The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile?
Purpose is a property of life and becomes a concept when intelligent minds recognize it.
Every snail crawling up a wall has a purpose: to find algea that may be clinging there, to find shelter from the drying sun, or dampness a hiding place from birds. The underlying purpose of all these short-term goals is to prolong and improve its life.
However complicated the mind and the life-form to which it belongs, it has short term goals to serve an underlying purpose: to prolong and improve its life.
But only humans have the audacity to project the need for a purpose on the world, even the universe.
Ultimate underlying meaning and significance is something only humans demand of anything.
They seek it in vain, so they make something up.
I am skeptical that there is any one ultimate "purpose" which is the sole source of feelings of meaning and significance in our lives. It seems to me that there is a plurality of factors - friends and family, love, personal projects, beauty, knowledge, sports, etc. - that contribute to the flourishing of a human life which we might very well not be able to ground in some ultimate purpose in a way that is not trivial.
Now given that we recognize this plurality of values, there are a couple of things one might ask. First, one might inquire what is the source of our association of values with these experiences or activities and I think this question is one that might be most aptly answered by some evolutionary account. Further phenomenological analyses might also bring light to what it is exactly that we value about different experiences.
Secondly, someone who is currently feeling down and unable to find value in their own life might hope for an answer or medicine for their plight. These people I would first and foremost refer to psychotherapists and other experts who might best be able to diagnose their particular problems and help them solve their own problems. It is also possible that these people might find solace in some life philosophy, such as stoicism or existentialism, but I find it equally likely that the key to their lock might be found in a number of different activies like painting, running or reconnecting with nature.
Thirdly, one might ask the properly philosophical questions "But what really makes for a meaningful life?" or "How should we live?". The answers to these questions might identify ways to live that differ in significant ways from the previous list of experiences and activities that we find valuable. For example, an extreme utilitarian might possibly think it appropriate to devalue their families and commit their lives to producing "the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people". Nevertheless, I personally find that the most convincing answers to these questions are ones that, in addition to perhaps offering some ethical imperatives, recognize what we already find valuable and offer us ways to better manage these sources of value, as I find the case to be with Aristotle's works on ethics.
And purpose comes with or is invented by mind. Bottom line, purpose is boot-strapped.
I think we can say with some certainty that whatever purpose is, it is not bootstrapped. It is something that precedes and goes before us; something that transcends us; something that beckons to us; something we participate in. It is not something we invent or produce; it is something we discover or encounter.
there exists an X such that 1) X provides purpose in the world, and 2) if there be no X, then there is no purpose,
There is no X such that X provides the rowness to the ducks, rather it is the relations between the ducks that sometimes has the form of a row; it is not an extra something in addition to the ducks.
Should I understand from your reply that you hold that there is no "ultimate underlying meaning and significance"?
Correct. Purpose requires will - either that of the living entity with internal goals, or an external entity that has power to exert its will over that of the subject. Inanimate objects have no desires, no will or aims, but they can be purposed to the aims of life-form that can exert its will upon them.
A pebble has no purpose of its own, but a crow can use it as a tool. Life-forms can also be used by an external will with the power to override their own. The purpose of a pig is to keep living and produce offspring. Man re-purposes pigs for his food.
I happen to think there is, but only as a product of mind,
If there were gods, they could find uses both for animate and inanimate objects; if the gods were powerful, they could override the will of intelligent life-forms. If they were powerful enough and wished to, they could find uses for the universe.
By "reverse" I do not know if you mean: "If world then maybe mind," which would be trivial, or, "If world then mind," which would not be trivial, but that I might ask you to support, somehow.
Simply: No world, no mind(s).
But then, I'm no longer sure that you refer to "the world" not as the universe, but as some image or model that doesn't exist.
I mean that minds are minuscule ephemeral sparks in a vast cosmos of billions of suns. Minds are dependent on the bodies that contain them and those bodies are dependent on their ecosystems which are dependent on their planet, which are dependent on their sun. Minds are trivial.
The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile?
Isn't purpose contingent on culture and language - an indication of worldviews and values and how we like to privilege our time? I've generally held that there is no intrinsic meaning or purpose and that purpose can be found in destruction as much as creation. No doubt there are evolutionary advantages in many forms of purpose (social cohesion, reproduction, survival, wellbeing) and perhaps people often follow a purpose they are not fully convinced of, but undertake that path out of obligation and enculturation. I don't think purpose is necessarily rewarding or worthwhile to the person pursuing it.
Where does it come from? Being human, the act of making sense and having to make choices.
But then, I'm no longer sure that you refer to "the world" not as the universe, but as some image or model that doesn't exist.
I mean that minds are minuscule ephemeral sparks in a vast cosmos of billions of suns. Minds are dependent on the bodies that contain them and those bodies are dependent on their ecosystems which are dependent on their planet, which are dependent on their sun. Minds are trivial.
That is one way to think about it. The other is that absent minds the Universe is 'blind'there is nothing that can experience anythingthere is no beauty, no poetry, no compassion, no love and also no ugliness, no doggerel, no cruelty, no hatred. In a way the mindless universe would be as good, or bad, as non-existence.
... do you suppose that there might be something primordial, in the sense of an idea and not necessarily temporally, on which purpose is founded and out of which it arises.
How might we demonstrate this? My intuition is that the organizing principles organisms employ to survive build purpose and meaning. We seek comfort and sustenance - these are achieved through purposeful goal setting and may eventually becoming culture.
That is one way to think about it. The other is that absent minds the Universe is 'blind'there is nothing that can experience anythingthere is no beauty, no poetry, no compassion, no love and also no ugliness, no doggerel, no cruelty, no hatred. In a way the mindless universe would be as good, or bad, as non-existence.
Well, yes. No mind is insignificant to itself, bot neither is any mind in a position to affect the universe much. The universe is whatever it is. I don't know that it's blind and stupid, but I know that we alone care about the things we care about. If our minds didn't exist, who would miss the poetry etc?
Also, we humans, who think so very highly of the mind don't seem particularly concerned with preserving or supporting even the minds of our own species, let alone all the other kinds.
Well, yes. The universe is whatever it is. I don't know that it's blind and stupid, but I know that we alone care about the things we care about. If our minds didn't exist, who would miss the poetry etc?
Also, we humans, who think so very highly of the mind don't seem particularly concerned with preserving or supporting even the minds of our species, let alone all the other kinds.
Are you suggesting that perhaps the Universe absent any and all percipients might not be blind and might even be intelligent? In that case would that not qualify it as being somehow mindful?
And yes, I agree that we who do understand ourselves as possessing minds are in many ways blind and stupidfar more so than the other animals it would seem.
Its often said not in so many words that there exists an X such that 1) X provides purpose in the world, and 2) if there be no X, then there is no purpose, that the world is without purpose. By purpose I tentatively mean, subject to adjustment, that which gives ultimate underlying meaning and significance.
Hi Tim - splendid question. In response to the first part, consider this snippet (originally from David Bentley Hart's review of a book by Daniel Dennett, but serves admirably as a summary of the nub of the issue):
In the pre-modern vision of things, the cosmos had been seen as an inherently purposive structure of diverse but integrally inseparable rational relations for instance, the Aristotelian aitia, which are conventionally translated as causes, but which are nothing like the uniform material causes of the mechanistic philosophy. And so the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect. Hence the mind, rather than an anomalous tenant of an alien universe, was instead the most concentrated and luminous expression of natures deepest essence. This is why it could pass with such wanton liberty through the veil of Isis and ever deeper into natures inner mysteries.
I think the crucial change to the modern worldview co-incided with the scientific revolution and the advent of Galilean and Newtonian physics. The perspectival shift wasn't necessarily an intended consequence of that, but the world concieved as comprising fundamentally material bodies obeying solely physical laws, discernable by objective science, was a momentious shift in the conception of the Universe (and I won't say 'the Cosmos', because the Cosmos is by definition 'a unified whole', and today's universe is not that.)
The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile?
So, in the context of pre-modern philosophy, it was simply assumed that everything exists for a reason, and that this reason is discernable by nous, intellect. The philosopher, in particular, was one who discerned reason, but in the pre-modern sense, which included the telos of particulars, the reason why they came into being in the first place. Whereas the naturalist account comprises trying to discern only a material causal sequence, leaving out the broader sense of reason as the ancients understood it.
An anticipation of this distinction can actually be found in the Phaedo:
[quote=IEP;https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/#:~:text=One%20day%20after%20his%20initial%20setbacks]One day...Socrates happened to hear of Anaxagoras view that Mind directs and causes all things. He took this to mean that everything was arranged for the best. Therefore, if one wanted to know the explanation of something, one only had to know what was best for that thing. Suppose, for instance, that Socrates wanted to know why the heavenly bodies move the way they do. Anaxagoras would show him how this was the best possible way for each of them to be. And once he had taught Socrates what the best was for each thing individually, he then would explain the overall good that they all share in common. Yet upon studying Anaxagoras further, Socrates found these expectations disappointed. It turned out that Anaxagoras did not talk about Mind as cause at all, but rather about air and ether and other mechanistic explanations. For Socrates, however, this sort of explanation was simply unacceptable:
"To call those things causes is too absurd. If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. (99a-b)"[/quote]
And in much ancient philosophy, it was taken for granted that there was, as Hart says, a kind of sympathy between nous and Cosmos. Again, the particular ability of the philosopher or sage was to discern this relationship. It is, of course, vastly different when mind is regarded as a consequence or output of the very material processes which it is seeking to discern - it reverses the perspective, which creates 'the hard problem'.
My own answer, briefly, is that the lights come on when mind is. No mind no world. And purpose comes with or is invented by mind
However, you also ought to consider that purpose or intentional action also comes into existence with the very most primitive organisms, which act with purpose to preserve their existence. This is one of the insights of biosemiotics, and (from phenomenology) the idea of the 'lebenswelt' or living-world of organisms: their world (and ours) comprises lived meaning, which are neither precisely 'in' the world or 'in' the mind but arise as an interplay of self-and-world. Whereas, the objective stance naively assumes that the world really exists as no mind perceives it - the so-called 'mind-independent world' - and it is the sciences' task to ever enlarge the understanding of that, not seeing the hidden metaphysical flaw that this entails. (Although as noted, biosemiotics, and also phenomenology, are aware of that, an awareness which is gradually expanding.)
Well, it exists, not as a thing but as an idea. Consider your experience/understanding/use/description of a tree. And what is that to the universe? All this is being just the point/problem of Kant's thing-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself.
Huh? My understanding of a tree has no influence on the universe or the existence of trees. Does thing-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself mean anything? Quoting tim wood
Does it? It may require will to act on it, to actualize it. Unless purpose and action are indistinguishable - but that seems untenable.
You need a body to actualize the purpose of the will. Quoting tim wood
Let's suppose you have neighbors that offend you. Why don't you shoot them?
How does that come into it? If I have neighbours who offend me, there is a huge range of possible reactions that don't involve shooting. How doe this relate to a purpose? Quoting tim wood
But how would that answer reconcile with "purpose?"
Whatever my feeling was about the neighbours, I would then have to formulate an appropriate response. I'd have to decide what I want (will), then devise a plan of action to achieve what I want (purpose). Quoting tim wood
If purpose implies choice,
It doesn't imply. It is simply the aim or goal to get or accomplish something desired. Purpose, aim, goal, intent, plan all precede action. A purpose may also be conferred upon implements made or co-opted to achieve a goal, aim, plan or intent. Quoting tim wood
Purpose then, the imperative to do the right thing, as best I can figure and do.
Whatever the "right thing" is in any situation is a reasonable purpose to have. I'm also reasonably sure it is not a universal imperative.
Are you suggesting that perhaps the Universe absent any and all percipients might not be blind and might be intelligent? In that case would that not qualify it as being somehow mindful?
Probably. I don't claim that the universe has a mind of its own; I just don't know that it doesn't.
If it does, it's as unlikely to care - crave or miss - our poetry and cruelty, as we are unlikely to crave or miss the cultural touchstones of Centurian termites.
Probably. I don't claim that the universe has a mind of its own; I just don't know that it doesn't.
If it does, it's as unlikely to care - crave or miss - our poetry and cruelty, as we are unlikely to crave or miss the cultural touchstones of Centurian termites.
If the universe has a mind of its own, might that mind not be vaster, more capacious, more compassionate than our own. If it were aware of our poetry and our cruelty, might it not value the former and lament the latter, far more so than we do ourselves?
How would we possibly assess the likelihood of either possibility? As to us valuing or caring about termites, it would seem that it is not outside the realm of human possibility.
So, in the context of pre-modern philosophy, it was simply assumed that everything exists for a reason, and that this reason is discernable by nous, intellect.
But was the assumption warranted? Was it not simply a stage of culture? Obviously there are some nostalgic, romantic projects that wish to overturn the modern world and its perceived bereftness but I think a good argument for this seems to be elusive. It all generally coalesces around the idea: "Oh, isn't the modern period hideously ugly and consumerist.' No doubt the premodern period was hideously ugly in its own ways, transcendent meaning or not.
Whereas the naturalist account comprises trying to discern only a material causal sequence, leaving out the broader sense of reason as the ancients understood it.
But what's the case that this is warranted? Why does it matter what the ancients thought?
Please make your case. Or, of your certainty, such as it is, if it is, may I have some? Or if you mean psychologically, then, absent further argument, I don't think it's a useful point.
Haven't I offered just as much "further argument" as you have? My primary point was that your claim flies in the face of general consensus. Claims that do that require more "further argument" than claims that don't.
What I would say, though, is that if you talk to anyone who is reputed to know about purpose, and how to help people find purpose, they will not follow your lead of "bootstrapping" or conjuring up purpose ex nihilo. The phrase itself is informative, "I am having trouble finding purpose," not, "I am having trouble making purpose."
If the universe has a mind of its own, might that mind not be vaster, more capacious, more compassionate than our own.
Or cold, mean and indifferent. It doesn't matter which, unless and until the universe reveals its preference and purpose in action - and we probably wouldn't recognize its intent even then. Quoting Janus
As to us valuing or caring about termites, it would seem that it is not outside the realm of human possibility.
We might care about the Earth ones. I did say Centaurian termites: we don't know whether there is any such thing.
I think we're at cross purposes due to having different ideas of "purpose."
Oxford's idea is: 1. "the reason for which something is done or created or for which something exists."
2. "have as one's intention or objective."
3. a person's sense of resolve or determination.
I usually just go by the dictionary meaning; otherwise, it's a guessing-game. Quoting tim wood
If not yourself, likely you can imagine someone wondering what the meaning and purpose of his or her life is, or life in general.
Lots of people do that. I suppose they're hoping to be significant, important, and they want an outside authority (God, Fate, Destiny, The Great River...) to imbue them with that significance. It's a whole lot easier than finding your own. Quoting tim wood
To the degree they ask, they're asking for something, and when they stop asking, a reasonable conjecture is that they stopped because they no longer had a need to ask.
That's a reasonable conjecture, assuming you know that they've stopped asking. It's possible that they found their purpose. Another reasonably conjecture is that, having received no answer, they gave up. Or became convinced that there isn't one. Or invented a purpose for themselves. Or somebody with a stronger will imposed one on them.
Very few questions of psychology have only two possible answers. Quoting tim wood
As to the existence of trees, I claim there is no such thing as a tree,
Nevertheless, I suggest you don't stand under the figment of one during the figment of a thunderstorm.
It's a collective term by which we refer to not specifically named members of a category of things. Language is fun to bend and twist for poetry, not so much for intelligible communication.
Good point, well said! But if not boot-strapped, then from what? Religion? Faith? Belief? Knowledge? Hope? Reason? That is, I disagree, and "finding" one of the great deceptions, often from those selling something. Purpose, then, has to be made, but no easy way to figure out how, or exactly what. . Ex nihilo because there is no other possible source - or do you know of such a source?
I think the fact that it cannot be made is what makes it elusive. If purpose could be made then it would make sense to ask for the recipe.
Good point, well said! But if not boot-strapped, then from what? Religion? Faith? Belief? Knowledge? Hope? Reason? That is, I disagree, and "finding" one of the great deceptions, often from those selling something. Purpose, then, has to be made, but no easy way to figure out how, or exactly what. . Ex nihilo because there is no other possible source - or do you know of such a source?
Quite simply, God is the source of purpose. Those who do not believe in God have a big hole in their capacity for understanding, because the purpose we know and observe, seems to have no purpose when we do not recognize God. When we come to apprehend the reality of God then all that purpose makes sense. And the atheists think the theists are being unreasonable, but it's really the other way around because the atheists are denying themselves the capacity to understand, and that is being unreasonable.
And the atheists think the theists are being unreasonable, but it's really the other way around because the atheists are denying themselves the capacity to understand, and that is being unreasonable.
I am an atheist but I don't think theists are being unreasonable.
Would you agree with me that teleology is an ancient attempt to make sense and that it is not of any great use today, nor since, say, Christians persuaded the world that God made nature? Or at least since Galileo?
However, you also ought to consider that purpose or intentional action also comes into existence with the very most primitive organisms, which act with purpose to preserve their existence.
Wayfarer
And if I call this an anthropomorphic attribution?
Not at all. It's the signal difference between any living and non-living thing. A crystal does nothing itself to maintain itself or to grow, even if it persists and grows. A cell must continuously act in order to do the same.
It all generally coalesces around the idea: "Oh, isn't the modern period hideously ugly and consumerist.'
That is a caricature, and also not very perceptive. The modern world, and modern culture, offer more opportunities for growth, exploration, fulfilment, and individuation than any previous era. It is an incredible time to be alive. But it has it's shadow side, the things it doesn't see, or has lost, without really recalling what. (Although there is also no doubt that a great deal of modern consumer culture, like the Pacific Ocean's great Garbage Patch, *is* hideously ugly.)
Above I tried to say that my purpose is to be good (and not bad) and to be as perfect as chance will allow. But even with that, I have the question as to why that would become either a purpose, or even my purpose, thus strongly implying something primordial even to that. Suggestions?
One can live a satisfactory life without a sense of over-arching purpose. Stoic philosophy for example didn't generally envisage an after-life, but still had a conception of eudomonia, right conduct leading to impeturbability. But again, very different to the hedonistic ethos native to liberalism (and maybe the reason why stoicism is attracting an audience.)
But I've always been drawn to cosmic philosophies, which are somewhat religious in nature. Not necessarily theistic, and in the sense of a cosmic-director God not at all, but something nearer the convergence of dharma and logos - that by discovering and being true to your purpose, you are doing your part in the grand scheme, and also discovering the reason of existence in a sense greater than the instrumental.
But I've always been drawn to cosmic philosophies, which are somewhat religious in nature. Not necessarily theistic, and in the sense of a cosmic-director God not at all, but something nearer the convergence of dharma and logos - that by discovering and being true to your purpose, you are doing your part in the grand scheme.
Well I can't find anything much to criticize in this. Certain things attract us. But it does seem to be the expression of a preference - one predicated on emotional or aesthetic satisfaction perhaps - just as mine is - I've never been drawn to cosmic philosophy or religions, they don't assist my sense making process. However, I do appreciate a dialogue between the different worldviews and I'd much rather discuss matters of meaning with a spiritually inclined person that the average atheist.
How do we demonstrate such a statement? Which god, by the way?
It is demonstrated this way. Purpose is prior to any display of purpose. Therefore there must be a purpose which is prior to all things which display purpose. That purpose cannot be attributed to anything which displays purpose, being prior to all such things. So it is attributed to God, as the source of purpose.
The other question doesn't make sense. If we're talking about God as the source of purpose, then obviously that's the God we're talking about. Quoting tim wood
Reply to Tom Storm Thank you for your kind words. I will only (gently) observe my view that philosophy proper ought to be concerned with such deep questions, even if out of keeping with the zeitgeist.
that the lights come on when mind is. No mind no world. And purpose comes with or is invented by mind.
I also want to circle back to this remark in the OP. As I will continue to say to anyone on this forum, a recent book by mathematics professor emeritus (now deceased) Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order throws this expression into much greater depth. But it also dispels the anthropocentric illusion that the mind of rational sentient beings alone generates this order. Theres a fascinating discussion of cognition in fruit-flies, showing how they are believed to perceive in gestalts, comprising the aspects of their world that are meaningful to them.
The meaning of a sensation is something primary and biologically given. There is no need to interpret the feelings of hunger and thirst, for example. The meaning of a sensation is embedded in the sensation itself. It may be said that a sensation is its meaning. Primary feelings are genetically given, and constructed in the course of gestation just as organs are. They are standard equipment in every animal body.
Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics by Charles Pinter
He elaborates in detail how this is generally true for all organisms, h sapiens included. So the philosophical point I want to make is that this process is much more than a matter of the individuals mind creating or inventing meaning or purpose. We are embedded in a psychosomatic process which stretches back to the origins of evolution itself. Of course nowadays, many biologists and philosophers of science realise this, but I still think its an under-appreciated point. The structure of the mind - yours, mine, anyones - comprises these layers of awareness and sensation, from the most basic organic functionality up to conscious thought (and beyond)! So while its true that mind is inexorably involved with this process, its simplistic to say that the mind simply invents it or devises it. There are thoughts we cant get outside of, to allude to an essay by Thomas Nagel. As is well-known, I believe this line of thought leads inevitably to a kind of phenomenological idealism. And I see the shortcoming of the strictly naturalist attitude as not recognising our embeddedness in the process of living, of imagining that were standing apart from it and judging it as object to us, when in fact our minds have a fundamental role in creating that order.
...that there exists an X such that 1) X provides purpose in the world, and 2) if there be no X, then there is no purpose, that the world is without purpose.
Nice.
i think you are right that this is a sort of "default" analysis of purpose. The trouble is that it encourages hypostatization by treating "x" as an individual, a thing that might be located in the world, and so folk go off in search of it.
But they will not find it, because purpose is given to things, not found in them. The purpose of a knife - the ubiquitous example - is not found in a physical description, but in the way it is used. "Ultimate underlying meaning and significance" is found in use.
So yes, purpose is invented by mind, in setting forth the use.
Or, to put the same point in a somewhat different way, purpose comes from our intent. In a way, it is for our intentional descriptions what causation is for our physical descriptions. purpose, then, is dependent on the descriptions we have at hand - He flicked the switch, turning on the light and alerting the burglar, but the purpose of turning on the light was not to alert the burglar.
So, in answer to your title, purpose is the use to which something is put, and comes from our intent. It is grounded in our intentional explanations for our actions, and has worth only in terms of those intentions and actions.
Edit: That is, no big grand universal purpose, just small wantings and doings.
Its axial age philosophy, going back to the origins of historical cultures, and their attempt to discern reason, in the larger sense. Of course we cant re-adopt or go back to that period, were separated from it by millenia, but I think in relation to the question posed in the OP, that its important to grasp what the question meant then, and what has changed. Which I tried to articulate in my first post, from the perrspective of the history of ideas, although I was rather disappointed by the initial response.
So, in answer to your title, purpose is the use to which something is put, and comes from our intent. It is grounded in our intentional explanations for our actions, and has worth only in terms of those intentions and actions.
"Proper function for which something exists" (EtymOnline). Linguistically 'purpose' does not imply something that is human-intention-derived. The purpose of a knife is to cut because humans made knives, and they made them to cut. It doesn't follow that the purpose of a human life "has worth only in terms of [human] intentions and actions." Your linguistic analysis is off and your logical inferences are faulty, and of course your conclusion is unsound.
V. late 14c., purposen, "to intend (to do or be something); put forth for consideration, propose," from Anglo-French purposer "to design," Old French purposer, porposer "to intend, propose," variant of proposer "propose, advance, suggest" (see propose).
Generally with an infinitive. Intransitive sense of "to have intention or design" is by mid-15c. According to Century Dictionary, "The verb should prop. be accented on the last syllable (as in propose, compose, etc.), but it has conformed to the noun," which is wholly from Latin while the verb is partly of different origin (see pose (n.2)).
N. c. 1300, purpus, "intention, aim, goal; object to be kept in view; proper function for which something exists," from Anglo-French purpos, Old French porpos "an aim, intention" (12c.), from porposer "to put forth," from por- "forth" (from a variant of Latin pro- "forth;" see pur-) + Old French poser "to put, place" (see pose (v.1)).
Etymologically it is equivalent to Latin propositum "a thing proposed or intended," but evidently formed in French from the same elements. From mid-14c. as "theme of a discourse, subject matter of a narrative (as opposed to digressions), hence to the purpose "appropriate" (late 14c.). On purpose "by design, intentionally" is attested from 1580s; earlier of purpose (early 15c.).
Reply to Banno - Ah, so you don't know the difference between a noun and a verb. It's fun watching Wittgenstenians flub linguistics. Apparently the tired claim has now morphed into, "Purpose is use."
Linguistically 'purpose' does not imply something that is human-intention-derived. The purpose of a knife is to cut because humans made knives, and they made them to cut. It doesn't follow that the purpose of a human life "has worth only in terms of [human] intentions and actions."
If it's not human intentions, then a supernatural will is required to give humans purpose. A god has to make them his tools.
I reject the idea of being someone's tool, no matter how powerful they are. I'd rather be a wild thing with no ultimate significance. If the gods hunt me down and eat me, so be it, but I will not have accepted "food-source" as my purpose in life.
Reply to Vera Mont - The proper human purpose is a relation to God, but there are other stepping stones for those who cannot countenance such a thing. If you get married and have kids you will tend to find purpose, because this is bound up with the human end. If you develop deep friendships or find a stewardship role in creation you will tend to find purpose, etc.
Or cold, mean and indifferent. It doesn't matter which, unless and until the universe reveals its preference and purpose in action - and we probably wouldn't recognize its intent even then.
Well, yes, but you had already more or less said or implied the possibility that if the universe had a mind it was more likely to be "cold, mean and indifferent", and I was merely presenting the other possibility. But as you suggest the question is pointless anyway as we cannot know, and I would add that we could not even calculate the probability of it being one or the other.
I think the first thing is to distinguish the sort of "purpose" you're talking about from any sort of goal, the sort that instrumental rationality is good with.
That makes the issue of "being alive" a little tricky, because it's easy to say that this is the primary and overarching goal of a living organism, but it's also set apart, as that which enables any other goal. Is there something else set apart from such goals, perhaps also set apart from maintaining yourself as a living organism? I think there sort of is.
@unenlightened gives you the first bit: this kind of purposiveness is something that inheres in living, in acting, in being, not something outside it. Getting your ducks in a row is a row-ly way of behaving with ducks.
I also think @Wayfarer and perhaps @Leontiskos are on the right track -- though they might be surprised to hear me of all people say this.
Here's how I get there. Goals we understand: the wolf on the hunt behaves in a goal-advancing way. But what about the wolf dozing a little, keeping an eye out, waiting, passing the time. I want to say that this wolf may not be pursuing a goal at the moment, but is still 100% being a wolf, behaving with perfect and complete wolfishness.
And this calls to mind the way the Greeks talked about the essence of things, of plants, of animals, and of human beings as well, that biocentric vision they had of a thing growing into the most complete expression of its own nature, whatever that is. I don't think that requires mind, although for some things being minded is part of it. It is for us, and it is for a wolf.
That's not an answer so much as an idea about how to think about or look for an answer. Some people seem to live purposefully, in the sense I mean, to have a kind of presence, a genuineness -- it isn't necessarily always certainty about what's right, but an engagement with the very idea of there being rightness. Some people don't. It can be hard for us, harder than it is for a tree or a wolf or a knife.
One of those Greeks advised us: "Know thyself." Maybe that suggests that in our case there's no avoiding self-awareness and therefore, if we are to approach the sort of pure expression of essence that a tree or a wolf or a river has, we must first understand, must know something about what we are, not just be it. And that's why it makes more sense to say this sort of purpose is discovered rather than invented.
I'll say one more little thing: I've always been attracted to Keats's -- what? observation? suggestion? -- that the world is "a vale of soul-making". Through suffering we grow a soul, and thus become more fully human, more than we were when we were born. I think that's the idea, and it's interesting to cast that Greek idea in these terms -- it's the growth not of your body but of your soul, that matters.
If you get married and have kids you will tend to find purpose,
From day to day and year to year until the kids are grown. Had I considered procreation my purpose in life - as some (mostly female) people do (and fall to pieces if they fail to achieve it), I would have tried to procreate, instead of taking care to prevent it. Though they gave me cause to make plans and set goals that centered solely on them, the children I did raise were not the purpose of life, any more than taking care of stray cats is. These are responsibilities I assume freely, of choice, and that choice then entails purposeful actions directed toward its fulfillment.
Well, yes, but you had already more or less said or implied the possibility that if the universe had a mind it was more likely to be "cold, mean and indifferent"
That wasn't my intention. It's simply a matter of scale. If the universe is sentient, whether we would judge it from our perspective benevolent, hostile or indifferent, it's so much bigger than us that our perspective could not possibly take in the scope of its intelligence or intent. From its perspective on that scale, even supposing it was aware of our existence, I surmise that it would be unlikely to differentiate between humans and bats or any other sentient species in any of the trillion or so galaxies it surveys. Quoting Janus
I just assumed it was a species of Earth termite that I had not heard of before
But the purpose one gives to oneself, or accepts for oneself, that, it seems to me, must come from within, found or made - though maybe advised from without, thus perhaps correct to say self-given.
Well, yes, I think that is what I said. There might be a need to guard against having a private purpose; one not apparent in any action.
"Boot strapped"? not sure of the sense there. An explanation in terms of purpose may be sufficient - My purpose in drinking was to quench my thirst, no further explanation is needed.
I do not here mean any sort of instrumental purpose, either as a cause or any kind of interim goal.
Folk appear to have missed this constraint you placed on the topic.
There's also some overgeneralisation. "Being alive" isn't the purpose of a worker bee. They are there only to serve the hive, even at the expense of being alive.
But I've always been drawn to cosmic philosophies, which are somewhat religious in nature. Not necessarily theistic, and in the sense of a cosmic-director God not at all, but something nearer the convergence of dharma and logos - that by discovering and being true to your purpose, you are doing your part in the grand scheme, and also discovering the reason of existence in a sense greater than the instrumental.
I think it's easy enough to make sense of Aristotle's notion of the way in which beings when flourishing do so by actualizing their specific potentials. And that idea can be aligned with, for example, the notions of dharma or dao, when those are understood as naturally immanent to the beings themselves, as opposed to something "given from above", that is, when understood as natural as opposed to supernatural.
So, I can understand the idea that "by discovering and being true to (actualizing) your" potential (instead of "purpose") you will be living your best possible life. Whether this somehow benefits the universe in any way other than it possibly leading to you directly benefiting other proximal beings and/ or your environment, remains obscure to me. Would even benefiting the whole Earth make any appreciable difference to the Cosmos as a whole? I can't see any way to coherently understand how it could. Perhaps you can enlighten me?
The other thing that puzzles me in what you say is that, although, you don't (apparently) believe in a grand schemer, you believe in a "grand scheme". I can make no sense of a grand scheme without positing a grand schemer, a grand designer without a grand designer or a grand purpose without a grand purposer. Care to unravel it for me?
I do not here mean any sort of instrumental purpose, either as a cause or any kind of interim goal. tim wood
Folk appear to have missed this constraint you placed on the topic.
You're right, I did miss it. I should not have responded. If all the meanings of 'purpose' are eliminated from discussion, there's nothing left to discuss but God.
Whether this somehow benefits the universe in any way other than it possibly leading to you directly benefiting other proximal beings and/ or your environment, remains obscure to me.
I think "cosmic philosophies" turn on interdependence and symbiosis. The common example is the violinist in the orchestra who is contributing a small part to a beautiful whole, a whole which depends on each of the small, interdependent parts. For the ancients this was usually captured in the balanced, cyclical motions of the heavens.
I've always been attracted to Keats's -- what? observation? suggestion? -- that the world is "a vale of soul-making". Through suffering we grow a soul, and thus become more fully human, more than we were when we were born. I think that's the idea, and it's interesting to cast that Greek idea in these terms -- it's the growth not of your body but of your soul, that matters.
Whether this somehow benefits the universe in any way other than it possibly leading to you directly benefiting other proximal beings and/ or your environment, remains obscure to me. Would even benefiting the whole Earth make any appreciable difference to the Cosmos as a whole? I can't see any way to coherently understand how it could. Perhaps you can enlighten me?
Isnt that the kind of intuition found in many forms? Acting in accordance with the Tao? Theres also such a thing as religious anthropology which asks precisely this question - see for instance https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Kadmon. It wont appeal to everyone but I mention it as representative of this theme.
Reply to Leontiskos According to our current understanding the rest of the galaxy is so far away that it would have very little effect on our solar system and our solar system would have a virtually negligible effect on it. Not to mention the rest of the universe.
Reply to Wayfarer OK, but you haven't even attempted to answer the questions i posed.
Reply to Janus Yes, not a good choice of links. I was thinking of 'man as microcosm' which is a theme in some philosophies. So I'll try again. The point of a 'cosmic philosophy' is not that it 'benefits' the cosmos, but that it makes sense of it, that mind and cosmos have some common ground or basis. It is of course a truism that the dissolution of the medieval synthesis and the scientific revolution completely shattered the traditional Western sense of the cosmos (per Alexander Koyré). And that the image of man in the early 20th century was widely understood as the 'outcome of chance and necessity' (per Jacques Monod), and that we became kind of exiles in an indifferent universe (per existentialism). How to re-imagine any kind of cosmic order, knowing what we now know? Actually the book title that comes to mind is 'At Home in the Universe', Stuart Kauffman, which attempts to do so on a scientific basis. Perhaps Terrence Deacon's book is another.
But there's something even deeper than that, but more simple: the resonance of mind and world as I tried to convey in that overlooked quote from David Bentley Hart - that 'the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect'. Considered alongside the argument in Pinter's book, Mind and the Cosmic Order, there is indeed an order, and mind is foundational to it. But it's never an object of analysis in the scientific sense (per David Chalmers). That's also where phenomenology and the emphasis on the reality of first-person experience is important.
I can make no sense of a grand scheme without positing a grand schemer, a grand designer without a grand designer or a grand purpose without a grand purposer.
That might be due to your cultural heritage, might it not? Buddhists have no such difficulty. Granted, they would also probably not talk in terms of a 'cosmic purpose', but it is at least implicit in their cosmologies, without a director to supervise the whole show. But in Western culture, we're caught up in this kind of Hegelian dialectic of theism (thesis), atheism (anti-thesis) and an emerging synthesis (whatever that turns out to be).
The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile?
Purpose is like the concept of cause and effect. It doesn't exist in the empirical world. It comes from the human mind i.e. imagination, desire, motives or will. It is psychological in nature.
Metaphysician UndercoverMay 06, 2024 at 10:48#9017790 likes
Fair enough? And may we say as well, boot-strapped? By which I mean valued because they are valued, any other value being derivative and incidental.
Doesn't "valued because they are valued" imply infinite regress, or maybe a vicious circle, rather than bootstrapping?
In the op you say "Bottom line, purpose is boot-strapped", but how could this be possible? Isn't it true that boot-strapping is a purposeful process? This would imply that purpose is necessarily prior to, as the intentional cause of any boot-strapping activity. Then purpose itself cannot be boot-strapped.
Purpose, in my opinion, is to attain value, whether that be financial, experiential(in such cases as heavens), or other. It gives us drive because it improves our experience. The ground of attaining value is gaining pleasure - and losing pain, whether that be short term or long term. Some may want to serve the world, but this is for some future reward, in that they are being moral. Some may take lots of pain to improve themselves in elegant 'loss-of-pain'.
God is something that directs us to the highest value, or 'heaven'.
And purpose comes with or is invented by mind.
Agreed. However purpose is understood, it follows from judgement alone, and for whatever a purpose is supposed to be follows from the kind/content of the judgement from which it is given.
Can we do purpose without first doing teleology on the one hand, or aesthetics on the other?
Invented or discovered? Neither: they follow implicitly and necessarily from that which is the condition for them, that being .a-hem ..predisposition in accordance with subjective moral law.
Not much more I can contribute here, however interesting the topic is. I have neither opinion nor knowledge regarding purpose in and of itself, so .
The meaning of a sensation is something primary and biologically given. There is no need to interpret the feelings of hunger and thirst, for example. The meaning of a sensation is embedded in the sensation itself. It may be said that a sensation is its meaning. Primary feelings are genetically given, and constructed in the course of gestation just as organs are. They are standard equipment in every animal body.
Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics by Charles Pinter
This doesnt seem right to me. Sensations from the eyes, ears, nose , skin and movement are massively intercorrelated on the basis of overarching normative patterns of interacting with a world. The purpose of perceptual sensation is to guide action , and it gets its meaning from such action. Action, furthermore, is anticipatory, and as such brings into play all of the sense modalities directly or indirectly. A kitten deprived from birth of interaction with its surrounding cannot see , despite having a normal visual system. Visually perceived objects have no meaning because such meaning must come from what we are intending to DO with objects, and our anticipation of the response of those objects to our actions. Even supposedly primal sensations like hunger are interpretive. My mother died from starvation as a result of advanced alzheimers. This is not uncommon. A person with dementia loses the ability to interpret the meaning of their hunger sensations as these are interconnected with other sources of perception within a functional totality whose purposiveness becomes fragmented with the loss of a sense of time, place and identity.
One of my favorite discussions of purpose is from Nietzsches On the Genealogy of Morals. Here he argues that the history of a thing, an organism , a cultural tradition only appears to be explicable in the basin of a pre-given purpose, when in fact such teleological notions are post hoc:
But purpose in law' is the last thing we should apply to the history of the emergence of law: on the contrary, there is no more important proposition for every sort of history than that which we arrive at only with great effort but which we really should reach, namely that the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former meaning' [Sinn] and purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.
No matter how perfectly you have understood the usefulness of any physiological organ (or legal institution, social custom, political usage, art form or religious rite), you have not yet thereby grasped how it emerged: uncomfortable and unpleasant as this may sound to more elderly ears, for people down the ages have believed that the obvious purpose of a thing, its utility, form and shape, are its reason for existence, the eye is made to see, the hand to grasp. So people think punishment has evolved for the purpose of punishing. But every purpose and use is just a sign that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful, and has impressed upon it its own idea [Sinn] of a use function; and the whole history of a thing', an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random.
The development' of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not its progressus towards a goal, still less is it a logical progressus, taking the shortest route with least expenditure of energy and cost, instead it is a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subjugation exacted on the thing, added to this the resistances encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results, too, of successful countermeasures. The form is fluid, the meaning' [Sinn] even more so . . . It is no different inside any individual organism: every time the whole grows appreciably, the meaning' [Sinn] of the individual organs shifts
That makes the issue of "being alive" a little tricky, because it's easy to say that this is the primary and overarching goal of a living organism, but it's also set apart, as that which enables any other goal. Is there something else set apart from such goals, perhaps also set apart from maintaining yourself as a living organism? I think there sort of is.
@unenlightened gives you the first bit: this kind of purposiveness is something that inheres in living, in acting, in being, not something outside it. Getting your ducks in a row is a row-ly way of behaving with ducks
Im not sure that being alive makes sense as a goal from a biological point of view. I think its sort of thinking is a throwback to the early days of Darwinism, when organisms were set off from a world, as if they were dropped into a separate environment and then subject to one-way selective pressure from that environment. But an organism isnt a an already determined thing, like a rock, surviving or not in a world. It is a system of interactions that maintains itself as a normative pattern of exchanges. It is not a living thing that survives, it is these patterns. And it is a misnomer to say that they survive. What they do is continually transform themselves, but in such a way that they maintain a relative self -consistency throughout these changes. I would not separate goal from purpose here. Any adjustment within the organism-environment system that maintains or strengthens the self-consistency of the specific manner of organismic functioning fulfills its goals and purposes, and modifications which fragment such integrity work against its purposes. Since the organisms current normative patterns shape the possibilities of future changes to the organism, there can be no purpose that comes from on high, or from a causal below, entirely independent of the total style of its functioning.
Note that what I just said concerning the nature of functioning of living systems can be applied in a general sense to human psychological and cultural goals and purposes. Theories, faiths, schemes of understanding , value systems and worldviews function like living systems. The are normatively structured interactions with a human created niche (our linguistically formed technological and social world). The aim of such schemes, practices and worldviews is to maintain their ability to assimilate events without disintegrating into incoherence and unintelligibly .
To the extent that a system of ideas survives, it does so not by simply duplicating itself, but by changing itself constantly in subtle or not so subtle ways so as to keep
up with a constantly changing environment that it is instrumental in shaping.
In understanding the concept of purpose, both at the biological and psychological level, it is crucial to appreciate the reciprocal , reflexive nature of the person-world interaction. Persons arent dropped into a world with purposes any more than organisms are dropped into an environment with purposes. Purpose is a dynamically self-adjusting back and forth between self and world , remaking itself constantly both from the side of the organism and its environment. There can be no transcending purpose when the very notion of intention is not only responsive to but mutually shaped by an outside.
Purpose is a dynamically self-adjusting back and forth between self and world , remaking itself constantly both from the side of the organism and its environment.
I think what interests me about the Keats is near here: you're not just born with an eternal soul, and that's what makes you special; it grows within you, or doesn't, through the process of living a life. The organism and the environment have memory, and the organism -- us -- can also reflect on those interactions, and develop some sense of how things are related, and the great variability of those relatings. There's a possibility there of coming to feel at home in the world, which can be very difficult for us. And in feeling at home, achieving freedom, which is also hard for us.
I don't know if "purpose" is a great word for talking about all this, or a phrase like "the meaning of life", but they're all ways of trying to get at the surprising challenge of living a good human life.
The organism and the environment have memory, and the organism -- us -- can also reflect on those interactions, and develop some sense of how things are related, and the great variability of those relatings. There's a possibility there of coming to feel at home in the world, which can be very difficult for us. And in feeling at home, achieving freedom, which is also hard for us
We do indeed have memory, but is that memory a static archive, or does it reassemble the past on the basis of where we are going? Do we understand history from the past forward or from our future to what has been? Heidegger said that feeling at home in the world conceals from us the strangeness and uncanniness of being-in-the-world, and that we only gain freedom when we no longer feel at home in the world. I agree with both you and Heidegger: if our world is so familiar that we treat it as an unchanging given, then we achieve no freedom. But by the same token, if the world is so unintelligible
that we cant make any sense of it at all, we are imprisonment by chaos.
if our world is so familiar that we treat it as an unchanging given, then we achieve no freedom
Absolutely, and one reason I squeezed in the word "variable" up there somewhere.
I think much of the challenge of freedom for us comes from our culture. We all swim in a sea of inherited ideas. It's all too easy to grab an off-the-shelf interpretation of anything, and that's not freedom.
But "going it alone" or "starting from scratch" is just not an option, so your inheritance, and a certain ambivalence about it, is something else you have to be, well, both comfortable and uncomfortable with. I don't imagine feeling at home in the world as static, but taking it all as it comes, including your own occasional feeling of alienation.
Something like that is what I think of as largeness of soul. Keats was a terribly unusual young man, who got here remarkably quickly. (The "negative capability" letter and the "vale of soul-making" letter are both earlyish, if I recall correctly, and probably only a few months apart.) And of course then there's his real hero, Shakespeare, who had an extraordinarily capacious soul.
Metaphysician UndercoverMay 06, 2024 at 19:49#9018980 likes
I understand reality as being the world we all live in, and also a set of constraints which things not of or in reality are not subject to. I don't object to beliefs, except when, as concerning things not of or in reality, the believer tries to place them into reality.
I cannot quite apprehend what you mean by "a set of constraints which things not of or in reality are not subject to". I assume you are saying that there are things which are not part of reality, and those things are not subject to this particular set of constraints you are referring to. Are these non-real things subject to any kind of constraints, and what kind of existence do they have if they are non-real?
And as God is supposed to be unconstrained, he cannot be in reality nor rationally supposed to be there.
Your conditions for "reality" do not state that there cannot be an unconstrained real thing. You said that things not in reality are not constrained by a specific set of constraints, but you didn't say that things in reality are necessarily constrained. What exactly do you mean by "a set of constraints"? I understand "sets" to be things created by human beings. Are these constraints artificial as well, or is it just the classifying of them into a specific set which is artificial?
If it's God, then I hold that to be a matter of faith,
Which I don't have, and therefore should not discuss how it works on the faithful. Quoting tim wood
which I hold to be personal, from the self and not from God but from an idea.
Usually not an idea that originates with the faithful. While each believer does a little customizing of the canon, the bulk and overwhelming content of it comes from other minds. A very, very few interpreters of the god's requirements tell all the faithful how best to gain the god's favour. They may think they place themselves in the god's hands; in fact, they place themselves in the ruling prelate's hands.
In the secular realm, the same role is played by heads of state and, in turbulent times, the leaders of ideological factions: the loyal subjects, patriots and freedom fighters receive their purpose from their figurehead.
To me, that seems a lot like abrogation of responsibility - but it does provide a clear, straightforward meaning for their life. And death.
That leaves the question as to why assume responsibilities.
We are social animals. We crave community, family, closeness, affection, recognition, a sense of belonging and contributing and being valued. To that end, we take a series of small and large decisions that result in what we know as ordinary life. That includes adults taking responsibility for the young, paying their dues, keeping the peace, lending a hand, making the world around them liveable for others as well as themselves. That requires no supernatural intervention.
Purpose is like the concept of cause and effect. It doesn't exist in the empirical world. It comes from the human mind i.e. imagination, desire, motives or will. It is psychological in nature.
Corvus
I agree, pretty much.
Right - like I said, nothing wrong with purpose, so long as it's mine. Anything like 'purpose' in the abstract - too hard.
But I doubt you would say that it's just a quid pro quo of doing and in return getting.
In a way, that's what a social contract always is. But it's not that simple or two-dimensional. Quoting tim wood
I "hear" duty, and not as a consequence of accepting responsibility, but as ground for that acceptance.
I don't know what that sentence means. We have duties and obligations, responsibilities and debts - all different, each resulting from a set of circumstances that are partly given (of the environment and a condition of survival) and partly undertaken by the subject for his or her own reasons. Quoting tim wood
duty for duty's sake
No such thing. Duty has no 'sake'; it's always in service to something much larger. There is duty for the sake of patriotism, or an oath, or as a condition of citizenship, or as part of a binding contract. Quoting tim wood
being both a good example of what I call boot-strapping
I really wish you wouldn't. It grates very hard on my grammatical nerves.
..for whatever a purpose is supposed to be follows from the kind/content of the judgement from which it is given.
Mww
Ok, but this would seem to cover everything
My teleological/aesthetic to your purposivity/purposefulnes ..dont we want all our bases covered?
But there's something even deeper than that, but more simple: the resonance of mind and world as I tried to convey in that overlooked quote from David Bentley Hart - that 'the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect'.
Since the idea of the natural order is an idea of the intellect by definition as are all other ideas, it is hard to see how it would not, as an idea, be akin to the intellect. As a reality for us it remains an idea. What it might be as mind-independent reality is of course unknowable (per Kant).
That might be due to your cultural heritage, might it not? Buddhists have no such difficulty. Granted, they would also probably not talk in terms of a 'cosmic purpose', but it is at least implicit in their cosmologies, without a director to supervise the whole show. But in Western culture, we're caught up in this kind of Hegelian dialectic of theism (thesis), atheism (anti-thesis) and an emerging synthesis (whatever that turns out to be).
I have never encountered an idea of "cosmic purpose" in my readings of Buddhist texts, I don't think my association of the meaning of 'purpose' with a purposer is any kind of scotoma due to "cultural heritage", I think the idea of cosmic purpose has always been associated with a god or gods who are the intenders and givers of the cosmic purpose. Without that idea of intention, the notion of purpose seems reducible to simply the way things behave, or a kind of immanent cosmic balance as presented in the notions of dharma and Dao.
I have never encountered an idea of "cosmic purpose" in my readings of Buddhist texts
Nevertheless, 'dharma' is both 'duty' and also 'law'. In other words, it's not simply an individual prerogative or obligation, but is inherent in the natural order (the original root being 'what upholds' or 'holds together').
And besides, isn't science itself predicated on there being a natural order? I know nowadays that the whole concept of natural law is called into question, but in my view that's mainly because it's a metaphysical issue.
Without that idea of intention, the notion of purpose seems reducible to simply the way things behave, or a kind of immanent cosmic balance as presented in the notions of dharma and Dao.
But as I pointed out, some degree of intentionality - not conscious intentionality, of course - is implicit in the activities of all organic life. That is what Aristotle and Greek philosophy classified as 'self-originated movement': organisms have an internal organising principle which acts towards an end, whereas the organising principle of artifacts, for example, is imposed from without by the artificer.
This kind of thinking was abandoned with the advent of Galilean physics, where the whole antiquated superstructure of Aristotelian physics, with it's 'natural places' for stones and the like, was discarded. The 'new science' sought to provide explanations solely in terms of the mechanical relations of measurable particulars, eschewing any idea of purpose. And that works fine as far as physics is concerned, but when it is applied to organic life, it is invariably reductionist, as it omits the purposeful activities that characterise even simple life-forms.
Subsequently, a neologism 'teleonomy' was devised by a biologist in 1958 to allow for the apparent purposeful activites of organisms (similar to Richard Dawkin's 'apparent' design in nature, which is not co-incidental.) But it was introduced to deal with the inescapably goal-directed nature of virtually all biological activity. 'Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but hes unwilling to be seen with her in public. Today (written in the 1930's) the mistress has become a lawfully wedded wife. Biologists no longer feel obligated to apologize for their use of teleological language; they flaunt it. The only concession which they make to its disreputable past is to rename it teleonomy.
But all of these philosophical considerations seem out-of-scope for this OP, so I'll leave it for now.
Nevertheless, 'dharma' is both 'duty' and also 'law'. In other words, it's not simply an individual prerogative or obligation, but is inherent in the natural order (the original root being 'what upholds' or 'holds together').
Why is it "duty and also law"? I would say it is because we conceive it as such or because it is simply the way things work best. If animals instinctively follow "the way" then that would explain why they are so much less fucked up than we are. I can accept the idea that to go against what is naturally the best way for us would be a negative. Perish the thought that we might ever do that! :wink:
How do we find out what is the best way for us? Perhaps introspection, self-awareness and self-knowledge, that is what we call "the examined life", might help. When it comes to the best way to treat the environment and other animals, I would say science and compassion might come in handy. Of course, the best way for us and the best way for the other animals and the living environment arguably cannot be two different ways.
The other point I would make is that dharma and Dao are earthly lawwe know little about the rest of the cosmos. We might assume that other galaxies and the far corners of the cosmos have the same or similar ways as we do. It would seem that only once life arrives can there be not merely a way, but a best way. And what makes that way best? Well, of course animal and human (and perhaps plant) flourishing, what else?
Metaphysician UndercoverMay 07, 2024 at 01:37#9019920 likes
If you'd read the OP, you could not have failed to observe that this, your sense of purpose here, is not the topic, and so without relevance.
If you'd have read what you said to me, you would know that you asked me "in terms of purpose - of any kind -". I assume that the clearly stated "any kind", implies that any such restrictions are to be put aside.
Anyway, I just reread your op, and cannot understand your proposed restrictions at all. Can you explain clearly how you are proposing to restrict the meaning of "purpose" in this thread?
And in passing since you claimed earlier that there could be no propose before purpose, I assume you also would hold that there can be no hearts until there was a heart.
What are you talking about? Of course there can be no hearts until there is a heart. That's a self-evident truth. But that's not at all relevant to what I said. I said purpose is prior to a display of purpose. A heart is a display of purpose, so purpose (or intent if you prefer) must be prior to the heart. How do you get from this to the self-evident truth of "there can be no hearts until there was a heart"?
But let's try these: is God constrained in any way? Is He real? My point being that in belief in an idea, you can have what you want. But not in any reality.
How is this relevant? In reality, sometimes you get what you want, sometimes you do not. In what way do you believe that the constraints placed on human beings are related to the constraints placed on God, if there are any?
The assumption is that if there are various particulars of some kind then there must be some one thing that underlies them all by virtue of which they are the things they are. If there are purposes then there must be some more basic and general thing, PURPOSE, without which there could be no purposes.
This is reductive reification. It posits an entity where none is to be found and thus invents a transcendent realm of eternal beings where it is to be discovered.
In the first, one is driven, but in the second is one also the driver?
The underlying necessity is the same: to keep living. The layer on top of that is: to live well. The first one is much the same for every being; the second diverges. The particular requirements for a good life differ from species to species; the desires we hope will improve our life* varies by individual.
So, there are root, long term, permanent aims that require small daily action to keep going, each one of which is proposed, planned and executed with purpose.
*For some, that means accumulating goods or reputation points or power. For some, it means being loved and valued and needed. For some, it means doing good to others of his kind, or other species, or the world. For some, it means fighting for a cause. For some, it means being part of something greater than themselves. Each of those central goals requires a different series of small, purposeful actions to achieve. We may not think of these desires, intentions and acts as a coherent whole, but that's what every life adds up to.
...on the working assumption that there is something there to see.
I am questioning that assumption. The problem is that when working with that assumption leads one to find what may not be there to find. And if not here then there.
Thus if you always play the king's gambit, and I always chose vanilla, we can ask if in any way these are related, the "always" being the clue. And if related, presumably in some way by the "always," then there is a subject that might be pursued without any reification risked.
Why should what I always do and what you always do be related in any way other than this being what we always do? My reasons for always playing the king's gambit may have nothing to do with why you always choose vanilla. Would you ask if what I sometimes do is related to what you sometimes do?
The underlying necessity is the same: to keep living. The layer on top of that is: to live well. The first one is much the same for every being; the second diverges. The particular requirements for a good life differ from species to species; the desires we hope will improve our life* varies by individual.
So, there are root, long term, permanent aims that require small daily action to keep going, each one of which is proposed, planned and executed with purpose
I think we need to make a distinction between just living and perpetuating a particular way of living. Organisms dont just live, they continually enact a specific normative pattern of interaction with an environment. It is this normative pattern that survives or perishes, not simply being alive as an abstract concept. If an organism is no longer able to maintain the dynamic consistency of its patterned exchanges with its niche, it is no longer that organism. To keep living as a body doesnt capture what is relevant to the specific aims of a living system. It is these aims which are synonymous with what it means for it to continue to be what it is over time.
Applying this perspective to the normative psychological aims of humans, the motives that drive us arent the short term means to a long term end of merely staying alive as a body, these short term in order tos define the normative nature of the person as a psychological system. We live for the sake of our norms , not for the sake of an abstract notion of life.
I think we need to make a distinction between just living and perpetuating a particular way of living.
I attempted to. That's why I didn't say 'just live'; I said 'keep living'. In order to choose any goals or aims, one must be vital enough to choose. One must perform the basic actions entailed in survival; these are the minimum requirement. Quoting Joshs
Organisms dont just live, they continually enact a specific normative pattern of interaction with an environment. It is this normative pattern that survives or perishes, not simply being alive as an abstract concept.
I thought it was the organism that survives that survives and inevitably perishes. Obviously, both of those events take place in a an environment. Nothing abstract about that. Quoting Joshs
To keep living as a body doesnt capture what is relevant to the specific aims of a living system. It is these aims which are synonymous with what it means for it to continue to be what it is over time.
That sounds to me like a hyperbolic description of a simple matter: be born, live, eat, eliminate, rest, want things, procreate (or not) die. There is no meaning to being what it is over time: it already is and has no choice about what it is. Quoting Joshs
We live for the sake of our norms , not for the sake of an abstract notion of life.
We tend to cling tenaciously to the very concrete fact of being alive. But beyond that, or overlayed on that, are all the short-terms goals of making our lives good, each according to his or her notion of good.
I'll add a top layer, to live ethically and morally - I think the two words mean the same thing, but both in case someone thinks they mean different things. A distinction that while the "lower" levels might be described as transactional, this top layer is not.
It seems to me youre splitting off a supposed
top layer of e and morality from everyday means-ends motivation , when in fact this top layer is embedded within and informs every motivated action we take, no matter how trivial. Every action we take in order to accomplish some aim understands that aim in relation to larger aims , and those larger aims are done for the sake of a self whose overall purposes are bound up with a core sense of ones relation to others, how we see ourselves as mattering or others and how they matter to us, our sense of belonging and esteem. All of these features are bound together at the top, or superordinate level of our identity, and infuse the meaning and direction of all our actions.
A distinction that while the "lower" levels might be described as transactional, this top layer is not.
I'm open to adding as many layers as Maslow, or even subdividing them into more layers. But your meaning of 'transactional' eludes me. It seems to me the base layer - once an organism is no longer dependent on its parents - consists largely of transactions with the environment, while the upper ones require transactions with other conscious organisms.
Not all these transaction are necessarily direct one-to-one bargains. Your anonymous charitable giving may not bring you face to face with its beneficiary. It makes you feel good (improving your life) and helps someone else also feel good (improving the community's life). But first, you had to acquire something to give, presumably by working for a third party, and you had to do the giving through a charity (unless you threw it through the recipient's window at night, like St Nicholas), thereby interacting with a fourth party, who then interacted with the recipient, who then used the money - if it was money you donated - to interact with some fifth party.
Lots of transactions going on!
n order to choose any goals or aims, one must be vital enough to choose. One must perform the basic actions entailed in survival; these are the minimum requirement
Youre separating raw vitality from the normative patterns of interaction that comprise what a living system actually does and is. I think this is an artificial separation , and makes living self-organization a secondary to a physicalistic notion of life.
That sounds to me like a hyperbolic description of a simple matter: be born, live, eat, eliminate, rest, want things, procreate (or not) die. There is no meaning to being what it is over time: it already is and has no choice about what it is
It does have a choice every moment. Thats what it means to be a normative system with aims and purposes. The constraints and affordance of an environment for oganisms and psychological systems are defined in relation to the specifically directed patterns of their functioning. When a choice is made between a good and bad option , it is not just the living system passively responding to what impinges on it from the world, or programmed into it, but the organism modifying its built niche according to aims which themselves are subtly refined in context of interaction with an outside. Conditioning is bi-directional, from world to living system and from living system to world.
The meaning of a living system isnt pre-given like a manufactured tool, it is continually re-established in subtly new ways through actual interaction with a world.
The structure of the inquiry being, is-it, what-is-it, what-kind-of-a-thing-is-it, genus/species, quiddities; and the tools being the simple "why" and "what."
and follow this with the example of 'always' then 'always' is being treated as a kind of thing with its own "whatness". It seems to me that you are reifying 'always' as if it plays a determinate role in what is being done.
But what is at issue here is 'purpose'. Your initial question:
The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile?
"Purpose in itself" treats it as if it is some thing that exists on its own apart from those things that have purposes.
Given, to be sure. But isn't there some aspect of yourself not merely given, but chosen and self-legislated?
Oh yes, but I think all those other "aspects of yourself" are derivatives from what you asked about in the OP: "purpose (in itself)" and not just mere "instrumental" (i.e. utilitarian/aspirational) purposes.
I recognize I have a standing purpose of never being in a position of not having clean clothes. Call it rule.
Thomas Schelling gives the example of two drivers playing chicken, and one of them pulls his steering wheel off and holds it up so the other driver can see it.
You seem to be talking about something near here, something that in some ways looks like a choice, but a choice that's no longer in play, one you can't go back on. (Maybe in some cases that's only relative, or temporary.) Such a commitment, that's beyond our reach to go back on it, is what you're reaching for with "purpose". Is that close?
If that's the right analysis, that might explain why people are inclined to say that purpose comes from outside (from God, Nature, Aristotle, Darwin, whatever): either way you experience it as not up to you.
But it does raise a question: what is this capacity to remove the steering wheel? How is this kind of commitment different from other choices we make and why do we do it? To what end?
How is this kind of commitment different from other choices we make and why do we do it?
I think maybe, to prove our resolution - to the authority (human or divine), to our fellow acolytes, and to ourselves. An absolute commitment is unconditional; if you want to be sure and to demonstrate that you won't renege, you have to make sure that you can't renege. Once the steering wheel is off, all further decisions are out of you hands; no longer your responsibility.
There's social contact stuff that comes readily to mind. Schelling's credible deterrent scenario is a surprise application of that. -- That was meant more as a "structural" analogy, because while the social value of predictability on your part is obvious, what good is it to you?
It's the sort of temporary move you make all the time, just to be able to think: you hold some variables as fixed, just for the moment, so you can see what the others do. But why fix them forever? And how?
One of the talking heads in the Heidegger film, Being in the World, attributes to Kierkegaard the idea that we can't be the source of all the meaning in the world, because if we were we could also take it all away.
I think we're kind of in that territory. It's easy enough to see why you'd want someone else to believe you'll hold up your end, keep your promises, honor your contacts, and all that, but how do you convince yourself and why would you?
It looks like it has to be a slightly different mechanism, and in fact that's the point of Schelling's scenario: removing the wheel is a move which *changes* the game. The game is built on each side swearing they won't turn but the other side knowing they still might anyway, even if they honestly believe they won't.
For an individual, how do you make a commitment to yourself you can't back out of?
(I'm passing over a lot of interesting stuff.)
Metaphysician UndercoverMay 08, 2024 at 00:20#9022670 likes
I'll try one more time: is God constrained in any way? Is He real? My point being that in belief in an idea, you can have what you want. But not in any reality.
God has to be real, because that is stipulated in the conception of "God", as an essential aspect of "God". If God was not real, then the conception would be contradictory, and there would be no God to talk about, just self-contradictory nonsense. So, if we are talking about God here, we are by definition talking about something real. You can dismiss talk about God as self-contradictory nonsense if you like, but please don't ask me if God is real, because it just indicates that you are totally ignorant.
As for your other question, I have no knowledge as to whether God is constrained or not. Some say that God is not constrained in any way, but I think that's just conjecture.
Take a look at this problem tim. I said to you that the purpose of an animal's heart is to circulate blood, and you said that's not the sense of "purpose" I am talking about. Now you clarify the sense of "purpose you are talking about, with the following.
On a good day, if I do something, it is for a reason. If my effort is successful, it might be said I had achieved my purpose in doing it. In this sense purpose like a work order or chore or task, a thing to be done.
How is this a different sense of "purpose" from when I said the purpose of the heart is to circulate blood? To circulate blood is "a thing to be done", by the heart, it is "the reason" for the heart. If the heart's effort is successful, it achieves its purpose. It's the very same sense of "purpose".
For an individual, how do you make a commitment to yourself you can't back out of?
Jumping off a tall building would do it.
For lesser commitments, you don't; there is always the possibility of failing, chickening out or changing your mind.
Yes, exactly. The idea is to constrain your own agency, even to the point of extinguishing it, if necessary.
It's a point of interest that we often find this sort of irrevocable commitment praiseworthy. I suppose the idea is that it takes a supreme act of agency to so constrain your future agency -- and then whatever praise later acts would normally get, if undertaken freely, is instead heaped upon the original act.
When it's all praiseworthy, anyway. But it's up to us whether to call such stubbornness "principle" or "prejudice". (From the Latin, judging ahead of time.) And that determines how we take this:
For lesser commitments, you don't; there is always the possibility of failing, chickening out or changing your mind.
We certainly talk that way when we're in the mood to judge the behavior of others, but we know perfectly well it's not that simple. You don't really make choices about your blind spots, for instance. Exactly how to hold people accountable for prejudices they grew up with, and may only dimly be aware of, is rather hotly debated these days. Less so, though analagous, whether anyone should get credit for having been raised to have sterling or at least unobjectionable character.
We know more too. We know that it can be terribly difficult actually to put into effect a choice we've made. We may firmly believe that some course of action would be "the right thing to do" and still not do it. Why? Who knows.
Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow
Anyhow, it's a known fact. So what appears to be principle or prejudice may be neither, but merely an inability to act otherwise, whether accompanied by an ability to think or choose otherwise or not.
And all of this suggests, I think, that choice is just the wrong model here, or less helpful than it might seem; if there is a way of making a choice you can't unchoose, it's whatever enables that, that's really doing the work. Hence people reach for lots of things that aren't up to you: God, human nature, your individual nature, whatever.
Bonus: some dialogue from an episode of Firefly I'm so fond of I may have posted it on here before.
[hide="Spoiler"]
It's from The Train Job. Mal and the crew of Serenity have been hired to steal what turns out to be a shipment of medicine for a town of miners with what amounts to black lung. Once they know, they decide to stealthily return it but are caught by the sheriff:
Sheriff: You were truthful back there, when you said jobs were hard to come by. A man gets a job, any job, he might not look too close at it. But when he finds out more about a situation like ours, well, then he's got a choice.
Mal: I don't believe he does.
I see purpose (now) as a settled state of mind beyond ordinary questioning about something significant, that serves to inform action or other beliefs, though flexible, if need be.
Yes, I think that's closer. I was thinking similarly of a sort of comportment, a style, a way of doing things.
The usual model boils everything down to decisions and preferences, but those are always open to change. Something no longer in play, if it ever was, isn't much like one of those, but more like a sort of framework for them. It's given. It will shape all the changeable stuff, channel it in a particular direction.
But that's just a model. The question is whether we're really like that, and if so, why?
There's Hume's line in the Treatise about the "belief" in (that is to say, unwavering commitment to) object permanence: he says there are things Nature has deemed too important to leave up to our fallible reason.
What we're talking about looks something like that. (Not the sort of thing Nature left to the rational-agent, decisions & preferences model.) If it does develop over time, over the course of a life, it does so by a process we play little conscious role in. It's practically something that happens to us, like aging itself, not much like something we do. You wake up one day and realize you have a principles (or prejudices), or feel you have a purpose, whatever. Not your doing, exactly, though somehow for that very reason close to the core of your identity -- because it wasn't up to you, anymore than your identity in any other sense is.
You don't really make choices about your blind spots, for instance.
Maybe not, but if it's not of supreme importance, we leave wiggle-room for them. Quoting Srap Tasmaner
But it's up to us whether to call such stubbornness "principle" or "prejudice"
I don't think it is. We may have a theoretical grasp of the situation, but I, personally, can't understand it well enough to judge. Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Exactly how to hold people accountable for prejudices they
grew up with, and may only dimly be aware of, is rather hotly debated these days.
When it comes to absolute commitment, dimly understood childhood conditioning is not a major factor. This kind of all-or-nothing decision is made consciously, with a head full of passionately held ideals.
I'm not particularly interested in praising or blaming, except when it's about causing harm to others. Quoting Srap Tasmaner
We may firmly believe that some course of action would be "the right thing to do" and still not do it. Why? Who knows.
Lots of reasons. It's too difficult. It's too costly. It's frightening. We might fail and be humiliated.
Sometimes we opt for a compromise: do only some of it and then turn back; support the people who do it, while we stay in the background; do the next best thing; do three other good things to make up for bailing on that one.... Quoting Srap Tasmaner
So what appears to be principle or prejudice may be neither, but merely an inability to act otherwise, whether accompanied by an ability to think or choose otherwise or not.
Okay. But are all commitments like that? Just habit or coercive circumstance?
But are all commitments like that? Just habit or coercive circumstance?
Ah, is this the issue for you? You're concerned that I'm downplaying if not denying the individual's agency, in favor of habit or circumstance?
Yeah, I expect I am. I don't think you choose who you are or what you believe. You at most become aware of who you are, what you are, what you believe.
Do we also consciously decide which ideals to hold, and how passionately?
Yes. Not all at once; over time, one observation, idea, judgment and commitment at a time. Quoting Srap Tasmaner
"Give me the child till the age of five-- " you know the rest.
I do. Aristotle apparently said Give me a child until he is 7 and I will show you the foundations of the man. Now that could mean he would observe how a child behaved between infancy and the age of seven to predict what kind of man that child would become. Or it could mean that in seven years, he could teach a child how to be the right kind of man.
Loyola perverted that to "give us a child till he's 7 and we'll have him for life", meaning that if they had control of very young children, they could program them to Jesuitism. (just boy-chidren, mind; neither of them knew a damn thing about girls). Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Almost everything that matters happens when you are a child.
Almost everything that matters happens when you are a child. Srap Tasmaner
Then there's no point living past puberty, right?
I only meant, everything that matters for determining what sort of being you are. Your understanding of physics, geometry, numbers, your native language, social bonds and social cues -- etc etc etc.
The point isn't even that you're finished by the time you're seven. Your brain's not even done yet. But you're set on your way and given the wherewithal to develop into something complete. What that will be depends on what happens to you, and of course on the choices you make, but how you make those choices is guided by what happened in those first years.
Do you disagree? Are we born and remain autonomous free agents? Rationally, I suppose, choosing our values and so forth, decade after decade? -- I presume that's a caricature of your view, so what's the real view? We are formed
over time, one observation, idea, judgment and commitment at a time
certainly, but what's the nature of these? What's their origin? Do you freely choose what you notice? Do you choose what ideas occur to you? If you are moved by something you observe, something that changes your worldview or your values, did you choose to be so moved?
Metaphysician UndercoverMay 08, 2024 at 11:57#9024080 likes
he usual claim is omnipotence - God can do anything and everything, which if the author and creator of the universe we live in, he would pretty much have to be.
Why do you conclude this? Do you have absolute control over anything you created? Why do you think that God would have absolute control over the universe He created? It seems to me, that "creations", whether they are by human beings, some other creatures, or even God, are just not like that.
Why? What makes you think that God must be absolutely unconstrained? I think that if you took the time to read some theology, you would see that even if it is often said that God is "all mighty", and sometimes said that He is "omnipotent" these conceptions are qualified, and it is not very often meant that he is absolutely unconstrained. Consider for example that it is often said that God only does what is good, and he exercises complete self-control to only do good. Clearly this indicates a special sort of constraint, which we as human beings also share with God. However, since we do not really understand self-constraint, and therefore have not been able to perfect it, we tend to imagine it in a very strange paradoxical way. The complete and perfect self-constraint which God is often said to have, is portrayed as an absolute freedom to do anything. And this is paradoxical because even though there are many things God could do, He also cannot do them, because of His self-constraint.
As to any necessity for his reality - yours sounding like Anselm's - that is only a "proof" for those who already take that real existence as axiomatic.
I was not handing you that argument as a "proof". I was only trying to make it clear to you that if you want to talk about "God", then you need to talk about "God" as He is understood. I find this to be a common problem with the atheist approaches to God. The atheist commonly approaches God with the presupposition, that God is an imaginary, fictitious thing, not real. But this is not how God is understood in theology. This prejudice which the atheist holds is completely contrary and contradictory to how God is actually understood, so it prevents the atheist from having any understanding of God. Aquinas, for example, asserted that God's essence is His existence. This implies that the very first principle one must accept before being able to understand anything about God, in any way, is that He has real existence. So if the atheist has any bit of intent whatsoever, to understand God, this prejudice must first be dismissed. Otherwise it's a waist of time.
Reality is the realm of nature, and recall we put that to the question.
Your claim, "reality is the realm of nature" is fundamentally false. By saying "the realm of nature" you imply the possibility of other realms not contained within the realm of nature. And as a "realms" these must be real. So even the statement itself, as written, implies its own falsity. It's like saying "there is only one multiplicity". The statement is self-defeating.
Consider, that "the artificial" is often contrasted with "the natural". We cannot say that the artificial is not real. So many will class artificial as part of the natural. But by doing this we lose the meaning of "natural", which is defined as "not artificial". The intent of the person who redefines "natural" in this way, may be to include the artificial into the realm of the natural, to argue that only the natural is real, but what's the point? That statement is self-defeating as shown, and to class the artificial as natural, is to ignore the substantial difference between the two.
As to hearts, I have to own up to my ideas about "purpose" being pretty clearly not as clear as I thought they were, or would have liked them to be.
This is why it is a very good thread which you have started. If you learn something new then the thread is good, right? The issue here, I think, is the presuppositions which we commonly take for granted. These are what are commonly known as bedrock or hinge propositions. Since they are taken for granted they are not subjected to our doubt. Since we do not doubt them or subject them to any form of methodological skepticism, then we do not develop an adequate understanding of their meaning. So the use of many words, such as "purpose", just floats freely, being a facilitator of mundane communication, a word whose meaning is taken for granted allowing for fluid conversation. Because of this, the word's meaning gets shaped to the circumstances of conversation, and what comes out on top is the most common usage. If someone asks what is the meaning of "purpose", we have all sorts of examples in common usage to refer to. But since its such a commonly used word, we can restrict the meaning we express, to these common examples, and having not applied a methodic analysis like the skeptic does, the true deeper meaning escapes us.
However, I think I can distinguish between purpose and function.
This is a good start. Let's look at the difference between "purpose" and "function". At first glance, we can say that the two might commonly be interchangeable, "a thing's purpose is the thing's function". But invert that and say "a thing's function is the thing's purpose", and that's not necessarily the case. This implies, right off the bat, that "function" has an even broader meaning than "purpose". Not all functions are purposes.
Further, we can see that "function" is most often an activity, whereas "purpose" is more often the goal of the activity, the end, or objective. This opens an even bigger rift between the two. What is exposed here is that "purpose" is something we attribute to an activity, the property of an activity, which puts it into a specific relation with an end, a goal. This makes the activity a means to an end. "Function" in its common usage does not necessarily imply such a relation of means to an end, because the function may be the activity itself, regardless of the purpose of the activity. So we might say, of a thing, that the thing has a function, and this function is the activity of the thing, without even indicating the purpose of that activity, or whether it even has a purpose.
So for example, if I am involved in a cooperative effort, I have a function, which is to bring the others coffee. That can be referred to as my function, what I am doing, bringing the coffee, and this can be said without any reference to the purpose, why I am bringing the coffee. In the heart example, the function of the heart can be stated as "to beat". The beating is the function of the heart, and this may be stated with a complete disassociation from the purpose of the heart. The thing has a function, an activity, and this is completely irrelevant to whether there is a purpose, goal, or end to that activity.
You can see how this has become a very convenient way to separate "function" from "purpose" thereby ignoring the question of "purpose". This is the way language evolves according to social circumstances to avoid areas of doubt, and facilitate mundane communication. We can talk about all sorts of things, and the function of each thing, with complete disregard as to whether that function has a purpose or not. That helps us to avoid having to think about whether or not natural activities have a purpose, thus keeping us away from the volatile "God" question.
The point isn't even that you're finished by the time you're seven. Your brain's not even done yet. But you're set on your way and given the wherewithal to develop into something complete. What that will be depends on what happens to you, and of course on the choices you make, but how you make those choices is guided by what happened in those first years.
Rationally, I suppose, choosing our values and so forth, decade after decade? -- I presume that's a caricature of your view, so what's the real view? We are formed
The real view? At about age 2, children begin to assert their character (Their temperament is already evident at two months.) They test the limits of autonomy, dependency and external constraint. By 7, understand about truth and falsehood, justice and injustice; manipulation and control; power dynamics. Their personality is roughly formed and they know who they are (that's usually the age at which a child recognizes if they've been assigned the wrong gender) but they don't know very much about the world.
In the next 10 or so years, they learn about the environment, other people, their society and culture, their own status in that social environment and their aspirations. Somewhere between 15 and 20, they question the beliefs, assumptions and values of their elders, and set out their own philosophy. (This is why censors are so adamant to deny them access to literature that doesn't support the status quo.) Not all adolescents are articulate; they don't all write down their thoughts - many are and do. The less intellectually inclined act out their doubts and opposition. The opportunistic keep their assessment to themselves and watch for opportunities to take advantage of its weaknesses. The meek accept the prevailing system and go along. The most fragile egos escape into materialism, fantasy or chemical placebos.
The 'nature' of moment-to-moment decisions? See problem, work out solution, make a plan, act on plan. See desired objective, work out path to desired object, make a plan, act on plan. Quoting Srap Tasmaner
You choose from the ideas that occur to you. (Must be a home invasion. Just a burglar. My teenage son sneaking in past curfew. The next door neighbor, drunk and come to the wrong door again. Shoot him! Just threaten to shoot him. Run away! Hide and watch. Wait till he comes up the stairs and push him off. Hit him with a vase.) Quoting Srap Tasmaner
If you are moved by something you observe, something that changes your worldview or your values, did you choose to be so moved?
No, but you have a pretty good idea by age 20 what kind of something would move you and what kind would not.
How is this a different sense of "purpose" from when I said the purpose of the heart is to circulate blood? To circulate blood is "a thing to be done", by the heart, it is "the reason" for the heart. If the heart's effort is successful, it achieves its purpose. It's the very same sense of "purpose".
Isn't the difference that one is consciously intended, and the other isn't? Isn't there a valid distinction to be drawn between conscious purpose and the autonomic system? One does not have conscious control over how fast your hair grows or your peristalsis.
Anyway, here's the 'meta-philosophical' point. That as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose.
This Forbes Magazine article just came up, on Dennis Nobles quest to have purpose admitted back into biology
Isn't the difference that one is consciously intended, and the other isn't? Isn't there a valid distinction to be drawn between conscious purpose and the autonomic system? One does not have conscious control over how fast your hair grows or your peristalsis.
I would say that this is acceptable as a proposal worth reviewing; i.e., the proposition that there is a valid distinction between conscious intention and an "automatic system" of a living creature. However, I would also argue that upon analysis such a theoretical distinction cannot be upheld in practise. This is because the supposed separate activities of the nonconscious (automatic), and the conscious, are constantly interacting as is well known to psychologists.
The brain creates patterns of activities which we might associate with 'habits', and even though they may originally be produced through conscious intention, these patterns, in the process of habitualization, become automatic. So there is a very close relationship between the supposed conscious and non-conscious, which makes it impossible to actually separate the intention of one from the intention of the other (intention acting in a hierarchical way as described in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics). There are all sorts of examples to support this.
From the side of conscious intention leading the way, consider that you decide on an activity like walking. Once the decision is made, and the act initiated, the habit (automatically) kicks in, and your legs start working in the way that you've learned. From the side of the nonconscious leading the way, consider dreaming as nonconscious. Then look at the way that sensations, sounds heard for example, may enter into the dream. Are you familiar with lucid dreaming?
Now, the issue is that since intention is hierarchical, if we propose a distinction between conscious and nonconscious intention, which one actually leads the way? The conscious mind thinking about this problem might be inclined to assign ultimate authority to itself, and this I believe is the perspective of libertarian free will. A scientist though, is inclined to observe from the outside in, seeing causation in the determinist way, making nonconscious automation the highest principle. It's a conundrum now. Therefore, I conclude that this proposal, to make a distinction between conscious and nonconscious intention is misleading, creating an unresolvable conundrum, and in reality the supposed two must be reduced to one general intention, as the guiding principle. The nonconscious is actually, in reality, prior, higher, and this may be revealed in mystical experiences.
Anyway, here's the 'meta-philosophical' point. That as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose.
This Forbes Magazine article just came up, on Dennis Nobles quest to have purpose admitted back into biology
This is exactly the problem. Our society has revolted against religion, attempting to remove any principles seated in religion from its codes. This has disassociated the intention (purpose) of conscious action from the intention (purpose) inherent within other living creatures. We cannot associate "intention" with other living beings, because that intention would be sourced from God. So the modern trend is to associate "intention" with the moral responsibility of conscious agents only. This I believe is actually quite modern because standard definitions of "intention" refer only to purpose, but the idea that "intention" is associated only with conscious acts is very pervasive in common usage.
The result is that now we have created a separation between the intentional acts of conscious agents, and the "purposeful" acts of other living creatures. But in truth, to understand biology and all the various activities of the multitude of living beings, along with the process of evolution, we need that continuity, between the purposeful acts of other living creatures, and the intentional acts of human agents. In reality, the intentional acts of human agents are just an extension, another specific incidence, of a purposeful act of a living creature.
Caerulea-LawrenceJune 18, 2024 at 17:56#9108390 likes
The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile?
When I skim-read some of the answers here, I wonder why there is such a strict divide between biological (alive) and inanimate. If we look at our bodies, the well-known expression "We are all stardust" isn't an euphemism, it is reality. Our bodies and our minds are made of the matter in the universe, and the only change is the complexity of the structures that 'life' "creates".
Isn't it therefore reasonable to say that what our minds do are exploring, understanding and parsing the inherent 'purpose' and 'meaning' in our bodies and from the world around us? Like small, hard to read text-files that we make a bigger and more complex story about?
I am curious what counter-arguments there are to this, and why people here create this divide between life and non-life, when so much of what we are is non-life - and so our thoughts, feelings, purpose, drive - isn't it more reasonable to say it is Atoms and matter having a living experience, and we are simply translators and archeologists?
The first thing we find out is that the best way for us is not identical with the best way for me.
I agree, when it comes to considering the details. There would seem to be general principles as to what is most conducive to human flourishing and rational self-government, but since we are not only beings of a certain kind but are also each unique individuals, knowing what is best for me must also come from direct self-knowledge and insight as well as grasping general principles and practices.
I don't see why a lack of overarching purpose and meaning should diminish the importance of general human and particular individual purpose and meaning.
But doesn't it reduce it to a matter of opinion? The assumption of Greek philosophy, generally, was that reason, logos, animated the universe but was also the animating principle of the individual soul/psyche. Not that there's anything wrong with what you're saying - it's not meant as a personal criticism, but insofar as this is typically how us moderns view the world, in terms of our individual search for meaning.
I saw an account recently of the meaning of a teleological explanation: it is an explanation in terms of what something is for, rather than what conditions caused it. It doesn't sound like much, but really a lot hinges on that distinction.
For instance in Aristotle's fourfold causation, the final cause of a particular thing is its end goal or purpose. A mundane example is that the final cause of a match is fire, as the lighting of fires is the purpose of a match. But notice that in this case, the final cause comes after the striking of the match, being the reason for the existence of the match.
The efficient and material causes are the composition of the matchhead and the act of striking it. That is very much how science since the scientific revolution has tended to view causality: what causes something to happen, in terms of the antecedent combination of causes giving rise to an effect. Cause in the Aristotelian sense has largely been dropped. That's where a lot of the controversy about the so-called meaninglessness of the scientific worldview originates. It's also what is addressed in the Forbes Magazine article I linked above - and it's a bitter controversy, indeed, with a lot of heavyweights slugging it out. So trivial, it isn't.
The result is that now we have created a separation between the intentional acts of conscious agents, and the "purposeful" acts of other living creatures. But in truth, to understand biology and all the various activities of the multitude of living beings, along with the process of evolution, we need that continuity, between the purposeful acts of other living creatures, and the intentional acts of human agents. In reality, the intentional acts of human agents are just an extension, another specific incidence, of a purposeful act of a living creature.
Agree. (I think this opens out into a discussion of Terrence Deacon's book Incomplete Nature, where he develops the idea of 'ententional processes' in nature although I've only read the first half of it.)
They're all "just letters", right? What distinguishes that paragraph from the rest of the text on this page is that, absent the organisation imposed by language-using agents, it conveys no meaning.
isn't it more reasonable to say it is Atoms and matter having a living experience
But there's nothing in the theory of 'atoms and matter' which account for the nature of experience. That is the subject of the well-known David Chalmer's paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, a perennial topic on this forum, and which spawned an entire academic industry of 'consciousness studies'.
But doesn't it reduce it to a matter of opinion? The assumption of Greek philosophy, generally, was that reason, logos, animated the universe but was also the animating principle of the individual soul/psyche. Not that there's anything wrong with what you're saying - it's not meant as a personal criticism, but insofar as this is typically how us moderns view the world, in terms of our individual search for meaning.
So, you think it would be better if everyone thought the same and all find the same meaning in, and purpose for, life? I don't see it that wayit's like aesthetics where I think there are real qualities, and real differences of quality, but as with altered states of consciousness, the truth as to which works are the best is impossible to determine definitively.
The kind of knowing involved in the arts, just as with self-cultivation, is participatory, not propositional. And what really matters is that you find purpose and, meaning in your own life. This is not to say that there are not general principlesso it is still wrong, and not merely " a matter of opinion" if someone finds their purpose in being a serial killer, pedophile or rapist.
I saw an account recently of the meaning of a teleological explanation: it is an explanation in terms of what something is for, rather than what conditions caused it. It doesn't sound like much, but really a lot hinges on that distinction.
Humans design things for particular purposes and even some animals can do that, I don't see how it follows that leaves were designed for the purpose of photosynthesis, stomachs for digestion, teeth for processing food or killing prey, claws for digging or killing and so on
For instance in Aristotle's fourfold causation, the final cause of a particular thing is its end goal or purpose. A mundane example is that the final cause of a match is fire, as the lighting of fires is the purpose of a match. But notice that in this case, the final cause comes after the striking of the match, being the reason for the existence of the match.
Yes I have been long familiar with Aristotle's four types of causes. Final causes are certainly relevant to human life because things are designed with particular purposes in mind. I don't see any reason to think that is the case with nature, although the question is one of those imponderables which cannot be definitively answered. The idea would only make sense in a theistic contextif you were one of those who believe in a God who has a plan then of course final cause would make sese in the context of that belief or assumption.
The efficient and material causes are the composition of the matchhead and the act of striking it. That is very much how science since the scientific revolution has tended to view causality: what causes something to happen, in terms of the antecedent combination of causes giving rise to an effect. Cause in the Aristotelian sense has largely been dropped. That's where a lot of the controversy about the so-called meaninglessness of the scientific worldview originates. It's also what is addressed in the Forbes Magazine article I linked above - and it's a bitter controversy, indeed, with a lot of heavyweights slugging it out. So trivial, it isn't.
I see no place for formal or final cause in the context of science. Material cause just means the set of conditions and constraints that operate globally as distinct from efficient or proximal causes which consist in local actions generally thought to involve energetic interactions.
Why should we project thinking in terms of formal and final causes beyond the human context? I'm not impressed by academic "heavy weights" but prefer to assess what they say on its own merits. I'm not impressed by arguments from authority, no matter who the purported authority might be.
That said I don't weigh in subjects I am not at least competent in, but when it comes to metaphysics there are no real experts. I agree with Wittgenstein that philosophy is not a matter of theory, but of practice, not of explanation but of description and conceptual clarityI say leave the theories to the scientists, since so-called theories which cannot be tested don't really qualify as theories at all in my book.
Why should we project thinking in terms of formal and final causes beyond the human context?
The nature of purpose is the question posed in the original post. I feel that article I linked at least addresses it. The Aristotelian dimension places it in historical context.
Thats the question posed in the original post. I feel that article I linked at least addresses it.
I'd prefer if you would speak for yourself rather than asking me to read linked articles. Otherwise, I'll be left guessing as to what your own thoughts are, and I really don't have the time for that.
I'd prefer if you would speak for yourself rather than asking me to read linked articles. Otherwise, I'll be left guessing as to what your own thoughts are, and I really don't have the time for that.
I did compose a lengthy response. I pinned the Forbes article because of its particular focus on the subject of the OP, and also to indicate that the question is a live issue and subject of debate, especially in biology.
I don't see any reason to think that is the case with nature, although the question is one of those imponderables which cannot be definitively answered.
In fact, the question of purpose, whether it is real or whether it is just imputed, seems to me a philosophical question par excellence. The fact that its *not* a scientific question, and why its not, is also a very interesting question.
In fact, the question of purpose, whether it is real or whether it is just imputed, seems to me a philosophical question par excellence. The fact that its *not* a scientific question, and why its not, is also a very interesting question.
The reality of human and animal purpose is not in question. The question as to whether nature itself exists to fulfill an overarching purpose ("overarching" because such a purpose would necessarily be beyond nature itself) seems to be an impossible question to frame coherently outside the context of the assumption of theism.
Apart from the idea that there could be a designer who created nature for a purpose, what other possibility is there for an overall purpose for nature as a whole? If you are able to frame the question in another way, I would be happy to consider it.
Science doesn't deal in anything which is either unobservable or has no observable effects, so I don't find it surprising that it is not a scientific question. If it cannot be coherently formulated as a question (outside the presumption of theism) then I can't see how it is a philosophical question either.
The other question I would ask is how such an unanswerable (if not coherently unaskable) question could have any bearing on the philosophical issues around the human situation and human potential.
and also to indicate that the question is a live issue and subject of debate, especially in biology.
Now you seem to be contradicting yourself: saying that the question of purpose is "a live issue and subject of debate, especially in biology" while also saying it is not a scientific question.
The reality of human and animal purpose is not in question. The question as to whether nature itself exists to fulfill an overarching purpose ("overarching" because such a purpose would necessarily be beyond nature itself) seems to be an impossible question to frame coherently outside the context of the assumption of theism.
as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose.
As for the purpose of nature as a whole, I think that indeed frames the question in such a way that we could never discern an answer. We dont know the whole, but only participate in and enact our roles and purposes within that larger context. But as Victor Frankl observed, those with the conviction that there is meaning and purpose in life generally do better than those without it. Call it faith, if you will, but I resist the facile claim that this amounts to belief without evidence.
Science doesn't deal in anything which is either unobservable or has no observable effects, so I don't find it surprising that it is not a scientific question
But this is why the question has assumed urgency in biology, in particular, as all living organisms obviously act purposefully. Of course, in physics, there is no question of purpose - its all action and reaction, describable according to mathematical laws. As that became a paradigm for knowledge generally, namely physicalism, then it was simply assumed that life itself was also purposeless, as physicalism assumes that physics is the master paradigm, of which organisms are but one instantiation. But this is just what is being challenged in this debate over whether and how organisms and evolutionary processes are purposeful.
The other question I would ask is how such an unanswerable (if not coherently unaskable) question could have any bearing on the philosophical issues around the human situation and human potential.
But this is exactly an instance of the kind of positivism that I keep saying you seem to advocate. Remember the exchange yesterday, about Wittgensteins complaint that modern culture seems to say that something either has a scientific solution, or no solution at all? Isnt this what youre implying? That if science cant adjudicate the question, then there cant be an answer to it?
purpose comes with or is invented by mind. Bottom line, purpose is boot-strapped. And for most people that never being an adequate account, they invent something, usually, G/god/s, but maybe also technology and science meet the need for purpose.
To me this is certainly the zone where the question comes from: that life is always toppling forwards, and being curious reason-seeking animals, humans ask for purposes. I too am a Collingwood man: the answers form an empty set. But the presuppositions that people bring to the question are interesting. Using the word 'mind' for instance is amazingly frequent, even among materialists.
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 19, 2024 at 11:09#9109590 likes
If we want to understand our own existence, it is necessary. The trend, when Darwinist evolutionists separated themselves from Lamarckian evolutionists, and ridiculed Lamarck, was to ignore the purposefulness of living actions as a cause of evolutionary change, accepting instead "chance" as a proper cause of variation in living beings. However, these biological assumptions create the rift of understanding between conscious intentional actions of human agents, and purposeful actions of other living creatures.
Now, intentional activity is relegated to the social sciences, and there is a separation between these social sciences and the proper science of biology. The rift has been created by the way that empirical evidence is valued and assessed, which dates back to Darwinism. "Purpose" is effectively excluded from science proper, as unobservable. However, it is a necessary subject of social science. This creates the separation between "purpose" in the actions of human agents, and "purpose" in the actions of other living creatures, which I referred to in my last post. We place human beings on a pedestal, being "agents of intent", subject to law and social conventions, separating them from other creatures, and in doing this we provide no principles to show how conscious intention along with laws and social conventions, are just an evolutionary progression from, (an extension of), the purposeful acts of other living beings.
as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose.
This is more of a psychological thesis than a philosophical treatment of the idea of purpose. Biologists may speak in terms of purpose in evolution, but they generally acknowledge this is a kind of metaphor. The 'literal' question is as to whether evolution is directed and driven by an end goal or goals. If it would have this kind of purpose then the question becomes 'Whose purpose?" and of course the only intelligible answer would seem to be 'God's".
You say purpose and intentionality are conceived in terms of something an agent does. What is an alternative way of framing it? That's the question you haven't addressed. The arguments over whether or not the Universe is animated by purpose, just are the arguments over whether or not a God exists. What else could they be?
As for the purpose of nature as a whole, I think that indeed frames the question in such a way that we could never discern an answer. We dont know the whole, but only participate in and enact our roles and purposes within that larger context. But as Victor Frankl observed, those with the conviction that there is meaning and purpose in life generally do better than those without it. Call it faith, if you will, but I resist the facile claim that this amounts to belief without evidence.
But the question just is about the purpose of nature as a whole. No one denies that humans and other animals have their purposes. And Frankl is indeed correct that those who find purpose in their lives do better than those who don't, but that says nothing about the existence or non-existence of purpose in nature as a whole. Some people need to believe in an overarching purpose in order to find purpose in their own lives, and others don't. Humans are diverse. I would say the most general purpose for humans would be to actualize, to realize, one's potential. Not everyone requires a "greater authority" in order to be concerned with the question of their own potential. Of course some do, and it is those who trun to religion. You agreed before that everyone does not need to think the same way.
But this is why the question has assumed urgency in biology, in particular, as all living organisms obviously act purposefully. Of course, in physics, there is no question of purpose - its all action and reaction, describable according to mathematical laws. As that became a paradigm for knowledge generally, namely physicalism, then it was simply assumed that life itself was also purposeless, as physicalism assumes that physics is the master paradigm, of which organisms are but one instantiation. But this is just what is being challenged in this debate over whether and how organisms and evolutionary processes are purposeful.
Yes,organisms act purposefullyI haven't denied that. It isn't assumed on account of physics that life is purposeless (in the overarching sense)it is only in the life sciences that purposeful behavior is observed. It follows that there is no evidence of purpose outside the context of life, and there it is only the purposes of individuals and collectives of individuals (animal and human communities) which are manifest. I don't think your psychological explanation holds water. There is no debate within evolutionary biology about whether evolution is purposefulsuch a question is outside the scope of science as it is a theological question.
The other question I would ask is how such an unanswerable (if not coherently unaskable) question could have any bearing on the philosophical issues around the human situation and human potential.
Janus
But this is exactly an instance of the kind of positivism that I keep saying you seem to advocate. Remember the exchange yesterday, about Wittgensteins complaint that modern culture seems to say that something either has a scientific solution, or no solution at all? Isnt this what youre implying? That if science cant adjudicate the question, then there cant be an answer to it?
When you find you cannot counter what I say with rational argument you resort to framing me as one of your favorite bogeymenas a positivist. How many times do I have to remind you that I don't think science is capable of answering anywhere near all the questions that are inherent in the human condition? Those questions have to be grappled with and answered, in their different ways, by individuals.
The point is that there can be no one general definitive answer to such questions, and that whatever "answers" are found cannot be rigorously tested as scientific answers can ("answers" in inverted commas because the experiences in which the sense of encountering them are generally ineffable). The one general truth that comes out of creative and spiritual pursuits is that people are capable of transformative altered states of consciousness. This is amply and perhaps most vividly demonstrated by the use and study of psychedelics, but I think meditative practices, mystical experiences and the arts also show this human potential for experiential transformation.
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 20, 2024 at 01:29#9110930 likes
Reply to tim wood I've learned from past experience that you get annoyed when I do not answer your banal questions. So I'll give it a go.
"I should like to start by asking," what, exactly, you think teleology is. In particular I'm interested in whether you will say that the telos of a thing a) is a (some)thing, and b) is in some way intrinsic to but separate from the thing.
Teleology is a way of studying things which looks at things in relation to purpose, reason for being. Accordingly, the telos of a thing can never be intrinsic to the thing, as purpose is defined by the thing's relation to something else, for example its function in a larger whole.
My bias is that for individuals becoming what they are is just the operation of law with occasional mutation - the kitten becomes a cat and never a horse. As for the evolution of species, that the operation of both law and chance, with occasional mutation. This group goes North and develops characteristics favorable for living in cold, that group South, and for hot. And those that do not, die.
Or are we in agreement, with just different words?
I don't think we are in agreement. You've left out the teleological aspect. Why did this group go north, and that group go south? See, you say that going north, or going south, caused these groups to develop "characteristics favorable" to those areas, but you neglect the fact that they choose to go in those directions, so they already had characteristics which made them favour those areas, prior to going.
Teleology is a way of studying things which looks at things in relation to purpose, reason for being.
That's correct: teleological explanations explain phenomena in terms of their purpose, rather than in terms of their antecedent causes. It seems a minor difference but a lot hinges on it.
The 'literal' question is as to whether evolution is directed and driven by an end goal or goals. If it would have this kind of purpose then the question becomes 'Whose purpose?" and of course the only intelligible answer would seem to be 'God's".
But this illustrates the very point I was making. The way we have to see it is that it must be either psychological - in the mind - or then it's theistic - as the agency of God. I'm attempting to deconstruct the worldview which makes it seem that these are the only choices. I think (and MU agrees in the above) that 'intentionality' is manifest at every level of organic life, and that it is purposeful.
Dennis Noble sees evidence of purposive and intentional evolution in our immune response to viruses. Detection of the invader triggers a flurry of rapid mutations in the genes of B cells, creating a legion of gene variants. These variants are antibodies, the most effective of which are deployed to combat the virus. In a defensive assault, the immune system self-modifies its own DNA. It changes the genome. Not supposed to be possible, says Noble. Happens all the time.
The conventional view is that this is still random natural selectioncranked up to warp speed inside the body during the lifetime of an individual organism. Noble agrees, but adds the observation that the organisms immune system initiates and orchestrates the ramped up process, harnessing natural selection to fight off the invader. For Noble, this routine procedure offers clear evidence of the organism actively participating in its own evolutionits doing natural selection. This is an alternative theory of evolution where cognition is fundamental. In this theory, the smallest unit of lifecellshave some version of intelligence and intent that allows them to detect and respond to their environment. Noble clocks the immune response as a goal-directed pattern of behavior at the cellular level that scales to every level of organization within a living system. He believes were working ourselves into a sweat to exclude something so essential to evolution and to life as purpose and intention.
The article goes on:
Noble is part of The Third Way, a movement in evolutionary biology that views natural selection as part of a holistic, organism-centered process. He co-authored Evolution on Purpose," published by MIT Press in 2023, which argues that organisms evolve with intention.
The Third Way site is here - I've been aware of it for a while, I read it from time to time. It's not aligned with any form of ID, but it's also sceptical of mainstream neo-darwinism. (I'm particularly drawn to the essays of Steve Talbott, which I encountered on The New Atlantis website.)
The historical background to the rejection of teleological explanations is tied to the advent of Galileo's physics which eliminated Aristotelian physics. But the idea of purpose and its absence is another matter.
The philosophical point lurking behind this is the question of 'randomness'. There's a lot of heat generated around the idea that evolution is a 'random process' - which of course it actually isn't, even under neo-Darwinism, because natural selection is a far from random process. But there still is an element of chance in two senses - that the existence of life itself is posited by naturalism to be a kind of fluke occurence, the fortuitous combination of elements that happened to give rise to organic life. And that the process by which mutations occur is also largely fortuitous, with unfavourable mutations being eliminated while those favourable to replication of the genotype being preserved. But the overall paradigm is still one of the 'blind watchmaker', to use Richard Dawkin's memorable simile: the process itself is not driven by any kind of intelligence, but is ultimately reducible to, and explainable in terms of, physical principles, albeit represented in unique forms by the complexities of organic chemistry.
Notice that the 'Third Way' approach mentioned above is not an attempt to re-introduce an 'intelligent designer' or presiding intelligence. It's strangely similar to one ancient form of the Logos, namely, the Logos Spermatikos, similar to that described in the Catholic (New Advent) Encylopedia:
God, according to them (the Stoics), "did not make the world as an artisan does his work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe" (Galen, "De qual. incorp." in "Fr. Stoic.", ed. von Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world "as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistible force which bears along the entire world and all creatures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly (Cleanthus, "Hymn to Zeus" in "Fr. Stoic." I, 527-cf. 537).
which I find a compelling metaphor (although I hasten to add, nothing like that is proposed on the Third Way site that I'm aware of.)
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 20, 2024 at 10:54#9111380 likes
But disagreement here. Going North didn't cause anything. Being North, they either adopted or died. Nor did I say that the going caused anything. And their choice incidental.
Of course going north was causal. It caused them to be in those conditions. The conditions you describe as required to be "either adopted or died". You appear to be refusing to acknowledge that animals choose which direction they go, and their is purpose behind their travels. Since animals are in general, free to wonder, there must be a reason why they would choose to put themselves in an 'adapt or die' situation. This reason for them doing this is causal, though you deny it.
That's correct: teleological explanations explain phenomena in terms of their purpose, rather than in terms of their antecedent causes. It seems a minor difference but a lot hinges on it.
I think that this is a misrepresentation. Teleology looks at purpose as causal. This is final cause. To portray a dichotomy between teleology and causality is to fall into the determinist trap of scientism, in which final cause, intention, free will etc., is excluded from the category of "causal". This restricts "cause" to efficient cause, making the world deterministic.
The 'literal' question is as to whether evolution is directed and driven by an end goal or goals. If it would have this kind of purpose then the question becomes 'Whose purpose?" and of course the only intelligible answer would seem to be 'God's".
Janus
But this illustrates the very point I was making. The way we have to see it is that it must be either psychological - in the mind - or then it's theistic - as the agency of God. I'm attempting to deconstruct the worldview which makes it seem that these are the only choices. I think (and MU agrees in the above) that 'intentionality' is manifest at every level of organic life, and that it is purposeful.
First, what exactly do you mean by saying that intentionality is active at every level of organic life? Second, even if intentionality were "active at every level of organic life" in the way you mean it (presuming that you actually have a good grasp on what you mean by that), how could you test in a way that could demonstrate that? And even if you could demonstrate it, what significance could it have to how we should live our lives?
I am not going to deny that intentionality is "active at every level of life", because I don't really even know what that could mean. I think I understand to some degree human and even some higher animal intentionality, and I can see how that understanding might help my own living self-cultivation, but I can't see how a belief like, for example, the intentionality of cells could be of any relevance to that cultivation, because I find no familiarity in the idea.
And the final point I want to make is that even if we could know and show that there is an intentionality that we could understand as such at every level of life what could that demonstrate or prove about anything transcendent (which I think is where you are wanting to go with this. perhaps in order to justify some of your cherished personal beliefs)?
Perhaps there was a good reason that Gotama refused to answer metaphysical questions; not just because he thought that such preoccupations would distract people from practice, but perhaps also because he realized that such question are inherently unanswerable. Surely if he could have given empirically demonstrable or somehow self-evident once heard, and hence convincing, propositional answers to such questions, then that would have settled the matter in his disciples' minds and then they could have got on with the important thing: practice, no longer distracted by the perplexity that being obsessed with such questions would create.
First, what exactly do you mean by saying that intentionality is active at every level of organic life?
How is it not clear? That every organism acts intentionally (although not with the conscious self-awareness that characterises higher organisms.) And it re-introduces intentionality at a fundamental level, in contrast to the physicalist model, which posits that organic life is understandable in terms of the same laws which govern physical and chemical reactions. If there's anything 'transcendent' about it, it is simply that.
How to demonstrate that - it's more like a philosophical framework or metaphorical model, a way of thinking about life. We're all looking at the same data, but some frameworks or metaphors might be more consonant with the observations than others. The physicalist/materialist model is mechanistic, whereas this line of thinking recognises a basic distinction between the organic and the mechanistic.
Perhaps there was a good reason that Gotama refused to answer metaphysical questions; not just because he thought that such preoccupations would distract people from practice, but perhaps also because he realized that such question are inherently unanswerable.
But this question was probably never even considered by the Buddha. This is a question about science and scientific models. It is being actively explored by many scientists - the Third Way Evolution site has an index of scientists that are exploring these ideas.
I think the underlying philosophical rift is between the materialism pushed by the so-called 'ultra-darwinists', which sees everything as being explicable in terms of physical laws, and an emerging holistic model of life and mind. It's part of the overall decline of materialism as a model, which is occuring in many areas of science.
Is such a shift in models itself a scientific matter? Are the conflicts about the interpretations of physics scientific questions? I would say not - they're all concerned with questions of meaning and interpretation, and that definitely overflows the bounds of scientific observation. Philosophy of science (Kuhn et al) have been documenting that since the 1960's. Is that 'metaphysics'? In a way it is, but that doesn't mean it shouldn't be considered.
How is it not clear? That every organism acts intentionally (although not with the conscious self-awareness that characterises higher organisms.)
It's not clear because you won't proffer a clear definition of intentionality which is different than acting "with the conscious self-awareness that characterizes higher organisms". Yes, "lower" organisms obviously respond to their environments, but I don't see how that equates to intentional behavior.
Just address that question or we will be unable to proceed.
Other than nothing you've written above addresses any of the questions i posed to you, so I find nothing else there to respond to.
lower" organisms obviously respond to their environments, but I don't see how that equates to intentional behavior.
Just address that question or we will be unable to proceed.
Organisms not only react to stimuli but often do so in ways that are adaptive and goal-directed, suggesting a form of intentionality. This is seen in behaviors that enhance survival and reproduction, such as finding food, avoiding predators, and seeking mates. These behaviors imply a level of agency and purposiveness that goes beyond the deterministic nature of physical laws.
Furthermore, the internal regulatory mechanisms of organisms, such as homeostasis, also exhibit intentional-like behavior. These systems maintain stability through feedback loops, dynamically adjusting to changes in the environment to sustain life. This regulatory process involves a form of self-organization and information processing that seems distinct from non-living physical processes.
Such adaptive, purposive behavior cannot be entirely reduced to physical interactions because it involves a level of complexity and coordination that physical laws alone do not account for. That suggests that the principles governing biological systems include emergent properties and processes that arise from, but are not reducible to, their physical and chemical constituents.
Those are the kinds of considerations that are behind Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature', although they're also addressed in diverse ways by the theorists listed on the Third Way website.
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 21, 2024 at 00:46#9112300 likes
That which produces an effect, where "effect" is the result or consequence of a cause. In other words, when something occurs as the result of, or consequence of another thing, that other thing is the cause.
Also you appear not to distinguish between purpose and purposeful. A screw in a machine has a purpose, but it would be a kind of animism to suppose it - the screw - to be purposeful.
I don't understand the distinction you\re trying to make. If a thing has a purpose then obviously that thing is purposeful. A screw in a machine, was put there for a purpose. It has a purpose, therefore it very clearly is purposeful, "purposeful" meaning "having purpose". And this is not "animism".
And I would appreciate it if you would provide your distinction between function and telos.
"Function" is the activity by which a thing fulfils its purpose. We can say that "function" is the means to the end, and "purpose" is the end. Both are subjects of teleology.
To me, function is what-it's-for, and if we're lucky, how it does it.
Put it this way, "what-it-is-for" is its purpose. How-it-does-it is its function. Can you see how the purpose is the end, and the function is the means to the end? The goal, or end, (the purpose), is the object, or desired state, while the means (function) is the activity which is supposed to bring about the realization of that object,
Above you have telos being about relation and thus not being in the thing, the relation being "between" the thing and its purpose - not sure exactly what that means, or what you're trying to say. If telos is just another word for purpose, and if by purpose is meant function, then it should not be too difficult to note where the words are used beyond their sense. If telos is somehow the purposefulness - intention - of something able to have such a thing, then that is imho, the issue - what would be that thing.
I didn't speak of "telos", I provided a definition of "teleology".
..the materialism pushed by the so-called 'ultra-darwinists', which sees everything as being explicable in terms of physical laws...
And, I might add, when it comes to the difficult question of what is at the bottom, the foundational cause, "physical laws" always fails in explanatory capacity. So, they end up falling back on chance, with concepts like random mutations, abiogenesis, symmetry-breaking, etc..
Organisms not only react to stimuli but often do so in ways that are adaptive and goal-directed, suggesting a form of intentionality. This is seen in behaviors that enhance survival and reproduction, such as finding food, avoiding predators, and seeking mates.
You're talking about "higher" organisms, and I've already agreed that some of those display purposive behavior. It seems to me you are stretching the meaning of intentional.
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 21, 2024 at 10:42#9112690 likes
No word games, please! I am quite sure the screw itself possesses zero purpose.
It seems you're the one playing word games, attempting to put an unnecessary restriction on the use of "purpose". Do you agree that "purpose" means "thing intended"? And do you not understand that there is something intended for the screw in relation to the machine that it is a part of? Therefore the screw has a purpose, and is purposeful.
If you are talking about some sort of inherent purpose, which would be intrinsic to the screw, I've already told you that purpose does not exist in that way. It exists in the thing's relation to something else. In this case, the screw has purpose in relation to the machine. Be careful in understanding this relation, because it is not invertible. Purpose exists in the relation of a part to a whole, and not in the relation of the whole to the part. We cannot say that the machine has purpose in relation to the screw.
As to our screw, no doubt a someone or someones intended it for something, which we can call its purpose. But that "its" cannot be used to attribute anything to the screw itself - being just language of convenience.
You're very wrong here. The part of the whole, which is named "the screw", has a very particular purpose assigned to it, and only it. Therefore the purpose is attributable to that part, and it alone. It does not matter that the manufacturer chose one particular screw from millions of similar possible choices, the purpose is assigned to that particular one, through the actions which followed from that choice.
You can call this "language of convenience" if you want. But since it is the only way that we have to talk about the intention which is responsible, as cause, for that particular screw's position in the world, it is a way of speaking truth about the object's context within a larger environment. The screw was put there as part of an intentional act, and the purpose is in the part's relation to the whole, not the whole's relation to the part, therefore we attribute "purpose" to the part.
But I think you do use and understand teleology to do just that, attribute to things and beings themselves that which they do not and cannot have.
It's very clear to me, that the screw, as a part, has purpose, in relation to the machine, as the whole. If you insist on denying the truth and reality of this predication "the screw has purpose", then how would you propose that we could proceed toward understanding the intention behind the relationship between the parts and the whole?
Such adaptive, purposive behavior cannot be entirely reduced to physical interactions because it involves a level of complexity and coordination that physical laws alone do not account for. That suggests that the principles governing biological systems include emergent properties and processes that arise from, but are not reducible to, their physical and chemical constituents.
I have a question or two about this. By "reducible to" do you mean 'explainable in terms of' or 'has its origin in'? Do you count global or environmental conditions as physical interactions? Do you claim there is "something more" metaphysically speaking than the physical world with its global and local conditions and interactions? If you do want to claim that, then what could that "something more" be in your opinion?
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 22, 2024 at 00:54#9114300 likes
This intention, and indeed "the whole," will you assay quick definitions?
As Plato demonstrated in the Theaetetus, some words are best left undefined until after the appropriate meaning is worked out through the dialectical process. So I'll leave these definitions for now, and hope that we can work out the meaning of these through discourse.
Thus given a machine - a whole - the purpose of the screw can be worked out, its relation as part to whole. But given just a random screw, its purpose is indiscernible. And further, in its purpose being fulfilled, the screw has zero choice; that is, in terms of the purpose articulated, if the something itself is without choice, then the something in itself has no purpose. - And this pretty much what you have already defined.
I agree that the random screw, in that description, has no purpose, that's what the predication "random" implies. As I said, purpose is a feature of a things relation to something else, and "random" implies without any order in those relations. In the example of the screw and the machine, it is the relation of part to whole which gives the screw purpose. In many cases it is in the relation of the means to the end which gives purpose. The end gives purpose to the means, but the end is not necessarily a "whole". We call the end an "object" as a goal, that is not exactly the same as a whole.
I do not understand the relation between choice and purpose which you are outlining. "A thing", whether it is an act which is the means to an end, or a physical object like the screw, is given purpose by an intentional agent, but this does not mean that the act itself (the means), or the thing itself (the screw) has choice. Choice, and the agent who chooses are independent from the purpose. That is why choice is "free" in the sense of freely willed. Purpose follows from the freely willed choice, it is not prior to it.
As to intention, if there be such, then there must be (another) such that has it - presumably a being of some kind. And again I invoke freedom. If there be such a being, it must be free to not intend, its choice to intend being therefore a free choice. Of such beings, they either are or are not - this simpler than may seem at first. If it is, then there are applicable predicates: it is. If it is not, then no predicates apply, and it is not.
I cannot follow this dialectic. I don't see the relation between intention and being which you start with. Nor do I see the relation to freedom. And the rest seems right out of place.
Can we agree that "intention" is the cause of purpose? Wherever we find purpose we can conclude that there is intention as the cause of that purpose.
We know that human beings have intention, and their acts are known to have purpose. So every time we observe a human act which appears to be purposeful, we conclude that there is intention behind the act, as the cause of the purposeful act. The intent is not necessarily evident to us. Do you agree, that anytime we distinguish purpose, there must be intent behind the thing we observe as having purpose, like the screw in the machine? And do you agree that the intent is not necessarily the intent of a human being, there could be other sources of intent? Therefore we cannot associate intent with "being" as you propose. We do not have the evidence required to limit "intent" in that way.
Freedom/choice important because without it, purpose dissolves into operation according to law. The engine maker doubtless has many intentions, and purposes many things for the parts of his engine, but the parts themselves (presumably) operate in accord with laws appropriate to them themselves.
Freedom/choice have a special relationship with intention, I agree. But I think we need to make one more step of separation now, to include the agent itself. The agent (not necessarily a being, as explained above) has freedom/choice, and the agent also has intention, but these two (freedom of choice, and intention) are distinct. They must be distinct because intention is toward a particular end, will freedom of choice is directed toward no particular end. So the agent has both, freedom to choose an end, and also already chosen ends, as intentions.
Now to jump ahead into what I think the issue is. Does every free being have a purpose? Trivially yes, many. Ultimately, only as self-legislated. By "self-legislated" I mean arrived at by a process of reason. Absent which, the being has no (ultimate) purpose.
So, I suggest you try looking at things this way, tim. Let's consider an individual human being as an agent. This type off being has many wants, needs, and desires. It also has freedom of choice. As a manifestation of these two distinct features, desires, and freedom of choice, the being develops intentions, which are particular goals or objectives. Intentions are derived from a combination of desires and of freedom of choice. But the being is hindered by things which are impossible.
Let's start with the human being as a baby. The baby wants all sorts of things, and some, like walking and talking are immediately impossible, but the baby, through intention and will power can learn and earn the capacity to talk and walk. Other things, like flying, are recognized as more absolutely impossible, due to physical constraints. So the freedom of the human individual is restricted by physical constraints, though some may be overcome. However, there is also social constraints like laws, which restrict one's freedom in a different way.
Consider that the human person grows to respect these different constraints as different forms of impossibility. Now the adolescent is free from many social constraints, in many ways, not being constrained by many responsibilities that adults get into, like a chosen career, a mortgage, credit card debt, a family to support, etc.. So the adolescent has much freedom to chose, and formulate intentions in a wide variety of ways. The intentions, goals and objectives are the property of the individual, and the individual's actions have purpose relative to those intentions. This is principle #1, what the individual does, has purpose relative to the individual's intentions, and the individual has freedom to choose one's intentions (being influenced by various desires, wants, and needs, as well as impossibilities).
Principle #2 is that the individual has a desire or need for relations with others. This puts the person into the context of a part of a larger "whole". The larger whole being a family, a team, a business, company, or society in general. As a part of a larger whole, the person has purpose in that relation. Now, not only does the person's actions have purpose in relation to that person, but also the person has purpose in relation to this larger entity.
The person is intermediary now. One's actions have purpose in relation to the person, and the person has purpose in relation to the larger organization. When we say that human beings are "rational animals" it is implied that the person will prioritize the purpose one has in relation to the larger entity over the lower purpose one gives to one's actions through one's own intentions.
But this presents a significant problem. Strictly speaking, the person's actions have purpose relative to the person's intentions, and that's how we understand purpose, as relative to intention. So when we understand that the person has purpose relative to a larger organization, it is more proper to understand the purpose in relation to the intention of the larger organization. But how do we understand this intention? An entity such as a family, a team, a company or business, or society in general, is not the type of thing (a being for example) which we would think of as having intention. Because of this, the way that a person gets purpose from a higher organization is very perplexing.
I have a question or two about this. By "reducible to" do you mean 'explainable in terms of' or 'has its origin in'? Do you count global or environmental conditions as physical interactions? Do you claim there is "something more" metaphysically speaking than the physical world with its global and local conditions and interactions? If you do want to claim that, then what could that "something more" be in your opinion?
Physical reductionism is generally taken to mean explainable in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry. It is the kind of attitude which says that living organisms are nothing but colllections of atoms or nothing but the vehicles by which genes propagate. In practical terms, the desired reduction base is something that can, at least in theory, be explained and predicted in those terms.
Global and environmental conditions were not, in times past, considered to be physical interactions, or considered as part of the reduction base. That is what might be called a holistic approach which is the opposite to reductionism.
The law of physics are context-free. They dont need to take into account environmental factors but rather describe the behaviour of ideal objects under specified conditions. This is what makes them universal - the behaviour of a body with specific physical attributes will predictably act in accordance with physical laws under said conditions - like, the apple will fall at a given rate, provided nobody catches it, or the wind doesnt blow and alter its path, or it isnt in zero-gravity environments.
The something more that biology has to consider is precisely the environment and the constant interaction of organisms with each other and their environment. That is where physicalist reductionism has been found wanting, and why biosemiotics and systems science have gained traction in biology: living beings are far more language-like than machine like, right down to the most fundamental levels of cellular biology.
Accordingly, I think its a mistake to try and conceive of the something more - the aspects of organisms that cant be reduced to the chemical and physical - as any kind of something. That leads to the misconception of an elan vital or spooky ethereal substance - in other words its a reification. As you know, Ive often commented that I think one of the consequences of Cartesian dualism is exactly that kind of reification, by treating mind as a thinking thing, more or less on a similar plane to physical things, but of a different kind.
Whereas the dynamic systems theory approach of e.g. Terrence Deacon and Alice Juarrrero and others speaks in terms of the interaction of bottom-up, physical reactions with top-down, causal constraints. Those latter kinds of factors are precisely what reductionism fails to consider.
[quote=ChatGPT] Terrence Deacon's concept of "ententionality," introduced in "Incomplete Nature," seeks to describe the unique properties and attributes of organisms and their goal-directed behaviors, which he believes are inadequately explained by traditional physical and intentional frameworks. Ententionality combines "intentionality" with "entelechy" (Aristotle's term for realizing potential), emphasizing that organisms inherently pursue goals and maintain themselves through a dynamic process of self-organization and adaptation. This idea highlights the complex interplay between biological structures and functions that give rise to purposeful behavior and consciousness, suggesting that life inherently possesses a form of directedness that goes beyond mere mechanistic explanations.[/quote]
Physical reductionism is generally taken to mean explainable in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry. It is the kind of attitude which says that living organisms are nothing but colllections of atoms or nothing but the vehicles by which genes propagate. In practical terms, the desired reduction base is something that can, at least in theory, be explained and predicted in those terms.
You seem to be equivocating between 'explainable in terms of' and 'finds its origin in' (or as I should have added 'is constituted.by') That something is not explainable in physical terms does not entail that it is anything over and above its physical constitution, the relations between its parts and the global and local constraints it is subject to.
So, of course intentional behavior is not explainable in terms of physical reactions, because to say it is would be to deny the very conception of intentionality that is purported to be unexplained. But all that means is that there is a limit to what can be understood in mechanistic terms. To reject physicalism on this basis is to be working from and reacting to outmoded mechanistic conceptions of physicality. In other words, it is to be attacking a strawman.
Global and environmental conditions were not, in times past, considered to be physical interactions, or considered as part of the reduction base. That is what might be called a holistic approach which is the opposite to reductionism.
Of course, but in times past global and environmental conditions were thought to be given by God or determined by karma or some imagined supernatural principle. Are you now appealing to those kinds of ideas, and if not, just what are you appealing to? What are you trying to imply beyond the well-accepted fact that not everything in human life or even nature can be understood in mechanistic terms. That's the problem, you never come out and say just what it is you are arguing for.
The law of physics are context-free. They dont need to take into account environmental factors but rather describe the behaviour of ideal objects under specified conditions. This is what makes them universal - the behaviour of a body with specific physical attributes will predictably act in accordance with physical laws under said conditions - like, the apple will fall at a given rate, provided nobody catches it, or the wind doesnt blow and alter its path, or it isnt in zero-gravity environments.
We call them "laws of physics" or "laws of nature', but really, they are just generalized formulations of observed regularities, and in that sense, they are not context-free, not independent of our empirical observations. We don't really know whether they apply everywhere in this universe but given that they seem to accurately picture the nature of what is observed, and that they are underpinned by elegant mathematics, we assume that they are universal.
Accordingly, I think its a mistake to try and conceive of the something more - the aspects of organisms that cant be reduced to the chemical and physical - as any kind of something. That leads to the misconception of an elan vital or spooky ethereal substance - in other words its a reification. As you know, Ive often commented that I think one of the consequences of Cartesian dualism is exactly that kind of reification, by treating mind as a thinking thing, more or less on a similar plane to physical things, but of a different kind.
If the mechanistically unexplainable aspects of nature are not "any kind of something" then they are not any kind of anything. In other words, all that is being shown by their (current) unexplainability is either the (current) limits of human understanding, or perhaps the permanent limits of human understanding, which might well make sense given that it seems reasonable to think that nature is non-dual, whereas human thought is intrinsically, inextricably dualistic.
That something is not explainable in physical terms does not entail that it is anything over and above its physical constitution, the relations between its parts and the global and local constraints it is subject to.
But such constraints are not considered in reductionism.
Of course, but in times past global and environmental conditions were thought to be given by God or determined by karma or some imagined supernatural principle. Are you now appealing to those kinds of ideas, and if not, just what are you appealing to?
Im not appealing to anything. The physicalist paradigm is just exactly that everything is ultimately reducible to the laws of physics. But its clear that these are abstractions that dont describe the complexities of organic life.
That Talbot essay is really worth the effort.
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 22, 2024 at 13:10#9115130 likes
Or are you suggesting purpose resides somehow in the engine and screw combined, you having already made clear it cannot be in either separately.
Yes I've said this for a number of posts now, purpose is in the relation. In this example, the purpose of the part (the screw) is in its relation to the thing which it is a part of (the machine), which can be called "the whole". And I explained that this relationship is not invertible. Purpose is in the relationship of the part (screw) to the whole (machine), not in the relationship of the whole to the part. That is why we say "the screw has purpose", referencing the relation of the screw to the machine, not "the machine has purpose" in relation to the screw. The latter expression, "the machine has purpose" requires putting the machine into the context of a further relation.
My own view is that the purposes of both are inventions of a being capable of such... all being the sole property of the being and nothing at all to either the screw or the engine
As I explained, purpose implies intention, therefore intentional creation is implied by any display of purpose. But it is clearly not the case that purpose is "the sole property of the being". If you look at the use of "purpose", in all cases it involves a relationship between things, and therefore cannot be the sole property of any being.
How can you agree with this? I said the agent is independent from the purpose. But above, you say purpose is the sole property of the being. Don't these two contradict in your mind? If purpose can only be the property of the being, how can the being be independent from it? In other words, how could this property come to be in the being, if the being is independent from it and also it cannot exist independent from the being?
An engine builder (presumably) has intentions; his tools and his materials, not. And if no element of freedom in his intentions, e.g., the freedom to not intend, then it's not intentions that he has.
This is contradictory as well. You are saying that an intentional being has the capacity to not-intend. However, to not-intend would contradict the premise of "intentional being". This is like saying that the intentional being could negate its own nature of being intentional, by intentionally not intending. But intentionally not intending would still be a case of intending. Therefore the capacity to not-intend contradicts "intentional being". This is like what they say about choosing not to choose. That's still a choice. And "choosing not to choose" is contradictory unless we separate the more specific from the more general, to give "choose" distinct references, or meanings. Therefore it's contradictory to say that the intentional being has the freedom not to intend.
Likely there are some adult English classes, maybe at night, you could take advantage of. Actually, I think you follow perfectly well, but don't want to admit it.
To tell you the truth, I was being polite. I could only interpret what you said as contradictory. So instead of accusing you of contradiction, I was forgiving, and gave you the chance to reconsider, to express what you meant in a different, clearer way, in case the contradiction was unintentional. Since you simply reassert your contradictions I have no choice now but to tell you why I cannot understand. What you say is contradictory, and your contradiction appears intentional. That makes understanding impossible.
Nope, and neither should you. Yours a categorical statement, when at best it is contingent and speculative.
You agreed that intention is the cause of purpose. Why is it that you cannot agree that when we see purpose, there is intention behind it? If you think that something else, other than intention might cause the purpose one observes, then you ought to disagree when I say that intention is the cause of purpose.
No. Intention, if intention is anywhere, is in the mind of the intender, and any purpose therefrom his purpose. The trouble is that we can suppose intention where there is none, and infer purpose wrongly.
Wait, slow down, you're going off track and inverting things unnecessarily. You agreed that Intention is the cause of purpose. Then you said intention is in the mind of the intender, and I would agree to this. And because intention is located there, in the mind, it is only evident to oneself. My intention is only evident to me, and your intention is only evident to you Do we agree so far?
However, what you don't seem to accept, is that we find purpose in the world around us, like the screw has purpose in the machine. Further, since you accept that intention is the cause of purpose, you should see that whenever we find purpose in the world, we can infer intention as the cause of that purpose.
So, we do not "suppose intention" and then "infer purpose". We observe empirical evidence of purpose, as in the case of the screw in the machine, and from this empirical evidence we infer intention. We conclude that the machine was constructed intentional from the evidence of the purposeful relations of the parts to the whole, like the screw, as one such part The other way around, to suppose intention and then infer purpose would be pointlessly misleading, because we would not know when to assume intention, because it is hidden from us.
Since you agree with me, that this way is misleading, you ought to also agree that the other way is far more reliable. we observe purpose and infer intention. And this is because we can observe purpose, in the relations of things. We see it in the relation between the screw and the machine, for example.
I don't think dogs or whales have human intent, nor humans doggy or whale intent. But human intent can only come from humans.
Of course, only human beings have human intent, that's tautological. To call it human intent is to say that a human being has it. However we find that other animals have intent. We can observe purpose in their actions and conclude that they have intent, in the way described above. But what would be the point of trying to distinguish human intent from the intent of other animals? Intent is very particular, specific to the individual. Your intentions are completely different from my intentions, as intentions vary substantially between one individual and another. So distinguishing "human intent" from "whale intent", would be at best completely insignificant, but most likely just arbitrary.
If not a being, and necessarily a particular being by type, human for human, eagle for eagle, etc., then what?
I don't know what. That's the very problem I exposed at the end of the post. We really know so little about the nature of intention, that we cannot make any conclusions about what sort of subject is required for the predication of "having intention". We know from personal experience, that humans have intention, and we know from observation of purpose, that other creatures have intention, but we do not have anything to demonstrate to us the limits of intention, i.e. where it may and may not be.
Intention? Will power? Learn? For babies I do not think any of these terms are either well or meaningfully defined. Certainly they have no explanatory value, except perhaps as a naming of convenience for a result for which there is no good account.
What!!? I am shocked and amazed at your naivety. You think "learn" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? You think "intention" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? You think "will power" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? I conclude, that in your mind the behaviour of babies is simply unexplainable.
Maybe you could provide a clearer view of your perplexity? My own view is that an individual "gets purpose from a higher organization" through a process akin to consumption and digestion.
Do you see, that you agreed with me, that intention is the cause of purpose? You ought also agree therefore, that where there is purpose, there is intention as the cause of that purpose. Therefore purpose is not acquired through a process like consumption, it is given, caused, by the actions of an intentional agent. Think of the screw and its purpose in the machine. The intentional agent who manufactured the machine, gave the screw its purpose. So, if the individual human being has purpose in relation to a higher organization, such as a family, business, community, society, or humanity in general, where is the intentional agent which gives this purpose to the individual?
These posts becoming long and exhausting. We should try to keep it simple and short. Given how we have proceeded with purpose and intention, I wonder if you care to reconsider your definition of teleology, here:
Why? That definition appears consistent with what i am saying, What would be the purpose of redefining at this point? We haven't agreed on anything very conclusive.
But such constraints are not considered in reductionism.
I haven't been arguing for reductionism. Is there a third person in this conversation? I have been trying to persuade you to consider the possibility that there are different kinds or definitions of physicalism. One kind would consist in the claim that everything can be explained in terms of physics. I find that claim ridiculous, because everything obviously cannot be explained in terms of physics.
Another kind would consist in the claim that everything that exists, all entities, events, relations, processes and qualities are fundamentally physical insofar as they consist in energy flow and exchange. This leaves the question about abstractions, generalitiesdo they exist somehow apart from the energetic processes of thinking of or about them? If we think they do exist apart from the thinking of them, that is itself a thought which involves energy flow and exchange. Do we even really know what the question could mean?
Mechanistic materialism still prevails in or underlies many naturalistic accounts.
Many or some? Do you know what is the percentage of contemporary naturalist accounts that are merely mechanistic, that deny the existence of emergent qualities which cannot be mechanistically explained?
The physicalist paradigm is just exactly that everything is ultimately reducible to the laws of physics. But its clear that these are abstractions that dont describe the complexities of organic life.
I've been trying to get you to see that it's not a case of the physicalist paradigm, but rather of a physicalist paradigm. I don't know why you are so worried about what I think is a minority position in today's world. As i see it a far bigger problem in today's world is materialism in the form of consumerismthe desire to acquire ever more and more possessions, the identification of the personal identity, of its worth, with material wealth.
One kind would consist in the claim that everything can be explained in terms of physics. I find that claim ridiculous, because everything obviously cannot be explained in terms of physics.
A recent survey of academic philosophers shows that slightly more than 50% accept or lean towards physicalism, presumably they dont. (Another survey shows that around 66% lean towards atheism. So the majority of academic philosophers lean towards physicalism and atheism. No surprises there.)
As i see it a far bigger problem in today's world is materialism in the form of consumerismthe desire to acquire ever more and more possessions, the identification of the personal identity, of its worth, with material wealth.
Theyre plainly related. Its logical for a social philosophy that recognises nothing other than the physical.
A recent survey of academic philosophers shows that slightly more than 50% accept or lean towards physicalism, presumably they dont. (Another survey shows that around 66% lean towards atheism. So the majority of academic philosophers lean towards physicalism and atheism. No surprises there.)
That doesn't specify what kind of physicalism they lean towards. Atheism is a separate issue, I had thought you were an atheist, in the sense of lacking belief in God, yourself.
Reply to Janus Indeed, but in my view much of the Christianity that is professed by Americans is bogus, like the prosperity gospel nonsense that proclaims that the faithful will be rewarded with material riches. So in that mindset, religion and materialism are combined, which Im sure is not in keeping with the intent of the Gospels. A lot of American Christianity seems an earnest parody to me.
Were loosing sight of the OP. The question was what is purpose, how does it arise. My argument is that in modern vision of the Cosmos, described by classical physics and Galilean science, purpose can only be understood in terms of intentional agents or agencies. The laws that govern the cosmos, and also evolution, are devoid of intentionality and purpose. So it was presumed that the Cosmos and everything in it arises as a consequence of the accidental collocation of atoms (Bertrand Russells term.)
Ive been trying to point to more recent philosophies of biology e.g. Terrence Deacon, Alice Juarrero, Steve Talbott, which question that form of materialism. One of the grounds on which it is questioned is the intentional nature of all organic life, which displays behaviours that cant be explained in bald reductionist terms. I agree that these are not materialist or physicalist but theyre also not typical, although theyre becoming influential. But I take the fact that they exist to be evidence of the waning of materialism, which is welcome. (Its also interesting that Brentanos work on intentionality was the original inspiration for phenomenology which is similarly opposed to reductionism.)
Ive been trying to point to more recent philosophies of biology e.g. Terrence Deacon, Alice Juarrero, Steve Talbott, which question that form of materialism.
I have read some Terrence Deacon many years ago now (I have his book Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter} and I take him to be as the second part of the title indicates a kind of physicalist. I don't remember him positing that anything beyond the physical world exists, any transcendent reality. The others I can't speak to.
The question is as to whether nature evolved in an unplanned way out of a primordial state of chaos or whether the world was created with a purpose in mind. If there is, as epigenetics seems to suggest, some feedback from an organism's experience of the internal and external environments, that doesn't equate to intentionality in my way of thinking. For me intentional means deliberate planned.
Animals are capable, to varying degrees, of intentional behavior because they are cognitive agents. For me, nature does not count as intentional unless it is either a cognitive agent or is directed by a cognitive agent.
Nonsense. The US, probably the most materialistic culture, has a high percentage of people who profess to be either religious or spiritual.
Yes, and more broadly the same is true for many people who identify with 'New Age' spirituality and Eastern religious ideas - even those who follow this or that guru. They remain resolutely obsessed with status, wealth and real estate. And having worked recently with a number of Thai Buddhists - the same materialism dominates.
It think it's pretty clear that spirituality and/or religion do not lead to less acquisitive worldviews, but often nestle comfortably alongside status seeking materialism. Nor do they lead to enhanced compassion or tolerance.
Of course many defenders of higher consciousness worldviews are likely to say that such people are not real, Buddhists, Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, Christians, etc.
I don't remember him (Deacon) positing that anything beyond the physical world exists, any transcendent reality.
I started on Deacon in earnest in January this year but stalled at around chapters 5 or 6. I see him more as trying to extend the scope of naturalism beyond physical reductionism.
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 23, 2024 at 00:41#9116230 likes
Were loosing sight of the OP. The question was what is purpose, how does it arise. My argument is that in modern vision of the Cosmos, described by classical physics and Galilean science, purpose can only be understood in terms of intentional agents or agencies. The laws that govern the cosmos, and also evolution, are devoid of intentionality and purpose. So it was presumed that the Cosmos and everything in it arises as a consequence of the accidental collocation of atoms (Bertrand Russells term.)
Newton described his first law of motion as dependent on the Will of God. What this law describes is the continuity of existence, as time passes, inertia. Things will continue to be, into the future, exactly as they have been in the past, unless a force causes something to change. What this law does is remove the necessity for a cause of the continuity of existence as time passes (the cause which Newton called God's Will), by making it something that we take for granted.
Now, when we take this thing for granted (what is expressed by the first law), the continuity of existence as time passes, then a "cause" is required to change it. This effectively removes the need for a cause of the continuity of existence as time passes (God's Will), by taking it as granted, and replacing it with the need for a cause of any change to this continuity of existence.
Yes, and more broadly the same is true for many people who identify with 'New Age' spirituality and Eastern religious ideas - even those who follow this or that guru. They remain resolutely obsessed with status, wealth and real estate. And having worked with a number of Thai Buddhists - the same materialism dominates.
Of course many defenders of higher consciousness worldviews are likely to say that such people are not real, Buddhists, Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, Christians, etc.
True, and that was basically the response tendered by @Wayfarer. I think that there is definitely such a thing as "higher consciousness", and although the "higher" part suggests "otherworldliness", "afterlife" or "spiritual realm", it doesn't have to be wedded to that way of thinking, it can be thought of simply as an altered statea heightened state of awareness and cognition.
They're all "just letters", right? What distinguishes that paragraph from the rest of the text on this page is that, absent the organisation imposed by language-using agents, it conveys no meaning.
isn't it more reasonable to say it is Atoms and matter having a living experience Caerulea-Lawrence
But there's nothing in the theory of 'atoms and matter' which account for the nature of experience. That is the subject of the well-known David Chalmer's paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, a perennial topic on this forum, and which spawned an entire academic industry of 'consciousness studies'.
Thanks for reading and commenting. I do not disagree with your point, for as I wrote in my middle paragraph of the same comment:
Isn't it therefore reasonable to say that what our minds do is exploring, understanding and parsing the inherent 'purpose' and 'meaning' in our bodies and from the world around us? Like small, hard to read text-files that we make a bigger and more complex story about?
Yes, we are language-using agents, but what are we reading? Yes, we can read letters, but we can also read landscapes, speed, color as well as faces (Many of us, and to varying degrees and to certain points). Moreover, we can also 'read' our own bodies.
The problem I see with saying that things convey "no meaning" is that you are adding 'organization' post-hoc. If you have a book, but you can't read, the letters there also don't convey any meaning to you, despite the book being both intentionally and purposefully written and bound. So, if you learned how to read, you would say "oh, this is meaningful". But the meaning was already inherent in the book, you only learned how to read.
Which I don't see clash with your argument at all. I'm not arguing that atoms and matter account for the nature of experience, but that treating atoms and matter as inconsequential to our understanding of purpose and meaning, seems arbitrary at best.
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 23, 2024 at 13:12#9117190 likes
Yes, we are language-using agents, but what are we reading? Yes, we can read letters, but we can also read landscapes, speed, color as well as faces (Many of us, and to varying degrees and to certain points). Moreover, we can also 'read' our own bodies.
The problem I see with saying that things convey "no meaning" is that you are adding 'organization' post-hoc. If you have a book, but you can't read, the letters there also don't convey any meaning to you, despite the book being both intentionally and purposefully written and bound. So, if you learned how to read, you would say "oh, this is meaningful". But the meaning was already inherent in the book, you only learned how to read.
Which I don't see clash with your argument at all. I'm not arguing that atoms and matter account for the nature of experience, but that treating atoms and matter as inconsequential to our understanding of purpose and meaning, seems arbitrary at best.
I think that the is a very good approach, the differences, and similarities, of "purpose" and "meaning". Both are closely related to intention, but in different ways. And both, purpose and meaning, exist as relations, in the way I described earlier.
Suppose an author writes some material, a book or something. Communication such as this is done with purpose, as intentional, the author has goals in this act. So, from the perspective of the author, there is purpose to that communicative material, that writing. The reader however, does not access the author's intentions directly, and so does not put the material in a relationship with the author's intentions, to apprehend the author's purpose. That is why deception is possible. Instead, the reader puts the material into relations, or associations within one's own mind, to apprehend the meaning.
I suggest that this constitutes a significant difference between purpose and meaning. "Purpose" relates the observable actions, or things, which the artist is working with directly to a goal or end which the artist has in mind. This is best described as the first-person perspective, because only the author could ever know the true intentions, and therefore the purpose of the writing. "Meaning" on the other hand relates the observable actions, or things, which the artist has worked with (notice the necessity of the past tense here) to memories, habits, acquired rules and conventions, within the mind of the observer. "Meaning" is what the observer derives from the work.
So in the latter, despite the fact that we define "meaning" as "what is meant", "what is intended" by the author or artist, there is really no direct involvement with intention here at all. In this way "intention" is completely removed from "meaning", and the common understanding of "the meaning of that writing", is that there is some sort of objective way that the writing is supposed to be understood, based in some kind of rules, and "the meaning" therefore is totally independent from what the author intended, i.e. the author's purpose.
I think you make an error in logic. You have purpose implying intentional creation. P => IC. And if in fact you have the P, then you have the IC - simple modus ponens. But you infer P; you don't have it; and thus you do not have IC.
This is not an issue of the validity of the logic, it is an issue of the truth or falsity of the premise. The premise year is a description, and any empirically supported premise suffers the same problem. There is a description, and the truth or falsity of the description must be judged. The judgement is always to some extent subjective, as is the description, the extent of which varies greatly depending on the type description.
So, this premise needs to be judged for truth or falsity. First, we must judge, 'is that thing a screw?', 'is that thing an engine?'. Assuming we agree that the items indicated fulfil the criteria of those terms, we need to ask by what principle is one said to be " a part of" the other. I would say that "part" here implies a specific relation, meaning that one is a component of the other, such that the other is a larger item, having a number of such "parts". If we agree on something like this, we can also agree on the truth of that description.
These things themselves entirely innocent of any intention, purpose, or creation, being just (presumably) pieces of metal. So also any relation, relation itself being just an idea. Are we in complete agreement on this?
No, we are not in agreement on this. By saying that one is a part of the other, you already include a relation. You want to deny my description, that the screw has purpose in relation to the engine, and replace it with your description, that the screw is a part in relation to the engine. Each description involves a relation between the screw and the engine, and neither description is more true than the other.
My description is just a little more detailed than yours. While you use the more general part/whole relation in your description, I proceed further in accuracy and precision in my description to say that the part has purpose. This is simple recognition that the thing you call "the engine" is also an artifice, therefore built with intention. This does not at all reduce the truth of the description. It is a simple fact that the thing you call "the engine", could also be truthfully called "the artifice". So, we simply have two different, yet both truthful descriptions of the very same thing. You say there is an engine and a screw is a part of the engine, I say there is an artifice which we call an engine, and the screw as part of that artifice has a purpose. You ought to be able to see that my description is just a more precise and accurate description of the items indicated, and the relations which constitute a part of the description.
As to freedom of choice, I merely say that, it seems to me, creation involves discontinuity, from not-being to being. And freedom necessary because no freedom, no discontinuity, no becoming. Rather instead it - whatever it is - in some sense inevitable. Which I call operation according to law. As to human freedom, you seem to hold that there is no freedom to not choose - not choosing itself being a choice. And this in this context both trivial and vapid - and counter-productive. Unless at the ice-cream parlor, you being offered a choice between vanilla and strawberry and choosing neither, are pleased to pay your four dollars for an empty dish full of neither.
I'm going to drop this subject of freedom and choice. It's only relevant in a tangential way, and we do not need the long posts.
That's right. I hold the words "learn, intention, and will-power" in themselves have no explanatory value.
Really? I find that highly unusual, even absurd. So, let's look at the above example. There's a thing called "the engine", and a thing called "the screw". Assume we know nothing about these things just their names. Now you say that the screw is a part of the engine. I say "the engine" is an artifice, a device intentionally built, and the screw has a purpose dictated by the creator's design. Do you honestly believe that my description provides no extra "explanatory value" over yours?
Come on now tim, does the difference between something produced intentionally, and something produced without intention have absolutely no significance to you? Have you never spent time in a court of law where intention provides great leverage with its explanatory value?
Purpose is a property of life and becomes a concept when intelligent minds recognize it.
Right on! All living organisms have an innate driving purpose : to stay alive. But philosophical discussions of Purpose may be traced back to Theological notions that each moral agent of the world has a unique role to play in the epic of creation. In Genesis, the bit-part role of pre-enlightenment Adam & Eve was simply to be caretakers in the garden, as the animals with hands. No need for reasoning or insight, or concepts such as Good vs Evil.
Over time though, theology became more complex and sophisticated, and the search for an individual's purpose --- the one supposedly assigned by God --- became more important to one's post-life destiny. Each actor's ultimate payoff or punishment depends on discovering the role they were "meant" to play in God's dramaturgy. Some search the inscrutable scriptures for clues, while others look into their own empathetic hearts. But failure to find the divinely assigned role still seems to provoke anxiety in those who are not content with their evolutionary niche as animals, but aspire to play the role of angels on God's golden stage.
Modern science seems to be content with the most basic purposes of survival & propagation of genes. Yet, some philosophers still seem to feel that each of us needs some higher goal than just eat, drink, and f*ck. Do we have assigned roles in the drama of life --- by God or Nature --- or do we choose our own personas to suit personal talents & needs? Shakespeare pithily captured the secular version of the purpose quandary. Does our minor role on the world stage have any importance in the script of destiny? Is Purpose merely a property of natural instincts, or a higher Concept for the amusement of the gods? :smile:
*1. Anxious actors in the play of Life & Death & Destiny:
[i]All the worlds a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage[i]
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/56966/speech-all-the-worlds-a-stage
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 24, 2024 at 00:28#9118270 likes
You are confusing yourself with language. A relation is either an idea - or the expression of one - or a thing. I don't see how a screw can in any sense have an idea, nor how it can be one, and at the same time a screw. Nor do I see how an idea can be a thing. And the screw is a part of the engine not in virtue of any idea or relation, but on the simple fact that it is.
I don't understand this. My OED defines "relation" as what a thing has to do with another. If you believe that a thing is not just an idea (don't you?), then why wouldn't you think that a relation is not just an idea? Do you believe that the earth and the sun are things, and not just ideas? How could you believe that these two things are not ideas, yet the relation between them is just an idea? That seems so inconsistent, so as to be incoherent.
And the screw is a part of the engine not in virtue of any idea or relation, but on the simple fact that it is.
So here, you are saying that the relation which you call "a part of", is not an idea, but a fact. So you really do believe that relations are more than just ideas. Can I have some consistency please?
I agree on this section, but did you mean artifact instead of "artifice"?
No, I meant artifice. An artifice is a clever device. Do you not think that an engine fits this description? Maybe you are thinking of a different meaning.
So, let's look at the above example. There's a thing called "the engine", and a thing called "the screw". Assume we know nothing about these things just their names. Now you say that the screw is a part of the engine. I say "the engine" is an artifice, a device intentionally built, and the screw has a purpose dictated by the creator's design. Do you honestly believe that my description provides no extra "explanatory value" over yours?
Look, we can describe the engine as "a piece of metal" like you did, or we can describe the engine as a piece of metal designed and built with intention. Do you honestly believe that the latter explains no more about what an engine is, than the former?
Yeah? How? Does the screw discuss with the engine? Or do they talk to you? What language does a screw speak? The screw and the engine - or any inanimate things - cannot partake of relationship - that can only be assigned by a being, and no guarantee the being gets it right.
Do you think that "relation" requires communication? if one thing affects another, for example, there is a relation between them. Communication is not a requirement for a relation. The sun has an effect on the earth, the moon has an effect on the earth, and the screw has an effect on the engine. There are relations between these things.
Until you pay more attention to your own use of language, we're going to have a difficult time.
Sorry, I have no inclination to restrict my language to suit your desires. You demonstrate severe obstinance, most likely the feature of a closed mind, which greatly limits your capacity to understand. Restricting my language in the way required for you to understand would disable me from being able to say what I want to say. This would simply leave me saying what you want me to say, so that your limited capacity for understanding could understand the things I say, within your own little world of 'how the world must be described' according to your dictates of 'the world is like this'. If you have no inclination to expand your little world to include the way that other people see the world, within your world, this type of discussion is pointless.
This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.
Metaphysician UndercoverJune 25, 2024 at 11:43#9121890 likes
Reply to tim wood Why do you want to turn this into a discussion about the shortcomings of language, rather than sticking to the subject? Everyone knows that language has problems, ambiguity, redundancy, and simple lack of scope. We can either take a defeatist attitude, and assume that our goals will never be obtained due to these problems, or we can accept the problems of language and continue on, recognizing the shortcomings and working around them. You seem to be in the defeatist camp. I learned from Plato, and his artful demonstration of "dialectics" that these problems, which many take as impassable roadblocks, are really just minor obstacles, requiring slight detours.
We can talk all the day long about engines and screws and their purposes and intentions and relation to each other, but I and I suspect you too know perfectly well that these descriptive terms, while about the objects, are in no sense part of the objects themselves.
Tim, why do you keep coming back to this point? I've explicitly said, numerous times, that purpose is not "in the object". It is in the object's relations to other objects. We've passed that little obstacle long ago. The disagreement we have is that you claim that relations only exist as ideas in human minds. I think that relations exist independently of human minds, just like the objects which are related to each other exist independently of human minds.
Here's a compromise proposal. You say relations exist as "ideas", or "expressions of ideas". I say relations exist outside of human minds. Can we agree that "ideas", or "expression of ideas" may exist outside of human minds? So, let's say that the screw has a relation to the engine, and this relation is an idea, or an expression of an idea, which is outside of all human minds.
Newton's gravity can stand here is an example: a mighty piece of description - which as a shortcoming apparently Newton himself understood better than most - but now replaced with the curvature of space-time, and some even newer, tentative theories. The-force-of-gravity is still a useful piece of description, but it would seem that there actually is no such thing.
Let's look at gravity as an example then, then, under the principles of my proposal. Let's use the word "gravity" to refer directly to a specific type of relation between two objects. We can easily avoid the descriptive shortcomings you talk about, by saying that the way we describe the observed effects of "gravity" is completely irrelevant. For example, we say that there is a specific type of relation between the earth and the moon, which we know as "gravity", and whether we describe the effects of gravity in a Newtonian way, or an Einsteinian way, is completely irrelevant to us, because we are interested in the relation itself, not the description of the relation. This is commonly known as the difference between the map and the territory. We are not interested in the map, (whether the map is Einsteinian or Newtonian), we are interested in the territory, that specific type of relation between the earth and moon, known as "gravity".
Now, to adhere to my compromise proposal, we'd have to say that this relation is either an idea, or an expression of an idea. But how could that be the case? The earth and moon, each with one's own gravity having an effect on the other, through that relation we are calling "gravity", existed long before human beings and their ideas and expressions of ideas? Such an "idea" or "expression of idea" could not be human.
This problem is the result of the restrictions on language which you are trying to enforce. You are insisting that "a relation" must be either an idea or an expression of an idea. You are refusing to acknowledge that in order to develop an adequate understanding of reality, we must allow that relations have independent existence. Do you understand, and respect this conclusion? In order to have an accurate and adequate understanding of reality, and truth about the world, we need to allow that relations exist independently from the human ideas which attempt to understand them, just like we do with objects. Objects have independent existence, and so do their relations. Therefore we must allow that relations are not just human ideas, or expressions of human ideas, that is a linguistic restriction which would render the world as unintelligible.
And just this an example of the kind of place where we have to be "damned careful" with what we say and mean. The proposition here is whether, not the map as you put it exists, but if the territory, the relation itself independent of mind, exists. I invite you here to think carefully about just what exactly it is that you believe - affirm - exists. My quick answer is the moon, the earth, and ideas about them. And people who have those ideas. The notion of accuracy of idea being here a test. If the idea is wrong, does it exist in your sense? That is, can existing things that cannot exist, exist? They can as ideas. If pressed I can affirm six impossible things before morning tea - as ideas.
The moon exists, and the earth exists, so says you. Do you agree that the activities of these things also exist, and that these activities are not just ideas about the things, they are what the things are actually doing? So for instance, we describe an activity as "the moon orbits the earth", and another as "the earth has tides which are the effects of the orbiting moon". These sorts of activities and relations exist independently of our thought and ideas about them, and our representations of them. Can you agree?
And this is where to my ear your answer equivocates. Where is the relation? What is it made of? Thing or idea?
Oh yes, I forgot to answer your question, I know you dislike that. Your act of limiting possible answers to two choices, "thing or idea", imposes a restriction which leaves the world unintelligible, as I explained here:
This problem is the result of the restrictions on language which you are trying to enforce. You are insisting that "a relation" must be either an idea or an expression of an idea. You are refusing to acknowledge that in order to develop an adequate understanding of reality, we must allow that relations have independent existence. Do you understand, and respect this conclusion? In order to have an accurate and adequate understanding of reality, and truth about the world, we need to allow that relations exist independently from the human ideas which attempt to understand them, just like we do with objects. Objects have independent existence, and so do their relations. Therefore we must allow that relations are not just human ideas, or expressions of human ideas, that is a linguistic restriction which would render the world as unintelligible.
Great, let these, then, be the examples of your insisting on the reality of a fiction and of reifying ideas in some kind of form which they don't have. The moon does not orbit the earth. But to you that's a fact and a relation that exists. How and where? Made of what? I keep inviting you to make your argument, to make your case, and you cannot or will not do it. And you can shift gears all you want, but until you engage your clutch, you're going nowhere, even if your engine is racing. You have your beliefs: some are imo nonsense. But they're your beliefs. If you want them to be more than merely your beliefs, you'll need more than just your insistence.
I would appreciate it if in your reply, if you reply, you acknowledge that the moon does not orbit the earth, and follow that with an explanation of how a false belief - the relation - can exist other than as an idea. If you get that far, please include how any belief can be other than an idea, and how any idea can be real and exist in whatever your sense of "exist" is. Ideas being the stuff of minds, it's hard to see how there can be such absent mind.
To be clear, I said there is activity which is described as "the moon orbits the earth", and that this activity exists.
Anyway, I think I'm starting to understand your perspective. Would you agree that the moon does not exist, and the earth does not exist? These words signify ideas, just like "the moon orbits the earth" signifies an idea. If you can agree with this, then we might have a starting point.
I approached this point when I made the statement about judging the truth or falsity of the description of the screw and the engine. The first step was to agree that there is a thing called "the screw", and a thing called "the engine". But if you want to insist that words refer to ideas, not the things or activities associated with those ideas, as you are doing, then we must start right from the bottom.
What the moon and earth actually do in terms of these descriptions is that both revolve around a common moving center as they cork-screw their way along curved geodesics in space-time - or at least I think that's the most recent and accurate description.
What are you saying now, that both things and their relations exist independently of the ideas which represent them? If you agree that both the moon and the earth exist independently of ideas, how can you deny that their intertwined activities also exist independently. And therefore their relationsare independent
I divide in two, then, things and ideas. Material and products of mind. You either divide into more than two, or one of your two is quite different from mine. and this the extra- or non-mind existence of ideas. Or, if I get it right, a) ideas have independent non-material existence, and b) you don't need a mind to have ideas.
How can you continue to refuse to acknowledge the third category, the relations between things? This is what we observe as the interactions between things. So, we need three categories, things, the relations between things, and ideas. If we deny the validity of this category, "the relations between things", then how could there be any truth to what the moon and earth are doing with each other in their interactions? If this is only ideas, then one description is just as true as the other. The description of the sun going around the earth every day is just as true as the description of the earth spinning on its axis, because it's all just ideas, and there's no real relationship which we are trying to truthfully describe.
In passing: you note what appears to be the existence of non-material, non-idea things like relations, forces(?), intentions, purposes, and the like. I think if you look closely enough at them, you will see that they're all ideas, all usefulness granted, but, I think you will agree, utility not itself constitutive of separate and independent existence.
No, as explained above, they cannot be "all ideas", or else there would be no truth or falsity about what the earth and moon are doing with each other, and what the earth and sun are doing with each other. Your perspective is known as Protagorean relativity. Your ideas about what these things are doing are no more true than mine, even though they are completely different, because there is no truth, it's just ideas, yours mine, or whoever.
"This is what we observe.., and if we deny the validity..., then how can there be any truth ...?So then it would appear that for you, what you "observe" and that comports what what you think is the case, so that it agrees with your criteria for truth, must be right and true and exist.
The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile? . . . .
My own answer, briefly, is that the lights come on when mind is. No mind no world.
I'm a latecomer to this thread. But I just read an article in Scientific American magazine, that discusses "an infant's aha! moment" when they realize they can influence the world. The authors ran experiments with babies to see "when the lights come on", as you put it. The point (purpose) of the investigation was to learn "about the origins of agency". They concluded that "the birth of agency is a dynamic, self-organizing process". Humans are not born with fully developed minds. At first, we are at the mercy of The World, but eventually we can become causal Actors in the non-self world.
Which seems to imply that the desire for control of the outside world is an inborn motivation --- want or need for food, warmth, novelty, etc --- that later emerges as a sense of agency early in development of the body and brain. At first, the baby moves its limbs randomly, without any focused purpose. But eventually, the child discovers that some of those movements can cause changes in the environment. In the experiment, a string tied to the baby's toe and attached to a crib-toy, would, seemingly accidentally, cause the toy to move. At first, the baby does not make the "connection" between her own wiggling and the surprising interesting waving of the toy. But, after the aha! moment of insight --- I did that --- "spontaneous movements become purposeful action". "As our model proposes, the experience of agency emerges only when an organism . . . senses it is coupled to its environment". Yet, in order to become a causal agent, one must learn to differentiate Self from World.
My interpretation of this psychological experiment is that Purpose begins as a Feeling of Desire, that is enhanced by the feeling of Power over the environment (agency). Then, eventually that vague feeling becomes transformed into a verbal concept : if I do this, then the result will satisfy my desire for (fill-in the blank). So, Purpose is both the Desire and the Reason for Doing. But, is that desire directed by an internal agency (self-caused), or merely one link in a long chain of causes & effects? Most people, post infancy, take their own agency for granted. But ornery philosophers question everything, including the questioner.
The article notes that, "historically, the entire issue of purpose and agency in living things --- and, dare one say, 'free will' --- has been clouded in philosophical debate and controversy". Hence, the TPF thread on FreeWill and Determinism. So, we can either "take the bit in the teeth" --- as a determined agent of purpose, or just lay back and let physics take its course. Purposeful behavior is for Agents of Action, not for the wishy-washy flotsam of the world. Purpose is the feeling of being in control. And getting intended results gives meaning to the sense of Agency. :smile:
And this is the state of man.An artificial impasse. Granted, the individual this (metaphysician undercover) easily could have and perhaps should have mentioned the specific points of contention, lest it seemed every word and effort of your expression is little than that of a raving madman, something hurtful. But perhaps, instead of such a mindset, the answers to your questions are self-evident! And he is in fact challenging you to pursue such avenues of self-inquiry further.
So, let's embrace the mindset of an casual observer. He requests clarification. You seem such a request is beneath your effort as, certainly, any rational mind could make sense of what you purported? Is this correct? So, perhaps frame it differently. You seem to make a statement, that the person perceives as a question. That is to say, he derives several statements at least one begetting a question. This is a compliment. Not an insult. Should you not go from there?
No, as explained above, they cannot be "all ideas", or else there would be no truth or falsity about what the earth and moon are doing with each other, and what the earth and sun are doing with each other. Your perspective is known as Protagorean relativity. Your ideas about what these things are doing are no more true than mine, even though they are completely different, because there is no truth, it's just ideas, yours mine, or whoever.
This reminds me of the opening of G.K. Chesterton's Orthodoxy, where he talks about how "no one is more rational than the mad man." Everything is explained rationally for the person with paranoid delusions. Why did that person in the street fold his arms just then? To signal another conspirator. Why wasn't my newspaper delivered today? The conspiracy. Why am I being taken to an institution? Well that is just exactly what would happen if I truly was the rightful King of Britain and a group of people were trying to keep me from making my claim!
The solipsist who thinks they are God has a reason for everything. The paranoiac as well. The problem often isn't a lack of rationality but a surfeit, tightly packed into a very small world, an ever shrinking circle that contains, for that person, everything.
Edit: I should probably note that I didn't follow the whole interchange there, just that part.
I made an edit, a correction, from "what what," to "what with what."
Good start tim. Maybe a few more acts of clarification, and I might be able to understand what you are asking.
Here's the problem. You take a couple snippets from my paragraph, present them out of context, and then draw a very strange conclusion containing three words "right" "true" and "exist". All I was talking about in that passage was "truth".
You should have simply asked, if it agrees with my criteria of truth, do I conclude that it is true, and I would have answered "yes". But "right" and "exist" are different words with different criteria, making your question appear absurd.
Which implies you understood well-enough to judge it inaccurate
I apprehended it as needing clarification, not as inaccurate. Therefore I did not judge it as inaccurate, I judged it as requiring clarification. Your use of "right" and "exists" in that context didn't make sense to me. The typo, which you edited in the reproduction also contributed to the not making sense to me.
No, our contention is not the existence of ideas. It is the existence of relations. Your assumption (which I take to be wrong) is that all relations are ideas. From this faulty premise, that all relations are ideas, you conclude that our contention is the existence of ideas. That is not our contention, our contention is whether there are relations which are not ideas.
I infer that for you truth is comportment with some set of criteria. I call that truth-according-to. And with that standard, you can, for example, represent the movement of the earth and moon on a very Euclidean piece of paper and say that the moon orbits, goes around, the earth. And that would be true-on-paper, but not really true. Thus "truth" itself a possible source of great confusion.
Yes, "truth" is a source of great confusion, especially if you represent it like this, that something could be "true-on-paper, but not really true". This confuses me immensely, such that I cannot understand what you are trying to say at all, in this paragraph.
An axiom for me is that material things, in terms of their existence, truly exist. For you to hold - in my view - that an idea exists independently is to hold that in some sense the idea is true apart from any notion of "true-according-to." But ideas can obviously be wrong, even impossible. And that would suggest that as ideas, they cannot so exist. - Unless you separate idea from its content. Do you claim not that ideas exist, but instead idea as an "empty vessel" exists without content? A very odd thing to claim if you do.
You are completely avoiding the issue with this straw man representation. You have an axiom which says 'material things truly exist'. I have an axiom which says 'the relations between material things truly exist just as much as the material things themselves truly exist. You apparently cannot understand how a relation can be anything other than an idea, so you misrepresent my axiom as 'ideas exist independently' just like material things do.
The issue is, that we cannot get to your misrepresentation (straw man) unless we accept your principle that all relations are ideas. I do not accept that principle. Therefore your claim that my belief is of independent ideas is false. My belief is of independent relations. And, I do not accept 'all relations are ideas', therefore I do not conclude, as you claim, that ideas exist independently.
I offer this quick distinction for convenience without claiming rigour: that you discover them and I invent them.
Try this instead. I say we represent relations, with models and such. That's why I use the map/territory analogy. You say we invent relations. I say your position makes no sense, because if we actually were free to invent the relations, then these ideas (what I call models or representations, and you call inventions), could consist of absolutely anything, and one would not be more true (in the sense of corresponding with reality) than another.
I invite you to try even to think about what that relation might be without yourself putting into it exactly what you're trying to find in it.
This is exactly the sort of question, or invitation which totally confuses me and therefore I ask for clarification. I cannot at all understand "without yourself putting into it exactly what you're trying to find in it". When we model a relation, i.e. try to describe it, we are neither trying to put something into the relation (that is an act of art, construction, manufacturing, or production). nor are we trying to find something in the relation. When we represent a relation, by describing it or modeling it, we are attempting to understand it. That is neither finding something in it, nor putting something in it.
Hard to see how any would not ultimately be "directed by an internal agency." And here implied a development, hierarchy, and a taxonomy of purpose, starting with the infant(ile), through to adult. But I wonder if there is a sub-taxonomy either within the adult or transcending or otherwise moving beyond adult, and what the names of those would be.
Yes. Most humans seem to take their own personal agency for granted. Since they get their desired results from voluntary actions, they feel like they can control some aspects of the non-self world. But some philosophers see that what-we-call-agency might be just a continuation of physical causation that began in the Big Bang.
So, we are now dealing with a taxonomy of at least two classes of causes : Physical and Meta-physical (mental). Unless we define the Mind as a divinely endowed spiritual Soul, the emergence of metal "abilities", such as Agency, can be viewed as continuous with the universal chain of Causation. Consequently, a secular philosophical "taxonomy of purpose" could combine involuntary external physical Causation with voluntary internal meta-physical Intention, to conclude with some form of Compatibilism. In that case, what we call FreeWill might be a "sub-taxonomy" of Universal Causation, that is expressed in scientific terms as Thermodynamics (positive/negative energy). But in a philosophical sense, it might be classified as Moral Choice (good/evil consequences).
Daniel Dennett, in his book Freedom Evolves, says "Human freedom is not an illusion; it is an objective phenomenon, distinct from all other biological conditions and found in only one species - us". But other, more Libertarian thinkers, have scorned that his watered-down freedom is "not an ability worth having". However, Freewill-within-Determinism Compatibilism is compatible with my own BothAnd worldview. Does that compromise work for you? :smile:
The definition of "relation" I already told you, "what one thing has to do with another". The definition of "Idea" is more difficult, my OED says "a conception or plan formed by mental effort". Does that suffice for you?
I believe that if material objects exist independently of a conception formed by mental effort, then it is also the case that what one thing has to do with another (such as the interrelated activities of the earth and moon which we discussed already) also exist independently of conceptions formed by human minds.
Why is this perspective so hard for you to apprehend? Imagine the earth and moon existing independently of human conception. Would these two things not be doing anything at all? And if they are doing anything, wouldn't they be doing something with one another, as being related to one another?
So what is it that you believe? To me, it seems like you believe that the earth and moon exist independently of mental effort, but you do not believe that they are doing anything. You seem to believe that doing something requires mental effort.
you misrepresent my axiom as 'ideas exist independently'
...
therefore I do not conclude, as you claim, that ideas exist independently.
In between those two quotes is the explanation of why I do not believe that ideas exist independently. Please, stop the straw man representation. How many more times will I have to make this request?
Obviously they can and do- called theories - and on the basis of applied criteria - experiments - work or are disproved. The word for this is "science."
You seem to be having difficulty understanding the difference between a relation, and the description of a relation (map and territory confusion). The theory is not the relation. The relation between the theory and the experiment is not an idea. The relation between the theory and the experiment is represented with ideas.
So it seems to me - not being versed in the details of Determinism - that among the first things a determinist must make clear is what, exactly, it means.
I too, haven't been concerned enough to make a detailed study of the roots of philosophical Determinism, perhaps in ancient Greece. But, I assume its modern form could be traced back to the secular Enlightenment (materialism), which broke away from medieval religious Theology (spiritualism). And which usually viewed the rational human mind as evidence for a dualism of supernatural soul within a natural body. In reaction, Science -- the philosophy of the mundane world -- became a monism of Materialism.
However, if you don't view the Mind as supernatural, there's no need for a continuous chain of causation to ward-off any spiritual incursions. So, for me, the Mind is merely the natural Function*1 of the brain. In animals that function is mostly control over the body & physical world. But, in humans a new function emerged : to use imagination (metaphors ; words) to assist in control over the complex sapiens social environment. Over time, that ability to create mental models of the world, evolved into the mental function we call Reasoning (logic + math) : constructing imaginary & artificial scenarios to predict what effect our choices will have on the physical & social systems we are immersed in.
Therefore, one important function of Mind is to refine abstract ideas into purposeful, goal-oriented, intentional behavior. So Purpose is an imaginary hand, with which to reach out and control the outside world. And it "comes from" a long long chain of physical causation which has eventually undergone a phase transition into meta-physical (imaginary) power to cause changes in the world. All self-moving animals have some degree of mental intentional power, to find food & avoid danger. In some cases, the intentional behaviors affect other Minds (social animals), and in other situations (technological animals) the changes affect the physical world : as in apes cracking nuts, and the Panama Canal moving mountains story. :smile:
*1. Function : in math a function is the relation between inputs (X & Y) and outputs (Z). In mind, a function is the job or work of the coordinated neural network : what it does, what it produces : i.e. Ideas -- imaginary models of reality.
"To resolve this issue, Aristotle asks what the ergon (function, task, work) of a human being is, and argues that it consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue "
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/
You appear to have a third category; the essence(?) of which you have yet to make clear.
What do you mean i haven't made clear the essence of this third category. I've stated it over and over, it is the relations between things, what one thing has to do with another. Like ideas, relations are immaterial, unlike ideas, relations are independent of human minds.
To keep it simple, you say they're related, I say they are not, on two causes, 1) that relations are ideas and things don't have ideas, and 2) the "relationship" of earth and moon is a convenient fiction and artifact of ideas, and that the two have actually nothing to do with each other.
Ok, that's what you think. I think you are in denial. You've already told me how you think that the moon and earth have something to do with each other, here: Quoting tim wood
What the moon and earth actually do in terms of these descriptions is that both revolve around a common moving center as they cork-screw their way along curved geodesics in space-time - or at least I think that's the most recent and accurate description.
So now you are just contradicting yourself, to uphold your denial. Why are you afraid to admit that the reality of the immaterial extends far beyond the reality of human ideas.
I mentioned the "corkscrewing through spacetime" only as against your idea/relation/model of the moon "orbiting" the earth. Now, take a moment and try to think through exactly what the earth is doing and what the moon is doing. I think you will see that any "relation" between them is an idea that comes from you.
No, I recognize that the earth and the moon are doing things, and that their activities are related. You apparently recognize this to, by describing it as a 'corkscrewing" activity. You, however refuse to separate the description "corkscrewing", which is an idea, from the reality of what the relation actually is, which is not an idea. So you keep insisting that the map, (model, or description, which is an idea) is the territory, (the relation itself). Then you contradict yourself by claiming that the earth and the moon which are engaged in this interrelated activity exist independently of human ideas, yet the interrelated activity which locks them together as an essential aspect of the existence which they have, is just a human idea.
Its often said not in so many words that there exists an X such that 1) X provides purpose in the world, and 2) if there be no X, then there is no purpose, that the world is without purpose. By purpose I tentatively mean, subject to adjustment, that which gives ultimate underlying meaning and significance.
"X provides purpose" is about X, where all subsequent qualification of "X" is bound by/limited to that which is capable of providing purpose. If X provides purpose, it must be the sort of thing that it makes sense to say is capable of doing so(providing purpose). For example, we could not substitute "potato chips" for 'X' and make any sense at all. Potato chips are not the sort of thing capable of providing[b] purpose. They could help provide a feeling of satisfaction/contentment. Even then without eating them, that purported 'purpose' is left empty, unfilled, unmet, unsatisfied, unrealized. So, potato chips alone are not enough, nor are potato chips the sort of thing capable of [b]providing purpose.
What thing(s) is(are)?
Seems to me that purpose presupposes agency. All things purposeful are so in strict relation to one's(the presupposed agents') aim, goal, prediction, and/or expectations.
The last claim in the quote at the top of the post asks the reader's acceptance of the author's potential future equivocation of the term "purpose". It also invokes "meaning" and "significance". All three presuppose agency.
Meaning and significance are not limited to providing purpose. They provide (mis)understanding. They provide a worldview. They provide the necessary preconditions for agency and hence help lay the groundwork needed for purposes to emerge. Purpose is nonexistent is complete absence of meaning and significance. Seems to me that meaning/significance is necessary but insufficient for purpose.
Thinking processes 'give' meaning and significance. The scare-quotes are intentional. By my lights, meaning and significance are not the sorts of things that can be given to another like a physical object. We could be said to 'give away' meaning and significance to another by virtue of helping them to draw correlations between the same sorts of things that we are/do.
Teaching a child how to use "tree" is a prima facie example. Teaching a child how pick oranges helps them to draw many of their own correlations between oranges and other things.
While both meaning and significance play a role in the child's mind/thought/worldview prior to learning how to pick oranges and/or call trees by name, there's no argumentative ground for attributing much along the lines of purpose to the child, as if they have one, or they've found other things useful.
Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.
Great, what is relation? I keep asking and you keep not answering. I ask what they do, and you answer that they do things and their activities are related. All you're telling me is that your not very good - or no good at all - at reflectively questioning your own thinking. This the state of a naive thinker who has taken certain things for granted and having done so, is incapable of further testing them or thinking about them. If relations are real in your sense please provide an example, which of course cannot be an idea.
I don't see any reason for this assessment. Each relation between individual things is distinct and unique. You asked me for the general, "what is relation" and I answered. I also gave you an example of a distinct and particular relation, that between the earth and the moon, and you criticized me for not describing this relation properly. That does not mean that I did not give you a particular example, it only means that I did not describe the relation, which served as my example, to your satisfaction. And, as much as the earth and moon are not ideas, neither is the relation between them an idea.
We're corkscrewing around each other in circles, because you have a mental block which prevents you from understanding the meaning of "relation". You force an unwarranted restriction on the meaning of this word, 'a relation is necessarily an idea'. This is the mental disability of a closed mind, a disorder which you willfully inflict upon yourself.
What is it, then, that the relation refers to that might be real.
"Relation" refers to what the one has to do with the other, what I described as orbiting and you described as corkscrewing. If the things (E&M) are real, don't you think that their motions are also real? And since their motions involve each other, isn't this a real relation?
All of this a description, and no mention of relation or the existence or causative efficacy of any relation.
Of course we can describe a relation without mention of the word "relation". But don't you recognize that when you say the E and M alter spacetime, and this effects the path of both, that you are speaking of "causative efficacy"?
Anyway, that's an unnecessary point because "relation" does not necessarily imply causative efficacy. When two things are doing something together (as in your description of the E and M) there is a relation, regardless of causation.
Why are you so hellbent on denial, that you describe the relation between the earth and moon in such an extraordinarily strange way, trying to be careful about what you say, and what you mean, intent on hiding the fact that you actually believe there is a real relation between the earth and moon?
The question is the nature of the existence of that relationship.
See, you actually do believe in the reality of such relations, you just do not understand the nature of the existence of that relationship. As I said, it is one of the many things which are unknown. Here is the mother of all such relationships, the relation between space and time. You seem to like describing relations in terms of spacetime, and within those descriptions is assumed a relation between space and time. But in reality the nature of the existence of that specific relationship itself, is the biggest of all the unknowns.
They wouldn't fit in the universe - on the assumption they take up space, however small!
Like ideas, they are immaterial. Why would they take up space? Then again, maybe what we call "matter" is simply the manifestation of a particular type of relations, which do take up space. Since the nature of the existence of relations is unknown, we really cannot exclude anything, can we?
Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.
Without that, there is no purpose.
creativesoul
Purpose then emergent, requiring person, desire, goal, means? In this your "agent," the person, necessary, desire as catalyst. It looks to me like ends and means are unnecessary. As with a person said to be ambitious, that is, a person with purpose but not (yet, presumably) with a goal or means to achieve it.
Means are purposeful. The purpose of means is to reach, attain, and/or acquire a goal/end.
Ambition without goals? What's that consist of?
However, I do agree that one can be ambitious without yet having, arriving at, and/or being capable of articulating a means to the desired end. Good call, but I can make no sense whatsoever out of ambition absent any goal, and/or desired outcome. General ones suffice. Being a good person, for example. One can be ambitious about life in general as well. So, there is little need for specificity, however there is most certainly a need for some sort of desired outcome/expectation. There's always something that one is ambitious about regardless of the complexity of the desired outcome.
I do feel compelled to admit/note that I wrote something earlier that I have come to disagree with in recent years. I misspoke. While I do hold that purpose presupposes agency, I do not hold that meaning and significance do as well. That is not my position, despite stating otherwise. Mea culpa.
X has purpose in strict relation to a creature capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use. Whereas all things meaningful and/or significant are meaningful/significant to a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. Purpose requires that and more. A simple/rudimentary thinking creature is all that's needed to attribute meaning and/or for things to become significant to them by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. However, "agency/agent" imply deliberate contemplation, abstract thinking, moral culpability, volition, a creature that 'cares', etc.
All that to say that I retract the claim that meaning and significance presuppose agency. Best to do that now, so as to avoid any confusion it will certainly cause otherwise, should this discussion continue.
A person can be hungry without knowing what he wants, but at least he's hungry.
Sure, but being hungry without knowing what one wants to eat is more akin to being ambitious without knowing how to achieve the desired outcome. That is ambition without clear means. It is not ambition without desired outcome/goal.
X has purpose in strict relation to a creature capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use...
creativesoul
Imho best to limit this to people because, so far as I know, there is no adequate language for making clear just what exactly animals are doing.
Hmmm. People are not the only creatures capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use. If a creature learns to use a stick to fetch termites out from deep inside of a nest, we can rest quite easy in claiming that the creature uses that stick for a specific purpose. The stick is a tool. The stick has purpose in strict relation to the creature intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting it to use. The purpose is 'given' to the stick by the creature under consideration.
Is that not adequate enough?
As to your distinction between purpose on one side and meaning and significance on the other, l don't quite get it.
All purpose is meaningful/significant to a creature capable of 'giving' purposes to things. All purpose presupposes meaning and/or significance. Not all meaning and/or significance presupposes purpose.
But I have no reason to think I would disagree with you. I assume you mean that a dim bulb can illuminate meaning and significance, but that it takes something brighter to execute purpose. In any case I think none of it exists absent an agent in which it is thought/supposed.
You may be getting hung up on my distinction between a capable creature and an agent. I think "agency" is fraught with historical baggage. The more I think about it, I'm not so sure I agree that all purpose presupposes agency either. Chimps. Crows. I'm hesitate to attribute agency to them, but I've no issue clearly explaining how they give purpose to rudimentary tools; how those tools become meaningful/significant to them.
I'm actively working this out as well. :blush: I'm not well rehearsed in the subject matter of purpose/teleology. I'm more seeing where my prior commitments leave/lead me on the matter.
Metaphysician UndercoverJuly 02, 2024 at 01:50#9139240 likes
Hooray! I'm going to go celebrate. Care to join me for a glass of champagne? Fuck the queen, or the biscuit, or whatever you're talking about, let's just celebrate!
We can always rest easy claiming - but that all the more reason to remember it's just a claim. And good claims work - but none of that makes them true.
My cat meows at the door; obviously it wants to go out. The evidence being that it goes out - except when it doesn't. Cat owners all share the experience of their cat, once the door opens, standing in the doorway, or lying down in the doorway, for an extended sampling of the day, no matter the weather. So what is the cat about? Who knows? All we get is the probability/possibility of certain behaviours.
I do not see the relevance of your mistake to what I wrote.
The cat didn't want to go out. That cat meows at the door for more than one reason. You're the one saying it's obvious that the cat wanted to do something that he did not do. Not I.
What's the problem with what I wrote? I don't have that problem. By all means, if I ever attribute thought/belief/reason that only humans are capable of forming, having, and/or holding to a non human, let me know.
Problems with your account are being held up as an example used against my account. Does that move count as a valid objection these days? My oh my, what is the world coming to?
When one creature that has never done so watches another creature that is well rehearsed in doing so gather termites from a mound using a stick, it learns how to use a stick for the purpose of gathering resources. They want to eat termites. They know how to use a stick in order to do so. The one will break a small limb from branch, strip it of all external leaves and twigs, poke holes into a termite nest, and then poke the limb deep into the nest allowing the termites to climb upon the stick.
That creature does that on purpose. The stick becomes significant to the watcher. The stick is already significant to the user.
Does any of that count as anthropomorphism to you?
Metaphysician UndercoverJuly 04, 2024 at 11:00#9145090 likes
Reply to tim wood
The substance of our disagreement seems to be the following. I think that if physical objects are real (not simply ideas), then the relations between them must also be real (not just ideas). You seem to believe that physical objects are real, but the relations between them are not real (the relations are simply ideas).
I've tried to explain how I understand your belief to be inconsistent. If objects like the earth and moon are real, then their movements must be real as well, and their relations reals too.
There is another possible resolution which we have not explored, and that is that neither objects nor their relations are real, they are all ideas. That is known as idealism, and I think it is well supported by modern physics. If we follow the principles of quantum physics we will find that all objects are composed of particles, which are features of fields. The fields are constructed from ideas about relations.
Would you consider this as a possible way of understanding "reality"? My point has been, that we cannot make a separation between a physical object and its relations with other objects, to say that one is real and the other ideal, without separating the object from its activities, one real, the other ideal, and this necessarily produces an inconsistency in our representation of "reality". Since you appear to be dead set against allowing the proposition that both, objects and their relations are real, would you be more inclined toward the other option, the one which is well supported by the science of physics, that both, objects and their relations, are ideal?
I think it must be pretty clear that any expression of the relation is just the expression of an idea.
Any expression whatsoever is an expression of an idea. "Moon", "earth", are expressions of ideas. Even if we use a name to refer 'directly' to an object, we are expressing an idea such as 'I am talking about that thing'.
With our E(arth) and M(oon) in mind, let's imagine a snapshot of our local space - no time passing.
The earth and moon with no time passing is completely fictional, therefore nothing other than an idea. How is imagining such a scenario going to be helpful in distinguishing between what is real and what is ideal? You've just given us a purely ideal scenario.
Your claim, then, seems to be nothing more than a claim - a belief on your part. And I give beliefs as beliefs a pass. If you want more, you shall have to make clear how it can be more.
You haven't addressed my latest proposition, "neither objects nor relations are real, they are all ideas". Can we agree on this? As indicated above, everything in your post supports this, the proposition that earth and moon might be independent of passing time, etc..
For me, nature does not count as intentional unless it is either a cognitive agent or is directed by a cognitive agent.
Apropos the debate about purpose in nature and the lack thereof. From John Vervaeke's lecture series, Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. In lecture 6, Aristotle, Kant and Darwin, Vervaeke brings in Alice Juarrero, a systems theorist and philosopher of biology who's mentioned quite a few times on this forum. Her books include Dynamics in Action and Context Changes Everything.
Where this comes in, is Vervaeke's discussion of Aristotle's hylomorphism, and how Aristotle accounts for change through time. You can review this section of the lecture and also review an excerpt from the transcript below. For context, he's discussing the aftermath of Newton's discovery of the principles of motion (by A>B>C he's referring to mechanical causation), and Kant's attempt to reconcile that with the phenonenon of organic growth.
Suffice it to say that this (A->B->C) became a predominant way of trying to explain how things work (after Newton). But then Kant encountered a very significant problem. And it's not a coincidence that it has to do with the kinds of things we were talking about with Aristotle. The kinds of things that can grow. Living things. Because Kant went out and he saw a tree! And this was very problematic for him because trees don't follow this model readily. Because... He was looking at it and he was saying "okay, well what's making the tree?" Well it's the sunlight! "Well how does the sunlight get in?" Through the leaves! "So... what's making the leaves?". Well, the tree! "So, the tree makes the leaves and the leaves make the tree! So the tree is making the tree!" And he coined the term "Self-Organizing". The tree is Self-Organizing. Now the problem with that is living things make use of "Feedback Cycles". In a feedback cycle the output from the system feeds back into the system. The tree makes the leaves, that gathers energy that goes into the processes that makes the leaves. Living things are self organizing. They use feedback cycles but when I try and give an explanation of a feedback cycle, I fall into a circular explanation....So Kant came to a rather startling conclusion. He came to the conclusion that there could not be a science of living things! That biology was impossible.
This is where Juarrero's work is brought in:
This is what Alicia Juarrero takes up and she said "actually for a very long time we had no way of solving this problem". And so there was a huge gap between our biology and our physics. Now again, why are we caring about this? Because we need to... If we're going to understand Aristotle, if we're going to deeply understand what we mean when we talk about that we are living things that grow and develop and that growth and development is (also) integral to our meaning and our sense of who and what we are - our 'personal identity' - that if we cannot give an answer to this problem (points to issues / question on the board), we cannot understand, fundamentally, who and what 'we' are and what the hell we are talking about when we talk about how important growth and development are to us... Because that language will forever be separate from any kind of scientific understanding! So where's this going wrong?
...So Juarrero first of all makes a distinction between "causes" and "constraints". So to get at that distinction, let's go back to what seems so obvious. OK.... Here's the marker... I push it! Why did it move? And immediately the Newtonian grammar just comes into place: "It moved because you pushed it!" And then you might step outside of physics and say "well, I wanted to push it!", but that's not what I'm asking! Because it could also just be that some other object bumped into this and it moved! Why else did it move? Okay, so think about what has to also be true in order for this to move. There has to be empty space. Relatively empty space in front of the marker. This (the surface - table) has to have a particular shape to it. This (the pen) has to have a particular shape to it. Those aren't events. Those are conditions. Causes are events that make things happen. Constraints aren't events, they're conditions! They don't make things happen, they make things possible. There's a big difference between a condition and an event. The Newtonian way of thinking has us so fixated on this (causes -> event -> happen), so fore-grounded on this that we're not seeing this (constraints -> conditions -> possible) anymore! But Aristotle, because of his Platonic view, actually considers this (Constraints flow) more important. Why? Because when I talk about a Structural, Functional Organization, when I talk about a pattern, I'm talking about this (Constraints flow). This is where you will find form. It is sometimes called the "Formal Cause".
This ties in with Terrence Deacon's ideas in Incomplete Nature (and in fact, there was an investigation as to whether Deacon plagiarized Juarrero when he published his book after hers, but he was absolved by an academic committee), and also (I think) with a lot of what @apokrisis says about biosemiosis. I introduce it here only because I think it helps to grasp the formative role of constraints and conditions in understanding the nature of purpose - not in the sense of mechanical causation, but in the sense of 'why things are the way they are'. This is where I think it makes sense to look for the original sense of Plato's eidos, the forms - not in some fanciful ethereal 'Platonic heaven' but in the underlying patterns of causal constraint which imposes order on possibility.
I'll leave it at that, as there's a limit to what can be meaningfully conveyed in a forum post. Suffice to say, I think it's pointing in a fruitful direction.
This ties in with Terrence Deacon's ideas in Incomplete Nature (and in fact, there was an investigation as to whether Deacon plagiarized Juarrero when he published his book after hers, but he was absolved by an academic committee), and also (I think) with a lot of what apokrisis says about biosemiosis.
Or indeed, exactly what I've always said.
As it happens Deacon is a serial offender when it comes to picking up good ideas and recycling them in his own jargon so that this arguments seem more original than they actually are. I was pissed off when he did the same with Vygotsky, for instance. His first book. Yet still, he is a good populariser.
Juarrero is more interesting as she had to recapitulate the biosemiotic case as an academic outsider whereas Deacon had all the benefits of being an insider.
She told the story really well with an outsider's clarity, but was ignored as she was outside the general swim of systems science. He told the story craftily in a way that built his status in the wider world of ideas, but created a sour taste within the systems science community.
Reply to apokrisis Maybe, but it's all grist to the mill from a layman's point of view. I've gotten halfway through Deacon this year and it is one book I really must finish (although I do say that a lot.)
Metaphysician UndercoverJuly 07, 2024 at 01:49#9150890 likes
This is where I think it makes sense to look for the original sense of Plato's eidos, the forms - not in some fanciful ethereal 'Platonic heaven' but in the underlying patterns of causal constraint which imposes order on possibility.
It's still very important to understand the difference between formal cause (as the existing conditions of constraint), and the final cause, that for the sake of which, the good or intent of the agent who acts, under those conditions. The purpose of the act is directly related to the final cause. And in Juarrero's distinction between causes and constraints, final cause must be a proper cause, while formal cause is the conditions of constraint. A scientific understanding of the formal cause, constraints, will never reveal the final cause, therefore not the purpose either.
Notice the difference between Every thing has a purpose and Everything has a purpose. A space that actually makes a big difference! Might be an example of one of Deacons absentials ;-)
It's still very important to understand the difference between formal cause (as the existing conditions of constraint), and the final cause,
The reason why the hylomorphic dichotomy of matter and form splits into four causes is because the further distinction of particular-general or local-global gets added.
So material cause has both its particular sense of some critical event - an efficient cause - and then the material cause which is a matter in the general sense of substantial being. Stuff you can work with.
Likewise formal cause divides into the immediacy of some actualising structure and then the generality that is an overriding purpose or constraining end.
At least this is how a natural philosopher would look at it. :smile:
For me, nature as a whole would not count as intentional unless it were either a cognitive agent or created and directed by a cognitive agent.
Of course, I don't deny that some organisms and humans are purposeful, I just don't believe that the universe as a whole has any purpose in mind or was created with some purpose in mind. So, it's still not really clear just what you are arguing for.
Reply to Janus I sometimes think it might be that the ancients simply assumed there was a reason for existence and that the universe was animated by purpose. The meaning of cosmos was a unified whole and was presumed to be ordered by reason, which is why reason could get a purchase on it in the first place; it was the task of the philosopher to discern that purpose. That is one of the many meanings of logos, isnt it? It took many centuries for the idea to emerge that that Universe might be purposeless, it is one of the realisations (if it is a realisation) that is born out of the mechanical philosophy of Galileo and Newton. I suppose the idea that the Universe is animated by reason is a thread that is common to nearly all traditional philosophy. Its only with the advent of modernity that this is called into question.
This is not the specifically the subject of the lecture I mentioned, but it is one of the themes explored in the series Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. In that lecture, he traces the development of dynamic systems and evolutionary theory (hence Darwin in the title) but then at the end goes back to discussion of the ethical import of Aristotles philosophy:
So let's now take it back to Aristotle because Aristotle was interested... now, he doesn't use this (points out both diagrams on the board), he doesn't use the dynamical systems language. That's our language. But this language was directly inspired by Aristotle so using it backwards to try and connect Aristotle to our current understanding, I do not think is anachronistic. So Aristotle is interested in our development. He's going to add something that was missing from the Socratic notion of wisdom. Remember the Socratic notion was trying to overcome self-deception. And then Plato adds a whole structural theory of the psyche to explain how we overcome self-deception - how we become wise and achieve wisdom. But what's missing, in the account of wisdom and meaning, according to Aristotle - if I can use this (board) language - is what's missing is an account of growth and development. How does wisdom develop? How does meaning develop? Well this is where we get something that we talk about and we use in our language, but we don't, I think, get the depth of what Aristotle is talking about...
I think maybe one interpretation is not to try and discern the meaning of the entire cosmos, as that seems a rather grandiose idea (although I think it is certainly an idea that Aristotle was prepared to entertain.) But I would hope that as were a part of that unfolding process, that insofar as we capable of living meaningfully, then were playing a part in it, and it is purposeful - which is the overall orientation of the talks hes giving.
It took many centuries for the idea to emerge that that Universe might be purposeless, it is one of the realisations (if it is a realisation) that is born out of the mechanical philosophy of Galileo and Newton. I suppose the idea that the Universe is animated by reason is a thread that is common to nearly all traditional philosophy. Its only with the advent of modernity that this is called into question.
Can the Universe be ordered without being animated by purpose? Do you see the difference? Purpose and reason seem to suggest A purpose and A reason. That is , a realism in which things works according to a certain scheme , a particular content of meaning. By contrast , it could be that the universe is ordered in the sense that it changes with respect to itself in a way that is profoundly intimate. What makes this unfolding ordered is not an assigned purpose, but the lack of arbitrary content violently polarizing its movement in one direction or another. For instance, psychologist George Kelly wrote:
The universe that we presume exists has another important characteristic: it is integral. By that we mean it functions as a single unit with all its imaginable parts having an exact relationship to each other. This may, at first, seem a little implausible, since ordinarily it would appear that there is a closer relationship between the motion of my fingers and the action of the typewriter keys than there is, say, between either of them and the price of yak milk in Tibet. But we believe that, in the long run, all of these eventsthe motion of my fingers, the action of the keys, and the price of yak milkare interlocked. It is only within a limited section of the universe, that part we call earth and that span of time we recognize as our present eon, that two of these necessarily seem more closely related to each other than either of them is to the third. A simple way of saying this is to state that time provides the ultimate bond in all relationships.
Kelly says all events in the universe are interlocked via temporal succession. What does he mean by interlocked? He says all its imaginable parts have an exact relationship to each other, but by exact' he doesn't appear to mean an objectively causal exactitude, even though he describes it as all working together like clockwork. The order of material causality is dictated by the empirical content, which is inherently arbitrary. A car engine's parts have an exact causal relationship with each other, but not an inferential one. If one part were removed, the others would retain their identity, even if the engine no longer worked. By contrast, in Kelly's form of interlocking, any two events are just as closely related to each other as either of them is to the third. In other words, all events are inferentially, relevantly, motivationally, replicatively related to each other like an optimally enlightened construct system, which is quite different than saying they are externally, causally connected via the representational relation between subjective knower and objective world.
Whereas mechanisms are assembled piece by piece from different parts, each with its own already fixed properties, that are all externally related to each other, living wholes are made up of internally related participant parts'. That is, instead of being structured into wholes by being all joined together by third entities (such as glue, nails, etc.) into unified structures, the parts' of a living whole do not already have a fixed character, nor are they fixed in place by glue' or nails.
Unlike for Vervaeke, getting the universe right doesnt mean capturing some particular contentful purpose or reason or scheme that we can nail down as the truth. It means that through discursive and practical niche construction, organism and environment are formed and reformed together through an ongoing, mutually intra-active reconfiguration. Over time , this process of mutual reconfiguration can reveal itself to us as Kellys profoundly interconnected and intercorrelated movement of a universe. We dont need the universe to be purposeful in order to reveal a reality in which human behavior can be understood as ethically benign. In fact, purpose, by implying a right path and a wrong path, gets in the way of such an understanding.
I sometimes think it might be that the ancients simply assumed there was a reason for existence and that the universe was animated by purpose. The meaning of cosmos was a unified whole and was presumed to be ordered by reason, which is why reason could get a purchase on it in the first place; it was the task of the philosopher to discern that purpose.
I think that's rightthe cosmos was understood to be centred on humans and was thus understood in anthropomorphic terms just as it was understood in anthropocentric terms,
With the Copernican revolution came the realization that humans are not at the centre of the cosmos. Then came Kant's second "Copernican" revolution which, ironically, in a way placed humans back at the centre. But this can be understood in the sense that, for us, experientially and phenomenologically speaking, we do find ourselves at the centre of things. I think it pays to remember that this is just a perspective, not an absolute.
But I would hope that as were a part of that unfolding process, that insofar as we capable of living meaningfully, then were playing a part in it, and it is purposeful - which is the overall orientation of the talks hes giving.
I agree that it is important for humans to "live meaningfully", and I think they in fact mostly do live meaningfully in the ways and to the degrees their individual capacities allow. As Karl Jaspers stresses, we are potentially capable of self-transcendence through reason, which means we are potentially capable via reflection, self-analysis and critique, of seeing where we are being ruled by instinctive appetites or unexamined inadequate or negative socially /culturally introjected notions and understandings.
This idea is also reflected in the Nietszchean/ Heideggerian/ Kierkegaardian/ existentialist notion of 'living authentically" as opposed to living according to Heidegger's "das Mann". Where I think we diverge is that I don't think it is necessary to project this sense of purposeful life and potential self-transcendence beyond the human. Animals have their purposes, but as far as we can tell they cannot transcend their instinctive natures, and when it comes to plants and the rest of the mineral universe, even the idea of purpose seems inapt.
Reply to tim wood As to the idea that God gives purpose, this might be true, but if there is a God then I believe (assuming God gives life purpose) that the purpose (obtained through faith and belief) ends up actually being faith and belief in a number of religions. Personally I choose to believe that life must have multiple purposes/meanings, just as life has much diversity in experiences and possibilities.
Can the Universe be ordered without being animated by purpose? Do you see the difference? Purpose and reason seem to suggest A purpose and A reason.
I said before, it seems an inevitable implication, but perhaps this is because of the theistic history of Western culture which seems to force itself upon us. Theres a passage I often quote from the Catholic Encyclopedia entry on Logos, to wit:
God, according to the Stoics, "did not make the world as an artisan does his work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe" (Galen, "De qual. incorp." in "Fr. Stoic.", ed. von Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world "as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistible force which bears along the entire world and all creatures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly.
The parallels with 'dharma' are striking, dharma likewise being 'a universal law', 'individual station or duty', (and (n Buddhism) an element of experience). And there are many non-theistic forms of this kind of belief in Hinduism also. As metaphors, think they're quite philosophically congenial to naturalism or the kind of emergent or extended naturalism that is beginning to appear.
Animals have their purposes, but as far as we can tell they cannot transcend their instinctive natures
Whereas, humans can. Which is one of the predicaments that popular Darwnism leaves us, as it makes no provision for this fact.
Steve Talbott, who's essays I really love, is a philosopher of biology who has a lot to say about that. There's a particular essay of his, From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, which I think draws out this distinction in exquisite detail. (I wish I could paraphrase it, but it's a very hard topic to summarize. I found Steve Talbott's essays on The New Atlantis site, they're first rate on all of this.)
Imho best to limit this to people because, so far as I know, there is no adequate language for making clear just what exactly animals are doing. As to your distinction between purpose on one side and meaning and significance on the other, l don't quite get it. But I have no reason to think I would disagree with you. I assume you mean that a dim bulb can illuminate meaning and significance, but that it takes something brighter to execute purpose. In any case I think none of it exists absent an agent in which it is thought/supposed.
Perhaps unpacking the last claim would help.
I do think giving purpose(s) to things takes more complex cognition/thinking than attributing meaning/significance. As before, purpose involves a means to some goal. I think we agree there.
I'm curious what sort of reasoning/justification grounds the implication that only humans are capable of attributing meaning/significance and/or giving purpose to things. The way you put the last claim may be indicative of how you've arrived at that. May I safely conclude that you do not believe any other creature(aside from humans) is capable of thinking in any way that it makes sense for us to say that they are attributing meaning or significance to something, or that no other creature is capable of 'giving' purpose to other things?
All of that presupposes some unspoken notions. Meaning. Significance. Thought. We may be working from very different notions.
I'm sure most pet owners can tell many like stories, clear examples of intelligence and even a sense of humor.
[quote=Steve Talbott, Evolution and the Purposes of Life;https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/evolution-and-the-purposes-of-life] The following extended passage about the chaffinch (a small finch) comes from a 1927 description by the British ornithologist Edward Max Nicholson (quoted in E.S. Russells 1934 book The Behaviour of Animals):
Here the male must leave the flock, if he has belonged to one, and establish himself in a territory which may at the time be incapable of sustaining him alone, but must later in the season supply a satisfactory food-supply for himself, his mate and family, and against as many birds of other species as overlap his sphere of influence. He must then sing loudly and incessantly for several months, since, however soon he secures a mate, trespassers must be warned off the territory, or, if they ignore his warning, driven out. His mate must help with the defence of the territory when she is needed; pairing must be accomplished; a suitable site must be found for the nest; materials must be collected and put together securely enough to hold five bulky young birds; eggs must be laid in the nest and continuously brooded for a fortnight till they hatch, often in very adverse weather; the young are at first so delicate that they have to be brooded and encouraged to sleep a great part of the time, yet they must have their own weight of food in a day, and in proportion as the need of brooding them decreases their appetites grow, until in the end the parents are feeding four or five helpless birds equal to themselves in size and appetite but incapable of digesting nearly such a wide diet. Enemies must be watched for and the nest defended and kept clean. When the young scatter, often before they can fly properly, they need even greater vigilance, but within a few days of the fledging of the first brood a second nest will (in many cases) be ready and the process in full swing over again. All this has to be done in face of great practical difficulties by two creatures, with little strength and not much intelligence, both of whom may have been hatched only the season before.
Here, too, organized behavior reflects the interests and needs, the perception, and the future requirements, of agents carrying out highly effective, end-directed activity. To be sure, the bird is not consciously reflecting upon its situation. But...we make sense of what happens by interpreting it as a series of reasonable responses to the birds ever-changing life context all in the light of its own ends. While we cannot view the bird as inferring, deducing, and deciding, it is nevertheless recognizing and responding to elements of significance in its environment. There is a continual and skillful adjustment to a perceived surround that is never twice the same surround.[/quote]
Can the Universe be ordered without being animated by purpose? Do you see the difference? Purpose and reason seem to suggest A purpose and A reason. That is , a realism in which things works according to a certain scheme , a particular content of meaning. By contrast , it could be that the universe is ordered in the sense that it changes with respect to itself in a way that is profoundly intimate. What makes this unfolding ordered is not an assigned purpose, but the lack of arbitrary content violently polarizing its movement in one direction or another.
Humans, more than most animals, are "animated by purpose". But the universe, as a whole system, is structured by Logic. That mathematical Logic is arithmetical, in that various threads of causation always add-up to a single global effect. Hence, the world may have an "assigned" (teleological) Purpose, but no-one knows what that final summation will be. Yet, humans, animated by their own motives, infer and impute various "schemes" to the world, to the World Mind.
Since we live in the middle of the Cosmic "life-span", the beginning and end are remote and vague. And, since causation interacts with itself --- action & reaction --- the "unfolding" can seem to be random & chaotic. So, humans like to impose their own purposes in order to "polarize" its path in their chosen direction. Nevertheless, Evolution --- to unroll like a scroll --- gradually reveals that which was inscrutable until actualized. And many evolutionists interpret that scroll as a story moving toward a denoument or coda. Some have proposed that rational homo sapiens must be the acme of evolution. Others, propose that logical artificial entities will eventually inherit the Earth. Presumably, their programming God looks like a robot.
Like most mysteries though, The End is obscured by misdirection, and the Purpose will only be revealed when all threads are tied-up in the final scene. Meanwhile, we will have to be content with incompletely informed prognostication ; which is "difficult, especially if it's about the future". :smile:
The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile?
As to what purpose is, I here take it to be that end for the sake of which an action, else movement, occurs or for the sake of which something iswith the latter (things) being subsumed by the former (processes) in any process theory.
That said, for the kick of it, Ill offer an extremely pithy premise regarding the universal purpose of biological evolutionwithin which context our own individual cognitive purposes unfoldwhich Id love to see falsified on either logical or empirical grounds:
The steadfast global purpose to the evolution of life is that of lifes optimal conformity to that which is actual and, hence, real. *
For better clarity, this irrespective of the detailed means, e.g. via optimal biological fitness relative to individuals and groups, via occurrences of genetic drift, and via the many almost innumerable other detailed means by which biological evolution is currently known to occur. Adaptation to an ever-changing world then being one less abstract facet of this just stated purposeful process. Such that that life which sufficiently deviates from optimal conformity to what is actual/real ceases to be while the life forms which maintains such optimal conformity to what is actual/real persevere.
------
* As to some of this pithily expressed premises implications: The same relationship of conformity to that which is real/actual can well also adequately define the attribute of truthsuch that when this conformity becomes complete, hence absolute (here tentatively entertaining the hypothetical that it in principle can), life then obtains a state of being wherein truth and reality/actuality become one and the same: here maybe better expresses as Truth with capital T. Also of note, as its been just specified, this global purpose of life will then occur in the absence of any superlative egos (i.e., Gods) so intending things to bewith the very notion of a purposing God being superfluous to the state of affairs specified (a God who'd furthermore also need to be subject to some end in order to act purposely, different issue though this is)instead, here purpose in the form of ultimately becoming one with global Truth is a staple aspect of existence; i.e., it becomes a brute fact of the world. So, in a likewise somewhat informal expression, the purpose of life is here taken to be that of not only eventually discovering the quintessentially genuine (true in this sense) actuality/reality of being itself but of also becoming one with it. Add some measure of indeterminacy and free will into the equation and, we via our own freely willed choices then (at least at times) stand in the way of this grand end being actualized, or at least further approached; this, for one example, by preferring fictitious accounts of what is and of what will be over truths regarding the same (truths which at times can be at least initially unpleasant to accept). Other implications could then follow, such as the provision of why lies in general are to be deemed bad: they further the whole from the very end here addressed (which I might add could also be labeled as "the Good").
All that saidwith all these implications being not perfectly expressedwhat Im primarily curious about is, again, any valid argument against the pithy premise regarding the global purpose of life (this via the analysis of biological evolutions purpose/end) which was previously specified.
P.s., While Im anticipating some degree of discord on the matter if Im at all replied to, I likely wont be around to reply for a number of days.
I was after clear signs of just plain intelligence
Birds and other animals surely exhibit intentional behaviour. What they dont exhibit is the rational, abstract and meta-cognitive awareness of h. sapiens. But the excerpt shows how intentional, purposeful acts don't necesssarily require the latter and that intentionality has a much broader scope than what we think of as conscious intentionality.
The steadfast global purpose to the evolution of life is that of lifes optimal conformity to that which is actual and, hence, real.
:100: I've been reading about the ideal of the mind's conformity with actuality and the distinction between 'conforms with' and 'corresponds to'. Compare with the Platonic principle 'to be, is to be intelligible.' See Eric D Perl Thinking Being.
:100: I've been reading about the ideal of the mind's conformity with actuality and the distinction between 'conforms with' and 'corresponds to'. Compare with the Platonic principle 'to be, is to be intelligible.' See Eric D Perl Thinking Being.
Thank you kindly. Yes, though in some ways subtle, I find the distinction quite important, both ontologically and epistemologically - in many ways related to the notion of forms/eidoi and their relation of either accordance/harmony or the converse (whereby conflict occurs in some measure). Thumbs up to the Platonic principle you quote.
I've so far gotten a "404 not found" in the link. I'll check back in later.
Humans, more than most animals, are "animated by purpose".
This is debatable. Humans, with intellect and will, provide themselves the freedom to choose from a multitude of options in their activities. Animals seem to be driven towards very specific goals, without the capacity to choose. Each is "animated by purpose", and I do not see how you could argue one is more so than the other.
we also learned that some animal behaviour is "hard-wired," instinctual - I do not know if that is still a valid viewpoint - and if so, then it seems fair to ask at such times what exactly is doing the intending or what it even means.
I agree that its a very murky question, but I think theres something fishy about it too. Sorry about the mixed metaphor, but speaking of murky and fishy, but a story thats fascinated me is the account of the long-finned eels in Sydneys Centennial Park. They live in murky ponds in the middle of said park, which is quite a few kilometres from the ocean. But every so often, at night and when its very wet, theyll begin a migratory trek through a route that takes them across open parkland into some ponds connected to Sydneys Botany Bay (hence their preference for wet evenings). And then theyll make their way to a deep ocean trench near New Caledonia, which is about 1,800 km from Sydney, to breed. Their larval offspring then drift around for a few years, becoming elvers, and then when reaching their adult form, will make their way back to Sydneys Centennial Park - even though they, as individuals, have never been there. But they know. Instinct, I guess.
There are many examples of migrating animals doing things like this - Pacific Salmon (or is it Atlantic? Whatever), who make their way back to their home stream from across thousands of miles of ocean. Birds who fly from the Arctic to Tasmania to breed. Obviously they dont consciously calculate anything in the way a human would, but it makes me wonder whether how well we really understand what instinct is, and how much of nature depends on these instinctive processes. Theyre not intentional processes, in the sense that human agents understand it, So in some sense theyre intentional but also unconscious. (Schopenhauer devotes a section of WWI to this.)
But to try and tie this back to some of the points I brought up earlier, Im wondering if it suggests a sense in which intentionality (or will in Schopenhauers sense) is manifested at the most basic level of organic life. I dont want to say that it is, but I think its an interesting question, and that it relates to questions of purpose and intentionality on a larger scale than the intentional actions of conscious agents.
Humans, more than most animals, are "animated by purpose". Gnomon
This is debatable. Humans, with intellect and will, provide themselves the freedom to choose from a multitude of options in their activities. Animals seem to be driven towards very specific goals, without the capacity to choose. Each is "animated by purpose", and I do not see how you could argue one is more so than the other.
Perhaps I should have said, "human purposes are both more complex and more general than animal's simple & narrowly focused goals" . But that's a mouthful, compared with just "more than". :smile:
Metaphysician UndercoverJuly 10, 2024 at 21:45#9161330 likes
Reply to Wayfarer
All eels have very interesting life cycles. They begin life in the ocean, and stay there many years, often traveling thousands of kilometers. Then they travel up fresh water rivers and streams for many more kilometers. There they stay for many years, to feed and grow. Then they head back to the ocean traveling thousands of kilometers to spawn. All the while, they metamorphose through numerous stages suited to what they are doing at the time.
I knew there was a good reason I didn't live in Sydney!
Don't worry! You could live your whole life in Sydney, as I have, but never cross paths with a migrating eel. I only know about it because I read of it in the Sydney Morning Herald. (Although I have observed them stealing pieces of bread that the visitors feed to the ducks when I've visited Centennial Park.)
My only point was to argue that the view we have that 'purpose' is solely the prerogative of conscious agents is a very narrow one.
I do not limit such behaviour to people, but I do think it makes sense to speak in terms of people on the assumption that at least at first there may be greater clarity.
Ah. Good. Thanks for clarifying.
So, I'm curious. Do you have a bare minimum criterion for what counts and/or what it takes for any and/or all examples of giving purpose to something to count as such?
I mean, it seems to me that if humans and other creatures can 'give things purpose' then there must be some bare minimum criterion, some basic set of common denominators/elements, which counts as such. What do all examples of a capable creature giving purpose to something include, human examples notwithstanding?
I'm concerned that focusing upon only human examples could lead us away from the more basic ones. It seems to me that our criterion regarding what counts as the most basic outline of 'giving purpose' needs to be perfectly capable of bridging the gap between the language less animals' cases and our own.
So, I'm curious. Do you have a bare minimum criterion for what counts and/or what it takes for any and/or all examples of giving purpose to something to count as such?
creativesoul
An excellent question! I had to read it more than once to understand what you were asking. Not, what are the minima for a purpose to be a purpose, but rather, as you have already granted that purpose is granted, given, assigned...
My apologies. The scarequotes implied uncertainty on my part. You used the terms. I indicated my own trepidation of that use by using scarequotes. That was a way of mentioning without assent.
Comments (263)
Purpose is a property of life and becomes a concept when intelligent minds recognize it.
Every snail crawling up a wall has a purpose: to find algea that may be clinging there, to find shelter from the drying sun, or dampness a hiding place from birds. The underlying purpose of all these short-term goals is to prolong and improve its life.
However complicated the mind and the life-form to which it belongs, it has short term goals to serve an underlying purpose: to prolong and improve its life.
But only humans have the audacity to project the need for a purpose on the world, even the universe.
Ultimate underlying meaning and significance is something only humans demand of anything.
They seek it in vain, so they make something up.
Quoting tim wood
Exactly the reverse.
Now given that we recognize this plurality of values, there are a couple of things one might ask. First, one might inquire what is the source of our association of values with these experiences or activities and I think this question is one that might be most aptly answered by some evolutionary account. Further phenomenological analyses might also bring light to what it is exactly that we value about different experiences.
Secondly, someone who is currently feeling down and unable to find value in their own life might hope for an answer or medicine for their plight. These people I would first and foremost refer to psychotherapists and other experts who might best be able to diagnose their particular problems and help them solve their own problems. It is also possible that these people might find solace in some life philosophy, such as stoicism or existentialism, but I find it equally likely that the key to their lock might be found in a number of different activies like painting, running or reconnecting with nature.
Thirdly, one might ask the properly philosophical questions "But what really makes for a meaningful life?" or "How should we live?". The answers to these questions might identify ways to live that differ in significant ways from the previous list of experiences and activities that we find valuable. For example, an extreme utilitarian might possibly think it appropriate to devalue their families and commit their lives to producing "the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people". Nevertheless, I personally find that the most convincing answers to these questions are ones that, in addition to perhaps offering some ethical imperatives, recognize what we already find valuable and offer us ways to better manage these sources of value, as I find the case to be with Aristotle's works on ethics.
I think we can say with some certainty that whatever purpose is, it is not bootstrapped. It is something that precedes and goes before us; something that transcends us; something that beckons to us; something we participate in. It is not something we invent or produce; it is something we discover or encounter.
Sometimes, it is possible to get your ducks in a row. But when your ducks are in a row, you do not have your ducks and a row.
Quoting tim wood
There is no X such that X provides the rowness to the ducks, rather it is the relations between the ducks that sometimes has the form of a row; it is not an extra something in addition to the ducks.
Correct. Purpose requires will - either that of the living entity with internal goals, or an external entity that has power to exert its will over that of the subject. Inanimate objects have no desires, no will or aims, but they can be purposed to the aims of life-form that can exert its will upon them.
A pebble has no purpose of its own, but a crow can use it as a tool. Life-forms can also be used by an external will with the power to override their own. The purpose of a pig is to keep living and produce offspring. Man re-purposes pigs for his food.
Quoting tim wood
If there were gods, they could find uses both for animate and inanimate objects; if the gods were powerful, they could override the will of intelligent life-forms. If they were powerful enough and wished to, they could find uses for the universe.
Quoting tim wood
Simply: No world, no mind(s).
But then, I'm no longer sure that you refer to "the world" not as the universe, but as some image or model that doesn't exist.
I mean that minds are minuscule ephemeral sparks in a vast cosmos of billions of suns. Minds are dependent on the bodies that contain them and those bodies are dependent on their ecosystems which are dependent on their planet, which are dependent on their sun. Minds are trivial.
Isn't purpose contingent on culture and language - an indication of worldviews and values and how we like to privilege our time? I've generally held that there is no intrinsic meaning or purpose and that purpose can be found in destruction as much as creation. No doubt there are evolutionary advantages in many forms of purpose (social cohesion, reproduction, survival, wellbeing) and perhaps people often follow a purpose they are not fully convinced of, but undertake that path out of obligation and enculturation. I don't think purpose is necessarily rewarding or worthwhile to the person pursuing it.
Where does it come from? Being human, the act of making sense and having to make choices.
That is one way to think about it. The other is that absent minds the Universe is 'blind'there is nothing that can experience anythingthere is no beauty, no poetry, no compassion, no love and also no ugliness, no doggerel, no cruelty, no hatred. In a way the mindless universe would be as good, or bad, as non-existence.
How might we demonstrate this? My intuition is that the organizing principles organisms employ to survive build purpose and meaning. We seek comfort and sustenance - these are achieved through purposeful goal setting and may eventually becoming culture.
Well, yes. No mind is insignificant to itself, bot neither is any mind in a position to affect the universe much. The universe is whatever it is. I don't know that it's blind and stupid, but I know that we alone care about the things we care about. If our minds didn't exist, who would miss the poetry etc?
Also, we humans, who think so very highly of the mind don't seem particularly concerned with preserving or supporting even the minds of our own species, let alone all the other kinds.
Are you suggesting that perhaps the Universe absent any and all percipients might not be blind and might even be intelligent? In that case would that not qualify it as being somehow mindful?
And yes, I agree that we who do understand ourselves as possessing minds are in many ways blind and stupidfar more so than the other animals it would seem.
:up:
Hi Tim - splendid question. In response to the first part, consider this snippet (originally from David Bentley Hart's review of a book by Daniel Dennett, but serves admirably as a summary of the nub of the issue):
I think the crucial change to the modern worldview co-incided with the scientific revolution and the advent of Galilean and Newtonian physics. The perspectival shift wasn't necessarily an intended consequence of that, but the world concieved as comprising fundamentally material bodies obeying solely physical laws, discernable by objective science, was a momentious shift in the conception of the Universe (and I won't say 'the Cosmos', because the Cosmos is by definition 'a unified whole', and today's universe is not that.)
Quoting tim wood
So, in the context of pre-modern philosophy, it was simply assumed that everything exists for a reason, and that this reason is discernable by nous, intellect. The philosopher, in particular, was one who discerned reason, but in the pre-modern sense, which included the telos of particulars, the reason why they came into being in the first place. Whereas the naturalist account comprises trying to discern only a material causal sequence, leaving out the broader sense of reason as the ancients understood it.
An anticipation of this distinction can actually be found in the Phaedo:
[quote=IEP;https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/#:~:text=One%20day%20after%20his%20initial%20setbacks]One day...Socrates happened to hear of Anaxagoras view that Mind directs and causes all things. He took this to mean that everything was arranged for the best. Therefore, if one wanted to know the explanation of something, one only had to know what was best for that thing. Suppose, for instance, that Socrates wanted to know why the heavenly bodies move the way they do. Anaxagoras would show him how this was the best possible way for each of them to be. And once he had taught Socrates what the best was for each thing individually, he then would explain the overall good that they all share in common. Yet upon studying Anaxagoras further, Socrates found these expectations disappointed. It turned out that Anaxagoras did not talk about Mind as cause at all, but rather about air and ether and other mechanistic explanations. For Socrates, however, this sort of explanation was simply unacceptable:
"To call those things causes is too absurd. If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. (99a-b)"[/quote]
And in much ancient philosophy, it was taken for granted that there was, as Hart says, a kind of sympathy between nous and Cosmos. Again, the particular ability of the philosopher or sage was to discern this relationship. It is, of course, vastly different when mind is regarded as a consequence or output of the very material processes which it is seeking to discern - it reverses the perspective, which creates 'the hard problem'.
Quoting tim wood
However, you also ought to consider that purpose or intentional action also comes into existence with the very most primitive organisms, which act with purpose to preserve their existence. This is one of the insights of biosemiotics, and (from phenomenology) the idea of the 'lebenswelt' or living-world of organisms: their world (and ours) comprises lived meaning, which are neither precisely 'in' the world or 'in' the mind but arise as an interplay of self-and-world. Whereas, the objective stance naively assumes that the world really exists as no mind perceives it - the so-called 'mind-independent world' - and it is the sciences' task to ever enlarge the understanding of that, not seeing the hidden metaphysical flaw that this entails. (Although as noted, biosemiotics, and also phenomenology, are aware of that, an awareness which is gradually expanding.)
Huh? My understanding of a tree has no influence on the universe or the existence of trees. Does thing-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself mean anything?
Quoting tim wood
You need a body to actualize the purpose of the will.
Quoting tim wood
How does that come into it? If I have neighbours who offend me, there is a huge range of possible reactions that don't involve shooting. How doe this relate to a purpose?
Quoting tim wood
Whatever my feeling was about the neighbours, I would then have to formulate an appropriate response. I'd have to decide what I want (will), then devise a plan of action to achieve what I want (purpose).
Quoting tim wood
It doesn't imply. It is simply the aim or goal to get or accomplish something desired. Purpose, aim, goal, intent, plan all precede action. A purpose may also be conferred upon implements made or co-opted to achieve a goal, aim, plan or intent.
Quoting tim wood
Whatever the "right thing" is in any situation is a reasonable purpose to have. I'm also reasonably sure it is not a universal imperative.
Probably. I don't claim that the universe has a mind of its own; I just don't know that it doesn't.
If it does, it's as unlikely to care - crave or miss - our poetry and cruelty, as we are unlikely to crave or miss the cultural touchstones of Centurian termites.
If the universe has a mind of its own, might that mind not be vaster, more capacious, more compassionate than our own. If it were aware of our poetry and our cruelty, might it not value the former and lament the latter, far more so than we do ourselves?
How would we possibly assess the likelihood of either possibility? As to us valuing or caring about termites, it would seem that it is not outside the realm of human possibility.
Not that I recall.
Quoting Wayfarer
But was the assumption warranted? Was it not simply a stage of culture? Obviously there are some nostalgic, romantic projects that wish to overturn the modern world and its perceived bereftness but I think a good argument for this seems to be elusive. It all generally coalesces around the idea: "Oh, isn't the modern period hideously ugly and consumerist.' No doubt the premodern period was hideously ugly in its own ways, transcendent meaning or not.
Quoting Wayfarer
But what's the case that this is warranted? Why does it matter what the ancients thought?
Haven't I offered just as much "further argument" as you have? My primary point was that your claim flies in the face of general consensus. Claims that do that require more "further argument" than claims that don't.
What I would say, though, is that if you talk to anyone who is reputed to know about purpose, and how to help people find purpose, they will not follow your lead of "bootstrapping" or conjuring up purpose ex nihilo. The phrase itself is informative, "I am having trouble finding purpose," not, "I am having trouble making purpose."
Or cold, mean and indifferent. It doesn't matter which, unless and until the universe reveals its preference and purpose in action - and we probably wouldn't recognize its intent even then.
Quoting Janus
We might care about the Earth ones. I did say Centaurian termites: we don't know whether there is any such thing.
Quoting tim wood
Oxford's idea is: 1. "the reason for which something is done or created or for which something exists."
2. "have as one's intention or objective."
3. a person's sense of resolve or determination.
I usually just go by the dictionary meaning; otherwise, it's a guessing-game.
Quoting tim wood
Lots of people do that. I suppose they're hoping to be significant, important, and they want an outside authority (God, Fate, Destiny, The Great River...) to imbue them with that significance. It's a whole lot easier than finding your own.
Quoting tim wood
That's a reasonable conjecture, assuming you know that they've stopped asking. It's possible that they found their purpose. Another reasonably conjecture is that, having received no answer, they gave up. Or became convinced that there isn't one. Or invented a purpose for themselves. Or somebody with a stronger will imposed one on them.
Very few questions of psychology have only two possible answers.
Quoting tim wood
Nevertheless, I suggest you don't stand under the figment of one during the figment of a thunderstorm.
It's a collective term by which we refer to not specifically named members of a category of things. Language is fun to bend and twist for poetry, not so much for intelligible communication.
I think the fact that it cannot be made is what makes it elusive. If purpose could be made then it would make sense to ask for the recipe.
Then you're still asking someone else to determine your purpose. You're asking to be the means to an end: a tool - or a meal.
I've done creative things which others appreciated and made changes, but no feelings of perfection or moments of reverie, I'm afraid.
Quite simply, God is the source of purpose. Those who do not believe in God have a big hole in their capacity for understanding, because the purpose we know and observe, seems to have no purpose when we do not recognize God. When we come to apprehend the reality of God then all that purpose makes sense. And the atheists think the theists are being unreasonable, but it's really the other way around because the atheists are denying themselves the capacity to understand, and that is being unreasonable.
I am an atheist but I don't think theists are being unreasonable.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How do we demonstrate such a statement? Which god, by the way?
Nope.
Quoting tim wood
Not at all. It's the signal difference between any living and non-living thing. A crystal does nothing itself to maintain itself or to grow, even if it persists and grows. A cell must continuously act in order to do the same.
Quoting Tom Storm
That is a caricature, and also not very perceptive. The modern world, and modern culture, offer more opportunities for growth, exploration, fulfilment, and individuation than any previous era. It is an incredible time to be alive. But it has it's shadow side, the things it doesn't see, or has lost, without really recalling what. (Although there is also no doubt that a great deal of modern consumer culture, like the Pacific Ocean's great Garbage Patch, *is* hideously ugly.)
Quoting tim wood
One can live a satisfactory life without a sense of over-arching purpose. Stoic philosophy for example didn't generally envisage an after-life, but still had a conception of eudomonia, right conduct leading to impeturbability. But again, very different to the hedonistic ethos native to liberalism (and maybe the reason why stoicism is attracting an audience.)
But I've always been drawn to cosmic philosophies, which are somewhat religious in nature. Not necessarily theistic, and in the sense of a cosmic-director God not at all, but something nearer the convergence of dharma and logos - that by discovering and being true to your purpose, you are doing your part in the grand scheme, and also discovering the reason of existence in a sense greater than the instrumental.
Well I can't find anything much to criticize in this. Certain things attract us. But it does seem to be the expression of a preference - one predicated on emotional or aesthetic satisfaction perhaps - just as mine is - I've never been drawn to cosmic philosophy or religions, they don't assist my sense making process. However, I do appreciate a dialogue between the different worldviews and I'd much rather discuss matters of meaning with a spiritually inclined person that the average atheist.
It is demonstrated this way. Purpose is prior to any display of purpose. Therefore there must be a purpose which is prior to all things which display purpose. That purpose cannot be attributed to anything which displays purpose, being prior to all such things. So it is attributed to God, as the source of purpose.
The other question doesn't make sense. If we're talking about God as the source of purpose, then obviously that's the God we're talking about.
Quoting tim wood
See above
Quoting tim wood
I also want to circle back to this remark in the OP. As I will continue to say to anyone on this forum, a recent book by mathematics professor emeritus (now deceased) Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order throws this expression into much greater depth. But it also dispels the anthropocentric illusion that the mind of rational sentient beings alone generates this order. Theres a fascinating discussion of cognition in fruit-flies, showing how they are believed to perceive in gestalts, comprising the aspects of their world that are meaningful to them.
The meaning of a sensation is something primary and biologically given. There is no need to interpret the feelings of hunger and thirst, for example. The meaning of a sensation is embedded in the sensation itself. It may be said that a sensation is its meaning. Primary feelings are genetically given, and constructed in the course of gestation just as organs are. They are standard equipment in every animal body.
Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics by Charles Pinter
He elaborates in detail how this is generally true for all organisms, h sapiens included. So the philosophical point I want to make is that this process is much more than a matter of the individuals mind creating or inventing meaning or purpose. We are embedded in a psychosomatic process which stretches back to the origins of evolution itself. Of course nowadays, many biologists and philosophers of science realise this, but I still think its an under-appreciated point. The structure of the mind - yours, mine, anyones - comprises these layers of awareness and sensation, from the most basic organic functionality up to conscious thought (and beyond)! So while its true that mind is inexorably involved with this process, its simplistic to say that the mind simply invents it or devises it. There are thoughts we cant get outside of, to allude to an essay by Thomas Nagel. As is well-known, I believe this line of thought leads inevitably to a kind of phenomenological idealism. And I see the shortcoming of the strictly naturalist attitude as not recognising our embeddedness in the process of living, of imagining that were standing apart from it and judging it as object to us, when in fact our minds have a fundamental role in creating that order.
Nice.
i think you are right that this is a sort of "default" analysis of purpose. The trouble is that it encourages hypostatization by treating "x" as an individual, a thing that might be located in the world, and so folk go off in search of it.
But they will not find it, because purpose is given to things, not found in them. The purpose of a knife - the ubiquitous example - is not found in a physical description, but in the way it is used. "Ultimate underlying meaning and significance" is found in use.
So yes, purpose is invented by mind, in setting forth the use.
Or, to put the same point in a somewhat different way, purpose comes from our intent. In a way, it is for our intentional descriptions what causation is for our physical descriptions. purpose, then, is dependent on the descriptions we have at hand - He flicked the switch, turning on the light and alerting the burglar, but the purpose of turning on the light was not to alert the burglar.
So, in answer to your title, purpose is the use to which something is put, and comes from our intent. It is grounded in our intentional explanations for our actions, and has worth only in terms of those intentions and actions.
Edit: That is, no big grand universal purpose, just small wantings and doings.
Its axial age philosophy, going back to the origins of historical cultures, and their attempt to discern reason, in the larger sense. Of course we cant re-adopt or go back to that period, were separated from it by millenia, but I think in relation to the question posed in the OP, that its important to grasp what the question meant then, and what has changed. Which I tried to articulate in my first post, from the perrspective of the history of ideas, although I was rather disappointed by the initial response.
"Proper function for which something exists" (EtymOnline). Linguistically 'purpose' does not imply something that is human-intention-derived. The purpose of a knife is to cut because humans made knives, and they made them to cut. It doesn't follow that the purpose of a human life "has worth only in terms of [human] intentions and actions." Your linguistic analysis is off and your logical inferences are faulty, and of course your conclusion is unsound.
Quoting Banno
Only for the anthropocentric.
Quoting Enynonline
Fuck off.
If it's not human intentions, then a supernatural will is required to give humans purpose. A god has to make them his tools.
I reject the idea of being someone's tool, no matter how powerful they are. I'd rather be a wild thing with no ultimate significance. If the gods hunt me down and eat me, so be it, but I will not have accepted "food-source" as my purpose in life.
And some theists think their faith makes them clairvoyant.
Well, yes, but you had already more or less said or implied the possibility that if the universe had a mind it was more likely to be "cold, mean and indifferent", and I was merely presenting the other possibility. But as you suggest the question is pointless anyway as we cannot know, and I would add that we could not even calculate the probability of it being one or the other.
Quoting Vera Mont
Ah, I wasn't paying attention, I just assumed it was a species of Earth termite that I had not heard of before.
I think the first thing is to distinguish the sort of "purpose" you're talking about from any sort of goal, the sort that instrumental rationality is good with.
That makes the issue of "being alive" a little tricky, because it's easy to say that this is the primary and overarching goal of a living organism, but it's also set apart, as that which enables any other goal. Is there something else set apart from such goals, perhaps also set apart from maintaining yourself as a living organism? I think there sort of is.
@unenlightened gives you the first bit: this kind of purposiveness is something that inheres in living, in acting, in being, not something outside it. Getting your ducks in a row is a row-ly way of behaving with ducks.
I also think @Wayfarer and perhaps @Leontiskos are on the right track -- though they might be surprised to hear me of all people say this.
Here's how I get there. Goals we understand: the wolf on the hunt behaves in a goal-advancing way. But what about the wolf dozing a little, keeping an eye out, waiting, passing the time. I want to say that this wolf may not be pursuing a goal at the moment, but is still 100% being a wolf, behaving with perfect and complete wolfishness.
And this calls to mind the way the Greeks talked about the essence of things, of plants, of animals, and of human beings as well, that biocentric vision they had of a thing growing into the most complete expression of its own nature, whatever that is. I don't think that requires mind, although for some things being minded is part of it. It is for us, and it is for a wolf.
That's not an answer so much as an idea about how to think about or look for an answer. Some people seem to live purposefully, in the sense I mean, to have a kind of presence, a genuineness -- it isn't necessarily always certainty about what's right, but an engagement with the very idea of there being rightness. Some people don't. It can be hard for us, harder than it is for a tree or a wolf or a knife.
One of those Greeks advised us: "Know thyself." Maybe that suggests that in our case there's no avoiding self-awareness and therefore, if we are to approach the sort of pure expression of essence that a tree or a wolf or a river has, we must first understand, must know something about what we are, not just be it. And that's why it makes more sense to say this sort of purpose is discovered rather than invented.
I'll say one more little thing: I've always been attracted to Keats's -- what? observation? suggestion? -- that the world is "a vale of soul-making". Through suffering we grow a soul, and thus become more fully human, more than we were when we were born. I think that's the idea, and it's interesting to cast that Greek idea in these terms -- it's the growth not of your body but of your soul, that matters.
Only for those who believe in a god.
Quoting Leontiskos
From day to day and year to year until the kids are grown. Had I considered procreation my purpose in life - as some (mostly female) people do (and fall to pieces if they fail to achieve it), I would have tried to procreate, instead of taking care to prevent it. Though they gave me cause to make plans and set goals that centered solely on them, the children I did raise were not the purpose of life, any more than taking care of stray cats is. These are responsibilities I assume freely, of choice, and that choice then entails purposeful actions directed toward its fulfillment.
Quoting Janus
That wasn't my intention. It's simply a matter of scale. If the universe is sentient, whether we would judge it from our perspective benevolent, hostile or indifferent, it's so much bigger than us that our perspective could not possibly take in the scope of its intelligence or intent. From its perspective on that scale, even supposing it was aware of our existence, I surmise that it would be unlikely to differentiate between humans and bats or any other sentient species in any of the trillion or so galaxies it surveys.
Quoting Janus
Probably because I misspelled it the first time.
Well, yes, I think that is what I said. There might be a need to guard against having a private purpose; one not apparent in any action.
"Boot strapped"? not sure of the sense there. An explanation in terms of purpose may be sufficient - My purpose in drinking was to quench my thirst, no further explanation is needed.
Do you think that the meaning of the word "purpose" entails that all purpose is bestowed by human intention? Yes or no?
Folk appear to have missed this constraint you placed on the topic.
There's also some overgeneralisation. "Being alive" isn't the purpose of a worker bee. They are there only to serve the hive, even at the expense of being alive.
I think it's easy enough to make sense of Aristotle's notion of the way in which beings when flourishing do so by actualizing their specific potentials. And that idea can be aligned with, for example, the notions of dharma or dao, when those are understood as naturally immanent to the beings themselves, as opposed to something "given from above", that is, when understood as natural as opposed to supernatural.
So, I can understand the idea that "by discovering and being true to (actualizing) your" potential (instead of "purpose") you will be living your best possible life. Whether this somehow benefits the universe in any way other than it possibly leading to you directly benefiting other proximal beings and/ or your environment, remains obscure to me. Would even benefiting the whole Earth make any appreciable difference to the Cosmos as a whole? I can't see any way to coherently understand how it could. Perhaps you can enlighten me?
The other thing that puzzles me in what you say is that, although, you don't (apparently) believe in a grand schemer, you believe in a "grand scheme". I can make no sense of a grand scheme without positing a grand schemer, a grand designer without a grand designer or a grand purpose without a grand purposer. Care to unravel it for me?
You're right, I did miss it. I should not have responded. If all the meanings of 'purpose' are eliminated from discussion, there's nothing left to discuss but God.
I think "cosmic philosophies" turn on interdependence and symbiosis. The common example is the violinist in the orchestra who is contributing a small part to a beautiful whole, a whole which depends on each of the small, interdependent parts. For the ancients this was usually captured in the balanced, cyclical motions of the heavens.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
:clap:
Quoting Janus
Isnt that the kind of intuition found in many forms? Acting in accordance with the Tao? Theres also such a thing as religious anthropology which asks precisely this question - see for instance https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Kadmon. It wont appeal to everyone but I mention it as representative of this theme.
OK, but you haven't even attempted to answer the questions i posed.
But there's something even deeper than that, but more simple: the resonance of mind and world as I tried to convey in that overlooked quote from David Bentley Hart - that 'the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect'. Considered alongside the argument in Pinter's book, Mind and the Cosmic Order, there is indeed an order, and mind is foundational to it. But it's never an object of analysis in the scientific sense (per David Chalmers). That's also where phenomenology and the emphasis on the reality of first-person experience is important.
Quoting Janus
That might be due to your cultural heritage, might it not? Buddhists have no such difficulty. Granted, they would also probably not talk in terms of a 'cosmic purpose', but it is at least implicit in their cosmologies, without a director to supervise the whole show. But in Western culture, we're caught up in this kind of Hegelian dialectic of theism (thesis), atheism (anti-thesis) and an emerging synthesis (whatever that turns out to be).
Purpose is like the concept of cause and effect. It doesn't exist in the empirical world. It comes from the human mind i.e. imagination, desire, motives or will. It is psychological in nature.
Doesn't "valued because they are valued" imply infinite regress, or maybe a vicious circle, rather than bootstrapping?
In the op you say "Bottom line, purpose is boot-strapped", but how could this be possible? Isn't it true that boot-strapping is a purposeful process? This would imply that purpose is necessarily prior to, as the intentional cause of any boot-strapping activity. Then purpose itself cannot be boot-strapped.
God is something that directs us to the highest value, or 'heaven'.
Good to see you once again.
Quoting tim wood
Agreed. However purpose is understood, it follows from judgement alone, and for whatever a purpose is supposed to be follows from the kind/content of the judgement from which it is given.
Can we do purpose without first doing teleology on the one hand, or aesthetics on the other?
Invented or discovered? Neither: they follow implicitly and necessarily from that which is the condition for them, that being .a-hem ..predisposition in accordance with subjective moral law.
Not much more I can contribute here, however interesting the topic is. I have neither opinion nor knowledge regarding purpose in and of itself, so .
This doesnt seem right to me. Sensations from the eyes, ears, nose , skin and movement are massively intercorrelated on the basis of overarching normative patterns of interacting with a world. The purpose of perceptual sensation is to guide action , and it gets its meaning from such action. Action, furthermore, is anticipatory, and as such brings into play all of the sense modalities directly or indirectly. A kitten deprived from birth of interaction with its surrounding cannot see , despite having a normal visual system. Visually perceived objects have no meaning because such meaning must come from what we are intending to DO with objects, and our anticipation of the response of those objects to our actions. Even supposedly primal sensations like hunger are interpretive. My mother died from starvation as a result of advanced alzheimers. This is not uncommon. A person with dementia loses the ability to interpret the meaning of their hunger sensations as these are interconnected with other sources of perception within a functional totality whose purposiveness becomes fragmented with the loss of a sense of time, place and identity.
Im not sure that being alive makes sense as a goal from a biological point of view. I think its sort of thinking is a throwback to the early days of Darwinism, when organisms were set off from a world, as if they were dropped into a separate environment and then subject to one-way selective pressure from that environment. But an organism isnt a an already determined thing, like a rock, surviving or not in a world. It is a system of interactions that maintains itself as a normative pattern of exchanges. It is not a living thing that survives, it is these patterns. And it is a misnomer to say that they survive. What they do is continually transform themselves, but in such a way that they maintain a relative self -consistency throughout these changes. I would not separate goal from purpose here. Any adjustment within the organism-environment system that maintains or strengthens the self-consistency of the specific manner of organismic functioning fulfills its goals and purposes, and modifications which fragment such integrity work against its purposes. Since the organisms current normative patterns shape the possibilities of future changes to the organism, there can be no purpose that comes from on high, or from a causal below, entirely independent of the total style of its functioning.
Note that what I just said concerning the nature of functioning of living systems can be applied in a general sense to human psychological and cultural goals and purposes. Theories, faiths, schemes of understanding , value systems and worldviews function like living systems. The are normatively structured interactions with a human created niche (our linguistically formed technological and social world). The aim of such schemes, practices and worldviews is to maintain their ability to assimilate events without disintegrating into incoherence and unintelligibly .
To the extent that a system of ideas survives, it does so not by simply duplicating itself, but by changing itself constantly in subtle or not so subtle ways so as to keep
up with a constantly changing environment that it is instrumental in shaping.
In understanding the concept of purpose, both at the biological and psychological level, it is crucial to appreciate the reciprocal , reflexive nature of the person-world interaction. Persons arent dropped into a world with purposes any more than organisms are dropped into an environment with purposes. Purpose is a dynamically self-adjusting back and forth between self and world , remaking itself constantly both from the side of the organism and its environment. There can be no transcending purpose when the very notion of intention is not only responsive to but mutually shaped by an outside.
FWIW, I didn't mean anything metaphysical by the word "soul". I don't know whether Keats did.
Quoting Joshs
I think what interests me about the Keats is near here: you're not just born with an eternal soul, and that's what makes you special; it grows within you, or doesn't, through the process of living a life. The organism and the environment have memory, and the organism -- us -- can also reflect on those interactions, and develop some sense of how things are related, and the great variability of those relatings. There's a possibility there of coming to feel at home in the world, which can be very difficult for us. And in feeling at home, achieving freedom, which is also hard for us.
I don't know if "purpose" is a great word for talking about all this, or a phrase like "the meaning of life", but they're all ways of trying to get at the surprising challenge of living a good human life.
We do indeed have memory, but is that memory a static archive, or does it reassemble the past on the basis of where we are going? Do we understand history from the past forward or from our future to what has been? Heidegger said that feeling at home in the world conceals from us the strangeness and uncanniness of being-in-the-world, and that we only gain freedom when we no longer feel at home in the world. I agree with both you and Heidegger: if our world is so familiar that we treat it as an unchanging given, then we achieve no freedom. But by the same token, if the world is so unintelligible
that we cant make any sense of it at all, we are imprisonment by chaos.
Absolutely, and one reason I squeezed in the word "variable" up there somewhere.
I think much of the challenge of freedom for us comes from our culture. We all swim in a sea of inherited ideas. It's all too easy to grab an off-the-shelf interpretation of anything, and that's not freedom.
But "going it alone" or "starting from scratch" is just not an option, so your inheritance, and a certain ambivalence about it, is something else you have to be, well, both comfortable and uncomfortable with. I don't imagine feeling at home in the world as static, but taking it all as it comes, including your own occasional feeling of alienation.
Something like that is what I think of as largeness of soul. Keats was a terribly unusual young man, who got here remarkably quickly. (The "negative capability" letter and the "vale of soul-making" letter are both earlyish, if I recall correctly, and probably only a few months apart.) And of course then there's his real hero, Shakespeare, who had an extraordinarily capacious soul.
I cannot quite apprehend what you mean by "a set of constraints which things not of or in reality are not subject to". I assume you are saying that there are things which are not part of reality, and those things are not subject to this particular set of constraints you are referring to. Are these non-real things subject to any kind of constraints, and what kind of existence do they have if they are non-real?
Quoting tim wood
Your conditions for "reality" do not state that there cannot be an unconstrained real thing. You said that things not in reality are not constrained by a specific set of constraints, but you didn't say that things in reality are necessarily constrained. What exactly do you mean by "a set of constraints"? I understand "sets" to be things created by human beings. Are these constraints artificial as well, or is it just the classifying of them into a specific set which is artificial?
Quoting tim wood
Are you serious? Is it not the case that the purpose of an animal's heart is to circulate blood, and the purpose of sense organs is to sense, etc..?
Which I don't have, and therefore should not discuss how it works on the faithful.
Quoting tim wood
Usually not an idea that originates with the faithful. While each believer does a little customizing of the canon, the bulk and overwhelming content of it comes from other minds. A very, very few interpreters of the god's requirements tell all the faithful how best to gain the god's favour. They may think they place themselves in the god's hands; in fact, they place themselves in the ruling prelate's hands.
In the secular realm, the same role is played by heads of state and, in turbulent times, the leaders of ideological factions: the loyal subjects, patriots and freedom fighters receive their purpose from their figurehead.
To me, that seems a lot like abrogation of responsibility - but it does provide a clear, straightforward meaning for their life. And death.
Quoting tim wood
We are social animals. We crave community, family, closeness, affection, recognition, a sense of belonging and contributing and being valued. To that end, we take a series of small and large decisions that result in what we know as ordinary life. That includes adults taking responsibility for the young, paying their dues, keeping the peace, lending a hand, making the world around them liveable for others as well as themselves. That requires no supernatural intervention.
Right - like I said, nothing wrong with purpose, so long as it's mine. Anything like 'purpose' in the abstract - too hard.
In a way, that's what a social contract always is. But it's not that simple or two-dimensional.
Quoting tim wood
I don't know what that sentence means. We have duties and obligations, responsibilities and debts - all different, each resulting from a set of circumstances that are partly given (of the environment and a condition of survival) and partly undertaken by the subject for his or her own reasons.
Quoting tim wood
No such thing. Duty has no 'sake'; it's always in service to something much larger. There is duty for the sake of patriotism, or an oath, or as a condition of citizenship, or as part of a binding contract.
Quoting tim wood
I really wish you wouldn't. It grates very hard on my grammatical nerves.
My teleological/aesthetic to your purposivity/purposefulnes ..dont we want all our bases covered?
Quoting tim wood
Yes, undoubtedly. Or, if not governance per se, then at least legislation.
About ol Sydneys last act: where/how does he fit into your notions of purpose with it?
Since the idea of the natural order is an idea of the intellect by definition as are all other ideas, it is hard to see how it would not, as an idea, be akin to the intellect. As a reality for us it remains an idea. What it might be as mind-independent reality is of course unknowable (per Kant).
Quoting Wayfarer
I have never encountered an idea of "cosmic purpose" in my readings of Buddhist texts, I don't think my association of the meaning of 'purpose' with a purposer is any kind of scotoma due to "cultural heritage", I think the idea of cosmic purpose has always been associated with a god or gods who are the intenders and givers of the cosmic purpose. Without that idea of intention, the notion of purpose seems reducible to simply the way things behave, or a kind of immanent cosmic balance as presented in the notions of dharma and Dao.
Nevertheless, 'dharma' is both 'duty' and also 'law'. In other words, it's not simply an individual prerogative or obligation, but is inherent in the natural order (the original root being 'what upholds' or 'holds together').
And besides, isn't science itself predicated on there being a natural order? I know nowadays that the whole concept of natural law is called into question, but in my view that's mainly because it's a metaphysical issue.
Quoting Janus
I agree, with the caveat that it is not a personal idea existing in an individual mind.
Quoting Janus
But as I pointed out, some degree of intentionality - not conscious intentionality, of course - is implicit in the activities of all organic life. That is what Aristotle and Greek philosophy classified as 'self-originated movement': organisms have an internal organising principle which acts towards an end, whereas the organising principle of artifacts, for example, is imposed from without by the artificer.
This kind of thinking was abandoned with the advent of Galilean physics, where the whole antiquated superstructure of Aristotelian physics, with it's 'natural places' for stones and the like, was discarded. The 'new science' sought to provide explanations solely in terms of the mechanical relations of measurable particulars, eschewing any idea of purpose. And that works fine as far as physics is concerned, but when it is applied to organic life, it is invariably reductionist, as it omits the purposeful activities that characterise even simple life-forms.
Subsequently, a neologism 'teleonomy' was devised by a biologist in 1958 to allow for the apparent purposeful activites of organisms (similar to Richard Dawkin's 'apparent' design in nature, which is not co-incidental.) But it was introduced to deal with the inescapably goal-directed nature of virtually all biological activity. 'Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but hes unwilling to be seen with her in public. Today (written in the 1930's) the mistress has become a lawfully wedded wife. Biologists no longer feel obligated to apologize for their use of teleological language; they flaunt it. The only concession which they make to its disreputable past is to rename it teleonomy.
But all of these philosophical considerations seem out-of-scope for this OP, so I'll leave it for now.
Why is it "duty and also law"? I would say it is because we conceive it as such or because it is simply the way things work best. If animals instinctively follow "the way" then that would explain why they are so much less fucked up than we are. I can accept the idea that to go against what is naturally the best way for us would be a negative. Perish the thought that we might ever do that! :wink:
How do we find out what is the best way for us? Perhaps introspection, self-awareness and self-knowledge, that is what we call "the examined life", might help. When it comes to the best way to treat the environment and other animals, I would say science and compassion might come in handy. Of course, the best way for us and the best way for the other animals and the living environment arguably cannot be two different ways.
The other point I would make is that dharma and Dao are earthly lawwe know little about the rest of the cosmos. We might assume that other galaxies and the far corners of the cosmos have the same or similar ways as we do. It would seem that only once life arrives can there be not merely a way, but a best way. And what makes that way best? Well, of course animal and human (and perhaps plant) flourishing, what else?
If you'd have read what you said to me, you would know that you asked me "in terms of purpose - of any kind -". I assume that the clearly stated "any kind", implies that any such restrictions are to be put aside.
Anyway, I just reread your op, and cannot understand your proposed restrictions at all. Can you explain clearly how you are proposing to restrict the meaning of "purpose" in this thread?
Quoting tim wood
What are you talking about? Of course there can be no hearts until there is a heart. That's a self-evident truth. But that's not at all relevant to what I said. I said purpose is prior to a display of purpose. A heart is a display of purpose, so purpose (or intent if you prefer) must be prior to the heart. How do you get from this to the self-evident truth of "there can be no hearts until there was a heart"?
Quoting tim wood
How is this relevant? In reality, sometimes you get what you want, sometimes you do not. In what way do you believe that the constraints placed on human beings are related to the constraints placed on God, if there are any?
Quoting tim wood
I think "purpose (in itself)" corresponds to Spinoza's conatus: everything necessarily persists in its being.
"It comes from" nature naturing.
"Its ground" is reality.
Being (or life) is the (or an) end-in-itself like song dance music (i.e. rhythm/melody for rhythm's/melody's sake).
"Meaning" is ... m?y? ... perspectival, semantic, ephemeral (or as Camus might say 'nostalgia').
I think (nurtured) self-worth, or dignity, "makes it all worthwhile."
This is reductive reification. It posits an entity where none is to be found and thus invents a transcendent realm of eternal beings where it is to be discovered.
The underlying necessity is the same: to keep living. The layer on top of that is: to live well. The first one is much the same for every being; the second diverges. The particular requirements for a good life differ from species to species; the desires we hope will improve our life* varies by individual.
So, there are root, long term, permanent aims that require small daily action to keep going, each one of which is proposed, planned and executed with purpose.
*For some, that means accumulating goods or reputation points or power. For some, it means being loved and valued and needed. For some, it means doing good to others of his kind, or other species, or the world. For some, it means fighting for a cause. For some, it means being part of something greater than themselves. Each of those central goals requires a different series of small, purposeful actions to achieve. We may not think of these desires, intentions and acts as a coherent whole, but that's what every life adds up to.
I am questioning that assumption. The problem is that when working with that assumption leads one to find what may not be there to find. And if not here then there.
Quoting tim wood
Why should what I always do and what you always do be related in any way other than this being what we always do? My reasons for always playing the king's gambit may have nothing to do with why you always choose vanilla. Would you ask if what I sometimes do is related to what you sometimes do?
Quoting Vera Mont
I think we need to make a distinction between just living and perpetuating a particular way of living. Organisms dont just live, they continually enact a specific normative pattern of interaction with an environment. It is this normative pattern that survives or perishes, not simply being alive as an abstract concept. If an organism is no longer able to maintain the dynamic consistency of its patterned exchanges with its niche, it is no longer that organism. To keep living as a body doesnt capture what is relevant to the specific aims of a living system. It is these aims which are synonymous with what it means for it to continue to be what it is over time.
Applying this perspective to the normative psychological aims of humans, the motives that drive us arent the short term means to a long term end of merely staying alive as a body, these short term in order tos define the normative nature of the person as a psychological system. We live for the sake of our norms , not for the sake of an abstract notion of life.
I attempted to. That's why I didn't say 'just live'; I said 'keep living'. In order to choose any goals or aims, one must be vital enough to choose. One must perform the basic actions entailed in survival; these are the minimum requirement.
Quoting Joshs
I thought it was the organism that survives that survives and inevitably perishes. Obviously, both of those events take place in a an environment. Nothing abstract about that.
Quoting Joshs
That sounds to me like a hyperbolic description of a simple matter: be born, live, eat, eliminate, rest, want things, procreate (or not) die. There is no meaning to being what it is over time: it already is and has no choice about what it is.
Quoting Joshs
We tend to cling tenaciously to the very concrete fact of being alive. But beyond that, or overlayed on that, are all the short-terms goals of making our lives good, each according to his or her notion of good.
It seems to me youre splitting off a supposed
top layer of e and morality from everyday means-ends motivation , when in fact this top layer is embedded within and informs every motivated action we take, no matter how trivial. Every action we take in order to accomplish some aim understands that aim in relation to larger aims , and those larger aims are done for the sake of a self whose overall purposes are bound up with a core sense of ones relation to others, how we see ourselves as mattering or others and how they matter to us, our sense of belonging and esteem. All of these features are bound together at the top, or superordinate level of our identity, and infuse the meaning and direction of all our actions.
I'm open to adding as many layers as Maslow, or even subdividing them into more layers. But your meaning of 'transactional' eludes me. It seems to me the base layer - once an organism is no longer dependent on its parents - consists largely of transactions with the environment, while the upper ones require transactions with other conscious organisms.
Not all these transaction are necessarily direct one-to-one bargains. Your anonymous charitable giving may not bring you face to face with its beneficiary. It makes you feel good (improving your life) and helps someone else also feel good (improving the community's life). But first, you had to acquire something to give, presumably by working for a third party, and you had to do the giving through a charity (unless you threw it through the recipient's window at night, like St Nicholas), thereby interacting with a fourth party, who then interacted with the recipient, who then used the money - if it was money you donated - to interact with some fifth party.
Lots of transactions going on!
Youre separating raw vitality from the normative patterns of interaction that comprise what a living system actually does and is. I think this is an artificial separation , and makes living self-organization a secondary to a physicalistic notion of life.
Quoting Vera Mont
It does have a choice every moment. Thats what it means to be a normative system with aims and purposes. The constraints and affordance of an environment for oganisms and psychological systems are defined in relation to the specifically directed patterns of their functioning. When a choice is made between a good and bad option , it is not just the living system passively responding to what impinges on it from the world, or programmed into it, but the organism modifying its built niche according to aims which themselves are subtly refined in context of interaction with an outside. Conditioning is bi-directional, from world to living system and from living system to world.
The meaning of a living system isnt pre-given like a manufactured tool, it is continually re-established in subtly new ways through actual interaction with a world.
Think of it vice versa.
Why is value important? Because it serves our purposes.
Why is purpose important? Because it's commands our values.
If you put it that way, that is the way it's put. (But it's still just living.)
Right. That is why I asked:
Quoting Fooloso4
and:
Quoting Fooloso4
When you say:
Quoting tim wood
and follow this with the example of 'always' then 'always' is being treated as a kind of thing with its own "whatness". It seems to me that you are reifying 'always' as if it plays a determinate role in what is being done.
But what is at issue here is 'purpose'. Your initial question:
Quoting tim wood
"Purpose in itself" treats it as if it is some thing that exists on its own apart from those things that have purposes.
Oh yes, but I think all those other "aspects of yourself" are derivatives from what you asked about in the OP: "purpose (in itself)" and not just mere "instrumental" (i.e. utilitarian/aspirational) purposes.
Thomas Schelling gives the example of two drivers playing chicken, and one of them pulls his steering wheel off and holds it up so the other driver can see it.
You seem to be talking about something near here, something that in some ways looks like a choice, but a choice that's no longer in play, one you can't go back on. (Maybe in some cases that's only relative, or temporary.) Such a commitment, that's beyond our reach to go back on it, is what you're reaching for with "purpose". Is that close?
If that's the right analysis, that might explain why people are inclined to say that purpose comes from outside (from God, Nature, Aristotle, Darwin, whatever): either way you experience it as not up to you.
But it does raise a question: what is this capacity to remove the steering wheel? How is this kind of commitment different from other choices we make and why do we do it? To what end?
I think maybe, to prove our resolution - to the authority (human or divine), to our fellow acolytes, and to ourselves. An absolute commitment is unconditional; if you want to be sure and to demonstrate that you won't renege, you have to make sure that you can't renege. Once the steering wheel is off, all further decisions are out of you hands; no longer your responsibility.
There's social contact stuff that comes readily to mind. Schelling's credible deterrent scenario is a surprise application of that. -- That was meant more as a "structural" analogy, because while the social value of predictability on your part is obvious, what good is it to you?
It's the sort of temporary move you make all the time, just to be able to think: you hold some variables as fixed, just for the moment, so you can see what the others do. But why fix them forever? And how?
One of the talking heads in the Heidegger film, Being in the World, attributes to Kierkegaard the idea that we can't be the source of all the meaning in the world, because if we were we could also take it all away.
I think we're kind of in that territory. It's easy enough to see why you'd want someone else to believe you'll hold up your end, keep your promises, honor your contacts, and all that, but how do you convince yourself and why would you?
It looks like it has to be a slightly different mechanism, and in fact that's the point of Schelling's scenario: removing the wheel is a move which *changes* the game. The game is built on each side swearing they won't turn but the other side knowing they still might anyway, even if they honestly believe they won't.
For an individual, how do you make a commitment to yourself you can't back out of?
(I'm passing over a lot of interesting stuff.)
God has to be real, because that is stipulated in the conception of "God", as an essential aspect of "God". If God was not real, then the conception would be contradictory, and there would be no God to talk about, just self-contradictory nonsense. So, if we are talking about God here, we are by definition talking about something real. You can dismiss talk about God as self-contradictory nonsense if you like, but please don't ask me if God is real, because it just indicates that you are totally ignorant.
As for your other question, I have no knowledge as to whether God is constrained or not. Some say that God is not constrained in any way, but I think that's just conjecture.
Take a look at this problem tim. I said to you that the purpose of an animal's heart is to circulate blood, and you said that's not the sense of "purpose" I am talking about. Now you clarify the sense of "purpose you are talking about, with the following.
Quoting tim wood
How is this a different sense of "purpose" from when I said the purpose of the heart is to circulate blood? To circulate blood is "a thing to be done", by the heart, it is "the reason" for the heart. If the heart's effort is successful, it achieves its purpose. It's the very same sense of "purpose".
I didn't understand most of that, especially the part about a game.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Jumping off a tall building would do it.
For lesser commitments, you don't; there is always the possibility of failing, chickening out or changing your mind.
Yes, exactly. The idea is to constrain your own agency, even to the point of extinguishing it, if necessary.
It's a point of interest that we often find this sort of irrevocable commitment praiseworthy. I suppose the idea is that it takes a supreme act of agency to so constrain your future agency -- and then whatever praise later acts would normally get, if undertaken freely, is instead heaped upon the original act.
When it's all praiseworthy, anyway. But it's up to us whether to call such stubbornness "principle" or "prejudice". (From the Latin, judging ahead of time.) And that determines how we take this:
Quoting Vera Mont
We certainly talk that way when we're in the mood to judge the behavior of others, but we know perfectly well it's not that simple. You don't really make choices about your blind spots, for instance. Exactly how to hold people accountable for prejudices they grew up with, and may only dimly be aware of, is rather hotly debated these days. Less so, though analagous, whether anyone should get credit for having been raised to have sterling or at least unobjectionable character.
We know more too. We know that it can be terribly difficult actually to put into effect a choice we've made. We may firmly believe that some course of action would be "the right thing to do" and still not do it. Why? Who knows.
Anyhow, it's a known fact. So what appears to be principle or prejudice may be neither, but merely an inability to act otherwise, whether accompanied by an ability to think or choose otherwise or not.
And all of this suggests, I think, that choice is just the wrong model here, or less helpful than it might seem; if there is a way of making a choice you can't unchoose, it's whatever enables that, that's really doing the work. Hence people reach for lots of things that aren't up to you: God, human nature, your individual nature, whatever.
Bonus: some dialogue from an episode of Firefly I'm so fond of I may have posted it on here before.
[hide="Spoiler"]
It's from The Train Job. Mal and the crew of Serenity have been hired to steal what turns out to be a shipment of medicine for a town of miners with what amounts to black lung. Once they know, they decide to stealthily return it but are caught by the sheriff:
Sheriff: You were truthful back there, when you said jobs were hard to come by. A man gets a job, any job, he might not look too close at it. But when he finds out more about a situation like ours, well, then he's got a choice.
Mal: I don't believe he does.
So there you go.[/hide]
Yes, I think that's closer. I was thinking similarly of a sort of comportment, a style, a way of doing things.
The usual model boils everything down to decisions and preferences, but those are always open to change. Something no longer in play, if it ever was, isn't much like one of those, but more like a sort of framework for them. It's given. It will shape all the changeable stuff, channel it in a particular direction.
But that's just a model. The question is whether we're really like that, and if so, why?
There's Hume's line in the Treatise about the "belief" in (that is to say, unwavering commitment to) object permanence: he says there are things Nature has deemed too important to leave up to our fallible reason.
What we're talking about looks something like that. (Not the sort of thing Nature left to the rational-agent, decisions & preferences model.) If it does develop over time, over the course of a life, it does so by a process we play little conscious role in. It's practically something that happens to us, like aging itself, not much like something we do. You wake up one day and realize you have a principles (or prejudices), or feel you have a purpose, whatever. Not your doing, exactly, though somehow for that very reason close to the core of your identity -- because it wasn't up to you, anymore than your identity in any other sense is.
Maybe not, but if it's not of supreme importance, we leave wiggle-room for them.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I don't think it is. We may have a theoretical grasp of the situation, but I, personally, can't understand it well enough to judge.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
When it comes to absolute commitment, dimly understood childhood conditioning is not a major factor. This kind of all-or-nothing decision is made consciously, with a head full of passionately held ideals.
I'm not particularly interested in praising or blaming, except when it's about causing harm to others.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Lots of reasons. It's too difficult. It's too costly. It's frightening. We might fail and be humiliated.
Sometimes we opt for a compromise: do only some of it and then turn back; support the people who do it, while we stay in the background; do the next best thing; do three other good things to make up for bailing on that one....
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Okay. But are all commitments like that? Just habit or coercive circumstance?
Do we also consciously decide which ideals to hold, and how passionately?
Quoting Vera Mont
Ah, is this the issue for you? You're concerned that I'm downplaying if not denying the individual's agency, in favor of habit or circumstance?
Yeah, I expect I am. I don't think you choose who you are or what you believe. You at most become aware of who you are, what you are, what you believe.
Quoting Vera Mont
"Give me the child till the age of five-- " you know the rest.
I really can't imagine what you have in mind here. Almost everything that matters happens when you are a child.
Yes. Not all at once; over time, one observation, idea, judgment and commitment at a time.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I do. Aristotle apparently said Give me a child until he is 7 and I will show you the foundations of the man. Now that could mean he would observe how a child behaved between infancy and the age of seven to predict what kind of man that child would become. Or it could mean that in seven years, he could teach a child how to be the right kind of man.
Loyola perverted that to "give us a child till he's 7 and we'll have him for life", meaning that if they had control of very young children, they could program them to Jesuitism. (just boy-chidren, mind; neither of them knew a damn thing about girls).
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Then there's no point living past puberty, right?
I only meant, everything that matters for determining what sort of being you are. Your understanding of physics, geometry, numbers, your native language, social bonds and social cues -- etc etc etc.
The point isn't even that you're finished by the time you're seven. Your brain's not even done yet. But you're set on your way and given the wherewithal to develop into something complete. What that will be depends on what happens to you, and of course on the choices you make, but how you make those choices is guided by what happened in those first years.
Do you disagree? Are we born and remain autonomous free agents? Rationally, I suppose, choosing our values and so forth, decade after decade? -- I presume that's a caricature of your view, so what's the real view? We are formed
Quoting Vera Mont
certainly, but what's the nature of these? What's their origin? Do you freely choose what you notice? Do you choose what ideas occur to you? If you are moved by something you observe, something that changes your worldview or your values, did you choose to be so moved?
Why do you conclude this? Do you have absolute control over anything you created? Why do you think that God would have absolute control over the universe He created? It seems to me, that "creations", whether they are by human beings, some other creatures, or even God, are just not like that.
Quoting tim wood
Why? What makes you think that God must be absolutely unconstrained? I think that if you took the time to read some theology, you would see that even if it is often said that God is "all mighty", and sometimes said that He is "omnipotent" these conceptions are qualified, and it is not very often meant that he is absolutely unconstrained. Consider for example that it is often said that God only does what is good, and he exercises complete self-control to only do good. Clearly this indicates a special sort of constraint, which we as human beings also share with God. However, since we do not really understand self-constraint, and therefore have not been able to perfect it, we tend to imagine it in a very strange paradoxical way. The complete and perfect self-constraint which God is often said to have, is portrayed as an absolute freedom to do anything. And this is paradoxical because even though there are many things God could do, He also cannot do them, because of His self-constraint.
Quoting tim wood
I was not handing you that argument as a "proof". I was only trying to make it clear to you that if you want to talk about "God", then you need to talk about "God" as He is understood. I find this to be a common problem with the atheist approaches to God. The atheist commonly approaches God with the presupposition, that God is an imaginary, fictitious thing, not real. But this is not how God is understood in theology. This prejudice which the atheist holds is completely contrary and contradictory to how God is actually understood, so it prevents the atheist from having any understanding of God. Aquinas, for example, asserted that God's essence is His existence. This implies that the very first principle one must accept before being able to understand anything about God, in any way, is that He has real existence. So if the atheist has any bit of intent whatsoever, to understand God, this prejudice must first be dismissed. Otherwise it's a waist of time.
Quoting tim wood
Your claim, "reality is the realm of nature" is fundamentally false. By saying "the realm of nature" you imply the possibility of other realms not contained within the realm of nature. And as a "realms" these must be real. So even the statement itself, as written, implies its own falsity. It's like saying "there is only one multiplicity". The statement is self-defeating.
Consider, that "the artificial" is often contrasted with "the natural". We cannot say that the artificial is not real. So many will class artificial as part of the natural. But by doing this we lose the meaning of "natural", which is defined as "not artificial". The intent of the person who redefines "natural" in this way, may be to include the artificial into the realm of the natural, to argue that only the natural is real, but what's the point? That statement is self-defeating as shown, and to class the artificial as natural, is to ignore the substantial difference between the two.
Quoting tim wood
This is why it is a very good thread which you have started. If you learn something new then the thread is good, right? The issue here, I think, is the presuppositions which we commonly take for granted. These are what are commonly known as bedrock or hinge propositions. Since they are taken for granted they are not subjected to our doubt. Since we do not doubt them or subject them to any form of methodological skepticism, then we do not develop an adequate understanding of their meaning. So the use of many words, such as "purpose", just floats freely, being a facilitator of mundane communication, a word whose meaning is taken for granted allowing for fluid conversation. Because of this, the word's meaning gets shaped to the circumstances of conversation, and what comes out on top is the most common usage. If someone asks what is the meaning of "purpose", we have all sorts of examples in common usage to refer to. But since its such a commonly used word, we can restrict the meaning we express, to these common examples, and having not applied a methodic analysis like the skeptic does, the true deeper meaning escapes us.
Quoting tim wood
This is a good start. Let's look at the difference between "purpose" and "function". At first glance, we can say that the two might commonly be interchangeable, "a thing's purpose is the thing's function". But invert that and say "a thing's function is the thing's purpose", and that's not necessarily the case. This implies, right off the bat, that "function" has an even broader meaning than "purpose". Not all functions are purposes.
Further, we can see that "function" is most often an activity, whereas "purpose" is more often the goal of the activity, the end, or objective. This opens an even bigger rift between the two. What is exposed here is that "purpose" is something we attribute to an activity, the property of an activity, which puts it into a specific relation with an end, a goal. This makes the activity a means to an end. "Function" in its common usage does not necessarily imply such a relation of means to an end, because the function may be the activity itself, regardless of the purpose of the activity. So we might say, of a thing, that the thing has a function, and this function is the activity of the thing, without even indicating the purpose of that activity, or whether it even has a purpose.
So for example, if I am involved in a cooperative effort, I have a function, which is to bring the others coffee. That can be referred to as my function, what I am doing, bringing the coffee, and this can be said without any reference to the purpose, why I am bringing the coffee. In the heart example, the function of the heart can be stated as "to beat". The beating is the function of the heart, and this may be stated with a complete disassociation from the purpose of the heart. The thing has a function, an activity, and this is completely irrelevant to whether there is a purpose, goal, or end to that activity.
You can see how this has become a very convenient way to separate "function" from "purpose" thereby ignoring the question of "purpose". This is the way language evolves according to social circumstances to avoid areas of doubt, and facilitate mundane communication. We can talk about all sorts of things, and the function of each thing, with complete disregard as to whether that function has a purpose or not. That helps us to avoid having to think about whether or not natural activities have a purpose, thus keeping us away from the volatile "God" question.
How does that give anyone a purpose?
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
No and no.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
The real view? At about age 2, children begin to assert their character (Their temperament is already evident at two months.) They test the limits of autonomy, dependency and external constraint. By 7, understand about truth and falsehood, justice and injustice; manipulation and control; power dynamics. Their personality is roughly formed and they know who they are (that's usually the age at which a child recognizes if they've been assigned the wrong gender) but they don't know very much about the world.
In the next 10 or so years, they learn about the environment, other people, their society and culture, their own status in that social environment and their aspirations. Somewhere between 15 and 20, they question the beliefs, assumptions and values of their elders, and set out their own philosophy. (This is why censors are so adamant to deny them access to literature that doesn't support the status quo.) Not all adolescents are articulate; they don't all write down their thoughts - many are and do. The less intellectually inclined act out their doubts and opposition. The opportunistic keep their assessment to themselves and watch for opportunities to take advantage of its weaknesses. The meek accept the prevailing system and go along. The most fragile egos escape into materialism, fantasy or chemical placebos.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
The 'nature' of moment-to-moment decisions? See problem, work out solution, make a plan, act on plan. See desired objective, work out path to desired object, make a plan, act on plan. Quoting Srap Tasmaner
The brain.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
You notice what affects you.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
You choose from the ideas that occur to you. (Must be a home invasion. Just a burglar. My teenage son sneaking in past curfew. The next door neighbor, drunk and come to the wrong door again. Shoot him! Just threaten to shoot him. Run away! Hide and watch. Wait till he comes up the stairs and push him off. Hit him with a vase.)
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
No, but you have a pretty good idea by age 20 what kind of something would move you and what kind would not.
Isn't the difference that one is consciously intended, and the other isn't? Isn't there a valid distinction to be drawn between conscious purpose and the autonomic system? One does not have conscious control over how fast your hair grows or your peristalsis.
Anyway, here's the 'meta-philosophical' point. That as our culture is individualist, we tend to conceive of purpose and intentionality in terms of something an agent does. Purposes are enacted by agents. This is why, if the idea of purpose as being something inherent in nature is posited, it tends to be seen in terms of God or gods, which is then associated with an outmoded religious or animistic way of thought. I think something like that is at the nub of many of the arguments about evolution, design and intentionality, and the arguments over whether the Universe is or is not animated by purpose.
This Forbes Magazine article just came up, on Dennis Nobles quest to have purpose admitted back into biology
Evolution May Be Purposeful And Its Freaking Scientists Out (wasnt paywalled for me).
I would say that this is acceptable as a proposal worth reviewing; i.e., the proposition that there is a valid distinction between conscious intention and an "automatic system" of a living creature. However, I would also argue that upon analysis such a theoretical distinction cannot be upheld in practise. This is because the supposed separate activities of the nonconscious (automatic), and the conscious, are constantly interacting as is well known to psychologists.
The brain creates patterns of activities which we might associate with 'habits', and even though they may originally be produced through conscious intention, these patterns, in the process of habitualization, become automatic. So there is a very close relationship between the supposed conscious and non-conscious, which makes it impossible to actually separate the intention of one from the intention of the other (intention acting in a hierarchical way as described in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics). There are all sorts of examples to support this.
From the side of conscious intention leading the way, consider that you decide on an activity like walking. Once the decision is made, and the act initiated, the habit (automatically) kicks in, and your legs start working in the way that you've learned. From the side of the nonconscious leading the way, consider dreaming as nonconscious. Then look at the way that sensations, sounds heard for example, may enter into the dream. Are you familiar with lucid dreaming?
Now, the issue is that since intention is hierarchical, if we propose a distinction between conscious and nonconscious intention, which one actually leads the way? The conscious mind thinking about this problem might be inclined to assign ultimate authority to itself, and this I believe is the perspective of libertarian free will. A scientist though, is inclined to observe from the outside in, seeing causation in the determinist way, making nonconscious automation the highest principle. It's a conundrum now. Therefore, I conclude that this proposal, to make a distinction between conscious and nonconscious intention is misleading, creating an unresolvable conundrum, and in reality the supposed two must be reduced to one general intention, as the guiding principle. The nonconscious is actually, in reality, prior, higher, and this may be revealed in mystical experiences.
Quoting Wayfarer
This is exactly the problem. Our society has revolted against religion, attempting to remove any principles seated in religion from its codes. This has disassociated the intention (purpose) of conscious action from the intention (purpose) inherent within other living creatures. We cannot associate "intention" with other living beings, because that intention would be sourced from God. So the modern trend is to associate "intention" with the moral responsibility of conscious agents only. This I believe is actually quite modern because standard definitions of "intention" refer only to purpose, but the idea that "intention" is associated only with conscious acts is very pervasive in common usage.
The result is that now we have created a separation between the intentional acts of conscious agents, and the "purposeful" acts of other living creatures. But in truth, to understand biology and all the various activities of the multitude of living beings, along with the process of evolution, we need that continuity, between the purposeful acts of other living creatures, and the intentional acts of human agents. In reality, the intentional acts of human agents are just an extension, another specific incidence, of a purposeful act of a living creature.
When I skim-read some of the answers here, I wonder why there is such a strict divide between biological (alive) and inanimate. If we look at our bodies, the well-known expression "We are all stardust" isn't an euphemism, it is reality. Our bodies and our minds are made of the matter in the universe, and the only change is the complexity of the structures that 'life' "creates".
Isn't it therefore reasonable to say that what our minds do are exploring, understanding and parsing the inherent 'purpose' and 'meaning' in our bodies and from the world around us? Like small, hard to read text-files that we make a bigger and more complex story about?
I am curious what counter-arguments there are to this, and why people here create this divide between life and non-life, when so much of what we are is non-life - and so our thoughts, feelings, purpose, drive - isn't it more reasonable to say it is Atoms and matter having a living experience, and we are simply translators and archeologists?
The first thing we find out is that the best way for us is not identical with the best way for me.
I agree, when it comes to considering the details. There would seem to be general principles as to what is most conducive to human flourishing and rational self-government, but since we are not only beings of a certain kind but are also each unique individuals, knowing what is best for me must also come from direct self-knowledge and insight as well as grasping general principles and practices.
Quoting Janus
But doesn't it reduce it to a matter of opinion? The assumption of Greek philosophy, generally, was that reason, logos, animated the universe but was also the animating principle of the individual soul/psyche. Not that there's anything wrong with what you're saying - it's not meant as a personal criticism, but insofar as this is typically how us moderns view the world, in terms of our individual search for meaning.
I saw an account recently of the meaning of a teleological explanation: it is an explanation in terms of what something is for, rather than what conditions caused it. It doesn't sound like much, but really a lot hinges on that distinction.
For instance in Aristotle's fourfold causation, the final cause of a particular thing is its end goal or purpose. A mundane example is that the final cause of a match is fire, as the lighting of fires is the purpose of a match. But notice that in this case, the final cause comes after the striking of the match, being the reason for the existence of the match.
The efficient and material causes are the composition of the matchhead and the act of striking it. That is very much how science since the scientific revolution has tended to view causality: what causes something to happen, in terms of the antecedent combination of causes giving rise to an effect. Cause in the Aristotelian sense has largely been dropped. That's where a lot of the controversy about the so-called meaninglessness of the scientific worldview originates. It's also what is addressed in the Forbes Magazine article I linked above - and it's a bitter controversy, indeed, with a lot of heavyweights slugging it out. So trivial, it isn't.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agree. (I think this opens out into a discussion of Terrence Deacon's book Incomplete Nature, where he develops the idea of 'ententional processes' in nature although I've only read the first half of it.)
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
But it's a difference that makes a significant difference. Look at the following nonsensensical words:
They're all "just letters", right? What distinguishes that paragraph from the rest of the text on this page is that, absent the organisation imposed by language-using agents, it conveys no meaning.
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
But there's nothing in the theory of 'atoms and matter' which account for the nature of experience. That is the subject of the well-known David Chalmer's paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, a perennial topic on this forum, and which spawned an entire academic industry of 'consciousness studies'.
So, you think it would be better if everyone thought the same and all find the same meaning in, and purpose for, life? I don't see it that wayit's like aesthetics where I think there are real qualities, and real differences of quality, but as with altered states of consciousness, the truth as to which works are the best is impossible to determine definitively.
The kind of knowing involved in the arts, just as with self-cultivation, is participatory, not propositional. And what really matters is that you find purpose and, meaning in your own life. This is not to say that there are not general principlesso it is still wrong, and not merely " a matter of opinion" if someone finds their purpose in being a serial killer, pedophile or rapist.
Humans design things for particular purposes and even some animals can do that, I don't see how it follows that leaves were designed for the purpose of photosynthesis, stomachs for digestion, teeth for processing food or killing prey, claws for digging or killing and so on
Yes I have been long familiar with Aristotle's four types of causes. Final causes are certainly relevant to human life because things are designed with particular purposes in mind. I don't see any reason to think that is the case with nature, although the question is one of those imponderables which cannot be definitively answered. The idea would only make sense in a theistic contextif you were one of those who believe in a God who has a plan then of course final cause would make sese in the context of that belief or assumption.
I see no place for formal or final cause in the context of science. Material cause just means the set of conditions and constraints that operate globally as distinct from efficient or proximal causes which consist in local actions generally thought to involve energetic interactions.
Why should we project thinking in terms of formal and final causes beyond the human context? I'm not impressed by academic "heavy weights" but prefer to assess what they say on its own merits. I'm not impressed by arguments from authority, no matter who the purported authority might be.
That said I don't weigh in subjects I am not at least competent in, but when it comes to metaphysics there are no real experts. I agree with Wittgenstein that philosophy is not a matter of theory, but of practice, not of explanation but of description and conceptual clarityI say leave the theories to the scientists, since so-called theories which cannot be tested don't really qualify as theories at all in my book.
Not for a minute.
Quoting Janus
The nature of purpose is the question posed in the original post. I feel that article I linked at least addresses it. The Aristotelian dimension places it in historical context.
I'd prefer if you would speak for yourself rather than asking me to read linked articles. Otherwise, I'll be left guessing as to what your own thoughts are, and I really don't have the time for that.
I did compose a lengthy response. I pinned the Forbes article because of its particular focus on the subject of the OP, and also to indicate that the question is a live issue and subject of debate, especially in biology.
Quoting Janus
In fact, the question of purpose, whether it is real or whether it is just imputed, seems to me a philosophical question par excellence. The fact that its *not* a scientific question, and why its not, is also a very interesting question.
The reality of human and animal purpose is not in question. The question as to whether nature itself exists to fulfill an overarching purpose ("overarching" because such a purpose would necessarily be beyond nature itself) seems to be an impossible question to frame coherently outside the context of the assumption of theism.
Apart from the idea that there could be a designer who created nature for a purpose, what other possibility is there for an overall purpose for nature as a whole? If you are able to frame the question in another way, I would be happy to consider it.
Science doesn't deal in anything which is either unobservable or has no observable effects, so I don't find it surprising that it is not a scientific question. If it cannot be coherently formulated as a question (outside the presumption of theism) then I can't see how it is a philosophical question either.
The other question I would ask is how such an unanswerable (if not coherently unaskable) question could have any bearing on the philosophical issues around the human situation and human potential.
Quoting Wayfarer
Now you seem to be contradicting yourself: saying that the question of purpose is "a live issue and subject of debate, especially in biology" while also saying it is not a scientific question.
Thats the question I was exploring above:
Quoting Wayfarer
As for the purpose of nature as a whole, I think that indeed frames the question in such a way that we could never discern an answer. We dont know the whole, but only participate in and enact our roles and purposes within that larger context. But as Victor Frankl observed, those with the conviction that there is meaning and purpose in life generally do better than those without it. Call it faith, if you will, but I resist the facile claim that this amounts to belief without evidence.
Quoting Janus
But this is why the question has assumed urgency in biology, in particular, as all living organisms obviously act purposefully. Of course, in physics, there is no question of purpose - its all action and reaction, describable according to mathematical laws. As that became a paradigm for knowledge generally, namely physicalism, then it was simply assumed that life itself was also purposeless, as physicalism assumes that physics is the master paradigm, of which organisms are but one instantiation. But this is just what is being challenged in this debate over whether and how organisms and evolutionary processes are purposeful.
Quoting Janus
But this is exactly an instance of the kind of positivism that I keep saying you seem to advocate. Remember the exchange yesterday, about Wittgensteins complaint that modern culture seems to say that something either has a scientific solution, or no solution at all? Isnt this what youre implying? That if science cant adjudicate the question, then there cant be an answer to it?
To me this is certainly the zone where the question comes from: that life is always toppling forwards, and being curious reason-seeking animals, humans ask for purposes. I too am a Collingwood man: the answers form an empty set. But the presuppositions that people bring to the question are interesting. Using the word 'mind' for instance is amazingly frequent, even among materialists.
If we want to understand our own existence, it is necessary. The trend, when Darwinist evolutionists separated themselves from Lamarckian evolutionists, and ridiculed Lamarck, was to ignore the purposefulness of living actions as a cause of evolutionary change, accepting instead "chance" as a proper cause of variation in living beings. However, these biological assumptions create the rift of understanding between conscious intentional actions of human agents, and purposeful actions of other living creatures.
Now, intentional activity is relegated to the social sciences, and there is a separation between these social sciences and the proper science of biology. The rift has been created by the way that empirical evidence is valued and assessed, which dates back to Darwinism. "Purpose" is effectively excluded from science proper, as unobservable. However, it is a necessary subject of social science. This creates the separation between "purpose" in the actions of human agents, and "purpose" in the actions of other living creatures, which I referred to in my last post. We place human beings on a pedestal, being "agents of intent", subject to law and social conventions, separating them from other creatures, and in doing this we provide no principles to show how conscious intention along with laws and social conventions, are just an evolutionary progression from, (an extension of), the purposeful acts of other living beings.
This is more of a psychological thesis than a philosophical treatment of the idea of purpose. Biologists may speak in terms of purpose in evolution, but they generally acknowledge this is a kind of metaphor. The 'literal' question is as to whether evolution is directed and driven by an end goal or goals. If it would have this kind of purpose then the question becomes 'Whose purpose?" and of course the only intelligible answer would seem to be 'God's".
You say purpose and intentionality are conceived in terms of something an agent does. What is an alternative way of framing it? That's the question you haven't addressed. The arguments over whether or not the Universe is animated by purpose, just are the arguments over whether or not a God exists. What else could they be?
Quoting Wayfarer
But the question just is about the purpose of nature as a whole. No one denies that humans and other animals have their purposes. And Frankl is indeed correct that those who find purpose in their lives do better than those who don't, but that says nothing about the existence or non-existence of purpose in nature as a whole. Some people need to believe in an overarching purpose in order to find purpose in their own lives, and others don't. Humans are diverse. I would say the most general purpose for humans would be to actualize, to realize, one's potential. Not everyone requires a "greater authority" in order to be concerned with the question of their own potential. Of course some do, and it is those who trun to religion. You agreed before that everyone does not need to think the same way.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes,organisms act purposefullyI haven't denied that. It isn't assumed on account of physics that life is purposeless (in the overarching sense)it is only in the life sciences that purposeful behavior is observed. It follows that there is no evidence of purpose outside the context of life, and there it is only the purposes of individuals and collectives of individuals (animal and human communities) which are manifest. I don't think your psychological explanation holds water. There is no debate within evolutionary biology about whether evolution is purposefulsuch a question is outside the scope of science as it is a theological question.
Quoting Wayfarer
When you find you cannot counter what I say with rational argument you resort to framing me as one of your favorite bogeymenas a positivist. How many times do I have to remind you that I don't think science is capable of answering anywhere near all the questions that are inherent in the human condition? Those questions have to be grappled with and answered, in their different ways, by individuals.
The point is that there can be no one general definitive answer to such questions, and that whatever "answers" are found cannot be rigorously tested as scientific answers can ("answers" in inverted commas because the experiences in which the sense of encountering them are generally ineffable). The one general truth that comes out of creative and spiritual pursuits is that people are capable of transformative altered states of consciousness. This is amply and perhaps most vividly demonstrated by the use and study of psychedelics, but I think meditative practices, mystical experiences and the arts also show this human potential for experiential transformation.
Quoting tim wood
Teleology is a way of studying things which looks at things in relation to purpose, reason for being. Accordingly, the telos of a thing can never be intrinsic to the thing, as purpose is defined by the thing's relation to something else, for example its function in a larger whole.
Quoting tim wood
I don't think we are in agreement. You've left out the teleological aspect. Why did this group go north, and that group go south? See, you say that going north, or going south, caused these groups to develop "characteristics favorable" to those areas, but you neglect the fact that they choose to go in those directions, so they already had characteristics which made them favour those areas, prior to going.
That's correct: teleological explanations explain phenomena in terms of their purpose, rather than in terms of their antecedent causes. It seems a minor difference but a lot hinges on it.
Quoting Janus
But this illustrates the very point I was making. The way we have to see it is that it must be either psychological - in the mind - or then it's theistic - as the agency of God. I'm attempting to deconstruct the worldview which makes it seem that these are the only choices. I think (and MU agrees in the above) that 'intentionality' is manifest at every level of organic life, and that it is purposeful.
The Forbes article:
The article goes on:
The Third Way site is here - I've been aware of it for a while, I read it from time to time. It's not aligned with any form of ID, but it's also sceptical of mainstream neo-darwinism. (I'm particularly drawn to the essays of Steve Talbott, which I encountered on The New Atlantis website.)
The historical background to the rejection of teleological explanations is tied to the advent of Galileo's physics which eliminated Aristotelian physics. But the idea of purpose and its absence is another matter.
Notice that the 'Third Way' approach mentioned above is not an attempt to re-introduce an 'intelligent designer' or presiding intelligence. It's strangely similar to one ancient form of the Logos, namely, the Logos Spermatikos, similar to that described in the Catholic (New Advent) Encylopedia:
which I find a compelling metaphor (although I hasten to add, nothing like that is proposed on the Third Way site that I'm aware of.)
Of course going north was causal. It caused them to be in those conditions. The conditions you describe as required to be "either adopted or died". You appear to be refusing to acknowledge that animals choose which direction they go, and their is purpose behind their travels. Since animals are in general, free to wonder, there must be a reason why they would choose to put themselves in an 'adapt or die' situation. This reason for them doing this is causal, though you deny it.
Quoting Wayfarer
I think that this is a misrepresentation. Teleology looks at purpose as causal. This is final cause. To portray a dichotomy between teleology and causality is to fall into the determinist trap of scientism, in which final cause, intention, free will etc., is excluded from the category of "causal". This restricts "cause" to efficient cause, making the world deterministic.
.
First, what exactly do you mean by saying that intentionality is active at every level of organic life? Second, even if intentionality were "active at every level of organic life" in the way you mean it (presuming that you actually have a good grasp on what you mean by that), how could you test in a way that could demonstrate that? And even if you could demonstrate it, what significance could it have to how we should live our lives?
I am not going to deny that intentionality is "active at every level of life", because I don't really even know what that could mean. I think I understand to some degree human and even some higher animal intentionality, and I can see how that understanding might help my own living self-cultivation, but I can't see how a belief like, for example, the intentionality of cells could be of any relevance to that cultivation, because I find no familiarity in the idea.
And the final point I want to make is that even if we could know and show that there is an intentionality that we could understand as such at every level of life what could that demonstrate or prove about anything transcendent (which I think is where you are wanting to go with this. perhaps in order to justify some of your cherished personal beliefs)?
Perhaps there was a good reason that Gotama refused to answer metaphysical questions; not just because he thought that such preoccupations would distract people from practice, but perhaps also because he realized that such question are inherently unanswerable. Surely if he could have given empirically demonstrable or somehow self-evident once heard, and hence convincing, propositional answers to such questions, then that would have settled the matter in his disciples' minds and then they could have got on with the important thing: practice, no longer distracted by the perplexity that being obsessed with such questions would create.
How is it not clear? That every organism acts intentionally (although not with the conscious self-awareness that characterises higher organisms.) And it re-introduces intentionality at a fundamental level, in contrast to the physicalist model, which posits that organic life is understandable in terms of the same laws which govern physical and chemical reactions. If there's anything 'transcendent' about it, it is simply that.
How to demonstrate that - it's more like a philosophical framework or metaphorical model, a way of thinking about life. We're all looking at the same data, but some frameworks or metaphors might be more consonant with the observations than others. The physicalist/materialist model is mechanistic, whereas this line of thinking recognises a basic distinction between the organic and the mechanistic.
Quoting Janus
But this question was probably never even considered by the Buddha. This is a question about science and scientific models. It is being actively explored by many scientists - the Third Way Evolution site has an index of scientists that are exploring these ideas.
I think the underlying philosophical rift is between the materialism pushed by the so-called 'ultra-darwinists', which sees everything as being explicable in terms of physical laws, and an emerging holistic model of life and mind. It's part of the overall decline of materialism as a model, which is occuring in many areas of science.
Is such a shift in models itself a scientific matter? Are the conflicts about the interpretations of physics scientific questions? I would say not - they're all concerned with questions of meaning and interpretation, and that definitely overflows the bounds of scientific observation. Philosophy of science (Kuhn et al) have been documenting that since the 1960's. Is that 'metaphysics'? In a way it is, but that doesn't mean it shouldn't be considered.
It's not clear because you won't proffer a clear definition of intentionality which is different than acting "with the conscious self-awareness that characterizes higher organisms". Yes, "lower" organisms obviously respond to their environments, but I don't see how that equates to intentional behavior.
Just address that question or we will be unable to proceed.
Other than nothing you've written above addresses any of the questions i posed to you, so I find nothing else there to respond to.
Organisms not only react to stimuli but often do so in ways that are adaptive and goal-directed, suggesting a form of intentionality. This is seen in behaviors that enhance survival and reproduction, such as finding food, avoiding predators, and seeking mates. These behaviors imply a level of agency and purposiveness that goes beyond the deterministic nature of physical laws.
Furthermore, the internal regulatory mechanisms of organisms, such as homeostasis, also exhibit intentional-like behavior. These systems maintain stability through feedback loops, dynamically adjusting to changes in the environment to sustain life. This regulatory process involves a form of self-organization and information processing that seems distinct from non-living physical processes.
Such adaptive, purposive behavior cannot be entirely reduced to physical interactions because it involves a level of complexity and coordination that physical laws alone do not account for. That suggests that the principles governing biological systems include emergent properties and processes that arise from, but are not reducible to, their physical and chemical constituents.
Those are the kinds of considerations that are behind Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature', although they're also addressed in diverse ways by the theorists listed on the Third Way website.
That which produces an effect, where "effect" is the result or consequence of a cause. In other words, when something occurs as the result of, or consequence of another thing, that other thing is the cause.
Quoting tim wood
I don't understand the distinction you\re trying to make. If a thing has a purpose then obviously that thing is purposeful. A screw in a machine, was put there for a purpose. It has a purpose, therefore it very clearly is purposeful, "purposeful" meaning "having purpose". And this is not "animism".
Quoting tim wood
"Function" is the activity by which a thing fulfils its purpose. We can say that "function" is the means to the end, and "purpose" is the end. Both are subjects of teleology.
Quoting tim wood
Put it this way, "what-it-is-for" is its purpose. How-it-does-it is its function. Can you see how the purpose is the end, and the function is the means to the end? The goal, or end, (the purpose), is the object, or desired state, while the means (function) is the activity which is supposed to bring about the realization of that object,
Quoting tim wood
I didn't speak of "telos", I provided a definition of "teleology".
Quoting tim wood
I think the nature of efficient cause is irrelevant at this point, and a different subject altogether, so I'll leave this question.
Quoting Wayfarer
And, I might add, when it comes to the difficult question of what is at the bottom, the foundational cause, "physical laws" always fails in explanatory capacity. So, they end up falling back on chance, with concepts like random mutations, abiogenesis, symmetry-breaking, etc..
You're talking about "higher" organisms, and I've already agreed that some of those display purposive behavior. It seems to me you are stretching the meaning of intentional.
It seems you're the one playing word games, attempting to put an unnecessary restriction on the use of "purpose". Do you agree that "purpose" means "thing intended"? And do you not understand that there is something intended for the screw in relation to the machine that it is a part of? Therefore the screw has a purpose, and is purposeful.
If you are talking about some sort of inherent purpose, which would be intrinsic to the screw, I've already told you that purpose does not exist in that way. It exists in the thing's relation to something else. In this case, the screw has purpose in relation to the machine. Be careful in understanding this relation, because it is not invertible. Purpose exists in the relation of a part to a whole, and not in the relation of the whole to the part. We cannot say that the machine has purpose in relation to the screw.
Quoting tim wood
You're very wrong here. The part of the whole, which is named "the screw", has a very particular purpose assigned to it, and only it. Therefore the purpose is attributable to that part, and it alone. It does not matter that the manufacturer chose one particular screw from millions of similar possible choices, the purpose is assigned to that particular one, through the actions which followed from that choice.
You can call this "language of convenience" if you want. But since it is the only way that we have to talk about the intention which is responsible, as cause, for that particular screw's position in the world, it is a way of speaking truth about the object's context within a larger environment. The screw was put there as part of an intentional act, and the purpose is in the part's relation to the whole, not the whole's relation to the part, therefore we attribute "purpose" to the part.
Quoting tim wood
It's very clear to me, that the screw, as a part, has purpose, in relation to the machine, as the whole. If you insist on denying the truth and reality of this predication "the screw has purpose", then how would you propose that we could proceed toward understanding the intention behind the relationship between the parts and the whole?
I have a question or two about this. By "reducible to" do you mean 'explainable in terms of' or 'has its origin in'? Do you count global or environmental conditions as physical interactions? Do you claim there is "something more" metaphysically speaking than the physical world with its global and local conditions and interactions? If you do want to claim that, then what could that "something more" be in your opinion?
As Plato demonstrated in the Theaetetus, some words are best left undefined until after the appropriate meaning is worked out through the dialectical process. So I'll leave these definitions for now, and hope that we can work out the meaning of these through discourse.
Quoting tim wood
I agree that the random screw, in that description, has no purpose, that's what the predication "random" implies. As I said, purpose is a feature of a things relation to something else, and "random" implies without any order in those relations. In the example of the screw and the machine, it is the relation of part to whole which gives the screw purpose. In many cases it is in the relation of the means to the end which gives purpose. The end gives purpose to the means, but the end is not necessarily a "whole". We call the end an "object" as a goal, that is not exactly the same as a whole.
I do not understand the relation between choice and purpose which you are outlining. "A thing", whether it is an act which is the means to an end, or a physical object like the screw, is given purpose by an intentional agent, but this does not mean that the act itself (the means), or the thing itself (the screw) has choice. Choice, and the agent who chooses are independent from the purpose. That is why choice is "free" in the sense of freely willed. Purpose follows from the freely willed choice, it is not prior to it.
Quoting tim wood
I cannot follow this dialectic. I don't see the relation between intention and being which you start with. Nor do I see the relation to freedom. And the rest seems right out of place.
Can we agree that "intention" is the cause of purpose? Wherever we find purpose we can conclude that there is intention as the cause of that purpose.
We know that human beings have intention, and their acts are known to have purpose. So every time we observe a human act which appears to be purposeful, we conclude that there is intention behind the act, as the cause of the purposeful act. The intent is not necessarily evident to us. Do you agree, that anytime we distinguish purpose, there must be intent behind the thing we observe as having purpose, like the screw in the machine? And do you agree that the intent is not necessarily the intent of a human being, there could be other sources of intent? Therefore we cannot associate intent with "being" as you propose. We do not have the evidence required to limit "intent" in that way.
Quoting tim wood
Freedom/choice have a special relationship with intention, I agree. But I think we need to make one more step of separation now, to include the agent itself. The agent (not necessarily a being, as explained above) has freedom/choice, and the agent also has intention, but these two (freedom of choice, and intention) are distinct. They must be distinct because intention is toward a particular end, will freedom of choice is directed toward no particular end. So the agent has both, freedom to choose an end, and also already chosen ends, as intentions.
Quoting tim wood
So, I suggest you try looking at things this way, tim. Let's consider an individual human being as an agent. This type off being has many wants, needs, and desires. It also has freedom of choice. As a manifestation of these two distinct features, desires, and freedom of choice, the being develops intentions, which are particular goals or objectives. Intentions are derived from a combination of desires and of freedom of choice. But the being is hindered by things which are impossible.
Let's start with the human being as a baby. The baby wants all sorts of things, and some, like walking and talking are immediately impossible, but the baby, through intention and will power can learn and earn the capacity to talk and walk. Other things, like flying, are recognized as more absolutely impossible, due to physical constraints. So the freedom of the human individual is restricted by physical constraints, though some may be overcome. However, there is also social constraints like laws, which restrict one's freedom in a different way.
Consider that the human person grows to respect these different constraints as different forms of impossibility. Now the adolescent is free from many social constraints, in many ways, not being constrained by many responsibilities that adults get into, like a chosen career, a mortgage, credit card debt, a family to support, etc.. So the adolescent has much freedom to chose, and formulate intentions in a wide variety of ways. The intentions, goals and objectives are the property of the individual, and the individual's actions have purpose relative to those intentions. This is principle #1, what the individual does, has purpose relative to the individual's intentions, and the individual has freedom to choose one's intentions (being influenced by various desires, wants, and needs, as well as impossibilities).
Principle #2 is that the individual has a desire or need for relations with others. This puts the person into the context of a part of a larger "whole". The larger whole being a family, a team, a business, company, or society in general. As a part of a larger whole, the person has purpose in that relation. Now, not only does the person's actions have purpose in relation to that person, but also the person has purpose in relation to this larger entity.
The person is intermediary now. One's actions have purpose in relation to the person, and the person has purpose in relation to the larger organization. When we say that human beings are "rational animals" it is implied that the person will prioritize the purpose one has in relation to the larger entity over the lower purpose one gives to one's actions through one's own intentions.
But this presents a significant problem. Strictly speaking, the person's actions have purpose relative to the person's intentions, and that's how we understand purpose, as relative to intention. So when we understand that the person has purpose relative to a larger organization, it is more proper to understand the purpose in relation to the intention of the larger organization. But how do we understand this intention? An entity such as a family, a team, a company or business, or society in general, is not the type of thing (a being for example) which we would think of as having intention. Because of this, the way that a person gets purpose from a higher organization is very perplexing.
Physical reductionism is generally taken to mean explainable in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry. It is the kind of attitude which says that living organisms are nothing but colllections of atoms or nothing but the vehicles by which genes propagate. In practical terms, the desired reduction base is something that can, at least in theory, be explained and predicted in those terms.
Global and environmental conditions were not, in times past, considered to be physical interactions, or considered as part of the reduction base. That is what might be called a holistic approach which is the opposite to reductionism.
The law of physics are context-free. They dont need to take into account environmental factors but rather describe the behaviour of ideal objects under specified conditions. This is what makes them universal - the behaviour of a body with specific physical attributes will predictably act in accordance with physical laws under said conditions - like, the apple will fall at a given rate, provided nobody catches it, or the wind doesnt blow and alter its path, or it isnt in zero-gravity environments.
The something more that biology has to consider is precisely the environment and the constant interaction of organisms with each other and their environment. That is where physicalist reductionism has been found wanting, and why biosemiotics and systems science have gained traction in biology: living beings are far more language-like than machine like, right down to the most fundamental levels of cellular biology.
Accordingly, I think its a mistake to try and conceive of the something more - the aspects of organisms that cant be reduced to the chemical and physical - as any kind of something. That leads to the misconception of an elan vital or spooky ethereal substance - in other words its a reification. As you know, Ive often commented that I think one of the consequences of Cartesian dualism is exactly that kind of reification, by treating mind as a thinking thing, more or less on a similar plane to physical things, but of a different kind.
Whereas the dynamic systems theory approach of e.g. Terrence Deacon and Alice Juarrrero and others speaks in terms of the interaction of bottom-up, physical reactions with top-down, causal constraints. Those latter kinds of factors are precisely what reductionism fails to consider.
See From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, Steve Talbott.
[quote=ChatGPT] Terrence Deacon's concept of "ententionality," introduced in "Incomplete Nature," seeks to describe the unique properties and attributes of organisms and their goal-directed behaviors, which he believes are inadequately explained by traditional physical and intentional frameworks. Ententionality combines "intentionality" with "entelechy" (Aristotle's term for realizing potential), emphasizing that organisms inherently pursue goals and maintain themselves through a dynamic process of self-organization and adaptation. This idea highlights the complex interplay between biological structures and functions that give rise to purposeful behavior and consciousness, suggesting that life inherently possesses a form of directedness that goes beyond mere mechanistic explanations.[/quote]
You seem to be equivocating between 'explainable in terms of' and 'finds its origin in' (or as I should have added 'is constituted.by') That something is not explainable in physical terms does not entail that it is anything over and above its physical constitution, the relations between its parts and the global and local constraints it is subject to.
So, of course intentional behavior is not explainable in terms of physical reactions, because to say it is would be to deny the very conception of intentionality that is purported to be unexplained. But all that means is that there is a limit to what can be understood in mechanistic terms. To reject physicalism on this basis is to be working from and reacting to outmoded mechanistic conceptions of physicality. In other words, it is to be attacking a strawman.
Quoting Wayfarer
Of course, but in times past global and environmental conditions were thought to be given by God or determined by karma or some imagined supernatural principle. Are you now appealing to those kinds of ideas, and if not, just what are you appealing to? What are you trying to imply beyond the well-accepted fact that not everything in human life or even nature can be understood in mechanistic terms. That's the problem, you never come out and say just what it is you are arguing for.
Quoting Wayfarer
We call them "laws of physics" or "laws of nature', but really, they are just generalized formulations of observed regularities, and in that sense, they are not context-free, not independent of our empirical observations. We don't really know whether they apply everywhere in this universe but given that they seem to accurately picture the nature of what is observed, and that they are underpinned by elegant mathematics, we assume that they are universal.
Quoting Wayfarer
If the mechanistically unexplainable aspects of nature are not "any kind of something" then they are not any kind of anything. In other words, all that is being shown by their (current) unexplainability is either the (current) limits of human understanding, or perhaps the permanent limits of human understanding, which might well make sense given that it seems reasonable to think that nature is non-dual, whereas human thought is intrinsically, inextricably dualistic.
But such constraints are not considered in reductionism.
Quoting Janus
Mechanistic materialism still prevails in or underlies many naturalistic accounts.
Quoting Janus
Im not appealing to anything. The physicalist paradigm is just exactly that everything is ultimately reducible to the laws of physics. But its clear that these are abstractions that dont describe the complexities of organic life.
That Talbot essay is really worth the effort.
Yes I've said this for a number of posts now, purpose is in the relation. In this example, the purpose of the part (the screw) is in its relation to the thing which it is a part of (the machine), which can be called "the whole". And I explained that this relationship is not invertible. Purpose is in the relationship of the part (screw) to the whole (machine), not in the relationship of the whole to the part. That is why we say "the screw has purpose", referencing the relation of the screw to the machine, not "the machine has purpose" in relation to the screw. The latter expression, "the machine has purpose" requires putting the machine into the context of a further relation.
Quoting tim wood
As I explained, purpose implies intention, therefore intentional creation is implied by any display of purpose. But it is clearly not the case that purpose is "the sole property of the being". If you look at the use of "purpose", in all cases it involves a relationship between things, and therefore cannot be the sole property of any being.
Quoting tim wood
How can you agree with this? I said the agent is independent from the purpose. But above, you say purpose is the sole property of the being. Don't these two contradict in your mind? If purpose can only be the property of the being, how can the being be independent from it? In other words, how could this property come to be in the being, if the being is independent from it and also it cannot exist independent from the being?
Quoting tim wood
This is contradictory as well. You are saying that an intentional being has the capacity to not-intend. However, to not-intend would contradict the premise of "intentional being". This is like saying that the intentional being could negate its own nature of being intentional, by intentionally not intending. But intentionally not intending would still be a case of intending. Therefore the capacity to not-intend contradicts "intentional being". This is like what they say about choosing not to choose. That's still a choice. And "choosing not to choose" is contradictory unless we separate the more specific from the more general, to give "choose" distinct references, or meanings. Therefore it's contradictory to say that the intentional being has the freedom not to intend.
Quoting tim wood
To tell you the truth, I was being polite. I could only interpret what you said as contradictory. So instead of accusing you of contradiction, I was forgiving, and gave you the chance to reconsider, to express what you meant in a different, clearer way, in case the contradiction was unintentional. Since you simply reassert your contradictions I have no choice now but to tell you why I cannot understand. What you say is contradictory, and your contradiction appears intentional. That makes understanding impossible.
Quoting tim wood
You agreed that intention is the cause of purpose. Why is it that you cannot agree that when we see purpose, there is intention behind it? If you think that something else, other than intention might cause the purpose one observes, then you ought to disagree when I say that intention is the cause of purpose.
Quoting tim wood
Wait, slow down, you're going off track and inverting things unnecessarily. You agreed that Intention is the cause of purpose. Then you said intention is in the mind of the intender, and I would agree to this. And because intention is located there, in the mind, it is only evident to oneself. My intention is only evident to me, and your intention is only evident to you Do we agree so far?
However, what you don't seem to accept, is that we find purpose in the world around us, like the screw has purpose in the machine. Further, since you accept that intention is the cause of purpose, you should see that whenever we find purpose in the world, we can infer intention as the cause of that purpose.
So, we do not "suppose intention" and then "infer purpose". We observe empirical evidence of purpose, as in the case of the screw in the machine, and from this empirical evidence we infer intention. We conclude that the machine was constructed intentional from the evidence of the purposeful relations of the parts to the whole, like the screw, as one such part The other way around, to suppose intention and then infer purpose would be pointlessly misleading, because we would not know when to assume intention, because it is hidden from us.
Since you agree with me, that this way is misleading, you ought to also agree that the other way is far more reliable. we observe purpose and infer intention. And this is because we can observe purpose, in the relations of things. We see it in the relation between the screw and the machine, for example.
Quoting tim wood
Of course, only human beings have human intent, that's tautological. To call it human intent is to say that a human being has it. However we find that other animals have intent. We can observe purpose in their actions and conclude that they have intent, in the way described above. But what would be the point of trying to distinguish human intent from the intent of other animals? Intent is very particular, specific to the individual. Your intentions are completely different from my intentions, as intentions vary substantially between one individual and another. So distinguishing "human intent" from "whale intent", would be at best completely insignificant, but most likely just arbitrary.
Quoting tim wood
I don't know what. That's the very problem I exposed at the end of the post. We really know so little about the nature of intention, that we cannot make any conclusions about what sort of subject is required for the predication of "having intention". We know from personal experience, that humans have intention, and we know from observation of purpose, that other creatures have intention, but we do not have anything to demonstrate to us the limits of intention, i.e. where it may and may not be.
Quoting tim wood
What!!? I am shocked and amazed at your naivety. You think "learn" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? You think "intention" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? You think "will power" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? I conclude, that in your mind the behaviour of babies is simply unexplainable.
Quoting tim wood
Do you see, that you agreed with me, that intention is the cause of purpose? You ought also agree therefore, that where there is purpose, there is intention as the cause of that purpose. Therefore purpose is not acquired through a process like consumption, it is given, caused, by the actions of an intentional agent. Think of the screw and its purpose in the machine. The intentional agent who manufactured the machine, gave the screw its purpose. So, if the individual human being has purpose in relation to a higher organization, such as a family, business, community, society, or humanity in general, where is the intentional agent which gives this purpose to the individual?
Quoting tim wood
Why? That definition appears consistent with what i am saying, What would be the purpose of redefining at this point? We haven't agreed on anything very conclusive.
I haven't been arguing for reductionism. Is there a third person in this conversation? I have been trying to persuade you to consider the possibility that there are different kinds or definitions of physicalism. One kind would consist in the claim that everything can be explained in terms of physics. I find that claim ridiculous, because everything obviously cannot be explained in terms of physics.
Another kind would consist in the claim that everything that exists, all entities, events, relations, processes and qualities are fundamentally physical insofar as they consist in energy flow and exchange. This leaves the question about abstractions, generalitiesdo they exist somehow apart from the energetic processes of thinking of or about them? If we think they do exist apart from the thinking of them, that is itself a thought which involves energy flow and exchange. Do we even really know what the question could mean?
Quoting Wayfarer
Many or some? Do you know what is the percentage of contemporary naturalist accounts that are merely mechanistic, that deny the existence of emergent qualities which cannot be mechanistically explained?
Quoting Wayfarer
I've been trying to get you to see that it's not a case of the physicalist paradigm, but rather of a physicalist paradigm. I don't know why you are so worried about what I think is a minority position in today's world. As i see it a far bigger problem in today's world is materialism in the form of consumerismthe desire to acquire ever more and more possessions, the identification of the personal identity, of its worth, with material wealth.
A recent survey of academic philosophers shows that slightly more than 50% accept or lean towards physicalism, presumably they dont. (Another survey shows that around 66% lean towards atheism. So the majority of academic philosophers lean towards physicalism and atheism. No surprises there.)
Quoting Janus
Theyre plainly related. Its logical for a social philosophy that recognises nothing other than the physical.
That doesn't specify what kind of physicalism they lean towards. Atheism is a separate issue, I had thought you were an atheist, in the sense of lacking belief in God, yourself.
Quoting Wayfarer
Nonsense. The US, probably the most materialistic culture, has a high percentage of people who profess to be either religious or spiritual.
In U.S., 47% Identify as Religious, 33% as Spiritual from here
Were loosing sight of the OP. The question was what is purpose, how does it arise. My argument is that in modern vision of the Cosmos, described by classical physics and Galilean science, purpose can only be understood in terms of intentional agents or agencies. The laws that govern the cosmos, and also evolution, are devoid of intentionality and purpose. So it was presumed that the Cosmos and everything in it arises as a consequence of the accidental collocation of atoms (Bertrand Russells term.)
Ive been trying to point to more recent philosophies of biology e.g. Terrence Deacon, Alice Juarrero, Steve Talbott, which question that form of materialism. One of the grounds on which it is questioned is the intentional nature of all organic life, which displays behaviours that cant be explained in bald reductionist terms. I agree that these are not materialist or physicalist but theyre also not typical, although theyre becoming influential. But I take the fact that they exist to be evidence of the waning of materialism, which is welcome. (Its also interesting that Brentanos work on intentionality was the original inspiration for phenomenology which is similarly opposed to reductionism.)
I have read some Terrence Deacon many years ago now (I have his book Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter} and I take him to be as the second part of the title indicates a kind of physicalist. I don't remember him positing that anything beyond the physical world exists, any transcendent reality. The others I can't speak to.
The question is as to whether nature evolved in an unplanned way out of a primordial state of chaos or whether the world was created with a purpose in mind. If there is, as epigenetics seems to suggest, some feedback from an organism's experience of the internal and external environments, that doesn't equate to intentionality in my way of thinking. For me intentional means deliberate planned.
Animals are capable, to varying degrees, of intentional behavior because they are cognitive agents. For me, nature does not count as intentional unless it is either a cognitive agent or is directed by a cognitive agent.
Yes, and more broadly the same is true for many people who identify with 'New Age' spirituality and Eastern religious ideas - even those who follow this or that guru. They remain resolutely obsessed with status, wealth and real estate. And having worked recently with a number of Thai Buddhists - the same materialism dominates.
It think it's pretty clear that spirituality and/or religion do not lead to less acquisitive worldviews, but often nestle comfortably alongside status seeking materialism. Nor do they lead to enhanced compassion or tolerance.
Of course many defenders of higher consciousness worldviews are likely to say that such people are not real, Buddhists, Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, Christians, etc.
I started on Deacon in earnest in January this year but stalled at around chapters 5 or 6. I see him more as trying to extend the scope of naturalism beyond physical reductionism.
Newton described his first law of motion as dependent on the Will of God. What this law describes is the continuity of existence, as time passes, inertia. Things will continue to be, into the future, exactly as they have been in the past, unless a force causes something to change. What this law does is remove the necessity for a cause of the continuity of existence as time passes (the cause which Newton called God's Will), by making it something that we take for granted.
Now, when we take this thing for granted (what is expressed by the first law), the continuity of existence as time passes, then a "cause" is required to change it. This effectively removes the need for a cause of the continuity of existence as time passes (God's Will), by taking it as granted, and replacing it with the need for a cause of any change to this continuity of existence.
Totally agree :100:
Quoting Tom Storm
True, and that was basically the response tendered by @Wayfarer. I think that there is definitely such a thing as "higher consciousness", and although the "higher" part suggests "otherworldliness", "afterlife" or "spiritual realm", it doesn't have to be wedded to that way of thinking, it can be thought of simply as an altered statea heightened state of awareness and cognition.
:up:
Quoting Wayfarer
Thanks for reading and commenting. I do not disagree with your point, for as I wrote in my middle paragraph of the same comment:
Quoting Caerulea-Lawrence
Yes, we are language-using agents, but what are we reading? Yes, we can read letters, but we can also read landscapes, speed, color as well as faces (Many of us, and to varying degrees and to certain points). Moreover, we can also 'read' our own bodies.
The problem I see with saying that things convey "no meaning" is that you are adding 'organization' post-hoc. If you have a book, but you can't read, the letters there also don't convey any meaning to you, despite the book being both intentionally and purposefully written and bound. So, if you learned how to read, you would say "oh, this is meaningful". But the meaning was already inherent in the book, you only learned how to read.
Which I don't see clash with your argument at all. I'm not arguing that atoms and matter account for the nature of experience, but that treating atoms and matter as inconsequential to our understanding of purpose and meaning, seems arbitrary at best.
I think that the is a very good approach, the differences, and similarities, of "purpose" and "meaning". Both are closely related to intention, but in different ways. And both, purpose and meaning, exist as relations, in the way I described earlier.
Suppose an author writes some material, a book or something. Communication such as this is done with purpose, as intentional, the author has goals in this act. So, from the perspective of the author, there is purpose to that communicative material, that writing. The reader however, does not access the author's intentions directly, and so does not put the material in a relationship with the author's intentions, to apprehend the author's purpose. That is why deception is possible. Instead, the reader puts the material into relations, or associations within one's own mind, to apprehend the meaning.
I suggest that this constitutes a significant difference between purpose and meaning. "Purpose" relates the observable actions, or things, which the artist is working with directly to a goal or end which the artist has in mind. This is best described as the first-person perspective, because only the author could ever know the true intentions, and therefore the purpose of the writing. "Meaning" on the other hand relates the observable actions, or things, which the artist has worked with (notice the necessity of the past tense here) to memories, habits, acquired rules and conventions, within the mind of the observer. "Meaning" is what the observer derives from the work.
So in the latter, despite the fact that we define "meaning" as "what is meant", "what is intended" by the author or artist, there is really no direct involvement with intention here at all. In this way "intention" is completely removed from "meaning", and the common understanding of "the meaning of that writing", is that there is some sort of objective way that the writing is supposed to be understood, based in some kind of rules, and "the meaning" therefore is totally independent from what the author intended, i.e. the author's purpose.
This is not an issue of the validity of the logic, it is an issue of the truth or falsity of the premise. The premise year is a description, and any empirically supported premise suffers the same problem. There is a description, and the truth or falsity of the description must be judged. The judgement is always to some extent subjective, as is the description, the extent of which varies greatly depending on the type description.
Quoting tim wood
So, this premise needs to be judged for truth or falsity. First, we must judge, 'is that thing a screw?', 'is that thing an engine?'. Assuming we agree that the items indicated fulfil the criteria of those terms, we need to ask by what principle is one said to be " a part of" the other. I would say that "part" here implies a specific relation, meaning that one is a component of the other, such that the other is a larger item, having a number of such "parts". If we agree on something like this, we can also agree on the truth of that description.
Quoting tim wood
No, we are not in agreement on this. By saying that one is a part of the other, you already include a relation. You want to deny my description, that the screw has purpose in relation to the engine, and replace it with your description, that the screw is a part in relation to the engine. Each description involves a relation between the screw and the engine, and neither description is more true than the other.
My description is just a little more detailed than yours. While you use the more general part/whole relation in your description, I proceed further in accuracy and precision in my description to say that the part has purpose. This is simple recognition that the thing you call "the engine" is also an artifice, therefore built with intention. This does not at all reduce the truth of the description. It is a simple fact that the thing you call "the engine", could also be truthfully called "the artifice". So, we simply have two different, yet both truthful descriptions of the very same thing. You say there is an engine and a screw is a part of the engine, I say there is an artifice which we call an engine, and the screw as part of that artifice has a purpose. You ought to be able to see that my description is just a more precise and accurate description of the items indicated, and the relations which constitute a part of the description.
Quoting tim wood
I'm going to drop this subject of freedom and choice. It's only relevant in a tangential way, and we do not need the long posts.
Quoting tim wood
Really? I find that highly unusual, even absurd. So, let's look at the above example. There's a thing called "the engine", and a thing called "the screw". Assume we know nothing about these things just their names. Now you say that the screw is a part of the engine. I say "the engine" is an artifice, a device intentionally built, and the screw has a purpose dictated by the creator's design. Do you honestly believe that my description provides no extra "explanatory value" over yours?
Come on now tim, does the difference between something produced intentionally, and something produced without intention have absolutely no significance to you? Have you never spent time in a court of law where intention provides great leverage with its explanatory value?
Right on! All living organisms have an innate driving purpose : to stay alive. But philosophical discussions of Purpose may be traced back to Theological notions that each moral agent of the world has a unique role to play in the epic of creation. In Genesis, the bit-part role of pre-enlightenment Adam & Eve was simply to be caretakers in the garden, as the animals with hands. No need for reasoning or insight, or concepts such as Good vs Evil.
Over time though, theology became more complex and sophisticated, and the search for an individual's purpose --- the one supposedly assigned by God --- became more important to one's post-life destiny. Each actor's ultimate payoff or punishment depends on discovering the role they were "meant" to play in God's dramaturgy. Some search the inscrutable scriptures for clues, while others look into their own empathetic hearts. But failure to find the divinely assigned role still seems to provoke anxiety in those who are not content with their evolutionary niche as animals, but aspire to play the role of angels on God's golden stage.
Modern science seems to be content with the most basic purposes of survival & propagation of genes. Yet, some philosophers still seem to feel that each of us needs some higher goal than just eat, drink, and f*ck. Do we have assigned roles in the drama of life --- by God or Nature --- or do we choose our own personas to suit personal talents & needs? Shakespeare pithily captured the secular version of the purpose quandary. Does our minor role on the world stage have any importance in the script of destiny? Is Purpose merely a property of natural instincts, or a higher Concept for the amusement of the gods? :smile:
*1. Anxious actors in the play of Life & Death & Destiny:
[i]All the worlds a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage[i]
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/56966/speech-all-the-worlds-a-stage
I don't understand this. My OED defines "relation" as what a thing has to do with another. If you believe that a thing is not just an idea (don't you?), then why wouldn't you think that a relation is not just an idea? Do you believe that the earth and the sun are things, and not just ideas? How could you believe that these two things are not ideas, yet the relation between them is just an idea? That seems so inconsistent, so as to be incoherent.
Quoting tim wood
So here, you are saying that the relation which you call "a part of", is not an idea, but a fact. So you really do believe that relations are more than just ideas. Can I have some consistency please?
Quoting tim wood
No, I meant artifice. An artifice is a clever device. Do you not think that an engine fits this description? Maybe you are thinking of a different meaning.
Quoting tim wood
I gave you the example. Why don't you address it? Here, have another look:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Look, we can describe the engine as "a piece of metal" like you did, or we can describe the engine as a piece of metal designed and built with intention. Do you honestly believe that the latter explains no more about what an engine is, than the former?
Do you think that "relation" requires communication? if one thing affects another, for example, there is a relation between them. Communication is not a requirement for a relation. The sun has an effect on the earth, the moon has an effect on the earth, and the screw has an effect on the engine. There are relations between these things.
Quoting tim wood
Sorry, I have no inclination to restrict my language to suit your desires. You demonstrate severe obstinance, most likely the feature of a closed mind, which greatly limits your capacity to understand. Restricting my language in the way required for you to understand would disable me from being able to say what I want to say. This would simply leave me saying what you want me to say, so that your limited capacity for understanding could understand the things I say, within your own little world of 'how the world must be described' according to your dictates of 'the world is like this'. If you have no inclination to expand your little world to include the way that other people see the world, within your world, this type of discussion is pointless.
Quoting tim wood
Tim, why do you keep coming back to this point? I've explicitly said, numerous times, that purpose is not "in the object". It is in the object's relations to other objects. We've passed that little obstacle long ago. The disagreement we have is that you claim that relations only exist as ideas in human minds. I think that relations exist independently of human minds, just like the objects which are related to each other exist independently of human minds.
Here's a compromise proposal. You say relations exist as "ideas", or "expressions of ideas". I say relations exist outside of human minds. Can we agree that "ideas", or "expression of ideas" may exist outside of human minds? So, let's say that the screw has a relation to the engine, and this relation is an idea, or an expression of an idea, which is outside of all human minds.
Quoting tim wood
Let's look at gravity as an example then, then, under the principles of my proposal. Let's use the word "gravity" to refer directly to a specific type of relation between two objects. We can easily avoid the descriptive shortcomings you talk about, by saying that the way we describe the observed effects of "gravity" is completely irrelevant. For example, we say that there is a specific type of relation between the earth and the moon, which we know as "gravity", and whether we describe the effects of gravity in a Newtonian way, or an Einsteinian way, is completely irrelevant to us, because we are interested in the relation itself, not the description of the relation. This is commonly known as the difference between the map and the territory. We are not interested in the map, (whether the map is Einsteinian or Newtonian), we are interested in the territory, that specific type of relation between the earth and moon, known as "gravity".
Now, to adhere to my compromise proposal, we'd have to say that this relation is either an idea, or an expression of an idea. But how could that be the case? The earth and moon, each with one's own gravity having an effect on the other, through that relation we are calling "gravity", existed long before human beings and their ideas and expressions of ideas? Such an "idea" or "expression of idea" could not be human.
This problem is the result of the restrictions on language which you are trying to enforce. You are insisting that "a relation" must be either an idea or an expression of an idea. You are refusing to acknowledge that in order to develop an adequate understanding of reality, we must allow that relations have independent existence. Do you understand, and respect this conclusion? In order to have an accurate and adequate understanding of reality, and truth about the world, we need to allow that relations exist independently from the human ideas which attempt to understand them, just like we do with objects. Objects have independent existence, and so do their relations. Therefore we must allow that relations are not just human ideas, or expressions of human ideas, that is a linguistic restriction which would render the world as unintelligible.
Quoting tim wood
The moon exists, and the earth exists, so says you. Do you agree that the activities of these things also exist, and that these activities are not just ideas about the things, they are what the things are actually doing? So for instance, we describe an activity as "the moon orbits the earth", and another as "the earth has tides which are the effects of the orbiting moon". These sorts of activities and relations exist independently of our thought and ideas about them, and our representations of them. Can you agree?
Quoting tim wood
What could this possibly mean?
Oh yes, I forgot to answer your question, I know you dislike that. Your act of limiting possible answers to two choices, "thing or idea", imposes a restriction which leaves the world unintelligible, as I explained here:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To be clear, I said there is activity which is described as "the moon orbits the earth", and that this activity exists.
Anyway, I think I'm starting to understand your perspective. Would you agree that the moon does not exist, and the earth does not exist? These words signify ideas, just like "the moon orbits the earth" signifies an idea. If you can agree with this, then we might have a starting point.
I approached this point when I made the statement about judging the truth or falsity of the description of the screw and the engine. The first step was to agree that there is a thing called "the screw", and a thing called "the engine". But if you want to insist that words refer to ideas, not the things or activities associated with those ideas, as you are doing, then we must start right from the bottom.
What are you saying now, that both things and their relations exist independently of the ideas which represent them? If you agree that both the moon and the earth exist independently of ideas, how can you deny that their intertwined activities also exist independently. And therefore their relationsare independent
Quoting tim wood
How can you continue to refuse to acknowledge the third category, the relations between things? This is what we observe as the interactions between things. So, we need three categories, things, the relations between things, and ideas. If we deny the validity of this category, "the relations between things", then how could there be any truth to what the moon and earth are doing with each other in their interactions? If this is only ideas, then one description is just as true as the other. The description of the sun going around the earth every day is just as true as the description of the earth spinning on its axis, because it's all just ideas, and there's no real relationship which we are trying to truthfully describe.
Quoting tim wood
No, as explained above, they cannot be "all ideas", or else there would be no truth or falsity about what the earth and moon are doing with each other, and what the earth and sun are doing with each other. Your perspective is known as Protagorean relativity. Your ideas about what these things are doing are no more true than mine, even though they are completely different, because there is no truth, it's just ideas, yours mine, or whoever.
Sorry, I don't understand what you're asking.
I'm a latecomer to this thread. But I just read an article in Scientific American magazine, that discusses "an infant's aha! moment" when they realize they can influence the world. The authors ran experiments with babies to see "when the lights come on", as you put it. The point (purpose) of the investigation was to learn "about the origins of agency". They concluded that "the birth of agency is a dynamic, self-organizing process". Humans are not born with fully developed minds. At first, we are at the mercy of The World, but eventually we can become causal Actors in the non-self world.
Which seems to imply that the desire for control of the outside world is an inborn motivation --- want or need for food, warmth, novelty, etc --- that later emerges as a sense of agency early in development of the body and brain. At first, the baby moves its limbs randomly, without any focused purpose. But eventually, the child discovers that some of those movements can cause changes in the environment. In the experiment, a string tied to the baby's toe and attached to a crib-toy, would, seemingly accidentally, cause the toy to move. At first, the baby does not make the "connection" between her own wiggling and the surprising interesting waving of the toy. But, after the aha! moment of insight --- I did that --- "spontaneous movements become purposeful action". "As our model proposes, the experience of agency emerges only when an organism . . . senses it is coupled to its environment". Yet, in order to become a causal agent, one must learn to differentiate Self from World.
My interpretation of this psychological experiment is that Purpose begins as a Feeling of Desire, that is enhanced by the feeling of Power over the environment (agency). Then, eventually that vague feeling becomes transformed into a verbal concept : if I do this, then the result will satisfy my desire for (fill-in the blank). So, Purpose is both the Desire and the Reason for Doing. But, is that desire directed by an internal agency (self-caused), or merely one link in a long chain of causes & effects? Most people, post infancy, take their own agency for granted. But ornery philosophers question everything, including the questioner.
The article notes that, "historically, the entire issue of purpose and agency in living things --- and, dare one say, 'free will' --- has been clouded in philosophical debate and controversy". Hence, the TPF thread on FreeWill and Determinism. So, we can either "take the bit in the teeth" --- as a determined agent of purpose, or just lay back and let physics take its course. Purposeful behavior is for Agents of Action, not for the wishy-washy flotsam of the world. Purpose is the feeling of being in control. And getting intended results gives meaning to the sense of Agency. :smile:
And this is the state of man.An artificial impasse. Granted, the individual this (metaphysician undercover) easily could have and perhaps should have mentioned the specific points of contention, lest it seemed every word and effort of your expression is little than that of a raving madman, something hurtful. But perhaps, instead of such a mindset, the answers to your questions are self-evident! And he is in fact challenging you to pursue such avenues of self-inquiry further.
So, let's embrace the mindset of an casual observer. He requests clarification. You seem such a request is beneath your effort as, certainly, any rational mind could make sense of what you purported? Is this correct? So, perhaps frame it differently. You seem to make a statement, that the person perceives as a question. That is to say, he derives several statements at least one begetting a question. This is a compliment. Not an insult. Should you not go from there?
This reminds me of the opening of G.K. Chesterton's Orthodoxy, where he talks about how "no one is more rational than the mad man." Everything is explained rationally for the person with paranoid delusions. Why did that person in the street fold his arms just then? To signal another conspirator. Why wasn't my newspaper delivered today? The conspiracy. Why am I being taken to an institution? Well that is just exactly what would happen if I truly was the rightful King of Britain and a group of people were trying to keep me from making my claim!
The solipsist who thinks they are God has a reason for everything. The paranoiac as well. The problem often isn't a lack of rationality but a surfeit, tightly packed into a very small world, an ever shrinking circle that contains, for that person, everything.
Edit: I should probably note that I didn't follow the whole interchange there, just that part.
Good start tim. Maybe a few more acts of clarification, and I might be able to understand what you are asking.
Here's the problem. You take a couple snippets from my paragraph, present them out of context, and then draw a very strange conclusion containing three words "right" "true" and "exist". All I was talking about in that passage was "truth".
You should have simply asked, if it agrees with my criteria of truth, do I conclude that it is true, and I would have answered "yes". But "right" and "exist" are different words with different criteria, making your question appear absurd.
I apprehended it as needing clarification, not as inaccurate. Therefore I did not judge it as inaccurate, I judged it as requiring clarification. Your use of "right" and "exists" in that context didn't make sense to me. The typo, which you edited in the reproduction also contributed to the not making sense to me.
Quoting tim wood
No, our contention is not the existence of ideas. It is the existence of relations. Your assumption (which I take to be wrong) is that all relations are ideas. From this faulty premise, that all relations are ideas, you conclude that our contention is the existence of ideas. That is not our contention, our contention is whether there are relations which are not ideas.
Quoting tim wood
Yes, "truth" is a source of great confusion, especially if you represent it like this, that something could be "true-on-paper, but not really true". This confuses me immensely, such that I cannot understand what you are trying to say at all, in this paragraph.
Quoting tim wood
You are completely avoiding the issue with this straw man representation. You have an axiom which says 'material things truly exist'. I have an axiom which says 'the relations between material things truly exist just as much as the material things themselves truly exist. You apparently cannot understand how a relation can be anything other than an idea, so you misrepresent my axiom as 'ideas exist independently' just like material things do.
The issue is, that we cannot get to your misrepresentation (straw man) unless we accept your principle that all relations are ideas. I do not accept that principle. Therefore your claim that my belief is of independent ideas is false. My belief is of independent relations. And, I do not accept 'all relations are ideas', therefore I do not conclude, as you claim, that ideas exist independently.
Quoting tim wood
Try this instead. I say we represent relations, with models and such. That's why I use the map/territory analogy. You say we invent relations. I say your position makes no sense, because if we actually were free to invent the relations, then these ideas (what I call models or representations, and you call inventions), could consist of absolutely anything, and one would not be more true (in the sense of corresponding with reality) than another.
Quoting tim wood
This is exactly the sort of question, or invitation which totally confuses me and therefore I ask for clarification. I cannot at all understand "without yourself putting into it exactly what you're trying to find in it". When we model a relation, i.e. try to describe it, we are neither trying to put something into the relation (that is an act of art, construction, manufacturing, or production). nor are we trying to find something in the relation. When we represent a relation, by describing it or modeling it, we are attempting to understand it. That is neither finding something in it, nor putting something in it.
Yes. Most humans seem to take their own personal agency for granted. Since they get their desired results from voluntary actions, they feel like they can control some aspects of the non-self world. But some philosophers see that what-we-call-agency might be just a continuation of physical causation that began in the Big Bang.
So, we are now dealing with a taxonomy of at least two classes of causes : Physical and Meta-physical (mental). Unless we define the Mind as a divinely endowed spiritual Soul, the emergence of metal "abilities", such as Agency, can be viewed as continuous with the universal chain of Causation. Consequently, a secular philosophical "taxonomy of purpose" could combine involuntary external physical Causation with voluntary internal meta-physical Intention, to conclude with some form of Compatibilism. In that case, what we call FreeWill might be a "sub-taxonomy" of Universal Causation, that is expressed in scientific terms as Thermodynamics (positive/negative energy). But in a philosophical sense, it might be classified as Moral Choice (good/evil consequences).
Daniel Dennett, in his book Freedom Evolves, says "Human freedom is not an illusion; it is an objective phenomenon, distinct from all other biological conditions and found in only one species - us". But other, more Libertarian thinkers, have scorned that his watered-down freedom is "not an ability worth having". However, Freewill-within-Determinism Compatibilism is compatible with my own BothAnd worldview. Does that compromise work for you? :smile:
The definition of "relation" I already told you, "what one thing has to do with another". The definition of "Idea" is more difficult, my OED says "a conception or plan formed by mental effort". Does that suffice for you?
I believe that if material objects exist independently of a conception formed by mental effort, then it is also the case that what one thing has to do with another (such as the interrelated activities of the earth and moon which we discussed already) also exist independently of conceptions formed by human minds.
Why is this perspective so hard for you to apprehend? Imagine the earth and moon existing independently of human conception. Would these two things not be doing anything at all? And if they are doing anything, wouldn't they be doing something with one another, as being related to one another?
So what is it that you believe? To me, it seems like you believe that the earth and moon exist independently of mental effort, but you do not believe that they are doing anything. You seem to believe that doing something requires mental effort.
Quoting tim wood
Tim, are you having trouble reading? I just got though explicitly telling you the opposite of this, twice in one short post. I told you:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In between those two quotes is the explanation of why I do not believe that ideas exist independently. Please, stop the straw man representation. How many more times will I have to make this request?
Quoting tim wood
You seem to be having difficulty understanding the difference between a relation, and the description of a relation (map and territory confusion). The theory is not the relation. The relation between the theory and the experiment is not an idea. The relation between the theory and the experiment is represented with ideas.
I too, haven't been concerned enough to make a detailed study of the roots of philosophical Determinism, perhaps in ancient Greece. But, I assume its modern form could be traced back to the secular Enlightenment (materialism), which broke away from medieval religious Theology (spiritualism). And which usually viewed the rational human mind as evidence for a dualism of supernatural soul within a natural body. In reaction, Science -- the philosophy of the mundane world -- became a monism of Materialism.
However, if you don't view the Mind as supernatural, there's no need for a continuous chain of causation to ward-off any spiritual incursions. So, for me, the Mind is merely the natural Function*1 of the brain. In animals that function is mostly control over the body & physical world. But, in humans a new function emerged : to use imagination (metaphors ; words) to assist in control over the complex sapiens social environment. Over time, that ability to create mental models of the world, evolved into the mental function we call Reasoning (logic + math) : constructing imaginary & artificial scenarios to predict what effect our choices will have on the physical & social systems we are immersed in.
Therefore, one important function of Mind is to refine abstract ideas into purposeful, goal-oriented, intentional behavior. So Purpose is an imaginary hand, with which to reach out and control the outside world. And it "comes from" a long long chain of physical causation which has eventually undergone a phase transition into meta-physical (imaginary) power to cause changes in the world. All self-moving animals have some degree of mental intentional power, to find food & avoid danger. In some cases, the intentional behaviors affect other Minds (social animals), and in other situations (technological animals) the changes affect the physical world : as in apes cracking nuts, and the Panama Canal moving mountains story. :smile:
*1. Function : in math a function is the relation between inputs (X & Y) and outputs (Z). In mind, a function is the job or work of the coordinated neural network : what it does, what it produces : i.e. Ideas -- imaginary models of reality.
"To resolve this issue, Aristotle asks what the ergon (function, task, work) of a human being is, and argues that it consists in activity of the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue "
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/
What do you mean i haven't made clear the essence of this third category. I've stated it over and over, it is the relations between things, what one thing has to do with another. Like ideas, relations are immaterial, unlike ideas, relations are independent of human minds.
Quoting tim wood
There's a lot of unknowns in the world, and this is one of them.
Quoting tim wood
Ok, that's what you think. I think you are in denial. You've already told me how you think that the moon and earth have something to do with each other, here:
Quoting tim wood
So now you are just contradicting yourself, to uphold your denial. Why are you afraid to admit that the reality of the immaterial extends far beyond the reality of human ideas.
No, I recognize that the earth and the moon are doing things, and that their activities are related. You apparently recognize this to, by describing it as a 'corkscrewing" activity. You, however refuse to separate the description "corkscrewing", which is an idea, from the reality of what the relation actually is, which is not an idea. So you keep insisting that the map, (model, or description, which is an idea) is the territory, (the relation itself). Then you contradict yourself by claiming that the earth and the moon which are engaged in this interrelated activity exist independently of human ideas, yet the interrelated activity which locks them together as an essential aspect of the existence which they have, is just a human idea.
"X provides purpose" is about X, where all subsequent qualification of "X" is bound by/limited to that which is capable of providing purpose. If X provides purpose, it must be the sort of thing that it makes sense to say is capable of doing so(providing purpose). For example, we could not substitute "potato chips" for 'X' and make any sense at all. Potato chips are not the sort of thing capable of providing[b] purpose. They could help provide a feeling of satisfaction/contentment. Even then without eating them, that purported 'purpose' is left empty, unfilled, unmet, unsatisfied, unrealized. So, potato chips alone are not enough, nor are potato chips the sort of thing capable of [b]providing purpose.
What thing(s) is(are)?
Seems to me that purpose presupposes agency. All things purposeful are so in strict relation to one's(the presupposed agents') aim, goal, prediction, and/or expectations.
The last claim in the quote at the top of the post asks the reader's acceptance of the author's potential future equivocation of the term "purpose". It also invokes "meaning" and "significance". All three presuppose agency.
Meaning and significance are not limited to providing purpose. They provide (mis)understanding. They provide a worldview. They provide the necessary preconditions for agency and hence help lay the groundwork needed for purposes to emerge. Purpose is nonexistent is complete absence of meaning and significance. Seems to me that meaning/significance is necessary but insufficient for purpose.
Thinking processes 'give' meaning and significance. The scare-quotes are intentional. By my lights, meaning and significance are not the sorts of things that can be given to another like a physical object. We could be said to 'give away' meaning and significance to another by virtue of helping them to draw correlations between the same sorts of things that we are/do.
Teaching a child how to use "tree" is a prima facie example. Teaching a child how pick oranges helps them to draw many of their own correlations between oranges and other things.
While both meaning and significance play a role in the child's mind/thought/worldview prior to learning how to pick oranges and/or call trees by name, there's no argumentative ground for attributing much along the lines of purpose to the child, as if they have one, or they've found other things useful.
Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.
Without that, there is no purpose.
I told you numerous times, "relation" is what one thing has to do with another. Please quit accusing me of not answering.
Quoting tim wood
I don't see any reason for this assessment. Each relation between individual things is distinct and unique. You asked me for the general, "what is relation" and I answered. I also gave you an example of a distinct and particular relation, that between the earth and the moon, and you criticized me for not describing this relation properly. That does not mean that I did not give you a particular example, it only means that I did not describe the relation, which served as my example, to your satisfaction. And, as much as the earth and moon are not ideas, neither is the relation between them an idea.
We're corkscrewing around each other in circles, because you have a mental block which prevents you from understanding the meaning of "relation". You force an unwarranted restriction on the meaning of this word, 'a relation is necessarily an idea'. This is the mental disability of a closed mind, a disorder which you willfully inflict upon yourself.
"Relation" refers to what the one has to do with the other, what I described as orbiting and you described as corkscrewing. If the things (E&M) are real, don't you think that their motions are also real? And since their motions involve each other, isn't this a real relation?
Quoting tim wood
That looks like a relation (what one has to do with the other) to me. Why deny that it's real?
Quoting tim wood
Of course we can describe a relation without mention of the word "relation". But don't you recognize that when you say the E and M alter spacetime, and this effects the path of both, that you are speaking of "causative efficacy"?
Anyway, that's an unnecessary point because "relation" does not necessarily imply causative efficacy. When two things are doing something together (as in your description of the E and M) there is a relation, regardless of causation.
Why are you so hellbent on denial, that you describe the relation between the earth and moon in such an extraordinarily strange way, trying to be careful about what you say, and what you mean, intent on hiding the fact that you actually believe there is a real relation between the earth and moon?
See, you actually do believe in the reality of such relations, you just do not understand the nature of the existence of that relationship. As I said, it is one of the many things which are unknown. Here is the mother of all such relationships, the relation between space and time. You seem to like describing relations in terms of spacetime, and within those descriptions is assumed a relation between space and time. But in reality the nature of the existence of that specific relationship itself, is the biggest of all the unknowns.
Quoting tim wood
Like ideas, they are immaterial. Why would they take up space? Then again, maybe what we call "matter" is simply the manifestation of a particular type of relations, which do take up space. Since the nature of the existence of relations is unknown, we really cannot exclude anything, can we?
Means are purposeful. The purpose of means is to reach, attain, and/or acquire a goal/end.
Ambition without goals? What's that consist of?
However, I do agree that one can be ambitious without yet having, arriving at, and/or being capable of articulating a means to the desired end. Good call, but I can make no sense whatsoever out of ambition absent any goal, and/or desired outcome. General ones suffice. Being a good person, for example. One can be ambitious about life in general as well. So, there is little need for specificity, however there is most certainly a need for some sort of desired outcome/expectation. There's always something that one is ambitious about regardless of the complexity of the desired outcome.
I do feel compelled to admit/note that I wrote something earlier that I have come to disagree with in recent years. I misspoke. While I do hold that purpose presupposes agency, I do not hold that meaning and significance do as well. That is not my position, despite stating otherwise. Mea culpa.
X has purpose in strict relation to a creature capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use. Whereas all things meaningful and/or significant are meaningful/significant to a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. Purpose requires that and more. A simple/rudimentary thinking creature is all that's needed to attribute meaning and/or for things to become significant to them by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. However, "agency/agent" imply deliberate contemplation, abstract thinking, moral culpability, volition, a creature that 'cares', etc.
All that to say that I retract the claim that meaning and significance presuppose agency. Best to do that now, so as to avoid any confusion it will certainly cause otherwise, should this discussion continue.
Sure, but being hungry without knowing what one wants to eat is more akin to being ambitious without knowing how to achieve the desired outcome. That is ambition without clear means. It is not ambition without desired outcome/goal.
Quoting tim wood
Hmmm. People are not the only creatures capable of intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting things to use. If a creature learns to use a stick to fetch termites out from deep inside of a nest, we can rest quite easy in claiming that the creature uses that stick for a specific purpose. The stick is a tool. The stick has purpose in strict relation to the creature intentionally, deliberately, and/or knowingly putting it to use. The purpose is 'given' to the stick by the creature under consideration.
Is that not adequate enough?
All purpose is meaningful/significant to a creature capable of 'giving' purposes to things. All purpose presupposes meaning and/or significance. Not all meaning and/or significance presupposes purpose.
You may be getting hung up on my distinction between a capable creature and an agent. I think "agency" is fraught with historical baggage. The more I think about it, I'm not so sure I agree that all purpose presupposes agency either. Chimps. Crows. I'm hesitate to attribute agency to them, but I've no issue clearly explaining how they give purpose to rudimentary tools; how those tools become meaningful/significant to them.
I'm actively working this out as well. :blush: I'm not well rehearsed in the subject matter of purpose/teleology. I'm more seeing where my prior commitments leave/lead me on the matter.
Hooray! I'm going to go celebrate. Care to join me for a glass of champagne? Fuck the queen, or the biscuit, or whatever you're talking about, let's just celebrate!
That is the case with all good claims.
Quoting tim wood
I agree. It is not easy to avoid anthropomorphism. We'll keep an eye out for it.
Quoting tim wood
I do not see the relevance of your mistake to what I wrote.
The cat didn't want to go out. That cat meows at the door for more than one reason. You're the one saying it's obvious that the cat wanted to do something that he did not do. Not I.
What's the problem with what I wrote? I don't have that problem. By all means, if I ever attribute thought/belief/reason that only humans are capable of forming, having, and/or holding to a non human, let me know.
Problems with your account are being held up as an example used against my account. Does that move count as a valid objection these days? My oh my, what is the world coming to?
When one creature that has never done so watches another creature that is well rehearsed in doing so gather termites from a mound using a stick, it learns how to use a stick for the purpose of gathering resources. They want to eat termites. They know how to use a stick in order to do so. The one will break a small limb from branch, strip it of all external leaves and twigs, poke holes into a termite nest, and then poke the limb deep into the nest allowing the termites to climb upon the stick.
That creature does that on purpose. The stick becomes significant to the watcher. The stick is already significant to the user.
Does any of that count as anthropomorphism to you?
The substance of our disagreement seems to be the following. I think that if physical objects are real (not simply ideas), then the relations between them must also be real (not just ideas). You seem to believe that physical objects are real, but the relations between them are not real (the relations are simply ideas).
I've tried to explain how I understand your belief to be inconsistent. If objects like the earth and moon are real, then their movements must be real as well, and their relations reals too.
There is another possible resolution which we have not explored, and that is that neither objects nor their relations are real, they are all ideas. That is known as idealism, and I think it is well supported by modern physics. If we follow the principles of quantum physics we will find that all objects are composed of particles, which are features of fields. The fields are constructed from ideas about relations.
Would you consider this as a possible way of understanding "reality"? My point has been, that we cannot make a separation between a physical object and its relations with other objects, to say that one is real and the other ideal, without separating the object from its activities, one real, the other ideal, and this necessarily produces an inconsistency in our representation of "reality". Since you appear to be dead set against allowing the proposition that both, objects and their relations are real, would you be more inclined toward the other option, the one which is well supported by the science of physics, that both, objects and their relations, are ideal?
Any expression whatsoever is an expression of an idea. "Moon", "earth", are expressions of ideas. Even if we use a name to refer 'directly' to an object, we are expressing an idea such as 'I am talking about that thing'.
Quoting tim wood
The earth and moon with no time passing is completely fictional, therefore nothing other than an idea. How is imagining such a scenario going to be helpful in distinguishing between what is real and what is ideal? You've just given us a purely ideal scenario.
Quoting tim wood
You haven't addressed my latest proposition, "neither objects nor relations are real, they are all ideas". Can we agree on this? As indicated above, everything in your post supports this, the proposition that earth and moon might be independent of passing time, etc..
Apropos the debate about purpose in nature and the lack thereof. From John Vervaeke's lecture series, Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. In lecture 6, Aristotle, Kant and Darwin, Vervaeke brings in Alice Juarrero, a systems theorist and philosopher of biology who's mentioned quite a few times on this forum. Her books include Dynamics in Action and Context Changes Everything.
Where this comes in, is Vervaeke's discussion of Aristotle's hylomorphism, and how Aristotle accounts for change through time. You can review this section of the lecture
This is where Juarrero's work is brought in:
This ties in with Terrence Deacon's ideas in Incomplete Nature (and in fact, there was an investigation as to whether Deacon plagiarized Juarrero when he published his book after hers, but he was absolved by an academic committee), and also (I think) with a lot of what @apokrisis says about biosemiosis. I introduce it here only because I think it helps to grasp the formative role of constraints and conditions in understanding the nature of purpose - not in the sense of mechanical causation, but in the sense of 'why things are the way they are'. This is where I think it makes sense to look for the original sense of Plato's eidos, the forms - not in some fanciful ethereal 'Platonic heaven' but in the underlying patterns of causal constraint which imposes order on possibility.
I'll leave it at that, as there's a limit to what can be meaningfully conveyed in a forum post. Suffice to say, I think it's pointing in a fruitful direction.
Or indeed, exactly what I've always said.
As it happens Deacon is a serial offender when it comes to picking up good ideas and recycling them in his own jargon so that this arguments seem more original than they actually are. I was pissed off when he did the same with Vygotsky, for instance. His first book. Yet still, he is a good populariser.
Juarrero is more interesting as she had to recapitulate the biosemiotic case as an academic outsider whereas Deacon had all the benefits of being an insider.
She told the story really well with an outsider's clarity, but was ignored as she was outside the general swim of systems science. He told the story craftily in a way that built his status in the wider world of ideas, but created a sour taste within the systems science community.
It's still very important to understand the difference between formal cause (as the existing conditions of constraint), and the final cause, that for the sake of which, the good or intent of the agent who acts, under those conditions. The purpose of the act is directly related to the final cause. And in Juarrero's distinction between causes and constraints, final cause must be a proper cause, while formal cause is the conditions of constraint. A scientific understanding of the formal cause, constraints, will never reveal the final cause, therefore not the purpose either.
The reason why the hylomorphic dichotomy of matter and form splits into four causes is because the further distinction of particular-general or local-global gets added.
So material cause has both its particular sense of some critical event - an efficient cause - and then the material cause which is a matter in the general sense of substantial being. Stuff you can work with.
Likewise formal cause divides into the immediacy of some actualising structure and then the generality that is an overriding purpose or constraining end.
At least this is how a natural philosopher would look at it. :smile:
Quoting Janus
Of course, I don't deny that some organisms and humans are purposeful, I just don't believe that the universe as a whole has any purpose in mind or was created with some purpose in mind. So, it's still not really clear just what you are arguing for.
This is not the specifically the subject of the lecture I mentioned, but it is one of the themes explored in the series Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. In that lecture, he traces the development of dynamic systems and evolutionary theory (hence Darwin in the title) but then at the end goes back to discussion of the ethical import of Aristotles philosophy:
https://www.meaningcrisis.co/episode-6-aristotle-kant-and-evolution/
I think maybe one interpretation is not to try and discern the meaning of the entire cosmos, as that seems a rather grandiose idea (although I think it is certainly an idea that Aristotle was prepared to entertain.) But I would hope that as were a part of that unfolding process, that insofar as we capable of living meaningfully, then were playing a part in it, and it is purposeful - which is the overall orientation of the talks hes giving.
Quoting Wayfarer
Can the Universe be ordered without being animated by purpose? Do you see the difference? Purpose and reason seem to suggest A purpose and A reason. That is , a realism in which things works according to a certain scheme , a particular content of meaning. By contrast , it could be that the universe is ordered in the sense that it changes with respect to itself in a way that is profoundly intimate. What makes this unfolding ordered is not an assigned purpose, but the lack of arbitrary content violently polarizing its movement in one direction or another. For instance, psychologist George Kelly wrote:
Kelly says all events in the universe are interlocked via temporal succession. What does he mean by interlocked? He says all its imaginable parts have an exact relationship to each other, but by exact' he doesn't appear to mean an objectively causal exactitude, even though he describes it as all working together like clockwork. The order of material causality is dictated by the empirical content, which is inherently arbitrary. A car engine's parts have an exact causal relationship with each other, but not an inferential one. If one part were removed, the others would retain their identity, even if the engine no longer worked. By contrast, in Kelly's form of interlocking, any two events are just as closely related to each other as either of them is to the third. In other words, all events are inferentially, relevantly, motivationally, replicatively related to each other like an optimally enlightened construct system, which is quite different than saying they are externally, causally connected via the representational relation between subjective knower and objective world.
Whereas mechanisms are assembled piece by piece from different parts, each with its own already fixed properties, that are all externally related to each other, living wholes are made up of internally related participant parts'. That is, instead of being structured into wholes by being all joined together by third entities (such as glue, nails, etc.) into unified structures, the parts' of a living whole do not already have a fixed character, nor are they fixed in place by glue' or nails.
Unlike for Vervaeke, getting the universe right doesnt mean capturing some particular contentful purpose or reason or scheme that we can nail down as the truth. It means that through discursive and practical niche construction, organism and environment are formed and reformed together through an ongoing, mutually intra-active reconfiguration. Over time , this process of mutual reconfiguration can reveal itself to us as Kellys profoundly interconnected and intercorrelated movement of a universe. We dont need the universe to be purposeful in order to reveal a reality in which human behavior can be understood as ethically benign. In fact, purpose, by implying a right path and a wrong path, gets in the way of such an understanding.
I think that's rightthe cosmos was understood to be centred on humans and was thus understood in anthropomorphic terms just as it was understood in anthropocentric terms,
With the Copernican revolution came the realization that humans are not at the centre of the cosmos. Then came Kant's second "Copernican" revolution which, ironically, in a way placed humans back at the centre. But this can be understood in the sense that, for us, experientially and phenomenologically speaking, we do find ourselves at the centre of things. I think it pays to remember that this is just a perspective, not an absolute.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree that it is important for humans to "live meaningfully", and I think they in fact mostly do live meaningfully in the ways and to the degrees their individual capacities allow. As Karl Jaspers stresses, we are potentially capable of self-transcendence through reason, which means we are potentially capable via reflection, self-analysis and critique, of seeing where we are being ruled by instinctive appetites or unexamined inadequate or negative socially /culturally introjected notions and understandings.
This idea is also reflected in the Nietszchean/ Heideggerian/ Kierkegaardian/ existentialist notion of 'living authentically" as opposed to living according to Heidegger's "das Mann". Where I think we diverge is that I don't think it is necessary to project this sense of purposeful life and potential self-transcendence beyond the human. Animals have their purposes, but as far as we can tell they cannot transcend their instinctive natures, and when it comes to plants and the rest of the mineral universe, even the idea of purpose seems inapt.
I said before, it seems an inevitable implication, but perhaps this is because of the theistic history of Western culture which seems to force itself upon us. Theres a passage I often quote from the Catholic Encyclopedia entry on Logos, to wit:
The parallels with 'dharma' are striking, dharma likewise being 'a universal law', 'individual station or duty', (and (n Buddhism) an element of experience). And there are many non-theistic forms of this kind of belief in Hinduism also. As metaphors, think they're quite philosophically congenial to naturalism or the kind of emergent or extended naturalism that is beginning to appear.
Quoting Janus
Whereas, humans can. Which is one of the predicaments that popular Darwnism leaves us, as it makes no provision for this fact.
Steve Talbott, who's essays I really love, is a philosopher of biology who has a lot to say about that. There's a particular essay of his, From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, which I think draws out this distinction in exquisite detail. (I wish I could paraphrase it, but it's a very hard topic to summarize. I found Steve Talbott's essays on The New Atlantis site, they're first rate on all of this.)
Perhaps unpacking the last claim would help.
I do think giving purpose(s) to things takes more complex cognition/thinking than attributing meaning/significance. As before, purpose involves a means to some goal. I think we agree there.
I'm curious what sort of reasoning/justification grounds the implication that only humans are capable of attributing meaning/significance and/or giving purpose to things. The way you put the last claim may be indicative of how you've arrived at that. May I safely conclude that you do not believe any other creature(aside from humans) is capable of thinking in any way that it makes sense for us to say that they are attributing meaning or significance to something, or that no other creature is capable of 'giving' purpose to other things?
All of that presupposes some unspoken notions. Meaning. Significance. Thought. We may be working from very different notions.
[quote=Steve Talbott, Evolution and the Purposes of Life;https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/evolution-and-the-purposes-of-life] The following extended passage about the chaffinch (a small finch) comes from a 1927 description by the British ornithologist Edward Max Nicholson (quoted in E.S. Russells 1934 book The Behaviour of Animals):
Here the male must leave the flock, if he has belonged to one, and establish himself in a territory which may at the time be incapable of sustaining him alone, but must later in the season supply a satisfactory food-supply for himself, his mate and family, and against as many birds of other species as overlap his sphere of influence. He must then sing loudly and incessantly for several months, since, however soon he secures a mate, trespassers must be warned off the territory, or, if they ignore his warning, driven out. His mate must help with the defence of the territory when she is needed; pairing must be accomplished; a suitable site must be found for the nest; materials must be collected and put together securely enough to hold five bulky young birds; eggs must be laid in the nest and continuously brooded for a fortnight till they hatch, often in very adverse weather; the young are at first so delicate that they have to be brooded and encouraged to sleep a great part of the time, yet they must have their own weight of food in a day, and in proportion as the need of brooding them decreases their appetites grow, until in the end the parents are feeding four or five helpless birds equal to themselves in size and appetite but incapable of digesting nearly such a wide diet. Enemies must be watched for and the nest defended and kept clean. When the young scatter, often before they can fly properly, they need even greater vigilance, but within a few days of the fledging of the first brood a second nest will (in many cases) be ready and the process in full swing over again. All this has to be done in face of great practical difficulties by two creatures, with little strength and not much intelligence, both of whom may have been hatched only the season before.
Here, too, organized behavior reflects the interests and needs, the perception, and the future requirements, of agents carrying out highly effective, end-directed activity. To be sure, the bird is not consciously reflecting upon its situation. But...we make sense of what happens by interpreting it as a series of reasonable responses to the birds ever-changing life context all in the light of its own ends. While we cannot view the bird as inferring, deducing, and deciding, it is nevertheless recognizing and responding to elements of significance in its environment. There is a continual and skillful adjustment to a perceived surround that is never twice the same surround.[/quote]
Humans, more than most animals, are "animated by purpose". But the universe, as a whole system, is structured by Logic. That mathematical Logic is arithmetical, in that various threads of causation always add-up to a single global effect. Hence, the world may have an "assigned" (teleological) Purpose, but no-one knows what that final summation will be. Yet, humans, animated by their own motives, infer and impute various "schemes" to the world, to the World Mind.
Since we live in the middle of the Cosmic "life-span", the beginning and end are remote and vague. And, since causation interacts with itself --- action & reaction --- the "unfolding" can seem to be random & chaotic. So, humans like to impose their own purposes in order to "polarize" its path in their chosen direction. Nevertheless, Evolution --- to unroll like a scroll --- gradually reveals that which was inscrutable until actualized. And many evolutionists interpret that scroll as a story moving toward a denoument or coda. Some have proposed that rational homo sapiens must be the acme of evolution. Others, propose that logical artificial entities will eventually inherit the Earth. Presumably, their programming God looks like a robot.
Like most mysteries though, The End is obscured by misdirection, and the Purpose will only be revealed when all threads are tied-up in the final scene. Meanwhile, we will have to be content with incompletely informed prognostication ; which is "difficult, especially if it's about the future". :smile:
As to what purpose is, I here take it to be that end for the sake of which an action, else movement, occurs or for the sake of which something iswith the latter (things) being subsumed by the former (processes) in any process theory.
That said, for the kick of it, Ill offer an extremely pithy premise regarding the universal purpose of biological evolutionwithin which context our own individual cognitive purposes unfoldwhich Id love to see falsified on either logical or empirical grounds:
For better clarity, this irrespective of the detailed means, e.g. via optimal biological fitness relative to individuals and groups, via occurrences of genetic drift, and via the many almost innumerable other detailed means by which biological evolution is currently known to occur. Adaptation to an ever-changing world then being one less abstract facet of this just stated purposeful process. Such that that life which sufficiently deviates from optimal conformity to what is actual/real ceases to be while the life forms which maintains such optimal conformity to what is actual/real persevere.
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* As to some of this pithily expressed premises implications: The same relationship of conformity to that which is real/actual can well also adequately define the attribute of truthsuch that when this conformity becomes complete, hence absolute (here tentatively entertaining the hypothetical that it in principle can), life then obtains a state of being wherein truth and reality/actuality become one and the same: here maybe better expresses as Truth with capital T. Also of note, as its been just specified, this global purpose of life will then occur in the absence of any superlative egos (i.e., Gods) so intending things to bewith the very notion of a purposing God being superfluous to the state of affairs specified (a God who'd furthermore also need to be subject to some end in order to act purposely, different issue though this is)instead, here purpose in the form of ultimately becoming one with global Truth is a staple aspect of existence; i.e., it becomes a brute fact of the world. So, in a likewise somewhat informal expression, the purpose of life is here taken to be that of not only eventually discovering the quintessentially genuine (true in this sense) actuality/reality of being itself but of also becoming one with it. Add some measure of indeterminacy and free will into the equation and, we via our own freely willed choices then (at least at times) stand in the way of this grand end being actualized, or at least further approached; this, for one example, by preferring fictitious accounts of what is and of what will be over truths regarding the same (truths which at times can be at least initially unpleasant to accept). Other implications could then follow, such as the provision of why lies in general are to be deemed bad: they further the whole from the very end here addressed (which I might add could also be labeled as "the Good").
All that saidwith all these implications being not perfectly expressedwhat Im primarily curious about is, again, any valid argument against the pithy premise regarding the global purpose of life (this via the analysis of biological evolutions purpose/end) which was previously specified.
P.s., While Im anticipating some degree of discord on the matter if Im at all replied to, I likely wont be around to reply for a number of days.
[edit: some typo's corrected]
Birds and other animals surely exhibit intentional behaviour. What they dont exhibit is the rational, abstract and meta-cognitive awareness of h. sapiens. But the excerpt shows how intentional, purposeful acts don't necesssarily require the latter and that intentionality has a much broader scope than what we think of as conscious intentionality.
Quoting javra
:100: I've been reading about the ideal of the mind's conformity with actuality and the distinction between 'conforms with' and 'corresponds to'. Compare with the Platonic principle 'to be, is to be intelligible.' See Eric D Perl Thinking Being.
Thank you kindly. Yes, though in some ways subtle, I find the distinction quite important, both ontologically and epistemologically - in many ways related to the notion of forms/eidoi and their relation of either accordance/harmony or the converse (whereby conflict occurs in some measure). Thumbs up to the Platonic principle you quote.
I've so far gotten a "404 not found" in the link. I'll check back in later.
Sorry about that, wrongly transcribed, here it is again https://www.gornahoor.net/library/ThinkingBeing.pdf
I am mainly interested in the chapter on Plato. He shows where the predominant interpretation of the nature of the ideas or forms goes wrong.
This is debatable. Humans, with intellect and will, provide themselves the freedom to choose from a multitude of options in their activities. Animals seem to be driven towards very specific goals, without the capacity to choose. Each is "animated by purpose", and I do not see how you could argue one is more so than the other.
I agree that its a very murky question, but I think theres something fishy about it too. Sorry about the mixed metaphor, but speaking of murky and fishy, but a story thats fascinated me is the account of the long-finned eels in Sydneys Centennial Park. They live in murky ponds in the middle of said park, which is quite a few kilometres from the ocean. But every so often, at night and when its very wet, theyll begin a migratory trek through a route that takes them across open parkland into some ponds connected to Sydneys Botany Bay (hence their preference for wet evenings). And then theyll make their way to a deep ocean trench near New Caledonia, which is about 1,800 km from Sydney, to breed. Their larval offspring then drift around for a few years, becoming elvers, and then when reaching their adult form, will make their way back to Sydneys Centennial Park - even though they, as individuals, have never been there. But they know. Instinct, I guess.
There are many examples of migrating animals doing things like this - Pacific Salmon (or is it Atlantic? Whatever), who make their way back to their home stream from across thousands of miles of ocean. Birds who fly from the Arctic to Tasmania to breed. Obviously they dont consciously calculate anything in the way a human would, but it makes me wonder whether how well we really understand what instinct is, and how much of nature depends on these instinctive processes. Theyre not intentional processes, in the sense that human agents understand it, So in some sense theyre intentional but also unconscious. (Schopenhauer devotes a section of WWI to this.)
But to try and tie this back to some of the points I brought up earlier, Im wondering if it suggests a sense in which intentionality (or will in Schopenhauers sense) is manifested at the most basic level of organic life. I dont want to say that it is, but I think its an interesting question, and that it relates to questions of purpose and intentionality on a larger scale than the intentional actions of conscious agents.
Perhaps I should have said, "human purposes are both more complex and more general than animal's simple & narrowly focused goals" . But that's a mouthful, compared with just "more than". :smile:
All eels have very interesting life cycles. They begin life in the ocean, and stay there many years, often traveling thousands of kilometers. Then they travel up fresh water rivers and streams for many more kilometers. There they stay for many years, to feed and grow. Then they head back to the ocean traveling thousands of kilometers to spawn. All the while, they metamorphose through numerous stages suited to what they are doing at the time.
Don't worry! You could live your whole life in Sydney, as I have, but never cross paths with a migrating eel. I only know about it because I read of it in the Sydney Morning Herald. (Although I have observed them stealing pieces of bread that the visitors feed to the ducks when I've visited Centennial Park.)
My only point was to argue that the view we have that 'purpose' is solely the prerogative of conscious agents is a very narrow one.
Ah. Good. Thanks for clarifying.
So, I'm curious. Do you have a bare minimum criterion for what counts and/or what it takes for any and/or all examples of giving purpose to something to count as such?
I mean, it seems to me that if humans and other creatures can 'give things purpose' then there must be some bare minimum criterion, some basic set of common denominators/elements, which counts as such. What do all examples of a capable creature giving purpose to something include, human examples notwithstanding?
I'm concerned that focusing upon only human examples could lead us away from the more basic ones. It seems to me that our criterion regarding what counts as the most basic outline of 'giving purpose' needs to be perfectly capable of bridging the gap between the language less animals' cases and our own.
My apologies. The scarequotes implied uncertainty on my part. You used the terms. I indicated my own trepidation of that use by using scarequotes. That was a way of mentioning without assent.