Kant's ethic is protestant
Yes or no?
My thinking is that Kant is protestant, through and through, because while he accepts there are other possible ethics he believes the only rational faith is believing in the Christian doctrine of immortality, free will, and the existence of God.
It's not so much about the baptism into community but about how God influences your ethical life as an individual rational being.
My thinking is that Kant is protestant, through and through, because while he accepts there are other possible ethics he believes the only rational faith is believing in the Christian doctrine of immortality, free will, and the existence of God.
It's not so much about the baptism into community but about how God influences your ethical life as an individual rational being.
Comments (135)
He believed in faith, but wanted it to also be limited by reason, at least by my understanding.
It's his belief, which he doesn't claim is knowledge or necessary but just how he sees things, that we must believe in those three things -- god, immortality, free will -- that makes me think he's a protestant.
Maybe Christian is better. It's more the focus on interiority and belief that made me think protestant.
Id say this is pretty close to a Kantian ethical perspective, but Id hesitate to call it Protestant.
. Accordingly he would feel compelled by reason to avow this judgment with complete impartiality, as though it were rendered by another and yet, at the same time, as his own; whereby man gives evidence of the need, morally effected in him, of also conceiving a final end for his duties, as their consequence. Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of creation) which at the same time can and ought to be mans final end
(Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 1793, in Greene/Hudson, 1960)
Still, while morality leads inevitably to religion by means of pure speculative reason, pure practical reason, the ground of morality writ large, has no need of such inevitability, and thereby no need of religion as such.
It should be clear, the dichotomy between whether religion grounds our morality, the rationality of organized church domains generally, or, individual morality grants personal religious inclinations, the merely subjective philosophical approach.
Quoting tim wood
Absolutely; couldnt be otherwise and still have Kant authorship. Still gotta be careful though, insofar as just reason isnt quite enough, there being both theoretical and speculative reason and thereby the cognitions and principles derived from each. Only speculative reason, albeit of pure practical interest, justifies Kantian moral philosophy, subsequently deemed as deontological, as reason-based.
Fair. Maybe it'd be better to say -- as I read Kant it seems his motivation for writing the ethic comes from that religious perspective, but he is, of course, attempting to universalize beyond his own perspective.
The thought came from a casual conversation I was having with someone who is not really into philosophy, but the analogy seemed to work to make sense of some of the ideas -- the person seemed to be struggling with the idea that one should believe in God but cannot know that God exists (talking Kant here -- the practical vs. the theoretical reason). My thinking on Kant is that while it's intended to be universal, it's still sort of the old Protestantism at heart -- while it's all rationalism and duty you are still free to pick your maxims. So, in a sense, it's the conscience that's the guide, though morality only comes from following our maxims that are in accord with the categorical imperative out of a sense of respect for the moral law itself.
It's like an inward-facing version of Rousseau's social contract: the necessary conditions for forming a moral society from the perspective of a rational agent choosing.
(though posting it here to see if it's a bad analogy after all)
The religious background of which we have just spoken is the source of what characterizes Kantian ethics from the outset, namely, its absolutism, the privilege it assigns to morality as revealer of the absolute to man, the seal of the absolute which it impresses upon morality, the saintliness with which it is clothed. The saintly and absolute value of moral obligation and of the ought; the inverse value -- sacrilegious and absolute -- of moral wrong; the saintly and absolute value of good will; the saintly and absolute value of purity of ethical intention: so many traits whose origin lies in the influence of revealed ethics, and which have been transposed therefrom. But since at the same time the whole universe of objective realities on which that revealed ethics depended in its own order and in the supra-rational perspective of faith had been eliminated, along with the universe of objective realities which metaphysics imagined itself to know, the saintly absolutism of morality required a complete reversal of the bases of moral philosophy and rational ethics. Moral philosophy became a-cosmic. The world of morality had to be constituted purely on the basis of the interior data of the conscience, while severing itself from the world of objects -- confined in sense experience -- which our knowledge attains, and especially from that search for the good, the object of our desires, which also belongs to the empirical order, and to which up to this point the fate of ethics had been tied.[/quote]
('while severing itself from the world of objects' is a point that John Vervaeke stresses about Kant in various of his lectures. )
I think recognizing its formal expression is important too though because I think Kant's deontology sets up existential thinking: to understand Kant as Kant writing Kant, we should pay heed to his religious background (and this "fills out" the formal ethic quite a bit), but looking at it as a formal system if all one needs to do is be consistent and wish everyone else would follow the maxim you can justify a bit more than Kant seemed to believe possible.
If Kant doesnt implicate his own religious background for the a priori pure metaphysics of his moral philosophy, why do we need to pay heed to it?
I think Kant writing Kant wanted Kant to be understood as a pure rational being, .worthy to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends ., rather than a religious man.
But then, the conditions which grant the moral good may not adhere in rational beings in general, but only specify how he is necessarily so.
I'm thinking the Critique of Practical Reason here where he talks about the three ideas which cannot be known theoretically, but which -- for the summum bunnum -- must be assumed for a practical reason at all. Immortality, Freedom, and God seem to fit with the overturning of an authority in a church to put the authority in the person who wills. (which is the bit I got from thinking that Kant is protestant -- the centering of the subject over an authority)
Take this passage from the Critique of [s]Pure[/s]Practical Reason, where we can see some obvious Christian lineage in his ideas:
It also makes sense of his insistence on truth-telling as a universal rule, I think: Whereas most would say sometimes expediency justifies lying, the universal nature of prescriptions gets along well with the Christian faith. (one of the reasons the "specificity" argument doesn't hit too hard for Kant's deontology, to me -- the one where you can make a maxim so specific that it can always be generalized. It makes sense according to the metaphysic -- but it goes against the spirit)
Quoting Mww
Oh he certainly wants, and even demonstrates, that he is a rational person -- though I'm not so keen on pure rational being. But I think most importantly to Kant is that he'd assert that being a religious man is not in conflict with being a rational, scientific man. It seems to me that's almost a "in a nutshell" explanation of Kant: How to believe in both science and religion without destroying either. (OR, for thems who want to fight, while destroying both :D )
Does being among humanity's strongest thinkers, professional grade mathematician, and a world class physicist indicate that Pietism is no-longer nourishing or rational?
And if that were so, why would Kant claim that it's important for practical reason, in general, to believe in God or the immortality of the soul, for instance? (the focus on the intent of an actor is also something important here -- something that fleshes out the choosing of maxims in the formal system)
Professor Maritain. It's not a matter of whether I "buy" the argument, @Moliere asked the question and I happened to know of that essay by him. I will say I've barely scratched the surface of Maritain, who was a monumental figure in 20th century Catholic philosophy, and not much more so of Kant, but I believe Maritain's analysis has merit.
Quoting Moliere
My thoughts also.
///
Going back to the souce I quoted, there's a useful synopsis of Maritain's argument in footnotes 15-16, from which:
But one would conflict with the other, without sufficiently critical examination of the differences in the conceptions and principles by which each obtains its respective truth.
. it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which ( ) establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena .
and to be confined to its own limits just indicates, by extension, our own cognitive limits, relative to the possibility of experience of any of the objects of one or the other, science or morality. Experience being, of course, the final arbiter of empirical knowledge, all else being merely logical inference.
(Also, that article opens with life details and highlights some concepts which come from Pietist influence)
Still plan on responding, but that's what I have time for this morning.
He certainly wasn't a Calvanist then.
I'd say that, at least by way of my understanding of Kant, that Pietism could be rational in Kant's system insofar that one doesn't claim to have a scientific knowledge of it, but rather employs the practical power of reason which is at least a legitimate use of reason if not the same as scientific knowledge.
Quoting tim wood
I'm more thinking on the 2nd critique than the first -- not that they are separable, but their topics are different. The questions of reason that reason cannot but help to ask about are all with respect to theoretical knowledge. With respect to practical knowledge they take on a different . . . uh.. . role? It's hard to generalize when already talking at such a level of generality.
So no -- the short answer is not enough! :D
I agree with respect to theoretical knowledge. And you're right that this is the sort of conflict Kant mitigates with his philosophy: theoretical knowledge of science, practical knowledge for ethics (which surely must assume Christianity, he indicates at times).
But I think there's more to the use of practical reason -- and then more confusingly, later, the powers of judgment -- than inference alone. That's what the first CI is about, right? And I think the first CI is complemented by the 2nd CI, even though Kant claims they are equivalent.
As far as focusing more on the individual's own ability to reason, rather than relying on a hierarchical decision, this might be something to consider. The 'Protestant Work Ethic" for example is an example of individuals showing how much they were in God's favor by the fruits of their labor. However, this also is contradicted by the fact that this "favor" was always meant as that they were "The Elect" and thus predetermined, which would be Calvinist, and against the notion that anyone had free will in regards to where one would end up. One simply is following "divine providence" in the Calvinist conception. This is a hard determinism, and not a compatibilist one which Kant might argue.
Must an ethic obtain for all sub-sets, or can the set of sets have properties separate from the sets it contains?
I'm trying to configure where specifically, "Protestant" comes into view here.. And I was trying to get at it from an "individualistic" way. However, that particular way of "Protestant Work Ethic" where one gains favor for oneself through one's labor is actually specifically Calvinist, not just "Protestant", so didn't work, but I still think some "individualistic" angle, can be used as opposed to Catholic/Eastern Orthodox, which might rely more on institutional knowledge.
(By the way, John Calvin was Protestant, and Calvinism one of the main schools of Protestantism. I'm not sure where pietism fits into the scheme, though.)
Quoting schopenhauer1
You can imagine that Kant would have no truck with Aquinas' 'five proofs' or any of the other argumentarium of Scholastic philosophy. They would all be subject to the kinds of critiques he had of other rationalist philosophers. He was famously dismissive of the ontological argument ('existence is not a predicate'). I think intellectually he was very much a product of the Reformation, even if he then went even further than the Reformers in questioning the very existence of the Church.
Nice.
He sure had this proclivity to reduce a concept further than the average philosopher even considered. Who woulda thought general reason had so many qualified reductions, and its not that easy keeping them properly separated.
Ever notice, of all the tables of this and that Kant comes up with to facilitate his metaphysical intent, he doesnt create one for reason? Like a pyramid ..reason at the apex, under it is branched pure/empirical, under pure is transcendental/practical, under empirical is theoretical/speculative. Or something like that.
But maybe he didnt, because there arent any qualified reductions; there is only reason, and its singular role in a tripartite cognitive system. But, while it does have such singular role, it has it only in that kind of system, but is not restricted to that role in the entirety of it applicability, insofar as it is itself the originator of ideas, which rely nonetheless on the cognitive system for their representations.
It can get very confusing.
-
But regarding the thread title and its ramifications, Im really not that interested in it. While he does say morality inevitably leads to religion, albeit in his post-critical prime, hence the possibility of leading to Protestantism, if one studies his moral philosophy in and for itself alone, he doesnt need to find out how it leads to religion.
Peter Simpson makes this point almost exactly.
---
- Excellent - I need to read more Maritain. I have been reading John Deely, a well-known semioticist, and he references Maritain often.
Quoting Jacques Maritain, Christianity and Philosophy - The Ethics of Kant
I am told that in Kant's later work he makes exceptions to the unknowableness of the noumenal on account of morality.
---
Quoting tim wood
There is a Lutheran priest named Jordan Cooper who has at least one lecture on Kant which digs into his Pietism a bit. Kant's religious orientation seems to me obvious, as well as colors of Protestant fideism.
---
Quoting Moliere
Right: that is the crucial (anti-religious) assumption at play.
---
Quoting Moliere
I didn't quite follow that conclusion, either. But it is Protestant at least insofar as it is individualistic, subjectivistic, and arguably fideistic.
Just saw your reply. No doubt Kant respected and used scholastic ideas. I guess I was more thinking of his categorical imperative as an individual agents way of determining right/wrong, rather than looking to external sources from a community of set beliefs etc. its individualistic and it can be argued the Reformation emphasized, individualistic readings and interpretation of the Bible, individualistic forms of church doctrine, and also puts emphasis on the individual as directly engaging the texts meaning along with the individual as living out ethical living in everyday life versus through special liturgical practices or ways of living (monks, mass, works of the church or whatnot). But I found this which seems to be about this subject. @Moliere maybe this will help:
https://problemi.si/issues/p2018-2/03problemi_international_2018_2_kobe.pdf
So basically the CI becomes about individual responsibility as an agent and their will to determine right action rather than a set of fixed doctrine that one can turn to regarding this or that matter.
The article indicates that it is very much the pietistic aspect of protestant ism that influenced Kant. That is to say the aspect that it is ones justification through faith. He makes an interesting point that even the person making the rational decision cant quite be sure that they made it out of respect for the moral law or self-interest or other intentions. This is similar to the Pietist idea that they can never know if they truly did something out of purely faith and not self interest or other intentions.
https://problemi.si/issues/p2018-2/03problemi_international_2018_2_kobe.pdf
You might find that interesting as it seems to answer the question about the influence of Pietism.
TL:DR: Kant's notion of intent coming from true respect for moral law is likened to the Pietist's intent coming from true faith as the arbiter of if an action is moral, and that due to the ambiguity of knowing if this is case, it may be very difficult to know. This is of course opposed to consequentialists or people who look at practical outcome (or intent that merely LOOKS like it is morally willed). Clearly for this camp, the consequences are easier to discern than one's actual intent or how one is willing their intent, etc.
Yes I would definitely agree here. I don't see the point to over-determine Pietism's affect on Kant's thinking, but I can understand that it possibly gave him some frameworks from which he could draw upon. I doubt it was anything like paying homage to Pietism, or because he thought of it doctrinally. Rather, some of the ways of thinking about things, the language, so-to-speak was was possibly a starting point how to look at certain problems. I think it's generally safe to assume people borrow ideas from the context they grew up in.
Pietism is a member of the set "Protestant", because it's Lutheran, and all Lutherans are Protestants.
I'm still hesitant, and starting to see how this is a technical question in the philosophy of religion more than about Kant at all: It seems we all agree on Kant, it's the other side that's not convincing -- but then that'd be to ask "What is Protestantism?", which seems to be the sort of set or word which does not have necessary/sufficient conditions -- so there's a lot of ambiguity in the assertion.
Oh yeah? Where?
It's always nice to find agreement.
Quoting Leontiskos
Not quite, in my estimation. I'd prefer to say that he argues that there is more than one legitimate use or power of reason other than theoretical (scientific) knowledge.
Knowledge is still limited. There's the moral "proof" of God, but it's not the same as what we usually mean by knowledge. You don't come to know God through his argument, you come to realize belief in God is necessary for a moral being.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yeh. Which, especially considering it's Kant, I'd say isn't warranted at all. Even in his philosophical work he's pro-religion, while obviously arguing for rationality too.
Quoting Leontiskos
What do you make of the syllogism above? Where Kant is a Lutheran (due to Pietism), and all Lutherns are Protestants, therefore....?
has a good point in that he's not really "claimable" by religion -- in the culture wars sense -- but this is part of what I love about Kant as a philosopher. He cared about consistency enough to make sacrifices to it.
I wouldn't go so far to "claim" Kant for any side at all. He's a philosopher that cares more about consistency than religion/atheism -- and his philosophy is even addressing a lot of those points that come up, so perhaps this is why he's attractive to both a/theists.
I feel the same way, but perhaps from a different point of view. I dont think we have the authority to suggest for Kant anything he didnt admit for himself.
Im not saying he never mentioned the influence his religious upbringing may have had on the formulation of his moral philosophy, only that Ive yet to find out about it. And from that it follows necessarily at least I have no warrant for understanding such philosophy as if it were conditioned by it.
So now that I look again he is appealing more to the Machiavellian-Hobbesian context than Rousseau in particular, but it is similar:
Quoting Peter L. P. Simpson, Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble
The broad idea is that Kant universalizes self-interest, which results in a communal ethic.
Quoting Moliere
Okay, interesting.
Quoting Moliere
Yes, and many would agree that Kant is unconsciously influenced by his religious upbringing in various ways.
Quoting Moliere
...Therefore Kant is a Protestant? Sure, but I think what is desired is a more direct link between Kant's thought and Protestant thought.
Quoting Moliere
Right.
All philosophers are conditioned by factors they fail to recognize or admit, and these factors are identified by scholars.
I think this is probably the one I was thinking of: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuvshyo0knI, especially the section on Kant's background.
Quoting tim wood
So from a Catholic perspective Kant is extremely individualistic, subjectivistic, and fideistic. Individualism and subjectivism are common to both Protestantism and the Enlightenment (and probably not coincidentally). Fideism is the separation between faith and reason, and the separation is found in different ways in different forms of Protestantism. Folks like Kant and later Schleiermacher emphasize rationalism and protect religion/faith by giving it a purely internal and separate character, and this internalizing is also in line with Pietism.
Quoting tim wood
Sometimes thinkers embrace and defend their nascent traditions, and sometimes they react against them, but in either case the nascent traditions are exercising their influence. For Kant I would say it is both, but I would say that Kant never really deviated from the fundamental manner in which Pietism sees the world fideistically. Religion for Kant is always somewhat separate and other, and his morality also participates to some extent in this same kind of opacity and sanctity. Obviously fideism dovetails with Enlightenment thinking, and I would argue that Enlightenment autonomy is in no small part inheriting from the Reformation itself, but in any case, there are various interrelating influences.
Quoting tim wood
It might represent a rough portrait of Kant's approach, sure. The exchanges between Kant and Hamann are rather interesting in this regard.
What's curious to me is that Kant tries to justify a Christian morality with "pure reason," and if this were possible or if Kant had been successful then I think the questions about his religious background might not loom so large. But ifas is generally accepted"pure reason" is insufficient to justify such strong, categorical moral claims, then the effect is that Kant ends up sneaking in religious or transcendent principles through the back door. My sense is that Kant's arguments for high-octane (religious) morality are creative and interesting, but also faulty. I don't think the project is impossible, but I don't think Kant succeeded. Most people, for example, do not think that Kant's absolute prohibition on lying holds good. The Kantian successors are basically trying to find ways to rationally justify a high morality or a high view of reason, and some of them (such as Nagel) are haunted by this question of whether their system really holds up without robust religious or metaphysical-anthropological presuppositions.
Oh. Ok. Thanks.
Do you think this a sound argument?
Putting aside the liberties taken with my statements, yes.
Or else it's not as black and white as you purport. This should not be hard to see given that both options you give seem to me to be caricatures.
Regarding burdens of proof and the like, the fact that some here take Kant to be a sacred cow doesn't count as a good reason to exempt him from the sort of analyses that are applied to all humans and thinkers. Lots of us don't take Kant to be a sacred cow, and therefore we will assess him the same way we we assess other cows. The birth narratives and childhood stories of sacred figures are jealously guarded, and Kant seems to be no exception. Apparently some secular followers of Kant are threatened by Kant's religious upbringing, and therefore that upbringing must be expunged or laundered lest Kant fail to be "claimable" by secularism. I don't see this approach, this reaction against Kant's background, as especially measured or unbiased.
In looking at the ideas and their descent/influences/etc., I have no interest in trivializing any thinker. What would the point be? I like to see as much as possible of a thinker's ideas, where they come from and where they go to understand a perspective, not to trivialize.
I don't think him being a Pietist -- and the similarity between his philosophy and the religion from which it was formed -- undermines or trivializes the philosophy. As you say you still have to address the arguments and such.
It's more that the religious origin gives me a perspective on him as a thinker because it makes sense of the philosophy -- in the formal sense of his ethics then, yeah, no religion is necessary. That's a big part of enlightenment thinking, and he's an enlightenment thinker.
Why would the religious origins and influences trivialize him, in your view? That's certainly not my aim. My aim was more to elucidate to someone who didn't understand the distinction between theoretical and practical reason.
I like it.
This is the sort of modern Enlightenment canard that now stands in disrepute, but you are of course welcome to continue holding it and/or arguing for it. It is possible that the postmodern consensus is mistaken.
That said, I find Kant's morality irrational or at the very least hopelessly opaque. I agree with Simpson:
Quoting Peter L. P. Simpson, Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble
Quoting tim wood
There would be the danger of something like a genetic fallacy in a thread on Kant's arguments, but this thread is literally about Kant's religious influences. The constant refrain that I am hearing from you and @Mww is the dogmatic claim that Kant's philosophy simply did not have religious influences. Now for those of us who who think that two things can be held simultaneously, namely that influences can be acknowledged without the thought being invalidated, this is not a problem. It seems that for those who think that to admit influences is to invalidate the thought, it must be denied that their favored thinkers had any influences at all!
This is one of the hallmark errors of Enlightenment thought: "If we receive from the past or from others then our thought is not legitimate" (and the truth of the matter is almost exactly opposite to this). The current errors of philosophy are a variation on this theme. Now it is said that if some proposition exists in language, then it cannot express a truth that transcends the immanent frame of that language (given the linguistic reduction). Orcloser to Kantianismif some proposition is derived from "phenomena" then it cannot express a truth that transcends the immanent frame of the subject (or their transcendental conditions - given the subjectivistic reduction). More sensible non-Enlightenment approaches do not take such a reductionistic avenue, and are therefore not as wary of admitting influences on thinkers.
You did not hear any such thing from me. Actually, I dont know what you heard, but I know I never said any such thing.
. The SEP article I linked states the following:
Which seems to indicate that Kant's religion is Lutheran, and Pietist. Do I know it now, or is this not enough to infer that his religion is Lutheran, and Pietist?
Quoting tim wood
What about this part of the article I linked previously? Are the authors of that article stating unwarranted assumptions?
Quoting tim wood
Was it a point, or an assertion?
I think that's the part where we're disagreeing -- religion, in Kant's writing, is bounded by reason, and so it is reasonable to be religious: these things aren't in conflict in Kant's philosophy, but rather this was the whole point of it: to figure out how one could believe in both science and theology from a rational perspective.
You in the sense that you affirmed <this claim>, and @tim wood in the sense that he is creating an artificially high burden of proof for the thesis that Kant's work might have religious influences.
C & P the claim.
Why not?
Quoting Leontiskos
Understanding Kant's Protestant fideism is very helpful in situating his thought, and this recognition is commonplace among many scholars. This kind of fideism is something of a novelty, at least in the form it took in Kant. For example:
Quoting Kant's Philosophy of Religion | IEP
Here is Nietzsche:
This is a theme that George Grant takes up, namely Kant's "great delay." Kant sets up the religious stopgap that morality cannot be had without God, and Nietzsche finally replies: Then we cannot have morality.
Kant's fideism whereby morality gets sequestered off on its own seems intricately bound up with the very sort of religion that Pietism represents, and not a few have noticed this. I'd say this is fairly crucial if one is to understand Kant in his historical context. Kant's fideistic move to protect morality (but also faith) is taken right out of the playbook of Pietism, which did the exact same thing to shelter interior religion from the quasi-rationalistic Lutheran orthodoxy of that time.
I don't think there is one Protestant ethical outlook. One potent vein of Protestantism is Calvinism, which disconnects your actions from reward or punishment. You don't act ethically for a reward, but rather because your life has no meaning other than to glorify God. For Baptists, God loves you and is ever-forgiving, so at any point, you can be "born again" into innocence by just waking up out of your degradation. I don't think either one has much to do with community vs individuality, but the Catholics had explored that opposition pretty thoroughly before Protestants came along.
Protestant faith belonged to those who struggled against the aristocracy's control over social structure, so there's an element of egalitarianism to it, like Hussites whose grave stones are all the same, no matter who you were in life. It's equality in death.
I'd push back here a bit. Self-interest is definitely a Hobbessian point, and to some extent Locke, but Rousseau -- by my understanding -- is more a romantic. "Man is born free, and yet everywhere is in chains"
The chains here being dogmatism: Sapere Aude, in theoretical and practical life.
Also since he believes that self-interest is something which makes an action not-moral -- an act can follow the moral law and so be legal, but it's the motivation towards the moral law which qualifies a particular as as moral or not moral -- I'd say that Kant inherits some of this Romanticism with respect to human beings: We are valuable ends unto ourselves.
In a way what becomes sacred is less the metaphysics of morals and more the individual making choices (with the strict confines around that so that many moral individuals acting together can eventually find consistency with one another, ala Perpetual Peace)
That's true.
Though the same can be said for Christianity as a whole, too.
The protestant bits are what's already been highlighted, and comes more from my familiarity with protestant churches. He "fits" in with them and it's part of his origins as a person. It's his historical lineage and influence.
"Protestant" maybe isn't any thesis at all, but a historical category?
That's fair. Take a peek at the SEP article I linked and let me know what you think.
Thanks for this. Still pittering along through the article, but yup -- this is a more detailed treatment of what I'm thinking through
:up:
With that said, I do think Kant in his pessimism is closer to Hobbes than Rosseau. In Religion within the bounds of Reason Alone Kant speaks about man as evil or corrupt by nature, and I am told that in his Perpetual Peace a very Hobbesian political approach emerges.
Quoting Moliere
I think Simpson argues convincingly that at the heart of Kant is the universalization of a kind of communal self-interest, but his argument is doing to draw on the universalization formulation of the Categorical Imperative, along with Kant's conceptions of inclination and respect. If we consider the formulation of the Categorical Imperative which has to do with means and endswhich you may here allude tothen an argument against universalized communal self-interest is certainly available.
Quoting Moliere
I think the moral principles are sacred in that they are largely opaque to reason, and for Kant any explanation or justification for them will necessarily be limited and incomplete. I think Kant sees it as mistaken to ask for clear rational reasons why we ought to heed his moral principles. In a very weird but true way, for Kant if there are sufficient rational reasons for some act then that act is not necessarily a moral act, and therefore moral philosophy and complete rational explanations are like oil and water.
Yeh, I'm of the opinion that the three formulations are not "really the same" as Kant claims. The first one provides an abstract foundation that any morality which is aiming to universalize principles must adhere to -- the second one adds more to that, but Kant claiming that it is the same provides a hint as to what is morally appealing to reason, I think. The third is a kind of consistency condition not just on the maxim but based on the first two. In valuing other people as ends-makers we recognize that just as we are moral agents making choices of principle so others' must be seen as well, and the fourth is where I think the influence from Rousseau is strongest.
But I don't think the collective will is one of self-interest, exactly. It's more like, in the long run of humanity, the final product that comes about when moral agents are acting within a moral community.
But does the first formulation really entail that we care about other ends-makers? Couldn't we universalize a maxim that the great dominate, and accept our fate in the war of all against all? What makes these four formulations the only formulations, given that each one -- while they paint a consistent picture of an ethic -- doesn't necessitate the others?
That's where I think this sort of elucidation of Kant's religion and moral commitments make his ethic more understandable. It's in the particular examples, and in making sense of all four formulations, that I think we get a sense of his ethic.
The unity of it comes down to human freedom to judge while recognizing the rights of other judgers. (the part that makes it particularly Christian, at least, is in how principles have to be universalized in a seemingly fair way between people -- a way which respects everyone's freedom and say. at least I'd say this is the fair reading)
Quoting Leontiskos
I'd put it that it's just a different kind of rationality. For him it's the necessary conditions for any particular moral principles one holds to that the philosopher spells out -- but the philosopher does not need to spell these things out because common, good people already know what is good. There is no deep technical knowledge: One does not lie because it is against the moral law. It's the simple, straightforward precepts of the common religion which follow the categorical imperative, or at least that his moral philosophy is aiming at.
I think he's of the belief that people already pretty much know what is good, hence the emphasis on conscience.
Quoting Leontiskos
There's a way of reading Rousseau which puts the popular will as a kind of agent. But I'd emphasize the "bottom up" reading more. The popular will is the result of individual agents willing. It's the call for freedom, and progress, which I'd emphasize from Rousseau to Kant. While it's true that Kant expresses a "warped wood" theory of human nature, it seems that he also believes in human progress else he wouldn't talk about the need for an afterlife to fulfill perfection. Also it makes sense of his insistence that we should develop our talents, and other such stuff.
He, like many philosophers, expresses the dismay of human nature in their time, but I think he's still a progressive liberal for all that.
Regarding the SEP article, an informative compendium of opinions, as are most encyclopedic entries of this particular subject matter.
Regarding the SEP articles effect on my opinions relative to the subject matter, it informed in a supplemental manner, but not sufficiently enough to alter my understanding of fundamental Kantian moral philosophy.
Kant is adamant that his thesis is not for popular consumption, therefore it fascinates me that folks reference a popular source for their definitive information.
Kant is adamant that his thesis is not for the common understanding, but my understanding is very specific, insofar as it is mine alone, thus it is hardly common. Why do you think he was so derisive of the . the arrogant pretensions of the schools ?
Kant wanted his thesis to be understood; I doubt he figured it important, for that understanding, to also incorporate a familiarity with the affectations of his developmental environment. He wants to be known his reasons grounding what he says, as befits a proper theory, regardless of the conditions by which what he says, came about, except with respect to arguments relative to his peers or predecessors.
I dont care one whit for his religious background, or even if there was or was not one to care about. I want to know if his epistemological and moral philosophies reflect my personality, or are that by which I may judge otherwise.
That is, when push comes to shove, precisely what a theoretical metaphysical philosophy is supposed to do, re: be subject, or object, in a logical cognitive system predicated on relations.
Thats what I think. Nothing all that special about it, in the Grand Scheme of Things, I admit.
I agree. Good points.
Quoting Moliere
I think this is right if we look at the fourth formulation instead of the first.
Quoting Moliere
Okay, interesting.
Quoting Moliere
I think that's a plausible interpretation, although I also think others are equally plausible. This sort of project would require a close reading of all of Kant's ethical works along with an (at least implicit) hierarchical ordering of the different "formulations" of the Categorical Imperative. This task is beyond me, but I think you are right that bringing in the religious background could be helpful in completing such a project. The idea here is that the religious element is necessary in order to bring clarity to Kant's underdetermined moral system.
Quoting Moliere
I think this explains in part why the opacity did not bother Kant, but I think Kant was under the spell of many false assumptions in this sort of thinking, and I think Nietzsche in particular is going to pick it apart.
Quoting Moliere
Okay, fair points. Good post. :up:
It's was an element of a large scale shift in power in Europe. The old Catholic view was that if you were born poor, this was God's will for you. To promote social mobility was blasphemy because it meant you were defying God's plan. The Catholic clergy were generally sons of the aristocracy, so Catholicism and the aristocracy were joined at the hip. Protestantism was backed by the rising merchant class so they could break from that kind of thinking. To them, it was obvious that God intended everyone to fully express their potential, whatever that may be. So Protestantism was the ideological grounding for social destratification. It was about freedom. The Catholic Church reacted to the rise of Protestants by becoming violently ultra-conservative. Where it had once been a rich forum for diverging ideas, it became just a reflection of the Protestants. That's what Catholicism has been ever since.
By the way, Erik Erikson wrote a really interesting book about Luther. It's part biography and part psychoanalysis. When Luther went off to become a monk, his father showed up at the monastery and stood outside screaming about the fact that Luther had abandoned the family's plan, which was about social mobility. Luther's father wanted him to study law and become a burgermeister, which would have been another step upward out of the mines and into a position of power.
Does any of that fit with Kant?
An opinion to which you are certainly entitled, but I would offer that Kant, being the non-stop dualist he admits to being, wants it understood the c.i. also has a dualistic nature, re: its form and its content. As such the form is always the same, insofar as commands of reason cannot be self-contradictory, whatever be the act determinable by the formula of its content, which only expresses the relation between an imperfect subject and the objectively necessity ..lawful ..object of his will.
-
Quoting Moliere
Granted that a maxim is a subjective principle, is it the principle, or the law of nature which necessarily follows from it, to which universalizing is aimed? I dont think that which is predicated entirely on subjective constitution has the power of universality as stipulated by the conception of law, especially regarding nature, which in Kant is the totality of all possible things, which in turn manifests as any act by any other moral agent.
If a principle could be universalized, why go through all the trouble of objectively acting as if the mere subjective will, in which the principle resides in the form of pure practical reason, is sufficient causality for all rational beings to follow suit? It is, after all, respect for the law which grounds the interest of the will relative to itself, hence it is respect for the law as universally willed by one, that subsequently becomes the duty of anothers to endorse. In a perfectly moral world, of course, as determined by pure a priori metaphysics.
quote="Moliere;909588"] .an act can follow the moral law and so be legal .[/quote]
Be ..legal? An act that follows the moral law, is good, a tacit description representing the worthiness of being happy, whether or not such act is in accordance with jurisprudence.
Im pretty sure you didnt mean to implicate contingent administrative codes, but ..legal?? I just had to bring that one up, donchaknow. Id beg forgiveness for quibbling, but I aint like that. (Grin)
From his Critique of Practical Reason:
That's the bit I mean, though I think he means to use legal terms in philosophical ways (similar to the way he uses "deducation" in CPR)
Quoting Mww
I think it's the scope of the commands of reason which Kant narrows with his further iterations. Basically I'd be more dismissive towards the ethic unless I took his other formulations seriously because I think the first formulation makes sense from an ethic that wants to be universalizable, but I'd say this open him up to some pretty damning criticism.
After all: What is self-contradictory about willing a contest of all between all? Isn't that basically one of Nietzsche's motifs (As @Leontiskos alluded to earlier, and which I agree with)? And surely, given the spirit of Kant's various texts, I don't think that's what his moral philosophy entails, exactly.
Taking each articulation "fills out" the ethic, in my estimation, to be something worth thinking through more thoroughly than a reduction to the first articulation of the CI opens up the work to. Read in context it makes a good deal of sense, but if it's the only rule we have to follow in formulating maxims then it seems we're able to will many things which are consistent, but insofar that we are willing to accept that we are also going to be treated as mere means to an end, for instance, we could consistently break the second formulation (even though that goes against the spirit of the text -- but again, there's a notion that's not exactly pure reason...)
Quoting Mww
Quoting Mww
There's something funny in Kant here because he posits freedom as its own kind of causality. And so here we are in the world with our bodies as we know them being subject to the laws of nature, and yet we are these noumenal selves with free will able to act. Flipping through the Critique of Practical Reason to find some relevant quotes to think through I came across this (long) quote shortly after the last one in the same chapter:
[hide]If now we consider also the contents of the knowledge that we can have of a pure practical reason, and by means of it, as shown by the Analytic, we find, along with a remarkable analogy between it and the theoretical, no less remarkable differences. As regards the theoretical, the faculty of a pure rational cognition a priori could be easily and evidently proved by examples from sciences (in which, as they put their principles to the test in so many ways by methodical use, there is not so much reason as in common knowledge to fear a secret mixture of empirical principles of cognition). But, that pure reason without the admixture of any empirical principle is practical of itself, this could only be shown from the commonest practical use of reason, by verifying the fact, that every man's natural reason acknowledges the supreme practical principle as the supreme law of his will- a law completely a priori and not depending on any sensible data. It was necessary first to establish and verify the purity of its origin, even in the judgement of this common reason, before science could take it in hand to make use of it, as a fact, that is, prior to all disputation about its possibility, and all the consequences that may be drawn from it. But this circumstance may be readily explained from what has just been said; because practical pure reason must necessarily begin with principles, which therefore must be the first data, the foundation of all science, and cannot be derived from it. It was possible to effect this verification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason quite well, and with sufficient certainty, by a single appeal to the judgement of common sense, for this reason, that anything empirical which might slip into our maxims as a determining principle of the will can be detected at once by the feeling of pleasure or pain which necessarily attaches to it as exciting desire; whereas pure practical reason positively refuses to admit this feeling into its principle as a condition. The heterogeneity of the determining principles (the empirical and rational) is clearly detected by this resistance of a practically legislating reason against every admixture of inclination, and by a peculiar kind of sentiment, which, however, does not precede the legislation of the practical reason, but, on the contrary, is produced by this as a constraint, namely, by the feeling of a respect such as no man has for inclinations of whatever kind but for the law only; and it is detected in so marked and prominent a manner that even the most uninstructed cannot fail to see at once in an example presented to him, that empirical principles of volition may indeed urge him to follow their attractions, but that he can never be expected to obey anything but the pure practical law of reason alone.
The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of morality, in the former of which empirical principles constitute the entire foundation, while in the second they do not form the smallest part of it, is the first and most important office of the Analytic of pure practical reason; and it must proceed in it with as much exactness and, so to speak, scrupulousness, as any geometer in his work. The philosopher, however, has greater difficulties to contend with here (as always in rational cognition by means of concepts merely without construction), because he cannot take any intuition as a foundation (for a pure noumenon). He has, however, this advantage that, like the chemist, he can at any time make an experiment with every man's practical reason for the purpose of distinguishing the moral (pure) principle of determination from the empirical; namely, by adding the moral law (as a determining principle) to the empirically affected will (e.g., that of the man who would be ready to lie because he can gain something thereby). It is as if the analyst added alkali to a solution of lime in hydrochloric acid, the acid at once forsakes the lime, combines with the alkali, and the lime is precipitated. Just in the same way, if to a man who is otherwise honest (or who for this occasion places himself only in thought in the position of an honest man), we present the moral law by which he recognises the worthlessness of the liar, his practical reason (in forming a judgement of what ought to be done) at once forsakes the advantage, combines with that which maintains in him respect for his own person (truthfulness), and the advantage after it has been separated and washed from every particle of reason (which is altogether on the side of duty) is easily weighed by everyone, so that it can enter into combination with reason in other cases, only not where it could be opposed to the moral law, which reason never forsakes, but most closely unites itself with.
But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle of happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them, and pure practical reason does not require that we should renounce all claim to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we should take no account of happiness. It may even in certain respects be a duty to provide for happiness; partly, because (including skill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfilment of our duty; partly, because the absence of it (e.g., poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty. But it can never be an immediate duty to promote our happiness, still less can it be the principle of all duty. Now, as all determining principles of the will, except the law of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are all empirical and, therefore, as such, belong to the principle of happiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of morality and never be incorporated with it as a condition; since this would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical admixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of mathematical evidence, which in Plato's opinion is the most excellent thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility.
Instead, however, of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure practical reason, that is, the explanation of the possibility of such a knowledge a priori, the utmost we were able to do was to show that if we saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, we should also see not merely the possibility, but even the necessity, of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom we attribute freedom of causality of their will; because both concepts are so inseparably united that we might define practical freedom as independence of the will on anything but the moral law. But we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the world of sense; we are fortunate if only we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now, by the moral law which postulates it, compelled and therefore authorized to assume it. However, there are still many who think that they can explain this freedom on empirical principles, like any other physical faculty, and treat it as a psychological property, the explanation of which only requires a more exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the will, and not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a being that belongs to the world of sense (which is really the point). They thus deprive us of the grand revelation which we obtain through practical reason by means of the moral law, the revelation, namely, of a supersensible world by the realization of the otherwise transcendent concept of freedom, and by this deprive us also of the moral law itself, which admits no empirical principle of determination. Therefore it will be necessary to add something here as a protection against this delusion and to exhibit empiricism in its naked superficiality.[/hide]
But my tl;dr understanding here is that it's the principle is aimed at universalization. So we have Kant who believes that lying is always bad, no matter the circumstances, and he holds it as a principle everyone ought follow. While we are all free agents, and so can choose our own ends, when we hold a principle to universalize it we obviously would like it if others followed suit -- that is, if they recognized that we are also end-makers as they are, and so if we respect one another as moral beings of choice we'll come to some rules just by the necessity of having to get along in a moral community.
So in the long run, supposing everyone adopts the same maxim, then the moral law becomes as if it were a natural law -- it's empirical, and everyone follows it, and so it is indistinguishable from natural law.
However, what makes this possible (again, in my head-cannon) is that there are two kinds of causality, one of which is a category for theoretical reason, and the other which is a category for practical reason, and since these are just two different powers of reason at the center of the thinking subject we are free to employ them as we see fit -- and Kant makes it clear in the quote above that theoretical reason is believed because of the success of science, and practical reason due to an appeal to common sense.
I don't think so. I mean I can squint a bit, but not really.
Its all good. Its better to have taken the time to digest this philosophy, then to argue over differences in interpretations of it, perhaps from differences in primary sources. You seem to favor CpR, the philosophy concerning the empirical part of ethics, while I draw from Groundwork, which concerns the non-empirical parts, re: morality proper. Actually, you might find a mix of the two, but I kinda dont.
On a tangent based on last notions of CI.. IF CI cannot be practically reasoned as to "what" counts as universalizable, what practical use is it?
For example, if All X, did Y, then there would be no need for X.. I know he presents "perfect" and "imperfect" as a way around this, but how is this really solving the problem and not being accused of ad hoc rationalizations of this "pristine" ethic that arises from the non-empirical?
Rather, I think the second formulation is simply a good basis to deem an ethics proper from, because it provides a locus of ethics (the individual), and the content of the universal principle (dignity, people as ends). Any other universalizability principle from the first formulation is bound to come up with application problems as to how one can and cannot universalize.
My inclination is to try and read them all as a whole, even though there are tensions all throughout the philosophy, and I certainly haven't worked out the whole coherent picture -- but it's still fun to think about and look at.
Re: The original question, I've been convinced that it's better to say Lutheran, at least, if I'm going to make this association, because that seems less loaded (yet more familiar than "Pietist", which is what I was thinking with "Protestant": a familiar distinction)-- something I didn't consider was how heavily the Protestant/Catholic divide could figure into the statement, when I was more just thinking about how my own origins in a protestant religion get along with a lot of Kant's sentiments, and I think this was probably was initially attracted me to the philosophy: It was like an ethics I "felt", that could be articulated, but without all the metaphysical stories and strange arguments.
Quoting schopenhauer1
By the way I've been expressing Kant he's not providing it as a practical tool, but as a philosopher's interpretation of the everyday good person's morality.
Though I don't think it's that hard, given Kant's examples and reading in context, what he has in mind. If not then I'd be on flimsy footing with respect to my assertion that we can differentiate the four formulations in the way I've attempted to make them more mutually supportive.
It does seem rather hard because how are we to determine if something like, Everybody shouldnt be an asshole because if everybody were assholes, we might live in a world without congeniality, is universalizable? That he would say wouldnt lead to a logical contradiction. Therefore, its an imperfect duty.
However, stealing would lead to a logical contradiction because property itself would be undermined if everyone followed this. I am sure that there are many maxim that if universalized would lead to contradictions or absurdities. Its hard to figure out what rules would be necessary to universalize and what ones are not important enough for this universalization.
Kant had no problem with choosing "Lying" as an example.
In a plain-language sense, it seems to me that as long as someone's principle they're enacting could be enacted by everyone without undermining the principle then this maxim is a maxim which passes the first formulation of the C.I.
If everyone follows the maxim "Do not lie" or "Always tell the truth", that would not lead to some contradiction in actions between the group of people who have adopted the maxim.
I'm not sure a person can adopt the maxim that "Everybody should not. . . " -- that's not of the form of a maxim, is it? Individuals will maxims, so quoting from the Groundwork of metaphysics of morals:
The clarification thereafter being that if the maxim was not universalizable then it would undermine the very basis of law.
Since the ethic is based in freedom which one's we pick to universalize is kind of up to us -- but a meta-ethical description from the philosophy would say that if you picked a maxim which might only look universalizable but carries special exceptions to it then it would fail the first formulation and could not even be a candidate for the moral law (since it, somehow, undermines the notion of law itself)
Given the large use of jurisprudence in Kant, and especially taking after his deduction, I take it that if we wanted others to adopt our maxims we'd have to present them in some sense as we would to any tribunal of reason: So we tell which ones we can universalize through rational judgment.
Quoting Moliere
Quoting Mww
The Groundwork is just as clear that an act premised on happiness would not be moral.
Quoting schopenhauer1
And regarding that earlier concept of communal self-interest the question arises of whether a failure to universalize results in a contradiction or whether it results in societal disintegration. For example:
Quoting Moliere
...Moliere talks about a "contradiction in actions between the group of people," which is apparently social conflict.
Well.. sort of -- but no, because social conflict is usually about competing groups -- two different actions or maxims or something.
Here still in the imagination: If the maxim could not be followed by a group of people, such as the lying example where if everyone told lies then no one could tell lies and so the maxim couldn't be followed insofar that everyone that's "in group" followed it -- that's what I think it means. Also, just looking at the quote, something about undermining law itself (or duty itself -- perhaps that you could come up with a metaphysic of morals that evaluates maxims, such as a utilitarian one which has some method of computing good or bad, but then this would not be an ethic of duty anymore, which is what Kant is getting at)
As long as the maxim that serves as motive for the rule can be followed by everyone then it's a candidate.
Batman's "Code Against Killing" works here. Batman doesn't kill the bad guys because killing is bad, full stop. As long as everyone followed the maxim "Don't kill", everyone could still follow the maxim "Don't kill" -- so it's permitted as a maxim. Batman does this not because it benefits him -- there are many criminals, such as the Joker, that if he'd kill Gotham would be safer. He does it out of a sense of duty (or trauma, whatever -- it's a superhero story so we can say it's duty ;) )
So to figure out if a maxim is universalizable first you'd have to have some maxim you're considering and go through this thought experiment before the tribunal of reason.
I poke fun at Kant's lying example, but @unenlightened has made the point many times over, and it is also true, that if we all adopt the maxim that everyone is lying -- that it's all propaganda -- then the lying and propaganda ceases to work because we all know that we're all making propaganda and lying to one another and so there's no point in listening. There is something deeply pro-social to the ethic, I think, even though it's framed in these individual terms (which is one of the reasons I bring up Rousseau)
I mean reformulate it how you like to fit the definition of a maxim.
Quoting Moliere
But that's the point, is that it's hard to figure out in every situation.. and since..
Quoting Moliere
...there's no objective tribunal, it's hard to tell what matters and what doesn't, and thus, it's hard to determine who is applying it correctly.
You may think being an asshole isn't universalizable, but I might think it is. And even the subject of this thread.. the Pietism for which he may have been influenced comes in mostly it seems, in the parts of his philosophy whereby he thinks we are being moral when we will ourselves out of respect of the law, which is a state that is impossible to ascertain.
Quoting Leontiskos
Could this distinction be between perfect and imperfect duties? I see imperfect duties as close to Rawls' Veil of Ignorance. What do you think?
I found this website helpful in a very brief sketch of the problems:
https://myweb.ecu.edu/mccartyr/GW/perfectandimperfectduties.asp
What would stop it from being universalizable? Surely if everyone follows the maxim "Be an asshole" that doesn't lead to self-contradiction as much as a world of assholes. This is why I think you need the 2nd, and other, formulations to start making sense of Kant's ethic as a recognizable, even common-sense, ethical theory (that is stated philosophically) -- I don't think that the other formulations logically follow from the first formulation (though they are consistent and seem to work well together, I think)
Although I'd be hesitant to put forward a maxim which references being or character or something along those lines because then it'd be difficult to distinguish it from virtue-theoretic ethics, which I think it ought be distinguished from.
I think actions are the sorts of things under consideration: So the 10 commandments come to mind, along with the imperfect duties like improving yourself which a person is given leeway to execute. They're of the form of an imperative:
"(You) Do not lie!"
"(You) Improve your talents!"
So if a person held to some maxim, which is that doing such and such is a good thing or not doing such and such is a bad thing, and it's done out of respect for the moral law rather than inclination then it is moral.
At least, this is what I would say. I'd think that for a maxim to fall to the first formulation it'd have to somehow mimic those examples where the maxim followed by an individual in a society can be followed, but if somehow everyone magically started to follow that maxim no one could follow the maxim anymore. He's going for something like a contradiction, but instead with respect to practical reason I think. So it's a logic, but now a logic of ethics.
In terms of a dispute between two decisions, well -- that'd be a split in the soul, in the case of an individual trying to make a choice. And of course choices are hard -- but that's what the power of judgment is about! :D
But my point was that maybe one cannot discern this is "a good thing". For example, if I tell myself, "Don't make the cashier go back to the register from the window to get the quarter he owes me. Let him keep the quarter because I can afford not taking the quarter and rarely use change..." Can that be universalizable? Perhaps, but then someone else can say, "No sir! That quarter, if you don't let the cashier give you the quarter when it is owed you, then it justifies not being provided one's fair share!" Or another person might say, "No sir, if everyone was to not take money they are owed, then the principle of saving and thrift would be violated, even if one can afford it!".
Now, this EXTREMELY minor, but that's the point.. Everyday living is unclear and full of contradictions and hard to discern values that often compete. Just following one version of an imperfect duty might override another version of an imperfect duty.
Now, it looks like you are prepared to say that Kant thinks that as long as we are following this imperfect duty out of respect for universal law, then it is all good. But then, how is the universalizable principle useful to tell us what to actually do? It becomes impotent. You seem to indicate that here:
Quoting Moliere
Quoting Moliere
That is the first formulation in regards to perfect duty, not imperfect duties. A lot fewer things fall under a performative contradiction. It is arguable that even the perfect duties could be interpreted rather indecently by someone who doesn't mind living in a "man eat man world", Mad-Max style, so they never thought of it as "theft" to begin with, just "might makes right". And we are at square one, because their ethic universalized would be just what they are doing.. "Come get it, bitch, or I will take what's mine!". Not decent at all!
Quoting Moliere
In fact, his notion that people should do things to maintain a society because then we wouldn't be alive to enact our free will in the first place, assumes a certain goal that doesn't seem to itself have justification. "Well don't you want to live in a society so you can carry out your ends?" can be answered, "No, not if it means that suffering exists!" And hence, antinatalism.. Ironically though, it is based on Kant's second formulation (that people have dignity), that I think the real value of a basis for ethics is defined more clearly, and is part of a basis for antinatalism. "Not causing suffering" is no longer a contradiction in regards to procreation, if we consider that the decision will affect someone.
Indeed, but then ethics is telling us very little how to act if the choices aren't really clear, but just there to make you feel better that you had a reasoning behind the decision.
But oddly enough, the Protestant background comes into play... As faith alone in the belief in Jesus is considered the height of Protestant understanding of salvation, so too does one's faith in respect for the universal law as the arbiter of "moral worth" for Kant. However, again, this might be seen as not enough, as we can never know if the decision itself was morally good, only our faith in our belief in the decision's intent.
Sure.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Not want to, it's your duty too -- even in misery, you have a duty to not commit suicide, by kant. So even if the anti-natalist demonstrates that hedonism is satisfied this will not move the deontologist who is fairly easy to imagine having a duty to preserve life, given the Christian trappings.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I don't think his ethic tells us what to actually do. That's a feature of it because it's based in human freedom. Given human freedom, these are the conditions of acting morally.
Now he'll say that most people do not act morally, but out of inclination, but hence the need for things like immortality so we may perfect ourselves into the beings we have the potential to become. "What to actually do" is up to us, insofar that we respect the moral law -- at least if we are going to act ethically according to Kant's theory of ethics.
I take it seriously as an ethic that we should understand, but I'm not defending it or anything like that. I'd say that it has a time and a place -- such as when we have principles, lines in the sand which we draw which we will not cross because that's just the right thing to do.
It's in this sense that I think it's fairly simple to understand what discerning "a good thing" is -- it's what people do because it's a good thing to do, rather than from self-interest or vice.
People will disagree on that "good thing", of course -- but still there are some people who hold principles because they think they are good, for all that. Whether they follow them or not, I believe this is the sort of thing Kant means.
About that, I think the second formulation and the "not causing suffering" go together, so can be uncoupled by the, as you say, "Christian trappings" of "preserve life".
Most deontological ethics revolve around dignity. I think autonomy, non-malfeasance, non-paternalism, etc. fall under this ethic, and leads to one that is negative ethics. A positive ethics, "We must live for X cause/objective", becomes a violation of the respect of someone's dignity.
How's that?
Suppose the maxim "Feed the hungry" -- sounds like a positive duty in that it's not limiting what one should do but is a maxim a person feels they ought perform. If everyone followed that maxim then it would not defeat itself. Where's the violation of dignity in feeding the hungry?
It's more complicated I should say. All things being equal, certainly feeding the hungry is recognizing dignity. But if you save a person after putting them into harm, that would not be recognizing dignity. So, if you could have prevented the harm to someone, but instead did things that allowed harm, so that you can justify it by taking care of the problem afterwards, that would not be respecting someone's dignity. So it is a matter of preventative over palliative if possible, not bypassing preventative with the justification of palliative.
Only if we must always have a maxim in order to make a decision -- but given that Kant believes we usually follow our inclination, rather than a moral maxim, we could just admit that there's no maxim here to making a choice.
In its application, and examples of conflict -- I think that's where we can start seeing how Kant's philosophy sets up the ideas that lead to existential themes.
I am not getting what you mean. Kant would say we follow our inclination but should follow a moral maxim.
Yeah sure, but I'm not sure that contradicts what I was saying about dignity. If you don't want to follow a maxim, don't follow a maxim.. According to Kant, that would not be moral though.
If I was to force someone into a game of unknown amounts of suffering, even if I gave them the tools that may or may not help mitigate it, and even if there were benefits from this force, it was still an unnecessary force. One would be using the other for some end, whether that is "living", "carelessness", "happiness-promotion", "legacy", or "something to do". All these other "reasons" would be indeed self-interest, or as you might say, "inclination".
That's the crux of it. There can be a lot more:
Don't cause harm, and justify it by mitigating harm if you didn't have to.
Don't assume for others what is good for them, and worth suffering for, especially without consent.
All this comes down to the second formulation of not using people.
Don't use people, disrespecting their dignity, by putting them in harmful conditions because you have positive-ethical project you would like to see carried out.
M'kay.
One thing that comes to mind is that I think of it as not merely using people. The pietism makes sense of this distinction: when, in your heart of hearts, you ask yourself if you're using people, even if you do not want to use people, you'll admit that you go to the shop keeper not because you're following a duty, but because you want to buy something for yourself. (EDIT: That is, you are using the shopkeeper, but you don't need to use him merely as a means to an end -- you can still respect his humanity)
This isn't a wrong mind -- it's just not right.
So going along with anti-natalism: if the reason you're creating a child is to use the child as a means to an end, and there is nothing more to it than that, then sure. But I think many parents feel a deeper attachment than that: they can recognize the biological inclination to continue on the species while at the same time treat their children as more than means to satisfying that biological inclination.
There are many maxims, after all.
Yes clearly I don't agree with this idea. Merely allows a LOT of leeway. But say we are granted "merely", I don't think causing (all future) harm to mitigating harm would fall under "merely", that is an agregious use.. But again, since decisions are ambiguous with Kant, my theme here seems to be popping up, that we are going to be stuck as to what counts.. I say this certainly counts as not simply "merely".. For example, I can say that I can FORCE you into a game because I think you would like it, without your consent, and you can say "Because I was thinking of YOUR interests, I can be justified". But that really does fly against autonomy, non-malfeasance, and the rest that you would think that goes with respecting someone's dignity, and not using that person. So I don't think "merely" should be used as a "do what you want" card because you can always justify anything by saying that you weren't "merely" using them...
Quoting Moliere
Sure, but the shopkeeper, of his own volition is working there, and is choosing to interact. He wasn't forced. But in a way, he was.. He was forced to be in the situation whereby he needed to find a way to live in the first place, which was unasked, and forced... Not "merely" anything.
Quoting Moliere
Indeed, but it's precisely this way of thinking that can justify doing anything in an aggressively paternalistic way towards another. I can force X upon you, because I deem it is good for you. That to me, is disrespecting an individual. There is the imposition, and then there is the negative outcome from the imposition.. In fact, TWO uses of imposition which make this a wrong.. Force-Imposition, Burden-Imposition. In this case it is the prevention of both a force-imposition AND a burden-imposition. Mitigating an already-existing set of impositions would be AFTER the initial preventative measure was bypassed and USING this notion to justify bypassing it.
Well I provided my response
I think Kant is rightly interpreted as prohibiting using others as a mere means, and I think it is a social impossibility to try to remove that word, "mere." If we remove that word then we cannot buy goods from the shopkeeper at all.
I responded that mere should not be an excuse to cause harm, by use of it as justification to do so. This is why I made a distinction between preventing and mitigating that which was not prevented. And thus, negative ethics takes precedent, unless someone is already in need of mitigation (hence how child-rearing, for example, falls under mitigation).
I don't think Kant, Moliere, or Moliere's Kant hold that "mere" can be an excuse to cause harm. No one holds that position. Your arguments here seem too bent on justifying antinatalism, and for that reason they are deviating from the topic of Kant. If we must remove the "mere" then we cannot buy from the shopkeeper, and that's crazy. The claim that such a purchase is an "excuse to cause harm," is highly implausible, even though an antinatalist might make that argument. At the very least it is an undue imputation of motive. (And if you insist on the idea that the shopkeeper consents, then consider the tourist who asks a native for directions. It's not as though every time we "burden" someone consent is involved.)
The key problem with your reliance on consent is that it is moot for Kant. For Kant you cannot use someone as a mere means even if they consent to being used as a mere means. Consent is irrelevant to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative.
Your argument here is something like, "If Kant's second formulation of the c.i. permits pronatalism, then it is false." The first problem is that this is invalid: even if antinatalism were true there could still be true moral principles that do not prohibit procreation. Not every moral principle will justify every moral conclusion. The second problem is that this is more a dispute over antinatalism than a dispute over Kant. Your argument has no force for anyone who doesn't already agree with you on antinatalism, and antinatalism is a highly controversial thesis. As I said, we already have a thread on antinatalism.
I wasn't saying that example was an example of using "mere" for justification. But of course, there are others that are more egregiously so.
Quoting Leontiskos
Well, it depends. I would contend that again, not all circumstances require preventative action. Am I disrespecting the dignity of the native by asking for directions? Well, there is one scenario where one simply says, "Excuse me sir, I need directions to X".. That would be not merely using someone. However, if I was to say, "Excuse me sir, I need directions to X, but I am giving you no choice but to help me, and don't worry, after you help me, you will thank me later for the privilege of having me force you to do so" then we are giving no "outs" for the native, and disrespecting is right to decline.
Quoting Leontiskos
Indeed, nor would I place all of a justification ONLY on consent. I usually say, violating someone's dignity...Consent is one component of that.
Quoting Leontiskos
Again, I am allowing "merely" but if it is not being an excuse to actually violate dignity... In other words, "I get to use you for X, because I have in my heart that it is good for you". That can become a slippery slope.
Quoting Leontiskos
I mean, Kant himself is highly controversial and I am trying to keep this at the level of Kant. Kant thought that lying is technically wrong no matter what, including about where your friend is when people are out to kill him, so if you think AN is controversial...
You are certainly using them as a means without their consent.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Again, the invalidity of your argument lies in confusing a prohibition with an allowance. Kant is saying, "You cannot use others as a mere means." This does not mean, "If you are not using others as a mere means, then whatever you are doing to them must necessarily be okay." It is logically impossible to use the second formulation as an excuse to act. The second formulation prohibits actions, it does not greenlight actions. I think you would see this more easily were not the planet of antinatalism exercising an undue gravitational pull on your thought.
Quoting schopenhauer1
But Kant's position on lying follows even from the "merely." When you call into question the legitimacy of the "merely" you do not soften the prohibition on lying, you significantly strengthen it. So if you think Kant's position on lying is incorrect, then a position which calls "merely" into question would be all the more incorrect.
Something that came to mind here: Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.
The quote that came to mind is about a scientifically designed society which creates hierarchies before people are born: (pdf page 6 in the link)
[hide]I shall begin at the beginning, said the D.H.C. and the more zealous students
recorded his intention in their notebooks: Begin at the beginning. These,
he waved his hand, are the incubators. And opening an insulated door he
showed them racks upon racks of numbered test-tubes. The weeks supply
of ova. Kept, he explained, at blood heat; whereas the male gametes, and
here he opened another door, they have to be kept at thirty- five instead of
thirty-seven. Full blood heat sterilizes. Rams wrapped in theremogene beget
no lambs.
Still leaning against the incubators he gave them, while the pencils scurried illegibly across the pages, a brief description of the modern fertilizing process;
spoke first, of course, of its surgical introduction- the operation undergone voluntarily for the good of Society, not to mention the fact that it carries a bonus
amounting to six months salary; continued with some account of the technique for preserving the excised ovary alive and actively developing; passed
on to a consideration of optimum temperature, salinity, viscosity; referred to
the liquor in which the detached and ripened eggs were kept; and, leading his
charges to the work tables, actually showed them how this liquor was drawn
off from the test-tubes; how it was let out drop by drop onto the specially warmed slides of the microscopes; how the eggs which it contained were inspected
for abnormalities, counted and transferred to a porous receptacle; how (and he
now took them to watch the operation) this receptacle was immersed in a warm
bouillon containing free-swimming spermatozoa-at a minimum concentration
of one hundred thousand per cubic centimetre, he insisted; and how, after ten
minutes, the container was lifted out of the liquor and its contents re-examined;
how, if any of the eggs remained unfertilized, it was again immersed, and, if
necessary, yet again; how the fertilized ova went back to the incubators; where
the Alphas and Betas remained until definitely bottled; while the Gammas, Deltas and Epsilons were brought out again, after only thirty-six hours, to undergo
Bokanovskys Process.
[/hide]
I'd say that this society violates the second formulation while maintaining the first: it's consistent, they continue on, and yet by relegating people before they are born to certain hierarchies -- even though everyone is happy -- it does not respect the humanity of people.
That, however, is a far cry from having children at all @schopenhauer1 -- I think utilitarianism, and psychological hedonism would be better friends to you than deontology, at least if you want to universalize anti-natalism (I did admit some conditions where I could, and even in my own life I can see, where having children isn't a good choice -- but the universal program is a bit much for me)
If you think it violates the second formulation, then who is being treated as a mere means? I don't quite see it, and I am thinking of the analogous situation of an arranged marriage. If parents arrange a marriage for their child, or if someone pre-selects an infant for a hierarchical role, does it follow that they are being treated as a mere means?
The difficulty is that the second formulation pertains to intention, and material acts only rarely have necessarily intentional implications of the kind that Kant is thinking of.
Well, I'd say so, yeah. I don't believe in arranged marriages or pre-destined roles for children, because I believe autonomy is more important than that.
For BNW, though, I'd say that it's at a different order than either because even with arranged marriages and roles the individual gets to choose within those confines(run away from home, get a divorce, use the role to their ends rather than to their parents as a king, whatever). What's happening in BNW is that the reproductive cells are being planned to produce people who will fit within different roles within a planned society -- so the Gammas that are needed for menial tasks are produced in a vat to push the elevator up or down and be happy with their position in life.
Building people to fit within a social structure seems to me to violate the general notions of autonomy that are valorized in Kant's ethic.
But I think we are talking about the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, not autonomy. I grant that an arranged marriage infringes autonomy.
Added in an edit:
Quoting Leontiskos
In one sense treating others to become better, for instance, is to treat them as means to an end: to the end of virtue. Even if they would, in fact, be better, we wouldn't be respecting them as end-makers if we manipulated them into being good, regardless.
Basically, autonomy, as I see it, is part of the second formulation. I don't think it would only apply when when someone is acting on a maxim? Though then perhaps I'm just being more expansive with the notion than you'd be.
For example, the arranged marriage infringes autonomy but does not necessarily result in the case of a mere means. I assume that Kant's "means to an end" is a means to my (selfish) ends. So if I give someone an apple am I treating them as a means? Well, if they are a slave and the apple is merely meant to nourish them to better serve me, then yes. But if the apple is intended for their own intrinsic good, then no. I don't have to ask them if they desire nourishment before I can legitimately give the apple. As long as I think it will serve them in themselves apart from any motive on my part, it is not treating them as a mere means.
Quoting Moliere
I have all along been uncomfortable with this language of "respecting them as ends-makers," because this is a reduction of the second formulation to autonomy. Obviously that is part of the second formulation, but I want to say that it is not the entirety of it. If it were entirely a matter of respecting them as ends-makers then I really would have to place their autonomy on a very high pedestal. This would be a rather significant, albeit interesting, deviation from Christianity. Is there textual warrant in Kant that the second formulation should be interpreted this way?
Quoting Leontiskos
As far as I recall, Kant follows Christianity in claiming that one can fail to treat oneself as an end in oneself, and this would seem to undo the autonomy thesis. If it were just a matter of autonomy then treating oneself poorly would be impossible.
Nothing super direct comes to mind, other than "treating them as an end unto themselves" and noting how individual freedom is central -- as in a category of reason -- for moral thinking in Kant.
Since I can choose my ends, I have to recognize that others can do so as well.
Also, something Rawls points out, deontology is a literal lack of a goal: so to treat someone so that they fulfill a goal would be to violate them.
****
There are times, of course, that we do this -- for the betterment of the person, even, and especially with children.
Still -- I'd say arranged marriages are just a bit much (as a USian), and generally I think that childhood autonomy is undervalued in our society. For the most part, yeah, I'd say that the emphasis on autonomy is at least a partial deviation from Christianity -- though there are strains in Christianity which emphasize the importance of choice, too.
If you force someone to church that doesn't mean they really believe in Christ, for instance. What's important is that they actually assent, in their heart of hearts, not the goal of "Increase church membership"
But that's my point, dear Leontiskos, that negative ethics take priority! One doesn't violate the negative ethics to promote some welfare creating one.
Quoting Leontiskos
I am not necessarily denying the "merely", but simply saying that the application can be quite tricky. That is to say, if I create conditions for someone else's suffering, justifying it by some cause, in what way is that not using someone? And if you say, it is, but they are not merely using someone, how is that not a slippery slope? If I beat someone to make them stronger, and then at the end of it, they indeed are stronger, am I not violating their dignity? Well, you might say "No, because it is not MERELY using them" that is simply "USING THEM", as indeed, I can always say that I was looking out for them by way of initially harming them..
But you will protest, but then that is my point... that WHERE to draw the line of "MERELY" is tricky.
If suffering is given a priority and is tied into not using people as a mere means to an end, then it certainly can be deontological to not cause unnecessary suffering. Think about it.. All justified harm to someone is MITIGATING whilst unnecessary harm causes it for no reason necessary FOR THE PERSON (or potential person) IN QUESTION.
That is to say, to create someone who will suffer unnecessarily is to use them as a means for something other than the person. As the person wasn't even there to begin with.
You almost understand my AN ethic.. That is to say, to create someone who will suffer unnecessarily is to use them as a means for something other than the person. As the person wasn't even there to begin with.
Again, my point.
And in any case, while AN isn't self-contradictory, if you're to respect the autonomy of other human beings you have to let them make their own choices under deontology, which would include having children. (it's not like that's self-contradictory... )
There are circumstances where I can imagine having a child violates the 2nd formulation -- say that you decide to have a child to save a marriage. That would be something where I can see how the child isn't being thought of at all, but is a solution to a problem: a marriage. That seems to violate the second formulation.
But I'm not seeing it for all birth. Sometimes people have children because they want their child to have a better life than they had, for instance -- they care about the child as an individual. In those circumstances I'm just not seeing how you could make the case.
Im sorry, but I just dont get that. A maxim is a subjective principle; how do we will a principle?
The will is the faculty of right action, or, volition. I can see acting on a principle, or in accordance with a principle, but I dont see the willing of one.
In the lines just before your quote, is this ..
. As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion .
..in which, to my understanding, just says the will is properly served iff one acts only in conformity to law in general universally, or, which is the same thing, without impulse from inclination or regard to consequence.
Notice as well, he says we will THAT our maxims, which just seems to indicate it is already presupposed.
Its the little things, donchaknow. Our maxim is to act in a certain way, to will THAT our maxim is obtained, is to will a certain act, which makes much more sense within the theory as a whole.
Dunno ..maybe its just me. What say you?
So to rephrase more properly with this in mind:
Quoting Mww
Individuals act on principles, or in accordance with a principle would be the same thing as I meant there. The contrast was -- can Everybody act in volition with a principle? Can I act in a manner that makes everyone act? It doesn't seem so to me. We'll want others, oftentimes, to follow our maxims, but the actual calculus isn't of the sort where if everyone is not following the maxim, for instance, I shouldn't -- it's the individual, rather than the group, that's more important in thinking through whether a maxim can be universalized, or an act is moral. (Or, really, it's the philosopher contemplating the individual)
That would be a strawman to what I am saying as I never said that someone's choice should be limited here, so not sure why this part is necessary to include.
Quoting Moliere
Because of the what I have been repetitively saying now- that causing known/unknown conditions for suffering, EVEN FOR THE GOAL of some positive ethic (happiness, etc.) is still causing those known/unknown conditions of harm that could have been prevented. And which is why I made the distinction with preventative to palliative. So my claim of how I am looking at violating the 2nd formulation is that if you overlook or BYPASS the preventative of suffering, to in fact cause the very conditions that someone will suffer, SO THAT you can follow through with a project, EVEN IF FOR THE CHILD, it is still using in such a way, even with the caveat of "merely" as a means, in fact, duly so because there is no way to cause the suffering that must then be mitigated, as it is known that suffering will occur. In other words, you cannot justify preventing suffering (or actively promoting it even), in the justification that later, you can MITIGATE it for someone.
You can swing back at me with general child-rearing or government actions, but I already addressed that with palliative versus preventative, and government I'd rather not discuss as much as its a category error to apply it to personal ethics, but even if so, go back again to palliative and preventative.
I think a hedonic ethic or a utilitarian ethic or a consequentialist ethic will serve AN better. Not that you couldn't put AN into deontology -- here you are doing it -- but others will have different maxims from you, and part of deontology is respecting others' choices.
You want an ethic that lets you tell when others are wrong, but deontology is more about the self choosing actions, I think. It's only in the eyes of God that we could tell if someone is right or wrong, but we only have the eyes of a human.
I mean again, Kant thought not lying to a killer was appropriate if one was to be truly moral, assuming with a straight face, so I guess any philosophy can be deemed so...
Quoting Moliere
But ironically, it is the duty to prevent life that would do this (presumably not doing so would fail to prevent the suffering that could have been easily prevented. Not like losing limb for country, or um, not lying to a killer).
Quoting Moliere
And I agree it works on multiple grounds.. It works on negative rule utilitarian grounds. It does not work on totalizing/classic utilitarian grounds, or rather, if it does, it leads to contradictions. I also just don't believe those types of ethics are actually "moral", as I think it conflicts with basic deontological considerations which I am laying out here.
Quoting Moliere
Granted, which is why I think the freedom to choose is part of deontological considerations.
Oh absolutely. Its those cursed turns of phrases in the Kantian corpus that instigates his successors to find contradictions. The most infamous being that gawd-awful noumena/phenomena thing. (Sigh)
Anyway, ever onward.
Quoting Moliere
Agreed. Given the possession of practical reason by humanity in general, then, all else being equal, each member would be individually conditioned by it with respect to his moral disposition, as long as it is the case practical reason is sufficient for the job, which, of course, the Esteemed Professor sought long and hard to prove.
The c.i. merely stipulates the necessary criterion for the worthiness of being happy, from which follows that disregard for it, is to be immoral, which is nothing more than even if some action willfully determined from your own version of pure practical reason makes you happy, you damned sure didnt deserve to be. Youve disrespected something along the line, perhaps without even knowing what it was. Or, which is more commonly witnessed, given human nature itself, one does know, but acts in disregard anyway. Either way, we all recognize this feeling we get from one or the other, hence the two primaries .pleasure or pain.
Excellent dialectical theme youve created here; I appreciate the thought-provoking aspect, even without total mutual accord.
Okay, then I am more comfortable in my claim that you are misinterpreting Kant. From my edit:
Quoting Leontiskos
As far as I recall, Kant follows Christianity in claiming that one can fail to treat oneself as an end in oneself, and this would seem to undo the autonomy thesis. If it were just a matter of autonomy then treating oneself poorly would be impossible.
-
The key here is that it is not legitimate to reduce "treat them as an end in themselves" to "treat them as an ends-maker." Those are not the same thing for Kant. The latter does not exhaust the former. Just because we are treating someone as an ends-maker does not mean that we are treating them as an end in themselves. The specific emphasis on autonomy and ends-making comes later, and I would argue that if taken too far is a strong deviation from Kant.
(Hence, in the arranged marriage, the parents are failing to treat the betrothed as ends-makers, but they are not necessarily failing to treat them as ends in themselves.)
Because it does not justify acts. Kant is not greenlighting, he is prohibiting. You've missed this point two times now.
Quoting schopenhauer1
But this is the metabasis, which you appeal to when it suits your argument and ignore when it cuts against it. The fact that "the person wasn't even there to begin with" is what makes the whole antinatalist project so logically out of kilter.
---
Quoting Moliere
I agree.
Quoting Moliere
It is goofy, and @schopenhauer1 is ignoring arguments in the antinatalism thread whilst arguing antinatalism in a thread on Kant. For example, his reasoning results in absurd consequences:
Quoting Leontiskos
Im not ignoring anything. But Ill look at the rest
Makes it unique, but not out of kilter.
I answered your hypothetical
Oh it wouldn't be the first time ;). And it wouldn't surprise me that my memories are off -- I through this in the lounge for that reason. I didn't feel like doing the deep work :D -- but I wanted to think through the ethics a bit.
Quoting Leontiskos
My memory on that claim is that it was with respect to masturbation, which always made me kind of shrug at that claim -- though, yes, that definitely fits with his Christian heritage. It may be here that this is what previously was raising feathers : I can acknowledge the Christian heritage, but at what point are we talking about Kant, the man, and Kant's philosophy, as intended, and Kant's philosophy, as written.
That was one of his examples I always sort of put to the side as worthless, though I could see the case being made for, say, substance abuse -- I don't think that's respecting yourself as an end (not sure if it would be a universalizable maxim, that one)
Though respecting someone as an ends-maker wouldn't entail, I don't think, that autonomy makes right or something -- rather, it is right to respect autonomy. It's a pretty important feature of the ethic, I think, though I agree that there would be times where just because someone says they choose something that then they are morally good or something like that. (EDIT:...is not a claim to morality)
You'd have to go through the process of reflection.
And that's where it gets hard to really apply the ethic to others. How can you reflect for someone else whether they are following a maxim?
One thing I don't think the ethic handles well is disparity in power. Kant doesn't really talk about children at all -- are they born with the categories? Do the categories become more apparent as they develop? When are they rational beings?
But I agree there's more to it than just because someone chooses something, or something along those lines, as I said above.
That's interesting. I had never put together that freedom could act as a kind of limit to practical reason, just as metaphysics is a limit for theoretical reason. Though I'm not sure it's strictly Kant as this point, it's still an interesting parallel!
Two things here...
Isn't Kant's philosophy predicated on a "free will"? So that being said, having the maximum playing field to enact one's will freely, would seem to be entailed for this to be played out, no?
For example, a highly totalitarian society might not allow enough freedom of choice for one to even make a free will decision in regards to various personal decisions...
Also, my deontology isn't strictly Kantian-based, though I think most modern deontology is inspired by his framework... Intent/autonomy/rights/dignity/not being used, etc..
Thanks :).
No need for total mutual accord, at least I don't demand it. It's pretty hard with the greats. And don't be shy -- say wherever and however you wish to disagree. I don't bite, though if questioned I'll give a quote or admit I don't know :D
Quoting schopenhauer1
Freedom is central to his ethics, but I don't think there's a maximization function -- that sounds a bit more like utilitarianism, and I'd be hesitant to reduce it all to free will: there's things like duty, respect, humanity, rationality that are all in play. Plus the religious background, at least so I've been saying (though where to draw the line...)
Quoting schopenhauer1
Sure. I'm not really presenting my direct ethical view, though it's not like I don't feel empathy for Kant's view at times -- but I don't think it's as universal as he'd like it to be. I think it's more of a time-and-place thing, like I do of all the normative theories.
Okay. :up:
Quoting Moliere
Er, I think it's much more than a one-off. Examples include masturbation, suicide, treatment of animals, and self-mutilation, but the deeper point is that an ends-maker is not necessarily an end in themselves. This is actually a big problem in our culture as far as I'm concerned: autonomy is maximized and dignity (of oneself or others) is minimized. There is no reason why I must treat an ends-maker as an end in themselves, as these are two distinct concepts. I think our motivation to do so has more to do with modern political philosophy than morality or Kant.
Quoting Moliere
Why is it right to respect autonomy?
Again, if I treat someone as a mere means then I am not respecting their autonomy, but if I fail to respect their autonomy it does not follow that I am treating them as a mere means (or that I am failing to treat them as an end in themselves). Perhaps more crucially, by respecting someone's autonomy it does not follow that I am treating them as an end in themselves. It only follows that I am not using them as a mere means. Libertarian indifference to others is a good example of this sort of thing.
Quoting Moliere
By considering the consistency of their actions.
Quoting Moliere
True.
Here is a logical presentation of the greenlight/prohibition distinction, which I tried to add in an edit but apparently did not get added:
You are committing the fallacy of denying the antecedent:
You'd have to qualify this again in context. Perhaps I wasn't really addressing your objection.
But I'd say we can move this to the other thread as I addressed you there, and actually have more to add so going to do that...