Discussion on interpreting Aquinas' Third Way
The issue may be stated in this manner: Aquinas' 3rd Way, as written, may require interpretation. That is to say, Aquinas' Third Way may not appear to be a satisfying argument without interpreting it.
Here is part of the argument for reference:
"The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now, if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary."
(Fradd, Delfino "Does God Exist" Chapter 6).
An objection to Aquinas' argument, in my opinion, is that, while there could have been a time when nothing was in existence, there also could have been "possible beings" in existence at all times. In that case, the absurdity that Aquinas is suggesting need not occur. In other words, there is nothing absurd about all beings being "merely possible" beings. And in other words there need not be a necessary being.
Here is an interpretation of Aquinas that I came up with (I think it resolves the objection stated above) --
From our perspective, there are things existing. From the perspective of us "now" those things must exist; there existence is necessary. Therefore, it is false that it is possible for the things that exist "now" to not exist (as they would if everything ceased to exist at the time of "now" or earlier). Since the things existing in nature now are merely possible beings, the necessity of their existence must derive from another, that is, from a necessary being.
What do you think? How do you interpret Aquinas' argument? I am interested to hear from both critics as well as supporters of Aquinas' Third Way argument.
Here is part of the argument for reference:
"The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now, if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary."
(Fradd, Delfino "Does God Exist" Chapter 6).
An objection to Aquinas' argument, in my opinion, is that, while there could have been a time when nothing was in existence, there also could have been "possible beings" in existence at all times. In that case, the absurdity that Aquinas is suggesting need not occur. In other words, there is nothing absurd about all beings being "merely possible" beings. And in other words there need not be a necessary being.
Here is an interpretation of Aquinas that I came up with (I think it resolves the objection stated above) --
From our perspective, there are things existing. From the perspective of us "now" those things must exist; there existence is necessary. Therefore, it is false that it is possible for the things that exist "now" to not exist (as they would if everything ceased to exist at the time of "now" or earlier). Since the things existing in nature now are merely possible beings, the necessity of their existence must derive from another, that is, from a necessary being.
What do you think? How do you interpret Aquinas' argument? I am interested to hear from both critics as well as supporters of Aquinas' Third Way argument.
Comments (56)
Is it not just the argument from contingency? There are threads on this argument here. Something from nothing.
I have never found it convincing (along with his other four ways). But it is one of the prominent classical arguments for theism and David Bentley Hart - a progressive Christian thinker and philosopher, writes to this very well.
We have no way of knowing if there was ever nothing. We are not even able to provide an example (for obvious reasons) of nothing even being the case. Might there not alwasy have been something - even before our particular singularity? How do we know that the universe isn't eternal? (If you look it up, some interpretations of quantum cosmology, particularly those based on theories like loop quantum gravity or certain interpretations of quantum mechanics, propose that the universe has no distinct beginning or end. Instead, time might be cyclical or have no boundary, allowing for an eternal existence.)
Our own localized experince points to contingency, but we do not have all the information. We have no way of investigating this matter except through speculative theory of a highly specialized nature. So no real role for the average person here.
But even if we accept that there was once nothing and now something - this does not get us to a necessary being or god. Certainly not a particular god of a particular contrived human religion. We get causation but to move from this to a being which made a choice to create a universe sounds to me like an anthropomorphism of reality.
The people who accept this argument on Aquinas' terms tend to already believe in god and those who reject it tend to already think of god as fictive and of no explanatory power. For me this points to the general impotence of classical arguments for or against god.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x3xQwFIUJ80
And Koons formalized it here: https://robkoons.net/the-rigorous-thomist/the-third-way-a-new-interpretation
Basically they claim it's a mistranslation to attribute to Aquinas an obviously fallacious: "if all things could not exist sometimes, sometimes they all don't exist". It's a matter of Latin adverbs that "sometimes" also means "in some case", or "it's possible that". So a better translation would sound like "If for all things it's possible they don't exist, it's possible they all don't exist which is an obvious tautology in most predicate modal logics. So the argument is modal in nature and it's a classic contingency argument. Idk about its metaphysical background and my Professor for example thinks it's not even thomistic, it's Avicennian, Thomas just uses it as an example of philosophical ways to God like most of the five ways. It's not a proof he himself would pur forward since he views existnce as an act of essence, not an accident of essence. In my Prof's view the argument requires a reification of possible essences which Aquinas wouldn't endorse.
Imo it's pretty straightforward and establishes the existence of a necessary being, but like in all modal logics, the meaning of possible and necessary is very vague. It's harder to prove the unicity, goodness, personhood of a necessary being. Assumptions behind contingency arguments are generally poorly understood. What do they quantify over? Do they take temporal structure into account? Do we need bimodal temporal logic to distinguish the sences of possibility? How do I distinguish possible and necessary objects?
Is the idea here that necessity needs to be imparted by something else that is necessary?
But consider the case of being dead (as opposed to simply not living). If something is dead, it was necessarily alive at some point, regardless of if that thing's existence was contingent. Or consider Greg, whose death was contingent, an accident. It is necessarily the case that Greg, being dead, is not alive.
Likewise, my being in a room alone might be contingent, but if I am in the room alone I am necessarily the tallest person in the room.
But not by the logic of the argument. In other words, you're simply asserting that Aquinas' reasoning is wrong. In order to show why it is wrong, you would have to establish that there can be an infinite sequence of contingent causes, without an initial uncaused cause to ground them. Simply asserting that 'there could have been' doesn't amount to an argument against it.
Am I understanding you to say that a contingency argument proves causation, but that it may only prove, at most, an infinity of contingent causes? If so, what would you say to one who objects to infinite contingents on the grounds that none of the members of that infinite would possess the existence necessary to pass along existence causally? Unless I have misunderstood you..
Let's go back a few steps. Your paragraph beginning 'An objection to Aquinas' argument....' is not, as I said, an objection. Aquinas argues that if every being were contingent (i.e., could either exist or not exist), there must have been a time when nothing existed, because contingent beings are not the necessary cause of their existence. If nothing existed at some point in time, nothing would exist now, since something cannot come from nothing without a cause. Therefore, the existence of contingent beings today implies the existence of a necessary being that initiated the chain of existence. (Note that this is very similar to, and probably built around, Aristotle's argument for the First Cause in Metaphysics.)
Simply asserting "there could have been 'possible beings' in existence at all times" does not effectively counter Aquinas's argument, because you have not provided a logical alternative to the necessity of a first, uncaused cause. To effectively challenge Aquinas's Third Way, you would need to demonstrate logically - rather than simply assert - how an infinite regression of contingent causes could exist without a prime mover or uncaused cause, or to provide an alternative explanation.
Does he say 'there could have been a time when nothing existed?' or are you imputing that to him. The argument, as you've provided, and which is a fair paraphrase, doesn't claim that.
He's simply observing that all things 'found in nature' are temporally de-limited, i.e. they have a beginning and an end in time. They don't exist 'by necessity' but only as a matter of contingency. He goes on:
I concede, the 'at one time there could have been....' might be speculative. But something to consider is that, if the Universe had existed eternally, and everything in it has a finite lifespan, then again, nothing would exist now, as everything that could have existed, would have already perished, as the amount of time involved is infinite, and no addition of finite durations can add up to an infinite sequence of time. (This is not stated explicitly in the argument, but it is part of the background to the family of arguments).
(You might also peruse this essay, which provides some more background on Aquinas' interpretation of creation.)
//ps// - there's a remark at the end of the Third Way, "Now it is impossible to go on to
infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes" - I belive that reference to 'has already been proved' is to another of the arguments. //
That's interesting. It would be good to get this right since my limited understanding has always been the contingency argument and Third Way presupposes nothing existed until the unmoved mover engaged in creation. If god is the creator and sustainer of our reality then it must be that case that before creation, before existance and causality, there was nothing but god.
(I'm bracketing this response as I don't want to derail the conversation about the OP. The popular image of God as a kind of cosmic director or literal sky-father is deeply entrenched in culture and is typically the target of athiest polemics. But it's telling that David Bentley Hart, whom you mentioned, is generally dismissive of theistic populism and personalism and its representations in such movements as intelligent design and creationism. The crucial and difficult thing to understand, is the sense in which God is not any thing. The 'nothing' that is at the ground of 'creation from nothing', is not 'before the big bang' in a temporal sense, but a fecund field which appears to us as nothing because of not being situated or existent in time or space. But it is nevertheless that (not that there is a 'that') from which everything emanates and to which everything returns. 'When (Augustine) cries out in the midst of his vision of the divine nature, Is truth nothing just because it is not diffused through space, either finite or infinite? he is acknowledging that it is the discovery of intelligible truth that first frees him to comprehend incorporeal reality.' (The Divine Nature: Being and Goodness, Scott McDonald, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine.) It is not a 'that' or a 'this' of any kind, certainly not a 'divine engineer' or the deistic 'first cause' who kick-starts a process but then lets it run on its own accord (which is where so many atheist polemics, and theistic apologetics, are far off base). My intuition about Aquinas is that at the end of his career, when he fell into an ecstatic state and declared 'compared with that I have seen, all I have written seems as straw', it was because of direct realisation of that reality. In Aquinas this is naturally interpreted through the prism of Christian faith, but there are comparable realisations of the 'divine no-thing' in the philosophy of Plotinus and even the ??nyat? of Buddhism - which is not to say they're "all the same" as the subject matter is beyond comparison.)
avoiding derailing again??? NOW i see.
Sorry...I see that it is actually my bad when I replied to you abruptly here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/887904. I apologize for my comment to you earlier, in "on the matter of epistemology and ontology" thread...i didnt realize you are just being courteous. I will slow my roll now. I'm sorry for the blind sided comments, I am learning!
Enough for now. Thanks, kizzy
I see, yeah, the argument does make more sense with that background in mind. Still, the argument would be easier to follow had he said, "by necessity, everything must not exist at some time if everything were contingent" or something like that.
:up:
In a way, it seems like there is [I]always[/I] sort of nothing but God. I think. Aquinas is tricky on this point. God is present to all things and gives them their being, and this is not a sort of making or production, but more a participation.
Thanks for this and nicely put. I am aware of this more sophisticated account of god and probably first encountered this through Tillich.
My point when I said -
-Quoting Tom Storm
- was simply trying to enter the sprit of the argument as generally presented, as understood by Aquinas and others who use the argument from contingency. But perhaps Aquinas changed his view as he became older? The sky father version, which transcends atheist polemics, does remain popular and I would imagine is in the minds of the vast majority of believers. But I get your broader point.
Quoting Wayfarer
I wonder if this Aquinas would have found his Five Ways lacking.
What we observe through empirical evidence, sensation, is activity, actual being. This proves that not all being is "possible being". So there is something absurd about the notion that all beings are possible beings. Understanding this requires understanding Aristotle's categories of potential and actual.
I wonder if there should be (if there isn't already) a thread on (dare I say it) alternative accounts of god which are not personal or anthropomorphic? Is your sense that most of these are likely to amount to versions of idealism - cosmic consciousness/eternal mind? Or even Leibniz's ultimate Monad idea of god?
There is a great deal of secondary literature looking at this argument. To start I would suggest Ed Feser's blog entries (first, second), and Jeff Speaks' close analysis of the argument (link).
Good idea, although on a secular forum, it's rather like tossing bits of bloodied meat into the Piranha River. ;-)
In addition to Leontiskos' suggestions above, I found a rather good text-book excerpt on the topic, see here (.pdf).
Yes, I was wondering about consequences too. But it might be good if in the OP we specify that this is not for secular polemics or atheist grenade throwing. As an atheist, I would appreciate a more nuanced awareness of the various notions of god in more accessible language. I found Paul Tillich very interesting back in the 1980's but I have forgotten most of what I read.
I've also often thought that some atheists and theists could form an 'alliance' around a more sophisticated understanding of god and take an assertive but respectful anti-fundamentalist position together. Bishop Shelby Spong did a good job of this a few decades ago. We really need Christians and Muslims to come out against this stuff, rather than just atheists. But that's another matter.
I read the link to Feser and found what he had to say helpful and interesting; it appears very similar to the background information Wayfarer articulated earlier.
Metaphysician Undercover, I have in mind by "possible being" something more like a "contingent being" rather than a being that is merely possible but not actual. Based on what I read, the reading of "possible" as meaning "contingent" that is "as what could have or could not have occurred/ existed" is consistent with Aquinas' use of the term "possible."
To summarize and condense, the argument I am suggesting as an interpretation of Aquinas' Third Way is as follows:
1. If everything is contingent, then it is possible for there to be nothing now.
2. But it is not possible for there to be nothing now.
3. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore, there must be a necessary being.
To say a bit more, I think that Aquinas is not only rejecting that "there is nothing now." rather, he is in addition rejecting even the possibility that there is nothing now.
Thoughts?
I would say that's a pretty simple, yet a fair representation. I think you are correct in your assumption that Aquinas rejects the possibility that there is nothing now. That proposition would not even make sense. What I said earlier, was that empirical evidence denies this possibility, but we also have arguments like Descartes'. So he starts with what we observe, contingent being (which excludes the possibility of nothing), and concludes that there must be also "necessary being".
I believe the point of the argument is that we observe the reality of contingent beings. The things we observe are contingent, and "contingent" in this context means dependent on something else, requiring a cause for its existence. The next point is that if there ever was a time when there was absolutely nothing, then there would still be nothing because there would be no cause as required to bring into reality these contingent things we observe.
The other necessary premise, which is not well stated is known as the principle of plenitude, sometimes exemplified by the infinite monkeys typing. The principle of plenitude states that if anything is possible, then if given enough time (the proposal of infinite time) it will become a reality. So Aquinas denies an infinite past with an infinite regression of contingent things, by applying this principle of plenitude, and assuming that if everything is contingent, then there is the possibility that at some time in the past there would be nothing, and by the principle of plenitude, there would have to have been such a time. These are the premises required to imply that not all existence is contingent.
1. We observe contingent beings.
2. if there ever was a time with nothing there would always be nothing.
3. By the principle of plenitude, if all beings are contingent beings then there would have been a time with absolutely nothing.
Regarding potentiality and actuality, there's a Wikipedia entry on that here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potentiality_and_actuality
I'm interested in Aristotle's idea of 'potentia' as things which might exist, but are latent or potential until they're actualised. It describes the 'domain of possibility', which is different to things that can't or will never exist. See the article for further discussion.
I am going to be a bit argumentative here, and say, well whether you admit of an infinite sequence of contingents or not, we still have the problem that "now" is in the midst of those contingents. Get what I mean? Like, even if the contingents are not infinite in duration through time, "now" could be within the timespan of those contingents. That seems like a problem and it is a problem even if we only have a finite duration of contingents. It seems like a problem whether the principle of plentitude is recognized or not.
That is why I prefer an alternative interpretation of the argument. Instead of saying, "by the principle of plentitude there would be nothing now, therefore there must not be only contingents," I am saying, "the very possibility of nothing now requires the existence of only contingents...but this isn't a possibility...therefore there must be a necessary being."
Do you think there are any "necessary non-beings" ? A square circle perhaps.
I don't see the problem. The time referred to as "now" is in the midst of the contingents, that is described as what we observe, contingent beings. But it's not a problem to the argument, because if there ever was a time when there was nothing, there would be no contingents right now, because contingents require a cause, and nothing could not ever be a cause. That's what a contingent being is, one which requires a cause for its existence. So, the possibility of nothing is ruled out in this way.
Quoting NotAristotle
I don't think your statement, "the very possibility of nothing now requires the existence of only contingents" is a coherent proposition. If there is nothing, then there is no contingents. So the possibility of nothing rules out the possibility of contingents, that's the point of the argument. "Nothing" and "contingents" are incompatible. That's what the third way demonstrates, but you make them compatible by saying that the possibility of nothing requires contingents.
This is because you've made "possibility" into a logical possibility, saying that nothing is logically possible because what we observe is contingent beings. But the argument denies the possibility of nothing, if there ever was nothing there would not be contingent beings now, so nothing is impossible. Aquinas is dealing with ontological possibility, as in Aristotle's "potential", like what Wayfarer mentions above. This is a sense of "possible" which is distinct from the modern usage of logically "possible".
As I said a contingent being is one whose existence is dependent on causation, it is caused to be. So prior to its existence it is merely "possible". It only comes into being if the appropriate efficient causes, the ones required to bring it into being, are initiated. In this way it is said to be a "possible" being, but this is an ontological possibility, meaning that the existent circumstances support the possibility of that being. This is other than logical possibility which just requires self-consistency.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
-- unless nothing occurred at a time after now.
To your point about the incompatibility of nothing and contingents, allow me to rephrase.. how about "if there is nothing at any time (or even at all times) there could not be a necessary being; any beings that exist, if they exist at all, would have to be contingent beings."
And I think I am claiming the possibility of nothing in the same way that Aquinas does; that is, if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing. The possibility of nothing is asserted within a conditional; I do not know enough about logic to know whether that makes it a logical possibility or not.
What I am claiming is that, were all beings contingent, it would be possible for there to be nothing at some (or all) times; and in particular, it would be possible for there to be nothing now (if everything were contingent). But, I contend that it is impossible for there to be nothing now. Therefore, by modus tollens, it cannot be the case that all beings are contingent. And therefore, there must be a necessary being.
I'm quite sure that this is what he is talking about. If you read his expression of the third way you'll see that he says that what begins to exist only does so by being caused by something already existing. This is efficient causation, which we know as the active, or actual cause of existence of contingent beings.
Quoting NotAristotle
This is incoherent, "occurred" indicates past time, so future is not relevant here.
Quoting NotAristotle
I don't see how this is relevant. What Aquinas says is that we notice there is not nothing, we notice contingent beings. And, he concludes that it is impossible that there ever was nothing. So, by the observed existence of contingent beings, "nothing" is ruled out as impossible.
Quoting NotAristotle
What Aquinas does is entertain the idea of "nothing" as what we would call a "logical possibility". We could say that Aquinas mentions "nothing" as a logical possibility, just like any suggestion which is not incoherent by self-contradiction could be said to be logically possible. But then he rules out "nothing" as ontologically impossible, and actually self-contradicting through reference to the material existence which we know and are familiar with.
In fact, what he shows is that your statement "if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing" is incoherent, as self-contradicting. This is because he shows that if there ever was nothing there would always be nothing. therefore there would be no contingent beings. So, the existence of contingent beings appears to validate the possibility of "nothing", as Aquinas shows. However, this apparent validation is really nothing more than an illusion because if there actually ever was nothing there could be no contingent beings. So what he does here is demonstrate that "if all beings were contingent, there could have been nothing" is incoherent, as self-contradicting when all the terms are understood properly.
Quoting NotAristotle
Yes, I think this is correct. If all beings are contingent, then nothing appears to be "logically possible". However, ontological reality shows us that there is something now, and this means, as you contend, "it is impossible for there to be nothing now". But you still need the rest of Aquinas' argument, to make your conclusion. You need to show that because the beings we notice now are contingent beings, it is therefore impossible that there was ever nothing. So "nothing" is impossible in a more absolute way. That is the impossibility which leads to the conclusion of "necessary being".
I might add that the third way extends beyond this point to show how an infinite regress of necessary beings is not possible, and finally this leads to the conclusion of "a necessary being".
Second, I have the same objection that I voiced to Wayfarer; namely, Aquinas says: "Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence." If what you are saying about his argument is correct, surely he would have said "...then at one time there must have been nothing in existence." Yet that is not what he says.
Additionally, if your interpretation is correct, then the principle of plenitide is not actually doing any work. That is because by definition, according to your definition, all contingent things require a cause. In that case it doesn't matter how much time is involved.
Furthermore, I disagree with the definition of contingent you have deployed. I would define contingent here as "possible to be or not to be." If everything is contingent, then according to your definition nothing is contingent because nothing is possible to be (if everything is contingent). That seems contradictory.
Lastly, the argument I am suggesting is grounded in the law of noncontradiction. We both agree that contingent things exist now. I maintain that, to avoid contradiction, the contingent things existing now must exist now (but can not-exist at another time). But if something must exist now, then there cannot be nothing now. But if everything is contingent then there could be nothing now. However, there cannot be nothing now based on the law of noncontradiction. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent i.e. there must be a necessary being
Well, continue in the context. He then says: "Now, if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd."
So, he moves from "there could have been nothing" to "if at one time nothing was in existence... even now nothing would be in existence". Therefore he has demonstrated, as I said, that "nothing" is impossible, given the current conditions of contingent beings.
Quoting NotAristotle
I believe this is incorrect. There could be an infinite regress of contingent beings. That means an infinite amount of time with contingent beings causing the existence of other contingent beings. Isn't this the objection you made in the op, in the following passage?
Quoting NotAristotle
That is why the principle of plenitude is required. The principle of plenitude is not stated by Aquinas, and I don't think there even was a formalized version of it at the time, I believe it was just something which was taken for granted at the time, like a self-evident truth, outlined first by Plato. However, if you do some online research, you will see that analyses of the third way argument have determined that the principle is a requirement, for Aquinas to make the conclusion of necessary being.
This is because of objections similar to the one which you made in the op. There could have always been contingent beings, and never nothing, if "nothing" is only a possibility. So, the principle of plenitude is required to move from possible beings, and the possibility of nothing, to: there actually would have been nothing at some time, and so now there would also be nothing, therefore providing what we need to conclude necessary being.
Quoting NotAristotle
I don't know, I can't follow this at all.
Quoting NotAristotle
I don't see how you derive this premise, and it isn't part of Aquinas' argument. Notice that Aquinas doesn't use "contingent" in the argument. So maybe we should leave that word out, as a distraction. What he says is that what we find are things which are possible to be, and possible not to be, because "they are found to be generated and to corrupt". Notice the temporal extension, of "generated" in the past, and "to corrupt" in the future. So your use of "now" is uncalled for.
It appears like what you are proposing is something like: "we notice that there are beings now, and what exists now must exist, therefore being is necessary. That's a nice simple argument, but it isn't Aquinas' argument.
Yeah! That is essentially the argument. I would amend it just by adding "...and what exists now must exist [now]..."
And I think I can now better appreciate what you are saying about the principle of plenitude, but...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am not sure that my objection about "now" being at the time of contingents is fully met. The possibility remains that "now" is within the time span of an infinite sequence of contingents, and that the time of "nothing" will occur sometime after "now." But if that is the case then the infinite sequence of beings can all being contingent and there needn't be a necessary being; that is a problem for the argument and that is essentially the objection.
This is sort of like Aristotle's law of identity. Whatever exists [now] must be what it is, and not something else. This is expressed as the following necessity: "A thing is the same as itself". Notice though, that this relates to a thing's essence, what the thing is, which cannot be other than the thing's essence, what the thing is. But this principle has not been extended to a thing's existence, as you propose, and I believe it cannot be, for the following reason.
I believe that this is because the intelligible part of a thing, what we know of the thing, is its form, its essence, and "existence" is not understood as being part of the thing's form. In other words, we do not know what your statement means, to "exist now", it is unintelligible to us. In fact, the "now" changes as we speak. Therefore we cannot make the proposed statement, "it is necessary that what exists now exists now", because time has past between the first "now" and the second "now" such that they refer to different times which accordingly have different existents.
You might recognize that Aquinas described God as a being whose essence is His existence, and by that principle essence and existence are equated, even made to be the same, in God only. It is only in this special case that a thing's identity, what the thing is, (which is necessary in the sense that the thing cannot be something other than the thing which it is), is assumed to be the very same as the thing's existence. And this transfers the necessity of the thing's form, expressed by the law of identity, that it must be what it is, to the thing's existence, what it is, is that it is. And this makes "that it is" necessary by the law of identity. But that's only in the special case of God.
Quoting NotAristotle
The contingents which you propose as occurring posterior to the time of now, in the future, have no existence. They are not real, and cannot be called beings, they are merely possibility. Therefore what you call "an infinite sequence of contingents" is not truly an infinite sequence, unless there is no beginning to it. If there is no beginning, then there is an infinite amount of time prior to now, and the principle of plenitude applies. If there is a beginning to the sequence, then there is not an infinite sequence, because it is limited by the beginning on one end, and now on the other end. In this case, the "necessary being" accounts for the cause of the first contingent being. It is "necessary", known by logical necessity, rather than being known as contingent.
Quoting NotAristotle
You are proposing that the sequence of contingent beings has a beginning, in order to avoid the infinite time prior to now, and the principle of plenitude, which would indicate that in that infinite time there would be a time of nothing. But contingent beings must have a cause. If there is a first contingent being, one which is prior to all other contingent beings, it cannot have a contingent being as its cause, then its cause is necessary, and this is necessary being as distinct from contingent being.
Not exactly, what I am proposing is this: First, let's assume that all beings are contingent only; that is, that there are no necessary beings. On that assumption, whether the principle of plenitude is applicable or not, but especially when it is applicable, the problem I articulated is salient. The problem is not that there are contingents posterior to "now." The problem is that there will be or may be nothing posterior to "now," that is, if we are still operating on the hypothetical assumption that everything is contingent only.
That is why I am forwarding the argument that I forwarded. But you mentioned an objection to that argument:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am not sure if the law of identity can be extended to a thing's existence either. Fortunately, I am not appealing to the law of identity; rather, I am appealing to the law of noncontradiction. In particular, I am appealing to what Aristotle says in De Interpretatione. The first sentence of Part 9 especially: "In the case of that which is or which has taken place, propositions, whether positive or negative, must be true or false." In other words, it must be true or false that something exists now, it cannot be both true and false.
And I would like to address the further objection you described concerning "now" --
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am not using now in a purely indexical sense. By "now" I mean this exact present moment. Which, in a few seconds will have become "then." Still, something must have existed in "that" moment.
That issue becomes irrelevant when we consider what is prior to now, as Aquinas did. By considering what is prior to now we see that it is impossible that everything is contingent only. Therefore the "hypothetical assumption" has already been ruled out as incoherent in the way I described, through reference to what has occurred in the past. So applying that hypothetical assumption toward the future is pointless because it's already ruled out as incoherent through a proper understanding of the terms. When you say "there will be or may be nothing posterior to 'now,'" you are just carrying on with a proposed possibility which has already been proven to actually be impossible by being incoherent.
Quoting NotAristotle
I really do not think you will make any progress in this direction. Aristotle showed how it is the case that when potential is a part of the thing we are talking about, we must allow a violation to the law of excluded middle with respect to that potential. This is in relation to the future, things not yet decided. In the case of material things, their "matter" is that potential, so as Aquinas says, these things are possible to be and not to be, and this provides for "change", generation and corruption. So instead of violating the law of noncontradiction to deal with the possibility to be and not to be, under Aristotelian principles, matter, as potential, violates the law of excluded middle, because it neither is, nor is not.
You'll see that modern dialectical materialists (and dialetheists), following Hegel who actually rejected the law of identity, allow that the nature of matter defies the law of non-contradiction. This is a resolution to the problem of "potential" which Aristotle considered, but rejected, insisting that the law of noncontradiction must be maintained, and opting for a violation of the law of excluded middle instead, to allow for the reality of potential.
Quoting NotAristotle
This does not resolve the issue with "now". By this description, any proposed "exact present moment" as "now", is really a moment in the past, because by the time it is proposed as "now", it has passed. If you propose a future now, then it is not present, but future. The "now", as a point in time is not real because in reality, time is passing, and any proposed point in time will always be future or past. You could propose an extended period, or duration of time as your "now", but this duration of time would consist of change, and this destroys our capacity to truthfully say that there is such a thing (notice the static fixity of "thing") as what exists now.
So, when we look at "now", we are stuck with a duration of time. And, that duration of time consists of change, "becoming". Aristotle showed that becoming is fundamentally incompatible with the logical contraries of "being" and "not being", "is" and "is not". If we have state A (what is) at time 1, and state B at time 2, and change occurs between these two proposed points in time, then we need to describe this intermediary time, in order to understand change. If we propose a state C (what is) at time 1.5 as the intermediary, then we are left with having to describe the change between the initial state and the intermediary state, and between the intermediary state and the final state. If we propose more states of what is, in between, we just head for an infinite regress of states of being, without ever describing the actual "change" which occurs between the states of being.
This is the problem with "now". We like to represent it as a point in time, with a particular, describable "what is" which corresponds with that point of time. However, when the point in time is properly analyzed we find that it cannot ever adequately represent "now", as we know and understand "now" in lived experience, as it always ends up being in the past, or a projected point in the future. So we find out that "now" really consists of a duration of time. The duration cannot be entirely in the past, or else it would be past time, nor can it be entirely in the future. Therefore the duration which we call "now" must consist of both past and future. Furthermore, there is a substantial difference between past (as what is fixed, determined, and necessary), and future (what is indeterminate, not fixed, and possible). Since both of these somewhat opposed. and incompatible aspects of reality exist at the very same time, "now", the question of "what exists now?" is itself incoherent.
How is the proposed hypothetical possibility impossible by being incoherent?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I did not see where the objection was in these two paragraphs.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Okay fine, let's forget about "now" and say instead that any moment in the past must have been. I will reformulate my argument:
1. If everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past.
2. But there couldn't have been nothing in the past, something having already existed in the past.
3. Therefore (by modus tollens) it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore there must be a necessary being.
Although I really do think Aquinas meant "now" as I do, in the colloquial sense, not in the technical sense you have described. Otherwise, wouldn't the objection you stated concerning "now" be a problem for Aquinas too?
By the nature of "contingent being", it is shown that it is impossible that "all being is contingent" by Aquinas' argument. Therefore the hypothesis "everything is contingent only" is rendered incoherent.
Quoting NotAristotle
I don't see how the necessity of the premise (2) "something existed in the past" is supported, when (1) explicitly says there could have been nothing in the past. That is the point of Aquinas' layout, it shows how (2) which contradicts (1), rendering the primary hypothesis "everything is contingent", as incoherent, is derived.
Quoting NotAristotle
There is no need for Aquinas to elaborate or clarify his use of "now" because he does not use it to distinguish between past and future. You made that distinction in your argument, so this left you open to that criticism.
But that is the problem isn't it; Aquinas' argument as you have stated it does not go through if there could be nothing posterior to "now." If there could be nothing posterior to "now" it could be the case that everything is merely contingent.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But (1) does not explicitly say there could have been nothing in the past; it says "if everything is contingent, then there could have been nothing in the past." It's a conditional statement, that is it. And that is basically what Aquinas is doing too, he is entertaining, in the same way a conditional does, the possibility that "everything is contingent."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But the original argument I formulated (1-4) does not make use of the past or future, rather it only discusses the present, so again I am not sure how my use of "now" is different than Aquinas'.
I don't think that's relevant. If everything is contingent, then there would be an infinite regress of contingent beings prior to now, implying infinite time prior to now. However, "all being is contingent" implies the possibility of nothing. And, by the principle of plenitude there would have been a time of nothing. If there was a time of nothing prior to now, there would still be nothing. Therefore "all beings are contingent" is incoherent.
Quoting NotAristotle
Right, and by the principle pf plenitude, if everything is contingent there would have been a time in the past with nothing. And, since "contingent being" implies that a prior cause is necessary for the being's existence, if there ever was nothing, there would always be nothing after that time. Therefore "everything is contingent" is incoherent.
That is the crux of the matter. The problem for the principle of plenitude is not when nothing is prior to now; the principle handles that objection well. The problem is when nothing will occur (or may occur) after now. That's the objection I am stating. Do you see why I think it is a problem for the argument you stated?
No, I don't see how it could be a problem. Since "all being is contingent being" implies an infinite regress of causation, therefore an infinite amount of time prior to now, nothing would have already occurred, prior to now, by the principle of plenitude. This makes your reference to "after now" irrelevant.
And would you say the nothing that occurred happened after all the contingent things passed away, or would you say the nothing occurred before the contingent things were generated?
The nothing did not occur, that's the point of the argument. If nothing did occur then there would still be nothing today. But if everything is contingent nothing would have occurred. Hence the conclusion of necessary being.
If all things are contingent then there would have been nothing at some time in the past (by the principle of plenitude). If there was nothing at some time in the past there would still be nothing now. There is not nothing now, there is contingent being. Therefore the proposition "all things are contingent is incoherent", and there is necessary being.
Right. I am asking you: "if everything is contingent, would there have been nothing today because there would have been nothing after all contingent things existed, or because there would have been nothing before all the contingent things began to exist?"
I think the point is simple. If the proposition "Everything is contingent" is true, then there is always nothing. The proposition "After all contingent things existed" is eliminated as meaningless because there would never be any contingent things.
That's right. "Everything is contingent" implies two things, the possibility of nothing, and infinite regress. Infinite regress implies infinite time which with the principle of plenitude realizes the possibility of nothing. The reality of nothing denies the possibility of any contingent thing. So "Everything is contingent" is self-refuting, incoherent, because what it actually means is that it is impossible that there is anything.