What makes nature comply to laws?
At first glance the question seems too naive to be considered at all and for religiously minded people the answer is as simple as that: God, the Creator of the world created its laws as well and the fundamental difference between Creator and Creation does not allow for any deflection. For someone not as content regarding the principles of reality on the other hand the answer is not as simple.
Immanuel Kant presents us with a surprising and seemingly absurd alternative: we ourselves are the source of physical laws. Seemingly absurd, because we cannot influence the laws of nature. A heavy object released will fall to the ground, somebody under the influence of certain drugs, who believes he can fly and jumps out of the window, will quite sure break his bones. Nevertheless in Kant's system these laws are the outcome of fundamental structures, called categories, pertaining to humanity at large. These categories are objective insofar as they guide what we call nature for everybody but still are subjective as they present us with a nature dependent on the way we conceive it.
The spatiotemporal world we live in is, according to Kant, of our own making. It exists only in our ideas (Vorstellung) and gives us no clue to what these things might be an sich or per se. The main reason for such a strange view came as a reply to an objection brought forward by David Hume called induction problem. The core of Hume's reasoning is: How can we be sure that from events in the past we can infer to events in the future?. E.g. how can we be sure, that the sun will rise again tomorrow? Although we have seen this happen hundreds of times before, there is no absolute clue to what will happen tomorrow or in thousands of years. Of course common sense contradicts this verdict emphatically and rightfully so. But considered carefully, we cannot dismiss the reasonings of Hume right away.
Kant maintains that the problem arises because we tend to look at things in a special way: we think habitually, that objective knowledge presumes the objects, we want to know about. In other words: we think, that objects exist prior to our knowledge and outside consciousness. But any knowledge in a strict sense about objects entirely out of our consciousness is impossible, especially regarding their behavior in the future. If this was the case, Hume's arguments are indeed irrefutable. So Kant's proposal was: let us just put it the other way round: our knowledge comes to a certain extent before the object, making our concept of objects and the inference to future occurrences from past ones possible. In his jargon he asks: how are synthetical judgments a priori or before experience possible? And his answer is: because these judgements are the requirements for objects at large (Bedingungen der Möglichkeit or preconditions of possibility) making objective knowledge possible at all.
Idealism in its purest form is called solipsism and maintains: the only fact, that I can be sure of is, that I exist. The rest is just assumption. This view, a reminiscence to Descarte's cogito ergo sum has some merits and cannot easily be refuted. The transcendental idealism of Kant is indeed some form of solipsism with the main difference, that here the subject is no singular occurrence but universally valid for all human beings. The one world we live in is objectively true but only a subjective representation nevertheless.
There have been some attempts to return to a realistic view of the world. But neither of them seems to me very convincing. For example Karl Popper: all physical laws brought forward by science are only more a less happy guesses and can be falsified any time by a crucial experiment. It is true, that no singular experiment and no number of identical experiments can prove the validity of a so-called law of nature, which is supposed to be universally valid. That means, it is valid for all possible experiments. It would take physicists infinite time to perform an infinite number of experiments to prove a physical law. So science at large is impossible? But we are able to send rockets to the moon and build large structures, calculating their statics beforehand by mathematical means. Somehow we can rely on the laws of physics after all.
Does this mean that transcendental idealism is in the end unavoidable and there is no realistic alternative to this world-view? And is the possibility and success of science proof, that Kant was rightfully claiming that we can never attain to a knowledge of things surrounding us per se i.e. independent of us?
Comments (119)
It depends what the expression "the laws of nature" is referring to. It could be referring to "the laws of nature" existing as concepts within the human mind, or it could be referring to the laws of nature existing outside the human mind and independently of the human mind.
If the first, we can influence them because they exist within the human mind. If the second, there is the problem of how we can know about them if they exist outside the human mind and independently of the human mind.
An atom, for example. Perhaps this atom isn't "complying" with a law, perhaps the atom exists in the first place because it is composed of things which behave according to the defined ways that those things behave.
Perhaps you meant to ask why things behave the way they do, or why their behaviour is consistent?
Quoting Michael
Are they merely descriptions, or are they presuppositions concerning what things are and how they behave?
You can't pre-suppose the world. Maybe a creator god can, but humans are in and of the world. They can't suppose anything that they don't already know something about. They can look at things - objects - in the world, describe them, use them, affect them and be affected by them. They can observe relationships and processes in the world, form mental models of how those processes work, infer causation. From this, the human mind can extrapolate a set of laws: this thing, when it meets that thing, always does thuswise. A human might presuppose that a thing similar to this, when encountering a thing similar to that will also behave thus. But he cannot presuppose from ignorance.
Nature doesn't 'comply' to anything. Nature is everything. Laws are a human convention to describe how things behave in nature. The implied coercion - how things must behave comes from having the word adapted from the description of how humans are compelled to behave in society.
In sum, I understand modern natural sciences in this way from an old post (2021):
Quoting 180 Proof
In other words, "physical laws" are invariants in the structure of physical models which attempt to explain regularities experimentally observed in the physical world. To the degree such models themselves are objective, the "physical laws" derived from them are objective.
I tend to look at maunderings of these kinds as a kind of affectation, or residue of the belief that the only true knowledge is absolute, certain knowledge which we poor humans cannot obtain, because we're humans and not something else, often God, but in any case something that isn't human. So we forever remain "only human" and thus inferior beings to thinkers of this kind. But if they're correct true knowledge and certainty, if there are such things, are unattainable and simply irrelevant. Much like Kant and Hume themselves in certain respects.
Acceptance of the lack of certainty, and the lack of any need for it, alters the conception of natural law. The most interesting view of natural law I've come across is the "evolutionary view" of natural law favored by C.S. Peirce. It happens that the universe evolved the way it did, and as a consequence certain "habits" developed on which we can rely (statistically, but not as absolute laws), but in other respects the universe remains subject to inquiry and undetermined.
Quoting Vera Mont
I wasnt suggesting we pulled these presuppositions out of our butts. Presuppositions are the products of human-world interactions. They are guides to future interactions based on ways of organizing previous interactions, and subject to change as the way we modify our environment by interacting with it feeds back into these presuppositions.
That doesn't get us any further, since I find it too convoluted to follow. How does one organize previous interactions? Surely, it's only an image, memory or concept of them that can be organized - presumably for reference. Organize, how? Form a mental model? Classify as to type? How does this process differ from describing the interactions themselves and deducing natural laws?
Observe and predict, sure; that's the beginning of science. Prediction and theory, based on observation and subject to change as new evidence comes to light. In my dictionary, a "presupposition" is i.e. that which has not yet been observed and analyzed.
For things to have a way of existing, they must follow certain patterns or habits or uniformities. This is the way they are able to exist.
But to ask why the way of existing is the way it is, doesn't have an answer. One can say, but I can imagine other ways of existing that are not the ones we have. Perfect. But those imagined other ways would have to have their certain patterns, habits or uniformities. That is how we are able to say something exists.
So, I think the answer to this is, that nature must follow "laws", or nature would not exist. Beyond that, the question loses clarity in terms of being able to say anything about it at all.
A cognitive organization , as a living system, exists by functioning , and it functions by continually making changes in itself, prior to volition. This self-changing process leads to the disintegration of the cognitive system (or organism) if it doesnt manage to maintain a relative normative consistency throughout these changes. Notice I am not making a distinction between change from within and change from without. The cognitive organization has no pure interior; it is radically outside of itself , always already in the midst of its world. What we call knowledge of the world is the systems successful accommodation to the unique aspects of new experience such that it can assimilate such experience within its normative schematics. This is what happens when a theory successfully predicts observed phenomena. Our world always appears lawful to the extent that perceived events can be placed within a network of referential relations.
Quoting Vera Mont
There must always be pre-existing cognitive structure to organize what is perceived. With each actual perception, such structure is both invoked and altered by what is perceived. Accommodation from scheme to world accompanies each assimilation from world to scheme. But because this modifying of of scheme by world need to allow for a relative ongoing stability of meaning, the presuppositions we bring to every encounter with things remain fairly consistent for long period of time. Kuhn described this relative ongoing consistency of presuppositions in terms of normal science , and the significant alteration of presuppositions in terms of revolutionary science, or paradigm shifts.
Quoting RussellA
Quoting Michael
This is exactly the question. To Bertrand Russell we owe a nice bon mot regarding causality: The farmer's wife calls her chicken every day 'put, put, put' to feed them. But one day 'put, put, put' they are slaughtered. Now the question is: are we in the position of these chicken or can we rely on being fed every day?
Quoting 180 Proof
I am pretty sure that almost all of us will agree to the assertion that a concept (model) referring to a thing (phenomenon) is not this thing (phenomenon) itself. But to stretch this conclusion to its limits by saying: these concepts are actually the respective world we live in and beyond our world-view and in abstraction from it there is definitely nothing left we could talk about not many people would subscribe to.
But the philosophical system brought forward by Immanuel Kant is indeed of that kind. This philosophy, like any other, is itself a mere complicated system of concepts. When he asks therefore how are synthetical judgements a priori possible we should read it like this how can we conceive the possibility of synthetical judgements a priori. Charles Sanders Peirce can be regarded as someone generalizing Kant's ideas. His main focus was on symbols and their meaning. He maintained, that every cognition is mediated by symbols and therefore we can never know anything regarding things per se. Instead of Kant's static system of categories and intuitions he was advocate of a dynamic view of symbols. We constantly invent new concepts regarding nature and therefore new ways of knowledge, e.g. Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics in contrast to Newton's classical mechanics.
C. S. Peirce died in 1914 and Kant's Critique is nearly 250 years old. Are these ideas therefore out of date or still a valuable source of insights?
I don't understand what you're saying here. Please reformulate and clarify.
More simply put, my position is : nature does not "comply" with "physical laws"; rather our best, unfalsified models conform via physical laws (i.e. generalizations of transformations of phenomena) to the observable, objective regularities of nature.
I was just talking about this to someone at home. Language does us a great disservice when we use terms like 'laws' of logic or 'laws' of nature in as much as for many this word implies a 'lawmaker', so that anthropomorphic theism is built into the language and infects people's thinking.
Knowing what will happen does not mean we know why it will happen
We are in the position of the chickens. For example, we have discovered that the equation [math]{d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}[/math] can accurately predict the distance a free-falling object falls from a position of rest. This equation describes what will happen not why it will happen. Until we know why the equation is able to predict what will happen, we cannot know whether that one day the equation will no longer work.
If the chickens knew why they were being fed, they would know that one day the feeding would stop, and would be slaughtered together with 140,000 of their comrades every minute..
What's their alternative? What is ours?
Quoting Tom Storm
Language is of our own making, and it serves us fine, as long as we're using it sensibly to communicate, instead of trying to bend artificial, specialized systems like Logic or Metaphysics around a mundane vocabulary.
We make laws to regulate our social behaviour. When we invent gods to grant our wishes, we have them make laws (pretty much the same ones we already had) to regulate our behaviour. When we raise a god up to creator of the universe status, we have him make laws to regulate the behaviour of everything. It's normal, sloppy, habitual thinking, which serves fine for chatting with a neighbour.
Philosophizing over such terminology is a waste of time.
But then, what else were we going to use it for... assuming time exists to be saved, used or wasted?
Kant believed that a world exists outside the mind and independent of the mind, and tried to prove this using the Transcendental Argument "Refutation of Idealism" within section B275 of Critique of Pure Reason.
We observe things in our five senses, such as a stone falling from rest
We have discovered that the equation [math]{d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}[/math] can accurately predict the distance a free-falling object falls from a position of rest, which we can describe as one of our "Laws of Nature".
In a similar manner, the human "Laws of Nature" can be used as a Transcendental Argument for the existence of a world outside the mind and independent of the mind.
Theorem
The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own observations proves the existence of a world outside me.
Proof
We observe a stone falling from rest and develop an equation that is able to predict its motion, accepting that: i) the equation is a human invention, ii) we know it has been successful in the past, iii) we don't know why it works and iv) we don't know whether it will stop working in the future.
However, we do know that what we observe is beyond the control of the human mind, in that by thought alone we can neither slow down nor speed up the rate of fall of the stone and by thought alone we cannot change the equation that successfully describes what is being observed. It follows that as what we observe is not within the control of the mind, it must be within the control of something outside the mind and independent of the mind.
IE, the consciousness of my own observations is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.
I don't interpret Kant as implying that human observers create the laws of nature. What we do is to mathematically define the apparent necessities*1 of Nature. We observe "regularities" of cause & effect, then describe the process as-if it was imposed on nature by the Initial Influencer : The Prime Mover or The Impetus*2. So, humans are indeed the "source" of the formal & mathematical definitions, that we then use to predict statistically certain future outcomes of accurately formalized current conditions.
The knowledge of Necessity is not a physical empirical fact, but a metaphysical rational inference, just as all philosophical universals, a priori principles, are extrapolations from a few observations to a generalization. Yet, pace Hume*3, as far as we know, these "rules" are a priori & absolute, not contingent. So, it's not "absurd" to think of them as-if Divine Laws, even though we have no divine revelation to confirm our best guesses. Those "laws" are like Mathematics in general, taken to be true until an exception is observed.
Therefore, "what makes nature comply" with laws of our own defining? The implicit Impetus or First Cause of the ongoing sequence of Cause & Effect is the enforcer of Necessity. If the "laws" were not essential to the workings of the world, then the Source, or LOGOS, or Lawmaker would be superfluous. Is there any better answer to the implicit OP question : why is the world not totally Chaotic? :smile:
PS___ Galileo said, "The laws of Nature are written in the language of mathematics."
Physicist Eugene Wigner wrote : "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences". Logical patterns in nature would be unreasonable only if its processes were totally random, instead of mostly predictable. Is that why Plato postulated an ab original Logos?
Wigner : https://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/~v1ranick/papers/wigner.pdf
*1. Kant on the Laws of Nature :
Appearances may well offer cases from which a rule is possible in accordance with which something usually happens, but never a rule in accordance with which the succession is necessary The strict universality of the rule is therefore not any property of empirical rules
Wigner : https://www1.cmc.edu/pages/faculty/jkreines/laws.htm
Note --- Hence, the universality & necessity of natural laws could only be mandated by a sovereign Ruler. Ouch!
*2. The Impetus :
In the latter work Philoponus became one of the earliest thinkers to reject Aristotle's dynamics and propose the "theory of impetus": i.e., an object moves and continues to move because of an energy imparted in it by the mover and ceases the movement when that energy is exhausted.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Philoponus
Note --- "impetus is something that impels, a stimulating factor while momentum is (physics of a body in motion) the product of its mass and velocity. https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-impetus-and-momentum
*3. Hume Causality :
(1) The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time. (2) The cause must be prior to the effect. (3) There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect. [...] (4) The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humean_definition_of_causality
Note --- If this logic holds, we can rationally back-track causation to the original Prior : the First Cause, the Prime Necessity.
As-If : We use "as if" and "as though" to talk about an imaginary situation or a situation that may not be true but that is likely or possible.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/grammar/british-grammar/as-if-and-as-though
The expression was chosen deliberately, I could have used 'obey' as well. The implicit question here is: what is the difference between the so-called laws of nature and civil law, that is: do we discover these laws of nature or do we just invent them.
Sorry, that You can see these questions as mere 'maundering'. I am interested in serious discussion, so, if You can, come up with something less idle talk.
Every scientific law is based on induction i.e. inference from particular observations. But all observations are unique in time and place. No observations can be repeated at the same space at the same moments. Therefore the ground of scientific laws are contingent i.e. not absolute. They can be disproved any time when the physical factors change in the universe, or new discoveries and observations reveal the new facts.
With these reasons, I think the OP is correct in saying that Kantian Transcendental Idealism is evidently true and unavoidable. We know the objects in phenomena due to our sensibility and perceptual schema which operate both in empirical and a priori foundation of our mind.
There are parts of the world we can never sense due to the limitation and nature of our sensibility which are in noumena as things-in-itself. We tend to think that we know objects like cups and trees and books in daily life with infallible certainty. But the moment we ask ourselves deeper into the nature of existence such as what is the book made of? What molecules and particles make up the book, cups or trees? We immediately are not sure about all the information hidden in the objects, which proves the obvious limitation of our knowledge even of the objects in phenomena too.
Just imagine someone living in the Middle Ages, believing the earth was the center of the universe. Such a person lived actually in a different world than we do today. To say, these people only believed, the whole universe is rotating around the globe whereas in reality our sun is just one star among millions and earth a planet circling it, does not meet the case in point. It describes only the world-view until the beginning of the last century. Nowadays we'd have to reformulate this view according to new theories regarding the universe and the structures of matter at large (Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics).
What I wanted to say is: in reality can only mean in relation to our concepts regarding reality. These concepts change and so does the world we live in.
Why not both?
There's a sense in which we clearly invent them. Newton's Principia was published in 1687, and that's a science text that uses the Law-like formulation. So it had to be written.
But if they are wrong then we change them, so there's a bit of discovery to it as well. Perhaps discovery and invention are not so opposed as common belief would have it?
'Obey' means the same thing and is wrong for the same reason: it is an action taken by a conscious entity with the option to do otherwise. Both words apply to humans and the domestic animals under human control. Humans formulate and enact laws to limit and govern the behaviour of individuals through coercion.
We invent - no 'just' about it; this was a big step in self-and social awareness - not only laws but the very concept of laws.
What we 'discover' - gradually, one revelation at a time - is how things operate in the world outside of us - and eventually that they operate the same way inside of us, which is another big step, followed by the realization that we ourselves operate inside of and according to the physical universe. We then superimpose our concepts, via language, onto the description of the relationships and patterns we observe in the world.
Ah, but I am serious and I ask a serious question: How have a serious discussion over something (like Kant's thing-in-itself, or Hume on causation) which our conduct demonstrates we don't take seriously? And indeed something which there is no reason to take seriously during the course of our lives?
From the standpoint of our conduct, we never normally think or act as if what we interact with all the time isn't what we think it to be or use it as, except in extraordinary circumstances. So, I didn't wonder what my car really is when I drove to the office this morning, neither did I wonder whether it is something like a car, which does just what a car does, but is something different from a car, which cannot be ascertained.
From the philosophical standpoint, Kant's "thing" (for example) is a perfect example of a "difference which makes no difference" to paraphrase Wild Bill James, or somebody. Peirce admired Kant, but knew maunderings (slow, idle wanderings) when he saw them. So, according to Peirce: "The Ding an sich...can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all reference to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage."
So, let's just agree that you take seriously what I don't as respects Kant and Hume.
But though I understand civil law quite well, at least as someone who has practiced it for many years, and you seem interested in it and whether it has any relation to natural law, I suspect the views of a mere lawyer wouldn't be welcome in that discussion either.
But their happy guesses of something that is underlying nature: actual natural law. Several philosophers (Armstrong, Sosa, Tooley are the best known) have proposed Law Realism: the notion that there exist actual laws of nature. Under this theory, laws of nature are relations between universals (IOW, they are not mere abstractions: platonic equations that exist in a "third realm").
A universal is a type of thing, something that is typically multiply instantiated. For example, electron and proton are two such universals. It is a law of nature that electrons and neutrons attract: "attraction" is a relation between the universals electron and neutron.
Laws of physics constitute our best guess at laws of nature, and are falsifiable - but that just means we've erred in the approximation of the actual law.
Law realism is a metaphysical theory, and in Armstrong's case - it's a fundamental aspect of the comprehensive metaphysical system he described in his life's work.
This abstract to Tooley's paper provides more background. If you want something more comprehensive, a used copy of Armstrong's "What is a Law of Nature" can be bought for $4 on Amazon.
Well I disagree with this antirealist suggestion, Pez "concepts" do not "change" themselves, we change our concepts in order to adapt. Turning on house lights at night in an unfamiliar house does not change the house, rather you change only your capability for orienting yourself within that unfamiliar house. Likewise, given that we inhabit the world, the 'models (i.e. pictures, maps, simulations) of the world' which we make conform with varying degrees of fidelity to the world and thereby inform our expectations of how we can adapt to the world. For instance, GR & QM were as true about the physical world in Aristotle's day and in Newton's day as they are today even though Aristotle, Newton and their contemporaries, respectively, were completely ignorant of them. Thus, changing our concepts of reality, in effect, only changes us and not reality itself.
Indeed, that is the case. But philosophy might be considered as an attempt to understand why we can know what will happen (if at all). Newton's laws of gravitation describe what will happen to an apple falling to the ground. But the connection between mathematics and natural science is not part of his formulas.
I'm not a Kant scholar. But my understanding of his Transcendental Idealism*1 is that it's merely an admonition to idea-mongering philosophers, not to confuse our artificial worldviews with absolute Reality. This is not exactly claiming, like Berkeley, that our perception of the world sees only "appearances" that represent the Ideal world as-if objects (ding an sich) ultimately exist in the mind of God. But merely to note that humans see only superficial Properties, that are meaningful to our space-time physical needs, instead of essential eternal Qualities.
Quantum Physics (QP) is another reminder that our 5 senses are attuned only to appearances, and our mental images represent only a fraction of reality. Heisenberg even echoed Kant to say that the "appearances" we call Reality, don't exist until observed. So, the quantum pioneers developed a new (non-mechanical) statistical worldview, to artificially sharpen the fuzziness of sub-atomic reality into a practical alternative to unrealistic Platonic Idealism.
In other words, QP is an attempt to make such abstract digital mathematical information useful to us coarse concrete analog organisms. As you suggested, the "success" of Quantum Physics, so alien to Classical Physics, allows us to adapt our way of dealing with the "transcendental" aspects of the world to a novel counter-intuitive "knowledge of things" that are not really things, such as non-local waves that can also behave like particles .
Whatever the Real World is, it is much more than our limited senses can cope with. So, we condense the incomprehensible behaviors of the Cosmos into mathematical symbols, and call them "natural laws". But Nature doesn't "comply" with our definitions ; instead, our formal laws are attempts to conform with Nature's regularities, symmetries, harmonies & proportions. :smile:
Transcendental Idealism :
In Kants view, human cognition is limited to objects that somehow depend on our minds (namely, appearances), whereas the mind-independent world (things in themselves) lies beyond the limits of our experience and cognition.
https://iep.utm.edu/kant-transcendental-idealism/
QUANTUM REALITY makes no sense to our senses
That's very elegantly put. Thanks.
Not sure if anyone has already answered this in the same way and I don't have time today to read the whole tread.
Nature does not comply to any laws, simply because nature is the laws.
The most that philosopher Kant claimed about our knowledge of what exists outside us is in his Refutation of Idealism in B275 of the Critique of Pure Reason. He concludes "I am conscious of things outside me". IE, he can neither know what these things are or even why these things are as they are.
Sorry, if my remarks have led You to think I am antirealist. If being a realist means to believe in the objective reality of the world surrounding us, I am no antirealist at all. Still conscious experience is our only means of getting in contact to this world. The question, if we can infer from this experience to something outside of consciousness, has been a long dispute among philosophers.
My position is: we cannot. The paradox situation here is, though, speaking of a world of conscious experience automatically implies the notion of something beyond this experience. In Kant's terminology this something is called noumenon, a necessary concept, but like an empty space without any trace of structure. If You are interested in Buddhist philosophy a comparison to the term shunyata might be of interest.
I am glad You mentioned this. It might be considered weird, that someone describing his philosophy as transcendental idealism writes a paragraph called Refutation of Idealism. The sole point of interest here hinges around the notion outside. Kant's ambiguous use of the term leads to many mis-interpretations. Here outside can only mean outside in space because otherwise it would be a contradiction to the rest of his philosophical system. Space however is one of the intuitive conceptions and therefore in consciousness.
The word "idealism" has more than one meaning (Merriam Webster - Idealism)
The term "transcendental idealism" should be thought of as a name rather than a description, as the Champs-Élysées is a name and not a description.
In fact, he proposed renaming his transcendental idealism with the more informative name of "formal" or "critical idealism," (Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason)
===============================================================================
Quoting Pez
In B275, Kant wrote "I am conscious of things outside me".
In the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason is the paragraph:
I may have the concept of an apple sitting on a table, and it may well be the thing outside me bears no relation to my concept of it.
Kant attempts to prove in the Refutation of Idealism that I can be conscious of things outside me.
Even if the thing outside me bears no relation to my concept of an apple sitting on a table, this doesn't detract from the fact that I am conscious of a thing outside me.
I quite agree to Your interesting contribution. In the German language "to invent" translates into "erfinden". "Finden" i.e. "to find" is actually part of this word.
Only some (idealist) philosophers ... most of whom argue from rather than towards their conclusion. Anyway, at least since Democritus in the 5th century BCE, many philosophers have inferred and then modern natural scientists have demonstrated that nature is, in fact, vastly "outside of consciousness" and that "consciousness" is therefore nature-dependent (i.e. reality-dependent) rather than the other way around. In other words, Pez, it's reasonable to infer that it is also a (meta) "law of nature" that intelligent minds can abstract "laws of nature" from (modeling) nature.
Btw, I understand the concept of noumena (Kant mostly uses the plural form whereas Schopenhauer critically uses the singular "noumenon'") to denote the asymptote-like limits of phenomena limits of ap/perception and not a posited "beyond" or "behind" phenomena (i.e. "transcendental illusion"? pace Hegel et al). IMHO, Buddhist "shunyata" is completely different from opposite of Kantian noumena insofar as, so to speak, (1) 'we can think but not experience' the latter whereas 'we can experience but not think' the former and (2) Kantianism posits things-in-themselves (we just cannot 'know' them) and Buddhism denies things-in-themselves (there are only 'transient illusions').
I'm not a Kant scholar, and have never read any of his works. But, "Transcendence" is inherently a debatable term, since it is based on subjective imagination instead of objective observation. Some critics seem to assume that Kant's "transcendental" referred to a religious heavenly realm of perfection isolated from the imperfect physical world. But others, such as the 19th century Transcendentalists, apparently believed in a parallel "spiritual" realm within this world, perceivable via intuition. For example, as depicted in movies : innocent children, guided by feelings instead of reason, can "see" dead people, or demons, or disguised alien monsters.
Yet I'm getting the impression that Kant may have been merely making a pragmatic philosophical distinction between concrete physical Reality (actuality) and abstract mental Ideality (possibility), as a way to discuss metal phenomena (i.e. noumena), without the baggage of habitual physical preconceptions. But his choice of "Transcendence" as a label may sound absurd to those of a Materialist worldview, in which nothing could possibly transcend the apparent reality of the 5 senses --- as confirmed by empirical science. Unfortunately, his support for Christian doctrine would make his objectivity suspect.
How do you interpret his usage of "transcendence"? Specifically, in his view, what limits are being surpassed? Was he denigrating mythical Pure Reason in favor of mundane non-magical Practical Intuition? :smile:
Practical Intuition :
Practical Intuition provides the tools you need to develop your intuitive potential to its fullest.
https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/1242635
Non-Magical Intuition :
Intuition is a form of knowledge that appears in consciousness without obvious deliberation. It is not magical but rather a faculty in which hunches are generated by the unconscious mind rapidly sifting through past experience and cumulative knowledge.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/intuition
PS___ In Philosophy Now magazine #158, editor Grant Bartley discusses the cover question : Freewill vs Determinism. In answer to "what freewill involves", he refers to Kant's notion of going beyond physical limits : "Kant calls the will 'transcendental' --- by which he means that for it to operate, will must not be part of the causal system of the physical world". In other words, "Transcendental" means Supernatural.
Is that a valid interpretation of Kant? I'm sure even to mention such an "outrageous" possibility on TPF would cause to do his best ballistic Trump imitation : red face, sneering & blustering. But I'm seriously seeking to understand what Kant was talking about, because he's "one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy". https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/
... you vapidly conflate with Kant's use of transcendental (which you further confuse with "Transcendentalism"). Apparently, it never occurs to you, Gnomon, to first read, let alone study, what you wantonly bloviate about. More shameless sophistry. :sparkle: :sweat:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/881651
Did you read the last paragraph?
This reminds of Heidegger's notion that being is that upon which beings are already understood. There is no being in the absence of at least a "vague and average" understanding of beings. So even if we grant for the sake of argument the irrefutability of Hume's logic, the rigor of logic is not the primary basis upon which we make our way about in the world. Instead, we make our way about the world from within our already existing "vague and average" understanding of the world. The number of actions submitted to the rigors of logic are few and far between.
Nature does whatever the fuck she wants, and laws have to learn to conform to her, if they know what's good for them.
Definitions
What is Kant's "Transcendental Idealism" about, taking the term "Transcendental Idealism" more as a name than a description, as even Kant considered finding a better term.
Based on the Merriam Webster Dictionary, "Transcendence" in Kantian philosophy means the state of being beyond the limits of all possible experience and knowledge. "Transcendental" in Kantian Philosophy means going beyond the limits of all possible experience but not going beyond the limits of human reason.
Note that it is ""Transcendental Idealism" not "Transcendent Idealism". The CPR is not about "Transcendent Idealism", as this would lie beyond what the human can cognitively grasp and would move into the realm of the unknowable. Not only beyond human experience but also beyond human reason, because beyond the scope of empirical investigation. Included would be such concepts as God and the soul.
The CPR is about "Transcendental Idealism", which is about our prior intuitions of time and space and a priori concepts of the Categories. Necessary conditions for the possibility of experiencing and understanding the world, and which predetermine our understanding of the world.
The CPR is not about religion or the spiritual realism, but is about what we can practically know about the world using reason and observation. Kant wrote:
The Transcendental Argument
Among Immanuel Kants most influential contributions to philosophy is his development of the transcendental argument, which he uses to show that we would not be able to understand our sensory experience if we were not able to impose a priori intuitions an a priori concepts on them. Thereby enabling the "conditions of the possibility of experience".
A Transcendental Argument begins with a strong premise, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a necessary condition for the premise. In a sense circular, but justifies its own truth through its own logical coherence.
Kant requires a transcendental argument because of his belief that it is not possible to abstract intuitions and concepts just from empirical experience, but transcendentally deduce them empirical experiences
Kant uses such a Transcendental Argument in his Refutation of Idealism in B275 against the Idealism of Berkeley in order not to prove that things exist independently of the mind, but only the possibility that things exist independently of the mind.
Kant chose a middle ground between Rationalism and Empiricism
Kant wanted to avoid the excesses of both the Rationalist and Empiricists by establishing a middle ground.
The Rationalist, such as Descartes and Plato, argued that humans can use Pure Reason to discover knowledge about the world without having first observed the world. They argued that Pure Reason can transcend experience and discover things like God and the soul.
The Empiricists, such as Hume and Locke, argued that humans can discover knowledge about the world just by observing the world.
Kant in the CPR made the case that on the one hand Pure Reason cannot answer metaphysical problems such as the existence of God or the soul but on the other hand can go beyond sensory experience in order to discover necessary truths about the world.
Summary
"Transcendental Idealism" uses the Transcendental Argument to make sense of the world given our sensory experiences.
(SEP - Kants Transcendental Idealism)
Thus we shouldn't be surprised that things we see are then logical. And when they are logical, then it's easy for us to say that "nature comply laws".
If something that we observe is paradoxical or doesn't fit in it earlier logic of how things are and behave, like the Michelson-Morley experiment didn't go so well with Newtonian physics, then we try to find a logical model for it. And what do you know, a technical assistant in a Swiss Patent Office got something logical to say about it!
Ahhh...logic restored.
But should laws not refer to something? Law itself being nature sounds, for me at least, a bit inconceivable.
Eg 2 hydrogen atoms consistently bond with 1 oxygen atom when they can because the stuff that makes these atoms up is defined, at it's very core, to behave in a particular way?
If you treat the word "law" as metaphorical, it seems like it gets a lot more conceivable
Is it inconceivable that there are naturally occurring negatively charged particles called electrons and positively charged particles caller protons that are naturally attracted to each other? Or is it more conceivable that electrons and protons don't actually have such properties, and are just following laws?
What's the difference between them having those properties, and them following laws that produce those properties? They seem like just different phrasings of the same thing to me.
Is it the difference between those laws being internally defined Vs externally defined?
The formulation for this discussion has been chosen to be a bit provocative on purpose. The question which laws are meant has not even been touched. The evolution of (incompatible) scientific theories is a different topic. The general issue then is: are there regularities in nature or are we only imposing them to be able to better plan our lives.
What's your opinion?
I think I mean mainly, that the question is ill-formed, in suggesting that human ideas can dictate reality, when it is the other way round, that reality dictates and ideas must conform. But most, perhaps all of 'our laws' are statistical averages, measures of temperature, and hence melting and boiling points, and gas pressure for examples. So the nearest thing to a sensible answer would be something like: "because particles are very small and very numerous and thus things usually average out the same way by chance."
Like if I drop a ball from a tower, and I time how long it takes to hit the floor, over and over again, and I keep recording the same time within a very small margin of error over and over again - how do you conceptualise the reason for this consistency? Is there something in reality, independent if human ideas, which underlies this consistency?
Either there are regularities or we are quite the kind of imposers!
I think it's called "regression to the mean". If you toss a coin twice you might get heads twice, tails twice or one of each ht or one of each th. If you toss a coin a million times, you are almost certain to get within a hundred or so equal numbers of heads and tails, because 'chances are'.
I'll quote myself, because I'm really curious about your thoughts on this:
Like if I drop a ball from a tower, and I time how long it takes to hit the floor, over and over again, and I keep recording the same time within a very small margin of error over and over again - how do you conceptualise the reason for this consistency? Is there something in reality, independent of human ideas, which underlies this consistency?
I agree. My immediate response was that these are "laws of nature" and not "laws for nature." Whether anything is classified as a "law of nature" depends upon whether human beings conclude it will admit of no exceptions. And we have been wrong so many times that we are not even bound to our conclusions, let alone nature.
Like, why is there attractive force between masses instead of repellant forces? Is that related to any of this matter following "rules" of some kind?
I wonder just how we would "plan our lives" if there were no regularities in nature. Very ineffectively, I would think.
If this is the issue, I also wonder if it has ever been asked just how likely it is that what is useful to us in planning our lives--in living--would be in some sense inconsistent with or at odds with nature. This would require, for one thing, an assumption that we're not part of nature, or not wholly part of it, which sadly is an assumption that's been made too often with unfortunate results (including the belief that there's an "external world" separate from us). But much as some would like to think we are apart from nature, I fear we're a part of it like everything else. And as parts of nature we interact with the rest of it necessarily, are formed by the rest of it and form the rest of it as well in some respects as part of that interaction.
That's what I suspected. But some critics seem to think Kant was talking about a supernatural Heavenly Realm, instead of a Hypothetical or Metaphorical state of perfection. Philosophical conjectures are often "beyond the scope of empirical investigation", but seldom beyond the range of rational analysis. Sadly, Philosophical Metaphors are all-too-often taken literally by those opposed to any preternatural implications.
On this forum, "transcendence" seems to be a taboo trigger-word for fully-invested Immanentists --- one in particular --- to get on their high-horse. Ironically, in a practical sense, I could be pigeon-holed into an Immanentism (reality vs ideality) slot. But when theorizing, I feel free to go beyond the current state of empirical knowledge, and to speculate into the unknown. Yet some would dismiss that philosophical freedom as a religious commitment to a supernatural faith. :halo:
Immanence and Transcendence :
Both what we can know by reason (immanence) and what we can know only by revelation (transcendence) are reflections of the very being of God. By contrast, immanence would signify that human reason is the highest norm for our knowledge of ethical and religious practices.
https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28079/chapter-abstract/212098546?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Quoting RussellA
Thanks for the quote. As I indicated above, I assumed that Kant was writing as a reality-exploring philosopher --- searching for the boundaries of Epistemology --- not as a Christian apologist. However, some on TPF reject anything he says as-if it was religious propaganda. Yet he seems to rely on mundane reasoning, not on divine revelation, for his conclusion that there are some "things" (ding an sich) that are not accessible to "empirical investigation". And it's exactly those known-unknowns that intrigue me. :nerd:
Quoting RussellA
Obviously, it would be impossible to prove anything beyond empirical evidence or the reach of reason. But what difference does it make to assert the "possibility" of such ding an sich? I'm guessing that he was responding to some aspect of Berkeley's Idealism. Ironically, Kant's own philosophy has the label "Idealism" pinned on it. So, he's not rejecting the general concept of Meta-Physical Reality, but some particular detail of Berkeley's formulation. Yes? :cool:
Quoting RussellA
Thanks again. That makes sense to me. Although it obviously doesn't compute for some Kant bashers. Taken literally, the title "Transcendental Idealism" seems to be directly opposite to "Immanent Realism". Was that effrontery intentional? :smile:
PS___ The OP seems to be questioning the possibility of a First Cause or Lawmaker to force Nature into compliance with somewhat arbitrary top-down "laws", as opposed to innate regularities emerging bottom-up, due to the constraints of random interactions. Top-down Laws would be Transcendent, while bottom-up Regularities would be Immanent. Hence, the thread's side-track into questioning Kant's notion of things & forces "beyond our sensory experience" or our "cognitive grasp".
Like, there is both. If you have a problem with the idea that physical laws are largely statistical, take it up with some physicists.
From a tower, perhaps, but what if the ball hits a number of pegs along the way?:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8713/causality-determination-and-such-stuff/p1
I think it's at least reasonable to suppose that the reason we can predict such things is that we're really really close to knowing what's going on in a general sense, but every particular has more to it than a generality. That is -- it's statistical, just 99.99999999 etc whatever you want to say close.
EDIT: And, to be fair, in practice I don't think I've seen anything beyond 5 or 6 sig-figs. Statistics are regularly a part of science in practice, even though the textbook problems give this impression of analytic certainty. That's mostly for the students benefit, whose already learning too much.
Something that follows no laws whatsoever, it would seem to me, wouldn't have any regular repeating patterns. So there must be *some reason*, from your point of view, why our world is so full of reliably repeating patterns. If nature does not conform to laws, then why can physicists predict with remarkable accuracy how long it will take a ball to hit the ground? What's the background process behind that, that doesn't involve laws in nature?
You say 'regression to the mean' but that's super general. Why should 'regression to the mean' mean balls fall down in that particular way and not some entirely different way? Or fall down in any particular way at all? Or stay coherent long enough for a person to recognize it as the ball? Regression to *what* mean? There must be some reason why the mean is this and not that - what do you call "that reason" if not something like laws or rules or ... ?? What do you call the reason?
I just Googled Bertrand Russell's statistical argument*1 to explain Nature's regularities, without recourse to a supernatural lawmaker. At first it seems to make empirical sense. But with afterthought, Nature still shows evidence of top-down statistical "laws"*2, begging the question of a Lawmaker or Regulator of Nature's "program", to direct its meandering median path, perhaps toward some future state.
For example, why would a random, non-designed, process (e.g. Evolution or coin flipping) have a tendency to average out extreme states? Is there a mathematical "gravitational" force pulling events toward some middle course? To suggest that Nature tends toward moderation also raises Why questions. Physical Science has postulated dozens of hypothetical "Forces" to explain consistent physical behavior ; four of them deemed "fundamental" to physics. Even Aristotle described four Causes in nature.
Yet again, why would such mysterious invisible causal pulls & pushes, with power over tangible matter, emerge within a non-directional randomized system?*3 Even "Chance" and "Chaos" are found to be lawful*4, and subject to arbitrary tugs toward the statistical median. So, Russell's argument merely redirects the question, pointing to the empirical predictable regularities of mathematics, instead of the hypothetical Great Mathematician*5, who defines what is Normal. :smile:
*1. The Natural Law Argument :
[i]The laws of nature are of that sort as regards a great many of them. They are statistical averages such as would emerge from the laws of chance; and that makes this whole business of natural law much less impressive than it formerly was. . . .
if there was a reason for the laws which God gave, then God Himself was subject to law, and therefore you do not get any advantage by introducing God as an intermediary. You have really a law outside and anterior to the divine edicts, and God does not serve your purpose, because He is not the ultimate law-giver.[/i]
https://www.mit.edu/activities/mitmsa/NewSite/libstuff/russell/node3.html
Note --- this just kicks the Lawmaker question farther back down the road toward an "ultimate" Reason-maker. Perhaps, Plato's LOGOS?
*2. Empirical statistical laws :
An empirical statistical law or (in popular terminology) a law of statistics represents a type of behaviour that has been found across a number of datasets and, indeed, across a range of types of data sets.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical_statistical_laws
*3. Is God a Mathematician? :
Nobel Laureate Eugene Wigner once wondered about the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the formulation of the laws of nature. Is God a Mathematician? investigates why mathematics is as powerful as it is. ___Mario Livio, astrophysicist
https://www.amazon.com/God-Mathematician-Mario-Livio/dp/0743294068
*4. Laws of Chaos :
Chaos theory has been developed from the recognition that apparently simple physical systems which obey deterministic laws may nevertheless behave unpredictably.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/chaos-theory
*5. Who says God is a mathematician? :
Michio Kaku explains why he believes in an intelligent creator and describes God as a mathematician and his mind as cosmic music. The final resolution could be that God is a mathematician, says Kaku. ___ Michio Kaku, theoretical physicist
https://bigthink.com/the-well/mathematics/
I can't pass a beggar without leaving a bit of change. If one begins with maximal simplicity, there is nowhere to go but towards complexity. However, once complexity has evolved, it can devolve into more simple forms, and there are many examples, For instance
https://www.sciencealert.com/what-happens-when-species-evolve-backwards-the-strange-science-of-devolution.
It is fairly obvious that every feature of an organism carries an energetic cost, and so as environments change, features that no longer contribute to survival are selected against.
I'll just note also that when i talk of statistical foundations of the gas laws and suchlike I am not talking of empirical statistical laws, but of theoretical, mathematical statistical laws. That is a misleading reference you gave in this context. This is what I was talking about.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinetic_theory_of_gases
For the uninitiated, an ideal gas is theorised as elastic particles moving at random and bouncing off each other. Pressure as measured is the average force exerted per unit area, and temperature a measure of the average velocity.
In quantum mechanics, things are indeed stochastic, and measurement results when taken in aggregate can be described as 'regressing to the mean', so the question I asked is, *what mean*? And in QM, the answer is, "the mean as described by the wave function". If the wave function of a quantum system gives us a probabilistic spread of possible measurements, then the "mean" being regressed to is the mean of that probabilistic spread.
And the wave function, in QM, it turns out is governed over time by the Schrodinger Equation - that equation defines how wave functions evolve over time.
So I think you're absolutely right in an important way, that we observer regularities because of a regression to the mean. I think you're stopping short when you don't ask yourself the question, "where does that mean come from? The mean as defined by what?"
So now we know where the mean comes from - the Schrodinger Equation, which evolves the wave function deterministically over time - what we have is something people might metaphorically refer to as a "law". However, this time it's not a law that's defining a singular behavior, it's a law defining statistical behavior, probability distributions. But a law nonetheless.
So even if the regularities we see are due to regression to the mean, when we look deeper into what that actually means, it looks like "laws" are still a pretty good metaphor.
So, the question here is, when I refer to the Schrodinger Equation as a law, am I making an ontological statement or just a statement about my model of the world? And I think my answer is, a little bit of both. It might be that hte Schrodinger equatiation and/or the wave functions are ontological, OR it may be that they're a model we have of something, and maybe our model is maybe a bit off, and maybe there's some other ontological reason why it seems like wave functions are obeying the schrodinger equation with remarkable consistnecy -- and it just turns out that hte schrodinger equation is a really good approximation of that ontological reason, or an approximation of a high-level consequence of the ontological reason.
But it would seem to me that, even if we're a little bit wrong, there's still *some underlying reason*. And I call that underlying reason a law.
If You can omit the notion "atom" at all, I am quite familiar with Your idea. An oxygen atom, for instance, is then only a bundle of laws, or as I would express it "a compound of related properties" and nothing else.
Quoting flannel jesus
This is what you said that I said. But it isn't what I said. I am not so dogmatic.
I do not pretend to be competent to speak about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, so I leave all that to others. but my position on mathematics is that it is the study of order and disorder, and thus of pattern and arrangement and symmetry. whatever there would be, would have some arrangement or other partial or complete, and perfect disorder has the structure of no structure and gives rise touch things as regression to the mean as soon as it is sampled or observed. I am a mathematical realist in the sense that mathematics deals with any possible or indeed any impossible world whatsoever, and that is why it finds 'unreasonable' application in this world. Naturally, the tendency is for humans to interest themselves particularly in the kind of maths that is instantiated in their world, and be less concerned with N dimensional hyperbolic manifolds and klein bottles and transfinite arithmetic etc.
Quoting flannel jesus
Call it what you like. But if, having discovered this law-like behaviour you then ask why the universe obeys this law, I cannot see that you can possibly come up with an underlying reason for your underlying reason. And this is why I call the op's question malformed.
Quoting unenlightened
Quoting unenlightened
Perhaps I'm misreading your words, I feel like they leave a lot of room for interpretation there.
Of course there is. Science is a big topic and hard to speak of globally. But it is an old cliché that scientific laws are descriptive and not prescriptive, and this means that they are the laws because nature obeys them, rather than that nature obeys them because they are the laws. Is this not clear to you?
Actually, I think all the problems and confusions we have in math starts from what you mentioned. Math for humans, and I would dare to say for animals too even if they math is "nothing, one, two, many", has started from the necessity of counting things. And we have thus put this small part of math as to be the basis of math, as the initial axioms everything starts from.
So yes, laws that scientists come up with are descriptive. That's the first type of law, not the second type.
I think the real question is all the issue that are in the realm of non-computable mathematics.
Then you need to answer the question that I refuse; what makes nature obey the second kind of law?
So in answer to your question, I wouldn't personally frame it as "obeying". Nature isn't obeying some laws defined from outside, rather nature IS those laws. There's not a separation between nature and the laws, our reality at its root is what it is because it is defined by those laws.
Our reality, I think, is probably in some sense a series of mathematical relationships between "things". Nature isn't being forced to obey those relationships, nature is the unfolding of those relationships (or if we're in a block universe, nature is maybe the crystallized structure of those relationships?).
I've never much liked the word 'laws' in this context. Apart from the metaphysical implications, it also implies a law giver or other mysterious entities. And leads to the the use of the word 'obey' which also seems irresistibly anthropomorphic.
Can't we just say that humans observe regularities and patterns in nature? To what extent these regularities are a function of our cognitive apparatus or are in nature itself, I'm not sure we can say. Our physics and science are incomplete and our philosophical understandings of what humans bring to observation and the concomitant construction of what we call reality, are also partial.
You are certainly free to just say that, but some of us like to go on to think about what the reasons might be that we do observe those regularities. I respect if you're not interested in that question
You left out the key part.
Quoting Tom Storm
Perhaps Kant can help us? Or phenomenology? What methodology do you think you have access to that can answer the above and determine what direction this enquiry should take? Or do you think straightforward empiricism can resolve this matter?
I'm happy to start from my own intuition and go from there. I wouldn't personally consult Kant myself
But if I wanted to seek external opinions about if the universe is really "lawful" under the hood, I would seek the opinion of scientists first, physicists in particular, rather than ancient philosophers. I respect that that's not necessarily a popular opinion here
The way you tell it is almost as if our cognitive apparatus is unnatural, or supernatural.
Perhaps that's the way you read it.
Not being a philosopher or scientist, I have no commitments either way. But I think the quesion what are the presuppositions which allow science to be understood as reliable is inevitable here. Once you start asking 'why' of scientific inferences, you tend to head into philosophy and more metaphysical areas.
:up: Yes, in one sense. Spinoza. Natura naturata and natura naturans, commonly translated as "nature natured and nature naturing. The passive and the active
I don't think our science is so incomplete that we can't determine that there are regularities in nature independent of our cognitive faculties. For example, I routinely capture highly regular sequences of events using an oscilloscope, where the time intervals between events are measured in microseconds or nanoseconds. I have no reason to think that my cognitive faculties are capable of distinguishing events at such temporal resolutions, let alone impose such regularity on the events.
I don't see any sensible of interpreting such high speed events as products of my mind.
I don't think you have to go that deep into ancient philosophy to understand all that. It is philosophical, yes, it's epistemology for sure.
Nature refers to everything, everything is a part of nature. Have you ever seen a star doing something UNnatural?
Everything that happens naturally does so because nature is the rules. Even human intervention cannot cause things to happen unnaturally.
I'm not sure we are talking about the same thing. My post referred to "Russell's statistical argument to explain Nature's regularities". Then I asked a philosophical (non-scientific) question : not how, but "why would a random, non-designed, process (e.g. Evolution or coin flipping) have a tendency to average-out extreme states into a law-like & predictable moderate position?".
Here's a physical example : The behavior of gas-in-a-box (Maxwell's Demon) illustrates --- without explaining --- that natural-but-inexplicable trait of averaging the pressure, by moving particles from a demon-caused condensed state toward a more natural diffuse state : order to disorder, or energy to entropy. In between those extreme states the gases were free to move forward and backward. Even biological evolution allows change to move back & forth*1. Would you agree that the average cosmic-trend-to-date has always been toward more local complexity (dust >> stars >> galaxies >> Earth), despite increasing general entropy {see image below}. If so, the topical question could be rephrased as : why do physical systems tend to follow a middle-of-the-road course, toward more & more order, as they evolve? Moreover, why is the cosmos now in a moderate state of Entropy, which allows Life & Mind to emerge?
Scientists have not been able to empirically determine an underlying reason for that law-like behavior, or for the simple to complex direction of natural Evolution. But some philosophers have speculated beyond the physical boundaries of Science --- to postulate a First Cause or Logos --- hoping to explain the Impetus and Intention behind such regularities in a universe that could otherwise be totally random and directionless. Even some professional scientists, Terrence Deacon, Paul Davies, Max Planck, Norbert Wiener, etc, have used the term teleology, not to explain, but to describe the lawful & directional forms of natural processes. So, isn't it reasonable for even fun-loving amateur philosophers like us to push the boundaries toward a Theoretical and Metaphysical answer to those Why questions.
Regarding "maximal simplicity", I must suppose that would equate to minimum organization and max Entropy, as in the heat death (big freeze) of the universe. Which is the opposite of the Big Bang"s demonic (hot & dense) low Entropy*2 beginning. The article below, by physicist Ethan Siegel*2, implies that Evolution began in an almost perfectly ordered (superdense) state*3 like a Black Hole, from which there was "nowhere to go", but toward more internal freedom to change, and to organize into more complex systems. But, why not take the easy path, directly to complete Entropy, without the eons-long detour of incremental steps toward more & more organization? Instead, the BB theory describes the original state as a hot-dense Plasma, which is like a gas-in-a-box situation. For some unknown reason, a metaphorical Demon (Inflation???) moved all the particles into one side of the box, then opened the door to allow it evolve eventually & naturally into stars & galaxies & us. Hence today, we find "particles" of matter organized into upright bipedal creatures with big brains, who ask dumb Why? questions.
Here's one amateur philosophical (non-scientific) speculation of a possible answer to the OP question of "what makes nature comply with its own inherent laws of nature" {my added bold}. Entropy alone would never even get to the original plasma state. So, is it reasonable that some countervailing inherent "force" or "law"*4 is responsible for enforcing the "regulations" of evolutionary organization? :smile:
PS___Sorry to unload on you. I had a lot of momentum. :joke:
*1. Can Species Evolve Backwards? ;
Thus, penguins didn't "devolve," they simply adapted to their new environment, and in that particular case, that meant losing a feature that had previously been beneficial.
https://www.sciencealert.com/what-happens-when-species-evolve-backwards-the-strange-science-of-devolution
*2. Did the Universe have zero entropy when it first began? :
The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is no. The Universe not only wasnt maximally organized at the start of the Big Bang, but had quite a large entropy even at the earliest stages we can describe
https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/universe-zero-entropy/
*3. Zero Entropy :
No entropy means no random motion in molecular level that means zero temperature that means zero heat energy that means zero possiblity for energy conversion that means "heat death of the universe" that means freeze of entire universe including all atoms and photons everything.
https://www.quora.com/What-would-happen-if-there-is-no-entropy-in-the-universe
*4. Enformy :
[i]In the Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce complexity & progress. [ see post 63 for graph ]
a. I'm not aware of any "supernatural force" in the world. But my Enformationism theory postulates that there is a meta-physical force behind Time's Arrow and the positive progress of evolution. Just as Entropy is sometimes referred to as a "force" causing energy to dissipate (negative effect), Enformy is the antithesis, which causes energy to agglomerate (additive effect).
b. Of course, neither of those phenomena is a physical Force, or a direct Cause, in the usual sense. But the term "force" is applied to such holistic causes as a metaphor drawn from our experience with physics.[/i]
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
MAXWELL'S DEMON COSMOLOGY : low entropy initial state ; high entropy final state
COSMOLOGY : What Demon placed the BB at the top of the energy/entropy curve?
Natural evolution has a law-like gravity ride downhill from the demonic Normal position
I think the scientific presumption is that demons do not exist. If they did exist, they would be just the entities to impose laws on particles like political economists such that wealth/energy would accumulate rather than dissipate.
But I would say, in disagreement with the above
"the average cosmic-trend-to-date has always been toward more local complexity (dust >> stars >> galaxies >> Earth), [s]despite[/s] because increasing general entropy. The complex ordering that is life is an eddy in the energy dissipation stream of the sun. and in no way contradicts entropic flow.
As to why we live in that peculiar condition that allows life to exist - that is a question too fatuous to respond to.
Quoting Gnomon
This is Hegel's "geist", disguised in pseudoscientific language. He, and you, may well be right. I certainly agree that the scientific view cannot account for everything, because it resolutely excludes the subject from consideration. But I at least, cannot not pretend that a hypothetical metaphysical aspect of reality that results in "progress" and implies a goal, is science. The great advantage of Hegel's version to my mind is that the direction it establishes is towards freedom - that is to the transcendence of the limitations of physical law as that goal. Thus for example, nature evolves heavier than air flight, and intelligence does the same thing faster and more extensively for flightless apes. And the science side of this is that life does it by exploiting exactly those chaotic complex situations where a butterfly's wing or a neuron's firing can have a disproportionate effect on the world.
Quoting Pez
TI is not a world-view, although it may be said to contain the ground for the development of one. TI is a doctrine, supported by a speculative metaphysical theory concerning the human intellect in general, and as such, has no warrant beyond its own logic for actually being the case.
So saying, even if not a world-view per se, TI is certainly avoidable by not having any knowledge of it, and, there can be realistic alternatives to it by assuming a different set of initial conditions. Just as in any theory, TI is neither certifiably irrefutable nor unalterable.
On the other hand, TI is unavoidable iff the rational thinking subject .that to which the theory applies .subscribes to its rules. With respect to the thread title, one of the major rules is the source of the legitimacy for attributing to Nature, only that by which its observable relations are comprehensible, and its unobserved relations are nonetheless possibly comprehensible.
Only if comprehension is invariant, that is to say, subsumed under the principles of universality and necessity, and thereby under any legitimate condition, is the attribution to Nature a law. From which follows as a matter of experience alone, we do in fact influence the laws of Nature, insofar as we propose them, even if it is true we cannot influence Nature or the intrinsic relations observable in it.
-
Quoting Pez
If it is the case the spatialtemporal world resides in our intelligence, insofar as it is of our own making, its absurd to then suppose we live in it.
If something is of our own making, how is it possible we dont have a clue about what that something is? If it is something because of us it cannot be nothing to us.
Wouldnt the fact we dont have a clue about these things, immediately presuppose them? How is it possible to have or not have clues about things that arent there to have or not have clues about? And if things are presupposed, the notion of ideas alone as conditions for having no clue about the existence of things, is categorically false.
If that in which we live exists merely from our ideas of it, why do we have and employ apparatus for the receptivity of various modes of physically real affectations caused by really existent things?
-
.. In the transcendental æsthetic we proved that everything intuited in space and time, all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as presented to usas extended bodies, or as series of changeshave no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought. This doctrine I call Transcendental Idealism . (A491/B519, in Kemp Smith,1929)
It is, then, in Kant, representations are that which exists only in human thought, and subsequent peer review iterations have extended mere human thought to ideas. That in which we live, in which we exist as a particular kind of thing amongst all things in general, is necessarily presupposed as existing by its own accord, independent of human intelligence, in order for there to be spatialtemporal phenomena at all.
Obviously, the "demon" was a metaphor that Maxwell used to illustrate a physical phenomenon --- work without a worker --- that had no better explanation. It remains a puzzle for both scientists and philosophers*1. But the metaphor is still used, not to explain but to illustrate, various anomalies in science. For example, physicist Paul Davies' The Demon in the Machine, in which he identifies the "demon" with Causal Information. Could that be the mysterious "entity to impose laws"? :smile:
*1. Maxwell's Demon i[i]s a way of demonstrating that the laws of mechanics are compatible with microstates and Hamiltonians that lead to an evolution which violates the Second Law of thermodynamics by transferring heat from a cold gas to a hot one without investing work. . . .
Maxwells Demon is a thought experiment devised by J. C. Maxwell in 1867 in order to show that the Second Law of thermodynamics is not universal, since it has a counter-example. Since the Second Law is taken by many to provide an arrow of time, the threat to its universality threatens the account of temporal directionality as well. Various attempts to exorcise the Demon, by proving that it is impossible for one reason or another, have been made throughout the years, but none of them were successful. [/i]
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7516722/#:~:text=Maxwell%27s%20Demon%20is%20a%20way,hot%20one%20without%20investing%20work.
Quoting unenlightened
So, you think Entropy is a causal force, instead of merely a degree of disorder or uncertainty in a system, as defined by physicist Rudolph Clausius?*2 In a similar metaphorical sense, I called my own coinage of "Enformy" a counter-force to Entropy. That's not yet a scientific fact, but it's a useful way for philosophers to think about the "general trend" of the universe to go downhill, while in local pockets of organization, like planet Earth, the thermodynamic trend has been "violated" ; reversed toward Life and Order. :cool:
*2. Entropy [i]is the general trend of the universe toward death and disorder. . . .
the degree of disorder or uncertainty in a system[/i]
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entropy
Quoting unenlightened
That's a good analogy. But I object to the "pseudoscientific" characterization. "Holism" was originally a scientific term to describe how Evolution works its natural "magic". But the term was adopted by New Agers, and rendered contaminated by its association with supernatural beliefs. Similarly, the term "Metaphysics" was originally a useful philosophical term to describe topics, such as Mind, that are not understandable from a reductive physical perspective. Today, scientists use the term "Systems Theory" as a disguise for their holistic research*3. :nerd:
Systems Theory & Holism :
Systems have common defining properties, such as hierarchical ordering, coupling, permeability, holism, emergence, equifinality, and homeostasis. Representing the broader systems perspective are several specific theories and perspectives, such as Weick's theory of organizing, communication network perspectives, ecological and evolutionary perspectives, and self-organizing systems theory. Systems theory has been extensively applied in research areas ranging from communication design and adoption of technology use in organizational operations to professional communication, health campaigns, and public relations.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316283969_Systems_theory
No. "because" not "by cause". An explanation is not a cause of anything except, occasionally, understanding.
Interesting objection indeed. Would You not say a dream is of Your own making? And as long as You dream is it absurd to say You live in that dream?
What do You mean by "really existent things"? That term is exactly what is at stake here. Not many people would earnestly doubt the real objective existence of things in space and time. At least I do not. Nevertheless the question about the nature of space and time and the validity of scientific theories remains. Your quote regarding Kant's Critique shows it quite clear, that Transcendental Idealsms has nothing whatsoever to do with ordinary idealism or solipsism.
Quoting Gnomon
Quoting unenlightened
Quoting unenlightened
OK. But, if your reply above is not a "causal" explanation, how does it explain --- increase understanding of --- how local complexity could increase, in apparent violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics? My footnote *2, describes a possible explanation --- given certain conjectures --- of how high-density stars could form even-though (despite) the uphill pull against the inexorable cosmic expansion trend toward lower overall density of matter*3. Ironically, it uses the counter-intuitive statistical notion of "Entropy Density"*4. Perhaps, instead of striking out "despite" in favor of "because", your explanation should insert "probably" or "possibly".
The Second Law is usually taken to be inviolable, with the possible exception of a highly unprovable & improbable First Cause scenario, as postulated in Cosmic Inflation theory, when presumably lax pre-bang physics also allowed a violation of the speed limit of light*5. Technically, that mathematical creation story took place before our Universe existed ; so it's not about Physics, but Meta-Physics : Voila! instant universe from nothing ; indistinguishable from magic. It's not a physical causal explanation, because it assumes a mysterious Cause that no longer exists in the real world. :smile:
PS___ Again, I apologize for pushing this esoteric Causation enigma, but it's a hobby-horse of mine.
*2. Did the Universe have zero entropy when it first began? :
The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is no. The Universe not only wasnt maximally organized at the start of the Big Bang, but had quite a large entropy even at the earliest stages we can describe
https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/universe-zero-entropy/
*3. Entropy vs Density :
When we think about the Universe in the earliest stages of the hot Big Bang, were imagining all the matter and radiation that we have today currently spread out across a sphere some ~92 billion light-years in diameter packed into a volume about the size of the worlds largest pumpkin. The Universe back at that stage was incredibly hot and dense, . . .
https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/universe-zero-entropy/
*4. What is the relationship between entropy and density?
[i]Density measures how closely the atoms are packed, whereas entropy measures the disorder or randomness. . . .
The law of entropy ( the law which says, entropy always increases) is better read as there is a high probability that entropy always increases. Its not physics, but probability that governs this.[/i]
https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-diference-between-density-and-entropy-basic
*5. Is cosmic inflation faster than light?
Around 13.8 billion years ago, the universe expanded faster than the speed of light for a fraction of a second, a period called cosmic inflation. Scientists aren't sure what came before inflation or what powered it. It's possible that energy during this period was just part of the fabric of space-time.
https://science.nasa.gov/universe/overview/
Yes to both. I cannot do science in a dream. While it could be said by dreaming I may represent myself as if I am doing science, in fact Im not doing anything scientifically.
Quoting Pez
Ehhhh, thats just me being ..me. Existing indicates that for which the negation is contradictory; really existing just indicates that for which the negation is stupid.
Quoting Pez
True enough, but it is a form of idealism nonetheless. Dunno, but maybe these days the term has been transitioned onto one of those newfangled language games, where idealism of old is now raw subjectivism, or some other such nonsense.
It's similar with general relativity. There used to be a force of gravity. Now mass curves space and that produces what acts like a force, but explains the details better. How does mass manage to curve space? No body knows.
That's ultimately what science has to say about the even simpler question of how the universe manages to follow the laws that our models postulate.
I think gravity is still a force, and mass curves spacetime. Its a little like mass increasing as velocity increases, a perspective replaced by increases in kinetic energy. Sorry. Nitpicking.
https://www.physicsforums.com/insights/understanding-general-relativity-view-gravity-earth/
Thanks for bringing this up. I wish I had a clearer picture odf it.
But why is it nonsense? Maybe You can explain it to me. Otherwise I can take it only as subjective opinion and further discussing nonsense does not interest me.
Was my Dunno, but maybe . your first clue? Is any opinion not subjective? Doesnt opinion characterize the majority of postings in this kind of public media? So it is no big deal to take what anybody says, at least initially, as mere opinion.
Speaking of nonsense ..
Quoting Pez
..relevant insofar as, because there is an antecedent necessary condition supporting the fact you exist, which is fundamentally reminiscent of Descartes, it is nonsense to assert the fact that you exist is the only fact there is to be sure of.
Quoting Pez
.. it is the case knowledge of objects out of our consciousness is impossible, which makes both their future behavior superfluous, and, the connection to Humes argument, irrelevant.
Categorical error: knowledge of objects impossible because they are not in consciousness, is very far from knowledge of objects impossible because they are not immediately perceived. Humes argument, re: that knowledge of unperceived objects is validated by constant conjunction, or, habitual cause/effect thinking, has nothing to do with the objects as the content of consciousness, and is entirely refuted by theories of empirical knowledge wherein the immediate appearance of objects to the senses is a fundamental prerequisite.
My opinions, of course. I can give the textual references for them, from Renes, Daves or Mannys opinions, if you like.
That's a good question. From our perspective as subjects to the Law, the physical regularities of Nature are Necessities*1 --- "gravity always wins". Also, since Nature has physical Forces to enforce those laws, the consequence is what we call Causation. Which raises the contentious question : is the lawful order & predictability of Nature due to top-down Causality (Lawmaker), or to fortuitous Accident (Chance)?
A slight alteration of the OP might ask : why are these particular Necessities needed for the workings of Nature? If the mechanics of the universe was completely random, no physical path would be favored, and Evolution would not need to be Selective, and Statistics would never vary from a central norm. Obviously, the world we live in is mostly non-random, except perhaps on the quantum level, where spontaneity happens just enough to call it "Uncertainty". On the macro scale though, most processes are directional and predictable --- hence the "effectiveness" of Science. So, it seems that a bit of fundamental randomness is Necessary, only to allow degrees of freedom (flexibility) in the otherwise deterministic path of Evolution*2. The general direction, at least on Earth, is toward more complexity & organization, with just enough plasticity to allow for novelty along the way*3.
Therefore, the universe --- or agents within --- could "disobey" natural Laws only if they were Un-necessary, or optional. But, as far as empirical Science can tell, the law-like limits on Physics are universal*4. And the only exceptions are found on the Quantum scale*5, which seem to serve only to dilute the mechanical rigidity of absolute Cause & Effect. So, only more Randomness, and less Lawfulness (i.e. Magic), would allow Nature to vary from it's legitimate path of orderly Causation & Evolution. :smile:
*1. What does necessary mean in philosophy?
In philosophy, necessity and sufficiency are two attributes that together constitute causality. A cause is necessary and sufficient to generate the effect. It being necessary is the negation or falsification: the effect cannot occur without the cause, so the cause is necessary for the effect to occur.
https://www.quora.com/How-can-you-explain-necessity-in-philosophy
*2. When being flexible matters :
In this debate, it has been argued that our view of evolutionary causation should be rethought by including more seriously developmental causes and causes of the individual acting organism. . . . to reflect on the causal role of agency, individuality, and the environment in evolution.
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32285230/
*3. Evolutionary Causation :
Most scientific explanations are causal. This is certainly the case in evolutionary biology, which seeks to explain the diversity of life and the adaptive fit between organisms and their surroundings. The nature of causation in evolutionary biology, however, is contentious.
https://philpapers.org/rec/ULLECB
*4. Is natural law a law in the true sense? :
Laws of nature are the only real laws based on principle and truth. Natural laws are universal, eternal, and immutable,
Nature doesnt have laws, since natural laws arent like man-made laws that tell people how they should behave. Instead, natural laws are merely our best descriptions of how we have observed that things behave within nature and how we think, by extension, things behave elsewhere within nature.
https://www.quora.com/Is-natural-law-a-law-in-the-true-sense
*5. Quantum Magic :
Some quantum scale behaviors (e.g. tunneling) might seem magical, but they are never found on the macro level of reality.
But take the signal traveling through the optical nerve for instance. Besides the fact, that it is heavily pre-processed by the retina: where is the "immediate" object?
Is our science complete enough to rule out the possibility that the universe will undergo a radical transformation next year, with all current regularities and physical constants replaced by new ones? Is it possible there is an undiscovered mechanism whereby the universe goes through such radical changes ever 13.7 billion years or so? How would you even calculate the odds of such an event?
Immediate appearance is before the processing. Object here just indicates that which is processed, depending on which sense is affected. The object for the ear is sound, for the tongue, chemicals, etc. The intellectual system, metaphysically speaking, the brain physically speaking, determines how the object of sense, referred to as sensation, is to be known by that system.
This really is quite close to the ideas presented by Kant in his Critique!
Alam, T. B. (2025). The Selective Universe: Order, Entropy, and the Philosophical Paradox of Natural Rigidity [Zenodo]. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17341242
So the question: "What makes nature comply to laws?" is moot. Nature does not comply to laws, nature is brought into existence by these laws.
Of course, this understanding does require an a priori understanding of a system, at least.