What would Aristotle say to Plato if Plato told him he's in the cave?
Plato: "You're stuck in the cave! You're busy dealing with the shadow of the forms. True knowledge is in the world of ideas."
Aristotle: [Your answer]
I think he might say "Plato, you're as good as a sleeping baby if you're not taking into account what's right in front of you. I agree that true knowledge is in the world of ideas, but there's no way out of the cave. The best we can do is work with what we've got."
Aristotle: [Your answer]
I think he might say "Plato, you're as good as a sleeping baby if you're not taking into account what's right in front of you. I agree that true knowledge is in the world of ideas, but there's no way out of the cave. The best we can do is work with what we've got."
Comments (23)
I think Aristotle might say to Plato: Do you mind that I am stuck in a cave dealing with the shadow of the forms? Well, that's a universal negative preposition. Not all men who are stuck in a cave deal with the shadow of the forms. No S is P. Etc.
I guess he would have answered with a syllogism. :grin:
But Aristotle addresses Plato's Ideas at various points, including Metaphysics I.6.
(The difficulty here is that Plato would never have said that to Aristotle. The allegory of the cave is not primarily a means of dialogical argument.)
He might say: Yes, I've been in your Academy for 20 years. I know this bit of philosophical poetry quite well. I am busy now creating my own. Better for us to be puppet-masters.
Aristotle: "And so your story of the cave is also a shadow and therefore does not reflect true knowledge either. Thus, the aporia of true knowledge remains ... and yet maybe such recurring questions are the forms, after all, and our fleeting answers (or stories) are the shadows."
So, the "Cave" is a nice allegory. a shadow on its own walls with no absolute meaning.
:fire:
Aristotle: (imagines)
Hm! Could you expound on this? The cave allegory isn't a means of argument, but do you think Plato wouldn't be bothered by Aristotle's fixation on the senses and particulars?
I suppose the simple answer is that I think Plato would have been bothered if Aristotle had been his philosophical predecessor. But because Aristotle is Plato's philosophical successor, who understands Plato's ideas and takes them into account in formulating his own theories, Plato's response would probably have been much more irenic and nuanced.
Looked at from a different angle, I think there is plenty of room in Aristotle's thought for a cave. I think Aristotle would agree with Plato that most people are trapped in a cave, unable to see the forms.
Get out of my light.
We are all stuck in the cave. We cannot escape, but some can be turned around to see the light of the cave fire and what the shadows are images of.
One must be of good humor to accept that even then most will still not understand what those things are that they shadows are images of. Further, they are not able to identify who the makers of these images are. They do not see that you too are a puppet maker, a maker of images, an opinion maker, a poet. Some take the opinions you present as something more. They mistakenly believe that being a philosopher means taking these opinions as the truth. They do not know that to think philosophically is to think dialectically. To question rigorously rather than accept and repeat as the truth.
Although our methods are somewhat different we both in our own way are examiners of opinion. As cave dwellers the best we can do is accept those opinions we find or make that seem to us best, while remaining open to revision when it seems reasonable to do so.
Plato: It is different.
Aristotle: Yes, I thought you might say so, for if it were the same, then by investigating the form in the particulars I would be seeing outside of the cave, don't you think?
Plato: That sounds right to me.
Aristotle:Tell me though Plato, how is the Form different than the form in particulars?
Plato: How do you mean?
Aristotle: Well, a great action is great by partaking in greatness; isn't that so?
Plato: It is.
Aristotle: Well, if a great action partakes in the Form of greatness, and the greatness of the Form is different than the greatness of the action, then either one is not great, or the other is not great, for by being different, they differ in the form of which they either participate or are participated in.
Plato: Quite so.
Aristotle: Well then greatness is not great.
Plato: Hmm, I see. Yes, that appears to be a problem.
Aristotle: It is Plato, it is quite problematic. So you see, I think you were wrong to say that the Form is different than what partakes in it in regards to that quality that is partaken.
Plato: Yes, I must have been mistaken. So now I say that the Form is the same as what partakes in it in regards to that quality that is partaken.
Aristotle: I was afraid you would say that.
Plato: Why is that?
Aristotle: Because, if the Form of greatness is itself great in the same way that a great action is great, then it will be necessary for there to be a form that includes both the great act and the greatness that is present in the Form of greatness. And then there will need to be a form of that, and a form of that, and so on and so on.
Plato: Oh dear Aristotle, that seems quite problematic too.
Aristotle: Quite so.
___: Excuse me, excuse me, if I may interject...
Plato: Why, is that you Socrates, old friend?
Socrates: Yes, it is I, Socrates.
Aristotle: What did you wish to say?
Socrates: Just this, I think Plato was right in what he said at first, namely, that the Form is different than what partakes in it in regards to the quality that is partaken of.
Aristotle: And why is that?
Socrates: Well for just the reason you stated, if the Form is the same, then it will need a Form above it, and in that case it is not really the Form of what is partaken of it.
Aristotle: Well how will you overcome the objection that Plato and I just discussed: that greatness is not great if the form is different than that that partakes in it?
Socrates: By saying that greatness is great, Aristotle, but that the Form of greatness is great in a different way than the greatness of a great action.
Aristotle: How is that?
Socrates: A great action is great, but in a qualified way. Meanwhile, the Form of greatness is supremely great, there is nothing not great about it; it includes not only a great action, but every other greatness. By being so great, it is, as it were, a different kind of greatness than the great things and actions and qualities that partake of it.
Aristotle: Hmm, well said Socrates.
Plato: Well said indeed.
:cool:
:smirk:
It's what one of the cynic philosophers replied to Alexander the Great. The emperor asked what he could do for the philosopher, and he replied 'get out of my light,' in true cynic fashion :rofl:
Googling it, it was Diogenes, the cynic!
I think they would disagree here, though:
Quoting NotAristotle
Imo, Plato could never agree that particulars could be anything but a smoke screen. And true knowledge could only be achieved dialectically and rationally, by setting ourselves free from the influence of particulars.
To investigate and to see the truth of what what is being investigated are not the same. An inquiry into Forms does not yield knowledge of them. If it did then Socrates' wisdom would not be knowledge of his ignorance.
Quoting NotAristotle
Fooloso4: Whoever you are, you are not Socrates. The Forms, as you say, are each one. The Form Great is not the greatest of the many things that are great. And, of course, NotAristotle is not Aristotle. Aristotle would recognize this as a version of the Third Man argument. The Form man is not a man. This Plato is not the supremely great Plato who would not agree that the Form Greatness is the greatest or the Form Man is the manliest. In his Parmenides we also find a rejection of the Third Man.
Do you maintain that you might or might not be, NotAristotle? That you might is quite different from not being either Aristotle or NotAristotle. For in either of those cases you must be. If you take what I say as misanthropy not only must you not not be, you must be human (anthropos). Being neither this or that are you some third thing, the third man?