Mindset and approach to reading The Republic?
Hi!
If you've read The Republic, how did you approach it? Skim, read, re-read? Did you stop and ponder at every thought-provoking passage? Did you annotate it? Summarize it as you went along?
And what mindset did you have? As in, were you intimidated? Were you excited?
I'm just curious, as I'm finally gonna pick it up soon :)
If you've read The Republic, how did you approach it? Skim, read, re-read? Did you stop and ponder at every thought-provoking passage? Did you annotate it? Summarize it as you went along?
And what mindset did you have? As in, were you intimidated? Were you excited?
I'm just curious, as I'm finally gonna pick it up soon :)
Comments (32)
I suggest looking at the Republic as an analogy for the human self. Also, note your thoughts and reactions in reading it, more than trying to understand anything you think he might be telling you. Good luck.
I read it slowly a book at a time, frequently going back and rereading sections in order to trace lines of argument and make connections. I raised questions and challenges and addressed them to the text as if I was talking to Socrates.
I do not know how it might have been if I read it on my own, but I read it in class and some of us were very taken with it and continued discussing it together.
Each time I read it I find something new.
I was excited and surprised that the text challenged my thoughts so directly five decades ago.
I took notes and annotated the text densely back then, noting connections as they appeared to me. I have a different point of view from those days but still receive the benefit of that work.
So, I suggest taking notes of your problems and impressions.
I also though it interesting that you mention noting my thoughts *above* understanding. Is that because it could drag me down to try to understand every single thing at first?
Quoting Fooloso4
I'm definitely aiming for this. Also, how lucky! Reading it with people who are invested and care must have been such a treat.
You could start a reading group here, or less formally, post questions and comments as you read. You will get a lot of different answers which will lead to further discussion and disagreement.
Because of the place of information in our world, I think we bring the assumption that there is always something we are going to be told, that the goal is to find some knowledge, or that argument is meant to justify a conclusion (something you are working to understand). But Socrates is searching, and teaching/asking you to search along with him, thus the goal is in a sense self-knowledge, explicating all our judgments and criteria and practices that we mindlessly operate under without considering. Plato makes it seem like there is a solution to the questions, but no one he questions is wrong about how the world works, they just dont meet the standard he desires.
Might as well be this one.
A passage from Book 7, 517b ff. This comes directly after the Allegory of the Cave, when Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the 'ascent of the soul' which is allegorised in the allegory.
Quoting Republic Book 7 517b
I've often read in discussions of Plato on this forum that he never claims that Socrates or anyone has ever seen 'the form of the good'. Yet in this passage, and even though Socrates has said 'God knows whether it happens to be true', he nevertheless says 'anyone who is to act intelligently....must have had sight of this.' That seems an unequivocal confirmation that the form of the Good is something that 'must be seen'.
Further along, attainment of this insight is linked with a particular faculty:
Notice 'present in the soul of each person'. A cross-cultural comparison might be ventured with the 'buddha nature' of Mah?y?na Buddhism, which represents the innate capacity for enlightenment that is present in every rational sentient being, albeit obscured by 'adventitious defilements.'
The metaphor of the "whole body" turning towards the light symbolizes a comprehensive transformation that's required for the soul to achieve enlightenment. In the context of Platonic philosophy, this isn't just about shifting one's gaze or changing a single belief but involves a profound and total realignment of one's entire being encompassing ethical, spiritual, and intellectual dimensions, something akin to conversion (albeit without the fideist overtones imposed on it by later Christianity). This turning (a.k.a. 'metanoia') is necessary for the 'eye of reason', to noetically grasp the forms, which alone are real. The principle is that understanding the forms (especially the form of the good) is not just an intellectual exercise but requires a holistic transformation of the individual's character and perspective. Hence the curriculum of the Academy required education in all the arts and sciences and also in sport and athletic achievement.
The 'realm of becoming' refers to the sensible, material world around us a world of change, impermanence, and appearance. In contrast, the realm of "being" is the world of forms, which is unchanging, eternal, and true. Thus, turning "away from becoming" means shifting one's focus from the sensory world - current affairs, you might say - to the realm of forms. This turning reflects Plato's epistemological and metaphysical views that true knowledge and understanding come not from the sensory experience but from noetic insight into the forms, with the form of the good being the apex. The movement away from becoming, then, is a metaphorical journey from ignorance to knowledge, from shadows to reality, mirroring the ascent described in the Allegory of the Cave.
One way I've come to think of the forms as being more like principles, whereas I think they're often confused with shapes (in the same way that 'ousia' is often confused with what we think of as 'substance'.)
Quoting Wayfarer
Maybe that would better suit someone else. I've noticed I don't have the availability to keep up with the amount and depth of the comments that this forum generates! So I wouldn't like to take up the responsibility of a reading group here.
As to more informal and topical posts, yes! I might post one or two :)
Wow, thank you so much for posting this. I love the spirit of it, I support it, and I keep realizing I need to be reminded of it. I'm gonna make a note of this in my bookmark for The Republic, tysm!
It's a good idea to get familiar with Plato's style. His overall humour and use of simile in a humorous way, can be very entertaining. Once you become acquainted with it, it may become very enjoyable to you. You'll be wanting to read more and more of it.
Quoting Wayfarer
I think you ought to respect a difference between "the form of the good" mentioned in the quoted passage, and "the good" itself, discussed earlier in The Republic. The philosopher grasps the form of the good, in seeing that the good is the cause of all things, but does not grasp the good itself.
This can be compared to the way that Aquinas describes how we apprehend God as the cause of all things, through His effects, but we do not apprehend God directly. So, "must have had sight of this" in the quoted passage means to have grasped the logical need for this principle, the good, but it does not mean to have actually understood it in any complete way.
There is a separation between "the form of the good" which the individual philosopher's mind apprehends, and the good itself, which is separate or independent from the human being's mind. This is comparable to Kant's phenomenon/noumenon distinction. Aristotle, and some Christian theologians who follow him, develop this division as the distinction between the apparent good and the real good. When a philosopher apprehends "the form of the good", it is grasped by that philosopher's mind. As such it can only obtain to the level of an apparent good, which is the good grasped by individual minds. The "real good" remains separate and independent.
Quoting Wayfarer
The "good" which is present to the mind of each person is the apparent good. Enlightenment consists of acknowledging that there must be a real good which is separate and independent of oneself, and independent from everybody else. A moral soul will attempt to attune the good within one's self, the apparent good, to the real good, which is independent. The problem for the philosopher, and this is what makes philosophy the most difficult undertaking, is that we only have goods within ourselves, apparent goods, to serve as guidance for directing us toward the real good. We only have effects to serve as guidance to direct us toward the cause.
We can see an analogy toward the end of The Republic. The carpenter follows a 'form of bed' when constructing a bed. This is analogous to "the form of the good". It is a formula which serves as guidance to the carpenter. However, Plato describes how the carpenter must also respect the notion of an Ideal bed, this is the divine form of bed, the best possible bed. The carpenter knows that his personal 'form of bed', the formula which he follows in building a bed, is not the most perfect, ideal bed possible, it is not the divine form of bed. Nevertheless, he uses whatever means he can to make his personal 'form of bed' as close to the divine form of bed as possible, though he does not in any way actual grasp the divine form of bed.
He also says in this passage "this is how it all seems to me". Why would he say that it seems this way to him if he knows it is this way?
Quoting Wayfarer
In the Apology he says that no one is wiser than him for he knows he he does not know anything noble and good.(21d) In other words, there is no one who acts intelligently.
Quoting Wayfarer
What is it that is present? It is not, as you say, the "attainment of this insight" or an "innate capacity for enlightenment". It is the capacity to know. Rather than pursuing those things most people desire, the soul turns its attention to the truth of what is noble and good. It does this using reason.
We who have not made the ascent from the cave act intelligently, to the extent we are able, by having our sight set on the good.
Quite right.
Quoting Fooloso4
But there are different kinds of knowing, as spelled out in the Analogy of the Divided Line. And the specific kind of knowledge that characterises the Philosopher is spelled out in Book 6:
Quoting Plato, Republic, Book 6
The 'two poles of generation and decay' are contrasted against 'something of that essence which is eternal'. Again it bears comparison to Indian philosophy (with which it was in fact contemporaneous). I understand all of this sounds too 'spiritual' in today's terms. It is felt to be superseded, a sentiment belonging to a vanished past. But as I see it, the spiritual orientation of Plato's philosophy has been deprecated in modern culture, because it is, as Lloyd Gerson says, antagonistic to naturalism, which is the prevailing orthodoxy.
I know you will probably not agree, but I'm used to being in the minority in these matters.
Definitely do that, but still settle for a good translation. In philosophy, I have seen that some translations have several unintelligible parts while others render the text perfectly understandable and easy to read, it makes a big difference.
I agree, and this is what makes epistemology so difficult. Epistemologists will try to reduce all knowledge to one category, one description or definition, which could encompass all knowledge. But this creates all sorts of problems because "knowledge" in its widest sense would include all sorts of fringe forms, like the knowledge which other life forms have, and the fundamentals like genetics and DNA. These fringe forms of knowledge present us with a kind of knowledge which we don't understand, "knowledge" which is not known by the common kind of "knowledge" which human beings are observed to have and use with their conscious and intentional interactions with their environment. I'll call this the "unintelligible" knowledge because it seems to escape our capacity to understand it.
So, the epistemologists will attempt to limit their definition of "knowledge" to the kind of knowledge which human beings employ in their interactions with their environment, thereby assuming a sort of boundary or separation between this type of knowledge, and the rest of the realm of "knowledge" which consists of that unintelligible type of knowledge which they cannot properly understand, define or describe. In reality though, the epistemological form of "knowledge" is just a small part of the overall wider form of knowledge. And, since it is a part of that unintelligible type of knowledge, the unintelligible actually inheres within it, as that unintelligibility is a feature of all the vast forms of knowledge. This means that the epistemologist's attempt to describe, or define a form of "knowledge" which is specific to human beings, and does not partake in the unintelligible aspect, is a mistaken venture. That is demonstrated in Plato's Theaetetus.
So, if we take Plato's divided line analogy, we find that common knowledge, what the epistemologists want to define as "knowledge" occurs around the centre, of the line, with two distinct categories on both sides of the centre. The centre division is the what Aristotle described in his Nicomachean Ethics as the division between practical and theoretical knowledge. Knowledge of forms, theory, are on the 'upper' side of the centre divide, and application to the sensible world, practise, is on the 'lower' side. Toward each extreme we head toward the more "pure" types of each, practise and theory, and as Aristotle explained, at each end the guiding principle is intuition.
The problem with the epistemological definition of "knowledge", is that by adhering to the centre portion, it attempts to exclude intuition from "knowledge", as not a valid form of "knowledge". This neglects the fact that intuition provides the foundation at the lower end of practical knowledge, and the guiding principles, 'meta-theory' , for understanding the eternal forms at the higher end. So epistemology tends to exclude these two extremes as not properly "knowledge", being the unintelligible aspect, even though the influence of intuition permeates through all knowledge.
Here is Bloom's translation of that passage:
And Horan's:
The philosopher loves any learning that discloses or reveals something of that being which always is.
The desire (eros) to learn this is not to know it. This is not something the philosopher knows, but something the philosopher desires to know.
The first is Wallace's "Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present." The book isn't really about mysticism, at least not in the sense of being about mystical experiences and contemplation. It's instead a very good treatment of Plato's entire philosophy. You might even want to skip the review sections on modern philosophy or on Hegel, it's really the Plato chapters (most of them) that are the best. It has one of the most clear explanations of the case for the reality of the forms out there.
The second is Schindler's "Plato's Critique of Impure Reason." This is perhaps a better source just on the Republic because it has a pretty extensive review of theories on each section of the book. I'll just warn that the introduction is a little off topic, but you can skip it and come back to it without missing much. I found it interesting though.
I read this one more recently so I don't know if it will stick with me the same way, and I will say it isn't quite as clear and concise, but I did think it was quite a good treatment and it offers a lot of other viewpoints up as well.
The Teaching Company also offers some good lectures on Plato. They are ludicrously overpriced on their website but Amazon, Audible, and Wonderium have more affordable ways to listen to them. Michael Sugrue's course on the dialogues as a whole is very good, although obviously spread pretty thin.
David Roochnik also has a course just on the Republic. I thought it was good, having more time to go into detail, but it just didn't seem to pull everything together the same way.
I'll leave an except from Wallace I really like:
[Quote]
By calling what we experience with our senses less real than the Forms, Plato is not saying that what we experience with our senses is simply illusion. The reality that the Forms have more of is not simply their not being illusions. If thats not what their extra reality is, what is it? The easiest place to see how one could suppose that something that isnt an illusion, is nevertheless less real than something else, is in our experience of ourselves.
In Republic book iv, Platos examination of the different "parts of the soul leads him to the conclusion that only the rational part can integrate the soul into one, and thus make it truly just. Here is his description of the effect of a persons being governed by his rational part, and therefore just:
[I]Justice . . . is concerned with what is truly himself and his own. . . . [The person who is just] binds together [his] parts . . . and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate, and harmonious. Only then does he act. (Republic 443d-e)[/I]
Our interest here (Ill discuss the justice issue later) is that by binding together his parts and becoming entirely one, this person is truly himself. That is, as I put it in earlier chapters, a person who is governed by his rational part is real not merely as a collection of various ingredients or parts, but as himself. A person who acts purely out of appetite, without any examination of whether that appetite is for something that will actually be good, is enacting his appetite, rather than anything that can appropriately be called himself. Likewise for a person who acts purely out of anger, without examining whether the anger is justified by whats genuinely good. Whereas a person who thinks about these issues before acting becomes entirely one and acts, therefore, in a way that expresses something that can appropriately be called himself.
In this way, rational self-governance brings into being an additional kind of reality, which we might describe as more fully real than what was there before, because it integrates those parts in a way that the parts themselves are not integrated. A person who acts as one, is more real as himself than a person who merely enacts some part or parts of himself. He is present and functioning as himself, rather than just as a collection of ingredients or inputs.
We all from time to time experience periods of distraction, absence of mind, or depression, in which we arent fully present as ourselves. Considering these periods from a vantage point at which we are fully present and functioning as ourselves, we can see what Plato means by saying that some non-illusory things are more real than other non-illusory things. There are times when we ourselves are more real as ourselves than we are at other times.
Indeed, we can see nature as a whole as illustrating this issue of how fully integrated and real as itself a being can be. Plants are more integrated than rocks, in that theyre able to process nutrients and reproduce themselves, and thus theyre less at the mercy of their environment. So we could say that plants are more effectively focused on being themselves than rocks are, and in that sense theyre more real as themselves. Rocks may be less vulnerable than plants are, but whats the use of invulnerability if whats invulnerable isnt you?
Animals, in turn, are more integrated than plants are, in that animals senses allow them to learn about their environment and navigate through it in ways that plants cant. So animals are still more effectively focused on being themselves than plants are, and thus more real as themselves.
Humans, in turn, can be more effectively focused on being themselves than many animals are, insofar as humans can determine for themselves whats good, rather than having this be determined for them by their genetic heritage and their environment. Nutrition and reproduction, motility and sensation, and a thinking pursuit of the Good each bring into being a more intensive reality as oneself than is present without them.12
Now, what all of this has to do with the Forms and their supposedly greater reality than our sense experience is that its by virtue of its pursuit of knowledge of whats really good, that the rational part of the soul distinguishes itself from the souls appetites and anger and so forth. The Form of the Good is the embodiment of whats really good. So pursuing knowledge of the Form of the Good is what enables the rational part of the soul to govern us, and thus makes us fully present, fully real, as ourselves. In this way, the Form of the Good is a precondition of our being fully real, as ourselves.
But presumably something thats a precondition of our being fully real must be at least as real as we are when we are fully real. Its at least as real as we are, because we cant deny its reality without denying our own functioning as creatures who are guided by it or are trying to be guided by it.13 And since its at least as real as we are, its more (fully) real than the material things that arent guided by it and thus arent real as themselves.
[b]
Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present - Robert M. Wallace
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This idea of freedom as self-determination and of the intellect being able to unify the person and make them most fully themselves ends up playing a big role in Aristotle (Book X of the Ethics), Boethius (the Consolation), St. Augustine, and St. Aquinas' view of the human food in the Summa Contra Gentiles, although they all develop it in novel ways. Aquinas and Hegel also expand it into discussions of essence and the intelligibilities of things in a very interesting way.
Or, if the idea of the Platonic ascent really strikes you fancy when you get to the cave, check out St. Augustine's "beatific vision" with St. Monica in Book IX of Confessions.
When I first read it, I was thinking it wouldnt live up to the hype. But I was wrong it really is important. It shouldnt be intimidating, but I can understand why it would be, given again the way its been built up.
Ive re-read it a few times and I also remember liking Will Durants synopsis of it. Happy reading!
It's worth considering how the description of the polis is framed originally as a means of describing how justice improves the self-governing soul.
Hegel's Philosophy of Right is an interesting continuation of many of the themes in The Republic, but it gets at the social level, the need for an organic self-determining consensus, in a better way.
Of course Hegel gets accused of being a totalitarian too, but I don't think this is really a proper reading. He is more just a fatalist who hadn't quite grasped the role advocacy organizations play in society, probably because they really didn't exist yet in his day.
It can be seen, but not demonstrated. That's Schindler's thesis anyhow. In each of the three images Socrates creates in the middle of the Republic something has to come from outside the image to introduce the absolute. E.g., in the divided line, the absolute (Good) cannot lie on the line because the absolute contains both appearances and reality what is good relative to other things and what is good in itself. In the cave analogy, it is Socrates himself who interjects and "comes in from outside."
This points to the historic Socrates, the man who lived a good life trying to help others, who was willing eschew wealth and comforts for the Good, and who ultimately died to demonstrate it. At the center of the Republic then is not a mere demonstration or argument, but an act, the act of the good man who must decend back into the cave because the absolute includes everything, including those trapped in the cave, even if it means suffering and death.
The nod to the historic Socrates [I]is[/I] the answer to Galucon's earlier demand that the Socrates of the dialogue demonstrate how it can be the we would prefer to be the just man who is ridiculed and punished instead of the unjust man who is praised and rewarded. He can direct us to the summum bonum but he can't dissect it and demonstrate its goodness without losing something, rather the "whole body," of the reader must be turned to it.
In Plato, there is a transcedent reaching out to things known, unlike Aristotle's conception of the mind coming to "be like" that which it knows. But I don't think they're really that different. Plato's framing has the benefit of showing how the quest for knowledge and the good allows us to reach past what we currently are, whereas Aristotle's has the benefit of showing how it transforms is internally.
I think overall, Plato is more optimistic about making this move. Aristotle has a similar goal in Book X of the Ethics, but it's less clear if man, hoping to "become like what is most divine," can ever reach that goal, which is why Aquinas has to add infused contemplation/grace into the equation in his commentary on the Ethics to allow the human being to actually achieve happiness in the beatific vision.
Augustine's expressionist semiotics is helpful here too. Signs can only direct our attention to the immutable. The grasp of it lies outside all signs, just as a proper grasp of a geometric proof lies outside any of the drawings used to direct one to understanding it.
What I get from this, is that this is something that can only be known first-person, as it were. Not that its personal in any sense, but (as Buddhists say) only knowable by the wise. The wise are like finely-tuned instruments which can detect what others do not. But then of course to those who dont know it, it might well sound like moonshine, as Socrates also says.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Through a glass, darkly is the Biblical expression. In the Christian faith, it is something that is only seen on the other side of death, although in the Christian mystics, death might be understood symbolically as representing the death of self. All of which belongs to another age of mankind altogether.
The Phaedrus is also helpful here in the "love" is normally excluded from the analytical frame in a way moral goodness is not (at least not from the Enlightenment on, where it increasingly becomes something that must be "demonstrable to all rational agents."). We generally don't demand that people explain "being in love" in stark, analytical terms, or even allow that such can be given an adequate description.
The Phaedrus starts out with the terrible speech, laying out a sort of cold, analytical love based on rational self-interest because this is a relative sort of love defined in terms of relative goods. The love of the last speech is instead ecstatic, the lover of absolute beauty is in a way "out of their mind," but at the same time has a firmer noetic grasp on beauty than the analytical lover who sees beauty in relative terms. "Genuine love, by contrast, cannot be explained exhaustively, which means that it cannot be situated in any manifest way relative to self-interest, precisely because it has an absolute character, or, rather, because it represents the relation to an absolute object." (Schindler's Plato's Critique of Impure Reason)
This reminds me of how Plato describes the philosopher as wanting to couple/mate with the Good in the Republic. There is a going beyond the self and participation-in.
Being is love with Absolute Beauty starts to look a lot like being in love with Absolute Good though. Normally, the Doctrine of Transcendentals (the communicability of Good, True, Beauty, and Unity) is identified in its earliest form in Aristotle, but it seems to also be in Plato to some degree too.
In the Symposium Socrates says:
At first it may seem that this contradicts what he says in the Apology where he claims to know nothing beautiful and good (21d). But eros is a desire for something one does not possess. Socrates knows the desire to be wise. This is a kind of self-knowledge. Eros is a kind of madness. The highest kind, according to Socrates in the Phaedrus, is love of the beautiful. About which Socrates makes a beautiful speech.
Toward the end of the dialogue Socrates says:
(278b)
With regard to those who make such speeches he says:
(278d)
Divine madness does not lead to knowledge of the beautiful or good. It inspires does not not result in what the philosopher loves, wisdom.
The Phaedrus is a play of opposites, of things that pull us in opposite directions. For the philosopher the pull of divine madness is opposed by reason and moderation, which finds its own extreme in the asceticism of the Phaedo. In the Symposium, this plays out differently. Some of the participants are suffering from a hangover and so the usual drinking competition is replaced by the more sober competition of speeches about eros.
As Plato has Socrates tell us in the Phaedrus:
(277e)
Some exegetical points:
Nature of the Higher Realm: Plato describes a transcendent realm that is "colourless, utterly formless, intangible" and accessible only to true knowledge (epist?m?). This description emphasizes the abstract and non-physical nature of the One beyond being and non-being. In this metaphysical domain, the only faculty capable of perceiving this is reason (nous). Plato often characterises reason as the pilot or charioteer of the soul, guiding it towards true knowledge. This underscores the idea that reason, rather than sensory perception, is what allows the soul to apprehend the true nature of reality.
Souls Nourishment and Delight: The passage suggests that a soul that engages with its proper objects of contemplationtrue and unchanging knowledgereceives nourishment and delight. This engagement involves a direct encounter with the Forms, such as Justice, Temperance (sound-mindedness), and Knowledge itself. For Plato, this intellectual nourishment is vital for the well-being of the soul, elevating it beyond the transient and imperfect physical world.
The Concept of Revolution: The "revolution" likely refers to the cyclical journey of the soul as it moves through the higher realms and back to the material world. This cyclic motion is a recurring theme in Plato's work, reflecting the soul's eternal quest for knowledge and its periodic engagement with the world of Forms. Also reflects the 'myth of the eternal return' which characterised the archaic Indo-European mythology. (c.f. Mircea Eliade)
Knowledge and Being: Plato makes a distinction between the knowledge of things that "become" (the sensory and changing) and the knowledge of "what is" (the "always so"). The former is seen as inferior because it is subject to change and decay, unlike the latter.
Descent of the Soul: After feasting upon the truths of the higher realm, the soul descends "into the inner heaven" and returns to the mundane world. However, this is not merely a return to ignorance; the soul retains a higher understanding acquired from its communion with the Forms. This journey reflects the dual nature of the Platonic soul, caught between the world of eternal Forms and the physical world. (Hence the logic of anamnesis - the soul recalling what it has learned but forgotten in the descent into birth.)
Ambrosia and Nectar: The reference to ambrosia and nectar, foods of the gods in Greek mythology, symbolizes the divine and immortal nature of the nourishment that the soul receives from its engagement with the Forms. This not only sustains the soul but also prepares it for its continuous cycle of rebirths and intellectual engagements. 'Nectar' is related to the Sanskrit 'am?ta' which means literally un (a-) dying (m?ta, the indo-european root of 'mortal' and also 'murder') and which is often translated as 'the nectar of immortality'.
The logic of "being and non-being", represents the discrete nature of the reality of "now". At each moment as time passes, there is a true representation of what is and what is not at that precise moment. Since this is a static form, a true "what is" at each precise moment in time, it transcends the sensory realm of what we know as the physical world. Sensory perception gives us a projection of continuous activity, rather than discrete moments of "what is". It is only reason which can lead us beyond the illusion of temporal continuity which our material bodies present our conscious minds with, through the unreliable, and deceptive, sense organs.
This is the way out of Plato's cave. If you study Augustine, you'll see that he takes up this position very strongly. The importance of "the free will", is the strength of will power. The free will allows us to separate ourselves from the temporal world of sensory diversions, to focus on the eternal principles, "being and non-being", and the true nature of reality.