is better" so cannot determine at this time if it is objective or subjective.
So I do not see the original conclusion: "Therefore, moral facts cannot exist." once you introduce comparative potential states of reality. Still, lets continue onto your argument for subjective morality, as the above argument is simply a clarification of what must be considered when addressing morality, and does not make any claims to whether moral claims are subjective or objective.
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets agree with points 1 and 2 and see if it necessarily leads to your conclusion.
First, this is really going to come down to your definition of what is objective and subjective.
"Something is subjective if it is dependent on a mind (biases, perception, emotions, opinions, imagination, or conscious experience).
Something is objective if it can be confirmed independent of a mind."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)
I think these are fairly uncontroversial and straight forward definitions, so lets start here.
Lets now go back to your definition of truth which I agree with:
Quoting Bob Ross
Now, is truth subjective, or objective? If it is subjective, then it cannot be determined independently of a mind. If it is objective, then it can be confirmed independently of a mind.
If truth is merely the correspondence of thought with reality, then it needs no mind. Truth is simply a 'state'. "Thought is in correspondence with reality". If we were able to be aware of this, we might call it knowledge. But truth does not require knowledge. Truth is simply a state of being that is unconcerned if there is an observer there to realize it.
Thus truth is best described as "objective'. With this, we can now examine your conclusion.
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].[/quote]
If there is a true moral judgement, then it must be an objective moral judgement. If moral judgements are subjective, and only subjective, your conclusion does not follow. For there to be a true moral judgement, a moral judgement must be objectively in line with reality. But if there is a moral judgement that is in line with reality, it is objectively true, not subjectively true. The subjects opinion to the matter is irrelevant.
But, can we salvage the intent of your theory? Lets try.
(Subjectivity and objectivity continued from the wiki citation)
"If a claim is true exclusively when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being, it is subjectively true. For example, one person may consider the weather to be pleasantly warm, and another person may consider the same weather to be too hot; both views are subjective. The word subjectivity comes from subject in a philosophical sense, meaning an individual who possesses unique conscious experiences, such as perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires, or who (consciously) acts upon or wields power over some other entity (an object).
If a claim is true even when considering it outside the viewpoint of a sentient being (how ?), then it is labelled objectively true. Scientific objectivity is practicing science while intentionally reducing partiality, biases, or external influences. Moral objectivity is the concept of moral or ethical codes being compared to one another through a set of universal facts or a universal perspective and not through differing conflicting perspectives. Journalistic objectivity is the reporting of facts and news with minimal personal bias or in an impartial or politically neutral manner."
Lets examine the idea of 'subjective truth'. Person A states, "Its hot" while person B states, "Its cool". From their perspectives, this is true. But how is it true? How is it 'in correspondence with reality" if we've claimed truth is objective?
Its because we've left out the implicit information within their statements.
Person A: From my subjective experience, I feel its hot.
Person B: From my subjective experience, I feel its cold.
These are both subjectively true, because it is objective. The feelings of a subject in reference to itself are objectively true. What one's subjective experience entails, is objectively true. We have a non-truth when this happens:
Person A: From my subjective experience, I feel its hot, therefore I will claim it is hot for everyone else.
Person B: From my subjective experience, I feel its cold, therefore I will claim it is cold for everyone else.
At this point, the conclusion is not objectively true. Its a subjective belief.
How do we tie this then back into a subjective morality? Lets examine your claim about subjective morality:
Quoting Bob Ross
Bob Ross: From my subjective viewpoint, I believe moral judgements are based on psychology, therefore all moral judgements are based on psychology.
As we can see, this is a subjective claim, and not objective. Just because you personally believe moral judgements are based on psychology, this does not make it true objectively or subjectively. While you could create a subjective truth by simply claiming, "From my subjective viewpoint, I believe moral judgements are based on psychology.", it is your claim that this is a truth that all people must objectively conclude about morality that makes it objectively and subjectively false.
I also wanted to address a couple of your points/counterpoints, but not go too long on this initial reply.
Quoting Bob Ross
Your own definition of truth counters this statement. Your definition of truth indicated no necessity that a person have knowledge or justification of something being true. A true moral judgement simply needs to be in correspondence with reality. The only thing you can state with your definition of truth is:
"For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that our moral judgement corresponds to reality."
Another point:
Quoting Bob Ross
This statement is a contradiction. If there are no moral judgements, then there is nothing one has to do. Therefore one would not have to 'lie down and starve to death'.
Finally:
Quoting Bob Ross
Except that if something is true, it is in correspondence with reality objectively. The subjective knowledge or lack of knowledge is irrelevant. Therefore if there are true moral judgements, then they are objective.
I always enjoy our conversations and look forward to your take on my OP!
I think I need to provide some clarity on my position:
1. By objective, I mean that which exists mind(stance)-independently; and by subjective, I mean exists mind(stance)-dependently.
2. I do not think truth is objective nor subjective but, rather, absolute and emergent from both subjectivity and objectivity. Heres my thread on that. More on this later.
3. My correspondence theory of truth, which can be summarized as truth is correspondence of thought with reality, requires both a subject and object; otherwise, one would have to concede that thoughts can originate from non-subjects and reality is not objective.
With that out of the way, let me try to adequately respond to your points.
I dont think comparing potential states of affairs (of reality) helps get around P1. P1 is the claim that it doesnt matter what is the case about reality at all when it comes to what ought to be: what ought to be is despite what is. If someone says yes, thats true, but potential states of affairs do relate to what ought to be, then I think that is perfectly compatible with P1 but affords no moral facticity: (mind-independent) potential states-of-affairs cannot be what a moral statement corresponds to such that it is true because they dont exist. If the person insists that moral facts are grounded in potential states-of-affairs, then the real premise in contention is P2, not P1.
More or less I would agree to these terms (notwithstanding the definitions I gave above), but I would quibble with can be confirmed part of the definition of objectivity: that makes it sound like we can confirm things that are completely sans any subject. I would just say that objectivity is that which exists mind(stance)-independently and we come to know it subjectively because we are subjectswhat tool can we use that isnt ultimately contingent on us observing it?
Neither. It is absolute; meaning that any proposition one has, it is either true or false and that proposition is not true relative to a subject.
No. I think you are conflating a moral judgment with what it expresses. Moral judgments are always subjective, irregardless of whether one is a moral realist or anti-realist. This is because judgments are formulated by subjectsthey arent floating out there mind-independently in reality. Prong-2 of my thesis and the thesis of moral realism is aimed at what does those moral judgments express?. Are those moral judgments true in virtue of corresponding to some mind(stance)-independent state-of-affairs in reality? Or are they true in virtue of corresponding to some mind(stance)-dependent state-of-affairs in reality (such as our psychologies)?
A moral judgment being true just means that some state-of-affairs in reality corresponds with it such that it makes the judgment truebut this could be just a fact about ones psychology, which is just a projection of ones own psyche: it is a stance-dependent state-of-affairs.
I would just say that something is subjective if it exists mind(stance)-dependently and objective if it exists mind(stance)-independently.
If someone claims something is hot and another claims that other something is cool then either (1) they need to be more precise with what they are claiming and they both are right (e.g., when I say it is hot I really mean the proposition it feels hot to me which certainly can be true, given truth is absolute, while another person claims it is false since me is indexical) or (2) one of them is wrong:
Exactly!
I am not claiming that it is subjectively true that moral judgments are the upshot of ones psychology, that is a true proposition and it is absolute.
Also, in the claim I believe moral judgments are based on psychology, the belief does not itself make it true that moral judgments are based on psychology so I agree that it could be true that I believe it and it is false. This is not the case with moral judgments: I believe one ought not torture babies is the cognitive attitude (or disposition) which makes it true because it is just an upshot of my psychology. For example, by analogy, I believe chocolate ice cream is the best ice cream flavor is true (relative to me, but absolute statement because it refers an indexical pronoun I) in virtue of me believing it (as an upshot of my pyschology) which is very different than I believe that 1+1 = 2 since 1 + 1 = 2 is not true in virtue of my cognitive disposition.
By good reasons I was referring to our epistemic access to true moral judgments and not referencing truth. I was saying to epistemically claim there are true moral judgments, we must have good reasons to believe that there are true moral judgments, and I dont see anything wrong with that.
Not quite. I was claiming that doing something entails at a minimum the concession that it is morally permissible; so if one cant even agree that it is permissible to do X, then they cant do X because they dont affirm that it is permissible. I think you would have to contend with the collapse of morals into actions to say that one can do something even if they dont find it morally permissible.
Again, I think you are conflating moral judgments with what they express. I am talking about what makes the moral judgment true: obviously, it is a state-of-affairs in reality, but are those state-of-affairs mind(stance)-independent? If they are preferences we have, then they arent and are thusly true in virtue of something subjective. It corresponding to reality is going to be an absolute calculation: either it does or it doesnt, and this is not contingent on what I or you believe; but the state-of-affairs that it corresponds to certainly can be something projected by our psyches. E.g., I believe ice cream tastes so good is true in virtue of facts about my pyschology, which are subjective judgments themselves.
Can you clarify what the (stance) means as well?
As is, your statements about subjective and objective veer wildly from their original intent. The terms objective and subjective generally refer to statements. Thus there is an objective statement and a subjective statement. When you state the term objective means "that which is mind independent", what is 'that'? Is it existence?
Even further, this begs the question that your definition of subjective and objective are true. Why do we need to redefine these terms? Is it so you can use the word 'subjective', even though it would have nothing to do with the original meaning of the term subjective? This would be a widely misinterpreted argument to give to others if you've deviated strongly from the terms' original meaning without very carefully clarifying what you mean.
If you mean to simply clarify the difference between an object and a subject, this can be done without changing the meaning of the original words. An object can make no objective or subjective judgements. Only a subject can. The reason we have the terms objective and subjective are to give meaning to the judgements a subject makes. When you make objective and subjective as 'not a subject' vs 'a subject' it just changes the entire meaning of the terms. If you want to make that argument, I would suggest making the argument with subjects and objects and not use the terms objective or subjective at all to ease confusion and clarify the argument.
I'll wait for you to clarify the exact intent of your use of subjective and objective. Your argument may very well be correct if I understand the meaning behind your terminology. Once I understand, I'll re-examine your argument with that in mind and see if I reach some different conclusions.
Sorry, I didnt get a notification of this response!
This is already in the OP under Brief Exposition of a Correspondence Theory of Truth, which, I would say, is where it should be:
The only quibble I have with myself is technically I need to change subjectivity to that which exists mind(stance)-dependently and not a negation of objectivity, because I consider certain things emergent from both which are certainly not just one or the other. So I will modify that part.
I think you are assuming that Wiki is the standard of how people use the termsI dont. People in colloquial speech use those terms very ambiguously and inconsistently. In metaethics, I dont think my definitions are very controversial granted a correspondence theory of truth.
A stance is a disposition, attitude, belief, preference, etc. that a subject has formulated.
Honestly, I dont think I am redefining them outside of the norm in metaethics, and I do not grant that people use them in any precise manner at all in colloquial speech. However, I am not all that interested in derailing into semantics, so if someone, at the end of the day, affirms my moral subjectivism while stipulating that I use the term subjective weird, then I am fine with that.
The misinterpretation lies in the ambiguity and inconsistency of their deployments in colloquial speech: my definitions are highly refined (or at least so I think (; ).
You are saying the same thing I am saying, but less refined. I say there is no such thing as an objective statement because all statements are subjective, you are merely predicating that subjective statement with objective if it is true in virtue of corresponding to some mind-independently existing state-of-affairs.
Correct. But the judgment is not objective, which is what it would technically mean when you say there are objective judgments. What I think you are actually conveying is that judgments are subjective and they can either express something objective or subjective themselves; and this is perfectly compatible and precisely conveyed with my terminology.
A state-of-affairs in reality to be specific, which are arrangements of existent entities: I do not tie state-of-affair to temporal or spatial relations only. I can also modify that in the OP as well.
My apologies! I reskimmed and missed it. Your argument is dense, so I did not retain it after I had finished reading your OP the first time. That's on me. :)
Quoting Bob Ross
If you wish to define subjective this way, that's fine. But if this is true, what's the point of the word? If all statements are subjective, why not just say "statement"? "Subjective statement" is redundant at that point as there is no contrast. The term subjective is only uniquely useful in contrast with an "objective statement". If you eliminate the vocabulary of objective statement, then you may as well eliminate the term "subjective statement" as well.
Finally, the elimination of these terms does not eliminate the original concepts they embodied. There is still the question of making a statement in regards to utilizing only your personal viewpoint, or making a statement that can be logically agreed upon by all potential viewpoints. But if this is your choice, that is fine. I'll re-examine your argument using what you've provided.
Quoting Bob Ross
What you've done here is make trueness subjective. I did read your other post, and your conclusion that truth is a merge of the two doesn't fit. Either something is mind independent, or mind dependent. This is the clear binary you've created. A statement is mind-dependent. I see your intention is to say, "I'm taking this objective thing, having a subjective stance about this objective thing, and if the two correspond, this is true." Really, this is the same as saying you take an object and subjectively identify it in a way that corresponds with reality. I have no issue with this. But to say that it is neither objective nor subjective is false. To be mind independent is to be free of any mind. To be mind dependent is to have at least an iota of mind in there. :) It is still mind dependent, as without a mind, you cannot make a true statement.
A statement from a mind that is true = Subjective
A statement from a mind that is false = Subjective
I have no problem with this as long as the definitions are consistent and logically flow. This is again the problem of 'everything is now subjective' and it devalues any meaning to the term. I'm addressing this now as it will become relevant soon.
Addressing P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
Quoting Bob Ross
If the intention is, "What ought to be is despite what is", I agree. This assumes that what is could be something different, which is a core consideration of a moral statement.
Quoting Bob Ross
You cannot come to know something objective according to your terminology. Objectivity is mind independent. Meaning that its existence is what is without any mind ever attempting to correspond to it. Once any attempt at correspondence is made, it is now subjective, or mind dependent. You can say 'an object' exists independently, and we can come to know that object subjectively. Again, since subjectivity is simply the act of a mind, or a subject, trying to know the object, we can eliminate the word subjectivity and simply state "An object exists independently and we can come to know that object truthfully". Nothing is lost by removing the term subjectivity when it is a redundant term.
I read the rest of your comments and think I understand what you are going for now, so I'll restart from my original critique again. As always, please correct me when I'm off!
Quoting Bob Ross
Now that I believe I much better understand your approach to subjectivity, I do not understand how you arrived at your conclusion here.
P1 is fine with the clarification that it means "What ought to be is despite what is". This implicitly includes states. For example, reality now vs reality one minute later. There is nothing within the current state explicitly which states it should be some other state. That is for us to judge when comparing this state with another possible state.
P2 is also fine. But lets clarify what you stated in your own terminology.
(Quoting Bob Ross
Therefore, we can refine P2 to mean:
Moral facts are judgements that a particular state of reality is preferable over another possible state of reality, and that these judgements are true.
These two statements alone do not lead to your conclusion that moral facts cannot exist. We're missing some steps! All you've done is create definitions. These definitions do not lead to this conclusion. P1 does not lead to any conclusions about P2. You would need to prove that P2 is false before you reached your conclusion. As is, P2 is merely a definition without an assertion of its truth or falsity.
If I had to guess what you were originally going for, I think you were neglecting potential states as part of the moral consideration and simply noting that reality at any time/state could not indicate what it should be in the next state. I understand the intention this way, but it doesn't work because morality does not only consider the current state of reality.
But perhaps the above is irrelevant if we look at your next argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets translate this into simpler terms:
1. Moral judgements are made by subjects (minds)
2. Moral judgements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one moral judgement corresponds with reality.
The problem is this isn't anything meaningful. I can replace "moral judgements" with the word statements, and statements meaning "Any thought, word, belief, or expression".
1. Statements are made by subjects
2. Statements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one statement corresponds with reality.
Of course, we haven't actually proved number 3 with our setup. The only real conclusion we can make is:
"Either at least one statement is true, or none are true."
I believe you prove that at least one statement is true if you amend the language of the subject to be self-referential, which is fine.
As we can see, all this argument notes is that we can think say or do things, and maybe they correspond with reality. This indicates nothing that should be done. It does not address states of reality as they should be. It does not indicate any criteria as to what defines morality. Is what "should" be done central to the individual, or is there something universal we can all agree on with logic? This is again a problem when you reduce "subjective" to meaning, "Any statement by a subject".
As a comparison with my knowledge theory, if you recall I noted that all knowledge starts with a discrete experience. Which means that all knowledge, language, etc. comes from an experiencer, or a subject. I did not belabor that point. Its very quickly addressed and moved on from because its just a starting point to fix problems from. The idea that you need a subject to think or say anything is a given. The idea that subjects are what consider any moral question is also a given. What can we logically conclude about morality from that starting point? Is there a logic that we must all rationally agree upon which leads to a morality everyone can logically ascertain? Or is morality simply what each individual wants, an expressed desire for singular or cultural ego?
Let me address the remaining points where relevant.
Quoting Bob Ross
Let me break this down further:
1. Moral cognitivism is the idea that there are true moral judgments
2. Assume moral cognitivism is false, that there are no moral judgements which are true.
3. I have the moral statement: "When I am drunk, I shouldn't drive and instead call a taxi."
4. Holding to point 2, this moral judgement is not true.
5. But point 3 is true.
C: Therefore moral cognitivism is true.
The problem is point 5 has not been proven to be true. A logically valid and intelligible conditional statement may very well not be true. What is true is a correlation with reality. A logically valid and intelligible conditional has not been proven to always be true.
But, you then attempt to prove that there is at least one moral judgement that is true. And if that is the case we can replace point 3 with that true statement and the argument will work.
Quoting Bob Ross
Here was my original statement and your reply.
Quoting Bob Ross
But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds.
Alright, a rather long one from me! I'm still off for the holidays so I have time on my hands. I'm enjoying the exploration Bob, keep at it!
I'm unsure whether this little observation i'm about to make is really relevant, so apologies if something in the exchange I have missed would indicate i'm being redundant..
If there are no true moral judgements, one need not include 'morality' in their considerations of an action. I'm unsure how a lack of 'true' moral judgements would entail inaction. It merely means one cannot use morality as a worthy benchmark for action or inaction.
I understand the whole donkey w/two foods TE, but that assumes an equal morality in the two options. If there is not a true moral position to be taken, what's the obstacle to action?
Absolutely no worries! I do the same thing all the time!
I think you are thinking that the term subjective only has any meaning in relation to a statement itself, which I dont agree with. Of course, a subjective statement is redundant, but a statement that expresses something subjective is not.
Subjectivity is useful insofar as it is contrasted with objectivity, which statements are categorized under the former. Statements are always contingent on the stance and mind of a subject...unless your are a platonist (;
I never used the term subjective statement: I would just say statement. I am not sure what the contention is here. Moral subjectivism has three prongs to its thesis, and prong 2 is that moral judgments express something subjective: this is not redundant.
I would say there is no such thing as analyzing a statement completely sans ones viewpoint. A statement is generated by ones viewpoint; and the use of logic doesnt make the statement objective: the statement can express something which is objective, such as the use of logic.
Not at all. The statement is subjective, and its correspondence is what it true; and that truth is not dependent on the statement.
This is by-at-large a fair critique. I would say that the correspondence of thought and reality is itself objective because that relationship exists mind-independently. My original reasoning was that truth being the correspondence of thought with reality would make it dependent on thought and reality and therefore it is neither subjective nor objective but, rather, a mixture of both. However, I recognize that the actual relationship (which is truth) of thought and reality such that they correspond exists mind-independently. So truth is objective and absolute. Good point Philosophim!
I was just saying that statement are subjective, not that everything is now subjective. The statement can be expressing something objective, and there are things that are objective which are never uttered in a statement.
The idea is that normativity and objectivity are exclusive categories. It doesnt matter what is the case nor what potentially could be the case nor what would be the case but, rather, only what should be the case.
I disagree. We come to know what is objective through reasoning and observance. We intuit that there is stuff which exists without us trying to think about them and that is what is objective.
No. The claim or statement is trying to express something objective. Of course, we only approach the limit of what objectively is out there; but that doesnt mean that it doesnt exist nor that we dont have good reasons to believe it does. It is uncontroversial that we are subjects and everything we directly know is mind-dependent because that is the filter by which we come to know the objective thingsthis doesnt mean that those objective things arent there.
This just begs the question by invoking truthfully; as truth is the correspondence of thought (subjectivity) with reality (objectivity).
Moral facticity is not just what you described there. If a fact is a statement that corresponds to reality such that what it purports thereof is and moral language signifies what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory, then a moral fact is a statement which accurately purports a state-of-affairs about reality that in virtue of which makes the moral judgment true (and thusly a fact). This means that there are states-of-affairs, if there are moral facts, that do inform us how reality ought to be, which violates P1.
P2 is a description of what a moral fact is based off of my correspondence theory of truth and my analysis of what moral language signifies. To disagree with it is to disagree with one or both of those theories which are prerequisites to my metaethical theory. We can certainly discuss those if you would like!
A potential state of reality in the sense of what could possibly happen due to the current state does not inform us of what ought to be either. You could tell me this ball will probably hit this other ball and I would not know from that claim anything normative, although I would know something about the next potential state of reality.
Likewise, you telling me well, this could happen and if combine with what is happening then this should happen and I dont think that is valid: I cannot infer from something possibly happening nor what is happening what ought to happen.
Just for clarification, this is not an argument I gaveit is a thesis. The arguments for those three prongs of the thesis are different and after this portion of the OP.
#1 here is not a summary of prong-1 (of the thesis). Prong-1 is moral cognitivism, which is the view that moral judgments are truth-apt statements (i.e., propositions) and not that moral judgments are made by subjects.
#2 is also false. Moral judgments expressing something subjective is not the same thing as judgments being expressions of subjects. Again, this is a conflation between statements and judgments being subjective and whether or not they express something objective/subjective.
#3 True! (:
Each prong is meaningful because it takes a stance on each relevance metaethical dilemma:
1. Are moral judgments propositional? i.e., are they truth-apt? Moral non-cognitivists, like emotivists, will say no...they are conative aspects of our psychology.
2. Are moral judgments expressing something objective? i.e., if there are true moral judgments, then are they true because they correspond to a mind-dependent or mind-independent state-of-affairs?
3. Is there at least one true moral judgment? i.e., do any moral judgments we make, even if they express something objective or subjective, actually correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality? Moral nihilists say no. They say that, yes, moral judgments express something objective but none of them are true.
Again, my thesis isnt an argument. The arguments for each prong are titles with that prong number and the name that was in brackets.
It indicates what moral properties subsist in or of and what their nature is. Of course it doesnt indicate what should be done, because it isnt a normative ethical theory. Thats what I was trying to convey in the other thread! Metaethical theories should not be conflated with normative theories!
Depends on what you mean. It certainly answers what the nature of morality is and what moral properties subsist in or of and answers various metatethical concerns underpinning normative ethics.
This is a false dilemma. Logic is just the form of an argument, and the logic involved in any substantive and sophisticated metaethical theory is going to be sound. Something being logically consistent does not make it something one should believe.
I agree, for example, that the logic is sound with moral non-naturalism; but that doesnt make the theory true.
No. Moral cognitivism is that moral judgments are statements that are truth-apt. Whether or not any of them are true needs a different argument because it is a different claim.
Thats fine, the point was to provide a basic syllogism that gives an argument for why one would be a moral cognitivism. At the end of the day, this is going to boil down to intuitions. It seems to be very clear that P2 is true, but of course you could deny that. It seems perfectly logically valid: I see nothing wrong with it with respect to its logical form; but if moral cognitivism is true then there has to be something wrong with its logical form because it is non-propositional.
I think you are trying to step outside of morality, but I say that action implicitly concedes that morality exists. You cannot go and eat a sandwich without implicitly, in action, conceding it is morally permissible to do. You can say morality doesnt exist, but your actions do not match your words.
As always, great points! I always enjoy our conversations!
Bob
But Vanilla ice cream tastes good, is nothing like, One ought not torture babies. Only from the latter can we infer something about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. According to your own definitions, the former is not a moral statement. Again, the simple fact that someone believes something cannot make anything permissible, omissible, or obligatory. This is all the more obviously the case when it comes to claims about other moral agents, such as the general permissibility of torturing babies.
Quoting Bob Ross
A belief never makes a moral judgment true. Why is it impermissible for me to torture babies? Because I believe it is. Thats simply not a valid reason. No one is obliged to not-torture babies because you believe it to be so.
Quoting Bob Ross
The example is irrelevant because it is non-moral, having nothing to do with what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory.
But the tangential point is that you are confusing all sorts of things even in this case. Jane believes ice cream tastes good, is a third-person proposition, and what you say of it is obviously false. A first-person statement like, I feel pain, is infallible, but belief statements are not like this. To say, I believe I feel pain, is therefore already confused, and is therefore an unused sort of locution. The same holds with, I enjoy ice cream/I believe I enjoy ice cream. Infallible statements are usually not belief statements, and to make them so is to stretch the sense of 'belief'. But again, these are non-moral according to your definition in the OP.
Quoting Bob Ross
Of course I differ. On your account Jane utters self-apparent falsehoods. If I said, Leontiskos believes everyone has brown hair, this would be a false statement, and particularly problematic insofar as I know that not everyone has brown hair. Saying that it is true relative to myself is a non-response. The statement is about people other than myself, and therefore its truth value must take into account more than just myself. Appeals to subjective reasons for supra-subjective claims are insufficient, and therefore irrational.
Quoting Bob Ross
The same contradiction arises here. If I disapprove of something for myself, it does not follow that I disapprove of it in others. And if I disapprove of it in others without sufficient reason to do so, then I am being irrational. Subjectivist reasons are insufficient reasons. It would be exactly as insufficient to say that someone should eat chocolate ice cream because I like chocolate ice cream. This is irrational. Private reasons for public claims are irrational reasons. A public claim requires a public reason.
Look, do you yourself even think personal/subjective reasons are able to justify claims about other persons? The reason it is irrational to say that someone should eat chocolate ice cream on the basis of my own idiosyncratic taste is because the putative reason does not have justificatory force for the sort of claim in question. This seems quite obvious, and I would be surprised if you are unwilling to admit it. Your deeper claim seems to be, "Yes, it is irrational. But your moral realism is irrational too, so I am justified in doing this." But even if moral realism were irrational, this would not justify you in doing irrational things.
Is the only coherent justification for moral truth other than divine command presented, though.
I was arguing that it is not coherent. No one would ever say, "Oh, well if you believe it, then I surely must accede."
The moral realist will say that you should follow the moral precept because it is true. It is true that you should not torture babies. This route is open to justification and reasoning. Unlike belief, truth is a sufficient reason. A belief matters if it is true, and it is never true merely because it is believed.
Quoting Leontiskos
...because i believe it is true
Is the best we've gotten, though. Im unsure you caught what i was trying to say.
I agree with you, in principle, but there has not been any account which does what you're positing to establish the truth of any moral statement.
Quoting Leontiskos
I should say, this isn't true, and to the high, high statistical degree in which is does consist, it's mainly people pretending that they understand the work an expert has done, to accede to the expert's belief without saying as much.
Which is odd - as this is basically how children acquire what their parents think is knowledge (particularly cosmological and philosophical knowledge - religious indoctrination being a prime example).
See:
The point here, though, is that belief qua belief is insufficient to justify moral claims.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yes, there are arguments from authority. But such a thing is more than mere belief. It is belief + authority.
belief + expectations + authority ....combined with what else though?. I don't know why were adding or using the plus sign, its not worth adding these words up, why do we need or think an equation will be able to find that balance? But okay lets add these words, with all random values from all different valued random minds and solve!!! I am down but not here on the forum to solve anything. I come because I dont have many people in my realm who I am able to talk about these deep philosophical thinkings that I had before I even knew the word "philosophy" even meant, literally the word was not known by definition or by example or influence personally until I took a required general philosophy class in college at the age of 22..but i was reminded that my thoughts were the same as yours but I didnt know I was able to THINK ABOUT MY THINKING let alone LEARN from thinking thoughts. Just being, I was. Now, its been 7 years and I am proud of where I took this self taught journey and more importantly, WHY? I could be doing MANY other things and focusing on a goal...but the thing is, I just went where it made sense for me...I was able to now learn differently and in an environment and realm where i am myself shocked at my deep interests. I have better things to do, i know for a fact thats true..but here I am. I impressed myself and its impressive how much i have learned now that I know how to learn...and with passion and interest and will its not learning anymore its a knowing and what you learn is up to you and from others subjective stances that will help you learn how to learn, if thats what you want. Do what you want....I am, right now...I am getting off track, my apologies...I am LEARNING! Im on track actually, but my pace is just off, or not even off...im just differently moving along it....Where was I? OH YES, the math! Lets add together or shall i say combine the meanings behinda belief + an authority + an EXPECTATION/s if thats what we must do but it might not be worth the time....
Whatever the answer is I believe, whether if or how it that exists or it that can exist, the moral objective final truth I believe can differ or maybe not be constrained or bound to or from the group of objective truths. Its a balance of answers that will help this group find its perfect place...A balanced equation isnt the answer but it may really just be the base to get there but its important to know how material might always effect each equation every time its repeated... each load or force or weight or value that were put unto the ground which we take our stances...it cant be done with one standard formula, but these equations can be solved to bring new answers despite using the same "formula" and I think that is because of timing and the unreliability of human error in general.
When trying to balance or come to conclusive answers, it seems that objective moral truths may not be truths...what if its just the TRUTH? What if its a place? It can be denied and also too far to reach but eventually TIME will take us and maybe then reached by those better fit for it. though if authority is misused, misplaced it overrides or over powers the entire point...and that in itself is a way to figure out the limits were willing to take to get there...
I want to believe this place exists, but it I cant be too bothered.
I am moved though. It might be very far down a long road or is it that we are on this road but keep missing the turn or getting lost or incapable of getting there physically....mentally, emotionally? I think at least the first two should both arrive together with a real self awareness that is proven with you as the source, be credible, be that reference! Or dont...maybe thats the better option. We will never get to an answer without your word being able to be taken for what it REALLY is. I think words arent even necessary really because sometimes they dont add up..It dont add up, doesnt make sense for some reason...And one, with the life they lead will reveal everything needed to know, no words needed, and now is rightfully judged and questioned and with a chance to make a proof become an example.... of why it isnt about adding up anything...
As humans with such specific needs, can we see it through the words that we see and share on this forum...?
Well, I can see you.
I have scrolled every topic from every page here, and find myself going back again and again to see if I find anything I missed.... I love this site, I learn a lot and I am on the site a lot...I like like-mindedness and I think that is something we all have in common to any degree small or large...we sought out or stumbled upon or was referred or just looking to connect to someone who gives the time...whatever got us here (i think some might just want to chat and find friends lol thats fine too not cool but fine) but we all signed up to be members here on THE PHILOSOPHY FORUM....
Not every account contributes and I see the regulars, I see how those that do, use the site, engage, I see what you comment on, I see what you introduce to the thread in your OP's and that tells me a lot where or what ideas you lean towards and how you go about them also tells its own sometimes story in itself...and I must say, I have been highly impressed by the shared content and work by a lot of you while I have also cursed aloud reading somethings posted by others but those others mean that I am aloud to JUDGE because its not about what I think is complete bullshit nonsense. I really think the positive outweighs the bad here greatly. I love the openness andI dont want to say it because its not the right word, but the bravery some people have as they confidently share stuff I find to be...regurgitated and wrong...but THATS ON ME...and I would like to have more confidence in sharing myself. You have helped shine a light in my darkness. That counts for something.
But I am not there yet, I question myself and its valid that I do. BUT IM HERE, thats progress. Im proud.
I need to format better and type in a way more people can clearly understand my point but the point is not having one all the time still allows one to come...I think in this case I am replying because I have something and I wonder can you see that?...its because of YOU ALL HERE!
I have been highly motivated by the contributions I have seen to work on my communications, but I still think where i lack in organization and formatting can be easily improved but what I am saying now i decided is worth the risk of facing the outcomes or fear I have, being dismissed or belittled or corrected without AUTHORITY..
Yeah you can say I am going off the rails, over explaining myself. I can see someone saying I am doing it so much so that it may have little to NO VALUE to what concerns the OP. But I would not question that feedback, because i didnt ask for any. I am not agreeing or disagreeing I just like the direction this post has taken. Thanks for being you. But not thanks as in, you did something i needed...i would have been fine. I wasnt losing sleep or now seeing something I didnt already...I'm just glad to see the like mindedness and jumping in because of it in this thread...
I may see it more as a whole but its not real yet as a whole but its being built...I am seeing it as a whole, while those who may be taking the value of their views more seriously then the part itself, when the part is nothing without the whole...where if this forum were to be gone tomorrow, would you get or be willing to share your ideas and what do you seek? Who is your audience? How is feedback turned into new value for you? How can you be bothered? How bored are you? How much do you like like minded people?
...Its amazing how I seem to forget how much I need and crave getting into the minds of others who are well taught and educated and interesting and talented and well spoken too! I dont get to talk to people day to day without having to stop myself from going too deep getting to the bottom of things. Things like understanding people better for them without them even knowing. But I like to understand more then you may know. I see me in those of you with similar deep thinking thoughts and I have been intimidated by how beautifully some people can articulate without going off the rails like me...but maybe thats what I want to do...i'm being true in that, if you need prove...I havent commented on anything on this forum WITHOUT GOING OFF the rails at least a little, but I think if you get anything from this know feedback exists in me for many of you if you ever need to hear it for yourself....
what I meant about me seeing this place (the forum) as the whole rather than interacting as a part that is of no whole, i mean to say... when i say "whole" and "part" i think of a machine that is still being built but we have the parts but its not fully built yet...its hard to build something that was never designed before but it isnt hard to get there from a vision of the whole for what its worth...and TIME IS LIMITING but how so? (another topic I can go on an on about and shall one day) AND one day this machine will serve its function as a whole, and a successful one at that! When the parts come together with the function of it known undeniably serving its purpose but how did we get assembled and how many machines exists like this?
I am trying to say SOMETHING but I cant do it efficiently YET...For me, seeing that I am a part in this whole,its clear I am not established yet or successfully set in this whole, where is my place? Do i belong? I feel I can find my place as a part though, but not for me this time for the whole only! Not me any part will do....
Sorry its long winded, I have typed this up and enjoyed doing it. Those lost let me know where I lost you, to where the point of the OP may become NOT LOST for me but just pushed aside for the moment, because thats HOW I DO THINGS right now...If the worst happens, I'm dismissed and belittled and booted from the forum by someone or everyone on here and that alone would tell me a lot. Is that not useful real knowledge? Yeah, I would get my feelings hurt (thats my problem) and want to defend my honor (also my problem) but I STILL CANNOT BE BOTHERED because I would be learning regardless...Where my part in this belongs and is taught to me but not by any worthy teacher...education is lost when I realize the student depending on these "teachers"...by teachers I mean, strangers asking strangers "what is the meaning of life" and being dead serious like the answer is here...IF it is and was, WHY WOULD WE TELL YOU? You cant just ask that LOL I judge stuff like that but am I wrong?
EVEN IF WE KNOW FOR SURE...Its like they expect people to hand them the answer they worked hard to arrive to...They lose the chance to get there on their own, do they even know what they WANT? Is it THE TRUTH? And doing it in the least authentic, most basic way, and without questioning who and what they get an answer from... just a "thanks!" they say to those who has the patience to give them any attention, you are better then me...but do they not know that people still give an answer, even when they dont know themselves for sure...its interesting to see it happen. It does here, its all here.
I Question things, I question myself for questioning things...but I need to make it make sense for ME and from there I can make sense of things with others..together we can arrive at a truth thats objectively true, i think. I think regardless if no one responds. Thinking thoughts are sometimes not worth questioning too deep as its just the brain being with you... I am willing to be corrected but from where I stand who is to bother?
Look at all these words!!! Dont have to read to see.... Look what you did to me, I cant thank you enough.
I was moved to share all this, but its the work im tasking myself with...I have written a lot about moral objectivity not as a task, but for fun in my free time from such a subjective POV that isnt necessarily about "me" being the subject but a subjective POV from a person willing to take on a role and be a part of a team...the whole is real, but its hard to imagine human kind getting there as good as parts of a whole that is just doing what its function...its doing what its supposed to, a machine with parts of the whole...are we as humans doing this too? Perhaps...I am not asking because I want or need that answer from any one part here but I question it and want to see the parts in action....even if its not what I want to see.
...I dont want to see anything, I just wanted to let those know...and say for another moment, I did ask the people here, are we as humans doing this and heading there? are you all doing your part? and everyone replied with a confident "yes" I wouldnt question that but I need to be sure you do...because I will eventually question it anyways or someone will...Is lack of questioning and acceptance a problem to be bothered with? If that is what is preventing people and the will they have to participate in what I think is actually positive growth in humanity but can we see just how positive it really is? How can we see it as the whole when we are in it too deep ourselves?
What I may actually want to ask as a real question to this audience is this:
What the hell is an objective moral truth going to do for me today? Even if say we all agreed that we found at least one of them? How important really is an objective moral truth if I can be almost certain that my existence may be unknown to someone and never have any affect on the ways of our lives... I am doing my part and my faith is certain in the hopes and belief that an objective moral truth exists but we dont have any business driving that bus to get there...our bus is planet earth and we are here together headed....to i guess another place.
The chance doesnt exist, that my life will not interact or be known to many or anoher person whom is far far away from me and my world, that is my realm of reality and theirs is theirs but we both can live objectively without even knowing that we are moving together without bounds, doing our part, living our lives is doing our part and losing our lives is also our part, life and death, starts are ends...but we are unbothered by eachother because we dont know what about the existence of another, its impossible to know....I always think about stuff like that, that someone exists out there that cannot be bothered by me, even with all the authority I have.
Free will? Or free from a will to worry? That is a choice, i think...What do I know? I know that we can get to the bottom of things, but where we chose to go wont tell us anything about a real ETA because we dont have a GPS that takes us, we dont have an address to type into one! We dont even have the means to get there...but we dont stop...we keep moving, not just in time WITH IT.
And hey, we have proof! Proof is in the pudding! Our growth and knowledge that we chosen and even LIKE more in the learning part itself over the whole point or final answer is good enough but sometimes with indirect communication comes great ideas for the self but not any one else..and we cant get anywhere without selfless self awareness, but its not revealing an answer that can work every time...I dont think its worth being bothered over really...because of TIME...we are someones past and of the future but here now...
The fact that I can relate to a Philosophers mind that are centuries older, of a different country, of a different sex,of a different language of a different TIME [ (im a 27 year old Female from Central Fla who is self taught in philosophy with a degree in Drafting and Design, I do AutoCAD and Solidworks for work) this is not important really, only worth mentioning because my outspoken (some may be thinking OVERLY spoken, fine) I am saying this because im not known here, I dont reply to much but when I have its overly done perhaps and lacking what the forum is interested in hearing, but I have many bookmarked OP's and many opinions on topics brought up by the good people of the forum...not that your good or bad but im addressing the members as "the good people" because its a community, we are not ever going to find common grounds but I think a common ground can come from a POV that isnt of this community but is like us because of an interest in knowing the questions we all think about..
These deep questions that is labeled and organized and laid out here for us to share what we consider to be philosophically worth of discussion exists in even in the unlikely, like-minded stranger...because they dont know how deep it is yet and yet they still are doing their part.
That person is thinking and wondering, WE, THEM, US, cant avoid that search as humans but it seems avoiding the dive is worth it for certain minds, and they are right...and that is there part and they know how to play it...No one can see things like you but maybe they could...you may never know. Its not about them as a they but without them are we able to see an US?
I dont think I will see the day WE as THEY can live that way but I know it is true that one day it may happen...that what is being discussed here isnt really worth the back and forth bullshit unless you think we can get somewhere...with ME INCLUDED!
Perhaps more direction is needed but we not need to keep asking the good people of the forum...unless you want to argue, which is also I guess fine and judgement is not coming from me if you like arguing with the same people. Who am I to judge is not the question, because I can answer that. Its that judgement, I believe is perceived and given and taken and passed and wrongly sometimes rightly so...but its the stance one is able to judge from... Even if one may tell you they arent judging, why do you believe them? Some times they may be telling the truth but privacy in the mind allows our judgements to flow and happen and perhaps manifest into certain behaviors, actions, reactions that clearly demonstrate how you COULD judge.
Objective ways to possibly moralize can come from expectations perhaps and I have a lot to say on this, but I had to make certain things clear to get HERE NOW....thats okay. Im just doing my part.
I'm thinking like when a person can BE LET DOWN BECAUSE OF AN EXPECTATION that was unmet say or even if one was LET DOWN BECAUSE their EXPECTATIONS were OFF and they say to themselves "How could I have not seen that coming?!? WTF?" Now what I notice is that what that thinking person may do is behave in a way that is hard on their mind and body and what they are giving out into the world by allowing themselves to be bothered with that expectation they placed even if they knew they had them...
Perhaps if they can ask those questions to themselves but WITHOUT JUDGMENT ON their own self, it wouldnt be as easy to pick up on how morals really are affecting someones well being and peace of mind. These expectations speak for you and speak for me...it just takes someone to notice them. People brush off the idea of an expectation, as its a common thing to hear people claim they dont have any, because they know it will let them down...I do this depending on who, what, where why and how I am going about doing a thing, that I have experience being let down in before in a similar case just a different time. But why not give an expectation a chance?
I am reminded even when I think I am free from expecting anything, If I really think about the question and really answer it to myself FOR MYSELF...and when that doesnt work, I can ask the right person to get me back to a place where I am not to question myself and what i expected...that isnt always the problem. Dont ask if you just want a pick me up or sulking buddy or the one who will tell you what you WANT to hear (unless you admit you arent ready for the truth, thats fine if aware of what your doing in that act of avoiding or masking)....If you are lucky enough, ask that question first to your self and then someone whose word or life means something to you..someone who knows you and who can give you an answer in a way that can force through that prior harsh self judgement AND find the reminder and the goodness you really wanted and how you are going to deal with what comes to bother you again down the line. Its all good, and not because the subject has expectations...its that they are using them to discovering truth in themselves and seeing it in them and getting to see it from another.
The good is the growth and I think we are all growing here..that proof exists no matter what. Its just that who really cares? It doesnt matter how far you come because the way another will be able to get the full good from the objective moral truths created by US will eventually see the whole for WHAT ITS WORTH and they can judge the lengths we took to get there from there growth as well. No growth is almost like really really slow growth or maybe growth that started and never finished but stopped growing while still living..You cant ever really know how much anything was ever worth from this place I think were all talking about, the one and only truth. But if we cant catch up in time to see this truth, if time doesnt stop can we just slow it down...Maybe lose track of time? I have done that before, it comes with a consequence but sometimes is worth it. Maybe we could lose the track we say of time....if we knew the track at all, I dont think its possible to all arrive on time and on track to any where any place any world any space...but that time can be spotted, i think, when IT from US spots it, how could they understand all that? What knows US? WHO knows US? Maybe its not us they see just the progress and ideas we bring to the world from earth...I think US is through me and you and every one it has to be SO BIG and SO SURE. With US what CAN happen? We can decide...i think.
Thats true, but that wasnt the point. It was to demonstrate why your analogy to math failed.
Why? Doesnt me believing vanilla ice cream tastes good make it true that my stance is that ice cream tastes good?
All reasoning for why a proposition is true is fallible; so I am not sure what you mean here. Third-person vs. first-person sentences has nothing to do with the fallibility of the statements or lack thereof. I can believe that I love yogurt and be wrong about that, same as I can believe that I believe I love yogurt and be wrong about that too: they are not infallible statements.
You would be wrong about that if you actually dont believe it; and of course whether or not people have brown hair is independent of your belief on it because there is a fact of the matter that makes it true...this isnt the case with morality.
The statement I love yogurt can be true relative to me and false relative to you, because we need to know who we are referring to by I.
This is a straw man: if you disapprove it for everyone, then you disapprove it for everyone. Obviously, if you only disapprove of yourself doing something, then, of course, you dont necessarily disapprove of it for other people.
What do you mean by personal/subjective reasons? I would say that some propositions are made true in virtue of beliefs we havee.g., I believe people shouldnt torture babies, I like chocolate ice cream, etc.
You are just begging the question with justificatory force: sure, I dont approve of forcing someone to eat chocolate ice cream, but if I did then I wouldnt have a problem withhence approval/disapproval.
Again, show me the contradiction or incoherent with two propositions I am holding with moral subjectivism, and I will concede it is irrational. Until then, I dont think it is.
You seem to be like another gentleman/lady I was discussing with that thought that pyshopathic serial killers cannot act rationally with respect to their torturing and killing of innocent people because their actions are immoral and that makes it irrational. I am not saying you think that, but saying people who are consistent with their goals are irrational (which is what you are saying) are irrational seems similar to me.
And the point here is that opinions about vanilla ice cream are not moral judgments.
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Bob Ross
That's not a moral judgment, as you just admitted.
Quoting Bob Ross
Your point depends on infallibility. You want to say that there are beliefs that are true simply in virtue of themselves existing. My point was that while infallible judgments do exist ("I feel pain"), they are not beliefs. We do not say, "I believe I feel pain." An infallible judgment is a matter of strict knowledge, not belief.
Quoting Bob Ross
I would be wrong whether or not I believe it. Belief makes no difference.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, and we are talking about predications regarding others, not predications involving only oneself. That's the whole point! "No one should torture babies," is not like, "I love yogurt." "I have brown hair," is not like, "Everyone has brown hair."
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Bob Ross
How is it a strawman when you agree with my claim entirely?
Quoting Bob Ross
So then you think this is a rational exchange:
Quoting Bob Ross
Of course I am not. Does or does not the claim, "Because I believe you shouldn't," justify the question at hand? Either your belief justifies your claim or else it doesn't. If it does justify it then a perfectly rational Leontiskos would respond, "Ah, wonderful response. I am now convinced. You have justified your claim." I am concerned with what is rational and what is irrational.
The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory. If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify any universal moral truths, then moral subjectivism is a preposterous theory. Ifas seems to be the case herethe moral subjectivist is able to do nothing more than assert their own personal beliefs, then clearly moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such truths.
Assuming that knowledge is (at minimum) justified true belief, what is the justification for the belief that no one should torture babies?
Quoting Leontiskos
The same goes for moral realism.
That wasnt the point: it was an analogy. If I say I believe one ought not torture babies for fun is a moral judgment that is true in virtue of the belief, then you will say I am question begging.
It is the same reasoning that leads you to believe that I feel pain is infallible makes I believe one ought not torture babies infallible: they are self-referential. I believe I feel pain is not self-referential: it is a belief about a fact about ones current state of pain or lack thereof. I feel pain, in the sense I think you are talking about, is self-referential: if I have it, then I have it: it isnt referring to something else, like I think 1+1=2. Same thing with moral judgments.
I believe no one everyone should have brown hair is like the former statements, and not the latter.
Ok, so, at the end of the day we are talking in circle because you keep asserting beliefs have nothing to do with the moral judgments truthity and I assert the opposite. To resolve this, instead of looping around and around, we need to provide arguments. My arguments are in the moral subjectivism OP: if one accepts there are true moral judgments and they are propositional and they are not expressing something objective, then they are expressing something subjective. You would have to contend with those arguments if you want to change my mind.
You used a misleading example that doesnt fit what I am targeting. If you wanted to make your point, you should have demonstrated why I disapprove of it for everyone is incoherent and not I disapprove of it for myself, therefore I disapprove of it for others: the latter was never an inference I was making.
I think it is rational insofar as my hypothetical response here would justify myself in stopping you but not justify you in not doing it. I would have to convince you that you shouldnt torture babies (by means I have described in length in the OP), but the my justification for stopping you in this case is valid but doesnt provide you with any good reasons to believe it yourself.
No one should torture babies seems an awful lot, within the context of what you are saying, as expressing something objective, which obviously moral subjectivism cannot account for because it doesnt think those exist. If you mean I believe no one should torture babies, and that justifies me in stopping people from torturing babies, then, yes, my theory can handle that just fine.
This seems to fit as you revise truth to be objective. As I understood it it would be when a person has a representation of a thing in itself that happens to correspond with the thing in itself. This correspondence is not mind-dependent, as it is not the mind trying to represent the correspondence. The correspondence is a thing in itself.
If I had the above correct, there is nothing objective we can ever reference with any clarity besides, "the thing in itself" But:
Quoting Bob Ross
But we can't if I understood it correctly. Reasoning and observance are all subjective representations of the world. What we can conclude are reasoning and observance that seem to correspond with the thing in itself. An active representation of this could be called 'knowledge'. But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself. We can only at best, represent it correct? Meaning intuition is subjective. The only thing we can know about objectivity through our subjective reasoning, is that we can never know what the thing in itself is.
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree that we approach the limit of what is objective, or mind-independent by basically using 'lack'. A thing in itself is the thing that we attempt to identify, but it is defined by the fact that it is always a representation and never an actual understanding of what it is in itself.
Quoting Bob Ross
I wouldn't say its begging the question. We can also take correspondence of thought and not know it truthfully. For example, we may believe that a particular apple is healthy, but we're unaware that there is a small rotten piece inside that contains nasty bacteria. We only know when we don't correspond to reality when it demonstrates our correspondence doesn't work. But to know a correspondence doesn't work, that correspondence must be tested. We have plenty of things we subjectively know and believe that are not true, we simply haven't put it to the test yet or misinterpreted the results.
Quoting Bob Ross
But Bob, if something is permissable, omissable, or obligatory, then this can be simplified to what 'should' or 'should not' be. Within the language that implies states of affairs. Morality is about comparing states of affairs and deciding which one is permissable, omissable, or obligatory. If you eliminate states of affairs, or make "reality" the combined set of all states of affairs, then you ALSO eliminate morality. To state something moral is by definition to state, "Reality in this state is better than in this state."
If P1 does not address states of reality, then you cannot have morality. Your true P2 should be "Morality is the claim that reality in one state is permissable, omissable, or obligatory over comparative states of reality". While P1 can indicate that any particular state alone cannot demonstrate morality, it doesn't negate the fact that morality is an act of comparison. If you cannot compare, you have no morality.
Quoting Bob Ross
That's simply untrue. As soon as you compare states of reality you have a moral choice. That's the only way something is permissable. To be permissable it must be the case that we can change the state to something else that is not permissable.
If for example a baby is about to get shot, you have time to decide what the future reality will be. You could shoot the shooter first. Step in front of the baby. Dive Hollywoodesque in slow motion to move the baby out of the way. These choices come about because we have in our head at a minimum two outcomes. Dead baby or living baby in a future state of reality. What is permissable? We only know this by comparing the two outcomes.
If I was a being that was born into a reality without time where a baby lay dead, then yes, this slice of reality alone cannot tell me what is morally permissable. In this only, I completely agree with P1. It is only after experiencing multiple states of reality and comparing them can we come to conclusion that some states of reality 'should' exist over others. Morality does not exist in a stateless non-comparative state. It only exists in a stateful comparison analysis.
Quoting Bob Ross
Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
This would then follow with:
2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."
Quoting Bob Ross
If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective. We of course cannot know if they are true because we cannot, as subjects, know what is objective. It is a correspondence that happens despite our beliefs or observations as what is objective is completely independent from minds (subjects). The tweak I made I think makes this more clear.
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].
Taken as a thesis and not a proof, this is fine. This still does not negate that there is not really anything meaningful stated here. Replace, 'true moral judgements' with 'true statements' and its still the same thing. So my criticism of this lacking any meaningful weight still holds for me.
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets simplify this further. You set up some definitions and propositional assumptions without a conclusion. That's not a normative theory. A theory has a conclusion with proof. No one cares about normative or metaethical as concepts except scholars with too much time on their hands. Did you come up with a theory of morality that is meaningful and useful to others? That's all that matters. It is a trap in philosophy I've seen many brilliant people fall into over the years. To focus on terminology and miss the one true point: usefulness and applicability. Take my advice here as an equal: eliminate any words or phrases that does not make your arguments as simple and clear as possible. Use George Orwells six points of writing. It is an ongoing battle for myself as well, but it is the way to make clear and meaningful arguments. An insistence on a normative and metaethical separation is missing the trees in the forest. You didn't do anything meaningful in your setup.
Quoting Bob Ross
There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible? Action simply implies something has been done. The question of whether that action should have been committed or not is morality. If you state that all actions are permissible, then no actions are impermissible. In which case, there is no question of how we should act, and thus no morality.
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't see that at all. Basically what you've done is set up basic definitions.
1. There is truth, definitions of objective, subjective.
2. We are subjects. What we say, do, think, comprehend, etc is subjective.
3. What is objective is mind-independent. Truth is mind-independent, therefore objective.
4. Morality is what is permissible. You have not given a clear example of what is permissible with any proof. Only that we can make moral judgements, and if they correspond with reality, or what is objective, its true.
4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.
5. Except that this is true for any statement, word, or concept in existence because of the way you've defined subjective. Making this statement meaningless and getting us no where closer to understanding or solving the question of morality.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, I can replace 'Moral cognitivism' with any phrase I want. "Claims about dogs are statements that are truth-apt." Any statement is truth-apt Bob. If you claim there is truth, and that statements which are true are those that correspond with reality, that's all you need. If its true, its 1+1=2. We don't call it "Cognitive number theory vs non-cognitive number theory". We call it math.
I only say this because I think you're brilliant Bob. I do not mean to say this as talking down to you, but with great respect as I see your amazing potential. Yes, we must understand the names to be successful in the philosophical world. I understand. But don't get caught up in naming math. DO math. Because you can while so many can't. Let them worry about naming it. While I disagree with your repurposing of subjective and objective for the reason's I've given, the underlying concept as I've understood it from your previous writings makes sense. That's the math. Math is what changes the world and allows humanity to achieve great things. I don't care what you call it. Neither should you.
I appreciate your courage, openness, and insights.
I appreciate your response!
Firstly, I agree that the simplest way to convey something is the best but, as of now, with all due respect, I think your simplifications are over-simplifications; and, believe it or not, the OP is the most concise, precise, and simplest way I have found to convey my metaethical theory.
Secondly, with respect to the terms, I hate semantics just as much as the next guy! So I agree that we should not get caught up on the terminology: the reason I use the terms I have been using is they are the most widely accepted and precise ways of conveying exactly what I want to conveyso why would I makeup new words or use less precise words to convey the exact same thing?
Thirdly, I think there is one core issue in our conversation that needs sorting out before we can continue, namely that you seem to think metaethics is useless and normative ethics is all that matters. Of course, this metaethical theory doesnt address what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory...it isnt supposed to! Thats for normative ethics. So, I think I need to provide a case not for moral subjectivism (specifically) but, rather, for the study of metaethics. If you dont see any value in metaethics, then theres no point in discussing moral subjectivism, since it is a metaethical theory.
As a side note, I am working on a normative ethical theory, I just havent posted it yet. It isnt posted with this metaethical theory because (1) I find it is useful to split the two so as to hone in on metaethical and normative ethical disputes separately and (2) I havent finished my normative ethical theory yet (to my liking).
Now, let me address some points you made to hopefully demonstrate why metaethics is important; but, first, let me outline some general points. Metaethics is about the nature of moral judgments and properties, and not what is right or wrong. This is incredibly important because it is important to know, beyond what is being expressed as right or wrong, what a moral judgment itself actually is (e.g., is it truth-apt? Is it expressing something subjective or objective? Are any of them true?). As an example, lets take the metaethical claim that there is at least one true moral judgment: if this is false, then morality is pointless and always incorrecthence, error theory. Lets take moral judgments are proposition: if they arent, then we cannot use them as propositions which, in turn, entails we cannot apply logic to themhence moral non-cognitivism. Lets take moral judgments express something objective: if this is false, then there is no moral fact out there that makes a moral judgment truehence moral subjectivism. You are saying all of this is useless ..but your own normative ethical theory we are discussing in the other form implicitly assumes metaethical claims.
I would like to note the following:
1. Judgments are not necessarily statements. A moral non-cognitivist would say that moral judgments are emotional dispositions (i.e., they are conative not cognitive) that are along the lines of boo to torturing babies!!!!!!!, where they are not saying the moral judgment is the statement boo to torturing babies!!!!!! but, rather, the underlying emotional attitude which can be expressed without a statement (e.g., someone looks very angry and astonished when witnessing someone torturing a baby, etc.). So when you say statements are truth-apt, even if it is true, it doesnt get you moral cognitivism. You would have to demonstrate moral judgments are truth-apt; and you seem to just blow this off and ignore the entire literature on moral non-cognitivism.
2. Statements are not always truth-apt. For example, I would say that the statement this statement is false is not truth-apt because it cannot be evaluated as true or false...it lacks that capacity.
The proposition 1+1=2 presupposes that it is truth-apt; but you seem to be trying to argue that it is truth-apt because it is a propositionthat isnt valid. If 1+1=2 can be true, then you have already conceded it is truth-apt, but we are questioning why. Why think it is truth-apt? That would be a meta-mathematical debate. However, this is a metaethical debate about whether moral judgments like one ought not torture babies for fun are truth-apt or not.
Mathematics would presuppose, and does presuppose, that mathematical judgments are proposition; just like how your normative ethical theory presupposes that moral judgments are propositional.
Of course not! Thats what a normative ethical theory is for! The point of moral subjectivism is to note that whatever a person judges morally, it is made true by being a fact about their psychology and not some moral fact out there in the world. I think you have missed the point if you are demanding actual normative claims out of the theory.
Ive never argued this. This is clearly false.
No, because not eating the sandwich could have implied one finds it morally permissible not to eat it. Whereas, eating it immediately implies that it is permissible to do soit wouldnt make sense if it implied they thought it was impermissible.
Also, I dont why it would be the case that for something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible, unless you mean that X being morally permissible entails that it is morally impermissible for X to not be morally permissible? But, then, I dont see your point.
I gave an argument for all three prongs of the thesis, so it is theory. You havent actually dealt with all of them. They were not definitions.
As long as it is useful to me, then thats good with me. Also, it isnt a fair criticism to claim that a theory is false because no one thinks it is useful. Likewise, most people dont find many things I find useful useful: why does that matter?
I agree that one should keep it simple, but you seem (to me) to be oversimplifying it. With all due respect, you keep conflating the two in important ways, and that is why I keep bringing it up. For example, in your other thread you assume moral realism is true without proving it...you didnt even attempt to. Likewise with moral cognitivism and moral non-nihilism. You just flatly assert or implicitly assume that they are true without providing an argument. Thats why each prong I have has an argument for it, even if one, at the end of the day, doesnt agree with them.
Correct. It is a prong of a thesis, not an argument. I outlined the thesis first, then argued for it. The argument for it is later on in the OP.
Thats not the point of moral non-nihilism: it is the position that there are true moral judgmentsi.e., they are not all false. Error theorists, i.e., moral nihilists, claim that moral judgments are truth-apt and express something objective but they are all false. I am explicitly denying that with this prong of the thesis, and proceed to give an argument for it later on in the OP.
No and yes. Truth being objective just means that the correspondence exists mind-independently, but to say that moral judgments express something objective does not follow from that.
You cannot do that validly: they are two different claims. The moral judgment is subjective and it expresses something subjectivei.e., judgments are always subjective because they are themselves an issuance by a subject and these particular judgments (moral ones) are true in virtue of projections of ones pyschology and not some non-pyschological fact about reality.
You statement we can make subjective moral judgments that are true could be compatible with a moral realists claim that moral judgments express something objective just as much as a moral anti-realists claim that moral judgments express something subjective.
You cannot do that, because something being propositional does not entail that it is true, it entails that it has the capacity to be true or false.
By agreeing to moral judgments are propositional, the person has in no way conceded that there is at least one true moral judgment. But with your revision, they would have to accept both.
This is fine, but I think we may have talked passed each other. P1 would dictate that in this baby example there is no fact you can cite which makes any of the moral judgments true, such as one should step in front of the baby first. What I am not saying, nor does P1 imply that, states of affairs inform our moral judgmentsrather, P1 dictates that there is no amount of consideration of what is the case nor the possible outcomes in this baby example that tells me anything about fundamentally what I should morally judge, it just supplements it.
In other words, the moral judgments are sui generis of your psychology: theres no moral fact you are able to cite in this baby example that tells you what to do, instead the non-moral facts inform you, based off of your psychology of what you approve or disapprove of, what you should do. The non-moral facts are not enough to dictate what should happen, there is a moral judgment, or multiple, that are just facts about your psychology that make you morally judge one way or another given the circumstances. For a moral realist, this is not the case, from the baby example there is a moral fact-of-the-matter out there in that possible world or this actual one that dictates what one should do, and one is just trying to discover what that isthey arent projecting their own opinions on what one should do.
All you seem to be noting, and correct me if I am wrong, is that we use the current and potential states of affairs to supplement our moral judgments, which is totally fine and I absolutely agree with...but I disagree that if you were to just give me the facts about the baby scenario, that I would be able to know what I should dothere is some should or shoulds which are being projected by my psychology that ultimately dictate, once I am informed of the facts about the baby example, what I decide I ought to do.
Not quite. Since I believe moral judgments are not made true by moral facts out there, I think that we project what we approve or disapprove of and use that to determine what to do. I am quite literally arguing that there are no moral states-of-affairs that exist mind-independently: there are no moral phenomena, just moral interpretations of phenomena as nietzsche put it.
Someone morally judging a situation based off of that situation and potential states-of-affairs is perfectly compatible with P1. P1 just says that there is no way to infer strictly from those mind-independent states-of-affairs what should be.
I would say that truth is not a thing-in-itself, because things-in-themselves are objects. This is why I find it hard to say truth is objective but also that truth isnt. There isnt a object, abstract or not, that exists which is the correspondence of thought with reality. The mere relationship between thought and reality such that they correspond is what truth is, and this can be acquired from a subjective viewpoint so long as that subject agrees that there are objects. They dont come to know truth itself like an object that they observe, it is the abstract relationship between thinking and being: between mind and not mind. If it were an object, like an apple, then you would be right.
Truth is only objective in the sense that that abstract relationship is not contingent on subjects determinations of it. If you are just noting that we cant be absolutely certain that that relationship exists from our subjective standpoint, then I wholly agree.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Bob
Do you actually believe that moral claims are true in virtue of beliefs? That is the question. I don't think you even believe yourself.
Quoting Bob Ross
But, "No one should torture babies," is not self-referential. It is referring not just to oneself, but also to 8+ billion other people.
Quoting Bob Ross
I have provided an argument: "Because I believe it to be so," is not a rationally justifying statement.
Quoting Bob Ross
If this is so then your response is not a (rational) justification. It does not rationally justify. Beliefs do not rationally justify moral claims. You admit that more is needed.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, if something is truth-apt then it can be argued for directly. Your OP presumed that it can only be argued for indirectly and accidentally. It seems that you do not believe such claims are really truth-apt if they cannot be argued for directly and/or rationally justified.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yikes. :groan:
Either the proposition, "No one should torture babies," is true, or else it isn't. Your belief can't make it true. You know this. Or you will upon further reflection. If you have no way to rationally justify a claim, then it is otiose to call such a claim "true." This whole "subjectivism" approach assumes something like the idea that beliefs, in themselves, can make moral claims true, and this is patently false. Such approaches are non-starters.
;
You keep asking @Bob Ross to rationally justify his claim. You must do the same.
I don't think you're a serious interlocutor and I've explained in detail why I am not interested in engaging you.
Quoting Michael
This is a thread about moral subjectivism, not moral realism. Please stay on topic.
1. Making sure I understand your definitions of objective, subjective, and truth and their logical conclusions.
2. Noting that the claim that all of our moral judgements are subjective, as is anything we do. Defining what it means to have a true moral judgement.
3. Noting that you have no underlying claim as to why all true moral judgements are based on psychology through the definitions you use, and why such a claim leads to contradictions.
I may repeat myself in points, so feel free to make the next focus about those three points so you don't have to spend too long on individual issues. For me, its the 3 points that matter, and all the details are an attempt to get to those points.
Quoting Bob Ross
Ah, you didn't mention that specific definition of judgement. I would note that, or reference that there are some definitions like judgement which are being used in accordance with certain moral theories. But let me show you that what I noted still stands. Everything you do is truth apt. I'll explain below.
Quoting Bob Ross
Meaning that anything a subject does either corresponds with reality, or does not. Including our feelings. I might feel angry at the idea of killing a baby and judge that I shouldn't. We can imagine an animal for example. Should it though? Its either true or false. Language is not needed. Morality is about the intent to act and the question on whether it should be acted upon or not. Its either true or false that you should. But the fact that its false that you should doesn't necessitate that its true that you shouldn't.
In other words, if there is no true morality. there is no should, then it is false that you should. But this still makes moral judgements truth apt, as when something is false, it enters into the binary of the possibility of true. Truth-apt simply means what is stated could be true or false conceptually. It makes no claims as to the actual outcome.
Meaning, if I take your definition of truth, subjectivity, and objectivity, everything is truth-apt. Either a belief, statement, emotion, etc. corresponds to reality, or it does not.
Quoting Bob Ross
But it is true that the statement is false. Many statements require implicit context for meaning. If we remove those implicit contexts, then It says nothing meaningful. Sentences which lack meaning are not truth apt, because they mean nothing but noise. Don't get caught up in the classic word game. :) We simply break the statement from nonsense into something that makes sense.
A. This is a sentence - True
B. A is false - False
The above word game is just a classic mistaken case of combining two propositions and their assertions into one sentence. Regardless, you are talking about moral judgements, which are evaluations of what one should do. Anytime you introduce the word should, there is the result of its true that you should, or false that you should.
Quoting Bob Ross
Because it is either true that 1+1=2, or it is false. I can write 1+2=2. This is also truth-apt. It is either true or false that 1+2=2. If something is true, it is truth-apt. If something is false, it is truth-apt.
"A sentence is truth apt if there is some context in which it could be uttered (with its present meaning) and express a true or false proposition."
https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105953845
Yes, there are specific cases when there is no question of truth or falsity, but we're not talking about exceptions into here when we're speaking about morality and simple statements. The question isn't whether judgements and statements are truth-apt. The question is, "What is true?" And you've already answered that. So when we say true in your paper we mean, a subjective statement which is in concurrence with reality. The concurrence with reality is objective, and outside of the ability of the subject to know.
Quoting Bob Ross
I definitely did miss the point! =D I suppose from my end, once you defined truth, its a given that judgements and statements are truth apt. However, something being truth-apt does not mean it is true. Which leaves me scratching my head when you make the leap to "Whatever a person judges morally, is true by their psychology." This is a claim that needs proof.
A. Morality is about what I should do. It is truth-apt, meaning what should be done could be true, or
false.
B. A true moral judgement is a moral decision of 'should' that corresponds with reality. A
false moral judgement is a moral decision of 'should' that does not correspond with
reality.
C. There is the possibility that I make an incorrect moral judgement, or one that does not correspond to
reality. This would be a false moral judgement.
D. I have a psychology. I make a moral judgement that I should do X because of my psychology.
E. It is true that I should do X because of my psychology.
F. But I have not shown why my psychology concurs with what should be in objective reality.
G. Because of that, I can state, "It is false that I should do X because of my psychology." with equal
weight.
Therefore: G contradicts E.
(I go over this again as a summary at the end)
In other words Bob, for something to be truth apt, it must have the possibility of being assigned a true and a false condition. An example of something that is not truth-apt is something like the amateur understanding of God. There is no condition in which it is possible for God to be false, therefore God is not truth-apt, God is simply true.
To demonstrate that a moral judgement is truth apt, there must be a condition for a moral judgement in which it could be false. Can you give me an example of a moral judgement based on one's psychology that would be false? And what I mean is, the condition. For example, "God is a physical being." It doesn't matter whether this is true or false, it simply means that if its true, God is physical, and if its false, God is not. What is the truth-apt condition of making moral decisions based on our judgements?
Quoting Bob Ross
Let me clarify. We cannot know things in themselves. You've eliminated the term "objectivity" from any meaningful understanding besides "That which exists which we cannot know." So there could be an objective morality, but it would be beyond our knowledge. For if we could know it, that knowledge would be mind dependent. Known and discussed morality, by your definition, is subjective. As is everything we speak, judge, etc. So technically I should be saying, "Morality as we know it is subjective." But if we state that there is a true moral judgement, this means that our subjective moral judgement is concurrent with objective reality. This concurrence is itself objective, as it does not require our subject to realize this is happening. Truth as well is "a thing in itself" (More details on this later!) Since everything we discuss is from a subject Bob, everything as we know it is subjective.
Quoting Bob Ross
First, I haven't been thinking at all in these terms. I'm just using the terms of your OP and showing where I see them logically leading. If I am oversimplifying, please correct me when you see it.
Quoting Bob Ross
Ok, I've been wracking my brain trying to understand how you're arriving at this conclusion, and this is the best I can come up with. So are you stating that because you think morality is based on our own psychology, whatever we do we must view as permissible? Because the logical equivalent is that whatever we do not do, is not permissible. Which means if at a future date, we decide not to eat a sandwich, not eating is permissible, while eating it is impermissible. The only way this binary does not exist is if there are actions that are not permissible nor impermissible. In which case, we cannot say that everything we do or do not do is permissible or impermissible. In which case, your claim that whatever we do is permissible doesn't work.
If permissible is synonymous with 'our actions', then why not just say, 'our actions'? We have to be very careful when we redefine words in philosophy, a thing I struggle with as well. The reality is, we all want a particular outcome. Sometimes we like the emotional intention of the original words, but want to change the underlying meaning. This is because the original meaning contradicts with the outcome we want with words. But when we change the original meaning of the words and try to use the original emotional intention, that can result in flawed philosophy. Its as logical a fallacy as any other.
The original intention of 'permissible' is what should or should not be done, but also assumes that someone can make an action that is impermissible, or not take an action on what is permissible. The emotional intention is a strong law that should be enforced. But all you're doing is taking the first portion of the word and throwing away the second part. But without the second part, what separate 'permissible' from moral? In which case, why not just use the word 'moral'?
I feel like your overall point is simple, but its bogged down at points by redefinitions and unnecessary labor. I get it. When I first wrote my knowledge paper years ago it was just like this. It was an over 200 page monster saddled with ideas, definitions, redefinitions, and thoughts that ultimately were unnecessary for the overall point. Its the nature of creating something unique and interesting. Few people understand the amount of thinking, labor, rewriting, etc. that lead to a succinct and solid idea. It is a compliment to your creativity and thinking, please don't take my attempts to simplify the points as trying to overcome your intent. I'm simply trying to cut what I see as fat to get to the meat. Where I oversimplify, please add why and how I can fix it.
Quoting Bob Ross
Which is fine. Once again, we can more simply state, "Moral non-nihilism claims there is an objective morality." "Moral nihilists claim there is no objective morality". The excessive truth-apt true, false is just unnecessary wording that hinders the point. And yes, we understand that the morality as they know it is subjective in your terms, because anything we say, do, feel, etc is subjective.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes. If you were making sure I understood this distinction, I do. So yes, if truth is objective, and there is a moral truth, then if a person's subjective claim to morality corresponds to this objectivity, it is a true moral judgement. This is as I've been intending. Because as I noted earlier Bob, everything we say, do, think, feel, etc. is subjective under your theory. So if I say, "true moral judgements are not subjective", this is of course a subjective statement. I am noting the thing in itself of the subjective judgement correlating with reality. Meaning the judgement as intended by the person is subjective, as everything is, but it so happens to correlate with the objective morality. This as well does not not that an objective morality exists.
Quoting Bob Ross
Once again, everything we ever do, say, judge, act, etc. is subjective. Which means that if my judgement corresponds with reality, then it is a true moral judgement. Which means we can make moral judgements which are true. Of course, since truth is objective, we can never know if our moral judgements are true, because what is objective can never be known as the thing in itself. Again, this is not me saying we have proven that an objective morality exists, only what must be entailed by a true moral judgement.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, this is the logical result of your vocabulary. If it is the case that a judgement (remember, no need to add subjective to this, everything we do is subjective) is concurrent with reality, this concurrence is objective and true. It doesn't mean we as subjects realize it is true. Objective truth is the reality of the situation as it is in itself. If a person has a judgement that is not concurrent with reality then there is no objective concurrence. There is only the subjects claim to what is moral while reality does not concur. So both sentences are right depending on the context and intent.
Quoting Bob Ross
No Bob, I can. Just as I can logically say "False moral judgements are propositional". If something is true, then of course it has the capacity to be true or false. The capacity has nothing to do with whether it is true or false, only that by being true or false, there is the binary option of it being the other. If I use a proposition and state, "This proposition is true", it still has the capacity to be false in a logic set up. Typically this is done to set up logical fallacies or proof by contradiction.
Quoting Bob Ross
Ok, so you don't believe there's an objective morality, nor any true moral judgements. If morality does not exist mind independently, then any judgement to should or should will correlate with this lack of objectivity. Thus it would be true that there is no objective morality. Now all you have to do is prove it.
Problem is, you can't with your current evidence.
1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.
2. Point 1 can be proven in two ways.
a. Explore all possible moral judgements and conclude they correlate with reality, including
contradictory psychological judgements.
b. Demonstrate why a moral judgement can never be contradicted by reality (Contradiction is an
opposition of opposite of correlation)
2. You claim our psychology is the basis for morality through your psychology.
3. I claim our psychology is not the basis for morality through my psychology.
4. This is a contradiction in reality.
5. Therefore neither of us can state morality is not objective until this contradiction is solved.
6. To solve this requires evidence to be presented to ascertain that either point 2 or point 3 is correct.
7. But, if point 2 is correct, then point 3 also stands, as my psychology can claim point 2 is wrong, and
you'll have to agree with me if point 2 is right.
Therefore if point 3 stands while point 2 stands, there is a contradiction. Therefore by point 6, point 2 is false.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, I understand but disagree with one statement. The "thing in itself" does not refer to an object. An object is a subjective attempt at understanding what a 'thing in itself is'. Our thoughts are 'things in themselves'. Their intentions, judgements, etc. about other things in themselves. When our intentions about other things are expressed and they correlate with reality, then they are true. Of course, this does not mean we know they are true. How we would know they are true would be subjective. But the subject does not need to have the knowledge or idea of objects, thoughts, etc, only an existence, judgement, etc that is correlating with reality.
Thus, if I claimed, "I believe I should do this," the fact that you believed that you should do this correlates with reality and is true. Everything is self-referential, therefore true. But if you claim, "I believe you should do this," it is uncertain whether this correlates with reality and is a true moral judgement."
Ok, that's a big chunk for you Bob! I know its busy because its Christmas season, so happy holidays if I don't hear from you before then!
Because you want me to say moral theory X is right and theory Y is wrong?
I dont have to say that. I am simply addressing the weaknesses in both theory X and theory Y. I dont know why you think this means Im not being serious.
Quoting Leontiskos
You claimed that we have a moral claim that we know to be true" as part of your counterargument. If you cannot justify this claim then your counterargument fails.
Merry Christmas to you too!
I want to, firstly, express my gratitude for your elaborate response: I can tell you read through it all and I know how much effort it is to respond that lengthy and substantivelyso thank you!
Before I respond, I originally was going to wait to post my normative ethical theory until it was more refined and polished up, but, like you said, it doesnt seem to make a different how precise I think I am using my terminology nor how exact the idea isas someone is going to find something wrong with it from their perspective. Since I dont think we are making all that much progress here metaethically and I think you enjoy the normative ethics stuff more, I suggest we go to my new thread to discuss normative ethics and then segue back here if need be...but I will leave it up to you as I am down for either.
Since our responses are getting quite lengthy, I am going to summarize what I got out of your response instead of trying to go paragraph by paragraph because that will end up being an essay longer than the OP (:
So, for my own sake of keeping track, I think you should pick a couple or perhaps one and we focus in on it first; otherwise, there is so many disputes going on here I dont know we can safely maneuver all of them at once (;
Heres some of our disputes:
1. Moral judgments expressing something subjective vs. being subjective themselves. You seem to be focusing on the latter, while I the former.
2. You believe I didnt provide a positive case for prong-2 of my thesis, but I think the proof of (1) moral judgments being propositional, (2) some moral judgments being true, and (3) that moral judgments do not express something objective entails that moral judgments express something subjective.
3. Truth-aptness for you is not contingent on a statement/sentence, but for me it is.
4. The liar paradox, stated as this statement is false, for you is truth-apt, for me it is not.
5. For you, it seems to be a problem that we cannot acquire 100% certain knowledge of what is objective because we only know it through ourselves as subjects, which I dont see anything wrong with. I have no problem admitting that we only have conditional knowledge of the things-in-themselves, in the sense that we only every analyze representations of things-in-themselves: this doesnt mean that we are just analyzing things which are purely subjective.
6. You seem to think that it is a flaw in my theory that moral judgments cannot never be false relative to the psychology of the person at hand, but this just seems like it is the central idea behind the theory itself.
7. I think that moral permissibility is the allowance to do something, which doesnt entail that one should or should not do it, and you seem to think it means that one should do it; and this is why I think you think there is a symmetry behind my example of eating a sandwhich = permissible and not eating a sandwich = impermissible; but I would say being permissible is not the same thing as one being obligated to do it.
8. I dont think moral nihilism is the view that there is no objective morality; but you seem to think we can simplify it down to that claim.
9. You seem to think you can simplify moral judgments are propositional to true moral judgments are proposition; but, to me, those are clearly too separate claims.
10. At one point, you said I dont believe there are true moral judgments, but I do.
11. Number 11 here is this:
This is not at all what objective morality means [in metaethics].
As a side note:
This is fair. I dont really have a problem saying that we also dont know ourselves except for how we externally and internally affect our sensibility. So, yeah, I agree that things-in-themselves are not objects. But truth isnt a thing-in-itself in that sense...that just seems super weird to say that the relationship itself exists as an entity, a thing-in-itself, out there that we are grasping. This seems platonistic to me.
Which would you like to talk about, or would you like to pause and discuss normative ethics?
Bob
Hello Leontiskos,
Yes, I do. I am not playing devils advocate nor being deceptive: I genuinely believe that, ultimately, moral judgments express something subjectivethere are no moral facts out there.
Thats why it is short-hand for I believe no one should torture babies. I feel like we are circling again.
No, Leontiskos, which premise of which argument that defends the thesis are you contending with? I provided a proof and you seem to just want to sidestep the whole OP.
Again. It is rational justification for me if I believe that one ought not torture babies but not for you. Me disapproving of it doesnt count as convincing justification for you but this doesnt mean I am not justified in subjectively holding you shouldnt do it.
Not a problem! I greatly respect your work and try to give it its full due. I have noted in the past that it is something I greatly appreciate you having done with me in the past. It is the least I can do!
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree it is a bit weird. I was thinking of a better way to say it earlier today as thoughts on your paper were roaming through my head. The thing in itself is objective. Truth as forever unknown to us is a thing in itself. Truth as known to us is subjective, and is at best an approximation that can never be known in the objective sense. The best way to subjectively know truth is to make a judgement that is not contradicted by reality.
Quoting Bob Ross
Honestly Bob, whatever you want. I'm just another subject giving opinions as I look into your ideas from another viewpoint. At any time you can agree to disagree, simply note things that have been stated or move on. It is respect for the time and effort you've put into this work that I try to seriously read your ideas and give it thought. Where this is useful to you, lets us continue. Where it is not, it is not!
Let me at least answer your summaries, and feel free to select what you find worth discussing.
Quoting Bob Ross
To me, I do not see a separation between the two with your definition of subjective. If everything we judge is mind dependent, then all moral judgements are subjective (in the fact we make them) and all moral judgements express something subjective (in the fact we make them). Since what is objective is mind independent, there is nothing we can say, do, or judge that is objective, as it is all subjective.
Quoting Bob Ross
If your claim is simply "Moral judgments express something subjective", by you definition of subjective, this is a given. It is only when you introduce truth where the question of objective comes in. If the thing in itself of a moral judgement correlates with reality, then it is objectively true. To subjectively know this, we simply observe whether our judgement is contradicted by reality.
The point I was trying to get at was not that this was 'wrong'. My point was that the definition of subjective is so broad, that this applies to anything we state, judge, do or say, even outside of morality. It also doesn't negate the fact that there is still objective truth, and how we know that truth subjectively. We might call this subjective truth a non-contradictory belief, or knowledge.
If you are claiming there are subjective moral judgements that are true, then there must be some underlying objective morality that is true. If there is no underlying objective morality in which our subjective judgement correlates with reality, then there is no true subjective moral judgement either. This goes for any statement, intent, action, etc.
Quoting Bob Ross
That's fine, mine is another viewpoint to consider or dismiss.
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't have a problem with the first part at all. But by consequence, this means that everything we analyze is purely subjective, as our analysis is mind dependent. As you have defined subjective, if there is even an iota of mind dependency, its 100% subjective. As defined, everything is purely subjective that we discuss. I have no problem thinking along these lines, I just find that it just makes the term 'subjective' fairly pointless when discussing morality, as everything we do is subjective. For me it boils down to the question, "If what is objective is mind-dependent, how can we as minds ever analyze anything objective?" To me, we can't, therefore everything we do is subjective, not just morality.
Quoting Bob Ross
I really should have used another word, falsifiable. If you are making a claim that something is true, it must also be falsifiable to be considered seriously in application. So for example, if I claimed "God exists", someone should be able to ask, "So what would be the case in which God does not exist?" Even if that case is not true, I should be able to make a case such as, "If I pray and God does not answer, God does not exist". If the claim of God existing was not falsifiable, someone would always come up with an excuse or reason why that doesn't prove God false.
So in what case is your falsifiable claim that moral decisions are true based on our psychology? You need not reply to me, just something to ponder for yourself.
Quoting Bob Ross
My problem with understanding your point was that you seemed to imply that acting in a particular way made it permissible. For something to be permissible, something else must be impermissible. If all is permissible, then there is nothing impermissible. And if there is nothing impermissible, at that point, why even use the term permissibility?
As well, you seemed to imply it was actions itself that made something permissible. But if what is acted upon is permissible, then what is not acted on would be impermissible. Again, if what you did not act on was not impermissible, then it is permissible as well. But then we have everything permissible again, and it just seems simpler to say, "There is nothing one should or should not do, thus no morality."
Quoting Bob Ross
Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality doesn't exist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_nihilism#:~:text=Moral%20nihilism%20(also%20called%20ethical,a%20particular%20culture%20or%20individual.
If there is no objective morality, then it can never be true nothing should or should not be. If nothing should or should not be, then morality does not exist.
Quoting Bob Ross
I wasn't trying to imply that you didn't believe there are true moral judgements, I was noting what it would entail to have a true moral judgement. A subjectively true moral judgement must at some objective level, correlate with reality. This is best known when reality does not actively contradict us.
Quoting Bob Ross
I claimed what it entails for there not to be an objective morality with your definitions. An objective morality in your definitions, would be a moral judgement that objectively correlates with reality. Our understanding of it would be subjective, most likely in our judgement not being contradicted by reality. If there is no objective morality, then all subjective judgements, even contradictory ones, correlate with reality. There is no truth in what one should or should not do, only actions.
Again, feel free to reply what you want to, or move on Bob. Take what is useful and discard the rest. :)
Rational justification doesn't work that way. Propositions are true or false. Conclusions are rationally justified or they aren't. "True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion.
Again, if your moral claims do not even pretend to possess rational justification, then clearly your moral system is ridiculous. Your disjunctive syllogism has led you to an incoherent position.
Edit: The way out of this silliness is to recognize that there are certain universal and/or objective values, such as "suffering is bad" or "suffering should be avoided" (). Even Hume recognized this.
Such black or white thinking. I presume you have some belief about how tall you are. How is that belief rationally justified?
You don't even believe one can be rationally justified with regards to the height of an object? lol...
The fact is, you have to settle for an approximation. Even if you were to get NIST to provide you with a measurement of your height, NIST would qualify their measurement result with an uncertainty.
So how is your belief, as to what your height is, rationally justified without settling for a simplistic answer at some point? I believe you settle for simplistic propositions without realizing that you are doing so. Do you think you can prove me wrong?
Sure, but I won't bother to do so unless @Bob Ross commits himself to your position, namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim. If he honestly thinks that both of these things are similarly unjustifiable, then I will consider responding to your post. If not then I will not consider it worth responding to.
Ah son, I've been involved in so many discussions with Christians like you, that I'm pretty unimpressed with threats to take your ball and go. Do what you need to do. Stomp the dust off your feet, or whatever.
I'm kind of a "He who has ears to hear, let him hear." sort of guy. So no sweat if you need to tune me out for awhile.
Still, perhaps I've instilled some subconscious recognition in you, of your tendency to look at things simplistically. Who knows? Perhaps some day you will have some recognition of how you have looked at morality simplistically.
The words true/truth have very different meanings/usages in math vs talking about the real world of human interactions.
As I understand things, 12 * 12 = 144 is NOT an objective truth, instead it is a mathematical statement that can be proven to be true by applying the axioms of Peano Math. I say this acknowledging that mathematical realism considers this to be objectively true, but I somehow doubt that you are invoking mathematical realism in your statements.
Alternatively, If you were to say "I have 12 cartons of eggs each of which has 12 eggs in it, therefore I have 144 eggs?" That statement would be objectively true.
Just to be clear, when I say "objectively true" I am using the Correspondence Theory of Truth. If you are a witness in a USA court and you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth - you are using the Correspondence Theory of Truth.
But maybe you have a different definition/usage of the words true/truth.
Hello Philosophim,
I appreciate it! (:
Sorry I am playing catch up with all the responses, as I was busy, and I noticed in your other response to my normative theory:
This is why I thought it may be better to move on to normative ethics because I think my metaethical position will make more sense in light of it, simply because my normative ethical theory outlines exactly what I think you are expecting out of my metaethical theory.
I mostly agree with this, if I am understanding it correctly. We never know 100% that what we think corresponds actually does; and I think that is what you are noting by truth is objective and something we cannot know. I just note that we can know it pragmatically, and thats all that matters to me. Truth is not objective, however, in the sense that there is an existent entity of truth, which I think we both agree on.
By a statement expressing something subjective or objective, I mean what it is purporting to understand. Yes, all I see is subjective in the sense that they are representations made by my mind, but those representations are somewhat accurate of whatever really is there: I am not just hallucinating. So, I can make claims which purport to, at least in principle, relate to the objects and not merely my representations of them. Again, knowing whether or not the statement actually latches onto anything objective is pragmatic: we cant 100% know.
Whether or not our beliefs about morality make the moral judgments true is falsifiable.
Whether or not our psychology can be wrong about a moral judgment is independent of whether the claim is falsifiable that our psychology is what makes our moral judgments true.
I would like to note, though, that ultimately our psychology, our approvals and disapprovals, are what make moral judgments true under my view; but psyches are an influx and complicated hierarchy of beliefs, desires, etc. and, thusly, one may have to choose between beliefs they have. Also, I do want to note that this should not be confused with making the claim that everything we cognitively say about morality is thereby true in virtue of being said: I can most certainly formulate false beliefs about my beliefs. I can say I believe torturing babies is perfectly permissible, but I dont actually believe that.
I am not following why this would be the case.
Correct. It correlates to our psychology.
Bob
You are confusing something being rationally justified for me in the sense that it wouldnt rationally justify you in the same circumstances with my position that indexically it is rationally for everyone. But since it is indexical, it can rationally justify me without justifying you if you arent in the same circumstances.
Which premise are you contending with? You just keep sidestepping the whole OP.
I honestly am not familiar with what this claim is: could you elaborate? I can't really comment until I understand what the claim is conveying.
Is rationality different for me and for you? When you provide an argument you are assuming a common standard of rationality, and you are assuming that validity and soundness are the same for you and your interlocutor. Rational justification is similar.
The point here is, "Because I believe it," is not a rational justification (for you or for anyone else). If you think moral claims are truth-apt and some moral claims are true, then you will have to do better than "Because I believe it" to justify the truth of these claims.
Quoting Bob Ross
I have explained multiple times that I am contending the conclusion of your disjunctive syllogism.
For example, if you said, "I have reason to believe the car is not black, and I have reason to believe that the car is not not-black, therefore I have reason to believe that the car is neither," I would point to your conclusion and give arguments for why it is incoherent.
I would say it is the same.
This is does not follow from what was said above, and simply begs the question.
Ok, either you must argue that the disjunctive syllogism, in form, is invalid (such as it isnt actually exhaustive or something) or one of the arguments I gave are invalid (and in that case you would have to tell me which premise or premises you are contending with).
So far you seem to just be saying that you think there are reasons to deny that moral judgments express something subjective without actually demonstrating what is wrong with the disjunctive syllogism that would, in principle, make that claim true.
That is disanalogous. Heres a better example:
I say The car must either be white or black; and I have reasons sufficient to prove it is not black; therefore it is white; and you say but we have reasons sufficient to prove it is not white.
Whats wrong with the reasons I gave for it not being black? Or is it that you think the reasons are valid but are outweighed by the reasons proving it is not white? Or that it could be a different color than white or black?
No, it is analogous. Your disjunctive syllogism has saddled you with a square circle.
I am not going to have time to engage this much going forward, but let me say one last thing. The point here is that if you possess moral truths, and these truths are susceptible to reason, then you should be able to convince others that they are true. Yet to convince someone of something, properly speaking, involves utilizing supra-subjective rationality. If a proposition were not susceptible to supra-subjective rationality, then one subjective individual would not be able to convince another that it is true. Perhaps they could convince another who fortuitously shared their non-truth-apt axioms, but they would not be able to convince someone without this good fortune. Further, if something is not rationally demonstrable, then it is not universally knowable and thence not universally binding. Shorter: if your position is not rationally knowable, then it is not binding.