Was Schopenhauer right?

Schopenhauer is an (quasi-ascetic) antinatalist as a consequence of his (transcendental) pessimism. 'Better to not have been born' sums up his view of the human condition. :sweat:

NB: As much as enjoy I reading Schop, I much prefer Spinoza before him and Nietzsche after. Also, Zapffe-Camus-Cioran-Rosset's absurdism (along with folk blues & jazz) have helped me to despair more cheerfully. :death: :flower:

Reply to Shawn as you probably know Bernardo Kastrup has published a book on him, Decoding Schopenhauer's Metaphysics, which compares his ideas favourably which those Kastrup has been developing over the last 20 years or so. Me, I think the argument can be made that he was 'the last great philosopher' (although I'll leave it to someone else to actually write it ;-) )

I still think the opening few sentences of WWR are among the immortal utterances of philosophy:

“The world is my idea:”—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself. If any truth can be asserted a priori, it is this...

There are quite a few other passages I could quote, but I'll resist the urge, although I will add that compared to his nemesis GWF Hegel, Schopenhauer's prose was succinct and direct. I've also read that he had a much bigger impact on playwrights and artists than on the profession of philosophy overall, and that this filtered through to popular culture in the early 20th C. And that he was Bryan Magee's favourite of the great philosophers.

I'll just leave this here as a pretty profound quote by Schopenhauer.

"[...] the Stoical philosophy is the most complete development of practical reason in the true and genuine sense of the word; it is the highest summit to which man can attain by the mere use of his reason..."

-Arthur Schopenhauer
The World as Will and Representation, par. 6

I'm just bogged down by the term apathy and indifference towards the attainment of happiness. Then again I always thought Stoical philosophy wasn't meant for the young and eager to enjoy life. :fear:

A lot of Schopenhauer's philosophy has to do with how human beings profess empathy and compassion.

Quoting Shawn

... in your opinion, is his enduring influence to this day due to him being right?

No, it's more to do with his style and curmudgeonly charming wit and the potent way he braids together Kantianism and (philosophical strands of) Hinduism. He certainly offers a lot of idealist/antirealist/subjectivist philosophical grist for the 'bourgeois New Age' mill (though it might not be apparent to most). Schopenhauer is also, IMO, a more intelligible alternative 'philosopher of being' to Heidegger and other p0m0 sophists which is why his thought has long been so influential (second only to Nietzsche?) on various, great literary and musical artists throughout the late great Twentieth century.

Reply to Shawn Don’t confuse [s]apathy[/s] Stoic ‘apathia’ with mere indifference or ennui. It’s more like the ability to rise above personal emotions and pettiness. I think a better word would be detachment.

There’s been a great recent addition to the corpus, Schopenhauer’s Compass by Urs App. It has a lot of original scholarship and reference to primary materials (diaries, letters, margin notes etc). Shows in superb detail the intellectual ambiance of Schopenhauer’s formative years, going right into the provenance of the particular, Persian translation of the Upani?ad that he read (in Latin), and his relationships and interactions with his peers, including Fichte, Schelling and others.

Quoting Shawn

Now, given that the maladies of human beings….

Personally, I find the relative value of S’s philosophy not related to human maladies, but to the general human investiture in transcendental idealism.

Quoting Shawn

in your opinion, is his enduring influence to this day due to him being right?

Nahhh, not from this armchair. Whatever influence he has, is due to his being Kantian. And Kant is on record as denying to himself any certifiable empirically-grounded correctness….being right…..re: metaphysics as a doctrine cannot stand the tests of being a science, and insofar as if it is the case that the apple doesn’t fall that far from the tree, then S should also deny being right to himself.

On the other hand, to posit for the record his philosophy is more right than Kant’s**, which is simply to say Kant was wrong about this or that, merely reflects conclusions from disparate initial conditions, but that doesn’t make S’s PSR or WWR any more or less “right” than CPR, CpR, or CJ.

That any of us these days think one or the other right, is a different story altogether, predicated on mere aesthetic agreement, rather than factual correctness.

** “…. What I have in view in this Appendix to my work is really only a defence of the doctrine I have set forth in it, inasmuch as in many points that doctrine does not agree with the Kantian philosophy, but indeed contradicts it. A discussion of this philosophy is, however, necessary, for it is clear that my train of thought, different as its content is from that of Kant, is yet throughout under its influence, necessarily presupposes it, starts from it; and I confess that, next to the impression of the world of perception, I owe what is best in my own system to the impression made upon me by the works of Kant….”
(WWR, 2, App., 1844, in Haldane/Kemp, (pub) 1909)

As I said: personally…..

Quoting Shawn

Now, given that the maladies of human beings is not only boredom; but, rather stuff like depression and anxiety and hopelessness, then what would one be able to say about the human condition according to Schopenhauer, in the present?

Yes his general evaluation was correct, even if one does not agree with the architectonics of his Kantian, neo-neoplatonist metaphysics. As I said in another thread:

He makes an interesting distinction between positive and negative properties. He argues that what we call "happiness" is a negative property, as it is really the pursuit of a desire for a change of state. Happiness is not what is intrinsic, but rather dissatisfaction is. What follows is a desire for change, which temporarily puts "relief" on the dissatisfaction, only for the ever-gushing willing nature of our existence to go back to another desire for a change of state. Boredom is seen as the ultimate revealer of a ground-state of dissatisfaction as he argues this to be the "proof" that we are not simply satisfied existing, but always rather dissatisfied. We are always struggling and looking for ways out of our dissatisfaction. We chase flow states, hedonistic ends, entertainment, chit-chatting, and all of it as a result of the dissatisfaction.

Much of life is maintenance, the upkeep of one's lifestyle, not even getting to the game of satisfaction-fulfilling.. Just maintaining the lifestyle to get there.

Then there are contingent externalities that puts people in a deficit. People with various diseases, or unfortunate situations happen to them, might put them at a perpetual deficit in their baseline of what they must contend with while overcoming the dissatisfaction.

Birth puts us on this dissatisfaction trajectory.

Schopenhauer's assessment of Stoicism was more profound than that of Nietzsche.

Schopenhauer's assessment of Stoicism was more profound than that of Nietzsche.

Perhaps it seems that way because N's assessment was Dionysian and not as Apollionian as S's assessment.

Quoting 180 Proof

Perhaps it seems that way because N's assessment was Dionysian and not as Apollionian as S's assessment.
6 hours ago

There's very little of the mad god Dionysus in Stoicism, it's true.

Quoting Wayfarer

Don’t confuse apathy Stoic ‘apathia’ with mere indifference or ennui.

I don't think an emotion or rather passion, which was once called apathia, which is nowadays called 'apathy', really could have changed all that much. The only thing that changed was our perception of such a passion... In my opinion, reification happened to the term in the context of socioeconomic systems and tidbits of rationalizations about psychologizing the term away.

Do you think so too?

Quoting Ciceronianus

the mad god Dionysus

i.e. life-affirming ("ja-sagen")

No.

Quoting Shawn

I don't think an emotion or rather passion, which was once called apathia, which is nowadays called 'apathy', really could have changed all that much. The only thing that changed was our perception of such a passion... In my opinion, reification happened to the term in the context of socioeconomic systems and tidbits of rationalizations about psychologizing the term away.

What has really changed between ancient philosophy and our own day is due to the advent of modernity and the ascendancy of individualism. It is, in philosophical parlance, egological (not egocentric) - assuming the prerogatives of ego at the centre. It’s essential on the political level as it allows pluralism, but here the topic is self-governing, not political government. I think compared to our inherited bourgous and egological way of life, stocism and other such doctrines were very austere. And indeed Schopenhaur praises asceticism as the solution to the problem of human willfulness. Easy to say, but very hard to do, unless it's inculcated during your formative years. (I speak from experience.)

Quoting Wayfarer

I think compared to our inherited bourgous and egological way of life, stocism and other such doctrines were very austere. And indeed Schopenhaur praises asceticism as the solution to the problem of human willfulness. Easy to say, but very hard to do, unless it's inculcated during your formative years. (I speak from experience.)

I think disposition has much to do with it. I'm not a fan of owning too many things. I feel better with less. Just sold my car. I am now working though my belongings, with a goal of giving away 50% of it all. And then I will review. There's a thread on the spiritual benefits of minimalism (and its challenges) gestating in my head.

Quoting Shawn

the avoidance of pain will lead to being content in life

Not to be churlish but surely you could have led with a better example to showcase Schopenhauer's genius and resulting effect on your life to those currently unaware. I can't say I find that specific mantra to be particularly dripping with profound wisdom. Makes me picture a warning label on an imported cutting board placed there by an overachieving translator.

On a serious note I'm likely less acquainted with him than yourself, but from a quick, nuanced read of his popular works and ideas, I have to say at least a few of them definitely seem to "leap out" at me as if he took exactly what I feel at times and put it into words I myself have yet to. Particularly this gem: "Life presents, in fact, a more or less violent oscillation between the two (pain and boredom)."

The man was clearly a genius, and like the old saying goes "ignorance is bliss", meaning I'm sure he was far, far from a blissful person - at least in a natural state but learned how to become content despite his likely (at times) burdensome intellect and resulting capacity to experience and understand pain and suffering at levels most are fortunately spared from - and in doing so helped others like him and those who aspire to be like him, fundamentally changing the intellectual world for the better in the process.

I'm sure not every single belief he held or declared is without some folly or shortcoming, some scenario where his wisdom would appear to fall short or otherwise be without any room for improvement or adaptation for the better. The world is a chaotic, violent place and those who fail to recognize this as a great and solemn truth merely delude themselves, I would say. Now, you could also say it doesn't have to be, at least it can be improved so as to make the world of tomorrow a literal world of difference by avoiding or rather properly dealing with some of the common behaviors, frames of mind, and patterns of thinking associated with overthinking about or focusing on the negatives of the world we live in. He seems to have found his own way to have done so, measurably and indisputably beneficial to others as well despite there being a seemingly overshadowing theme of pessimism to some readers. Some things can be simplified, others can only be oversimplified.

In short, the man had an idea and ran with it. It obviously resonated with enough people, in that era, and even in our own to have turned into something we're still discussing a good 200 years later. Sometimes we ask ourselves the wrong questions at the right times. Was he "right"? Should his beliefs be declared law of the land and mandatory in public education for the good of humanity as a whole? Perhaps. Perhaps not. What matters is, did his influence help guide you to become a better, more content, dare I say realized, human being or better still, did it help refine the image of the ideal person you can still be and have yet to become?

Reply to Tom Storm :up:

Quoting Tom Storm

I think disposition has much to do with it. I'm not a fan of owning too many things. I feel better with less. Just sold my car.

I admire that (although I just bought a car.) But I also gloomily realise the truth of the old maxim about the patterns being set in early childhood, and mine were certainly not at all conducive to either stoicism or asceticism. (Then again, I recall reading in History of Western Philosophy that Schopenhauer himself lived comfortably enough, and chuckled spitefully when his landlady fell down the stairs, an anecdode that Russell seemed to relish, so as to defray any claim regarding moral superiority on Schopenhauer's part.)

Nevertheless I'll take this opportunity to present another passage from Schopenhauer which I find prescient:

Quoting WWR page 35

Of all systems of philosophy which start from the object, the most consistent, and that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism. It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent order (or arrangement) of things,veritas aeterna, and so fails to take account of the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is. It seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemistry, to polarity (i.e. electricity), to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom.

And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility—that is knowledge—which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result—knowledge, which it reached so laboriously, was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought matter, we really thought only the subject that perceives matter; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it.

Thus the tremendous petitio principii (begged question) reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue. The fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective, and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as it is thought, or, after it has taken form, as empirically given—that is to say, as substance, the chemical elements with their primary relations. Some such thing it takes as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means of it; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away.

Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly. All that is objective, extended, active—that is to say, all that is material—is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction (i.e. physics)).

But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time. From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained. To the assertion that thought is a modification of matter we may always, with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject, as its idea. Yet the aim and ideal of all natural science is at bottom a consistent materialism.

My bolds :yikes:

Quoting WWR page 35

But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time.

Great quote from Schop!.. .This parallels what I was saying in the other thread:

This actually goes back to Schopenhauer's notion that subject and object are always intertwined. Your thought of a dead, lifeless universe, is still a thought. And even if it is a representation of some "reality", that reality will never be YOUR reality, which is NOT simply "lifeless universe" but a psychologically embodied being THINKING of the lifeless universe, and projecting it, Signifying it, as you might say.

Reply to Outlander
By the way, Outlander, I just wanted to say that was a really good reply to the OP. I didn't want that to go unnoticed.

Reply to Shawn

Reply to schopenhauer1 (carrying on from our discussion on suffering)

Quoting Outlander

ignorance is bliss

I think Schopenhauer traveled very close toward truth, but like everyone, could not extricate the path traveled from the truth found.

His pessimism is derived from his attachment to the very source of the problem he "disccovered," that boredom/dissatisfaction is an inescapable condition for humans and incessant striving/desire the inevitable result: human suffering. (Arguably, outside of physical pain, physical fear and "lonliness" all suffering including anxiety/depression as we currently commonly understand/experience may be rooted therein); and it is derived concomitantly from his resistance to the "True" locus of "bliss," the Organic Being undisturbed by Mind; untempted by its striving and attachments. He failed to take the Vedanta/Mahayana wisdom far enough. (In that regard, a victim of his age. Bless him for how far he got!)

Ignorance is bliss is not saying stupidity is bliss. It is saying living without clinging to the activity of boredom and its cessation (impossible), but rather attuning to the do-ings of [your] nature, body hungry/body eat-ing; body tired/body rest-ing etc., is already bliss.

And its not that we cannot extricate our aware-ing true nature/being from the chattering boredom. It's that as Schopenhauer (of this forum) showed me, boredom is built-in to that chattering. EDIT I then add[causing us to attune always to its resolution and resist our true natures]

Reply to Shawn

His principium individuationis had a profound effect upon my metaphysics, though probably not in in the direction he had hoped for. It rather led me to the more physicalist view and to oppose his brand of idealism, representationalism, whatever you want to call it. The fact of our location in time and space should be enough to unlink the holistic tendency in thinkers, the one that can only find value and beauty in the world so long as it persists as some inter-connected and spirit-imbued homogeneity, and not a realm of distinct originals. But mythology is strong.

Quoting ENOAH

and it is derived concomitantly from his resistance to the "True" locus of "bliss," the Organic Being undisturbed by Mind; untempted by its striving and attachments.

Quoting ENOAH

t is saying living without clinging to the activity of boredom and its cessation (impossible), but rather attuning to the do-ings of [your] nature, body hungry/body eat-ing; body tired/body rest-ing etc., is already bliss.

This sounds like the fadd-ish distillation of Buddhist practices of "mindfulness". Would this be the sort of thing you are addressing? If so, that (along with certain "realist" views) is what I was targeting when I claimed that you cannot extricate the subjective from the "is". It is mind, mind-ing, it is not mind, extricating itself from any secondary projections of what actually is. It is projections all the way down, even if one feels during meditation or "mindfulness" exercises that one is getting to some "reality" that is non-signifying/projecting/whatever.. Call me a skeptic of the "mindfulness" idea...Which is ascetic-lite.. Schopenhauer did go full-in I think..but it was so far in that he himself would never be able to achieve it, leaving it to those with enlightened "characters" that have the capacity to completely deny their will-to-live in a sort of Moksha. However, I am skeptical of that too :smile:.

Quoting 180 Proof

the mad god Dionysus
— Ciceronianus
i.e. life-affirming ("ja-sagen")

Not id est, I think, but quite literally mad because Hera made him such when she finally located him. But his worship was also associated with wine, revelry, fertility and festivity as well. I'm sure N knew this all very well.

Quoting schopenhauer1

This sounds like the fadd-ish distillation of Buddhist practices of "mindfulness".

Originally (unwittingly) derived therefrom. The difference (which is essential) being that it is exactly not in mindfulness (at least not in mindfulness as theory) that "one" attains "relief" from the "predicament" which Schopenhauer (correctly) observed. There is nothing "spiritual", nor "idealist[ic]" in it. It is exactly in "realism". That is the Body is already "relieved" from both boredom (yes, the body can be restless, a presumed evolved mechanism for survival; but boredom is the "projected" "version" displacing restlessness** ) and the "resulting/associated" suffering/dissatisfaction/desire.
I submit animals "suffer" pain and struggle; but it is our "words" alone which construct "suffering" for us. And relief from suffering is not in the four noble truths, the eightfold path, jnana, bhakti, karma, or katha yogis: it is not in any form of practicing ascetism. The relief is already there in the living being's natural and real nature, as a being, undisturbed by becoming.

Quoting schopenhauer1

It is projections all the way down,

Yes, definitely. Except we are not the projections, albeit, seemingly captive by them.

I think there is this underlying "truth" (it cannot be truth at all in its expression: only in living) in much Western Philosophy, though both those who intuited it, and the millions of interpretations, inevitably failed (just as I am failing miserably) at expressing it. Plato's cave allegory. The real being is unconcerned/undisturbed by the shadow paintings "projections." Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, undetectable to the rest of us, she has surrendered any hope of actively changing her incessantly dissatisfied condition, and yet, by faith in the reality of her true being, carries on knowing she will be satisfied.***


**(the exact words used must be "transcended." A problem inherent to "philosophy" is also inherent to the rest of the human condition: our projections do not and cannot access reality)

***yes, I have "bastardized" both Plato's and SK's points, but as I say, each of them, and I too, cannot but "bastardized" truth in its expression. I am "really" saying this single point: The relief from suffering is in attuning, even if extremely briefly, to your true nature and to realize there is no suffering.

Anyway, back to my so called real job for now, I will read with enthusiasm upon my return to the forum.

ADDENDUM: Should it appear otherwise, do not think for e second that i do not "know" that it might very well be projections and nothing but; this driving my desperation to find a "real-er" reality. But...

Reply to Ciceronianus Yes, and it was the 'orgiastic worship (i.e. revels = revelations) of the Dionysus-myth' in particular – not the myth itself –that N found life-affirming in contrast to e.g. Christianity ... or S's life-denying ('world weary') pessimism (and his quasi-Stoic response to 'suffering').

Quoting ENOAH

Originally (unwittingly) derived therefrom. The difference (which is essential) being that it is exactly not in mindfulness (at least not in mindfulness as theory) that "one" attains "relief" from the "predicament" which Schopenhauer (correctly) observed. There is nothing "spiritual", nor "idealist[ic]" in it. It is exactly in "realism". That is the Body is already "relieved" from both boredom (yes, the body can be restless, a presumed evolved mechanism for survival; but boredom is the "projected" "version" displacing restlessness** ) and the "resulting/associated" suffering/dissatisfaction/desire.
I submit animals "suffer" pain and struggle; but it is our "words" alone which construct "suffering" for us. And relief from suffering is not in the four noble truths, the eightfold path, jnana, bhakti, karma, or katha yogis: it is not in any form of practicing ascetism. The relief is already there in the living being's natural and real nature, as a being, undisturbed by becoming.

But I see this idea of "already there" a kind of version of "mindfulness". "I am not this.." "My evaluation of the pain is not the pain".. Etc. etc. The thing itself, is not the thing I interpret. And so you convince yourself through a sort of repeated mantra that the pain you think you are feeling is not what is real.

I don't think you have to be a realist or idealist to hold the efficacy of this therapeutic technique.

But, we did discuss this previously about the chasm between the animal-being and the human-being. Humans, due to the "projections" (using your terms), cannot help but be who they are- self-reflective beings. There is no "going back to Eden". Self-reflection is baked into the human condition.

Also, I think you slightly misconstrue Boredom here as a secondary trait, when BECAUSE of its foundation in the HUMAN condition, it is inescapable. And so, CONTRA "mindfulness" (or the equivalent you seem to be indicating above), there is no escaping boredom by deflating it as some response to the restlessness. Rather it is restlessness par excellance as it is to be in the human condition.. It cannot be separated as flotsam and jetsam riding the waves of more foundational feeling. It is the foundational feeling. It is restlessness. The ways we go about it we have discussed, which are akin to something like Zapffe's four psychological techniques:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Wessel_Zapffe:Isolation is "a fully arbitrary dismissal from consciousness of all disturbing and destructive thought and feeling".[5]
Anchoring is the "fixation of points within, or construction of walls around, the liquid fray of consciousness".[5] The anchoring mechanism provides individuals with a value or an ideal to consistently focus their attention on. Zapffe also applied the anchoring principle to society and stated that "God, the Church, the State, morality, fate, the laws of life, the people, the future"[5] are all examples of collective primary anchoring firmaments.
Distraction is when "one limits attention to the critical bounds by constantly enthralling it with impressions".[5] Distraction focuses all of one's energy on a task or idea to prevent the mind from turning in on itself.
Sublimation is the refocusing of energy away from negative outlets, toward positive ones. The individuals distance themselves and look at their existence from an aesthetic point of view (e.g., writers, poets, painters). Zapffe himself pointed out that his produced works were the product of sublimation.

Besides which, as I explained in a previous quote, you cannot separate the projections (the subjective/the inner mental construct) from "reality", as they are always intricately, and inextricably, intertwined.

Quoting schopenhauer1

But I see this idea of "already there" a kind of version of "mindfulness". "I am not this.." "My evaluation of the pain is not the pain".. Etc. etc. The thing itself, is not the thing I interpret. And so you convince yourself through a sort of repeated mantra that the pain you think you are feeling is not what is real.

And I understand the objection to that. While I might try to rebut by tightening my way of expressing that, instead, let's say it is correct and one who settles where I have is convincing themselves through a mantra. That would be "problematic," right?

Forget physical pain, hunger, absence of bonding etc. These, I admit are feelings and therefore (within the framework of my thinking) real. But take the suffering of losing your partner to infidelity, never succeeding at a goal, losing all your belongings to a fire, bankruptcy, and countless other forms of "suffering." Are these even similar to the so called instances of real pain described above? Is one suffering from these not just "convincing themselves through a mantra"? I don't know? Am I being sophist-like and just trying to pursue a position which I favor? If so, I need to be straightened out and am grateful. But I think I understand your objection, and yet, still "believe" (keeping it simple) there is a projected self which "suffers" and a real being which gets "caught up" in those projections only because they trigger real feelings.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Humans, due to the "projections" (using your terms), cannot help but be who they are- self-reflective beings. There is no "going back to Eden". Self-reflection is baked into the human condition.

Ok. Yes. I've been loose on this. Extremely likely there is no going back. I have consistently thought so. But not because the projecting/projects are real and natural (I am at a loss for better words) but because the projecting is how each mind inevitably and autonomously function. And since hypothetically the end of prehistoric times (dawn of human history) each human is input with this process by "socialization." Now granted my hope that one can find relief by being the Body instead of becoming the mind is just hope. But I do reserve that possibility. Likely my desire to be optimistic and give hope has carried me away in that particular thread about suffering.

To word it differently, I have no problem saying there is no escape from the projections. Where I do "have a problem" is saying they are real. The becoming mind/being body dichotomy, I cling to. This is not dualism, because ultimately only the being is real.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Also, I think you slightly misconstrue Boredom here as a secondary trait, when BECAUSE of its foundation in the HUMAN condition,

I 100% misconstrue and knowingly. This is my taking liberty with Schopenhauer. I say that the Organic feeling (I'm only calling restless for convenience) is real, and in the Organic human (and many other beings) condition; while dissatisfaction/boredom are projections displacing such innate feelings with the (ultimately false) Narratives projected by mind in its processes.

From a broad "philosophical" perspective, our differences and their root causes seem clear to me and I am not troubled, yet acknowledge I have much to learn.

But from a personal perspective, from the perspective of the individual mind behind the veil of Enoah, I am deeply concerned about our differences. Why? Because I do have much to learn. And it is entirely possible that I am missing something. Sadly, despite your kind efforts, I cannot see it. ADDENDUM; note however my goal is not consistency with Schopenhauer per se.

Quoting schopenhauer1

This actually goes back to Schopenhauer's notion that subject and object are always intertwined. Your thought of a dead, lifeless universe, is still a thought. And even if it is a representation of some "reality", that reality will never be YOUR reality, which is NOT simply "lifeless universe" but a psychologically embodied being THINKING of the lifeless universe, and projecting it, Signifying it, as you might say.

Pretty much the exact argument of my The Mind Created World OP.

Quoting ENOAH

He failed to take the Vedanta/Mahayana wisdom far enough. (In that regard, a victim of his age. Bless him for how far he got!)

There is some truth in that, but consider that in his day and place, there was no opportunity for meeting (darshan) with a realized sage from those traditions. And there is also a sense in which his 'pessimism' is overstated, he has many passages on 'better consciousness' and aesthetics and tranquility. But it is true that he tended to stress the first of the four Buddhist truths (that to exist is to suffer.)

There's an appendix in Bryan Magee's 'Schopenhauer's Philosophy' that considers Schopenhauer's relationship with Eastern philosophy. It begins like this:

[quote=Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy]There is nothing controversial in saying that of the major figures in Western philosophy Schopenhauer is the one who has most in common with Eastern thought. Less adequately pondered is the fact that much of what it is that the two have in common was taken by Schopenhauer from Kant. To suppose that Schopenhauer's philosophy was formed to any decisive degree under the influence of Eastern thought is not only a mistake, but misses the crucial point that in Kant and Schopenhauer the mainstream of Western philosophy threw up conclusions about the nature of reality* which are strikingly similar to some of those propounded by the more mystically oriented religions or philosophies of the East, yet arrived at by an entirely different path.

It would be an error, though one characteristic of Western intellectual provincialism, to suppose that the Oriental doctrines in question were not supported by rational argument: in the case of Buddhist philosophy, in particular, they conspicuously are. But the Kantian-Schopenhauerian conclusions were reached by processes internal to a tradition of thought which is fundamentally rooted in the development of mathematical physics, and this is something with which Buddhist philosophy has been little concerned until the twentieth century. Incidentally, both the Kantian and Schopenhauerian philosophy and the more sophisticated of the mysticisms of the East have received, and continue to receive, extensive corroboration from the revolutionary developments of the twentieth century in the natural sciences. (There is a growing literature on this in the case of Eastern mysticism - a good introduction is The Tao of Physics by Fritjof Capra, which also contains a useful bibliography.) The Eastern religion most congruent with contemporary science is Buddhism. [/quote]

*I would say 'the nature of Being' in this context. "Being" conveys the gist better than "reality" in that it is not something we're apart from or outside of.

Nice that he mentions Tao of Physics, too.

Reply to schopenhauer1
Hey. You might see (if you don't already) where we diverge--even with respect to Schopenhauer. Or, perhaps, that we do not diverge.

I am not (despite appearances) more than 51% confident about these "beliefs" but they currently tip the scale, and that 2% becomes everything.

I think there is a Real living body in a real living nature and universe. And as for so called "reality," (the word, already a projection), I think "I" a projection, have no business (besides self interest) denying that that's Realty, my living breathing body in nature.

I think my body is, by its nature as being, always aware-ing "itself" which is its senses, drives, internal images/memory, feelings, and movements, all of which happen as a biologically conditioned process. We don't have to project "I am hungry" to aware-ing feeling hunger, etc.

Now the projections, you've been generous enough to go along with, I recognize that the Body makes them and the body receives them. They're not these Cosmic Grand Projections like "Maya" if that settles any concern.

And this is where I believe you and Schopenhauer major, stop, as I tread into the wilderness. You reason properly, acknowledging already that the projections are body's, that even if boredom is both constructed and projected, it is the very Body's (we assume nervous system) nature doing it. We cannot but artificially divide projection from body. That would seem like some archaic, Eastern no less, Maya (and maybe Im exaggerating. Point is, it is body both making and feeling boredom).

But what I am saying is that while the projections are made by images stored in memory and restructured in the body's image-ing "organ" (I know nothing about the Science), the "Projections" per se (since, as we seem to agree, ontologically indivisible from the being from which they proceed because they are, "as projections" i.e., the "images", nothing. They are fleeting, empty, structures of images functioning to code body to feel and act in a biological system set up for autonomous conditioned response)...But, the projections "as projections" are exactly where the Narrative of suffering takes place. Neither when Buddha said it, nor Schopenhauer were they referring to anything besides the narrative of suffering (try to describe what they meant otherwise ("describe" already too late) without narrative). Boredom too. Yes both are real; and for both (Suffering and Boredom) their cause and effect is the real body. But these projections as projections have strangely, unique only to humans,* taken the helm of the body's real consciousness, its aware-ing of its drives and actions in nature, and has displaced them with stories. Unique among all creatures, we don't attune to reality, we attune to the projections as projections. The Reality remains. It's just attuned to the "television." Reality, so attuned, becomes the character "I" and emotes "boredom" instead of being Reality, and feeling restless.

It is that just described, which is the why of suffering, and why attuning to one's aware-ing might help (though I agree, might be "psychologically" impossible; but not becausevthat reality is the projections as projections; it is not). Call it psychological if that makes it palatable; say that the projections I insist upon as evolving an autonomy and displacing our organism, is pure psychology; either way, I cannot but settle here for now.

*explaining how is complex etc. Also, I feel almost embarrassed for us that we don't realize the projections are unique, they don't make us special or privilege us. We are conceited apes riding on unicycles in pink frilly dresses and think the unicycle and dress are where it's all at.

Reply to Wayfarer

Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer's Philosophy:Less adequately pondered is the fact that much of what it is that the two have in common was taken by Schopenhauer from Kant.

I'm surprised, but i can see that, even
being a novice re Schopenhauer, and only marginally more familiar with Kant. However, my experience has been that there are parallels of all degrees of patency/latency in many philosophies. While I have cringed in the past when people have said so, and I get how cliche it sounds. It holds true.

Quoting Wayfarer

Nice that he mentions Tao of Physics, too.

:up:

Reply to schopenhauer1 last remark. I did not comment on Zapffe because I know even less than I do on Schopenhauer. But that I am definitely going to read into. Thanks again.

Quoting ENOAH

Yes both are real; and for both (Suffering and Boredom) their cause and effect is the real body. But these projections as projections have strangely, unique only to humans,* taken the helm of the body's real consciousness, its aware-ing of its drives and actions in nature, and has displaced them with stories. Unique among all creatures, we don't attune to reality, we attune to the projections as projections. The Reality remains. It's just attuned to the "television." Reality, so attuned, becomes the character "I" and emotes "boredom" instead of being Reality, and feeling restless.

It is that just described, which is the why of suffering, and why attuning to one's aware-ing might help (though I agree, might be "psychologically" impossible; but not becausevthat reality is the projections as projections; it is not). Call it psychological if that makes it palatable; say that the projections I insist upon as evolving an autonomy and displacing our organism, is pure psychology; either way, I cannot but settle here for now.

What is "Reality" here? What is this "real" Real of the Body you mean? This again, just sounds like there is a "something" we can get back to with the right frame-of-mind. I mean, I have heard of something akin to ego-death, but that brings up some other notions. True, our psyche is constructed and mediated through language and learning mechanisms, and is largely a socially-derived phenomenon, but how could it be different, for the human? We evolved thus.

Quoting schopenhauer1

but how could it be different, for the human? We evolved thus.

Yes. Im not self deprecating, just being honest, maybe I lack the skill in logic. I don't see how that accurate statement precludes that our evolution included an "emergent" (not restricted to any scholarly/academic use) system of signs which evolved a law and dynamic of its own which are "other" than everything else in nature; made not of energy and matter, but of images operating to form "order" meaning/narratives out of the "chaos" always-only-being-doing of what really is. I won't explain all the details of how this might have evolved in this space. But I've learned about it in many forms from Plato to Kant and thereafter.

You're right, there is no dichotomous reality. But humans are attuned to something operating as an orderly narrative, when that's not what is really happening.

Hmm. It's an artificial layer on top of reality. Like makeup isn't the face though one might only know a face through the make up. Hmm because that was risky. Disregard.

For us reality is necessarily mediated through the projections firing off autonomously in the brain, not what the senses immediately see. And this only for humans. How just an organic evolution. It is very "other".

Quoting ENOAH

For us reality is necessarily mediated through the projections firing off autonomously in the brain, not what the senses immediately see. And this only for humans. How just an organic evolution. It is very "other".

So I agree that humans have a running narrative of reasons and explanations and goals and emotional responses, etc. etc. that come from having a linguistic-based mind, and the dynamics of our brain. This indeed does make us distinct from other animals. However, I don't see how it could ever be different for the human animal. This is how we survive and live in the world. There is no secret knowledge that then "drops" the pretense of a linguistic mind that evaluates, reasons, explains, etc. It is how humans function and is part of the socialization process, which cannot be bypassed. The human creates a self and places the self in relation to the world, and judges itself accordingly.

What Schopenhauer was saying about Boredom, is beyond merely having nothing to do and tedium. Rather, it is a sense of non-fulfillment in our being. You see, it could NEVER be any other way because our very impetus for doing anything is driven by this angst. The angst drives the kaleidoscope of actions we take, for whatever goals, survival or otherwise. What he is implying is that, if existence was fully satisfying unto itself, we wouldn't need goals. We would simply exist. But we don't. We are becoming...

If we were to think about it in neoplatonic or medieval, or gnostic terms, we can say that a "perfected" state, one of purely "being" (not becoming) would be one where we would wont for nothing. There would be no need for need. That isn't our state. It is precisely the dis-satisfaction that drives us to do anything at all. And it could not be any other way, otherwise, we would not exist. And all of a sudden, Schopenhauer's idea of the extinguishing of the Subject-Object comes into form, as that is somehow the opposite, some sort of state of being and not becoming. Now, is that obtainable? Different question.

So I guess my contention is that in no possible world is there a state of satisfaction. It is all becoming from the dissatisfaction. Boredom in this sense is not just the "emotional state of x, y, z" but rather, the very test for which when we run out of end goals and actions, we are looking at our very becoming/willing nature at work itself, without any content. It's the engine's fumes as it keeps working but nothing to do. You can try to ignore it, anchor yourself, distract it, or otherwise.

I'm starting with your last statement.

Quoting schopenhauer1

my contention is that in no possible world is there a state of satisfaction

Yes, we definitely diverge here.


Quoting schopenhauer1

I don't see how it could ever be different for the human animal

Here I mostly agree with you. I wont reiteratethe qualifier yet. Before humans developed language at lets say a level that included a basic grammar and a bunch of words, were we therefore different?
Quoting schopenhauer1

come from having a linguistic-based mind, and the dynamics of our brain.

Quoting schopenhauer1

There is no secret knowledge that then "drops" the pretense of a linguistic mind that evaluates, reasons, explains, etc. It is how humans function and is part of the socialization process, which cannot be bypassed.

I agree with all of that. Unless you wish, I won't explain how its not inconsistent.

Quoting schopenhauer1

What Schopenhauer was saying about Boredom, is beyond merely having nothing to do and tedium. Rather, it is a sense of non-fulfillment in our being.

Yes, I understood that earlier and have been enriched by the discovery that Schopenhauer had that idea. Thank you.

Quoting schopenhauer1

is driven by this angst.

Ok, I do believe I understand your explanation plus how it properly reflects Schopenhauer. And I am repeating myself, but from different angles. "This angst" is essential.

The angst has to have a basis in the body and its organic feeling, here I, you/Schopenhauer agree.

But you(s) "settle" there. You say boredom is built-in to the human being organically (or, I guess, some fancy surrogate like "being" but I'd question why). Hence ultimately the inescapable pessimism*. It is built-in to our very chemistry (people in a more social theory framework say same re violence, which I would equally contest).

I say, yah, it is pretty much inescapable because it's built-in, but it's not built-in to our bodies, but rather built-in to "our running narrative of reasons and explanations and goals and emotional responses, etc. etc. that come from having a linguistic-based mind, and the dynamics of our brain" those autonomous movements of signifiers, "culture" if that's palatable, but not what we really are, a restless organic being. Suffering like its root Boredom are mechanics of Mind.

Quoting schopenhauer1

we were to think about it in neoplatonic or medieval, or gnostic terms, we can say that a "perfected" state, one of purely "being" (not becoming) would be one where we would wont for nothing. There would be no need for need

That is what one would imagine pure being to be while that one is trapped in becoming. But being is nature, pure and simple. Why wouldn't it be unless the "one" deciding has a vested interest in elevating other. There is no other. It is made up of images projected from reality to reality. But in that loop, is boredom and suffering.




*(looked into Zapffe by the way, lamented his poor existence. I might be fixated as he was by an error. Thank God Mind's positive)

Quoting ENOAH

That is what one would imagine pure being to be while that one is trapped in becoming. But being is nature, pure and simple. Why wouldn't it be unless the "one" deciding has a vested interest in elevating other. There is no other. It is made up of images projected from reality to reality. But in that loop, is boredom and suffering.

But again, I am having trouble what you envision this "being nature, pure and simple" is. And I am also perplexed how it is you think humans can ever get to it, overriding our innate linguistic-based/signifier capacities:

Quoting ENOAH

but rather built-in to "our running narrative of reasons and explanations and goals and emotional responses, etc. etc. that come from having a linguistic-based mind, and the dynamics of our brain" those autonomous movements of signifiers, "culture" if that's palatable

That is part of what it is to be a human being.

To reiterate the point you said:
Quoting ENOAH

Before humans developed language at lets say a level that included a basic grammar and a bunch of words, were we therefore different?

But it is precisely because humans "developed" language (along with other cognitive mechanisms related and intertwined with it), that is our way of being as human in the world. That is part of the human ways of living and survival.

Quoting schopenhauer1

So I agree that humans have a running narrative of reasons and explanations and goals and emotional responses, etc. etc. that come from having a linguistic-based mind, and the dynamics of our brain. This indeed does make us distinct from other animals. However, I don't see how it could ever be different for the human animal.

Don't overlook the significance of trance states and sacred silence, which humans also 'have access to' (to express it in modern terminology). For example, in the yoga sutras, there are references to 'nirvikalpa samadhi'. 'Nirvikalpa' is derived from the negation (nir) of vikalpa (mentation, thought forms, vritti). So that state is one of complete abeyance of discursive thought. In Buddhism, there is a Pali term 'papañca' meaning 'conceptual proliferation' or 'mental elaboration'. Suffice to say that internal mental chatter is the default state of humanity, excacerbated by our media-saturated culture. It is the subject of the delightfully-named 'Honeyball Sutta' which explains how beings become enmeshed in never-ending chains of emotional reactivity and attachment, resulting in 'taking up rods & bladed weapons, of arguments, quarrels, disputes, accusations, divisive tale-bearing, & false speech.'

So speech and discursive reason are indeed central to the human way of being in the world, but they are not the be-all and end-all of existence. And I think this was something Schopenhauer would have understood.

Quoting schopenhauer1

I am having trouble what you envision this "being nature, pure and simple" is. And I am also perplexed how it is you think humans can ever get to it, overriding our innate linguistic-based/signifier capacities:

The first part I need to think of how I'm understanding/expressing this.

The part about how humans can override, yes, as I've said, I recognize the problem and it's degree. But I do not close it off for reasons given.

Quoting Wayfarer

Suffice to say that internal mental chatter is the default state of humanity, excacerbated by our media-saturated culture

Reply to schopenhauer1

I could rest there. But I'm compelled to add, and what is the source/nature/structure of that chatter? If a god created us did it have this chatter in mind? If we are organic beings formed by the evolution of cells, is the chatter a formation of cells? Is there a time when our ancestors, the species homo sapiens roamed about without the chatter?

Quoting ENOAH

If a god created us did it have this chatter in mind? If we are organic beings formed by the evolution of cells, is the chatter a formation of cells?

Actually the sources I referred to, and I think Schopenhauer, don’t posit that dichotomy between naturalism vs Divine creation. That, I think, is very specific to (post) Christian culture.

Reply to Wayfarer sorry, I was stretching the hypothetical.

Quoting ENOAH

I could rest there. But I'm compelled to add, and what is the source/nature/structure of that chatter? If a god created us did it have this chatter in mind? If we are organic beings formed by the evolution of cells, is the chatter a formation of cells? Is there a time when our ancestors, the species homo sapiens roamed about without the chatter?

No because "inner speech" or "self-talk" has evolved WITH being a homo sapien. You cannot extricate that which is inbuilt into our evolutionary cognitive framework. It's not just that language is something socialized- our brains are primed for language, and eventually at some development a sense of "self" usually enters the picture along with planning, social interactions, problem-solving, memory and learning, and providing various counterfactual scenarios in our mind that this allows for, which helped us survive. I am not denying this is part of why humans also suffer more greatly, but I would not agree that it is something that can be turned off. Neural structures like long-term potentiation, episodic memory, language centers are there because that is how we evolved.

Books like this might help envision what I mean:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Language_Instinct

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Symbolic_Species

Quoting schopenhauer1

You cannot extricate that which is inbuilt into our evolutionary cognitive framework.

Yes, I understand that that is challenge. Interesting, though. I trust your interpretation of the reasoning. Yet, I have found "theories" in Western Philosophy no less, which either promote a hypothesis that the Mind and its projections are constructs and as such, other than real EDIT or rest on such a premise for related hypotheses.

My sense is that these are radical and contested views from the perspective of more conventional philosophy.

Your efforts have helped guide my perspective going forward, even if not changed my perspective outright.

I will keep trekking and inquiring.

Reply to ENOAH
Schopenhauer was a hard determinist. He said this was a source of solace. Whatever the human race is, it was bound to be, since the beginning of time.

Quoting Wayfarer

I still think the opening few sentences of WWR are among the immortal utterances of philosophy:
“The world is my idea”.

I can see why Kastrup might endorse Schopenhauer's analytical Idealism, and why you could appreciate his notion of a Mind Created World. But I have never been able to get on board with his Debbie Downer*1 "wanh, wanh, wah" Pessimism and Roseanne Rosannadana "it's always something" Cynicism. Hence, I've never attempted to actually read any of his "succinct" prose. All I know of his work is limited to his aphorisms. One of which inspired my latest contrarian blog entry*2.

Was Schopenhauer right : that the world is a sh*thole, and human sh*t is the worst kind? So, abandon all hope, ye who enter this hell on Earth? Or was the Buddha right : that the world is a sh*thole, but willful humans can look up at the holy seat and follow the light to get out of nastiness, and into Nirvana? It may be true that sentience is the ability to suffer, but it's also the ability to know and to enjoy.

Is it true that optimistic Idealism is self-refuting? Leibniz said this sh*thole is the best possible world --- considering the compromised circumstance : that God & Satan are competing to run this defiled paradise. But his hopeful Idealism was ridiculed by Voltaire's cynical sarcasm*3. If this imperfect world is "my idea" why is it far less than ideal?

In the OP, Reply to Shawn found Schopenhauer's "denial of the will to live" --- what 180 labeled Antinatalism*4 ---off-putting. Since he was influenced by Buddhism, why didn't Schop find inner peace? Why didn't he follow the eightfold path to Nirvana? Schop's ironic Idealism seems to imply that he & we project our dismal depression onto our mind-made worldview. That's contrary to a traditional notion of "Ideal" as perfect and all good. Like Voltaire, he derided Leibniz's Theodicy , that this is the best possible world. But, unlike the Stoics, he didn't advise that we create the best possible life from an imperfect world.

Schopenhauer's assessment of the human condition seemed to be similar to that of the Buddha : "the cause of suffering is Desire" ; and of Stoicism : "Stoicism teaches that we should discern our desires carefully"*5. But both of those philosophies offered a way to a more positive outlook. Yet Schop took a darker branch of the Buddha's path of enlightenment*6. One commentator observed : "If he was indeed depressed, it was depression as an intellectual disposition, not the usual sense of the word "depressed" {see Carlin quote below}. Consequently, I find his harsh intellectual analytical Realistic Idealism to be depressing --- intellectually of course, not emotionally. :worry:


*1. Debbie & Roseanna are Saturday Night Live characters

*2. Schopenhauer’s Will as Intention :
In his 1818 book, The World as Will and Representation, philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer “identifies the thing-in-itself — the inner essence of everything — as will: a blind, unconscious, aimless striving devoid of knowledge”. Hence the material world, as represented in a conscious mind, is more like a challenging ever-changing dynamic system than an inert material object. For most humans though, Willpower is presumed to be both self-control and control over the environment. Hence, neither “aimless” nor “devoid of knowledge”. Will is intentional in the sense that an idea ? a desire, need, goal ? in the metaphysical mind is directed out into the physical world, as-if the immaterial mind had some ability to affect material objects. I’m not talking about mind-over-matter magic, but about human technology, the application of knowledge (information) for practical physical purposes : i.e. Science.
http://bothandblog8.enformationism.info/page19.html

*3. Voltaire is a cynic (someone who believes people are selfish) and a misanthrope (someone who dislikes humanity)
https://webpages.uidaho.edu/engl_258/lecture%20notes/voltaire_and_candide.htm

*4. Side note : the Wiki entry on Antinatalism has a picture of Schopenhauer.

*5. Desire is want --- lack of something needed --- but it's also the motivation (Will) to acquire something to fill that need.

*6. The dark philosophy :
"Schopenhauer developed a distrust of people in general, a depressed view of the world, an inability to maintain close relationships with anyone ..."
https://eternalisedofficial.com/2022/03/25/philosophy-of-

Quoting Gnomon

I can see why Kastrup might endorse Schopenhauer's analytical Idealism, and why you could appreciate his notion of a Mind Created World. But I have never been able to get on board with his Debbie Downer*1 "wanh, wanh, wah" Pessimism and Roseanne Rosannadana "it's always something" Cynicism. Hence, I've never attempted to actually read any of his "succinct" prose. All I know of his work is limited to his aphorisms. One of which inspired my latest contrarian blog entry*2.

This is extremely uncharitable... This is dismissive, trivializing, mocking, etc. all with admittedly not reading much of his ideas. This is a transparent smear campaign!

Quoting Gnomon

But, unlike the Stoics, he didn't advise that we create the best possible life from an imperfect world.

As if this is a given that it MUST be the case that this is possible or a moral imperative. I question your assumptions.

I suggest you read some of my previous posts on here to discuss some of his ideas rather than just smear him from a distance.

Reply to frank Poor guy. Thank you.

Quoting schopenhauer1

This is extremely uncharitable... This is dismissive, trivializing, mocking, etc. all with admittedly not reading much of his ideas. This is a transparent smear campaign!

I wasn't talking about Reply to schopenhauer1, but about a dismal worldview that is not amenable to my own. From comments by other philosophers, I concluded long ago that "his ideas" were not conducive to rational philosophy*1*2*3. As depressed Hamlet said, "there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. To me, it is a prison". He wishes that his “thinking” would allow him to live out his life in ignorance, insentient of the tragedies of his polarized political world, in which fatherly kings can be slain, by a treacherous mother. The Will of the world may seem "aimless", in that it is not aimed at yours truly. But, the Will of a human is aim-able by intention.

Sure, sh*t happens, but I don't have to sit sourly in the stinky sh*thouse, breathing its stench, after the bad stuff has been "eradicated" from my person. On a more positive note, I found the Buddha-like quote below, about not dwelling on depressive thoughts. A more balanced worldview does not have to be "deluded". The Carlin quote above, echoes the Buddha, in that desire for an unattainable perfect world can be the cause of psychological suffering. Maybe Schop should heed his own advice. Compared to images of the serene Buddha, Schop's portraits as an old man look pretty grim.

If Schop's absurd, perverse, strife-filled world is "Idealism", I prefer the imperfect Real one, where I can sit quietly in my little relatively strife-free zone of willful ignorance, and read a book, without thinking tragic thoughts. I apologize if I indirectly offended you in my post to Wayfarer. It was not a critique of Schop's corpus of work, but of his gloomy opinion of cosmic Will, especially as it manifests in human behavior. :smile:



*1. Arthur Schopenhauer was among the first 19th century philosophers to contend that at its core, the universe is not a rational place. Inspired by Plato and Kant, both of whom regarded the world as being more amenable to reason,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/

*2. In the sphere of thought, absurdity and perversity remain the masters of the world, and their dominion is suspended only for brief periods.
___ Arthur Schopenhauer

*3. As a man thinketh, so is his worldview
[i]“Do not eat the bread of a miser,
Nor desire his delicacies;
For as he thinks in his heart, so is he."[/i]
___ Proverbs 23:7

Reply to Gnomon
If you read my profile you will see I disagree with just about every sentiment you expressed, including the "pessimism bad because its sad.. nom nom nom"

Quoting Gnomon

I have never been able to get on board with his Debbie Downer*1 "wanh, wanh, wah" Pessimism and Roseanne Rosannadana "it's always something"

Grow up mate. Schopenhauer is for Big School, not kindy.

Reply to schopenhauer1

I'm reading from Will and Representation. Now, I'm skipping around.

Will. He speaks about as if it were an almighty scoundrel, etc. leading to the impression that the will is something "else". Separate. I won't even confuse it with a separate from "what".

I'm going to read before I conclude. But until then, here is a loose, but to me, compelling, picture.

Schopenhauer was not blessed with Husserl, Heidegger, and then all of the stuff that followed from existentialism to functionalism, structuralism, linguistics, postmodernism, psychoanalysis (and these are the blessings my limited narrative can enumerate), and he was barely exposed to Buddhism, the way, he would have been today. How can we disregard those limitations when honestly extrapolating? Extrapolating not to conclude with truth, but to clear the forest for a proper sense of what is worthy of interpolation.

So he intuits this autonomous thing, the will, and you tell me it's one and the same as the self, and Rationality, and those (among other things) constitute a unified, whole and real human being.

Or, is it, will is (in a Spinoza/panpsychism/Vedanta way) survival, the being of everything? In which case, what are these attributes or dualities?

Either way, owing to where he was along his (with humility, this) particular path

1. He was expressing qualities as dualities. Either forcing them into a monism to suit his narrative, or recognizing that only a single of the "dualities" like, will*, is real, the rest are projections. *though I observe he mis-defined "will" if by it he meant the insatiable etc; he mis-alotted some things to will etc..

2. His pathatic (as in pathos) pessimism is rooted in not realizing that the scoundrel stuff, the boredom, the suffering, isn't our will, there is hope; though the "scoundrel" has a powerful hold. Ironically, our will is that supple. The hope is in the interpretation that the dualities are projections; and correcting his error that insatiable follows naturally with survival. The will if that is organic being, is balanced. The dualities are insatiable.

Schopenhauer generally got everything right, and to him history owes a debt, but assuming his "the will" is the real being, (so far) he was mistaken in locating dissatisfaction and suffering there.

Reply to ENOAH
Before I answer I’ll let someone else try here. I’ll let this breathe. @Wayfarer any comments?

Reply to Wayfarer Reply to schopenhauer1


First, apologies to both of you. Please ignore if it is frustratingly butchering Schopenhauer. For my part, I am grateful to him.

"And in all the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason, we shall find the same emptiness, and shall see that not time only but also space, and the whole content of both of them, i.e., all that proceeds from causes and motives, has a merely relative existence, is only through and for another like to itself, i.e., not more enduring."

The empty, for another like to itself, not more enduring, is, whether or not he expressed it as such, the relative constructions and projections of Mind. The location of suffering.

The more enduring is the living organism, the human body aware-ing its feelings, movements, sensations, without regard for the projections. The location of enduring.

The latter is impossible for the former to access; and so, yes, humans suffer inevitably, in their projections. But the latter is still there, still enduring, suffering when in pain, alone or hungry; blissful when fed, painless and bonding.

Note: the suffering projections indirectly code the body attuned to mind to feel suffering. That's where Zazen or forms of Yoga might alleviate suffering by highlighting the aware-ing of body, reducing attendance upon the Narratives of suffering.

Worst case scenario, why can't Schopenhauer inform history in unexpected ways? Isnt history itself, let alone Schopenhauer, always changing?

Quoting ENOAH

First, apologies to both of you.

I think you need to slow down a bit. You make many rapid-fire comments, very much stream of consciousness - which is fine, it's part of the appeal of this medium, one of the reasons I've now made 21k entries here :yikes: . But philosophers like Schopenhauer are deep and hard to understand (speaking as a student, not as an authority!) Read, digest, and contemplate.

Myself, I like to believe that Schop. was 'the last great philosopher'. But then, there's Wittgenstein and Heidegger, also great, so it doesn't quite work. But he was the last great idealist philosopher, and as such deserves a special place in the pantheon (spoken as an advocate for idealism). But take time to take it in - I'm not wanting to idolize him, but he's a really substantial philosopher, material you can read for a lifetime. There's time, at least, for that.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think you need to slow down a bit.

Of course. I'm getting carried away. I'll follow your good advice.

Reply to Wayfarer Reply to ENOAH
Quoting ENOAH

Schopenhauer was not blessed with Husserl, Heidegger, and then all of the stuff that followed from existentialism to functionalism, structuralism, linguistics, postmodernism, psychoanalysis (and these are the blessings my limited narrative can enumerate), and he was barely exposed to Buddhism, the way, he would have been today. How can we disregard those limitations when honestly extrapolating? Extrapolating not to conclude with truth, but to clear the forest for a proper sense of what is worthy of interpolation.

But you realize that these folks were blessed with Schopenhauer's insights FIRST. And just because they came later, doesn't mean, as an axiom, they improved upon it.

Quoting ENOAH

So he intuits this autonomous thing, the will, and you tell me it's one and the same as the self, and Rationality, and those (among other things) constitute a unified, whole and real human being.

Eh, that seems not quite right. Will is not one-and-the-same as Self and Rationality. Rather, Will is identified as the noumena of Kant- the Thing-in-Itself. It is what underlies reality, and cannot be known as one knows a simple idea, as it is beyond time/space/causality and the interconnectedness of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (that there is a reason or cause of various events and knowledge).

Quoting ENOAH

Or, is it, will is (in a Spinoza/panpsychism/Vedanta way) survival, the being of everything? In which case, what are these attributes or dualities?

Yes this is more akin to what he meant. Survival of individuated/individual beings are a direct manifestation of the underlying Will.

Quoting ENOAH

1. He was expressing qualities as dualities. Either forcing them into a monism to suit his narrative, or recognizing that only a single of the "dualities" like, will*, is real, the rest are projections. *though I observe he mis-defined "will" if by it he meant the insatiable etc; he mis-alotted some things to will etc..

This is loaded language, and I wouldn't quite use the word "qualities", unless you qualify where in the text. But he is saying that whilst Will is the Noumena, the Thing-in-Itself.. this insatiable blind, aimless, striving "force" or principle, co-commitant/co-existing with it is Representation, which is another aspect of Will. If Will is blind and its main principle is "striving", then how can it strive without having "becoming" in some sense? And so Will's expression via Representation is to have a subject that perceives, experiences, and knows objects (which also have a subjective side to them.. even basic forces and vegetation it seems in his philosophy).

And the subject, as Kant proposed, is mediated by a priori categories such as time/space/causality, such that when it looks upon the object, it manifests the idea of the object in space/time/causality and the PSR (the world of phenomenon).

Now here is where it gets tricky, and kind of questionable for me.. The objects for Schopenhauer, are akin to some kind of Platonic Forms. These Forms are the direct manifestation of Will unmediated by a subject. So if we were to have a nested relationship it would be Will > Subject-Object > World as an Idea to a knower (Mediated world of time/space/causality).

My commentary:

Since Schopenhauer is hugely complex, it's hard to distill all of it without having questions left over. One of mine is WHY is it that Will has the double aspect? And I guess, that if it's main principle is that of striving, striving needs to have ends to strive towards and thus this system of subject-objects that present itself beings who are becoming (for something). But it can never reach a "real ends" because Will is always and ever present, and if it is ever present, it cannot stop but doing what it does, which is striving (creating subjects-for-objects) so that it can express/manifest itself.

So what does that mean for us? It means that we are but grist for the mill (Will). That is to say, Will cares not for its individuated expressions that are its manifestations. We end up suffering as being taken along for its ride as beings who strive constantly, being expressions of Will.

Schopenhauer's main answer to the question, "What then is to be done?" is to participate in artistic reflection (as that will give our willing nature a brief glimpse at the sublime of objects without desire). It is purely experiencing the Will without willing, if you will.. Also deep acts of self-sacrificing compassion can get us to briefly pause our willing nature, and finally, ascetic repose. If we deny-the-will to the point of getting beyond our own subject-object nature, we can perhaps escape.

Reply to Mww

So you do like that Schopenhauer wrote what he did, or would have you preferred him not write?

I once thought I read you saying something along the lines of, Schopenhauer should've stayed quite or something along those lines.

But, you are also ironic so, it might have been that.

Reply to Shawn

There's a lot of stuff in Schopenhauer and one need not take it whole. I think his pessimism has a grain of truth to it, maybe more than a grain, but I think he also exaggerates a little. I don't think life is THAT bad. But it can be very bad.

As for his metaphysics and epistemology, there's a lot of it which I personally find very insightful. However, having read Hume later than I should have, I am torn between S' views on the nature of the will and causality as opposed to Hume's.

So, it's complex. He is one of the last best system builders and one can only admire his honesty about many topics; while maybe thinking he was a not-so-nice person.

Quoting Wayfarer

I have never been able to get on board with his Debbie Downer*1 "wanh, wanh, wah" Pessimism and Roseanne Rosannadana "it's always something" — Gnomon
Grow up mate. Schopenhauer is for Big School, not kindy.

OK. I'll leave the grown-up philosophy to those who are able to gnaw on tough gristly meat. But his fatalistic worldview (amor fati) is not for me. Although Siddhartha was also moved by the suffering of his huddled masses of countrymen --- several thousand years before Schopenhauer's insight --- at least he proposed a self-help attitude that might make the toughness more palatable. Other than a few quotes & wiki articles, I know little about scowling Schop, and I'm content to leave it that way.

I'm currently reading a historical novel, Hawaii, by James Michener. He doesn't pull any punches, as he describes innumerable instances of "man's inhumanity to man" over many centuries. In a scene on a Leper's Island --- where those infected, through no fault of their own, were banished to suffer & die, out of sight & touch of the unaffected fat & happy Hawaiians --- an uninfected Chinese woman, who volunteered to go to the miserable colony with her leprous husband, years later asked about a missionary who had died of the disfiguring disease, "did he suffer?". The reply was, "here everybody suffers". To me, that sounds like Schop's world. But I prefer the world of the stubborn stoic woman, who was the heroine of this episode. She didn't wallow in misery & self-pity, but -- with low expectations --she got to work and made a good life out of the bad hand she was dealt. I suspect that Schop's idealistic expectations of life were too high, out of his reach.

Optimism is not about looking the other way, but focusing on what's within arm's reach. "Pessimism leads to weakness, optimism to power." — William James. :smile:

[i]Schopenhauer ended up saying that the meaning of life is to deny it . . . .
When Schopenhauer explicitly asks the question (in On Human Nature), it is this sense of it he appears to have in mind. His answer is depressing. The point or purpose of life is to suffer. We are being punished for the crime of being born, punished for who we are, namely, the nasty thoroughly egoistic will.[/i] https://iep.utm.edu/mean-ear/


If Schop's world is inherently irrational, how can we find enobling meaning in suffering?

Reply to Gnomon As you know, I generally look to Buddhist principles as a source of guidance, and they proclaim that there is indeed 'an end to suffering', even if it's not something we're likely able to grasp in this life. I concede that is something like religious faith, but one that Schopenhauer himself expressed, even despite his distaste for mainstream religions and rejection of the idea of God. In other words, it's not suffering all the way down - suffering has a cause and an end. I wouldn't look to Nietzsche for insight on that, however.

Quoting schopenhauer1

If we deny-the-will to the point of getting beyond our own subject-object nature, we can perhaps escape.

hence the motif of divine union, merging with the divine, etc. There's a theme I'm exploring in medieval philosophy, 'the union of knower and known'. Too large a digression for this thread.

Quoting Wayfarer

hence the motif of divine union, merging with the divine, etc. There's a theme I'm exploring in medieval philosophy, 'the union of knower and known'. Too large a digression for this thread.

Interesting! Thread?

Reply to schopenhauer1 It turns out to be more like a book. It's related to the theme I keep returning to. See this chat.

Sorry if 'm not directly addressing anyone who referenced my OP, as impolite; but, took a break for a while and had some questions about Schopenhauer.

Namely, since Schopenhauer was influenced by Buddhism and Hinduism, especially, I had a question regarding compassion and empathy in the landscape of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Whether Schopenhauer mentioned it or not; but, the philosophy of Schopenhauer is rife with the notion of empathy or compassion being a prerequisite for entertaining his notions of pessimism. I see it as such;

Without compassion or empathy, how would one become pessimistic without noticing the sadness of the world without compassion or empathy, which are needed to feel out or empathize with one another's suffering. If you agree, please let me know.

I think this thread has been one of my better threads. Thanks again for sharing your thoughts. They are appreciated even if I have nothing to say, since I wouldn't know how to respond.

Reply to Wayfarer
I think this has a lot of influence for Schopenhauer, especially here in your chat:

Intellectual Reception of Forms: According to Aquinas, when the intellect knows an object, it receives the form of that object. However, unlike sense perception, which apprehends particular, individualized forms, intellectual knowledge apprehends universal forms. This means that the intellect abstracts the essence from the particular instances and grasps it in its universality.

Some of my own notes here:

1) In Schopenhauer the Universal Ideas/Forms are directly manifestations of the Will, but so is the "knower". The "knower" is the subject mediating via space/time/causality to garner the "Idea" which is the mediated version of external forms with subjective-space/time (the phenomenal world).

My question then is how does time function for Aquinas? For Schopenhauer, it seems to be a sort of instrument for becoming. Or that's how I take it. In order to strive for something, you need objects and duration, and displacement, etc. All the dimensionality needed to make the myriad of the world-framework.

2) In Schopenhauer, unlike Aquinas' knowledge through the religious-mystic, seems to have it through negation. Denial of one's will. Also, for Schopenhauer, a lesser form of denial, is the ability to see the "sublime" of objects-qua-objects in art and object-qua-their-inner nature (Will) via music.

Reply to schopenhauer1 From the SEP entry:

According to Schopenhauer, corresponding to the level of the universal subject-object distinction, Will is immediately objectified into a set of universal objects or Platonic Ideas. These constitute the timeless patterns for each of the individual things that we experience in space and time. There are different Platonic Ideas, and although this multiplicity of Ideas implies that some measure of individuation is present within this realm, each Idea nonetheless contains no plurality within itself and is said to be “one.” Since the Platonic Ideas are in neither space nor time, they lack the qualities of individuation that would follow from the introduction of spatial and temporal qualifications. In these respects, the Platonic Ideas are independent of the specific fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason, even though it would be misleading to say that there is no individuation whatsoever at this universal level, for there are many different Platonic Ideas. Schopenhauer refers to the Platonic Ideas as the direct objectifications of Will and as the immediate objectivity of Will.

'
I recall from Kastrup's discussion of the Ideas, that they are like modes of vibration, similar to the way that when a guitar string is plucked, it will emanate a specific note, due to the tension of the string etc. There's a sense in which the ideas as archetypes represent the possibilities of things - that if something is to exist, it has to take a certain form - but that 'form' is not something that exists separately in the supposed 'ethereal realm'. In that sense the ideas transcend existence. They are kind of like a combination of necessity and possibility (ref.) And in this respect there are continuities with neoplatonism and the 'grand tradition' generally i.e. The Ideas are like intermediaries between the One and the individual. However in Schopenhauer will is 'irrational and blind' whereas in neoplatonism the nature of the One is beneficient and purposive.

But then as the SEP also notes in respect of Schop's ethics, 'Moral consciousness and virtue thus give way to the voluntary poverty and chastity of the ascetic. St. Francis of Assisi (WWR, Section 68) and Jesus (WWR, Section 70) subsequently emerge as Schopenhauer’s prototypes for the most enlightened lifestyle, in conjunction with the ascetics from every religious tradition.' I find this paradoxical, not to say contradictory, aspect of Schopenhauer a bit confounding. On the one hand, he wrote ascerbic diatribes against all religion, but on the other, he seems to recognise the Upani?ads and the 'life of Jesus' as kind of ideals. I think he had some kind of conflict around these issues - which I well understand, given the highly conflicted nature of religion in European history.

All in all, his writing on 'representation' and the ideas, I find highly amenable, but not so much his conception of the all-powerful will. I'm still dubious about those aspects of Schopenhauer, but as we all agree, he's a substantial figure in philosophy, and I'll continue to think it over.

Reply to Manuel

Hey you…..

Would I have preferred S not to write? Great big emphatic no; it’s not for me to say.

From a personal point of view, would I have preferred he not write what he did? From the perspective of German idealism…the philosophy of the day, so to speak….what he wrote was inevitable; it’s what happens when one guy sets the world on fire, but the next guy wants to say something to make a name for himself by either making the fire bigger and better, or by demonstrating the ease of extinguishing it.

If S didn’t write what he did, somebody else would have written something; the enemy you know is easier to combat than the enemy you never met.

Ok, so…what. There’s an Enlightenment-era paradigm shift in metaphysics. It’s recorded history, not open for debate. The philosophical world is on fire. Every peer group member says to himself….why the HELL didn’t I think of that??? Ironic that Einsteins’s physics’ paradigm shift had to wait 30 years to be sustained because the technology of the day wouldn’t allow it even given the understanding of the primary ground, re: the math, but Kant’s metaphysics took 30 years to obtain even a respectable glimmer of comprehension because the peer group of the day couldn’t wrap their collective heads around even the basic conditional predicates.

If one has a background in K before studying S, he should recognize that S understood K pretty damn well, above and beyond the fact that S merely says he does.

Odd, innit, that a paradigm shift in metaphysics with a predication on empirical knowledge, logically proves as irreducibly the case that there is something the human intellect doesn’t know, and never can?

Given a system by which all empirical knowledge is possible, then defeat that system by making it impossible to know this something….why not make it so that something unknowable, actually is? Well, shucks, it can’t be the same as the unknowable thing, so what best to be exchanged for the unknowable, than the absolutely knowable, without question or exception, logically proved by the conclusion that the negation of such knowledge is impossible?

Those with sufficient exposure are already familiar with what the unknowable is in K, and also just as much what erasure of the unknowable is in S. Bottom line….if we know our will indubitably, and if it is possible to make the will, as it is known, to represent what K stipulated as unrepresentable, then the thing K said we couldn’t possibly know, just disappears, and with it the entire Kantian epistemological dualism.

My bitch? Kant’s will, re: the very thing we know best of all, can never do the job S’s will is called upon to do, re: replace what we don’t know at all. Kant’s will belongs to moral philosophy, and has nothing whatsoever to do with German transcendental idealism writ large, hence can never be, as a perfectly well-known conception, a substitute for a perfectly unknown conception.

But, you know as well as I the pervasiveness of cognitive prejudice. Pretty hard to dislodge what’s first absorbed.

Reply to Mww

That was remarkably well written M, even by your standards (of which I've always considered to be extremely high).

There's A LOT that could be said here in reply to what you said S and K and the unknowable and - I would add - even Hume and Locke, but, then we go back to Plotinus and even further back to Plato and then we don't get anywhere.

As I've said I think K's conclusions about the unknowable were very much anticipated and discussed very interestingly by others prior to him, though I suspect they did not notice the importance of what they were saying.

But. But. The emphasis Kant made on the given point of the unknowable was strong enough that the previously mentioned observations (made in a different manner), were finally taken to be as deep and as important as they should have been taken. Plus, all the other stuff Kant said about the synthetic unity of apperception, the synthetic a-priori and the law like nature of the "ought" among other things were also quite deep.

My own feeling is, that those who came after K (not S) were honestly more than anything bloated showmen, who sometimes said an interesting thing here and there, but otherwise presented other things so obscurely it was passed off as Hidden Truths.

As for the will not doing the job S wanted it to do, I would agree with you, tentatively.

Thanks for the clarification.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Will is identified as the noumena of Kant- the Thing-in-Itself.

Yes I understood that but rehashed it poorly.

Quoting schopenhauer1

so Will's expression via Representation is to have a subject that perceives, experiences, and knows objects

Ok, that is clarified now.

Quoting schopenhauer1

as Kant proposed, is mediated by a priori categories such as time/space/causality, such that when it looks upon the object, it manifests the idea of the object in space/time/causality and the PSR (the world of phenomenon).

Yes, this is where I have the most trouble and need to understand more thoroughly. And this...Quoting schopenhauer1

The objects for Schopenhauer, are akin to some kind of Platonic Forms. These Forms are the direct manifestation of Will unmediated by a subject

Quoting schopenhauer1

WHY is it that Will has the double aspect?

...confusing me into seeing dualism...If you have a neat answer, please. Otherwise, I will read with a view to an answer.

Quoting schopenhauer1

That is to say, Will cares not for its individuated expressions that are its manifestations. We end up suffering as being taken along for its ride as beings who strive constantly, being expressions of Will.

And this, I understand and agree with, but with my modifications, admittedly requiring more "research" on my part before expressing the modifications with so much zeal

Quoting schopenhauer1

It is purely experiencing the Will without willing, if you will.

Wow. Not making conclusive comparisons, reminds me of Wu Wei, the Taoist, actionless action

Quoting schopenhauer1

If we deny-the-will to the point of getting beyond our own subject-object nature, we can perhaps escape.

I assume that last one was a generous "I guess," and not a certain position espoused by S?

Thank you,

Quoting Mww

if we know our will indubitably, and if it is possible to make the will, as it is known, to represent what K stipulated as unrepresentable, then the thing K said we couldn’t possibly know, just disappears, and with it the entire Kantian epistemological dualism.

Unless the thing K said we couldn't possibly "know" we simply "are". Knowing belongs to the representations and it cannot "know" (represent) the present and real. What we are independent of the representations, the human being as a present participle. As in, not becoming, so not accessible to the becoming, the knowing, only accessible by being. We already are exactly that.

Admittedly neither orthodox to Kant nor to Schopenhauer.

To try to validate it in the "Eastern" context of Schopenhauer, Tat Tvam Assi. Ultimate Reality? You are that.

Anyway. This is a thought and I don't intend to pursue it. But I am interested in your thoughts, if any. I found your brief assessment to be excellent.

Quoting ENOAH

Unless the thing K said we couldn't possibly "know" we simply "are".

Empirically, to know is to represent phenomenally. That which we simply “are” cannot be represented phenomenally, insofar as such representation is given from sensation alone, and we obviously cannot sense that which has no perceivable matter or substance.

On the other hand, derived from a long convoluted transcendental argument, if we think of ourselves as subject to which all representation belong, united under a single consciousness, we cannot possibly discover a conception by which it becomes possible to know “what” we are. It is then the case we, thought as subjects, can never be objects, which is the same as never knowing ourselves as such. So it is that we must be content to know we are nothing more than a mere transcendental idea which functions as subject. All this because when we try to know as something, the very thing that knows anything, we are met with an impossible situation.

Thing is, in juxtaposition to S, re: questions about knowledge of the world and that which is unknowable in it, these are strictly empirical questions, which cannot include mere transcendental ideas. So it is that a quite similar notion, unknowable as the what we “are” that is unknowable, which gets us to the mistake I hold S to have made, for he wants to force a purely transcendental idea into a necessary ground for a strictly empirical domain.

Furthermore, S couldn’t have even forged his personal philosophy if he didn’t de-construct what Kant intended the ding an sich to be. The thing-in-itself, in Kant, is a real existence, unknowable merely from the fact that thing has never been an appearance to our sensibility, has never run the gauntlet of the human cognitive system. As soon as the thing-in-itself is presented to sensibility, it is no longer -in-itself, it becomes a yet undetermined thing -in-us, and we can intuit, thus represent it as phenomenon, subsequently experience it and know it as a certain thing. S, on the other hand, wants all things as representations of will, which removes the very construct of representation from the cognitive system itself. Under these conditions, and in anticipation of Kant’s concept that no knowledge is at all possible for that without representation, we find the thing that was unknowable because it wasn’t representable, now is the very representation that was formerly unavailable to us.

Instead of things being given to sensibility, it is representations that are so given, which leaves the gaping explanatory hole in the form of…..how the HELL can a mere representation be of physical substance???????? How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses?

And if S’s representations are conditioned by space and time in order to make them appear real for our senses, as Kant’s things appear to us, then it remains questionable how the will can be a source of such conditions insofar as will is the origin of them. And if will doesn’t originate space and time, in that they still belong to the subject as pure a priori intuitions of transcendental deduction….S hasn’t done anything Kant didn’t already do.

Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. Turn-about is fair play? If he can do it so can I, kinda thing? Dunno, but maybe….

Anyway….opinion. I’m entitled to mine no matter how misguided….prejudiced….it may be. (Grin)

Quoting Manuel

your standards (of which I've always considered to be extremely high).

And I, yours even moreso. One had better appreciate and respect those with far greater formal training than himself.

Quoting Mww

Instead of things being given to sensibility, it is representations that are so given, which leaves the gaping explanatory hole in the form of…..how the HELL can a mere representation be of physical substance???????? How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses?

So you have to remember that Schopenhauer believes that the world is Will AND Representation. It is NOT one or the other, but both. Thus Will is nothing without Representation as its double-aspect. Thus, sensation is simply how Will manifests itself on the "flipside" to a subject when certain interactions happen (of external stimuli with sense perceptions). The physical causations have the double-aspect of the internal feelings. And this interaction he calls "Representation". The feelings are immediate, but they are still a "presentation" of subject/object mediated in the PSR phenomenal world.

Quoting Mww

And if S’s representations are conditioned by space and time in order to make them appear real for our senses, as Kant’s things appear to us, then it remains questionable how the will can be a source of such conditions insofar as will is the origin of them. And if will doesn’t originate space and time, in that they still belong to the subject as pure a priori intuitions of transcendental deduction….S hasn’t done anything Kant didn’t already do.

I am not quite sure what you are contending here. Schopenhauer thinks that BOTH subject and object are manifestations of the Will that is the noumenal aspect of the whole apparatus. I think of Will as a sort of aimless Logos "principle" behind the phenomenal world. Will is simply "striving", and the apparatus is striving "playing out" in its individuated ways. Its the expression of how Will strives. Of course "why" it takes this form and not another is a bit of a "just so" answer, but that is another objection that doesn't affect this one.

Quoting Mww

Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. Turn-about is fair play? If he can do it so can I, kinda thing? Dunno, but maybe….

I think Schop would even agree with this. His idea of art and aesthetics "bringing out" the external Forms in their sublime universal form, and this being some sort of stop-gap of the Will, pretty much shows this.

Quoting Mww

As soon as the thing-in-itself is presented to sensibility, it is no longer -in-itself, it becomes a yet undetermined thing -in-us, and we can intuit, thus represent it as phenomenon, subsequently experience it and know it as a certain thing. S, on the other hand, wants all things as representations of will, which removes the very construct of representation from the cognitive system itself. Under these conditions, and in anticipation of Kant’s concept that no knowledge is at all possible for that without representation, we find the thing that was unknowable because it wasn’t representable, now is the very representation that was formerly unavailable to us.

Quoting Mww

How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses?

Quoting Mww

Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will.

:up: :up:
Thank you!


:

Quoting Wayfarer

In other words, it's not suffering all the way down - suffering has a cause and an end. I wouldn't look to Nietzsche for insight on that, however.

Yes. I don't project a sunny Pollyanna view onto our imperfect world. But I also can't subscribe to Schop's gloomy-give-up outlook. I wouldn't want to model my personal worldview on his example of analytical intellectual critical methodology*1. His scientific approach to criticism is reductive, but I look to philosophy for a more holistic & creative big picture, including both the bad and the good stuff. Since I am a sentient creature, I can experience pain & suffering for myself. I don't need Schop's help to touch it where it hurts, to feel the exquisite agony of physical & psychological trauma. But I could benefit from a longer-broader view that envisions some "end" of suffering, preferably in the here & now world.

I suspect that Schop, as a young man, was an Idealist, taught to expect a more perfect world. But, as cynical comic-commentator George Carlin noted, a cynic is a disappointed idealist. When I was young, I too was indoctrinated with an idealistic worldview, in which a loving father in heaven was there to sooth my suffering. Unfortunately, I learned the hard way that divine succor was an ideal concept, not to be found in this real life, but in some remote angel-harp-cloud-world. Instead, I realized that practical succoring is found in your fellow sufferers, and in your own inner fortitude. So, instead of descending into angry Atheism, I became a Stoic Agnostic, and looked to human-authored philosophy, rather than cleric-authorized religion, to inform my pragmatic self-dependent positive forward-looking worldview.

If I found the world to be completely irrational & absurd, then my rational self-help plan of action would be insane. In the OP, Reply to Shawn found Schop's "denial of the will to live" unacceptable. But that sad state of mind would be sane, if the "Will" running the world had no inherent Logic or direction. And, if the world is a creation of my own mind, its absurdity would be a reflection of my own state of mind. Schop, like other European intellectuals of his era, was impressed by the "Eastern" holistic, non-dogmatic philosophies that contrasted with his own dualistic, legalistic religious heritage. Yet, I suspect that he failed to find any reason for living, other than fear of death, in a godless directionless life.

But, enough of this sober serious "Big School" stuff. As my teasing about Debbie Downer should indicate, I don't take Schop's worldview so seriously. It's not an ideal model for me to emulate. I prefer to filter the bad stuff through a sense of humor. That said, I can see that his notion of a "mind created world" would resonate with your own. But don't take it too literally. The imperfect real world will still be following its own internal logic (natural laws) into the uncertain future, long after your personal Mind has graduated to Nirvana. :cool:

PS___ My answer to the OP question is that Schop may be right about the imperfections of the not-yet-complete world process, and about our human ability to create a world-model of personally experienced & selected facts, but wrong about the hopelessness of the whole enterprise, which is not about little ole me.



*1. Why does negativity seem more intelligent than positively?
Negativity deals with the analytical while positivity is more creative.
https://www.quora.com/Why-does-negativity-seem-more-intelligent-than-positively

Despite my efforts, and the generous input of others in this thread and otherwise, I have yet to properly grasp (or abandon) what I believe to be something basic. So I will present it as simply as possible below for the consideration of anyone not yet worn out by my repeated efforts.

Where below am I naive or inconsistent?


PLATO
Forms(X)-->Particulars(Y)
KANT
Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y)
SCHOPENHAUR
Will(X)-->Representation(Y)

ALTERNATIVELY
Being(X)-->Becoming(Y)
[Body]-->[Mind]*
[Living]-->[knowing]*

While there are seemingly significant qualifiers differentiating each beyond nuances, is it not true that the following can be "extracted" from the "root" of each (i.e. before the differences emerge)?

Y is the "ground" where difference, therefore, meaning, therefore, desire, therefore, suffering is "constructed." This ground is mediated reality.

X is the "ground" where there is only the will to survive. No difference, etc., therefore no constructing suffering. This ground is direct reality.

And if X and Y are indivisible, inseparable, and not "two" distinct "grounds," why does this line of philosophical history separate them?


*is it "Body-->Mind"/"Living--knowing" which is "problematic"?

Quoting ENOAH

PLATO
Forms(X)-->Particulars(Y)
KANT
Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y)
SCHOPENHAUR
Will(X)-->Representation(Y)

ALTERNATIVELY
Being(X)-->Becoming(Y)
[Body]-->[Mind]*
[Living]-->[knowing]*

Interesting summary of general philosophical principles, extracted from real-world details. Forms are the essential idea of a thing that is instantiated in actual real things. The Noumenal ding an sich is also the idea of a Phenomenal object, as represented in a mind. The World-Will concept has been represented both as an unstoppable destructive tidal wave, and as an ongoing creative process, suitable for the evolution of thinking & willing & adapting beings. We are all in the same world, but we can choose to look at the dark side, or the brighter side of the same cloud.

Schopenhauer's pointless power of natural Will, may describe a snapshot of "Being" similar to Einstein's frozen Block Universe, going nowhere. But a "Becoming" world would offer more opportunities for growth & learning & evolution. Your notion of Living, as an opportunity for Knowing, is also more optimistic about the human condition. Instead of helplessly chained to the whipping wall, we are able to devise (represent) ways to escape, in reality (plan) or ideality (hope). :cool:

Schopenhauer’s Will as Intention :
For most humans though, Willpower is presumed to be both self-control and control over the environment. Hence, neither “aimless” nor “devoid of knowledge”.
http://bothandblog8.enformationism.info/page19.html

Quoting ENOAH

While there are seemingly significant qualifiers differentiating each beyond nuances, is it not true that the following can be "extracted" from the "root" of each (i.e. before the differences emerge)?

Y is the "ground" where difference, therefore, meaning, therefore, desire, therefore, suffering is "constructed." This ground is mediated reality.

X is the "ground" where there is only the will to survive. No difference, etc., therefore no constructing suffering. This ground is direct reality.

And if X and Y are indivisible, inseparable, and not "two" distinct "grounds," why does this line of philosophical history separate them?


*is it "Body-->Mind"/"Living--knowing" which is "problematic"?

1) Yes this is a more-or-less good summarization of the main premise of his theory.

2) As to why his line of philosophical history separates them, I would have to understand what you mean exactly. If you mean, where does this line of thinking come from, then that would be Kant's noumena/phenomena. If you mean, how is it split in history, as a metaphysical construct, it has no historical beginning- the world is both noumenal Will AND mediated Representation. They co-occur, not one after the other.

3) Body-mind is simply the apparatus, subject/object, knower/known. The problematic part is that Will IS this construct constantly playing out, over, and over, and over. An aimless unity viewed as individuated by its hapless subject-object creating, "illusory" manifestations (the representations that are but the manifestations of Will).

Quoting ENOAH

Where below am I naive or inconsistent?

Not necessarily either, but the subtleties of these subjects are such that they resist compression to a schematic. Understanding what exactly Plato intended by 'ideas' or 'forms' is quite a difficult task in its own right, and Kant is infamously difficult to read.

One analogy I've found for Schopenhauer's 'will' is the Buddhist 'tannha' (craving or thirst). I got ChatGPT to summarize this comparison which can be viewed below:

[hide]Schopenhauer's 'Will'
For Schopenhauer, the 'will' is the fundamental reality, an irrational, blind force that manifests itself in all living beings. It is the source of all desires and actions, and it perpetuates the cycle of striving and suffering. Schopenhauer's 'will' is not a personal or individual will but a universal force that drives all phenomena. His pessimistic view holds that the endless striving of the will is the root of suffering, and liberation can be attained by negating the will through asceticism and denial of desires.

Buddhist 'T????' (or 'Ta?h?')
In Buddhism, 't????' or 'ta?h?' (P?li) is often translated as 'thirst,' 'craving,' or 'desire.' It is identified as the second of the Four Noble Truths and is considered the origin of suffering (dukkha). 'T????' refers to the insatiable craving for sensory pleasures, existence, and non-existence, which leads to the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (sa?s?ra). Overcoming 't????' through the practice of the Noble Eightfold Path leads to the cessation of suffering (nirv??a).

[b]Comparative Analysis
Similarities:[/b]
Source of Suffering: Both Schopenhauer's 'will' and the Buddhist 't????' are seen as the root causes of suffering and the continuous cycle of existence.
Nature of Desire: Both concepts emphasize the relentless and insatiable nature of desire, leading to perpetual dissatisfaction and striving.
Goal of Liberation: Schopenhauer and Buddhism both propose that liberation from suffering involves overcoming the driving force of desire. For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirv??a.

Differences:

Metaphysical Foundation: Schopenhauer's metaphysics is rooted in a form of philosophical idealism, where the 'will' is a metaphysical principle underlying all phenomena. Buddhism, on the other hand, does not posit a metaphysical will but focuses on the psychological and phenomenological aspects of craving and its cessation.

Path to Liberation: Schopenhauer emphasizes asceticism and the denial of individual will as a path to liberation. Buddhism prescribes a specific ethical and meditative path (the Noble Eightfold Path) to eliminate craving and achieve enlightenment.
Ultimate Reality: Schopenhauer's ultimate reality is the will, which one must negate, while in Buddhism, the ultimate reality is the cessation of suffering and the realization of the nature of existence (dependent origination and emptiness).

Scholarly Exploration

Scholars have delved into these comparisons in various works. For instance:

Bryan Magee discusses the parallels between Schopenhauer and Eastern thought in his book "The Philosophy of Schopenhauer."

Urs App explores Schopenhauer's engagement with Eastern texts and ideas in "Schopenhauer's Compass: An Introduction to Schopenhauer’s Philosophy and its Origins."

D.T. Suzuki and other scholars of comparative philosophy have also noted the resonances between Schopenhauer's ideas and Buddhist thought, particularly in the context of suffering and desire.

These comparisons underscore the significant cross-cultural philosophical dialogues that have shaped modern understandings of desire, suffering, and liberation.[/hide]

Quoting Wayfarer

Goal of Liberation: Schopenhauer and Buddhism both propose that liberation from suffering involves overcoming the driving force of desire. For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirv??a.
Differences:

This is getting very esoteric, but can it be argued that Schopenhauer's famous "denial of Will", is actually a sort of existence of unmediated existence?

But how is it you suppose, one can "deny" if one IS will. What is this "other" of "denial" which would not be part of "Will" itself, thus self-refuting the effort from the start?

Quoting schopenhauer1

This is getting very esoteric, but can it be argued that Schopenhauer's famous "denial of Will", is actually a sort of existence of unmediated existence?

This is where I think Schopenhauer was disadvantaged by not having encountered an adept or guru of the Eastern paths he admired (of course in his day and age that would have been very unlikely given geography and history.) I think Schopenhauer intuited that there was a state of the 'cessation of suffering', which he said was exemplified St Francis and other ascetics, but I don't know if he really reached those states (and who does?) In Urs App's book Schopenhauer's Compass, there's a whole chapter on what Schopenhauer describes as 'better consciousness' (apparently what we would call higher consciousness) so again, he was very much aware of that in a way that most later philosophers were not. But Zen teachers will demand going far beyond just a kind of theoretical grasp and it takes considerable training to truly integrate that understanding. Schopenhauer was a perceptive philosopher, but not, in Eastern parlance, a 'realised being'.

See also
Schopenhauer and Buddhism
Peter Abelsen

Philosophy East and West
Vol. 43, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), pp. 255-278 (24 pages)
Published By: University of Hawai'i Press

What was Schopenhauer known for?

In my mind he was a bona fide person, more authentic and genuine about his philosophy and its import towards life like no other philosophy. Perhaps the only philosopher that was more bona fide was Wittgenstein.

As a person, he wasn't very interesting to investigate; but, his aphorisms enduring popularity is still a testament to his genuineness and authenticity.

In the Wikipedia entry on higher consciousness I belatedly linked to my last entry, there's this snippet:

[quote=Schopenhauer]The better consciousness in me lifts me into a world where there is no longer personality and causality or subject or object. My hope and my belief is that this better (supersensible and extra-temporal) consciousness will become my only one, and for that reason I hope that it is not God. But if anyone wants to use the expression God symbolically for the better consciousness itself or for much that we are able to separate or name, so let it be, yet not among philosophers I would have thought.[/quote]

Quoting Wayfarer

In Urs App's book Schopenhauer's Compass, there's a whole chapter on what Schopenhauer describes as 'better consciousness' (apparently what we would call higher consciousness)

So what do you think of this one?
Quoting schopenhauer1

But how is it you suppose, one can "deny" if one IS will. What is this "other" of "denial" which would not be part of "Will" itself, thus self-refuting the effort from the start?

Reply to schopenhauer1 Have another look at #7 of the SEP entry.. I think it addresses that question. The emphasis on will is 'less of an outlook derived from an absolute standpoint that transcends human nature and as more of an outlook expressive of human nature in its effort to achieve philosophical understanding .... It can be understood alternatively as an expression of the human perspective on the world, that, as an embodied individual, we typically cannot avoid. This tempered approach, though, does leave us with the decisive question of why the world would appear to be so violent, if the universe’s core is not thoroughly “Will,” but is also something mysterious beyond this.'

Perhaps the gist is that his is a perspectival approach - from the human perspective, the world appears 'as will', but to those who have 'gone beyond', it is something else.

Reply to Wayfarer
I think it's the other way around. Will is represented as 1) your own body, and 2) the world.

Schopenhauer is along the lines of phenomenology. He follows what appear to be intellectual dictates, such as the Law of Explanation. He's not saying this law is a feature of the universe, it's a feature of thought. We can't think beyond it, so it's like a signpost of the border of thought.

Taking him this way, he flows into Witt's Tractatus, which can be taken as a warning against trying to turn phenomenology into a theory of everything.

Quoting ENOAH

Poor guy. Thank you.

Genius poor guy.

Reply to Wayfarer
I do rather like SEP's phrasing here:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schopenhauer/#7:For if Will is only one of an untold number of the universe’s dimensions, there would be no reason to expect that the individuating effects of the principle of sufficient reason would generate a world that feasts on itself in the manner that Schopenhauer describes.

It sounds like something I'd say :smile: as a criticism.

But it brings up a good point. And again, the question remains- "what" is this "denial of Will" that can be employed that would "not Will" if "all is Will"? Is there a Will above Will? Is there Will+? This now looks like gnosticism. That is to say, Will is the demiurge, but there is "higher Will" which is more foundational. But then when one is "denying the Will", is one employing "higher Will" to deny the "lower Will"? And then this starts to unravel... And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it.

Quoting Wayfarer

One analogy I've found for Schopenhauer's 'will' is the Buddhist 'tannha' (craving or thirst).

Ok, if that's the case, then definitely he places suffering in the category of the real being, and unlike Buddhism, not in the category of Maya/Samsara/Karma. That is, suffering for S. is not restricted to the "illusions" but also Buddha Nature (if that and S's "will" are similarly the ground of real being).

Quoting schopenhauer1

As to why his line of philosophical history separates them, I would have to understand what you mean exactly.

I mean to say, for me the two categories summarized as X and Y are ontologically(?) separate. The one being, "Being", the other being a modified "reality" mediated or projected solely by the emergence of human minds. If I am mistaken, and for all of these philosophies, X and Y are indivisible (I.e. suffering cannot be isolated to Mind or resolved in being, independent of mind), then why are they consistently spoken of as if one is the ground of being and the other projections of Mind?



Quoting Gnomon

The Noumenal ding an sich is also the idea of a Phenomenal object, as represented in a mind

Ok. Here I see the distinction from what I'm proposing. At least for Plato and Kant. But what about Schopenhauer?
If K and P were not positing two "realities" one being, the other becoming, wasn't Schopenhauer?

I see from further in your reply, likely not. As for the "two realities" I'm observing, as you suggest, these might be two ways to "choose" to view the one reality?

Hmm.

Thank you to all three, for helping me understand.

Quoting ENOAH

Ok, if that's the case, then definitely he places suffering in the category of the real being, and unlike Buddhism, not in the category of Maya/Samsara/Karma. That is, suffering for S. is not restricted to the "illusions" but also Buddha Nature (if that and S's "will" are similarly the ground of real being).

Not exactly, look at our conversation right above:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/904945

Quoting Wayfarer

For Schopenhauer, this is through the negation of the will, while in Buddhism, it is through the elimination of craving and the attainment of nirv??a.

Sorry Wayfarer, I just noted your reveal. Thank you. And I see that you might note (not unlike Gnoman) that The "division" is not ontological, between Will and Suffering, but rather a "choice." Suffering does "emerge out of" the Will, but one might "attempt" to "avoid" it by negating the will.

I would only suggest that negating the will (ground of being) does seem impossible (as Schopenhauer the forum member has been pressing with kindness). It would make more sense if the "resolution" to suffering is negating the projections which (I believe to be) its "locus."

But things are more clear now in that I understand where I diverge.

Quoting Gnomon

In the OP, ?Shawn found Schop's "denial of the will to live" unacceptable.

Yes, I would like to elaborate on why I find it unacceptable. How is one to deny the will to live? Doesn't this imbue a persons life or deny their adaptability to the environment they are in?

Compare and contrast the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest with Schopenhauer's notion of the denial of the will to live?

Quoting schopenhauer1

Not exactly, look at our conversation right above:

Below is from your conversation above. That is the very point I "think" I am concerned about. Seems to me I should pause again. :smile: Sorry.

Quoting schopenhauer1

But then when one is "denying the Will", is one employing "higher Will" to deny the "lower Will"? And then this starts to unravel... And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it.

Quoting frank

Genius poor guy.
15m

No doubt

Quoting ENOAH

I mean to say, for me the two categories summarized as X and Y are ontologically(?) separate. The one being, "Being", the other being a modified "reality" mediated or projected solely by the emergence of human minds. If I am mistaken, and for all of these philosophies, X and Y are indivisible (I.e. suffering cannot be isolated to Mind or resolved in being, independent of mind), then why are they consistently spoken of as if one is the ground of being and the other projections of Mind?

I think that is a great point, and I think it valid. I think the question is a legitimate one that stands.. And goes right back to a conversation I had with Wayferer in a previous thread... I'd have to look to find it, but it was the one I sent you a little while ago.

It does seem like if Schopenhauer is offering a dual-aspected world, that indeed, Will is not the "true" or "primary" but simply the "flip-side", but he keeps discussing the Representation as "Illusion", as if it is NOT double-aspected but rather epiphenomenal, that is to say somehow "emergent from". However, this second interpretation would seem to be false under his own pretenses regarding the co-occurrence of both. There can be no prior or "originary", only BOTH being one and the same.

This can perhaps recovered in a couple ways, but these attempts are more just hypothesis...And it may answer my previous question about "denial" to @Wayfarer just above...

First off, no ONE manifestation/representation can ever be "Will itself", as Will is the WHOLE superstructure.. All that exists.

However, perhaps as a manifestation of Will, one can become a sort of Will-less individual. Don't ask me what or how that looks.. It seems impossible, bit would be something like an individuated aspect of Will knowing its own nature first-hand, without the mediation. Again, I have no idea what that really means.

So "denying" the will is "more weighted" of the noumenal understanding rather than the phenomenal presentation. It isn't "becoming one with Will" per se, because that is an impossibility.. It is the manifestation, understanding its own nature as much as a manifestation can.. I guess. And if that sounds really woo woo.. it is to me as well.. I'm just trying my best to work with what a I got in terms of Will and "denial of Will" ... and what that means.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Representation as "Illusion", as if it is NOT double-aspected but rather epiphenomenal, that is to say somehow "emergent from". However, this second interpretation would seem to be false under his own pretenses regarding the co-occurrence of both. There can be no prior or "originary", only BOTH being one and the same.

I get why ultimately they must just be Will (I have in mind, none of the nuances peculiar to each philosopher. Most basic: will=ground of being; representation=those projections emerging there"from").

But.

Is it possible to conceive of the projections (phenomena/mind/becoming) as epiphenomenal, ultimately not "real;" and so, there is ultimately only one, but the projections are nevertheless

1) existent (though fleeting and empty, like shadow paintings)
2) effective against the real. Like a Fictional story can cause one to really cry. It effects reality while maintaining its status as Fictional
3) avoidable, or at least, tune-out-able by a process of attuning to the Will (drive for survival) without attention to the projections (desire and suffering)
?

Quoting ENOAH

Is it possible to conceive of the projections (phenomena/mind/becoming) as epiphenomenal, ultimately not "real;" and so, there is ultimately only one, but the projections are nevertheless

1) existent (though fleeting and empty, like shadow paintings)
2) effective against the real. Like a Fictional story can cause one to really cry. It effects reality while maintaining its status as Fictional
3) avoidable, or at least, tune-out-able by a process of attuning to the Will (drive for survival) without attention to the projections (desire and suffering)
?

That is indeed a way to look at it, but I have problems with it...

Whence the illusion? If you say that it is secondary, and not somehow, ONE AND THE SAME, then you are trying to say that there is some sort of temporal and causal succession (first there was Will, and then there was Idea/Representation). That doesn't seem to make sense.

It also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation, as causation is purely in the phenomenal world of Representation, but cannot be said of Will itself.

Quoting schopenhauer1

also makes no sense to say that Will CAUSED Representation

Totally agree. I thought I was framing it in a way conceding to an orthodox view. Causation is misapplied. (But there is the added problem which I concede that this applies not just to applying "cause" to any relationship with Reality, but to everything expressed, rendering all of this moot.)


Quoting schopenhauer1

Whence the illusion?

This is a far more serious problem. What resolves it for me, is undoubtedly not Schopenhauerian. A simple answer is best for now. The question may be posed as what makes the projections not just an extension of what is real? The answer is in their structure/nature(?). While the Universe is formed of matter and energy, as are all of the organisms including their brain functions, Mind emerged as something other; it is structured by Representations that now move in accordance with their own laws and mechanics (as opposed to the rest of "us" bound by the laws of nature).

I won't get into the how and wherefore of it. But for me, this epiphenomenom has an affect on our will, our natural selves, to the point of superimposing an "I" upon it. And yet, it is not Real.

Quoting ENOAH

This is a far more serious problem. What resolves it for me, is undoubtedly not Schopenhauerian. A simple answer is best for now. The question may be posed as what makes the projections not just an extension of what is real? The answer is in their structure/nature(?). While the Universe is formed of matter and energy, as are all of the organisms including their brain functions, Mind emerged as something other; it is structured by Representations that now move in accordance with their own laws and mechanics (as opposed to the rest of "us" bound by the laws of nature).

I won't get into the how and wherefore of it. But for me, this epiphenomenom has an affect on our will, our natural selves, to the point of superimposing an "I" upon it. And yet, it is not Real.

This all sounds like an attempt to square the circle here. Something I also struggle with in Schopenhauer. That is, how is the multiplicity the same as the unity. It just starts sounding more absurd.. I proposed a Higher Will (will denied), and Lower Will (will manifested), but this makes no sense if all is One Will.

Then it also starts looking like early forms of trinitarian justifications.. same substance different modes, or whathaveyou. This also will not do.

Rather, the only way I can interpret it is that Will literally IS the illusions. It is NOT primary/originary/more REAL than the illusions. Rather, illusions simply IS WILL as it is carried out.

However, I still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play. "What" that is, is beyond me. But it's the same problem as Buddhism's desire for no desire. And I am sure there are plenty of clever ways to get around it..

Quoting schopenhauer1

Will literally IS the illusions.

Hard pill to swallow...hence the squaring of the circle. You may be right, more universally than just this.

Quoting schopenhauer1

still don't know where Denial of Will comes into play.

One thing for sure, it can't be accomplished using the tools of the "illusion" no matter how entangled with the will. Right?

Quoting ENOAH

One thing for sure, it can't be accomplished using the tools of the "illusion" no matter how entangled with the will. Right?

I just don't even know what "denial of the Will" even means in this context. There is no fit.

This is why I said it is something akin to the Representation knowing its essence more familiarly? So where the ordinary mode is to be caught up in the world of phenomenon, the enlightened person is the least "caught up", though still in the world, as the phenomenal doesn't just disappear altogether.

It's not a satisfying answer though.

But as to Will BEING Illusion (not prior to it or more Real than it), I think we should continue that discussion. I am not sure how, but if you have ideas, I will hear it out.

Edit: The only way I can characterize it is that it is "double-aspected" like the double-aspect theories of consciousness contend that material is mental to some extent, not that material causes mental.

Quoting frank

He's not saying this law is a feature of the universe, it's a feature of thought. We can't think beyond it, so it's like a signpost of the border of thought.

That is along the same lines as the 'critical reflection' in the SEP entry that I mention above. But I'd say, it's deeper than a feature of thought, it is inextricably part of organic life, as all living things strive to survive (although only humans come along and ask why.)

Quoting ENOAH

definitely he (Schop.) places suffering in the category of the real being, and unlike Buddhism, not in the category of Maya/Samsara/Karma. That is, suffering for S. is not restricted to the "illusions" but also Buddha Nature (if that and S's "will" are similarly the ground of real being).

I'd be very careful at this point. First, 'Buddhanature' was not something S. ever would have encountered even despite what knowledge of Buddhism he had, as it is part of a set of Buddhist doctrines that weren't translated until much later. Second, look again at the reply to S1 above, from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer. It suggests he's not really positing 'Will' as a philosophical absolute, as a kind of 'blind God' (which sounds more like H P Lovecraft :yikes: ) but more as an inevitable condition of existence, something that drives living beings to continually crave to exist and to continue, without their really understanding why.

Without getting into all the intricacies of Buddhist philosophy, which are considerable, one of the basic formulations is called the 'chain of dependent origination' (Prat?tyasamutp?da), shared by all schools. The driving factors are ignorance, greed and hatred (depicted iconographically as a rooster, pig and snake chasing each other in a circle). So ignorance is what causes beings to be born in the realm of Sa?s?ra (with the caveat that in Mah?y?na Buddhism, the bodhisattva may be voluntarily born out of compassion for the sake of suffering beings). But ignorance has no intrinsic reality. And that actually converges (oddly enough) with a religious teaching associated with Augustine, 'evil as privation of the good' - in the same way that illness is simply the absence of health, or a hole the absence of ground, evil or ignorance has no intrinsic being, although it appears totally real to those afflicted by it.

Quoting schopenhauer1

the ordinary mode is to be caught up in the world of phenomenon, the enlightened person is the least "caught up", though still in the world, as the phenomenal doesn't just disappear altogether.

That is definitely the most Reasonable view. You cannot achieve anything outside of the phenomenal because there is no refuge in so called reality. The two are inextricably one. Thus, enlightened necessarily is enlightened as to the predicament, and willing (deliberate use) to carry on as unattached as possible (ironically using that very willing to detach from willing. A problem I see resolved differently).

But we share in the pith of it. Wu Wei.


Quoting schopenhauer1

I think we should continue that discussion. I am not sure how, but if you have ideas, I will hear it out.

:up:


Quoting schopenhauer1

it is that it is "double-aspected"

And I would see that ("double-aspected") as an "aspect" of the projections, rooted in a primeval structure, difference. Because Mind exploded once difference became habituated into real consciousness*, we have this problem to grapple with in the first place. Not this but that is recognized as the root of the projections (representations) by Vedanta/ Mahayana (I can't speak of Theravada) and Western philosophy.

What is the "nature" of this will/representations dichotomy? Right? You say "double-aspected" which is consistent with Schopenhauer and, I might concede conventional reasoning. It applies the autonomous requirement of difference. Not this but that.

I too necessarily employ the structure difference. I say there is only will, like you, but the second aspect is does not beling tobthe will. The second is Fictional (illusion) because it is projected, and it isn't what anything else is or has ever been. It is truly new and other. But has no enduring structure, just empty signs in motion triggering feeling, action, sky scrapers, nuclear bombs, and this very dialogue.


*(I'll use the language I'm familiar with. Know that I am aware of their "flaws" within the context of this discussion)

Quoting ENOAH

I too necessarily employ the structure difference. I say there is only will, like you, but the second aspect is does not beling tobthe will. The second is Fictional (illusion) because it is projected, and it isn't what anything else is or has ever been. It is truly new and other. But has no enduring structure, just empty signs in motion triggering feeling, action, sky scrapers, nuclear bombs, and this very dialogue.

But then how can anything be "projected" as if it proceeds from something. This is all language of the phenomenal which would be inappropriate as it is the language of causation, duration, temporality, and causality. This is the language of the Phenomenal world applied to the Noumenal.

Rather, it would make more sense that the Noumenal is simply the Representation in its other aspect, one that we cannot know except by way of intellectualization. I guess the Enlightened person "knows" it in some mystical sense.

Quoting Wayfarer

not something S. ever would have encountered even despite what knowledge of Buddhism he had, as it is part of a set of Buddhist doctrines that weren't translated until much later.

Ok. Ive never considered that for Schopenhauer, yet I sensed he wasn't a Buddhist Scholar or anything even for his time. But maybe from what you've made clear, he was well versed given the resources.

Quoting Wayfarer

Will' as a philosophical absolute, as a kind of 'blind God' (which sounds more like H P Lovecraft :yikes: ) but more as an inevitable condition of existence, something that drives living beings to continually crave to exist and to continue, without their really understanding why.

Ok. Yes. You are correct to clarify. I originally "brought" his "will" into a category with Being recognizing I wasn’t being true to Schopenhauer but neglecting to be clear.

If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive?

Quoting ENOAH

If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive?

Well, Freud, who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, alluded to the ID as the wellspring of desire and arousal. Boredom isn't such a negative thing with how this whole industrialized psychological programming went crazy with advertisements and our beloved dopamine nation. Endless, really.

Quoting ENOAH

If not Will for Schopenhauer, then what would he have "equated" with, say, Brahman or whatever stage of Buddhist translations' version of Tathagatagharba(?), or even Spinoza's Monism/God? What would Schopenhauer call that? Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive?

They're difficult questions, but I'd be careful about reification. Buddhanature is not any kind of entity or thing, but the latent capacity for enlightenment. Perhaps more like a 'principle'. Buddhism in particular is very sensitive to 'objectification'. So, 'will is not a being but a drive' is much nearer the mark.

Quoting schopenhauer1

then how can anything be "projected" as if it proceeds from something

Right. Words are inevitably problematic. All the more so when I do not share your knowledge of the technical. Projections is misleading. Here's an oversimpified description of the process. Representations are constructed by the Body to trigger feelings and actions. The feelings and actions are real but we are attuned to the representations as though they are real.
In the spirit of further oversimplifying, one time, hypothetically before thd hypothetical emergence of mind, the brain would construct a representation of a tiger when a certain twig snapped to trigger the Body to run. Mind is a universe of such representations.

Quoting schopenhauer1

it would make more sense that the Noumenal is simply the Representation in its other aspect, one that we cannot know.

It might. If I am stretching, then it would. If I am not, that it resolves the cannot know with the answer, well "know" is not a category of truth anyway, that's why it can't be known.

Quoting Wayfarer

Buddhanature is not any kind of entity or thing, but the latent capacity for enlightenment

Understood. So for Schopenhauer there is nothing like Brahman or another monistic ultimate reality besides Will which is more like a drive? Sorry, that's what I was wondering.

Quoting Shawn

Freud, who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, alluded to the ID as the wellspring of desire and arousal.

Oh. Would Schopenhauer have seen the Will as Freud's ID?

If so, there is nothing redeeming in us at the root? But where does reason or rationality fit in?

Reply to ENOAH I think that’s about right.
//
What I’ve read about Schopenhauer’s influence on Freud is that both he and Kant anticipated the discovery of the unconscious.

Reply to schopenhauer1

I bow to your expertise on all things Schopenhauer. And thanks for not rippin’ me a new one for misconstruing his philosophical value.
————-

Quoting ENOAH

Y….is mediated reality. X…..is direct reality.

KANT: Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y)

The others I leave to others, but in Kant, while phenomena as mediated reality is correct, it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t.

“…. In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or à priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities….”

“…. I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction (…) but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but….solely through the pure understanding…..is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition….”.

If noumena are instances of direct reality, why is it there is never an example of a noumenal object? Everybody talks of noumena as a general kind of thing but no one ever gives a name to what a particular noumenon might be. Because no one can, under the auspices of Kantian transcendental idealism pursuant to a posteriori cognitions, re: experience.

Anyway….in trying to help sort it out I might have just made it worse.

Quoting Mww

If noumena are instances of direct reality, why is it there is never an example of a noumenal object?

You know that Schopenhauer criticized Kant's use of the term 'noumenal', right? According to a passage in World as Will and Idea:

The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers indicated as ????????? [phainomena] and ???????? [nooumena]; the opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms ????????? and ???????? were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances.

The Wikipedia entry on Noumenon, from which that is copied, also says

The Greek word ???????o?, nooúmenon (plural ????????, nooúmena) is the neuter middle-passive present participle of ?????, noeîn, 'to think, to mean', which in turn originates from the word ????, noûs, an Attic contracted form of ????, nóos, 'perception, understanding, mind'. A rough equivalent in English would be "that which is thought", or "the object of an act of thought".

So, from that, I would have surmised that the ideas, in the Platonic and Aristotelian sense, might be regarded as 'noumenal objects' insofar as they're apprehended directly by intellect. Lloyd Gerson says in his essay Platonism and Naturalism:

in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. ...Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

A related comment from Ed Feser:

Quoting Edward Feser

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.

Now, I know these are all very knotty philosophical problems, in no way am I trying to resolve them. It's just that it seems to me that 'noumenon' as 'intelligible objects' in the sense of those two quotations make sense to me, but that does not seem to be what Kant meant by the term, as Schopenhauer said. I sometimes wonder if Kant put too much emphasis on the necessity of empirical validation, as there are whole fields, such as pure mathematics, which seem to me to constitute real knowledge, but which are not empirically realised.

Quoting schopenhauer1

And then you get to bring in those fun Sanskrit and Pali terms to placate it.

...although Schop himself used Greek terms some of the time, e.g. (I hope relevantly, I mainly know about Schop in relation to music not metaphysics):

Schopenahuer, vol 1 p.88:the wise man always holds himself aloof from jubilation and sorrow, and no event disturbs his ???????? [ataraxia].

Reply to Wayfarer

I appreciate your comment, and I offer these rejoinders just to demonstrate a conformity.

S says…..The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks…..
K says……(to cognize) as attested by experience, or à priori, by means of reason…..

To cognize by experience is intuitive; to cognize by pure reason is abstract, hence the difference is not entirely overlooked.
———-

S says….the opposition and incommensurability between these terms….
K says…. inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all significance, that is, all relation to an object, disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think…

One says they are opposed and incommensurable; the other had already acknowledged the case and says why it is so.
———-

Wiki says…..the object of an act of thought….
K says….the understanding (…) takes for granted that an object (…) must be capable of being thought (…) and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence….

One must already grant that understanding just is the faculty of thought, without which the comparison doesn’t work.
————

Feser says…..For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one….

K says….. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. (…) the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere.

While it is true we think in images, as soon as we present to ourselves a representation of a triangle in general, it is a particular instance of a universal idea. In no other way than by means of principles, is it possible to think things in general, the backbone of pure transcendental cognitions.
———-

Quoting Wayfarer

it seems to me that 'noumenon' as 'intelligible objects' in the sense of those two quotations make sense to me, but that does not seem to be what Kant meant by the term, as Schopenhauer said.

“…. The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis…”

“…. I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis, which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients—an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling….”

Kant wanted noumena to be understood only as intelligible objects, and the conception of strictly intelligible objects in general does make sense, insofar as Kant was an admitted dualist, so if we can come up with this, then we damn well better be able to come up with non-this but that, other than as a form of mere negation. But the fact remains, it is impossible to cognize a noumenal object, no matter how much sense the notion makes.

I always wondered….who is doing the quibbling? Those who question his use of the terms, or himself for using them as he does?

Quoting Mww

it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t.

Ok. Thank you. You have put me on track re Noumena.

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that?

Quoting Mww

Kant was an admitted dualist

What were the "opposing" "realities" in his dualism?

Quoting Wayfarer

That is along the same lines as the 'critical reflection' in the SEP entry that I mention above. But I'd say, it's deeper than a feature of thought, it is inextricably part of organic life, as all living things strive to survive (although only humans come along and ask why.)

You're doing what Witt warned against: you're giving in to the desire to see the world from a vantage point you can't have. But there wouldn't be much philosophizing going on if everyone took Witt's point. :razz:

Quoting frank

You're doing what Witt warned against: you're giving in to the desire to see the world from a vantage point you can't have. But there wouldn't be much philosophizing going on if everyone took Witt's point. :razz:

It's nonsense to speak of nonsense, because it is precisely defining what "is" that we are doing, and thus, what is legitimate for there to have a "sense" about.. I feel Witt's understanding is asinine, and playing to a certain crowd that wanted to remove itself from metaphysical speculation. He was doing metaphysical speculation himself, but then playing cutesy at the end by saying "Just lift up the ladder now that I showed it to you!" .. No, you are not immune either, bro. Just one of many speculators.. Take a number.

Quoting mcdoodle

...although Schop himself used Greek terms some of the time, e.g. (I hope relevantly, I mainly know about Schop in relation to music not metaphysics):

the wise man always holds himself aloof from jubilation and sorrow, and no event disturbs his ???????? [ataraxia].
— Schopenahuer, vol 1 p.88

True! I was being cheeky there because it seems that every time there is some contradiction or paradox in Schopenhauer's Will, a Sanskrit and/or Pali word is thrown out there to show that there is this other concept inserted that can save it.

Quoting schopenhauer1

No, you are not immune either, bro.

I agree. I have my biases. For me, it's a step in the right direction to at least recognize that. It makes you more mentally flexible. It allows you to step into the shoes of those who believe the opposite. From there, you can more clearly see the weaknesses of your own position, you know?

Quoting ENOAH

Ok. Thank you. You have put me on track re Noumena.

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that?

I'm not sure if @Mww is trying to convey this but..
Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself". For Kant, I believe, this could be many objects, a plurality of various objects. However, it cannot be known, what, if any, "being" stands behind empirical understanding. It is "X" for lack of better term for Kant. For Kant as well, it is only a concept that is gotten to by negation. It is the "not-empirical thing".

For Schopenhauer, he thinks he can go "beyond Kant" by not just proposing that there are "things-in-themselves" behind the empirical, that we can never know (X), but rather, we CAN KNOW and very INTIMATELY what X actually IS.. and that is a monism, Will.. The very fact that we have an "inner being" (subjective experience) is for Schopenhauer proof that Will exists as this double-aspected thing that strives.

Now again, does Schopenhauer here mistakenly equate his "subject" for Will? I am not sure.. I think he might be saying just the fact that there is inner experience points to a "striving" of sorts- a greater Will at work. I don't think he is actually identifying the subject as Will.

Quoting schopenhauer1

For Kant, I believe, this could be many objects, a plurality of various objects. However, it cannot be known, what, if any, "being" stands behind empirical understanding. It is "X" for lack of better term for Kant. For Kant as well, it is only a concept that is gotten to by negation. It is the "not-empirical thing".

Yes that is clear to me now. Thank you.

Quoting schopenhauer1

For Schopenhauer, he thinks he can go "beyond Kant" by not just proposing that there are "things-in-themselves" behind the empirical, that we can never know (X), but rather, we CAN KNOW and very INTIMATELY what X actually IS.. and that is a monism, Will.. The very fact that we have an "inner being" (subjective experience) is for Schopenhauer proof that Will exists as this double-aspected thing that strives.

Yes, and this is also finally clear to me. S. goes beyond K at "disclosing" that "non empirical" with a "higher" status in the scheme of reality. Whereas K settles upon not accessible to knowing; S says it is the Will, the very "drive" of all being(s).

Quoting schopenhauer1

I don't think he is actually identifying the subject as Will.

I would be surprised if he was. I would think tge "Subject" belongs to representation, that "double" part of Wills "double aspect."

But finally, is therefore the most ultimate reality for S the Will? Or is there a Being of all Beings which is merely manifesting as the Will?

Quoting Mww

While it is true we think in images, as soon as we present to ourselves a representation of a triangle in general, it is a particular instance of a universal idea. In no other way than by means of principles, is it possible to think things in general, the backbone of pure transcendental cognitions.

Thanks for your elucidations, they're helpful.

Quoting ENOAH

is therefore the most ultimate reality for S the Will? Or is there a Being of all Beings which is merely manifesting as the Will?

Reply to ENOAH See this blog post. It's not directly about Schopenhauer, but some of his near-contemporaries, grappling with the division between phenomena/noumena posed by Kant:

Hegel and Schleiermacher thought that Kant had missed something important—namely, that the self which experiences the world is also a part of the world it is experiencing. Rather than there being this sharp divide between the experiencing subject and things-in-themselves, with phenomena emerging at the point of interface, the experiencing subject is a thing-in-itself. It is noumenal—or, put another way, the self that experiences the world is part of the ultimate reality that lies behind experience.

So: the self that has experiences is a noumenal reality. Both Schleiermacher and Hegel believed that this fact could be made use of, so that somehow the self could serve as a wedge to pry open a doorway through the wall of mystery, into an understanding of reality as it is in itself. ...

... Schleiermacher dealt with this conundrum by privileging a distinct mode of self-consciousness, one in which all attempts to make the self into an object of consciousness—that is, all attempts to come to know the self—are set aside. When the self is made an object of study it becomes a phenomenon, and as such is divorced from the noumenal self. But it is possible to simply be—to become quiescent, if you will, and simply be what one is rather than attempt to know what one is.

And in this place of cognitive stillness, one discovers in a direct experiential way an ultimate reality that cannot be conceptualized or made into an object of study. This is the domain of mystical experience—and even though it is ineffable (that is, even if it cannot be made into an object of knowledge) it brings with it a kind of insight or enlightenment. One may not be able to adequately put this experience into propositional terms that can be affirmed as true, but that doesn’t mean one hasn’t in some sense encountered noumenal reality. One hasn’t encountered it as an object of experience (since that would turn it into a phenomenon). Rather, one encounters it in the way one experiences.

The challenge, then, is to attempt to articulate this encounter in a way that is meaningful to us--in other words, in a way that our cognitive minds can grasp and affirm. The encounter itself is what Schleiermacher calls “religion.”

Reply to Wayfarer Fascinating on a few levels. Thank you!

Quoting ENOAH

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that?

Not as such, no. There’s serious conceptual diversity between him and his successors, in that for Kant, the only realism is empirically conditioned, as opposed to that pseudo-realism which is technically only logical validity, while the only empirically direct, which he terms “immediately given”, is perception. So it is that the only directly real is that which is perceived, but that has nothing to do with direct reality, which, pursuant to reality’s inclusion in the table of categories, is neither directly real empirically nor perceived. “Direct reality”, then, reduces to a metaphysical non-starter.

On the other hand, reality, as such, is directly deduced transcendentally as a pure conception, pure meaning without a definitive conception subsumed under it, more commonly termed a universal, from which follows that this form of the real, first, belongs to reason rather than sensibility, and second, is real only insofar as without it all a priori cognitions become impossible. Which presents a kinda quasi-contradiction, in that if the real is only that which is empirically conditioned, then pure transcendental deductions cannot be real, but they are real insofar as they are and can only occur as objects of pure thought.
———-

Quoting ENOAH

What were the "opposing" "realities" in his dualism?

He states for the record his dualism resides in that which is experienced as opposed to that which is thought. Whether these are realities is questionable, considering how these conceptions are defined in accordance with the theory to which they are the ground.

And to nip the inevitable in the bud, no, noumena are not one of the opposing realities. While it is a valid conception, insofar it is not self-contradictory, it remains only that, a mere conception, hence is very far from an empirical reality for human intelligence.

Yea? Nay? Maybe, who knows?

Quoting schopenhauer1

I'm not sure if Mww is trying to convey this but..
Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself".

I’m not, in keeping with the definitions incorporated in the thesis. While it is true noumena are speculative notions, by definition a notion is “….a pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image….”.

The solution to what noumena entails, arises from why is there no sensuous image. And while it is the same reason for noumena as it is for things-in-themselves, re: neither are ever appearances to sensibility, that does not make the one the same as the other, but they remain nonetheless conceptually interchangeable with each other given their respective origins both reside in understanding alone.

The difference is the starting point. For us, we start with the thing’s appearance to our senses, then understand that which appears does not have to appear, and if it doesn’t, we understand that thing still remains as it is in itself. Noumena, on the other hand, originate, not in its affect on sensibility but in understanding, and from its conception we immediately comprehend why it cannot ever be an appearance.

(“….intuition cannot think, and understanding cannot intuit…”///“…. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind….”)

For what that’s worth…..

Quoting Mww

the only realism is empirically conditioned, as opposed to that pseudo-realism which is technically only logical validity,

Quoting Mww

Direct reality”, then, reduces to a metaphysical non-starter.

Quoting Mww

a universal, from which follows that this form of the real, first, belongs to reason rather than sensibility, and second, is real only insofar as without it all a priori cognitions become impossible.

Ok. Makes sense for Kant. But seems either extremely honest or extremely convenient. I tend to think the former. I.e., noumena is unknowable enough; he won't even touch that which really is unknowable.

Quoting Mww

we understand that thing still remains as it is in itself.

Quoting schopenhauer1

Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself".

Does anyone know the historical first instance of this "need" for an "in itself?" Assume it is not intuitive. Was it Plato's forms and/or this anamnesis? Was it pre-socratic? If so, what form did it first take.

It seems to me that this "in itself" is a hinge by which opposing views cannot reconcile which way it closes.


ADDENDUM: I.E., why can't "concept" which have no objective appearance be habituated constructions shared and reconstructed such that initiation into Culture/ Language means input with that data.

Quoting ENOAH

….either extremely honest or extremely convenient.

Maybe, but with respect to a theory predicated on sound logic, honesty and convenience don’t have much sway. At its simplest explanation, noumena cannot be known because they are what are called intellectual objects meaning they have no possibility of being represented in intuition. Only that which is intuited can be phenomenon from which arises experience, which is the same as being known as a certain something.
—————

Quoting ENOAH

….that which really is unknowable….

How do we distinguish between the unknowable and the really unknowable?

Quoting Mww

How do we distinguish between the unknowable and the really unknowable?

Fair question. Deliberately, yet recklessly, I created the category "really" unknowable.

My thinking emerges from these very categories I have been grappling with, in some "points" intersecting across philosophers, in other places, divergent only superficially, in still others, clearly divergent.

Currently (admittedly, possibly plain only to me), I see "across the board" the phenomenal/representational as mediated reality; the noumenal as still mediated reality; though posited as unknowable because its constructed source is ambiguous; that which remained unspoken of by Kant, and referred to as The Will by Schopenhauer, as really real (though neither philosopher made compelling arguments for how they described/why they "ignored" it.)

Quoting ENOAH

My thinking emerges from these very categories I have been grappling with, in some "points" intersecting across philosophers, in other places, divergent only superficially, in still others, clearly divergent.

I could be wrong but, I don’t think Schop makes the distinction between Thing in Itself and noumenal. For schop Will is Thing itself is Noumena…however I suppose the notion of Will, it’s feeling to us as representation is Thing itself, and perhaps the ascetics Denial, is akin to Noumena or some such playing with the concepts

Reply to Wayfarer

Me, I think the argument can be made that he was 'the last great philosopher' (although I'll leave it to someone else to actually write it ;-) )

The guy who does the Great Courses' modern phil survey course makes this point. He is talking about Hegel, but the two were contemporaries and even taught across the hall from one another for a period. He says Hegel was the last great philosopher in terms of creating an all encompassing system (aesthetics, ethics, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, etc.) Others since have had careers that touch on all these eras (although even that is rare these days) but they don't build them off one another and make them hang together as a whole. I think it's fair to say this sort of thing could be said of Schopenhauer's thought too.

For a more recent candidate, there is Ferdinand Ulrich, who is still alive. I haven't made it very far with him but since a number of people who know their philosophy extremely well have described him with all sorts of superlatives I will try to get there. I take it he is systematic in this way, although not nearly as prolific as Hegel. Despite some famous people singing his praises, he hasn't really broken out in popularity, which does seem somewhat essential to being "great." The type of philosophy he does hasn't been in vouge for a while, but that might change.

Quoting schopenhauer1

I could be wrong but, I don’t think Schop makes the distinction between Thing in Itself and noumenal. For schop Will is Thing itself is Noumena…

I agree. That was me extrapolating.

Quoting ENOAH

….the noumenal as still mediated reality; though posited as unknowable because its constructed source is ambiguous; that which remained unspoken of by Kant

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena? We know….theoretically…..what phenomena are mediated by, re: sensation, but what mediates noumena when we don’t even know what a noumenon would be? And whatever it may be, it certainly isn’t a sensation for us.

It isn’t posited as unknowable because of its source, for it is possible for a priori knowledge to arise from understanding alone, re: mathematics, or, the logical laws of rational thought.

It’s unknowable not because of what it is or what its source is, but because of what it isn’t and what its source is not; it isn’t that which appears to human sensibility and therefore its source is not intuition.

Quoting ENOAH

that which remained unspoken of by Kant (…) as really real….

Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses.

Quoting ENOAH

….though neither philosopher made compelling arguments for how they described/why they "ignored" it.)

I suppose you could say he failed to describe affects on our senses. He made a brief reference to the ontology of things, but in a treatise on epistemology, things just need to be given, where they come from and what they are be what they may. Where they come from doesn’t matter, and we’re going to say for ourselves what they are anyway, as befits our kind of intelligence, so……

Cool thing about speculative metaphysics: you can see across the board any way that makes sense to you.

Quoting Mww

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena?

First, this is currently where I'm settled. And it goes without saying, I speak without authority.

We shouldn't have noumena. Noumena, only seemed to Kant et. al. to be unknowable. But their "thing in itself" is as unknowable as that of an apple. Both are known already mediated, and there is no inherent difference in what they are in our experience. Yes, noumena are not apparent to our five (conventional to western) senses, but they are no less representations to our 6th/7th senses, image-ing/inner feeling. Though I will be corrected, loosely, I note, Vedanta based philosophies recognize these.

And regardless, any concept, including logic and reason itself, I think are part of the world mediated/represented (I like constructed/projected). "We" as in the particular form human Mind took, constructed logic no more or less than it constructed apple. And what these two are independent of our constructions are equally not knowable.

This should not reflect the hypothesis, but the best and quickest way to illustrate here is, if it arises in thought or our form of "conscious experience", it is a representation even if there is no corresponding object. So God, Souls, and Meno's triangle, are not unmediated realities that exist independently of our representations. They are "learned" constructions.

Another way to illustrate would be to turn to what is not projected, the "really real," so called because real is already a projection (as is really real, but...). It is necessarily unspeakable. I think whether you're an apple, a soul, or a human, what you really are is meaningless to ask because meaning too is projection. What you are remains in being it; not knowing it. We ask because it enhances the experience of constructing knowledge; not because it brings us anywhere close to uncovering real being.


Quoting Mww

Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses.

Is that a settlement he necessarily reaches given his empirical approach? That is, is he saying, What things are, I cannot know, so I can only express positions on them as appearances, and for those representations based upon other than appearance, I will infer only from observing their effects?

Or, is he saying reality is its effects? I.e., even if I could access Truth as knowledge unmediated, I'd say reality was the affecting. If it is this, it sounds more like Schopenhauer's Will being that which drives all activity of being. And perhaps Kant just stayed clear of that (at least in his critique of pure reason).

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

The guy who does the Great Courses' modern phil survey course makes this point. He is talking about Hegel, but the two were contemporaries and even taught across the hall from one another for a period. He says Hegel was the last great philosopher in terms of creating an all encompassing system (aesthetics, ethics, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, etc.)

It's well-known that Schopenhauer despised Hegel (and didn't hold too many of the other German philosophers of his day in high regard either.) I agree with Schopenhauer that Hegel was extremely verbose. I feel that German idealism collapsed under the weight of its own verbosity and obscurity but that Schopenhauer's reputation has endured, because of the relative brevity and style of his writing. (I know that Schelling and Hegel each have a following but they're really confined to the ivory tower, don't you think?)

Quoting Mww

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena? We know….theoretically…..what phenomena are mediated by, re: sensation, but what mediates noumena when we don’t even know what a noumenon would be? And whatever it may be, it certainly isn’t a sensation for us.

In traditional (pre-modern) philosophy, wasn't it the case that 'intelligible objects' were known immediately, i.e. knowledge of them was unmediated by sense? That when you know an arithmetical principle or proof, you 'see' it in a way that you can't see a sense-object? They are "higher" in the sense of being immediately grasped, rather than intermediated by the senses. Isn't that the gist of the 'eye of reason' in the Platonic tradition? (I'm writing here from a more pre-Kantian perspective.)

Reply to ENOAH I think key to the 'noumena' issue is Kant's criticism of the rationalists including Liebniz and Descartes, both of whom believed the existence of God could be proven by rational principles. A major part of his critique is in criticizing the legitimacy of those kinds of ideas (on the one side, but also of the empirical philosophers on the other, who claimed knowledge comes from sense-experience alone.)

Kant argued that as a matter of principle we can't know what is beyond the bounds of sense and reason, which God by definition is (although elsewhere he also 'made room for faith' as he saw a necessity for God as the ground of practical reason and ethics). But much of his discussion of 'noumena' and 'ding-an-sich' (which are not the same but often confused with each other) is set against that background.

I think interminable confusion results from trying to figure out what 'noumenal' or 'ding-an-sich' really means, or is. It's like trying to peek behind the curtain, so to speak. Whereas, according to this primer on Kant,

Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it, given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble.

Viewed in that light, and resisting the urge to 'peek behind', I think it's quite a reasonable idea.

Quoting Wayfarer

key to the 'noumena' issue is Kant's criticism of the rationalists including Liebniz and Descartes, both of whom believed the existence of God could be proven by rational principles.

Ok. Good to know that context. Makes even more sense.

Quoting Wayfarer

Viewed in that light, and resisting the urge to 'peek behind', I think it's quite a reasonable idea.

Yes, I see and agree it is reasonable.

Thank you

Quoting ENOAH

But their "thing in itself" is as unknowable as that of an apple.

That object which was initially unknown became “apple”, hence to say that object is unknowable, is a contradiction. The thing-in-itself, on the other hand, never becomes anything at all, so can be said to be, and remain, unknowable.

Quoting ENOAH

Both are known already mediated, and there is no inherent difference in what they are in our experience.

The thing-in-itself is not mediated, hence the difference in what they are relative to our experience, in that only the mediated object, in this case called “apple”, is one.
————-

Quoting ENOAH

We" as in the particular form human Mind took, constructed logic no more or less than it constructed apple.

Somewhat more or less, but I get your point. The constructed apple is the synthesis of empirical conceptions grounded by the categories. Logic is the a priori transcendental deduction of relations in the form of principles, for which the categories have no application.

Quoting ENOAH

And what these two are independent of our constructions are equally not knowable.

And what I just said relates to this, because logic cannot be independent of our constructions, insofar as the human intellect just is logical, whereas all that is naturally real, can.
————-

Quoting ENOAH

Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses.
— Mww

Is that a settlement he necessarily reaches given his empirical approach?

The point of the treatise, given from its title, is to describe what the system does when it is left to its own internal machinations, which can only arise in juxtaposition to what it does when it is affected by external influences. So it isn’t so much a settlement he reaches, as the simplest, easiest place to begin.

Quoting ENOAH

That is, is he saying, What things are, I cannot know….

He’s obviously not saying that; we do know what things are. We tell them what they are by the properties we think as belonging to them.

Quoting ENOAH

…..so I can only express positions on them as appearances

This seems to mistreat appearance as “what it looks like” when it should be “when it makes its presence felt”.

Quoting ENOAH

Or, is he saying reality is its effects? (…) reality was the affecting.

Yes, by definition, that is in principle what he’s saying:
“…. reality is concerned only with sensation, as the matter of experience…”
“… reality is the conjunction of the thing with perception.…”

Quoting ENOAH

it sounds more like Schopenhauer's Will being that which drives all activity of being. And perhaps Kant just stayed clear of that

Oh HELL yeah he stayed clear!! Kant wouldn’t let will be the equivalent of, or synonymous with, reality, no way, no how. In Kant, reality is a pure conception of the understanding, a category, but will is a pure transcendental faculty from which arise moral volitions. Reality is a necessary condition for knowledge a posteriori; will is a necessary functional component for aesthetic judgements a priori. One can never sub for the other.
————-

Quoting Wayfarer

It's well-known that Schopenhauer despised Hegel….

And was severely critical of the “Young Hegelians” who followed him blindly. Not one to pull his punches, ol’ Arthur.

Quoting Wayfarer

'noumena' and 'ding-an-sich' (which are not the same but often confused with each other)

Whew!! Finally. Music to my ears. The text says treated the same as, cognized the same as, which the inattentive consider as being the same as.
————-

Quoting Wayfarer

In traditional (pre-modern) philosophy, wasn't it the case that 'intelligible objects' were known immediately, i.e. knowledge of them was unmediated by sense? That when you know an arithmetical principle or proof, you 'see' it in a way that you can't see a sense-object?

You’d be more familiar with that than I, but I’d say, in Kant, the immediacy of knowledge a priori is relative to the principles upon which it rests, in particular, the LNC, which he calls analytical or explicative judgement and we call tautological truths.

Quoting Mww

That object which was initially unknown became “apple”, hence to say that object is unknowable, is a contradiction. The thing-in-itself, on the other hand, never becomes anything at all, so can be said to be, and remain, unknowable.

Yes, and I meant "unknowable" as to the "in itself". Though, as you said, Apple "becomes" knowable. It is only in its construction/projection.

Quoting Mww

The thing-in-itself is not mediated,

Yes. I'm mixing terminology. It is not mediated. Hence "in itself." What I mean to say is even the noumenal, though they seem to have an existence before or independently of our constructions, are constructions.



Quoting Mww

because logic cannot be independent of our constructions,

Yes


Quoting Mww

This seems to mistreat appearance as “what it looks like” when it should be “when it makes its presence felt”.

Yes, understood.

Quoting Shawn

In the OP, ?Shawn found Schop's "denial of the will to live" unacceptable. — Gnomon
Yes, I would like to elaborate on why I find it unacceptable. How is one to deny the will to live? Doesn't this imbue a persons life or deny their adaptability to the environment they are in?
Compare and contrast the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest with Schopenhauer's notion of the denial of the will to live?

I'm not a Schopenhauer scholar, so I'm just shooting in the dark here. His description of WILL --- "a blind, unconscious, aimless striving {random erratic motion?} devoid of knowledge {unintentional ; indeterminate?}, outside of space and time {supernatural?}, and free of all multiplicity {singular ; monistic?} " --- sounds like a natural mechanical energetic force, except for the "outside" and "monistic" modifiers, which sound more like a deity. Yet it's not an individual object or person, but more like an impersonal energy field or Causal Essence.

For example, Aristotle's Prime Mover kicks-off the world in a certain direction, then innate mass/velocity Momentum keeps it going. Ironically, Schop's term "Striving" makes it sound like a goal-directed, self-directing (cybernetic) mechanism/organism. Or perhaps like Plato's intentional First Cause/Logos.

In any case Schop's mechanical "Will" may be only distantly related to the animal "will to live". In Darwinian terms, the latter is merely an instinct to avoid death, in terms of pleasure vs pain motivations. Hence, animals are goal-directed organisms. But Schop could be interpreted to generalize that selective avoidance-of-pain into a cosmic drive-to-survive that propels the animate & inanimate world to evolve from a fetal state into a more mature system. He seems to think humans are merely sentient animals with only short-term emotional goals.

Could Schop really imagine that the evolutionary world system was internally motivated by an ultimate goal of perfection to "strive" (expend Energy) against Entropy? If so, I would think he'd be more sanguine about the world's prospects for a better future. And wouldn't be associated with "toxic" Antinatalism. :cool:


Will to live :
The will to live (German: Wille zum Leben) is a concept developed by the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, representing an irrational "blind incessant impulse without knowledge" that drives instinctive behaviors, causing an endless insatiable striving in human existence.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_to_live

Quoting Gnomon

I'm not a Schopenhauer scholar...

All his works are freely available online. Granted, a fair amount of reading, but the World as Will and Representation Vol 1 is a good start. In respect of the nature of the will, and why everything should be seen as its manifestation, read the paragraphs beginning here. Not easy reading, but then which of the German idealist were?

Quoting Wayfarer

read the paragraphs beginning here.

Why does it sound to me like K is saying, like the Body is an idea uniquely arising to the Subject, so to is the will; both ultimately, "explanations" a Subject must necessarily construct to make "sense of itself".

Reply to ENOAH It’s the double-aspect point of one’s own body - that on the one hand it’s an object to us but on the other it’s the only thing we’re subjectively aware of. Still getting my head around that.

Reply to ENOAH Also that’s S not K

Reply to Wayfarer yes, K. and you wouldn't say my read, though worded idiosyncratically, is inaccurate?

Reply to ENOAH As far as I can tell. It’s a lynchpin of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. (I also wonder if it was an inspiration for Freud’s libido theory?)

I ran that query by ChatGPT, see https://chatgpt.com/share/97df2f69-9f7b-44d4-8451-30735412e03b

Quoting Wayfarer

All his works are freely available online. Granted, a fair amount of reading, but the World as Will and Representation Vol 1 is a good start. In respect of the nature of the will, and why everything should be seen as its manifestation, read the paragraphs beginning here. Not easy reading, but then which of the German idealist were?

Thanks. But it's a bit late in life for me to begin a scholastic study of "German idealists". I have a pretty good foundation in the pioneering Greeks. But I've never read any of Kant or Hegel or Schop --- other than popular quotes, Wiki articles and Wayfarer posts. So, all those famous philosophers are, for me, mainly symbols of specific concepts (Hegelian Dialectic) or general worldviews (Transcendental Idealism) that I may, or may not, want to use in what's left of my own real life. :smile:

Reply to Gnomon Know what you mean.

Quoting Shawn

Some of his quotes, like, the avoidance of pain will lead to being content in life, is still something I live by.

As a rule, I only take life advice from people who I would actually want to be. Arthur Schopenhauer does not fall within that category. I don't think he ever loved. IIRC he was deeply resentful of women and wished it was better for him to have never been born. Why would I take life advice from someone like that?

I'll listen to his insights on philosophy and he was surely brilliant with his syncretism, but not someone who I would want to model my life after. Very much open to hearing his insights on religions and the nature of reality though.

Quoting ENOAH

Or is it utterly absent and there is only will and Representation, and will is not a being but a drive?

It seems inescapable logically, that if everything In itself is basically Will and not material (as Schopenhauer asserted) then being must be equated/ confated with Will.

But Kant, who completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms ????????? and ???????? were already in use, then took possession of the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as designations of things in themselves and their appearances.

It seems to me that this ignores the distinction between things-in-themselves and 'things-in-themselves' as thought. To be sure the thing in itself is thought, although it is not thought as thought, but as unknowably real; I understand the thinking of things in themselves as being noumenal, not the (unknowable, unthinkable) real things in themselves as such

Quoting Janus

then being must be equated/ confated with Will.

Confounded, if you ask me. But that's weirdly my limit reached with Schopenhauer. Everything "before" this Will, (that he on some levels "maligns") is Ultimate Reality or Being (because at least K had the decency to bow out), I cam stand behind, albeit with minor modifications. But not that.

Quoting Janus

not the (unknowable, unthinkable) real things in themselves as such

I understand. What are the real things in themselves? Are they just that? Real? Is it plural, as you suggested?

If we "designate" the idea of God as noumenal because we cannot know God, is then God, independent of our knowing, Real? And would that apply to all so called noumena?

Is the real not utterly inaccessible to knowledge, and that's why Kant was "right" to keep his distance?

Reply to ENOAH Of course I hope you read what I said under the caveat "for Schopenhauer". I was basically asserting it to be a logical concomitant in Schopenhauer, not merely an interpretation of Schopenhauer.

Quoting Janus

Of course I hope you read what I said under the caveat "for Schopenhauer". I was basically asserting it to be a logical concomitant

Yes, I was agreeing, and hinting that this necessary conclusion is my problem with Schopenhauer, whether he meant it or not. But I can't believe he fully meant it. Not judging his genius. Obviously. More his context, historical, and otherwise.

Reply to Janus I'm just interested in your take on this. Same with my second "reply". I agree with you, insofar as the word fits; more like, you're enlightening me to more perspectives

Quoting ENOAH

I understand. What are the real things in themselves? Are they just that? Real? Is it plural, as you suggested?

If we "designate" the idea of God as noumenal because we cannot know God, is then God, independent of our knowing, Real? And would that apply to all so called noumena?

Is the real not utterly inaccessible to knowledge, and that's why Kant was "right" to keep his distance?

Not exactly: I'm saying the things in themselves are thought as real, but of course that for us they are noumenal, that is they are not real but merely thought.

So, the idea of God, for us, would be noumenal, but God, if real, would not be noumenal as such, because the latter term applies to things insofar as they are artefacts of thought. I think it would apply to all noumena, that, if they are real, they are not merely thought, even though they may not be able to be anything but thought for us.

Quoting ENOAH

Yes, I was agreeing, and hinting that this necessary conclusion is my problem with Schopenhauer, whether he meant it or not. But I can't believe he fully meant it. Not judging his genius. Obviously. More his context, historical, and otherwise.

Cool, I will just say that I have very little regard for the concept of genius, or at least for the notion of the authority of genius. So, I believe he did mean to equate Will with Being,,,the fundamental reality. Just my opinion of course. Genius or not, we are all historically and culturally situated, although it doesn't necessarily follow that we can comprehensively understand that situation.

Quoting ENOAH

I'm just interested in your take on this. Same with my second "reply". I agree with you, insofar as the word fits; more like, you're enlightening me to more perspectives

I like to think we can all enlighten each other to something more with our perspectives. We are all unique, after all.

Reply to Janus sorry, last of the choppy replies.

I.e., is Kant not saying noumena, the "idea" of "things" not accessible to the senses, is as far as we go. Anything beyond noumena, any "thing" as it is "in itself" so to speak, independent of our ideas and perceptions, is inaccessible, be that a so called "apple" from the phenomenal "view" or so called God from the noumenal point of view. The limit of knowledge in its pursuit of Truth is idea (of Truth) ?

Quoting Janus

I'm saying the things in themselves are thought as real, but of course that for us they are noumenal, that is they are not real but merely thought.

Yes. Understood


Quoting Janus

I think it would apply to all noumena, that, if they are real, they are not merely thought, even though they may not be able to be anything but thought for us.

Ok, and I see this position commonly in various forms. I respect it and desire it. But why? Why is it that "object" referenced as noumena necessarily (if that's what you're
saying) exist beyond thought? And they must, you already accept we cannot know their form. So we are speculating about both their existence and form. We might as well resign ourselves to the fact that idea is as far as we go. If there is a reality it is utterly other than any idea we have.

Reply to ENOAH Perhaps, according to Kant, there could be no accessibility. I would take this to mean "no discursive accessibility", but I don't know what Kant thought about it. I am pretty sure he denied the possibility of "intellectual intuition" as proposed by Spinoza and revived by Hegel. Absent that possibility, then it would seem to come down to a "leap of faith" (per Kierkegaard).

Quoting ENOAH

Ok, and I see this position commonly in various forms. I respect it and desire it. But why? Why is it that "object" referenced as noumena necessarily (if that's what you're
saying) exist beyond thought? And they must, you already accept we cannot know their form. So we are speculating about both their existence and form. We might as well resign ourselves to the fact that idea is as far as we go. If there is a reality it is utterly other than any idea we have.

I agree, yet I think the idea of the radically transcendent is of great import and meaning in human life, precisely as "the great indeterminable" that overarches our existence. To acknowledge this is to give an honest, realistic assessment of our situation, insofar as we can understand it, or least so I think.

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly and could mean nothing to those who have not experienced it, in the sense that they could have no idea what it means, but they certainly could imagine many things.

Quoting Janus

yet I think the idea of the radically transcendent is of great import and meaning in human life, precisely as "the great indeterminable"

No disagreement from me, to that whole paragraph.

Quoting Janus

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly and could mean nothing to those who have not experienced it

Might even be, as in Kierkegaard's knight of faith, imperceptible to those who have not.

Quoting Janus

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly and could mean nothing to those who have not experienced it, in the sense that they could have no idea what it means, but they certainly could imagine many things.

It’s worth recalling the origin of ‘enlightenment’. It was used by the Pali Text Society to translate ‘bodhi’ from the Buddhist texts. Elsewhere that word is translated as ‘wisdom’ which doesn’t carry the same rather portentous connotations. I suppose that the idea of ‘conversion’ - something like a Road to Damascus experience - is then also imputed to it. But perhaps in reality it is something rather more prosaic. That is more like the S?t? Zen attitude of ‘ordinary mind’.

(Here, I’m actually reminding myself.)

Quoting Wayfarer

That is more like the S?t? Zen attitude of ‘ordinary mind’.

Quoting Janus

If enlightenment is possible, then it must be experienced directly

Just sitting in Zazen is Enlightenment. "Ordinary mind," is bodily aware-ing "freed" from the displacement of projecting mind.

That's what I took Janus to mean. And that's why Schopenhauer "failed" when he misapplied some of the projections to the Will (given that the Will, for him, is ultimate reality)

Reply to Wayfarer Yes, perhaps it is an altered, yet 'ordinary', state of consciousness...like a 'flow' state or "being in the zone".

Quoting ENOAH

Just sitting in Zazen is Enlightenment. "Ordinary mind," is bodily aware-ing "freed" from the displacement of projecting mind.

That's what I took Janus to mean. And that's why Schopenhauer "failed" when he misapplied some of the projections to the Will (given that the Will, for him, is ultimate reality)

That seems right to me...it is simply being without getting caught up in conceptual notions of "ultimate reality". I guess the point is that ideas can never be reality, because they are inherently dualistic. Easier said than done, though.

Quoting Janus

Easier said than done, though.

Totally

@ENOAH @Wayfarer, You might enjoy this. It's an old paper (1911), but its intro condenses Schopenhauer's ideas well in a few paragraphs:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/27900310?seq=1

Quoting Janus

That seems right to me...it is simply being without getting caught up in conceptual notions of "ultimate reality". I guess the point is that ideas can never be reality, because they are inherently dualistic. Easier said than done, though.

Reply to ENOAH

Reality for Schopenhauer, if it's based on Kant's framework, can never be "known" except the appearance of a thing on our cognitive apparatus...Schopenhauer posited that we can infer that there is Will based on our own subjective aspect which is will manifest in ourselves, through construct of a subject-for-object, with the appearance/representation/phenomenon the aspect of subject-object mediated through the subject's faculties of space, time, and causality imposed upon the object.

Quoting schopenhauer1

we can infer that there is Will based on our own subjective aspect

Ok, yes "infer" based on our subjective. He too admits to not "knowing" the "ultimate".

Thank you for that link. 1911! Looking forward to reading it.