Wondering about inverted qualia

But surely if they had different labels, they would learn after a while that they were not talking about the same things and they would end up changing their language use?

Edit: or maybe that was your point!?

Quoting Matripsa

So positing an "inversion" of color qualia may not actually establish a difference in phenomenal experience - it may just be describing a difference in linguistic labeling habits. In the end, it may not even make sense to talk about "experiencing the qualia of red"

I agree. But if receiving a certain exact wavelength (termed Red, rather than the valence of it's presentation to an S being termed Red) causes a different phenomenal experience in two individuals who do not differ in their hardware (colour-blindness) then I think the argument is still live.

As it seems Apustimelogist below (above - I was still typing when he commented) has noted, it's not as if this wouldn't, from their perspective, mean one is 'right' and in line with the experience of those others without a physical aberration, and one is 'wrong' in the same way. This would mean the language would respond to the scenario, rather htan the other way around, over time. I think this is true, and why we have a very specific idea of Red globally.

However, I think this speaks to a point that will get very quickly political:

There are objective facts about colour. They are constructed, linguistically, but that to which they refer is objectively xxxHz or some such designation which is independent of experience or observation (it is hte same observation, however it is noted by the S observing it - the langauge is not important to this element).

Do we rely on these objective 'core' facts of perceivable objects to denote when, and where someone has deviated from the 'norm'?
I think its the only sensible way to deal with data. Others don't, and it gets aggressive quick. Apparently, noting that someone failed in being on-time, chronologically, is bigoted.

Quoting Matripsa

Unlike other sensory modalities, our experience of color is deeply intertwined with linguistic labeling practices from the start.

Quoting Matripsa

we may just be experiencing the qualia of what is agreed upon or linguistically coded to be "red" within a particular cultural/linguistic framework.

I agree with this observation, and, for me, the query goes further. Although I acknowledge that my explorations on this topic are not conventional.

I wonder whether or not other examples raised in the "qualia" argument against physicalism might be subjected to the scrutiny, that,
1. our experience of most things (i.e., not just color) are "deeply intertwined with linguistic labeling practices from the start." AND,
2. [For me] the coding is significant, not just within a particular culture, but universally. AND THEREFORE, [here is where I really deviate from both convention, and even your point]
3. Almost all of our sensory "experiences," which i will call perception to differentiate from unobscured sensation, has ineluctably been mediated by such "coding." Red is Red for everyone and any variations of that experience are relatively not significant enough to argue subjects are isolated from one another.


Edit: to clarify further, I'm saying we see "red" because we have made "clor" and "red" signifiers accepted by convention etc. Who knows what these are to organic sensation free of the mediation of perception?

Quoting AmadeusD

But if receiving a certain exact wavelength (termed Red, rather than the valence of it's presentation to an S being termed Red) causes a different phenomenal experience in two individuals who do not differ in their hardware (colour-blindness) then I think the argument is still live.

Everyone differs in their hardware. Color-blindness is just one sort of variation.

Reply to wonderer1 this is true, yet doesn’t change my point.
Our hardware obviously all differs - but in ways which do not appear relevant to this case. In other cases, other differences may be relevant. I suppose you could convert this concept into that the hardware is doing the same thing, rather than is some fuzzy version of physically close-enoigh (as I wrongly intimated in the above quoted passage )

Quoting Matripsa

... qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties ...

So what accounts for "qualia" other, or more efficacious, than "physical/functional properties"?

Reply to 180 Proof I could just say "non-physical properties" and that's a complete answer but I think that avoids the issue. Qualia are experienced as non-physical.

Quoting AmadeusD

Qualia are experienced as non-physical.

:roll:

Reply to 180 Proof You'd be a lot cooler if you weren't too cool.

Ah well. Horse to water and all..

Reply to AmadeusD :yawn:

Quoting AmadeusD

Qualia are experienced as non-physical.

Is anything we experince non-physical? Can we demonstrate there is anything outside of brain states, physical processes? Asking for a friend.

Reply to 180 Proof It strikes me as bizarre that you're not aware not responding is better for both of us at this point.

Parfit would be disappointed :snicker: Ah well. I'm here to talk philosophy. Do whatever you want i guess.

Quoting Tom Storm

Is anything we experince non-physical? Can we demonstrate there is anything outside of brain states, physical processes? Asking for a friend.

I don't really understand the question. The entire point is that we cannot demonstrate the physical-ness(sorry, there's not a better word I know) of certain things such as memories (no, nothing in neuroscience changes this position at the current time) or desires. They are non-physical properties of experience, even if there is a correlated brain-state. This does not demonstrate that the experience is physical. It is patent that some experiences at non-physical. A change of opinion. Being awake/being asleep (in the phenomenal aspect).

That is, unless you take the entirety of phenomenal experience as an evolutionarily-required post-hoc sense-making program. This seems wrong to me on plenty of levels but it does seem plausible, for sure. IF that were the case, I'd be able to take your inference fully. It seems obviously that if this is hte case, the only possible information is physical states to inform the 'sense making' apparatus/i. Given I find issue with the theory i unfortunately cannot take that as sound.

Quoting AmadeusD

They are non-physical properties of experience, even if there is a correlated brain-state. This does not demonstrate that the experience is physical.

But are you satisfied that it demonstrates the experience is non-physical? How would we demonstrate that conscious experience reflects a non-physical reality? Isn't it an inference based on a lack of data or knowledge?

Quoting AmadeusD

That is, unless you take the entirety of phenomenal experience as an evolutionarily-required post-hoc sense-making program

Perhaps that is the case. I have no idea, I'm not an expert on the nature of consciousness.

Anyway - all that aside - what is your explanation of consciousness? Are you a dualist, or more of an embodied cognition guy?

Quoting AmadeusD

Ah well. I'm here to talk philosophy.

:gasp:

Quoting Matripsa

So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. Anyway, not sure where to go with that, I just wanted to show that our experience of color is inherently intertwined with language and it should somehow be a part of the argument or at least mentioned.
Anyway, I'm certainly no expert,

You sound like an expert, deep in the cave, unafraid of the light and the dark - welcome to the forum!

The concept of the qualia of experience is a great one. It makes an object of the purely subjective. Once we start talking about this as an object though, we lose the qualia to stumble through our languages. And we get all of the problems of labels.

There is no way to learn whether Mark was right or wrong to say “green” to describe the qualia of Mark’s own experience. Only Mark can know this. That’s why qualia is such a great concept - it is the “only Mark’s space” in the universe. You would have to be Mark to even know what word to say or judge the sense in saying anything like green.

Objectifying qualia is like saying “I am”. It turns something pre-linguistic, or extra-linguistic, or something that needs no words, into words, and the non-linguistic qualia is then lost to the distraction of its re-representation in text.

Qualia is better analyzed by a poet, or novelist, or shown in a painting. We scientific thinkers and philosophers stink at it. We come up with examples like “green” versus “red” and we think we might hit home on some nuance between qualia and language.

But whether qualia are physical (like feelings and sensations) or immaterial (like experiencing personified in the subject), I’m no expert either.

I guess I lean towards qualia being the union of the physical and the non-physical. Qualia unifies the physical senses with the reflective subject. Qualia is the experience of something coming to be, the experience of becoming, while it is the experience of something that already is, at the same time, in a subject, like Mark. Like Alice.

Quoting Matripsa

In one of my recent classes, we discussed the famous "inverted qualia" argument against physicalism about consciousness. For those unfamiliar, it posits a scenario where two individuals (Alice and Mark) have qualitative experiences that are systematically inverted relative to each other (e.g. what feels like "red" to Alice feels like "green" to Mark), despite being physical/functional duplicates.

I wouldn't call it an argument against physicalism, just a fun thought experiment. Physicalism would simply point out that they see different colors by subjective experience due to physical differences in their brains. Its a much greater leap of belief to assume you can get a completely different outcome from an identical physical process.

Quoting Matripsa

So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience.

Sure, this seems very possible in theory. One thing that helps with discussions like this is to find something objective that doesn't change despite a person's experience. The color 'red' objectively is a wavelength of light. How our brains process and produce the interpretation of that wavelength could very well differ. We already know this is possible through color blindness.

So if there can be different ways people interpret the wavelength, its very plausible that some people have a different qualitative experience of your interpretation of 'red'.

Quoting 180 Proof

So what accounts for "qualia" other, or more efficacious, than "physical/functional properties"?

Consciousness

Reply to bert1 How so?

Reply to Matripsa

I like your objection. It’s a nice thrust at the inverted spectrum argument, but it would be easier to say the argument itself is conceptually inconceivable, like p-zombies.

Quoting Matripsa

This is meant to show that qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties, as Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical states are identical by premise.

Seems like it assumes the thing it's meant to prove. Seems circular to me.

Quoting Tom Storm

But are you satisfied that it demonstrates the experience is non-physical? How would we demonstrate that conscious experience reflects a non-physical reality? Isn't it an inference based on a lack of data or knowledge?

You're essentially asserting a no true scotsman here(which i note you do acknowledge at the end of this passage by suggestion). The only way I could agree with you, is if I believed that it was always likely further discovery would invalidate my current position[/i]. While this is obviously nominally true, It cannot be the case that an open-ended "well something is likely prove it wrong, sometime, somewhere, for some reason" is a valid argument, or defeater. It is self-effacing speculation.
It would be true for all but modal claims. Is that the case? Or can we - demonstrate - that certain things are almost certain, despite further discovery clearly being able to debunk that position?
I do not find that an appealing concept, or a valid way to approach claims. I believe we can demonstrate that something is not the case, only. I think this has been done, in the terms I've set out.

Quoting Tom Storm

what is your explanation of consciousness?

It seems clearly non-physical, to me. Otherwise, I don't think anyone saying they have a clue is being honest with themselves so i largely refrain from even speculating.

Quoting flannel jesus

This is meant to show that qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties, as Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical states are identical by premise.
— Matripsa

Seems like it assumes the thing it's meant to prove. Seems circular to me.

Then i think you missed the bolded word.

Reply to AmadeusD Unfortunately I'm still not seeing what you apparently intend for me to see. The word "as" doesn't help me understand how the thought experiment isn't assuming the very thing it supposedly demonstrates

Reply to flannel jesus Fair enough.

Well, the way i'm reading it we have two distinct things 'in action':

1) Quoting Matripsa

qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties

2) Quoting Matripsa

Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical statesare identical

I understand that you read them as the same thing, and I can see why. I have, by way of formatting, linked the concepts I think need to be linked (and, by inference, that the two types of format (referring to the passages highlighted by each type of formatting) are not linked).

This is because 1. is a claim and 2. is exemplar. That is how supporting a claims works (not being facetious). IN this case, the two sentences seem very similar but their tenses and meanings are very different. "as" puts the latter into the empirical box (at least, on M's account) and the former into the conceptual box.

It is the specific, empirical instance in 2) of the concept discussed in 1) which gives rise to supporting the claim made about the concept in 1).

I happen to agree, so it's possible im reaching a bit but I'm having no trouble explaining this so i don't get the feeling i am reaching.

Quoting 180 Proof

How so?

I take 'quale' to be another (somewhat unhelpful) word for an experience. An experience has two defining ingredients, consciousness and content. The content part is indeed explained (or perhaps better to say described) by physical/functional properties. The consciousness ingredient is not explicable (or describable) by physical and functional properties, and on that I know we disagree. Consciousness has no internal structure and function that is further explicable. It is its own explanation.

Reply to AmadeusD To me, it just seems like they're saying:

"Consider these people we've imagined, alice and bob. They have the same physical states, but experience different things. Imagining this thing proves that people who have the same physical states can experience different things."

I don't think a thought experiment like that actually proves anything.

Reply to flannel jesus You've just said it proves that people with the same physical states can experience different things. Which is, indeed, the point being got-across in my view (and again, one with which I agree so perhaps I'm being a soft touch).

I do not see anything wrong with your passage being (rightly, a rehash of the quoted from M) totally sound.

If the claim is that the above isn't possible on account of experience being identical physical states, then we're good. You've shown it to be false (assuming you accept the above - but i figure that's what you're trying to ascertain - what does someone who accepts that read into it)

Quoting AmadeusD

I do not see anything wrong with your passage being (rightly, a rehash of the quoted from M) totally sound.

I do. You can prove just about ANYTHING like that. "Imagine we live in a world where . This proves we live in a world where ."

It's not a generally agreeable form of argument in my estimation.

Quoting AmadeusD

You're essentially asserting a no true scotsman here

How so? I'm saying it could be more 'a woo of the gaps' situation, or a fallacy from ignorance, perhaps?

Quoting AmadeusD

While this is obviously nominally true, It cannot be the case that an open-ended "well something is likely prove it wrong, sometime, somewhere, for some reason" is a valid argument, or defeater. It is self-effacing speculation.

Who says it is open ended? It might seem that way to you now, but who knows? Actually I am open to the postion of mysterianism which argues we may never know. Open ended ignorance also seems possible.

Quoting AmadeusD

Or can we - demonstrate - that certain things are almost certain, despite further discovery clearly being able to debunk that position?

Well, it is the case that science provides reliable but tentative models which are regularly the subject of revision, so there's a sense in which we never arrive at absolute truth.

Quoting AmadeusD

Otherwise, I don't think anyone saying they have a clue is being honest with themselves so i largely refrain from even speculating.

I'd can't say either way, although I am skeptical that there is such a phenomenon as the non-physical (apart from concepts). 'Seems' like it isn't enough for me.

Reply to flannel jesus I do. You can prove just about ANYTHING like that. "Imagine we live in a world where . This proves we live in a world where .Quoting flannel jesus

As far as I can tell, this is a rather ungenerous way of reading hte passage, but one i understand.

It wasn't suggested that the thought proves the empirical. The point is that if we could show that disparate phenomenal experience can arise from identical brain states, then this would defeat physicalism as currently thought about. It seems to me reasonable that this is a live argument that will probably survive most attacks, given we cannot show one way or the other. As noted elsewhere, no two people have 1:1 Hardware to bear this out. Which is why it's a thought experiment, I would think.

But, i concede, it is not irrational to just say "yeah, well, so?" but its meaningful to me.

[quote="Tom Storm;894125"]How so? I

At risk of sounding like a dick, I did quite lengthily do this in the post you quoted.

Quoting AmadeusD

While this is obviously nominally true, It cannot be the case that an open-ended "well something is likely prove it wrong, sometime, somewhere, for some reason" is a valid argument, or defeater. It is self-effacing speculation.

(we will need to tease apart some things here, because you've quoted large parts of that explanation)

Quoting Tom Storm

Who says it is open ended?

Quoting Tom Storm

but who knows?

Oh my guy, come on now.

Quoting Tom Storm

Open ended ignorance also seems possible.

For sure. But my pressure, such as it was, was trying to get you to commit to this as it would require you to basically claim ignorance on everything.

Quoting Tom Storm

Well, it is the case that science provides reliable but tentative models which are regularly the subject of revision, so there's a sense in which we never arrive at absolute truth.

For sure, but again, would you commit to the above?

Quoting Tom Storm

non-physical (apart from concepts).

Seems like a plain contradiction to me ;)

Quoting flannel jesus

Sure.

Nice.

Quoting Michael

That's not how the thought experiment goes.

Not sure that's a reasonable response.

Quoting flannel jesus

The point is that if we could show that disparate phenomenal experience can arise from identical brain states, then this would defeat physicalism as currently thought about.

Yes, that's absolutely the case! And absolutely not how it looked like it was being presented to me.

IF we lived in a world where Alice and Bob had the same brain states and processes, but were experiecing different things, THEN some aspect of experience is outside of physical brain states / processes. Sure.

We don't live in a world where we have proved the first part of that IF, so we cannot safely conclude the consequent is true.

Reply to Matripsa



The claim is that if it's conceivable that Mark and Alice have no relevant physical differences and yet see different colours despite looking at the same object then colours are non-physical.

And just for fun let's carry on from this and assume that the box in question reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm. If we show the above image to Mark and Alice then this is what they will see:




Both Mark and Alice will agree that the left hand side of the image shows the colour of the box as seen in real life (named "gred" in their language), although Alice will disagree with the right hand side being labelled "Alice's POV".

First of all, does it make sense to speak of shared sensations?

If the answer to that question is deemed to be negative, then inverted-qualia arguments cannot get off the ground, but in which case aren't necessary for refuting physicalism, for a negative answer to the former question would imply that the set of "Alice's sensations" is both disjoint from, and unrelated to, the set of "Bob's sensations", however they might be labelled. But then again physicalism cannot also get off the ground, since physical concepts are "shareable" by definition.

Recall Frege's semantic distinctions of sense (referring to a term's public usage), reference (referring to what if anything a term signifies) and ideas (referring to a term's private aesthetic meaning that varies from person to person). Then ask if a sensation is shareable in any of those above semantic aspects.

Obviously, Fregean ideas aren't shared by definition, so if by "sensations" we mean the Fregean ideas that each of us subjectively intuits about word meaning, then we can refer to our previous analysis and conclude that that the concept of inverted-qualia is nonsensical.

But if by "shared sensations" we are referring only to Fregean sense (which the word itself might suggest), then we are only referring to the shared public usage of the term "sensation". in which case "inverted qualia" could mean something like when two subjects react equally and oppositely to the same stimulus - a meaning which actually amounts to a physical definition of "inverted qualia", even if the concept says nothing about any underlying Fregean senses that will typically be assumed to exist regardless of the physical concept's silence on the matter. In fact, the very meaning of a "physical concept" might be interpreted to mean a concept that is by definition invariant to the Fregean ideas that individuals privately associate with the concept, in contrast to aesthetic concepts whose definitions are allowed to vary among language users in line with their unique Fregean ideas that they each associate with their shared terminology.

Lastly, the common-sense of naive realism and the classical psychology of perception might lead us to consider "sensations" as lacking any Fregean referents. Indeed, we tend to speak of an object as "looking red to an individual" but not as being red per-se. However, the later Wittgenstein remarked that different types of sensation vary as to the degree that the subject of the sensation attributes the sensation to himself versus the object of his perception. In Wittgenstein's example of a green stinging nettle, he points out that we will tend to refer to the nettle as possessing "green leaf patches" but not as possessing "painful leaf patches", and seemed to imply that the degree to which a sensation-type is attributed to the object of perception was determined by the Fregean sense of the sensation type.

Quoting sime

First of all, does it make sense to speak of shared sensations?

Possibly shared type, but not shared token.

Reply to sime Also I don't think language is at all relevant and is in fact a red herring. Presumably deaf, illiterate mutes who aren't blind can see colours.

It's possible that the colour that one deaf, illiterate mute sees some object to be isn't the colour that some other deaf, illiterate mute sees the object to be.

With respect to physicalism, the question is whether or not this difference in colour perception requires differences in biology, and with respect to naive realism, the question is whether or not one of them is seeing the "correct" colour (in the sense that that colour is a mind-independent property of the object).

Quoting sime

If the answer to that question is deemed to be negative, then inverted-qualia arguments cannot get off the ground

Huh? Why? Inverted qualia arguments are specifically about different S experiencing different things. The degree of difference is what seems to defeat certain theories.

Quoting AmadeusD

For sure. But my pressure, such as it was, was trying to get you to commit to this as it would require you to basically claim ignorance on everything.

I do claim ignorance of many subjects - origin of the universe, idealism, gods, consciousness - 'I don't know' seems reasonable to me. Pretty sure no one on this site knows either.

But this;

Quoting AmadeusD

Who says it is open ended?
— Tom Storm

but who knows?
— Tom Storm

Oh my guy, come on now.

-referred to two different ideas, so shoving them together seems unfair.

Back to my question, however.

Is your position not a case of a fallacy from ignorance? It may not be, but it seems so. Are you not essentially saying, 'I can't explain consciousness via physicalism, so it must be non-physical.'? Are you a dualist?

Quoting AmadeusD

non-physical (apart from concepts).
— Tom Storm

Seems like a plain contradiction to me ;)

Fair enough.

Quoting Tom Storm

I do claim ignorance of many subjects - origin of the universe, idealism, gods, consciousness - 'I don't know' seems reasonable to me. Pretty sure no one on this site knows either.

This is equivocal, though. Is it hte case that you don't know anything, or that you don\t know some things?

Quoting Tom Storm

Who saysit is open ended? It might seem that way to you now, but who knows?

Quoting Tom Storm

referred to two different ideas,

Oh, no you don't. Hehe.

Quoting Tom Storm

Is your position not a case of a fallacy from ignorance?

It's not really a case of anything. Intuitively, like 90% of people, I feel as if there are non-physical properties to my experience (and the world). I have never seen an adequate explanation of how many things are physical. I have no reason to commit to either, but I have plenty of reason to lean against physicalism, as it is. Its mild. Possibly insignificant.

Quoting AmadeusD

It's not really a case of anything. Intuitively, like 90% of people, I feel as if there are non-physical properties to my experience (and the world). I have never seen an adequate explanation of how many things are physical. I have no reason to commit to either, but I have plenty of reason to lean against physicalism, as it is. Its mild. Possibly insignificant.

Ok. That's reasonable.


Quoting AmadeusD

Who saysit is open ended? It might seem that way to you now, but who knows?
— Tom Storm

referred to two different ideas,
— Tom Storm

Oh, no you don't. Hehe.

Oops, you're right. I misread my own comments. Apologies. But can't I say that something might seem open ended now but who knows, in time it might not be?

Quoting AmadeusD

Huh? Why? Inverted qualia arguments are specifically about different S experiencing different things. The degree of difference is what seems to defeat certain theories.

Fregean ideas are necessarily perspectival, whereas the public meaning of Fregean sense is a-perspectival. So if by "qualia" you mean to refer to your first-person perspective constituted by your Fregean ideas, then what criteria of comparison to you propose to use to relate your lived and actual qualia with what you abstractly conceive and hypothesize to be my experiences? How could scientific analysis which is deliberately restricted to propositions stated only up to the third person, be of any help here?

On the other hand if by "qualia" you are in some sense referring to both of our experiences, then I presume you are no longer referring either to your actual first-personal experiences or to mine, but to some abstract concept. Which is the starting point of any behavioural, functional or computational third-personal analysis of "shared sensations" "sensation similarity" and so on, whether in type or in token.

Quoting Michael

Also I don't think language is at all relevant and is in fact a red herring. Presumably deaf, illiterate mutes who aren't blind can see colours.

Semantics is relevant, due to the aforementioned ambiguity as to what is being referred to when speaking of qualia. In these sorts of discussions, it is often implicitly assumed by participants that "qualia" is meant in some Fregean sense. Which does indeed permit the sort of abstract functional and behavioural analysis that you propose in terms of type-token distinctions and similarity criteria, but which also forgets the reason why "qualia" were included in philosophical parlance in first-place - as a means of bridging the subjective private understanding and use of language in the first person, with the use of physical concepts that speak only in terms of abstract definitions stated in the third-person.


Quoting Michael

With respect to physicalism, the question is whether or not this difference in colour perception requires differences in biology, and with respect to naive realism, the question is whether or not one of them is seeing the "correct" colour (in the sense that that colour is a mind-independent property of the object).

Yes, I am in agreement there, although I would say that the question you mention is with regards to the physical analysis of perception, rather than a philosophical analysis of perception which less constrained than physical analysis, since the latter analysis is free to define concepts in relation to Fregean Ideas, which isn't possible in an aperspectival physical analysis.

IMO, when eliminative materialists speak of "consciousness not existing", I interpret them to mean (whether they agree with my interpretation or not), that physical analysis is by definition restricted to the analysis of cognition and perception in terms of Frege's notions of sense and reference which constitute the meaning of "objectivity", but which does not include the meaning of "subjectivity" that refers to the unshareable Fregean ideas that modern philosophers often refer to as "qualia".

Quoting Matripsa

So positing an "inversion" of color qualia may not actually establish a difference in phenomenal experience - it may just be describing a difference in linguistic labeling habits. In the end, it may not even make sense to talk about "experiencing the qualia of red" as if there is some objective, mind-independent property that fixes what "red" refers to. Rather, we may just be experiencing the qualia of what is agreed upon or linguistically coded to be "red" within a particular cultural/linguistic framework. The very notion of inverting an experience of "redness" might be incoherent without that shared linguistic coordination.
For example, instead of the color wheel being inverted for Alice, the color wheel labels are. So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. Anyway, not sure where to go with that, I just wanted to show that our experience of color is inherently intertwined with language and it should somehow be a part of the argument or at least mentioned.

After reading this thread I come to the conclusion that we do the same thing with the words "physical" and "non-physical". Those are just two different ways of talking about experience, reflecting different cultural/linguistic frameworks. Each is itself incoherent if situated within the other's linguistic coordination.

The problem with the op though is the premise you use to make your conclusion. You state that Alice and Mark "both experience the same qualia of 'green'". But this is not a true premise, Alice and Mark are different people, with different bodies, different memories and different experiences. Therefore it is impossible that they could both experience the very same quale. You might say they experience similar qualia, but never do they ever experience the same quale.

I think it is very important to respect this difference when talking about qualia, and recognize that two different people might share the same type of qualia, but they do not share the same qualia. And this is a very significant feature of language to understand. Sometimes we talk about things, and this speech can be described as numerous people talking about the very same thing, and other times we talk about types, and this speech can be described as numerous different things being classified as of the same type.

So if we talk about qualia, as if they are things which people are experiencing, and we say that there is red qualia, and green qualia, these are different types of qualia. But if we want to talk about one particular quale, an individual's experience of green, in a particular spatial-temporal context, we need to respect the fact that no one, not even the person experiencing this particular quale, would ever experience the very same quale, in a different spatial-temporal context.

The thing is that we have no access to physical things beyond our physiological boundaries. Physical things are themselves only latent in images of experiences. We cannot directly access the physical things beyond our minds, and our physical theories or even metaphysics are occasionally even thrown out for new ones.

So I think its relevant to question whether the invertibility of qualia relative to physical theories is actually a property of the physical things themselves or just a consequence of the way we process information about the world.

I am basically skeptical that our ability to imagine inverted qualia is anything more than my general ability to imagine different objects as having different colors, which would have an information processing origin rather than being inherently about metaphysics. I don't think there is much to reason to consider the difference between physical and non-physical (concepts beyond the) ways we process information. Hence why a p-zombie would have qualia concepts.

Edited: brackets

Quoting AmadeusD

There are objective facts about colour. They are constructed, linguistically, but that to which they refer is objectively xxxHz or some such designation which is independent of experience or observation (it is hte same observation, however it is noted by the S observing it - the langauge is not important to this element).

Thank you for taking the time to respond! I agree with your point, there are objective facts, however for the sake of the argument I was just elaborating on the inverted qualia argument, which does not argue for a physical possibility but rather a logical one.

Quoting Fire Ologist

I guess I lean towards qualia being the union of the physical and the non-physical. Qualia unifies the physical senses with the reflective subject. Qualia is the experience of something coming to be, the experience of becoming, while it is the experience of something that already is, at the same time, in a subject, like Mark. Like Alice

Thank you so much for taking the time to respond! You have a very interesting and refreshing view of qualia that I really appreciate. Your response reminds me of something I read by Karl Jaspers where he said "At the summits the activity is the inner action by which I become; myself; it is the revelation of Being; it is the activity of being oneself which yet simultaneously experiences itself as the passivity of being-given-to-oneself". Thank you again for your wonderful insights!

Reply to sime I can't quite grasp where the relevance is, or answer is, to my comment. Probably me. Sorry.

Quoting Tom Storm

But can't I say that something might seem open ended now but who knows, in time it might not be?

Yes, I think you can. I suppose this goes to whether or not that is a reason now for anything to be the case mentally.

Quoting sime

First of all, does it make sense to speak of shared sensations?

In a word — no. The word "red" and the meaning "stop" are reliably connected with the top light of the traffic signal. This is what we need to agree on and can agree on even if some of us are colour-blind.

But philosophers talk of sensations, formerly of impressions, currently of qualia, as internal subjective and radically private. Cue Wittgenstein's private language argument.

The only way to describe the sensation of the top traffic light that we have agreed to call "red" is to associate it analogically with other sensations - loud, angry, hot, that sort of thing. And this too becomes an agreed set of associations such that one cannot oneself know if they are personal to one's actual sensation or learned socially.

In the end, if we propose a possible sensation that is radically private (and all sensations are such), we cannot say anything about them at all. Certainly one can propose that my sensation of the top light is "the same" as your sensation of the bottom light, and vice versa, but this inversion can never be detected, by definition of the term 'sensation', and so such talk is meaningless.