The history surrounding the Tractatus and my personal thoughts
I'd like to use this thread to do 2 things.
The first is to adopt, discuss, and defend a particular reading of the Tractatus. The second is to discuss the history surrounding when the work was written due to the fact that many of the prominent ideas present in the work have exact parallels in the writings and works of scientists during the turn of the 1900s.
Regarding the first objective, my position is essentially this:
At the point in history that Witt wrote the Tractatus, there were two prominent camps of scientists each of which developed their own view of what scientific theories consisted in and what they could and could not tell us...these two camps are exemplified by Ernst Mach/Ostwald on one end and Heinrich Hertz/Ludwig Bolzmann and to some extent Helmholtz on the other. The former were positivists, considering metaphysics useless, only appealing to sense data for their scientific speculation. The latter found some form of metaphysics allowable, but only insofar as it was tied back to reality.
Russell was a proponent of Mach's view and so were the logical positivists ...Witt no doubt became familiar with it through Russell, but Witt was already familiar with Boltzmann's and Heinrich Hertz's work on mechanics (they wrote the textbooks on mechanics at the time). Hertz developed what is referred to as a "Picture theory" or "image theory" (Bilder in german), and Boltzmann adopted it in defending his use of the atomic theory in his work. Witt, I think, developed his own "picture theory" (he uses the same bilder terminology, and the ideas between how Hertz discusses the idea and how Witt does is notable).
Witt, I think, is trying to say something akin to Boltzmann and Hertz - he's trying to make space for some metaphysical speculation that's tethered to reality, but could go beyond it to what logic tells us is possible.
Witt himself says:
... I think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively. I dont believe I have ever invented a line of thinking, I have always taken one over from someone else. I have simply straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarity. That is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Srafffa have influenced me. What I invent are new similes.
Regarding the second objective, I will be using the thread to post a bit of the history and try and work into the Tractatus.
Feel free to read and comment if anything I post is of interest. I welcome feedback, and other's thoughts on the subject.
The first is to adopt, discuss, and defend a particular reading of the Tractatus. The second is to discuss the history surrounding when the work was written due to the fact that many of the prominent ideas present in the work have exact parallels in the writings and works of scientists during the turn of the 1900s.
Regarding the first objective, my position is essentially this:
At the point in history that Witt wrote the Tractatus, there were two prominent camps of scientists each of which developed their own view of what scientific theories consisted in and what they could and could not tell us...these two camps are exemplified by Ernst Mach/Ostwald on one end and Heinrich Hertz/Ludwig Bolzmann and to some extent Helmholtz on the other. The former were positivists, considering metaphysics useless, only appealing to sense data for their scientific speculation. The latter found some form of metaphysics allowable, but only insofar as it was tied back to reality.
Russell was a proponent of Mach's view and so were the logical positivists ...Witt no doubt became familiar with it through Russell, but Witt was already familiar with Boltzmann's and Heinrich Hertz's work on mechanics (they wrote the textbooks on mechanics at the time). Hertz developed what is referred to as a "Picture theory" or "image theory" (Bilder in german), and Boltzmann adopted it in defending his use of the atomic theory in his work. Witt, I think, developed his own "picture theory" (he uses the same bilder terminology, and the ideas between how Hertz discusses the idea and how Witt does is notable).
Witt, I think, is trying to say something akin to Boltzmann and Hertz - he's trying to make space for some metaphysical speculation that's tethered to reality, but could go beyond it to what logic tells us is possible.
Witt himself says:
... I think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively. I dont believe I have ever invented a line of thinking, I have always taken one over from someone else. I have simply straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarity. That is how Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Srafffa have influenced me. What I invent are new similes.
Regarding the second objective, I will be using the thread to post a bit of the history and try and work into the Tractatus.
Feel free to read and comment if anything I post is of interest. I welcome feedback, and other's thoughts on the subject.
Comments (55)
The project drew the attention of a number of its contemporary scientists, including the attention of theoretical physicist Ernst Mach. Mach, like Ostwald was a positivist. They both believed that bringing society under a common scientific worldview, was necessary to bring human reason into the next phase of its development. This required that science be reformulated to only allow within its explanations, facts which were built from experience, and experience alone. Because of this, Mach agreed with Ostwald on another point - that the atomic theory postulated by thinkers such as Helmholtz and Boltzmann, while useful perhaps on paper, was dangerous to the rigor of science. The theory violated what Mach took to be a fundamental tenet of science, that one should never theorize past experience doing so was not only unnecessary, but dangerous to the economy of thought.
One and the same view underlies both my epistemologicophysical writings and my present attempt to deal with the physiology of the senses the view, namely, that all metaphysical elements are to be eliminated as superfluous and destructive to the economy of science (AS, IX).
In 1912, a public manifesto was released by Mach; signed by 32 other thinkers, such as Einstein, Freud, Hilbert, Loeb, etc the document essentially called for precisely the vision Ostwald had put forth. Asking all interested scientists and philosophers to help establish a common worldview for society, by drawing upon all knowledge within the special sciences which can be derived from the facts of experience. Positive facts, as they were called, the positivism which Mach called for, influenced a number of like minded thinkers. Machs thinking would continue to influence the intellectuals in Vienna past the first world war. So, when Moritz Schlick, took over the position as chair of philosophy of science (a position previously held by Mach and Boltzmann), in 1922, he began having weekly structured group meetings intending to set the human pursuit of knowledge on proper footing. This group would eventually become known as the Vienna Circle, including members such as Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Friedrich Weismann, and in 1929 they would release their own manifesto (written by Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath) citing as their aim the unify science, developing a language where every word refers to something real, not metaphysical the position known as logical positivism. The group discussed in great detail Wittgensteins Tractatus, and saw within it a verification principle of meaning, much like their own work, but Wittgenstein was rarely compelled to join the meetings, and when he did, he would read Tagores poetry to them aloud with his back turned.
Ludwig Boltzmann stood opposed to energetisicm of Ostwald, and the anti-metaphysical agenda of Mach. Throughout the late 1800s/early 1900s most physicists were still against the atomic theory, and the influence of Mach on the sciences saw metaphysics as dangerous to the economy of thought insofar as it was useless metaphysics.
Boltzmann saw great utility in the use of models in his work, seeing them as inventions of the human mind which prove their value insofar as they prove useful.
Models in the mathematical, physical and mechanical sciences are of the greatest importance. Long ago philosophy perceived the essence of our process of thought to lie in the fact that we attach to the various real objects around us particular physical attributes our concepts and by means of these try to represent the objects to our minds. Such views were formerly regarded by mathematicians and physicists as nothing more than unfertile speculations, but in more recent times they have been brought by J. C. Maxwell, H. v. Helmholtz, E. Mach, H. Hertz and many others into intimate relation with the whole body of mathematical and physical theory. On this view our thoughts stand to things in the same relation as models to the objects they represent. The essence of the process is the attachment of one concept having a definite content to each thing, but without implying complete similarity between thing and thought; for naturally we can know but little of the resemblance of our thoughts to the things to which we attach them. What resemblance there is, lies principally in the nature of the connexion [sic], the correlation being analogous to that which obtains between thought and language, language and writing. ( ) Here, of course, the symbolization of the thing is the important point, though, where feasible, the utmost possible correspondence is sought between the two ( ) we are simply extending and continuing the principle by means of which we comprehend objects in thought and represent them in language or (Boltzmann 1974a, 213).
Boltzmann, like Hertz, Mach, and Helmholtz agreed that the representations we make ought not
be said to share a complete similarity with the objects represented, but disagreeing with Mach,
Boltzmann believed that such metaphysical speculation could be fruitful.
( ) Hertz makes physicists properly aware of something philosophers had no doubt long since stated, namely that no theory can be objective, actually coinciding with nature, but rather that each theory is only a mental picture of phenomena, related to them as sign is to designatum. ( ) From this it follows that it cannot be our task to find an absolutely correct theory but rather a picture that is as simple as possible and that represents phenomena as accurately as possible. One might even conceive of two quite different theories both equally simple and equally congruent with phenomena, which therefore in spite of their difference are equally correct. The assertion that a given theory is the only correct one can only express our subjective conviction that there could not be another equally simple and fitting image (Boltzmann 1974b, 90-91).
In order to explain, for example, the transference of heat, Boltzmann posited atoms whose motion transferred energy. Boltzmann says that ...the fact that this cannot be demonstrated quite so clearly is due only to the difficulties of computing molecular motion. The atomistic view of the world, didnt rely on experiences of atoms, but Boltzmann saw them as furnishing our understanding such that he thought: ...contemporary atomistics gives a fully adequate picture of all mechanical phenomena; even if they have yet to prove them via experience, he says ...we shall hardly expect to find the phenomena that will not fit into the frame of the picture, since, ...all essential facts are found in the features of our picture. Adopting the term bilder or pictures from physicist Heinrich Hertz, Boltzmann essentially thought the models we make within the mind, are a kind of picture. Mach, however, thought them merely mathematical fictions, only proving useful on paper, but not truly grasping the matter. In fact, in 1910 Mach wrote: If the belief in the reality of atoms is so essential for you, I forsake the physical way of thinking, I do not want to be a real physicist...I thank you very much for the community of believers. For I prefer the freedom of thought.
Hertz owed much of his thought to his teacher Helmholtz, who posited a theory meant to explain how we form images of reality. Helmholtz, similar to Mach, believed that objective events in nature are the causes for our sensations which he called signs -translated via our organs. These signs bear no resemblance to reality, they are, however, ...still signs of something something existing or something taking place (FP). Unlike signs, the images we form from them must, ...be similar in some respect to the object of which it is an image (FP). He thought this a necessity in accounting for our ability to ... discover the lawful regularities in the processes of the external world (FP). But, in what sense exactly they are to be seen as resembling one another isnt immediately clear. In an earlier text, Helmholtz had written that: Our representation of things can be nothing else at all except symbols, naturally given signs for things, that we learn to use for the regulation of our motions and actions...comparison between representation and things not only fails to exist in actuality...but any other kind of comparison is in no way thinkable and has no sense at all (1857).
In the Principles of Mechanics, Hertz says that in trying to predict future events,
We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects...
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought. (The Principles of Mechanics, 2)
Hertz believed that experience proves whether this conformity exists, insofar as our images are useful. Unlike Helmholtz, Hertz believed that you can form many different images for the same object, and they might differ in fundamental ways. They must all, however, adhere, Hertz thought, to two principles. These were:
The form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured.
And
All pictures must conform to logic
In picking between two (or more) images, Hertz said we ought to pick the more appropriate, that is, the one which pictures more essential relations and which has the fewest superfluous relations (2). But, we cannot avoid empty relations altogether Hertz thought, they enter into the images because they are simply images, - images produced by our mind and necessarily affected by the characteristics of its mode of portrayal (2). The pictures we form, can display their utility to us, thereby proving their conformity to reality without needing to suppose or supply any further conformity. For our purposes it is not necessary that they should be I conformity with the things in any other respect (PM,1). Hertz believed logic fully capable of disallowing inadmissible images into our mind, and paired with the first principle which disallows images which fail to conform to the essential relations of things experienced, our images could be both useful in science and improve in accuracy (3).
What enters into the images for the sake of correctness is contained in the results of experience, from which the images are built up. What enters into the images, in order that they may be permissible, is given by the nature of our mind (3).
Hertz ultimately thought:
To the question whether an image is permissible or not, we can without ambiguity answer yes or no ; and our decision will hold good for all time. And equally without ambiguity we can decide whether an image is correct or not ;. but only according to the state of our present experience, and permitting an appeal to later and riper experience. Bat we cannot decide without ambiguity whether an image is appropriate or not ; as to this differences of opinion may arise. One image may be more suitable for one purpose, another for another ;. only by gradually testing many images can we finally succeed in obtaining the most appropriate.
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Now, thinks back to Wittgenstein. Recall, that a thought is a logical picture of a fact (3); whether it is true or not requires us to compare it to reality. But, remember, meaningful language can present false facts; elements combined in a way which simply isnt true.
An atomic fact is thinkable means: we can imagine it (3).
This is because, in thought, we can imagine states of affairs which simply turn out false. Wittgenstein combines Hertz two principles, stating that a pictures (a thought) is a picture insofar as it has a logical form. That is, every picture is permissible by logic an illogical picture is not a picture - and its unique logical form is what it has in common with reality such that it can picture it.
Wittgenstein tells us ...everything in logic is permitted. This is because ...we cannot think illogically (5.473). It is therefore impossible ...to present in language anything which contradicts logic (3.032). If the form of the thought is such that it pictures the essential relations of the thing being pictured, then the thought is true. It is therefore logic which limits the usage of meaningful language. While Wittgenstein indeed thought that the aim of science is a true picture of the world, he didnt think that there was just one picture of the world.
Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots. We now say: Whatever kind of picture these make I can always get as near as I like to its description, if I cover the surface with a sufficiently fine square network and now say of every square that it is white or black. In this way I shall have brought the description of the surface to a unified form. This form is arbitrary, because I could have applied with equal success a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. It can happen that the description would have been simpler with the aid of a triangular mesh; that is to say we might have described the surface more accurately with a triangular, and coarser, than with the finer square mesh, or vice versa, and so on. To the different networks correspond different systems of describing the world (6.431).
The squares of the fine square mesh, or the triangles or hexagons of the other two, would be the objects with which we form atomic propositions; they merely have a form, and when connected with the other object which otherwise merely gives a colorlessness, we get a black or white shape. This is how science reaches its goal; by bringing experience into a unified whole, through the application of different pictures which are coherent to us, and furnish our understanding. But, Wittgenstein thought these pictures didnt actually tell us anything about reality.
(We could construct the network out of figures of different kinds, as out of triangles and hexagons together.) That a picture like that instanced above can be described by a network of a given form asserts nothing about the picture.
This is why Wittgenstein believes that Newtonian mechanics merely brought ...the description of the universe to a unified form, not that it literally describes how things exist. the fact that it can be described by Newtonian mechanics asserts nothing about the world; but this asserts something, namely, that it can be described in that particular way in which it is described, as is indeed the case (6.342). Wittgenstein, like Hertz and Boltzmann, thought that our pictures dont literally picture the world, they merely furnish our understanding by giving us an intelligible picture that is useful. A picture is intelligible to us if there is a uniformity present; that is, all elements are balanced and make sense relative to one another.
In the terminology of Hertz we might say: Only uniform connexions are thinkable (6.361).
We can only posit additional elements when there is an asymmetry present in the picture.
"When, for example, we say that neither of two events (which mutually exclude one another) can occur, because there is no cause why the one should occur rather than the other, it is really a matter of our being unable to describe one of the two events unless there is some sort of asymmetry. And if there is such an asymmetry, we can regard this as the cause of the occurrence of the one and of the non-occurrence of the other"
Laws are not out in the world, and our utilization of the concept of law is only one mesh we can apply to the world. That the objects and laws which govern them are accurately pictured in science is an illusion according to Wittgenstein (6.371). Whatever mesh we apply to reality, we must not forget that we could equally and rightly apply another mesh as well. There is no riddle between the idealist and realist conception of the world, each are merely one mesh which essentially states ...Whatever building thou wouldst erect, thou shalt construct it in some manner with these bricks and these alone (6.341). Helmholtz reached a similar position at the end of The Facts of Perceptions wherein he wrote:
It is always well to keep this in mind in order not to infer from the facts more than can rightly be inferred from them. The various idealistic and realistic interpretations are metaphysical hypotheses which, as long as they are recognized as such, are scientifically completely justified. They may become dangerous, however, if they are presented as dogmas or as alleged necessities of thought. Science must consider thoroughly all admissible hypotheses in order to obtain a complete picture of all possible modes of explanation. Furthermore, hypotheses are necessary to someone doing research, for one cannot always wait until a reliable scientific conclusion has been reached; one must sometimes make judgments according to either probability or aesthetic or moral feelings. Metaphysical hypotheses are not to be objected to here either. A thinker is unworthy of science, however, if he forgets the hypothetical origin of his assertions. The arrogance and vehemence with which such hidden hypotheses are sometimes defended are usually the result of a lack of confidence which their advocates feel in the hidden depths of their minds about the qualifications of their claims. (The facts of Perception, 1878)
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More to come
I have learned from philosophy of science that the 'particular physical attributes' that are 'attached' (or imputed) to objects, are derived from Galileo's 'primary qualities'. These include mass, velocity, etc:
[quote=SEP, Primary and Secondary Qualities;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualities-prim-sec/]We cannot conceive a corporeal substance without a determinate figure, size, position, motion/rest, and number; nor can we imagine bodies separated from any of these attributes. Galileo calls them primary affections of matter.'
....He argues that the appearance of a body corresponds to the properties of the body that are its cause. It is not up to philosophy to say how various apearances are related to the affections of the objects we perceive; rather it requires the technical methods of natural philosophy. For example, to avoid being deceived by the broken visual appearance of an oar half in water, we need to find the physical cause of the appearance. This will show that the visual appearance is correct. [/quote]
These primary qualities are those that are measurable, hence their significance in Galileo's epistemology. The fact that they're objectively measurable, or the same for all observers, is what is signficant about them. This is one of the foundations of scientific method, isn't it? Measurement being fundamental to that. But I question the sense in which 'objective measurements' are concepts. I would have thought the hypothesis is the concept, the predictions of which are measured against observation.
Quoting 013zen
Isn't this proposal subject to criticisms of 'correspondence theory of truth'? 'According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense. 1- In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison? 2- The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief. (Randall, J. & Buchler, J.; Philosophy: An Introduction. p133)
According to the SEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Considered by some to be the greatest philosopher of the 20th century", and according to the IEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein (18891951) "Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and regarded by some as the most important since Immanuel Kant".
So there must be more to Wittgenstein than he says of himself " I dont believe I have ever invented a line of thinking". So the question is "what?"
Without wanting to overlap with @schopenhauer1 current thread on Wittgenstein, as you infer, no-one lives in a vacuum, including Wittgenstein when he wrote the Tractatus. So it cannot be that he did no more than cut and paste what was around him at the time, but must have creatively added something of significant originality.
It cannot be the case that his insights in the Tractatus have been superseded by his later works, or by more contemporary philosophers, as the Tractatus is still being discussed by contemporary philosophers as being of contemporary philosophic importance.
So even if the Tractatus is only an incomplete and partial explanation of the relationship between thought, language and the world, what original insights did it add to the contemporaneous debate between Mach/Ostwald on one side and Hertz/Boltzmann on the other?
Analogously, I am sure that no mark Monet ever made hadn't been made by a prior artist, so Monet's originality was not in the marks he made but in the relationship between the marks he made. Similarly, as with a simile, the originality is in the comparison between two things, not the things themselves. So we know Wittgenstein may well have borrowed ideas from both the empiricist and metaphysician, but where in the Tractatus is hidden his unique insight into the relationship between the empiricist and the metaphysical?
Though perhaps this is not directly relevant to the OP about the history surrounding the Tractatus, although maybe the question of why the Tractatus is important must be part of the history of the Tractatus.
While I take your point, I don't necessarily agree that this must be the case.
With that being said...I tend to take Witt at his word when he says that all he's ever done is brought the ideas of others into closer proximity in order to see the similarities between them.
But, I think you're exactly right when you say:
Quoting RussellA
Quoting RussellA
This is exactly the question I am searching after; if there is such a thing.
With that being said, I pointed out my disagreement with the original bit I quoted simply because I suspect part of Witt's influence is, in part, due to him "borrowing" so much from sources that typically disagree. Because of this, it held a certain position for each new generation of thinkers. Since the original interpretation was positivistic during Witt's life, it held a certain influence for some time among the prominent positivists, and then it was reinterpreted as being elucidatory, and that held prominence for some time before the "supposed" new reading came along championed by folks like Conant, which supposes the work is a proponent of there being only austere nonsense. Due to the diversity of its "sources" there's "something for everyone" so to speak, perhaps.
But, I think that's only part of it. I do believe that there is something unique in what he was doing in precisely the manner you point out regarding Monet. But, just as art is relevant to an age, I do wonder what if anything Witt can tell us today - even if I am correct that he did have something relevant to say to his contemporaries.
Hertz wrote the principles of mechanics, and died in 1894 in his 30s. Boltzmann died in 1906...Hertz said relatively little about his "picture" theory in The Principles of Mechanics, only saying that the images formed needed to not be contradictory, and needed to produce another image representative of the necessary consequents of the thing being pictured - namely, reality.
But, that's about it.
Even still, positivism was the prominent view amongst scientists and philosophers after the death of these two, and when the Tractatus was written in 1918.
I tend to wonder if Witt was trying to show how one can set up the positivism of Mach with the new logical methods of Frege's work and arrive at a Hertzian and Boltzmann like view, which allows of metaphysical pictures. This is to say that the manner in which Hertz envisioned it, when likewise furnished with Frege's work, draws a bridge between the two views - they share a logical bridge, so to speak.
At the time, this idea would have been relevant, but if this is the case, I wonder how it would be relevant today. Since the atomic view was proven right, scientists have cozied up to making metaphysical pictures of reality, that only loosely correspond to what its meant to picture. Examples are utilized all the time for teaching purposes, with the stipulation that "this isn't quite exactly how so and so looks" - the elucidation is, like Wittgenstein says, to be "thrown away" as it was only meant to be used as a heuristic to get the right picture. We employ a similar methodology when we talk about the characteristics of current in a conductor being isomorphic to water within a pipe. Pressures and currents correspond to voltages and amps, despite energy not being transmitted in any similar regard whatsoever. It's to be thrown away, once what you understand from it is gained. It makes the way for a fuller understanding.
If my thinking is even somewhat correct, in some ways we may have already taken a lot of the insights that perhaps Witt thought his contemporaries needed to make.
As I see it:
As Kant successfully combined in his Critique of Pure Reason two prior theories previously thought independent of each other (Empiricism and Rationalism) into one, the synthetic a priori, Wittgenstein successfully combines in his Tractatus two prior theories previously thought independent of each other into one, (the Positivism of Mach and Ostwald and the model picture of reality of Hertz and Boltzmann) into one, language and thought as a logical picture of reality.
Positivism, in Western philosophy, is generally any system that confines itself to the data of experience and excludes a priori or metaphysical speculations.
For Boltzmann there is utility in a model corresponding with reality, and for Hertz, the thought of an image or picture, or the language of a sign or symbol, conforms with reality.
The Tracterian approach to language and thought as a logical picture of reality is equivalent to a metaphorical picture of reality
There are many articles that describe the language used by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus as metaphorical.
1) Wittgenstein and Metaphor, Jerry H. Gill, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
2) Wittgenstein and metaphors in the Tractatus, Patrizia Piredda, 2021, Academia Letters
3) Wittgensteins Metaphors and His Pedagogical Philosophy, A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education.
One consequence of language as metaphor is the revolutionary idea that substance is able to traverse the actual and passible worlds rather than only underlying the actual world as traditionally thought. This solves the philosophical puzzle about how we are able to think about things that don't exist. Logical space is not the source of material change but of modal change (Kyle Banick - Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Metaphysics and Ontology, YouTube)
As regards terminology, I wouldn't call science's current approach a "metaphysical picture of reality", rather a metaphorical picture of reality. I agree about the importance of metaphor in how we understand the world, and as you say "Pressures and currents correspond to voltages and amps, despite energy not being transmitted in any similar regard whatsoever".
In the light of the Tractatus as proposing a metaphorical picture of reality, does this cast light on 6.54
Once I am able to metaphorically picture a voltage as a pressure, the metaphor becomes redundant. in that I now understand voltage as pressure. Not that voltage is like a pressure but rather voltage is a pressure. For Wittgenstein, the ladder is the metaphor, and can be thrown away as redundant once it has enabled understanding.
Many argue that language is metaphorical in nature.
1) Metaphors We Live By is a book by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published in 1980. The book suggests metaphor is a tool that enables people to use what they know about their direct physical and social experiences to understand more abstract things like work, time, mental activity and feelings.
2) Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes a strong point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor.
The Tractatus developed the Picture Theory of Language, language as metaphor, from which developed the modal notion of possible worlds. This was revolutionary in the 1920's, and as such relevant to his contemporaries. But this raises the question whether still of relevance today. I would say yes, for two reasons. First, language as metaphor and the modal notion of possible worlds are still relevant, and second, it appears that even today there are many who have not yet accepted these insights.
For example, Donald Davidson in his article What Metaphors Mean argues that metaphors mean what their words literally mean, in that they have no hidden meaning but can be explained by what they do within the context it is being used
In addition, those Direct Realists who believe that the world we see around us is the real world itself, things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.
The insights of the Tractatus have still not been fully accepted, important though they are.
I more or less agree with this; it's basically the direction my thoughts have been headed, lately.
With that being said, the only this you say that I overtly disagree with is:
Quoting RussellA
Voltage is not pressure; we are using one mode of thinking to facilitate another.
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So, since we have similar thoughts...I've been mauling over recently if this is, perhaps, a re-envisioning of Maxwell's use of physical analogy in science, with the added concern of how to better adapt thought to those analogies in order to eliminate supposed "pseudo-problems".
Also, I've read a paper by John Preston regarding the similarities between Mach, Hertz, Boltzmann, and Wittgenstein's treatment of "pseudo-problems" and how specifically Hertz and Boltzmann were proponents of the idea that these "problems" were illusions that would ultimately vanish once we've adopted the proper expressions for the phenomena we are attempting to elucidate via analogy. Boltzmann specifically was very focused on this just before his death, and gave some lectures which sound surprisingly Wittgensteinian on the topic.
Quoting Wayfarer
Hertz, Boltzmann, and I take Wittgenstein held that the problem never arrives, because all that is meant by "truth" is the correspondence, and whether or not there is such a correspondence, reality will tell us.
"In order that this requirement may be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought. Experience teaches us that the requirement can be satisfied, and hence that such a conformity does in fact exist" (Hertz, Intro).
As you rightly point out, the correspondence theory of truth is that P is true iff what P says corresponds with reality in the right way. But, then one can ask, in what sense can P, a proposition made up of words, correspond with reality made up of objects?
Also, it seems circular in its reasoning in that you could always ask how one is certain that what P says, in fact, conforms in the right manner to reality.
But, these three thinkers didn't think any of our "pictures", "models", "propositions" could be literally said to be True, with a capital "T", they are only more or less similar to what they are meant to depict.
It's like if I had a map of Boston...I can have several different styles and variations of that map showing different information, landmarks, territories, etc and the shapes could be different depending on the scale and what not.
What if we ask, "well which map is true"?
None of them, really. To be a true "map" of Boston, I'd need a map the same size as Boston that's identical to Boston in every way. The map isn't a "true" representation of Boston but each map I look at has some of the correspondences with Boston and those correspondences might be "true" while others not. Reality is what tells you whether or not this is the case.
The same is the case with my example above regarding pressures/volts amps/currents.
Is a volt a pressure? No, but certain similarities in one manner of thinking correspond to the other and can help to elucidate the other. But, it is not true that voltage is a pressure. Voltage is far more complicated but there is an isomorphism in how the two dynamic systems behave such that one can be meaningfully mapped to the other in an informative way.
Yes, that's the point I was trying to make, and you've addressed it well.
1) Voltage is not pressure; we are using one mode of thinking to facilitate another.
2) I've been mauling over recently if this is, perhaps, a re-envisioning of Maxwell's use of physical analogy in science, with the added concern of how to better adapt thought to those analogies in order to eliminate supposed "pseudo-problems".
3) .....................because all that is meant by "truth" is the correspondence, and whether or not there is such a correspondence, reality will tell us.
4) ..................there must be a certain conformity between nature and our thought. Experience teaches us that the requirement can be satisfied...............
5) But, then one can ask, in what sense can P, a proposition made up of words, correspond with reality made up of objects?
6) The map isn't a "true" representation of Boston but each map I look at has some of the correspondences with Boston and those correspondences might be "true" while others not. Reality is what tells you whether or not this is the case.
7) Is a volt a pressure? No, but certain similarities in one manner of thinking correspond to the other and can help to elucidate the other.
Taking the above into account, certain concepts may be helpful in working through the Tractatus.
What is the relationship between a model of the truth, a metaphorical truth, a simile expressing the truth or the literal truth
The Correspondence Theory means different things to different people
Correspondence means to have a close similarity, to match or agree almost entirely (Oxford Language Dictionary).
For the Direct Realist, as regards thought, if the Direct Realist sees a red postbox and thinks about this red postbox, their belief is that in the world exists a red postbox, and they are directly seeing it. Therefore, for the Direct Realist, there is no correspondence between what they see and think and what exists in the world, as what they see and think entirely agrees with what is in the world.
For the Indirect Realist, as regards thought, if the Indirect Realist sees a red postbox in the world and thinks about this red postbox, their belief is that in the world exists something that is not a red postbox but is causing them to see and think about a red postbox. Therefore, for the Indirect Realist, there is a correspondence between what they see and think and what exists in the world, as what they see and think only agrees with what is in the world.
As regards language, for both the Direct and Indirect Realist, there is a correspondence between the word and what exists in the world.
Therefore for Randall and Buchler, it is true that as regards thought, the Direct Realist believes they directly know reality and therefore don't need to compare their belief with the world, whereas for the Indirect Realist, as they believe they don't directly know reality, they therefore do need to compare their belief with the world.
What is a model of the truth
In thinking about why the sun rises in the east various models can be proposed. One model is that the Earth revolves around the sun. Another model is that the Sun was put into a chariot and everyday the God Helios would drive the chariot all along the sky causing the Sun to rise and set. It has been discovered that the model of the Earth revolving around the sun has proved more predictive that the model of the God Helio.
As any model can be improved, it is not that case that a particular model is wrong but that some models are more useful in particular contexts than others. For example, the model of the Earth revolving around the Sun may be more suitable in a science context, whereas the the model of the God Helios may be more suitable in a literary context.
It can also be seen that applying the wrong model in the wrong context may well result in unwanted philosophical problems which may well disappear if a more suitable model had been chosen. For example, on the one hand, using the God Helios model in a science context will clearly create philosophical problems that wouldn't have arisen if the Earth rotating around the Sun model was used. On the other hand, using the Earth rotating around the Sun model in the context of Greek mythology, in trying to understand the relationships between Helios and his parents Hyperion and Theia, will be clearly unhelpful
IE, no model is wrong in itself, but may be wrongly used. The purpose of a model is to be able to predict changes to the context within which it is being used.
Models, metaphors, similes and the literal truth in the example of seeing the colour "red"
If one sees the colour red, then one is thinking about the colour red.
1) For the Direct Realist, if one sees a red postbox then a red postbox exists in the world. The thought of a red postbox is neither a model, metaphor nor simile but is the literal truth.
2) a) For the Indirect Realist, if one sees a red postbox, the belief is that there is something in the world that caused the perception of such a red postbox. But what exactly that something is is unknowable, in the sense of Kant's noumena.
b) As regards models, the cause of what is seen can be modelled, such as a model of red postbox. Such a model exists in the mind and not the world, as the world is unknowable. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated by being able to predict changes in what is seen, not changes to what is in the world, but changes to what is seen.
c) However, it is a human characteristic to equate effect with cause. The cause of a bitter taste is a bitter drink, the cause of an acrid smell is acrid smoke, the cause of seeing the colour red is something that is red, the cause of heat on the skin is a hot object and the cause of a screeching noise is a screech. The effect is seeing a red postbox. The cause is categorised by the mind as a red postbox.
d) Therefore, what is the relation between what is seen (a red postbox) and what the mind has categorised as its cause (a red postbox). This relationship cannot be literal, as the effect is not the same as its cause. The relationship is not that of a simile, as the effect is not like the cause. The relationship must be that of a metaphor, because an identity has been assumed between two different things having a necessary property in common. Different in that one is an effect and the other is a cause, but sharing the necessary property that the mind has categorised the cause after the effect.
IE, for the Direct Realist seeing a red postbox is the literal truth and for the Indirect Realist seeing a red postbox is a metaphorical truth.
Models, metaphors, similes and the literal truth in the example of voltage and pressure
Is pressure a model, metaphor, simile or the literal truth in explaining voltage.
When one reads "Voltage is the pressure from an electrical circuit's power source that pushes charged electrons (current) through a conducting loop, enabling them to do work such as illuminating a light. In brief, voltage = pressure, and it is measured in volts" (www.fluke.com) - in what sense does voltage = pressure.
In the Merriam Webster dictionary, the word "pressure" has several meanings, including "the action of a force against an opposing force" and "voltage" as "potential difference expressed in volts".
We can model voltage by thinking about the pressure of water causing water to run when a tap is opened, where the pressure of water in pipes becomes a model for the voltage determining current in a wire.
As a simile, the pressure of water in pipes is like the voltage determining current in a wire.
It may be that originally pressure only referred to water, but the meaning of words is not predetermined, and the meaning of words change with time, sometimes becoming more generalised. As the Merriam Webster dictionary notes, pressure may be taken as the interaction between two forces, and with a change in meaning, rather than saying voltage in wires is like pressure in water, we can now use the metaphor that voltage is pressure.
However, this then takes us to Donald Davidson and his article What Metaphors Mean, where he argues that metaphors mean what their words literally mean and that there is no hidden metaphorical meaning. In effect, he is saying that what seem to be metaphors are in fact words being used literally. In the case of the seeming metaphorical expression "voltage is pressure", he is making the case that this means that voltage is literally pressure.
IE, even the expression "voltage is pressure" may be read not only as a model but also as a simile, metaphor and literally, all dependant upon one's point of view.
I want to talk about the mechanist, picture theory of meaning. There is nothing wrong with it in my opinion; but, in my opinion, many scientists have moved from it towards not a picture denoting a microscopic view of a state of affairs; but, more towards a unified wholistic view of meaning as comprising many parts working in a system. This is where the picture theory of meaning, simply can't zoom out and broaden its scope to account for new parts of the whole to describe.
Do you agree with this?
This was quite helpful :)
Adding to what you said, though... The debate which took place during the end of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s was a debate amongst indirect realists. Positivists, following after Hume, Comte, Kant, Mach, etc responded to our inaccessibility to reality by giving up metaphysical postulating, in favor of analyzing experience into elements, while Helmholtz, Boltzmann, Hertz thought there must be some uniformity between our experience and reality (or as you put it, between cause and effect). I only add this because, while it may be true that contemporaneously indirect realists are proponents of models, and the like, historically it is precisely this "in fighting" that was of fundamental importance to understanding the culture surrounding the Vienna circle and the like.
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Quoting RussellA
This is a prime example of using a metaphor to get across a particular picture of what's occurring - namely, that voltage is kind of like pressure. But, as you've pointed out, no model is ever quite right, and that's the point (and in part what I take Witt's point to be). A voltage is quite literally, not a pressure.
As you point out:
Quoting RussellA
We seem to have a synonym of sorts, based on the definition; but the definition merely reports usage (again, as you point out), and its no surprise that people do, in fact, use the words in that manner...but, it's precisely because that particular picture is so engrained in colloquial understanding that of course that's how people use the word.
But, our modern laws presented in differential equations for things like volts, clearly seem to suggest that "pressure" is only a suitable understanding of what voltage "accomplishes" at the macroscopic level (which is why we use the metaphor), but fundamentally, it's merely the amount of energy delivered by 1 coulomb (or a set amount of electrons). It's more like if you had three 12 oz bottles; 1 filled with water, 1 with Pedialyte, and one with juice. A volt is how hydrating the 12 oz bottle is.
Quoting RussellA
I take it he means only in scientific applications, yes? :P Either way, I personally find this view unintelligible at face value.
Could you be more clear? :sweat: I am only somewhat familiar with the mechanist theory as it pertains to folks like Descartes and the revival of early atomism...but you say picture theory of meaning.
Quoting Shawn
In what sense?
Yes, if the modeling, which logical positivists were interested in, is about a true state of affairs (facts), then how can they account for complex relationships where differing parts of mechanisms render a theory or scientific discovery as true?
Quoting 013zen
I believe, in the sense that if one were to try (like many scientists do) and encompass a theory to be explanatory for the whole frame, then I believe that picturing relations in the atomistic sense is something that can't attempt to do.
This leads into the question as to how a model of the truth, the metaphorical truth, the simile as an expression of truth and the literal truth relate to the Picture Theory of the Tracatus.
The Picture Theory of the Tracatus
Before the Tractatus, philosophers thought that language mirrored reality.
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus introduced the idea that language doesn't mirror reality, but has the same logical form as reality.
On the one hand there is thought
On the other hand there is are propositions
There is the relation of thought with language.
We can have the thought that the grass is green, and we can have the proposition that "the grass is green". The thought is the proposition, in that any thought must be expressible as a proposition, and any proposition must be expressible as a thought. Both the thought and proposition picture not reality but the logical form of reality.
However, only substances can be pictured, as only objects make up the substance of the world. As concepts such as god, religion, ethics, good, evil and morality are not substances, they cannot be pictured.
Thoughts and propositions are an amalgam of Formal Concepts and Concepts Proper. Formal Concepts include things such as objects, events, things, numbers, complex, fact, functions and make up the logical framework of a thought and proposition. Concepts Proper such as mountains, hills, tables and chairs are what are being represented.
The logical part of a thought or proposition does not tell us how the world is. For Wittgenstein, there is no synthetic a priori, as knowledge about the world only comes from observation of the world, and for the Tracatus a priori philosophising has no use.
The difference between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism
The Direct Realist believes that thoughts and propositions picture reality, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that the thoughts and propositions picture the logical form of reality.
Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Conversely, direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence. (Wikipedia Direct and indirect realism)
The Picture Theory is a model
A picture is a model
The Picture Theory cannot be literal
A picture cannot be literal, as a picture has the same logical form of reality, not the same form as reality.
If we picture an apple, as the picture cannot tell us about the form of reality, the picture cannot tell us what exists in the world, meaning that what exists in the world is unknowable, as is Kantian noumena. If the picture could tell us about the form of reality, then we would know what existed in the world.
Therefore the apple we picture doesn't exist in the world, but it does exist in the picture, otherwise we wouldn't be able to picture it.
The difference between metaphor and simile
From the Merriam Webster dictionary
Metaphor = a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them (as in drowning in money)
Simile = a figure of speech comparing two unlike things that is often introduced by like or as (as in cheeks like roses)
To be a simile, the picture has to be like the logical form of reality, whilst to be a metaphor, the picture has to be the same as the logical form of reality.
For both the metaphor and simile there is a relation between two different things, whether Mr. S is a pig or Mr. S is like a pig. For a metaphor these two different things have a necessary property in common, whereas for a simile they only have a contingent property in common.
The Picture Theory cannot be that of a simile
The relationship between the picture and what is pictured cannot be that of a simile, as this would lead into an infinite regression, similar to the homunculus argument against Indirect Realism. This argues that the mind of the Indirect Realist is directed at an object, such as an apple, that represents another object, another apple, which in its turn represents another object, another apple -etc.
Similarly, the picture of an apple cannot be a picture of a representation of an apple, but must be a picture of an apple.
The Picture Theory must be that of a metaphor
In order to avoid this infinite regression, the picture must be of what is pictured. The picture of an apple must be the apple that is pictured, sharing the same necessary properties, and as such, a metaphor.
IE, the Picture Theory within the Tractatus is a metaphorical theory.
1. Logical positivists were not proponents of "modeling". For a logical positivist, the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification.
2. Positivists, proper, were less interested in language but moreso theorizing; they considered "economical" theories, to be those that were based on our senses.
3. Witt's picture theory, I think, accounts for this by recognizing the simple fact that we can, and do, meaningfully talk about those complex relationships. The picture theory states that meaningful language pictures a possible state of affairs...that is to say, a logically possible state of affairs. This is to say, that unlike the logical positivists that thought all metaphysics was meaningless, Witt thought that if it is a logical possibility based on experience, that it too must be meaningful. How else could we understand it otherwise? We build models of objects in our mind by adding and subtracting possibilities we've gleaned from experience.
Quoting Shawn
The atomistic element of the work is simply to say that there are logically distinct categories that we utilize in building up a proposition. They are logical atoms, so to speak.
I don't see the problem. A reality made up of objects is always already a linguistically mediated or interpreted reality.
But was that even addressed by Witt? That seems like a psychological point that goes way deeper than simply linguistic analysis. How brains, neurons parse out objects, how our brains even obtain language is way broader than the simple parsing of sentences into objects and their predicates, no matter how many symbols you add universal, existential or otherwise.
No, because that was not the purpose the Tractatus. The Tractatus was addressing a specific problem, not trying to explain every aspect of language.
The Tractatus was an attempt to show that we can analyse ordinary language propositions,
such as "the car is red and the car is on the road", into elementary propositions such as "the car is red" and "the car is on the road" which can then be combined using truth-functions. A proposition is elementary when it is independent of all other elementary propositions.
The Tractatus was an attempt to prove in one particular instance that a whole may be understood by understanding parts that are independent of each other.
Even if the Tractarian project failed because of the colour-incompatibility problem, the question of the relationship of the whole to its parts remains of philosophical interest.
So perhaps I should explain more then: It was not addressed by Witt, but it SHOULD HAVE if his goal was to show how propositional logic allows for mapping onto reality due to selecting out true states of affairs; the MECHANISM for doing so must be EXPLAINED. Otherwise, what's the point? And even his own method of simply asserting the theory fails, because of self-contradictions that propositional logic can run into, as you suggested.
So from this:
1) He accounts for no mechanism behind the "Picture" in the theory, just asserts it.
2) The logic that supports the "Picture" fails on its own, even without explanation to how it maps onto/corresponds to reality.
Well, he did say that the world is the totality of facts not of things.
That doesn't even mean anything. There are many levels of "facts".. There are historical facts, scientific facts, geographical facts, social facts (political, sociological, economic, etc.), psychological facts, evolutionary facts, it's endless. They all have different domains, many of which are debatable. He is saying nothing in not so many a words.
Facts are not debatable, whether or not something is a fact may be debatable.
Let me ask you, are there many philosophies that would advocate that the world is composed of false states of affairs?
I know there were debates about "existence" vs. "subsistence" and such, but most people had a notion that there is a difference between things that actually are the case, things that have potential to be the case, and things that can never be the case. But I am not sure how this actually adds to this. No one generally believes the world is made up of false facts.
Not to mention that this seems like really weakened Kantian or PSR notions that there is a ground (facts) to our knowledge. It's like a non-explanatory linguistic-based Kantian notion of how we can filter reality.
There are no "false states of affairs", there are only states of affairs. I think Wittgenstein's statement shows a kind of relational 'process' view of the nature of the world rather than a 'substance' or essentialist view.
Oh FFS, use whatever pedantic terms you want.. true propositions, states of affairs, what have you...
Quoting Janus
Go on.. I am wondering if this is just Janustein or Wittgenstein though..
It is my inexpert interpretation of one of Wittgenstein's ideas.
Fair enough :up:
There is nothing wrong in making an assertion and not justifying it by a mechanism, which, after all, is the basis of scientific modelling. From Britannica Scientific Modelling
I am in Crewe train station waiting to catch the train to London.
It is a fact that the train leaves from platform 4.
It is also a fact that the Eiffel Tower is 300m tall.
It is also a fact that the Great Northern is the highest selling beer in Australia.
It is also a fact that the capital of Nevada is Carson City.
My knowledge of the world is the set of these independent facts.
In the statement "my knowledge of the world is the set of these independent facts", whether the world exists in the mind (as proposed by Idealism) or exists independently of the mind (as proposed by Realism) is irrelevant to the truth of the statement.
That the sun rises in the east is explained by the model of the Earth rotating around the Sun. No mechanism for why the Earth rotates around the Sun is included within this model, as mechanisms are not part of models.
As Witt writes in the Tractatus:
and as a model the Picture Theory does not need to be justified by a mechanism.
That the fact "the train leaves from platform 4" and the fact that "the Eiffel Tower is 300m tall" are independent facts is true, independently of any mechanism that could be used to justify it. That they are independent is a primitive truth.
That the colour red is not the colour green is true is also a primitive truth, and as such cannot be justified by any mechanism.
Yes, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus may make statements not justified by any mechanism, such as:
But this is one of the major aspects of the Tractatus, that some truths cannot be described in words, but can only be shown
We all know that the colour red is not the colour green, and there is no mechanism that could justify such knowledge. As the Tractatus says, it cannot be said, it can only be shown.
Suppose you have the proposition:
"The car is red and the car is on the road"
This is clearly a complex proposition...but, "the car is red" and "the car is on the road" are not elementary propositions, but still complex propositions. Hence why, by saying "The car is red" you know it cannot be "blue", despite the fact that the truth of one elementary proposition cannot determine the truth of another.
No, the elementary proposition is: "F(x)" and "G(x)" with "x" being a formal or pseudo concept (a wittgensteinian object), which is taken as argument for the functions "is red" and "is on the road", which mean nothing in and of themselves. They are as Frege would say, unsaturated.
You can, of course say something of the sort:
"God created the universe"
and this is perfectly meaningful. "God" is taken as the object or argument for the function "created the universe".
No, genuine metaphysical talk about "God" or "ethics" isn't a problem because some resignation that "silence" is required regarding certain "things" that are somehow determined to be "not substance" (This would simply be begging the question...like, who made Witt the determiner of such a delineation? Also, he never seems to draw that line out...). We ought to remain silent where we cannot speak clearly...and we can only speak clearly about things closer to our experience.
Witt talks about his issue with ethics in his Lecture on Ethics, and his position is far more nuanced than some arbitrary line drawn between substance and lack thereof...whatever that could mean. "God" insofar as we have a conceptual understand, or model of the "object" can, of course be meaningfully talked about. But, to suppose that one could ever develop a "science" of ethics, or of "God" is totally nonsensical. To say something is "ethically good" or "absolutely good" is to say, no matter what the circumstances or facts surrounding the action, it is always "good" to do "x". This is a tautology. But, Witt doesn't think that insofar as it is a tautology, that it is meaningless. He, actually, believes that ethics IS tautological in nature. We cannot help but feel that, for example, "tourchering and murdering adorable puppies for fun" is wrong....Witt calls it a genuine paradox because on the one hand, if we analyze the sentence it simply pictures facts, with no ethical element...no ethical "atoms" exist, so to speak....but, none the less, we cannot help but determine that no matter what, "x" is wrong. Since, clear language can only justify something by providing other facts as support, but no matter how many auxiliary facts we provide we cannot help but determine "x" to be wrong (there is no justification)..."ethical" terms "overflow" their usage...but, of course, since this is a tautology. That's what tautologies do...they are unyielding to any other states of affairs.
At any rate....I need more time to digest your comments, before providing a more well put response. But, like I said, I agree on a lot of the general themes, as well as a lot of the thrust of the work...but, not so much the details...but that will require more time to tease out. Hopefully this suffices for now.
My point is this: which philosophies argue that the world, at least in terms of human communication, is not composed of facts or true propositions? You might think of post-modernism, but that emerged later. Nietzsche could be considered, but his metaphysics didn't focus much on how we understand the world, especially not through language.
Consider the concept of "subsistence" vs. "existence." For example, the statement "the unicorn is on the mat" is a false proposition because it's an impossibility. So, I'm puzzled as to why a philosophy would assert, "My knowledge is made up of independent facts," as if this were a profound statement. What does this even mean in a way that significantly impacts philosophical thought?
If I say, "the cat is on the mat," and we observe a cat on the mat, we might call this a true proposition. But does this contribute to philosophical discourse any more than saying, "Saving money is beneficial for future needs"? It's a truism. Almost no one disputes it. Well done for stating the obvious.
What intrigues me more, as a fan of philosophical insights, is understanding what constitutes true propositions. Telling a financially illiterate person that saving money is good without explaining how to save effectively is pointless. Similarly, stating truisms in philosophy without delving into the mechanisms behind them adds little value.
My broader point is that non-empirical philosophies can also be considered true propositions:
"The world is Will and Representation because of X, Y, Z."
Here, X, Y, and Z are not empirical evidence.
How do we determine that this philosophy is not a true proposition? It only needs to be a true proposition. "Will and Representation" could be token objects that either are or are not the case.
If Wittgenstein isn't explaining why a proposition cannot be true, why should we care if the broader claim, "The world consists of true propositions or independent facts," is correct? Again, it's a truism that means nothing without a mechanism to determine what is actually true or not.
From here you can try to tell me that it has to form a picture that models such as the cat on the mat. But at the same time, Will and Representation can also form a picture or model of a state of affairs of the world if it is true. However, it is a metaphysical truth that is not empirically falsifiable. So now it is not the picture but the verification that his notion of meaningful language hinges on. But then that doesnt answer the question of why true propositions have to be empirically verified to be meaningful. Its very much just an assertion and discounts facts or states of affairs that one cannot necessarily verify empirically. Its arbitrarily putting a hierarchy on what counts as meaningful language it seems to me.
@013zen You might be interested in this as well.
Yes, there is no dispute that what is important in language are facts and true propositions, but the dispute arises in deciding what is a fact and what is a true proposition.
I believe that both unicorns and mats can exist, and therefore it's possible that there could be a unicorn on a mat. The statement "the unicorn is on the mat" could well be both a fact and a true proposition.
Unicorns certainly exist in literature, taking as a an example the book Into the Land of the Unicorns by Bruce Coville. Unicorns certainly exist in language, otherwise we couldn't be talking about them. The fact that no-one has seen or photographed a unicorn in the world is not proof that unicorns don't exist in the world, in the same way that because no-one has seen a particular rock at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean, this is not proof that such a rock doesn't exist.
You believe that the statement "the unicorn is on the mat" is a false proposition. I believe that the statement could equally be a true proposition.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I am sure most are in agreement that "the cat is on the mat" is true IFF (the cat is on the mat), where the proposition "the cat is on the mat" exists in language and (the cat is on the mat) exists in the world. This is a truism that no-one would dispute.
We know where language exists. What is disputed in where this (world) exists. Does it exist in the mind of the observer, the position of Indirect Realism, or does it exist outside and independently of the mind, the position of the Direct Realist.
Yes, it is obvious that the cat exists in the world, but it is not obvious where this world exists.
Quoting schopenhauer1
When starting the Tractatus, Wittgenstein did think that knowledge was made up of independent facts, but later concluded that his reasoning was unsound. He wrote Philosophical Investigations on the principle that facts cannot exist in isolation from each other.
According to the Merriam Webster dictionary, "profound" means having intellectual depth and insight.
On the one hand the statement "my knowledge is made up of independent facts" is philosophically profound, but on the other hand the statement "my knowledge is made up of inter-connected facts". is also philosophically profound.
What we want to know is which statement is true.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Aren't thoughts 1) and 2) in opposition.
I cannot justify in words my non-empirical thoughts that "evil is bad" and "beauty is good", yet I believe them to be true. I believe them to be truisms.
The only mechanism I can think of to explain such beliefs is that they have been programmed by evolution into the human gene for the benefit of the survival of the group.
As there are only 75 pages in the Tractatus, primarily devoted to Linguistics, I don't think we should also expect a foray into Evolutionary Biology, even if that is what he believed.
I was trying to give some relevance to the truism that "My understanding of the world are a set of "true" propositions or "independent facts". Otherwise it is a truism. Hence I brought in ideas of subsistence and existence. You are in fact making my point when you say:
Quoting RussellA
It is this that has relevance, not the truism that the world is what are true propositions. Rather, what COUNTS as factual is the actual interesting part.
Quoting RussellA
I contend this. I think that the statement "My knowledge is made up of independent facts" is not profound, but amounts to a TRUISM. Truisms are not profound, almost by default. They are uninteresting things most people already hold.
Quoting RussellA
This is going on a tangent.
My last point I added to the last post is relevant here:
Quoting schopenhauer1
Also, you didn't answer my question.. "What philosophy DOESN'T think their understanding of the world comprises independent facts"? I have yet to meet a person, who thinks "This is morally bad, or this is good" is the same as "The cat is on the mat." What problem then is he solving?
His philosophy implicitly relies on VERIFICATION for making distinctions yet the case would have to be made why empirically verifiable statements are more meaningful, especially if it can be the case that NON-VERIFIABLE propositions CAN BE true.
The Tractatus and facts
"The cat is on the mat" is true IFF (the cat is on the mat), where "the cat is on the mat" exists in language, and (the cat is on the mat) exists in the world.
The fact that (the cat is on the mat) in the world is dependent upon there being a relation between the cat and the mat. What is the nature of this relation?
Mereological Nihilism, aka compositional nihilism, is the philosophical position that in the world there are no objects with proper parts, in that there are no metaphysical relations that connect parts to a whole.
For example see:
1) Wikipedia Mereological Nihilism
2) Amie L. Thomasson's video "Do tables and chairs really exist"
The SEP article on Bradley's Regress discusses the ontological debate between particulars and universals, where FH Bradley specifically outlined arguments against the relational unity of properties.
The SEP article on Relations notes that some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. As it writes "Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh?"
IE, if a fact in the world is dependent upon the ontological existence of relations between parts, then if there are no such things as ontological relations in the world, then it follows that there are no facts in the world.
As the existence of ontological relations in the world would lead to philosophical puzzles, my belief is that relations don't ontologically exist in the world, thereby agreeing with mereological nihilism and concluding that there cannot be facts in the world.
In the event that there are no facts in the world, then neither can there be independent facts in the world.
I find it funny that I think you have made a better summary than the original :wink:.
But was Tractatus really aimed to dispute the position of mereological nihilism? Okay, let's say that charitably he was..
The part that needs explaining so the philosophy doesn't end up (sounding like) a truism and what he has to defend is something against this right here:
Quoting RussellA
How does he actually do that, rather than simply asserting premises that he thinks is true?
In the Tractatus, language shows the logical form of the world, and the world is the totality of facts.
But where exactly is this world?
It is said that the Tractatus can be read from both the viewpoint of Idealism, where the world exists in the mind, and from the viewpoint of Realism, where the world exists outside the mind.
If the Tractatus is attempting to show that language can be analysed into elementary propositions, where each elementary proposition is independent of all other elementary propositions, and where each elementary proposition pictures a fact in the world, then whether this world exists inside the mind or outside the mind is irrelevant
Therefore, the Tractatus need not pay any regard to Mereological Nihilism, which is is a philosophical idea specifically about a world that exists outside the mind.
As I can assert that "evil is bad" as a self-evident truth, perhaps the Tractatus can also assert that "the world is the totality of facts" as a self-evident truth. Anyone disagreeing that "evil is bad" or "the world is the totality of facts" then has the opportunity to present their argument.
After all, most of our statements are assertions, whether "I walked to the supermarket", "stealing is bad", "I admire Monet's aesthetic", "the world is a complex place" or "the play starts at 9pm". Rarely is it expected that we need to justify what seems to be self-evident.
But that is just what makes philosophy different than everyday activity. I want from my philosopher reasoning and justifications for their assertions and claims.
If your claim is "The world is what are the facts", this is either of the following:
1) A truism- something everyone pretty much holds in everyday life.
2) A profound philosophical insight- in which case it must give the context for which it is set against, what notion it is overturning or contradicting
Wittgenstein's logical atomism was different to that of Russell's, although they had some similarities (generally referring to SEP - Logical Atomism)
For Russell, the basic logical atom is the object, which can then be combined with other objects. For Wittgenstein, however, the basic logical atom is a state of affairs. a combination of objects.
Russell's logical atomism is epistemological. He gives no a priori argument for logical atomism, but can be empirically verified. Wittgenstein, however, gives an a priori argument for logical atomism requiring no empirical verification.
In the Tractatus is the principle of the logical atom. On the one hand, within language the elementary propositions are mutually independent and can be independently true or false. They are combinations of semantically simple symbols, ie names. On the other hand, each elementary proposition asserts the existence of atomic states of affairs in the world. These are combination s of simple objects, devoid of any complexity.
The Tractatus was written on the assumption that language may be analysed using truth-functions into elementary propositions that are independent of each other.
However, Wittgenstein gradually came to the conclusion that his project had failed.
Wittgenstein's turn away from logical atomism, the independence of elementary propositions, happened in two phases. Phase one with the 1929 article Some Remarks on Logical Form, the colour exclusion problem. Phase two 1931-32.
The colour-exclusion problem arises from 4.211, that it is metaphysically possible for each elementary proposition to be true or false independently.
Suppose P = "a is blue at t" and Q = "a is red at t". From empirical observation, P and Q cannot both be physically true. Wittgenstein was aware of the problem, yet thought with further analysis it could be shown not to be logically impossible.
The fact that we have never observed one object having two different colours at the same time does not mean a logical impossibility, after all, that an apple has the contemporaneous properties of sweetness and greenness is not a logical impossibility.
Given propositions P "A is blue at t" and Q "A is red at t", if P and Q are independent of each other, this means that object A i) can be blue and red ii) can be blue and not red iii) can not be blue and can be red and iv) can not be blue and not be red.
But what exactly is being combined in Wittgenstein's logical atomisms
First, Formal Concepts do not represent but are part of the logical structure and can only be shown.
Therefore we cannot say "there are objects", which is not depicting anything, but we can say "there are red objects", which is depicting something.
As Russell writes in the Introduction "Objects can only be mentioned in connexion with some definite property"
Second, colour may be read as an object
From the article On the Nature of Tractatus Objects by Pasquale Frascolla, once objects are identified with those universal abstract entities which are qualia, some statements of the Tractatus become liable to a consistent reading.
After all, if all the properties of an object were removed no object would remain, in that no object can exist in the absence of any property.
Then, using Russell's Theory of Descriptions, proposition P "A is blue at t" becomes "there is something that is the combination of object A with the colour blue" and proposition Q "A is red at t" becomes "there is something that is the combination of object A with the colour red".
The colour exclusion problem only arises in Wittgenstein' logical atomism, where the logical atom is in language the ontological combination of simple symbols and in the world the ontological combination of simple objects. IE, the incompatibility of the logical atom consisting of object A combined with blue and the logical atom consisting of object A combined with red.
Colour exclusion is not a problem for Russell's logical atomism, where the logical atom is the simple symbol in language which may then be non-ontologically combined with other simple symbols and the simple object in the world which may then be non-ontologically combined with other simple objects. IE, there is no incompatibility in the non-ontological combinations of object A, blue and red.
IE, The colour exclusion problem is problematic for Wittgenstein's logical atomism which depends on the combinations of objects, as such combined objects cannot be shown to be logically independent of each other.
The Tractatus is about the nature of language, using language to understand language, which is a logical impossibility. The task becomes that of the mystical.
Consider Schopenhauer's quote The two enemies of human happiness are pain and boredom. But to understand the quote one needs to understand the words "happiness", "pain" "boredom" which are impossible to describe using other words. So how to know what "happiness" means when it cannot be described.
It is only possible to understand language if one can understand the words being used in that language, and one can only understand those words using other words, which in their turn can only be understood by other words, leading to an infinite regress.
Yes, perhaps a statement can be justified, but why stop there, why shouldn't the justification be justified, and then again, why not justify the justification of the justification.
I just think this is loading the question to get this answer. Only if a philosopher believes that they can provide absolute certainty, can this be true. He seems stuck on the idea that philosophers are under the spell that they CAN provide a complete knockdown argument for their claim. I don't think most philosophers work that way.
You mentioned the mystical. I see Schopenhauer in a way, as being an analytic mystic. The mysticism is first (Will), and the analytic part, (how Will is constructed) is just the "gist" of how Will operates. He is giving his best go at it, but with the idea that it can never be truly completely understood.
And let's take a philosopher more like Socrates. His questions are generally pretty loosely going in a direction, and thus open for creative destruction and reconstruction. So, not every philosopher is giving "the" most certain view of things NOR are they thinking that they are conveying it in the most absolute certain and accurate way. I don't know anyone who really thought of language as such a perfect system, including other philosophers.
However, this does bring me to a possible exception- the early analytic philosophers such as Russell. And perhaps with his notion of precise logical constructions of language and proofs, and his own demands on philosophy, and especially ideas like "definite descriptions" and demands for meaning to be fixed in such a way, that Wittgenstein is almost always speaking to this (type of) philosopher in particular. If that is the case, it turns a much more grandiose ambition into a squabble amongst a very specific set of philosophers at a particular place and time rather than saying much about what the project of philosophy was actually getting at. Just my two cents right now.
What is there about the writings of Wittgenstein that are so important yet are so difficult to express in words. As if we will be any closer to the value of his thoughts if we were able to put them in writing.
Can an aesthetic ever be expressed in words.
Wittgenstein has an aesthetic that is inexpressible in words, as a Derain has an aesthetic that is beyond the ability of language to explain.
Wittgenstein's value is in the aesthetic of his thoughts and writing, and as with a painting, or a sunset or flower, enables an aesthetic experience on the part of the reader, encouraging their application of taste and judgement.
For Hume, delicacy of taste is not merely "the ability to detect all the ingredients in a composition" but also the sensitivity to discriminate at a sensory level.
For Kant, "enjoyment" is the result when pleasure arises from sensation, but judging something to be "beautiful" has a third requirement: sensation must give rise to pleasure by engaging reflective contemplation.
There may be an aesthetic in both how something is expressed and what is expressed.
There is beauty in mathematics.
For Schopenhauer, the aesthetic experience involves a pure, will-less contemplation.
For Wittgenstein, ethics and aesthetics are the same
For Nietzsche, the aesthetics of morality establishes a form of life.
I am sure that part of Wittgenstein's importance is in the aesthetic of his thoughts, and as with Derain's painting of The Drying Sails 1905, can perhaps be described in words but never properly expressed in words.
His aesthetic cannot be said but must be shown.
(Using the Wikipedia article on Aesthetics)
I'll do my best to address some of the points you make...
You say:
Quoting schopenhauer1
As it turns out, what amounts to the second sentence of any philosophical work is rarely, if ever, meant to be a "...profound philosophical insight"; like any argument, the first statements are meant as premises for the conclusion to follow. Typically, these premises are meant to be fairly uncontestable (less we run the risk of being challenged immediately on soundness).
With that being said, it's hardly a truism, either; especially at a time when there was a rich history of identifying base reality with physical objects having properties. Witt is saying instead that physical objects as we know them cannot exist with their properties independent of the facts; It is at the level of fact that properties are allocated. This is something we can all reasonably agree to, especially now in our modern times, but was certainly something the positivists would have also agreed to, hence why its at the beginning of the text.
Quoting schopenhauer1
A proposition being taken as true requires a couple of things:
1. Understanding
"To understand a proposition means to know what is the case, if
it is true. (One can therefore understand it without knowing whether it is true or not.)" 4.024
2. isomorphism between proposition and reality its meant to represent
"In the proposition there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs, which it represents.
They must both possess the same logical (mathematical)
multiplicity (cf. Hertz's Mechanics, on Dynamic Models)" (4.04).
"The propositions show the logical form of reality.
They exhibit it" (4.121).
This is simply to say, that if we understand a proposition, we understand its "sense" which illustrates the necessary logical form and multiplicity with the reality we are comparing it against.
"The proposition shows its sense" (4.022).
With this understanding, we can construct a world in our mind to compare against reality. If there appears to us to be an isomorphism such that to each element of the proposition there coincides an element of reality, and the relations pictured in the one seem to model the relations we witness in reality, we cannot help but judge the one as true of the other.
"The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical
scaffolding, and therefore one can actually see in the proposition
all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true. One can draw conclusions from a false proposition" (4.023).
Quoting schopenhauer1
Verification, or the truth conditions of a proposition is only necessary for understanding. If, for example, you could not say what would have to be true for something to occur, then you simply do not understand it, despite it obviously being a possibility. This happens all the time obviously since we don't understand everything that occurs around us. But, notice that whenever you lack understanding, you also seem to lack truth conditions.
If the evaporator coil for your air conditioner freezes up, and I ask you why it happened, unless you know the possible causes, such as lack of airflow, being low on refrigerant, or a fault with the metering device, you quite clearly lack any frame of reference regarding understanding the phenomena despite one, or all, of them being true. And if you understand why each of these can cause the issue, then you better understand the phenomena in question.
"The car is red."
"The apple is ripe and delicious."
Elementary propositions are the logical form of the proposition, which is shown in its use.
"The sign determines a logical form only together with its logical syntactic application" (3.327).
Witt is clear, that elementary propositions, as he imagines them, are for example:
"The elementary proposition I write as function of the names, in the form 'fx', '?(x, y)', etc..." (4.24).
So, the elementary propositions from the above would be:
'F(x)' and '?x: F(x)^G(x)'
This is why elementary propositions are independent from one another. 'F(x)' is just the general logical form; a function within the words of the proposition. I cannot, for example, infer the other elementary proposition:
'?(x, y)'
This is the point about elementary propositions. An elementary proposition is not
"The car is red"
This is a proposition capable of being true or false and depending on its veracity or falsity we can infer other propositions from it.
Hopefully my question is not too far removed from the OP, the history of the Tractatus.
In the Tractatus, language can be analysed into logically independent components, known as elementary propositions.
Wittgenstein writes in 4.211 that it is the sign of an elementary proposition that there is no other elementary proposition contradicting it, meaning that it is metaphysically possible for each elementary proposition to be true or false independently.
However, Wittgenstein later began to realise that the logical atomism of the Tractatus was incapable of dealing with the colour incompatibility problem (aka colour exclusion problem).
In the colour exclusion problem, it's impossible for two different colours to occur at the same place simultaneously.
In 6.3751, as he writes that the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is impossible, he also writes that a particle cannot have two different velocities at the same time.
Many simple colour propositions, such as "this car is red" and "this car is blue" fail the truth-functional combinations of elementary propositions, in that "this car" cannot be both red and blue simultaneously.
I agree that the colour exclusion problem wouldn't be relevant if elementary propositions are the logical form of the proposition, such as R(x) and B(x), where R and B are the predicates "is red" and "is blue". It is then the case that R(x) and B(x) are independent of each other.
But if elementary propositions are the logical form of the proposition, such as R(x) and B(x), then why did Wittgenstein turn away from the logical atomism of the Tractatus because of the colour exclusion problem?
Ha! Like my last thread, we've gotten into tangents concerning the main point, however, since I am the OP and I think its important to work out the tangential points, I have no issue whatsoever discussing other aspects of the work. Also, I haven't had the time to put any serious work into expanding on the OP...hopefully once I have more time. With that being said, this does have a bit of history in it concerning the work....
Quoting RussellA
Quoting RussellA
Truthfully, I've never heard the position that this supposed problem was one of if not the reason why Witt wrote the PI.
In Duty of a Genius, Monk details two sources for Witt "changing" some of his views from the Tract...the discussions Wittgenstein had with Frank Ramsay and Pierro Sraffa, after he returned to Cambridge in 1929.
Monk specifically suggests that it was Sraffa's influence, noting a comment Witt made to Rush Rhees which identified Sraffa's anthropological method, as being particularly influential in the "forms of life" which are kind of cultural couches we frame our statements within.
Monk also notes an encounter Sraffa had with Witt wherein the former asked what the "logical form" of a physical gesture could possibly be, despite the gesture clearing displaying meaning.
Quoting RussellA
I don't see how it fails...or rather, I don't quite take your point. Isn't this the case with, for example:
1. The ball is large
2. The ball is tiny
1. The apple is delicious
2. The apple is disgusting
Witt's points with his remarks on a point only being capable of one color, has nothing to do with this supposed color exclusion problem that you're talking about. Again, it only seems to crop up in an atomic theory akin to Russel's...Witt's seems to have elementary props as logical form of propositions, as I've noted above.
The colour exclusion problem for the Tractatus
Ramsey's criticisms of the Tractatus is crucial in Wittgenstein's change from his early to late philosophy.
Ramsay argued that Wittgenstein's statement that it is logically impossible that a single point in the visual field can be two colours at the same time was contradictory to his statement that elementary propositions are logically independent, a pillar of the Tractatus, This is known as the colour-exclusion problem.
6.3751 For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour.
4.211 It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary that there can be no elementary proposition contradicting it
It is the properties of space, time and matter that determine the non-logical impossibility that at the same place both the general propositions "this is red" and "this is green" can be true, not the logical necessity of the tautology or the logical impossibility of the contradiction.
On the one hand, the simple colour proposition "this is red" appears to be an elementary proposition because seemingly not a truth-function of other propositions, but on the other hand, the simple colour proposition "this is not green" logically follows from the simple colour proposition "this is red", meaning that such simple colour propositions cannot be independent.
Wittgenstein's abandoning logical atomism was in large part due to Ramsey's pointing out the colour-incompatibility problem in the Tractatus, and turned away from the Tractatus to that of a family resemblance approach in Philosophical Investigations, which does not use the logical necessity of the Tractatus to distinguish meaningful from senseless propositions.
What are elementary propositions.
Note that in Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein was treating the expression "this place is now red" as an elementary proposition, not the logical form of the proposition such as F(x) as the elementary proposition.
In addition, elementary propositions assert a states of affairs, where an elementary proposition is an arrangement of names and a state of affairs is an arrangement of objects. An elementary proposition is true or false dependant upon whether a state of affairs obtains or not. It is the case that the elementary proposition has the same logical form as the state of affairs it asserts, not that the elementary proposition is the logical form.
[b]"Every proposition has a content and a form. We get the picture of the pure form if we abstract from the meaning of the single words, or symbols (so far as they have independent meanings).
That is to say, if we substitute variables for the constants of the proposition. The rules of
syntax which applied to the constants must apply to the variables also" (1).[/b]
The analysis of proposition into elementary proposition - replacing of the words of the proposition with variables is intended to show the form of the proposition.
He goes on to describe how one might analyze the proposition: "The square is red" into the elementary propsition: " [6-9, 3--8] R ", where the square is put on a grid with increasing numbers along the x and y axis which are of equal distance from each point. "3-8 signifies a position along the x axis where the point goes from white to red, and 6-9 the same along the y axis.
"A simple example would be the representation of a patch P by the expression " [6-9, 3---8] " and of a proposition about it, e.g., P is red, by the symbol " [6-9, 3--8] R ", where " R " is yet an unanalyzed term (" 6--9 " and " 3-8- " stand for the continuous interval between the respective numbers)" (4-5).
If Witt truly thought that "X is red" was an elementary proposition, why would he attempt to construct an analysis into " [6-9, 3--8] R " in Some Remarks on Logical Form?
Monk, while suggesting that Frank Ramsay was one influence on the PI, he thinks Sraffa's challenges were the real root. He cites journal entries after Ramsay and Witts weekly discussions wherein Witt says that Ramsay's critiques were shallow.
Quoting 013zen
As I understand it, the atomic proposition is of the form - Is red (the patch) - not - Is red (x).
In Wittgenstein's article Some Remarks on Logical Form, I take atomic proposition to be a synonym for elementary proposition.
Wittgenstein writes that "Every proposition has a content and form"
He also writes that any given proposition is the logical sum of simpler propositions, eventually arriving at the atomic proposition. It is in these atomic propositions that contain the material, the subject matter. IE, the content.
As every proposition has content and form, and as any given proposition is the sum of atomic propositions, atomic propositions must also have content and form.
As - Is red (x) - has form but no content, it cannot be an atomic proposition. However, as - Is red (the patch) - has both content and form, it may be an atomic proposition.
Wittgenstein writes that a proposition about the patch can be "P is red"
Wittgenstein represents this patch by [6-9, 3-8]
Therefore the expression - Is red (the patch) - may be replaced by - Is red [6-9, 3-8] - or as he writes [6-9, 3-8] R
Therefore the expression [6-9, 3-8] R is a proposition, and as he says, every proposition has content and form.
Wittgenstein replaces the proposition - Is red (the patch) - by [6-9, 3-8] R - where both are of the form of an atomic proposition.
And here's where I disagree. Witt says:
"Every proposition has a content and a form. We get the picture of the pure form if we abstract from the meaning of the single words, or symbols (so far as they have independent meanings). That is to say, if we substitute variables for the constants of the proposition." (1).
Once we are able to successfully substitute the words of a proposition for variables to we get the "pure form of the proposition, but he does not say that we have the content. The material and subject are tied to the form, but the content is provided by its use as an actual proposition. He never says that atomic propositions have content; only that they have form.
"They, then, are the kernels of every proposition, they contain the material, and all the rest is only a development of this material" (2).
The development, I take it, being furnishing content to the elementary "parts".
Imagine I were to present you with the expression:
"F(x)"
What would you say is the form and subject matter of this? Clearly a functional relation where x is being taken as argument; we might say in ordinary language of some object falling under some concept. X is falling within the domain of F.
But, now I tell you:
"The square is red"
You immediately have a proposition with form and content. The atomic proposition and the proposition share the same form, but only the proposition has content.
Quoting RussellA
This would imply that one elementary proposition could be replaced by another that is somehow equal, would it not? Witt says in the Tract that there is only one correct analysis (into atomic proposition) of a proposition:
"There is one and only one complete analysis of the proposition" (3.25).
Quoting RussellA
Witt clearly is offering this up as an example of an atomic proposition, not a proposition. He starts by saying that he believed that one needed to introduce numbers into atomic propositions, and that he would provide an example of what he means, which was the square example with [6-9, 3-8] R as the elementary proposition:
"And here I wish to make my first definite remark on the logical analysis of actual phenomena: it is this, that for their representation numbers (rational and irrational) must enter into the structure of the atomic propositions themselves" (4).
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/3558/ongoing-tractatus-logico-philosophicus-reading-group/p23
I agree that [6-9, 3-8] R is an atomic proposition, aka elementary proposition.
Referring to Wittgenstein's Some Remarks on Logical Form, as he writes that any given proposition is the logical sum of simpler propositions, eventually arriving at the atomic proposition, this means that an atomic proposition is still a proposition.
He writes "the representation of a patch P by the expression [6-9, 3-8]
The numbers [6-9, 3-8] are introduced to represent the patch, which is the content.
He also writes "a proposition about it, e.g., P is red, by the symbol [6-9, 3-8] R"
So we have the proposition "the patch is red", which may also be written as either "Is red (the patch)" or [6-9, 3-8] R.
As [6-9, 3-8] R is an atomic proposition, then so is "the patch is red".
"Is red (the patch)" has both form and content, whereas "Is red (x)" has form only. The argument x being a variable is a Formal Concept.
This is an assumption you're making, and one which I think isn't necessarily the case. Firstly, there seems to be a clear category difference between propositions on the one hand, and atomic proposition on the other. Why have a distinct word for them otherwise? Propositions are made up of simpler propositions, but eventually we arrive at atomic propositions which are merely kernels of all other propositions, Witt says. They are not, propositions in and of themselves. Secondly, Witt spends a great deal of time talking about the differences of propositions proper and atomic propositions...if they are the same, or rather, if an atomic proposition is a proper proposition, why do you suppose Witt spent so much time saying what a proposition is and what an atomic proposition is, despite the latter simply being among the former?
Quoting RussellA
With that snippet it does seem that way, however, reading the whole statement:
"A simple example [ of an atomic proposition containing a number]...would be the representation of a patch P by the expression " [6-9, 3---8]" and of a proposition about it, e.g., P is red, by the symbol " [6-9, 3--8] R ", where " R " is yet an unanalyzed term (" 6--9 " and " 3-8- " stand for the continuous interval between the respective numbers)".
He says, we have
1. An expression: "[6-9, 3---8]"
2. A proposition: "P is red"
3. A symbol: "[6-9, 3--8] R"
We know from the Tractatus, that a symbol is what's contained within the propositional "sign"...an expression is itself a symbol...these are what the proposition shows aka its logical form...also known as an elementary proposition.
"The sign is the part of the symbol perceptible by the senses. Two different symbols can therefore have the sign (the written sign or the sound sign) in common they then signify in different ways" (3.32 - 3.321)
We can see from 3 why at the beginning of some remarks on logical form, Witt says:
"If we try to analyze any given propositions we shall find in general that they are logical sums, products or other truth functions of simpler propositions. But our analysis, if carried far enough, must come to the point where it reaches propositional forms which are not themselves composed of simpler propositional forms. We must eventually reach the ultimate connection of the terms, the immediate connection which cannot be broken without destroying the propositional form as such".
3, is an immediate connection of terms, unlike the proposition "P is red" which is connected by the copula.
I actually did stumble across that topic while browsing...truthfully, I've found that larger topics are more difficult for me to follow. I can process more and try to respond with as much clarity as I can muster when its fewer folks. Otherwise, I get busy for a day or two, and then I come back and its like there is so much to read and process and to read back and remember where I even left in the conversation...honestly, at that point its difficult for me to re-engage with the conversation.