Axiology is the highest good
The thesis statement of this thread is that axiology (the study of value) is the highest good.
Do you agree with this statement? How do you understand the association between value and what is good? How are they related to one another?
Thanks!
Do you agree with this statement? How do you understand the association between value and what is good? How are they related to one another?
Thanks!
Comments (54)
Your thesis statement is circular at best (e.g. the study of value is 'the highest value' :roll:).
If what you're saying is that of what is of "value" and "good" are one and the same, then I would disagree.
Seems easy to get lost in semantics. A critic might suggest why not have the study of the value of studying the value of a study of value while your at it. Or something along the lines of suggesting all philosophy relates to the characteristics or lack thereof of things and ideas as such is what constitutes a definition which is required for any form of understanding. Or am I way off here? What is your take, bearing those possibly warranted critiques in mind?
According to Harry Frankfurter and Hume (the respectable late philosopher), the highest good seems to be 'love'.
Quoting Outlander
Well, I think the confusion can be mitigated about the quality of value by asserting that it exists in degrees of greatness, yes? So, if love is something we value, then I believe that it seems to exist in a category of its own.
Quoting Outlander
I don't think the disambiguation or delineating what is good and what is of value is entirely a semantic issue. Again, if you want to go in this direction I believe in the very subjectivity of 'value' is to be associated with relativism or postmodernism if that's how you want this discussion to shape into...
A solid statement to make, assuredly. But what is love in this sense? By most definitions it alludes to a feeling of admiration that transcends (is devoid of any and all or is otherwise operating outside of the realm of) logic. If this is true, how useful is such a quality in philosophy, really? Does it not make philosophical discourse into little more than a game of favorites based on transient states of favor not fixed in any deeper absolute truth or concrete value?
Quoting Shawn
Value is certainly, in most cases, non-binary, I agree. I'm semi-artistic, but nothing at all in comparison to others. One can be a tad miffed at something just as one can be overwhelmingly infuriated, yes. A sign can be reddish-purple or flat out bright red. A person can be a bit misdirected and misguided without being flat out lost and bumbling around mindlessly, etc, etc. However, one cannot be "a little bit" pregnant, for example. Rough example but a valid one of a quality that is in fact binary or otherwise limited to a dual state of either "committed" or not. But for most conceptual things, I would agree.
Could there not be different types of a single value each with varying degrees, though? Take love, for example. There's platonic, romantic, and one other I believe. You could love someone as a brother but hate them as a friend, no?
Quoting Shawn
Just my personal difficulty in understanding the concept as I believe it to be intended, is all. Nothing more. :smile:
If you could replace 'value' with a single word, what would it be? Worth? (to whom?) Characteristic? (intrinsic and absolute or circumstantial based on social or environmental factors?) Something else?
I enjoy your threads as they're often brief and to the point, allowing even those ignorant of common philosophical models and -isms such as myself room to jump in and postulate from a beginner's frame of mind comfortably in between other mentally-taxing tasks. Looks like I may have gotten a bit over eager on this one, however.
It seems like a deep question, rather very deep. According to relativists and postmodernists, to the best of my knowledge, there are very few absolute truth's. But, I will list something that might seem perplexing... Namely, if economics is the domain where value is defined, in terms of a unit of value (such as money), then why the hell are things this way? Why do Westerners seem like sheer materialists in terms of professing what they believe as what is valuable or concrete value? Does that make some sense, because I find it hard to believe...
Quoting Outlander
Yes, there are degrees of value. Just referencing Wiki here; but, there seems to be no consensus on what philosophers denote as what is value. The best we have to agree on is probably money. Again sheer materialism, right?
Quoting Outlander
I think methodological nominalism forces be to conclude that it would have to be worth, given society and personal values where they get sorted out...
Quoting Outlander
Thanks, looking forward to your posts.
If I were to say "Happiness is the highest good, because it leads to all the others", then how might you say the philosophical study of values is higher than that?
We're given a chance in, for example, our house, to redeem our natural, pre-tech-submission ,moral behaviour, you think passively as you conduct predetermined automation, you are confronted with impulses over your mind making you notice morality, and are either criminal or moral in mind.
Tech submission is fine but it ups the game.
What is of the highest good can only be defined by how you or a group of people value it, no?
Not "What is of highest good?" -- I'm asking what would it count to be a "highest good" at all? Or, perhaps easier: Why axiology and not something else?
Quoting Shawn
That's the thesis, but where's the reason for it?
If God is literally the name of the driving force and mirror that allowed life to begin.
A good question. :up:
But, doesn't the situation that you are framing require us to have a way of qualifying what is good by appreciating it? Hence, the presupposition, to me, seems like we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good."
That's the start of a reason, I think. I'm reading you as saying "Because we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good" " -- am I reading you right?
Yes, that's what I'm saying.
OK, so rephrasing the thesis with justification:
"The study of value is the highest good, because we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good" "
So I'm wondering if the first meaning of "value" is the same as the second? Is the study of value becoming able to value what is good?
Because I had been reading the thesis as "Axiology is the highest good, because..." which I think of as category of philosophy in which questions like "What is the highest good?" are asked, but usually people get by with goods just fine without studying axiology. (which isn't to say I don't find axiology important, but people are able to value good without study, so the thesis seemed confusing to me)
Yes, I shortened the thesis too much. So, I think the study of value is of the highest good to the philosopher.
Quoting Moliere
Yes, well, what a impoverished world to value things only materialistically with a unit of exchange to do so, such as money.
M'kay.
I can at least think about it now. I was just confused as to what you were saying.
Yes, and the further question asks whether the highest good is the highest good or the study of value (axiology). Even supposing that we have to enter into the study of value to determine the highest good, does it then follow that the study of value is the highest good? It seems to me like saying that the study of nutrition is the most nutritious thing.
I would say that one must study good (or value) in an abstract way, but that this abstraction or reification is not itself the highest good. It seems that it simply cannot be the highest good by the very fact that it is a means to an end.
(I leave aside the probable thesis that the study of value is not the same as the study of good)
Right!
If "studying the highest good" is going into a monastic life in order to improve oneself and happens to include reading texts then I think I can understand the motivation for the assertion.
But not if it's just straight up reading text books. That's what I was confused by, and am still thinking over.
Yeah, I agree. One can, by analogy, go to a nutritionist and follow their advice to be nutritious.
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't know how much study is important at all to the good at a personal level, but I recognize its importance as a discipline. I think that's getting me hung up a bit -- are we meaning the study of value is the highest good for the academic type philosophy, or the medical type philosophy?
The study of nutritious certainly helps us be nutritious, but eating the right foods and not the wrong ones is what makes one healthy.
I think this is a good example. Presumably axiology functions like temporary monasticism in relation to the highest good. For example, St. Ignatius of Loyola fashioned his 30-day silent retreat (in large part) to help people make the most important decisions in their lifeto make "an election". Now supposing that this temporary 'monastic' retreat succeeds in allowing the person to make such a decision, does it follow that the retreat is higher than the decision that it made possible? I want to say that the decision is more important than the retreat, because the retreat exists for the purpose of the decision. If the retreat were more important than the decision then the person should just have become a permanent monk and forgotten about their decision altogether!
Quoting Moliere
Yes, exactly. The study of nutrition is good as far as it goes, but one could literally die of starvation while becoming obsessed with the study of nutrition. :wink:
Quoting Moliere
Axiology is a formal discipline, but I want to say that folks dip their toes into axiology whenever they reflect on a decision. "Is this really the best thing to do in my circumstance?" "Is this really the right decision to make?" So even in this non-academic sense one could compare the weighing of goods and choices with the subsequent adherence to a chosen good. Axiology helps us weigh goods, but the point (to so speak) is buying goods, not simply weighing them.
The merit of academic axiology is admittedly all the less plausible. :lol:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiological_ethics
I don't want to interject anything of my own unless there are any questions to answer.
There is a secondary question beyond the idea that axiology is a means to an end, and it relates to akrasia. For the modern mind if one knows the highest good then they will necessarily choose it, and therefore axiology assumes a preeminent place. For the ancient mind to intellectually know the highest good does not mean that one will necessarily be capable of choosing it and adhering to it, and because of this axiology becomes more subsidiary. In that case the proper ordering of desires becomes a central end of education (in the broad sense).
What does "highest good", as you're using the term, mean or refer to?
:up:
I believe you are correct about this way of stating the interrelationship between incontinence and axiology. Yet, the hierarchy of values is, what I suppose, a function of the nous performing this decision, as Plato would have defined it. So, what would you say about such an idea?
Quoting Leontiskos
No disagreement, here. Education must count as a very high good, maybe even the highest, according to Plato. :chin:
Well, is it something that, in your mind, has to be true universally? Because I only know of a few goods that, I assume, have the highest or very high goodness to them, which I value highly.
I don't see how it would be exclusive to philosophers; but, rather to anyone concerned about "the good."
And what is "the good" to "anyone" philosopher and non-philosopher alike?
What they value.
:roll:
Quoting Shawn
Quoting Shawn
This morning I went chasing a quote and dug up this:
On His Own Ignorance And That of Many Others II, Petrarch
The quote I had in mind was "It is better to want the good than to know the truth", which you can see this English translation doesn't translate it as that, probably going for something less catchy but more accurate :D. But it's relevant, and I thought it'd be cool to bring something textual to think through these questions -- and it's fairly short because it's a letter so it's not a big ask, perfect for TPF. (EDIT: After all, if axiology is the highest good, then we ought to be doing some studying)
This is a letter Petrarch wrote which deals with these themes of knowledge and value -- which seems to relate in that your thesis is that the study of ethics is the highest good, and also because he's clearly more on the medical-type philosophy side.
I'm going to paste the part of the letter which skips the parts that were necessary at the time: the whipping of the self before getting to the point, and the praise of God for loving this insignificant worm after the point just so we can talk about the point and not get lost in the genre. It was the beginning of the Rennaissance so writing conventions differed from ours, plus it is just a letter which has a nice story for thought in it.
Tell me what you think of it whenever you have the time, if you'd like.
*****
As had come to be their custom, there called on me these four friends whose names you need not be told, since you know them all. Moreover, an inviolable law of friendship forbids mentioning the names of friends when you are speaking against them, even if they do not behave like friends in a particular case. They came in pairs, as equality of character or some chance bound them together. Occasionally all four of them came, and came with astonishingly winning manners, with a gay expression on their faces, and started an agreeable conversation. I have no doubt they came with good and pious intentions. However, through some cracks an unfortunate grudge had crept into hearts that deserve a better guest. It is incredible, though it is true--if only it were not too true! The man whom they wish not only good health and happiness, whom they not only love but respect, honor by their visit and venerate, to whom they try with greatest effort to be not only kind but obedient and generous--this very same person is the object of their envy. So full of patent and hidden frailties is human nature.
What is it that they envy me? I do not know, I must admit, and I am amazed when I try to find out. Certainly it is not wealth, for every single one of them surpasses me as much in wealth as "the British whale is bigger than the dolphin," as that man has said. Moreover, they wish me even greater wealth. They know that what I have is moderate, not my own property but to be shared with others. It is not magnificent but very modest without haughtiness and pomp. They know that it really does not deserve any envy. They will not envy me my friends.
The greater part of them death has taken from me, and I have the habit of sharing them willingly, just like everything else with other friends. They cannot envy me the shapeliness of my body. If there was ever such a thing, it has vanished entirely in the course of the years that vanquish all. By God's overflowing and preserving grace it is still quite satisfactory for my present age, but it has certainly long since ceased to be enviable. And if it were still as it was once, could I forget or could I then have forgotten the poetic sentence I drank in as a small boy; "Shapeliness is a frail possession," or the words of Solomon in the book in which he teaches the young: "Gracefulness is deceitful and beauty is vain." How should they then envy me what I do not have, what I held in contempt while I had it, and what I would despise now to the utmost were it given back to me, having learned and experienced how unstable it is? They cannot even envy me learning and eloquence! Learning, they declare, I have absolutely none. Eloquence, if I has is any, they despise according to the modern philosophic fashion. They reject it as unworthy of a man of letters. Thus only "infantile inability to speak" and perplexed stammering, "wisdom" trying hard to keep one eye open and "yawning drowsily," as Cicero calls it, is held in good repute nowadays. They do not call to mind "Plato, the most eloquent of all men," and--let me omit the others--"Aristotle sweet and mild," but whom they made trite. From Aristotle's ways they swerve, taking eloquence to be an obstacle and a disgrace to philosophy, while he considered it a mighty adornment and tried to combine it with philosophy, "prevailed upon," it is asserted, "by the fame of the Orator Isocrates."
Not even virtue can they envy me, though it is beyond doubt the best and most enviable of all things. To them it seems worthless--I believe because it is not inflated and puffed up with arrogance. I should wish to possess it, and, indeed, they grant it to me unanimously and willingly. Small things they have denied me, and this very greatest possession they lavish upon me as a small gift. They call me a good man, even the best of men. If only I were not bad, not the worst in God's judgment! However, at the same time they claim that I am altogether illiterate,that I am a plain uneducated fellow. This is just the opposite of what men of letters have stated when judging me, I do not care with how much truth. I do not make much of what these,friends deprive me of, if only what they concede me were true.
Most gladly should I divide between me and these brothers of mine the inheritance of Mother Nature and heavenly Grace, so that they would all be men of letters and I a good man. I should wish to know nothing of letters or just so much as would be expedient for the daily praise of God. But, alas, I fear I shall be disappointed in this my humble desire just as they will be in their arrogant opinion. At any rate, they assert that I have a good character and am very faithful in my friendship, and in this last assertion they are not mistaken, unless I am.
This, incidentally, is the reason why they count me among their friends. They are not prevailed upon to do so by my efforts in studying the honorable arts or the hope ever to hear and learn truth from me. Thus it comes plainly to what Augustine tells of his Ambrose, saying, "I began to love him, not as a teacher of truth, but as a man who was kind to me"; or what Cicero feels about Epicurus: Cicero approves of his character in many passages, while he everywhere condemns his intellect and rejects his doctrine.
Since all this is the case, it may be doubtful what they envy me, though there is no doubt that they do envy me something. They do not well conceal it and do not curb their tongues, which are urged by an inward impulse. In men otherwise neither unbalanced nor foolish this is nothing but a clear sign of undisciplined passion. Provided that they are envious of me as they obviously are, and that there is no other object of their envy--the latent virus is expanding by itself at any rate. For there is one thing, one empty thing, that they envy me, however trifling it may be: my name and what fame I have already won within my lifetime--greater fame perhaps than would be due to my merits or in conformity with the common habit which but very rarely celebrates living men. It is upon this fame that they have fixed their envious eyes. If only I could have done without it both now and often before! I remember that it has done me harm more often than good, winning me quite a few friends but also countless enemies. It has happened to me as to those who go into battle in a conspicuous helmet though with but little strength: they gain nothing from the dazzling brightness of this chimera except to be struck by more adversaries. Such pesti- lence was once but too familiar to me during my more flourishing years; never was there one so troublesome as that which has now blazed up. I am now an anvil too soft for young men's wars and for assuming such burdens, and this pestilence revives unexpectedly from a quarter from which I do not deserve it and did not suspect it either, at a moment when it should have been long since overcome by my moral conduct or consumed by the course of time. But I will go on: They think they are great men, and they are certainly rich, all of them, which is the only mortal greatness nowadays. They feel, although many people deceive themselves in this respect, that they have not won a name and cannot hope ever to win one if their foreboding is right. Among such sorrows they languish anxiously; and so great is the power of evil that they stick out their tongues and sharpen their teeth like mad dogs even against friends and wound those whom they love. Is this not a strange kind of blindness, a strange kind of fury? In just this manner the frantic mother of Pentheus tears her son to pieces and the raving Hercules his infant children. They love me and all that is mine, with the single exception of my name--which I do not refuse to change. Let them call me Thersites or Choerilus, or whatever name they prefer, provided I thus obtain that this honest love suffers not the slightest restriction.They are all the more ablaze and aglow with a blind fire, since they are all such fervent scholars, working indefatigably all night long.
However, the first of them has no learning at all--I tell you only what you know--the second knows a little; the third not much; the fourth--I must admit--not a little but in such confused and undisciplined order and, as Cicero says, "with so much frivolity and vain boasting that it would perhaps be better to know nothing." For letters are instruments of insanity for many, of arrogance for almost everyone, if they do not meet with a good and well-trained mind. Therefore, he has much to tell about wild animals, about bird and fishes: how many hairs there are in the lion's mane; how many feathers in the hawk's tail; with how many arms the cuttlefish clasps a shipwrecked man; that elephants couple from behind and are pregnant for two years; that this docile and vigorous animal, the nearest to man by its intelligence, lives until the end of the second or third century of its life; that the phoenix is consumed by aromatic fire and revives after it has been burned; that the sea urchin stops a ship,however fast she is driving along, while it is unable to do anything once it is dragged out of the waves; how the hunter fools the tiger with a mirror; how the Arimasp attacks the griffin with his sword; how whales turn over on their backs and thus deceive the sailors; that the newborn of the bear has as yet no shape; that the mule rarely gives birth, the viper only once and then to its own disaster; that moles are blind and bees deaf; that alone among all living beings the crocodile moves its upper jaw.
All this is for the greater part wrong, as has become manifest in many similar cases when animals were brought into our part of the world. The facts have certainly not been investigated by those who are quoted as authorities for them; they have been all the more promptly believed or boldly invented, since the animals live so far from us. And even if they were true, they would not contribute anything whatsoever to the blessed life. What is the use--I beseech you--of knowing the nature of quadrupeds,fowls, fishes, and serpents and not knowing or even neglecting man's nature, the purpose for which we are born, and whence and whereto we travel?
These and like matters I have often discussed with these "scribes" who are most learned, not in the Law of Moses and the Christian Law, but, as they flatter themselves, in the Aristotelian law. I did so more frankly than they were accustomed to hear and perhaps with less caution: talking with friends, I did not think of any harm that might derive from it. At first they were astonished, then they became angry, and, as they felt that my words were directed against their sect and the laws of their father, they set up a council among themselves to condemn for the crime of ignorance--not me whom they undoubtedly love-- out my fame which they hate. If only they had called others to this court! Then there would perhaps have been opposition to the sentence they intended to pronounce. However, to keep the verdict harmonious and unanimous, only these four convened. They discussed many different matters concerning the absent and undefended defendant--not because they disagreed in their opinions, for they all felt the same way and intended to say the same thing, but they were arguing with each other and against their own sentence after the manner of expert judges. Thus they wanted to render a decision with more color by sifting and squeezing the truth through the narrow sieve of contradictions.
As the first point, they said that public renown supported me, but replied that it deserved little faith. So far they did not lie since the vulgar mass very rarely sees the truth. Then they said that friendship with the greatest and most learned men, which has adorned my life--as I shall boast before the Lord--stood against their verdict. For I have enjoyed close friendship with many kings, especially with King Robert of Sicily, who honored me in my younger years with frequent and clear testimonials of my knowledge and genius. They replied--and here I will not say their iniquity but their vanity evidently made them lie--that the king himself enjoyed great fame in literary matters but had no knowledge of them; and the others, however learned they were, did not show a sufficiently perspicacious judgment concerning me, whether love of me or carelessness was the cause.
They then made another objection against themselves, saying that the last three Roman popes had vied with each other in inviting me--in vain, it is true--to a high rank in their intimate household; and that Urban himself, who is now at the head was wont to speak well of me and had already bestowed on me a most affable letter. Besides, it is known far and wide and doubted by no one that the present Roman emperor--for there has been no other legitimate emperor at this time--counts me among his dear familiars and has been wont to call me to him with the weight of daily requests and repeated messages and letters. In all this they feel that some people find some proof that I must have a certain value. However, they resolve this objection too, maintaining that the popes went astray together with the others, following the general opinion about me, or were induced to do so by my good moral behavior and not by my knowledge; and that the emperor was prevailed upon by my studies of the past and my historical works, for in this field they do not deny me some knowledge.
Furthermore, they said, another objection against them was my eloquence. This I do not acknowledge altogether, by God not. They pretend that it is a rather effective means of persuasion. It might be the task of a rhetor or an orator to speak oppositely in order to persuade for a purpose, but many people without knowledge had succeeded in persuading by mere phrases. Thus they attribute to luck what is a matter of art and bring forth the widespread proverb: "Much eloquence, little wisdom." They do not take into account Cato's definition of the oratory which contradicts their false charge. Finally, it was said that the style of my writing is in opposition to their statement. They did not dare to blame my style, not even to praise it too reservedly, and confessed that it is rather elegant and well chosen but without any learning. I do not understand how this can be, and I trust they did not understand it either. If they regain control of themselves and think over again what they have said, they will be ashamed of their silly ineptitude. For if the first statement were true--which I for my part would neither assert nor make myself believe--I have no doubt that the second is wrong. How could the style of a person who knows nothing at all be excellent, since theirs amounts to nothing, though there is nothing they do not know? Do we so far suspect everything to be fortuitous that we leave no room for reason? What else do you want? Or what do you believe? I think you expect to hear the verdict of the judges. Well, they examined each point. Then, fixing their eyes on I know not what god-- for there is no god who wants iniquity, no god of envy or ignorance, which I might call the twofold cloud-shrouding truth--they pronounced this short final sentence: I am a good man without learning. Even if they have never spoken the truth and never shall speak it, may they have spoken it at least this once!
In what sense does the study of value instantiate value? You can study anatomy but never practice medicine. Arguably, the practice of medicine instantiates more benefits than the study of anatomy.
I find the premise that what people actually do reflects their values much, much more than what they say (or write). So while axiology may have some value, it can hardly lay claim to being the highest value, therefore, neither can it lay claim to being the highest good.
Okay. :up:
Quoting Shawn
I think you are thinking about axiology as the means to the highest good. For Plato philosophy is the means to The Good. Yet I think Plato would say that The Good is the highest good, not philosophy. As you say:
Quoting Shawn
I agree that it is one of the highest goods, just as Plato would agree that philosophy is one of the highest goods. But I do not agree that it is the highest good.
No, let me rephrase what you said. The study of value, appreciates the valuable from the rest of things.
Yes, I agree that it's a nice letter. Yet, it seemed so apologetic as to apologize for even writing the letter. :snicker:
I find this hard to believe.
I wanted it all in context, but I should highlight the portion that's most relevant to the topic and why I started looking it up in the first place:
His friends criticize him for merely being a good man who does not care for truth. The bits on envy, so I read the letter at least, are very much Petrarch's interpretation of his friends. When I think about what his friends are saying it sounds like his friends are bragging.
But the point with respect to studying axiology I was thinking of is in Petrarch's insistence that being lettered and educated isn't as important as being a good man. Something to note here is how literacy wasn't widespread at the time since this predates the Gutenberg press, and also that Petrarch is clearly a man of letters in this time as demonstrated by his writing. So he's not insulting education or its value, but insisting that it's not the same as being a good man, and that this is more important than being lettered.
So, I take this as a analogy that was provided of the nutritionist.
Yet, I find it hard to believe that without knowledge of valence of value, how would anyone know how to appreciate or cherish the good? If you take a glance at how transient happiness is, then the very notion of what one values would serve as a compass in the fleeting moments of cherishing and loving the good.
I like this formulation better. :up:
"The study of axiology" is not itself axiology (i.e the study of value), so how does this "enhance the appreciation of value" when its object of study is not even (a) value?
And "appreciation of value" does not even evaluate (or act consistently with) (a) value, so what does such "appreciation" mean, that is, what is one doing when one is "appreciating" value itself a mere abstraction (like a number)?
It would seem that "the study of" connotes the act of reflection upon the topic or instance of something. So it can rightly be construed as an extension or expansion of the thing being studied. Just as the study of music enables one to directly experience nuances of performance inaudible to the untrained ear. In other words, that reflection upon something is able to enhance the value of that thing. Which is to say that reflection is inherently valuable, or confers value.
Would this relationship hold generally: if and only if a person does not have knowledge of valence of X, then it's hard to explain how they have an appreciation of or cherishing of [s]the[/s] Y.
Where, in your example, the variables are set to
X=value
Y=the good
?
I agree with your sentiment here. I think what I'm hung up on is whether or not the compass in times of suffering -- what one values -- is a knowledge, and also I'm uncertain what "valence" might mean in relation to value which is why I tried to break out the sentence from the topic at hand to understand your assertion; is there another example for X and Y in the above which would fit within the sentence, or another way to put the sentence with another example?
Or, really, I'm asking after what all these terms mean in relation to one another, or if there's a simpler way to state the belief you find hard to see as false.
Quoting Shawn
I think Petrarch's different here in that the nutritionist example differentiates goodness from knowledge of goodness, but the layperson ought visit the expert in order to better their chances of becoming good -- that is, there is a knowledge that may not be necessary, and is certainly different from the activity, but it enables that activity.
Petrarch, as I'm understanding the letter -- I'm not expert on him by any means -- prioritizes this activity to the point that even though he clearly loves letters(knowledge), he would trade this knowledge without hesitation for being good. There's a different priority there which, if one could be good without knowledge then it seems one could cherish and appreciate that goodness even though they have no knowledge of the valence of the good.
In the same manner as the bodybuilder trains his or her body to become more muscular, so too the layman or moreso the philosopher can profess the study of value to become more content or cognizant of what to value.
Yes, well I don't have all the answers to your question; but, I can attempt to say that the study of value would lead a person to believe that what they value is in fact a good "thing."
On the contrary I'm hesitant to say that there's a direct correspondence between X and Y. So, what do you think about the association between X and whether it is intrinsically related to Y, as I'm getting hung up on intrinsic goods which have a strict relationship, and instrumental or extrinsic goods with a weaker relationship...
I think valence of value is confounded by many factors, such as, whether one 'likes' or 'dislikes' something to be valued. Otherwise, it may also depend on the inherentness of a quality or attribute to the ascription of value. Hope that doesn't sound too vague.
Nope! That helps. To summarize what I'm understanding:
Valence of value is known by liking or disliking or perception of intrinsic value or willing some value
Quoting Shawn
I want to reformulate with the above now. I was confused and so wrote some confusing things.
Quoting Shawn
What if the good is different from knowing value?
That seems to be Petrarch's point.
The good layperson without that knowledge still cherishes good even without that understanding because they just are good -- it's a different sort of knowing from axiological knowing, even in the monastic sense.
I think it does, but the question is -- do these values, or commitments, equate to a knowledge? Or are they just convictions?
I'm (very) old school: they (we) are what we do and not merely what they (we) say practice alone cultivates habits. To "profess" is merely to preach which, more than anything, promotes hypocrisy. Besides, axiology is the study of how to reflectively form and apply value that necessarily begins with critique of "what to value" (i.e. givens re: customary, sociological, religious, ideological, etc) and therefore, IMO, does not (except, maybe, by process of elimination) posit/justify "what to value".