What the science of morality studies and its relationship to moral philosophy

This is a very good start to a discussion and I think can highlight a key difference between philosophy and science. Science often times takes hypotheses and established definitions and uses them in identifying tests. Thus if we say 'morality is cooperation," then we observe where cooperation happens in animals and say, "That is morality."

Philosophy on the other hand is the logical establishment of "What does this definition mean?" which we can then test. You see, in the first case, there is no question as to what the definition of morality is. Its, "Cooperation". So we observe a few serial killers working together to mass murder people. "Ah, look at that morality in action!" we would say as scientists. But as philosophers we would take a step back and say, "Huh, cooperation as morality in this situation doesn't make sense. Maybe its not as simple as that."

I think any good philosopher must understand up to date facts and observations. You cannot create a reasonable definition without a strong foundation on what is already reasonable. But the creation of the definitions that we use can also color how we see facts. The goal is to create a definition that solves potential contradictions, emotional conflicts, and has universal rational agreement. When such a definition does contradict our emotional intuitions, it must provide rational points which can often explain why we feel that way, but also why that feeling is incorrect.

So, should we use observations of cooperative behavior? Yes. Should that be the only consideration in morality? No, because it leads to unintuitive contradictions to people sense of what morality is without adequately explaining why those contradictions to our intuitions are incorrect.

If you're interested, I'm exploring the idea of an objective morality here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

Quoting Mark S

But the science of morality can study why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is a growing consensus that “human morality” (here our moral sense and cultural moral norms) exists because it solves cooperation problems in groups.

There are fallacies at play here. "A moral norm aids cooperation, therefore the moral norm exists for the sake of cooperation." Not only is this fallacious reasoning, but it also departs from the "is" questions that you associate with "science." There is no "is" fact that moral norms exist for the sake of cooperation. Further, this conclusion contradicts the answers you would often receive if you asked the moral actors why they hold to their moral norms. The person who engages in this form of reasoning basically says, "Well, these people tell us that they hold to their moral norm because of X, but they really hold to their moral norm for the sake of cooperation, because [insert fallacious argumentation]."

It is basically Bulverism combined with a substituted motivation, and this has nothing to do with science. One center of the problem is the equivocation between moral norms as active via intentional agents and moral norms as passive via a mechanism such as evolution. Once someone speaks about "moral norms" in this latter sense the equivocation trap is set. The latter sense is in fact not a moral norm at all; it is a correlation.

What the so-called "scientist" has done is redefined morality in terms of expedience, and once that redefinition is complete it gets folded back to cover over the colloquial understanding of morality. Plato was already fighting hard against this move 2500 years ago. Of course it is true that many people throughout time have acted only for expedience. Such people do not believe that morality (or justice) in the true sense exists, and many of the "scientists" come from this group, importing their own view.

Reply to Philosophim

Quoting Philosophim

So we observe a few serial killers working together to mass murder people. "Ah, look at that morality in action!" we would say as scientists. But as philosophers we would take a step back and say, "Huh, cooperation as morality in this situation doesn't make sense.

Yes, it is descriptively moral in human societies to solve cooperation problems that prevent the society from achieving its goals, for instance genocide or mass murder. Descriptively moral behaviors have included a lot of things we would consider despicable – no surprise there.

You seem to be thinking about what is universally moral. It is universally moral (as part of morality as cooperation) to solve cooperation problems while not exploiting or harming others. So, no, the mass murders cooperation does not count as universally moral by morality as cooperation.

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like.

Moral philosophers tend to focus only on what is universally moral. We have missed a lot by not being able to explain what is descriptively moral.

I expected my examples of “Don’t eat pigs” and “Homosexuality is evil” would have made it clear that the science of morality explains both what is descriptively moral and what is universally moral.

If I had proposed "It is universally moral (as part of morality as cooperation) to solve cooperation problems while not exploiting or harming others." in my OP, I would have been moving over into making a philosophical claim which I was trying to avoid.

Quoting Mark S

Yes, it is descriptively moral in human societies to solve cooperation problems that prevent the society from achieving its goals, for instance genocide or mass murder.

Descriptive morality is just the study of people's opinions on morality. If you claim "Cooperation is moral," that's not descriptive. A study of descriptive ethics would be to ask, "Why do people consider cooperation moral?"

Quoting Mark S

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like.

That's a fine thing to claim, but where is science in your example describing a universal morality?

Quoting Mark S

Moral philosophers tend to focus only on what is universally moral. We have missed a lot by not being able to explain what is descriptively moral.

I don't think that's the case at all. In attempting to discover a universal morality, oftentimes philosophers look to the reason behind why people take the actions that they claim are moral. For example, why was it considered moral to kill a deformed child in ancient times? Understanding why people believe actions are moral is fundamental to creating a rational universal morality, as it should explain why they have these intuitions, and if they are misguided, why they are misguided.

Reply to Leontiskos

That our moral sense and cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is a robust hypothesis that 1) explains virtually all past and present cultural moral norms (suggested counterexamples would be gratefully received) and 2) everything we know about our moral sense. It is a simple explanation of a huge, superficially chaotic data set. It is a good candidate for the normal, provisional kind of scientific truth.

It also is not new. Protagoras proposed it to Socrates in Plato’s dialog of the same name. Socrates rejected it, perhaps because it was too close to what the common people thought about morality at the time and therefore not intellectually challenging. Protagoras proposed it by reciting a Greek myth about why Zeus gave people a moral sense. If you replace Zeus with evolutionary processes, you get a remarkably coherent story of the evolutionary process.

Finally, your criticism that morality as cooperation redefines morality as expedience is a philosophical claim irrelevant to science.

Reply to Mark S

Put differently, to say that morality is for cooperation is a teleological claim, and according to your understanding of science this is not a scientific claim at all.

Quoting Mark S

But the science of morality can study why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.

A moral norm involves valuation, and therefore any field which prescinds from matters of value cannot appraise moral norms, except insofar as it explains them away. But to predicate cooperation of morality is to explain one value term with another value term, and "science," as you have described it, cannot do this. The account is therefore not even logically coherent.

Quoting Philosophim

If you claim "Cooperation is moral," that's not descriptive.

Right.

Quoting Philosophim

[quote="Philosophim;885149"]The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like.
— Mark S

That's a fine thing to claim, but where is science in your example describing a universal morality?

I did not include the derivation of what is universally moral by morality as cooperation in the OP to keep it short and because it was unnecessary to my points. I can’t say everything at once.

In outline:

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense. However, solving these cooperation problems has been done for what we see as morally reprehensible goals such as mass murder.

Might there be a part of all these descriptively behaviors that is universally moral – meaning universal to all descriptively moral behaviors?

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others. But exploiting or harming others (in outgroups) creates a cooperation problem, which we know is immoral by morality as cooperation.

So all descriptively moral behaviors have a universal ingroup cooperation component and a potentially immoral interaction with exploited or harmed outgroups.

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”.

Quoting Leontiskos

But to predicate cooperation of morality is to explain one value term with another value term, and "science," as you have described it, cannot do this.

What then can descriptive science do? It can study the practices of cultures or people, including their strategies for cooperation. It can study their language. It can describe what they mean when they use a word, such as "morality." But as to morality proper, it can say very little, because morality is a normative sphere and not a descriptive sphere. Those who claim to be doing descriptive science but then manage to make or imply normative moral claims are engaged in sophistry, and this is a problem that plagues our age.

The common example of this is:

1. When we look at societies we find that they were interested in cooperation.
2. Therefore, our moral beliefs are really just an epiphenomenon of our desire for cooperation.
3. Therefore, true morality is cooperation.
4. Therefore, you should be more cooperative.

Quoting Leontiskos

[quote="Leontiskos;885152"]to say that morality is for cooperation is a teleological claim

I did not say morality is for cooperation. Given a standard philosophical understanding of “morality” as what everyone ought to do, I see no justification for such a claim. I said the existence of cultural moral norms and our moral sense are explainable as parts of cooperation strategies.

Quoting Leontiskos

A moral norm involves valuation, and therefore any field which prescinds from matters of value cannot appraise moral norms, except insofar as it explains them away. But to predicate cooperation of morality is to explain one value term with another value term, and "science," as you have described it, cannot do this. The account is therefore not even logically coherent.

Consider three cultural moral norms:
Eating pigs is an abomination
Homosexuality is evil
Do to others as you would have them do to you.

All are parts of known cooperation strategies explored in game theory.
The first two are marker strategies as described in the OP.
The Golden Rule is a heuristic for initiating indirect reciprocity, arguably the most powerful known cooperation strategy.
Similarly, virtually all cultural moral norms I am aware of can be explained as parts of known cooperation strategies.

And somehow in your mind this is logically incoherent? How?

Perhaps you are leaping to philosophical conclusions that I have not made and that are incoherent.

Quoting Mark S

Evolutionary game theory and the cooperation strategies it reveals are based on simple, species-independent mathematics. Species that have not incorporated cooperation strategies into their biology and cultures are likely unable to form the highly cooperative societies necessary for civilizations. Therefore, we can expect virtually all civilizations, independent of species, to have incorporated cooperation strategies into their biology and cultures.

Punishment of violators is a necessary part of the evolutionary stable reciprocity strategies that are the most powerful cooperation strategies within human morality. Hence, we can also expect that virtually all civilizations will intuitively feel, as we do, that violators of cooperation strategies deserve punishment – the hallmark of human morality.

Interesting… thanks for posting that. :up:

It’s seems that you may perhaps be describing the search for some kind of general strategy or law.
A law that might tell us what to do (and what not to do) in order to keep humanity flourishing, and do so in an environment that is relatively healthy and robust.
As you mention, the taboos and habits of individual groups can be put aside for the moment as particular (and sometimes quite peculiar) preferences.

Science has in recent years been telling us some rather disturbing facts and hypotheses about the how Earth and humans interact. (Or simply put ‘the environment’).

There isn’t always agreement, even among scientists, but there seems to be a broad consensus that human civilization is changing what was until very recently considered unchangable.
Humans, in their millennia-long attempt to make the world more habitable for humans, are very close to quickly making it less habitable.

It reminds me of someone playing poker, who is having an incredible run and amassing a huge pot… but do they know when to quit? That is, quit before losing the whole pile of cash?

There are certain ‘laws of nature’ that concern animals, their breeding, eating, and environment.
Such as the way a group of animals will increase when given access to more food, but depletion of that food source will cause a decrease in population.
And the way that animals (in general terms) kill mainly that which they eat.
(IE, despite all the gore and blood, the species are most definitely not at war with each other, trying to destroy all those around themselves. For why would they want to destroy their food source?)

A bold humanist might say that if there are any ‘laws’ or strategies that animals unconsciously or instinctually follow, then they are just that… “animal instincts”.
And being for animals, this person could boldly argue that such laws do not apply to humans.
We have power over our environment, they might argue, and an intelligence that is unbounded.

To which a skeptic might say, Yes! The intelligence of humans is so great that it can outwit all other creatures.
And we are so intelligent that we can occasionally outwit ourselves.
In this case, by accidentally (or intentionally) going against the earth which gives us life.

Not sure if that’s anywhere near what you were asking with the OP, but that’s what comes to mind. :smile:

Quoting Mark S

The first two are marker strategies as described in the OP.

According to who? Certainly not those who practice them.

What is the "scientist" even supposed to be doing in such a case? "You say you abstain from pigs because they are unclean, but the real reason you abstain from pigs is because you are trying to set group boundaries." And the question is: is this sort of Freudian psychologizing descriptive science?

The other problem here is that insofar as it is descriptive science, it has nothing to do with morality proper. The Freudian "scientist" can theorize, "Well, these primitive people are confused about why they do what they do. They're really after cooperation, not ritual cleanness, because evolution." Okay...? But what does that have to do with morality? This arrogant rewriting of people's beliefs and motives is of course quite silly, but it also doesn't have any logical connection to moral normativity. I'd say this is just about how sophists justify bacon.

Reply to Mark S I think the attempt to reduce habits of normative non-reciprocal harm-reduction (i.e. morals) to "strategies for solving cooperation problems" (e.g. game theory, cybernetics) is incoherent and misguided. This proposal is incoherent due to the category mistake of reframing non-reciprocity (altruism) in terms of reciprocity (mutualism), or vice versa. Also, it's misguided to assume that calculation (i.e. problem solving) is fundamental to moral judgment ("strategy"?) when, in fact, it's reflective habit (i.e. virtue) that is fundamental to moral conduct (empathy-care-compassion).

Quoting Mark S

I said the existence of cultural moral norms and our moral sense are explainable as parts of cooperation strategies.

Anthropological and developmental evidences suggest you've put the cart before the horse, Mark. For example, the so-called "moral sense" in human toddlers and many nonhuman animals is expressed as strong preferences for fairness and empathy towards individuals both of their own species and cross-species ... prior to / independent of formulating or following any "cooperation strategies".

Quoting Leontiskos

But what does that have to do with morality?

What it has to do with "morality" is that morality as cooperation is the underlying principle that explains why past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist.

I expect you are thinking of "morality" as what everyone imperatively ought to do - a topic in moral philosophy. Morality as cooperation is in a different domain of knowledge - what 'is', which I hope we agree may or may not be what we ought to do.

Quoting 180 Proof

This proposal is incoherent due to the category mistake of reframing non-reciprocity (altruism) in terms of reciprocity (mutualism), or vice versa. Also, it's misguided to assume that calculation (i.e. problem solving) is fundamental to moral judgment...

These are good, concise points.

The difficulty for me is that the "Freudian psychologizing" can occur at each stage. Egoists will claim that altruists are "really" egoists, and those who reduce morality to calculation or expediency will claim that all morality is "really" nothing more than this, just as those who claim that morality is just game theory or evolutionary will apply this, a priori, to all putative instances of morality.

The egoist can have his theory that there are no true altruists, but this judgment could never be a matter of scientific fact, and therefore it should not be presented as such.

Quoting Mark S

What it has to do with "morality" is that morality as cooperation is the underlying principle that explains why past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist.

In other words:

Quoting Leontiskos

Therefore, our moral beliefs are really just an epiphenomenon of our desire for cooperation.

Quoting Mark S

I expect you are thinking of "morality" as what everyone imperatively ought to do - a topic in moral philosophy. Morality as cooperation is in a different domain of knowledge - what 'is', which I hope we agree may or may not be what we ought to do.

Well then what does the "morality" in your phrase, "morality as cooperation" mean? Or when you speak about "moral norms" in the sentence quoted above, what do you mean? You are pretending to use these words in non-normative ways, but it seems clear to me that you are not being consistent in this.

The only way to fully "explain" a normative term in a non-normative way is to involve yourself in the claim that those who use the term and hold to the normativity in question are fundamentally confused. So if "cooperation" is conceived in a non-normative manner then this Bulverism rears its head; and if "cooperation" is conceived in a normative manner then we have moved out of the purview of descriptive science.

The unvarnished claim here is, "Cooperation explains morality, says Science."

Reply to 180 Proof
Hello 180 Proof!
Thanks for commenting.

Quoting 180 Proof

I think the attempt to reduce habits of normative non-reciprocal harm-reduction (i.e. morals) to "strategies for solving cooperation problems" (e.g. game theory, cybernetics) is incoherent and misguided.

I agree that trying to reduce the philosophical understanding of morality (such as habits of normative non-reciprocal harm-reduction) as what people ought to do to strategies for solving cooperation problems is incoherent. This is not my argument.

I am reducing past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense to morality as cooperation – a exercise entirely in the domain of science.

Quoting 180 Proof

This proposal is incoherent due to the category mistake of reframing non-reciprocity (altruism) in terms of reciprocity (mutualism), or vice versa.

Also fully in the domain of science is understanding how the biology underlying empathy and loyalty can exist and motivate true altruism, sometimes even unto the giver's death.

That explanation, first proposed by Darwin, is that empathy and loyalty motivate cooperation that can increase what is called inclusive fitness of groups who experience empathy and loyalty even at the cost of the individual's life.

Quoting 180 Proof

For example, the so-called "moral sense" in human toddlers and many nonhuman animals is expressed as strong preferences for fairness and empathy towards individuals both of their own species and cross-species ... prior to / independent of formulating or following any "cooperation strategies".

And of course, people, including babies and myself for most of my life, are utterly oblivious that their moral sense motivates and cultural moral norms advocate parts of cooperation strategies. Biological and cultural evolution stumbled across them by chance and they were selected for by the benefits of cooperation they produced. We just experience the motivation to follow our moral sense and, sometimes, cultural moral norms.

When people are motivated by empathy, loyalty, gratitude, righteous indignation, shame, and guilt or “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, cooperation problems are solved. No intellectual understanding of what is going on is required. How helpful an intellectual understanding might be in daily life is still to be seen.

Reply to Leontiskos
Quoting Leontiskos

You are pretending to use these words in non-normative ways, but it seems clear to me that you are not being consistent in this.

The simpler claim here is, "Cooperation explains morality, says Science."

To claim "Cooperation explains morality” is a philosophical leap I would not make and science definitely can’t. “Morality” here can be interpreted as “what everyone ought to do” a category of strange thing I am not sure exists.

Cooperation explains our moral sense and cultural moral norms. That is a scientific claim, so yes, “says Science”.

The word “morality” in the theory Morality as Cooperation refers to past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense. Cultural moral norms are norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. Our moral sense is our biology-based facility for making near-instantaneous judgments about right and wrong.

Of course, cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgements are “what everyone ought to do” in that culture or in that individual’s opinion.

But I expect you don’t confuse “cultural moral norms” and our “moral sense” with what a philosopher would describe as “moral” when answering questions such as “How should I live?”, “What are my obligations?”, and “What is good?”.

So why the difficulty with understanding what “Morality as Cooperation” refers to as an explanation of why our cultural moral norms and moral sense exist?

Reply to Leontiskos Like the Buddhist desire to overcome desire, I think an egoist might practice altruism (i.e. non-reciprocal help/care of others) in order to overcome – deflate, sublimate – her ego: a positive, or adaptive, form of selfishness à la Spinoza's 'ethical conatus' (and not mere selflessness).

Quoting Mark S

— a[n] exercise entirely in the domain of science.

So then why do you think this "exercise" has any relevance to moral philosophy?

Reply to 180 Proof
Quoting 180 Proof

— a[n] exercise entirely in the domain of science.
— Mark S
So then why do you think this "exercise" has any relevance to moral philosophy?

As I said in the OP,

Quoting Mark S

Perhaps understanding what human morality ‘is’ will provide valuable insights for philosophical studies into what morality ought to be.

Our moral sense and cultural moral norms shape our moral intuitions. Therefore, our moral intuitions are also virtually all parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. To the extent that a moral philosopher relies on guidance from their moral intuitions, this might be an additional helpful insight.

There are many perspectives in moral philosophy. Some philosophers may find these results from the science of morality helpful to their area of study, others certainly will not. That is OK with me.

My interest is how to make the science of morality culturally useful. My chief interest here is in learning how to present it so it will be understood. That is still a work in progress. The responses here have been helpful.

Quoting Mark S

My chief interest here is in learning how to present it so it will be understood. That is still a work in progress. The responses here have been helpful.

Who is your intended audience? If it's the average person, me, for instance, I struggle to see why it should matter to me.

Quoting Mark S

My interest is how to make the science of morality culturally useful.

What would that look like in practice?

My understanding of morality is that it's a code of conduct (an agglomeration of historical cultural mores) enforced through a legal system. Morality provides stability and predictability, which helps societies to thrive (within certain parameters, given that the powerful can manipulate most moral systems to suit their interests).

How different is your view to this?

Can you briefly show me an example of a cooperation strategy in action and how this sheds light on morality?

The inherent rightness or wrongness of certain actions (e.g., murder or stealing) is a separate matter, I take it?

Quoting Mark S

Perhaps understanding what human morality ‘is’ will provide valuable insights for philosophical studies into what morality ought to [s]be[/s].

Given that morality is an aspect of philosophy (i.e. ethics), a scientific "understanding of morality" seems, IMO, as useless to moral philosophers as ornithology (or aerodynamics) is useless to birds.

[quote= Hillel the Elder, 1st century BCE]What is hateful [harmful] [i]to you, do not do to anyone.[/quote]
:fire:

Quoting Mark S

I did not include the derivation of what is universally moral by morality as cooperation in the OP to keep it short and because it was unnecessary to my points. I can’t say everything at once.

Not a worry, I understand that.

Quoting Mark S

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

This is weirdly worded. A descriptive moral behavior is why someone does something they believe is moral. Meaning that someone could believe that cooperating with another has nothing to do with morality. Descriptive moral behavior is subjective, therefore more a study of sociology on unreliable narrators than objective science.

Quoting Mark S

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others.

No, this is not universal. Sometimes people cooperate due to threats or personal profit. They might not morally agree with the situation. For example, getting drafted into a war you think is wrong. Cooperating with a killer because they're threatening your life if you don't. Is this cooperation due to a sense of morality? Most would say no.

Quoting Mark S

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”.

Considering this could be applied to problems that don't require cooperation, isn't the real claim of morality more along the line of "Taking actions without exploiting or harming others?"

Reply to 180 Proof

Quoting 180 Proof

as useless to moral philosophers as ornithology (or aerodynamics) is useless to birds

I was an aeronautical engineer in my working career. I expect a bird who was able to understand aerodynamics would find it quite useful to learn how to take off with more weight and to fly with less energy.

Quoting 180 Proof

Perhaps understanding what human morality ‘is’ will provide valuable insights for philosophical studies into what morality ought to be.
— Mark S
Given that morality is an aspect of philosophy (i.e. ethics), a scientific "understanding of morality" seems, IMO, as useless to moral philosophers as ornithology (or aerodynamics) is useless to birds.

To your point that you find the science of morality, at least in its Morality as Cooperation form, useless:

I can see it would be useless if your philosophical position is that a morality exists that is what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences – that imperative moral oughts exist. If someone already knows what is imperative, then what is merely instrumental could be of no interest.

But I remembered you were supportive of a kind of moral naturalism. This is what the science of morality is all about.

Regardless of your personal position, would you argue that a moral naturalist would find the science of morality useless?

Here is how this science is useful to me given my philosophical position:

I do not believe imperative moral oughts exist. My preferred answer to “How should I live?” is simple stoic wisdom except for interactions with other people. I prefer morality for interactions with other people defined by a kind of rule consequentialism with the moral consequence being a version of happiness or flourishing and the moral rule being Morality as Cooperation.

So the science of morality is not just helpful, it is critical to my moral philosophy. Would you claim I am being illogical?

Hillel the Elder, 1st century BCE:What is hateful [harmful] to you, do not do to anyone.

Right. And the New Testament describes the positive form as summarizing morality.

Why? Science can explain that. Forms of the Golden Rule are heuristics for initiating indirect reciprocity, perhaps the most powerful cooperation strategy known. Further, as usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb, this same science can identify when it would be immoral to follow them – when doing so will predicably create cooperation problems rather than solving them.

Are science’s explanations of why versions of the Golden Rule exist, are found in all well-functioning cultures, and are commonly described as summarizing morality of no interest to you?

Reply to Tom Storm

Quoting Tom Storm

My chief interest here is in learning how to present it so it will be understood. That is still a work in progress. The responses here have been helpful.
— Mark S

Who is your intended audience? If it's the average person, me, for instance, I struggle to see why it should matter to me.

Hi Tom,

Though here I address people with backgrounds or at least interest in moral philosophy, my ultimate goal is to make Morality as Cooperation useful to the average person. As you may be referring to, the average person will correctly think “Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems can do not exploit others” useless, on its own, as moral guidance in normal life.

It is the insights from Morality as Cooperation about standard cultural moral norms that I am hoping can be useful for average people. For example,

1) Food and sex taboos are commonly semi-arbitrary markers of being a good person. If they are found to harm people, they should be abandoned.

2) Versions of the Golden Rule are commonly said to summarize morality because they are usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb for initiating a powerful cooperation strategy. Following them would be immoral in cases (such as when tastes differ) when the result would predictably be less cooperation, not more.

3) Shame and guilt over immoral behaviors exists because these emotions, on average, increased cooperation for our ancestors. Shame and guilt to the point one stops doing good things (and thus creates a cooperation problem) is immoral.

4) Punishment, of at least social disapproval, of moral norm violators is necessary for cooperation norms to be sustainable in a culture. The goal of moral punishment is solving cooperation problems.

Quoting Tom Storm

My understanding of morality is that it's a code of conduct (an agglomeration of historical cultural mores) enforced through a legal system. Morality provides stability and predictability, which helps societies to thrive (within certain parameters, given that the powerful can manipulate most moral systems to suit their interests).

How different is your view to this?

My view is similar. Legal systems are powerful means of solving cooperation problems and increasing the benefits of cooperation in a society. Punishment of norm violations such as theft, murder, and lying under oath by the group as a whole is much more effective than punishment by individuals at maintaining cooperative societies.

Quoting Tom Storm

The inherent rightness or wrongness of certain actions (e.g., murder or stealing) is a separate matter, I take it?

No. Murder and stealing are violations of moral norms that solve cooperation problems. The cooperation problem is “How can I avoid being murdered of stolen from in cases when other people really want to murder or steal from me?”. The solution is moral norms and laws that imply or specify punishment for violators. They are, in effect, reciprocity rules, I won’t murder or steal from anyone else and they will not murder or steal from me, even when they really want to.

Reply to Philosophim
Quoting Philosophim

“Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems in groups” is arguably scientifically true based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense.
— Mark S

This is weirdly worded. A descriptive moral behavior is why someone does something they believe is moral. Meaning that someone could believe that cooperating with another has nothing to do with morality. Descriptive moral behavior is subjective, therefore more a study of sociology on unreliable narrators than objective science.

It has been a common assumption that descriptively moral behavior’s diversity, contradictions, and strangeness showed they were based on no unifying principles that explained them all. Advances in game theory in the last few decades reveals that to be a false assumption as I have described.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”. That tag is that people feel violators deserve punishment. This tag exists because punishment of violators is required for cooperation strategies to be sustainable. This tag is also the source of morality’s feeling of mysterious bindingness for everyone that has so pre-occupied much of moral philosophy.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice).

Quoting Philosophim

Yes, the ingroup cooperation strategies are universal even when used for purposes that exploit or harm others.
— Mark S

No, this is not universal. Sometimes people cooperate due to threats or personal profit. They might not morally agree with the situation. For example, getting drafted into a war you think is wrong. Cooperating with a killer because they're threatening your life if you don't. Is this cooperation due to a sense of morality? Most would say no.

The ingroup cooperation strategies that do not exploit those in the ingroup are the universal PART of all descriptively moral behaviors. Any exploiting or threatening to exploit others (outgroups) makes the totality of the behavior only descriptively moral.

Quoting Philosophim

Hence, by morality as cooperation, “universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting or harming others”.
— Mark S

Considering this could be applied to problems that don't require cooperation, isn't the real claim of morality more along the line of "Taking actions without exploiting or harming others?"

No. There are behaviors that do not exploit or harm others that have nothing to do with morality. To be universally moral, the behaviors must do both, solve cooperation problems and not exploit others.

Quoting Mark S

It has been a common assumption that descriptively moral behavior’s diversity, contradictions, and strangeness showed they were based on no unifying principles that explained them all. Advances in game theory in the last few decades reveals that to be a false assumption as I have described.

Mind giving a few examples? Your conclusion that cooperation that does not exploit other people is moral does not come from descriptive morality. For example, if I believe exploiting others for my own gain, and I work with other people to profit is moral, that is descriptive. If you're going to conclude, "This person's reason why they think something is moral is wrong, while this other person's contrary reason is correct," you need something more than subjective justification.

Quoting Mark S

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.

No debate here, but this is ultimately meaningless. All of our actions come from biology. Its why a monkey cannot do what a human does. Its why a disabled person can't skip and jump like someone who can normally walk. Can we show definitively through science a morality that doesn't result in basic contradictions, handles edge cases, and is rationally consistent?

Quoting Mark S

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”.

No. Cultural norms and biology based intuitions alone cannot be called moral. If I have a biological impetus to be a pedophile, its still wrong even if I have a group around me that supports and encourages it. Same with killing babies for sport. You have to explain why the biology and culture that is in conflict with this is correct/incorrect. That requires more than descriptive morality.

The law, and morality, are not the same. There are plenty of laws and cultures we would consider immoral. Descriptive morality takes any objective judgement away from morality, and simply equates it to what society encourages or enforces on others. You will find few adherents to that.

Quoting Mark S

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice).

No debate with that, but I'm not seeing that here.

Quoting Mark S

The ingroup cooperation strategies that do not exploit those in the ingroup are the universal PART of all descriptively moral behaviors. Any exploiting or threatening to exploit others (outgroups) makes the totality of the behavior only descriptively moral.

This makes no sense. Universal means 'across the board'. And yet in the same breath you have descriptive moral behavior that is not universal. Meaning that no, it is NOT universal. You need a clear reason why a group of serial killers who believe killing the weak in society is a moral good are wrong compared to groups of people who think we should support the weak in society with our resources. Descriptive morality alone cannot solve this. This is the inevitable conflict of "What is moral" that always pops up when you have different subjective viewpoints, and needs something outside of the subjective to solve it rationally.

Quoting Mark S

No. There are behaviors that do not exploit or harm others that have nothing to do with morality. To be universally moral, the behaviors must do both, solve cooperation problems and not exploit others.

So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation.

Quoting Mark S

Regardless of your personal position, would you argue that a moral naturalist would find the science of morality useless?

I'm a "moral naturalist" (i.e. aretaic disutilitarian) and, according to your presentation, Mark, "the science of morality" is, while somewhat informative, philosophically useless to me.

I prefer morality for interactions with other people defined by a kind of rule consequentialism with the moral consequence being a version of happiness or flourishing and the moral rule being Morality as Cooperation. So the science of morality is not just helpful, it is critical to my moral philosophy. Would you claim I am being illogical?

I think your "preference" is wholly abstract – "a kind of rule" – and therefore non-natural which is inconsistent with your self-description as a "moral naturalist". What you call "cooperation" (reciprocity), I call "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" (empathy); the latter is grounded in a natural condition (i.e. human facticity) and the former is merely a social convention (i.e. local custom). Of course, both are always at play, but, in terms of moral naturalism, human facticity is, so to speak, the independent variable and convention / custom / culture the dependent, or derivative, variable.

No doubt the relationship of nature-culture is reflexive, even somewhat dialectical, yet culture supervenes on nature (though it defines or demarcates 'natural-artificial', etc). No, you're not "illogical", Mark; however, I find the major premise of your "Morality as Cooperation" to be non-natural (i.e. formalist/calculative/instrumental) and therefore scientistic or, at the very least, non-philosophical vis-à-vis ethics.

Are science’s explanations of why versions of the Golden Rule exist, are found in all well-functioning cultures, and are commonly described as summarizing morality of no interest to you?

All "science" says, so to speak, is that 'h. sapiens are a eusocial species with prolonged childhood development for intergenerationally acquiring homeostasis-maintaining skills (from natal, empathy-based social relations, not unlike all other primates and many higher mammal species which also care for their offspring so that they survive long enough to reproduce)'. The parenthetical part is a philosophical reflection, not mere empirical data, and thus significant for our moral reasoning.

I'm interested in reflecting on natural conditions for moral conduct independent of – anterior to – "well functioning cultures" and indifferent towards codified norms/strategies of "cooperation" which are only artifacts of "well functioning cultures" (and as such, IMO, are all that (a) "science of morality" can "summarize").

Quoting Mark S

I take as given that, as a matter of logic, science can’t answer philosophy’s ought questions based only on what ‘is’.

But the science of morality can study why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is a growing consensus that “human morality” (here our moral sense and cultural moral norms) exists because it solves cooperation problems in groups.

Yet it doesn't erase the difference between the objective and the normative. Or science and moral philosophy, as you put it.

If moral norms solve cooperation problems in groups, we can obviously understand that moral thinking goes further than a group of humans. What about other groups, what about other living beings, our World and the environment in general?

I think there's one thing we simply have to admit to ourselves: we are fascinated by scientific solutions. Solutions and policies that we have come to using the scientific method. We don't like that our decisions especially on complex things is done because or moral or ethical thinking, but we hope to a solution using science. It's logical, science is about the reality, not some dubious moral philosophy. Scientism rules!

Yet if we just understand that "how the World is" and "how the World should be" are two totally different questions that aren't easy to answer and that the first question doesn't immediately give us an answer to the second question, that's a good start.

Quoting 180 Proof

Like the Buddhist desire to overcome desire, I think an egoist might practice altruism (i.e. non-reciprocal help/care of others) in order to overcome – deflate, sublimate – her ego

True.

---

Quoting Mark S

“Morality” here can be interpreted as [...] a category of strange thing I am not sure exists.

And that is the key to the OP: you don't believe morality exists. I would suggest using more scare quotes.

Reply to Leontiskos
Quoting Mark S

“Morality” here can be interpreted as [...] a category of strange thing I am not sure exists.

My perspective is that 'morality' as "what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences" does not exist.
But 'morality' as "a set of cooperation strategies innate to our universe and necessary to form and maintain civilizations" is as real as the mathematics underlying it.

Quoting ssu

If moral norms solve cooperation problems in groups, we can obviously understand that moral thinking goes further than a group of humans. What about other groups, what about other living beings, our World and the environment in general?

Regarding interactions between groups, it seems workable to apply the same definition of what is universally moral as within groups: “behaviors that solve cooperation problems and do not exploit others.” I cringe and feel anger when I hear political leaders talk about how each country, for example, should negotiate what is best for it regardless of the needs of other countries.

Can we apply the same criteria to other conscious beings and environments? Where might we find a good moral philosopher when we need one to sort out such issues?

The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. We need moral philosophy to answer 1) the broader ethical questions you ask as well as the “How should I live?” kind of ought questions and 2) other complex ethical questions about applying such science.

If morality as cooperation becomes generally accepted, I expect the field of moral philosophy would be revitalized, not shut down. We do not face a binary choice in relying on science or moral philosophy for ethical guidance. Instead, we can rely on both disciplines' strengths and areas of expertise.

Quoting ssu

Yet if we just understand that "how the World is" and "how the World should be" are two totally different questions that aren't easy to answer and that the first question doesn't immediately give us an answer to the second question, that's a good start.

Right, my intent was that what I have written is consistent with this position.

Quoting Mark S

The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.

I can't understand how this would be the case. Unless you take "the science of morality" to just be sociology focused on social norms? I would also posit that given the extreme expanses of time that would need to be "number crunched" in regard to their moral outputs, lets say, across history, that this science could never be used.

Reply to 180 Proof
Quoting 180 Proof

I'm a "moral naturalist" (i.e. aretaic disutilitarian) and, according to your presentation, Mark, "the science of morality" is, while somewhat informative, philosophically useless to me.
...
I think your "preference" is wholly abstract – "a kind of rule" – and therefore non-natural which is inconsistent with your self-description as a "moral naturalist". What you call "cooperation" (reciprocity), I call "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" (empathy); the latter is grounded in a natural condition (i.e. human facticity) and the former is merely a social convention (i.e. local custom). Of course, both are always at play, but, in terms of moral naturalism, human facticity is, so to speak, the independent variable and convention / custom / culture the dependent, or derivative, variable.

No doubt the relationship of nature-culture is reflexive, even somewhat dialectical, yet culture supervenes on nature (though it defines or demarcates 'natural-artificial', etc). No, you're not "illogical", Mark; however, I find the major premise of your "Morality as Cooperation" to be non-natural (i.e. formalist/calculative/instrumental) and therefore scientistic or, at the very least, non-philosophical vis-à-vis ethics.

I apologize for my delay in responding.

I understand you to propose, where => is read as “produces”

Empathy and other relevant parts of human nature => cultural moralities
And then,
Empathy and other relevant parts of human nature (as givens) + rational thought => 180 P’s moral naturalism

I propose:

Cooperation strategies innate to our universe + Biological and cultural evolutionary processes => Empathy and the rest of our moral sense + cultural moralities
And,
Cooperation strategies innate to our universe (as givens and the stance independent natural facts) => M’s moral naturalism

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe. By taking that higher level of causation as given, I avoid potential misinterpretations of the semi-random collection of parts of cooperation strategies that make up our moral sense.

The relevant game theory strategies are innate to our universe and, therefore, fundamentally natural. To be unnatural requires thought and the imagining of unnatural things such as gods and, in my opinion, imperative moral oughts.

Of course, whether one ought to advocate and conform to science's moral naturalism is a philosophical question. I hold that doing so is a matter of preference, and I think I have good reasons for it being my preference.

Am I correct that your moral naturalism goes beyond givens about interactions between people (Morality as Cooperation’s domain in our moral sense) to more fully answer the question “How should I live?”

Reply to AmadeusD
Quoting AmadeusD

AmadeusD
1.4k
The science of morality can explain why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.
— Mark S

I can't understand how this would be the case. Unless you take "the science of morality" to just be sociology focused on social norms? I would also posit that given the extreme expanses of time that would need to be "number crunched" in regard to their moral outputs, lets say, across history, that this science could never be used.

From the OP,
"... the science of morality can study why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is a growing consensus that “human morality” (here our moral sense and cultural moral norms) exists because it solves cooperation problems in groups. Human morality appears to have been biologically and culturally selected for by the benefits of the cooperation it enabled."

The Morality as Cooperation hypothesis is a candidate for scientific truth based mostly on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense.

You are correct that we can only explain the cultural moral norms we know about and what we know about our moral sense. But we know a lot of diverse, contradictory, and strange cultural moral norms and a lot about our moral sense and its judgments (which also are diverse, contradictory, and strange). If a simple hypothesis can explain that superficially chaotic data set, then we have a robust hypothesis that is strong candidate for scientific truth.

Again from the OP:
"The diversity, contradictions, and, to outsiders, strangeness of past and present cultural moral norms are largely due to 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups or in disfavored or even exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in ingroups and outgroups. "

The insight that the chaos in this data set is only superficial is critical to the great simplification of cultural moral norms into a few categories and high confidence in the hypothesis. "Number crunching" is not an issue here. The number crunching needed to reveal cooperation strategies has already mostly been done (but is still going on) as part of game theory. The cooperation strategies found to date make the simple categories that cultural moral norms and our moral senses' judgments belong to self-evident.

Of course, the data set to be explained as part of sociology. So what?

Quoting Mark S

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe.

This claim seems to me quite an unwarranted (reductive) leap that, so to speak, puts the cart (cultural norms) before the horse (human facticity). Explain how you (we) know that "cooperation strategies are innate to our universe" and therefore that they are also "innate" in all human individuals.

Reply to Philosophim

Quoting Philosophim

Your conclusion that cooperation that does not exploit other people is moral does not come from descriptive morality

‘Morality as Cooperation” as a hypothesis that explains past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense has two parts (which I was not intending to be a part of this thread, but here we are).

Those two parts are:
1) Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems within an ingroup but may exploit others. (“Homosexuality is evil!” and “Women must be submissive to men!”)
2) Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without exploiting others (“Do to others as you would have them do to you”) Such norms are universal to all descriptively moral behaviors because cooperating in an ingroup without exploiting others is necessary to enforce moral norms that exploit outgroups.

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.— Mark S

Quoting Philosophim

Can we show definitively through science a morality that doesn't result in basic contradictions, handles edge cases, and is rationally consistent?

Like the rest of science, Morality as Cooperation will generally not have contradictions and is rationally consistent. (Any contradictions and irrationality in science indicate that the science needs more work.) However, our application of science could be irrational and inconsistent, just like people. Edge cases such as abortion, how much moral regard to give conscious creatures and ecosystems, and ethical concerns beyond interactions with other people are not necessarily handled at all. We might like for them to be, but that is not the case.

Remember that the science of morality describes what the function of human morality (cultural moral norms and our moral sense) 'is', not some intellectual construct that claims to handle edge cases.

All these cultural norms and biology-based intuitions have a necessary tag that identifies them as “moral”.— Mark S

Quoting Philosophim

No. Cultural norms and biology based intuitions alone cannot be called moral. If I have a biological impetus to be a pedophile, its still wrong even if I have a group around me that supports and encourages it. Same with killing babies for sport. You have to explain why the biology and culture that is in conflict with this is correct/incorrect. That requires more than descriptive morality.

I assumed it was obvious that “moral” in quotes referred to descriptively moral. See my comment above about what is universally moral to all descriptively moral behaviors. What is universal to all descriptively moral behaviors is the ingroup morality that does not exploit others but is necessary to enforce moral norms that do exploit others.

Quoting Philosophim

The law, and morality, are not the same. There are plenty of laws and cultures we would consider immoral. Descriptive morality takes any objective judgement away from morality, and simply equates it to what society encourages or enforces on others. You will find few adherents to that.

I expect most people will prefer to advocate and conform to what is universally moral, not what is merely descriptively moral.

Finding underlying principles in chaotic data sets, such as descriptively moral behaviors, is science’s bread and butter (standard process and practice).— Mark S

Quoting Philosophim

No debate with that, but I'm not seeing that here.

Do you think that past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense are NOT explained as parts of cooperation strategies? Interesting. Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.

Quoting Philosophim

So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation.

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity. Our ancestors who did not experience empathy tended to die out. Empathy for a bug is a misfire on its evolutionary function. Could stomping on the bug still be immoral in a culture? Sure. People who kill bugs can be thought of as deserving punishment (being descriptively immoral in that society). In that society, this moral norm would be a marker strategy for a person with empathy and therefore a good person to cooperate with.

Secretly slipping $20 to someone initiates indirect reciprocity, the core of social morality. Having received $20 from an unknown person will make the receiver more likely to help someone else thereby spreading cooperation. Perhaps you are thinking of cooperation only in terms of direct reciprocity? Indirect reciprocity, in which reciprocal help is usually returned to someone other than the initiator, is a far more powerful strategy.

Understanding our moral sense and cultural moral are parts of cooperation strategies explains much about human morality that would otherwise remain puzzling.

Nice, thank you.

Quoting Mark S

The Morality as Cooperation hypothesis is a candidate for scientific truth based mostly on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense.

Unfortunately, nothing here (or behind it in the comment) responds to my position. I understand your position. I'm wanting to explanation as to how it affects the world in the ways claimed. It seems it doesn't? I can't see its explanatory power prima facie. I can see it's claim to it, but not any reason to take it seriously. More further on..

Quoting Mark S

If a simple hypothesis can explain that superficially chaotic data set, then we have a robust hypothesis that is strong candidate for scientific truth.

But the claim isn't of that kind. THe claim is one where its apex would be an efficient and predicatable statistical analysis of moral norms over time, in various cultures based on lets say 1000 variables "number crunched" for "intimative" power to ascertain the most likely moral position of future states/generations/peoples. That seems to just be a really focussed sociology. So, I'm wondering whence comes some kind of verifiability in the present? Maybe interesting as to how we 'got to" any particular moral situation (but again, so various even across the present moment that I think attending to the "chaos" would presuppose something you've not shown - coherence).

Quoting Mark S

The insight that the chaos in this data set is only superficial is critical to the great simplification of cultural moral norms into a few categories and high confidence in the hypothesis.

But this assumes the success of hte claim, without even beginning the project of showing that success. I'm unsure this has gotten off the ground. The underpinnings still seem fairly wide of a workable hypothesis beyond internal monologues.

Quoting Mark S

The cooperation strategies found to date make the simple categories that cultural moral norms and our moral senses' judgments belong to self-evident.

They certainly don't appear that way to most people, from what I can tell. I'm failing to see anything in your defenses that would establish this claim. And if this claim were established, I'd think you're well on your way to a workable hypothesis. But as above, without showing some coherence across those disparate data points I think its very hard to get interested in the hypothesis.

Quoting Mark S

So what?

A purely observational, statistically analytical historical "hypothesis" is not one which has the power to explain anything more than what "was" (and, maybe, under certain constraints, what is... but we already have various disciplines making sense of that data, to the degree it can be made sense of)

Quoting 180 Proof

Explain how you (we) know that "cooperation strategies are innate to our universe" and therefore that they are also "innate" in all human individuals.

:up:

Some nontrivial percentage of individuals are psychopaths, and that has been investigated in a game theory context as well:

Abstract
Static networks have been shown to foster cooperation for specific cost–benefit ratios and numbers of connections across a series of interactions. At the same time, psychopathic traits have been discovered to predict defective behaviours in game theory scenarios. This experiment combines these two aspects to investigate how group cooperation can emerge when changing group compositions based on psychopathic traits. We implemented a modified version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game which has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically to sustain a constant level of cooperation over rounds. A sample of 190 undergraduate students played in small groups where the percentage of psychopathic traits in each group was manipulated. Groups entirely composed of low psychopathic individuals were compared with communities with 50% high and 50% low psychopathic players, to observe the behavioural differences at the group level. Results showed a significant divergence of the mean cooperation of the two conditions, regardless of the small range of participants’ psychopathy scores. Groups with a large density of high psychopathic subjects cooperated significantly less than groups entirely composed of low psychopathic players, confirming our hypothesis that psychopathic traits affect not only individuals’ decisions but also the group behaviour. This experiment highlights how differences in group composition with respect to psychopathic traits can have a significant impact on group dynamics, and it emphasizes the importance of individual characteristics when investigating group behaviours.

Reply to 180 Proof Quoting 180 Proof

Rather than taking empathy and other parts of human nature as givens, I go up a level of causation to their source, the cooperation strategies that are innate to our universe.
— Mark S
This claim seems to me quite an unwarranted (reductive) leap that, so to speak, puts the cart (cultural norms) before the horse (human facticity). Explain how you (we) know that "cooperation strategies are innate to our universe" and therefore that they are also "innate" in all human individuals.

Cooperation strategies, such as direct and indirect reciprocity, are species-independent and innate to our universe because the simple mathematics they are based on are species-independent and innate to our universe.

That these cooperation strategies are encoded into our biology is evident when we consider the emotional responses triggered by our moral sense: empathy, loyalty, gratitude, righteous indignation, guilt, and shame.

These are not just a hodgepodge of emotions.

Empathy, loyalty, and gratitude motivate helping behaviors that initiate or motivate continuing direct and indirect reciprocity.

Righteous indignation (anger triggered by moral norm violations) motivates punishment of others who violate the group’s moral norms. Guilt and shame are direct punishments of ourselves when we violate moral norms.

This combination of motivation to help others and punishment of moral norm violations are the two necessary components of all reciprocity strategies. These emotional heuristics for parts of reciprocity strategies are what began us on the path to being the incredibly successful social species we are.

Are these emotions innate in all people? Psychopaths have diminished to no ability to experience empathy or conscience (shame and guilt) and an inability to learn how to do so. An old term for psychopaths is moral idiots. In them, these heuristic emotions for reciprocity are greatly reduced or even absent.

Reply to Mark S "Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe" anymore than (e.g.) strawberries are caused by strawberry-flavored atoms. Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim.

Reply to 180 Proof Quoting 180 Proof

?Mark S "Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe" anymore than (e.g.) strawberries are caused by strawberry-flavored atoms. Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim.

Of course, empathy and other emotions are not cooperation strategies.

Empathy and the other emotions I mentioned motivate behaviors that are heuristics for the two necessary parts of reciprocity strategies.

I've tried posting links to the literature, but I could never tell that anyone read the links.

In this thread, I am trying to discuss the relationship to moral philosophy of the scientific study of our moral sense and cultural moral norms.

Reply to wonderer1
Quoting wonderer1

Some nontrivial percentage of individuals are psychopaths, and that has been investigated in a game theory context as well:

Nice study. Thanks for posting.
We could summarize the results as "moral idiots" are bad at cooperation.
That is the point.

Quoting Mark S

‘Morality as Cooperation” as a hypothesis that explains past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense has two parts

Yes, its a hypothesis, not a confirmed scientific fact. I don't have a problem with examining the hypothesis. But if you're claiming its fact? There's a LOT that needs answering.

Quoting Mark S

What people believe is moral is a function of the biology underlying their moral sense and cultural moral norms. That biology and those cultural norms can be explained in terms of their evolutionary origins.

How do you explain someone who believes their cultural norms are immoral? For example, there is a culture in which a caste system exists and those on the lower end of the caste are said to deserve their lot. What if, as many have, find it immoral? Might of culture or law is often times not the same as morality, and yet you claim it is. You're only taking some people's viewpoint of the prescriptive morality in the culture, and not considering the other viewpoints of descriptive morality over the same rules and traditions in that culture. Descriptive morality is subjective to the people you select, but when you speak about universality, you need to address any and all discrepancies.

Quoting Mark S

Like the rest of science, Morality as Cooperation will generally not have contradictions and is rationally consistent. (Any contradictions and irrationality in science indicate that the science needs more work.) However, our application of science could be irrational and inconsistent, just like people. Edge cases such as abortion, how much moral regard to give conscious creatures and ecosystems, and ethical concerns beyond interactions with other people are not necessarily handled at all. We might like for them to be, but that is not the case.

This is a very unscientific set of thoughts.

1. I showed you quite a few contradictions and rational inconsistencies in your proposal that Morality is Cooperation.
2. Irrational application of science, is faulty science. Its not, "It could be faulty science." Demonstrate what is faulty or irrational.
3. Edge cases are NOT to be dismissed in science. Science constantly challenges its own conclusions, and if there is ANY discrepancy, that is swarmed over like flies until it is resolved.

Hand waving away anything that doesn't agree with the desired conclusion and telling people "It Doesn't matter if we don't like it" because 'science' says so, is not a good argument. A hypothesis that cannot answer discrepancies and offer concreate logical consistencies is a faulty hypothesis.

Quoting Mark S

I assumed it was obvious that “moral” in quotes referred to descriptively moral. See my comment above about what is universally moral to all descriptively moral behaviors. What is universal to all descriptively moral behaviors is the ingroup morality that does not exploit others but is necessary to enforce moral norms that do exploit others.

Many cultural norms or laws are exploitive or about co-option. How is dying for my country cooperation when I'm not going to receive one single benefit from dying for it? How is giving 10% of my money away to the church when I'm poor and need help cooperation? Often times morality has the threat of punishment or death if one does not follow it, such as following God's commands. Why would cooperation need threats if we both mutually benefit?

Thus your thesis that cooperation is universal conclusion we can take from all descriptive morality has a lot to answer before it can be claimed to be universal. Also, I think it would help at this point that you publish some of these scientific articles and conclusions you keep purporting. I'm curious at this point where you're getting this hypothesis from.

I appreciate you staying engaged with this and trying to answer the issues.

Reply to Philosophim :up: :up:

Quoting Mark S

In this thread, I am trying to discuss the relationship to moral philosophy of the scientific study of our moral sense and cultural moral norms.

From what I can tell, sir, that so-called "relationship" is pretty weak. While interdisciplinary disciplines like moral psychology, evolutionary ethics & sociobiology are empirically interesting (re: 'cultural norms' as eu-social constraints/biases), in situ 'moral sciences' do not motivate/facilitate either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct. I stand by my earlier assessment:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/885373

Quoting 180 Proof

in situ 'moral sciences' do not motivate/facilitate either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct.

Are you claiming that science cannot study what motivates/facilitates ethical judgment or moral conduct?

Our moral sense and cultural moral norms motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture—descriptively moral behaviors.

Do you see anything illogical about science studying our moral sense and cultural moral norms that motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture?

Further, the science of morality identifies what “motivates/facilitates either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct” as part of cooperation strategies.

Here are two examples of the science of morality’s relevance to moral naturalism:

1) The fact that our moral intuitions regarding interactions with other people are part of cooperation strategies reveals much about the natural conditions relevant to moral naturalism. This knowledge should be helpful in defining moral naturalism.

2) Indirect reciprocity is a much more powerful cooperation strategy than direct reciprocity. (In indirect reciprocity, the reciprocated help will generally not be returned to the person who initially helped another as required for direct reciprocity.) The non-reciprocal part in your moral naturalism’s "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" implies cooperation to reduce harm by indirect reciprocity. If so, the science of morality directly supports "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" as the goal of the most natural of moral naturalisms.

Quoting 180 Proof

Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim.

A thread about the state of the science of morality might be well worthwhile. I’ll give that some more thought.

Quoting 180 Proof

"Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe"

Neither is Morality, but here you are - a moral Naturalist ;)

Reply to AmadeusD "Neither is Morality" what?

Quoting Mark S

Are you claiming that science cannot study what motivates/facilitates ethical judgment or moral conduct?

No. Why do you ask?

Do you see anything illogical about science studying our moral sense and cultural moral norms that motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture?

No. The sciences I'd mentioned in my previous post, more or less, do just that.

Quoting AmadeusD

Morality

is not

Quoting 180 Proof

innate to the universe"

Yet here you are, a moral Naturalist. And apparently a grumpy one. :)

Reply to AmadeusD You're mistaken. I have not claimed or implied "morality is innate to the universe".

Reply to 180 Proof Perhaps, but I'm also joking.

In anycase, I understand moral naturalism to entail that it is empirically discoverable, as an aspect of the universe. I can't understand how that wouldn't entail an 'innate to the universe' conception of morality. If that is the case, even if your view is sui generis, would be very much interested to know what the source is, if it's not innate. I don't realy know any naturalists

Quoting AmadeusD

In anycase, I understand moral naturalism to entail that it is empirically discoverable, as an aspect of the universe.

What "it" are you referring to?

Reply to 180 Proof morality. I'm not a dentist...

Reply to AmadeusD I'm not a "dentist" either and you're completely mistaken about moral naturalism as I've used the term in this thread. "Morality" is certainly not "innate" or "furniture of the world" any more than ecology or medicine are, and yet the latter are, at minimum, bound (i.e. enabled-constrained) by the laws of nature.

Quoting 180 Proof

"Morality" is certainly not "innate" or "furniture if the world" any more than ecology or medicine are, and yet the latter are bound (i.e. enabled-constrained) by the laws of nature.

Ah, ok, interesting. And is it hte case that you apply that similar boundedness to Morality, but perhaps with different parameters?
Again, I don't really know any moral naturalists so my understanding is purely academic. Just enquiring, mind to mind :)

Quoting AmadeusD

And is it hte case that you apply that similar boundedness to Morality, but perhaps with different parameters?

Yes.

Here's a recent post from another thread that might make clearer and more precise what I mean by moral naturalism ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/857773

Reply to 180 Proof Thanks very much, that's very helpful - It seems to be counter to a general conception of moral naturalism, so that's really cool to me.

Not at all compelling, though, for various reasons.

Reply to AmadeusD Do tell – "not compelling ... various reasons"? (I can use all the help I can get. :smirk:)

Quoting 180 Proof

(3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e.obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such;

Fair enough! The thing that shook me off the track was that the underlined appears to be the unpinning of the system (otherwise, I see no connection with anything moral in the description - set me right if i'm wrong). If this is the case, this seems an arbitrary assertion for which nothing in the wider post acts as support. It seems, this is your emotivist crux, hiding under a cloak of objective reason.

Reply to AmadeusD "Arbitrary?" In ethics, "moral" means something else? My parenthetical stipulation, which you've underlined, expresses empathy (absent some pathological condition) as an empirical assumption about – psychological fact of – humans (i.e. natural beings with sufficient, or unimpaired, agency). Explain why you think "moral (i.e. obligates natural beings to care for one another)" is "arbitrary" rather coherent within the context of those four statements (as well as the rest of that post).

your emotivist crux

My stated moral position is not "emotivist". :roll:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism

Quoting Philosophim

...I don't have a problem with examining the hypothesis. But if you're claiming its fact? There's a LOT that needs answering.
...How do you explain someone who believes their cultural norms are immoral?
...This is a very unscientific set of thoughts.
..Hand waving away anything that doesn't agree with the desired conclusion and telling people "It Doesn't matter if we don't like it" because 'science' says so, is not a good argument.
...How is dying for my country cooperation when I'm not going to receive one single benefit from dying for it?
...Often times morality has the threat of punishment or death if one does not follow it, such as following God's commands. Why would cooperation need threats if we both mutually benefit?
..., I think it would help at this point that you publish some of these scientific articles and conclusions you keep purporting. .

Responding in order to your above comments:

I propose a highly robust hypothesis based on its remarkable explanatory power for the huge, superficially chaotic data set of our moral sense and cultural moral codes, no contradiction with known facts, no remotely competitive hypotheses, simplicity, and integration with the rest of science.

Such robust hypotheses are excellent candidates for scientific truth.

I personally see it as true in the normal provisional scientific sense. Not all investigators accept that, so I sometimes refer to it as a hypothesis despite my opinion.
...
What people believe is moral is a function of their cultural moral norms. Not everyone necessarily agrees with, advocates, follows, and enforces their culture's norms. Everyone in a culture is not required to agree on what is moral.
...
What criteria are you proposing that make my hypothesis unscientific?
.....
What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others – is a universal part of descriptively moral behaviors since to exploit others requires cooperation in the ingroup that exploits the outgroup.
...
The science of morality studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. That limited area of study necessarily limits its usefulness for resolving edge cases in ethics that have little to nothing to do with solving cooperation problems - why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is no “Science of ethics” that I am aware of. that would be relevant to all ethical disputes. No handwaving involved.
...
Loyalty – one of six commonly recognized emotions triggered by our moral sense that motivate behaviors that are parts of known cooperation strategies – Loyalty motivates initiating indirect reciprocity (unselfishly helping our group) and exists because our ancestors who experienced this emotion tended to survive due the benefits of cooperation it provided. Behaviors that, on average, increase reproductive fitness are what are selected for, An individual’s survival is not assured.

Punishment – by our conscience, a god, other individuals, society, or the law – is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Without punishment of violators, self-interest would drive people to exploit other’s efforts at cooperation by not reciprocating. For example, why be loyal if there is no punishment for being disloyal? Science's answer to the why be loyal (or why be moral) question is at the heart of the cooperation problems human morality solves.
...
I have started thinking about a “Recent perspectives within the science of morality” thread and how it could be helpful. There is essentially universal agreement that human morality exists because it enabled our ancestors to cooperate in groups. However, there are different perspectives (hypotheses) about how science best expresses that.

Reply to 180 Proof

Just to outright answer your question, you're asking me to prove a negative here. You did not provide anything which supports the assertion of those facts being moral. You just... feel that way ;)
------
hehe, Ok. Well, I've thought through your clarifier and gone back to the full post.
I think I was holding back on how much this is Emotivist (its in a see-through bag, it seems).

"obligate" far exceeds even your clarifying statement, by a margin that puts it squarely in emotivist territory. You are letting me know your emotional stance on the fact that human cognize their harm. I re-present it here, more fully, to point this out more fully:

Quoting 180 Proof

Anyway, simply put: (1) it is a fact of the matter that every natural being is inseparable from the natural world; (2) natural beings capable of normativity require reasons (i.e. facts/evidence-based claims) for doing things as a rule and for not doings as a rule; (3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e. obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such; (4) and in the normative framework of moral naturalism, (our) species' defects function as moral facts¹ which provide reasons² (i.e. claims (e.g. "I do this³ because² 'not to do this' can/will harm¹ her")) for species-members (us) to care for³ – take care of³ – (our) species' defects as a rule we give ourselves.

The underlined here, is now the very specific place that you smuggle in the claim, avoiding emotive language. But, unfortunately, (2) shows quite clearly that the framework relies entirely on your personal feeling that our 'species defects' matter to a degree that demands normative responses.

The bolded is where you may be able to set me right, my having to backtrack on all the above:

What do you mean "give ourselves" when earlier, you're attempting to outline a natural obligation which is not a rule we give ourselves - as the reason for acting per this framework? Could you clarify how moral facts (i.e as a reason, this must be inarguable - because that's what a moral fact is.. A reason) require some further rule for their observation, beyond the reason they provide in and of themselves?

Quoting AmadeusD

Just to outright answer your question, you're asking me to prove a negative here.

You're mistaken again. I've not asked for "proof" of anything including for you to "prove a negative". Apparently, Amadeus, you don't have an answer for
Quoting 180 Proof

re: moral (i.e. obligates natural beings to care for one another) 

In ethics, "moral" means something else?

so your claim that my usage of moral is "an arbitrary assertion" is, at best, unwarranted.

Emotivist [ ... ] squarely in emotivist territory. You are letting me know your emotional stance on the fact that ...

Okay this strawman is obtuse. To wit:
Quoting 180 Proof

My stated moral position is not "emotivist". :roll:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emotivism

Since you spend the rest of your post quarreling with your (misunderstood) "emotivism" strawman instead, and rather than waste my time, I'll leave you to it accepting that you incorrigibly find my (briefly sketched) moral naturslism (aretaic disutilitarianism) unconvincing. I've argued for my moral position on this thread only as a critical objection to the OP's "morality as cooperation" scientism and not as a fully systemized argument (which is why I'd acknowledged several influential moral philosophers at the close of this post). Anyway, enjoy shadoxboxing with strawmen. :yawn:

Quoting Mark S

What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others

Why would this be an Ought?

Quoting 180 Proof

so your claim that my usage of moral is "an arbitrary assertion" is, at best, unwarranted.

Its completely apt. Your rejection of it, is just another example of ignoring your Emotivist bent. That's not on me, my dude.

Quoting 180 Proof

Okay this strawman is obtuse

Its a perfectly sound take on your position. If you think that constitutes a strawman, by all means.

Quoting 180 Proof

incorrigibly

Pretending that you being unable to convince someone is a result of their stubbornness is... risible. I note you haven't attempted to clarify anything, either. You've referred to writings which I have also referred to and then just asserted something not readable from it. Okay. But that ends there, then.

Quoting 180 Proof

I've argued for my moral position on this thread only as a critical objection to the OP's "morality as cooperation" scientism and not as a fully systemized argument (which is why I'd acknowledged several influential moral philosophers at the close of this post). Anyway, enjoy shadoxboxing with strawmen. :yawn:

I responded to the post you linked to. Which is elsewhere.
You seem quite well acquainted with Straw :)

Reply to AmadeusD :yawn:

Reply to 180 Proof Just so, my friend.

Quoting AmadeusD

What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others
— Mark S

Why would this be an Ought?

That's what I keep coming back to. It seems there is an assumption that cooperation strategies are good and therefore ought to be obligatory or foundational to any moral system. Sam Harris did the same thing when he proposed that 'wellbeing' is good therefore it ought to be obligatory as the foundation for moral decision making.

Reply to Tom Storm Given the factcity of disvalues (i.e. whatever is bad for – harmful to – natural beings)^^, it is a performative contradiction not to reduce disvalues; rationally, therefore, disvalues ought to be reduced whenever possible without increasing them. And, insofar as exercising this ought reinforces habits (i.e. virtues, customs (mores), commons capabilities (agencies)) for reducing disvalues, this ought, at minimum, is moral.

Makes sense or not? :chin:

^^see lower half of the post

Sense? Sure. Provides a basis for ought? No.

Quoting Mark S

I propose a highly robust hypothesis based on its remarkable explanatory power for the huge, superficially chaotic data set of our moral sense and cultural moral codes, no contradiction with known facts, no remotely competitive hypotheses, simplicity, and integration with the rest of science.

No, you don't. Look Mark, proposing cultural values are moral values is ethics 101. Its highly debated. Your 'no contradiction with known facts' is dogmatic at this point with the examples I've given you. I still see no posted scientific papers that agree with you. You haven't addressed the specific examples I've given you like "Dying for your country". I'm not feeling like you're engaging with questioning, but dogmatically harping that your theory is right because 'science'.

As such, I'm quickly losing interest. I'm not trying to convince you of anything, I'm letting you know the glaring weaknesses of your claim which would be dismantled in any professional setting in seconds. If you want to explore the examples I gave you and try to find solutions, feel free. But if you're just here to preach, good luck to you, I'm out.

Quoting 180 Proof

Given the factcity of disvalues (i.e. whatever is bad for – harmful to – natural beings)^^, it is a performative contradiction not to reduce disvalues; rationally, therefore, disvalues ought to be reduced whenever possible without increasing them. And, insofar as exercising this ought reinforces habits (i.e. virtues, customs (mores), commons capabilities (agencies)) for reducing disvalues, this ought, at minimum, is moral.

Makes sense or not? :chin:

You're talking to a non-philosopher, so I have no problem acting on that which I think is beneficial. :wink: I also think that one ought not do a lot of things - like cause suffering in others. I'm comfortable with this solution to moral problems for me. But I would never care to develop a comprehensive theory of morality like Mark S.

Quoting Philosophim

I'm not feeling like you're engaging with questioning, but dogmatically harping that your theory is right because 'science'.

As such, I'm quickly losing interest. I'm not trying to convince you [@Mark S] of anything, I'm letting you know the glaring weaknesses of your claim ...

:100: Yes, scientism (or pseudo-science) is, at best, bad philosophy (i.e. sophistry).

Reply to Tom Storm :up:

Quoting AmadeusD

What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others
— Mark

Why would this be an Ought?

Amadeus, this question merits a careful answer. I’ll describe:
1) What makes it “universally moral”
2) What kind of ought that origin implies.
3) What kind of ought it is not.

The above principle is universal to the direct and indirect reciprocity strategies that are encoded as our moral sense and cultural moral norms. It is universal to what is descriptively moral in societies with the exception of favoritism for kin.

Answering your question: It is an instrumental ought regarding which moral principles to advocate and follow in a society given any and all of these goals:
1) Increase the benefits of cooperation within and between societies
2) Maximize harmony with everyone’s moral sense.
3) Define a moral code based on a principle that is not just cross-culturally, but cross-species universal

However, its origins in science entail no imperative bindingness – what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences. Any arguments for its imperative bindingness would be philosophical arguments, not scientific ones.

Quoting Mark S

Answering your question: It is an instrumental ought regarding which moral principles to advocate and follow in a society given any and all of these goals:
1) Increase the benefits of cooperation within and between societies
2) Maximize harmony with everyone’s moral sense.
3) Define a moral code based on a principle that is not just cross-culturally, but cross-species universal

I may be reading you wrongly but here's my take.

To me it seems as if point 1 potentially contains your overarching idea - the need to promote human (or conscious creature) flourishing (found in your word as 'benefits').

There is no intrinsic moral reason to promote cooperation or cross cultural agreement. Who cares?

You first need to establish some foundation for moral concern for sentient beings it seems to me. You then build the system towards this goal by arguing that the best pathway to promote human flourishing is through cooperation.

You might then argue that you can objectively measure cooperation strategies when applied in moral situations.

Otherwise it seems to me your moral concern is for the fidelity of a system. A concern with systemic neatness rather than with flourishing.

But perhaps this is what you mean already and I have missed it.

Reply to Tom Storm
Quoting Tom Storm

What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others
— Mark S

Why would this be an Ought?
— AmadeusD

That's what I keep coming back to. It seems there is an assumption that cooperation strategies are good and therefore ought to be obligatory or foundational to any moral system. Sam Harris did the same thing when he proposed that 'wellbeing' is good therefore it ought to be obligatory as the foundation for moral decision making.

Tom, see my reply about its bindingness to Amadeus https://thephilosophyforum.com/profile/15230/mark-s.

Quoting Philosophim

No, you don't. Look Mark, proposing cultural values are moral values is ethics 101. Its highly debated. Your 'no contradiction with known facts' is dogmatic at this point with the examples I've given you. I still see no posted scientific papers that agree with you. You haven't addressed the specific examples I've given you like "Dying for your country". I'm not feeling like you're engaging with questioning, but dogmatically harping that your theory is right because 'science'.

Some of the peer-reviewed literature:

You can connect with it by googling morality as cooperation on google scholar. But rather than dump you off into that ocean, which contains many perspectives on morality as cooperation, I suggest the following list compiled by Oliver Curry with quotes by their authors:

‘Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices,
identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that
work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make cooperative social life
possible.” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). ‘‘[M]orality functions to facilitate the generation
and maintenance of long-term social-cooperative relationships” (Rai & Fiske, 2011).
‘‘Human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating
with others” (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). ‘‘[T]he core function of morality is to promote
and sustain cooperation” (Greene, 2015). ‘‘[M]oral facts are facts about cooperation,
and the conditions and practices that support or undermine it” (Sterelny & Fraser,
2016). (Compiled in a paper by Oliver Curry)

Curry, O. S., Mullins, D. A., & Whitehouse, H. (2019). Is it good to cooperate? Testing the theory of morality-as-cooperation in 60 societies. Current Anthropology, 60(1).

Haidt, J., & Kesebir, S. (2010). Morality. In S. Fiske, G. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.),
Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp. 797–832). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011). Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. Psychological Review,
118(1), 57–75. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021867.

Tomasello, M., & Vaish, A. (2013). Origins of human cooperation and morality. Annual Review of Psychology, 64(1), 231–255. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev- psych-113011-143812.

Greene, J. D. (2015). The rise of moral cognition. Cognition, 135, 39–42. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.018.

Sterelny, K., & Fraser, B. (2016). Evolution and moral realism. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 68(4), 981–1006.


Important note: “Moral systems”, “Morality”, “Human morality, and “Moral facts” from the quoted authors refer to behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by cultural moral norms, and not necessarily to philosophical meanings.


Regarding your proposed counter-examples, I thought I had explained them, including how dying for your country is part of a reciprocity strategy. The short answer is the motivation for loyalty only works to your gene's advantage on average.

I have said:

“Also fully in the domain of science is understanding how the biology underlying empathy and loyalty can exist and motivate true altruism, sometimes even unto the death of the giver.
That explanation, first proposed by Darwin, is that empathy and loyalty motivate cooperation that can increase what is called inclusive fitness of groups who experience empathy and loyalty even at the cost of the life of the individual.”

“So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation.— Philosophim

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity. Our ancestors who did not experience empathy tended to die out. Empathy for a bug is a misfire on its evolutionary function. Could stomping on the bug still be immoral in a culture? Sure. People who kill bugs can be thought of as deserving punishment (being descriptively immoral in that society). In that society, this moral norm would be a marker strategy for a person with empathy and therefore a good person to cooperate with.

Secretly slipping $20 to someone initiates indirect reciprocity, the core of social morality. Having received $20 from an unknown person will make the receiver more likely to help someone else thereby spreading cooperation. Perhaps you are thinking of cooperation only in terms of direct reciprocity? Indirect reciprocity, in which reciprocal help is usually returned to someone other than the initiator, is a far more powerful strategy.

Understanding our moral sense and cultural moral are parts of cooperation strategies explains much about human morality that would otherwise remain puzzling.”


“Loyalty – one of six commonly recognized emotions triggered by our moral sense that motivate behaviors that are parts of known cooperation strategies – Loyalty motivates initiating indirect reciprocity (unselfishly helping our group) and exists because our ancestors who experienced this emotion tended to survive due the benefits of cooperation it provided. Behaviors that, on average, increase reproductive fitness are what are selected for, An individual’s survival is not assured.

Punishment – by our conscience, a god, other individuals, society, or the law – is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Without punishment of violators, self-interest would drive people to exploit other’s efforts at cooperation by not reciprocating. For example, why be loyal if there is no punishment for being disloyal? Science's answer to the why be loyal (or why be moral) question is at the heart of the cooperation problems human morality solves.”

Proposed counterexamples are still welcome.

Reply to Mark S :up: Reply to Mark S Some great references you included here! Cool

Quoting Mark S

The above principle is universal to the direct and indirect reciprocity strategies that are encoded as our moral sense and cultural moral norms. It is universal to what is descriptively moral in societies with the exception of favoritism for kin.

No it isn't.

Quoting Mark S

2) Maximize harmony with everyone’s moral sense.

This is a shotgun to the foot. This is an emotive position.

Quoting Mark S

It is an instrumental ought

Then I have no issues. I just reject that anything you've posited is any way 'moral science'. It appears, patently, your assertion carried forth into a logical framework where you get the desired result of a self-consistent system. This is just utilitarianism with 'co-operation' instead of 'happiness' as its aim. Nothing wrong with that, but it certainly falls short of anythign we could consider a scientific position or train of thought.

Quoting 180 Proof

Yes, scientism (or pseudo-science) is, at best, bad philosophy (i.e. sophistry).

Sophistry implies clever arguments that make the worse argument appear to be the better. I don't believe I am clever enough for sophistry.

Wikipedia says that "Scientism is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality." This thread is dedicated to explaining what science can tell us about why cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist. That science, supported by evolutionary game theory, now reveals why they exist and their underlying universal core cooperation strategy. That is not scientism.

If someone decides they prefer that underlying principle as the basis for their society's moral norms, I still don't see that as scientism. But perhaps you do?

Quoting Mark S

reveals

It does not.

Quoting Mark S

Some of the peer-reviewed literature:

I'm not asking for a course study. That's easy enough to find. I'm asking what literature you're using, and what ideas you're basing this off of. When you reference something by science, put a quote so we can see where you're coming from and what research you're basing it off of.

Quoting Mark S

Regarding your proposed counter-examples, I thought I had explained them, including how dying for your country is part of a reciprocity strategy. The short answer is the motivation for loyalty only works to your gene's advantage on average.

Ok, but that's not cooperation. I can do many things for my gene's advantage that do not involve cooperation. How is me, under threat of jail or duress, getting drafted in a war to die for my country cooperation?

Quoting Mark S

“Also fully in the domain of science is understanding how the biology underlying empathy and loyalty can exist and motivate true altruism, sometimes even unto the death of the giver.
That explanation, first proposed by Darwin, is that empathy and loyalty motivate cooperation that can increase what is called inclusive fitness of groups who experience empathy and loyalty even at the cost of the life of the individual.”

Once again, this does not answer my example of coopting others for power. Many ideas of morality and laws in culture are not about cooperation or willingness, but forced obeyance under threat of punishment or death. Don't misunderstand, someone can find cooperative benefit in going to war. But you need to consider the people who don't and are forced to. I'm not seeing this consideration so far.

Quoting Mark S

If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality?

Quoting Mark S

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity.

Indirect reciprocity? Look, I'm not thinking they're going to pay it forward. For all I know the guy's a psychopath. I also lost 20$. I do it because I think if I have spare resources, it should go towards helping another life live well. This is not cooperation. This is sacrifice. Altruism. You don't get to twist everything into, "But you see, if we twist the word around its really indirect cooperation." Be better than that.

Quoting Mark S

Our ancestors who did not experience empathy tended to die out.

Do you have evidence of this? Empathy can also be double edged. If you're empathic to the wrong person, they can take advantage of you, kill you when you're vulnerable and/or take all of your resources.

Quoting Mark S

Empathy for a bug is a misfire on its evolutionary function

Again, do you have proof of this? Or is this an opinion so we can hand wave anything away that doesn't fit into 'cooperation'?

Quoting Mark S

Could stomping on the bug still be immoral in a culture? Sure. People who kill bugs can be thought of as deserving punishment (being descriptively immoral in that society). In that society, this moral norm would be a marker strategy for a person with empathy and therefore a good person to cooperate with.

You're really going to try to claim that if I stomp on a bug, it could be considered immoral because it means I'm not good to cooperate with? How does that have anything to do with whether I can work with other people towards a common goal? The problem is you're trying too hard to fit everything into cooperation. You know what's more likely? Cooperation is not the full end all explanation for morality.

Quoting Mark S

Understanding our moral sense and cultural moral are parts of cooperation strategies explains much about human morality that would otherwise remain puzzling.

No question. But you're claiming cooperation is the entirety of morality which is inadequate as I've covered.

Quoting Mark S

“Loyalty – one of six commonly recognized emotions triggered by our moral sense that motivate behaviors that are parts of known cooperation strategies – Loyalty motivates initiating indirect reciprocity (unselfishly helping our group) and exists because our ancestors who experienced this emotion tended to survive due the benefits of cooperation it provided.

So once again, if I'm loyal to a dictator that slaughters millions of Jews, this is somehow moral?

Quoting Mark S

Punishment – by our conscience, a god, other individuals, society, or the law – is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies.

Threat of punishment for not following a culture or society is not cooperation. Its also not 'reciprocity'. Its servileness. Slavery. Personal sacrifice for obedience to others. Its not, "You see, by serving the master plantation owner, the slave is indirectly benefitting themselves by the fact that they aren't beaten and killed for daring to be an individual human being." If you go this route, you're lost. I suppose this would mean if one lone slave stood up to their master they would be violating cooperation and thus be immoral.

This needs work. A lot of work Mark S.

Quoting AmadeusD

The above principle is universal to the direct and indirect reciprocity strategies that are encoded as our moral sense and cultural moral norms. It is universal to what is descriptively moral in societies with the exception of favoritism for kin.
— Mark S

No it isn't.

You are incorrect. Can you say why you think it is not?

Quoting AmadeusD

Maximize harmony with everyone’s moral sense.
— Mark S

This is a shotgun to the foot. This is an emotive position.

How is someone's preference for the moral principle that is most harmonious with people's moral sense a "shotgun to the foot"? Please explain. Are you saying they should not prefer it?

Quoting AmadeusD

It is an instrumental ought
— Mark S

Then I have no issues. I just reject that anything you've posited is any way 'moral science'. It appears, patently, your assertion carried forth into a logical framework where you get the desired result of a self-consistent system. This is just utilitarianism with 'co-operation' instead of 'happiness' as its aim. Nothing wrong with that, but it certainly falls short of anythign we could consider a scientific position or train of thought.

I am glad to hear you have no issues.

Of course, science, including the science of morality (which studies why moral norms and our moral sense exist), only provides instrumental oughts. Beyond exploring how this instrumental ought knowledge could be culturally useful, I have no plans to comment on any possible imperative oughts..

No, it is not "just utilitarianism with 'co-operation' instead of 'happiness' as its aim". Morality as cooperation is silent regarding ultimate moral goals (utilitarianism's focus). Morality as cooperation only deals with moral means as defined by our moral sense and cultural moral norms, not moral ends.

There is no "moral science" except as a strawman. As I have described, there is a science that studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms extst. Perhaps you think the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist is off-limits for science? If so, why?

Quoting Philosophim

I'm asking what literature you're using, and what ideas you're basing this off of. When you reference something by science, put a quote so we can see where you're coming from and what research you're basing it off of.

The references are representative of the literature I am using. What I propose here is a synthesis of this literature and, in that sense, a personal perspective. I am thinking of going into that more in a separate thread.

Quoting Philosophim

Ok, but that's not cooperation. I can do many things for my gene's advantage that do not involve cooperation. How is me, under threat of jail or duress, getting drafted in a war to die for my country cooperation?

Much of cooperation has nothing to do with morality. I have not claimed all cooperation is relevant to morality.

The two most powerful means of promoting cooperation in the modern world are money economies and the rule of law. Both can increase cooperation in amoral ways. Prior to their invention, cooperation relied on morality with a little help from the inefficient strategy of barter. Remember Protagoras's myth about the function of morality enabling cooperation (in Plato's dialog of the same name)? At one time, morality as cooperation would have been the common view, and I expect I would not have had as much pushback as I am getting here. Money economies and the rule of law are fantastic at increasing cooperation, but really muddied the waters about the function of morality.

There are cultural norms connected with both money economies and the rule of law. whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. These are moral norms which solve cooperation problems.

Why do you think the law that threatens jail or duress if you refuse to get drafted for war is a moral norm? Obeying laws in general is a moral norm. Helping defend the group is a moral norm. A specific law is not necessarily a moral norm.

Quoting Philosophim

Many ideas of morality and laws in culture are not about cooperation or willingness, but forced obeyance under threat of punishment or death.

Laws that force cooperation are not recognized as moral norms for good reasons. And moral norms that exploit others to increase the benefits of cooperation for ingroups are only descriptively moral. So what?

Quoting Philosophim

If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality?
— Mark S

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity.
— Mark S

Indirect reciprocity? Look, I'm not thinking they're going to pay it forward. For all I know the guy's a psychopath. I also lost 20$. I do it because I think if I have spare resources, it should go towards helping another life live well. This is not cooperation. This is sacrifice. Altruism.

I agree; you are not necessarily thinking they will pay it forward, thereby continuing indirect reciprocity; you are just acting on your altruistic impulse.

I was explaining why the impulse exists. The biology underlying your altruistic impulse and when it is triggered was selected for in our ancestors because, on average, increase in reproductive fitness. You act altruistically because of the impulse, not because of any knowledge about cooperation strategies.

Quoting Philosophim

You're really going to try to claim that if I stomp on a bug, it could be considered immoral because it means I'm not good to cooperate with? How does that have anything to do with whether I can work with other people towards a common goal?

Jainism, Buddhism and Hinduism forbid harming any living thing. This can be a high-cost moral norm for farmers or anyone bothered by bedbugs or mosquitoes. The best explanation I know of for why such a high-cost moral norm has persisted in cultures with billions of people is that it is marker of being a good person in that culture. Do you have a better explanation?

Quoting Philosophim

Threat of punishment for not following a culture or society is not cooperation. Its also not 'reciprocity'. Its servileness. Slavery. Personal sacrifice for obedience to others.

Direct and indirect reciprocity are cooperation strategies. Punishment of violators (such as people who exploit others) is a necessary (not an optional) part of those strategies in order for them to be stable in a society. Punishment can be as simple as social disapproval or refusal to cooperate with the exploiter in the future. Punishment of moral norm violations also have included death.

Cultural norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment are moral norms. Punishment, like altruism, is a necessary part of cooperation strategies.

Quoting Philosophim

This needs work. A lot of work Mark S.

That is why I post here.

@Mark S
Quoting Philosophim

Indirect reciprocity? [ ... ] if I have spare resources, it should go towards helping another life live well. This is not cooperation. This is sacrifice. Altruism. You don't get to twist everything into, "But you see, if we twist the word around its really indirect cooperation." Be better than that.

:smirk: :up:

Reply to AmadeusD Hi

Quoting AmadeusD

we could consider a scientific position or train of thought

WE? until when? say it becomes a scenticfic pos, can you still not chose to deny it? How can you or anyone at that be bothered then? How bad would that LOOK, if you were that? Bother...to pretend, perhaps!

Bother, i typed it in bing search bar, all lower case and found it defined right at the top of the page! per oxford lang. data, the recommended first glance definition at the top--i liked the examples they used, and know what it means but i just am including here now the example sentences that was chosen to be consumed. Seems,i mean, FEELS relevant and is amusing to me at least. Amusing. Amuse. Its A-muse to me, even-- maybe, but so it seems...

bother: "take the trouble to do something - "scientists rarely bother with such niceties""the driver didn't bother to ask why""nobody bothered locking the doors"

Maybe no one cared anyways... Damned if we do, not if we DONT. Who knows?? Who can?

I was just rereading Boethius' "The Consolation of Philosophy," and I've decided it might be the pound for pound greatest moral work of all time. It's quite short and packed with great verse, symbolism on every page, and probably the single best display of "philosophy as therapy."


It occured to me that the science of morality is just about useless for Boethius as he sits in his prison cell awaiting his torture and execution for not not allowing corruption. His problem is that he is wallowing in self-pity and ruled over by his emotions (surrounded by the Muses). He is in the situation described by Plato in the Phaedo, "nailed to the body" by extreme pain (or pleasure).

Where science is probably most helpful is in knowing what to do and how to do it, rather than in being motivated to do the good (or to bother discovering it). Science would be extremely helpful to Boethius while he is still Consul and dealing with the intricacies of public policy.

Could it still be useful for him as he sits in his prison cell? To some degree, in that it might help him with self-knowledge. But its uses seem fairly limited in comparison to Lady Philosophy's weak and strong medicines.

The first medicine she applies is Stoicism, showing Boethius how the fruits of fortune cannot be the source of a stable human flourishing, how money, power, glory, and pleasure do not "make one good." The second medicine, which can only be applied after Boethius is liberated from the passions and appetites, is the philosophical ascent into the transcendent and the consideration of the good in itself and the nature of being.

Point being, science, and techne in general, is only useful once one is already self-determining to some degree. Being "ruled over by the rational part of the soul," ends up being a prerequisite for good science and for making use of science (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15027/plato-as-metaethics). Science can only do so much to help us make the jump from continence to virtue, from doing the good to loving it.

Boethius' complaints line up to Plato's three parts of the soul. He laments being in prison and having lost his wealth and comforts (appetitive and spirited/emotional complaints). He also is upset by the lack of justice in his situation (spirited and rational complaints). Finally, he has the same deep existential questions as Job, "if God, from whence evil," and why does God not punish the injustice?"

Like Job, he is answered by a divine theophany, Lady Philosophy recalling the personified Wisdom (Sophia) of Proverbs, Sirach, and The Wisdom of Solomon. But Philosophy itself ends up sitting somewhere between the human and the divine. Boethius describes her height as variously shifting between the "measure of mortal men," and her crown touching the heavens. Philosophy then is a bridge, whereas Job's problem is that there is no bridge — he is "a worm" and there can be no intercessor between him and God (e.g. the great lines in Job 40 where God asks Job out of the whirlwind if he can do what God can, lay all the proud low at will, garb himself in glory — "then I shall admit that thine own right hand can save you.")

Science then, lies in Lady Philosophy's ambit, but not Lady Philosophy within the compass of science. This makes it a tool/art relationship, rather than a grounding one.

(There is also something interesting in the positing of Sophia/Chokmah, the Incarnate Logos, or emanated Nous as the necessary intercessor between created man and the Absolute - the problem brought up in Job, which has a lot of parallels with Boethius)

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

I was just rereading Boethius' "The Consolation of Philosophy," and I've decided it might be the pound for pound greatest moral work of all time.

Spinoza's Ethics is a bit shorter and IMO much more than "therapy". An even shorter, Platonist work The Sovereignty of Good by Iris Murdoch ranks highly with me as does the very succinct, Naturalist work by one of Murdoch's oldest friends Philippa Foot: Natural Goodness. I think those three are also among the greatest works of moral philosophy "pound for pound" (along with a handful of other works written (or inspired) by Epicurus, Epictetus, K?ngz?, Buddha ... )

Quoting Kizzy

WE? until when? say it becomes a scenticfic pos

It isn't one, by its elaboration. Like - he isn't using science to support this system. So, your question is somewhat nonsensical, on that account. The rest of your comment seems non sequitur talking to yourself..

Quoting Mark S

You are incorrect. Can you say why you think it is not?

Because it flat-out isn't. You are trying to prove something. I am denying it. You need to present something to support it. It flat-out isn't a universal. Do your best...

Quoting Mark S

How is someone's preference for the moral principle that is most harmonious with people's moral sense a "shotgun to the foot"? Please explain. Are you saying they should not prefer it?

This proves, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the basis for this theory lives in your head.

Quoting Mark S

(which studies why moral norms and our moral sense exist), only provides instrumental oughts.

No it doesn't. It provides descriptive narratives about existing moral behaviour. It gives absolutely nothing by way of 'ought'. It gives us what some people think that means currently and nothing else. Which is what you've run with. What you think morality is - and then carried it forth into a logical system. Again, fine, but not in any way science, or derived from it.

Quoting Mark S

Morality as cooperation is silent regarding ultimate moral goals (utilitarianism's focus).

No. It is aimed at co-operation. This also goes to the above., You are flat-out ignoring basic facts about what you're saying - whicih stem from your own account. Contradictory.
Quoting Mark S

Morality as cooperation only deals with moral means as defined by our moral sense and cultural moral norms, not moral ends.

No, Your moral sense. Which, it seems, is 'harmonious co-operation toward well-being' or some such.

Quoting Mark S

There is no "moral science" except as a strawman.

Then your entire premise is false and I am happy to leave it here for you to play with :)

Reply to Kizzy
I am glad you find them interesting. The references include several different perspectives on the science. What I have presented in this forum is my synthesis of those perspectives.
Would you be interested in a thread here about the state of science about our moral sense and cultural moral norms?

Quoting Mark S

Kizzy
I am glad you find them interesting. The references include several different perspectives on the science. What I have presented in this forum is my synthesis of those perspectives.
Would you be interested in a thread here about the state of science about our moral sense and cultural moral norms?

Reply to Mark S Sure would, Mark! Where are we starting from? I can lead if you want. Unless you have somewhere specific you want to get right into? I struggle seeing the bounds of this thread though in your synthesis I dont know if they are really set and how far we should push them. I can take direction and I have many thoughts tied into moral senses/cultural norms and the state of science around it. So, I'm excited!

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

It occured to me that the science of morality is just about useless for Boethius as he sits in his prison cell awaiting his torture and execution for not not allowing corruption.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Where science is probably most helpful is in knowing what to do and how to do it,

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Science would be extremely helpful to Boethius while he is still Consul and dealing with the intricacies of public policy.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Point being, science, and techne in general, is only useful once one is already self-determining to some degree.

Excellent.

You aptly describe my perspective also, including Stoicism being the best philosophical therapy for those who are suffering. I hope you didn’t think I would disagree. Thanks for commenting.

Science can’t tell us what our values and goals imperatively ought to be, but once we choose values and goals, science can often tell us what we ought (instrumental means) to do to be most likely to achieve them.

The science of morality can tell us (or Boethius) how we ought (instrumental) to refine cultural moral norms to best support moral values and achieve moral goals using means defined by the moral principles that underly our moral sense and cultural moral norms. Because of their origins, we will find these moral means more harmonious with our moral sense and more motivating than any other possible set of means for achieving moral goals.

Reply to 180 Proof

:up:

I had forgot the ethics was so short because my copy had an introduction as long as the book lol. Another classic. Big fan of Murdoch too.

I do think it's a bit of a shame that verse and drama are so out of style in philosophy these days. But I suppose this could be selection bias, where we only get the good examples of philosophical verse. I imagine there are many ways to do it poorly. Plus, I guess we still have people like Dostoevsky and Kundera more recently, it's just that this sort of literary phil seems quite dead outside the existentialist frame. Where are the poetic epics looking at the philosophical implications of quantum foundations or extended evolutionary synthesis!?

Reply to Mark S

I think that is mostly right, although science can inform metaphysics and our idea of what human flourishing consists in. So, there is the technical side of science, that shows us what to do in order to reach our goals, but then there is also a knowledge component that informs our goals (epistêmê, theoretical wisdom, for Aristotle). I think its possible for elements of episteme to cross over into sophia, philosophical wisdom.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

... literary phil seems quite dead outside the existentialist frame. Where are the poetic epics looking at the philosophical implications of quantum foundations or extended evolutionary synthesis!?

:up: :up: Actually, there are quite a few speculative fiction authors on the margins ...

(to be continued when i get home)

Reply to AmadeusD ,
Quoting AmadeusD

There is no "moral science" except as a strawman.
— Mark S

Then your entire premise is false and I am happy to leave it here for you to play with :)

The topic of this thread is the science of morality which studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.

“Moral science” implies a ‘science’ of bindingness, which does not exist as far as I know, but has been a common basis for strawman arguments against the science of morality. I am again surprised to see it resurrected here. It is the zombie strawman that will not die.

Reply to Kizzy
Quoting Kizzy

Would you be interested in a thread here about the state of science about our moral sense and cultural moral norms?
— Mark S

?Mark S Sure would, Mark! Where are we starting from?

I have started composing a thread on the state of the science of morality and my synthesis of that science. Give me a week or so to post it, and then you can let me know what you think.

Quoting 180 Proof

... literary phil seems quite dead outside the existentialist frame. Where are the poetic epics looking at the philosophical implications of quantum foundations or extended evolutionary synthesis!?
— Count Timothy von Icarus
:up: :up: Actually, there are quite a few speculative fiction authors on the margins ...

Do you know of any speculative fiction by authors knowledgeable about moral philosophy regarding the philosophical implications of the evolutionary synthesis? What a moral philosopher (or a knowledgeable non-professional) was willing to speculate about could be revealing.

Quoting Mark S

I am again surprised to see it resurrected here. It is the zombie strawman that will not die.

Very much unluckily for you, I didn't do that and expressly addressed the fact that you're system is not scientific, or derived from science. It takes your assertion and then massages the 'science of morality' to support points it is not apt to support. That you have not picked that up does not mean I didn't say it. :) However, it is clear you will continue with this, ad infinitum, regardless fo response - and more power to you!

Quoting AmadeusD

I am again surprised to see it resurrected here. It is the zombie strawman that will not die.
— Mark S

Very much unluckily for you, I didn't do that and expressly addressed the fact that you're system is not scientific, or derived from science.

It seems an appropriate time to write a post describing the different perspectives in the present state of the science of morality and my synthesis of that science. I'll do that in my next thread. I apologize for misreading your comment as implying the science I described was necessarily flawed because it was deriving ought from is.
Quoting AmadeusD

I just reject that anything you've posited is any way 'moral science'.

Quoting AmadeusD

I can't understand how this would be the case. Unless you take "the science of morality" to just be sociology focused on social norms? I would also posit that given the extreme expanses of time that would need to be "number crunched" in regard to their moral outputs, lets say, across history, that this science could never be used.

I believe a moral is a matter of cause and effect and that science is very important to our moral judgment. The science of good and evil can begin with studying animals. Earth sciences are very important to moral judgments about how we use and dispose of resources.

I wish we all agreed the Biblical story of creation is a fable and most likely a plagiarized Sumerian story based a real climate event of a drought and flooding and return to a climate favorable to farming. And from there use science to understand creation, our earth and being human.

The stories we tell ourselves are very important and a failure to include science in our understanding of reality is a serious mistake.

Quoting Athena

The science of good and evil can begin with studying animals.

No it can't. These concepts were invented by humans. Animals have no notions (possibly, at all, but at least) of these things.

Quoting Athena

Earth sciences are very important to moral judgments about how we use and dispose of resources.

No they aren't. They are important as to the empirical data of the same field. This is hte key distinction between morality and empirical investigation. EI gets us what is. Morality gets us what ought to be. That is, if you think there is such thing as morality above-and-beyond the human assertion of it, on it's own terms. Quoting Athena

based a real climate event of a drought and flooding and return to a climate favorable to farming

This seems to run quite counter to the science, though.

Quoting Athena

The stories we tell ourselves are very important and a failure to include science in our understanding of reality is a serious mistake.

I think this is true. And is very, very important in noting the two above responses to you - the science isn't moral, nor does it inform morals. That is actually, why it's science, in some large part.
Social science is where it get's murky - as noted in the quote you've used, implicitly - is it right to continually point out the organisational failings of certain cultural groups? Is it right to point out the crime rates of non-oppressed groups? Is it right to.... Well, who knows? But in sociology, you at least have to consider this.
The facts behind it (i.e the statistical data) has no moral worth.

Quoting AmadeusD

No it can't. These concepts were invented by humans. Animals have no notions (possibly, at all, but at least) of these things.

I will ask you to hold your opinion until you have read the book "The Science of Good & Evil- Why People Cheat, Gossip, Care, Share, and FOLLOW THE GOLDEN RULE by Michael Shermaer, or in some way validate the notion that you know what you are talking about when it comes what we share with other social animals. Right now you appear to be as someone who is practicing medicine despite having zero education in that field of knowledge.

Quoting AmadeusD

Earth sciences are very important to moral judgments about how we use and dispose of resources.
— Athena

No they aren't.

Excuse me, how can a completely ignorant person make moral decisions about how we live on this planet? We have destroyed much of our planet and may have caused the end of life as we know it because of our ignorance. The greatest evil is ignorance.

Quoting AmadeusD

based a real climate event of a drought and flooding and return to a climate favorable to farming
— Athena

This seems to run quite counter to the science, though.

Excuse me, please question what you do not know. It is precisely because of science and the work of archeologists and geologists that I said the story of creation and a flood appear to be a story of a climate event. The Garden of Eden was most likely in Iran. This is determined by evidence of the four rivers, a very long and harsh drought, and flooding. The Biblical story of creation being a Sumerian story of many gods and goddesses and a river asking a goddess for help it stay in its banks so it would not flood her plants again. The goddess used mud to create a man and woman and she breathed life into them.

That understanding of the story is also based on knowledge of primitive peoples humanizing the world, sort of like we might name our car or a computer and speak of these things as living entities with personalities. These stories being much easier to remember than plain facts and often carry survival information. If the only human beings you know are the people around you, that leaves a lot information outside of your awareness, and when this lack of knowledge leads to saying I have lied, there is a problem. :brow:

" the science isn't moral, nor does it inform morals" your inability to grasp the meaning of what I say about moral judgment is a source of frustration for me. Let's see if you can follow this moral reasoning- saying that I lie is offensive and I take that as an invitation to attack. Can you see that cause and effect of having bad manners? If you can't get informed this problem might get worse.

Quoting Athena

I will ask you to hold your opinion until you have read the book "The Science of Good & Evil- Why People Cheat, Gossip, Care, Share, and FOLLOW THE GOLDEN RULE by Michael Shermaer, or in some way validate the notion that you know what you are talking about when it comes what we share with other social animals. Right now you appear to be as someone who is practicing medicine despite having zero education in that field of knowledge.

You are free to ask. That may be your defensive position, but I don't take it all that seriously. I am aware of socialisation in many animal genii, species and groups. They do not have notions of 'good' and 'evil'. they are literally invented by humans. They may have analogous reactive states. And even that's not clear.

Quoting Athena

Excuse me, how can a completely ignorant person make moral decisions about how we live on this planet? We have destroyed much of our planet and may have caused the end of life as we know it because of our ignorance. The greatest evil is ignorance.

This is literally nothing but your emotional response to the idea that morality isn't objective. And that's absolutely fine. But it says nothing about my comment. Unless you have an infallible conception of an objective morality, knowing more states of affairs can't inform your moral judgements. I understand that we need guiding principles to make any moral judgements. But facts about oil don't do the guiding, morally. The facts guide us to solutions (or, not lol) once a moral jdugement and aim has been established. "saving the planet" seems a good moral aim, which would exist even if you were misinformed about Earth sciences. Alas, I personally just don't care. Let the world die. Or, to use your terms, kill it. Who cares. Its insignificant to me. It would be extremely hard for you to show i was 'morally wrong' without enforcing your emotional response as a moral benchmark.

Quoting Athena

" the science isn't moral, nor does it inform morals" your inability to grasp the meaning of what I say about moral judgment is a source of frustration for me. Let's see if you can follow this moral reasoning- saying that I lie is offensive and I take that as an invitation to attack. Can you see that cause and effect of having bad manners? If you can't get informed this problem might get worse.

The bolded is just you justifying your being offended. If you aren't lying, you'll ignore me. If you take it as an attack, that is not reason. That is emotion. I simply do not care that you're frustrated. That's something for you to deal with in your own mind. The result may be refraining from responding. That would be fine. As would many other responses. Continually being offended probably isn't going to help anyone in any way. I simply take the phrase 'bad manners' as juvenile.

Quoting Athena

to saying I have lied,

You'll need to point out where I said that before I can respond. I don't recall, and cannot see my doing so. Interestingly, your two overall objections (ignorance, hubris) apply equally to you in this instance.

1. You seem to think I must not know anything about this subject and have proceeded to make some sweeping, digging remarks based on that erroneous assumption - which stems from my disagreeing with you. That's wild. And extreme hubris.

2. You are, apparently, completely unaware of the maturity of this research which goes far beyond what you've just said. There are, in fact, more than 2000 flood myths around the world. Almost all of them point to a specific point in time (including the Atlantis Myth). We know exactly what happened at this point in time: the end of the Younger Dryas. A time when billions of gallons of melt water flowed into the oceans, swallowing up coast lines, creating the Arabian peninsula etc... The Comet Research Group have been working on this for quite some time.

Quoting Athena

The Garden of Eden was most likely in Iran.

It was far more likely in South Eastern Turkey. But also, it most likely did not exist and persists merely as a allegory to speak about a time when North Africa and parts of the Levant were lush and wet. (I'll add here I am biased toward that theory because I have been involved in in: I am cited as a reference in this book.

Quoting Athena

This is determined by evidence of the four rivers, a very long and harsh drought, and flooding.

Quoting Athena

The Biblical story of creation being a Sumerian story of many gods and goddesses and a river asking a goddess for help it stay in its banks so it would not flood her plants again. The goddess used mud to create a man and woman and she breathed life into them.

This is one theory, yes. It is more likely it is an amalgamation of several pre-Talmudic myths, not limited to Atra-Hatsis (Gilgamesh, Ziusudra et al...) but extending as far out as India (Manu), China (Nuwa) and many others. There is, in fact, an analogous myth carved into the walls of the Edfu temple in Upper (southern) Egypt. There is some, close-to-direct, evidence that the Atlantis Myth was derived directly from these writings originally found at Saiis.

I appreciate that this is something you are interested in, and have much to say and think on it.

[quote="AmadeusD;891506"]
Not caring how your words affect me, just got added to you saying I lied. If you want to interact with me you will have to do better. You know, cause and effect. I am not going to play with you if I don't like how you play. Is that an objective moral?

Reply to Athena I have no clue what you're talking about now.

I didn't claim you lied. Not sure how your first utterance is either true, or relevant here.

I don't care, per se. I enjoy interesting exchanges. I don't even know who you are. You are responding to my comments. If you stop, it will mean only I have nothing to respond to. If you don't like how I play, that's fine. But it is entirely possible you're just wrong and don't like that.
No, that isn't objective or moral. It is.. your subjective emotional dummy-spitting. I acknowledged this earlier. ..

Quoting AmadeusD

I simply do not care that you're frustrated. That's something for you to deal with in your own mind. The result may be refraining from responding.

It has no moral valence. It just prevents you from adequately interacting with people who have an interest, and further knowledge, in a shared field of interest. And that's fine. No moral content there.

Quoting Mark S

"morality" is that morality as cooperation is the underlying principle that explains why past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist.

Cooperation with whom? We are very diverse and we hold different ideas about God and God's will for us. I sure as blazes will not cooperate with people I want to avoid, like the Jevohva Witnesses who want to explain God to me and make me one of them. :grimace: Or the Christian Nationalists who are more authoritarian than liberal.

Neither I am going to support Israel at the expense of Palestine.

To me, it looks like we all have different ideas about what an ideal civilization is and want others to conform to our notion of how things should be. I don't feel very cooperative. My bad.