A Case for Moral Realism

Reply to Leontiskos

No, the very fact that you revise your ideas and write long posts is evidence that you are not approaching these topics glibly.

Oh, I see. I was just confused at what you were trying to convey to me. I agree that many people on these forums put very little effort into their positions: they seem to be more interested in argumentation.

Okay, so you think goodness is act-centric, but you are thinking beyond human acts.

Correct.

Reply to baker Probably a little of both, But i'm resistant to the former as a fairly involved and directive (as an attribute) father. I must have some level of udnerstanding that I could know better than others. Maybe I'm overcautious, so unless its patent (i.e you're bloody 12 - sit down) I refuse to engage.

That said, my understanding is that I cannot formulate a rule that accounts for my moral view on any given thing that I could universalise intellectually. I just can't understand how it's possible that my intuitions aren't entirely fallible and apply only to me as their source.

Quoting Bob Ross

In the case of #1, you would be disagreeing that the word ‘good’ should be used to refer to ‘acts which promote flourishing’; and, to that, my response is, briefly, that I think this is historically how the word tends to be used. We say ‘I am doing good’ when our bodies are healthy (i.e., our body parts are acting in harmony and unity to accomplish survival and thriving) and our goals are being fulfilled; and, most universally, we say ‘everything is going good’ when everyone is acting in harmony such that each person is respected and sufficiently sovereign. Likewise, when we say society is ‘doing good’, we usually mean that each part of the society is acting in harmony and unity to achieve the safety and sufficient sovereignty of its citizens. You see the pattern.

So acts which promote flourishing are good because we have historically used the word "good" to describe acts which promote flourishing? This seems to be a kind of constructivism: moral facts are established by the conventions of our language use.

I think that you're on the right track, but I think that this is a form of anti-realism, not realism.

Quoting Michael

I think that you're on the right track, but I think that this is a form of anti-realism, not realism.

I am exactly in this camp, in terms of Bob's system here.

Quoting Bob Ross

In the case of #1, you would be disagreeing that the word ‘good’ should be used to refer to ‘acts which promote flourishing’; and, to that, my response is, briefly, that I think this is historically how the word tends to be used. We say ‘I am doing good’ when our bodies are healthy (i.e., our body parts are acting in harmony and unity to accomplish survival and thriving) and our goals are being fulfilled; and, most universally, we say ‘everything is going good’ when everyone is acting in harmony such that each person is respected and sufficiently sovereign. Likewise, when we say society is ‘doing good’, we usually mean that each part of the society is acting in harmony and unity to achieve the safety and sufficient sovereignty of its citizens. You see the pattern.

Though this is an interesting take if we consider other languages.

The Arabic word for "moral" is "??????". But if we take an Arabic-speaking nation like Saudi Arabia, the things they describe as being ?????? are in many cases not the things that we describe as being moral. Islamic countries tend to have different values to non-Islamic countries.

If we follow your reasoning then it must be that the English word "moral" isn't a translation of the Arabic word "??????" as each word is used to describe different things.

So what we mean by "moral" isn't what they mean by "??????", so there aren't actually any moral disagreements as we're comparing apples and oranges. In fact, the Arabic-speaking people don't make any moral claims at all because they don't use the word "moral". They only make ?????? claims.

There certainly does seem something problematic here. I think there's a case to be made that the word "moral" is a translation of the word "??????" even though the things we describe as being moral are not the things they describe as being ??????. If so then it must be that your approach to understanding the meaning of the word "good" is mistaken.

If the words "moral" and "??????" mean the same thing, and if the things we describe as being moral are not the things they describe as being ??????, then one or both us are wrong in our claimed "particulars".

So, as I asked before, how do we determine whether or not something which is claimed to be moral really is moral? If we can't do that then we can't look to the things that are claimed to be moral to determine what "moral" means, as we may be looking at things that aren't moral.

Quoting Bob Ross

Correct.

I think you are on the right track. You seem to be proffering something akin to virtue ethics.

Quoting Michael

So acts which promote flourishing are good because we have historically used the word "good" to describe acts which promote flourishing? This seems to be a kind of constructivism: moral facts are established by the conventions of our language use.

This is a strange interpretation. It seems to me that he is simply defending his definition of 'good' by recourse to use. Ross is saying that acts which promote flourishing are good because that is what 'good' means, and we know what 'good' means by looking at the way the word is used. If you think the word means something else, then you should say what you think it means.

You seem to have decided, a priori, that the good and the moral can have nothing to do with motivation. You say things like, "It doesn't matter if X is good or moral, because I will do it or not do it regardless." But if @Bob Ross is correct in saying that the good has to do with flourishing, and flourishing bears on motivation, then of course we must be motivated to seek the good. In that case your a priori assumption simply turns out to be mistaken.

Quoting Leontiskos

Ross is saying that acts which promote flourishing are good because that is what 'good' means, and we know what 'good' means by looking at the way the word is used.

That's a reasonable approach, but as I explained here there might be some issues with his application of it.

To summarise; those who speak another language might use their word for "good" to describe things that English speakers don't describe as being good. If we follow Bob Ross' reasoning then it would seem to follow that their word for "good" isn't in fact their word for "good" because, given how they use it, it must mean something else.

But this does seem problematic. We often say that people of other cultures (with their own language) have different moral values. How can this be unless relevant words share meaning across languages but are used to describe different things?

Perhaps it's more accurate to say that we use the word "good" to describe things that we ought do and the word "bad" to describe things that we ought not do. This is somewhat supported by the etymology of the related word "moral", from the Latin "moralis" meaning "proper behavior of a person in society". Other languages have their own words used the same way. We just disagree on which things we ought and ought not do.

Regardless, we have to distinguish the type of use that establishes the meaning of a word from the type of use that is a fallible act of predication. It's not entirely clear which kind of use is in play when we say that acts which promote flourishing are good.

Hi! I started a thread on Happiness and was redirected here to relate it to my assertion of objective morality. Sounds fun! Here I am! My second thread only.

Quoting Bob Ross

Ethics cannot be done from an armchair,

Aw, sure it can. Ethics can be done from anywhere, at anytime, by anyone. (This is the) Protestant Reformation of your faith.

Quoting Bob Ross

I would say that we do it like any other categories we make: we induce it from particulars.

I see this right triangle, that obtuse triangle, that isosceles triangle, etc. and I formulate/induce the general category of a triangle.

Ok that particular is fine. It is something the senses can seize upon to make a category distinct.

Quoting Bob Ross

I see someone helping the needy, being nice to someone else, being respectful, upholding a beings sovereignty, etc. and I induce the general category of the good.

Nope. You're totally off the rails there. You cannot judge what is good without some standard. There is nothing here for a declared subjectivist to lock onto. You say x, Fred says Y, Rita likes z. Nope. You have made a useless category.

Then if you start to describe what is this good thing about any action/belief, a reasonable amount of people have to agree or it would just be chaos. If a reasonable amount of people do agree, then what is the source of that agreement? {It is the instinct towards the objective morality} Especially over time as people get more advanced they would diverge to the point of unrecognizably ramified. That is not at all what is observed. People from random parts of the world may have some glaring differences but the generally sense and came up with the same patterns and indeed can relate the goodness thing in one action to the same goodness thing in another. So not only does it have the pattern it has but it is also deemed GOOD, a second step you are ignoring.

Quoting Bob Ross

I see someone torturing a baby for fun, a person being incredibly rude, a person demeaning another, a person being incredibly selfish, a person having complete disregard for life, etc. and I induce the category of the bad.

Same trouble. The complexity of your categories in these good/bad judgments requires a second meta level of pattern matching not possible without some n-dimensional similarity and that is exactly what you are trying to refute. You are proving objective morality, not your case.

Quoting Bob Ross

Just like how I can separate triangles into one pile and squares into another, and more generally shapes into one pile and non-shapes into another, I, too, can put generous acts into one pile and respectful acts into another, and more generally good acts into one pile and bad acts into another.

Nope, and for the reasons mentioned.

Quoting Bob Ross

Am I going to sort each into each pile 100% accurately? Probably not. Does that take away from the plentiful evidence that the categories do exist? Certainly not.

I agree on this spreading and uncertain breakpoint analysis. Just like electron shell discretion in quantum mechanics there do seem to be a lot of this cant or this must rules in life. But is the fact that people can even agree on a category at all over time a hint at some meta level order to the universe? Is awareness then subjective, really. If we get it more right, it's closer to something. What is that? It's objective truth. Is awareness part of morality?

Reply to Michael

So acts which promote flourishing are good because we have historically used the word "good" to describe acts which promote flourishing? This seems to be a kind of constructivism: moral facts are established by the conventions of our language use.

Unfortunately, I am unfamiliar with constructivism; but, semantically, yes: I am saying that we refer to this conception, G, as the word ‘good’ because that’s what people by-at-large mean by it when they use it. I think this is a standard convention of semantics: try to use the term how most people have historically used it.

I think that you're on the right track, but I think that this is a form of anti-realism, not realism.

Semantics is always subjective; so when I say we should assign G the word “good” in english, I am merely talking about subjectively what word we use to refer to G. G itself is not subjective, which is the general conception of acts which promote flourishing: just like how the conception of a “3-sided shape of which its interior angles add up to 180 degrees” is not subjective, but using the word “triangle” to refer to it is.

Though this is an interesting take if we consider other languages.

I am not familiar enough with arabic to analyze what the best word is to use when translating the english word “good”. All I am arguing is that we refer to it as “good” in english, and that’s all I need for my semantic argument to work. It is entirely possible that “good” does not translate from english to a specified language adequately: this happens all the time.

So, as I asked before, how do we determine whether or not something which is claimed to be moral really is moral?

Whether or not it can be classified under the conception of The Good. Again, you are asking: “how do we determine whether or not something which is claimed to be a triangle really is a triangle?”. Well, we have abduced the general conception of a triangle, and if the given shape can be classified meaningfully under that conception, then it is a triangle. No different with The Good.

If we can't do that then we can't look to the things that are claimed to be moral to determine what "moral" means, as we may be looking at things that aren't moral.

When assessing whether a particular shape is a triangle, we can absolutely misinterpet it as a circle; but this does not take away from the fact that, by-at-large, we have made progress towards what are triangles and what aren’t; and that most people can tell the basic difference between the two. Same with The Good.

I think most people can tell the difference between feeding starving children (as good) and torturing babies for fun (as bad); just like they can see a standard triangle and distinguish it from a standard circle. Yes, some shapes are weird: it is entirely possible I could present them with a triangle/circle hybrid that a normal person won’t know exactly which shape it is, just like I can bring up controversial moral claims, but this doesn’t take away from the general distinction between the two.

Reply to Bob Ross My comment to Leontiskos here is worth reading.

The crux of this issue is this:

Regardless, we have to distinguish the type of use that establishes the meaning of a word from the type of use that is a fallible act of predication. It's not entirely clear which kind of use is in play when we say that acts which promote flourishing are good.

These are two different kinds of claims:

1. A three-sided shape is a triangle
2. This plastic object is a triangle

Whereas (1) is true by definition, (2) isn't, and so (2) is possibly false. If (2) is false then looking at that plastic object isn't going to help us determine the meaning of the word "triangle".

You seem to be saying that "acts which promote flourishing are good" is similar to claim (1). This needs to be justified. Perhaps it's similar to claim (2).

Reply to Leontiskos

You seem to be proffering something akin to virtue ethics.

Yes, but I would say my OP doesn’t really support that; but I do support it.

It seems to me that he is simply defending his definition of 'good' by recourse to use. Ross is saying that acts which promote flourishing are good because that is what 'good' means, and we know what 'good' means by looking at the way the word is used. If you think the word means something else, then you should say what you think it means.

Exactly.

is correct in saying that the good has to do with flourishing, and flourishing bears on motivation, then of course we must be motivated to seek the good.

That’s true. Yes, we do seek flourishing. However, I would say, by default, we are only motivated (usually) towards the lowest Good, which is egoism (i.e., my flourishing). I am not sure that we are, by default, motivated towards the highest Good, which is universal flourishing. Only after grasping the good, intellectually (to some extent), do we acquire motivation towards the highest Good.

Reply to Chet Hawkins

Hi! I started a thread on Happiness and was redirected here to relate it to my assertion of objective morality. Sounds fun! Here I am! My second thread only.

Nice to meet you, Chet! I look forward to hearing your thoughts!

Aw, sure it can. Ethics can be done from anywhere, at anytime, by anyone. (This is the) Protestant Reformation of your faith.

What I was meaning by this is that we cannot completely understand what is the right or wrong thing to do by pure contemplation from your armchair. Abstract reasoning is important, but it has to be supplemented with experience. Ethic is a science.

Nope. You're totally off the rails there. You cannot judge what is good without some standard. There is nothing here for a declared subjectivist to lock onto. You say x, Fred says Y, Rita likes z. Nope. You have made a useless category.

For you, what is the difference, the distinguishing factor, between the triangle analogy and The Good such that you would accept the former and reject the latter?

I think they are perfectly analogous, and The Good is just an abstraction of particular acts. The Good is not normative.

Then if you start to describe what is this good thing about any action/belief, a reasonable amount of people have to agree or it would just be chaos

I think people do generally agree. We see a basic triangle and say “yep, that’s a triangle”. Likewise, we see someone feeding a starving child and say “yep, that’s good”. Perhaps, to help convey my point, strip the general conception of The Good of the word ‘good’: let’s call it G instead. G is just the general conception of acts which promote flourishing, and is abduced from particular acts [which promote flourishing]. No different than how the general conception of a triangle, let’s call it T instead to remove semantics, is the general conception of a “three-sided shape”, and is abduced from its particulars (e.g., a right triangle [a right T], an obtuse triangle [an obtuse T], etc).

It’s when we try to get people to justify The Good where things get confused and diverse.

People from random parts of the world may have some glaring differences but the generally sense and came up with the same patterns and indeed can relate the goodness thing in one action to the same goodness thing in another. So not only does it have the pattern it has but it is also deemed GOOD, a second step you are ignoring.

The biggest mistake of most moral realist theories, or so I say, is trying to fuse what is good with what one ought to do: The Good is non-normative. You seem to be still holding they are fused. I do not claim that the Good, in-itself, determines what one ought to do nor supplies the individual, technically speaking, with any normative standard whatsoever. Any moral realist theory which attempts this fails.

So, in this theory, it is not claiming that The Good is relative to a normative standard: it is just the abstraction of particular acts which promote flourishing, conception G, and I semantically refer to it as ‘The Good’ because that is how most people at least implicitly use the term. I say “I am doing good” when I am flourishing. I say “she is doing good” when she is flourishing. I say “society is doing good” when society is flourishing. When we say “helping the sick is good” I think the underlying intuition most people are expressing is that the act promotes flourishing [of that person who is sick, by helping them heal] and this is why they call it good. It is when people try to get someone to fuse this with normativity that the person rightly retracts their statement because there is absolutely no valid means of doing so. The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be. Seeing someone help the sick, albeit it good, does not itself obligate me to help the sick. The Good has been defamed of her name for the sake of incessant attempts at the synthesis of normativity with it.

The complexity of your categories in these good/bad judgments requires a second meta level of pattern matching not possible without some n-dimensional similarity and that is exactly what you are trying to refute.

Not if The Good is non-normative.

Quoting Bob Ross

For you, what is the difference, the distinguishing factor, between the triangle analogy and The Good such that you would accept the former and reject the latter?

...

I think people do generally agree. We see a basic triangle and say “yep, that’s a triangle”. Likewise, we see someone feeding a starving child and say “yep, that’s good”. Perhaps, to help convey my point, strip the general conception of The Good of the word ‘good’: let’s call it G instead. G is just the general conception of acts which promote flourishing, and is abduced from particular acts [which promote flourishing]. No different than how the general conception of a triangle, let’s call it T instead to remove semantics, is the general conception of a “three-sided shape”, and is abduced from its particulars (e.g., a right triangle [a right T], an obtuse triangle [an obtuse T], etc).

Hmm, ok, I will try to answer in my way and yet include enough detail that you can show me where I am wrong your way.

Agreed that triangle is a repeatable observation in general. But with good you run afoul as mentioned of a second order inclusion of meaning that would not be 'common' and thus relatable without authority intervening arbitrarily. So the concept of the word good is indeed quite the point. Abstracting this concept to G proves my point. Still, in an effort to be more pragmatic and less idealistic with the case, here goes:

What is to flourish? Is it to grow more living things? That seems like a relatively simple to understand assertion. But wait! Without an objective morality my society says flourish indeed means to kill babies born with x traits, and there is a strange eugenic component that my society really really loves, a hierarchy. So, there is a list of physical factors that have a relative/weighted negative flourish value when phenotypically expressed in a baby. The cutoff line or murder-it line changes from time to time in that society.

It turns out this practice would be devastating to what you and I might agree flourishing is, but this hypothetical society (much like our own in many ways) is convinced that it is a sign of flourishing to kill these many types of babies; that an objectively morally corrupt practice is moral. They even add in time wasting ceremonies that are public where everyone drinks the blood of these murdered babies just because they really want to flourish {adding flourish}. Do you not agree that this is possible?

Your conflation of G hides the truth of the missing meta level issue. The concept flourish is not at all associated with the same acts. Your purely (erroneous) logic is tacking on what you think is good based on the existing standard to all sides, making the match a forced and choreographed affair. That is not allowed in an intellectually honest case.

When the Mongoni who have this practice for flourishing meet the Trifal who do not, they start asking at diplomatic meetings where children are present to honor their potential new friends by murdering the offensive children of the other diplomats that have not been culled, in order of course to strengthen the genetic lines of the Trifal, because they are trying to aid the unaware in their moral understanding. This also begins to cast great doubt on the wisdom of the Trifal from the point of view of the Mongoni (not to mention vice versa), who are elite, slow in birthrate, and very very pure (in their own deluded sensibilities).

What is accepted as the concept, 'to flourish' is not the same in both cultures. In Trifal the babies are nurtured at least as properly as human babies are currently by most societies on our planet.

To add to this messed up conflict just waiting to happen, both sides are moral subjectivists, possessed of the erroneous belief that their chosen dogma/delusion is acceptable as a morality. They have no reason therefore to seek a common ground in that sense (and both societies are in decline because they morally value not seeking common ground without shared values). They both believe it is their right to define flourish as a concept. {And therefore both are wrong, immoral}

It does not matter that you respond with no, flourishing obviously means this or we can define this such that … … is included. That is because your own assertion is subjective morality. You cannot include moral value judgments. Your is the objective good. To support subjective morality you nust properly proceed as I did in the example above from a random verb, 'flourish', and then you attach a random (subjective moral) action to it. It could be anything if you are honest.

I could go on and on with such examples.

The trouble is the one example, the triangle, is too simple, and the other example, the good, is too complex and conflated. I mean come on, its bad enough people think two apples are categorical. The principle of uniqueness forbids it in a sense. It is … what … kind of danger to conflate them, to group them, without realizing that the distinction that is the categorical filter is itself arbitrary. This means arbitrary in realized value, not specific current index. For example apples could be fruits conforming to a certain genetic percentage of DNA similarities and that then could be changed later. This opens up the question, with subjective standards, what is real? Was the earlier apple that used to qualify and now does not, an apple then and not now? The people at both times called it an apple. But the people that define 'Scotsman' change. There is no guarantee at all that differing authorities will decide that similar things are similar in parallel. The infinite variety of descriptors and the infinite fineness of the observation make this entirely problematic.

The above paragraph is not actually an argument for subjectivism. What is discovered is not the fact that differing points of view are allowed to make (incorrectly) different value judgments. What is properly discovered is that if a value is a value objectively, it does not change, if the holders or believers of said value are objectively correct. This ties awareness and accuracy at least to morality. This example is insanely small, a tiny tiny iota of perfection, an immorally (in)accurate slice of assertions, still, as contended, better than a subjectivist's point of view. I will say, it is likely that a subjective view or model of the universe is perhaps almost equally likely to come up with a workable description of morality, but that is only almost.

The almost is based in my 'Brevity Principle' which is to say, “As far as humanity can tell using all its resources to date that are widely known enough to be discussed, morality has to have been objective since at least the expected dawn of time.” That brief period compared to a possible infinity of time stretching out before us is expected to be a certain number of time units in length. So, if you are arguing about what happens after a hideously unknown and unimaginably massive amount of time passes to end objective morality and show that morality is possibly subjective then, why would you bother? There is a minuscule reason to bother, I agree. But that reason is based in objective morality. What are you basing yours on? Such a subjective morality is just not what we are living with now and not what we have been living with since time began. If that's your jam, conjecture as to what might happen in some extremely unlikely time in the future, and not discuss reality as we can measure it now, consistent since it began, then, ok, you have a point.

All of this related to descriptors in the physical realm are one thing. They are one teleological hurdle
to get past. Of course what we call science can help us pin down these differences and ostensibly agreement can be made. But, why do you believe this?

The reason why you believe this (about science or any consistent approach) is the problem. Is it your faith in the meaningfulness and perhaps depth of belief in logic and analysis (consistency) that underscore the problem. That faith is based in something you disavow with your ideas. An objective moralist like me would simply claim, “It is 'good' to be more aware” and such a person is correct. An objective moralist like me would simply claim, “It is 'good' to be more accurate with measurements and judgments related to meaning, both; e.g. accuracy on its own is 'good' ”. Without objective morality the two sides are 'allowed' to subjectively value awareness and accuracy. There can be no honest expectation of any similarity in what awareness and what accuracy are by subjectivists. If you let timeline downstream or competitive practices determine by contest/experimentation what is accurate by any measurement at all, you are proving your dependence on objective morality.

You might go down the route of declaring that awareness and accuracy are not moral considerations at all. That would just be hilarious. I'm going to go with Socrates on this one. There are two sorts of good, virtue and happiness. And I do not remember the context of my brother from another mother's railing at the Athenians, but, I would disagree that these are similar enough to be easily grouped. One side is deontological and the other consequential. They are related but one cannot speak of both in the same breath with moral honesty. Of course, I am stating my subjective moral opinion in an objective moral universe. As Milton might suggest, “let truth and falsehood grapple, truth is strong'.

Awareness and accuracy are virtues. Their expression leads to one and only one meaningful moral consequence, happiness value. Unhappiness is just lower relative happiness. {This is analogous to evil is just a lesser (objective ha ha) value of good} This relationship between happiness and moral choice was my other thread and too much of a digression here. So, I'll trim that desire and try to stay on topic.

The intent to become aware, the need of it, born of the fear of the unknown, is morally sound, objectively.

The intent to become accurate, born of the anger against 'wrongness', yes another debatable value judgment, is morally sound, objectively.

These are laws of the universe. They are tautologies. Belief cannot change them. Of course I am only stating my current belief. Due to perfection as a concept, accuracy, judgment, … one of these beliefs is better than the other, objectively. Although we can be and often are in error, the truth strength of perfection is compelling enough in all the universe to allow infinite wrongness on the other side and still be better to continue that genuine compelling nature objectively. This is why desire exists.

These virtues which are improperly defined only because there is an objective morality which is damnably perfect and I who am defining them am not perfect. This perfection, unattainable, or perhaps the purpose of the universe and a universe ending event, is objective. Perfection itself, as a concept, only has meaning if morality is objective. There is no way to define 'better' without some supposed objectivity. And although we can be wrong about better, truth is not wrong about it. It always seems harder and harder to get to. Why? Again … derail … restraint … on on!

It is hard to define perfection. I say it is objective, so, I should be able to get closer and closer to it. If something is subjective there is no way to get closer and closer to it, because it itself varies. Accuracy itself is dismissed. But a clever definition for perfection is 'A belief and state of being which can never be obtained despite any strength of desire for it, but should be aimed at by virtue of the existence of that desire.' So, if you can be there or believe it entirely, it is not morally correct enough yet. “Doubt may be an unpleasant condition, but, certainty is absurd!” - Voltaire

If something can be more and more (never perfectly) proven as 'right', independently, by a moral agent, then that something involves a suspected morally objective set of value judgments approaching what is referred to as 'Truth'. This is effectively the scientific method and it can be applied to meaning(morality) in the same way, albeit a meta level harder task, as to physical 'science'. In fact the word 'science' is in quotes because the pattern of meaning intrinsic to that term can only be defined by the greater objective moral concepts including of course awareness and accuracy as virtues.

You cannot define what you value amid non-armchair 'science' without an objective morality. That is because if morality can change then awareness and accuracy can change, and let's add in consistency as a value. Is it valuable? What guarantees that is so? Only objective value can do so. The concept of science itself, and any pursuit based on it depends entirely on an approach (never arriving) at … . That is objective truth, perfection.

What subjectvists do not understand is this short and simple: If morality were subjective all stability as 'good' is not something you can put forth or depend on. You have embraced pure chaos. Within any meaningful timeframe (The Brevity Principle outtake), even a split second, all rules could and would change. The living universe would be partaking of the nonsense of subjective morality. Gravity disappears from one second to the next. Random people but a third of the planet are able to see a new color but only for 30 seconds. What did it mean? The weak nuclear force is tripled over the course of two months. Death becomes so morally preferable that all living creatures in the universe go into zombie desire comas and like robots kill themselves. Order itself has a moral component. Objectivity is a principle of order. Subjectivity is a principle of chaos. Both are components of morality. I am not here to denigrate chaos.

Only the overarching order of the universe, objective morality, the only thing in existence, ensures that all moral agents are equally possessed of free will. This balanced scenario allows for an equal dip into both order and chaos as well as that sneaky balance stuff I will call wisdom and adherence to objective moral resonance. So chaos is included and necessary within the order allowing for immorality. Immorality is nothing but the chaotic or orderly over or under expression, out of balance with perfection. With a subjective morality/universe there is nothing to balance, no need for balance, and in fact therefore balance cannot even be formed as a concept. You need objective morality for all of that, in fact, all meaning.

As this single quote resulted in 4 pages of response, I think I will stop here and see if this is taken properly before more investment.

Reply to Chet Hawkins

I appreciate your elaborate response!

Unfortunately, it is so long that I am having a hard time knowing where to start (and end), so let me just respond to the key points (that I was able to decipher from your post). You let me know if there is anything in particular you would like to discuss (that I may have perhaps overlooked).

Firstly, you seem to be still thinking that The Good requires “a second-order inclusion of meaning” (presumably a standard) which I am overlooking. I say to this, that it does not have any such thing.

Secondly, you ask what ‘flourishing’ is? I would say that it is the ‘optimal or sufficient actualization of goals’. I use it very similarly to ‘happiness’, except that I think that ‘happiness’ has a certain connotation of ‘feeling pleasant’ that I wish to avoid. Flourishing is sufficient realization over time relative to a goal (or goals).

Thirdly, you seem to also worry, subsequently, that flourishing may be subjective, which I deny. To take your example, it is entirely possible that a society could be flourishing relative to their own goal of sacrificing babies (to whatever extent they want)—just like how a psychopath serial killer can be happy by torturing other people—but this is not the highest Good. The lowest Good, afterall, is, by my own concession, egoism and some intermediate level is a society which has set out goals which make them fulfilled (pyschologically) by sacrificing some babies, but the highest Good is the ultimate sight for the eyes of the moral, virtuous man. You seem to have forgotten that The Good, under this view, has levels. Flourishing, as I have defined it, is relative to goals/purposes; and from this one can abstract the highest form of The Good, which is everything flourishing [relative to their own goals]. Therefore, what that society is doing, in your example, is factually wrong (in light of the highest Good). This form of the Good, as the form or relation of flourishing, is not subjective: what it means for a particular person to flourish is relative to their own goals, but what it means to flourish (in general) is not; and flourishing of all, as the highest Good, does not waver with opinion. So you are partially correct in inferring that what it means to flourish is going to have that subjective element of being relative to a goal, but that itself, in form, is objective. I do not get to choose what it means to flourish, but what it means for me to flourish is.

Fourthly, you briefly asserted, without any real elaboration on any positive argument for it, a ‘brevity principle’: “As far as humanity can tell using all its resources to date that are widely known enough to be discussed, morality has to have been objective since at least the expected dawn of time.” I honestly did not understand why this would be the case nor why it is called the brevity principle.

Fifthly, I think you are misunderstanding, or perhaps we just disagree, on the implications of moral subjectivism; and, more importantly, the nature of desire. Just to briefly quote you:

What subjectvists do not understand is this short and simple: If morality were subjective all stability as 'good' is not something you can put forth or depend on. You have embraced pure chaos.

This is not true at all if moral subjectivism is true, nor is it true of the nature of desire. Desire—i.e., will—is subjective, but it is by-at-large very persistent, as opposed to whimsical: people are psychological motivated by the deepest depths of their psyche, which their ‘ego’ has no direct access to, and this evolves very slowly. People depend on their desires all the time and with quite impressive precision and for large lengths of time. The only kind of chaos that might occur due to moral subjectivism is people’s fundamental desires may not agree with other people’s.

Sixthly and finally, you claimed that objective morality provides free will equally to subjects; which is not true at all. Firstly, it is clear that all animals of the animal kingdom (including humans) have varying degrees of free will, Secondly, there is no such law of the universe that dictates that we have free will: it is a biproduct of our ability to cognize. Thirdly, if morality is objective, then it says nothing about what free will we may or may not have: it says what we should be doing or/and what is good to do.

Bob

Quoting Bob Ross

“we can determine the concept of a triangle from particular triangles, but how do we know, first and foremost, what a triangle is?”: well, the former is what determines the latter.

Might be way late on this, but as noted in the other thread, practice! Hoping it makes per....sort of good. LOL.

We know what a triangle is because its conditions are contained in its concept. The concept itself determines what particulars are susceptible to come under that concept. We can't do that with 'good'. There is no a priori conception. It must be derived from particulars.. Imo.

Quoting Chet Hawkins

What subjectvists do not understand is this short and simple: If morality were subjective all stability as 'good' is not something you can put forth or depend on.

What? Subjectivists have no obstacle to relying on their conception of 'the good' and I, personally, am convinced this is what Bob is doing. Establishing a subjective measure for 'good' which has objective parameters.

I don't think 'the good' could possibly be objective. Even your 'version' is just your version. That's it. It has objective parameters, but choosing the basis for what those parameters capture is subjective as anything. Calling it objective relies on telling every other person in teh world that their conception is wrong, if it isn't perfectly aligned (ironically) with yours. It appears to, funnily enough, be doing the exact same heavy lifting Bob's is, but with a more 'This is Inarguable' flavour.

Quoting Bob Ross

The Good is not normative.

Agreed. That which may or may not be good, as in instances of, is. The metaphysical argument being, one cannot know (appreciate, consider, allow….whatever) a thing as good, without the quality itself being resident in consciousness somewhere, somehow, over and above mere experience. Same with beauty, justice, and so on.

Quoting Bob Ross

It’s when we try to get people to justify The Good where things get confused and diverse.

Agreed. THE Good, good in and of itself, is an ideal, thus non-contingent given. Not susceptible to instances. It’s an aesthetic judgement of feeling, rather than a discursive judgement of thought.
————-

On the other hand, your triangle example doesn’t work the same as the ideal of The Good, in that it is impossible to think a triangle in general, for each though of one is immediately a particular instance of the conception. The Good, however, as an ideal, can never be constructed in accordance with a conception, hence remains a different kind of judgement.

En passant……

Quoting Bob Ross

Yes, but I would say my OP doesn’t really support that; but I do support it.

Okay.

Quoting Bob Ross

That’s true. Yes, we do seek flourishing. However, I would say, by default, we are only motivated (usually) towards the lowest Good, which is egoism (i.e., my flourishing). I am not sure that we are, by default, motivated towards the highest Good, which is universal flourishing. Only after grasping the good, intellectually (to some extent), do we acquire motivation towards the highest Good.

So a fairly basic way to overcome the egoist's objection is to recognize that there are common goods, the benefit of which is in our private interest. Think of the mother who nourishes her child and sees the good of her child as her own good; or the father who finds his own good in the good of his family, or the soldier who makes sacrifices for the good of his nation, which is his own good. A bright dividing line between "my good" and "others' good" does not exist in reality. People regularly (and without intellectual recognition) come to recognize others' good as their own good. It is solidarity or incorporation, and it flows from our social nature. Like bees, humans thrive in community; their flourishing is bound up with the flourishing of others, and to deviate from this is to deviate from a pre-critical mindset. Or in other words, Hobbes was wrong when he tried to redefine the human being in terms of selfish individualism.

Quoting Michael

Regardless, we have to distinguish the type of use that establishes the meaning of a word from the type of use that is a fallible act of predication. It's not entirely clear which kind of use is in play when we say that acts which promote flourishing are good.

The first very crucial thing to note is that definitions are also fallible. In order to understand the meaning of a predication, one must understand the meaning of the words within the predication, and when one fails to do so their false definition(s) will prevent them from understanding the meaning of the predication, and will also then prevent them from judging the truth of the predication. Once the terms of the predication are understood, the predication is understood, and can be judged true or false. So it is not only the predication that is fallible. In these dialogical contexts it is as often or more often the terms that are the problem.

Quoting Michael

1. A three-sided shape is a triangle
2. This plastic object is a triangle

Whereas (1) is true by definition, (2) isn't, and so (2) is possibly false. If (2) is false then looking at that plastic object isn't going to help us determine the meaning of the word "triangle".

This is not a bad example for my point. A plastic object is never a triangle. A triangle is a three-sided polygon, or plane figure. Or, "a three-sided polygon that consists of three edges and three vertices." A plastic object, not being a polygon or plane figure, is never a triangle. The reason someone might think a physical object is a triangle is because your definition is false, or at least ambiguous given the ambiguity of "shape."

Now in some ways I am quibbling, but the point is that our definitions are often less accurate than we suppose.

Quoting Michael

But this does seem problematic. We often say that people of other cultures (with their own language) have different moral values. How can this be unless relevant words share meaning across languages but are used to describe different things?

Perhaps it's more accurate to say that we use the word "good" to describe things that we ought do and the word "bad" to describe things that we ought not do. This is somewhat supported by the etymology of the related word "moral", from the Latin "moralis" meaning "proper behavior of a person in society". Other languages have their own words used the same way. We just disagree on which things we ought and ought not do.

I am not a moral (cultural) relativist, so I reject your premise.

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is. Your Arabic case is just another example of this.

As far as I can tell, the argument behind positions such as yours or hypericin's is fairly simple. "There is a great deal of disagreement about whether X is good; therefore there is no correct answer to the question."

Quoting Leontiskos

In order to understand the meaning of a predication, one must understand the meaning of the words within the predication

This is the issue I am addressing. We say that something is good, but what does "good" mean?

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good.

The problem with this is that different cultures with different languages describe different things as being good (using their words for "good"), and so if we accept Bob Ross' reasoning then the word for "good" in one language doesn't mean the same thing as the word for "good" in another language.

If this is an unacceptable conclusion then we must reject Bob Ross' reasoning. Something else is required to determine the meaning of the word "good".

Quoting Leontiskos

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is.

This is a false dichotomy. Some people claim that chastity is good; others that it isn't. Both groups might agree on what chastity is, and on what it means to be good (e.g. "something we ought support"), but still disagree on whether or not chastity is good.

Quoting Michael

I’m not arguing for cultural relativism.

Okay.

Quoting Michael

The first culture describes some X as being A. The second culture describes that same X as being not B.

This is an entirely plausible scenario. Even though “A” means “B” they are used to describe different things. What this shows is that we cannot determine the meaning of “A” (or “B” or “good”) simply by looking at what sort of things are described as being “A” (or “B” or “good”).

In this scenario, one of the cultures is wrong.

So it isn’t as simple as saying “good” means “promotes flourishing” because we use the word “good” to describe acts which promote flourishing. Like one of the cultures above we might be wrong.

So A=B?

I agree one of the cultures is wrong; I agree mere description/assertion does not suffice.

Going back to my previous post:

Quoting Leontiskos

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is.

If one party says X is good, and another party says X is bad, then the first thing to do is to figure out whether they mean the same thing by good/bad. If they do mean the same thing (and they also mean the same thing by "X"), then one of them is wrong. If they do not mean the same thing, then they could both be right (or wrong). A culture is a kind of party.

Quoting Michael

So it isn’t as simple as saying “good” means “promotes flourishing” because we use the word “good” to describe acts which promote flourishing. Like one of the cultures above we might be wrong.

As I see it the way you go about this is wrong-headed. If @Bob Ross posits that good is that which promotes flourishing, then it is not a proper response to say, "But what if that's not what good is?" The only proper response is to offer an alternative definition of good, with your own competing arguments (or to do so implicitly with a concrete critique of the definition).

The token "good" does not have any intrinsic signification. Therefore the bottom-level question, "But what if that's not what 'good' means?," doesn't make any sense. The meaning of words comes from language users, and is tied up with their intent. This intent is generally communal/linguistic, but it is always a back-and-forth between the community and the individual. The lexical vocabulary of the community influences the individual, and the lexical vocabulary of the individual influences the community. Thus to properly interact with an individual's predication or definition must involve bringing to bear either communal meaning or else your own counter-individual meaning (it's either "we don't use the words that way"/"that is untrue for us" or "I don't use the words that way"/"that is untrue for me" because...).

As I see it, your meta-error is that you attempt to disagree, yet without managing to properly interact in the way just set out. You are effectively doing something akin to saying, "But what if the token g-o-o-d doesn't mean 'promotes flourishing'?"

(Philosophers like Aristotle and Wittgenstein are right to pay attention to common use. It's just that common use isn't the be-all end-all for philosophical discussion.)

Quoting Leontiskos

The only proper response is to offer an alternative definition of good

You're shifting the burden of proof. If Bob Ross suggests that the meaning of "good" is X then he needs to support this claim. I don't need to offer an alternative.

Quoting Leontiskos

The meaning of words comes from language users, and is tied up with their intent. This intent is generally communal/linguistic, but it is always a back-and-forth between the community and the individual.

I address this in my post above, which I rewrote before you replied (because it said that you hadn't been online for 2 hours). I'll say it again:

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good.

The problem with this is that different cultures with different languages describe different things as being good (using their words for "good"), and so if we accept Bob Ross' reasoning then the word for "good" in one language doesn't mean the same thing as the word for "good" in another language.

If this is an unacceptable conclusion then we must reject Bob Ross' reasoning. Something else is required to determine the meaning of the word "good".

Quoting Mww

The Good, however, as an ideal, can never be constructed in accordance with a conception, hence remains a different kind of judgement.

:ok:

Quoting Michael

The problem with this is that different cultures with different languages describe different things as being good (using their words for "good"), and so if we accept Bob Ross' reasoning then the word for "good" in one language doesn't mean the same thing as the word for "good" in another language.

Then, as noted in my last, both languages could be right or wrong. There is no necessary contradiction if "good" does not mean the same thing as "??????". @Bob Ross' predications have their meaning in light of the English word "good," not the Arabic word "??????". If your rejoinder is, "Well, X may be good, but it isn't necessarily ??????," then Ross should respond, "True. I only called it good, I never called it ??????."

Quoting Michael

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good.

And how do you propose that we determine the meaning of the word "good"?

Quoting Leontiskos

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is. Your Arabic case is just another example of this

Hey dude :)

It seems to me disagreeing about what comes under the category 'good' can obviously be a particular disagreement.

I often (as a pretty centrist person) have discussions that begin with establishing what is considered 'good'. A case in point is transwomen in women's sport.

Generally, I establish that we both (the interlocutor's position doesn't matter to this idea) are after the same thing - reduction of suffering, and general respect for people with different views and presentations. So we have a categorical way to assess each of our claims, and whether they come under this agreed definition (in the particular case).

We then discuss the differing opinion, with recourse to the agreed 'Good'. In this case, I do no think transwomen should be competing in female sports (at elite levels), and the other, lets assume, does think they should.

They believe it is a method for achieving the Good we agreed on. But I disagree. It isn't. It's a bad method.

The details and positions are, again, not important. I don't think we could be wrong, because we already agreed on what 'Good' is. There's no daylight. The disagreement is what can come under that label. Not the X, not the Good... The categorisation.

Reply to AmadeusD

When I say, "...disagreeing about what X is," what I primarily mean is, "whether X is or is not good." There is a subtle interplay of object specification, but that can be left to the side. So I am not disagreeing with what you say here.

Quoting Leontiskos

There is no necessary contradiction if "good" does not mean the same thing as "??????".

But does it mean the same thing?

If it does mean the same thing then Bob Ross' explanation for how we determine the meaning of the word "good" doesn't work, or at least is insufficient.

If it doesn't mean the same thing then it doesn't make sense to say that Arabic speakers have different moral values, because they don't really have any moral values, given that they don't have a word for or concept of "moral" (much like we don't have a word for or concept of "??????"). Comparing our moral values to their ?????? values is comparing apples to oranges. It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that our moral values are "correct" and that their ?????? values are "incorrect", given that what they mean by "??????" isn't what we mean by "moral".

Reply to Leontiskos Fair enough - It certainly seemed like the implication was that a particular disagreement isn't possible and that it must be at a 'higher' level i.e what Good is, or what X is rather than whether its 1 or 2 (good, or bad). Sorry for misunderstanding.

Quoting Michael

But does it mean the same thing?

I have no idea. I don't speak Arabic.

Quoting Michael

If it does mean the same thing then Bob Ross' explanation for how we determine the meaning of the word "good" doesn't work, or at least is insufficient.

Why? Your argument is like saying that if I haven't studied C++ then I can't know what "if" means in Java. When Bob uses the word "good" he is not making a supra-English utterance, at least not in the way you seem to suppose.

Quoting Michael

If it doesn't mean the same thing then it doesn't make sense to say that Arabic speakers have different moral values, because they don't really have any moral values, given that they don't have a word for or concept of "moral" (much like we don't have a word for or concept of "??????"). Comparing our moral values to their ?????? values is comparing apples to oranges. It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that our moral values are "correct" and that their ?????? values are "incorrect", given that what they mean by "??????" isn't what we mean by "moral".

This is the debate over whether there is legitimate "analogical" predication (or what Aristotle sometimes called "pros hen" predication). The Medievals argued about this for centuries, and the debate was never really resolved. In Heidegger's first dissertation he wrote on a (pseudo) Scotistic text that dealt with this question of univocity.

I am not going down that rabbit hole, but note that this is not a matter of words, it is a matter of concepts (as you seem to recognize). If the Arabians had no concept for good, then some of these problems would arise. And it may be true that certain interlocutors, such as yourself, have no explicit concept of good or moral. This introduces the question of how genuine learning is able to take place, which is also a doozy of a topic. Granted, I think all of this gets much closer to the nub of the matter at hand for you.

Quoting Leontiskos

Why? Your argument is like saying that if I haven't studied C++ then I can't know what "if" means in Java. When Bob uses the word "good" he is not making a supra-English utterance, at least not in the way you seem to suppose.

Because this is a contradiction:

1. The meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe
2. The words "moral" and "??????" mean the same thing
3. The things the word "moral" is used to describe are not the things the word "??????" is used to describe

One of these must be false. I think (3) being true is uncontroversial, and so we must determine which of (1) and (2) is false.

If (1) is false then Bob Ross' explanation of the meaning of the word "good" fails.

Quoting Leontiskos

I am not going down that rabbit hole, but note that this is not a matter of words, it is a matter of concepts (as you seem to recognize).

What's the difference? Do you have a concept of ??????? Perhaps only if "??????" and "moral" mean the same thing. If they don't mean the same thing, and if there's no other English word that means the same thing as "??????", then you probably don't have a concept of ??????.

And conversely, if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral" then Arabic speakers probably don't have a concept of moral.

So if Arabic speakers do have a concept of moral then surely there must be an Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral". Perhaps "??????". And so premise (2) above is true. Therefore premise (1) above is false, and Bob Ross' argument has failed.

Quoting Michael

Because this is a contradiction:

1. The meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe
2. The words "moral" and "??????" mean the same thing
3. The things the word "moral" is used to describe are not the things the word "??????" is used to describe

One of these must be false. I think (3) being true is uncontroversial, and so we must determine which of (1) and (2) is false.

It is likely that (2) and (3) are partially true and partially false (and incidentally, (1) is also partially true and partially false). Consider

1. The meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe
2. The words "fast" and "rapido" mean the same thing
3. The things the word "fast" is used to describe are not the things the word "rapido" is used to describe

Neither of these claims are entirely true or entirely false. You seem to have a Scotistic idea that two concepts must either be entirely identical or entirely unidentical, with no in between.

Quoting Michael

What's the difference? Do you have a concept of ??????? Perhaps only if "??????" and "moral" mean the same thing. If they don't mean the same thing, and if there's no other English word that means the same thing as "??????", then you probably don't have a concept of ??????.

It is different to say, "Good is different from ??????," and to say, "Arabians have no conception of good." That is the first problem.

Quoting Michael

And conversely, if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral" then Arabic speakers probably don't have a concept of moral.

So if Arabic speakers do have a concept of moral then surely there must be an Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral".

These are both false. Do you have a concept of a Ford sedan? On your theory, you could only have a concept of a Ford sedan if you have a word for a Ford sedan. This is plainly false. We don't have a word for a Ford sedan.

If an Arabian has a concept of flourishing then they very likely have a concept of @Bob Ross' "good." It doesn't matter at all whether that concept is represented by the word ??????.

Weird - this was a post in response to Leontiskos which he has quoted below. I have no idea how i mucked up bad enough to delete it, but there we are.

Quoting AmadeusD

This is, in fact, the case. Identity cannot be partial, by definition.

Then communication is necessarily impossible, for no two word-conceptions are ever identical. When you say "cat" and I say "cat" we do not mean the exact same, identical thing. Apparently, then, we must be constantly talking past each other, endlessly misunderstanding each other. To be precise, even each time you use the word "cat" you will mean something slightly different. Apparently, then, you are using a different word each and every time you use the same token.

Language is much like organisms in this way, and the identity of words is akin to the identity of living organisms. If identity requires a perfect, univocal copy, then you must have no persistent identity.

Quoting Leontiskos

we do not mean the exact same, identical thing

Correct. Unsure that it follows that communication is impossible. Its imprecise, for sure. Quoting Leontiskos

endlessly misunderstanding each other.

Yep. And our efforts in communication are to minimize the misunderstanding.

Quoting Leontiskos

If identity cannot be partial, then you must have no persistent identity.

Correct. And this question (of personal identity, what it might mean, and how it might obtain/what it might consist in) is actually the exact mission of my (about to get underway) philosophical career. It's possible that some form of special pleading has to accepted for the term "personal identity" to have any meaning.

Quoting Leontiskos

It is different to say, "Good is different from ??????," and to say, "Arabians have no conception of good." That is the first problem.

That's why I said if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as 'moral' then they might not have a conception of good.

Do you have a conception of ???????

Quoting Leontiskos

These are both false. Do you have a concept of a Ford sedan? On your theory, you could only have a concept of a Ford sedan if you have a word for a Ford sedan. This is plainly false. We don't have a word for a Ford sedan.

We have the phrase "Ford sedan". I didn't mean to suggest that it requires a single word.

Quoting Leontiskos

If an Arabian has a concept of flourishing then they very likely have a concept of Bob Ross' "good." It doesn't matter at all whether that concept is represented by the word ??????.

If they have a concept of "flourishing", and if this concept is different to their concept of "??????", and if "good" means "flourishing", then "??????" and "good" don't mean the same thing.

Quoting Leontiskos

(1) is also partially true and partially false

Which is precisely why I said that determining the meaning of the word "good" isn't as simple as just looking at which things we describe as being good. (1) is an oversimplification. Bob Ross' account of the meaning of "good" is insufficient.

Quoting Leontiskos

If an Arabian has a concept of flourishing then they very likely have a concept of Bob Ross' "good." It doesn't matter at all whether that concept is represented by the word ??????.

Quoting Michael

If their concept of "flourishing" is different to their concept of "??????", and if "good" means "flourishing", then "??????" and "good" don't mean the same thing.

But that in no way contradicts what I said. :chin:

Quoting Michael

We have the phrase "Ford sedan". I didn't mean to suggest that it requires a single word.

Well that's what you said, and that's what your logic requires. Here is what you said, 'So if Arabic speakers do have a concept of moral then surely there must be an Arabic word that means the same thing as "moral".' All along you have been searching for this one-to-one correspondence between an English word and an Arabic word, and have been basing your arguments on this idea.

Quoting Michael

Which is precisely why I said that determining the meaning of the word "good" isn't as simple as just looking at which things we describe as being good. (1) is an oversimplification. Bob Ross' account of the meaning of "good" is insufficient.

Sure, but I've addressed this sort of thing:

Quoting Leontiskos

Thus to properly interact with an individual's predication or definition must involve bringing to bear either communal meaning or else your own counter-individual meaning (it's either "we don't use the words that way"/"that is untrue for us" or "I don't use the words that way"/"that is untrue for me" because...).

As I see it, your meta-error is that you attempt to disagree, yet without managing to properly interact in the way just set out. You are effectively doing something akin to saying, "But what if the token g-o-o-d doesn't mean 'promotes flourishing'?"

(Philosophers like Aristotle and Wittgenstein are right to pay attention to common use. It's just that common use isn't the be-all end-all for philosophical discussion.)

Common use is a perfectly good starting point for a definition. Indeed it is the prima facie definition. So to object to defining a word according to common use, without providing a further objection to the definition in question, is a meta-error on your part. You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to mean that which conduces to flourishing, but I don't see why the word 'good' means that which conduces to flourishing." This would not be a legitimate objection.

@Michael, I sort of think you are laboring under a cousin of the thesis that J. L. Austin opposed, namely the idea that words can't do things. "If 'good' is that which conduces to flourishing, then 'good' is a word which moves, motivates, and acts upon us. But words are descriptive; they can't do that sort of thing. So 'good' can't mean that."

It's a strange mixture of the is-ought divorce, Moore's Open Question, and a purely descriptive understanding of language. You seem to hold, a priori, that words like 'good' and 'moral' cannot bear on action or motivation. You say things like, "I will act thus and such whether or not I deem my action to be good or moral. Whether it is good or moral makes no difference to the way I act."

Quoting Leontiskos

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to mean that which conduces to flourishing

I don't agree with that.

There's a difference between using a word to mean something and using a word to describe something. The latter does not entail the former, which is where Bob Ross' argument falters. He argues that because we use the word "good" to describe acts which are conducive to flourishing then "good" means "conducive to flourishing". That just doesn't follow.

Quoting Michael

I don't agree with that.

There's a difference between using a word to mean something and using a word to describe something. The latter does not entail the former, which is where Bob Ross' argument faulters.

Well that dovetails nicely with the point I made <just above>, but let me rephrase my statement:

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to describe that which conduces to flourishing, but I don't see why the word 'good' means that which conduces to flourishing." This would not be a legitimate objection.

Of course, it is possible that there are words you would never personally use, having no reason to ever affirm the meaning that the word conveys.

Quoting Leontiskos

You seem to be saying the very strange thing, "Well I agree that we use the word 'good' to describe that which conduces to flourishing, but I don't see why the word 'good' means that which conduces to flourishing." This would not be a legitimate objection.

It's not a strange thing. Some people use the word "good" to describe chastity. It doesn't follow that "good" means "chaste".

Quoting Michael

It's not a strange thing. Some people use the word "good" to describe chastity. It doesn't follow that "good" means "chaste".

Well in that case you are claiming that 'good' involves flourishing, but that flourishing does not exhaust goodness. This is precisely the sort of thing that requires an argument, as I have said repeatedly. You are obliged to give a reason for your claim that flourishing does not exhaust goodness if you are to partake in philosophical discussion.

Note that this is similar to the problem of induction. Meaning is induced from our experience of use. If you think that someone has not had sufficient experience to make an induction about meaning, and they must stop short at correlation, then you must either show them their mistake or at least give a reason for why you believe they have made a mistake in the first place. If @Bob Ross says, "Well I witnessed the word being used 7,390 times, and each time it was used in this manner, therefore it means thus and such," you can't merely say, "Ah, but 7,390 isn't sufficient. You're at the level of description or correlation, not meaning and knowledge." These would be claims without justification. It is dissent without substantive argument, like, "Nu-uh!"

It's that same question you never manage to answer:

Quoting Michael

Bob Ross is saying that we determine the meaning of the word "good" by looking at what sort of things we describe as being good.

Quoting Leontiskos

And how do you propose that we determine the meaning of the word "good"?

Quoting Leontiskos

Well in that case you are claiming that 'good' involves flourishing, but that flourishing does not exhaust goodness.

Nowhere in saying "some people use the word 'good' to describe chastity" am I saying anything about flourishing.

Quoting Michael

Nowhere in saying "some people use the word 'good' to describe chastity" am I saying anything about flourishing.

You have successfully evaded the question at hand yet again. Claim thy prize.

Reply to Leontiskos Given that I haven't said what you've accused me of saying, your questions are misplaced.

Quoting Bob Ross

I appreciate your elaborate response!

No worries! I am nothing if not pedantically elaborate. I know it can be a good thing, but not necessarily. I promise my intent is as good as I can make it currently.

Quoting Bob Ross

Unfortunately, it is so long that I am having a hard time knowing where to start (and end),

Quote entire response/post and copy the opening tag. Then when you read until you need to answer, close the quote with the ending tag and answer. Paste the opening tag from the copy buffer and on you go until you finish.

Quoting Bob Ross

so let me just respond to the key points (that I was able to decipher from your post). You let me know if there is anything in particular you would like to discuss (that I may have perhaps overlooked).

No worries! That is my general state of affairs. Sometimes I am life the Mask from the movie, 'Somebody stop me!'

Quoting Bob Ross

Firstly, you seem to be still thinking that The Good requires “a second-order inclusion of meaning” (presumably a standard) which I am overlooking. I say to this, that it does not have any such thing.

Interesting. Well, that's just crazy. And it is of course born of subjectivist delusion, but I do not want to just throw a no without reason.

I mean, come on, you're the one trying to defend subjective morality. That means if I believe the word flourish means killing babies with x traits on that basis alone is possibly moral or a principle of only 'my morality'. And if you believe that killing babies with x traits on that basis alone is likely immoral or a principle of only 'my morality'.

With behavior we must speak in terms of motivation or WHY someone does something. I do not mean with any idea of morality in mind. I mean just the simple act of doing something. A why is required. The why can often be boiled down to a single emotion, desire.

So, your postion is based on the rough equivalence of desire and morality. If you cannot or more to the point will not address this glaring error, it is not hard for me to know where to begin. It is imminently clear that self-indulgence is your guiding light, a very unwise point of view for a philosopher, a lover of wisdom. This digresses but, I hope you get my point. Moral subjectivism is what I refer to as chaos apology. It is only a shamed nod to desire as wisdom.

Due to perfection, this is actually true. But the path of desire alone is fraught with the peril, the immoral side, of self-indulgence. The basic pattern is either always true or never was true only. Desire -> Greed -> Wisdom? No. One case. Following desire can be bad. Self-indulgence subjectivity is 'wrong'/'unreal'/'immoral'. But this is not just a suggestion. It's the law of reality.

The truth is we must properly mix desire with other emotions to attain balance (wisdom). Subjectivism is a gross submission to desire.

Quoting Bob Ross

Secondly, you ask what ‘flourishing’ is? I would say that it is the ‘optimal or sufficient actualization of goals’.

Hilarious. Myself and at least one other person here have pointed out that you are sweeping the second order issue under the rug. You just tied like 6 goals into that definition. Nope. It has to be more primal. And even the triangle one breaks down at a high enough filter level. The critic at higher detail says "This triangle is here! That one is there! You should say 'trianglehere' and 'trianglethere' and give rise to the German language. You are wrong! Blah blah blah."

There IS a second order trouble when you speak of the good. In fact its not even that easy. The good is all virtues. So you could have a dimension for each virtue and then any choice must include n-level complexity (and it does). The word 'goals' is your rug that you are sweeping all of truth into as to hard to look at. Stay messy. Stay real.

Quoting Bob Ross

I use it very similarly to ‘happiness’, except that I think that ‘happiness’ has a certain connotation of ‘feeling pleasant’ that I wish to avoid.

this statement taken at the meta level is telling and horrifying. Wear you hair shirt on your own time. This is said in humor.

"Satisfaction = death" - me.

Wisdom is only ever earned via suffering. Necessary suffering is wise to inflict upon people in order to facilitate them earning wisdom. Unnecessary suffering is immorality defined. The only debate in the universe is where that line is between necessary and unnecessary.

Despite colloquial mainstream annoyances like all definitions, words really do need to conform to better meaning, consistent meaning. Ambiguity is acceptable. You're the subjectivist. I will instead tolerate the many subjectivist errors towards wisdom because the intent to become wise seems present.

Being avoidant about what is, ... does not help at all. Confidence (anger) demands that fear recede. And desire demands we move towards truth and perfection. Avoidance is objectively immoral. :) Again, some of this is kidding, but, it's kidding on the square as Al Franken would say.

Quoting Bob Ross

Flourishing is sufficient realization over time relative to a goal (or goals).

Does it not also include growth? What about accuracy? Is beauty a part of your flourish. It's so unclear really. And then you are forced as well to explicitly state an infinitude of cases because you must pin down the particulars. There is no over-arching category that applies. You are ... lost amid the infinite seas of chaos/desire. Subjectivity is disintegration, a lack of wisdom, finally.

You again included the goal. That is the meta second level of distinction that I was referring to.

Quoting Bob Ross

Thirdly, you seem to also worry, subsequently, that flourishing may be subjective, which I deny.

What? Eh ...

OK, so there is no way for us to be objective. We can only try to be objective. And we are not perfect/objective so we often fail and we fail in a myriad of ways. The only hope we have is that there is something in the universe that is flawless, perfect, and gives rise therefore to desire itself, the entire emotion in every sense. That is objective moral truth, the GOOD.

Experience is subjective. Morality is objective.
When you discuss yours and mine all you are discussing is errors. That is to say how far our choice vectors deviate from the actual objective direction emotionally to objective moral truth (the GOOD).

What is the guide?

The guide is happiness as a scale.

Just like the GOOD is objective and we properly speak in terms of more or less GOOD only and not evil per say, this confuses subjectivists, we also then speak of the consequence of choosing more and more GOOD which is more and more happiness. You could also say they are less unhappy. That is what the other thread was about. Further, if one does understand the discrete virtue structure of morality, one can understand that this reward consequence mechanism can seem to be in error (but only because we do not perfectly understand it). Increasing behavioral strength returns virtue divided happiness. So, if one is smart one becomes over time immorally content (satisfaction = death) with getting only the smart virtue return on happiness. The difficulty to excel at what one is not ... good ... at becomes too much to face. It's easier just to press the known buttons.

This non flaw in reality which supports objective morality as a conclusion is the reason why a serial killer can be 'amazingly' happy. Its the most happy they have ever been but its not genuinely happy. This thing I call genuine happiness is a resonation with perfection, the desire source. If it is authentic it can only point in a singular direction of meaning, e.g. objective. If that serial killer were taught and could learn (structures and chemical states as a confluence of pre existing choices make such transitions super hard {moral choice is always the hardest}) This is observed in every way. It takes an EQ to sense it, to 'feel' it in a balanced way across all emotions.

The wise have this trait, this balance and can 'see beyond' exemplars of singular virtues. Inexactlyasmuch as people love to clap for physical things star athletes do, they do not usually do so with intelligence (because this is too threatening to the observer that realizes that they are out of their depth {avoidance}). That is one meta level difference, just like triangle would be say to kinds of triangles. But there is a worse, more, exponential shift. That shift is from any virtue to all virtues, e.g. between intelligence and wisdom. So people were too terrified to admit intellectual success even though it plays out right before them. They did not understand it. The guy just teleported! Arthur C Clark is spinning in his magical grave. But amplify that to a higher level. Intelligence recoils in every way when faced with wisdom if the observer of the exemplar is the one and not the other. This recoil is meta level worse than the int to str example. It is the source of the concept of Nihilism, denial of meaning, objective meaning.

Quoting Bob Ross

To take your example, it is entirely possible that a society could be flourishing relative to their own goal of sacrificing babies (to whatever extent they want)—just like how a psychopath serial killer can be happy by torturing other people—but this is not the highest Good.

I mean you as a subjectivist just said, '... it is not the highest good.' What? Seriously? YOU can't say that. There is no good to you. If everything is possibly good finally, then nothing is good. Good vanishes. And you certainly cannot by your own stance forbid anyone else's radical nonsense as not good. You have no basis.

I suppose I should say: The existence of desire proves that there is one good. The failure of desire is hearing the signal of objective morality wrong because . It takes effort to choose the good. Variations in intent are only errors except for one of them.

Here is the quintessential Pragmatic immoral failure writ small explained:
True Statement: 'Death is preferable to immorality.' - me
Pragmatic Delusion: 'No way! I matter! I am different in how I matter. I am not you. You are not me. You have to live as a positive. Survival #1'

Quoting Bob Ross

The lowest Good, afterall, is, by my own concession, egoism

No. A much better definition for the lowest good is 'nothing'. I'm not going to bother defending that because my ego is something. And that's better than nothing. Oh wait, I just defended it!

Quoting Bob Ross

and some intermediate level is a society which has set out goals which make them fulfilled (pyschologically) by sacrificing some babies,

Nope.

this 'fulfillment' is delusional. It partakes of the good because everything must. But its relative goodness is and will be measurable. And the relativity is to an objective standard as a referential frame, the only one that matters, unchanging, truth.

Quoting Bob Ross

but the highest Good is the ultimate sight for the eyes of the moral, virtuous man.

Yes perfection, one and only one thing, objective. You are arguing my point for me.

Quoting Bob Ross

You seem to have forgotten that The Good, under this view, has levels.

Yes, but, those levels only serve to inform us where the top is. Perfection, unique, one way.

Quoting Bob Ross

Flourishing, as I have defined it, is relative to goals/purposes; and from this one can abstract the highest form of The Good, which is everything flourishing [relative to their own goals].

It great that you can selfishness, self-indulgence, and pretend it is wisdom. It is also terrifying and morally corrupt. It is pandering to chaos/desire.

Quoting Bob Ross

Therefore, what that society is doing, in your example, is factually wrong (in light of the highest Good).

i agree but you are arguing the objectivist point of view and just do not realize it. Ok call an apple and orange and we will all just walk around carefully remembering that to support your 'special' subjective reality. Nope. I don't have time. I don't have patience. And I am not just attacking you here, I am humoring the scenario as I show my point of view.

Facts are only a subset of beliefs.
Wrong and right must be judged by a standard. You say 'factually wrong' and I am thinking you think facts are objectively correct. Yeeesh! But if they are not always objectively correct then something external to 'fact' is superior. That something is objective truth.

The value weight of any relationship imaginable morally causes all order in the universe. Were this not the case the chaos would overwhelm the objective truth and disintegration, the consquence of imperfect desire, would rip the universe apart. In fact what is not understood and that is because its so hard to understand, that if subjective morals were how things are, then that disintegration of the universe would be instantaneous always. So those possible universes are by definition cancelled out. This one has existence! Thank you objective morality! Let get busy correcting everyone's errors (that they foolishly call 'their morality')

Quoting Bob Ross

This form of the Good, as the form or relation of flourishing, is not subjective:

Due to experience, everything, even existence itself, is subjective. The only thing that is not subjective is morality. The objective nature of morality ... provides for ... the fulcrum of choice, free will. This is why we ... cannot ... be objective. We can intend toward perfect objectivity, perfection, the GOOD, only. What we achieve ... will be ... subjective, not objective. Just ask any two people!

But the underlying system with the stability to allow for existence is objective morality. The orderly rule of the universe is that the chaos of free will is the only thing there is. This causes subjective experience and makes one prone to the foolishness of subjective morality.

Quoting Bob Ross

what it means for a particular person to flourish is relative to their own goals, but what it means to flourish (in general) is not;

Lol, so again, you are back to declaring my argument, objective morality. I can't tell. Maybe you are a moral realist.

Quoting Bob Ross

and flourishing of all, as the highest Good, does not waver with opinion. So you are partially correct in inferring that what it means to flourish is going to have that subjective element of being relative to a goal, but that itself, in form, is objective. I do not get to choose what it means to flourish, but what it means for me to flourish is.

No no, you are confusing being, current state, with meaning, which is timeless.
You again here basically stated that morality was objective, and then you say that what happened is objective. OK, if we say it's dead in the past then it was done and cannot be undone.

But what does that matter? We are discussing meaning here.

If twenty people can remember things differently, and they can, then what objectively happened would have no meaning anyway. The subjectivist MUST admit that any interpretation, however inaccurate, is acceptable. That is true unless accuracy is objectively good. What is this good thing? How do you define accurate without the good? You cannot.

Joke: I say accurate is to miss by 50% of the space of any aim, you know, keep things organic, Feng Shiu. Subjectivists must accept and defend that as not immoral by definition. That just 'their morality'. That is what good is to them. So, no, you're just comically wrong.

You cannot define accuracy itself without the good. No virtue can be defined.

Quoting Bob Ross

Fourthly, you briefly asserted, without any real elaboration on any positive argument for it, a ‘brevity principle’: “As far as humanity can tell using all its resources to date that are widely known enough to be discussed, morality has to have been objective since at least the expected dawn of time.” I honestly did not understand why this would be the case nor why it is called the brevity principle.

I named it and invented it. I can call pants pants if I want.

The infinity of time (possible) is much much less in units than it is back to when we think time began until now. Thus we are discussing an admittedly brief time in the history of the multiverse. Hence the name.

It would be the case that this is indeed a partial support for objective morality, because the laws of the universe so far seem consistent and stable from now back to then. That's all we 'know'. The future is unknown. So, since there has been stability enough for us to make these observations and communicate them, there ... is ... an objective scenario of meaning in the universe. At least for this brief amount of time between the start of time and now. If you are discussing subjective morality as an outer envelope, the 'way things are' for real, then you must wait until the end of a stable universe to demonstrate your point as this current reality shows quite the opposite.

Quoting Bob Ross

Fifthly, I think you are misunderstanding, or perhaps we just disagree, on the implications of moral subjectivism; and, more importantly, the nature of desire. Just to briefly quote you:

What subjectvists do not understand is this short and simple: If morality were subjective all stability as 'good' is not something you can put forth or depend on. You have embraced pure chaos.

This is not true at all if moral subjectivism is true, nor is it true of the nature of desire. Desire—i.e., will—is subjective, but it is by-at-large very persistent, as opposed to whimsical: people are psychological motivated by the deepest depths of their psyche, which their ‘ego’ has no direct access to, and this evolves very slowly. People depend on their desires all the time and with quite impressive precision and for large lengths of time. The only kind of chaos that might occur due to moral subjectivism is people’s fundamental desires may not agree with other people’s.

You ARE a moral realist and you just don't realize it.

I should stop there because that is the whole truth but ...

The source of accurate desire is perfection, the objective moral GOOD. To say there is a source, to depend on it as you do, means you ARE a moral realist and you are just putting different window dressing on your religion. Christianity has fallen out of vogue, let's decorate with Islam this year!

NOTHING can pre-inform the desire a priori if you are trying to defend moral subjectivism.

Quoting Bob Ross

Sixthly and finally, you claimed that objective morality provides free will equally to subjects; which is not true at all. Firstly, it is clear that all animals of the animal kingdom (including humans) have varying degrees of free will,

indeed. Amplitude of moral agency is not relevant to outcomes.
Intent is superior to consequence. It precedes it.
Consequence is not really relevant except to inform future intents. The basis of Consequentialism is delusional.

All you are saying is 'evolution, man' and I agree. The alive universe evolves moral agency only, the breadth of free will and the ability to enact it, empowerment. This process is ONLY the earning of wisdom at some level. Of course, there are varying degrees. That entirely misses the real point.

The real point is that this process of evolution may take many paths, but all of them are pulled by desire and that is sourced in perfection, in objective moral truth, the GOOD.

This is necessarily a convergence of meaning to a single perfect point.

From any moral current state, there is one and only one path to the final perfect and singular point. That path is the most good path or intent for that moral agent right now. If they move or change their moral state then the vector to the GOOD changes based NOT ON THE GOOD, but on their failure quality of choice only. In other words we are talking about ONLY their errors, not 'their morality', the term 'my morality' is incoherent. Subjective moral assertion is incoherent. Is it disintegration only, chaos.

Quoting Bob Ross

Secondly, there is no such law of the universe that dictates that we have free will: it is a biproduct of our ability to cognize.

(This is a) Wildly conceited and egoic point of view. We did this? Really? The same people that invented twinkies and cigarettes? I see (backs away slowly).

No.

Free will is what causes physical reality to occur.

Ever more complex patterns evolve to express more and more emerging amplitude of power, e.g. moral agency. This is why a table is very limited in its choices. It's mostly table. Table, table. But then when we get to life which is a normal emergence, expected, obvious; we see a meta level 'leap' in moral agency from jellyfish to Republican to animal to human. (That was a joke people, even if in poor taste. I am sorry.) That is all because morality is objective. The direction to the GOOD is one way, brother-man. Step into the light Carol Anne!

Man's ability to cognize is arguably mildly better than the table. Yes. Table, table. Malkovich, Malkovich! But let's not get all puffed chest about it. let's assume the pattern is a resonance from something more fundamental. Why? Because nits make lice! Keep following the source question until its realize that meaning proceeds endlessly from meaning, but, that amid this circular logic, there is a pattern, and not just the circle. Amid that pattern there are many patterns. When we get to the highest dimension of meaning that we humans are currently capable of that I can swim in/on, we see that only one direction for each virtue and thus one integrated direction for all virtues is ... GOOD. There is no other more appropriate word for it.

To sully the term GOOD with subjective delusion is ... you guessed it ... immoral.

Don't worry we are all constantly immoral in infinite ways. So that is not a vile accusation. It's only a tautology. But accepting the obvious evidence that morality is objective despite a sea of subjective errors about it all being partially interesting only, is ... better ... than any other corresponding belief scenario.

Quoting Bob Ross

Thirdly, if morality is objective, then it says nothing about what free will we may or may not have: it says what we should be doing or/and what is good to do.

It does. You are precisely right. I could not have said it better myself. You are strong in moral realism, just not in correct labelling.

Opinions only, subjective guesses as to objective truth. Eh, I get shot anyway, despite just being a messenger.

Reply to Chet Hawkins

That, I must say, was the most fabulously entertaining dissertation.

Having a long-standing inclination for analyzing perceived dialectical subtleties, I’ll be interested in Bob’s response.

'Mind-independent' is a fascinating rug to sweep things under as a term. That mind-independent state is natural law. But this correct observation of mind-independent absolutely does not mean differing from mind to mind as you are fooling yourself into believing.

You are mistaking the error(s) of subjective choice for signal error. There is no signal error. It is perfect. The error is from ... you, ... us ... choice. Repeat it with me now, 'free will'! Can I get an Amen! {I am not religious - this is only humor}

As in objective moral truth, the GOOD, is a law of the universe, a mind-independent state for real. As in error-independent, as in choice-independent. The signal, the form, is still perfect as a law of the universe. It seems unattainable and we should assume that from all choices the limit as x approaches perfect is ... (sorry math), perfect seeming but not really perfect. To anyone significantly lower in wisdom than the chooser that choice would seem perfect and be both insanely compelling and damnably hard to get to, so terrifying as a GOOD-aimed example. {C'mon Leroy! Lower those expectations! the rest of us are just trying to do the daily grind. We (don't want to be)/aren't angels (because that is too hard to choose).

The trouble is that that definition is in error (like all extant choice always is, such choices not being possibly perfect). So, how can this Chet guy, howling interloper, explain that bit of conjecture?

Let's see. {Brace for underwhelming impact}

What is love? {Baby don't hurt me ...}

Love is all, everything, the system that includes the GOOD as the unique point amid a realm of meaning of pure perfection in choice, thus clearly indicating objective moral truth.

So, I reiterated my definition of GOOD there in text without specifically calling it out. So I am now, just to hit the nail again (everything IS a nail).

New premise/hypothesis: Nothing in the universe does not partake of mind. Oops! That would mean there is no such thing possible in existence as mind-independent states. Just so, I'm afraid.

The only thing you can say properly is this: The mind is always there. Its a singular field in reality. It emerges differently depending on the person, the body. But if we then relate that separate part of mind to that body only, we can delude ourselves. What we say when we think we are saying 'mind-independent' is really 'this-mind-independent', just another reductionist failure. You did not get particular enough. And even if you demand petulantly that minds are separate, that is only your belief (in error I might add).

What Ken Wilbur would call the Noosphere in his 'A Brief History of Everything' is nothing but mind. But if we can even remotely assume that the universe is consciousness, and I do, so we can, all Noosphere elements are ... linked ... in some way. What is that linkage that allows for your then magical clumping of related things into 'flourish'? That linkage is consciousness itself, a unified field. NOTHING is independent finally of that state, all. Therefore, the Noosphere, is part of ALL, part of everything. There is no person, no Malkovich, no table, that can claim to be dispossessed of a connection to mind. Mind is finally only one thing, 'the' mind. So, speaking of mind-independent states is speaking of delusion only.

If you want to say one person's mind, or the mind of each person, you still err. That is because these separations YOU prefer deny you then the ability to group the patterns because we retreat to German here and say thismindmorality and thatmindmorality and grouping is not possible. If you admit to the possibility then you are left with a continuum of Noosphere like mind/mind(s). The delusional separation of ego and identity are properly shed, the sub-part of consciousness 'belongs' in the continuum and the connection IS NOT independent in any way. There is in fact no way to separate this and that mind. Emergent mind is only plugged into consciousness of all. It is a part. It is connected. The body antennae is confusing you as a separation. But it's just a conduit, as mentioned, an antennae, for the pervasive signal of love which includes the GOOD as a part.

{As an aside I will add that only rising moral agency allows us the power to utilize what is already there in the signal of love, the GOOD, by, you guessed it, choosing it as a direction in intent. The fact that minds seem to even the observant to be disconnected is only an error in observation giving rise to the error in belief. This demonstrates the point I am making in another way. In time, with inevitable evolution, the body/mind instantiation will be empowered to clearly see that no mind was ever in the history of the universe independent from the 'all mind', wu, wu, wu (true, true, true). Where have you gone, old quaint error of choice? You were so delusionally fun (because you were easy to choose), true true true {sung to the tune of Mrs Robinson by Simon and Garfunkel. }

It is the GOOD within love that originates desire and shows us all a singular direction. And it is the flaws in choice, in all choices that misinterpret this direction and thus intend or aim in the wrong direction, perhaps still convinced they alone see the right path (when they are wrong). But this plethora of errors and directions do converge throughout reality and amid groups with no contact. Over time they converge infinitely. The converge upon a single point. That is the perfect GOOD. That shows the proof for moral realism, objective morality, singular, not dependent upon errors in choice and belief is only a choice set.

{No Germans were hurt in the making of this post. Any proximity real or imagined to actual Germans is fully intended and as humor only. No negative intent was intentionally intended. Pax! Agape! Anal nathrak uthvas bethod dohiel tienveh! Void in California (obviously)}

Quoting Chet Hawkins

As in objective moral truth, the GOOD, is a law of the universe, a mind-independent state for real.

Yeah, but you've totally avoided ever (I mean, over multiple threads now) letting us know what your formulation for objective morality is.
What's it grounded in? How is it measured (Happiness, already having been rejected by you as a measure)?

Quoting Chet Hawkins

and I do, so we can

Ah. Feel free to not respond to me if I seem too combative :P I'm unsure we can get anywhere.

Quoting AmadeusD

As in objective moral truth, the GOOD, is a law of the universe, a mind-independent state for real.
— Chet Hawkins

Yeah, but you've totally avoided ever (I mean, over multiple threads now) letting us know what your formulation for objective morality is.

I suspect objective morality only. It is a theory for me. I cannot prove anything. No one can really. My arguments are to support my suspicion.

Quoting AmadeusD

What's it grounded in? How is it measured (Happiness, already having been rejected by you as a measure)?

This is precisely incorrect.

I asserted that happiness is a measure. But care must be taken. Disingenuous or partial happiness is often claimed as genuine happiness. This confuses the unwise.

One virtue may be extremely high in a moral agent and their expression of that virtue, so high, will return a high happiness result that blinds them to lower happiness returns from other virtues.

But and still, the other virtues, all virtues, are required for wisdom. So there is much more work to be done.

Still, measuring happiness is one correct approach to understanding objective moral truth.

In fact part of the original argument for subjective morality here in Bobs OP was that existence is good or more existence is better. I agree. Why is that though? It is because more leads to a higher value on some virtue axis.

But wisdom is pursuing higher values on ALL virtue axes at the same time. And wisdom is realizing that the lowest virtue value of all virtues is the limit to wisdom. Failures show more strongly than the strengths. In fact, due to the interaction among virtues, being very high on one or just a few is an impediment to earning wisdom, because that high happiness return gets in the way of earning more wisdom. It becomes lazily easy to just accept what one can muster.

But subjective morality would literally require that from one day to the next there could be a defendable 180 degree shift in what is good. The reason that does not happen realistically is because morality is much more stable than that. It's objective.

But examples abound in the real world where people fight for immorality or a set of immoral desires against others that have similar immoral desires. But amid that fight there is always or usually a pretense towards some ideal. Why? Why bother if morality is subjective? It's because happiness is being returned to those that believe they fight for the GOOD.

Quoting AmadeusD

and I do, so we can
— Chet Hawkins

Ah. Feel free to not respond to me if I seem too combative :P I'm unsure we can get anywhere.

In general I respond. I am an anger type person. Combat is acceptable.

Reply to Chet Hawkins given your response here I’m not interested in discussing further. Take care and see you around the forum :)

Reply to AmadeusD

Might be way late on this, but as noted in the other thread, practice! Hoping it makes per....sort of good. LOL.

Absolutely no worries! I appreciate your responses.

We know what a triangle is because its conditions are contained in its concept.

One only knows what is contained in a concept after abducing/inducing that very concept. Prior to learning what a triangle is, with your faculty of reason, you did not know anything about it; so it doesn’t help to know, generically, that a concept, by definition, contains the essence of its referent.

My point starting from the particulars to the universals, is methodological: our faculty of reason only obtains concepts fundamentally from abduction/induction and not deduction. Deduction comes in after we already have abduced/induced something.

We can't do that with 'good'. There is no a priori conception. It must be derived from particulars.. Imo

Firstly, when I am talking about abducing/inducing concepts, I am not talking about our faculty of understanding (i.e., our cognition responsible for producing our conscious experience) but, rather, our faculty of reason (i.e., our cognition responsible for self-reflectively analyzing our conscious experience). We do not come to know what a triangle is a priori with our faculty of reason; albeit our faculty of understanding already is familiar with it a priori. E.g., a newborn baby can immediately represent to themselves a triangle within their conscious experience but they cannot represent abstractly, over-and-above their conscious experience, what the concept of a triangle is: I am interested in the latter, for all intents and purposes.

Reply to Mww

The Good is not normative. — Bob Ross

Agreed. That which may or may not be good, as in instances of, is.

I would say that the instances of good are also non-normative.

The metaphysical argument being, one cannot know (appreciate, consider, allow….whatever) a thing as good, without the quality itself being resident in consciousness somewhere, somehow, over and above mere experience. Same with beauty, justice, and so on.

I didn’t follow this part: can you please elaborate?

On the other hand, your triangle example doesn’t work the same as the ideal of The Good, in that it is impossible to think a triangle in general, for each though of one is immediately a particular instance of the conception. The Good, however, as an ideal, can never be constructed in accordance with a conception, hence remains a different kind of judgement.

I would say that The Good is not an ideal: is an conception; and, consequently, can be applied to every particular just like a triangle. The Good is identical to flourishing. An ideal that one could formulate from The Good is striving towards a reality with the highest form of Good, which is universal flourishing in a universally harmonious way.

Reply to Leontiskos

So a fairly basic way to overcome the egoist's objection is to recognize that there are common goods, the benefit of which is in our private interest. Think of the mother who nourishes her child and sees the good of her child as her own good; or the father who finds his own good in the good of his family, or the soldier who makes sacrifices for the good of his nation, which is his own good. A bright dividing line between "my good" and "others' good" does not exist in reality. People regularly (and without intellectual recognition) come to recognize others' good as their own good

This is a good way, indeed, to get people to generally care, to some extent, about others; but it does not overcome egoism: it merely explicates the incoherence of basic, standard egoism that the stereotypical narcissist is going adhere to. They don’t recognize that, actually, if they only care about their own flourishing then this entails they should, to some extent, care about others.

Truly overcoming egoism, in all its forms, requires the individual to transcend their own good and do things for the sole sake of the good of something which is not themselves. If one does something for someone else for their own sake, then they are not doing for that person’s sake.

However, the more I have thought about egoism, I would say that you are absolutely right that egoism and altruism blend together when properly understood; because being purely selfless is to just take advantage of oneself—to not see one’s own worth—and being purely selfish in a narcissistic way generally is incoherent. But being both egoistic and altruistic, in a balance, allows for optimal flourishing.

Reply to Leontiskos
Reply to Leontiskos
Reply to Leontiskos
Reply to Leontiskos

:up:

Quoting Bob Ross

However, the more I have thought about egoism, I would say that you are absolutely right that egoism and altruism blend together when properly understood; because being purely selfless is to just take advantage of oneself—to not see one’s own worth—and being purely selfish in a narcissistic way generally is incoherent. But being both egoistic and altruistic, in a balance, allows for optimal flourishing.

Right.

Quoting Bob Ross

Truly overcoming egoism, in all its forms, requires the individual to transcend their own good and do things for the sole sake of the good of something which is not themselves. If one does something for someone else for their own sake, then they are not doing for that person’s sake.

This is where we disagree. Take marriage, for example. In the traditional Judeo-Christian understanding of marriage, the two become "one flesh," thus becoming one (quasi-)organism and acting simultaneously for themselves and for their spouse (at least in large part). It is the idea of symbiosis, or of symbiotic organisms. Such a metaphor comes from the sexual act, which is itself a symbiotic act. The idea that I must act for the other's sake and not for my own is a largely Kantian idea, and it is problematic. It is not impossible to do this, but it is difficult and rare, and such an idea should not form the basis of realistic ethics. I think that, more than anything, it has confused us.

Reply to Chet Hawkins

Interesting. Well, that's just crazy. And it is of course born of subjectivist delusion, but I do not want to just throw a no without reason.
…
I mean, come on, you're the one trying to defend subjective morality.

I am not arguing for moral subjectivism. This position (in my OP) is a form of moral realism.

That means if I believe the word flourish means killing babies with x traits on that basis alone is possibly moral or a principle of only 'my morality'.

Nope: we don’t define what flourishing is other than the word to semantically refer to it.

So, your postion is based on the rough equivalence of desire and morality.

Not at all. This moral realist theory posits that The Good is identical to flourishing, and The Good is analyzed within contexts; and the smaller the context the lower the Good, and the larger the context the higher the Good.

Hilarious. Myself and at least one other person here have pointed out that you are sweeping the second order issue under the rug. You just tied like 6 goals into that definition

Flourishing is just the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. I don’t think this is all that controversial.

What “second order issue” are you referring to? Normativity?

The good is all virtues. So you could have a dimension for each virtue and then any choice must include n-level complexity (and it does). The word 'goals' is your rug that you are sweeping all of truth into as to hard to look at. Stay messy. Stay real.

The Good, in this view, is flourishing: it is not virtues. Virtues are habits of character that are good.

By ‘goal’, I just mean ‘purpose’; and I think I have been really open about that flourishing is sufficient fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. I don’t think I am sweeping it under the rug at all.

this statement taken at the meta level is telling and horrifying. Wear you hair shirt on your own time. This is said in humor.

I am not following.

Wisdom is only ever earned via suffering

One can be flourishing in insufferable conditions; and I never said that we can’t use suffering to flourish more (in the long term).

Also, wisdom is not The Good. This is a separate issue, but I am assuming you are also leveraging this critique against The Good as well.

Necessary suffering is wise to inflict upon people in order to facilitate them earning wisdom

I do not necessarily agree with this, if you are implying we should torture people to give them “more wisdom”.

You're the subjectivist. I will instead tolerate the many subjectivist errors towards wisdom because the intent to become wise seems present.

I think you have misunderstood the OP: this is not a thread about moral subjectivism. I have a separate thread for that metaethical theory if you would like to discuss that there. If you are accusing this theory of truly being a form of moral subjectivism, then I am not seeing yet why that is the case.

Does it not also include growth? What about accuracy? Is beauty a part of your flourish. It's so unclear really

Flourishing, being the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose, is not necessarily, in -itself, dependent on anything other than the purpose being fulfilled. That purpose can be anything. For most people, yes, personal growth is going to be a part of that. I am not sure to what extent beauty factors in for most people, and I am not sure what you mean by accuracy: accuracy of what?

You again included the goal. That is the meta second level of distinction that I was referring to.

The Good, as flourishing, is not dependent on a goal itself: it is the objective relation between a thing and its purpose such that it has been sufficiently fulfilled.

OK, so there is no way for us to be objective. We can only try to be objective.

That is irrelevant to what I said, which was that I deny that the Good is subjective. That our striving towards the good is subjective does not entail whatsoever that the good itself is subjective.

it is not the highest good.' What? Seriously? YOU can't say that. There is no good to you.

The highest Good is universal flourishing, which is the flourishing of everything harmonously (with one another). Again, I think you misunderstood the OP. Perhaps you were forwarded here from someone in the TFP that was asking you to analyze my other thread about moral subjectivism. This thread is about a moral realist position I have come up with.

You say 'factually wrong' and I am thinking you think facts are objectively correct.

A fact is a statement about reality that properly corresponds to it. Facts are objective insofar as their agreement with reality is mind-independent. When I say ‘factually wrong’, I mean that there is a state-of-affairs or arrangement of entities in reality in virtue of which make it true that it is wrong. This is objective, not subjective.

Due to experience, everything, even existence itself, is subjective

You are conflating experience being subjective with everything being subjective.

Lol, so again, you are back to declaring my argument, objective morality. I can't tell. Maybe you are a moral realist.

I would like to ask, and I mean this with all due respect: did you read the OP? I usually give people the benefit of the doubt, but I am now suspecting you may have jumped into this thread from someone else who notified you of my moral subjectivist metaethical theory that I defended in a different thread (or actually multiple threads). Am I right? If not, then I apologize. If so, then I would suggest reading the OP: it is a pretty quick read and you will probably understand better what this moral realist position is (and what it isn’t); and, that way, we can hone-in on our conversation to the OP itself.

You ARE a moral realist and you just don't realize it.

I am still confused at why you think that this theory (I have presented) is purporting to be a moral anti-realist position; let alone moral subjectivism.

Secondly, there is no such law of the universe that dictates that we have free will: it is a biproduct of our ability to cognize. — Bob Ross
(This is a) Wildly conceited and egoic point of view. We did this? Really? The same people that invented twinkies and cigarettes? I see (backs away slowly).

My claim (that you quoted) never attempted to say that we invented free will. It is a biproduct of our ability to cognize.

Free will is what causes physical reality to occur.

It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, you are think that there is a natural law of morality which actually forms things, like a force. I don’t see why that is the case.

I will say that I disagree with most of what you said about moral subjectivism, but this thread isn’t meant to debate that; so if you want to discuss that then shoot me a message on the moral subjectivism thread of mine.

Quoting Bob Ross

Interesting. Well, that's just crazy. And it is of course born of subjectivist delusion, but I do not want to just throw a no without reason.
…
I mean, come on, you're the one trying to defend subjective morality.

I am not arguing for moral subjectivism. This position (in my OP) is a form of moral realism.

Ha ha! Well mea culpa. Two people arguing the pro at the debate. Run Away!
I feel now like Rosanne Rosanna-danna on the old SNL

'Nevermind!'

Quoting Bob Ross

That means if I believe the word flourish means killing babies with x traits on that basis alone is possibly moral or a principle of only 'my morality'.

Nope: we don’t define what flourishing is other than the word to semantically refer to it.

So, your postion is based on the rough equivalence of desire and morality.

Not at all. This moral realist theory posits that The Good is identical to flourishing, and The Good is analyzed within contexts; and the smaller the context the lower the Good, and the larger the context the higher the Good.

OK so now, the whole rest of this post will be you and me mostly agreeing. I was fairly sure you stated that you posted an argument for moral realism to DESTROY it with your 'real' argument.

Quoting Bob Ross

Hilarious. Myself and at least one other person here have pointed out that you are sweeping the second order issue under the rug. You just tied like 6 goals into that definition

Flourishing is just the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. I don’t think this is all that controversial.

What “second order issue” are you referring to? Normativity?

Yes and that would be only 'meeting desires ends by attaining them.' In other words morality redefined as desire only.

Normativity is (pardon) bovine poo revisionism for objective morality. It's just another way of saying moral subjectivism has merit in and of itself. It does not.

It doesn't matter what people believe because what is good is a law of the universe, objective.

Quoting Bob Ross

The good is all virtues. So you could have a dimension for each virtue and then any choice must include n-level complexity (and it does). The word 'goals' is your rug that you are sweeping all of truth into as to hard to look at. Stay messy. Stay real.

The Good, in this view, is flourishing: it is not virtues. Virtues are habits of character that are good.

Well yes, I follow your distinction here. But no, you are sidestepping a dangerously important issue. If you fail to realize that virtues ARE the quantum discrete parts of goodness, you fail (in general).

That is to say something like this:
Flourish -> Good
Flourish?
Accuracy (is part of) Flourish
Judgement (is part of) Flourish
Beauty (is part of) Flourish
...
therefore something like:
(Accuracy, Judgement, Beauty, ... ) -> Good

Now assume there are 16 discrete virtues discoverable (not saying there are that number)
But now we can get dirty and correct:

(Accuracy, Beauty) -> missing 14 virtues, e.g. not GOOD, not even by half
etc

And
(62% accurate, 78% beautiful, 10 others at some value above 50%, 2 at like 2%) - > Obvious Room for improvement

And then:
Current societal standards = 40% objective perfection (guess)
Above example % are ONLY within THAT already immoral societal aim.
Egregiously immoral as in fairly damn immoral.

Hopefully that nonsense symbolic logic is followable.

Quoting Bob Ross

By ‘goal’, I just mean ‘purpose’; and I think I have been really open about that flourishing is sufficient fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. I don’t think I am sweeping it under the rug at all.

But you miss a critical point that CANNOT be missed unless you are wrong (you are wrong):
That is that flourishing IS NOT informed by opinions. Flourishing is objective.

Opinions are only degrees of error away from perfection.

Quoting Bob Ross

this statement taken at the meta level is telling and horrifying. Wear you hair shirt on your own time. This is said in humor.

I am not following.

Well you did what the other guy did and did not put your part my part refers to that you are referring to here with your response. That makes it too hard to respond. I have no idea. I dont want to back trace it. Please quote the WHOLE thing each time. Computers carry forward the cumbersome whole easily. That's their purpose.

Quoting Bob Ross

Wisdom is only ever earned via suffering

One can be flourishing in insufferable conditions; and I never said that we can’t use suffering to flourish more (in the long term).

Good, then we agree on this. Again, your earlier part is not included so I dont know what I was really commenting on.

Quoting Bob Ross

Also, wisdom is not The Good. This is a separate issue, but I am assuming you are also leveraging this critique against The Good as well.

Wisdom is many things. It is a trait that as shown above is ALL, repeat ALL, bar none virtues combined, both in belief and in expression of belief as action. Wisdom is the know, do, want of GOOD.

If one knows wisdom but does not do it or want it one is not wise.
If one does wisely but does not know it or want it one is not wise.
If one wants wisdom but does not know it or do it one is not wise. - John Cusack (not really)

Quoting Bob Ross

Necessary suffering is wise to inflict upon people in order to facilitate them earning wisdom

I do not necessarily agree with this, if you are implying we should torture people to give them “more wisdom”.

I said necessary. But yes, if it is necessary. It is not torture as that implies negative intent, negative wants. But because I know one must suffer to decide that it will act in alignment with objective moral aims and that one must also decide to want these aims, I will inflict necessary suffering on one. That one includes myself. What is necessary is not then rightly called torture. But it will be deemed torture by the weak.

If you shrink back from this then here is the result of such a whiny and ineffectual point of view. It will breed the next level of don't go this far spoilage of the choosers. They will choose over and over again ad infinitum to suffer less and less and thereby will declare more and more subtle nuances of action as torture, relegating what is necessary to nothing. This is simply more pandering to desire.

Your path leads to alien encounters that mortify and render our species useless because we have forgotten how to 'keep it real', what real pain is, what real suffering is. Our scions of your would be world will collapse into PTSD when their virtual avatars are unplugged and the scent generator in their pod malfunctions.

The wise understand that suffering must be real, exquisite and rather constant to maintain awareness and self-restraint against the weakening influence of over expressed desire.

Certainly at least a grand portion of society (mayhap the soldiery or some analogous force) must be made to suffer more to be the hand of action for the corpulent pod lifers. But then, you are separating wisdom by separating virtues and no one is then truly wise. It is only a sort of hive mind wisdom that emerges. I suppose it is a possible approach.

I aim more to the Renaissance man style, jack of all trades and aiming at master of all trades also. The cross pollination of the virtues is the only real goal.

Quoting Bob Ross

You're the subjectivist. I will instead tolerate the many subjectivist errors towards wisdom because the intent to become wise seems present.

I think you have misunderstood the OP: this is not a thread about moral subjectivism. I have a separate thread for that metaethical theory if you would like to discuss that there. If you are accusing this theory of truly being a form of moral subjectivism, then I am not seeing yet why that is the case.

I missed that admittedly and I apologize. No wonder at all then. I thought you were basically saying things that sounded like realism and that your intent was to say things that were subjectivism.

Quoting Bob Ross

Does it not also include growth? What about accuracy? Is beauty a part of your flourish. It's so unclear really

Flourishing, being the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose, is not necessarily, in -itself, dependent on anything other than the purpose being fulfilled. That purpose can be anything. For most people, yes, personal growth is going to be a part of that. I am not sure to what extent beauty factors in for most people, and I am not sure what you mean by accuracy: accuracy of what?

Beauty and accuracy are objective. That is part of the problem of subjectivism. It does not admit to this. In wanting what is immoral it decides that all wants are equal in 'goodness'. That is dangerous lie.

Lets take beauty. What is it? It is an expression of a pattern within reality that shows a more pure instantiation of objective moral truth, of the GOOD. This is why beauty is compelling. Beauty is an image, a representation of what might be, so it partakes of desire. But, is here, instantiated, and that is anger/being. So its presence angrily 'demands' attention. That is what beauty is. The more it is a match for the beauty of perfection the more it pulls on our hearts with desire. The more it is a match the more we perceive it to force our attention. It is not actually graceful. It is raw, commanding. If there were no objective end, beauty would not be a thing.

Subjective errors towards beauty are caused by bad choices, just like other erroneous choices. The signal of love is being misinterpreted. Often this is because some part of us knows on some level that we cannot attain it, therefore immorally we denigrate it. We turn away from beauty because it shows clearly what is right. Right is only in one virtue. Ugly is an objective instantiation of a more immoral form. I am completely serious.

Quoting Bob Ross

You again included the goal. That is the meta second level of distinction that I was referring to.

The Good, as flourishing, is not dependent on a goal itself: it is the objective relation between a thing and its purpose such that it has been sufficiently fulfilled.

The which says NOTHING about morality at all. If my goal is to kill Asians, then if I succeed I am flourishing. That is subjective morality. Objective morality says that killing people just because they are Asian is incoherent immoral nonsense. So, objective morality would claim that it matters not how well you flourish killing Asians, you missed the point of morality.

Quoting Bob Ross

OK, so there is no way for us to be objective. We can only try to be objective.

That is irrelevant to what I said, which was that I deny that the Good is subjective. That our striving towards the good is subjective does not entail whatsoever that the good itself is subjective.

Ok, as expected there will be a lot of me saying 'nevermind' because I thought you were saying here that the good is subjective. You are claiming that in another thread so these arguments are still valid for you to respond to.

Quoting Bob Ross

it is not the highest good.' What? Seriously? YOU can't say that. There is no good to you.

The highest Good is universal flourishing, which is the flourishing of everything harmonously (with one another). Again, I think you misunderstood the OP. Perhaps you were forwarded here from someone in the TFP that was asking you to analyze my other thread about moral subjectivism. This thread is about a moral realist position I have come up with.

Now you just added another component, 'harmoniously'. You cant do that either. You didn't say that before. Saying that is a meta level difference and I can almost agree. But no, people are often harmoniously evil together. So, wrong again. More is needed. That more is objective. It is all good virtues combined.

Quoting Bob Ross

You say 'factually wrong' and I am thinking you think facts are objectively correct.

A fact is a statement about reality that properly corresponds to it. Facts are objective insofar as their agreement with reality is mind-independent.

Oh lordie! The mind-independent thing again. As shown later that is a rug and a bad one. nothing is mind-independent in the way you seem to suggest. We are all connected.

I guess I can agree about your fact definition but its a weak definition. Here is a far far better one:
"A fact is only a belief for which some moral agent has perhaps even arbitrarily decided there is enough evidence to declare that fact close to truth, NOT reality." Truth and reality are different. Truth is superior because it is objective. Morality is part of truth. Reality is the what we can interpret of truth, only, e.g. beliefs. Reality is subjective delusion. Truth is objective.

Quoting Bob Ross

When I say ‘factually wrong’, I mean that there is a state-of-affairs or arrangement of entities in reality in virtue of which make it true that it is wrong. This is objective, not subjective.

Nope. Reality is subjective delusion. Truth is objective. Facts are only currently held as 'true' beliefs about truth. They never describe truth accurately. Their correctness is only scale of how wrong they are, often relative to one another.

Quoting Bob Ross

Due to experience, everything, even existence itself, is subjective

You are conflating experience being subjective with everything being subjective.

Truth is the only thing that is objective.

We can infer that truth is objective, but never prove it. We are left only and always with hopefully better and better beliefs about reality amid truth.

Everything that we call reality is subjective. Truth alone is not.

Quoting Bob Ross

Lol, so again, you are back to declaring my argument, objective morality. I can't tell. Maybe you are a moral realist.

I would like to ask, and I mean this with all due respect: did you read the OP? I usually give people the benefit of the doubt, but I am now suspecting you may have jumped into this thread from someone else who notified you of my moral subjectivist metaethical theory that I defended in a different thread (or actually multiple threads). Am I right? If not, then I apologize. If so, then I would suggest reading the OP: it is a pretty quick read and you will probably understand better what this moral realist position is (and what it isn’t); and, that way, we can hone-in on our conversation to the OP itself.

Agreed and admitted.
I did read and understand it.

But I am a person who cares too much about a person's real positions. So I was naturally gravitating towards your subjectivist belief that is more real that this fake objectivist post. I admit the error and apologize.

I suppose I will now have to contend with your actual subjectivism in the other thread. Yoiks and Away!

Quoting Bob Ross

You ARE a moral realist and you just don't realize it.

I am still confused at why you think that this theory (I have presented) is purporting to be a moral anti-realist position; let alone moral subjectivism.

Again, you are right. It was because I can only ever focus on the real. If you present a front, a fake realism, and I read before as I did that you are a subjectivist, I can't help but speak to you, the real you, that is a subjectivist. Also the sheer length of some of this made me lose my awareness of the former position as a stance only, a pretense. Again sincere apologies.

I was like WTF this guys arguments are all moral realism. How can he claim subjectivism? Oops!

Youth In Asia! Something must be done!

Quoting Bob Ross

Secondly, there is no such law of the universe that dictates that we have free will: it is a biproduct of our ability to cognize. — Bob Ross
(This is a) Wildly conceited and egoic point of view. We did this? Really? The same people that invented twinkies and cigarettes? I see (backs away slowly).

My claim (that you quoted) never attempted to say that we invented free will. It is a biproduct of our ability to cognize.

It is not. It is a law of the universe. It is the only law, really. All else can be derived from it.

Quoting Bob Ross

Free will is what causes physical reality to occur.

It seems as though, and correct me if I am wrong, you are think that there is a natural law of morality which actually forms things, like a force. I don’t see why that is the case.

That much is clear. We will meet again, when you are you. Luckily for you, morality is objective.

Quoting Bob Ross

I will say that I disagree with most of what you said about moral subjectivism, but this thread isn’t meant to debate that; so if you want to discuss that then shoot me a message on the moral subjectivism thread of mine.

Will do! Thanks for understanding!

Reply to Chet Hawkins

I think it might be best if I give a brief elaboration of this moral realist theory, and see what you disagree with. So far, it seems as though most of your critiques and points are irrelevant to the OP.

This theory posits that morality is objective—i.e., that there are states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality that inform us of what is moral or immoral. It posits that what is good (viz., The Good, in the sense of an objective goodness) is flourishing—i.e., goodness is identical to flourishing. Flourishing is, at its core, the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. Flourishing is contextual and objective: it is contextual insofar as one must posit a context in which one is assessing flourishing (e.g., I am flourishing, you are flourishing, we are flourishing, society is flourishing, etc.) and objective insofar as it is a mind-independently existing relation between a purpose and fulfillment thereof (viz., one’s psychology has nothing to do with flourishing being identical to the fulfillment of purposes). This relation, however, contains an element of subjectivity insofar as purposes are subjective (i.e., what it means for something [within a context] to fulfill its purpose is relative to the psychology of one or more subjects): this does not make flourishing itself subjective but, rather, merely that that very objective relation is that of (subjective) purposes being fulfilled. Each context one could posit, for evaluating flourishing, which is infinite in amount, is hierarchical in the sense that larger contexts have more flourishing and smaller contexts have less flourishing (in total); and, consequently, the larger the context of flourishing, the greater the good (i.e., the greater the flourishing). Thusly, the highest good is universal flourishing, because it has the greatest amount of flourishing being the largest context. The highest good has the most good and is, therefore, the best good: it is the ultimate good. Therefore, if one is committed to being good, then they should strive for this best good, this highest good, this universal flourishing, instead of a lower one.

With that being said, what do you disagree with in that theory?

I would like to also disclaim that this position is not “fake”, as you implied multiple times in your response: by noting that I have a separate thread for moral subjectivism, I was not meaning to imply I am a moral subjectivist. Personally, I hold this theory instead; but I am more than happy to discuss moral subjectivism, as I think it gets a very bad wrap by most people who, quite frankly, do not fully understand the theory.

Normativity is (pardon) bovine poo revisionism for objective morality. It's just another way of saying moral subjectivism has merit in and of itself.

I don’t think removing normativity from the good makes moral subjectivism itself have merit. Instead, it just fixes a lot of problems with moral realist theories which posit the contrary and makes more realism more plausible.

Another thing I would like to disclaim is that when I say flourishing has that subjective element of being the fulfillment of a (subjective) purpose: I am referring to the depths of the soul and not whimsical day-to-day opinions or desires a person has.

It doesn't matter what people believe because what is good is a law of the universe, objective.

So, this is not something posited in my theory; and I don’t see any evidence to support the good being a natural law.

Well yes, I follow your distinction here. But no, you are sidestepping a dangerously important issue. If you fail to realize that virtues ARE the quantum discrete parts of goodness, you fail (in general).

I didn’t follow any of this: what is a ‘quantum discrete part of goodness’? Virtues are habits of character that are good: they are not identical to goodness.

Well you did what the other guy did and did not put your part my part refers to that you are referring to here with your response. That makes it too hard to respond.

Correct. I am not going to quote everything you say, because there is too much. I only tag the portion relative to what I am responding to, and trust you will be able to navigate your own responses.

I said necessary. But yes, if it is necessary. It is not torture as that implies negative intent, negative wants.

It is immoral to torture someone (or torture them absent of this ‘negative intent’ you mentioned) for the sake of building their virtue.

Beauty and accuracy are objective.

What do you mean by accuracy? Accuracy of what?

I don’t think beauty necessarily instantiates objective moral truth. Being ugly has nothing to do with what is moral or immoral. There could be a reality with universal flourishing and every person therein is uglier than a bat.

If my goal is to kill Asians, then if I succeed I am flourishing. That is subjective morality

The first sentence is in principle correct, the second is not implied from the first. In the smallest, or one of the smallest, contexts of flourishing, of good, if one has the purpose of killing asians, then they would thereby flourish if they are sufficiently killing asians. However, the buck does not stop here: the highest good is universal flourishing, and killing asians clearly violates that. So, colloquially, my theory would state “it is immoral to kill asians for the sole sake of fulfilling one’s own desire”.

Nevertheless, flourishing is not subjective; so even in the example you gave, it does not follow that morality is subjective.

Objective morality says that killing people just because they are Asian is incoherent immoral nonsense.

No it does not. Objective morality (i.e., moral realism) is a three-pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (moral cognitivism).
2. Moral judgments express something objective (moral objectivism)
3. There is at least one true moral judgment.

Moral realism itself does not entail that moral anti-realism is internally incoherent, although a particular theory may advertise that, nor that it is nonsense; but, rather, just that it is objectively wrong to do so.

Now you just added another component, 'harmoniously'. You cant do that either

It is implied by the highest good: universal flourishing requires, nay presupposes, universal harmony.

Oh lordie! The mind-independent thing again. As shown later that is a rug and a bad one. nothing is mind-independent in the way you seem to suggest. We are all connected.

You cannot claim that moral is objective and turn around and deny that objectivity is ‘that which is mind-independent’.

I will stop here for now, so that we can hone in on our conversation to the OP.

Reply to Leontiskos

The idea that I must act for the other's sake and not for my own is a largely Kantian idea, and it is problematic.

I guess it depends on what you are referring to by 'egoism' and 'altruism'; and, to me, in a marriage one is acting for one's own sake and another's sake--so there is an element of egoism there (albeit it not narcissism). Acting truly as if the two partners are one organism isn't how marriage usually works in practice. E.g., one does not divorce their partner to save the marriage, like one would chop off their arm to save their body: they don't do this precisely because marriage presupposes that each partner is trying to find the right balance between themselves and the other person. Obviously, divorcing to save a marriage makes no sense, but if it truly is just a matter of two people being fused into one person, then they should have no problem sacrificing one for the sake of the other in a dire situation.

My point is just that marriages are about finding the right balance between one's own needs and another person's, not some relationship where egoism has been completely overcome.

Quoting Bob Ross

...finding the right balance between one's own needs and another person's,

Isn't that the very nature of ethics? How we ought treat others?

Quoting Leontiskos

The idea that I must act for the other's sake and not for my own is a largely Kantian idea, and it is problematic. It is not impossible to do this, but it is difficult and rare, and such an idea should not form the basis of realistic ethics. I think that, more than anything, it has confused us.

That's pretty close to how I think.

Though I'd extend the range to include all forms of Christianity.

It's a nice thought, but for the wrong species.

Reply to Banno Seems so, to me.

Reply to Banno

That is a part of ethics, the other is: what is good?

Quoting Moliere

That's pretty close to how I think.

:up:

Quoting Moliere

Though I'd extend the range to include all forms of Christianity.

Christianity says, "Love your neighbor as yourself," not, "Love your neighbor, not yourself." Without self-worth sacrifice is unintelligible.

Quoting Moliere

It's a nice thought, but for the wrong species.

I actually don't think it is a nice thought for any species.

---

Quoting Bob Ross

Acting truly as if the two partners are one organism isn't how marriage usually works in practice.

I don't think our culture takes marriage very seriously, so this is no surprise. But the point is that humans simply aren't forced to choose their own good at the expense of others, nor are they barred from promoting the good of others in a symbiotic manner.

Quoting Bob Ross

I think it might be best if I give a brief elaboration of this moral realist theory, and see what you disagree with. So far, it seems as though most of your critiques and points are irrelevant to the OP.

That is your assessment, not mine. Of course I mention them only because to me they are relevant in the case of my stance FOR moral realism. I suppose I could take the con to moral objectivity and argue that, but that is not my belief, and I prefer genuine argument meaning arguing only for that which one does actually believe.

Quoting Bob Ross

This theory posits that morality is objective—i.e., that there are states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality that inform us of what is moral or immoral. It posits that what is good (viz., The Good, in the sense of an objective goodness) is flourishing—i.e., goodness is identical to flourishing. Flourishing is, at its core, the fulfillment of something relative to its purpose. Flourishing is contextual and objective: it is contextual insofar as one must posit a context in which one is assessing flourishing (e.g., I am flourishing, you are flourishing, we are flourishing, society is flourishing, etc.) and objective insofar as it is a mind-independently existing relation between a purpose and fulfillment thereof (viz., one’s psychology has nothing to do with flourishing being identical to the fulfillment of purposes).

I mean you did not answer my earlier critiques and instead retreated back into your 'jargon' I prefer to believe I refuted, actually answering your comments.

I mentioned before many ways and explained it perhaps in a less than best way that it does not matter how you attempt to define 'flourish'. Yet you keep going back to that as if repeating the same thing I objected to as an error works. It certainly does not help.

Whether you or I or anyone believes that they are flourishing is not relevant if morality is objective. All beliefs are partially in error. So there is wrongness amid even overall correct claims. This situation in fact underscores the objective nature of morality. The unchanging and pristine nature of perfection, of objectivity, of truth, as opposed to belief, is what we should be debating.

Finally, the issue between subjective and objective goals is only that the objective ones do not change. They cannot ever change. They are truth and truth does not change.

A subjective morality requires that indeed fundamental laws of the universe must change on a moment to moment basis. I say that indeed because as mentioned, I assert that morality is a natural law. Its truth was true at the dawn of time and perhaps before, depending on if a before could exist.

The only possibly objective things, or true things, can only be so if they are always true (reiteration). This means that morality was objectively true at the dawn of time. The one thing logically requires the other. So, only a moral subjectivist can claim that morality is not a natural law. I have explained my position with these statements. Theoretically, amid real discussion you must provide a substantive reason why you disagree.

Assertion set tentative:
1) Truth is eternal and ubiquitous. To write a truth assertion you must show or contend that this assertion was true at the dawn of time, and never has not been true at any point in time.
2) States are not ever truth. If something can change it is a state and not truth. A truth can be distilled into a principle, often called first principles, a useless term because truth already suffices.
3) States are best referred to as transitional and therefore effectively delusional. They are not truth, they never were truth, and dwelling on them is missing the point of truth-seeking. It is (objectively) disingenuous immoral behavior.
4) Perfection is the only real ideal, and is effectively synonymous with truth.
5) Moral perfection can have a special name and that is the GOOD. It just means perfection. So Ideal, perfection, truth, and objective (and even the term God) can all mean the same thing. In my belief model and writings here, they are always all the same things. There is no need to separate them and that act of separation by intent is in and of itself suggested and can be discussed as immoral and bound to have immoral consequences therefore.
5) Consequences are only state fallouts of intents. Intents are synonymous to me with the term 'choices'.
6) Perfection is a state and a final choice consequence as well as an ideal. It can be considered a strange duality of delusion and truth and it is the only exception to all rules. Its distinction on this basis is critical to all thought, all definitions, all discussions.

I am not trying to derail the thread at all. I still intend to discuss it more, although I think I have made great points already that have been ignored because they do not fit the OP. But that is not correct, so, what am I to do? They do fit any OP that has any bearing on the 6 assertions I detailed here and any sub-assertion that conflicts with the 6 here amid that OP is in fact being challenged on that basis. My reasons were explained and my explanations were not addressed. That leaves me reiterating until they are addressed. One does not properly address an assertion by merely saying, 'that does not obtain', or similar dismissive non-helpful attempts at countering an argument by mere negation statements.

Quoting Bob Ross

This relation, however, contains an element of subjectivity insofar as purposes are subjective (i.e., what it means for something [within a context] to fulfill its purpose is relative to the psychology of one or more subjects): this does not make flourishing itself subjective but, rather, merely that that very objective relation is that of (subjective) purposes being fulfilled.

I can agree that because I believe morality to be objective that to me flourishing is objective. But that merely means that subjective opinions on flourishing are all always wrong in some way. They simply can never be perfect.

And this inability to arrive at objectivity is super relevant. It leaves us all sitting in our subjective error pool of beliefs still 'doomed' to want perfection because that objective moral truth gives rise to desire itself, but eternally unable to arrive there.

This situation is the juxtaposition of moral duty. Amid moral duty, an objective aim at perfection only, we must both seek perfection and acknowledge that it is impossible to arrive there. That is in fact, wisdom. It could be called as well the source of humility itself.

Subjective experience makes choice errors likely, despite the pull of perfection, because desire itself is distorted by the immorality and weakness present in the state/choice mix. State is current only and choice is the next pulse to the next new state. State can be and is always immoral/imperfection and by degrees. Choice can be and is always immoral/imperfection and by degrees.

Nothing but free will exists in any state. The state is just an accumulation of free will consequences, and free will manages the choice which is the next pulse to the next new state. Nothing is in action but free will.

I will add for completeness although I mentioned this before, that all instantiation is possessed of free will. Even though the moral agency of an atom seems ridiculous or infinitesimally small, it simply has to be there because that seed via evolution gave rise to greater and greater moral agency. So, Animism was always the best belief system, and later religions were a backslide only. I am still just framing my arguments for you. The internal consistency of my belief system is very high in my opinion. If someone wants to say it is wrong they need to have a logic reason why and explain it here. They should not just link to someone else's argument or even their own from elsewhere or Wikipedia as an example. I am providing enough information here to allow for meaningful debate.

Quoting Bob Ross

Each context one could posit, for evaluating flourishing, which is infinite in amount, is hierarchical in the sense that larger contexts have more flourishing and smaller contexts have less flourishing (in total); and, consequently, the larger the context of flourishing, the greater the good (i.e., the greater the flourishing). Thusly, the highest good is universal flourishing, because it has the greatest amount of flourishing being the largest context. The highest good has the most good and is, therefore, the best good: it is the ultimate good. Therefore, if one is committed to being good, then they should strive for this best good, this highest good, this universal flourishing, instead of a lower one.

Yes, my system of belief is in alignment with that, except in one way that should be stated.

That is saying 'highest' and 'lowest' does have proper inferences but it implies something that is not true. Striving for a lower good can only be a relative determination. The default point of comparison is what you are calling the highest good, and what I call perfection. Perfection must be specified (in my opinion) as an n dimensional intersection of dimensions that by definition will all only intersect at one point and that is perfection. To say 'highest' therefore is misleading. That is a scalar uni-dimensional term. It is entirely insufficient to describe the objective moral good.

Another way to say it that between any two state/choice comparisons, one is always both:
1) Originating from a better state because perfect state matches are impossible ... AND
2) One choice n-dimensional matrix value is always better than the other.

This is effectively a writ small description of judgment, a single virtue. Choices that are judged as wise or good should always point directly to perfection and they are 'bad' by the degree that they are missing in this vector aim.

Quoting Bob Ross

With that being said, what do you disagree with in that theory?

I just stated why. I am a moral realist so I do not disagree with what I define that to be, in general. Any model that ends up supporting the tenets I defined as moral realism, because that is what I understand and believe it to be, is fine with me.

But some of the language used indicates the belief system assertions are not all agreed upon and therefore must be stated, as I did.

Quoting Bob Ross

I would like to also disclaim that this position is not “fake”, as you implied multiple times in your response: by noting that I have a separate thread for moral subjectivism, I was not meaning to imply I am a moral subjectivist. Personally, I hold this theory instead; but I am more than happy to discuss moral subjectivism, as I think it gets a very bad wrap by most people who, quite frankly, do not fully understand the theory.

As mentioned, we should both be able to easily agree that all understanding is incorrect when compared to perfection. So, we do not have to harp on that.

What we should be dealing with is the fact that moral realism put a tremendous and increasing burden of free will onto the chooser. The reason it does so is only because as moral states rise in moral value, in goodness, it gets harder and harder to make more and more moral choices. This truth is critical to acknowledge as part of any useful moral realism set of assertions.

It takes greater and greater virtue states and greater and greater aim accuracy at perfection to increase the moral state value of the next state after a choice pulse. Accomplishing that is harder and harder because you are requiring the chooser to do it all at the same time.

Quoting Bob Ross

Normativity is (pardon) bovine poo revisionism for objective morality. It's just another way of saying moral subjectivism has merit in and of itself.

I don’t think removing normativity from the good makes moral subjectivism itself have merit.

And I never said that it did.

Normativity is just moral subjectivism redefined. It takes the viewpoint off of perfection and normalizes to an error based standard. There is no point to that. It is immoral counter wisdom. So, do not do it. Do not admit that normativity is useful. If you do, you are inherenity supporting subjective morality.

Quoting Bob Ross

Instead, it just fixes a lot of problems with moral realist theories which posit the contrary and makes more realism more plausible.

Indeed not. Normalizing to an imperfect standard is merely immoral. It is an error, just like moral subjectivism. There is no need even giving pretense to errors, finally.

I guess I would say, it is more perfect to just call it subjective morality, to build a thought-of-as-perfect for now, best guess, standard of perfection, and then try aiming at that. Then you can identify where in the intent dimensions your 'normative' new subjective standard originates from and you all know and admit you are discussing moral errors only.

None of this implies that the guessed at perfection currently is anything but a normative standard. That can be confusing. But there can only be 1. We should agree on what a best guess is and use that as the universal default standard. Anytime debate moves a virtue scale or consensus, the 'authority' shifts the normative perfection. But all sub perfection guess normalizations are just and only even worse error including deviations.

I am trying to be clear with my meanings here.

Quoting Bob Ross

Another thing I would like to disclaim is that when I say flourishing has that subjective element of being the fulfillment of a (subjective) purpose: I am referring to the depths of the soul and not whimsical day-to-day opinions or desires a person has.

There is zero difference in these things you claim as partially different. No single choice is neutral. There is nothing in this universe but morality of state and accuracy of moral aim towards objective moral perfection. Those are the core tenets of objective morality.

Maybe you mean depths of the soul to be belief which is state only.
Maybe you mean day to day opinion to be intents which is choice only.

But, It sounded to me like you were opening up a new category of important choice and unimportant choice, and that is a delusional lie.

Correct me if I am wrong.

Quoting Bob Ross

It doesn't matter what people believe because what is good is a law of the universe, objective.

So, this is not something posited in my theory; and I don’t see any evidence to support the good being a natural law.

The entire universe is evidence but I know that is a dodge.

As mentioned earlier though and unless that earlier but is refuted this position of yours is merely wrong. Since morality is objective, it is a natural law, a truth, by definition. To remove it as natural law is to remove objective morality entirely. That or the very concept of objectivity is not properly understood 9is my contention).

Quoting Bob Ross

Well yes, I follow your distinction here. But no, you are sidestepping a dangerously important issue. If you fail to realize that virtues ARE the quantum discrete parts of goodness, you fail (in general).

I didn’t follow any of this: what is a ‘quantum discrete part of goodness’? Virtues are habits of character that are good: they are not identical to goodness.

And I did not say they were. They are however, as mentioned, parts of goodness. And the way they are arranged or add value to perfection is discrete meaning objective. But this is objective in multiple ways at the same time. People do not realize that virtues have discrete structure and value. People will often devalue one virtue compared to another. That is a moral error. All virtues that I am referring to, that can be properly named as such, have a discrete interaction between them. And they are all equal, precisely perfectly equal.

I do not claim perfect knowledge, only better moral awareness than most, hence an interest in philosophy and such and spreading the 'good' word from my normative perfect moral value set. Ostensibly others here are at least interested if not possessed of their own normative belief set. And possibly they could also have less interest in spreading the 'good'.

Quoting Bob Ross

Well you did what the other guy did and did not put your part my part refers to that you are referring to here with your response. That makes it too hard to respond.

Correct. I am not going to quote everything you say, because there is too much. I only tag the portion relative to what I am responding to, and trust you will be able to navigate your own responses.

That is sad because it is just as easy to quote the whole thing and avoid this problem, facilitating all of our efforts at communication.

Quoting Bob Ross

I said necessary. But yes, if it is necessary. It is not torture as that implies negative intent, negative wants.

It is immoral to torture someone (or torture them absent of this ‘negative intent’ you mentioned) for the sake of building their virtue.

And yet it is moral to inflict suffering on others to help them earn wisdom in a 'safer' setting. Otherwise there is no need to teach, ever. There is no need to communicate ever. This forum is purposeless without that tenet in place. Suffering the exposure to others ideas is the potential for communication/teaching/learning and the best incidence of those is the earning of wisdom.

As previously mentioned, the only real debate is whether or not some inflicting of suffering was necessary (teaching) or whether it was unnecessary (torture) and since morality is objective, that line is also objective and never ever no matter opinions to the contrary subjective. People are just wrong about what they think torture is because being wrong in part is a tautology. Therefore it is always best to have a scenario wherein we compare two different assertions on exactly the same issue and judge them for where that line is drawn between necessary and unnecessary. That is the whole point of any debate and choice.

Quoting Bob Ross

Beauty and accuracy are objective.

What do you mean by accuracy? Accuracy of what?

I don’t think beauty necessarily instantiates objective moral truth.

And I did not say it did. Any given beauty is a partial error and there would then be a perfect beauty that would then instantiate objective moral truth. The fact that imperfect beauty can still be quire moral and amazingly beautiful is included and fine. But no beauty we see except all is perfect and we cannot grasp all, ever. So, although we experience all, we sit within it, we cannot really perceive it yet. We are evolving to perceive it accurately.

Quoting Bob Ross

Being ugly has nothing to do with what is moral or immoral. There could be a reality with universal flourishing and every person therein is uglier than a bat.

I disagree and for the reasons stated already and not refuted in any way.

Although such instantiations are in some moral state, if they are not perfectly beautiful, they are in a partially immoral state. Beauty is both a state and is also involved as a virtue amid choice. All virtues double dip in this way.

The subjective belief that ugliness (immoral non perfect beauty) is neutral with respect to morality like you just suggested is immoral. It allows for laziness and panders to immoral desire and in a want, a choice, to remain or accept the immoral state and not will towards perfection.

Rev Bem, the Magog Wayist monk from Andromeda
Rev Bem Image
Great, now i cannot get image inserts to work right. Rev Bem is batlike making this funny. He is also a moral Wayist monk, making it poignant.

Quoting Bob Ross

If my goal is to kill Asians, then if I succeed I am flourishing. That is subjective morality

The first sentence is in principle correct, the second is not implied from the first. In the smallest, or one of the smallest, contexts of flourishing, of good, if one has the purpose of killing asians, then they would thereby flourish if they are sufficiently killing asians.

So, you are wrong here. So far, YOU are correct, and now you will say the incorrect part.

Quoting Bob Ross

However, the buck does not stop here: the highest good is universal flourishing, and killing asians clearly violates that. So, colloquially, my theory would state “it is immoral to kill asians for the sole sake of fulfilling one’s own desire”.

And THAT is the second order distinction I have been talking about.

Any definition of flourish that aims at errors about flourishing less than aiming at perfection are just immoral errors and never were flourishing. So disincluding Asians is what I claim it is, a subjective moral delusion and no, you are wrong, it is not some after the fact correction, because no one can do that, change perfection. One cannot do that and be accurate.

The only reason the vector to objective perfection changes per person, giving rise to the delusion of subjective morality, is that current moral states can be different, and if perfection does not move/change, then the vector from two different states is different. That is the trouble that must be overcome. That is the trouble you refuse to address. It is therefore your trouble in belief, and not mine by my standards and by the standard you seem to be professing, moral objectivism, if properly understood.

Quoting Bob Ross

Objective morality says that killing people just because they are Asian is incoherent immoral nonsense.

No it does not. Objective morality (i.e., moral realism) is a three-pronged thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (moral cognitivism).
2. Moral judgments express something objective (moral objectivism)
3. There is at least one true moral judgment.

I do not claim to know moral cognitivism. It is not necessary to know it to assert what I refer to as my objective morality, perfection. The one true moral judgment is perfection, to me, so there is no need to say that either. Thus only item 2 pertains to me. And I contend that it is all that is needed.

I will add regarding moral cognitivism that as I understand it, it is rather useless. That is to say non-cognitivism claims that moral statements are all errors and I agree but only because perfection is elusive, nigh unto impossible. That is not dauting to me at all. It is perfection and acceptable. Yet and still cognitivism is a refutation of non-cognitivism, supposedly only. It essentially confirms moral realism by claiming that some moral statements can be true and although I have no idea how they qualify or disqualify a moral statement, I agree.

So the trouble with uselessness of both cognitivism and non-cognitivism is precisely that they expressive only together of perfection. That is to say ... and I can just repeat myself ...
1) Perfection is effectively impossible to arrive at and all opinions are partial errors (true) non-cognitivism
AND
2) Perfection is simultaneously the only maximally worthy goal. (That statement IS a moral statement and IS true). That is cognitivism or what I would conclude from it.

Wisdom is finally the ability to hold seemingly (but actually not) contradictory statements as both true simultaneously. But such statements have an additional caveat to be wisdom. They must aim at best guess perfection, to be better and finally only at perfection to be perfect.

Quoting Bob Ross

Moral realism itself does not entail that moral anti-realism is internally incoherent, although a particular theory may advertise that, nor that it is nonsense; but, rather, just that it is objectively wrong to do so.

And I disagree.

Moral anti-realism is a contention that morality is not objective (to me). If there is some other definition it is intentionally deceptive.

Moral anti-realism would be an immoral stance, clearly less than perfect if indeed morality is objective.

So I assume we just disagree and you have stated no reason why it could be otherwise.

Quoting Bob Ross

Now you just added another component, 'harmoniously'. You cant do that either

It is implied by the highest good: universal flourishing requires, nay presupposes, universal harmony.

I covered that earlier. Flourish is from any state, a different vector but that differing does not support subjective morality.

Discussing lower versions of flourishing is only discussing subjective morality is my claim. I explained why. Perfection is a single point within n-dimensional intent space.

Quoting Bob Ross

Oh lordie! The mind-independent thing again. As shown later that is a rug and a bad one. nothing is mind-independent in the way you seem to suggest. We are all connected.

You cannot claim that moral is objective and turn around and deny that objectivity is ‘that which is mind-independent’.

I will stop here for now, so that we can hone in on our conversation to the OP.

I agree the OP intends to be discussing objective morality, not subjective morality as I thought earlier.

But your interpretations of the concepts of what could be objective morality are not correct, to me. I have explained why very well. If you do not want to discuss why your claim towards objective morality is not in fact objective morality, I argue there is no reason for discussion at all.

Again, the morality model you described at least in this post is not possibly an objective moral model at all.

Reply to Chet Hawkins

Firstly, I want to say that I really appreciate your responses, as I can tell you are putting in a lot of effort to convey as much as possible about your position to me.

However:

I mean you did not answer my earlier critiques and instead retreated back into your 'jargon' I prefer to believe I refuted, actually answering your comments
...
zI am not trying to derail the thread at all. I still intend to discuss it more, although I think I have made great points already that have been ignored because they do not fit the OP. But that is not correct, so, what am I to do?

I am having a hard time keeping up with the critiques you are making, because they are so sporadic. In order for us to continue discussing productively, I would like to ask you to give me one critique you have of the OP: any one of them--but just one; and then we can dive into it and, once we have discussed it at length, then we can move on to another critique (point) you have; and so and so forth. Does that sound good?

I am not trying to thwart your “attack” or beat-around-the-bush: I simply want us to have a productive conversation that I can manage; so that I can adequately respond to your thoughts. My brain operates very systematically: I need to be able to at least infer where to start and connect my way to where to end and, unfortunately, I am unable to sufficiently parse your responses.

I want to disclaim that I know, from your perspective, it may be frustrating that I am not responding to everything you are saying; but I started to (even in this last response you made I wrote up a draft) and there is just so much material I disagree with and most of it isn’t actually relevant (or perhaps it is and I have failed to grasp it yet).

For now, give me one critique, one point, you have with the theory; and I will do my due diligence to adequately respond. Then we can move on to the next, then the next, etc. I think that is a better plan, go forward, for us to tackle this conversation optimally. Let me know what you think.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Quoting Bob Ross

Here is a new metaethical theory I am working on that is a form of moral realism, and, since I find it a worthy contender of my moral anti-realist position, I wanted to share it with the forum to see what people think.

Very well, from the start.

You say this theory represents moral realism. So, you must then agree that the reader must agree that this theory indeed can possibly describe moral realism. Does it feel like or seem to be moral realism? If it bears little resemblance to moral realism, the debate is ended because you are demanding us to lose our minds and believe that black is white as a starting point.

Quoting Bob Ross

I do not have a name for it yet, so I will just explicate it.

On we go, in good faith ...

Quoting Bob Ross

For the sake of brevity, and because I have already covered arguments in favor of them in my moral subjectivist paper, I am presupposing moral cognitivism and non-nihilism in this thread.

I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism. That applies here. To assert uselessness is useless.

I can give the same argument again?!?!?!

The brief is this:
1) All beliefs are in error partially because perfection is impossible (anti-cognitivism)
2) Some moral statements are possibly true because they embrace the concept of limits towards infinity as infinity. (cognitivism)

This ... proves ... to me ... that moral cognitivism (and anti-cognitivism both) are useless. They are simultaneously false and true meaning they are both true and juxtaposed. This state of things is normal. It is found in all truth worthy of the name. It is found in all wisdom.

So, THAT would be your one thing. Start there and only there if you wish. I will continue to respond JUST to the OP though to offer more. Respond only to one at a time if you wish.

Quoting Bob Ross

If anyone would like me to elaborate on them, then I certainly can; and I suggest anyone who is interested in that to read the relevant portions of my discussion board OP pertaining to moral subjectivism on those two metaethical positions. I will focus on a positive case for moral objectivism, which I deny in my moral subjectivist (anti-realist) view.

Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.

My acceptance and balance with chaos is unusual to this forum. It is misunderstood. That is because academia and classical logical approaches are not inherently chaotic. They often dismiss chaos as the enemy. Chaos is an integral and required part of morality. You are not allowed to dismiss it. You must deal with it. That so far, in my opinion, is a large part of your ... problem.

Heaven knows, I am only one small man. If I alone in a single post offer up too much to deal with, what hope is there of tackling something as wiley and wonderful as objective moral truth or let's just say, the truth, in general? Not much I'm afraid.

On we go ...

Quoting Bob Ross

The core of this theory is that ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ are not determined by mind-independent states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality but, rather, are abstract categories, or forms, of conduct.

There is so much wrong with this paragraph that it might take infinite time to detail it.

1) There is no such thing as a mind-independent state of affairs. That's the biggest issue.
2) If the good is a form, that is mind-independent, in the only way I think you mean it, which means more properly stated that the GOOD does not depend on opinion or choice, but is preset, a law of the universe, then I agree, you are talking about objective morality. But you later suggest that you are NOT talking about a law of the universe making your premises unclear (entirely).
3) This means you are asserting that these 'forms' which you do not define yet, are mind-independent. But you also have said in other posts that you are not referring to a law of the universe. So you are contradicting yourself and not in a good way.

For now, let's leave that complaint as this section and move on.

Quoting Bob Ross

The (mind-independent) states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality inform us of what is right or wrong in virtue of being classified under either category.

You are unclear here as to the 'categories'. I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories. That is confusing because we all know there is a continuum there. If one is dealing with a continuum one must/should specify the dividing line between them. So what precisely denotes good and what evil? What filter do I use to distinguish between them? How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?

Quoting Bob Ross

For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’.

This paragraph explains NOTHING OF USE about the former paragraph and yet that is what it purports to be doing. No help. Why?

It is no help because you just basically gave no filter and expect that we can decide what makes something good or evil. You have not even said that there is a continuum. What relates the good to the bad?

This paragraph only has use if of course, as assumed by it, everyone, sort-of agrees on what good means. They do not. In fact, that is the entire point of this discussion. Is what is good or evil objective or subjective?

Quoting Bob Ross

So, in light of this and in an attempt to contrast with my other moral anti-realist theory, I would like to point out the flaw, from the perspective of this theory, of my moral subjectivist argument; so let me outline it briefly again:

And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.

I'm here to hear your ostensible realism theory and the first thing you start explaining is subjectivism. What? Can we talk about the thing before we talk what isn't the thing?

Quoting Bob Ross

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it should be.

Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:
Anti-P1: The way reality is currently is clearly the best example of how it should be because it's the only example we have. Guess what? That's a tautology. Have fun with that.

Quoting Bob Ross

P2: Moral facts are statements about states-of-affairs which inform us of how reality should be.

No they are not.

Better P2: Moral facts are statements about what choices should be made by any and all choosers.

To be is a horrible verb. It is misunderstood and misused constantly. States can change. Truth cannot. So if moral statements are true they cannot change. So, if there is something that IS, the verb to be, the suggestion is that it is that permanently. If it can be something else, then it IS NOT (only) what we are saying it IS. This is the trouble with is-a. It's ALWAYS a lie. So everything is a delusion? Yes. Except for one thing, truth.

Moral statements are possibly true. That means they do not change.
Choices result in consequences that are states. States can change.

If something 'should', then the something that 'should' can only be a state.

Hence, my better P2.

Quoting Bob Ross

C: TF, moral facts cannot exist.

I do not know what you mean here. What is TF, true, false? By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises. You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist. Again, putting TF in front of this statement with no explanation is messy at best.

Quoting Bob Ross

Analyzing this argument from this theory, as opposed to moral subjectivism, P2 is false; because moral facts are not only about states-of-affairs, in the sense that they are made true in virtue of corresponding to some state-of-affairs in reality, but, rather, are made true in virtue of how the state-of-affairs sizes up to the abstract category of ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’.

I like that. It's not discrete but it says the right things to be considered in support of realism.

Quoting Bob Ross

So, the key misunderstanding of moral subjectivism, or so the argument goes (:, is that a fact is a statement that corresponds to reality and not solely states-of-affairs in reality—as abstract categories are still mind-independently true insofar as, although we can semantically disagree, the actions are subsumable under more general classifications and this is not stance-dependent—and thusly P2 is false.

Smaller sentences might help. This is hard to follow. You merely claim it is a misunderstanding and although this sentence is perhaps one of the longest in history it does not say why there even is a misunderstanding.

You do not offer these 'more general classifications' so why was time wasted with P2 in the first place?

As I more cleanly mentioned in my earlier post and I even explained it, STATES are not truth. If something can change it is not truth. This does not deny the existence of truth. If we find any stability in reality it is because of truth.

Here is one for you: Logical:
Nothing can depend on anything that is not truth, finally.

Therefore nothing can depend on a state that can change. Stand on quicksand if you like, I do not like it.

Quoting Bob Ross

Likewise, P1, if taken as true, only refers by 'reality is' to states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality and not abstract categories of events or actions in that reality (nor what potentially could occur in that reality).

You do not say what this means. So what if P1 only refers to states and not truths? And this is wrong anyway.
And realize what you did there. You just said that P1 changes. Its therefore not true. Why bother discussing what is not true. What is the point of that?

The meat of any matter of discussion on objective anything is only and always discussion of what does not and cannot change. States are right out! Do not proceed from state to state unless you reference them within a frame of truth that is unchanging. If the frame changes, discussion is useless. Do you understand the problem?

Discussing subjective morality is only possible in an objectively stable universe. Thankfully that is what we have. Properly understood that is the end of the discussion. On to determining what is objectively a should.

But instead we continue with delusions and since that is the process of growth, I accept this burden.

Quoting Bob Ross

Although there is a lot I would like to say, I want to keep this brief—so I will say only one last thing: this is not a form of platonism. By abstract form or category I do not mean that there exists an abstract object, or a set of them, in reality that in virtue of which makes moral judgments (which express something objective) true—as this falls into the same trap that they are indeed states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality and this violates P1.

Is that a sentence? Smaller is better. Discreet! You asked me to address ONE thing instead of a complex and interweaved response to you, but sentences like this are a tornado through a trailer park. Wreckage abounds.

Don't use the word virtue the way you do. It confounds the issue. And it is wrong as stated. Virtue is an ideal, and that ideal is objective or, let's say, can indeed be imagined as such. Any given state is only a point along a continuum which has its end in perfection of that virtue. This does not deny the form. A state cannot deny truth.

It sounds like you are suggesting that because states exist, truth cannot. That is patently absurd. This is caused by the fact that P1 is incoherent in the way I mentoined.

Quoting Bob Ross

Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications.

This is nothing more finally than conceit.

It is the conceit of thought, of a thinker, to think that, in thinking, all else came from thought alone. It is a ruination of 'Cogito ergo sum!' The latter explains that thinking is only one aspect of being. The former is an elevation of thinking to being and is simply obviously nonsensical.

Reply to Chet Hawkins

So, you must then agree that the reader must agree that this theory indeed can possibly describe moral realism.

Any theory can possibly “describe” moral realism. That it is a form of moral realism depends on if it is purporting at least the following thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism].
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism].
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].

Does it feel like or seem to be moral realism? If it bears little resemblance to moral realism, the debate is ended because you are demanding us to lose our minds and believe that black is white as a starting point.

I agree with this. Rhetorically, even if the theory is a form of moral realism, people will not be convinced if it seems counter to moral realism.

I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism.

Moral cognitivism is the metaethical theory that moral judgments are propositional, which is a required position for moral realists to take. You cannot reject moral cognitivism and be a moral realist.

1) All beliefs are in error partially because perfection is impossible (anti-cognitivism)
2) Some moral statements are possibly true because they embrace the concept of limits towards infinity as infinity. (cognitivism)

Beliefs being fallible does not entail that moral judgments are non-propositional. Saying moral judgments are propositional means that one can formulate them into statements which are truth-apt. If you reject moral cognitivism, then, for example, “one ought not torture babies for fun” is incapable of being true or false.

This ... proves ... to me ... that moral cognitivism (and anti-cognitivism both) are useless.

They are defined such that they are foils to each other and, thusly, you have to either accept one or the other (or suspend judgment): you cannot sidestep the issue by claiming they have low practical utility—even if it is true.

They are simultaneously false and true meaning they are both true and juxtaposed

That is logically impossible, because non-cognitivism is the negation of cognitivism. You are saying X and !X are both true, which is the definition of a logical contradiction.

Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.

Correct. Moral cognitivism and non-nihilism are metaethical theories which are not themselves the same as the debate about realism vs. anti-realism; rather, they are subcomponents of the moral realist thesis, and, for the sake of brevity and because I have already outlined them in full in my moral subjectivism thread, I refer the reader there. This OP is about a moral naturalist theory that presupposes moral cognitivism and non-nihilism and ventures to prove objectivism.

1) There is no such thing as a mind-independent state of affairs. That's the biggest issue.

Are you an idealist? I am a realist (ontologically), so I think that most events are mind-independent.

2) If the good is a form, that is mind-independent, in the only way I think you mean it, which means more properly stated that the GOOD does not depend on opinion or choice, but is preset, a law of the universe, then I agree, you are talking about objective morality. But you later suggest that you are NOT talking about a law of the universe making your premises unclear (entirely).

To clarify this a bit, another way of thinking about it is that the Good under this view is identical to flourishing, and flourishing is objective. The methodological approach to determining that is two-fold: (1) the analysis of acts such that they are conceptually subsumed under general categories and (2) the semantic labeling of a particular category as ‘the good’.

That is what that paragraph of mine is getting at.

3) This means you are asserting that these 'forms' which you do not define yet, are mind-independent. But you also have said in other posts that you are not referring to a law of the universe. So you are contradicting yourself and not in a good way.

That which is mind-independent is not necessarily a law. A law is a force of nature that dictates particular behaviors of objects. The action of a cup smashing to pieces is a mind-independent state-of-affairs, but it is not itself a law.

I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories.

At least those two, there could be more. Such as a neutral category.

So what precisely denotes good and what evil?

The good is flourishing, and the bad is the negation of that. In action, what is good is progressing towards The Good (i.e., flourishing) at its highest level (i.e., universal flourishing) and evil is the regression from it.

How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?

It will be whether or not the action progresses or regresses from a world with universal flourishing—i.e., the highest Good.

It is no help because you just basically gave no filter and expect that we can decide what makes something good or evil. You have not even said that there is a continuum. What relates the good to the bad?

This has nothing to do with that quote of me, which was:

For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’

I was referring to, here, is that, in simplified terms, normativity is not objective; but the good is. The good is flourishing—which is the abstract category I was referring to—and this is objective. I do grant that I need to refurbish the OP to be more clear. If it helps, then use my summary I gave a couple responses back instead of the OP itself.

In the OP, I focused too much on the methodological approach to determining what goodness is and not in clarifying the end result (of it being identical to flourishing).

And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.

The problem with that is that you argued as if I was arguing for moral subjectivism, which is not what is happening in the OP. For those tracking my threads, of which many have been, I wanted to provide clarity on how I overcame my main argument for moral non-objectivism.

Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:
Anti-P1: The way reality is currently is clearly the best example of how it should be because it's the only example we have. Guess what? That's a tautology

P1 wasn’t supposed to be incredibly elaborate: it was meant to re-iterate the syllogism from my moral subjectivism thread. The elaboration of that premise is found there.

As for your ‘anti-P1’, it doesn’t negate P1 and it isn’t tautological.

No they are not.

Better P2: Moral facts are statements about what choices should be made by any and all choosers.

We have entirely different theories of truth and, subequently, of facticity.

Facts are statements that agree with reality.
Truth is the correspondence of thought with reality.
By states-of-affairs, I do not just mean temporal processes: I also mean atemoral arrangements of entities in reality.

Moral facts are morally signified statements which agree with reality.

Moral statements are possibly true. That means they do not change.

This is a non-sequitur.

What is TF, true, false?

Sorry, that is shorthand for ‘therefore’.

By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises

C follows logically from P2 and P1.

You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist.

One can define something and in the next breath claim that something cannot exist: there’s no logical contradiction nor incoherence with that.

Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.

It is the conceit of thought, of a thinker, to think that, in thinking, all else came from thought alone

Categories are conceptual, and conceptualization is the process of subsuming things under more general concepts. I never claimed everything came into being from thoughts.

It is a ruination of 'Cogito ergo sum!'

That is not what the cogito argument means: it is not that “thinking is the one aspect of being”. It is the argument that one exists because they can think.

Bob

Quoting Bob Ross

So, you must then agree that the reader must agree that this theory indeed can possibly describe moral realism.

Any theory can possibly “describe” moral realism. That it is a form of moral realism depends on if it is purporting at least the following thesis:

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism].
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism].
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].

So, you went right back to a requirement that I do not believe in. I suppose that's a hard thing to get past. If you want to HIDE behind an academic construct instead of addressing the issue, that is not going to help. It does not matter, by the way, if you are right. The fact that even everyone but me agrees that the above is true is irrelevant.

In fairness, what you do not know about me is a lot of things. One that I am a software developer with 30+ years experience and so although I am not a philosophical logical guru, I do understand logic. I also chafe when people offer up the 'I've been a so and so for so many years' thing that I just did. I get it. Academic pursuit. But no, it isn't. Reality is academically interpreted and yet not only possessed of such considered structures. The trouble with science and academia is the same, every time, its odd constructions are considered right, until every single time, someone proves them wrong, or just not detailed enough to be useful. That's where I am at, trying to do that. And I face a true believer in the status quo, entrenched in a singular approach I know is masking the problem for him and others.

Nowhere in reality can I find and point to the tree of moral realism to verify that these 3 propositions must be true. I have to depend on you and this body of academic work that contends that these three are the right requirements. I do not. I refuse. If that makes me a caveman or a fool, I accept that danger. You have to let me know if that means I should no longer post here, because retreating (yes, it is a retreat) behind such structures is not helping anyone. But it is to be expected. My model predicts it. More on that in a bit.

It's one of those conundrums that's really sticky. Lots of moving variables and if you get even one wrong the whole thing looks like spaghetti instead of a string.

Quoting Bob Ross

Does it feel like or seem to be moral realism? If it bears little resemblance to moral realism, the debate is ended because you are demanding us to lose our minds and believe that black is white as a starting point.

I agree with this. Rhetorically, even if the theory is a form of moral realism, people will not be convinced if it seems counter to moral realism.

And I am not convinced. I am not even convinced now that moral realism matters at all if it must answer the 3 propositions. I am trying to argue for objective moral truth. That has ramifications that disagree entirely in my opinion with those three propositions as stated. It does not help at all that you keep regurgitating them back to me. I will try to address your comments about why they are necessary below.

Quoting Bob Ross

I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism.

Moral cognitivism is the metaethical theory that moral judgments are propositional, which is a required position for moral realists to take. You cannot reject moral cognitivism and be a moral realist.

Yes, I can. I just did. I do again. If that makes me incoherent, so be it. Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.

Quoting Bob Ross

1) All beliefs are in error partially because perfection is impossible (anti-cognitivism)
2) Some moral statements are possibly true because they embrace the concept of limits towards infinity as infinity. (cognitivism)

Beliefs being fallible does not entail that moral judgments are non-propositional. Saying moral judgments are propositional means that one can formulate them into statements which are truth-apt. If you reject moral cognitivism, then, for example, “one ought not torture babies for fun” is incapable of being true or false.

Well, ok, so, I think that statement is true, so, that means I must be for what you call moral cognitivism, but, the idea of anti-cognitivism is then the issue. But you for some reason did not do the redefine of that one here.

I suppose that is the one I most reject then and I am a moral cognitivist by ... someone's ... definition. Who cares is my answer. Morality is objective. I can offer arguments as to why.

I do not want to go into the deeper basis of my theory or model yet, because it is not only about morality being objective. It's about so much more, everything in the universe, indirectly. But I am one that believes effectively that there is nothing in the universe but truth and all of it is based only in morality. Indeed, morality is the reason for physical existence. I just want to get to a place where I can understand why and how anyone could argue against objective morality. So, on we go.

Quoting Bob Ross

This ... proves ... to me ... that moral cognitivism (and anti-cognitivism both) are useless.

They are defined such that they are foils to each other and, thusly, you have to either accept one or the other (or suspend judgment): you cannot sidestep the issue by claiming they have low practical utility—even if it is true.

OK, If I must decide, it does indeed seem that moral cognitivism is, within reason, acceptable. I know we will have to revisit that issue though. So, hopefully my objection is noted.

Quoting Bob Ross

They are simultaneously false and true meaning they are both true and juxtaposed

That is logically impossible, because non-cognitivism is the negation of cognitivism. You are saying X and !X are both true, which is the definition of a logical contradiction.

So, what is deemed a contradiction is often not. I understand you are saying that these are not interpreted phenomena that seem contradictory but that the negation was DERIVED from the opposite. Well, ok. But when in the history of mankind has the wording not been wrong on something? Never. I do not want to just digress into confusion either. On we go.

Quoting Bob Ross

Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.

Correct. Moral cognitivism and non-nihilism are metaethical theories which are not themselves the same as the debate about realism vs. anti-realism; rather, they are subcomponents of the moral realist thesis, and, for the sake of brevity and because I have already outlined them in full in my moral subjectivism thread, I refer the reader there. This OP is about a moral naturalist theory that presupposes moral cognitivism and non-nihilism and ventures to prove objectivism.

I can accept for now, with the objection in place.

Quoting Bob Ross

1) There is no such thing as a mind-independent state of affairs. That's the biggest issue.

Are you an idealist? I am a realist (ontologically), so I think that most events are mind-independent.

I consider myself both an idealist and a realist. So, about now you are shaking your head. Yes, I mean it. I am dedicated to balance. Balance and wisdom REQUIRE in my ethics that idealist is correct AND that pragmatism is correct at the same time. The contradiction is not there even though people erroneously believe that it is. Sounds familiar right?

Pragmatism is prone to realism, which is based in logic, yadda yadda. Idealism is based in mostly the idea of perfection, in various forms, which I am sure you are familiar with given your verbiage so far. The error of academia is that in pursuing only the realist or pragmatic path, they are almost guaranteed to fail. That is what, in my opinion, you are doing, and probably most people on this forum are doing. The paths of being and of desire (idealism) are being neglected. They do not have equal weight in your considerations. The trouble is that if truth were known, then logic would agree with my complaint. It is a 'childish' or imperfect logic that cannot find its way past this conundrum. Academia in its entirety has that flavor.

The thing is, and this is a case in point, I can argue with the academics some on their home turf and not be offended by their blindness. Most balanced types just hand wave the tediousness. Most idealists can't even do they because they lose it in the face of logic and reason. My question is to the rigorous academic, can you entertain the notion that you are merely wrong? That is to say, the structure that you are relying on to make these models is built on an incorrect base? Because that is what I will end up contending I think. If you can't and I can, I understand. You don't believe my strange tubes are cannons yet and you hide in your fort and think I don't have the holy hand-grenade.

Quoting Bob Ross

2) If the good is a form, that is mind-independent, in the only way I think you mean it, which means more properly stated that the GOOD does not depend on opinion or choice, but is preset, a law of the universe, then I agree, you are talking about objective morality. But you later suggest that you are NOT talking about a law of the universe making your premises unclear (entirely).

To clarify this a bit, another way of thinking about it is that the Good under this view is identical to flourishing, and flourishing is objective. The methodological approach to determining that is two-fold: (1) the analysis of acts such that they are conceptually subsumed under general categories and (2) the semantic labeling of a particular category as ‘the good’.

And this is a retreat to jargon again.

No

If you think that flourishing can be defined by two different cultures, and that either one could be correct, you are not what I call a moral objectivist. It is required by my belief model that neither can be correct. That is not relevant either. Truth is not at all related to anything but perfection. Moral objectivity is truth to me. No one can be perfect and knowing is the understanding or aware part of perfection. So, that is why knowing is not possible. The fact that virtues like knowing or being accurate are not perfectly possible to us is fine and it actually proves or is evidence for objective morality. The math of this phenomenon which is demonstrable within reality can be represented by the limiting force. That means it is a limit as intent approaches perfection, and asymptotic. There can be no belief strong enough to arrive at perfection in intent. When we see this effect in reality, we know we are near to truth, yet cannot arrive.

Your flourishing example is terrible and cannot be used. That is because either the intent is to the aim of the perfect good or it is abject failure. So, despite the fact that two differing cultures have nuances of that definition that they are both aiming at and succeeding in, flourishing by your (subjective) definition, the fact that they answer the objective progress towards what is my objective GOOD is not finally relevant. Progress is fine, sure. But both are still errors. They are not perfect. So we cannot be objective in intent. We can only try to be objective in intent.

Further, since there is an objective truth about flourishing, that objective truth is the ONLY real truth, the perfection of that concept. Everything else is just an error. But between the two sub-cultures one error is always objectively closer to the perfect aim by intent. This is relative morality (not subjective). It allows us to possibly use judgement. We can say this or that belief is better or worse than the other. With your way, it is my assertion that because you say, I think, that they are both objectively flourishing despite their possible amazingly different aims, you are saying they can be equally moral. They cannot. It is impossible. If you believe they can that is what I call subjective morality or moral subjectivism. That is in fact the definition of it.

For me all that is necessary for moral objectivism are these propositions:
1) Morality is objective and represented by a perfect intent, which is unique.
2) Moral perfection is all truth at once. Nothing that is possible is left out.
3) Between any two beliefs, one is always better than the other, because it is intended along a vector more proximal to objective moral truth.

Now the thing is these propositions are not academic. I am not schooled in how to craft them. I almost want to thank the fates that that is true. I see the closed mindedness that is prevalent when realism and structure, order, is too highly favored over chaos and balance. It is not pretty and those rocky walls will fall even if they are sorcerously smooth like Orthanc. Truth has better cannon than that.

Quoting Bob Ross

3) This means you are asserting that these 'forms' which you do not define yet, are mind-independent. But you also have said in other posts that you are not referring to a law of the universe. So you are contradicting yourself and not in a good way.

That which is mind-independent is not necessarily a law. A law is a force of nature that dictates particular behaviors of objects. The action of a cup smashing to pieces is a mind-independent state-of-affairs, but it is not itself a law.

You say it is not a law and that is not relevant at all. It depends entirely on law. Everything does. There is nothing in the universe but truth, and that is what philosophy is about discovering. We do not create truth. We can only discover it. If we make something, it is flawed. Same argument I used before. Perfection is a limit and we cannot arrive, only intend to make progress towards it by aiming directly at it the best we can.

But, again, as mentioned, and still not addressed, there is no such thing as mind independent. You did not confirm my refinement of that. You refuted it. So we have no common ground yet in shared understanding. We do have common ground in reality. So one of us is more correct and one less.

Mind is ubiquitous. Every iota of this universe contains it. There is no state for which there is not a mind component. That component is not zero, ever. The seed of our human mind is in inorganic matter. The fact that science does not yet understand this is irrelevant. The fact that an academic can go on and on about mind-independent states when they cannot exist is ... terrifying.

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality, it is ubiquitous and there is no mind-independent state. It is ironic in the extreme that the realist, taking the path of the mind to truth, suggests almost comically that there is such a thing as a mind-independent state. It's ludicrous from my perspective.

I still think you mean that there seems to be a respectable barrier between one mind and another. I think that is what you mean. Please confirm what you mean. I need some term or understanding I can follow. our minds are NOT actually separate from one another. We are just currently unable to muster the will or connection because it is too hard for us. We are not in a state of being that facilitates this awareness enough. We are making progress towards that state. But these many failures do not deny my assertion. The reality though DOES deny your assertion of any mind-independent state, despite the seeming support of the current limit of our being. The seed of any mind, of all minds, was present as a law of the universe at the start of time and will always be so. It is the only way mind could emerge and be deluded enough to consider itself laughably separate.

Quoting Bob Ross

I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories.

At least those two, there could be more. Such as a neutral category.

Holy lack of clarity batman! Pow! Ok! Well, I think you should state the list of categories and also mention that they are a single value on a sliding scale if they are. Because these things are all different conceptually, yes?

But, no, I deny it. As soon as you went there I was like, nope. I was ready for that. My model shows and for now this is unsupported entirely, that there is no such thing as a balance between good and evil. This also speaks directly to your (what I would call incoherent) ideas on flourishing. Good is only in a singular direction. If two things, aims, intents, disagree; then one is objectively better than the other, always. This means there is no way to balance good and evil for the good. The only way is not a balance at all. Its all one way. That is in fact the meaning of objective. Perfection itself as a concept is synonymous with objective.

There is a balance amid the progress towards the good that is helpful. But it is not good and evil. It is order and chaos. And I will go ahead and say clearly, the path of logic and reason is only the path of order. The path of idealism is the path of chaos. And balance is the third way, neutral with respect to those two only. But the evil and good bit is not a balance at all. It's one way only. That confusion, of a possible balance between good and evil is rampant in moral subjectivism. It has no merit.

Quoting Bob Ross

So what precisely denotes good and what evil?

The good is flourishing, and the bad is the negation of that. In action, what is good is progressing towards The Good (i.e., flourishing) at its highest level (i.e., universal flourishing) and evil is the regression from it.

This can only be true if all definitions of flourishing are perfect, e.g. precisely the same. That is not to say that progressing towards what someone erroneously considers as good is acceptable. No, that that they consider as good must itself also be exactly the same. Otherwise, flourishing is not good. And perfection is quite demanding, I assure you.

So, I still think your flourishing maze of reasoning is wrong, unless you clarify it.

Quoting Bob Ross

How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?

It will be whether or not the action progresses or regresses from a world with universal flourishing—i.e., the highest Good.

Yes, as long as the 'highest' Good, and I already warned you about the term 'highest', is the same for everyone. No two people can differ on what flourishing is, because that is subjective morality.

Quoting Bob Ross

It is no help because you just basically gave no filter and expect that we can decide what makes something good or evil. You have not even said that there is a continuum. What relates the good to the bad?

This has nothing to do with that quote of me, which was:

For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’

This is classic jargon and obfuscates understanding. It does not help in understanding.
There is no such thing as mind-independent.
Abstraction is caused by the virtual nature of perfection only. This is the limiting issue mentioned earlier. It is called virtual in honor of the virtues which have that quality. Each is perfect and an unattainable ideal only. Yet and still, the sum of all virtues combined is a perfection of perfections. It was always singular, but that is a way to say it to facilitate understanding.

There is in fact a mind-dependent state of affairs (objective morality) that makes it absolutely true that one ought not to torture babies. It must depend on mind, because everything amid truth does. The term torture includes the negative intent to me, so, it's evil by definition. The whole situation gets much more dicey if you said instead 'cause suffering' for 'torture'. As examples and conundrums go, that is vastly superior to yours. That is because the wise should indeed inflict suffering on the unwise to facilitate their earning wisdom. And then we should be led to speak about such a concept as, 'is harm really harm, as long as it is necessary suffering only?' THAT is a much better set of arguments and such. The term torture is too evil committed.

Quoting Bob Ross

I was referring to, here, is that, in simplified terms, normativity is not objective; but the good is. The good is flourishing—which is the abstract category I was referring to—and this is objective. I do grant that I need to refurbish the OP to be more clear. If it helps, then use my summary I gave a couple responses back instead of the OP itself.

Well, I think you should realize by now what my issue with flourishing is. It does not work as an example for the reasons I have stated many times now. You have not addressed my concerns in that sense. You are still just repeating it. I do not know what else to do to get you to address it.

Quoting Bob Ross

In the OP, I focused too much on the methodological approach to determining what goodness is and not in clarifying the end result (of it being identical to flourishing).

Which it isn't. Your flourishing is not the good as described. That is unless no two people can differ in any way on precisely the details of what flourishing is, not the fact that they are making progress towards their goals. That can be progress towards evil. It can be evil for one and less evil for another making the latter more objectively moral in their intents. Is that agreed?

Quoting Bob Ross

And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.

The problem with that is that you argued as if I was arguing for moral subjectivism, which is not what is happening in the OP. For those tracking my threads, of which many have been, I wanted to provide clarity on how I overcame my main argument for moral non-objectivism.[/.quote]
We are past that.

[quote="Bob Ross;876496"]Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:
Anti-P1: The way reality is currently is clearly the best example of how it should be because it's the only example we have. Guess what? That's a tautology

P1 wasn’t supposed to be incredibly elaborate: it was meant to re-iterate the syllogism from my moral subjectivism thread. The elaboration of that premise is found there.

As for your ‘anti-P1’, it doesn’t negate P1 and it isn’t tautological.

This is classic you so far. You just state these things and do not say why. That means I ignore you. I say it does negate P1 and it is tautological and round and round we go until you deign to explain WHY.

Quoting Bob Ross

No they are not.

Better P2: Moral facts are statements about what choices should be made by any and all choosers.

We have entirely different theories of truth and, subequently, of facticity.

Yes, but, the twain shall meet. We are both within reality. One of us is onto a better set of assertions and beliefs. This is collaborative. But explanation is needed. If you just assume the work without showing it, we all lose. I admit I am trying to learn here. Are you?

Quoting Bob Ross

Facts are statements that agree with reality.

They are not. They never do. They cannot.
Perfection is unattainable. Any lack of agreement is lack of perfection. No fact has ever agreed with reality. They only SEEM, SEEM, SEEM to agree with reality. It's always a delusion.

The mind path to truth is always delusional. It must be balanced by the other two paths, chaos and balance, in order to attain perfection.

A fact properly defined is only a belief that a chooser has decided is supported enough with evidence to deem it true. Each chooser is a local authority. Facts sadly often bear little in common with reality or truth.

Quoting Bob Ross

Truth is the correspondence of thought with reality.

Said like a mind path only advocate for sure.

No

Truth is objective and dependent of mind, yes, in all cases, but just as dependent of chaos and balance.

Truth is unknowable, unattainable, and unchanging.
It can be approached, in thought, in being, in will. That is good, to do so. The degree of miss to that perfect approach is the degree of evil, which is only properly defined as less good.

Quoting Bob Ross

By states-of-affairs, I do not just mean temporal processes: I also mean atemoral arrangements of entities in reality.

I know that. I agree.

States are possibly three kinds:
Being state
Thought state
Intent/will state

There are no other states. These three states combine to form the state.

Quoting Bob Ross

Moral facts are morally signified statements which agree with reality.

There are no other facts apart from moral.
Morality encompasses everything. Nothing is devoid of meaning. Everything is only meaning. That is non-Nihilism, to me.

But no, as mentioned, facts are all errors. So they never agree with reality. That makes your last statement false.

Better to say:
Moral statements agree with truth. Reality is only truth. All else is delusion.

We swim in a sea of delusion supported by free will. Only morality is true. Only morality is objective.

Quoting Bob Ross

Moral statements are possibly true. That means they do not change.

This is a non-sequitur.

Why? You should not just say that and not explain.

What I meant was that if truth does not change and a moral statement is made and is accurate to describe truth, then there is no reason to change that moral statement. And if you do, it becomes false.

Quoting Bob Ross

What is TF, true, false?

Sorry, that is shorthand for ‘therefore’.

By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises

C follows logically from P2 and P1.
You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist.

One can define something and in the next breath claim that something cannot exist: there’s no logical contradiction nor incoherence with that.

I disagree. There is no way to define something that does not exist. To try is insane.

The concept is perhaps approached only when defining 'nothing'. That one is really hard. But when you defined nothing you do run up against the truth of my assertion and not yours. Defining something that does not exist is worse than useless. Its insane. It has no relevance. It cannot be proved, disproved, or meaningfully discussed. It's just confusion.

Quoting Bob Ross

Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.

It is the conceit of thought, of a thinker, to think that, in thinking, all else came from thought alone

Categories are conceptual, and conceptualization is the process of subsuming things under more general concepts. I never claimed everything came into being from thoughts.

Interesting. I do claim that everything comes into being from thoughts. But being is another path, just like intent and will is. The structure and order is thought.

Quoting Bob Ross

It is a ruination of 'Cogito ergo sum!'

That is not what the cogito argument means: it is not that “thinking is the one aspect of being”. It is the argument that one exists because they can think.

Bob

The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:

I am because I think.
I am because I intend.
I intend because I think.
I intend because I am.
I think because I intend.

This set of statements encircles all the possible equivalent statements at that level. Without these statements the understanding is less than best. It highlights the think side only, a problem I detect amid most of academia.

It's compelling, tempting, and entirely wrong to pursue truth only through thought. It is fast, better in every way, more alive, to use all three paths. We cannot avoid finally using all three paths, but that is not the issue. The issue is stress or priority. In prioritizing thinking over being or intent/will/passion; we will fail more often and in very patterned ways. The failure of the mind path is cowardice.

Sincere good luck @Bob Ross

Quoting Chet Hawkins

Morality is objective.

What does this mean if not "some moral propositions are objectively true"?

Quoting Michael

Morality is objective.
— Chet Hawkins

What does this mean if not "some moral propositions are objectively true"?

I mean, I agree.

I am only in this thread like ... for ... moral objectivity. But if there is something called moral realism that is different for glossy technical reasons, I am trying to understand so that I can either agree or disagree there.

The moral cognitivism issue was one I either just misunderstood or disagree with parts of it.

I guess then the clarity I think I am trying to obtain for myself and maybe others, is, ...
1) Morality is objective (all that assertion may not be to assert moral realism)
2) Once that happens, I have more to say, as in, how was this concept obtained? How can it be derived from reality? Why is it that this is the case, and of course then, had to be the case?

Quoting Chet Hawkins

I mean, I agree.

If some moral propositions are objectively true then:

a) moral propositions are truth-apt and b) some moral propositions are true.

Quoting Chet Hawkins

I am only in this thread like ... for ... moral objectivity. But if there is something called moral realism that is different for glossy technical reasons, I am trying to understand so that I can either agree or disagree there.

It's useful to separate a moral theory out into its constituent parts. There are, roughly speaking, three considerations when discussing meta ethics:

1. Are moral propositions truth-apt?
2. If moral propositions are truth-apt then are any true?
3. If there are true moral propositions then are they objectively true?

We can set out these three considerations as affirmative claims that are then either accepted or rejected:

a) Moral propositions are truth-apt
b) Some moral propositions are true
c) Some moral propositions are objectively true.

(c) entails (b) entails (a).

If you reject (a) then you are a moral non-cognitivist. If you reject (b) then you are an error theorist. If you reject (c) then you are a non-objectivist.

Some say that you must accept (c) to be a realist, others say that you need only accept (b) to be a realist, and that to accept (c) is to be a "robust" realist.

Although I wouldn't get too caught up in labels, they're just pragmatic tools with no real philosophical significance. What matters is whether or not (a), (b), and (c) are true.

Reply to Chet Hawkins

In terms of “hiding” behind moral realism, it cannot be hiding if the OP is an exposition of a moral realist theory. If you have disputes with moral realism, or the underlying framework within metaethics, then we can discuss that.

He seem to use the terms ‘objective’ and ‘truth’ very differently than me and the contemporary literature, which is fine; but I need more clarity from you on what you mean by them. I have already explained what I mean by them.

Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.

By something being ‘objective’, are you just meaning that it is ‘immutable’?

Who cares is my answer. Morality is objective. I can offer arguments as to why.

The purpose of this thread is to discuss the view outlined in the OP, not your ethical theory insofar as it doesn’t relate thereto. My position is a form of moral realism, and a part that is the affirmation of moral cognitivism. Are you a moral cognitivist or non-cognitivist?

I consider myself both an idealist and a realist

By ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, I was referring to metaphysical, specifically ontological, outlooks—not whether or not you like following ideals. Idealism, traditionally, is the position that reality is fundamentally made up of minds, and realism is the view that it is fundamentally made up of mind-independent parts.

I was thinking perhaps you are an idealist, and that would explain why you seem to think that nothing in reality is mind-independent.

If you think that flourishing can be defined by two different cultures, and that either one could be correct, you are not what I call a moral objectivist.

It cannot be defined by two different cultures in the sense that they are both correct about what flourishing is while simultaneously having contradictory accounts. There is only one way there is to be flourishing.

Moral objectivity is truth to me

So this would entail that what is true is equivocal to what is moral, which seems very implausible. If it is true that Gary raped that woman, then is it thereby moral? Of course not. If it is true that 1+1=2, then is it moral? Of course not.

Truth is correspondence of reality, or perhaps the whole, or what is, but certainly not equivalent to what is moral.

Your flourishing example is terrible and cannot be used. That is because either the intent is to the aim of the perfect good or it is abject failure

You are importing your own views and then simply demonstrating mine are incompatible with them; instead of analyzing my position on its own merits. This ‘perfectness’ being ‘goodness’ doesn’t exist in my theory: should it? I don’t think so.

1) Morality is objective and represented by a perfect intent, which is unique.

I don’t know why morality is ‘represented by a perfect intent’, or what that means.

2) Moral perfection is all truth at once. Nothing that is possible is left out.

Again, this just equivocates truth with morality.

3) Between any two beliefs, one is always better than the other, because it is intended along a vector more proximal to objective moral truth.

Why would this be a part of the thesis?

There is no state for which there is not a mind component. That component is not zero, ever. The seed of our human mind is in inorganic matter. The fact that science does not yet understand this is irrelevant.

Hence why I thought you may be an idealist. Anyways, you are confusing ontology with epistemology: our knowledge of the world is always mind dependent, but that does not entail that what fundamentally exists is mind-dependent.

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them.

Ok, so you are an idealist.

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality

That is a flat-out contradiction. You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is.

I still think you mean that there seems to be a respectable barrier between one mind and another. I think that is what you mean. Please confirm what you mean. I need some term or understanding I can follow. our minds are NOT actually separate from one another.

I mean that it seems as though, and we have good reasons to believe that, our minds are emergent from mind-independent parts and that the universe is fundamentally mind-independent.

The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:

I am because I think.
I am because I intend.
I intend because I think.
I intend because I am.
I think because I intend.

This set of statements encircles all the possible equivalent statements at that level. Without these statements the understanding is less than best. It highlights the think side only, a problem I detect amid most of academia.

It's compelling, tempting, and entirely wrong to pursue truth only through thought.

I never was, nor will I be, arguing for the cogito argument. I don’t see the relevance of this to my moral realist position. I do not hold cogito ergo sum: I don’t buy the descartes argument for it. ‘I’ do not exist simply because something thinks.

For the sake of brevity, I am going to stop there for now; and see if that helps.

Bob

Reply to AmadeusD

:wink:

Quoting Bob Ross

You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is.

FWIW, I think he's attempting to make 'consciousness' and 'mind' two different things. I guess I don't flatly reject that, but i have a feeling he doens't quite know what he's saying and you're right to call it out.

Quoting Bob Ross

In terms of “hiding” behind moral realism, it cannot be hiding if the OP is an exposition of a moral realist theory. If you have disputes with moral realism, or the underlying framework within metaethics, then we can discuss that.

Well, perhaps I need to detail more of my model, but, I agree that this is kind of derailing this thread because of the way everyone, including me of course, is choosing to discuss it. I am a free form theorist, but I can learn this way, I think; assuming it's not just repugnant once I do get more of it. For now I think I'll read more of what others say here on these forums and digest it. Maybe I can. Who knows.

I am certainly not here only to annoy you, which is all I seem to be accomplishing now.

Quoting Bob Ross

He seem to use the terms ‘objective’ and ‘truth’ very differently than me and the contemporary literature, which is fine; but I need more clarity from you on what you mean by them. I have already explained what I mean by them.

Well, If I explain more of my model it would help. But I surmise that it would be rejected from start to finish here, although I think its way more useful to people in its verbiage and formulation than what I seem to need to do and say here to interact with you successfully.

I had hoped that interaction with lay and professional philosophers or logicians would be less problematic, that my rather unorthodox approach would be more what was missing perhaps, a theme that follows me wherever I go in life. So, far that is not the case.

Truth to me is all that is objective, the summation of it. It of course does not change. It is pointless to call anything that can change truth. You may make a truth statement about something in a state and that statement is true. It is not especially wonderful or meaningful to me. It's just as cool as saying, it's hot, or it's cold. Who cares? I mean I know people care about temp and I do to. That's not what I mean. Useful truth is only about laws of the universe that never change. Effectively, there are no other truths. There are only states. The laws of truth govern the state changes. So, that's truth.

Objective is the nature of truth, unchanging, eternal, conceptual. Only truth can be objective. If something can change, it is a state. Truth statements about states are less useful than truth statements about objective laws of the universe. So, that's objective.

That's a short sweet and easy to understand synopsis of the system. There is a lot more detail, but that is the highest level, the monad.

Quoting Bob Ross

Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.

By something being ‘objective’, are you just meaning that it is ‘immutable’?

Well, no. It does not change. So, to me you can also say, TF it is a law of the universe. It is truth or part of truth. And there are many such laws. But one can also say 'Morality is truth' or 'Morality is objective' or 'Objective morality is a law of the universe'. The 'rules' of morality do not change. Opinion is only error. Choice always contains error. Belief always contains error. Fact is just a certain type of belief, so, facts always contain error.

Quoting Bob Ross

Who cares is my answer. Morality is objective. I can offer arguments as to why.

The purpose of this thread is to discuss the view outlined in the OP, not your ethical theory insofar as it doesn’t relate thereto.

That makes no sense to me at all. It's like you started talking about microscopic portions of the wall and their dimensions and such, but I am not allowed to discuss that same wall my way. It's ridiculous to me. Of course all opinions about the wall should be entertained when speaking about the wall. I mean moral objectivism is indeed what we are both talking about, just two apparently quite different models of that same thing. I do not mind leaping into such a discussion and saying, no, that's not what 'red' means to me. Here is what it means to me. I will tell you why and how I support my belief. I will not just say, 'Hey we are only discussing this way to moral objectivism.' I suppose if that is how it is, I need a new thread of my own.

That's what I tried to do with the first post on happiness and was told that moral objectivism was being discussed here. Apologies if that is also wrong. It seems I have nowhere to be me.

Quoting Bob Ross

My position is a form of moral realism, and a part that is the affirmation of moral cognitivism. Are you a moral cognitivist or non-cognitivist?

As discussed already in great detail I suppose I would have to be a cognitivist.

Quoting Bob Ross

I consider myself both an idealist and a realist

By ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, I was referring to metaphysical, specifically ontological, outlooks—not whether or not you like following ideals. Idealism, traditionally, is the position that reality is fundamentally made up of minds, and realism is the view that it is fundamentally made up of mind-independent parts.

Well then tradition is not so useful to me. I'm more fluid.

To me there is the path of mind. That path is also the path of a single emotion, fear. Fear is entirely responsible for realism, Pragmatism, and what might be referred to as the limiting force amid moral objectivism.

Quoting Bob Ross

I was thinking perhaps you are an idealist, and that would explain why you seem to think that nothing in reality is mind-independent.

Everything in reality, all iota of matter and even dreams, all of it, yes, everything, partakes of fear. It cannot avoid it. It is objectively true. It is a law of the universe. But, yeah, assuming there is interest, I need another thread to discuss it it seems.

Quoting Bob Ross

If you think that flourishing can be defined by two different cultures, and that either one could be correct, you are not what I call a moral objectivist.

It cannot be defined by two different cultures in the sense that they are both correct about what flourishing is while simultaneously having contradictory accounts. There is only one way there is to be flourishing.

Ah, then we agree. Perfection is singular.

Quoting Bob Ross

Moral objectivity is truth to me

So this would entail that what is true is equivocal to what is moral, which seems very implausible.

No, because you will now go off into state changes that do not matter to truth at all.

Free will allows for errors in choice and state. One cannot be moral. One can only TRY to be moral. To be moral would be to be perfect. It cannot happen. When it happens I am guessing that would 'end' the universe in all dimensions we are capable of discussing.

Quoting Bob Ross

If it is true that Gary raped that woman, then is it thereby moral? Of course not. If it is true that 1+1=2, then is it moral? Of course not.

Again, truth does not apply to states. I would even use another word and clear up logic itself on that basis. A true state is a goofy thing to say/discuss. States can change.

If this model is correct, it accurately describes reality. I contend that it does. I have of course only put fear here in very low detail. And there are chapters of this treatment that flow into every aspect of reality.

Quoting Bob Ross

Truth is correspondence of reality, or perhaps the whole, or what is, but certainly not equivalent to what is moral.

Yes it is, to me. To me there is nothing but morality in the universe and that is synonymous with truth, or God, or Love; choose your delusion.

And note the word certainly there in your verbiage in light of my fear treatment above. It can become quite telling if you know what to look for. There is no certainty.

Quoting Bob Ross

Your flourishing example is terrible and cannot be used. That is because either the intent is to the aim of the perfect good or it is abject failure

You are importing your own views and then simply demonstrating mine are incompatible with them; instead of analyzing my position on its own merits. This ‘perfectness’ being ‘goodness’ doesn’t exist in my theory: should it? I don’t think so.

Yes, I agree. I am discussing objective morality as I understand and believe it to be. But that should be useful to you. If I have even some shred of a point, at all, you can use my model and assertions to fuel thought and discussion on yours. Clearly I was confused at the examples you gave and admittedly I thought you were on the track of subjective morality and then what you were saying sounded like objective morality.

If you build a tight model, I mean, you can make it, but does it really answer to reality? How can you judge two different models, then? How do you compare one to the other? Is intuition involved at all?

Quoting Bob Ross

1) Morality is objective and represented by a perfect intent, which is unique.

I don’t know why morality is ‘represented by a perfect intent’, or what that means.

Well it's not hard to imagine, is it?

Assume there are 16 discreet virtues for example. And assume there is a harmonic amid choice for each of these. There is a perfect vibration to choice for each virtue separately and then if you get all 16 perfect at the same time, you have a single perfect choice, the entire and only purpose of the universe. Does the universe end? Probably! Its conjecture of course, but that's the general idea.

Quoting Bob Ross

2) Moral perfection is all truth at once. Nothing that is possible is left out.

Again, this just equivocates truth with morality.

And again, that is precisely correct. I assert that is true. They are the same thing.

Quoting Bob Ross

3) Between any two beliefs, one is always better than the other, because it is intended along a vector more proximal to objective moral truth.

Why would this be a part of the thesis?

We need as choosers, as moral agents, some capacity to judge the error level of a choice or state. Due to the nature of the limiting force and the seeming impossibility of perfection, this 3rd contention becomes true and interesting. It means if we have a morality meter no two choices or beliefs could ever be precisely equal in moral value, goodness value. This all depends on, you guessed it, moral objectivism.

Quoting Bob Ross

There is no state for which there is not a mind component. That component is not zero, ever. The seed of our human mind is in inorganic matter. The fact that science does not yet understand this is irrelevant.

Hence why I thought you may be an idealist. Anyways, you are confusing ontology with epistemology: our knowledge of the world is always mind dependent, but that does not entail that what fundamentally exists is mind-dependent.

The physical reality we think we know, is not known. It is delusion. It is just emotion, just consciousness. The model I am getting to is a theoretical 'proof' for this truth.

Quoting Bob Ross

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them.

Ok, so you are an idealist.

Not in my model, I am not.

Idealism is just as much of an error, a moral error, as Pragmatism is. Only wisdom is the right path. Wisdom is the middle path between these two, combining the order of Pragmatism and fear with the chaos of Idealism and desire.

Quoting Bob Ross

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality

That is a flat-out contradiction. You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is.

I agree. That is only because I am not saying it quite right. But, unlike logicians I am more comfortable with that. So, I need your help actually.

I want to learn how to say it right, if that is possible.

Quoting Bob Ross

I still think you mean that there seems to be a respectable barrier between one mind and another. I think that is what you mean. Please confirm what you mean. I need some term or understanding I can follow. our minds are NOT actually separate from one another.

I mean that it seems as though, and we have good reasons to believe that, our minds are emergent from mind-independent parts and that the universe is fundamentally mind-independent.

And of course, I disagree entirely. I would say there is precious little reason, the limit as x approaches none, to suspect that. It is in fact a horrid suspicion, and groundless. It is much more likely that all seeds of emotive capacity were part of natural law. We only see discrete breakpoints because we are still deeply deluded. We do not have enough awareness yet. We are going there.

Quoting Bob Ross

The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:

I am because I think.
I am because I intend.
I intend because I think.
I intend because I am.
I think because I intend.

This set of statements encircles all the possible equivalent statements at that level. Without these statements the understanding is less than best. It highlights the think side only, a problem I detect amid most of academia.

It's compelling, tempting, and entirely wrong to pursue truth only through thought.

I never was, nor will I be, arguing for the cogito argument. I don’t see the relevance of this to my moral realist position. I do not hold cogito ergo sum: I don’t buy the descartes argument for it. ‘I’ do not exist simply because something thinks.

Whereas Descartes fits my model well and indeed my model would allude to the other statements I made as equivalent and necessary as a full closed set.

I would also say that to think without existing is entirely incoherent. Why would you try to defend that? Yes, something exists because it can think. Any I that thinks, must exist.

Quoting Bob Ross

For the sake of brevity, I am going to stop there for now; and see if that helps.

I mean, I think I get you. I am not at all sure you get me. I would like to discuss the whole topic of objective morality.

I tried to trim this down after the fact. It was like 3-4 times larger before. Hopefully its still succinct and coherent.

Quoting Michael

a) Moral propositions are truth-apt
b) Some moral propositions are true
c) Some moral propositions are objectively true.

(c) entails (b) entails (a).

If you reject (a) then you are a moral non-cognitivist. If you reject (b) then you are an error theorist. If you reject (c) then you are a non-objectivist.

Some say that you must accept (c) to be a realist, others say that you need only accept (b) to be a realist, and that to accept (c) is to be a "robust" realist.

Although I wouldn't get too caught up in labels, they're just pragmatic tools with no real philosophical significance. What matters is whether or not (a), (b), and (c) are true.

Well. ok, yes.

Clearly by these descriptors I am a moral objectivist.
But I am interesting in the gray area that arises when people do not pay attention to details, and yet often enough people think improperly that I am the one missing the details.

That is to say, states cannot be true, meaningfully. They are too transitional.

That is also to say what a person 'is', is not finally good or evil. They actions and intents are done on a choice already made. This means that the choice CAN be determined as good or evil, assuming one also believes morality itself expresses good and anything else is evil.

Evil is in fact merely a lack of perfection. All aspects of reality partake in some degree of evil as expressed. That is every state of every thing and every being in the universe. It's unavoidable. It's true.

So, one cannot discuss things like killing babies as making one evil. They are evil choices only.

---

Why do I bother making such distinctions? Why indeed is it typical for people of all cultures to entertain these notions? Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt?

It is only the nature of existence itself, a law of the universe, which we refer to as morality, that causes this tendency, just like gravity. Morality is another law of nature. It is no more ephemeral nor less compelling than that.

Gravity itself actually is morality in action. All laws of nature are only morality. There is nothing happening but morality.

Gravity is a pull one experiences towards mass. The greater the mass, the more the pulls. Literally, this yields a compelling moral proposition which is the basis of the physics:

'What matters, will draw you to it, and that is morally correct.'

Then we would be tempted by delusion and foolishness (immorality) to say things like,

'Yeah ok, wise guy, let the black hole pull you in.' or
'I feel my porn, calling to me. It must matter and be moral.'

But these do not deny the truth of the first statement. What happens is, other virtues are involved and they split the need for choice, bend it, in another direction.

Loosely,
'Matter that expresses higher moral agency, matters more, at this time, but not finally.'
and
'Some patterns are self-destructive. Fear must rise to balance desire in these cases.'

Morality is the hardest thing there is to understand. It is only worth understanding at all because:

Morality does not change. It is objective.

An interesting possible corollary proposition:
'It is not important to understand any state or being. It is only important to understand morality.'

Quoting Chet Hawkins

Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt?

Moral non-cognitivists will say that a sentence such as "this is wrong" actually means something like "don't do this", and that the sentence "don't do this" isn't truth-apt.

Quoting Chet Hawkins

Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt?

Why does the monkey throw the cucumber, if the researcher is not a bad person?

Reply to wonderer1
Ha ha! The researcher is not a bad person. But the researcher is BEING a bad person currently.

They have a monkey trapped in a cage, for heaven's sake. That's just horrid, almost no matter the reason. And then they are experimenting on it by feeding its buddy better food or more desired food. That is not exactly a moral aim.

I mean I know they rationalize that they are learning behavioral things by doing this in a 'controlled' way, but I don't think you can escape it being fairly wrong.

Choices, of course, not people, are possibly bad or evil or immoral, use your favorite term.

Quoting Michael

Moral non-cognitivists will say that a sentence such as "this is wrong" actually means something like "don't do this", and that the sentence "don't do this" isn't truth-apt.

Well, I would say instead to be more clear:
is morally wrong according to what can be guessed about objective moral truth.
That means will objective contribute less to happiness than which is more in alignment with objective moral truth.
And then I have to be vague here because you were, but, then you would state the moral proposition for review.

Of course, we all can contend different and immoral things and we do all the time. And people are not even aware of how to judge these actions because they are not deep thinkers or deep feelers and they exist in a pool of easy prosperity and are mostly only concerned with shallow consequences like a giddy high, rather than genuine happiness. But leave that same person on a desert island for a year with 10 other people and it's probably the best thing that ever happened to them, if they live.

Quoting Chet Hawkins

Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt?

Possibly because moral propositional statements can have a predictable effect on people, and this predictability is useful somehow.

Quoting Banno

Isn't that the very nature of ethics? How we ought treat others?

Not necessarily. In theistic systems, morality/ethics is primarily about the relationship between God and man, and it's only about how we ought to treat others in the sense that this reflects on our relationship to God.



Quoting Michael

That's why I said if there's no Arabic word that means the same thing as 'moral' then they might not have a conception of good.

Google translates ?????? as "moral", "ethical". What is the basis of this translation?

Quoting baker

Google translates ?????? as "moral", "ethical". What is the basis of this translation?

The argument the other person made was that the meaning of a word is determined by the things it is used to describe.

The things Arabic speakers describe using the word “ ??????” often aren’t the things English speakers describe using the word “moral”.

Therefore if we accept the other person’s reasoning then the words “??????” and “moral” don’t mean the same thing.

If the words “ ??????” and “moral” do mean the same thing then the other person’s reasoning is wrong, and the meaning of a word is not determined by the things it is used to describe.

Quoting Michael

If the words “ ??????” and “moral” do mean the same thing then the other person’s reasoning is wrong, and the meaning of a word is not determined by the things it is used to describe.

Or else, some people are using the words "moral" or "??????" wrongly.

Quoting baker

In theistic systems

Part of why theistic systems are muddled.

Quoting baker

Possibly because moral propositional statements can have a predictable effect on people, and this predictability is useful somehow.

'useful' might be a virtue, something between achievement and accuracy. But, this is a problem with all virtues. There are 'uses' that are towards evil ends. So, how do we account for that?

We have to add in all other virtues to see the effect it has on the aim. So, saying usefulness is not in and of itself sufficient. We need some other descriptor that means 'good' use. Just so.

So, if you say then that the aim is good amid being useful, and the predictable effect is also good, then that shows alignment with objective morality. If, however, something is useful and not good, then it really was not ever accurately useful in the first place, if you follow. The real term useful must include only that which is useful for good.

Quoting baker

Or else, some people are using the words "moral" or "??????" wrongly.

What determines the right way? Is it how most speakers of the language use the word? If the vast majority of Arabic speakers use the word "??????" to describe acts which are condoned by the Quran, and if the meaning of a word is determined by the things most speakers of the language use it to describe, then it would seem to follow that being condoned by the Quran is part of the meaning of the word "??????".

Quoting Chet Hawkins

Ha ha! The researcher is not a bad person. But the researcher is BEING a bad person currently.

So perhaps the monkey's behavior arises from evolved instincts conducive to training conspecifics not to be bad persons?

Quoting Chet Hawkins

Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt?

Could the answer to your question be, "Because we share instincts, to some degree, with our capuchin cousins?"

Reply to Chet Hawkins

Firstly, I want to disclaim that you are NOT aggravating me nor am I frustrated with you; and I apologize if my responses are giving you that impression. I have nothing but respect and admiration for anyone who is willing to genuinely discuss difficult topics with sincerity, an open-mind, and a respectful attitude. Even if we end up completely disagreeing on everything, I respect your endeavor to think more about these topics (:

With that being said, your responses are just typically very long, and seem divergent (in terms of the topics being brought up) and I personally have difficulty keeping track. Perhaps it is just an issue on my end, who knows!

In terms of your ethical theory, I would suggest that, if you want people to contend with it properly, you open a discussion board for that. I am more than happy to respond to whatever about your theory has relevance to my theory, but beyond that it just becomes pure derailment. If you create a thread for your theory, I will be more than happy to talk about it in full detail there.

In terms of your theory of truth, what is ‘truth’ to you? Is it ‘the whole of reality’? Is it ‘what is’? Is it ‘the correspondence of thought with reality’? Etc.

You say “truth to me is all that is objective”: I think everything that exists mind-independently is objective.

Likewise, it seems like you are associated immutability with truth, and I am not sure what you are exactly implying there: are you saying that, to you, truth is an existent object out there that is unchanging? Or just that truth is absolute?

By something being ‘objective’, are you just meaning that it is ‘immutable’? — Bob Ross
Well, no. It does not change. So, to me you can also say, TF it is a law of the universe. It is truth or part of truth. And there are many such laws

If “Truth to me is all that is objective, “ and “Objective is the nature of truth, unchanging, eternal, conceptual.” then it incoherent for you to claim that objectivity has the property of immutability—unless you are just mentioning that it doesn’t just have that property with this response (quoted above).
What exactly does it mean, under your view, for something to be ‘objective’, then? You are clarified that truth is all that is objective to you, but not really what objectivity is to you.
Furthermore, a law is a definite behavior of nature; not something that simply does not change. E.g., an immutable cup is not a law.

Everything in reality, all iota of matter and even dreams, all of it, yes, everything, partakes of fear.

I do not know what this would mean other than that there is a universal mind or set of minds that are the fundamental building blocks of reality that are driven primarily by fear; and I don’t see any good evidence that this would be true.

Perfection is singular.

What does that mean? Perfection is a state of something where it ideal.

Again, truth does not apply to states.

That doesn’t make any sense. This would entail that it cannot be true or false that “I ran yesterday”.

Are you just noting that truth is absolute?

The physical reality we think we know, is not known. It is delusion. It is just emotion, just consciousness. The model I am getting to is a theoretical 'proof' for this truth

My friend, you are an idealist then. You are saying that reality is fundamental mind and not matter.

There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality

That is a flat-out contradiction. You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is. — Bob Ross
I agree. That is only because I am not saying it quite right. But, unlike logicians I am more comfortable with that. So, I need your help actually.

I want to learn how to say it right, if that is possible.

Unfortunately, I am still not following what you mean. It seems perfectly contradictory so far (with regard to the above quote). What are you trying to convey by it being everything and only one-third of everything?

I would also say that to think without existing is entirely incoherent. Why would you try to defend that? Yes, something exists because it can think. Any I that thinks, must exist.

It does not follow that if there are thoughts, then there is a soul, a unified mind that exists in reality.

I mean, I think I get you. I am not at all sure you get me. I would like to discuss the whole topic of objective morality.

Admittedly, I do not understand your position yet.

I tried to trim this down after the fact. It was like 3-4 times larger before. Hopefully its still succinct and coherent.

I appreciate it! (:

Bob

Quoting wonderer1

Ha ha! The researcher is not a bad person. But the researcher is BEING a bad person currently.
— Chet Hawkins

So perhaps the monkey's behavior arises from evolved instincts conducive to training conspecifics not to be bad persons?

Implying the monkey sees the human as a peer? Doubtful. The bizarre situation with regular human interaction is almost not factorable. Caged animals are well aware they are caged.

The throwing monkey thinks that Chk'ka has Stockholm syndrome. And he's been psychosomatic against vinegar containing products ever since that Quepos Norwegian tourist incident. You just don't know how hard it's been on him. And his moon is in Mercury! Ugh, the monkanity!

Quoting wonderer1

Why do so many make moral propositional statements if they are not truth-apt?
— Chet Hawkins

Could the answer to your question be, "Because we share instincts, to some degree, with our capuchin cousins?"

Well, of course we do. They were named for a religious order after all. But those nasty little buggers never converted. They stuck with free will and balance, instead of highbrow persecution and itchy clothing.

Quoting Banno

Part of why theistic systems are muddled.

As if non-theistic aren't.

Quoting Michael

What determines the right way? Is it how most speakers of the language use the word? If the vast majority of Arabic speakers use the word "??????" to describe acts which are condoned by the Quran, and if the meaning of a word is determined by the things most speakers of the language use it to describe, then it would seem to follow that being condoned by the Quran is part of the meaning of the word "??????".

Philosophers don't seem to often use "The other person is wrong/inferior" as an explanation for differences in how people understand morality.

But in culture at large, in day-to-day dealings with people, "The other person is wrong/inferior" is probably the most common explanation for differences in how people understand morality. Even at a forum like this, "You're wrong/inferior" tends to at least lurk behind so many posters' arguments.

It's not clear what determines the right way to understand morality, but it seems to be central to a person's sense of morality to take for granted that they know, in an axiomatic manner, what is moral and what isn't.

Quoting Chet Hawkins

Possibly because moral propositional statements can have a predictable effect on people, and this predictability is useful somehow.
— baker
'useful' might be a virtue, something between achievement and accuracy. But, this is a problem with all virtues. There are 'uses' that are towards evil ends. So, how do we account for that?

I meant usefulness in a meta sense.

"Be the bigger person and don't hold it against him that he [took your lunch/stole your lunch money/ took credit for your work/...]"

Uttering moral propositional statements can be used to control people -- for better or worse. My point is that just uttering them often has an effect, and a predictable one at that.

Reply to baker I enjoyed your recent chat with Reply to Jamal.

Quoting baker

I meant usefulness in a meta sense.

"Be the bigger person and don't hold it against him that he [took your lunch/stole your lunch money/ took credit for your work/...]"

Yes, I get that. I agree.

Quoting baker

Uttering moral propositional statements can be used to control people -- for better or worse. My point is that just uttering them often has an effect, and a predictable one at that.

To state the truth is wise, even if people 'use' it the wrong way. You make your choice, and they make theirs. Deception to avoid them suffering or you suffering their bad choices, is just another bad choice, only. There are no real exceptions. If you think you have found an exception, then that is only a case where the utterance of the proposition was taken too singly, and represents only one or a few of the virtues. To utter a wise statement all virtues must be included.

Example(s):
Aphorisms of old and memes are not often wisdom. They are anti-wisdom. That is because of the conundrum you just underscored. That is statements are taken in isolation and defended with all strength. It is included in wise understanding of any virtue that that virtue in isolation or taken too far is actually unwise. But these posters of memes and aphorisms, they fail utterly and their utterances are failures. That is because they want to hang their hat as done on the single virtue they like, while simultaneously downplaying and poo pooing the virtue opposite that would bend this one back to real wisdom. Such is the nature of reality.

Reply to Banno How does one read between the lines of a one-liner?

Quoting Chet Hawkins

Uttering moral propositional statements can be used to control people -- for better or worse. My point is that just uttering them often has an effect, and a predictable one at that.
— baker
To state the truth is wise, even if people 'use' it the wrong way. You make your choice, and they make theirs. Deception to avoid them suffering or you suffering their bad choices, is just another bad choice, only. There are no real exceptions. If you think you have found an exception, then that is only a case where the utterance of the proposition was taken too singly, and represents only one or a few of the virtues. To utter a wise statement all virtues must be included.

Example(s):
Aphorisms of old and memes are not often wisdom. They are anti-wisdom. That is because of the conundrum you just underscored. That is statements are taken in isolation and defended with all strength. It is included in wise understanding of any virtue that that virtue in isolation or taken too far is actually unwise. But these posters of memes and aphorisms, they fail utterly and their utterances are failures. That is because they want to hang their hat as done on the single virtue they like, while simultaneously downplaying and poo pooing the virtue opposite that would bend this one back to real wisdom. Such is the nature of reality.

I'll go so far as to say that propositional moral statements are used by people as tools to exert power over other people. As such, moral statements are treated as if they were truth-apt, even though the speaker himself might not actually believe they are. As in, instead of slapping someone in the face or hitting them with a bat, one tells them, "Be the bigger person!" or "It's wrong not to forgive", and it can have the same effect of getting the other person to be compliant and submissive.

Not to get too Nietzschean about it, but if you look at the function of uttering propositional moral statements, it is precisely as described above. The simplest explanation is that there is nothing more to propositional moral statements but that they are tools for controlling others.

@Bob Ross, Antonio Rosamini's thought has been recommended to me as something of a resuscitation of ancient ethics. I have not read him in detail, but you may find his Principles of Ethics helpful, especially chapter two (beginning on page 28).

Quoting Antonio Rosamini's Principles of Ethics, p. 28

Everybody speaks of good as ‘that which is desired’. It is impossible to call
good what is detested. Good, therefore, is anything that moves enjoyably the
faculty of desire which draws us to enjoy good. Everyone agrees about this.
There is no need to demonstrate the absurdity of the contrary. For people in
general, good means a relationship between things and the faculty of desire. But
what are the things we call good because they can move our desire?
Answering this question will lead us to a fuller, more precise notion of good...

Reply to Leontiskos

Thank you for sharing! I will give it a look.

Reply to Leontiskos

I am honestly starting to think goodness is simply identical to 'being in self-harmony and self-unity'; and flourishing, prosperity, is simply what a standard, biological organism is going to need in order to completely actualize their self-harmony and self-unity.

Quoting baker

I'll go so far as to say that propositional moral statements are used by people as tools to exert power over other people. As such, moral statements are treated as if they were truth-apt, even though the speaker himself might not actually believe they are. As in, instead of slapping someone in the face or hitting them with a bat, one tells them, "Be the bigger person!" or "It's wrong not to forgive", and it can have the same effect of getting the other person to be compliant and submissive.

I mean, I agree. If you are saying that morality is super hard, I agree. And if you are saying 'The road to hell is paved with good intentions', I agree. But that does not release us from the burden of choice. In fact, it only underscores it.

The trouble with all choice is that there are so very many bad ones and only one perfection. I have found that people that lean in with where you seem to be going are often moral subjectivists. Instead of respecting the objective nature of morality and the good, they just err on the side of doubting everything, even the good. That is not the 'way'. One must morally decide on what good is and stand for that. That means not only making moral propositions as statements but acting accordingly, intentionally, and with force.

Quoting substantivalism

Not to get too Nietzschean about it, but if you look at the function of uttering propositional moral statements, it is precisely as described above. The simplest explanation is that there is nothing more to propositional moral statements but that they are tools for controlling others.

I disagree, entirely.

The simplest explanation is that moral statements are intended because they are partial resonances with what is ... objectively good. It is a weak point of view in my opinion that sees control in every 'should'. The point of any valid 'should' is that it indeed points to an intent or suggests an intent in alignment with objective good. That has proper resonance. Many and most choosers feel inside themselves the difficulty of making proper moral choices. And they excuse themselves from those choices by teaming up with all other immoralities. They collectively suggest, oh, see, this is about power. Nope. It is about generating the most happiness for the most people. And that path is the hardest path there is. I get it. It's easy to be lazy or self-indulgent or cowardly, the three main sins. They all team up to make reality easier to handle. This is the Pragmatic short-cut. Lower those expectations! Intentional failure by aiming at less than best is unwise and immoral.

Yes, being strong and not weak is wise. That means you do not turn the other cheek in shame. You do not weaken yourself by so doing. Likewise you do not take the hit that matters, the deep harm. You catch that blow and defend it with everything you have. Misunderstanding the meaning of turning the other cheek is not wise. It is an expression that should be powerful, not an expression of powerlessness.

Quoting Bob Ross

this does not take away from the fact that there is such a thing as kindness

You've gotta be cruel to be kind, in the right measure. :grin:

Reply to Agree-to-Disagree

This doesn't really negate my example though...