What is 'Mind' and to What Extent is this a Question of Psychology or Philosophy?
I am aware that there have been so many threads on the nature of consciousness and 'mind', especially as it may be one of the most central questions of philosophy and psychology. At the moment, I am reading, 'Infinite Mind: Science of the Human Vibrations of Consciousness'by Hunt(1996). It looks at the concept of 'mind- fields' and to what extent can these be pinned down to space and time, especially in relation to brain states?
I am aware that this may lead into the areas of neuroscience. Cognitive science and neuroscience are extremely important in the understanding of consciousness. I have been perplexed by the nature and 'mind' as long as I can remember. In a number of discussions,I have had dialogue with @180 Proof, in which he argues that I am raising an issue in psychology as opposed to phllosophy. I can see his point but I am not sure that it is that simple, because all psychological models rest on philosophical assumptions.
In particular, there is the question as to whether the mind is a 'blank slate', as suggested by John Locke and Stephen Pinker. This would imply that the brain is a physical mechanism to be programmed through socialisation. This may be contrasted by the position that 'mind' involves innate structures of an inherited nature. It can get into the tangents of free will vs determinism, but it is also a complex area of what consciousness, and whether it involves reflective learning.
I am hoping that I am not raising a stale and overtired area of thinking, especially in relation to the mind-body relationship, as well as between idealism and physicalism. As far as I can see, the issue of what is 'mind' is so central to philosophy, ranging from Hegel to Gilbert Ryle and phenomenology. I don't believe that 'mind' can be reduced to psychology, because it is at the core of human existence. So, in the light of cognitive science and neuroscience, how, and what do you see as the overriding and outstanding issues of the philosophy of mind in the twentieth first century? Is there any essential debate beyond the scope of psychology?
I am aware that this may lead into the areas of neuroscience. Cognitive science and neuroscience are extremely important in the understanding of consciousness. I have been perplexed by the nature and 'mind' as long as I can remember. In a number of discussions,I have had dialogue with @180 Proof, in which he argues that I am raising an issue in psychology as opposed to phllosophy. I can see his point but I am not sure that it is that simple, because all psychological models rest on philosophical assumptions.
In particular, there is the question as to whether the mind is a 'blank slate', as suggested by John Locke and Stephen Pinker. This would imply that the brain is a physical mechanism to be programmed through socialisation. This may be contrasted by the position that 'mind' involves innate structures of an inherited nature. It can get into the tangents of free will vs determinism, but it is also a complex area of what consciousness, and whether it involves reflective learning.
I am hoping that I am not raising a stale and overtired area of thinking, especially in relation to the mind-body relationship, as well as between idealism and physicalism. As far as I can see, the issue of what is 'mind' is so central to philosophy, ranging from Hegel to Gilbert Ryle and phenomenology. I don't believe that 'mind' can be reduced to psychology, because it is at the core of human existence. So, in the light of cognitive science and neuroscience, how, and what do you see as the overriding and outstanding issues of the philosophy of mind in the twentieth first century? Is there any essential debate beyond the scope of psychology?
Comments (70)
Pinker's book, The Blank Slate, explicitly argues against the notion of a blank slate.
The brutal fact of the matter, Jack, is that as far as mainstream science and academic philosophy is concerned, 'mind is what brain does'. In the mainstream, it is viewed squarely through the perspectives of neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and pyschology, and those who dissent are invariably characterised as fringe or new-age - the author you cite would doubtlessly be described as such by a lot of people.
Surveys in academic philosophy, as Banno frequently points out, show only a very small percentage of respondents support or advocate for philosophical idealism (from memory, less than 2%.) The majority, presumably, operate under a paradigm such as reductive or non-reductive physicalism or something of the kind.
There is a US University department, the Division of Perceptual Studies at University of Virginia, founded by past-life memories researcher Ian Stevenson, which is devoted to paranormal psychology. You'll find their published books on philosophy of mind and paranormal psychology here. There's also a thriving industry of books and videos devoted to these ideas, they're certainly not bereft of an audience, but most universities won't go near them.
As far as 'mind fields' are concerned, I think Rupert Sheldrake is one source, although his ideas extend beyond philosophy of mind per se. He is often derided as a crackpot - Steve Pinker and others say he's a pseudo-scientist - but he at least has a seat at the table, so to speak. His website is at sheldrake.org. This video interview also seems relevant.
A question I ponder is, if there are fields other than electromagnetic fields - the existence of which is clearly demonstrable - how would they be detected? By what instruments? Sheldrake's 'morphic fields' are related to earlier ideas of morphogenetic fields which have fallen out of favour, but were regarded as part of the mainstream at the time. One analogy I think makes kind of sense is the body/mind as being more like a receiver or transmitter of consciousness rather than the originator of it. But of course that leaves a lot of open questions. (It is one of the ideas discussed by Sheldrake in the video cited above.)
Quoting Jack Cummins
Afraid so, but don't let that stop you.
I agree but for a contrary reason: I think body is "at the core of human existence" and that "mind" is a description, in part, for what our bodies brains mostly involuntarily do (i.e. our 'subjective' way of talking about ourselves and others). Just as 'existence precedes essence' in existentialism, body enables-constrains mind is the basis of embodied philosophy (but given your more 'esoteric' preferences, you"ve ignored for years the links and lists I've offered, Jack, so I won't bother referring to them again) that deflates or eliminates reliance on 'folk psychology' (i.e. dis-embodied subject (soul) ... and the prevailing apologia e.g. psychoanalysis, psychotherapy ... Husserlian phenomenology, Kantian/Hegelian idealism, Cartesian dualism, Platonism). I suppose my stubborn anti-supernaturalist bias is why I can't grok subjectivist (or spiritualist) conceptions of "mind". :sparkle: :eyes:
update:
From a 2023 thread Consciousness question ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/756241
That's useful to know as I was reading, 'The Language Instinct'. It may show my weakness based on reading about Pinker's ideas and attempts to put ideas into categories, especially thinkers such as Pinker and Dennett. I hope that this does not mean that my entire thread will be dismissed because as far as I see it the question of what is inherited as 'mind', is a central area of thinking underpinning all psychological theories.
What is radio broadcast? "Radio broadcast is what radio receivers do."
Common sense - you never hear the radio except when there is a radio receiver, and it has to be turned on, like a functioning brain.
Except it's obviously false; the broadcasts come from elsewhere, and permeate space, and the radio receivers make it locally manifest when they are tuned to the appropriate frequency. At least, that is the faith I have been brought up with - I have never actually seen a "broadcast".
It is not that I don't see the body as essential to existence. After writing the thread I have become physically unwell, with a sore throat and possibly a fever. It would be a mistake to separate such bodily illness from mind. Dualism may be an illusion, but it does come down to whether mind or matter is primary and Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' does describe the centrality of body for being.
Disembodied existence most probably doesn't make sense in many ways, although at times I am not certain of this. I do believe that ghosts are disturbances in energy fields rather than the literal souls. However, there does appear to be an essential lifeforce, like the spark of consciousness or animation. Of course, this is not unique to human beings, but mind as in reflective consciousness separates humans. It is bound up with language and this gives rise to ideas, although it is possible that the ideas exist independently of human consciousness. That is debatable though, as indicated in the recognised question as to whether there is a sound of a tree falls and no one is around to hear it.
Some people are only able to intuit the evidence of mind as it correlates to their own thoughts. Which leads to an organic limitation. Some people are able to intuit the evidence of mind in this broader sphere, which aligns with a broader, "spiritualized" conception of mind. The fact that mind evolves cybernetically (as growing knowledge) over generations testifies to its trans-physical nature
I have read Sheldrake and found his approach interesting with the idea of morphic fields as a memory underlying nature. At the time of reading his writing I did think his perspective would be a foundation for belief in reincarnation, even though I am unsure if Sheldrake would go that far.
The dialogue between Buddhism and neuroscience is also important and I understand that the debate about physicalism and idealism exists within Buddhist thought. It is probably hard to ignore the basis of physical embodiment in the scientific sense because so much about the brain, with the main issue being whether mind can be reduced to brain entirely. The consciousness may have a certain transcendent nature.
The idea of radio broadcast is important and it is as if the brain and senses are the machinery of consciousness. It does go back to the issue of whether the brain and nervous system are a filter as in Bergson' s thinking, which was drawn upon by Aldous Huxley in 'The Doors of Perception'.
The concept of spirit is important although Hegel's idea of it as imminent is an important contribution. The idea of spirit is a often associated more with religious viewpoints but the idea of 'manifestation' is a relevant concept because it implies something as a source of life, and that may be the central basis of belief in 'God', but not necessarily in the form of the anthromorphism. It is more along the lines of the anthropic principle.
Yikes. Talk about a loaded question .
If the conditions are limited to cognitive science and neuroscience, wouldnt it be science of mind? Which leads to a contradiction, insofar as the science of mind would need to empirically decide the absence or impossibility of that which is necessarily presupposed, but never intended for empirical status, susceptible to, thus legislated by, methodological naturalism, re: scientific rigor.
If philosophy of mind, and because philosophy proper has no use of empirical experimentation, the light of neuroscience would seem to be pretty dim with respect to purely abstract conceptions, in spite of the gross reifications by which they arise.
So overriding/outstanding issue? Neglect of lane.
"Appear" to whom? Like aether, phlogiston, qi ... elan vital has been debunked as a "force" or "energy", so are you speaking metaphorically? The philosophical significance of "essential lifeforce" is lost on an Epicurean/Spinozist like me.
Mind is the limited and naive theory of ones own body from the perspective of someone who is unable to observe what is actually occurring. The hypothesis represents the subjective disconnect between states of feelings and states of affairs.
I am certain that if our senses pointed inwards our so-called inner lives would be less of a mystery. In there is a multiplicity of parts and movements we just arent privy to in the present arraignment. All one can do is try to make sense of the odd feeling here and there, maybe the discomfort emanating from an illness or pain, insofar as whatever causes them is able to reach the sensual aspects of the body and make itself knowna niggling fever could be the only evidence of a much greater malady, for example
Since we are unable to observe what is occurring in a majority of the body, the nature of our subjective lives is always one of grasping, the result of trying to understand inward while forever looking out.
What form do you imagine such internal sensors taking? After all, if we had an internal eye and light source to look at our brain as a whole, I wouldn't expect it to provide much interesting information.
In a very meaningful sense we do have senses pointing inward, in that we have neurons in our brains which monitor and report on the goings on in other parts of our brains. I suppose a case might be made for it potentially being beneficial to have such internal monitoring to a greater degree, but natural selection tends to weed out features like heads too big to pass through a mother's birth canal.
Personally I wouldnt imagine such a being. The best way to go about such monitoring is to utilize the senses of others, and maybe some invasive technologies, should they ever become safe enough.
My question arises because neuroscience has changed the thinking of mind completely. There was so much more of a unity between philosophy and psychology prior to major developments in the twentieth century, in psychiatry as well as psychology. There had been so much mystification about mental states and even attributing mental.illness to 'demon possession. Ideas of biochemistry of the brain and CT scanning changed so much.
So, it may be getting to the point where science almost makes the pictures of nervous system explain everything, with philosophical issues getting missed. Some of the central conceptual issues may still remain at the underpinning of different approaches and cognitive models are often seen as far more accurate theories as opposed to the psychodynamic thinkers. The crossovers between the approaches may be important as well as the empirical approach of evidence.
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Subjectivity is often the area of psychotherapy and there may be an important aspect in research. However, one's own mind is not possible without some basis in subjectivity. Feedback from others may be useful to some extent in gaining some objectivity through others' perceptions.
It may even lead to an understanding of one's own blindspots but the ego may stand in the way and allow for limited insight into mind and self as a doorway of self awareness and the layers of subconscious which may be masked by the nature of the persona. This may go into the territory of social psychology and and awareness of social processes, including the dynamics of projection.
See this interview.
His theory of morphic resonance posits that there is a kind of collective memory accessible to individuals, which can manifest as memories that seem to come from past lives. This theory sits at the intersection of science and spirituality, suggesting that phenomena often attributed to reincarnation could instead be understood through a shared, collective memory framework.
Sheldrake's approach allows for the acknowledgment and acceptance of memories of past lives without necessitating belief in reincarnation as the migration of a soul or person from one body to another across lifetimes. Instead, it suggests that individuals might "tune into" memories from the collective past, which could explain why some people have vivid, detailed recollections that seem to be from lives they never lived.
This idea finds a parallel in Buddhist teachings on rebirth, where continuity from one life to the next is not that of an individual, but rather a stream of consciousness (citta-santana) conditioned by karma. In Buddhism, there is no static self or soul that transmigrates, but a causal matrix of mental and physical conditions forms as a being, due to actions and intentions set in motion in previous lives.
I'm afraid that most respondents to "Mind" questions will divide themselves along the lines you mentioned. My personal worldview --- and mindview --- is somewhere in the middle of that Idealism---Realism range, but some critics tend to put me into whichever category best suits their high-minded position and superior/dismissive attitude.
FWIW, I recently wrote a blog post*1 on the unapologetic Idealist, Bernardo Kastrup : link below. His book is compact & concise, as he cogently argues pro-Idealism, but not necessarily anti-realism. I don't consider myself to be in either camp philosophically, but this forum will try to force you to commit to one or the other political position. :smile:
*1. How Does the Brain Create Mind?
In his book, Science Ideated, computer scientist Bernardo Kastrup argues with philosophers about the nature of the Conscious Mind.
http://bothandblog8.enformationism.info/page14.html
Note --- click where indicated by an arrow to see hidden images
Same as every other member of TPF, Jack, I expect from you what I expect from myself: good reasoning and valid arguments rather than unwarranted opinions or superstitions which are more suited for social media gossip than rational discussions. So you're just a "psychonaut" :sparkle: and not a (non-academic) philosopher?
Maybe this will interest you, Jack; maybe not ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/891620
:lol:
Quoting Gnomon
Clarify, if you can, why you believe "Idealism and Realism" are disparate conceptual positions on a continuum which are different by degrees rather than different in kind.
:up:
Though there is value in it, and I mean this respectfully, why restrict the discourse to an analysis of the present state of scholarship?
Take dogs, for instance.
Save for my deficiency in Scientific terminology and precision, is this not what our dogs are in Reality? As much as we fantasize about their human qualities. If were being honest, isnt it this? That for dogs, they are not these human-like experiences of love and desire to please, arising out of some advanced empathy, or out of any of the other qualities we superimpose upon them.
But rather, arent dogs really an organism which evolved (was bred?) to bond with humans? For them, a most-fit-for-survival-trait. And how are they driven to so bond? Is this where the love etc. comes in? No. They evolved to receive feelings of bliss when we engage in bonding, react positively toward them, and negation of bliss if our bond seems threatened.
There is no story to it but the ones we superimpose upon that natural bond with our Minds Language. Signifiers are constructed to displace what is Real. Dog wags tail and licks face: the Signifiers good boy, I love you too, displace what in reality was a triggered response to the treat, the contact, or so on.
Now folks may stubbornly reject that, but imagine you accept it, if only for safe passage to the next paragraph.
Now. Why isnt it obvious that its the same for all organisms, sentient and sophisticated ones too, including humans? Why have we, in all our millennia of mythologies and philosophies not settled upon that we are not in Gods image, endowed with an independently willful soul which must be located, but that we are only a conceited ape?
We too, in Reality, are beings driven by evolution to respond to triggers in various ways. What is real human consciousness? Aware-ing those processes, those triggers, drives, responses, organically. What is beyond that for humans, no less than for dogs, is what Mind, a system of evolved Signifiers, superimposes on those drives and responses. Signifiers become the almost exclusive triggers for organic responses, like feelings and movement; empty, fleeting images stored in memory, autonomously constructing Fiction in ways evolved over dozens of millennia, and still evolving, and displacing Reality; usurping sensation, displacing it with perception, feelings with emotions, and image-ing with ideas.
What is Mind? A layer of autonomously dynamic Signifiers displacing being with time and its Narratives. Consciousness, for Humans is displaced by that fiction. Not Real. Always, only Becoming.
What is Reality? For the humans, as for dogs, it is the Organism in its organism-ing. Always present. Being.
Arguably, the best thing that the world of comic books has ever produced is a twelve-issue series called Watchmen. In it is a character named Rorschach. We learn his origin in issue #6. He was trying to rescue a little girl who had been kidnapped. When he found the kidnappers house, he found out that the girl had been killed, butchered, and fed to the dogs. Rorschach handcuffed the man to a pipe, and set the house on fire. He left a saw with the man, but told him that hed never be able to cut through the cuffs in time. Implying that, if he wanted to live, hed have to cut his own hand off. Then he went outside to watch the scene. Here's how he describes that moment:
:up:
That is Mind. In one of its seemingly infinite possible forms of becoming. Right on.
And yet, did it occur to Moore, brilliant as "The Watchmen" is; has it really occurred to any of us, especially in this locus of history, that we, too, are just superimposed creations; not just our world, but all which we consider our selves; and, that we are not bound by our creations, be they dark or beautiful. We are not that.
We are--from the perspective of our Fiction's arrogance--that dumb lump of flesh. Not "no meaning, save what we choose to impose," just, no [place for] meaning. Life, free from our evolved, autonomous need for fabricating meaning, the thing making both dark and beautiful out of what is simply Natural, and inherently meaningless, alien to meaning.
Is the mind connected to physicality of some sort, or is it detached somehow? Some sort or somehow. Therein lies the question. There is unlikely to be a logically deduced certainty, because the raw materials - the epistemological grounds for thinking about it - are lacking. We have no foundational substrate here.
To truly understand the mind we would have to be able to create one. Or at least be able to test one out and put it through some use cases and tests and train it different ways and have control sets (scientifically speaking), and then get a better idea.
Then we would understand how the mind is physically connected to the brain, or how it is not - but how it persists anyways given a certain set of conditions. Yada yada yada .
And then we would have our answer - which would be an answer given to us as a side effect of a better and more useful goal: creating an AGI or more dangerous, depending if you believe in Asimov and the 3 (4 if you like the universal one) laws of robotics. But certainly we wouldnt need to logically understand mind before we could embark and succeed on such an adventure? Or would we? Haha
Lets talk about it more in a few thousand years . At least a few hundred as we are at zero on the progress meter for developing an AGI. Because iteratively arriving at an AGI is logically impossible. Just as answering the mind question is with logical iterations.
Until that happens this whole question seems like a blind spot.
Isn't that 'biological reductionism'?
There is a subject, philosophy of mind. I believe you referred to David Chalmer's homepage the other day, that's his main subject matter.
Yes Im aware and am looking forward to reading it. I was just setting up the potential AGI answer.
Unfacetiously, I don't know "what" my overall thinking on the matter might be labeled, if labeled it must be. But if the concept expressed in that sentence quoted sounds like biological reductionism, so be it. And if biological reductionism is somehow anathema (I don't know that it is, I'm assuming) perhaps it is redeemable with some fresh modifications. Perhaps I'm intellectually reckless. My ego prefers "open minded."
I'm not at all concerned with any universal, or objective meaning. But I'm not going to give up my own. The kind of mind humans have is, perhaps, the only thing in the universe that contemplates such things. I intend to as long as I'm able.
Hey no problems, it's a discussion forum, we're here to kick ideas around.
I have an aversion to the kind of evolutionary naturalist accounts of mind advanced by Dennett and evolutionary materialism, that we're all just gene machines acting out a survival algorithm for unconscious biological drives. But then:
Quoting ENOAH
is a pretty far-out post, really. There ways of interpreting it, but I think, here, you're kind of extrapolating the idea of biological evolution beyond its proper domain.
Quoting Pantagruel
That is an area in which German culture has an advantage of the Anglo-american. There is no equivalent term in English.
The means is enough without an end? Means can justify the end, and the end can justify the means. But the means by itself? Surely we are looking for a truthful answer here, and that is the end we want.
Just seems that this field is difficult and - not saying I know the answer either. Just that it seems an impossibility.
I hope to be proven wrong. Ill be reading all the Chalmer articles over the next while and will go through the exercise of trying to see things from his point of view. Most interesting - and what Im most looking forward to - is to find out the grounds for his points of view, as that is usually the crucial part. But that way of thinking - foundationalism - also has flaws, so Ill keep an open mind.
I sounded curt. Sorry.
Now that I quickly familiarized myself with what you meant, I already realized my presumptiousness.
What I was saying can be seen as falling in with biological reductionism.
But briefly, here is how I would say a modified or qualified BR.
1. Of course science is--within conventional terms--right that all of our experiences have at the root neurons and chemistry. There must be that fleshy infrastructure.
2. Mind isn't that fleshy infrastructure. It has evolved a "life of its own" but it is not structured by matter. It is structured by the images in memory saved by the organism to create the appropriate triggers for survival. They now operate autonomously giving "us" as in the flesh, a displacement of our organic being, with an illusion of meaning, linear narrative, etc. etc. It qualifies the BR with an existent, but empty, thing displacing the BR "stuff" with its dynamics. It is not Dualism, because Mind is empty, structured by representations, not Real.
3. Back to that fleshy infrastructure. Ironically, BR fails to do it justice. Everyone, including BR wants Mind to be real. So they just say Brain is Mind. But Mind is empty. And the Body is the locus of the real being. We look at BR and scoff at how they reduce mind to brain function. While ironically, brain functioning is our Reality. The Narrative mind is the Fiction we are inescapably attuned to.
How to define the mind? By function? By requirements? How it changes? How it works?
By function: a liver cleans the blood. The liver isnt the act of cleaning, it is the physical thing that cleans. The act of cleaning is a physical process.
A brain thinks. At least at some point a brain is necessary for thought so there is obviously some connection. But the brain isnt the act of thinking, it is the physical thing that thinks. The act of thinking is a physical process. Regardless of what more it might be.
How to get from the physical process to the mind? What logical construct makes sense to enable such a leap? It obviously happens but what can we know about it? Without knowing how that happens what does that say about the things we do know about the mind?
Perhaps, of a scant few, but Everydayman couldnt care less if he tried, unless neuroscience lowers his grocery bill.
It is probably true that many people are not interested in neuroscience in their daily lives and beliefs. It is the area of both those who are interested in psychology and philosophy mainly, which is only a certain 'minority', although it does seem that psychology is becoming one of the most popular subjects for study. It is often a choice for both self knowledge and career pathways.
Having read your post and the linked one, I would say that I am definitely in favour of reasoned arguments and that is why I read philosophy rather simply books in the 'mind, body and spirit category', which often come with a lack of rigour in thinking.
The area of reason, a priori logic, in conjunction with a posteri logic, evidence, the evidence of empiricism by Kant, is extremely complex. The difficulty may be about putting the two together, which is where speculation comes in. To argue on the basis of one's own experience in making the link is weak and may be contrasted by evidence based knowledge, but even this comes with bias and the critical role of observer in experiments and research. This is where the interpretative leanings, especially in relation to materialism and idealism come in.
I know that you don't subscribe to this clear division and are well read in the approach of substance dualism. This is one way of seeing it of various options, including non dualism and pansychism. I do have a certain amount of sympathy for panpsychism in its argument for rudimentary consciousness underlying all matter and for non dualism, as mind and matter being entwined in a complex interface. This would also go hand in hand with phenomenology, especially the role of intentionality which is at the basis of the role of human consciousness in the overall scheme of understanding.
Probably because on the one hand theres no math in it and on the other, its socially more inviting than sports analytics.
Getting back to your original question: Id rather answer it as if youd asked, What should be the outstanding issues? Im sure @Wayfarer and others may be right in describing the current dominance of reductive physicalism within academia, but fashions change.
The most important scientific questions should focus on trying to learn what consciousness is whether its a biological phenomenon exclusively, and whether some Copernican revolution will emerge in our understanding of how the mental and the physical are lawfully connected. Fascinating as this is, its not for philosophers to weigh in on.
Rather, I think the essential debate for us hasnt changed much. It was, and is, How can the subjective processes and procedures of consciousness produce things like ?ideas, ?concepts, ?meanings, ?truths? How can these interior, 1st-person-point-of-view results be given a description that does justice to what they seem to demonstrate namely, that reasons are not caused, and are not causes, in the same way that physical processes are? I reveal my biases here, of course. Many would argue that the questions are absurd, as nothing of the kind actually happens. But for those of us who think that reasons do provide justifications and, often, objective truths, our problem is to explain what we mean by this, and how it could be possible in what seems to be a causally closed physical world, a world that, in theory at least, should be completely explainable in its own terms, without recourse to esoterica like mental content.
The best philosopher I know on this subject is Thomas Nagel. Both The Last Word and The View from Nowhere lay out the case for why we cant reductively explain, e.g., logic and mathematics without running up against paradox and contradiction.
In a later post, you replied to : "what do you expect from me?". As a survivor of many of his Either/Or broadside attacks, I will presume to guess what he wants : for you to take a hard stand on one side or the other of the Mind/Matter or Soul/Body issue. He typically demands "simple" Black & White answers to complex philosophical questions. What he wants from you is true/false syllogistic logic, which requires proven premises.
But, as you implied, Psychology is not Physics ; it is a soft science, where the evidence is mostly human opinions & feelings. Likewise, Philosophy is a soft science, where even "experts" like 180 are swapping personal beliefs ; presumably, in hopes of learning to view a problem from different subjective perspectives. Socratic dialogue*1 ideally begins from the position of "know nothing" rather than know-it-all.
Since most of the "hard" (metaphysical) questions --- that have survived syllogistic reasoning for thousands of years --- are resistant to "simple" factual answers, I think it is prudent to approach them as Socrates did, from a position of self-doubt : my current belief could be wrong. Consequently, I have developed my own personal approach to hard questions that I call The BothAnd Principle*2.
Don't expect 180 to respect such "mealy-mouth" reasoning though. He will hold you to a high standard : his own "true" belief on the question in question. :cool:
Note --- Hard sciences include subjects like Physics, Math, and Chemistry, while soft sciences include topics like Sociology and Philosophy. The terms hard and soft refer to the "hard" standard of the scientific method.
*1. The Socratic Method says Reich, is better used to demonstrate complexity, difficulty, and uncertainty than to elicit facts about the world. The aim of the questioning is to probe the underlying beliefs upon which each participants statements, arguments and assumptions are built.
https://tilt.colostate.edu/the-socratic-method/
*2. The BothAnd Philosophy :
[i]*** Philosophy is the study of ideas & beliefs. Not which are right or wrong that is the province of Religion and Politics but which are closer to universal Truth. That unreachable goal can only be approximated by Reason & Consensus, which is the method of Science. In addition to ivory tower theories, applied Philosophy attempts to observe the behavior of wild ideas in their natural habitat.
*** The BothAnd philosophy is primarily Metaphysical, in that it is concerned with Ontology, Epistemology, & Cosmology. Those categories include abstract & general concepts, such as : G*D, existence, causation, Logic, Mathematics, & Forms. Unlike pragmatic scientific "facts" about the physical world, idealistic Metaphysics is a battle-ground of opinions & emotions.
*** The BothAnd principle is one of Balance, Symmetry and Proportion. It eschews the absolutist positions of Idealism vs Realism, in favor of the relative compromises of Pragmatism. The methodology is Holistic (both/and) instead of Reductive (either/or). It espouses the Practical Wisdom of the Greek philosophers, instead of the Perfect Revelations of the Hebrew Priests. The BA principle of practical wisdom requires skin in the game*3 to provide real-world feedback, which counter-balances the extremes of Idealism & Realism. That feedback establishes limits to freedom and boundaries to risk-taking. BA is a principle of Character & Virtue, viewed as Phronesis or Pragmatism, instead of Piety or Perfectionism.
*** The BA philosophy is intended to be based on empirical evidence where possible, but to incorporate reasonable speculation were necessary. As my personal philosophy, the basic principle is fleshed-out in the worldview of Enformationism, which goes out of the Real world only insofar as to establish the universal Ground of Being, and the active principle in Evolution.
*** Phronesis : an Ancient Greek word for a type of wisdom or intelligence. It is more specifically a type of wisdom relevant to practical action, implying both good judgment and excellence of character and habits, or practical virtue[/i].
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html
*3. Skin In The Game, by Nassim Nicholas Taleb; researcher in philosophical, mathematical, and (mostly) practical problems with probability. It investigates the adverse impact of having people act and make decisions without shouldering any downside if things go wrong. Philosophy, unlike War & Politics, allows people to pontificate on forums without consequences.
https://thepowermoves.com/skin-in-the-game/
I am interested by the way in which Sheldrake develops his ideas to explain past life memories. It is consistent with the understanding of past lives by some Buddhist thinkers in which there is more of an underlying continuity of past life forms as opposed to concrete entities and in line with the fluid conception of self. The mistake which some people may make in querying past lives is to think it involves the specific stream of narrative personal identity, or the ego consciousness.
The general understanding is consistent with the relationship between a person and 'other minds', including ancestors and other living people. It is likely to involve a web of system interconnections. This would link with the idea of a collective unconscious, or to choose another philosophical term, intersubjective relationships in nature. It involves the evolution of consciousness in nature.
Some people may grow up with vestiges of past lives. I read, 'Past Lives, Past Masters', by Andrew Weiss, in which he, with no previous belief in reincarnation undertook the hypnotherapy of a patient. It involved the revelation of detailed memories from past lives, leading Weiss to consider the nature of past lives seriously. He ends up concluding that it was unclear if it was based on actual lives lived by the woman and himself or the tapping into the collective unconscious.
I am not sure why the idea of the collective unconscious is rejected by so many. It is at the juncture of 'science and spirituality', as you suggest, and this may be where it seen by many as problematic. I am extremely influenced by Carl Jung's ideas, as you and others on the site may be aware. I don't know why the ideas of Jung are seen as pseudoscience because they give a more flexible idea of 'mind' than many other approaches.
Jung draws upon ideas which may be seen as 'supernatural', which was the objection of Freud, but he does also draw upon ideas of biological naturalism. The idea of the collective unconscious is neither completely biological materialism or idealism, possibly fusing them in a complex way and drawing upon the Platonic idea of archetypes. I found the writings of Anthony Stevens helpful here because he traces such ideas in relation to biology as opposed to some 'supernatural' thought.
Even the idea of the supernatural is open to critical scrutiny, as argued by the biologist, Lyall Watson, in his 'Supernature', who sees the whole approach of extrasensory perception as being problematic when seen as 'paranormal', as opposed to being about the complexity of 'minds' in nature.
I am not wishing to ignore your post previous to the one above. I am simply just going through the replies and the only reason I replied to @180 Proof's post first was because I have more regular interaction with him and it was mainly on this basis that I started the post. I see all posts as being important and do wish to pay attention to them and, besides, the thread topics are for general interaction and not simply dialogue with me.
My software of my phone makes quoting difficult but I am trying to engage fully and hope that your ideas, and everyone else's are appreciated. I will look at your initial response to me now, as I am out in a quiet space.
I have read your initial post and the one you just read, although connecting with some of the links is difficult, or sometimes is difficult to enlarge on my phone. Sometimes, this limits my own responses and I am still inclined towards 'paper books', but realise that the web is a source of so many ideas.
The distinction between hard and soft science is a particularly important area, especially in what may emerge as the 'hard problem of consciousness'. Hard is often equated with science and the understanding of the brain, especially cognitive science.
I remember once weiting in a student essay about the debate as to whether psychology is a science or art. I was inclined to the position that the emphasis upon it being science was limited because if ignores the artistry and metaphysical imagination in inherent conceptions at the core of psychology. I later did some courses which were science based in nursing and saw the limitations of psychology being seen as 'hard science, and this issue may arise in approaches to the nature of 'mind' and consciousness.
Your question above is an interesting one because it does involve the one of what constitutes a 'mind'. One interesting discussion may be Gilbert Ryle's analysis of the idea itself and he argues that it may be 'a category mistake', based on the thinking of Descartes.
The problem which I see with this is the reductive thinking which became apparent in the thinking of the pop writing of Daniell Dennett, of 'consciousness as an illusion', which may have become extremely influential in the the understanding of the nature of consciousness and 'mind'. It is extremely reductive and the issue may be that it leaves out the reflective nature of 'mind' as agency, which was also apparent in the determinist psychology of BF Skinner.
The idea of 'mind' may be seen on the basis of behaviour , but also involves inner experience. The distinction between the inner and outer may be an important one, although it is somewhat blurry at times. Also feel free to suggest what you would list as the characteristics of 'mind', which may be important at this time as human intelligence is facing the competition of artificial intelligence. Here, I would argue that the idea of intelligence is a question in the concept of mind. This involves the nature of sentience and its role in human mental and emotional states, as opposed to 'mind' as pure reasoning intelligence.
You make some important points and the issue of whether it is biological may be an important one. The primacy of biology may be so central to ideas of essentialism, including the basis of nature and nurture in thinking about free will and even ideas about what is gender. At times, the emphasis on biology may be so strong, as suggested by @Gnomon in his argument about the nature of the division between 'soft' and 'hard' science'. Mental states may be reduced to biology, which may end up with the nature of human imagination being dismissed or seen as a mere 'add on' feature in the nature of consciousness rather than imagination being seen as the an essential aspect, as realised in the numinous states of meditation and artistic creativity.
I have read Nagel' s writing on, 'The View From Nowhere', and found it helpful in thinking of the nature of awareness. It may go back to the epistemological limits of Kant, but in a more specific way. It is not possible to stand outside of consciousness in understanding. In other words, the capacity of 'mind' and the whole scope and nature of mental states may be inherent in the process of philosophical understanding. It may be asked, to what extent is self awareness, both introspection and taking on board more objective measures, essential to all philosophical understanding, even those related to the interpretation of scientific evidence and its role in human understanding?
:sweat:
As Witty says (and many others back to antiquity point out): "Philosophy is not a theory but an activity." TLP, 4.112 (i.e. NOT SCIENCE)
Instead of "I will presume to guess" (i.e. making sh*t up), Gnomon, just read what I actually wrote in reply to @Jack Cummins ...
Quoting 180 Proof
Speaking of which:
Quoting Gnomon
Clarify, if you can, why you believe "Idealism and Realism" are disparate conceptual positions on a continuum which are different by degrees rather than different in kind.
Pretending to be a scientist for a moment, my hunch is that consciousness will indeed prove to be an exclusively biological phenomenon, in the sense I originally meant. But that would have no bearing on whether the subjective products of consciousness have the objective or universal qualities that Nagel and others believe they do. That's why I think it remains a philosophical rather than a scientific question.
What is the basis of good argument and I wonder about its linguistics and grammar. One aspect which I wonder about in your writing is your use of italics and sentence breaks, as they may lead to ambiguities. I am not sure if these are intentional and about the limits of logic and language? Generally, in the understanding of the nature of understanding of 'mind', I wonder about language and its limit. Wittgenstein may have recognised the limits of language but this may be so germane in the understanding of 'mind' and consciousness' and pinning these down to logic and science...
Valid inferences, contextual relevance, clearly defined / precisely used terms, etc.
... such as Socratically provoked by this post:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/891620
I am not disputing valid inferences and terms but it is so complex, involving logic and linguistics. The complexity of this may be why a site such as this are needed when the basics and minor aspects are both important in the grasp and understanding of 'mind', including its experiential and theoretical nature.
Maybe not, you just don't bother with making pinning yourself down with "good arguments".
The whole nature of ambiguity may arise in thinking about the idea of 'mind'. It may be the very nature of ambiguity which is a problem in psychological and philosophical understanding. It may be a wish to put 'reality' and ideas into boxes, when there are so many inherent problems. I hope that in acknowledging the nature of ambiguity of this I am not seen as the antiphilospher, or, perhaps, I should stand as the antiphilospher, as seeing the problematic and blurry areas of philosophy, especially the nature of 'mind'. Each person may experience 'mind' and try to come up with valid explanatory logic, for better or worse.
I am sorry if you see me as not making 'good' arguments. I wonder what are the essentials for making 'good' arguments in relation to understanding the nature of 'mind'. Even the idea of 'good' is a value judgement, although I would presume that your idea is based more on the basis of the concept of 'truth', especially in relation to accuracy.
I am not sure to what extent each of us comes from an entirely different basis of motivation and logic. I am certainly opposed to mystification of ideas. If anything, the nature of conceptual and psychological understanding may be important. For example, I know that my own psychological issues with Christian philosophy stem from issues of sexuality. This takes it back from the philosophical issues to the psychological ones. In this respect, I see the area of psychology and philosophy as being of equal importance..I am not sure to what extent each is primary and psychology or philosophy as the key area for debate. To what extent do you see the nature of psychology or philosophy as as the foundation for thinking?
Quoting 180 ProofNot sure what you're getting at. Biology, physics, and chemistry, to name a few, are not theories.
We produce 'testable empirical theories' (i.e. explanations of how transformations of specified states-of-affairs happen) using sciences, not philosophy which, lacking any empirical means, only clarifies and re/interprets what we think we know (or mean) but frequently do not such as 'theories' (and their constitutive elements e.g. assumptions, principles, methods, formalisms, etc).
Quoting Jack Cummins
IMO, begin by deciding whether "the nature of mind" is 'natural or supernatural' and thereby following lines of philosophical inquiry and argument consistent with either the best available scientific research or the most venerable esoteric traditions. Without this decision, all one can do is confuse many issues (e.g. compare apples & onions) and generate the very "ambiguity" one's own indecisiveness generates and then blames for being "too complex". And if the initial decision (i.e. either natural or supernatural) does not cash out in the end, one has learned at least that and might start over pursuing the alternative course of reflection and inquiry; however, if both paths are cul de sacs, then one is nonetheless in good company of countless seekers who at least understand how to live within (their) cul de sacs. So what if we "fail" (S. Beckett)? Why are you seemingly so intellectually afraid to fail, Jack? To decide is, after all, the thrust of Kant's motto (borrowed from the poet Horace): Sapere Aude. :fire:
The question as to whether 'mind' is 'natural' or 'supernatural' may be of significance but the division between natural and supernatural may not be clear. I have mentioned this in relation to Lyall Watson' s critique that the concept of the 'supernatural', and whether it comes down to the paranormal or aspects of the dichotomy of sensory perception.
I do wonder to what extent spiritual and religious concepts come into play in this area of thinking. I am definitely aware of a Catholic guilt complex which spurred me into rethinking..So, I try to look.beyond the ideas of religious thinking. I certainly question the dogmatiism of religious thinking and 'souls', especially in relation to ideas of heaven and hell in the afterlife. These are so fear based.
Kant may have been confounded by the dogmatic assumptions of Christian thinking. It could be argued by the whole basis of Christianity and atheism come down to the issue of sexuality, as this may be the most pertinent area of mind and body. It is the issue underlying Kant's perspective on pleasure and duty, and t
he treatment of human beings as ends.
Ideas of the 'supenrmatual', its absence or not, and naturalism may be be dependent on philosophical assumptions, especially the debate between the metaphysical and the moral..I am far from the most traditional of thinkers, because I am open to diversity in the expression of human sexuality
You may question why I think introducing the nature of sexuality into the debate about 'mind'. The reason why I do so is because the dichotomy between body and mind in philosophy may involve 'sexuality', as a key link.
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So then decide whether 'mind is either natural or supernatural' and consistently follow the implications of that decision as far as it goes.
I notice that you highlight the word 'decide' between the idea of 'natural' and 'supernatural' and this dichotomy may be ab important area for debate. I have already spoken of the way in which Lyall Watson speaks of how some aspects of life, perception of extrasensory perception may be viewed as 'supernatural' erroneously, with the nature of perception and its extrasensory being wider.
The main basis of my own views are based on personal experience and I realise that these are limited as anecdotal evidence..
In understanding the nature of mind and consciousness, it may come down tje pros and cons of the experimental methodologies, both quantitative research and narrative description of qualitative research..
It may not be unclear as to how the dialogue between evidence based understanding and ideas of the nature of ''mind'and consciousness come into play. Ideas of consciousness and mind rest on both psychological and philosophy assumptions
.thinking of 'mind' involves psychology and philosophy, especially in relation to multidisciplinary perspectives.
. This area of rbecause the concepts and assumptions of the nature of 'mind' are of significance here. The ideas of the nature of mind and consciousness may not of significance here. How do you see the idea of intentionality as an aspect of psychology and philosophy?
For me, in psychology "intentionality" corresponds to attention¹ and in philosophy corresponds to aboutness².
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention ¹
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aboutness ²
Quoting Patterner
More than that: nature is that aspect (i.e. causal nexus) of encompassing reality, or being, from which human beings are fundamentally inseparable.
We can be separated from nature?
And in what way are we able to be separated from nature?