Is Judith Thomsons abortion analogy valid?
In her essay A Defense of Abortion Judith Thomson uses the example of someone being sick and needing Henry Fonda to touch them to save their life as an example of a need not representing an obligation on someone elses part analogous to a fetus need for their mothers body to live not meaning the mother is obligated to allow it use of her body.
Heres the relevant excerpt:
For we should now, at long last, ask what it comes to, to have a right to life. In some views having a right to life includes having a right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life. But suppose that what in fact IS the bare minimum a man needs for continued life is something he has no right at all to be given? If I am sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the touch of Henry Fondas cool hand on my fevered brow. then all the same, I have no right to be given the touch of Henry Fondas cool hand on my fevered brow. It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide it. It would be less nice, though no doubt well meant, if my friends flew out to the West coast and brought Henry Fonda back with them. But I have no right at all against anybody that he should do this for me.
My question is is this a valid analogy for the moral permissibility of abortion?
If we disregard abortion and interpret the absurd scenario literally would Henry Fonda (or any other person) be morally obligated to touch someone if touching them was the only way to save their life?
Heres the relevant excerpt:
For we should now, at long last, ask what it comes to, to have a right to life. In some views having a right to life includes having a right to be given at least the bare minimum one needs for continued life. But suppose that what in fact IS the bare minimum a man needs for continued life is something he has no right at all to be given? If I am sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the touch of Henry Fondas cool hand on my fevered brow. then all the same, I have no right to be given the touch of Henry Fondas cool hand on my fevered brow. It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide it. It would be less nice, though no doubt well meant, if my friends flew out to the West coast and brought Henry Fonda back with them. But I have no right at all against anybody that he should do this for me.
My question is is this a valid analogy for the moral permissibility of abortion?
If we disregard abortion and interpret the absurd scenario literally would Henry Fonda (or any other person) be morally obligated to touch someone if touching them was the only way to save their life?
Comments (13)
I am in agreement that women should have control over what happens to their bodies and that a foetus should not trump a woman's rights in this respect. We don't allow (without consent) people's bodies to be used for all sorts of things which might save another life (organ or bone marrow donation, etc).
Quoting Captain Homicide
Henry Fonda, the reluctant Jesus... Most of us could probably go out and save a life now but don't.
What is the nature of the obligation in moral obligation? How does that implicit ought work?
Exactly.
Not really. OTOH, the same society that requires that a woman carry a foetus to term - even if it was got by rape, coercion or deceit, even if it's defective - can and does deny that same woman and infant the necessities of a reasonable life. So the obligation is not on Henry Fonda - from whom it would be futile to demand it in any case - but the state government, to save both lives if possible, but if not, at least the mother's.
Oddly enough, France, where abortion is an elective procedure up to 14 weeks of gestation, also has a strong social support structure for single mothers. It seems regimes that do least for their citizens also impose the strictest limitations.
:up:
No, it isn't. It is a false analogy. In a false analogy, the two ideas share one common aspect, nothing else.
There is just too much lack of clarity with these terms, like "obligations" and "rights" as applied to "a fetus growing towards personhood in a pregnant woman", to then build an analogy and expect that it will lend clarity to the terms that could not be plainly put in the first place.
Henry Fonda imparting his healing powers by walking uphill in the snow for nine months and then chopping off his hand. Or maybe the sick person, after having their face touched and healed, has to move in with Henry and scream at him when they are hungry or need new pants fort the next 18 years.
The pregnant woman knows that if she gives birth, if she touches the face, there will be a new thing screaming with more needs. Nothing is finished at birth, unlike after Henry touches the face. That has to be part of the question regarding obligation. We need the fact that a baby, after birth, still must oblige others for it to survive to contextualize a question about what rights that same creature might have before birth. This creates the tension that makes us question killing a fetus in the first place. This analogy does not have that context at all.
I've never seen a good analogy involving pregnancy that doesn't create more distractions than it does elucidations of anything.
Yes and no. You're correct that the Fonda example does nothing to capture the details and nuances of pregnancy. However, the abortion "argument" revolves around the concept of competing interests. In that sense (alone) it does, in an admittedly awkward and clumsy manner, capture that concept.
A bit more pungent.
I'm not sure it's specifically meant as an analogy, but as a reductio ad absurdum against the premise that one person is obligated to save the life of another.
Of course, @Tzeentch raises the point that (at least when sex is consensual), the mother bares some responsibility for the situation in which abortion is considered, and so perhaps a better example would be to ask if Henry Fonda would be obligated to touch her brow if her illness was caused by Henry Fonda himself (even if unintentionally). But then we have to ask; what if he must do more than just touch her brow? What if he must donate a kidney to save her life? Is that too much? Does his obligation to help her only extend so far?
Although as for abortion, the very premise that the foetus has a right to life can also be questioned, and so even if Henry Fonda is obligated to touch her brow to save her life, it wouldn't then follow that abortion is morally impermissible, especially as bearing a child for 9 months and giving birth to it is a much greater burden than just touching someone's brow.
With my post above in mind, consider a slightly more realistic scenario: I knowingly have COVID, but nonetheless attend a party. Someone else catches COVID from me. I fully recover but they are soon to die. They can be saved with a partial lung transplant but none will be available in time. Am I morally obligated to donate a part of my lung to save their life?
Maybe so, but it still has a lot of holes. The fetus isn't famous or valued by anyone in the world - except perhaps as a poster child or slogan. Most of the people campaigning to ban abortion are unwilling to adopt and raise the unwanted babies they intend to "save". Nor will the dependent become a self-sufficient high earner after nine month: it will continue to be a burden of somebody for a considerable period.
Quoting Michael
Certainly she does - only if the sex is consensual - but to whom? Who is to be healed by another's sacrifice? At the point when abortion is considered, there is no illness: it's a quite normal, healthy pregnancy. (If it's not, the whole question alters)
So - zoom out. The woman is not alone responsible for her condition. She had sex with a consenting male partner, who gets off with nothing worse than a notch on his bedpost. They both live in a society that provides a certain environment and culture and education and social service. How many ways should this responsibility be divided?
Quoting Michael
Nobody has a right to life: we are all mortal. Nobody can be guaranteed any particular length of life; anyone can die for any reason at any time between age 0 and 125 (atm).
A society that considers it morally acceptable to kill its foreign enemies, along with any of their family that happens to be in the vicinity, and its own criminal elements, that considers it morally acceptable to let people and other species suffer for its own comfort and convenience, surely can't cavil at terminating its proto-human parasites.
OTOH, if the society truly looks upon the unborn as its children, it should be exerting all necessary effort to prevent unwanted pregnancies, protect girls and women from being impregnated against their will, supporting those who do become pregnant and taking care of the resultant infants, whether the mother is able and willing to or not.
Quoting Michael
Yes. But nobody's all het up to write that into law and punish you for any attempt to evade your responsibility. Political zealots are far more interested in moral issues that involve sex, especially the regulation of female fertility.