Would P-Zombies have Children?
Kids slow you down. They're resource-intensive. They take up vast amounts of time. It seems the only reasons to mate and have them are emotional reasons: the urge to procreate, the feeling your life won't be complete without them, the anticipation of the joy they'll bring, etc. P-zombies don't have urges or emotions, so why would they reproduce?
I suppose it's possible p-zombies could come up with a belief system about the importance of preservation of the species (although I think p-zombies would be entirely self-interested) and have kids based on that. But long before p-zombies got to the stage in their evolutionary development where they can form complex philosophical belief systems about the importance of preservation of the species, they would have been p-zombie primates or p-zombie hamster like creatures with no belief systems. With no urge to reproduce and no way to think of rational reasons to do so, they would have died out very early in their evolutionary development. Is it possible p-zombies are metaphysically impossible?
I suppose it's possible p-zombies could come up with a belief system about the importance of preservation of the species (although I think p-zombies would be entirely self-interested) and have kids based on that. But long before p-zombies got to the stage in their evolutionary development where they can form complex philosophical belief systems about the importance of preservation of the species, they would have been p-zombie primates or p-zombie hamster like creatures with no belief systems. With no urge to reproduce and no way to think of rational reasons to do so, they would have died out very early in their evolutionary development. Is it possible p-zombies are metaphysically impossible?
Comments (153)
Would this assume that the standard model of evolution is the only route to conscious existence? It is entirely possible that an entire world of p-zombies is created completely by the random chance of atom arrangement (possible, but ridiculously improbably haha). I am by no means an expert, just the word 'impossible' always piques my curiosity :)
It's true, a world of completely evolved p-zombies could pop into existence like a Boltzmann Brain. Would the p-zombies then decide to continue their species and reproduce? Is it still metaphysically impossible that p-zombies could evolve into beings like us in the non-Boltzmann way (the "normal" way)?
For a moment there I thought 'lol imagine just popping into existence and how that would feel' but then realised they probably wouldn't feel anything.
I wonder if the act of procreation could be considered self-centred - the continuation of your lineage - and so if they are entirely self-interested it might be in their best interest. Or it could be they are too self-interested to even considered another being. I don't know a great deal about them, but I assume they have no biological drive to procreate (though I did read some are behaviourally identical to humans, so if we say behaviour can be a reaction to biology, they may have the 'continuation of the species' built-in). If their physiology is indistinguishable from a human physiology, would their brain still have that drive?
And then, it's altogether possible p-zombies just randomly start popping into existence in a measured and sustainable volume over time in that particular part of the universe. Could be quite comical.
This gets to the nub of the debate really well I think. The answer to this question depends brings out the different views.
Someone who thinks the physical is causally closed would presumably say the p-zombies would reproduce. Because the reason we reproduce is just because that's what DNA does - it creates reproduction machines. Feelings, emotions and so on are causal illusions, it seems like we do things because of how we feel, but we don't.
There is also a definition problem. p-zombies must reproduce by definition. They are indistinguishable from humans in terms of their behaviour, their response to stimuli etc. But if we think that p-zombies just wouldn't reproduce, then we have a conceptual incoherence - the p-zombie is in principle impossible in some sense.
Do feelings cause action? It certainly seems like they do. I guess I think that p-zombies are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. They are conceivable, because consciousness is not a function. They are metaphysically impossible because panpsychism is true.
P-zombies that procreate are self-replicating machines that look and behave human.
Then we are self-replicating machines, since they are the same as us, except dead inside. But as Bert points out:
Quoting bert1
I think this goes to the heart of it. I don't think we're just self-replicating machines because I think it's obvious we are motivated by desires and feelings. Would a materialist grant that a p-zombie might act completely different than a human because it can't have desires or feelings? But if the materialist grants that, wouldn't that imply a p-zombie human and a normal human really aren't that much alike after all?
Quoting bert1
They happen to cause action in our case, but it is possible that in some other world those same actions are caused by something other than feelings.
Quoting RogueAI
They wouldn't be p-zombies if they acted differently. A p-zombie is defined as an entity that looks and behaves human but that does not have conscious experience.
True, but if feelings are sufficient for action (and I think it's obvious feelings are sufficient motivators to do certain things), and x has feelings and y doesn't, x may behave differently than y.
They may also behave the same. Or it may be that both x and y have feelings but still behave differently.
Would a p-zombie ever murder someone after having a bunch of drinks at a bar and getting in an argument, and then a fight? Or is that uniquely a human thing?
Could a p-zombie commit a crime of passion?
A p-zombie, by definition, will look and behave exactly like us. Anything we can do they can do. They're just not conscious.
How could a zombie commit a crime of passion??? By definition they have no passions.
Yes.
Them killing someone after an argument after drinking alcohol wouldn't be a crime of passion then.
Isn't it a little far-fetched to imagine a p-zombie getting in a drunken argument and murdering someone? Doesn't something like that require a lot of anger, which they don't have? For that matter, why would they drink alcohol or do any kind of drugs? There's no mind for them to alter.
The more we discuss them the more incoherent they seem.
Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction
The brain controls the body. Drugs (and other normal stimuli like light and sound) affect the functioning of the brain.
Are you conscious?
I find it very hard to believe. But I can believe that there are differences in neural architecture such that for some people this qualia talk makes no sense. What this implies for your subjective state, if indeed there is on, is hard to say.
I used to come across "I'm a p-zombie" in the international skeptics forum many years ago.
I react to data from my senses. So yes, I am conscious in the same way that a self-driving car is conscious of the traffic around it.
No, not conscious in the Chalmers sense, something more, something that machines cannot have. I've looked for the 'more' part, the part that is inexplicable, and find only the automaton.
Quoting hypericinThen the P-zombie argument falls flat because it is unbelievable that something could behave identically externally without that extra thing on the inside. The argument hinges on not being able to tell. So you must believe.
Quoting RogueAI
They'd act very different if they didn't look like that. As said in terminator, I sense injuries. The data could be called "pain.". I react in a way that attempts to minimize that pain, sometimes quite irrationally. The face expressions? Those seem to come from subconscious places to which I have no direct access. A sleeping (unconscious) person will still wince in pain given certain stimuli.
One of these must be true:
1. I consider myself to be a p-zombie is false because you are a p-zombie and so dont believe anything.
2. I consider myself to be a p-zombie is false because you are not a p-zombie and believe that you are not a p-zombie.
3. I consider myself to be a p-zombie is true because you are not a p-zombie and believe that you are a p-zombie.
The statement I consider myself to be a p-zombie is only true if you are not a p-zombie and so no rational person can believe themselves to be a p-zombie.
I think p-zombies may believe things. They have the capacity to record and analyze information the same way we do. There is just no concomitant phenomenal experience of believing.
It is a thought experiment, it is an open question whether it is believable or not. But this is a different matter than having a real life p-zombie talking to you on a forum.
It may or may not be logically possible. But it seems much more likely that it is a matter of neural differences which make the concept of qualia obscure. Or simple confusion.
Im not sure that counts as belief. Belief seems to me to be a conscious activity. Machines can record and analyze information but they dont believe anything.
You are free to not count that as belief. But you cannot use that to then logically conclude that "I consider myself to be a p-zombie" is only true when he is not a p-zombie. By definition, you have excluded the possibility that he p-believes it.
That is, when he says "I consider myself to be a p-zombie", what he really means (to you) is "I p-consider myself to be a p-zombie".
Yes, but any p-zombie or human would say that. It's not a question that distinguishes the two cases. I've been taught that 'hurt' and 'feel bad' are appropriate ways to express the state of my information processor when it detects signals originating from nociceptors. Most self-driving cars don't have these, so in that sense, the car is a poor example.
Not sure what having children has to do with being conscious. Things have been having children since eukaryotes, which arguably are not particularly conscious.
Quoting MichaelOK, 'belief' is one of those things reserved. It is not appropriate to say that a self-driving car believes that steering onto the soft shoulder at speed would be a poor choice. Different language must be used.
All that said, the statement "I consider myself to be..." does not use the word 'believe'. If you equate them, then you really need to pony up a generic word that applies to cars and such which consider some judgement to be 'true'.
But a p-zombie making the same statement would be one of truth, even if the phrasing is designated to not be allowed by you.
OK, so it's false, only because the actual p-zombie is not allowed to use the phrasing. The p-zombie differs on that ruling.
Quoting hypericinBelief in it is critical to the argument. The p-zombie apparently isn't allowed to 'believe', so there's seemingly no position from which an actual p-zombie can argue his case.
Chalmers is full of descriptions of all this miraculous stuff that isn't physically possible. It's so obvious to the people actually conscious (his definition), leaving people like me wondering what the miracle is. There's nothing inexplicable. No hard problem, so the conclusion is that Chalmers experiences something I don't, something that cannot be conveyed to me, which is sort of like trying to convey the experience of seeing red to Mary. I can pick red out of a box of crayons by sight, as can a robot. Mary was never given a chance to, so I'm not sure if the analogy is apt.
I cannot think of anything I can do that a machine cannot. Chalmers has access to something that obviously is out of reach of the machine. The conclusion is that I'm missing what he experiences.
When humans say "pain hurts" it's true. When a p-zombie says it, it's not. And, I'm not so sure a p-zombie would say "pain hurts". Why would they lie? Wouldn't they just be confused about what "hurting" is and ask for clarification?
I assume you are telling the truth when you say "pain hurts" and it does indeed hurt so you are not a p-zombie.
Perhaps they have desires and urges we're not aware of.
And, I'm not so sure a p-zombie would say that. Why would they lie?[/quote]Lies are intentional. The p-zombies doesn't know. I only suspect because there's something missing, something many others find obvious, but not all.
You're definitely confusing me when y'all say there's a whole vocabulary that I'm not allowed to use, and without giving me replacement words. So I use the words.
It is truth, but 'hurts' to me is just detection of signals of injury. It's not like I lie and don't actually get this sensory input. But the extra bit, that which I would be totally unaware except for people talking about how obvious and inexplicable it is, only the talk of that makes me aware of something more that should be there.
Quoting RogueAI
I would hope so. They invented sex after all.
You could just say I am a p-zombie.
What does p-consider mean?
P-zombies have no consciousness. They just have an outward appearance (including observable behaviour). Youll need to explain it in these terms.
(By outward appearances I dont mean to exclude muscles and bones and internal organs)
I don't agree with this. "so he says he feels pain, not knowing that it isn't real pain". That's an epistemic issue, not a truth issue. For any x, if x is not feeling pain/hurting, and x says it is feeling pain/hurting, x is wrong. X is saying something false.
But this isn't true for you. Pain/hurting is more than just a detection of signals of injury. Pain/hurting hurts. It feels bad.
"p-consider", "p-belief" is all the informational operations of "consider", "belief" without the conscious part. Like how a computer-vision program might "believe" it is looking at a table, without any conscious awareness of it.
But belief is a conscious mental activity. P-belief/p-consider is incoherent. It's missing a necessary condition for anything that remotely resembles believing and considering. P-belief is so far removed from actual belief, calling it p-belief is misleading.
Exactly. Zombies by definition behave as we do, but they cannot adopt attitudes towards propositions, and so do not have beliefs.
This thread is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical zombies.
One might suppose that the OP question could become "would a being without attitudes or intentions reproduce?". The answer is that it would behave as its physical circumstances dictate. If they dictated reproduction, then the zombies would reproduce.
, you are attributing the intent to expediency to zombies. They do not have intent.
We don't behave this way, so p-zombies would not behave this way. But without a mind, how could they behave in any other way? I think there may be a contradiction here.
What do you think a philosophical zombie is?
Edit: no, forget that. I see others have tried to explain the error in the OP to you. I'll leave you to it.
Something like "the computer algorithm inside my head has caused me to speak the phrase 'I am not a p-zombie'"?
Certainly that's possibly true, but anything that speaks like that isn't a very good facsimile of a real person, and so isn't a p-zombie.
If they're a convincing doppelganger, as p-zombies are, then they speak ordinary English, in which case the word "belief" that they use means what the word "belief" means in ordinary English. And so any self-proclaimed belief, as expressed by a p-zombie, is false. P-zombies, by definition, don't believe anything.
The misunderstanding is once again yours. If you ask a p-zombie, "will the sun rise tomorrow", they would say "yes, I believe so". By definition they behave as we do. This includes belief. They will report beliefs, and behave as if they believe. The only difference is that none of these behaviors is accompanied by experience.
They would of course never say that, and may be naïve to the notion of computer algorithm. Something inside their heads causes them to say things, just as it does for us. The only difference is the lights are out.
Which is precisely why their claims, when made by them, are false.
"I am conscious" is false when said by a p-zombie.
"I believe that I am a p-zombie" is false when said by a p-zombie.
The words they use mean what they mean in ordinary English. They certainly don't have the intention to mean anything else.
This "obvious error" rests on the presumption that inner life is necessary to the notion "belief".
I'm not convinced that "belief", unlike "conscious", entails inner life.
But the larger point is, your "cheating" here:
Quoting Michael
You can disqualify the statement because by your definition belief must entail consciousness. But the fact remains that they might be a p-zombie, along with the informational p-zombie belief-analog that they are p-zombies.
Judging by your incessant posting, you have no life at all, let alone "inner", so I'm not sure on what authority you speak.
Whatever "belief-analog" they have isn't belief.
If the p-zombies are speaking English then the words they use mean what they mean in English, and "belief" in English means something like "the subjective attitude that a proposition is true."
Yes, which is why I said this.
Wouldn't it be preferable to say intentional attitude? That's the usual term used by philosophers, with a quite substantial backing in the literature. It avoids the problematic notion of the subjective.
There is someone who made a thread yesterday or the day before explaining how he has no inner monologue and also cannot form images mentally.
But wouldn't "belief", for a p-zombie, be precisely this "belief-analog"? It might be false on your notion of belief, but not theirs.
Sure, I just grabbed that definition from Wikipedia.
"Belief" is a word in the English language that has a well-established meaning. If p-zombies are speaking English then the word "belief" means what it means in English.
This is true for the majority of people, it seems. https://www.iflscience.com/people-with-no-internal-monologue-explain-what-its-like-in-their-head-57739
https://irisreading.com/is-it-normal-to-not-have-an-internal-monologue/
I find it fascinating - and fascinating that it took until 2022 for a real grappling to occur.
Which? I've heard of this before, its super interesting that we have so much variation in our inner lives, yet almost never talk about it.
The relevant definition in Webster's is "something that is accepted, considered to be true, or held as an opinion". This to me doesn't entail subjective state.
Thinking words for me is like reading a book but not imagining what is happening, you just repeat the words you read. It is only when I focus on what I am reading and follow along by imagining it that I can remember anything of what I read. But reading more than 30 pages for me in one sitting is quite exhausting when it comes to complex books like the Iliad or La Commedia. Maybe that explains how some people are able to read 200+ pages of classics in a day they are not quite reading it.
This guy right here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14847/are-words-more-than-their-symbols/
Quoting hypericin
You sure?
Conversely, as noted in that thread, I have an extremely active internal dialogue to, at times, a debilitating degree. I cannot understand how you could possibly deal with systematic knowledge, or logically working through propositions without definitive reference to prior thought - whcih occur to my mind in sentences/phrases. I can't 'image' an emotional concept, for instance, but i can put it into words and hold that while i tinker with the next element of the larger thought process. If i attempt to think in concepts and images only, not only is it utterly, dismally, emotionally triggeringly boring, I can't make heads or tails of fucking anything. I can't only make sense of images in reference to the language in which i first understood the image (perhaps this was a process of acquiring 'concepts' when i was an infant), or subsequently reappraised it under.
This parallels what I experience. I think you might underestimate the inner monologue. After all, I am guessing that animals can think visually as well. Our ability to manipulate glyphs which represent arbitrary concepts, both aloud and internally, is part of what sets our cognitive ability apart.
But then again, there's these guys who just don't have it! Crazy..
I do use internal monologue quite a bit. When I am having my "ADHD moments" (I am not diagnosed but everybody has those every now and then), the voice keeps going, and even forces my mouth to speak the words occasionally. But as I hinted, I only use internal monologue intentionally when there is a need or a desire to turn thoughts into words, which might help with clarity and memory especially when I move from one thought to another while needing to remember the previous. But when I just "need to think", I don't use words.
You have a point. Let's stipulate p-zombies have beliefs. Would a p-zombie believe it's in pain (the way a human understands pain, which is accompanied by a feeling) if it's not actually in pain? Suppose a p-zombie burns it's finger, and has damaged itself, but there is no feeling of pain. Would it believe it's in pain? In other words, would it believe something it knows to be false?
I think it would believe that "pain" denotes the cluster of behaviors that it and we engage in when injured. So long as it is engaging in these behaviors, it is "in pain".
I mentioned something about how animals think without words in that thread. So I felt like commenting on this aspect here.
Although animals will have wordless thoughts in one way or another, the argument can well be made that thinking via words will set limitations on what can be thought by humans, this in manners that wordless thinking will not. This limiting of thought via words that grants thought relatively stringent structure would then be a hindrance in activities ranging from novel artistic expressions to novel ideas in both the sciences and in philosophies.
For humans, wordless thought can think outside of the box in which word-driven thought resides, so to speak. Sometimes in very abstract (and logically consistent) manners.
What does it mean to "accept", "consider", or "hold as an opinion"? Again, these aren't terms that it makes sense to attribute to a p-zombie. A p-zombie is just a machine that responds to stimulation. It's an organic clockwork-like body that moves and makes sound.
It's quite ironic that you're anthropomorphising p-zombies.
Quoting Michael
Until recently, only humans could "accept", "consider", or "hold as an opinion", and it has been generally presumed that these are always accompanied by subjective states. This is a fact, but it does not imply that these notions are incoherent without subjective states.
But now, it is not true anymore. Take ChatGPT. You can ask it to "consider X", that is, to examine a proposition without being committed to its belief, and it obliges very well, without a trace of subjective state.
Quoting Michael
Why ironic? They are already maximally anthropomorphized.
This gets me thinking about 'muscle memory' events, like knocking a cup off a counter and reflexively catching it without time to think. We must have subconscious expectations which direct moving our hand to where it needs to be to catch the cup. Are these subconscious expectations not in some sense beliefs? And if we posit conscious beliefs and subconscious beliefs, is there a clear dividing line?
Well given that a p-zombie:
1) Behaves identically to a regular person;
2) The reason it behaves are for the same reasons as a regular person (i.e. it has a human brain that performs functions just like ours); and
3) The circumstances about the world under which I myself am "accepting" or "considering" things is the same as which apply to the p-zombie (in regard to the p-zombie performing acts of p-"considering" and p-"accepting", etc);
Then maybe it makes sense to attribute to it these things you mentioned after all. For all intents and purposes they cannot be distinguished in either case.
Edit: attempt at clarification same points, partly by formatting.
Most of us don't know it. It isn't easy to tell until you get a glimpse of the bit being missed, sort of like having your vision restored after cataracts have reduced you to near grayscale levels.
Quoting Michael
Hence my attempt with the car, which very much is aware of its surroundings, but 'aware' is perhaps one of those forbidden words. It all smacks of racism. They basically degraded black slaves by refusing to use human terms for anything related to them, using cattle terms instead,.It made it easy to justify how they were treated. "Cows don't feel pain. Neither do p-zombies. It's not immoral to set em on fire."
I'm sorry, just because we're not conscious in the Chalmer way doesn't mean we don't hold beliefs. I refuse to withhold perfectly understandable terms when no alternatives are offered.
Quoting RogueAI
I didn't say the statement "so he says he feels pain, not knowing that it isn't real pain" was true.
I said the statement, "pain hurts" is true regardless of what utters it.
Quoting RogueAI
That's just using a language bias to attempt a demonstration of a difference where there isn't one. A Roomba cannot be conscious because you define 'conscious' to only apply to humans. That doesn't demonstrate that a pimped-out Roomba isn't doing the exact same thing, it only means that the Roomba needs to pick a different word for the exact same thing, and then tell the human that he isn't that sort of conscious because he's an inferior human.
That's the sort of argument I see coming from everybody. The word is not legally applied to you, therefore you you're not doing what the chosen race is doing.
Quoting RogueAI
What is the computer doing then when it processes data from a camera pointed at a table. The computer 'concludes' (probably a forbidden word) that there is a table in front of the camera in question, and outputs a statement "there seems to be a table in front of the camera". You say it's not a mental activity. I agree with that. That usage of "mental activity" only applies to an immaterial mind such as Chalmers envisions. So OK, you can't express that the computer believes there's a table there, or that it concludes that. How do you phrase what the computer does when it does the exact same thing as the human, which is deduce (presumably another forbidden word) the nature of the object in the field of view.
If you can't provide acceptable alternative terms, then I'm sorry, the computer believes there's a table there. Deal with it.
Quoting BannoSo I claim I'm doing. But how would you express what the p-zombie does when it correctly identifies the table in front of it that it cannot 'see'?
Quoting RogueAII do, and you don't. So why are we indistinguishable (except for me deciding to stop imitating the language you use for that which I cannot ever know)?
I don't have a computer algorithm in my head. My head does not implement a Von-Neumann architecture, even though I'm capable of simulating one, and a Von-Neumann machine is capable of simulating me. None of that is true of you. The lights are out for me, but I don't know it since I've never experienced the light and had that 'ooooohh' moment.
Quoting hypericin
Well, per Michael, this includes false claims of belief. I'm doing something that I think is belief, but Michael says it's by definition false.
I would say, if your claim were true, it would be a revolutionary finding, and upend our notions about what it means to be human.
Hence, forgive my skepticism.
I still think the problem is conceptual. Frankly, it is hard to think about, how this mistake might arise.
Interesting stuff, regardless. New OP? "I am a p-zombie, prove me wrong"?
Quoting noAxioms
:up:
It wouldn't be a finding at all. If it was true, nobody (not even I) would know for sure. Of course, I'm sure that 'knowing' things (and being 'sure') are all forbidden. But I do have whatever it takes to pass an interview for a technical job, even if it isn't knowledge. I have claims of it on my resume, all false apparently.
Apologies to RogueAI for somewhat hijacking this topic. It's about p-zombies still, but not much about having children. I have no way of knowing if my kids are conscious or not. Not sure if a new topic would cover any ground not already covered.
I'm enjoying the thread.
It doesn't seem at all appropriate to say that it believes or accepts or considers anything. That would be a very obvious misuse of language.
ChatGPT and p-zombies are just very complicated versions of the above, with p-zombies having a meat suit.
Because RubbishAI lacks every feature that would otherwise make this language appropriate.
Quoting Michael
In most contexts we make extremely fine taxonomic distinctions between objects, even though they definitely have no subjectivity. But suddenly when subjectivity is involved, you want to flatten everything not subjective into one big pile. Even p-zombies, which are physically and behaviorally identical, only lacking a presumed quality you cannot see or verify. We might spend the rest of our life's allotment of time on this forum going back and forth with @noAxioms and still not definitively figure out whether he is a p-zombie or not.
I agree. If he were to just to say I am a p-zombie then I would accept that its possibly true. I am simply explaining that I believe that I am a p-zombie is false if he is a p-zombie and irrational if hes not.
Well, the point of the p-zombie thought experiment is to figure out what phenomenal experience does, if anything. If I understand epiphenomenalism right, that's the idea that phenomenal experience does absolutely nothing. Under an epiphenomenal view, a p-zombie should be able to believe things (as not being able to experience its own belief adds nothing of value to the concept of believing).
Internal organs include the brain, right? So I have aphantasia. I look at things, my visual cortex is active. I imagine things, my visual cortex is not or barely active. The same would be true for my p-zombie twin. A p-zombie without aphantasia would have an active visual cortex when seeing things, and thus he wouldn't be lying when he said he sees things in his head.
It's just that seeing things in your head isn't accompanied by any phenomenal experience; it's just the visual cortex (among other things) doing its thing.
How we interpret this state of affairs probably differs from philosophy to philosophy, from person to person. Ordinary langauge generally doesn't take into account the question what (if anything) phenomenal consciousness does. We cannot observe anyone's phenomenal consciousness outside of our own, anyway, so we just assume that other people have it, too. That's such a total assumption under usual circumstances, that we don't raise the topic at all.
But with the p-zombie thought experiment we must. A p-zombie can have aphantasia (to the extent that its brain behaves like an aphantasiac brain), be insentive to pain, detect phantom limbs after an operation... all that groovy stuff that can come with a human brain, which he has. A p-zombie, by definition, has subjectivity to the extent that the brain is involved. But a p-zombie can't experience subjectivity as a phenomenon.
So a p-zombie can believe things as far as brain-activity is involved, but a p-zombie can not experience believing things. So believing things would be brain behaviour accompanied by corresponding experience, and p-believing things would be brain behaviour not accompanied by experience.
I'm not sure what I think of this myself. But it makes sense to me that, if p-zombies are biologically indistinguishable from non-p-zombies, that you could have p-zombies that are sensetive to pain, and p-zombies that are insensitive to pain, as this has behavioural consequences. Sentences like "P-zombies don't feel pain," are therefore too imprecise in the context of this thought experiment. The problem is, thoug, once we push through to the experience part of the thought experiment we're pretty much in uncharted terrain, and it's all fuzzy and imprecise. I mean what's the difference between holding and experiencing a believe and holding but not experiencing a believe?
Quoting Michael
If a p-zombie's body is "an organic clockwork-like body that moves and makes sound" then so is yours or mine. The bodies are indistinguishable. So what is this consciousness? How important is it? I'd say that makes them significantly human; I've not yet figured out what difference consciousness makes, but then that's part of the point of the thought experiment to begin with.
I dont think the meaning of the word belief can be reduced to an explanation of brain states, just as I dont think the meaning of the phrase phenomenal subjective experience can be reduced to an explanation of brain states.
If we are p-zombies then we dont have phenomenal subjective experiences and we dont have beliefs. We just react to stimuli.
Maybe. I know they're supposed to be behaviorally identical to us, but address this point: When I burn my finger, I might cry out "that hurts" and also have the belief that I'm in pain (because I actually am). When my p-zombie counterpart burns its finger it also cries out "that hurts", but does it also believe it's in pain? If it does, then it's believing something it knows to be false (engaging in doublethink), since it has all my knowledge and would know that p-zombies, by definition, cannot feel pain. If it doesn't believe it's in pain, then I and the p-zombie are no longer acting the same way, since we now have different beliefs. Either way, it seems, the p-zombie is a lot different than me: either it's constantly engaging in doublethink, or it's beliefs and my beliefs are a lot different.
The p-zombie doesnt believe anything. It just burns its finger and cries out that hurts.
I'm not so sure it doesn't have beliefs. Hypericin made a good case. If they do have beliefs, what do you think of the point I made a post ago?
If they do have beliefs then theyre conscious and so not p zombies.
1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness
2. P-zombies are not a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is non-physical
4. Therefore either physicalism is false or nothing is conscious
5. We are conscious
6. Therefore physicalism is false
The p-zombie argument is a thought experience that intends to show that either substance or property dualism is correct. It isnt a skeptical argument that suggests that p-zombies might actually exist.
Does the p-zombie have knowledge?
No
OK, so let's say we have a p-zombie duplicate of me, and we plunk it down in a world identical to this one, right? Me and the p-zombie should then act the same way, only the zombie is dead inside. If all the variables are identical, there should be no divergence between us as we go about our business, right? I go to work, it goes to work. It does my job as well as I do.
Yes
Why think it does work? I think the most reasonable perspective on p-zombies is that they are an incoherent idea.
They seem to be.
Neither do I. I'm not sure what in my post made you think I did. For example, the "as far as" in the line quoted was meant as a limit to similarity. I focus on brain-states because they're the common point here.
Quoting Michael
Obviously not. That's the added-in extra, no? If brain-states are the common point, experience is the divergence.
You seem to just assume that phenomenal experience is a prequesit to having beliefs. Maybe it's obvious to you, but I don't get it. I think I'd have an easier time understanding you if you outright rejected p-zombies as an incoherent concept. It feels like you're doing that to me.
That's right, and the thing you seem to miss out on in your op
Quoting RogueAI
I would have thought they don't necessarily have any beliefs whatsoever, but I suppose there are various types of zombies one might think up for the thought experiment.
So then we're back to the problem I laid out a couple posts prior. They don't have beliefs, so they don't have knowledge. How then are they navigating the world like humans do if they don't know anything? Are they following some program? But that begs all sorts of questions.
External stimuli such as light and sound stimulate its sense receptors, these signals are sent to the brain which then responds by sending signals to the muscles causing it to move in the manner appropriate to navigate the stimulus.
P-zombies are a collection of bones and muscles and blood and organs and a central nervous system, including a brain, that reacts to stimuli.
What part of the mechanical body and its internal or external motions does the word belief refer to? I say none of it. Not its bones, not its brain, not its limbs or lips moving. The word belief points to some non-mechanical aspect of our being, i.e some conscious activity that p-zombies by definition dont have.
It is a program that given an input sentence, repeatedly selects a word, from a database of word sequences, that is likely to go next, forming sentences.
It has no feelings, beliefs, knowledge or intentions.
So I asked it, and it replied
(Grist to the mill. Another four or five pages...)
It depends on how you want to define knowledge. If it's just a matter of having access to justification for an assertion, or being able to demonstrate some proficiency, then a p-zombie can have knowledge. If you want knowledge to have some extra phenomenal aspect, then obviously p-zombies wouldn't have it.
On that note, I present this:
One of these is a duck. It swims, quacks, and avoids predators. The other is a p-zuck, which does none of that by definition. It simply behaves as its physical circumstances dictate. No more.
It is impossible by any test to tell which is which.
The duck quacks, and reacts to a quack noise by another. The physical circumstances of the p-zuck dictate that it produces a series of air vibrations that the duck interprets as a quack, but the 'quack' statement as understood by the duck is false because that which produced the vibrations does not quack.
The duck also is not sure if it is itself a p-zuck since it cannot tell the difference and as far as the duck can tell by any test imaginable, it also behaves as its physical circumstances dictate. So it's potential conclusion either way is not irrational. It truly doesn't know. Neither does the p-zuck, but what it is doing is not 'concluding' or 'believing' and it cannot communicate its conundrum because it has no available language by which it can express what its physical circumstances are dictating.
Swimming, quacking, and avoiding predators are mechanical behaviours and so they are exactly what a p-duck does.
The whole point of a pzombie is that it behaves identically to a human, it simply doesn't have the inner experience to go along with it. So, the short answer to your question, I think would be yes, they'd still procreate since we do.
But, you've raised an interesting question...
Do we procreate simply due to our inner experiences? Emotions, urges, logistics, etc? Hmm, that's a hard one...
Well, we know a virus or even a simple single called organism procreates. What degree of inner experience do we assign to them? Certainly not emotions... maybe a prototypical kind of urge? I don't think it can even be called an urge at this point. Yet, they reproduced nonetheless.
Once you decide they're impossible, questions about what they do or what they believe become moot.
Impossible because conscious experience is physical or impossible because non-physical conscious experience is a necessary consequence of brain activity (or other physical processes in the body)?
I wouldn't say impossible, but it's ludicrous to think there would be a couple of p-zombies carrying on, what to us would appear to be a deeply personal heartfelt conversation, while in fact their conversation is simply meaningless noises they are making for no reason.
I have to think that people considering p-zombies plausible is a result of not having really thought through what is under consideration.
I think you need to read this.
I don't see a need to reject 2 in order to reject 3.
Getting to 3 in your argument seems to require a non-sequitur.
If consciousness is physical and if we are conscious then anything that is physically identical to us is conscious and anything that isnt conscious is physically different.
Therefore if we are conscious and if it is possible for something to be physically identical to us but not be conscious then it must be that consciousness is non physical.
And yet there are people who pretty much live like zombies, at least some of their time. Not people in a coma, but people who mindlessly peruse Facebook and such. As if they were robots. Even when they talk about their "hopes and dreams", it all sounds so rehearsed and artificial that one cannot but wonder whether there is actually anyone at home there.
Ah, I was hasty and didn't pay sufficient attention to the "identical" in 1.
With that aspect of the definition in mind, I'll shove p-zombies the short distance from utterly ludicrous to metaphysically impossible.
Those people are not physically identical to us, and so aren't relevant to Michael's argument.
So, physically identical except in respect of its lacking consciousness, possibly physical?
Or, physically identical but different non-physically, in respect of its lacking consciousness, presumed non-physical?
There are two different senses of consciousness. One is functional consciousness, such as the ability to sense and react to stimulus. The p-zombie has this kind of consciousness. What it lacks is phenomenal consciousness. There is no experience that accompanies its interactions.
If I want to make the argument that phenomenal consciousness is fully addressed by an explanation of functional consciousness, my argument is vulnerable to the p-zombie argument. Since it's conceivable that a person could have the functions without the phenomenal, I have the burden of proving that functionality explains phenomenality. That would require that I have a working theory of consciousness, which doesn't exist at this time.
The outcome is that the "hardness" of the hard problem is affirmed. You could cast it as a threat to physicalism, but if we more fully understand phenomenal consciousness, we'll probably just add that to the realm of the physical. That's what's happened with other discoveries that upended previous conceptions of physicality. So the p-zombie argument just ends up saying that there's a giant gap in our understanding.
We can conceive of something that is physically identical to us not having consciousness, therefore it is metaphysically possible for something physically identical to us to not have consciousness, therefore consciousness isn't physical.
So, the latter?
How do you get from being able to imagine something, to that thing being metaphysically possible?
People can certainly imagine things that aren't physically possible. Why would the situation be different for metaphysical possibility.
Logical and metaphysical possibility amount to the same thing. A thing is metaphysically possible if some god could make it so.
Philosophers disagree.
"Inflationists, such as David Chalmers (2002), hold Modal Monism, the view that there is only one modal notion or primitive, such that metaphysical and logical modality coincide."
SEP
Since the p-zombie argument is associated with Chalmers, we might want to consider the way he uses "metaphysical possibility."
I'd just say Chalmers has bad epistemic hygiene. Inflationism might be handy for making weak arguments appear strong, but I'm not seeing a good reason to take it seriously based on what the SEP says.
How would you explain the difference between logical and metaphysical possibility?
I keep trying to imagine a zombie version of me doing my job effectively without knowing anything and then coming home and kicking its feet up and having drinks without feeling alcohol cravings and I keep failing. I think the whole p-zombie is incoherent. Do you at least see where I'm coming from?
It makes absolutely no sense that there could be things out there with no conscious yet they routinely claim they are conscious and enter into debates about the hard problem of consciousness.
Moreover, because our brains are the things which are functionally responsible for our conscious claims, it follows that the reason I, as a conscious being, believe that I am conscious is for the exact same reasons that a p-zombie believes it is consciousness, even though the p-zombie is wrong and I just happen to be correct.
To me, science doesn't seem to give or necessitate any room for anything additional to routine physics and biology as explanations for why our brains behave the way they do so it is strange that a p-zombie would make these claims from the physical interactions of the brain. And the fact that my brain is only interacting with physical things brings up the question of how I can even know I am phenomenally conscious if the brain mediates all my knowledge. My knowledge about my own consciousness would be entirely incidental.
So it follows that phenomenal consciousness is entirely redudnant.
The simplest explanation is that there is no duality between the mind and brain. P-zombies are incoherent and don't make sense in the actual world at all.
The body is a physical object. Muscles contracting, neurons firing, sense receptors responding to various stimuli; all of this is purely mechanical.
I think the problem is that you keep trying to think of the why in intentional terms, when in fact intentions have nothing to do with it. Im sure you know of deterministic arguments against free will? So just consider them. P-zombies have no free will. Everything they do is a physical effect of prior physical causes.
Theyre an advanced ChatGPT in an advanced Boston Dynamics robot.
I think he's right, but that's because I'm a panpstychist. I suspect all causation is, at bottom, psychological. That avoids overdetermination.
The p-zombie argument is an argument against physicalism. If you're a panpsychist then the p-zombie argument is irrelevant. You already accept the conclusion that the mind is non-physical.
Yes, that's pretty much true. I just wanted to point out the problem of over-determination, which RogueAI is approaching. He may have an overdetermination problem if he thinks causation in humans is psychological, and I wonder how he handles it.
Or the p-zombie argument shows that we would need to expand the concept of physical in order to accommodate phenomenal consciousness. It also puts the burden of proof on a reductive physicalist.
Because it's so obviously true. Are you going to tell me you've never done anything purely based on psychological reasons or because you were compelled by desire or rage or passion?
That I did it for psychological reasons isnt that it couldnt have been done for non-psychological reasons.
What would the non-psychological reason be for, say, killing a cheating spouse for revenge?
Physical determinism.
Which takes us back to consciousness and mental states. Physicalism would be on much more solid ground if it could explain consciousness, but it loses bets like this: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-25-year-old-bet-about-consciousness-has-finally-been-settled/
and I predict it will keep losing those bets because it's a dead end.
Quoting Michael
This argument seems to depend on consciousness having zero benefit or purpose. It would never have been selected for since it brings zero benefit. The argument makes somewhat more sense if one is in denial of evolution of course.
The p-zombie can function identically without the consciousness (as I do). It reports the same experience (except I don't in this conversation because I've been stripped of the vocabulary necessary to do so). So line 3 should be "Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is undetectable". It seems to be more of an argument for epiphenomenalism.
Lines 1 and 5 beg the conclusion, making the argument fallacious. I claim I am not 'conscious'. I would be lying if I said I was.
If physicalism was true, the non-conscious being would make the exact same argument as above, per line 1, demonstrating that the argument carries no weight.
Quoting Michael
This also begs the conclusion.
Quoting Michael
How do you know that this isn't a description about how you work? I mean if it was, then by definition you would not know it, so I guess I am asking how you would report that you know that this isn't a description of how you work.
Quoting Michael
How do you know that you have this sort of free will? Given many definitions of free will (that your choices are not the result of physical causes), I agree with your argument above. But then this zombie has no idea why anyone would benefit from that sort of free will. It sounds like a curse.
Quoting MichaelBy your definition it cannot be. You've made that very clear.
Quoting wonderer1Only because the language forbids using half those words for what the zombie is doing. It very much claims 'heartfelt', 'meaningful', etc, but they're apparently all lies. The zombies doesn't know that they're lies.
Line 1 is just a definition.
Line 5 doesn't beg the question because it doesn't claim that consciousness is non-physical. It just claims that whatever consciousness is we have it. A physicalist can also accept this premise.
Quoting Michael
Quoting noAxioms
Yes, this is one of the common counterarguments against the p-zombie argument.
1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness[/quote]
Physically identical implies that the difference is non-physical. 'We' have something non-physical that the physically identical zombie doesn't. That's very much begging the conclusion. I mean the conclusion is drawn by step 3 without any additional unreasonable premises.Step 1 defines consciousness to be supernatural, and step 5 asserts that we have it, per that definition. How is this possibly not begging?
So I attempted to interpret this in a non-begging way, allowing consciousness to be a physical process. In that case the p-zombie would not by physically identical, but rather some physical difference rendering him unconscious,and an unconscious person does not plausibly behave like a conscious one. It would be like asserting that you with all your senses cut off (not to mention voluntary motor control), would still be able to function without anybody noticing the difference.
Under physicalism, both the conscious and unconscious people would behaves as their physical circumstances dictate. Somebody behaving as his physical circumstances dictate does not imply that he is not conscious, at least not until the argument is accepted, but it is fallacious.
An unconscious being is not a metaphysical impossibility, but I do notice that nothing in the 6 points mentions the fact that the zombie behaves like the conscious one, with no way to detect the difference. It doesn't take a medical professional to detect the difference between a conscious and unconscious person. They're in different physical states, so they might be physically identical except for whatever states render him unconscious, such as say sleep or anesthesia.
Step 1 doesn't define consciousness. It defines p-zombies. Here's a different argument:
1. A p-zombie is physically identical to us but has no consciousness
2. P-zombies are a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is physical
If step 1 defined consciousness as being supernatural then the conclusion would be a contradiction, but it isn't. Therefore step 1 doesn't define consciousness as being supernatural.
To make it clearer, here's another argument:
1. A foo is a four-sided triangle
2. Foos are a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore triangles, if they exist, do not have four sides
Step 1 does not define "four-sided" or "triangle". It only defines "foo".
No different than before. This is the same statement, stating right up front that consciousness is non-physical.
3 doesn't follow from the prior statement. 1 asserts that consciousness exists, so 3 cannot say 'if it exists'. 3 should read 'consciousness exists, and is not physical'. It follows directly from 1 and line 2 is superfluous.
It isn't. 3 directly contradicts 1, regardless of the actual nature of consciousness.
No it doesn't. See my other argument in that post:
1. A foo is a four-sided triangle
2. Foos are a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore triangles, if they exist, do not have four sides
Premise 1 doesn't define "four-sided" or "triangle". It only defines "foo".
So:
1. A p-zombie is a non-conscious organism physically identical to a conscious human
2. P-zombies are (not) a metaphysical impossibility
3. Therefore consciousness, if it exists, is (non-)physical
Premise 1 doesn't define "non-conscious organism" or "physically identical to a conscious human". It only defines "p-zombie".
OK, we're at an impasse. I did see the argument, and it begs, and you don't see that. We can both just repeat our stances forever.
Quoting Michael
This is yet again a begging argument. The whole purpose of the argument is to somehow determine how many sides a triangle has, which means we need to start from an agnostic position of not knowing. You don't do that. Step 2 says that Foos are impossible, which you cannot demonstrate unless you beg that triangles have something other than 4 sides.
The analogy is also poor since the Foo and the not-4-sided triangle are not physically identical.
The other issue isn't a begging one, but seems to hinge on another sort of fallacy.
Quoting Michael
So I can conceive of a universe that is physically identical to ours, except momentum being conserved isn't the result of supernatural intervention. A rock, in the absence of an external force acting on it, could continue at its velocity indefinitely without help from the supernatural entity carrying it, or however that works. Therefore it is metaphysically possible for something physically identical to us to not require the magic, therefore momentum isn't physical.
That I do believe leverages the same logic, but I don't know the name of the fallacy. Never mind the fact that I also leveraged the begging of the magic. This example was meant to point out the fault in concluding that momentum (or anything of your choice like say mass or a clock running) isn't physical.
What do you mean? That people who mindlessly peruse FB have mush for brains?
No, I mean the sort of physical identity that is of relevance here would be something like, "Having all of a person's the electrons, protons, and neutrons in the exact same relative locations and with the exact same momentums at some instant in time." (Of course not a knowable state, even if a physical possibility, but for the sake of the p-zombie argument - a good enough description of the sort of scenario under consideration.)
Yes.