About definitions and the use of dictionaries in Philosophy
Hi, everyone!
I had recently some reactions --and more in the past-- against definitions and the use of dictionaries in Philosophy. I am however a big supporter of dictionaries, not only in philosophy but also in science and, in fact, in every area and field of knowledge, i.e. in everything! :smile:
And I have very good reasons for that, but describing them is beyond the purpose of this topic.
So, I have two essential questions for those who are against dictionaries and the use of dictionaries in Philosophy:
1) How did they get to know about the meaning of words and esp. terms and even more esp. of abstract ideas (concepts) in the first place?
2) How can they expect to communicate effectively with others if they don't know the standard, common, agreed upon definitions/meanings of terms (with all their variations depending on context ) or if they have their own, personal, different definitions/meanings according to their own views and reality?
One can always of course describe one's own definition/meaning of a term --nothing bad about it-- but at least they should make that clear if that definition/meaning departs from the standard, common, agreed upon definition and meaning. Isn't that right?
I can give of course a lot of examples, but here's just one that refers to a recent discussion: It's about the term "sensation". Dictionary.com --you can take whatever other standard dictionary you like-- gives two meanings of it:
[i]1. "The operation or function of the senses; perception or awareness of stimuli through the senses."
2. "A mental condition or physical feeling resulting from stimulation of a sense organ or from internal bodily change, as cold or pain."[/i]
The first one refers strictly to the senses. In the second one the terms "mental" and "feeling" are added, which are beyond mere perception, awareness of stimuli.
Now, if include "mind" in the meaning, we are involving thinking and all what does that entails, which is certainly beyond mere perception. Likewise, if we consider "feeling" as including "emotion", which is also certainly beyond mere perception.
Therefore, we can't just use the term "sensation" or "feeling" without specifying what we exactly we mean by that. Isn't that right? Well, this is what actually happens in these discussions. And of course, the conversation between two interlocutors goes in circles and reaches a dead end. Yet, that could be avoided and the different views of the interlocutors can be both accepted and agreed upon by each other, if they only specify, describe what they mean by the terms they use --in the example: "sensation" and "feelings". Yet, this --weirdly and unreasonably enough-- almost never happens.
Note that I have had reactions showing dislike and even disgust regarding dictionaries. I'm not surprised, because it is a common phenomenon, which I come upon very often in my discussions in various communities. And there are reasons for that, of course, the description of which is also beyond the purpose of this topic.
So, I really want to know what you are thinking about the subject.
(I could launch a poll, but I prefer to have your opinion instead of just a vote.)
I had recently some reactions --and more in the past-- against definitions and the use of dictionaries in Philosophy. I am however a big supporter of dictionaries, not only in philosophy but also in science and, in fact, in every area and field of knowledge, i.e. in everything! :smile:
And I have very good reasons for that, but describing them is beyond the purpose of this topic.
So, I have two essential questions for those who are against dictionaries and the use of dictionaries in Philosophy:
1) How did they get to know about the meaning of words and esp. terms and even more esp. of abstract ideas (concepts) in the first place?
2) How can they expect to communicate effectively with others if they don't know the standard, common, agreed upon definitions/meanings of terms (with all their variations depending on context ) or if they have their own, personal, different definitions/meanings according to their own views and reality?
One can always of course describe one's own definition/meaning of a term --nothing bad about it-- but at least they should make that clear if that definition/meaning departs from the standard, common, agreed upon definition and meaning. Isn't that right?
I can give of course a lot of examples, but here's just one that refers to a recent discussion: It's about the term "sensation". Dictionary.com --you can take whatever other standard dictionary you like-- gives two meanings of it:
[i]1. "The operation or function of the senses; perception or awareness of stimuli through the senses."
2. "A mental condition or physical feeling resulting from stimulation of a sense organ or from internal bodily change, as cold or pain."[/i]
The first one refers strictly to the senses. In the second one the terms "mental" and "feeling" are added, which are beyond mere perception, awareness of stimuli.
Now, if include "mind" in the meaning, we are involving thinking and all what does that entails, which is certainly beyond mere perception. Likewise, if we consider "feeling" as including "emotion", which is also certainly beyond mere perception.
Therefore, we can't just use the term "sensation" or "feeling" without specifying what we exactly we mean by that. Isn't that right? Well, this is what actually happens in these discussions. And of course, the conversation between two interlocutors goes in circles and reaches a dead end. Yet, that could be avoided and the different views of the interlocutors can be both accepted and agreed upon by each other, if they only specify, describe what they mean by the terms they use --in the example: "sensation" and "feelings". Yet, this --weirdly and unreasonably enough-- almost never happens.
Note that I have had reactions showing dislike and even disgust regarding dictionaries. I'm not surprised, because it is a common phenomenon, which I come upon very often in my discussions in various communities. And there are reasons for that, of course, the description of which is also beyond the purpose of this topic.
So, I really want to know what you are thinking about the subject.
(I could launch a poll, but I prefer to have your opinion instead of just a vote.)
Comments (79)
Herein lies the problem. Philosophers often use terms in idiosyncratic ways and in ways that are no longer standard. This is not a reason to reject dictionaries but a reason to be cautious about the dictionaries being used. When reading philosophy a glossary of terms related to particular philosophers and schools will be more helpful than a general dictionary. In addition, a definition may be a good starting point, but one must look at the context in which the term is being used rather than insisting that a philosopher means X because this is how the term is defined somewhere.
Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary. Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition. Then look up the definition of each of those words. Iterate. Given that there are a finite number of words in the dictionary, the process will eventually lead to repetition. If one's goal were to understand a word, one might suppose that one must first understand the words in its definition. But this process is circular. There must, therefore, be a way of understanding a word that is not given by providing its definition.
Most folk can use the word "tree"; and tell a tree from a shrub, or a bush. But setting that out in words, to the exclusion of shrubs and bushes - that would require some effort. We do not need to be able to give the definition in order to use the word. A babe understands the meaning of "Mom" but cannot provide a definition.
These two arguments derive from J. L. Austin, who amongst philosophers is more associated with dictionary use than any other. He did not advocate using dictionary definitions as an ending, but as a beginning, as the place to start in order to understand how a group of words function and how they relate to each other. They provide us not with answers, but with more questions.
There will be amongst us those who hold that there is such a thing as the meaning of a word; and that any worthwhile theory of language must set out, preferably in an algorithmic fashion, how that meaning is to be determined. There will be others, amongst whom I count myself, who think Quoting Willard Van Orman Quine, SEP
Much of philosophy consists in working through the way words function. Beginning with a definition is in such cases pet?ti? principi?.
Is there a process that can be used to achieve, perhaps asymptotically, the goal of ensuring that you and I agree as to the meaning of some utterance? I've consistently argued that there is not a single thing that might be called the meaning of an utterance, but instead we should look at what is being done with the utterance. Hence, if there is not a thing that is the meaning of an utterance, there cannot be a method that will help us work towards understanding what that meaning is. Even using a dictionary.
But there are ways to achieve agreement, cooperation, or even progress. Chief amongst these we might place the Principle of Charity, which says that you and I and old Fred over there have pretty much the same beliefs. That is, while there are a few statements on which we will disagree, overwhelmingly we agree as to the position of the chairs in the room, the state of the weather, the agreeable nature of vanilla ice cream, and so on. Now Old Fred might be a raving, unmasked flat earther, but despite this he and you and I will agree as to what is the case far more often than we will disagree.
While you may be right about the impracticalities involved, we have little choice but to make charitable assumptions about those with whom we chat. The alternative is to deny any form of agreement, and hence any form of conversation.
Anyways, the above is cobbled together from posts of mine spanning three or four years.
I am going to answer this question, or pair of related questions, without recourse to a dictionary, by way, in part, of illustrating that communication is possible without recourse to dictionaries. Indeed it must necessarily be the case that the meanings of words were already established and communicated before the first dictionary was created to record them. My answer will also give an answer in passing to your first question.
Fortunately, language has a large measure of redundancy, such that even if *unreadable splodge*, the meaning can very often be discerned quite easily. This means that an unfamiliar word can be guessed at from its context, and by triangulation with another occurrence in another context, a fairly clear idea can be obtained as to the meaning. And this method of providing uses in context is very often part of a good dictionary entry.
Because "meaning is use". Now a dictionary uses words, to define each word, and one has to understand the words in the definition to grasp the meaning of the word in question. So there is always more work to be done if one is sufficiently insistent, until as must happen, one finds that the dictionary itself loops around and the definitions become circular. At which point one has have recourse to familiarity with the language as used informally anyway. One does not learn to talk in the first place at least, from a dictionary, but from social interaction.
None of this is to denigrate dictionaries, they are fun and useful in equal measure. And if you want to reference one now and then, it can sometimes circumvent a deal of wrangling in philosophical discussion. But in my experience, it is the little common words like "I" and "is" and "thing", and "meaning" that no one defines or bothers to look up, that cause all the big philosophical problems, and here is exactly where a dictionary definition is no help at all.
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/17/politics/tbt-clinton-grand-jury-testimony/index.html
Mind you, if you want to really disappear down a rabbit hole of definitional circularity, I can recommend the classic text, The Meaning of Meaning. by Ogden and Richards, They find about 16 different uses of the term "meaning" by reputable philosophers, and discount a few more as illegitimate - as in 'the meaning of life', for example. I mean, why be satisfied with dictionary.com, when you can have a book length discussion of a word?
When we participate in meaningful communication we enter a dimension that we do not control at will. Language functions as a social law, kinda. For there to be understanding between two people they must share a language that they both understand (and the rules, uses, semantics and sintaxis of those languages are learned and not actively generated by the participants). There is no communication if each participant has a private language, as Wittgenstein would say.
Dictionaries are the written form of social law (digitally written for digital philosophers :) ). It functions as a "third" between two communication participants, and as a "fourth" if there are three participants. If some type of understanding is expected between the participants, it is always necessary to resort to the common law. Sometimes this law is embodied in dictionaries.
Thanks for your reply to the topic, Fooloso4.
Quoting Fooloso4
This might be the case, but in these cases they describe, explain and even give the definition of the meaning of these terms. I mean, if they do care about readers or listeners undestand what they say. I included this case in my description of the topic, and said "nothing bad about it". (I could even stress the point more, by saying "this is perfectly OK".) But from my experience a lot of them don't. Once I was disappointed by Bernardo Kastrup in an interview who started saying "Everything is in consciousness and exists only insofar as it is in consciousness." He never revealed his meaning of "consciousness". Not any example, whatsoever. What then can the listener get from that? How can one undestand this claim, position, thesis or whatever. One could either assume that BK uses the term "consciousness" with its "common", "standard" meaning --which, esp. for this term, there isn't one-- or use one's own definition/meaning of the term --which also could lead to a dead end. Isn't that right?
The main problem in these cases, the reason why this "phenomenon" --unfortunately too frequent-- is that people assume that you know and undestand exactly what you are talking about and what you and know the meaning of the terms as they undestand them. This is also a common mistake school and university teachers do. They assume that you know what they are talking about. And in a lot of cases, they don't even allow questions. This is the main reason people develop a huge amount of misconceptions in their education and vocabulary knowledge, in general.
To explain what a term means (for you) when you first use it, in teaching, lecturing, writing, etc. takes a few seconds and its value is invaluable.
Quoting Fooloso4
I fully agree with that. I myself often mention cases where a definition is incomplete and, even worse, ne."circular", which is a common phenomenon. But even in this case, one can use them as basis for a more complete or modified definition. A problem arises esp. when a definition contains "additives" as I call them. The second definition in the example of the term "sensation" in relation to perception that I brought up, shows exactly that: mind state and feelings are not involved in mere perception. See, such things can make a proposition, thesis, etc. "successful" (plausible, well-grounded, etc.) or failed or even nonsensical.
Quoting Fooloso4
I totally agree within this too. But how many times --if ever-- have you seen such a thing in action?
Quoting Fooloso4
Certainly. But in most cases a term has a basic, main meaning --which is applied to most cases-- and then it can also have secondary meanings. And one should mention or make clear which meaning one uses.
The problem is always the same: lack of definitions.
Thanks again, for your insightful comments!
Thanks for replying to the topic.
Quoting Banno
This is the perfect, absolute way one would use if one wants to become "superliterate". But this is rarily the case, isn't it? :smile: Also, we have the context in which a term is used, so we can "filter" the definitions based on that. (Which is what we normally do, and the dictionaries helps as in that by giving us the area of appication in parentheses --e.g. in Philosopy or (Phil.)-- or as part of the definition.
Quoting Banno
What is the image that comes to your mind when I say "tree"? If it's a shrub or a shrub and an actual tree (based on the basic, common definition of theword), then you should look it up. :grin:
(Which I don't believe is the case.)
Quoting Banno
If it could, I would like to adopt it! I would pay whatever amount of money! :grin:
Quoting Banno
Quite interesting. Thanks for this ref. I would read more about him and his work. Has a quite intelligent face and a large forfront.
(BTW, as you may have undestood --together with other people-- I am a linguist too.)
Quoting Banno
I rose to tha bait with the term "algorithmic" --being a professional programmer-- and it gives me the opportunity to say something quite pertinent to the topic: In most programming languages, in order that you can use a variable, it is required that you first define it. And not only that, sometimes you must also specify its type: integer, string, etc. That is, its context.
Thanks for giving me the opportunity to use this parallelism. :smile:
Quoting Banno
I like that. It's an ideal situation. It certainly offers a ground for solid undestanding. But can you bet on it?
Quoting Banno
I don't quite undesstand why. I could only think that it acts as a spoiler, depriving of of the fun and pleasure to discover what it is all about youself! :grin:
Quoting Banno
Well, as I already said in this thread, the best way to achieve undestanding is via a definition: from a disctionary or one's own definition. This creates a common undestanding of the term one part uses, indepentent;ly of whether the other part aggrees to it or not. The important thing is for the other part to undestand well what you are talking about. Isn't that right?
Quoting Banno
Well. at this point of reading your message, I should like to note that I expected at least a practical example from you. I should have mentioned about this element in my description of the topic, because I consider it very important, in fact a solvent, a digestive for theory and concepts.
(It's not for nothing that most dictionaries --here they are again!-- give at least one example for each meaning of a word.)
But at least I gave an example, thus demonstrating in practice the importance and need for this element, which arises in a lot of cases, esp. when the talk is too theoretical or conceptual or not very clear or one cares and needs that others do undestand what you are talking about.
Quoting Banno
This is true. It is a special case in which one know what the other talks about without the other having to explain anything. Yet, don't forget that either there has been a time at start when they have agreed upon some principles, definitions/nmeanings otf terms, thus establishing an agreement on them. Or if I join a group with established principles, beliefs, etc. and have accept them, I have likewise established a similar agreement.
Quoting Banno
There's certainly no need for that! :smile:
Thanks again for your contribution to the topic.
Thanks for your reply to the topic.
Quoting unenlightened
Whys would I do I have to read a whole page or I don't not how much text in order to get the meaning of the word. Your example was very good because I heve absolutely no idea what "splodge" means!
(I can also give you a dozen of similar cases, of course.)
In the days before Internet, one had to look for words/terms in a dictionary, and maybe there wasn't one near. So, one had to strive and struggle with the text to get the meanings of words in the way you are proposing. And then this could easily lead to misunderstanding of the text and even confusion. But these days, this process is at the tips of the fingers and takes only a few seconds. Moreover, what you are saying underestimates all dictionaries and maybe renders them useless.
So, honestly, I can't see how you can consider this way of undestanding a text better or even just useful.
Otherwise, I accept yout method as an alternative.
Because "meaning is use". [/quote]
Well, I would rather say "understanding is use" ...
Now a dictionary uses words, to define each word, and one has to understand the words in the definition to grasp the meaning of the word in question. So there is always more work to be done if one is sufficiently insistent, until as must happen, one finds that the dictionary itself loops around and the definitions become circular.[/quote]
As I said to @Banno earlier, on does not need to do that. In fact, if that were the case I would be myself one who hates dictionaries! Fortunately, in 99% of the cases, the process stops on the first look up. But this of course requires that one uses dictionaries on a regular basis, which results in a lesser and lesser need to clear words with time.
BTW. this is I believe one of the reasons a lot of people dislike and even hate dictionaries. As a lot of students hate and are bad in Math at school. Because they mised the opportunity to undestand the materials and follow the course since its beginning. And with time, the process of "catching up" with Math gets harder and harder. Obviously.
None of this is to denigrate dictionaries, they are fun and useful in equal measure.[/quote]
It's good at least that you find them fun. (I ignore the word "useful" here, because you have just rejected them earlier, in favor of a method "without the use of dictionaries") . At least, you don't hate them. That;s good. :smile:
But I don't think that people have created hundreds of dictionaries --dating back to the antiquity-- just for fun, as a pastime. Do you?
But in my experience, it is the little common words like "I" and "is" and "thing", and "meaning" that no one defines or bothers to look up, that cause all the big philosophical problems, and here is exactly where a dictionary definition is no help at all.[/quote]
I believe there's some truth in that.
Mind you, if you want to really disappear down a rabbit hole of definitional circularity, I can recommend the classic text, The Meaning of Meaning. by Ogden and Richards,[/quote]
This is a very known circularity. It's like the known pseudo-paradox "I am lying". These are intended cases of cicrularity. :smile:
There are too many fallacies of definition to rely on dictionaries. For instance, they sometimes use in the definition itself the word to be defined or a close synonym of it. Definitions are tautological, circular, either too broad or too narrow, the argumentum ad dictionarium, and so on.
Dictionaries are descriptive. The authors of dictionaries only attempt to record accepted usage of terms at any given time, at least according to them, so there is the inevitable difference in definitions between dictionaries, between editions, all of which is subject to the biases and faults of their authors. As such, it only has benefit as a reference, not as some definitive account of definition or meaning.
Thank you for responding to the topic.
Quoting NOS4A2
Of course dictionaries sometimes contain ineffective definitions. But it is obvious that one is not bound or supposed to take up such definitions. But this is rarely the case. In the great majority of the cases they do just fine. I know that well because I use them on a regular basis. And I'm not bound to a single dictionary. I consult others two simultaneously for a term. You see they all have something to say. And in most cases they give the basic meaning of a term or word. So, next time you fin a "fallacious" (as you say) definition in a dictionary kust look in another one. Thare dozens of standard and good dictionaries in the Web. And this is a great oppotunity we have these days because we couldn't do it in the pre-Internet times!
We all know that there are a lot of inaccurate and even fake news in the Web. This does not mean that we stop reading news, esp. from standard sources. like NewYork Times, CNN, BBC, etc.
Quoting NOS4A2
This is a fortunate fact that they give accepted meanings of words. And they don't to that offhand. If you saw the film "You The Professor and the Madman", which tells the story of how the first Oxford English Dictionary was compiled. It had about 6,500 pages and it took about 10 years to complete.
Can you imagine what would happen if disctionaries were compiled by authors based on what "according to them" were the correct definitions?
I personally shiver to the idea ...
The issue is that English is a rootless language, a halfbreed of Dutch and French.
In any other language I do not see the issue of "But what do you mean by X?" popping up nearly as often as in English. People in a given country (mostly) went to the same school system, belong to the same culture, so why so much trouble with communication?
An English speaker may use the word "microbe" but when asked to define it will fumble (inb4 you go look it up to reply to me). Does that include viruses? Spores? What about tartigrades or ant eggs? A Greek person however will have no issues telling you what micróvio means.
If you go very basic, English speakers will have a decently clear idea of what "befriend" means, and then what "friendly" means, even if the latter does not imply the concept of friend. But being that English's vocabulary beyond the bare basics consists of the complete mutilation of French which is already a bit of a mutilation of Latin nobody knows what they are even saying when they say "civilisation", "conceive", "peace".
To address the quoted segment, any Latin person will tell you what sensatione- means, even if it is not easy to explain, just like its root verb sentir(e). While Anglos and Anglas and Anglxs think that man can mean woman and woman can mean man. How can you trust this language to do philosophy and rhetoric if it can't even define two of the most basic concepts of human society?
Thanks for your reply to the topic. And welcome to TPF! :cheer:
Quoting Lionino
Good point. I will take up this later ...
Quoting Lionino
This is a very plausible question.
Quoting Lionino
Ah! You got ahead of what I have in mind to talk about! :smile:
Quoting Lionino
Well, OK, we can also look at the Latin root of the word "sensation", but in our case, we are dealing with a technical term or with a word as applied to a specific context. So, if we are talking e.g. about "perception" we have to use definitions that apply to and are commonly used in that subject.
Quoting Lionino
Good point, too.
That's where dictionaries and encyclopedias --I forgot to include them in my topic!-- come into play.
***
A note regarding what I promised to talk about at start. And you have "touched" yourself.
Right, it's about the Greek language, esp. ancient Greek. Greek words are so well "rooted" that you can understand their meaning by just their etymology. But this, as I mentioned above, is good for us only in the general sense of the words. When these are applied to a specific context, esp. when this context is technical (scientific, philosophic, etc.)
BTW, you seem to be involved in linguistics, like myself. Are you also Greek or of Greek origin?
(In your profile, you have stated "Atlantis" as your location. It's a great place! I have also lived there, but about 10,000 years ago ... )
Quoting Alkis Piskas
A definition is a good first step to understanding a word, but that doesn't make it authoritative or necessary to go back to.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Language precedes dictionaries, one learns by hearing how a word is used. Word use defines the standard, common, agreed-upon meaning of terms, not dictionaries, which merely attempt to record those meanings.
Words, especially in philosophy, are far too important to hand over to anyone. One has to come to understand them on their terms. The majority of philosophical debates are about words, their meaning, and how they should be applied. To pull out a dictionary in such a case be harshly criticised.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I'm afraid I have to disagree. In everyday speech, we use context to understand words, rather than relying on definitions. Of course, miscommunication is unavoidable, and because of that, any set of rules will provide us with examples of miscommunication.
In my opinion, the reason discussions in philosophy in particular are so abundant with miscommunication is due to the broad context. Philosophy involves very high-level topics and is rarely limited to a comprehensible context. Normally, one would talk of "a sensation" or "a feeling" and the topic would be that sensation or feeling, so it's easy to follow along, even if the word isn't precise.
This OP is a perfect example of having a broad context, the topic is of definitions and the use of dictionaries in philosophy. That's a gigantic topic. One could see the topic and interpret it in a completely different way than you intended. The mismatch in how different parties understand the context leads to difficulties, which is the problem, rather than inappropriate word use. That's my take anyway.
While a dictionary is a great place to start, sometimes the philosophical discussion is about the word itself. Meaning that the current definition has something lacking. If so, the person who wants to change the definition should give a very clear alternative definition, and also why they think it is necessary and enhances the word. This should be the very first step in any philosophical discussion, and oftentimes discussions boil down to whether a person accepts this new definition or not.
That being said, anyone who gives you flak for daring to use a dictionary should be red flagged in your mind. Anyone who resists clear definitions is likely a charlatan who will continue to twist and retwist the meaning any time you think you get a handle on it and it points to a contradiction. Discussing with people like this can be a waste of time, so be careful.
This is different from discussing from someone who is trying to get a clear definition. Such a person will appreciate the dictionary reference, but point out where it lacks, and propose an alternative. Often times this alternative has not been fully explored either, and can gain solid identification through the act of discussion. Arguably, this is the entire goal and purpose of philosophy. Read the intent of the person to see if the discussion is about discovery or "I want to be right and use this word no matter what the underlying definition is".
Quoting Philosophim
These explanations are why we have something called a lexicon. In any given body of knowledge, population, community, and language in general, there is the lexicon that we abide by, naturally and automatically.
Philosophy has its own lexicon that's different from politics, for example. When the political news refer to the "world", they mean the countries that make up the human population.
Just because this is a public forum that welcomes everyone, it doesn't mean we can just join and start a conversation using an entirely new lexicon that is personalized to our own desires. We can challenge everything you say that's outside the lexicon of philosophy (unless of course, you want to talk about films, or music, or fiction, or any popular reads).
That said, a dictionary is created by the lexicographers, so using it in the philosophical discussion is a reasonable means.
Thank you for responding to the topic.
Quoting Judaka
Of course not. I talked about that (multiple times).
Quoting Judaka
Yes, this is normally the case. When children don't undestand a word, they ask their parents and rely on their answers to get wiser. ... "What does "xxx" mean pa?". They are lucky if "pa" 1) is willing to answer their question, 2) knows well the meaning of the word, 3) can describe it to the child well and in an easily undestandable way etc. On the other hand, there are parents who refer their children (after a certain age) to a dictionary. This is quite clever, for the reasons given above and more.
Quoting Judaka
Although I don't have many examples of this. I have though a lot of examples for the opposite, people assuming that the audience or the other parts of a discussion know what terms --even concepts and key words in a discussion-- mean. I talked about this too, in this thread.
But tell it to the people in here who don't care about
Quoting Judaka
Well, what about givind a definition the meaning of a term --maybe in obe's own words or with some modifications-- without mentioning the dictionary? Would that change anything in essence? Would that be criticised?
Most probably not, I suppose. Therefore, isn't the fact of bringing up a dictionary of secondary importance?
Quoting Judaka
Good. Fortunately you brought up the hot issue I was talking about.
Quoting Judaka
Well, you maybe see more to it even than myself, who have created and talked about it! :smile:
Quoting Judaka
That's a good take! :smile:
Thank you for participating in the discussion.
Quoting L'éléphant
Right.
Quoting L'éléphant
Do you refer to a particular lexicon, like a specialized dictionary or encyclopedia --e.g. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, etc.-- or a personal vocabulary, based on their own personal meanings of terms?
If it's the first case, what Philosophy lexicon are you using?
Quoting L'éléphant
At risk of not having got this right, I fully agree. :smile:
Quoting L'éléphant
Right. That including also --or even mostly-- the specialized lexicons (to use your generic term) on Philosophy I mentioned above.
The act of defining one's terms will perhaps be criticised, it depends on the term, how it's being defined, the reasoning behind it and the people involved. Let's say I defined capitalism as "People selling stuff for money". Most wouldn't accept or allow that. It'd just seem like I'm redefining out of ignorance.
If I defined "sensation" to be synonymous with feeling, that might not sit right with many as well, as they'd view my definition as being simply incorrect.
For my part, I rarely accept others' defining terms however they want, there needs to be a good argument for it. It depends though. If the term is important to the discussion or not.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
If alternatively rather than defining capitalism as I did previously, I wrote a paragraph or two describing it, would that still qualify as a definition? A problem with most definitions is that they're overly simplistic and there's no argument for them. A dictionary is just the worst because the definition is a few short words or a sentence with no argument attached.
Definitions are sometimes used in complex situations to "get back to basics' or simplify/resolve a situation, and that can be an inappropriate response. It's important not to assume that a disagreement is a miscommunication or ignorance about a word. The disagreement could be philosophical and those differing views represent themselves in the differences in how each party understands a word.
Negative reactions to defining a term are likely to do with the circumstances, attitude and manner in which a word was defined. What giving the definition aimed to do and it was expected to be received. As opposed to people just despising attempts at clarity. Philosophy will generally only be participated in by a proficient speaker of the language the discussion is using. It's not unreasonable to expect or assume that others wouldn't require one to define terms.
Nonetheless, a gigantic topic with examples and counterexamples in every direction. there's no simple conclusion.
One last point I'd mention is that the giving of definitions, in my experience, leads to tangents in discussions. If you stop me now and ask "Okay, but how are you defining "definitions"? I"m noticing some differences in how we use the term". Instead of bringing clarity, because this mightn't be an easy issue to resolve, it could take up much more focus than intended. The topic of the discussion may just become "What is a definition" instead of what we had been discussing originally. Hence I hesitate to give or request definitions. In such cases, the better approach might be to cease using that word.
Most won't let others define words however they want, which is fair, words are public and personal. It may sometimes be wiser to just literally write the definition instead of the word. Alternatively, create a new term and then you're free to define it however you want. If I think definitions are necessarily short, and you think they can be any length, I could try to say "short-definitions" aren't helpful but "long-definitions" are okay. Though some wouldn't even accept that.
Judaka, I think I undestood your concerns. You are referring to a kind of "constant" use of definitions in a discussion, writing or speech. And your points make sense.
However, I have talked about basic, key terms in a duscussion. And that one must know what the person who is using them means with them, when this is obviously not evident. And that this can be done either by directly defining/describing the terns, or explaining them in a broader frame, giving examples, etc. Anything, except letting terms and concepts fly in the air or covered with a veil that prevents them from being seen clearly or even at all.
You can well define "capitalism" as "People selling stuff for money", if this is what capitalism means to you. If you get cricised for it, that would be a mistake.
And. if instead of giving a definition, you explain your views about capitalism by describing it in a broader scope, etc., I consider it even better. But nothing prevents you from doing both, isn't it? :smile:
As for the "simplistic" definitions, I'm responding with a cliche: "truth is always simple". And I definitely believe it. When one looks for the essence of something, its description is always simple.
The word applied technically has to come first from common language, as we know sensation is not a scientifically coined term. We have two options: either take the meaning as it is in common language (useless for English as "sensation" can mean anything semantic vagueness), or define precisely the word semantic neologism.
And if the word is not precisely defined in a given field, might as well throw it out or finally define it.
But my point is more that Latins knows what sensatione- means because they know what sentir(e) means. How could they not? Sentir(e) literally means "feel", and being used so often, they would know when it applies and when it does not. English does not have that privilege in the case of "sensation", but it pretty much does in the case of "friendly" (analogy).
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I would say not only the etymology, but also the relation to other words (analogy, which ultimately comes from etymology), and also the sound the word makes, and perhaps even other factors I have not thought of.
OBS: analogy here means as here. TLDR: analogy of female of waiter being waitress, like female of emperor being empress (French words).
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I am not but I have Greek people close to me in my life, big fan of tzatziki. The Atlantis is just a placeholder as I don't live in my native country and I would rather not have people think I am actually Thatplacestanian.
"Sensation" is mainly a widely used scientific term, as it refers to the senses, a mental condition and physical feeling, all of which are used in the science of biology, physiology, medicine, pshycology..
Quoting Lionino
The words "sensation" and "sense" in English come from the Latin "sensus" (= sensation, feeling, meaning). So, we are travelling back to Latin grounds that you like to talk about. :smile:
Quoting Lionino
Right, this too.
Quoting Lionino
I personally couldn't think you are a ... Thatplace...what? :grin:
You see, the English word sensation (sen-say-shon) comes from the Proto-Indo-European *snt-ie/o-, cognate with the Lithuanian sintéti and Old Irish sét.
The word sensation does not come from Latin sensus. It comes from French sensation, as does half of English, we see that in the suffix '-tion', which is particularly French, not Latin or Spanish.
Singling out Latin in that process from PIE *snt-ie/o- to modern English sensation is pretending that English has Roman roots which it has 0 of. Particularly, I am yet to see a single culture that is more opposite to Romanness than English, I see more similarities even with Ethiopians (who are Orthodox and Axum an important trade partner of Romans).
English is a halfbreed of Northwest Germanic (Frisian-like) with Nordic contamination and Old French (often Norman) with Celtic substrate. Latin does not come into the equation just like Arabic and German (hochdeutsch) do not.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
The country I am currently located in.
We are not bound by the already existing definitions created by others. We can use existing definitions, we can modify existing definitions, or we can create new definitions. A (the?) primary goal of philosophical discourse is to deepen understanding, not define it.
The following is from https://www.etymonline.com/word/sensation
sensation (n.)
1610s, "a reaction to external stimulation of the sense organs," from French sensation (14c.) and directly from Medieval Latin sensationem (nominative sensatio) "perception," from Late Latin sensatus "endowed with sense, sensible," from Latin sensus "feeling" (see sense (n.)).
French is a Latin language.
Perhaps you missed the pivotal point. One cannot learn one's first language from a dictionary. Therefore there is a way of understanding the meanings of words that is not found in their lexical definitions.
Hence there is a sense of "meaning" that is not found in a dictionary.
Wittgenstein characterised this as the way we use words.
It would be an error, then, to think that dictionaries provide the whole of meaning.
Hence, giving some sort of primacy to dictionary definitions would be placing a covert restriction on our use of words.
Hence starting a philosophical thread by stipulating definitions stifles thinking.
And again, doing philosophy very often - if not always - consists in working through the meanings of the terms involved. If dictionaries gave the whole of the meaning of our lexicon, there might be no philosophical disagreements.
Quoting Arne
P1: Arabic is a Semitic language.
P2: The English word 'lemon' comes from Arabic l?m?n.
C: The English word lemon comes from Proto-Semitic!
Where is the fallacy?
I don't think I missed anything. I made this comment referring to your saying "Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary. Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition ." This is the way one can become a kind of superliterate. And I never talked about such a thing.
Quoting Banno
Certainly, this can often be the case. A lot of definitions, I believe, are incomplete. But they still offer the essence, the central idea of a term, esp. for concepts, which is most important.
They also offer different uses of a term according to different contexts. Which is also very useful.
Quoting Banno
Certainly yes. But again, I never claimed such a thing.
My main point and why I launched this discussion was that too may people in here believe that disctionaries --and encyclopedias, I forgot to mention them too-- are not useful in philosophy, if not totally useless. So, I would like to ask any person who believes that, if they also reject or consider useless standard lexicon sources regarding esp. philosophy, such as the following, suggested by Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s1.html):
And Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy itself, of course.
And once more, there is a huge difference between taking the definitions from such sources for granted and/or in an absolute way, and with rejecting or ignoring them totally.
Also, I'm talking esp. about basic, key terms used in a subject of the discussion. And that a "speaker" who is using them has to make it clear what they mean by them and how they use them, either by giving their definition or description and/or (practical) examples of their use.
Which, in most cases, is not ... the case. :smile:
I agree. You aren't. :grin:
This is interesting because we can take our own case as an example: Our communication through digital marks on the internet. How can the use of words appear here, for example, in a digital philosophy forum? Here there are no practical examples that indicate the use of words, but, similar to a dictionary, we have to work only with marks referring to each other.
This can be constituted as a criticism of the notion of practical meaning that is based on empirical use. Well, the internet space breaks with the direct (live in person), empirical and practical use of words. But not only that, it reaches a greater and global space of understanding, as global as the Internet. In fact, one can speak of greater universality achieved by the digital space. Isn't this universality of meaning (signs or marks referring to each other, abstracted from experience and practical and everyday use) a greater possibility for philosophy?
It is very common in this context (that of philosophy) to say "I say this in this sense"), as a non-normal and non-everyday sense. And the perfect example is the neologism. Using words in their mostly differential and referential sense with respect to other words outside of the many specific contexts that delimit them opens the space for greater intelligibility and understanding. This is very similar to what Saussure called "langue" as opposed to "parole." This nature of words as signs is capable of breaking contexts and uses, offering the possibility of translation, intercommunication on a global scale and the creation of new meanings and uses. And philosophy finds this very useful.
Not necessarily.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Yeah, I'm not referring to defining terms pointlessly either,
Quoting Alkis Piskas
If miscommunication is "obviously evident" then something action needs to be taken to address this, that's self-evident. I am just saying that my preferred solution is to phrase oneself differently and abandon the term causing confusion. Alternatively, if it's appropriate, and for key terms it often is, then make the term's meaning the core of the debate.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I can't agree with that. One can't let others define terms however they want. There are many reasons for this, but to focus on the most important one, "truth" only requires a single validation. "It's true that capitalism isn't causing wealth inequality" because capitalism is just "selling stuff for money". You can only dispute that claim by challenging the way capitalism was defined. Then the discussion becomes about "What is capitalism".
Words and terms are public, they're shared, and while they are also used for personal expression, that doesn't mean there's no right or wrong of what words refer to.
The individual who thinks capitalism = people selling stuff for money should be forced to make a choice. Reach an agreement that "People selling stuff for money" doesn't necessarily cause wealth inequality, or be forced to defend the notion that capitalism = "People selling stuff for money".
There are times when I'll allow another to use a term in a way I don't agree with, but that stops once they start concluding from how they've defined their terms.
It's absolutely imperative that we use terms at least somewhat similarly, for the sake of logic, truth and our conclusions. An argument or line of logic can be true or false depending on how the terms within those arguments are understood. Preserving this is far more important than avoiding miscommunication by allowing people to define terms however they want. I'm confident in my doubt that you practice what you preach here, you're too smart for it.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I'll just say that I disagree, for me, the generic doesn't trump the specific. Philosophy searches for "the essence" because it's big-picture, so there's no alternative, this is a nasty flaw of philosophy, not something to be celebrated or promoted.
What are "digital marks on the internet"? E.g. emojis, icons, buttons, etc.?
Also, what dou you mean by "a digital philosophy forum"? I can think of two kinds of (any) fora: online and offline.
Quoting JuanZu
Can't really get that either. Undestanding it depends of course on understanding what you described earlier.
Quoting JuanZu
Yes. This is quite logical. We use it in everyday language as well, as a means to avoid a word being taken literally or in the wrong sense, esp. when it has different meanings. At least, those who care about undestanding and good communcation do it. :smile:
Yes. You can say that they are simply pixel-marks. In any case, in general, due to context limitations, we can only resort to other digital marks to make ourselves understood by other people. In this context we cannot make ostensive definitions, nor can we make gestures with the body, nor resort to the situation that surrounds us and we perceive with our senses. The above are empirical determinations of the context that are supplied and exceeded by the nature of the marks-signs that function even when these determinations (ostensive definitions, etc.) are not presented. We can call them ab-presence marks: Marks that can function without the presence of subjects.
When I talk to you in this forum I do not see your body, nor do I hear your words, nor do I see your gestures, I only see your ab-presence marks-signs in the space provided by the internet. But thanks to the abstraction of these empirical determinations we can establish a more universal, intercontinental, etc. communication. But above all, conceptual communication. And this works in a similar way to how a dictionary works: to make explicit what we want to say we have to use words that refer to other words, without being able to access many empirical and practical determinations of meaning.
Maybe now what I said is more understandable:
Here there are no practical examples that indicate the use of words, but, similar to a dictionary, we have to work only with marks referring to each other.
This is why the use of dictionaries is so useful in these contexts (such as in a philosophy forum). That is, a definition through marks is more universal and conceptual (and it is no coincidence that the concept and the universal are related, differentiating themselves from particularity and empirical limitation).
______________________________
However, philosophical discussions are not common as everyday conversations are. That is why I have referred to philosophical discussion as non-normal or non-common discussion. Because in philosophical discussion we work with concepts and the concepts themselves are thematized. It has a universal approach that the everyday use of language does not have. For this, a more abstract and global medium such as ab-presence marks-signs, whether physical or digital, is useful. Dictionaries work well in these contexts because they are composed of the abstract element of the concept: A dictionary can be used to understand another person even in the non-presence of the participants, at a distance (far from gestures, and from various empirical determinations), even when that person has already died.
Yes, those dictionaries. But also, from the writings of the philosophers themselves, which are not dictionaries themselves. Their books are filled with definitions/meanings.
Say you wake up in the morning and are deciding what clothes to wear for the day.
Is your brain using consciousness, information, thought or ideas? Or any of some other words?
It's really physically one thing but relying on one word gives a false sense of the physical circumstance (mental circumstance) being defined by a single word.
Yes, if you know that the term is causing a confustion. Which usually you don't or don't care about.
Quoting Judaka
This is a good idea.
Quoting Judaka
What do you mean by "can't let others"? Only a school or university teacher can do that. :smile:
This is equivalent to not letting others having an opinion of their own. Which is totally unacceptable, esp. in philosophy.
There are a lot of ways to disagree with someone else definition or description.
Quoting Judaka
You are very right about this. This is happening too often in this and other similar places (forums & communities). Evidently, the only solution for this is to realize that this is happening and just stop talking about that irrelevant, "parasitic" subject. :smile:.
Quoting Judaka
No, there isn't. But see, because they are shared, they are public, as you say, their definition has to reflect or represent the common opinion and knowledge regarding them, as well as the basic, essential elements which they are based on.
For axample, "perception" is an essential --if not the most essential-- element when one talks about "consciousness". So the definition of consciousness must not only include it but based on it. From this central point, one can expand it or even rephrase it and talk about related terms, like senses, feeling, etc., which are all part of perception. This is the best way to create commonly accepted definitions. Because it is difficult for one to disagree about an essential element, the root of something, the existence of which can be easily proved. (Difficult, but not impossible, of course. :smile:)
Quoting Judaka
Certainly.
(I would only replace "true or false" with "well-grounded or ungrounded" (or "solid vs unstable", etc.), since the first case refers to statements, whereas the second refers to a whole argument or line of logic.)
Quoting Judaka
I'm not sure if get this right. Do you consider the essence as generic? And if so, what is the "specific"?
Quoting Judaka
It is true that philosophy focuses on the essence of things. I have forgotten that. I'm talking about and practicing it by habit! :grin:
(Otherwise, I respect your opinion that this cay be taken as a flaw and not something to hail about.)
I see. That is, like the ink on the paper, the electrons fired on a screen, etc. And like the acoustic waves that words produce when they are uttered. Words are material symbols that can be presented in any and all of these forms.
But what we are talking about and interested in here is the meaning of the words, independently of their form and carrier, i.e. what they convey to us, what thoughts are triggered in us when we perceive them, indiviudally and in combination, as groups. Isn't that right?
(Although the medium in which they are transmitted might also play a role. (See McLuan's theory of "The medium is the message").)
Quoting JuanZu
Right, you are talking here about the known disadvantage of the written messages. This is the reason why emoticons and later emojis where created, as a substitute for the mood in which a message is transmitted. (In spoken language the problem is lesser, since we can rely on the tone and pitch of voice. But gestures and face expressions are still missing.)
Anyway, all this is unimportant when discussing on philosophical or scientific grounds, isn't it?
Quoting JuanZu
Right. But I consider empirical descriptions --i.e. examples of how a concept works in practice, in life, etc.-- quite important, since they make an abstract idea better undestandable --more concrete and more "visible" and tangible-- by giving flesh and bones to it. They also show that the person using that concept has a solid reality of it, not just a bunch of words and thoughts in his head.
Here's a video that shows the importance that a known philosopher --Bernardo Kastrup-- gives to definitions and how effectively he handles them:
"All is in consciousness, but not necessarily conscious"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCzbnuCVpEs
In the excerpt below, BK describes the phonomenon of consciousness in relation to reality and mind:
"All reality is in consciousness. It unfolds as a phenomenon of consciousness. That reality is not in a world fundamentally outside mind, outside consciousness. So, for instance, if I hold this statue here, then the concreteness, the color, the solidity I feel, everything I perceive, is an excitation of subjective experience, itself an excitation of consciousness. This statue is not fundamentally outside the field of my subjective experience."
I brought this example to show that talking about "definitions" does not necessarily mean giving an explicit, dictionary-like definition, but also any kind of description that explains the meaning of a concept. In this case, the description also focuses on the essential element of the concept,
--"consciousness"-- which is, perception. Furthemore, BK offers a practical example of the concept, to make it more concrete.
From that, one can easily create a concise, dictionary-like definition, if one wants to. This shows that definitions and descriptions are very close and alternatives in providing the meaning of concepts, in philosophy as in any other field.
This is a very good example of what I was talking about in this topic and during the whole discussion.
Simultaneously, BK's description also supports my definition of "consciousness" which I have put forth quite a few times in here, (and more times elsewhere (recently, in the discussion of "Why is the Hard Problem of Consciousness so hard?").
So I hope that this satsifies those who need froma a person to provide reference from an "expert" or "professional", as a kind of "proof" --as silly as this may sound-- otherwise, they cannot even acknowledge a definition coming from a "common" interlocutor or "amateur".
Kastrup is more cult figure than philosopher. Idealism has precious few followers amongst professional philosopher.
Consciousness is not just perception, but also involves acting on the world. Consciousness is not passive.
It is not at all clear from what you say what "the meaning of a word" is. You seem to think it is what is given by a definition, but Quoting Banno
I think you are mostly right. But this:
Quoting Banno
and the points you make based on this seem to be shaky. Just because a child learning a language picks it up without reading a dictionary (although some children do read dictionaries), doesn't mean that the meanings of the words the child learns are not roughly represented by what is found in a dictionary and that the definitions contained within aren't really useful. What you are saying about how setting out a philosophical argument with clear definitions is stifling is not the result of linguistics, but rather the simple point that there is some leeway with the way words are used when arguing within different paradigms.
I'm basically saying that the internal logic of an argument is more important than adhering to some sort of arbitrary dictionary - but those words in question, while there is leeway in the way they can be used, must exist within some parameters determined by the larger body in which the argument exists. The way the word is used is more important than any sort of definition one might point to, but the thing has to make sense.
Of course not. What is shown is that dictionaries can only be a secondary way of understanding a word. Of much greater import is the way the word is used.
I think you agree with this.
And if you want to know how a word is used, a good current dictionary will tell you the common usages. There is no difference between the idea that dictionaries define words and the idea that dictionaries describe usage. It's the same thing. Although I acknowledge that this is not always understood.
Just as there is a difference between reading a car manual and driving a car.
There remains a way of understanding how a word is used that consists not in a dictionary definition but in actually making use of the word.
And it is this that will be missed if one places undue emphasis on dictionary definitions.
Sure
I think meaning is something that happens to a system of signs. Something that happens to the medium, so to speak. When two sign systems meet, they establish certain relationships where one affects the other actively and passively. These relationships are the meaning. For example, when we read a definition in a dictionary, we are affected by its system and its specific configuration (word order, spacing, syntax, etc.); The meaning is created in this relationship and this is determined as the certain configuring effects in our system of signs. That is, the letters affect our learned and memorized language, they resonate within it and individualize it (and this can be said a fortiori for someone using the language and speaking to us) Not so much in the sense that the medium is the message, but that the message is a relationship between the mediums. And meaning (as something iterable, repeatable, that survives through mediums) depends on the spatial and temporal stability of sign systems and their relationships.
In a dictionary there are usually no "emojis" or the facial expressions of the writer. But this is due to our intention of objectivity and the suitability of the medium for this purpose. Dictionaries have on their part the permanence and durability of ink in some cases, which can transcend the vocal sounds that are carried away by the wind (Socrates did not write, but we know about him thanks to Plato's ink). When we think about objectivity, theory, concept and universality (which characterize science and philosophy) we choose the most appropriate means for its realization. How important was Albert Einstein's mood at the time he first spoke about the theory of relativity? Not very important, in the paper there is no indication of his humor, there is no emojijust like there isn't one in a dictionary. That is why for the theoretical and universalist intention of science and philosophy the empirical and contingent element is subtracted or abstracted dictionary-like. And what is said about a dictionary can also be said about any medium that gives us a definition or a concept: A paper, a manual, a recorded sound, a recorded explanation from someone, etc.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Yes me too.
Every time we apply the concept more broadly (in daily life, in practical examples, analogies, metaphors, etc.) we are doing something that is supposed to be its essence: Universality and its application to many cases at different space and time. And according to what was said above, our theories, concepts, definitions and laws (just like meaning, and other "universal" things that are repeated through space and time) are relationships between sign systems of great stability in space and time. The ink in a dictionary is not carried away by the wind, as can happen with spoken sounds. That is why the dictionary as a written medium is more suitable than speech to realize universality. And a fortiori the same can be said of computers, SSD, "the cloud", etc.
BK Kastrup is one of the main --if not the main-- supporter and defender of idealism, more precisely analytic idealism. What creteria are you using to distingusih "cult figures" from actual philosophers?
And, do you mean that actual philosophers don't care about giving definitions/descriptions of the terms/concepts they are using? Because this was the main purpose I posted this message.
Quoting Banno
Can you make this a little more clear to me? Do you mean that consciousness contains action?
Quoting Banno
What is this way?
You open and leave a lot of doors open, Banno ...
I think that you are talking about how one uses a language in general and not esp. definitions, which is our subject. Because if one does not follow the grammar and syntax rules of one's language, this will be reflected in everything one says or writes, wouldn't it?
Your ideas on the subject of language sound quite original and maybe there's something really interesting and useful here. However, I admit that they are not clear to me.
Quoting JuanZu
But emotions are not and should not be part of or belong to definitions. I brought up "emojies" in the context of written language in general.
Quoting JuanZu
Right.
Thank you. One does one's best to help.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
In first aid, consciousness is assessed by obtaining a reaction. Would that philosophers might learn first aid.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Philosophical investigations, §201 and thereabouts.
You are dealing with an obscurantist who throws a hook and pulls the line bit by bit, and finally you see there was no bait (see here).
Here is the what he quoted:
Not very helpful on its own.
Don't be solicitous. If he had a point to make, he would have stated already.
Use is part of the meaning but it is not everything. Wittgenstein's theory is incomplete without a theory of the sign. That is why I talk about sign systems. Instead of saying that a system of signs is always being used in order to have meaning, I would say that a system of signs is always in effective relationship with another system of signs in order to have meaning. Thus, taking the example of a book (a book-dictionary), the written marks enter into a relationship with our language sedimented in our memory. But the book cannot be ignored as an active element in the production of meaning. Wittgenstein's theory would ignore the book as an active agent and give primacy to the subject as the producer of meaning as he uses his learned language.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I understand. What I wanted to point out is that there is a reason why there are no emoji-type expressions, casual expressions and so on. The reason is that there is the intention of objectivity, of the concept and of the universal. I also wanted to point out that according to the theory of the sign that I work on (which refers to the texts of Peirce, Derrida, Saussure among others) it is always, in a certain sense, universalizing: Leaving itself and having effects on the other (in another system of signs), as if becoming a ghost, extending his identity towards the other. The meaning would be the effects of the signs extending their spatiality and temporality. A good book (or a good dictionary) is remembered by many: Its being and its effects seem to transcend its particular spatiality and temporality.
An interesting idea.
The Tractatus is of course a work about signs, much of which was carried over to the Investigations, but a large part of which was dropped. He intended the two books to be read together, the Investigations as a critique of the system of signs Tractatus.
So what is problematic about signs? Simply that there is so much that is not captured by the signs we use, or that changes depending on the situation in which one finds oneself. It might be more accurate to say it is the utterance, not the sign, that holds meaning.
If your case is that language requires both signs and use, then you will not be at odds with Wittgenstein. It would be a mistake to think Wittgenstein did not understand the need for signs. Much of the Investigations concerns the rules and limits of the use of signs.
So again, understanding the relations between signs will leave the language dead. To understand it is to make use of it. Hence the emphasis on language games and forms of life.
The biggest difference I have with Wittgenstein is what I said in my response to @AlkisPiskas:
[B][I]"Thus, taking the example of a book (a book-dictionary), the written marks enter into a relationship with our language sedimented in our memory. But the book cannot be ignored as an active element in the production of meaning. Wittgenstein's theory would ignore the book as an active agent and give primacy to the subject as the producer of meaning as he uses his learned language"[/I][/b].
I claim that there is a certain autonomy of signs that explain how another system of signs is affected. For example, when we read a book, some specific linguistic signs appear in our thoughts and not others. This effect cannot be justified simply by the intentional use of the reading individual without the active intervention of the book. In a certain sense I say that the book writes in the subject and triggers a series of effects that individualize the language we use and with which we think and speak in general. This explains the fact that we can learn new words through a dictionary, without needing to see someone, another subject, using them. This implies that the relationship called "reading" is not saturated by the use learned by the subject. Which explains the possibility of error, misuse and disuse.
In fact, if we follow one of Wittgenstein's theses on private languages, the thesis that there is a public language implies an impersonal and supra-subjective element where a language seems to escape the intentional use of the subject [psychoanalysis is based on this theory]. In this sense, language is a system of signs with a certain autonomy beyond the use of individuals. Which obviously makes it possible to treat language in a more objective way. Is the intentional element necessarily linked to language use? So, if the intentional element is exceeded, we cannot continue talking about use, but, in a certain sense, we must talk about language acting by itself, we talk about a living system of signs, as opposed to a dead one, like that of a machine but still a system of signs. It is no coincidence that you speak of something "dead" of a system of signs understood beyond intentional use. I claim that signification always has a dead but totally active face.
So, a Wittgensteinian, eh?
Thank you, Banno. I'll have to look all that closer ...
Have a great new year!
Thank you Lionino for making my life easier by serving to me Banno's reference on the plate.
Well, besides W's usual fallacious and unexpected ideas --here, courses of action based on rules, etc.-- the reference has nothing to do with consciousness and what is its relation with "action", which is what I asked.
As for my being solicitous, well, I'm always open to and interested in new or different ideas. On the condition of course that are supported by pertinent and valid arguments or definitions/descriptions and/or examples. Which, unfortunately, usually does not happen.
Have a great new year!
But it is this exact these "sign" systems I'm taking about. Initially I thought you meant "symbols", but as you went on, I saw hat you wer really talking about signs. And, although I am a linguistic person, I can't see how they can play such a basic and important role in language and communication as ypu postulate in this thread with me.
Quoting JuanZu
Language is not something simply settled in memory like words and other symbols. It is much more than that. It is a system of communication, which in turn is a process of exchanging information, and as such it is live, even if written on paper, displayed on a monitor, etc. in the form of words and other symbols. Because this text when read becomes "live" in our mind and creates thoughts, i.e. the reverse process occurs of how the text is [[s][/s]created in the first place. The whole process is a kind of encoding and decoding.
E.g. the message that you are reading right now has been processed from information (thought with meaning (in my mind) into language (on paper), in the form of words or abbreviations, punctiation marks and other symbols (e.g. emojis, if it is transmitted in electronic form). This is the "encoding". When this reaches a recipient, the process is reversed.
(The sign language you are talking about is a special form of language that uses visual-manual modality to convey meaning, instead of spoken words (and other symbols contained in written language.)
Quoting JuanZu
I wonder what mess would have been created if he was taking that alo into consideration! :grin:
Quoting JuanZu
Exactly.
Quoting JuanZu
That's much better. At least now I know what you mean by sign systems and I can trurn to these guys and the theory of (the) sign or theory of signs (I just saw that there are some variation of the term.)
Thanks. (Even if you did that unintentionally. :smile:)
Have a great new year!
I don't really disagree with you on the importance of words and definitions in philosophy but if you want to make progress in philosophy you need to go beyond common usage. Common usage might have the effect of ingraining false beliefs into our thinking that we don't realize.
Also strict definitions might have a straight jacket effect of not going outside the lines when we should be crossing some false mental thresholds.
For example information and consciousness are two separate things by their common definitions but in their physical state are one in the same. A prime example of words gone wrong.
Consciousness is physically a brain state.
Information is physically a brain state.
If you want to argue that information is not a brain state I would advise against it. The definitions that say otherwise are fantasies of the mind.
I never said to stick to common dictionaries as far as philosophy is concerned. Although, good disctionaties include specialized definitions of terms when terms have special meaning and usage in philosophy. (They use for that indications such as "In philosophy:", (philos.), etc.) Those who are using dictionaries on a regular basis know that well.
But if one wants to explore a term/concept exclusively in a philosophical context, there are a lot of specialized dictionaries and encyclopedias of philosophy that one can refer to. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy suggests some of them (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s1.html):
And Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy itself, of course.
?????????. Same to you.
I agree with everything. I would just like to clarify that a system of signs is not necessarily a living system of signs [this would be demonstrated by computation]. As for "exchanging information" I have always wondered what is being exchanged. That is, continuing with the example of this forum, you see these marks on a screen, they are pixels. Where is the information and meaning of these marks? I can use a magnifying glass or a microscope to examine these pixels and probably won't find anything like meaning. It is because of this problem that I speak of meaning as an effect of an effective and active relationship between signs. It follows that nothing is exchanged, but is constantly produced as something new. Right now, when you read this, you are creating meaning as an effect of "my" words. But I am certainly not sending you anything, I am simply provoking something in you in a technologically mediated relationship. This is very counterintuitive.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I agree. There are sign systems of all kinds. When I talk about sign systems I do so in a more or less formal sense. There are written, spoken, thought, machined and many more types of systems in nature.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Given Wittgenstein's character, I prefer not to think about what he would answer. It makes me anxious.
Have a great new year too.
Philosophy is not like football. Although some folk treat it that way. it's not about teams.
I've been unable to follow this.
I have not explored the "theory of signs" yet in order to assimilate this ...
Quoting JuanZu
Exactly. There's no information anywhere, until someone decodes (translates, interprets) the words or symbols (or signs, in your case) and gets the meaning they convey. Because even just decoding is not enough. These symbols --either by themselves( isolated) or in combination (as a group, structure)-- have to create a meaning in the mind in order that they can be considered information (knowledge).
Now, one could disagree and say, e.g. "But this book contains information." Yes, but only loosely speaking, not literally. If you open this book, and look at it, touch it or smell it, you won't find any information. Not until you start reading it and and what you read has a meaning for you. Because the book make contain nonsense, symbols that are unknown to you, which may well be just "garbage", or belong to some code, e.g. Morse Code, which has to be decoded, etc. One can say that the book contains information (knowledge) only if one reads it and gets a meaning from what one reads.
Quoting JuanZu
Exactly.
Quoting JuanZu
I think you are speaking about different moments in time, two different events. My reading of your message happens in a different period of time and location. Once you have sent the message, your part (encoding) is completed. When I receive your message and start reading it, a decoding process takes place.
However, there will still be no exchange (communication) between us, until I reply you back with a message of mine, in whatever form and content, whenever this happens and from whatever place.
Now, again, one could disagree and say, e.g. "But JuanZu has communated something to you, independently of whether you receive it, read it, reply to it, etc.". And again, yes, but only loosely speaking. No communication (exchange) can take place until the other part replies to the message, in whatever form, time and place. Even with just an "OK" or a symbol, like an emoji. And even without actually reading and obtaining the conveyed information. Well, this would not be of course the best one could expect from a communication, but it would still be a communication. There would be an exchange of information.
Quoting JuanZu
Yes, I can undestand all this now.
Quoting JuanZu
:grin:
Agree.
Again I agree with everything, except for one thing:
Quoting Alkis Piskas
I have problems with this. When we talk about exchange we talk about something that passes from one side to the other while being the same. Like money, or a commodity. However, that does not happen with meaning and information. If I talk to you, no matter how much you respond to me, your words (like sounds, sound waves) do not contain any meaning that travels through the air with them. In each moment the meaning is created as something new (that is why there can always be error in interpretation, a "wrong" meaning because it is always new).
If you ask me something and I answer you, my answer in terms of exchange is as "empty" as your question. You may reply to me "but then there is no communication." And there certainly isn't if we continue to think of communication as representation. That is to say, normally when I hear your words whether in the form of a question or in the form of an answer I imagine that I am thinking the same thing as you but duplicated. However, that is not true, if we assume that meaning does not fly with sounds, nor is it transported in ink marks, etc., a fortiori we cannot say that I think the same as you.
So what is communication? This is my approach: Communication in this case is a mutual affectation where multiple meanings are created, but nothing is exchanged. It is a relationship of affectation around a third thing, but not of representation. The meaning, in the case of two speakers, is the third thing that maintains the relationship, it is an indeterminate third that is always differentiating and determining itself. It only appears and repeats itself as a third place, being pure virtuality. And if it is a third for two speakers, it is the fourth for three, and so on. Our interpretations of what the other person says [in the case of two speakers] refer to a third in terms of its pure tertiary, but indeterminated. Inside you and me this indeterminate virtual thirdness happens, and we gravitate to that, so to speak. That is the only thing that is repeated and remains the same: the third, the fourth, etc. for each case. We don't think the same [ I can always missunderstand you and think something totally different] but we share this thirdness as mutually happens to us.
Certainly.
Quoting JuanZu
Exactly. They acquire a meaning only when they are processed by the mind, i.e. decoded and undestood,
Quoting JuanZu
This reminds me somehow of the incremental search used by the search engines! :grin:
I know what you mean. You are referring to the parts of a message, while it is transmitted by the sender, and its processing by the receiver. (BTW, note that this process is about the same in both oral and written forms. Not only you can read a message aloud but you can hear it in your mind.)
However, the message, the information is not complete and until the sender completes it. (Indeed, a frustrated "Let me finish, please" may come in if the listener interrupts the speaker.)
Anyway, this applies to live communications and in talking only.
In any case, a message, and the information it contains, is considered complete only when it is fully transmitted.
Quoting JuanZu
Can't get this.
Quoting JuanZu
Well, I find all this a little too complicated. And why you keep rescticting communucation in oral form?
Quoting JuanZu
Can't get this either. Sorry. Affectation implies pretense and/or conspicuousness. How does this enter in a simple, straightforward communication? In commmunication in its general sense, as it is commonly and widely used?
I think I understand what you mean. You try to think of the situation as a whole. However, keep in mind that communication is never complete at once, it must be built. I can tell you something, but always, for whatever reason, my words may not reach their recipient. Perhaps the mistake is to conceive the meaning and information retroactively once the whole is constituted (as when a listener hears a sender and says "this is what he had thought", when in reality it cannot be the same). I prefer to say that the whole is a meaningful relationship where meaning emerges in various parts but is not the whole. Retroactivity is an erroneous causal inversion, where we imagine that the result (the message) was at the beginning.
Meaning is part of the whole, but it is not the whole. I think we both mean the same thing when you talk about a complete message. For it is certainly completed when it has meaningful effects. When I hear you, when I think I understand you, the message is already complete, but because it has already had its effects and a significant relationship has been established. However, I think it is impossible to say that the message is distributed among the interlocutors. Instead of the message I talk about the messages, in plural. The only thing that is maintained is the mutual relationship with respect to a third thing that is constantly being determined and differentiated.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
What I mean is that the sounds, the ink marks, the file, the pixels, are empty in that they are devoid of meaning. They provoke meaning as soon as they enter into a relationship with a system of signs distinct in each case.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
Oral communication is just one example among others. I can also speak in the same way about letters. When you read a letter of mine that I have sent you (or an email), you imagine that the meaning you generate is the same as that of the sender (me). But in reality, because it is generated and created at the time of reading, it cannot be the same. Hence, I have raised the need to think about something that appears third and indeterminate.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
If we talk about a letter, I mean that the ink marks affect you and produce effects on you (like another system of signs, in this case alive). These effects are the meaning, your inner language is affected and caused to be determined in x way: Something specific appears in your thought, some specific words arranged in a specific way.
And yet you hide when one is presented to you on a silver plate:Quoting Alkis Piskas
So be it.
Yes, maybe we do.
I'm certainly not hiding from anything. Neither do I hide anything. I'm a person who opens all his cards on the table and speak openly and clearly. And I expect that the person I communicate with does about the same.
You are a mysterious and obscure person, Banno.
It would be better that we don't communicate anymore with each other.
Well, what I'm relating is pretty much standard OLP of the Oxbridge variety, a bit archaic, but perhaps a background for current ideas in analytic philosophy.
Let's go over it again.
There's an argument, found in Austin but implicit in Wittgenstein and Quine and others, pointing out that meaning is more than what is found in a lexical definition.
There's the observation, central to OLP but also found in other areas, that often what is at stake in a philosophical discussion is exactly the meaning of the terms involved, and in such case that stipulating definitions would be dogmatic and counterproductive.
There's an off-hand rejection of a certain pop philosophy as overly simplistic.
And a quote from Wittgenstein, used several times, reiterating the first point in this list: that there is a way of understanding the meanings of words that is not found in their lexical definitions.
What was obscure or mysterious here?
Or was your ire raised by my opinion of Kastrup?
The "meaning of these marks" lies in the way they activate pattern recognizing neural networks in your brain, and the way those recognized patterns bring up associations in your mind. We don't find meaning looking at the words with a magnifying glass, because the meaning is a function of recognitions occurring in our brains.
I don't think this is the place to discuss the reductionism involved in conceiving meaning as simple brain processes. There is an association but no identification; and the association cannot be carried out without semantically, operationally and phenomenologically presupposing the term with which we want to associate the brain processes. Association is not identification. In any case it is quite off-topic to talk about this here.
It is relevant to the fact that for you...
Quoting JuanZu
But I'm happy to drop it if you aren't interested.