Is perfection subjective ?
I was contemplating this question and would like to hear the thoughts of fellow thinkers here on whether perfection is a trait that can be universally acknowledged or whether its a more subjective description that can also evoke aesthetics in the subject.
The word perfection can be applied to works of art such as sculptures and paintings, it can be applied to flora and fauna and the myriad types of organisms in it or it can even be applied to actions such as scoring or witnessing a beautiful goal in sport for example.
Yet the conundrum remains due to comparative thinking when it comes to what constitutes perfection, sure you might have seen a beautiful perfect goal be executed in sport or purchased a perfectly crafted chair but there is always something better which leads me to think that so called attained perfection is purely subjective on the taste of the subject rather than a thing in itself.
Any other thoughts ?
The word perfection can be applied to works of art such as sculptures and paintings, it can be applied to flora and fauna and the myriad types of organisms in it or it can even be applied to actions such as scoring or witnessing a beautiful goal in sport for example.
Yet the conundrum remains due to comparative thinking when it comes to what constitutes perfection, sure you might have seen a beautiful perfect goal be executed in sport or purchased a perfectly crafted chair but there is always something better which leads me to think that so called attained perfection is purely subjective on the taste of the subject rather than a thing in itself.
Any other thoughts ?
Comments (70)
This woman is perfect.
There is no perceived flaw on the woman, so it would be subjective.
This machine does a perfect Carnot cycle.
This is about a physical object, a machine, so it is objective.
This triangle is perfect because it is equilateral.
It depends on what your ontology of such objects (like triangles) is. I would say that if you are a platonist, it is objective, conceptualist, it is subjective, nominalist, neither or just circular.
Edit: exchanged psychologist for conceptualist to avoid confusion with the profession.
Common agreement doesn't make something objective. Objectivity is the experience in act of truth. I can look at something and know that it is perfectly beautiful, but others may disagree. We do not always experience the same mental qualia as others, even if words are the same
Thanks that clarifies things for sure, so to describe something as perfect is to take into account subjectivity, as in the perfect woman example (open to disagreement for sure as a matter of personal preference), objectivity in terms of intended output as per Carnot cycle and things that can fall somewhere in between.
But as Lionino explained in his Carnot cycle example there are certain operations that are produced which are perfect with little room for dispute so how do you account for that ?
If a machine can, if unhampered, do great feats this shows it's material perfection/beauty and usefulness but the question of beauty is usually about arts. Aesthetics ponders on the timeless. I like seeing a perfect score too, but not everything is beautiful. Many things are interesting but not beautiful. Many things in science are interesting but not beautiful. So I do think there is something objective about it
Quoting kindred
While value judgments are ultimately subjective, including perfection, you can say something is objectively perfect for a specific goal. In the Carnot cycle example the goal is the most efficient cycle.
We have to define a goal for there to be any objectivity.
As the often quoted saying goes beauty is in the eye of the beholder would imply that perfection is subjective.
On the other hand natures organisms and animals that roam the earth would be described as perfect, not by the same criteria but rather by the fact of the ecological niche theyre able to occupy, with imperfections being ironed out over time through extinctions such as that of the dodo or other evolutionary adaptations. By mere fact of them being extant (which would be a criterion for perfection) then despite whether they have predators or not would imply that such creatures are perfect or as perfect as they can get from an evolutionary perspective.
I disagree with all that. If two people see a third thing and one sees it as beautiful and the other doesn't, keep in mind that they look with different eyes, are possibly in a different stage of life, and could be at different energy levels (to talk in modern terms). The beauty is there but only one is seeing it (if he is truly having beautiful experience)
If perfection is the description of a mere functional goal then that doesnt say much as the definition in this case appears more restrictive then the definition of perfection I had in mind.
On the other hand without a clear definition the word itself remains open to interpretation, therefore the more descriptive in terms of output the more objective we get when classing such machines or organisms in terms of perfection.
Quoting Gregory
But then what would make what is being witnessed beautiful is it the thing in itself - or is it the witness that ascribes such a value ?
You're trying to separate the beauty from the person in order to make it part of you. If you are going to doubt the beautiful, why not insist the whole person is a subjective illusion? When seen something beautiful is seen to exist *as* beautiful. Beauty is imbedded in the form of an objective object or subject
Beauty is such a tricky concept to adequately measure objectively because everyones standards are different. The question is whether the object itself is beautiful or just my opinion of it. This can vary from person to person when it comes to beauty I believe.
How about we start with an actual example of perfection in the world and then go from there?
It strikes me that 'perfection' is a word which we use in various ways - from a mere superlative to an almost transcendental category. Which usage is correct?
My two cents worth:
Theres an expression Ive always found humorous: something being better than perfect. A superficial look might deem the expression self-contradictory and absurd, but it can make plenty of sense:
Suppose I need an item which you then build, and I then declare it to be better than perfect. What Im here expressing is that the built item not only completely adheres to, else fits, its intended, or else wanted, purposes but that it surpasses these very same.
In keeping with what expressed, this to me illustrates that perfection is always fully relative to the either concrete or else sometimes rather abstract purposes involved. And purposes always involve aims, goals, teloi.
A perfect goal in soccer fully satisfies the purposes of the game, the purposes for which one is watching the game, and so forth. As is also the general case for a perfect chair.
Can there be any type of perfection that is fully divorced from any and all notions of purpose? I so far cannot find any example of this.
A circle comes to mind, which is perfect by implication. Any imperfection of a circle would make it other than a circle: an oval maybe, or maybe a circular shape with waves in its circumference, or else a C-like form. None of which are circles proper. This, though, hearkens back to notions of the ideal, wherein the ideal is perfect - the perfection of some given set of attributes. And the purpose of any ideal is to serve as a standard: as that by we compare and measure or else aspire toward in our efforts. When we seek to draw a circle, then, we will always hold the (perfect) circle as the ideal we seek to emulate. (A circle is then always perfect as circle, but a circle will not always be the perfect object of awareness in many a context: it will for example be imperfect when one seeks to go from A to B in the shortest trajectory possible. So a circle might not then be deemed objectively perfect in at least this sense.)
So too then with any other ideal: such as one persons ideal of perfect goodness and their aspirations to get near it or another persons ideal of perfect mischievousness which they crave to enact; one persons ideal of getting closer to perfect objectivity of judgment and anothers ideal of best becoming a tyrant over all others. It is these ideals, all of which are a perfection of one type or another, we hold that in large part determine how we then choose to behave so as to best approximate these very ideals that call to us, that pull us toward them.
The ideals we ourselves actively hold then, in one way or another, always being aims we seek to fulfill.
My main point here is to evidence that perfection is meaningless outside of notions of purpose.
As to perfection being subjective, in one sense it always will be, for it will always be in relation to the interests of one or more psyches and their strivings, their purposes in this sense.
As to whether perfection can ever be objective, this will depend heavily on the metaphysics one adopts: any system of nihilism will affirm no, for it will likewise deem the universe to in fact be purposeless; whereas, for example, at least some interpretations of Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism will affirm yes: the Unmoved Mover and the One which was also known as the Good, these (among other examples) can be interpretable as perfect being and the proper aim of all of us imperfect beings - this same objective perfection as goal however arrived at from, and defined by, different scaffoldings of thought.
So, long story short: Whether or not there can be such a thing as objective perfection one which is absolute - will fully depend on the metaphysics one subscribes to. No in a purposeless universe, and yes in a purposive universe. Notwithstanding, the occurrence of perfection will always be contingent on the occurrence of purpose.
An example would be any piece of equipment that is more than adequate to its intended purpose such as a chair. Now you might want to question how can a chair be perfect which is a valid question but for the sake of argument, one made to a high quality and more than comfortable and able to hold the weight of the person without breaking, long lasting etc. Lets call this chair the perfect chair - would you be happy to have the label perfect applied to it rather than just adequate?
To paraphrase Rumi, "Your task is not to seek love [beauty], but merely to seek and find all the barriers within yourself that you have built against it."
Which happens to be different wording for this one standard definition of the adjective "perfect"
Quoting https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/perfect
Quoting kindred
No. See above.
Perfect generally means that which can't be improved upon. Where do we find this perfect thing? Unless we accept Platonism?
Is that not perfect red being produced?
Electromagnetic waves are, obviously, objective, even if the experience of colours is not.
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
For objects defined by their final cause (a lift is that which works as a lift), the goal is already implicit when you use the word.
The machine is accurate. Which means it does what it is designed to do with a very small margin of error. In what sense does this imply that the machine is perfect? Efficient maybe.
Same for you chair argument. If anything, the design and construction of the chair are effective. The chair qua product may be durable, comfortable, attractive. Whether or not it is more durable, comfortable, attractive than any other chair is purely subjective. A "perfect" chair would have to perfectly fit every human being, and this is a manifest impossibility.
Quoting Lionino
As you say, the word "lift" has its job in the name. Would any lift that can lift be a perfect lift?
I don't think most people would call a really slow, smelly, uncomfortable, ugly lift "perfect".
Isn't narrowing our judgment of perfection to the lift lifting, itself subjective?
The machine does a Carnot cycle, which makes it the most efficient machine possible under the current laws of physics. That falls just fine under the definition of perfection.
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
Very much true for a lift. But in the case of a steam machine doing a perfect Carnot cycle, you could very well say that the machine is perfectly efficient in an objective sense, exactly because it is doing a perfect Carnot cycle, and concerns such as aesthetic or economic ones would not come into play.
Yes, as I said, if efficiency is your criterion of perfection. That is still a value judgement. You could replace the word "perfect" with efficient and your description of the machine would lose nothing. In fact, I would argue that describing it as efficient is more accurate and less misleading. Perfect implies there is some overarching objective standard, which there is not (barring your declaration that this is it of course).
edit: I'm actually a huge fan of the concept of efficiency, and I favour it over perfection because it is more descriptive.
And take all the Dionysian fun out of the terms usage? I dont know.
When someone I'm enamored with tells me they'll see me at 10 o'clock, I'm gonna reserve the right to reply, "perfect".
Quoting Tom Storm
A tangential topic to the OP, but isnt that what any system of objective morality is founded on? A goodness which is universally applicable to the underlying purpose(s) of all co-existent sentient beings without exception. Yes, as you've mentioned, this would require adopting some variant of the Platonic ideal/form of the Good - but is in no way sinister in and of itself. It only becomes sinister when upheld in partial manners; as in, good/beneficial for my purposes/aims but not yours kind of thing. But then, if so, it wouldnt be an objective good to begin with. Same potential sinister perversion can equally apply to the notion of the greater good, for an added example; but being of benefit to more people than oneself likewise is not in and of itself sinister, being instead a standard for the reduced egotism requisite to a functioning society.
I so far take it you're not big on objective morality. That's fine. Here just illustrating that the objectively perfect (i.e., "fit for purpose") goodness which an objective morality entails is not of itself sinister ... of course, this were it to be non-hypocritical (as previously described).
The machine does a perfect Carnot cycle, here replacing perfect with efficient would turn a fine sentence into a nonsensical one.
The problem with evaluating "perfect" or "perfection" as a term is that is has no definitive (objective) intrinsic meaning, rather it is a comparative (subjective) measure of another word's meaning. Much like "better", "worse", "okay" or "average".
As others have noted, if your axis is efficiency, "perfect" means: "perfectly efficient".
Of course in common usage, folks use it as a general descriptor of "quality", using the subjective definition of that term that the user (silently to themselves) gives it. Thus an observer will likely use a somewhat different (subjective) definition of quality, and disagree that the object of evaluation is, in fact an example of perfection.
You would be using the word metaphorically/poetically.
Quoting javra
I don't think Platonism is sinister. Just unwarranted.
The word sinister came up specifically for the notion below.
Quoting Tom Storm
Quoting javra
I think morality is a code of conduct that shifts with time and varies between cultures. There are intersubjective agreements made around principles like - 'we should prevent suffering' which can operate as a 'foundation' for moral choices. But in the end morality is a conversation we have about oughts and ought nots.
Quoting Tom Storm
While Ive got no issues with the use of metaphor/poetry in speech, wanted to point out the following:
The usage of the adjective perfect would in the case specified be in full keeping with fit for purpose - as in, her meeting me at 10 would be fully fit to the purposes/aims I (and maybe she as well) hold in mind. Hence, her meeting me at 10 would be perfect in non-metaphorical/non-poetic manners going by the terms one translation of being fit for purpose. Plus, the term perfect in this standard (not even figurative) dictionary sense Ive previously linked to is both more succinct and more aesthetic sounding than saying that fully fits my/our purposes/aims - tough they here can only be implicitly understood to mean the same thing.
Which is to in part say that, while one can deem that any philosophy of life should be Apollonian, the living of life is often best done in Dionysian manners. And, imo, in order to be honest, the Apollonian ought to fully account for what is Dionysian in life rather than prohibit those good-natured aspects of it not yet analytically understood. This, specifically, apropos to the usage of the term perfect in the sense of fit for purpose. But it could also apply in cases such as that of lovingly telling an infant Im gonna eat you up (which I acknowledge would be fully metaphorical/poetic).
At the end of the day, though, whether its taken to be metaphorical/poetic or not is not that big of an issue for me - even though I dont find its stated usage to so be for the reasons given. Heck, all language, regardless of how analytical, can well be interpreted as foundationally metaphorical/poetic in some deeper sense.
All the same: going back to "losing the word perfect when all we mean by it is fit for purpose", I find no reason to not reserve the right to use the term in cases such as that here mentioned.
I didn't think it was nonsensical, but wow, ok. So who has built one of these perfect Carnot machines in actuality?
More redundant than nonsensical. The word Carnot cycle already summons the idea of efficient (100% efficiency to be exact), so "efficient Carnot cycle" is pleonastic, while perfect Carnot cycle is not.
Quoting Pantagruel
No one, because it requires 0 friction, 0 heat leakage, among other things.
Wouldn't the perfect definition of perfect, simply be, the definition of perfect? Just the definition of perfect, no more, no less, just the perfect definition of perfect.
Perfection, then would mean the actual.
An imperfect chair is only potentially a chair until it can actually serve as a chair, at which time it can be called perfect.
"Need a seat?" Slides over a chair with a broken leg. Slides a phone book under the broken leg to stand it up straight and solid. "Perfect!"
So is perfection subjective?
I think it can be, in the sense that something can be perfect to me, and maybe no one else. I say this chair is perfect, and then someone else tries it and says it is terrible. Sounds like perfection is subjective.
But if I can explain all the reasons it is perfect to me - allows my legs to bend at just the right height, gently supporting my back, soft, but firm - they might say "yeah, I see why you say it is perfect to you - that would be perfect - except to me, that chair hurts my knees and my ass."
So if we can convey why we think something is perfect, we might be conveying why actual things objectively would generate the same judgment of perfection if perceived in the same way to any subject. In this sense the perfect is an objective thing. This, I think is the perfect use of the word "perfect" to convey objectivity and actuality, not just subjectivity.
What is the perfect solution for X in the problem 2+2=X? This makes it easy to convey perfection.
But if the problem is, what is the perfect artform, abstract sculpture or live symphonic music - the argument could go on forever and maybe neither one is actually perfect. So we just say "shut up - you don't know perfection if it bit you in artform" or agree to disagree and say "perfection must be subjective."
In the, saying something is perfect to me, tells you nothing. Unless the question is something simple, like "Is 2+2=4 correct?"
A physical feeling can only be objective. It doesn't mean anything to call it subjective. The feeling of the chair is just a judgment that it feels good
Ah. So this is that sense of perfection that precludes objective existence. Like a perfect vacuum. Or a perfect circle. Really more of a Platonic ideal.
Quoting Lionino
If a Carnot cycle is, by definition, 100% efficient, isn't saying "perfect Carnot cycle" redundant too?
"The word perfect is used in various ways.." This sounds like subjectivity is at play.
"...it just means..." This sounds like objectivity is at play.
"The more interesting..." Wait, more interesting than my post?
"The transcendental implications of the idea of perfection."
What would really be interesting is what you mean by "transcendental implications" in general, and then apply it to "perfection".
Did you say "the idea of.." for a reason, or do you just mean "transcendental implications of 'perfection' which happens to be an idea"?
Quoting Fire Ologist
You're almost there. Keep going....
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes, what a great question! Wouldn't that be interesting? Imagine if there were a Platonic category of perfection - an instantiation of perfection that operates above and beyond any human criteria of value. The way the Platonic realm is said to work. Wouldn't that be something? Do you believe in this category?
Kind of, yes, if you use it in the restricted sense.
You can still say this is a Carnot cycle, since it is isothermal and adiabatic overall except for a small period.
Quoting Pantagruel
It is not instantiated, sure, but it is objective, as it refers to a body. Though the OP is about whether perfection is objective or subjective; if we are platonists (about abstract objects), we would have to automatically grant that perfection can also be objective, yeah?
But for a more concrete example of "objective perfection", I would simply use this example again.
I don't think there are forms, floating in an eternal world of the forms, objectified for us to know (by recollection or experience of participating things....).
I can see why Plato said that. That schematic of universal forms and particulars fits over-top of experience easily. But it seems too easy. Not to belittle Plato at all, but it lacks a curiosity into the physics, so to speak, of the 'perfect'.
Then instead of forms, if we skip straight to the example of the perfect - the perfect thing - and see if we can understand perfection from a perfect thing, we get nowhere. Once you hold up an example, you get bogged down in all of difficulties of being clear about making any claim about any physical thing. I say that chair is the perfect chair, and as a chair, exemplifies perfection itself, but you could just say, "perfect how? Perfect for sitting? So is that stool. The chair doesn't help at all and you've said nothing about perfection." And again, we are no closer to understanding what a 'perfection' is, arguing back and forth about mere uses that beat around the bush.
Still, I think we all have to admit that there is something distinct about 'perfection'. I mean no one would say another word for 'perfection' is 'shoddy'. (You might describe a shoddy thing as a perfect example of shoddiness, but you aren't defining perfection here, but only defining shoddiness.) Perfection has a distinct use, or a distinct meaning, that shoddy can never replace. There is something distinct there when one is trying to speak of 'perfection'.
So maybe I place perfection's thereness (so to speak) in the community of minds that would agree, sort of make an agreed upon use, and the few parts we all agree on, how we all use 'perfection' perfectly well, in that transcendental space we've constructed, we'll insert an objectified 'perfection'. "There are three knives, two of them are rusty. Which one is the most perfect? Since we all agree the one with no corrupting rust is the most perfect, we will together admit the perfect is like the uncorrupted knife, and we agree that every time we use the word perfect, we will use it consistently with this use."
This is the better place (the transcendent place we make) to start to define 'perfection', I think. However, if 'perfection' only exists in convention among minds, I still have to admit that I don't know what I have in my own mind alone when I think to myself that I know what 'perfection' is. I can't have a floating form. I am not looking at an example. I am still distinguishing 'perfect' from 'shoddy', but if I don't know what a mind thinking 'perfection' is in itself, why would adding other minds thinking 'perfection' to themselves AND adding the two minds creating some agreed upon, transcendental 'perfection' as if it was objective...this starts to sound like the same wishful thinking as Plato, making a floating form.
It's still better - two minds are more likely to make a more perfect 'perfection' than one.
The question is "Is 'perfection' subjective?" But don't we have to ask first, "Is anything objective?" You kind of just asked that, so I think you would agree this question is in the mix here. I mean, if nothing is objective, or we can't know it if it is, than what measuring stick can we hold up to anything to adjudge "No, this one is subjective." And then to ask about a thing like 'perfection' whether it is subjective or not - difficult question.
After all of that, I would still say that I do believe in objectivity itself. Along with objectivity, there is the subjective experience of these objects. And perfection is useful in describing things in subjective experience and things in the objective world. Sometimes we agree that some performance, some experiment, some physical act, was perfect, and we all can agree. Other times I see perfection and know no one else could ever possibly see it because I am looking through eyes and at phenomena that no one else could ever experience, but I still see perfection and could care less what anyone else thinks.
Perfection lives with the subjective, and can be inserted in the physical world for others to live with as well.
Still haven't defined perfection though. Then we are throwing in language, definition, use of a concept. I'd say perfection is a mix of 'complete' (but that's not it), with 'actualized' (but that's not enough), with superlative (that may be too much), with 'good' (but that's still not enough), and with 'perfecting' the verb, bringing it to life as an activity (but this seems opposite to 'complete' and "actualized')... tough word to define. I say it has it's objectivity (allowing us to avoid using 'shoddy' in it's place and carving it's distict contours), and it's subjectivity (allowing us to use it all). But no forms.
I thought you were only interested in perfection's application to morality; that perfection being one and the same with Neo-platonic, if not also Platonic, notion of "the Good", which you've stated you find unwarranted. At any rate:
Placing aside interpretations and/or misinterpretations pertaining to the metaphysics of Platonism, and here addressing objectivity as that state of being which is fully impartial relative to all coexistent sentience (let me know if you have a better but incongruous definition of objectivity), heres an argument for the occurrence of objective perfection:
p1) There either can occur or cannot occur such a thing as an objectively perfect circle (this in contrast to the subjective perfection of a circle which my five-year old niece has drawn on paper).
p2) If there is no such thing as an objectively perfect circle, then neither can there be such thing as an objectively imperfect circle.
p3) If there is no such thing as an objectively imperfect circle, one can then objectively have a circle which takes the shape of an octagon.
p4) A circle in the shape of an octagon, however, is not a circle when objectively addressed - as is commonly confirmed by all sane humans.
c1) Therefore, there is such a thing as an objectively perfect circle.
c2) Ergo, objectively perfect givens can and do occur.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Good point. I guess I would say that instead of objective there are intersubjective agreements on matters. These are held by communities which share values and world views. Politics, religion, art and science are examples of such intersubjective communities and yet even here there are schisms.
Quoting javra
Indeed, but you know what it's like here; you enter a conversation and come out the other side covered in the conceptual detritus of ideas others raise in your passing.
Quoting javra
I don't understand that sentence.
Quoting javra
I'm not a big syllogism guy. Firstly I can never understand them and secondly it seems to me (as my old philosophy tutor used to argue) that one can make a valid argument for anything using a syllogism. But reality will always have its own ideas. I stay away from them.
Let's just take P3
The fallacy here lies in the equivocation on the term "imperfect circle." In the first part of the statement, "imperfect circle" I assume refers to a circle that deviates from the ideal geometric definition of a circle, perhaps in terms of symmetry or roundness. However, in the second part of the statement, "imperfect circle" seems to be interpreted as any shape that is not a perfect circle, including polygons like an octagon.
The fallacy occurs because the two interpretations of "imperfect circle" are not equivalent. A circle that takes the shape of an octagon is not objectively a circle; it's objectively an octagon. An octagon lacks the defining characteristics of a circle, such as being round and having a single continuous curve.
But let's not do syllogisms.
You did give me a chance to use the word 'objectively' so maybe there is progress. :wink:
Would an oval then be an "imperfect circle" any more than any polygon? Why, when both are clearly not circles but yet resemble circles each in their own way?
Poetically addressed, an octagon is very much roughly circular when looked at from afar, and hence can be construed to be an imperfect circle - this just as much as an apeirogon can. Only that the apeirogon, being far nearer in shape to a perfect circle than an octagon, is then far less imperfect by comparison - but is imperfect (edit: as a circle) nonetheless.
I'm not selling anything, you. So to you an apeirogon is not an imperfect circle. Hard to comprehend, but fine. What then is an imperfect circle to you?
Surely you know this expression essentially means, 'I do not accept the proposition you are putting to me'. Or are you not, in fact, trying to convince me of something via argument? Anyway, I've already said syllogisms don't do it for me. Let's see what others think.
Fair enough. You are entitled to that reaction.
But have I said that objectively perfect things do not occur? I actually don't think this, so if you can find me saying it, I withdraw it.
My actual point is what evidence do we have and can anyone provide an example in the real world of such a perfect thing? Not an abstraction, not an argument, not a theoretical description: but an actual perfect thing.
And I'm not even sure if we came to an agreed working definition of perfection.
I did say "implicit assertion". Which is corroborated by the following.
Quoting Tom Storm
Abstractions are abstracted from concrete givens, and as far as I know there are no concrete examples of perfect circles. If the latter is then true, then perfect circles cannot be abstractions by definition.
That touched upon, whatever they might be conceptualized as being by you, are you saying that (perfect) circles do not occur in the real world, but only in fictitious worlds?
Exactly. Can we demonstrate perfection in any thing?
Quoting javra
A perfect circle is still an abstraction even if there is no such thing as one in real life. Abstractions are not always directly derived from concrete examples. They can also emerge from conceptual reasoning, logical deduction, or mathematical principles. But my point doesn't rest on use of the word abstraction. Call it 'theoretical' if that sounds better to you.
Quoting javra
Do we know if a perfect circle can be realised? I call it an abstraction because until it is concrete it is just an idea that represents general qualities or features distinct from specific instances or occurrences.
But even if there were a perfect circle what does this mean for perfect morality? Is it the same use of the word perfect or is this another equivocation?
And by now I've forgotten what Bob Ross was arguing about morality and perfection in the first place. :wink:
That's the hitch. A perfect circle is realized in this world by all minds which can comprehend it's, granted non-physical, being and, furthermore, all minds with sufficient comprehension will be able to thus realize an understanding of the exact same geometric form. Such that this understanding is objective. Not so with abstractions proper: ten people will provide ten different examples of what the abstraction "bird" is epitomized by: from a finch, to maybe an eagle, and so forth. All can however only provide the exact same example of what a perfect circle is epitomized by. And from this universality of agreement in understanding among all sapience then gets derived things such as the number pi.
Is pi a realized, actual, number that occurs in the real world? I'd myself say of course: it is not unrealized, nor a mere potential, nor a fictitious construct. In which case, so too must the objectively perfect circle then also be a given that is realized all the time in the real world. For there can be no number pi in the absence of the circle's actuality.
In short, the answer to this quoted question would be "yes", albeit not physically within matter.
But its getting a bit late for me. And, again, I've got nothing to sell. So I'll leave it at that for the time being.
Nice. I hear you but i don't think this is all that useful a formulation. We can find any number of minds to agree and visualise a unicorn but it still doesn't make it true. In this way we can also have objective accounts of ghosts and UFO too. Not sure what the word objective adds to this understanding.
Quoting javra
No worries. I don't have the right currency, anyway. Have a good one.
You cannot say that something is objective because it "refers to a body." Unicorn refers to a body in that sense too, but it is not objective, it is a construct of the imagination. Moreover, the perfection of what you are describing explicitly precludes its material instantiation.
Well, that is quite literally the meaning of objective.
Quoting Pantagruel
If you mean that 'unicorn' is subjective insofar as it only exists as a thought inside the mind, yes.
Quoting Pantagruel
Not always.
You are equivocating between the sense of an objective perspective and an objective thing. An objective is something intended and can be either a material thing or an idea. An objective thing has a real, independent existence, ie. is an object. All you are doing is declaring that realism (or maybe Platonism) is true, nominalism false.
I don't know what you mean by "objective perspective", perspective is something subjective.
Quoting Pantagruel
I am saying, as before, that if platonism is true, we automatically have objective perfection by definition. But even within nominalism you can simply "summon" objective perfection by manipulating semantics:
Perfect red is ?=650nm.
Imperfect red is everything between ?=600nm and 700nm besides 650nm.
Hydrogen emits light at ?=650nm.
Hydrogen is perfectly red.
If you don't admit degrees and only accept black-and-white scenarios, "perfection" in an objective sense becomes a non-point as something either is or is not and there is no need for adverbs.
Well, a perspective can be objective. It can also take an object (intentionality) which is what I meant. An object of a perspective can be material or it can be mental.
Just wanted to point this out:
Quoting javra
By entailment: If a perfect circle is no more objective/true/real than is a unicorn, then the number pi is no more objective/true/real than is a unicorn. If the number pi is no more real than is a unicorn, then neither is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (which in part relies upon use of pi) any more real than is a unicorn. If the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (which is a fundamental concept to quantum mechanics) is no more real than is a unicorn, then much if not all of quantum mechanics is no more real than is a unicorn. And, if the latter is true, then all technology reliant on quantum mechanics is no more real than unicorns.
I know, it might be hard to follow - but it's not oriented at convincing you of anything.
Unless evidenced wrong, the just mentioned argument appears to me quite sound; in brief: If a perfect circle is no more real than are unicorns, then the reality of our quantum mechanics based technology is on par to the reality of unicorns.
Since unicorns are commonly taken to be fully fictitious/unreal, something then is quite amiss with claiming that perfect circles are not objective in a way that unicorns can never be.
But I didn't say that a perfect circle is no more real than a unicorn. I said we can't rely upon the mechanism you identified since it can also imagine a unicorn. It's a critique of the epistemology not the putative conclusion per say.
You made this point which I liked:
Quoting javra
But it may also lead to unicorns. :wink:
Ha. Not that I agree (e.g., there is no one universal exemplar of the perfect unicorn), but, if so, it can then likewise also lead to unicorn based technologies we all live by and universally agree upon.
That I would like to see. Apparently their horns contain magic...
But you are quite right to say that a perfect circle and a unicorn have little in common. A perfect circle is a mathematical abstraction, while a unicorn is a mythical creature. The unicorn relies upon open an open ended imaginative discourse, while the circle's properties are defined mathematically.
Almost makes it sound as though the perfect circle - being here a mathematical abstraction delineated by its mathematical definition and, hence, not occurring to anyone prior to any such formal definition of it - is purely a construct of human imagination. This rather than being apprehended by understanding as something that objectively is (again, this in non-physical manners).
But, if so, then via pi and so forth so too is all our modern scientific knowledge of quanta nothing more than concoctions of human imagination. This rather than being discoveries (however imperfect) regarding the way the world in fact is.
Which to me would kind of relate to those magical unicorns you bring up: this being magical thinking with global efficacy.
I am not sure my point leads here but I am sympathetic to this regardless. I am a reluctant anti-foundationalist and consider human knowledge to be contingent. With constructivist leanings, I've often thought truth is shared subjectivity.
If I can remember back to the point of the discussion I think I was arguing that I have never seen an physical example of perfection in the real world. Examples we could proffer like Margot Robbie or George Elliot's Middlemarch or Mahler's Second Symphony or Botticelli's; Primavera, whatever, are using the word perfect to say we like them. The notion of perfection in this kind of context becomes a superlative rather than a precise philosophical understanding.
I suspect only maths offers us what we might dub perfect solutions (but I am no mathematician, so I'm happy to be wrong here) where an equation is the most elegant, prefect solution to a given problem. An equation which cannot be any better. This would satisfy my idea of perfection as that which can't be improve upon.
OK. Understood. To be clear, my own vantage in this discussion wasn't concerned with the issue of whether circles are perfect in the sense you here specify - to me, we both so far have given all indications that we both accept they are - but, rather, whether perfect circles are subjectively perfect (as you seem to have so far repeatedly upheld) or else objectively perfect. But its not the most pivotal of issues to me.
In seeing you've started a new thread on the issue of mathematics, best of luck in your investigations.
Ditto.
Thank you for an interesting conversation. I've appreciated your approach. :up: