An Analysis of Goodness and The Good
Upon further contemplation, the following is my analysis of [the property of] goodness and The Good:
Goodness is identical to having value; for if it is not, then it completely loses its traditional meaning: it turns traditional studiessuch as ethics, axiology, and pragmatisminto sciences of what is and not what should be. Valuebleness is not, however, identical to oughtness; but only by way of value does one determine what ought to be.
Goodness can be deployed in a twofold manner: in itself or for something else. The former is intrinsic (goodness), and the latter is extrinsic (goodness); and, as such, the former is intrinsic valuableness, and the latter is extrinsic valuableness. Intrinsic goodness is legitimately called moral goodness and is the subject matter (along with other related dilemmas and topics) of ethics proper: ethics, as a science, must be objectivefor it cannot be a viable study if each member is studying something else than another (and this is exactly what happens if the study itself were subjective). Any moral anti-realist position, then, although it is an objective study, is not ethics proper because, as a study of psychology or nihilism, it is a study of what is and not what should bei.e., moral anti-realism is about extrinsic goodness, which is a study that is itself objective insofar as it pertains to (objectively) how well a thing suits a (subjective) purpose (e.g., the clock is good if it sufficiently tells the time, etc.) but good, in this sense, is subjectively conditioned and thusly is not objective itself (e.g., the clock being good is, in the previous sense, relative to a subjective purpose of telling the time, etc.). Moral anti-realism only relates to morality insofar as it negates it.
What can be predicated as morally good, then, is what can be said to have intrinsic value; and intrinsic value is value a thing has in itself. To determine extrinsic value, is a matter of tracing the value to the things (inter-)subjective (literal or theoretical) sourcee.g., if one needs/wants something to tell the time, then a clock is really good (for this [subjective] purpose); whereas, to determine intrinsic value is a matter of analyzing how much, if at all, a thing demands value. Intrinsic value is value which is innately insisted upon by the (objective) thing, and is not mere value dependent on a subjects interpretation of it.
Having intrinsic value should not be confused with treating something like it has intrinsic value: one can treat anything just like they would if it actually had value in itself, but this does not make it so. Similarly, it is common to conflate intrinsic value with that which is done for its own sake (e.g., aristotle thinks that flourishing/happiness [i.e., eudamonia] is intrinsically valuable [i.e.., is morally good] because it is the ultimate good which we all strive for, and being such is not done for the sake of something else [but, rather, for its own sake]): one can do something for its own sake as a matter of a non-objective (conative or cognitive) disposition, which would have its source in extrinsic valueit cannot be intrinsic value if the value is dependent on a subjects evaluation of it. Hence, it cannot be that intrinsic value = something done for its own sake. For example, I can dedicate my whole life to the maximization of the creation of pizzas, and, as such, create pizzas for the sole sake of creating them (i.e., for their own sake); but this surely does not make the creation of pizzas intrinsically valuable.
Instead, intrinsic value is value demanded by the thing in virtue of its nature (and not, I should be clear, its ability to voice itself). A great example is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can say or feel that avoiding pain is not valuable but when one is put in a state of serious pain there is an innate insistence, from the nature of pain, that demands its avoidance to be valued. It is hard, in an active state of pain, to actually believe that the avoidance of it has no value: this kind of demand from the nature of the thing is what I mean by intrinsic value.
There are two types of intrinsic value: negative and positive. The former is value in its negation, whereas the latter is value in its presence. A good example of negative intrinsic value, is the avoidance of pain; and positive intrinsic value, is the obtainment of pleasure.
Pain and pleasure, however, are not the only intrinsically valuable states. So are emotions (e.g., anger, fear, happiness, joy, anxiety, etc.); states of peace, love, hate, beauty, etc.; and, ultimately, the state of eudamonia (i.e., a state of persistent and supreme flourishing and happiness) and decadence (i.e., its negatively, intrinsically valuable counter-part). Most intrinsically valuable states come in pairs (of negative and positive value), such as pain ? pleasure, but they are not real counter-parts; e.g., the absence of pain is not really pleasure and vice-versa, the absence of decadence is not itself a state of flourishing, etc. The positively, intrinsically valuable state is always more valuable because it is always more valuable then the bare state of the negation of the negatively, intrinsically valuable state (e.g., the bare absence of pain does not itself innately pressure as much as the positive state of pleasure).
The most positively, intrinsically valuable state is eudamonia because it demands, by its own nature, the most recognition in it being present. It is easy for anyone with sufficiently capable rational capacities to understand this, when they are in the state; but not so much when they are not. People often cannot see what lies beyond the pleasures they chase; but there is no real doubt in a rational mind when in a state of eudamonia (or something closely resembling it) that it innately pressures the person into positively valuing itindependently of what they may feel or believe about it.
Eudamonia is an interesting state, because it has communal, inter-dependencies which are required for one to achieve it in a maximal sensee.g., a person cannot, no matter if they are a psychopath or ordinary citizen, achieve a maximal state of eudamonia if everyone else around them is tremendously degenerating. Thusly, the most (positively) intrinisically valuable state is universalized states of eudamonia (i.e., universal flourishing and deep happiness); and this is The Good.
Goodness is identical to having value; for if it is not, then it completely loses its traditional meaning: it turns traditional studiessuch as ethics, axiology, and pragmatisminto sciences of what is and not what should be. Valuebleness is not, however, identical to oughtness; but only by way of value does one determine what ought to be.
Goodness can be deployed in a twofold manner: in itself or for something else. The former is intrinsic (goodness), and the latter is extrinsic (goodness); and, as such, the former is intrinsic valuableness, and the latter is extrinsic valuableness. Intrinsic goodness is legitimately called moral goodness and is the subject matter (along with other related dilemmas and topics) of ethics proper: ethics, as a science, must be objectivefor it cannot be a viable study if each member is studying something else than another (and this is exactly what happens if the study itself were subjective). Any moral anti-realist position, then, although it is an objective study, is not ethics proper because, as a study of psychology or nihilism, it is a study of what is and not what should bei.e., moral anti-realism is about extrinsic goodness, which is a study that is itself objective insofar as it pertains to (objectively) how well a thing suits a (subjective) purpose (e.g., the clock is good if it sufficiently tells the time, etc.) but good, in this sense, is subjectively conditioned and thusly is not objective itself (e.g., the clock being good is, in the previous sense, relative to a subjective purpose of telling the time, etc.). Moral anti-realism only relates to morality insofar as it negates it.
What can be predicated as morally good, then, is what can be said to have intrinsic value; and intrinsic value is value a thing has in itself. To determine extrinsic value, is a matter of tracing the value to the things (inter-)subjective (literal or theoretical) sourcee.g., if one needs/wants something to tell the time, then a clock is really good (for this [subjective] purpose); whereas, to determine intrinsic value is a matter of analyzing how much, if at all, a thing demands value. Intrinsic value is value which is innately insisted upon by the (objective) thing, and is not mere value dependent on a subjects interpretation of it.
Having intrinsic value should not be confused with treating something like it has intrinsic value: one can treat anything just like they would if it actually had value in itself, but this does not make it so. Similarly, it is common to conflate intrinsic value with that which is done for its own sake (e.g., aristotle thinks that flourishing/happiness [i.e., eudamonia] is intrinsically valuable [i.e.., is morally good] because it is the ultimate good which we all strive for, and being such is not done for the sake of something else [but, rather, for its own sake]): one can do something for its own sake as a matter of a non-objective (conative or cognitive) disposition, which would have its source in extrinsic valueit cannot be intrinsic value if the value is dependent on a subjects evaluation of it. Hence, it cannot be that intrinsic value = something done for its own sake. For example, I can dedicate my whole life to the maximization of the creation of pizzas, and, as such, create pizzas for the sole sake of creating them (i.e., for their own sake); but this surely does not make the creation of pizzas intrinsically valuable.
Instead, intrinsic value is value demanded by the thing in virtue of its nature (and not, I should be clear, its ability to voice itself). A great example is pain: pain has intrinsic value (in the sense of avoiding it) insofar as one can say or feel that avoiding pain is not valuable but when one is put in a state of serious pain there is an innate insistence, from the nature of pain, that demands its avoidance to be valued. It is hard, in an active state of pain, to actually believe that the avoidance of it has no value: this kind of demand from the nature of the thing is what I mean by intrinsic value.
There are two types of intrinsic value: negative and positive. The former is value in its negation, whereas the latter is value in its presence. A good example of negative intrinsic value, is the avoidance of pain; and positive intrinsic value, is the obtainment of pleasure.
Pain and pleasure, however, are not the only intrinsically valuable states. So are emotions (e.g., anger, fear, happiness, joy, anxiety, etc.); states of peace, love, hate, beauty, etc.; and, ultimately, the state of eudamonia (i.e., a state of persistent and supreme flourishing and happiness) and decadence (i.e., its negatively, intrinsically valuable counter-part). Most intrinsically valuable states come in pairs (of negative and positive value), such as pain ? pleasure, but they are not real counter-parts; e.g., the absence of pain is not really pleasure and vice-versa, the absence of decadence is not itself a state of flourishing, etc. The positively, intrinsically valuable state is always more valuable because it is always more valuable then the bare state of the negation of the negatively, intrinsically valuable state (e.g., the bare absence of pain does not itself innately pressure as much as the positive state of pleasure).
The most positively, intrinsically valuable state is eudamonia because it demands, by its own nature, the most recognition in it being present. It is easy for anyone with sufficiently capable rational capacities to understand this, when they are in the state; but not so much when they are not. People often cannot see what lies beyond the pleasures they chase; but there is no real doubt in a rational mind when in a state of eudamonia (or something closely resembling it) that it innately pressures the person into positively valuing itindependently of what they may feel or believe about it.
Eudamonia is an interesting state, because it has communal, inter-dependencies which are required for one to achieve it in a maximal sensee.g., a person cannot, no matter if they are a psychopath or ordinary citizen, achieve a maximal state of eudamonia if everyone else around them is tremendously degenerating. Thusly, the most (positively) intrinisically valuable state is universalized states of eudamonia (i.e., universal flourishing and deep happiness); and this is The Good.
Comments (45)
Given this statement, what is your question?
* Cf. Nicomachean Ethics I.iv; Summa Theologiae I-II.1 & 2
Not all OP's are a question. I am just curious was people's thoughts are on my position. Do you have any thoughts? I am guessing a lot :wink:
What is, according to Aristotle, goodness simpliciter, then? I guess I didn't grasp that when I read it.
Unless by this you mean that the property of goodness is not identical to 'being in a state of eudamonia', which I completely agree with.
At this point only a few of my own ... from a 2023 thread Is "good" indefineable? ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/778879
and also from one our previous discussions:
Quoting 180 Proof
Since you seem to be building off Aristotle you might look closely at this part. The idea that "objectivity approaches truth at the limit," or that "x in-itself is what it is without relation to some knower," is a fairly modern invention. I don't think it is going to tend to play nicely with ancient and medieval ethics. For Aristotle and later Aristotlean's like St. Thomas, things are defined by their relations to one another, such that "in-itselfness" cannot be the gold standard for knowledge.
The ancients and medievals were concerned with absolute good, rather than what we would tend to think of as "objective good," today. The absolute, to be truly absolute, must include both appearances and reality, the relative and the in-itself. One reading of Plato is that only the Good is good "in-itself." When we move to applying the good to the world of appearances, wherein lies all human ethical decisions, we have moved to the realm of relative good (forms might also be said to be good in-themselves in a different, more complicated way).
So consider what Aristotle says about human telos in Book X of the Ethics. He seems to have a lot in common with Plato here. The highest human good is contemplation because it is human reason that is the most divine part of the person. This is a reaching out to the Absolute, rather than an attempt to locate the "in-itself goodness," of things, which is going to be impossible.
Only an undivided noetic grasp of the Good gets at the Good in-itself. Words, human discursive reasoning, etc. is essentially processual, meaning its subject is not present to us "all at once," and so grasping the Good in this way relativizes. Likewise, words point to relations, to appearances. Thus, we can only speak of relative good. This is why Plato points to the historical figure of Socrates, the good man, rather than attempting to answer Galucon's question about "why would we ever prefer to be the man who is truly just but who is punished and denigrated rather than the man who merely appears just and is rewarded and celebrated?" And I think this grounds Eckhart's view of the truly just man as "becoming justice itself."
However, this does not entail any sort of all encompassing moral relativism. Ethics certainly is relative, based on the role one is in, one's culture, etc. Yet the Good still grounds it. It's sort of like how one cannot point to the "objective," "in themselves differences" between men and women. Men and women always exist within a culture that shapes how any differences between the sexes manifests. The range of possible contexts for these differences to manifest in is essentially limitless. However, this doesn't mean there are no true differences either. The absolute view includes all such possible contexts, rather than trying to reduce them out of the equation.
For St. Thomas and later Aristotlean's only God (Being itself) has substantive Good. You can get this from readings of Plato as well. It's less clear in Aristotle but Book X seems to point in the same direction (Aquinas' commentary on book X is interesting).
The opening parts of Axel Honneth's Freedom's Right has a really good summary of this sort of social freedom and how it interacts with other sorts of freedom, and the connection between freedom and flourishing. This area is the core focus on Hegel's Philosophy of Right, which is actually fairly straightforward as far as Hegel's writing goes.
And if the good for man involved a social element, the individual cannot be the sole measure for even relative good.
Linking goodness with value seems straight forward. But then this leads to the question "What is value?" Normally it is living things that give 'value' to other things. For your purposes, this would be 'extrinsic' value. A great example would be the value of two diamonds. One is worth $50 while the other is worth $100 in a particular area. Of course, in a different area, they could be valued at different amounts. The way we determine value is 'evaluation'. In this case again, this is extrinsic, and clear.
But if value is determined by other living things, how do we find intrinsic value? What you're claiming is similar to the idea that that some diamond has an innate value of 25$, no matter what other people are willing to pay for it. That seems at odds with the notion of value. But you seem comfortable with the idea that people can evaluate the value of something differently from what its intrinsic value is. I'm not saying its not possible, but how can we measure intrinsic value and separate this from a measurement of extrinsic value?
You can do this with your example of a clock. Someone can value the clock because it tells time, while someone else could place zero value on the clock because its ugly, and they have a way to tell time already. Clearly this is extrinsic value. But then how do we objectively determine the intrinsic value of the clock? Finishing this example would be helpful.
Quoting Bob Ross
What is your meaning of 'demand'? How does a clock demand? Can this be described using a different set of words or phrases that avoids personification? I know we had these questions in another thread, and I was curious if given some time, you've been able to construct new answers or approaches. And if there is nothing new to add, I'll simply bow out and let you handle other questions. :)
Yes, that is the most important takeaway.
Quoting Bob Ross
When thinking specifically about Aristotle, he rejected Plato's notion of The Good and tended to see goodness simpliciter as a logical, largely contentless predicate. He thought one always had to consider the context when using the word 'good', and that any usage which lacks a context is misguided.
The problem with this perspective can be found through reference to Aristotle, as the others have indicated. "Value" is relative, and it is determined in relation to a further end. So if something has value, it is apprehended as the means to an end. You go to work for the sake of earning money, for the sake of buying things, for the sake of this or that want, or need, etc., etc.. Aristotle noticed that this cannot go on as an infinite regress so he said that there must be an ultimate end. Therefore he proposed happiness as that ultimate end, which is desired only for the sake of itself.
To explain the problem now, the relative values, as means to ends, are validated in relation to the ends which they are needed for. Without the end which a thing is given value for, as the means to that end, the thing on its own cannot be said to have any value. Its value exists only in relation to the end which it is useful for. The ultimate end, proposed as happiness, has no such thing which it is useful for, or else it would not be the ultimate end. Therefore it cannot be validated as a value. If it has nothing which it is useful toward, it cannot have any value. So if goodness is defined in reference to the end, instead of the means, it must be defined by something other than "value", because value is what defines the means.
The main point of disagreement (between us), then, would be that I don't think that the negatively, intrinsically valuable (such as 'harm' that you refer to) is more valuable, when comparing equal or unequal 'amounts', than the positively, intrinsically valuable; because the positive counter-part includes the absence of those which are negatively valuable and provide positive value itself.
The eradication of serious and significant pain or harm is implied in a state of persistent flourishing, for example.
I merely think that you stop too short with setting your ideal as the elimination of negatively valued 'things', when the ultimate goal should be to go beyond mere eradication thereof to positively valued 'things'.
In terms of the invalidity of in-itself, I just dont buy that we cant understand what things are in-themselves conditionally: phenomena as it was before Kant butchered it.
In terms of grounding Good in the Absolute, theres quite a few things that grab my attention:
1. The Good is not the same thing as goodness. I think Aristotle didnt even notice this, and thats why the analysis is so muddy.
2. This would be tantamount to claiming that what can be predicated as (morally) good, is what exists; because the absolute refers to what exists as it is beyond any change (or perhaps appearances, depending on the view): this says nothing about what ought to be. It transforms ethics into something it is not: a study of what is.
3. Saying the Absolute, God, grounds The Good is vague and unhelpful (without further elaboration). What is goodness? And why and how can God be predicated to have it? In virtue of what makes this predication valid?
Bob
Great questions, Philosophim!
In light of our conversations, I have been trying to come up with different ways to express it; just to try to convey it to you, and I dont think I have found a better way to explain it. Nevertheless, I will try again; and even if I dont manage to get the point across to you, then it will still be beneficial to this thread to answer your questions.
Like I stated in our previous conversation, the concept of value to me is primitive and absolutely simplelike being, space, time, true, false, etc.and, consequently, has most of its meaning through intuition, experience, and action: NOT explication. The best I can say is that value is worth, wholly admitting this is circular.
Now, because the concept of value is primitive, it does not follow that we cannot analyze how things can be valued and what has valuebut, merely, what the concept of value means is off limits to proper explication.
How things can be valued, in principle, is two-fold: either (1) the value of a thing is bestowed upon it by a subject or (2) it has it itself. You seem to think that only #1 is possible, but I think both are. The only real way to convey either is through example, so let me use the clock one you used:
You are right that this is a great example of extrinsic value, and note that value did not need to be explicated here; as one would is sufficiently experienced will know exactly what is being conveyed here with the value of this clock.
The problem is that I cannot finish this example, by providing how the clock has intrinsic value, because it cannot have it. A clock simply does not have this kind of ability to demand to be valued. A great example we have discussed before, is pain.
I think, upon closer examination, it seems as though only (metaphysically possible) states of a subject are capable of this sort of innate insistence; but I am open to the idea that there may be other things which possess it.
You are using a bad example for illustrating intrinsic value: that example only clearly demonstrates extrinsic value. A clock, just like a rock, cannot demand any sort of value.
The best example I can think of, of which none others will make sense if a person cannot grasp this one, is pain. Let me take one more jab at conveying it to you.
What I think you are saying, is that when in pain the valuing of the negation of that pain is solely the subjects cognitive or conative evaluation of itI think this is mistaken. Perhaps if I can break you out of that line of thinking, then you will catch at least a glimpse of what I am trying to convey (:
If a person completely believes and desires that pain has no value and you are right that value is purely subjective judgments, then even if they are in tremendous pain the pain will not be have any value; but, if you can envision a person which, in tremendous pain, still appreciates the value of avoiding pain despite not believing and desiring it to have no value, then you have contradicted your own point: the pain must have value independent of the desires and beliefs of the person.
Thats the best I can do to help you see what I mean.
Bob
I see. For me, I think that goodness is identical to 'having value'.
My analysis doesn't determine what has intrinsic value based off of what is done for its own sake:
I neither claim nor imply this. How do you get that from my 'preventing or reducing disvalue'?
Not a worry and I appreciate the attempt! I may also repeat myself a bit, so feel free at any of these points 'Agree to disagree".
Quoting Bob Ross
A job of philosophy is to take what cannot be yet explained, and put it into words that consistently make sense and can be used rationally. When we can't do so, its 'giving up'. Its no different to me then if people stated, "We can't know what knowledge is," or "We can't know morality". If value is goodness, and we can't know value, we can't know what goodness is.
Further, if a word is mostly understood in terms of "intuition, experience, and action" this is a subjective term. To be objective is to have a clear term that can be verified independently apart from personal experience. I know you claim that this idea of morality is objective, but I'm not seeing any evidence that this is the case.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is a claim that must be proven however. If someone said, "Here is my definition of value that is clearly explicated," do you have a proof that this is impossible? I'm not seeing your claim that value cannot be explicated as anything more than an opinion. Claiming to invalidate all possible definitions of value is a tall order that requires some major proof. There is no proof of this here, which means that someone who comes along and claims they have a definition, automatically competes with your claim at minimum, equally.
Quoting Bob Ross
Its not that I think only #1 is possible. Its that you have not demonstrated any way we can know that #2 is possible. We can't make the mistake that just because I can string two words together, that the concept necessarily exists. That's the unicorn problem. I take a horse, I take a horn, and combine the concepts and 'unicorn'. But does a unicorn actually exist? No. "Intrinsic value" is the combination of intrinsic, and value. We can combine the words, but there's no evidence such a thing exists. That's what you have to prove.
Quoting Bob Ross
It doesn't have to be explicated because we know what external value is. We can explicate it easily as well. "External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs." But here's the thing. If "internal" value isn't real, then "external" value is redundant. Meaning that 'external value' just becomes value, and once again, we've explicated value clearly.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is because it is a knowable example we have of determining value. If there is an alternative way of determining value intrinsically, we need that method for me to be able to think in those terms.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm going to break this down a bit.
Assume that value is subjective.
If a person thinks an emotional state does not have value, then it will not have any value no matter how strong of an emotional state it is.
If however there is a person in tremendous pain who values pain, despite not valuing pain, its a contradiction.
I don't see how the above argument revokes that its subjective. Your conclusion is not a conclusion, but a premise which contradicts itself. Now if you meant, "They value avoiding pain, but don't value pain itself," this is not a contradiction, nor does it revoke the assumption that value is subjective.
Alright Bob, I hope I was able to clearly communicate my points here as well. Feel free to answer what you wish.
It seems like you are anchoring your ethics in reducing harm, and not progressing towards flourishing.
The job of philosophy is no doubt to provide analytical explication of things, but it is not meant to incessantly attempt at explicating things. If something has been determined, by analysis, as inexplicable (i.e., explicated as inexplicable), then one should not continue to try to explicate it (unless new evidence arises). Philosophy is not the study of delusionally trying to run through a concrete wall.
Not at all. There are good reasons to believe that some concepts are inexplicable, which is not to say we cant know them.
Knowledge is not merely information which has been explicated: it is also the range of information implicated. You reject the idea of implicit knowledge: I dont.
I think we can know just fine what being, value, etc. are even though we cannot explicate them properly.
I dont know why you would believe this. We convey concepts to each other all the time implicitly (through action, experience, and intuition) and they are clearly not subjective. A 5 year old cannot explicate clearly a definition of a triangle, but definitely knows notionally what a triangle is.
1. You cant verify independently of your experience any termsthats impossible.
2. That definition includes inter-subjectivity in it, which demonstrates it is false.
3. The meaning of words are inter-subjectively defined, and are thusly not objective.
4. Concepts are objective, not words.
5. Objectivity is that which exists mind-independently.
What has intrinsic value, is a matter of objective inquiry: the truth of the matter is stance-independent. If I feel or believe as though something is intriniscally valuable, that doesnt make it so. Intrinsic value is objective. Even if you dont agree that anything has intrinsic value, I think you can appreciate that the inquiry would be objective.
It isnt going to be actually or logically impossible, and there is no definitive way to determine whether a concept is simple or simply misunderstood. Abductively, through the attempts to define it and failing to do so, one slowly understands better how primitive the concept is by way of how entrenched it is into all the other concepts one deploys to try and define it.
For example, how do you properly explicate the color green to a blind person? You cant. Its a particular wavelength in light that ones eyes interpret a particular way: how does that explain what the color green looks like? It doesnt.
The (phenomenal) color of green is not explicable whatsoever: it is shared conceptual through experience. You cannot give a definition of green that will adequately convey what it looks like. Does that mean the concept of green doesnt make sense, or that you cant know what green looks like (just because you cant explicate it)? I would say no.
For you, either you (1) explicate the phenomenal color of green, or (2) you have to reject that you know what the color green looks like. Theres no definite proof that the color green cant be explicated, but for those who know (implicitly) what it is (in terms of what it looks like), they understand what I mean.
Its inductive: I dont have to provide a proof such that it is impossible. Inductions dont work like that.
Prima facie, this is true. I would then demonstrate that either (1) they begged the question or (2) did not convey properly the concept. If you say well, Bob, I can explicate what the color green looks like. I would say ok, lets hear it. You say X. Now, either X does define it (and I am wrong), X begs the question, or X doesnt define what it looks like. Upon investigating and attempting to define what the color green looks like, coupled with my understanding of what it is (from experience), I eventually abductively conclude it cannot be properly defined (explicitly), and I am willing to bet that X is going to fall under one of the latter two options (and not the first).
I have, with my pain example. Thats why I keep trying to get you to explain your take on the example. If we cant converge on that, then theres no hope.
Just like if we cant converge on what the color green is, by way of our experience, then theres no hope in coming to a conclusion on whether we can define it fully (explicitly).
I dont find this to be an accurate definition, but thats a minor quibble at this point.
The other way, in addition to what I have already explained, is the idea that it is extrinsically motivating for subjects and does not arise out of a subject itself: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/894861 .
I was saying that IF you think that it is possible for the person to understand that the pain has value despite having no belief or desire that it is; then we have found common ground. If you do not, then it doesnt help our conversation.
I am trying to dance our way into giving you the intuition. This is similar to debates between people about internal vs. external theories of motivation: one guy cant see how someone can be motivated to do something without having a desire to do it, and the other canthey then spend days having the former convey the intuition to the latter, and usually to no avail.
Heres the key question: can you see how pain an motivate someone to negate it despite them having any desire or belief to negate it? Or is that not something you can see happening?
To value avoiding pain, is to negatively value pain. Either way, I was talking about avoiding pain (if I have to choose).
Bob
No doubt, but you have not done this. And that's my issue. There's a lot of assertions and opinions, and inductions. That's not a solid analysis. If you're happy with this, that's fine, but as a philosophical proposal, its weak.
Quoting Bob Ross
No. I don't reject this notion. We're talking about value, and you keep changing the subject. Why?
Quoting Bob Ross
No, that's not proven objective knowledge. Its assumed. You seem to be confusing assumptions, inductions, and general inclinations as proof. We can only put the 5 year old through tests to show that they can prove a triangle, because a triangle has very clearly explained rules. A triangle is 3 straight lines that connect at their ends. And if the 5 year old can't explicate it doesn't mean it can't be explicated. You seem to be saying that because you can't explicate value, it doesn't prove that others can't. That doesn't prove anything.
Quoting Bob Ross
Then the first person that shows a proof that it can be explicated wins. Or if they don't someone else creates a competing induction and we just decide to do based on which one we like more. That's again, subjective. There is no reason for anyone to accept your premises unless they feel like it.
You seem to confuse the idea that 'mind independent' means 'independent of minds'. No, it means that there is a rationality that holds true despite what other minds may feel. There is nothing rational that allows you rise above emotional feelings on this. 1+1=2 despite what we feel about it, or even if we agree with it because its a solid logical concept from beginning to end. Your whole argument feels like its a matter of faith instead of rationality.
Quoting Bob Ross
So no. :)
Quoting Bob Ross
But we're not talking about the color green. We're talking about value. And I did come along and give you a competing definition. So no hypotheticals are needed, why is my definition logically wrong?
Quoting Bob Ross
Yeah, that's an odd way to remove desires from yourself and imprint them on other things. Things don't motivate us Bob. We motivate ourselves for things. Its why we all have different values for different feelings, states, and things.
Quoting Bob Ross
If the whole proof for intrinsic values rests on what I think, then this is not objective. This is just a conflict of opinions. I have no idea what you mean by a person valuing something and not valuing it at the same time beyond an colloquial expression. People value relief Bob. They value a life free of pain. Pain is only valuable if it helps us avoid and/or heal from injuries. A Masochist might actually value pain in itself, and purposefully injure themselves for it. The idea that we're all going to have the same outlook and value about pain doesn't work out in practice, and thus we have no common ground for intrinsic value.
Finally, pain can be defined objectively. If your nerves fire with a particular signal up to the brain, that's pain. How your brain interprets it and values it may be different. But the only thing intrinsic to pain, is the nerve interplay.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, this is all based on subjective experience then. An objective argument wouldn't need my understanding of the intuition. Using your example of green, there is a set wavelength of light that is green. That's the objective wavelength of light for green. How we see or interpret it is subjective, but that right there, is the intrinsic color of green. If you can put forward something similar for value, you'll have an objective argument. Until then, this is just a nice thought experiment but not a strong philosophical argument.
I dont see any way for our conversation to progress, because we keep dead-ending at the same spots, so I will just respond to the parts where I think I am adding to the conversation (instead of reiterating).
You use the term objective in really nonsensical wayse.g., objective knowledge, objective definition, objective wavelength, objective argument, etc. Sometimes its use is straight up incoherent, and other times it adds nothing to what you are saying.
I have already explicated clearly what objectivity is, and I think your position on it is wrong and confused.
An argument is an evidence-based proof; and can absolutely include intuitions in it. Arguments are not objective; but are hopefully rational. Likewise, experience is always used in arguments: theres no such thing as an argument that is devoid of a posteriori content.
objective knowledge is something you can say, but that doesnt make it coherent. Knowledge is about information minds have, and has three main components: justification, belief, and truth. Refactor and create whatever epistemological theory you want (to accommodate for gettier cases and what not), but it will include these three (including yours that I remember from before). Truth is objective, the other two arent.
You are saying mind-independently existent (or stance-independently true) [viz., objective] information that a mind has [viz., knowledge].
You completely missed the point of the example, and failed to explicate what green looks like.
You rejected it many times in our older conversations about epistemology; and it was relevant to what you said, because by saying a concept is simple (and indefinable) is NOT to say that they cannot be known.
This doesnt completely define pain, because it does not define how it feels (phenomenologically). You cant completely strip out the subject, Philosophim: it doesnt work.
Sure. We can talk about that, but it doesnt negate the idea that pain has intrinsic value. There are fine lines between pleasure and pain for sure.
I believe in external motivation; so I deny this. I think we can have reason which motivate us without us having any desire towards it. You are clearly a Humean, and theres no easy way to find common ground on that.
Quoting Bob Ross
???
Cancer-independent is not identical to being independent of cancer?
Your rationality presupposes my use of objectivity; and that it is independent of desires is not enough: just because one believes something is the case, does not make it so.
No, it is based off of what seems more correctwhich one is more convincing. Just because you are not convinced, does not make this endeavor subjective: you have a tendency to do that.
Bob
On the contrary, I propose that moral agents flourish to the degree effectively 'preventing and reducing harm and/or injustice' become habits. This form of moral naturalism I call aretaic disutilitarianism (i.e. agency-cultivating active opposition to both (agency-disabling) harms and injustices).
Since value is relative, in the way I described, your discussion of "intrinsic value" doesn't make any sense. It's an oxymoron. Things like pain and pleasure do not have value, they would be better described as "invaluable", meaning beyond valuation, or impossible to value.
Do you see that "value" implies the ability to scale the worth of a thing relative to the worth of other things? The idea that things have "intrinsic value" would negate the idea that the thing's value is determined by the scale of worth. So this, "intrinsic value" cannot be "value" as we know it.
Probably true. We have some fundamental differences on certain topics, and they may be irreconsilable. No harm in noting that and agreeing to disagree after giving our sides again.
Quoting Bob Ross
Bob, I use objective in the common sense. We've discussed this before and you have a very unique way of looking at subjective and objective. Generally this is how I use objective and subjective, so it is not incoherent:
OBJECTIVE arguments are often those that have to do with logos, that is, reason, evidence and logic, generally dealing with material questions (things that can be sensed or measured and have to do with the real outside world, outside of oneself).
SUBJECTIVE arguments are most often those dealing with the personal situation, feelings or experiences of a particular individual, family or group, and are usually arguments from ethos or pathos (though material subjective factors may involve arguments from logos as well).
https://utminers.utep.edu/omwilliamson/engl1312/subjective.htm#:~:text=SUBJECTIVE%20arguments%20are%20most%20often,arguments%20from%20logos%20as%20well).
Quoting Bob Ross
I have never once heard your explanation of objectivity and thought it made any rational sense. That is your personal definition, but the common definition which people use is as I noted above. Generally I try to avoid the subject directly because it seems to be more of an emotional spot for you. Just in this case its unavoidable.
Quoting Bob Ross
Arguments can be objective or subjective. Intuitions are subjective viewpoints. Objective arguments work to eliminate parts the require a subjective viewpoint. Per my example, the experience of green is subjective and the wavelength of green is objective.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'll be more direct in my point then. The personal subjective experience of green cannot be explicated. The objective wavelength can. The personal subjective experience of value cannot be explicated. But if there is an objective intrinsic value, it can.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is still not an answer. Bob, I agree that that a concept can be simple, indefinable, and known subjectively by that one person experiencing it. I'm not challenging that. I'm challenging you to demonstrate that value is simple, indefinable, and can be known objectively by people because it is intrinsic to an object. Pain is an example, but not a breakdown or system we can use.
Personally, why I think you keep going to 'being' or 'green' is because you can't do it with value. The only argument you have given is the subjective experience of pain, and whether we value it or not. I'm not disagreeing with you there that we all have our own subjective experience of pain, and value of it. I'm disagreeing that this somehow reveals objective value intrinsic to a state or object.
Quoting Bob Ross
We strip out the subject where possible when we are talking about objectivity. There is a subjective part to pain, and an objective part to pain. I am not denying the subjectivity of pain. I am denying that because you or I place a personal value on pain, that its objective proof that pain has intrinsic value. You have yet to show an objective value that all people, regardless of their subjective experience, can rationally agree represents intrinsic value.
I did not mean in the other thread, but in this one. I am not referencing the other thread where possible as this is a fresh take with a different context. This is what I was referring to:
"We can explicate it easily as well. "External value is the attribute a living being gives something else that confers some benefit to the living being and its wants and/or needs." But here's the thing. If "internal" value isn't real, then "external" value is redundant. Meaning that 'external value' just becomes value, and once again, we've explicated value clearly."
Why is this wrong?
Quoting Bob Ross
As a belief, this is fine. But a belief is not an objective argument. If someone said they believed in God, therefore he's real, would you think that was objective? Also, I'm not Humean, just human. :)
Quoting Bob Ross
No, my point is that it is subjects who create subjective and objective arguments. I've said this before, and it will be one more time. Objective doesn't mean, 'an object' and subjective doesn't mean, 'a subject'. Objectivity and subjectivity are claims that subjects make. It is independent of one mind, but not independent of minds.
Quoting Bob Ross
It genuinely isn't because I'm not convinced of the argument. Bob, in my own moral theory, I believe everything has intrinsic value by the fact of its existence. The difference between you and I is mine has a rational foundation that can be measured against other existences. I can explain and justify what good and value are from a place of reason. Even your idea of flourishing fits in my theory nicely. You've taken this the wrong way. My point is you claim objectivity, but clearly cannot back that claim.
You're missing a fundamental step that can elevate your moral theory from, "Just another theory," into something that people can rationally hold in high regard. Don't be angry that I'm pointing out a flaw. Listen to it, give it a fair consideration in your head, and maybe you'll be able to come back with something better.
So, there's my take. This is your thread Bob, so anytime you feel the discussion has met its end or you would like the final say, I will grant it with a bow and let you continue with others.
This is a fair proposal. It bases value in existence, allowing for "intrinsic value" by the very fact that a thing's existence is intrinsic to it. The problem now would be how to scale different values. By what principles would you say that one type of existence is higher or lower than another type of existence?
My fault for referencing an outside thread. This is Bob's thread and the context should be kept to it.
I appreciate your response! Since we have no common ground, I would like to take things step-by-step. First, I want to address your idea that my argument is not 'objective', in your sense of the word.
For now, I am going to use 'objective' and 'subjective' in your sense of the terms.
Consider the below argument:
P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value.
P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it).
C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.
Now, I don't want you, right now, to contend with the premises in the sense of what you merely disagree with; but, rather, I want you to tell me if this syllogism meets your requirements for being an 'objective argument'.
I think it does, because the premises and conclusion are formatted rationally and logically consistently; and none of it is true in virtue of my or someone else's subjective disposition towards the subject. Do you agree?
This is a good start. As written, the argument is incomplete. I'll point out why, and then point out how based on the answers, this can end up being a subjective or an objective argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
How do we determine that it is a thing which motivates a mind? Can it rationally compete with and invalidate the idea that a mind that is motivated towards goals simply uses things to obtain its goals? Is it that the food in front of me has an internal compulsion that expels outward towards my mind demanding that I eat it? Or is it that my mind desires food, and seeing the food triggers my mind to want it for what it wants/needs?
If the answer is, "Quoting Bob Ross, then this is a subjective answer to the question because belief alone is entirely subjective. Because you have a subjective answer as part of a major foundation of your argument, any part of your argument that relies on this foundation is now a subjective argument.
If the answer is, "Here is the proof that external motivation exists, and we can see this proof holds up despite differences in our feelings or personal experiences", then you have an objective foundation, and any part of your argument that relies on this foundation without including subjectivity is now an objective argument.
As a quick aside, I like that this is a much more straight forward definition of intrinsic value. It might be incomplete from my view, but it gives a much clearer picture of the definition of intrinsic value in one sentence.
Quoting Bob Ross
My second question would be, "How have you proven that a state of pain is not a mind?" I'll give you a faux example that seems reasonable. "The mind is defined as the aspect of consciousness which analyzes its own states and make decisions based on those states. Pain is a state that the mind decides to act on or react to, therefore it is not the mind itself, just a state that the mind considers."
If we both agree that this is a clear and provable definition that can be accurately applied despite differing states of human subjective experience, then we have something objective to reference. If however we defined it like, "A mind is unique to every person and cannot be explicated," then we have a subjective definition of mind, and thus a subjective argument at its foundation.
A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed. An objective argument can have its definitions challenged as new information comes along. A subjective argument may be the best argument we can present with limited information. So having a subjective argument is not a death knell based on what we know, but it is important that it not claim to be an objective argument. In the case of moral theories, there are countless subjective moral theories out there, so another subjective argument has a high bar to reach to out compete every other theory. The problem is most subjective arguments boil down to subjective preference at their core, meaning people just do what they want and call it moral. And if that's the end case, why bother with a theory at all? Escaping that end result is incredibly difficult, but maybe you can do it.
I hope that was a clear answer to the question!
It is not valid to argue that a syllogism is incomplete because each premise needs to be questioned and expoundedthat is the nature of all syllogisms.
A valid and complete syllogism (i.e., formal argument) is one which has:
1. A major premise.
2. A minor premise.
3. A conclusion.
4. A logically sound form.
My syllogism meets these demands, and is thusly complete and valid.
What you move on to note, is exactly what I was asking you to refrain from noting: various issues you have with accepting the premises. A person not accepting the premises of a syllogism does not make the syllogism invalid.
On a similar note, your definition of an objective argument was:
My premises fit this description: they are not themselves appeals to subjective dispositions. So:
This, even if it were true (which it is not), does not make the argument subjective, by your definition, because the premises I expounded are claims which are not dependent on beliefs.
You are questioning the justification for the premise itself, which would require another, separate syllogism. I am asking if this syllogism itself is objectivenot whether some subsequent one is or not. P1 is a claim which is expressing something objective: it is not saying ~Something has intrinsic value if I want it to.
You asking for justification for external motivation theory, which is not provided in the syllogism itself; and wasnt intended to. Even if a syllogism produced for such justification were based solely on beliefs, and thusly is subjective, it wouldnt negate the fact that P1 is expressing something objective.
I am going to disregard all of these parts, because I am asking you a specific question: do you think that the premises + conclusion constitute an objective argument. I am not asking for an analysis of how plausibly true you find the premises.
The question is whether the syllogism is (1) valid (as per explicated above) and (2) meets your definition of objective argument (which is to say its premises and conclusion can be said to be rationally constituted, logically sound, and independent of subjective dispositions).
If, by this, you are claiming that an argument is subjective if the fully expounded list of syllogisms (required to prove it)(which would be infinite, by the way) anywhere contains a subjective element; then, my friend, there are not objective arguments. You cant prove 1+1=2 with an objective argument if you are that absurdly strict with your definition of objective argument.
P1 is not a definition of intrinsic value: it is a claim about what has it.
Do you mean to say that, in this hypothetical, the term mind is defined as something of which its meaning is relative to the given subject-at-hand? The fact it is inexplicable, in this scenario, has nothing to do with it being subjective.
In short, you are confusing an analysis of why the premises are true/false, with whether they are purporting something objective; and by your definition of an objective argument, this syllogism would suffice to meet that standard.
Bob
If you'll read it again, it was not an issue with the premise, it was a request to flesh out your definitions so we could see whether they were objective or subjective. As it was initially written, it was impossible to classify the argument as objective or subjective because I simply don't understand what you mean. Its fine if you wish to write it that way, but then you can't claim its objective either. If a reader needs aspect of your syllogism fleshed out or explained, its a syllogism that needs more work to have the proper rigor. That in itself is not a claim as to whether its arguments are subjective or objective.
I made a point not to dispute your definitions, I only noted what it would take to classify them as subjective or objective. That's why I gave you examples for both sides.
Quoting Bob Ross
If you use definitions, it must be known what concepts those definitions represent. Do they represent subjective definitions and concepts, or objective definitions and concepts? Its a fact of language, and not something that you appeal to. Even if they cannot be explicated, is that claim based on subjective or objective premises? It is unavoidable in any discussion, especially when you actively claim they are objective.
Quoting Bob Ross
Quoting Bob Ross
No, the argument is not objective, nor can I tell if its subjective at this point. This is an assertion. How you justify the assertion is what makes it objective or subjective. Is intrinsic value objective or subjective? Is the claim that things can motivate minds objective or subjective? Those are the questions that need answers.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, I'm not asking you to infinitely expand syllogisms. That's silly. Also you cannot objectively claim
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct. A claim that something is inexplicable can be founded on objective or subjective premises. In this example, it is a subjective premise.
In sum, I'm not questioning whether the premises are true or false, I'm demonstrating how we can determine if they are subjective or objective. Let me repost part of my conclusion in the last post once again: "A subjective argument is not necessarily wrong, nor is an objective argument necessarily correct. It is about the type of concepts presented and being analyzed." It seems my points were taken as an attack on your theories truth or falsity, when they are simply examples that point out why some of your arguments are subjective, and also examples of how you could make them objective. Address those examples specifically without regards to the truth or falsity of the premises and I think we'll be able to reconcile on subjectivity vs objectivity.
I guess I am not fully fathoming what you mean by subjective vs. objective definitions and arguments. I thought you were saying that 'subjective' refers to something which has its truth relative to mind-dependent dispositions (e.g., feelings, thoughts, beliefs, etc.) and that 'objective' refers to something which has its truth NOT relative to mind-dependent dispositions. Am I misunderstanding?
It seems obvious to me that the premises are not appealing to being true relative to mind-dependent dispositions, what would make you think otherwise?
The definition or the underlying meaning?
The definition is subjective, because all definitions are subjective. I don't know what it would mean to define something objectively. We choose what sets of symbols (i.e., words) to associate with what underlying meanings (i.e., ideas/concepts): I don't see how it could be otherwise.
The underlying meaning is objective, because it is the idea/concept of having value in-itself. If this is not understood, then one doesn't understand what 'in-itself' means. Again, just to sidestep your Kantian ties, what I mean by 'in-itself' is the nature, the essence, of the thing and not what it exists as independently of all experience of it.
How could it possibly be subjective? I don't understand where you are coming from here, unfortunately. Either a thing motivates a mind or it doesn't: this isn't relative to what anyone believes or feels about it.
Bob
I think this is a decent paragraph, and shows some improvement in your ideas and rhetoric.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is an interesting paragraph. A week ago Pope Francis released a document called Dignitas Infinita (infinite dignity). I'm not sure how it will be received, but it is trying to do something similar to what you are trying to do here, saying that the human being itself has infinite value.
Quoting Bob Ross
Aristotle says that eudaimonia is the highest end because of its nature, not because subjects happen to value it. But Aristotle and Aquinas immediately address the most obvious objection, namely that different people are made happy by different things ().
Here is how Aquinas puts the quandary:
Yes, this is a problem. If "last end" is defined as happiness, then we need a separate description of happiness or else the two words just become representative of each other. Then "happiness" means "last end", and "last end" means "happiness", and all we have is a vicious circle.
So if we look at the broader context, to get an understanding of exactly what happiness is, we see that it is something which is produced in a variety of different ways for the various different people. This appearance of a multitude of differences prevents that mode of inquiry from proceeding, and we are forced to look back at the more general, to find a description with a more universal application, instead of referring directly to all the specific differences.
Notice that Aquinas mentions "the fulfilment of their perfection". Developed from Aristotelian principles, the goal of "perfection" becomes the last end for Aquinas. Every existing thing, by the nature of its very own form, has a perfection which is proper to it, and it alone. So that is what could bring a person true happiness, the perfection of one's very own form, the unique form which is proper to oneself, and this becomes the last end, the goal of each individual.
So this defines "happiness" in "perfection", and leads us toward the need to understand this concept, "perfection" which is revealed as a sort of ideal form.
I always appreciate your thoughts!
Here's where I get a bit confused with Aristotle, because I agree that eudaimonia is the highest good because of its nature BUT I don't see how Aristotle is really arguing that; since his definition of intrinsic value is ~"that which is done for its own sake". It seems like something can be done for its own sake and be a matter of subjective disposition, no?
I think he would need to define intrinsic value not in terms of what is done for its own sake, but, rather, what can be assigned value in virtue of its innate (natural) insistence of being valued (e.g., pain is a great example, although not the ultimate good).
What am I missing?
I think I have identified one of the subtle issues with my theory, that may be causing you trouble (understanding it). That a thing demands or insists on being valued, does not mean it has value independently of a subject's determination or analysis of it (i.e., that it has value in-itself as I was referring). Either a thing has value in-itself, which I would have to explain how it is constituted into the being of the thing, or it is assigned value (by a subject).
Ok, let me break down more clearly what I do and do not mean. To your credit, value is always assigned but, to my credit, it is not always extrinsic value. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing because, and to the degree that, it innately insists (or demands) on being valued. Extrinsic value is value a thing has been assigned relative to how well it fulfills a (subjective) purpose.
Intrinsic value, unlike extrinsic value, is objective because, although we assign it, it is being assigned because the thing actually (mind-independently) motivates people to value it for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: a person is motivated, even if they overcome it, to value a thing with intrinsic value despite what they believe or desire to value it at. It is external motivation (for the subject) which they can not think or desire away.
Another way to put it, is that intrinsic value is value a thing has (1) for its own sake and (2) is attributable to the thing (which exists mind-independently) from its natural ability to motivate people of #1.
The intrinsic value a thing has, then, would be proportional to how motivational the thing is at demanding people to value it for its own sake (whether that be positively or negatively); and this is how we could compare them.
Obtaining pleasures, for example, would be less intrinsically valuable then a state of eudaimonia because the latter, when in that state, is more innately motivational towards valuing it for its own sake than the former (although it is not clear to a person who has not reached the latter state and is stuck in the former one).
Does that help?
I think this is that question of goodness simpliciter vs. goodness for human beings. For example, you seem to be involved in the notion that "insisting on being valued" makes sense apart from agents who do the valuing. In your OP, rather than speaking about happiness "insisting on being valued," I would want to speak about the idea that happiness is (for humans) self-evidently valuable. The question is this: is eudaimonia valuable in itself, or is it valuable for humans beings? Or is it valuable in itself for human beings?*
Quoting Bob Ross
I would simply want to speak about what is correctly valued as opposed to what is incorrectly valued; or what is rightly done for its own sake as opposed to what is wrongly done for its own sake; or what is the highest good/end as opposed to what appears to be the highest good/end.
* This last sentence seems to represent Aristotle's thought. Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, and others go beyond Aristotle in this, but Aristotle's position is careful and easily defensible. He does not commit himself to goodness simpliciter in any substantial sense.
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I still do not see how this description of "intrinsic value" makes any sense. You seem to be saying that there are some things in the world, which demand of people, that the people want them, and they want them simply for the sake of having the thing, itself, and not for anything else. But doesn't this really just say something about people in general, that people exist in such a way that there are specific types of things which they will want, simply for the sake of having that thing.
Notice, that I say "specific types of things" that people want, but you portray particular things as having this intrinsic value, rather than types. If it is a type of thing which is valued in this way, then the value is not really intrinsic to the things themselves, but it is attributable to the type.
So take food for example, as such a type. Food appears to be valued for its own sake. This type of thing is inherently good. But what is the case, is that we make a category of things judged as good to eat, we name this category "food", and then we judge which things ought and ought not be placed in this category. So "good" is a defining feature of the category, and its definition is based on what is needed by the human being, it is not based on what is intrinsic to any particular thing.
We might say that nutrition is a good which is intrinsic to particular things, but it is only classed as "nutrition:, or "good", based on how it is received by human beings. It appears like the good is intrinsic to the thing, but it is really only "good" in its relation to humans. These chemical compounds are ones needed by humans. Isn't this very similar to pleasure and pain? These two are categories, one of good feelings, the other bad feelings. They are types of feelings, the good type and the bad type. Then particular instances of feelings need to be judged as to whether they fit one category or the other. So they are really only good or bad as a result of their relation to the conscious mind which does the judging.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yes, I think Aristotle was the first to distinguish between the apparent good, and the real good. Aquinas followed him on this distinction, and I believe Augustine did too, to a large degree. Plato was more vague on his notion of "the good".
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I'm not intending to use the term truth, but arguments. I would not use 'mind-dependent' as a description for subjective or objective at all. This leads to the mistake in thinking that objectivity exists like some Platonic form. It does not. Objectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is not dependent for the argument. Subjectivity is an approach to thinking that minds take to ensure that the subject of the self is dependent for the argument.
Thus, things like logic, math, concepts, studies, and findings are used for objective arguments. Personal experiences, intuitions, and desires are all subjective arguments. Both are tools, have their strengths and weaknesses, and a complete thinker will be able to apply both effectively to an argument. After all, we are subjects that have personal experiences, and many discussions that involve personal experiences have no objective approach. A lack of understanding this distinction can easily allow confusion between the two.
Consciousness is a great example of this. There are objective ways to approach consciousness, and subjective ways to approach consciousness. Realistically, the only way we can measure consciousness in a human is by physiological measurements and behavior. Asserting a person's personal experience is outside of objectivity because we can never know what its like to be that person.
Subjective consciousness is our individual experience of reality. A person may not exhibit any physical signs of pain, but inside, its an undeniable reality. And it WANTS things. For example, it can want to be immortal, so it invents an idea that it can exist once its body dies. It wants to pretend its not tied to the brain, even though the objective reality is that this is so. It often tries to claim its experiences are objective reality, when they are just really strong feelings of desire that X should be real.
A good thinker can marry the two. You cannot discuss consciousness only in objective, nor only in subjective terms. A good thinker can find the strength in each side, and uses it for its particular tool in the argument. Am I master at this? No. But it is something I and many philosophers who strive to do well will do.
When I point out that you have subjective arguments in your ethical theory, it is not that you should never use subjective arguments. You should be aware of their strengths and weaknesses and use them effectively. People are rarely persuaded by math. They are persuaded by feelings. Feelings without math may be fun, but can lead to alcoholics losing everything they have. Math without feelings may be brilliant, but can die in a dusty book that no one will ever read.
Is the argument you are giving for intrinsic value subjective or objective? This is determined by what you are using to determine whether something is intrisicly valuable. If your reliance is on the feelings and desires of people, its subjective, plain and simple. "I've smoked every day until 90 years old and never gotten cancer" is subjective. "Smokers have a X% higher chance of getting lung cancer is objective". When you appeal to me to recognize a feeling of value that you call intrinsic value, you are appealing to subjective notions. There can be good reasons for that. But it is not objective.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, is your argument for why things can motivate minds a subjective, or objective one? Do we have evidence of rays that emit from objects, interact with brains, and compel them to do things? Or do we have some people who really WANT that thing over there, therefore believe its not their fault, it must be compelling them? Do you see which argument is objective vs subjective?
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm not saying this isn't possible. But you would need something like a 'value atom' or a proof that demonstrated X had value that could be confirmed logically.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is a run on sentence, so lets break it up into something that goes step by step and we can walk through.
1. There exist things which can compel people to value it.
2. This value is something which does not benefit the person. The person may even hate the thing. But innate to their experience, they still value it.
3. The value is a consistent and undeniable reality within a person's mind, and this is because of the object itself.
An example I would give is, "The Grand Canyon". Such a feeling is usually described as 'awe'. Some might hate the Grand Canyon, but still feel awe, or value. Still, this is a subjective claim. Saying "The Canyon" is causing this is a feeling/belief. There is nothing here that we can measure or evaluate beyond a person's individual feelings about something.
What would an objective claim for this look like? As I noted before, perhaps a wave that extended from things that would provably interact with the mind and cause consistent physiological interactions. Perhaps a massive study that could quantify value and demonstrate how it affects people with researched statistics.
If you wanted to objectively demonstrate that eudaimonia had more value, you would of course have to clearly define value, and then demonstrate that societies with eudaimonia had generated more of this defined value then societies that did not have this.
I hope you can see the difference now. Let me know what you think.
I think your use of the terms is incoherent with your definitions.
If:
Then objectivity is fundamentally about anything which is not relative to subjective dispositionsthats the difference between reason, logic, the real outside world, etc. and desires, beliefs, etc.
Making this sort of distinction, is inevitably to distinguish between two different dependency relations: one being a dependency on subjective dispositions, and the other notobjectivity, in your sense, is defined negatively in relation to subjectivity.
An argument is about truth: you cant separate them in any way that would be meaningful for this discussion. The premises, which are propositions, are expressing something objective if they can be evaluated (as true or false) independently of what any person feels or believes about itand this is what your definition entails (quoted above).
This is no way implies that objectivity or truth are platonic forms.
You actually (sort of) recognized this in your own counter-point:
If this is true, then a premise is objective (or expressing something objective) IFF whether or not it is true or false is NOT dependent on any given subjective disposition.
Food tastes delicious is a proposition which does NOT express something objective, because one has to evaluate the truth of this sentence relative to the given subject at hand (since how a thing tastes is directly dependent on who is tasting it).
I've smoked every day until 90 years old and never gotten cancer" IS expressing something objective, because the evaluation of its truth (or falsity) IS NOT dependent on any subjective disposition: either I really did smoke every day for 90 years and didnt get cancer, or I didntthis is not dependent on how anyone feels or believes about it.
What you are trying to explicate with your example of smoking, is NOT that the proposition is subjective but, rather, that it is anecdotal and thusly cannot be used to demonstrate a statistic on the effects of smoking on the human body. That is cannot be used validly to prove anything related to a proposition like "Smokers have a X% higher chance of getting lung cancer is objective" has no relation to whether it is subjective or objective...by your own definitions. Ive smoked every day... is a proposition based on reason, valid logic, and is independent of desires/beliefs which obviously meets the definition you gave (quoted above previously). Thats what it means to evaluate something outside of oneself (to take from your definition): on the contrary, Ive smoked every day and didnt get cancer is true because I want it to be true is subjective, by your definitions.
That you asked for some sort of measurable entity in reality, as opposed to a phenomenal quality, demonstrates sufficiently to me that you are using your definitions incoherently; and that you think that an argument is only objective if it references some scientifically measurable entity...which is nonsense, even by your own definitions. If the arguments premises expound propositions which can be evaluated outside of oneself, independently of desire/belief, with reason, with logic, etc. then it is objective. It isnt valid to tack on and it has to be about some sort of instrumentally measurable concrete entity...nah.
I am glad you gave this example, so I can clarify how it is not analogous to my examples and is not an example of something which has intrinsic value.
If one removes the beliefs and desires they have about the Grand Canyon and views it, they will no longer feel any awe about it; thusly, the Grand Canyon itself is not innately motivating them. This is just extrinsic value, like when a person is motivated to workout or play basketball, because the thing itself is not, per its nature, a source of motivation.
Now, in colloquial speech, we may say things like I was motivated to workout because of the documentary I saw about body-building, but this is mistaken if taken literally: if the desires and beliefs that the person has about everything relevant to the documentary on body-building and then they watched it, then they would certainly not be motivated to workout (because of it). It is their interpretation of the documentary, of the Grand Canyon, that is the source of motivation; and so this is a form of extrinsic value, because the value one assigns the Grand Canyon is relative to some subjective purpose that the person has for it (e.g., one is motivated to value to the grand canyon because, for example, they like the feeling of being in awe).
Now, to provide ample clarification, the feeling of awe does have intrinsic value, although the Grand Canyon does not, because if one removes all the desires and beliefs a person has about the feeling of awe while they are having it, the feeling of awe, as per its nature, will motivate them, to some degree, to value it.
Bob
I would also like to mention that even with the idea of 'objectivity' requiring publicity of the empirical content, it is still possible to analyze what mind-independent 'things' motivate subjects---by study of the brain, psychology, sociology, the nature of the mind-independent thing, etc. ... none of this is dependent on subjective experience, although it is entirely possible to acquire the same knowledge from the "subjective side" as you put it.
Logically this is equivalent to noting that subjectivity is defined negatively in relation to objectivity. Objectivity and subjectivity in the general sense are binary. If you're being objective, you're not beings subjective and vice-versa. I'm not sure how this point is anything new, its part of the fundamental relationship between the two concepts.
Quoting Bob Ross
Are you saying that whatever type of premises we stick inside of a syllogism, are now objective because the structure of a syllogism is objective? That's fundamentally wrong. If I have as a premise, "I believe the color blue is the best color in the world," its true, but still a subjective belief. Subjective and objective premises can be evaluated as true or false. That doesn't change the fact they are subjective or objective.
Same with the structure of what a premise or syllogism is. These are objective structures. That does not suddenly make what the premises contain objective. If I understand what you're saying, you're claiming that anything within a syllogism is objective because the structure of a syllogism or premise is itself objective. If true, that's simply incorrect. Let me know if I have the correct understanding of this.
Quoting Bob Ross
Incorrect. The truth or falsity of subjectivity and objectivity are irrelevant to what they are. The contents of a premise can be objective or subjective based on what they are claiming.
Quoting Bob Ross
Partially Correct. Upon reviewing that paragraph I neglected to include the conclusion. The old man concludes that smoking is safe for people based on his own experiences. Yes, it is objectively true that the old man has never gotten cancer, but it is his conclusion that is subjective because it relies on the old mans' personal experience, or anecdote. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument, not an objective one.
Quoting Bob Ross
You are drawing an incorrect conclusion from my example. If a phenomenal quality can be confirmed independently of one's subjective experience, it is objective. If I claim, "I like the color blue," you know its true, but no one else can get inside of your head to confirm that you actually have the experience of liking it. If you say, "That color is blue," we can confirm it independently of our own subjective experience of 'blue'.
Same with me claiming "Because my favorite color is blue, everyone's favorite color is blue." The conclusion is drawn from a purely subjective experience. Whether its true or not is irrelevant. The argument is drawn and concluded from a subjective viewpoint, not an objective viewpoint. Therefore the argument is a subjective argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
At this point it seems like all states of intrinsic value are simply what we feel. I'm going to make two requests for your next post.
1. What's an example of an object that has intrinsic value? Not our emotional states. Most of your core examples seem to do with pain, awe, etc., or our personal emotions. I'm having a hard time seeing how you're not simply describing personal emotions demanding attention and action instead of the objects themselves.
2. You claim your value morality is objective. As you've noted, I've been giving both subjective and objective examples of arguments. Now its your turn. Write me an argument for your value morality that is subjective under your view. This will help me to see how you view subjectivity and objectivity beyond the abstract. There should be no barrier to this.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm not saying its not. But you need to give a specific example and not just a claim that we can. I've given some examples that would fit this, but it doesn't mean they work for your theory. How do you specifically evaluate the intrinsic value of things without requiring subjective viewpoints? How would a psychologist objectively conclude that X has intrinsic value?
No.
By structure of a syllogism is [being] objective, you are referring to the form of the syllogism being valid (i.e., that it is logically consistent, has a minor and major premise, and the conclusion is necessitated by the premises) but that the premise itself is expressing something objective is to say that its truthity is NOT relative to subjective dispositions (e.g., this is green as opposed to I think this is green).
An argument is objective if all of its premises express something objective.
1. No objects have intrinsic value that I am aware of, although they may exist (I guess, since I cannot technically eliminate their possibility).
2. Not all states that have intrinsic value are constituted of emotionse.g., a state of indifference.
An example of an argument that contains two premises that express something objective (and thusly is objective itself):
P1: A thing that is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid or acquire it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it) has intrinsic value.
P2: The state of pain is not a mind and motivates a mind to avoid it (despite that mind's conative or cognitive disposition towards it).
C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.
An example of an argument that contains two premises that express something subjective (and thusly is subjective itself):
P1: A thing that I desire to have intrinsic value has it.
P2: I desire that the state of pain has intrinsic value.
C: Therefore, the state of pain has intrinsic value.
An example of an argument that contains one premise that expresses something objective and one that expresses something subjective (and thusly is a subjective argument):
P1: If I believe that a unicorn exists, then it exists. [Expresses something objective]
P2: I believe that a unicorn exists. [Expresses something subjective]
C: Therefore, a unicorn exists.
Thats fine, as long as it is noted that the claim itself was objective (that he had not gotten cancer from smoking).
One would evaluate whether or not the thing is a source of motivation and is not itself a subject; and this can be done by analyzing other people than oneself OR oneself through an unbiased lens.
This would not be specifically a psychologists job, as this endeavor would require knowledge from multiple different sciencessuch as sociology, biology, etc.
One would need to understand peoples general psychologies, sociology, and biology to better distinguish something which one is motivated towards due to their disposition vs. what is externally motivating. E.g., one person may have an extreme dispositional towards a thing, a society may view a thing as extremely important, etc.
Bob
Ok, we might be getting closer here. I think I might finally be understanding what you're implying, but as always, correct me where needed. :) "This is green" is only objective if we know there are objective ways to determine that 'that' is 'green'. There is an implicit understanding in that sentence. The problem with your argument is we don't know if there is an objective way to say, 'This has implicit value." I think what you're saying is if you can craft an argument that's worded without addressing this question.
Let me put it another way.
1. An evil demon exists.
2. Evil demons always compel people to do wrong.
3. Therefore if people do wrong, it might be an evil demon.
As I noted with your argument earlier, this argument is incomplete. The first thing I would ask is, "What's an evil demon?" Then, "How do we know an evil demon exists?" Those need answers, and I would not be able to call this argument objective or subjective until I got them. If you're crafting an incomplete argument and calling it objective while having incompletely defined words, or refusing to answer questions which would let us know whether the premises are concluded by objective or subjective means, its objectivity or subjectivity is not really assessable.
I (hopefully) see our differences now. This reminds me of a similar problem I ran into when learning and teaching math. Let me see if I can show you.
Solve for X: 2X + 1 = 3
2x = 2
2x/2 = 2/2
Conclusion x = 1
The answer is correct, and to a mind who knows that you get 2x = 2 by doing the implicit step of:
2x + 1 -1 = 3 -1, this is a full and logical argument. The problem I would run into in math tutorials was often times implicit steps like this were skipped. My students would note this, and I would have to adapt and make these implicit steps explicit for them to understand.
For a person who knows how 2x=2 happened, the implicit step does not need to be made explicit. Lets go one step further. None of us need a primer to know what 2X is. We've already learned that. Its an implicit step that if listed, would be redundant and a waste of time for both of us. But if you introduced this to a person who said, "I don't know what 2X is," your argument is incomplete for them.
Now, imagine that the person asks, "What does X mean?" and you replied, "It can't quite be defined, its a fundamental that we simply understand," I would be scratching my head because, "But at the end x = 1. Isn't that a number?" If you replied "No, you just have to understand it" then I am right in saying, "Then this is a subjective argument.".
I'm posting it this way because the argument to solve for X is correct and objective if we know all the other objective implicit information that goes along with it. So lets assume that your argument is correct Bob. Its missing steps for me as a reader to see how you arrive at your conclusion. How can we say value is objective when it can't be defined apart from our 'innate understanding? How do you claim that this is objective when every example given so far has been about subjective feelings?
So from your viewpoint, maybe you're seeing something implicit and obvious that doesn't need to be explicated. Either that, or you're unaware there is something implicit underlying your argument that you have not realized. Your readers will help you see that. Remember that this is your idea, and its your job to convince the readers that it makes sense. You could have the perfect idea, but if its implicit steps are not fully explored, a reader is going to think its faulty or subjective. And from their viewpoint? They are going to be right.
I want you to recall some of past conversations over my own writing. Not that I am perfect, but I always intended to follow certain rules. Nothing you asked was too small or stupid. Maybe a question was too complex or out of order, and another concept had to be explained first, but I tried to never shelve a question or point and not come back to it later. If I tried explaining it to you one way and it didn't make sense to you, I tried another example or approach. Because sometimes the writer doesn't understand the implicit step that they're missing as well. A good conversation allows both the writer and reader to catch steps like this and hopefully makes the argument better. If the reader is trying to understand, and cannot despite your explanations, in extremely rare cases its the limitations of the student. 99 times out of 100 its the teaching.
Looking at your example of an objective and subjective argument, all you did was repeat your definition of implicit vs explicit. That didn't answer my question. I asked you to create a claim for intrinsic value that contained the same result, but was from a subjective viewpoint. Just like, "I know green because I experience green," (turns out they are colorblind) vs "I know this is green because of the wavelength." So the examples didn't help me. Its like if I asked, "How did you go from 2X + 1 = 3 to 2x = 2", and all you did was repeat the steps I already have in front of me. It doesn't help.
You cannot overexplain a new concept or theory, but you can very much under explain it. My discussion with you has never even gotten to 'flourishing', because there are steps from my view point that are necessary for me to even start thinking about your conclusion.
Look at when I asked this as well:
Quoting Bob Ross
The answer is underexplained. How are we analyzing other people? Are we analyzing them through their subjective feelings about the source of motivation? Are we measuring things like people actions when faced with the source of intrinsic value? What process are we using to determine that someone is viewing oneself through an unbiased lens? You're missing steps that need answering for this to be a complete explanation if you're going to claim this is objective.
Quoting Bob Ross
This answer essentially says, "I don't know." This is a supposition. We need at least one example from you that a psychologist could at least start with. For example: "Here's the method I propose which works with this one individual. Now we would need to repeat this method thousands of times to make sure that the results stay consistent, and that is out of the scope of what I can do here." Otherwise you don't know, which is fine to admit in an argument.
Finally lets look at this question and reply:
Quoting Bob Ross
Point one is incomplete. How can we not eliminate their possibility? If this is an objective argument, you should demonstrate a situation in which there would be a doubt, vs the times when we're certain it does not have objective value.
Point 2 doesn't counter my point that I'm just seeing this as an analysis of our emotions, and whether they compel us to action. Indifference does not compel us to action, (or does it compel us not to act?) and fits within the point I made. This would be a good time to dig in and demonstrate how this is not merely an analysis of emotions and how we are most likely to respond to them. Because you did not, I as the reader am going to view my interpretation as unchallenged.
I hope you know how much I respect you Bob, and I can tell that emotionally, there's something you really value and see here. If you still see some value on it, keep working on it. Currently your explanation and walkthrough is unclear and incomplete to me. If you want to keep trying to make it clearer through other examples and explanations, we can keep trying. If you feel you've reached your end and you can't explain it any other way, that's also fine. My personal agreement is not contingent on your argument, and I will end this with a salute your way whenever you are ready. :)
I would like to disclaim that, as always, I appreciate your feedback and critiques! It is rare on this forum to find a person that is willingly think about an idea in depth, and give thoughtful responses; and you are one them (:
I think that your use of the more colloquial meanings of objective and subjective is causing you to fall into a muddied trap; which is why you are incapable of understanding why an analysis of these sort of states (which only alive beings can have) is an objective analysis. I say that with all due respect, and assuming fully that you completely disagree (; , and hopefully I can help expound my thoughts on this.
I greatly appreciate your elaboration on your idea of incompleteness with respect to arguments, because it allowed me to understand better where your head is it. Theres some things worth noting.
1. You must remember that by argument we are discussing a formal argument in the strictest sense of the word: a syllogism. We are not talking about informal arguments (or at least I wasnt).
2. Formal arguments (i.e., syllogisms) are not subjective because they are incomplete (in the sense that you mean: that they are not a full account of exactly why a conclusion is true): they are subjective if a premises truthity is relative to subjective dispositions. I outlined this in my examples before, so please bring them up if you need clarification on what I mean here.
3. A formal argument (i.e., a syllogism) is not itself incomplete because it is incomplete (in the sense that you mean). This is a common mistake outside of philosophy that people make: it is not valid to claim a syllogismwhich is logically sound, consists of a major and minor premise and a conclusion, and has its conclusion necessitated if the premises are trueis invalid because the reader, or recipient, requires further elaboration on a premise to understand it. A complete syllogism is comprised of a major premise, minor premise, and a conclusion that is necessitated therefrom.
4. There are good reasons philosophers stick to syllogisms, or pseudo-syllogism, and do not attempt an elaborate expounding of the position they are arguing for. Firstly, what you are noting is a deficiency in the understanding of the reader and not the syllogism itself; and, thusly, it is impractical to provide the exact amount of elaboration needed to expound the view because the knowledge a person comes in with, as a reader, varies. Secondly, to have a complete argument, in the sense you described, is impossible; and I can demonstrate it. For every premise I give, a person can validly ask for clarification; thusly, there is no end to the length of an argument that is fully complete. To take your math example, even if you added the implicit step of 2x + 1 1 = 3 1, they can still ask for a proof of that as well (and are perfectly within their rights to)(but more on that example later, because I dont think that is what you are trying to convey with that example).
I think what you are trying to convey is that there are implicit steps in this proof: but there arent any in my syllogism I gave you. Asking what is intrinsic value? in the proof that pain has intrinsic value is not an demonstration of an implicit step being skipped. If there were an implicit step in the syllogism, then you would be able to demonstrate that the syllogism is not logically valid; thats how you know.
So, in short, I think you are confusing the need for further clarification (for a particular learner) with having implicit steps in an argument. An implicit step is in the logic, not the content, of the argument.
Some things worth noting:
1. That argument, unlike mine, is not a valid syllogism; so I surprised you used it. What you said is:
P1: p.
P2: q.
C: z ? t
The logic is incredibly unsound. Heres an example of your example that is a valid syllogism:
P1: If an evil demon exists and evil demons always compel people to do wrong, then if a person does something wrong, then it could be an evil demon that compelled them to do it. [p ? q]
P2: An evil demon exists and evil demons always compel people to do wrong. [p]
C: Therefore, if a person does something wrong, it could be an evil demon that compelled them to do it. [q]{ Modus Ponens }
2. What makes your example argument incomplete, is not that you dont understand what an evil demon is: thats just a limitation you happen to have in terms of your knowledge. It is not the arguers job, when explicating a general argument, to write out a book on everything that a person may not understand: there job is to provide a quick and dirty argument, that is logically sound, for a particular conclusion. Syllogisms are entry-arguments into discussions. That you dont understand what an evil demon is, has no bearing on if the argument provided was objective nor complete itself.
The last thing I would like to note for now, is that an analysis of emotions is not subjective when one is analyzing their natures. The nature of an emotion is objective, because it is not dependent on what a subject desires or believes about it. For example, I can strongly hate the idea of what hate is, but that doesnt change what hate actually is. I dont get to say: I hate it, so now hate is really joy because I like joy. Nope. So I hope you can see how the study of emotions is not subjective.
Secondly, not all states are emotionsnot even the ones I have given you up to this point. For example, the state of flourishing is clearly not an emotion.
I know you have a philosophical background, so I would like to say that if you are familiar with Aristotelian ethics, then it is worth mentioning that my view has many similarities to it (and of course many differences). If you are familiar with it, then it may make sense to you when I say that a state of eudamonia (1) is not a state of emotion and (2) is not subjective. If you arent familiar with Aristotle, then no worries...just thought you may be since you have such a background.
Bob
Quoting Bob Ross
True, but this isn't a formal philosophy paper. Its a discussion forum where you have a reader asking for elaboration. And prior to publication, there's usually high levels of review with potentially months of rewrites and careful citations. Its just you and me Bob!
From my view a syllogism is a tool to formalize an argument, but it is not the argument itself, especially on an informal philosophy board. The argument is what I'm addressing.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm not claiming you need an infinite set of validation. I've noted your argument is not complete enough for me to understand the logic that you're undertaking, and I'm not trying to needle in on any gotchas. Again, if you're unable to reach me or convey the idea you see accurately, it doesn't mean the argument is wrong. But from my point, what I do see is subjective to me, and I'm not seeing clear arguments that show otherwise.
Quoting Bob Ross
I see it as vague and seems to be a blend of words without underlying concepts. Pointing out you may be missing implicit steps is just something to think about. As your student of your philosophy here, its not adding up to me, but I'm trying to help you show me otherwise.
Quoting Bob Ross
If it is spoken about objectively, yes. If we would say, "Hate feels like this objectively," it would be wrong. If we say, "Hate is intense feeling of wanting to destroy something without remorse," then it can be seen as objective. We aren't describing the personal intensity or feeling of experiencing hate, but describing hate in terms of actions that a person will take.
The "nature" of a thing is a bit outdated of a term, and again, something I would want fully detailed in a good conversation. By nature you could mean, "reality" which just 'is'. What just 'is' could be, but often is not the same as what is known. Objective and subjective arguments are not about what 'is', but about the approach we take to claims of belief and knowledge. I prefer the 'definition' of the thing to its 'nature'.
But we're not studying emotions, we're studying 'value'. How you define value is through other people's emotional evaluation of something. That is by definition, subjective. If you defined value something like, "The emotion, rational decision, or societal context that causes humans to preserve, protect, or promote actions or states of being relative to other actions or states of being," then we would have something we could start with that we could objectively evaluate. Stating, "Value is an indefinable concept, we just know it innately" means its a subjectively defined word.
Quoting Bob Ross
True, but to get to flourishing you first need the steps of defining value, then intrinsic value, and showing how we can objectively determine it. It seems like flourishing is a step you consider after establishing all of those basics. I mean, we all like flourishing. We all want flourishing to be good. But feelings are not objective proof.
Quoting Bob Ross
I read Aristotle a very long time ago now. Let me tell you what I learned overall by reading many different philosophies. Any philosophy that was considered good enough for objective measure has been turned into a science. What you are reading are the leftovers, the failures. They are fantastic references to see where humanity has already explored and found to be a dead end. If you want to use some aspect of them that you still think are valuable (after all, its the end that's a failure, not some of the parts necessarily) then its best to make it your own and clearly explain to the audience what you mean.
You've seen this as well in your past posts. You reference one part of an older philosopher's work, and suddenly everyone has their opinion of that philosopher's end work, when you just want to talk about the part. Not explicitly telling people that these are often old, outdated, and ultimately philosophies that could not take the step to science, is in my opinion, philosophies' greatest failure as a study. It elevates the wrong points to discuss, does not explicitly teach the lessons it has learned, and does not clearly tell its students, "You are studying our failures."
So, one of the reasons why I engage so much (thank you by the way, you do as well!) is that I do not apply outside philosophical work to your work, I apply logic and discussions to your ideas. Its your definitions, your thoughts, and your outlook, not Aristotle's. Everything that can be said about Aristotle has likely already been said. But not everything about your idea has been said. :) Good discussion Bob, feel free to cap it.
No worries and sounds good!
I dont know what you mean by argument: it seems like you are just using it as a catch-all term for whatever a position entails.
That you need more information to understand it, does not make it incompletethats all I was noting before.
If theres more from me that you require, then I am more than happy to give it: just ask!
Thats because, with all due respect, you dont have a clear understanding of what an argument is. You have just been using it as a vague term for what the position is expounding.
Because you are using the term so vacuously, I cannot respond adequately to the critique. If theres something specifically subjective about my argument, then please elaborate on it.
Do you now see how a study of the natures of emotion is objective, then?
By nature, I mean the essence of a thing; and this is surely not outdated at all.
Are you claiming this, or thinking I am claiming this?
Another issue I think you are having, is that you are not grasping the difference between a concept and its use. Determining whether or not something has value, and to what degree, has no relevance to whether or not we can verbally explicate the concept of value.
Moreover, that a concept is indefinable (in the sense of properly, verbally, explicating its meaning) does not entail it has no meaning; nor that that meaning is subjective. You are using subjective way too liberally (and vaguely) here.
Value is to have worth. Subjects assign value (worth) to things. Intrinsic value is value assigned to a thing in proportion to how intrinsically motivating it is. The state of flourishing is intrinsically valuable, because it motivates, as per its nature, towards its acquisition and preservation. We can determine this through (1) experience of the state (or similar ones) and (2) observance of other people in different states: we observe, based off of our knowledge of beings, how likely it is that the said thing is motivational independently of any subjective disposition about it and which are not. Other than expounding more how to differentiate the two, I cannot be any clearer; because it cannot possibly be any clearer than this.
You are right insofar as there are always improvements to be made to any position, and wrong insofar as most of the most influential (and long-lastingly true) ideas were written long ago. It is a mistake to think that everything done in the past is a failure.
True.
I dont think it is possible to turn most of philosophy into a science, because it is that which is predicated for science in the first place. Scientism never worked, nor will it ever work. Most of the fundamental studies are by necessity non-scientific.
Bob