Analysis of Goodness
Goodness has two historical meanings: hypothetical and actual perfection. The former is perfection for (i.e., utility towards) some purpose (e.g., a good clock is a clock that can tell the time, a good car can transport things, a good calculator can perform mathematical calculations, etc.); and the latter is perfection in-itself (i.e., a good organism, clock, phone, plant, etc. is one which is in harmony and unity with itself). The former is pragmatic goodness; and the latter moral goodness.
For those who cannot fathom perfection as it is in-itself, simply imagine a wild jungle in complete disarray, everything trying to impede on everything else, and now imagine a jungle in which everything is in complete harmony and unity: the former is in a state of absolute (actual) imperfection, and the latter in a state of absolute (actual) perfectionit is not perfection relative to some goal or purpose endowed unto it by a subject, nay, it is perfect qua perfection (viz., perfection in terms of solely what it is in-itself).
Each of the two types of goodness has within them higher and lower goodness, each according to their contextual size (viz., a good which is about a smaller context is lower than one which is about a larger context). The lowest pragmatic good is particular utility (i.e., what is perfect for this purpose) and the highest is universal utility (i.e., what is perfect for every purpose); the lowest moral good is particular harmony and unity (i.e., that this is perfect) and the highest is universal harmony and unity (i.e., that everything is perfect).
Moral goodness is higher than pragmatic goodness because it deals with actual (as opposed to hypothetical) perfection; and the highest moral good is universal harmony and unity (and this is why altruism morally better than egoism). Morality, then, in its most commonly used sense, is simply an attempt at sorting out how one should behave in correspondence to how one can best align themselves with universal harmony and unity; and pragmatism, then, in its most commonly used sense, is an attempt at understanding the best ways to achieve purposes (even if they purposes are only granted for the sake of deriving those best means) so that one has readily at their disposal the best means of achieving any purpose.
Neither studies [of pragmatism nor morality] are, when understood as described hereon, non-objective: the best means of achieving a purpose (or purposes) and the best means of achieving (actual) perfection are both stance-independent. These studies are as objective as they come, and are both essential to practical life: morality being essential to living a good life, and pragmatism being essential to achieving that good life.
Politically, a society centered on pragmatic goodness will tend towards anarchism (i.e., each man is given, ideally, the knowledge of and power to achieve his own ends) and a society centered on moral goodness will tend towards democracy (i.e., each man is given, ideally, equal representation and liberties, but also duties to their fellow man to uphold a harmonious and united state).
Goodness is not normative: it is the property of having hypothetical or actual perfection. Normativity arises out of the nature of subjects: cognition and conation supply something new to realitythe assessment of or desire for how things should be (as opposed to how they are). Moral goodness, for example, is just the state of being in self-harmony and self-unity: it does not indicate itself whether something should be in that state. It is up to subjects to choose what should be, and a (morally) good man simply chooses that things should be (morally) good.
For those who cannot fathom perfection as it is in-itself, simply imagine a wild jungle in complete disarray, everything trying to impede on everything else, and now imagine a jungle in which everything is in complete harmony and unity: the former is in a state of absolute (actual) imperfection, and the latter in a state of absolute (actual) perfectionit is not perfection relative to some goal or purpose endowed unto it by a subject, nay, it is perfect qua perfection (viz., perfection in terms of solely what it is in-itself).
Each of the two types of goodness has within them higher and lower goodness, each according to their contextual size (viz., a good which is about a smaller context is lower than one which is about a larger context). The lowest pragmatic good is particular utility (i.e., what is perfect for this purpose) and the highest is universal utility (i.e., what is perfect for every purpose); the lowest moral good is particular harmony and unity (i.e., that this is perfect) and the highest is universal harmony and unity (i.e., that everything is perfect).
Moral goodness is higher than pragmatic goodness because it deals with actual (as opposed to hypothetical) perfection; and the highest moral good is universal harmony and unity (and this is why altruism morally better than egoism). Morality, then, in its most commonly used sense, is simply an attempt at sorting out how one should behave in correspondence to how one can best align themselves with universal harmony and unity; and pragmatism, then, in its most commonly used sense, is an attempt at understanding the best ways to achieve purposes (even if they purposes are only granted for the sake of deriving those best means) so that one has readily at their disposal the best means of achieving any purpose.
Neither studies [of pragmatism nor morality] are, when understood as described hereon, non-objective: the best means of achieving a purpose (or purposes) and the best means of achieving (actual) perfection are both stance-independent. These studies are as objective as they come, and are both essential to practical life: morality being essential to living a good life, and pragmatism being essential to achieving that good life.
Politically, a society centered on pragmatic goodness will tend towards anarchism (i.e., each man is given, ideally, the knowledge of and power to achieve his own ends) and a society centered on moral goodness will tend towards democracy (i.e., each man is given, ideally, equal representation and liberties, but also duties to their fellow man to uphold a harmonious and united state).
Goodness is not normative: it is the property of having hypothetical or actual perfection. Normativity arises out of the nature of subjects: cognition and conation supply something new to realitythe assessment of or desire for how things should be (as opposed to how they are). Moral goodness, for example, is just the state of being in self-harmony and self-unity: it does not indicate itself whether something should be in that state. It is up to subjects to choose what should be, and a (morally) good man simply chooses that things should be (morally) good.
Comments (137)
I struggle to follow your argument - possibly because I am not a philosopher and also because I regard words like goodness, evil and perfection as being contingent and subject to personal or intersubjective worldviews.
Quoting Bob Ross
Only if you agree that telling time is the chief function of a clock. As someone who has spent a lot of time in horology circles, the idea of a 'good' clock is subject to many other considerations, telling time may be the least important - age, maker, decorative appeal, historic significance, may all rate higher than time telling. I guess what I'm saying is that when you come to establishing what is good you are trapped by the criteria of value you use to establish merit.
Can you demonstrate an instantiation of perfection about which we can all agree upon so that I can see what perfection 'looks' like?
some varied (modern) readings:
On the Genealogy of Morals, F. Nietzsche
Human Nature and Conduct, J. Dewey
The Sovereignty of Good, I. Murdoch
Reasons and Persons, D. Parfit
Natural Goodness, P. Foot
Creating Capabilities, M. Nussbaum
The property of being measured by any standard is always going to be subjective. You repeatedly use human artefacts as exemplars of goodness. Those are not even an objective cases to begin with; human intentionality is literally constitutive of what a car or a clock or a radio is. You say to imagine a wild jungle in complete disarray versus one that is in harmony. That is simply absurd. Natural systems are in a constant process of evolution and change, so there is never any criterion for preferring one configuration over another, let alone a perspective from which to apply it.
Good is irretrievably subjective and normative.
:up:
Which part did you disagree with or were confused by? I am more than happy to elaborate.
I did not argue this in the OP: I said that pragmatic goodness is about utility towards a purpose (or purposes), and an example of this is a good clock in ordinary language: we say a clock is good when it can adequately tell the timebecause it fulfills the commonly accepted purpose of telling the time that it was designed for.
Which kind of perfection?
I am not following: could you please elaborate?
Although I don't completely agree with Nietzsche, he is one of my favorite philosophers. However, I don't think he adequately refuted moral realism; but his work on individuality is unmatched.
Likewise, I don't see (as of yet) how any of your responses adequately refuted or contended with moral realism--let alone the particular one explicated in the OP.
If by standard you are referring to something normative, then I completely agree; and this does not negate the OP.
Yes, but pragmatic goodness applies to everything: it is just goodness in the sense of utility.
That natural systems have a constant process of evolution has nothing to do if there is a (non-normative) standard of moral goodness. This is just a non-sequitur, until you justify this comment.
Why? You gave absolutely no justification for your assertions.
By 'context-dependent', I am assuming you don't mean 'subject-dependent'; so if it is not sociological or psychological, then what context are you referring to here?
Thinking here of man made objects and natural organisms if theyre not able to fulfil the function/s of their intended design would you say that such organisms or inventions are not good in this sense?
A paper printer that does not print correctly or not print at all by virtue of not fulfilling its function would lack goodness, and thus would be a bad printer even though originally it was good when it was able to function correctly. @Bob Ross
Man though is different and able of goodness or lack of, so its inherently neither, as goodness is judged upon the actions one performs and whether theyre beneficial to the individual within the context of the society they operate in, in obedience to its laws, customs and regulations. A breach of such laws would be considered not good as the punishment would be to the detriment of the individual.
Any.
Quoting Bob Ross
You've just repeated my point in different words. I said that identifying what counts as good is subject to a multiplicity of potential criteria. How do we deicide which is the right frame?
I suspect we are not going to agree - I am more interested in quesions and peeling back presuppositions and in recognizing the role of personal values and you seem more interested in locating some form of objectivity from experince.
But I would be interested in your example of perfection.
Yeah, I don't get this at all. Anything human made is human value-laden. What you are saying makes less than no sense to me.
I am just a reader not a philosopher, so most of my views are likely to be from the common sensical ideas. But isn't moral goodness a superfluous term? Why not just say, moral or immoral, instead of moral goodness and moral badness?
Good is too wide term which is usually applied to the situations and things in daily life of the ordinary people. How are you? I am good. How was your weekend? It was good.
Where are you off to this weekend? To a party. Have a good time.
Buy some fish. Try to get good ones.
But morally good? It sounds unclear. Is there such a thing or situation as morally good? Good for who? Isn't just being moral enough?
What is a concrete explanation of what that would be? Because the jungle example simply restates the same predicates "harmony" and "unity with itself" with a subject "jungle", without explaining what those predicates actually mean.
Quoting Bob Ross
Is it? Is harmony and unity with itself a common feature of the normative principle of every major ethical theory? Because if it is not, there are many people who will disagree with your characterisation of moral goodness.
Quoting Bob Ross
That would be a normative principle in itself, but harmony and unity are still not concretely defined.
By your terms, a machine that pumps water up and down with 100% efficiency would be high on moral goodness, but nobody would want that machine because it is useless (low pragmatic goodness). I don't think anybody would ascribe moral goodness to a machine, especially when it has no agency.
Quoting https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/moral-agents/v-1
What you wrote is suggestive that you are trying to describe a type of goodness that is related though different from moral goodness proper, and calling it "moral goodness" confuses your argument.
This question is predicated off of the assumption that one is talking about pragmatic goodness; and, with respect thereto, it would defined in terms of how a thing fulfills its purpose. This is not dependent on actions necessarily, unless its purpose entails some sort of action(s).
When speaking of pragmatic goodness, I would say that purpose is subjective and it is different than function. Either way, if the generally acknowledged purpose of something (in the sense of its function, as you noted) is not being fulfilled, then it would be (pragmatically) bad.
This is a separate question from whether it is morally bad.
It would be pragmatically bad, if its purpose is to print paper; but not necessarily morally bad.
Humans are evaluable under the same criteria as anything else: they are pragmatically good iff they fulfill their purpose, and they are morally good if they are actually perfect.
Ok. Perfection is identical to flawlessness. There are only two types of perfection: hypothetical and actual perfection. The former is pragmatic goodness; the latter moral goodness.
To try and bring out the contrast, let me use a perhaps odd example. A calculator would be hypothetically perfect if my purpose for it is to hold up books and it is flawless at fulfilling this task.
The calculator is actually perfect if it is in a state of 100% (flawless) self-harmony and self-unityi.e., all the parts are in agreement and peace with the other parts. The calculator isnt broken, it doesnt have parts that oppose other parts in a manner that brings disunity, etc.
There is no chief function of a clock, unless by that you just mean the most commonly accepted pragmatic purpose of a clock. Then I agree.
Yes, human made objects are made with human intentions and values. However, the purpose for that human made object is whatever a person wants it to be, because pragmatism is just about gathering knowledge about utility of objects to obtain particular goals. Yes, this can imply that people will make objects crafted specially for their own purposes. I don't think the OP disagreed with that in any way.
Recommending readings isn't a valid justification of your contentions. You just claimed that my use of goodness is context-dependent, without elaborating on what that even means: that's the definition of a blanket assertion. If I am wrong, then please quote where you elaborated on what that means, and I will gladly concede.
I see. I don't understand how I have reduced goodness to something it isn't: how did I do that?
Pragmatic vs. moral goodness is a valid dichotomy, as far as I can tell: it is not a spectrum.
Goodness is the property that ascribes whether or not something is moral or immoral, not vice-versa.
The OP argues that moral goodness is actual perfection, which is self-harmony and self-unity.
The property of being in self-harmony and self-unity is what perfection in-itself is: they are identical.
In terms of an example, imagine a two rocks just laying there on top of a table vs. two rocks violently colliding with each other constantly: the former is in a state of harmony and unity, while the latter is clearly not.
That is not a requirement for me to be right.
Harmony is a state of peace; and unity is oneness.
No. The efficiency only matters if we are talking about pragmatic goodness. As long as the water-pumping machine has harmonious parts and is unified, then it is actually perfecteven if it is not hypothetically perfect.
I was trying to describe what moral goodness isI was not describing an offshoot of moral goodness.
It is still not clear how that connects with morality. Where is the moral agency there?
What I meant was an actual instantiation of perfection, not more abstractions or discussions of usage. Let's look at something in the world which we can agree upon is an example of perfection.
Quoting Bob Ross
Well if that's the case then we can't say what perfection in a clock looks like since there will be multiple competing possibilities as I have already described. I've already said that time keeping is but one dimension in those who collect clocks. :wink:
Please prove how Goodness is the property of moral or immoral.
Quoting Bob Ross
Is there such a thing as moral goodness as actual perfection? Goodness for who? An act is either moral or immoral on the basis of many different factors related to the act and the agents. But where does goodness come from? What is moral goodness as actual perfection?
I gave you an example and you completely ignored it: please re-read my previous response.
I don't think you are quite understanding pragmatic goodness. It is perfection for some purpose. You are contending in the above quote that we can't say it is perfect because there are multiple purposes for a clock; but the whole point of pragmatic goodness is that its perfection is hypothetical--i.e., it is perfection relative to a purpose.
In terms of actual perfection, the clock is perfect (morally good) if it is in self-harmony and self-unity.
Being 'moral' or 'immoral' is a property of something that is good, not vice-versa. The properties of 'being moral' and 'being immoral' are extensions of 'being good' or 'being bad'.
One cannot evaluate what is moral without knowing what is good; but one can determine what is good without knowing what is moral, because they determine what is moral from what is good.
I outlined this in the OP: what did you disagree with? Actual perfection isn't 'goodness for someone', it is perfection as it is in-itself.
My analysis of goodness does not find moral goodness contingent on agency: it is simply self-harmony and self-unity; and applies to everything--not just subjects.
I take it you didn't elaborate on it then, and agree with me that you made blanket assertions. I am more than happy to discuss your thoughts in more detail, but I am not willing to pretend like something is happening that isn't: you made blanket assertions with no elaboration (on them).
It is nearly impossible for me to understand what you are saying, if you don't give me an elaboration on your assertions.
There is no moral agency in that example, because morality is not restricted to agency. Moral goodness, as described in the OP, is actual perfection; which is not contingent on agency itself. Either something is in a state of self-harmony and self-unity or it is not.
Moral agency comes in with the introduction of subjects capable of trying to uphold moral goodness and transform reality into the highest (moral) good.
Bob, morality is by definition, historical convention, and common sense related to human actions. Do you not see that by redefining morality in this way you are completely altering its fundamental meaning?
Basically what I was trying to get across.
Quoting Lionino
If you want to describe this sort of goodness that relates to harmony and such, we can talk about that; but changing the meaning of "moral goodness" to mean that will just make people ignore what you are saying, as no one uses the word 'moral' that way, the dictionary doesn't allow it either.
I do not think history supports this claim. Both of the terms, goodness and perfection, have various meanings. You move from a claim about the historical meaning to a meaning you favor. In the middle is a questionable assertion of what morality is based on what you claim to be its its "most commonly used sense":
Quoting Bob Ross
An argument can be made that morality is a response to the lack of universal harmony and unity. It is because there is no actual perfection in the world that we must choose and act so as to attain and maintain what we value, and that in our imperfect world these values may conflict with those of others. Some believe that to be moral is to be obedient to a higher power and so regard moral deliberation as immoral since it wrongly puts the individual in a position of authority.
What does universal harmony mean? In pursuit of universal harmony do I confer equal moral standing to humans and rats? Do I allow rats to live in my home? Do I allow every human beings who may want to live in my home?
Morality is not conventionally nor historically only about human actions. The vast majority of human beings have been, historically speaking, moral realists; and they believed in The Good (i.e., an objective goodness) which is independent of any stance a subject may have on the matter. To think that these moral facts are only about human actions is an incredibly narrow interpretation of morality.
Plato, for example, surely never thought that the Form of the Good was about specifically human actions nor, as a matter of fact, about solely actions.
The moral code by which humans live is predicated on and informed by The Good.
Do you mean this below?
Quoting Bob Ross
As you say an odd example.
I think this is just a strange way of defining the idea of flawless. You may as well say that perfection is an erect penis flawlessly being used for hanging up a dressing gown.
Quoting Bob Ross
This sounds like what happens when language is used imprecisely.
I can accept that we might use the word perfect to describe a calculator which does its job flawlessly.
I would avoid talk of parts being in agreement and at peace with each other. The calculator is not Krishnamurti.
What benefit does the word prefect bring you here? Does it not just mean 'working as intended'?
Quoting Bob Ross
I think if it means pragmatic goodness then leave out perfection. The hallmark of 'pragmatic' is it's efficacy in certain situations (which may change with new information and says nothing about whether it is good or true). It's utility. The moment it is called perfection it suggests the goodness is far from pragmatic and constitutes that which cannot be improved upon.
Quoting Bob Ross
You have parsed perfection into a kind of dualism - that which is not quite perfection (the physical) and that which transcends the human (Greek philosophy's The Good).
I'm assuming you are joking about a clock being morally good, with self-unity, etc.
I dont think it is a false dilemma. Lets take your examples as examples.
Ignorant goodness, assuming I was able to parse this correctly, is any good act which is unintentional or lacks the proper foreknowledge required for it to be intentional. This is NOT a subcategory of the property of goodness but, rather, an adjective of goodnessi.e., saying an act that was good was made in ignorance is just to predicate what was good with the property of ignorance WHICH IS NOT an extension property of goodness itself. This is why, in truth, a moral or pragmatic act that is good could be predicated in this manner with ignorance. So this example doesnt prove your point.
Beautiful goodness, if I understood your meaning here correctly, is anything that meets the standards of beauty (and not that goodness is beautiful itself). This is just a subcategory of pragmatic goodness: one is evaluating if the thing is good based off of a purpose of being beautiful. Perhaps it is causing confusion calling it pragmatic goodness and if so, then think of this as hypothetical perfection instead. By it being pragmatically good because it is beautiful, I mean that it is good only insofar as it fulfills the purpose of being beautiful and this is the measure of its usefulness (towards that purpose).
That pragmatic vs. moral goodness is not a false dilemma, I can easily prove. One is about a thing being perfect for something (i.e., pragmatism) and the other is for nothing. There are only two options here (legitimately): either a things perfection is being sized up based off of its fulfillment to a purpose, or it is being sized up based off of its fulfillment of no purpose at all. If the latter, then the only other option is it is being sized up to perfection as it is in-itself; otherwise, the person is not actually evaluating its perfection (for example, if they were to determine it arbitrarily).
I honestly dont think so. But I am more than happy to discuss it in more detail if you would like!
If you disagree, then please provide more examples of goodness that do not fit into the categories, or demonstrate how my dilemma is false by refuting my previous proof of it. So far, I am not convinced.
What do you mean by right and left? I dont know what that would even mean in this context.
I absolutely agree with you that people have used it in various different ways throughout history, but my point was to refine the general notions (that were used throughout history) to a concept. Viz., when I say that goodness boils down to two categories historically, I do not mean that historically people recognized with full clarity these two categories but, rather, their notions of goodness do, nevertheless, in fact, boil down thereto.
I would simply add that morality, as a practice, certainly is the response to a lack of goodness; and this is the same as a lack of universal harmony and unity.
Yes, I know many the type. I am not here trying to argue that everyone ends up using the concept of goodness like I have; but I do think an analysis of goodness throughout history demonstrates that, at its core, even these types of people recognize what is good as universal harmony and unity. They just arent satisfied with stopping there: they require further justification, and they find it in an authority figurelike God.
Universal harmony is just a state whereof everything is living and existing peacefully; which includes everything.
However, as you noted correctly, it is an ideal and may not be every actualizable down to the T; and we are far from it and we have limited resources; so it is perfectly reasonable to prioritize life over non-life, humans over other animals, etc. to try to progress towards it as best we can.
I dont think any person of good character would disagree that ideally we should not eat other animals; but whether or not we can to survive is a separate question.
I think that, when the dust settles, goodness does boil down to the two categories described in the OP. I think the 'highly contextual' aspect you are noting is really just due to people's hazy notions of what is good, and what goodness is, rather than a property of goodness itself.
It isn't a "narrow" view of morality Bob, it is the definition of morality.
"a particular system of values and principles of conduct, especially one held by a specified person or society."
"the extent to which an action is right or wrong"
"certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or"
"a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people"
"a set of personal or social standards for good or bad behaviour and character"
It strains credulity that you would argue this. Whatever it is you're trying to get at, it isn't morality. And trying to categorize it as morality only confuses your presentation.
If the standard of conduct whereby actions are evaluated is not morality, then what is it that you call the standard of conduct whereby actions are evaluated?
:fire:
So, rather than referencing the various and diverse things that have been said you replace what was actually said with your own notion of goodness. As if, were they only as capable as you in recognizing what they really meant they would replace what was said with your version of what goodness is.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is the opposite of what we find through most of history!
Quoting Bob Ross
Where is the historical evidence to back this up?
Quoting Bob Ross
The answer to the separate question is that we can, and many have, survived without eating other animals. At least not intentionally.
Fair enough, just my feedback. :)
It is not a definition of flawlessness nor perfection: it is an example of a specific type of perfection; and, yes, if the purpose being endowed onto an erect penis is to hang up a dressing gown, then its hypothetical perfection is directly proportional to how well it fulfills that purpose.
Hypothetical perfection is about working as intended, and actual perfection is about being in a state of harmony and unity.
This is how we use it in language all the time. We say thats a good clock when contextually we think the clock is telling the time very accurately; we say thats a horrible clock when contextually we think it is not telling the time correctly; etc.
These are all examples of perfection for <...>.
Although I understand we dont usually think about actual perfection when it comes to inanimate objects, but, nevertheless, moral goodness equally applies to them; so, no, I am not joking but merely using a weird example to break you out of your current mindset. If I used a human behavior example, or something similar, then you wouldnt probably understand the nature of moral goodness as depicted in this OP because you wouldn't be considered exactly what it means for something to have the form of 'unity and harmony'.
Yes, those are standard, colloquial definitions; but they, like all colloquial definitions, are rough estimations, and do not accurately describe in a field of profession (in this case, ethics) what the term means. In fact, it is wholly inadequate to explain the vast majority of prominent ethical theories (throughout history) this way.
Let's take real, prominent examples (historically) of ethical worldviews.
Christianity, by-at-large, views morality, at its core, as embedded into God's nature: goodness is in God's nature. This is goodness is not dependent on any conduct, code, or behavior: it exists stance-independently; and God will's what is good exactly because His nature is good. This is incoherent with your definition, insofar as Christian Ethics is not solely about moral behavior but, rather, it is also about what is good (and this is independent of behavior and guides that behavior).
Same with Islam ^
Platonism, by-at-large, views morality, at its core, as the Form of The Good, and this is also stance-independent and independent of behaviors. The Good is what guides behavior but is not reducible to ethical behavior, which is incoherent with your colloquial definitions with this regard.
Aristotelianism, by-at-large, views morality, at its core, as fulfillment of a thing's purpose; and this is stance-independent and what is the form (note the lowercase 'f') of the good. This is incoherent with your definitions insofar as what is good is not about behavior itself but, rather, behavior is guided by it.
Kantianism, by-at-large, is about, at its core, a priori moral principles which are what is considered what's good; and this moral law, which exists transcendentally, is stance-independent and independent of human behavior. This is incoherent with your definitions insofar as behavior is guided by the a priori moral law and not identical to it. Considerations of the moral law itself are considerations which are a part of morality but do not pertain themselves to behavior.
Etc.
So why does the internet purport such inadequate definitions? Because those definitions are completely adequate for common use: most people don't study ethics, and they just notionally mean 'the study of right or wrong behavior' when they use the term 'morality' in colloquial speech. Prominent dictionaries, especially google's version of it, are notoriously bad at giving techincal definitions but are proficient at giving colloquial ones.
Your definitions aren't bad as a general, practical notion; but will never stand up to scrutinous refinement in ethics.
My argument does not depend on historically everything being in universal harmony and unity; rather, I am arguing that goodness is a form that the vast majority of people have recognized throughout history, even though they may have never recognized with with such refinement nor were capable of bringing it to its highest form: universality.
Anyone who thinks that it is morally permissible to kill and eat an animal for purely trivial reasons has not understand the highest form of the good. Nevertheless, they usually understand it at a much lower form, the lowest of which being egoism (viz., they usually understand, even if they dont care about other people or other animals, that what is good for them is for their body and mind to be in harmony and unity with itself; and so they work towards it via self-actualization).
Saying that something is not reducible to one of two options is to say that it is false dilemma: you are claiming that there is at least one other option, because not all particulars can be reduced to the two options proposed.
Again, I don't see how this true: give me an example of goodness that cannot be categorized under pragmatic or moral goodness.
:kiss:
If you ignore what was actually said and done and evidently valued, and in its place assert your own version of universality, then things might seem to have been as you paint them to be. It is a kind of willful blindness and ignorance.
Quoting Bob Ross
Trivial reasons? You said:
Quoting Bob Ross
Is surviving a purely trivial reason?
For much of human history human and animal sacrifice was practiced. It was not believed to be purely trivial. Rather than being regarded as immoral it was what pleased the gods. Beliefs and practices change. The idea that we are progressing toward a state of universal truth and perfection is an idea that should not have survived the 19th century.
I never said you that you said that I could not reduce it; but you are clearly saying it is a mistake.
A very easy way, which I have been asking for this whole time, for you to demonstrate your point is to give me an example of goodness that is not reducible to either of the two. If you can't, then I have no reason to believe you.
So, what example do you have?
I've studied ethics extensively and I think you are well off-base. I'll leave you to your musings.
I wonder if it is simple as that. Who judges what is moral or immoral? If someone with power and authority comes along, and says to you cutting grass in the winter is bad moral, therefore you are morally bad, then is the authority morally good, and are you morally bad?
Goodness and pleasantness are synonymous, so the weather is good today, so it is pleasant. Does it mean that morally good means morally pleasant? Morally bad means morally unpleasant?
Quoting Bob Ross
I didn't say that I disagreed with the OP. I was wondering if goodness is an absolute concept. I mean is there such a thing as absolute goodness?
Goodness seems to be a relative concept. It is good only from one's point of view. Something can be good for you, but it can be bad for others. Do you recall an old song lyric "One man's ceiling is the other man's floor."? But I am wondering if there is goodness from all the people in the world. If there were, what could they be?
Goodness is also a property of objects, actions, and situations, but it is dependent on a lot of factors and conditions on the objects, actions and situations. You cannot just say there is moral goodness which is perfect and morally good, and no one really knows what the goodness is without the considerations.
With all due respect: prove it. Respond to the historical examples I just gave.
I'm just trying to figure out why you connect goodness with perfection. Do you think that perfection is always good?
With all due respect, I wouldn't know what to prove. What are you trying to do, establish an objective foundation for morality in order to eventually link it back to human actions? The moral law within is a moral law because it is prescriptive. Do your thing. It makes no sense to me, I am willing to leave it at that. As far as proving it, I did repeatedly. So clearly you and I are not on the same page.
Aristotle's eudaimonia -- the purpose of humans is eudaimonia.
I don't think we can make the distinction you require, in this way. The problem is that activities which are conducive to "harmony" are judged as "good" because they are for that purpose, harmony. Now you've introduced "harmony" as the ultimate goal, the final end which all things strive for in perfection. So it's really just reducible to a pragmatic "good", but the ultimate pragmatic good, like Aristotle's proposal of "happiness".
But "harmony" refers to the relationship between things, and you characterize it as a perfection of the thing-in-itself, a relation which a thing has with itself. So you've mischaracterized "harmony" to say that it is a perfect relationship between a thing and itself, when really it is a relationship between distinct things. This indicates that to find out what constitutes the true perfection which a thing might have, as "in-itself", we need to look for something other than harmony.
(hypothetical and actual) perfection is (are) identical to goodness (as a property); and so I would respond with, yes, something is 100% good only when it is 100% perfect (whether that be qua utility or qua perfection).
It is really difficult to have a productive conversation if you cannot contend with my responses. I am not sure how to proceed from here, but, then again, it seems like you aren't interested in having any conversation about it (and if that is the case, then we can end our conversation here: no problem).
I appreciate your elaboration!
Although you didnt cite it, it appears as though you are quoting the Genealogy of Morals. Firstly, I will just briefly comment that I think Nietzsche does a good job at outlining the historical facts about the development of [human] morality, but I dont think his conclusion that there is no objective morality (to paraphrase) is correct. For example, I see absolutely no incoherence with me accepting Nietzsches genealogy of morals, and accepting that morals are stance-independent (albeit obviously not what he was going for). The common problem with Nietzsches moral anti-realism is that the evidence and support for it is entirely lacking in his works, because, quite frankly, he takes as granted the Dostoevskian idea that ~without God, everything is permitted. He makes absolutely no positive case for moral anti-realism in any of his works, and just primarily asserts it as an implication from the premise that God doesnt exist.
Anyways, let me address specifically your use of his work here.
This is correct and perfectly well with my theory (although I am sure you seeing it as in opposition to my view in the OP): people have associated what is good with what is God (e.g., classical theism) for a LONG time; and it has only been recently in human history that we have found God to be irrelevant to what is good (or at least this is increasingly popular view amongst moral realists nowadays).
When I say that historically people have used notions of goodness that refer to either hypothetical or actual perfection (in the sense that I outlined it in the OP), I mean theism as an example of it. It is not a coincidence that the historical progression even within theism about Gods omnibenevolent nature has evolved such that we have slowly understood it to be universal harmony and unity.
The historical analysis that you quoted here is all fine and correct, but you conclusion from it is not.
In short, the farther back one goes into human history, the closer a persons notion of (moral) goodness is to the most egoistic context of self-harmony and self-unity; and the farther forward goes into human history, the closer a persons notion of (moral) goodness is the most universal context of self-harmony and self-unity. All Nietzsche is doing in the Genealogy of Morals is providing most of the justification for this (without meaning to). He just sees this evoluation as a shift in tastes towards universal harmony and unity as opposed to an actual objective (moral) progression towards it.
So, yes, there are periods of history, a while ago, where it was common to define good terms relative to the elites tastes or values; but, to my point, they still by-at-large recognized, implicitly at least in their notions of goodness, that what is good, in its most abstract form, is self-harmony and self-unity; which is self-apparent, in the case of an aristocracy, when one asks an elite noble what is good for them. People recognize almost innately the form of The Good when it comes to themselves: thats why I think the most fundamental, primitive, and easily-understood context of moral goodness is egoismit is incredibly obvious to almost anyone that what is best for them is to be in harmony and unity with themselves even if they cannot abstract out this form and apply it universally.
I dont see how your quote about aristocracies demonstrated my dualism (with respect to goodness) is a false dilemma or, as you put it, a reduction. I think, to be charitable, that you think that the fact that people have used terms like good in very egoistic ways is somehow not completely reflected in my binary analysisand I am here to say it does (;
I understand the general approach you are taking, but you still have not given an example of a form of goodness that cannot be fit into my dualism; nor have you demonstrated, in the abstract, that it is, in the case of goodness, a false dilemma.
Aesthetic goodness is the same as your beautiful goodness, as far as I can tell, and I have already addressed how that is subsumable under my category of pragmatic goodness because, as mentioned before, it is the analysis of a things perfection for being beautiful. Aesthetic goodness, then, is not something that is being reduced away with my dualism.
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
I understand that you think that good is always perfect, but what I was wondering was do you think that perfection can ONLY be good?
Ok Bob. How does the perfect nuclear weapon fit into your schema? Since human beings are arguably impairing the perfect balance of our eco-sphere, utilizing the perfect nuclear weapon to erase humanity would seem to be an ideal example of goodness.
That is precisely where I was going. You took the words right out of my mouth ;)
Yes, I kind of figured. It was only a matter of time.
Haha, I was biding my time, but not getting an answer, so you were probably right to forge ahead.
Our ability to analyze "goodness" has limits. In this I believe we agree. I approach the task more simply combining "hypothetical" and "actual" starting with Arestolte's Doctrine of the Mean(1), then combining harmonic application(2). Lastly, accepting this process, this ubiquitous human struggle is a constant and fundamental: 'self Vs. self-in-society'(3).
[Apologies for the giant-sized image!]
(1)
(2)"Strictly speaking, there are no such things as good and bad impulses. Think once again of a piano. It has not got two kinds of notes on it, the "right" notes and the "wrong" ones. Every single note is right at one time and wrong at another. The Moral Law is not any one instinct or any set of instincts: it is something which makes a kind of tune (the tune we call goodness or right conduct) by directing the instincts.
--C.S. Lewis, 1952
(3)"Our whole life is startlingly moral. There is never an instant's truce between virtue and vice
--Henry David Thoreau, Walden, 1854
The problem is that there will always be holes in philosophical ideas, some more than others. But even the best philosophers have holes in their theories. Whenever I post a reply to something, I am already aware of the holes in my viewpoint, but I'm not going to point them out lol. If someone sees them, great. It would be so boring if we all just took everything said as being 'perfectly' correct. (I'm not sure I believe that anything is perfect btw. It seems unlikely) Sometimes though, to address a hole, we need to change tack. It's all just a part of life's rich tapestry. Haha philosophy overdose! *she explodes*
I think some people feel they can avoid such pitfalls if their logic is stringent enough (without being aware that extreme-logicism can itself constitute one of the "holes" of which you speak).
Perfection (for a purpose or as it is in-itself) is always (pragmatically or morally) good all else being equal. All else not being equal, the context matters.
For example, it may be that a clock is good for telling the time but that, for a particular person, they want a clock that also looks beautiful and, so, a particular clock that, all else being equal, is pragmatically good [for telling the time] is not "good" for this particular person (because it is, let's say, very ugly).
For example, it may be that a nerve-agent poison is good because it is actual perfection all else being equal (because it is in self-harmony and self-unity) but that it not something which is "good" in the greater context of societal or universal self-harmony and self-unity.
Hopefully that helps.
Bob
Good question! @Beverley this is another example that I think fits in with your questions.
A nuclear weapon is hypothetically perfect if it suits a particular purpose well (e.g., if my goal is to cause mass destruction, then this is perfect for that); and it is actually perfect if its parts are in harmony and unity. However, I think what you are trying to convey is that it is painfully obvious that nuclear weapons are not better for the greater good--so what's going on here?
The problem with your implication here is that my brief elaboration of hypothetical and actual perfection are within the context of all else being equal. The further context, which breaks that stipulation, is required for your implication here to hold water.
All else not being equal, a nuclear weapon is not something that would be in the best of possible worlds because it is anti-thetical to universal harmony and unity (i.e., self-unity and self-harmony where the self-reference is a universal context).
Likewise, it is entirely possible, with all that being said, that the use of a nuclear weapon may be "good" insofar as it is good for working towards universal harmony and unity (e.g., maybe bombing the Nazis pans out as a good action, overall).
In practical life, we use pragmatic goodness as a stepping stone towards moral goodness.
Bob
:up:
As I put it, however, it is not clear that this is anti-thetical to universal harmony. The human race is arguably more anti-thetical to universal harmony than would be its elimination.
This is really the point, your position is absolutely rife with assumptions, which are value-laden. Which is the larger point. So even from a pragmatic standpoint, we require guidelines to conduct that are thought to be valid, hence moral normativity.
I find this division to be problematic. I agree that perfection of a single purpose (really not a thing per say to me) can be understood at least. I call that functional worthiness.
When you say actual perfection or moral perfection, I can agree with the term moral perfection but the relationship to me seems improperly defined. Moral perfection or simply actual perfection and its relationship to the other kind of perfection mentioned is that moral perfection is functional perfection for all purposes. Do you see how that way of stating the relationship adds clarity?
Quoting Bob Ross
And I would surmise that this example of a harmonious perfection is incorrect. That is to say, there is no lapse in perfection within any state of reality. We already have the potential for perfection, moral or absolute perfection, now. It is a tautology that this perfection is all that there is, really.
In our foolishness we deny that this potential is as meaningful as it is. We get confused by the temporary states we see or think we see of imperfection. We then incorrectly theorize some delusional desire as perfection, instead of understanding that we live amid a whole that is already perfection.
I state this all the time and here I will again: Peace is delusional. War or conflict or change, choose your word, is non-delusional. The accompanying delusion of time is also no help to us, occluding the truth of extant perfection from our limited senses. It is perhaps easier to understand that perfection is true if we suppose to eliminate the delusion of time.
So, it is the denigration of war, an immoral act, that causes this goofy desire, this delusion of peace as possible. I do indeed propose that this denigration of change/conflict/war is in fact immoral and the often giddy and foolish wish for peace is likewise immoral. That means that many of our ideas of what perfection really is are wrong (and will continue to be so, hopefully in lesser ways as we earn wisdom).
Quoting Bob Ross
I disagree entirely.
The problem is that amid perfection and unity, any is all. The fact that you state the above paragraph the way you do means you do not realize or believe this, or you are again going off on some academic exercise and not stating beliefs which as mentioned in a previous thread is confusing and somewhat disingenuous (even if specifically stated as such).
If any is all then there is no 'level' to goodness. And in fact that makes sense because if morality is objective (and I believe it is) then any aspect of good is only precisely equal to any other aspect of good. Their is no hierarchy. That would be order-apology or believing that order was superior to chaos, an immoral position. Likewise chaos-apology or believing that chaos was superior to order, is an immoral position. Order is often thus immorally conflated with the good, and chaos is often immorally conflated with evil.
You seem to me to confuse or conflate order and lower level good or pragmatism. And then you confuse or conflate chaos and higher level good or idealism. Neither can be correct! Both conflations are wrong.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is incorrect to me. Hypothetical is actual to me. Imagination is real. State changes are actually almost impossible to imagine if they are impossible really. Therefore they are not impossible, just improbable. Pragmatism properly expressed is the limit as intent approaches idealism. This has the proper ascetic as asymptotes extend into infinity showing the relative difficulty of perfection.
What is missing here then for clarity is a better way of saying 'every way' in which perfection can be had. That missing element is the list of virtues that are all equal as mentioned in other threads. These discrete virtues each have pragmatic orderly limits within their approach to their specific virtue perfections. The sum total of all of these infinite limits is the elusive total or moral perfection. But see how instead the 'lesser' and 'higher' goodnesses by your description do not fit properly the real world. Instead both pragmatism (fear) order and idealism (desire) chaos both (along with wisdom (anger) balance) must be mixed at all 'levels' of goodness, reaching to perfection.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is a false equivalence. Egoism for the good is or can be perfectly good. So say ego alone is not immoral. This is a truism with goodness that is confusing to many. Biased for the good is good. Bias for anything no good is 'evil'. This truth makes things as tricky as they really are because so many incorrect interpretations of what is good and evil abound.
Likewise altruism can be perverted and be for 'evil' causes and often is. The road to hell is indeed often paved with (fake) good intentions. That is to say if the intentions were GOOD then they would not lead to hell. So if intentions lead to hell then they were never perfectly GOOD in the first place. Most of the old aphorisms are horribly immoral and not wisdom at all.
Quoting Bob Ross
As you probably know, I do not like the term morality used this way. If morality is objective, and I believe it is, then one must learn to speak in terms of morality and what we do. We do not do morality. People do not have morals at all. They have immoral beliefs only. That is true. The question is not if the belief is immoral because it is. No one and no one belief is perfect. It is in the true nature of perfection to remain elusive and unreachable. So discussing belief (and fact also since facts are only a subset of beliefs) is discussing immorality. Notice how a discussion that starts out properly discussing moral agents immorality only, not their morality, is always more correct. I highly recommend we change to that way of speaking and writing about it to avoid other obvious errors.
Quoting Bob Ross
We agree that the destination of perfection is state independent. Yes. But that is not helpful when you suggest we can be objective. We cannot be objective. We are not perfect. So all assertions, all beliefs, all facts, are immoral as stated and always slightly wrong. It is again better to speak or write in this way, than it is to suggest a comforting lie to people, that they can get to objectivity or perfection. No, that is hubris and makes us all prone to more error.
Quoting Bob Ross
I disagree. These studies may try to be objective but we must admit that they will fail. Pragmatism is the fear-based cowardice that demands a short-cut to the effort required for moral choice. This is the efficient demand of fear and it is foolish. You say it is essential. It is not.
Courage allows us to stand to the unknown and anger pushes fear aside and into balance, the calmed state. The unknown is tautological because we are not perfect. Anger is required to face the unknown and this is not without fear, but instead in balance with fear. And amid that balance another balance must also be struck. That is the powerful pull of perfection (desire) must also be balanced so that we do not rush over eager into immorality (self-indulgence). That is the tendency of desire. Again anger must balance this and with desire keep us in conflicted balance all the way throughout experience. This conflicted balance is effectively ongoing and eternal war.
Quoting Bob Ross
These are heinous Pragmatic lies (of course only in my opinion).
Pragmatism is fear only and an order centric view of moral goodness. You are conflating order and the good and that is immoral.
Idealism is every single bit as needed amid intent as is Pragmatism. Idealism in this sense is the desire side pull of perfection to every ideal. It is chaos because it beckons in all ways at the same time causing people to take rather random seeming paths through intent space towards perfection.
Democracy is an immoral sham based improperly on the intrinsic worthiness of all. The trouble is that is another foolish conflation. In conflating intrinsic worthiness with functional worthiness an unwise person believes that since we are all intrinsically worthy, we are all functionally worthy. In the case of Democracy the presumption is that the functional worthiness to vote wisely is included with intrinsic worthiness and nothing could be further from the truth. Socrates himself warned us against Democracy 2500 years ago and we are still not to that level of wisdom in daily affairs.
Sophocracy, a rule of the wise at least attempts to measure wisdom, allow voting only from the wise, and since there must be some elite, it makes sure that the elites are at least formed using the least corruptible trait in the trait index by definition, wisdom. After you test for and locate the wise, then you can have your nod to Democracy. Let qualified brain surgeons only operate on brains. Let qualified wise voters only vote. Until we all face that truth, human governments are all immoral shams.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is not true either.
Goodness is normative. But one can be excused within reason for saying something as foolish as that goodness is not normative. That is because a moral action or intent is the single hardest thing a moral agent can do or choose. Effort increases as moral caliber increases. In other words it gets harder and harder to make more and more GOOD choices. This is the disguise of non-normative goodness that you missed seeing. I see that disguise.
It is no wonder that people are confused. Perfection is elusive and unattainable. Pragmatism is a tempting cop-out just the same that wishful thinking idealism is a tempting cop-out. But balance and anger are well aware of the struggle and the need to suffer to earn real wisdom.
The 'shoulds' are natural moral laws of the universe, objective and unchanging. Genuine happiness is the consequence of any choice aligning with perfection alone, an intent towards perfection. And lesser degrees of happiness are granted to aims and intents less in alignment or resonance with what is objectively good. Thus unhappiness is the consequence of all imperfect intents which means all intents but the key is that unhappiness increases by the degree of misalignment with an objectively perfect intent (the hardest thing in the universe).
But how can we progress towards something that MAY be possible, but that we can see no real example of in the world in which we live? In this case, it could be completely fictitious. Or how is this any different from such skeptics suggestions of, for example, the world being controlled by pink and yellow spotted beings, which are controlling our minds from brains stored in vats? This could be just as true as the idea of something being perfect due to existing in harmony with itself. In fact, the pink and yellow spotted beings seem to hold more weight because with them, at least we can give more details about the situation. Then, if one day, we all wake up and see pink and yellow spotted beings around us, we would know the pink and yellow spotted being theory was true; we would be able to spot it (haha couldnt resist the pun ;)).
But if we all woke up one day and everything was working in perfect harmony, would we all just automatically, magically know? Or, would we all be perfectly working in harmony too and therefore we would perfectly know and not even have to think about it? But if we were all perfect, why would we even have to know anything? There would be no point in knowing. What would be the point for anything if everything was totally perfect? So, from my point of view at least, that is not good. Bring me back varying levels of imperfection, and with it the joy of working bloody hard against all odds and seeing improvements and feeling a sense of real achievement. That to my imperfect mind is good. Bring back the people who, although not superheroes, fight for others who need help, despite achieving no obvious gain for themselves the person who jumps in front of a gunman to save a life just purely on instinct. Not a perfect thing to do, but *she takes a breath* am I making any sense at all? Does anybody think Im making any sense? (In my head I am, but my head may be a very odd thing.)
Anyway, I think I got sidetracked somewhat, but what I was originally responding to was the notion of progressing towards the idea of this perfect good.
Quoting Tom Storm
I am pretty sure the answer to that was 'no'.
Quoting Tom Storm Still no evidence of one, at least that fits with what I've asked for below (which I think is what you were also looking for.)
Quoting Pantagruel
Pretty much impossible to say if or how it may achieve perfect harmony... unless one is perfect themselves of course.
Quoting Corvus
Yes, it makes me wonder, what is the point?
It seems to me as if we can only really understand what this type of perfection is exactly (not vaguely, as in imagining...
Quoting Bob Ross
...but being able to list all the things exactly and say how they interact, and how they are in unity, if we are perfect ourselves. But since we are not, how can we achieve something that we cannot even describe or precisely imagine? How can we even attempt to proceed in that direction when we dont even know which direction that is? (And this is all assuming that this thing is achievable and not simply a made-up thing) But furthermore, if this thing is not present in the world in which we now live, then how much use can imagining or discussing anything about it be? It seems as if we may as well discuss the pink and yellow spotted beings.
Ah, I think I see what you are asking about: essentially, is a world with harmony and unity without any subjects equal to, greater than, or less than in moral worth to one with subjects?
My answer is that, all else being equal, they are equal in moral worth because they are equally (actually) perfect (in terms of their state). However, not all else being equal, the world with subjects (which are properly aligned with moral goodness) has a better length of preservation of that state (of actual, universal perfection) and, consequently, is going to be a better possible world.
Now, a couple things to address with that being said:
1. The human race, being capable of the greatest capacities of rational behavior, are not more anti-thetical to universal harmony; in fact, they are essential to upholding and enacting such a world.
2. The more intelligent a being is, the more useful it is towards reaching and upholding actual, universal perfection; and so it is going to be pragmatically more valuable for morality than less intelligent beings as well as non-life.
Because of this, it is pragmatically better for morality to train and modify the views and behaviors of humans to be aligned with reaching and upholding universal harmony rather than eliminating them. So, with that in mind, it is anti-thetical to reaching and preserving universal harmony to eliminate humans (in the grand scheme of things).
In other words, in a nutshell, if we are just considering the state of universal harmony (and unity), then both worlds (mentioned at the onset of this response) are equal in moral worth; BUT, if we are also considering the length of preservation of that state [of universal harmony], then the best possible world is one with the maximum amount of intelligent beings with the maximal amount of intelligence whereof all of them are perfectly aligned with upholding universal harmony.
Hopefully that helps.
Bob
The world is full of examples of this form of moral goodness. Have you not seen something that is in an optimal degree of self-harmony and self-unity such that its parts produce a task incredibly efficiently? Have you not experienced a state of peace between things, as opposed to conflict and violence?
The difference is that these hypotheses you have mentioned are unparsimonious and unfalsifiable. The form of moral goodness is parismonious and falsifiable. Not to mention, some of them are just nonsense with no real evidence for them (such a the pink and yellow spotted beings); which is clearly not the case with my analysis of moral goodness.
You would know it just as much or as little as when you wake up to there being yellow and pink spotted beings. Most people, I think, are able to comprehend what a state of harmony and unity is, just as much as what a spots of yellow and pink are.
One needs knowledge to act. In a world full of subjects with universal harmony and unity, actions still exist. Subjects are still doing things.
I am not claiming that everyone will value moral goodness; I am merely outlining what it is.
Moreover, yes, it could be less satisfactory for humans, as we are now in our evolutionary process, to be in a perfect world; but this doesnt mean we should strive for imperfection but, rather, that we have evolved in a way to feel that way.
I suggest that you read the entirety of me and Tom Storms interaction, because I gave several.
Bob
I did see you giving an example of a calculator and a jungle, but i couldn't find an example where you explained how each part of it was in harmony. I don't think this would be possible, and that is the problem.
But there is nothing that is PERFECTLY efficient and harmonious, and this is what your definition stipulated.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, but not PERFECT peace. Again, you stipulated perfection. There is no example of perfection due to something being in total harmony. This is why it is impossible to describe this kind of total harmony, because we only have a vague idea of what it would be, as we have never experienced it in real life.
Quoting Bob Ross
But unless you can see an example of this in real life, it is possible that it does not exist, or it is as likely to exist as the pink and yellow spotted beings. You are going into the realm of all things that MAY be possible, which could be anything, including pink and yellow spotted beings. This idea of something being in perfect harmony could simply be something you made up in your head.
Quoting Bob Ross
Sure, we may know what harmony and unity is, but not PERFECT harmony and unity. There is a massive difference. In real life, there is always something opposing perfect harmony.
Quoting Bob Ross
What would we need to do if everything was perfect?
Quoting Bob Ross
I agree with this because we need to strive for something, otherwise we lose the motivation to live. But i seriously doubt we will ever reach perfection, if it is even something that exists, or could exist.
So you are assuming that rationality has a universal value. Ok. What about aesthetics? What about sentimentality? What about the inherent value of free-will? Perhaps the inherent value of free-will is the culmination of "harmonious value" - qua the material product of the evolutionary process. In which case, the most harmonious universe is actually the one filled with the greatest degree freedom.
Considering the destruction of the Middle East and Southeast Asia by Yankees for decades and the political destabilisation of several American countries, bombing the twin towers and the Pentagon pans out as a good action too, insofar as it hit the financial and logistical center of those operations, thus working towards a universal harmony?
Firstly, the examples I gave are examples of actual perfection; but they do not exemplify necessarily anything in the actual world.
Secondly, you are absolutely correct in questioning the actual possibility of actual perfection, in the sense of something being at 100% perfection, because it is foreseeable that everything in reality is subjected to change by external pressures/things which, in turn, will hinder its ability to be 100% in harmony and unity. This is a perfectly reasonable worry to expound. My response to this is to note that this is an ideal and, as such, does not need to be 100% actualizable to be impactful in ethics. Every major ethical theory, and any worth any salt, are driven, at their core, by ideals and not the limitations of the foreseeable, actual world.
Total harmony is easily describable: it is when everything in question is resonating in a peaceful manner with each thing. One can know things that they have never directly experienced (e.g., 1 + 1 = 2, a ? b, law of noncontradiction, law of excluded middle, etc.). Likewise, we use ideals all the time, which by definition have never been experienced at 100%; for example, that no innocent person should go to prison is a commonly accepted principle BUT it is not clear that it is actualizable, 100%, in society: theres always someone that gets convicted of a crime they didnt commit and put in prison. Math is another great example, our mathematical models of reality are estimations and not exact, precise descriptions. Logic is another great example. Etc.
If we are to take this critique seriously, then we would have to reject all knowledge that isnt knowledge derived from experience; which is going to a heck of a lot more than you think. You will need to reject math, logic, the principle of sufficient reason, all known laws of nature, all ideals, pretty much all of ethics, etc.
I am perfectly happy admitting that one can have valid knowledge that goes beyond the possibility of all experience. No problem.
100% harmony and unity is (actual) perfection, and 100% self-harmony and self-unity (i.e., 100% perfection) is, of course, plausibly impossible. Thats fine.
Live our lives, in peace.
The point of an ideal is not that one can ever reach it: it is that, even if one cant reach it, they strive towards it.
For example, human society generally strives towards world peace and equal rights of humans; but this isnt foreseeably realizable either. Right now we do not know if it is even possible to setup a society or societies on earth such that there is 100% equality. Does this mean we give up on it or claim it is an invalid pursuit? Of course not!
Bob
I dont know what you mean by this, so I am going to default to answering no.
I was saying that rationality has pragmatic worth/value for moral progression. If thats what you mean here, then yes.
For aesthetics, I would say it has no analogous worth for moral progression and preservation; other than perhaps some consequences for helping motivate people.
For sentimentality, ditto ^.
For free will, this is prerequisite to rationality; the degree of rational capacities is proportional to the degree of free will a thing has. So, yes, this also has proportional (to rationality) pragmatic worth/value for moral progression and preservation.
So we need to be careful here: I am not saying that the most harmonious possible world is the one with the most rationality. All else being equal, it is entirely possible for there to be a 100% rational world with 0% harmony. I was pointing out, rather, that the best possible world which has achieved a state of universal harmony will have 100% rationality geared towards the preservation of that state. Same goes for free will, being a prerequisite of rationality.
Bob
That's going to depend on politics, especially how good/bad one thinks the US is. I am a supporter of the US (by-at-large) and I am not convinced that what you described was a progression towards universal harmony and unity, so I would say no.
More abstractly, the point is that the goal is to try to work towards universal harmony and unity; and to do so in a manner that ensures its preservation. If you believe that bombing the twin towers does this, then, in principle, yes it would be morally good. I just don't believe that is the case.
Strange that to make an abstract point you had to use the industrial mass murder of Europeans as an example, instead of something like euthanising serial killers or castrating rapists.
Quoting Bob Ross
I wonder why. Perhaps the same reason why such a moral perversion as the hypothetical and historical nuking of civilians is relativised. I said strange but I was not shocked at all; the longer I live the better I see what Evola meant with racial soul.
Quoting Bob Ross
Isn't it your position that morality is objective? So how does it depend? If morality refers to a verifiable fact outside of the mind (meaning of objective), surely it does not depend on opinion, ¿no?
It seems sufficiently transparent to me that either both nuking Germans and running a plane into the twin towers is moral (under this hypothetical), or neither are moral, or morality is not objective.
yes, I see that.
Quoting Bob Ross
Okay, that is fine if you accept that. But it still stands that, since there are no concrete examples of these, they are no more provable than beings with pink and yellow spots. Just because YOU BELIEVE them to be true, it doesnt mean that they are. As your belief, that is fine, and i totally respect that, but if you want to state this as a fact, you need to back it up with proof. And there is no concrete proof from real life, as we know it.
Hey look, I think it is a wonderful idea. How amazing would it be if we had no pain, or strife or war and conflict. If we all lived in harmony with each other, and if we all realized that we are all pretty much the same and hence, we all cared for each other because we could all see from each other's point of view.
But unfortunately, this never happens. It is sad, but what actually happens is this: there is a majority of people in this world who just want to be happy and have the basic things, such as food, water, shelter and companionship and respect from others. Then there are a very slight minority who are power greedy and think, if I can con enough people, then I can feel better and be better than all those other people. The only thing is that, they are kidding themselves, and not only are they kidding themselves, but they are hurting others at the same time.
I do not see you as a power crazy person who doesn't care about others at all. I could be wrong I suppose, but I think not. I just do not see any examples of perfection in real life, and this makes me think that they do not exist, which I don't think is unreasonable. Now of course, I could be wrong. But so could you. Which person would i prefer to be wrong? Of course, i would prefer me to be wrong, and for there to be the possibility of a perfectly good world with everyone living in harmony with each other. How amazing would that be?
And also, this whole notion that there is some kind of behaviour-transcending "perfection" can be utilized to justify any action that the believer believes is consonant with it. ie. it is a rationality which is conducive to the abuses of extremism. Very dangerous.
It was one example that illustrated the point: you are splitting hairs here.
I am not interested in derailing the conversation into politics. It has absolutely no relevance to the OP. If you would like to discuss, then please create a new thread, and I will respond in there.
You are just cherry-picking information and reading quotes out of context. I never said that what is morally good is stance-dependent. Never once. What you quoted is me saying that whether or not you believe the US is by-at-large good (or better for the world than if it didnt exist) is going to depend on politics (of which I am not interested in derailing into). Whether or not they are by-at-large good is stance-independent, but not your belief. For the sake of the OP, all that is worth mentioning on this point is:
One of our beliefs is factual or neither are factual; and I believe that the US has by-at-large helped progress the west into a morally better (set of) societies. Thats not to say the US is a saint.
Vaskane, insults do not help further the discussion: I am not interested in disrespectful, unproductive, and ingenuine comments.
You still have of yet to properly defend your only point (that I have been able to decipher) which is that the moral and pragmatic categories of goodness are mistaken reductionisms of morality; and since you refuse to engage in the actual comments I made in our discussion multiple times now, I am going to assume you don't have any support for your claim (until you actually engage in it).
I was not claiming that the US has only ever done good things; rather, that by-at-large they have been good for the development of humanity (especially in the west). This is not binary thinking at all: binary thinking on this subject would be to say that the US is either done 100% good or 0% good (i.e., 100% bad). Admitting there are degrees to it and conceding that they have also done bad things does not fit your narrative of me.
I have no clue what comment you are referring to: could you please quote it?
With all due respect, you keep alluding to Nietzschien thought without being able to elaborate and backup those claims. Just to give you an idea where my head is at, I am very well versed in Nietzsche [believe it or not (; ], as he is one is one of my favorite philosophers; so it isn't helpful for me to understand your view when you simply make quick-witted, allusions to Nietzschien thought: you need to dive in deeper and explain and defend that position so that we can have a productive conversation. I tried to do that a while back by elaborating on my thoughts about Nietzsche, but you ignored it and, instead, sent this unsubstantive response (and I say that with all due respect: it is clear you put no effort into this response, and this makes it very hard for me to have a productive conversation with you).
EDIT
Also, just as a side note, "Beyond Good and Evil" is literally a work about, at its core, moral anti-realism. I just note that because I am not sure if you realize that Nietzsche is not arguing for merely that good vs. evil is a false dilemma (i.e., a mistaken reductionism); but, rather, he is arguing for the non-facticity of morality itself. If you are actually using that as your justification, then we will need to dive into metaethics; because my OP is about a moral realist position. Just food for thought (:
I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob
What exactly are you questioning the facticity of (in my view)?
I never claimed that it is a fact that a 100% morally perfect entity exists. This was never something I even attempted to claim, nor would I.
Whether or not we can 100% realize moral goodness universally is a separate question from (1) what moral goodness is and (2) what factually gets us closer to that state and (3) what helps us preserve our progress.
Your entire OP is based upon a false definition followed by an unending stream of equivocation between goodness and perfection, which are manifestly not the same thing, as pretty much everyone has agreed, except for you. Trying to further equivocate with harmony only makes your reasoning more precarious.
The primary historical meaning of goodness is not perfection, it is virtue, which is understood to be independent of pragmatic concerns. This is why it is possible to do good, to do the right thing, even in the face of overwhelming odds, even when the right or good actions fail. This is the entire significance of deontological ethics. Indeed, many philosophers believe (and I agree) that actions which are done out of pragmatism do not qualify as moral; rather, only those actions which are done out of the sense of duty.
I am questioning the idea of anything being perfect. I am saying that it could be impossible, or simply a made up concept, since there is no evidence of it. If this is the case, according to your definition, goodness also does not exist. Now, something is clearly amiss here. This would suggest that there is something wrong with your definition.
This makes so much sense to me. I haven't studied ethics, but this simply makes sense. Hooray!
:up:
This idea of universal perfection seems to get more bizarre the more I think about it.
First of all, I still fail to see how we would proceed if everything was perfect. What would be the motivation to do anything?
I suppose we could assume that once universal perfection was reached, there could be no going back, as in, nothing could slip back into imperfection because, well, everything would be perfect, so there would be no flaws, and therefore, possibility of regression. (Hmm, I cant help but feeling a sense of being trapped in this case. It seems unsettling.)
Okay so, if everyone was perfect then everyone would have to live in perfect equality, otherwise, one person would be at an advantage, and that situation would be imperfect. Everyone would need to have access to the same facilities, food etc If I had one more carrot than my neighbour, or Joe Bloggs who lives on the other side of the globe, then that would constitute an imperfection. And here we already begin to see how this situation seems impossible.
Furthermore, there could be no illness, as that would be an imperfection. But if there was no illness, then surely people could not die. They could not die from failure of their bodies, but it would seem as if they could not die from accidents either, because they would be the result of imperfections. What about natural disasters? Well, an earthquake would represent a pretty bit imperfection, so that could not happen. But then the structure of the earth would have to be perfected somehow, as would the structure of all celestial bodies. The sun, for example, appears to be pretty destructive and imperfect, however, of course, we need the sun. Somehow, the sun, and all stars, would have to be changed, in fact, the whole structure and design of the universe would need to change. Could it be done? It seems like utter nonsense to me.
But strangely, if everything was perfect which some may think would be extremely good then conversely, it seems as if good may not even be possible any longer. You couldnt point to something and say, That is a good because everything would be perfect, so one thing could not be better than the other. Also, if there was no hardship, and nobody needed to struggle or try, then a selfless act, carried out by someone who does not benefit from it, means nothing because that person doesnt need any benefit because everything around them would be perfect. And anyway, there would be nobody that needed a selfless act. There would be no point in goodness. It seems as if goodness is only relevant in contrast to badness, but if there is no badness, then goodness would be irrelevant. So, this universal perfection, which is supposed to be ultimately good, cannot be good anymore, and seems to contradict itself.
Is it just me, or does this perfect world seem to be the most annoying, boring and uninspiring place? I have a vision in my head of everyone walking around with some kind of fake smile on their faces (Maybe this is from a movie I have seen. I can imagine this as a movie, only the fake smiling people end up not being perfect as first thought and turn into mass murderers lol) However I try to picture this idea of a perfect world, it turns out being incredibly bad. But it could be just me.
Also, I admit, there may be flaws in my assessment of a perfect universe, but I still think it would turn out being nonsensical.
What is the relation between goodness and perfection?
Quoting Pantagruel
Is virtue (arete) unrelated to perfection?
Arete could also be translated as "excellence," and for Aristotle it was deeply related to perfection. This would be the use of perfection in sentences like "the glove is a perfect fit," or "thanks for working in my car, it's been running perfectly (without malfunction) ever since." This conception of perfection is grounded in function or purpose (telos).
But the idea of "virtue," singular, as opposed to the "virtues," is a modern innovation. The virtues were those excellences a person needed to fulfill their social role, and they might vary depending on the sort of person you were. The virtues required of a knight are not necessarily the same as those required by a nun, or a teacher, etc.
With the shift to market economies and mass production, social roles took on a declining importance in how people defined their lives. The products of people's labor was no longer largely consumed in the immediate community, so work could no longer be tied back to ones role in supporting the community (alienation). Thus, efforts were made to recontextualize ethics in terms of universal laws or principles "what can said to be good in every case."
There is an argument to be made that this is a mistaken outlook. Trying to develop ethics outside of a social context is like trying to develop a view of "the differences between men and women sans culture." It doesn't work because people don't live outside of a culture and community; ethics isn't practiced individually.
There are places where fairly objective lists of the virtues still exist in our modern world, and these tend to be professions with defined "practices." For example, it probably be far easier for us to reach agreement on what makes someone a "good scientist" or "good doctor," than what makes someone a "good person." This is the sort of analysis where the virtues were originally intended. Aristotle sets out the "life of contemplation," as the highest sort of life, but maintains that one may be virtuous and flourish in other types of life.
There are, of course, candidates for metavirtues that are required for all people to fulfill their roles. But modern ethics tends to focus more on the ethical nature of individual acts than "a good life," which is another complication. I personally find the older focus on the entire life/life narrative, "count no man happy/wise until he is dead," (Solon/The Book of Sirach) works better. The framing of good/bad in terms of free floating "acts" in a life makes it impossible to get a grip on the necessary context for ethical behavior.
Not at all. However I believe the more literal interpretation is "to excel", which certainly aligns with the fact that moral value aligns with actions.
Well here is what Aristotle says:
Quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a15
This is the central piece of his rough outline of the good of man (happiness).
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
On my reading Aristotle believes that phronesis is the staple virtue for the active life, for it includes the other virtues necessary for action, such as justice, temperance, fortitude, etc. It seems to me that these virtues will be necessary for the knight as well as for the teacher.
I don't think it is wrong to say that the entry point for a study of virtue is that of professions, and secondarily, social roles, but I wouldn't say that the ancients spoke only about virtues and not about virtue. Plato and Aristotle consider this problem explicitly, and of course Socrates is constantly interested in the unified sense of a predicate.
The virtues are the skills and talents needed to attain eudaimonia. There are many, so speaking of "attaining virtue," singular, would be similar to saying one needs to "attain skill," or "talent" to be a good musician. It's true, but there are particular forms. The English-language history is interesting here because if MacIntyre's sources in After Virtue are to be believed, speaking of a single "virtue," as in "the singular skill of being good," didn't enter English discourse until 18th century.
Plato does attempt to unify the virtues in the Protagoras, but in the sense that all virtues are born of knowledge, not that there is a single excellence required for "the good life." And of course Plato has a unified idea of the good, but that's not the same thing, although modern discourse has tended to flatten out "virtue" such that they start to become synonymous. "One must be virtuous to be a good person," becomes a tautology
The point is not that the virtues are wholly dependant on one's vocation or social status; Aristotle's analysis applies across these distinctions. It's that they are seated and expressed within a context on an entire life, which necessarily includes the aforementioned, rather than being applied to individual acts (this follows with eudaimonia also being achieved across a lifetime and its legacy). In an ethics based on the moral value of individual acts, the focus on skill/habit tends to get lost.
The polis shows up most robustly in contrast to thinkers like Hume, for whom morality must be about the concerns of the individual. For both Plato and Aristotle, there is a strong sense of a "shared good," e.g., Socrates' claims that it would make no sense for him to make his fellow citizens worse in the Apology. The point here is that there is nothing like the tendency to think in terms of "trade-offs," the way there is in modern ethical discourse, where we are always concerned with how much utility an individual must give up to obey some precept and "shared good," is just defined as "an instance where every individual benefits as an individual from the same good."
For the Greeks the term would be kalos as applied to human beings. For the Latins, beginning at least with Cicero, the term would be honestas. If what you say about MacIntyre is accurate then he seems to be missing these fairly obvious historical examples.* It is true that there is a simplification of moral vocabulary around the time of Hume, but I don't think it is at all correct to claim that before the 18th century there was no conception of virtue in the singular sense.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I would submit that in Plato's Republic justice is presented as the excellence of excellences, the keystone virtue that underlies the flourishing of the city and of the individual.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Okay, that's fair.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think this is right.
* Unless your claim that "virtue in the singular is a modern innovation" is not drawn from MacIntyre.
Literally every major use of the term good (or an equivalent in a different language) has been used, at its core, in one of the two senses. That is why I use the definition.
By goodness being identical to perfection, I do not mean to exclude the possibility of degrees thereof: I am more than happy to agree that something can be 58% good and thusly not perfect. In other words, just to clarify, I am not saying that a thing is only good if it is perfect but, rather, that 100% goodness is identical to perfection.
Although I may be misunderstanding you, it seems like your worry of equivocation [of the two] is predicated on the idea that I mean that something cannot be good, in any sense or degree, if it isnt perfect.
The reason I didnt go into depth on this in the OP, is that I wanted to keep it short and sweet; and see where the conversations lead me. I could whip up a much longer, substantive OP if you would like.
Virtue is certainly an example of one of many uses of the term goodness in a moral sense; and I can demonstrate how it is subsumable under my conception of moral goodness.
Any and every virtue ever considered in a serious manner by people, especially experts in the field of study (even prior to there being a formal field of study for it), is virtuous in virtue of cultivating a character that habitually strives towards universal harmony and unity. My challenge to you is to give me any virtue, which is considered a virtue in any serious literature or by-at-large by any society, and I will show you how it is only virtuous, at its core, in light of my conception of moral goodness. (:
Oh, I see. Properties can have degrees; e.g., something can have the property of 'being functional' without being 100% functional. Something can have the property of 'being in self-harmony and unity' without being in 100% self-harmony and unity.
Moral goodness when considered at 100% is perfection; but the lesser degrees, when a thing isn't quite at 100%, can still be considered good proportionally to what degree it sizes up to 'being in self-harmony and self-unity'.
So, no, it isn't that nothing morally good exists; but, rather, that nothing 100% morally good exists. Perhaps we can find common ground there (;
I literally just gave you the virtue of duty, including the sense in which actions can be considered deontologically virtuous meaning they are intrinsically valued, independent of their consequences.
The fact that you can ex post facto provide an explanation for something as being "harmonious" is not surprising, is it? With your penchant for creative definition your ability to explain almost anything would not surprise me.
I see. Hopefully I can clarify my position as we converse.
My response to this still is:
If by this you are just talking about your belief that the term good reflects nothing more than opinions of those who are very powerful, then I refer you back to my quote above.
If you mean something more than that, then please elaborate so I can adequately respond.
You are correct that harmony is the union of two or more things into a peaceful congruence; but I merely add unity to emphasize the union of everything in question and not just the mere harmony of certain subparts. Perhaps I should come up with a better way of describing it, but I think it conveys the point.
Secondly, complete disarray is the opposite of harmony [and unity]: the former is 100% disharmony [and disunity]; so I am not sure which part of the contrast you are saying is incorrect here.
No. Moral goodness is identical to self-harmony and self-unity; and the adjectives higher and lower are simply indicating the scope: the larger the context (viz., the larger the entity attributable to the property), the larger the good (i.e., the more good there is).
I am not boiling down goodness to higher vs. lower; they are further considerations about the scope.
No. Goodness in terms of levels is just the hierarchical structure one can formulate of the analyzable scopesi.e., the highest good is going to be universality with 100% goodness, the lowest as particularity with 0.000...0001% goodness, and all kinds of levels in between those twolike a spectrum.
Nietzsche, in that quote, was criticizing Kant because he didnt think that Kant supplied any real explanation of how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. To try to be charitable, I am assuming you mean that this is analogous to by claim that the highest goodness is that which is universal harmony and unity; but, then, I dont see how it is actually analogous: I gave ample justification for it.
As noted earlier, this is completely incorrect.
Hmmm
You are confusing my use of harmony with one specific use of the term: it doesnt just mean resonation of things by finding a middle ground, like in musical tunes. Harmony is also, in a different but related sense, about peaceful congruence; which isnt always finding the middle between two extremes.
Without elaboration, I have no means of responding adequately to any of this part. I stand by my critique of Nietzsche, and you didnt even try to refute it.
Although it may not have seemed like it, I am and have not been insulted by you (:
I simply do not wish nor like to engage in ad hominems and unsubstantive banter. Its not productive, and it doesnt make either of us more knowledgeable nor better.
Yeah, I just dont see these as reductionisms; other than that, obviously, conceptions and ideas are phantasms of the real worldbut this is true of all language and renders this counter-argument trivial and useless.
Bob
If me demonstrating how your examples are subsumable under my position is 'ad hoc'ing it' ('ex post facto'ing it') and 'thusly' invalid, then, Pantagruel, what are you looking for me to do to justify my position to you?
How can I possibly convince you otherwise, if you see every possible justification as ad hoc explanations? I chose to ask you for a virtue so I can demonstrate how it is subsumable under my terms because I thought that would help you see my position; but it seems like, even then, you wouldn't. So, what would convince you? What can I do?
Morality is and always has been about human actions, it is the essence of morality:
The domain of morality is the domain of duty. Duty is prescribed behaviour. (Durkheim, Moral Education).
I'll go with Emile Durkheim lecturing at the Sorbonne any day as one of my authoritative views on the basic nature of morality:
(Moral) authority does not reside in some external, objective fact....it consists entirely in the conception that men have of such a fact; it is a matter of opinion, and opinion is a collective thing.
Here you go again not engaging in the conversation... :roll:
I am using the definitions that make the most historical sense when the historical notions of goodness are refined to the level of a conception.
This is a completely irrelevant passage from Nietzsche, that doesn't address anything I said in my response nor the OP.
Here go again asserting the Nietzschien assumption of moral anti-realism; without a shred of evidence to back it up.
When did I ever say that??? This is so disingenuous.
You are now importing your own view of what is good without any shred of justification for nor elaboration on it.
Nope. I am using in the sense of "agreement or concord", "the quality of forming a pleasing and consistent whole", "pleasing arrangement of parts : CONGRUENCE", "internal calm: TRANQUILITY", etc. These are all colloquial definitions that fit what I am conveying.
Which is not the same thing as finding the synthesis between complete disarray and order. The latter is one particular instance of the former, and you are treating it as if they are equivocal.
I mean the peaceful congruence of all parts of a thing, when I say a thing is in 100% self-harmony. This is not equivocal to being the synthesis of two extremes.
Yes, that's not the least bit abstract....
Natural systems do not exist in a state of "peaceful congruence." Natural systems if anything exist in a state of far from equilibrium meta-stability governed by non-linear dynamics.
I don't disagree with your desire to promote and investigate the idea of "harmony," and if that is all you are claiming, ok. But you need to step back from the many expansions and reductions and focus on one thing. What comes across is an attempt to foist a common-sense, naturalized umbrella encompassing everything that you feel aligns in some way with the notion of goodness, that does not in any way do justice to the notion of morality.
Firstly, lets take it one step at a time: do you agree or disagree with my response to your use of the term harmony? It is impossible for us to make any real headway, if you keep sporadically seguing into different points.
Secondly, you have misunderstood the OP: I never argued that something is morally good if it has utility, nor that it is relative to utility. I strongly suggest you re-read the OP.
Firstly, you have to specify which type of goodness you are referring to. Here, I am assuming you mean moral goodness.
Secondly, I would say that the property of moral goodness is being in a state of self-harmony and self-unity, and we attribute that property by degree of how well it sizes up thereto. E.g., something might have the property of being straight, such as a line, without actually being perfectly straightthe property doesnt change here and it doesnt itself have degrees but, rather, our attribution of that property to something does.
Not a single person, as of yet, has provided much justification for this other than blanket assertions; and not much discussion has, unfortunately, been had about it. I am more than happy to discuss this further if you would like.
What???? Please re-read the OP: this demonstrates a clear lack of understanding of the OP. I never claimed any of this: not even in the responses I have made in this thread. Not once.
Since you brought up with completely irrelevant point, I will clarify that I am, in fact, an agnostic: so, no, I do not believe in God or gods as I suspend judgment on it.
This is all completely irrevelant, ad hominem attacks...and 99% of them are completely false anyways. I am not a theist, and I dont know where you got that idea (in this thread).
Bob
How natural systems are has nothing to do with how they should be, in the sense that how it is does not directly inform us of how it ought to be. So I don't see how this is a valid counter to my position.
Just to clarify, I am not claiming that morality is just about what is morally good: this is, indeed, an invalid oversimplification. It is about assessing what should be, and thusly what actions should be conducted, relative to the standard of moral goodness. The moral goodness analysis is only one piece of the puzzle.
So, just to clarify, I am not claiming that it does complete justice to our notions of morality and not even goodness but, rather, moral goodness.
Hopefully that helps.
Bob
Indeed it is not, it is the essence of morality to be prescriptive.
However, as a final note, I will say that, if your theory is accurate, it ought to be conducive to harmony (otherwise what is the point?) In fact, it appears to have had the exact opposite effect. Which tends to testify against its validity.
:confused:
I agree that morality has a prescriptive element to it; but 'what is good' is not prescriptive at all. I very much subscribe to the ontological is-ought gap.
I don't understand: could you please elaborate?
Well your theory is about conduciveness to harmony as a kind of ideal. Kant's theory about the inherent morality of duty is expressed eloquently through his categorical imperative, "act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." The content and meaning of the theory and its expression are synonymous.
So how does your theory contribute and conduce to what the theory describes? As I've observed, judging by the responses in this thread, it falls far short of producing any kind of harmony. If it doesn't either reflect or contribute to what it describes, of what value is it?
Yes, I do think that makes a lot more sense, to me anyway.
However... and I don't like this 'however' because I feel as if I want to agree. You have stood your ground and responded to so many different comments on here, and some have been pretty tough. I wonder if I could have done that?
But my nature is to look at things from ALL viewpoints, so that I may get a clearer idea of what I think is true. I question everything, myself included. I always have. Therefore, when I first 'found' philosophy, it fitted so much into how I seem to see things, and I tend to think that this is what philosophy is all about, reflected in the way that Socrates encouraged people to question their knowledge.
Bearing this in mind, the first thing that I thought of when I read your response was that, if we can accept that nothing is 100 percent perfect, then I wonder if any definition can be 100 percent perfect either. Now, I get the feeling you are going to say something about an 'ideal' of something, or some definition, being 100 percent perfect. But that just seems to return us to the problem of an 'ideal' being something that may not be real.
Okay, but here is another thought I've had: I've been trying to figure out how harmony can equal goodness, and it occurred to me that people whose lives have, through no fault of their own, unfortunately led to disharmony often seek to redress the imbalance in their lives by trying to bring harmony into other people's lives. In other words, people who have experienced 'bad' things often seek to help others who have experienced similar 'bad' things. This brings to my mind many different thoughts, but firstly, can I just ask, would you tend to respond that those people are not in harmony, and hence cannot be classed as 'good', because there is an imbalance in this situation? The imbalance is due to the fact that, by them helping others when they are at a disadvantage themselves, and not in harmony, then they are giving more than they are receiving, and hence are causing more imbalance? This seems strange to me, but it is the only way I can see to fit with your idea of harmony equaling goodness in this situation. I admit, I may be missing something, as I have not studied ethics, and I am just going by my own thoughts.
"According to new research, all six planets orbit the same star in resonance with each other, following an unwavering rhythm that has lasted billions of years."
~Emile Durkheim
Even in the video above, Alex doesn't push back on the idea that a world whcih has less suffering that the sum optimal suffering of all beings would be better....
But that's literally Sam's position on 'better'. It begs the question. If you give hiim the one free miracle all moralists need, he's away to the races and much faster and more accurate than the vast majority of thinking on the subject. But, it's still just his pet. There's nothing objective about 'assessing' something for a 'yes/no' action matrix. S is the source and the destination.
I have seen the entire interview - I follow O'Connor quite closely these days. I think he was the quiet winner here. Harris continues to not address the holes in his theories (i.e what I put forward above) and just runs with them as if he hadn't made those initial leaps. And nothing in this supports his position beyond that, imo.
One of the key disagreements here relates to the idea that there is a universal human end (happiness). If all humans ultimately desire happiness, and if Harris' doomsday scenario is the epitome of unhappiness, then it logically follows that we should try to avoid this doomsday scenario. I don't think there is anything controversial about this; I think Harris merely underestimated the sophistry of Anglo-American moral philosophy that is now roosting at Oxford. Still, Harris did well, and he basically got O'Connor to admit that one could deny that 2+2=4 on the same Emotivist basis on which he denies Harris' claim. Requiring infinite justification for any claim is always an epistemological error, whether in mathematics or ethics.
I would not be surprised to see O'Connor abandon his Emotivism in the next 6-7 years.
To some degree, I agree, but this does nothing for the disagreement, imo. For Harris' "we should avoid" - this is a best-fit claim, not a moral one. IFF, then. Morally, why? No answer from Harris. Its, IFF. He's not making a moral argument at all, at the end of the day. He's saying "this is how we can get aesthetically moral-looking decisions out of states-of-affairs. And it's a good system to use - it's just not an objective moral system - and I actually think:
Quoting Leontiskos
It is exactly the above. The type of horse-crap people like MacAskill and Earp put forward as if it's profound thinking. It's not even in the field they claim it to be in. Parfit, unfortunately, started this wave of inanity. Sam hasn't escaped it, it seems.
Quoting Leontiskos
He did not. But as I say, agree to disagree? LOL.
Personally, Emotivism is the only reasonable position and O'Connor has rightly landed on it.
We've seen this claim over and over, and O'Connor makes it as well. The claim is, "That's not a moral claim, and I am unable to define what I mean by a moral claim." This is not a serious objection.
What Harris has demonstrated is a "should" that is necessary and universal. If that's not a moral claim then I don't know what is.
Quoting AmadeusD
You probably missed it. Watch the section I pointed out above.
This is your misrepresentation of the claim, sure. It doesn't involve the second part, in reality. Not sure what you were trying to do here, though. It's not serious if you don't take is seriously. But that's defining it out of seriousness for convenience.
Quoting Leontiskos
He absolutely has not. You take it to be one, because you agree with his premise. It is unsupported. It is a 'free miracle'. IFF his premise is correct, off to the races. I have already addressed this. You haven't presented anything new.
Quoting Leontiskos
I've watched the entire interview. He did not.
Okay. Less interesting.
Quoting AmadeusD
Why not Perspectivism? That would involvement linking emotional processes with the successes and failures of situational sense-making. By that thinking, the feelings of happiness and sadness give us information concerning the relative capability of our perspectival knowledge system with respect to anticipating events in a coherent manner. It agrees with OConnor that happiness doesnt tell us anything universal about the content , moral or otherwise, of the events that produce it. But it takes happy-sad out of the category of the merely arbitrary, subjective and irrational, and instead ties emotions to not only personal sense-making , but interpersonal processes of anticipatory cognition. If our emotions are expressions of individual development in terms of knowledge construction, and the latter is inextricably tied to reciprocal interaction within a larger social community, then there can be a kind of universal evolution of moral understanding.
I take Emotivism to entail Perspectivism - but the latter is restricted to moral statements, where the latter can essentially relate to any valence one has.
Quoting Joshs
I see where you're going. I don't quite think this is the right analysis, But i do think I land at a similar place. But it's called Emotivism, morally, as best I can make out. Overall, I don't think we're far apart (in this post - No idea if this is your view or not).