A Reversion to Aristotle
Modern society is decaying; and this decay is a direct result of moral anti-realism. It is hard to say why moral anti-realism has caught wind like wild fire, but I would hypothesize it is substantially influenced by Nietzschien thought.
With this moral anti-realism, society slowly loses its ability to function rationally (since it has cut out The Good from its inquiry) and begins to cause people to damage themselves in the name of you-do-you!. As Nietzsche rightly pointed out: All of us are no longer material for a society (The Gay Science, Book V, p. 304).
The form of moral anti-realism taking prominence, is this Nietzschien kind. Not only is it bad for a human to think they can acquire happiness through fulfilling their desires but this sort of thought leads to the crumbling of society into arbitrary, narcissistic power-struggles. None of which is good for people.
Interestingly enough, aristotelian ethics provides anecdotes to many of the issues emerging as an effect of this Nietzschien thought; and, therefore, I suggest society by-at-large goes back to aristotles ideas (for the most part) to live a better life. I would like to take this post to elaborate on some of the key aspects of his ethics, of which can greatly help the populace better live their lives (than this common, Nietzschien alternative).
Teleology
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action as well as choice, is held to aim at some good (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Ch. 1, p. 1)
The first key element of aristotelian ethics, is looking upon everything in life through the lens of telos and seeing the good as things living up thereto. A good eye is an eye that can see well; a good clock is one that can tell the time well; etc.
People get way too entrenched in their radical individualism these days, and this causes them to damage themselves irreversibly in the name of fulfilling their desires (all the while thinking they are contributing to their own happiness). If people were constantly, instead, thinking about how they could fulfill their nature (as a human being) then they would be able to better navigate their lives to secure a deep and persistent sense of happiness.
Now, there is a common objection to this sort of thinking which I address later on. For now, I will comment that I think that everything should be viewed through the lens of telos as it relates to well-being (i.e., eudamonia) and not just telos simpliciter; but Aristotle, on the contrary, accepts a stronger version of teleology than I would (whereof everything has a purpose towards what is ultimately good, as per the dictations of the Nous).
Eudaimonia
Happiness [eudaimonia] appears to be something complete and self-sufficient, it being an end of our actions (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Ch. 7, p. 12)
The chief good for a human being is to be a eudaimon (viz., to embody the chief good [for human beings] of eudamonia [i.e., of a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being]); and this is the most persistently satisfying and deeply rewarding pursuit a person can endeavor on. Everything else is, if it does not relate somehow thereto, a mere distraction.
People seem to have a sense that happiness is key to a good life; but seem to be utterly confused on how to achieve it nowadays: they seem to think it has to do with being radically individualistic and/or hedonisticit doesnt.
Now, there is an objection worth noting that, prima facie, the pursuit of ones own happiness, and that being the chief good, seems pretty narcissistic. I will address that later hereon.
Virtue
So it must be stated that every virtue both brings that of which it is the virtue into a good condition and causes the work belonging to that thing to be done well. For example, the virtue of the eye makes both the eye and its work excellent, for by means of the virtue of the eye, we see well...If indeed this is so in all cases, then the virtue of a human being too would be that characteristic as a result of which a human being becomes good and as a result of which he causes his own work to be done well. (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch. 6, p. 33)
The happy [eudemian] life also seems to be accord with virtue, and this is the life that seems to be accompanied by seriousness but not to consist in play...If happiness [eudaimonia] is an activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable that it would accord with the most excellent virtue, and this would be the virtue belonging to what is best (Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 6-7, p. 223)
A key aspect of living well for a human being (and, arguably, any member of a rational kind) is living a (morally and intellectually) virtuous life; but it is important to note that, for Aristotle, virtue is not a morally-loaded term. For Aristotle, virtue is a sort of excellence which is relative to the subject, craft, etc. in question; whereas moral virtue is the subtype of virtue which is about moral excellencei.e., doing well at being moral. It can be seen more clearly now that a person who wants to fulfill their nature must excel in every regard to that nature (i.e., must be virtuous); and a part of this is being moral, as morality pertains fundamentally to how to act best in accordance with what is good.
Being vs. Doing
moral virtue is the result of habit...[and] none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature, since nothing that exists by nature is habituated to be other than it is (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch. 1, p. 26)
An important distinction in Aristotles ethics, which is largely ignored in modern times, is the difference between doing something and being something: the former is a mere action related to that something, whereas the latter is an embodiment of that something (viz., is a way of living which best exemplifies that something). I am not thereby a healthy person by doing something that is healthy; and, likewise, I am not thereby a good person by doing something that is good. Being good, healthy, etc. is about cultivating habits of character which best align with, that best embody, what is good, healthy, etc.
People very often think they are a good person for merely forcing themselves to do something good (when they could have chosen not to); when, in reality, they are not a good person if they have to fight their own impulses to do the right thing.
Principle of the Mean
Virue, therefore, is a characteristic marked by choice, residing in the mean relative to us, a characteristic defined by reason and as the prudent person would define it. Virtue is also a mean with respect to two vices, the one vice related to excess, the other to deficiency (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch.6, p. 35)
Moral virtue, which pertains to right and wrong behavior, is, according to Aristotle, all about cultivating the mean habit out of two extremesfor this will best help a person live a well principled life via reason. For example, the mean between niceness and meanness is kindness; and the mean between cowardice and rashness is courageousness. These are (moral) virtues exactly because they are, with respect to their topics of behavior, the most well-regulated (with reason) habits of character; whereas the (moral) vices are vicious exactly because they are the passions overtaking reason and causing the person to live a poorly-regulated life.
People tend, nowadays, to think that happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains; but this couldnt be further from the truth: living a well-regulated lifei.e., a morally virtuous lifeis going to give one a deep and persistent sense of happiness.
Objection 1: What Telos?
A common objection to Aristotelian ethics is that there are no good reasons to believe in telos. Afterall, nature is an ever-going process of evolutionso wheres the telos?
Firstly, Aristotle believed in God (i.e., the Nous) and so, for him, there is telos in everything. However, I think with the advancements in science (such as evolution) we do need to give a more adequate response than Aristotle has in his works.
There are two types of telos: strong and weak. The former is purpose endowed by an agent (whether that be God or a human or what not), whereas the latter is purpose endowed by an non-agent. My house has strong telos, because it was developed and designed by human beings for the purpose of shelter and housing. Whereas my eye was not, at least for my fellow naturalists, not designed by any agent but, rather, underwent (and is undergoing) a process of evolution; however, this does not negate the fact that my eye is designed to see (and in a particular kind of way) and, consequently, it has a weak form of telos.
At worst, the answer to this objection is to note that the kinds of telos which the objector is finding missing is really weak teleology or not relevant to living a good life (because it does not relate to well-being).
At best, one could accept a form of theism that gets around this objection.
Objection 2: Fails the Is-Ought Gap Test
Aristotle never addresses the is-ought gap because, quite frankly, it wasnt considered an issue back then; but, for us in the modern era, we do need to at least address it.
The is-ought gap objection would go something like this: it seems as though that one should fulfill their nature does not follow immediately from the fact that one needs to fulfill their nature to achieve happiness; and so it seems as though Aristotle is just appealing to obviousness to justify what is good being a thing fulfilling its nature.
Because I happen to think the is-ought gap is a force to be reckoned with, I actually think Aristotles original positions falls prey to the is-ought gap and, thusly, this objection prima facie succeeds. However, I think Aristotelian ethics can be salvaged quite easily: what is good is what is (positively) intrinsically valuable, and what is the most (positively) intrinsically valuable is well-being in the deepest, richest, and most persistent sense. If this is true, then the fact that one should fulfill their nature follows validly from them needing to fulfill their nature to achieve eudamonia.
Objection 3: Narcissism
The third most common objection is that Aristotelian ethics instructs people to care about other people only insofar as it relates to them achieving their own happiness; which is morally counter-intuitive since it is incredibly narcissistic.
Aristotles response sort of bites the bullet (so to speak), by accepting that one should only care about people as it relates to their own happiness but that rational creatures cannot achieve happiness (in a supreme sense) without caring about other people.
I would say, contrary to Aristotle, that the moral person cares about what is good indiscriminately and, consequently, should care about the well-being of all living beings (even though they may have to prioritize some over others pragmatically but yet still in an unbiased fashion). There is no need, under my view, to paradoxically collapse narcissism into altruism in my interpretation of Aristotelian thought.
Thoughts?
With this moral anti-realism, society slowly loses its ability to function rationally (since it has cut out The Good from its inquiry) and begins to cause people to damage themselves in the name of you-do-you!. As Nietzsche rightly pointed out: All of us are no longer material for a society (The Gay Science, Book V, p. 304).
The form of moral anti-realism taking prominence, is this Nietzschien kind. Not only is it bad for a human to think they can acquire happiness through fulfilling their desires but this sort of thought leads to the crumbling of society into arbitrary, narcissistic power-struggles. None of which is good for people.
Interestingly enough, aristotelian ethics provides anecdotes to many of the issues emerging as an effect of this Nietzschien thought; and, therefore, I suggest society by-at-large goes back to aristotles ideas (for the most part) to live a better life. I would like to take this post to elaborate on some of the key aspects of his ethics, of which can greatly help the populace better live their lives (than this common, Nietzschien alternative).
Teleology
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action as well as choice, is held to aim at some good (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Ch. 1, p. 1)
The first key element of aristotelian ethics, is looking upon everything in life through the lens of telos and seeing the good as things living up thereto. A good eye is an eye that can see well; a good clock is one that can tell the time well; etc.
People get way too entrenched in their radical individualism these days, and this causes them to damage themselves irreversibly in the name of fulfilling their desires (all the while thinking they are contributing to their own happiness). If people were constantly, instead, thinking about how they could fulfill their nature (as a human being) then they would be able to better navigate their lives to secure a deep and persistent sense of happiness.
Now, there is a common objection to this sort of thinking which I address later on. For now, I will comment that I think that everything should be viewed through the lens of telos as it relates to well-being (i.e., eudamonia) and not just telos simpliciter; but Aristotle, on the contrary, accepts a stronger version of teleology than I would (whereof everything has a purpose towards what is ultimately good, as per the dictations of the Nous).
Eudaimonia
Happiness [eudaimonia] appears to be something complete and self-sufficient, it being an end of our actions (Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Ch. 7, p. 12)
The chief good for a human being is to be a eudaimon (viz., to embody the chief good [for human beings] of eudamonia [i.e., of a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being]); and this is the most persistently satisfying and deeply rewarding pursuit a person can endeavor on. Everything else is, if it does not relate somehow thereto, a mere distraction.
People seem to have a sense that happiness is key to a good life; but seem to be utterly confused on how to achieve it nowadays: they seem to think it has to do with being radically individualistic and/or hedonisticit doesnt.
Now, there is an objection worth noting that, prima facie, the pursuit of ones own happiness, and that being the chief good, seems pretty narcissistic. I will address that later hereon.
Virtue
So it must be stated that every virtue both brings that of which it is the virtue into a good condition and causes the work belonging to that thing to be done well. For example, the virtue of the eye makes both the eye and its work excellent, for by means of the virtue of the eye, we see well...If indeed this is so in all cases, then the virtue of a human being too would be that characteristic as a result of which a human being becomes good and as a result of which he causes his own work to be done well. (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch. 6, p. 33)
The happy [eudemian] life also seems to be accord with virtue, and this is the life that seems to be accompanied by seriousness but not to consist in play...If happiness [eudaimonia] is an activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable that it would accord with the most excellent virtue, and this would be the virtue belonging to what is best (Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, Ch. 6-7, p. 223)
A key aspect of living well for a human being (and, arguably, any member of a rational kind) is living a (morally and intellectually) virtuous life; but it is important to note that, for Aristotle, virtue is not a morally-loaded term. For Aristotle, virtue is a sort of excellence which is relative to the subject, craft, etc. in question; whereas moral virtue is the subtype of virtue which is about moral excellencei.e., doing well at being moral. It can be seen more clearly now that a person who wants to fulfill their nature must excel in every regard to that nature (i.e., must be virtuous); and a part of this is being moral, as morality pertains fundamentally to how to act best in accordance with what is good.
Being vs. Doing
moral virtue is the result of habit...[and] none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature, since nothing that exists by nature is habituated to be other than it is (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch. 1, p. 26)
An important distinction in Aristotles ethics, which is largely ignored in modern times, is the difference between doing something and being something: the former is a mere action related to that something, whereas the latter is an embodiment of that something (viz., is a way of living which best exemplifies that something). I am not thereby a healthy person by doing something that is healthy; and, likewise, I am not thereby a good person by doing something that is good. Being good, healthy, etc. is about cultivating habits of character which best align with, that best embody, what is good, healthy, etc.
People very often think they are a good person for merely forcing themselves to do something good (when they could have chosen not to); when, in reality, they are not a good person if they have to fight their own impulses to do the right thing.
Principle of the Mean
Virue, therefore, is a characteristic marked by choice, residing in the mean relative to us, a characteristic defined by reason and as the prudent person would define it. Virtue is also a mean with respect to two vices, the one vice related to excess, the other to deficiency (Nichomachean Ethics, Book II, Ch.6, p. 35)
Moral virtue, which pertains to right and wrong behavior, is, according to Aristotle, all about cultivating the mean habit out of two extremesfor this will best help a person live a well principled life via reason. For example, the mean between niceness and meanness is kindness; and the mean between cowardice and rashness is courageousness. These are (moral) virtues exactly because they are, with respect to their topics of behavior, the most well-regulated (with reason) habits of character; whereas the (moral) vices are vicious exactly because they are the passions overtaking reason and causing the person to live a poorly-regulated life.
People tend, nowadays, to think that happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains; but this couldnt be further from the truth: living a well-regulated lifei.e., a morally virtuous lifeis going to give one a deep and persistent sense of happiness.
Objection 1: What Telos?
A common objection to Aristotelian ethics is that there are no good reasons to believe in telos. Afterall, nature is an ever-going process of evolutionso wheres the telos?
Firstly, Aristotle believed in God (i.e., the Nous) and so, for him, there is telos in everything. However, I think with the advancements in science (such as evolution) we do need to give a more adequate response than Aristotle has in his works.
There are two types of telos: strong and weak. The former is purpose endowed by an agent (whether that be God or a human or what not), whereas the latter is purpose endowed by an non-agent. My house has strong telos, because it was developed and designed by human beings for the purpose of shelter and housing. Whereas my eye was not, at least for my fellow naturalists, not designed by any agent but, rather, underwent (and is undergoing) a process of evolution; however, this does not negate the fact that my eye is designed to see (and in a particular kind of way) and, consequently, it has a weak form of telos.
At worst, the answer to this objection is to note that the kinds of telos which the objector is finding missing is really weak teleology or not relevant to living a good life (because it does not relate to well-being).
At best, one could accept a form of theism that gets around this objection.
Objection 2: Fails the Is-Ought Gap Test
Aristotle never addresses the is-ought gap because, quite frankly, it wasnt considered an issue back then; but, for us in the modern era, we do need to at least address it.
The is-ought gap objection would go something like this: it seems as though that one should fulfill their nature does not follow immediately from the fact that one needs to fulfill their nature to achieve happiness; and so it seems as though Aristotle is just appealing to obviousness to justify what is good being a thing fulfilling its nature.
Because I happen to think the is-ought gap is a force to be reckoned with, I actually think Aristotles original positions falls prey to the is-ought gap and, thusly, this objection prima facie succeeds. However, I think Aristotelian ethics can be salvaged quite easily: what is good is what is (positively) intrinsically valuable, and what is the most (positively) intrinsically valuable is well-being in the deepest, richest, and most persistent sense. If this is true, then the fact that one should fulfill their nature follows validly from them needing to fulfill their nature to achieve eudamonia.
Objection 3: Narcissism
The third most common objection is that Aristotelian ethics instructs people to care about other people only insofar as it relates to them achieving their own happiness; which is morally counter-intuitive since it is incredibly narcissistic.
Aristotles response sort of bites the bullet (so to speak), by accepting that one should only care about people as it relates to their own happiness but that rational creatures cannot achieve happiness (in a supreme sense) without caring about other people.
I would say, contrary to Aristotle, that the moral person cares about what is good indiscriminately and, consequently, should care about the well-being of all living beings (even though they may have to prioritize some over others pragmatically but yet still in an unbiased fashion). There is no need, under my view, to paradoxically collapse narcissism into altruism in my interpretation of Aristotelian thought.
Thoughts?
Comments (169)
Quoting Bob Ross
Quoting Bob Ross
I think Aristotle's mean is very important. People think happiness is about chasing pleasures and avoiding pains, but they also fail to observe the mean in explicitly moral thinking. For example, I was recently having a discussion with Joshs over his idea that all blame/culpability should be eradicated from society (link). This is a common contemporary trope, "Blame/culpability is bad, therefore we should go to the extreme of getting rid of it altogether" (Joshs takes the culturally popular route of saying that everyone is always doing their very best, and therefore it is illogical to blame anyone for anything).
For Aristotle it is never that simple. We can't just run to the extreme and call it a day. Things like blame and anger will involve a mean, and because of this there will be appropriate and inappropriate forms of blame and anger. The key is learning to blame and become angry when we ought to blame and become angry, and learning not to blame and become angry when we ought not blame and become angry.
Quoting Bob Ross
More simply, the objection asks why one ought to want to be happy. For Aristotle this is sophistry. Humans do want to be happy, just as fish do want to be in the water. It's just the way we are. "We don't necessarily want to be happy," is nothing more than a debater's argument.
How so? What makes you think this?
Yes, moral anti-realism is the total reason why an extremely complex, changing world is in a dumpster fire compared to the halcyon days of old (that never really existed) even though the world is ironically probably in a place of greater moral awareness than for the great majority of its history.
That society is in moral decline is a common illusion (https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06137-x). Every generation thinks this.
If you are going to make a case for a change in moral thinking based on the idea that society's morals are in decline, you need to prove that they actually are. I for one don't believe it, and I've been around for over 70 years. There are good, bad and indifferent people in every generation, and that's just how the human race is.
Yes. It is odd how an appeal to a lost age cancels the argument of what is essential to being human by insisting upon the force that brings about its demise. I am stunned by the logic before weighing it against facts.
:sweat: Maybe diagnosed, certainly not "influenced" ...
:100:
:up: :up:
The is-ought gap comes from asking theoretical reason to do practical reason's job. It's a category error from the older perspective; practical reason, whose target is the Good is what motivates us to act. This doesn't work for the modern perspective, which is fundamentaly uncomfortable with conciousness and tries to sequester it. This is because it isn't reducible to mechanism and because this would seem to keep the human sphere "free" as everything else is reduced to mechanism.
This is why so often today you see people trying to define the Good in terms of what people prefer/enjoy. The classical way to look at things would be to say: "people want what is good. When someone does x, they are seeking some good (even if it is a relative or counterfeit good)." Nowadays, you get something like "x is good because people are seeking it."
Why the inversion? It's the elimination or demotion of practical reason. Why people act has to be explained in terms of truth, either the theories of the social sciences or, as often, a mechanistic account based on the natural sciences is desired. Goodness still finds its way in, e.g. the black box of "utility" in economics, but its subservient to theory.
I've never come across the third objection. It seems quite at odds with Aristotle's philosophy. It makes it sound like Aristotle is talking about some "rational agent's" incentives to do whatever maximizes his or her "utility," not unlike Hume. If this were true, the same criticism MacIntyre levels against Hume would hold: "we should be good, pro-social, etc. just in those cases where it benefits us." But for Aristotle happiness always includes other people. Man is the "political animal." Happiness is a life in accordance with the virtues, which in turn precludes narcissism or selfishness.
In the Ethics he talks about the three levels of friendship. It is the first that is narcissisticbeing friends with someone for what they can give you. The second stage involves mutual pleasure. The third is enjoying someone due to the good we see in themenjoying that good for its own sake (there is a clear similarity here with Plato's description of love as "giving birth in beauty" within another). And this sort of non-self interested friendship is key to a good life. "Without a friend no one would want to live, even if possessing all good."
For Aristotle the human good is inextricably bound up in the polis as well.
[Quote]
The most choiceworthy life, on Aristotles view, is a pattern of activity that fully engages and expresses the rational parts of human nature. This pattern of activity is a pattern of joint activity because, like a play, it has various interdependent parts that can only be realized by the members of a group together. The pattern is centered on an array of leisured activities that are valuable in themselves, including philosophy, mathematics, art and music. But the pattern also includes the activity of coordinating the social effort to engage in leisured activities (i.e., statesmanship) and various supporting activities, such as the education of citizens and the management of resources.
On Aristotles view, a properly ordered society will have an array of material, cultural and institutional facilities that answer to the common interest of citizens in living the most choiceworthy life. These facilities form an environment in which citizens can engage in leisured activities and in which they can perform the various coordinating and supporting activities. Some facilities that figure into Aristotles account include: common mess halls and communal meals, which provide occasions for leisured activities (Pol. 1330a110; 1331a1925); a communal system of education (Pol. 1337a2030); common land (Pol. 1330a914); commonly owned slaves to work the land (Pol. 1330a303); a shared set of political offices (Pol. 1276a403; 1321b12a10) and administrative buildings (Pol. 1331b511); shared weapons and fortifications (Pol. 1328b611; 1331a918); and an official system priests, temples and public sacrifices (Pol. 1322b1728).
Aristotles account may seem distant from modern sensibilities, but a good analogy for what he has in mind is the form of community that we associate today with certain universities. Think of a college like Princeton or Harvard. Members of the university community are bound together in a social relationship marked by a certain form of mutual concern: members care that they and their fellow members live well, where living well is understood in terms of taking part in a flourishing university life. This way of life is organized around intellectual, cultural and athletic activities, such as physics, art history, lacrosse, and so on. Members work together to maintain an array of facilities that serve their common interest in taking part in this joint activity (e.g., libraries, computer labs, dorm rooms, football fields, etc.). And we can think of public life in the university community in terms of a form of shared practical reasoning that most members engage in, which focuses on maintaining common facilities for the sake of their common interest.[14] [/quote]
Well this is the big counterpoint to any thesis about modern "moral decay," e.g. MacIntyre's After Virtue. Violent crime is way down in Europe and the US. Wars kill a vastly smaller share of the population than in prior eras. New technologies have offered us all sorts of new opportunities. We each can carry the world's libraries around with us in our pockets, and even have texts read to us at will.
However, I do think this has to be weighed against other factors like the surge in suicides and "deaths of despair," as well as plummeting self-reported well being. Then there is declining membership in pretty much all sorts of social institutions, marriage, etc. Hell, even the age old past time of having sex or being in romantic relationships is plummeting, especially for the young. And then you have the political climate, which at least here in the US is arguably as bad as it has been since the Depression, even if it hasn't been particularly violent (yet...).
Plus, you have the long term moral import of climate change, ocean acidification, etc. hanging over us.
I am less sanguine about "every generation says the world is going to hell." There might very well be some truth to that, but we can look at history and see pretty clearly that sometimes it has gone to hell more in some periods than others. And in each of those occasions, be it the European Wars of Religion or the World Wars, there were warning signs in the sorts of ideologies and world views dominant prior to the cataclysms. Likewise, some of the better times in human history seem to have been supported at least to some degree by the thought of the time, although the influence is obviously always bidirectional here.
My view would tend towards the idea that ethics only has a major affect on the culture writ large when it is instantiated in cultural institutions and public policy (borrowing from Hegel here). Ethics can seem unimportant because it's often only seen as "ethics," when it comes down to the individual level, but policy is ultimately downstream of policymakers ethics.
More generally, given your fin-de-siecle opening, I don't understand how you demonstrate that Aristotelian ethics and moral anti-realism are incompatible, which is presumably your aim. The arete/virtues are not represented by Aristotle as factual or everlasting, the arrival at the 'mean' between different extremes is a subtle and nuanced analysis, and the whole approach requires a good society (with a good if unmentioned quota of slaves to do the donkey-work) with education from an early age, to inculcate the habits of virtue.
That is hardly believable. And it is demonstrably false for national capitals. I'd bet that Western Europe 100 years ago and sometimes I think even 500 years ago was generally much safer than it is today when it comes to violent crime.
Quoting Herg
A quick comparison of what clothing is acceptable today and 70 years ago, what sort of lyrics features in mainstream music, and all else shows otherwise. I wasn't around in the 60s, but I don't think children were being exposed to sexual content as extremely often as they are today.
At least in terms of the US I know that the Baby Boomers, on average, lost their virginity earlier than any other generation before or since, had more partners than any other generation, and used drugs more than any other generation. And of course the surge in crime rates starts as they come of age and peaks and then goes into rapid decline as they enter middle age. If anything, the opposite problem exists now. Young people are completely cut off from romantic relationships in many instances.
So, even if the content is a problem, and I'd still argue it is, it certainly isn't the case that it has outweighed other forces in the culture. You might easily argue that digital entertainment has simply become a substitute good for romance, sex, and drugs, and being more affordable you don't need to commit crimes to get all you can consume.
Actually, I'd argue precisely this. A straightforward analysis of "vice indexes" papers over the dire problems. Some young man wasting his life away in isolation playing video games is perhaps in many ways worse off than one who is promiscuous and involved in petty crimes.
Is it? I suppose it depends on what your comparison was. I was thinking over the long term. Attempts to reconstruct the homicide rate of medieval Oxford for instance land well above modern Baltimore today. People seem to always think crime is getting worse, regardless of what actually happens with crime though.
Certainly descriptions of Victorian London are dire enough, hell scapes populated by almost entirely by depraved criminals, no-go zones for the police, etc. It even becomes hard to determine who Jack the Ripper's "canonical victims" are because so many dismembered women are being found around the same area in a short span.
But as for recent history for the most serious crimes, there is a tend downward, although it's most pronounced in the US.
Exactly. Certainly, Nietzsche has been influential. He seems to sell better than any other philosopher today (which is pretty ironic given his elitism). But in the end he is diagnosing an incoherence in Enlightenment ethics, taking them to their logical conclusion.
I think Bob is pointing to [I]moral decay[/I], which might itself exist along other elements of positive growth. For example, in A Brave New World we see a picture of a society that would surely get extremely high marks on virtually every metric by which modern technocrats tend to evaluate policy "success." Crime is largely a non-issue, there is no poverty, self-reported well being is surely quite high, and technology has allowed for a great deal of comfort, even largely removing the symptoms of aging. But at the same time it seems fair to say that such a society, despite these positive attributes, has slipped into the direst form of moral and ethical decay.
And there are aspects in which the trajectory of society since Huxley's time has followed his dystopian vision, even as it generally still fails to deliver on at least the "pleasure" part of the equation.
Civil rights have to rank high on the "moral decay" calculus. I'm definitely not going to agree that any society or time period where gay marriage is illegal, for example, is morally superior to what we have now. That would preclude any time period in the U.S. prior to 2015 from being considered morally superior to the present.
Well, I have some graphs as well.
The graph for Italy is also conveniently cut off at a time when violence was peaking for political reasons:
Statistics are a tool to be abused by whoever uses them, distorted by whoever makes them.
Anybody who doesn't know what Bob means by moral decay is simply playing dumb. Stockholm, Paris, London, Rome, Brussels are unrecognisable from their 90s counterparts. The cities didn't change their buildings or streets, it is unrecognisably more dangerous. Music now is more obviously overtly sexual than ever, even the 2000s, where the sex was mostly in the undertones. Anybody who travels knows. Anybody who keeps up with mainstream music knows. That part of his thesis is undeniable from the standpoint he is looking at (society is in moral progression from the viewpoint of tolerance).
Yes, you seem to be making that point quite well with the move to religious terrorism, just gun violence in Sweden (also an outlier, and at any rate my home town of 150,000 people had around that many gun homicides in a year plenty of times), and sexual violence, which has indeed been on the rise, although this is generally explained by people being vastly more likely to report it than in prior decades.
As to music, this is sort of comical. I don't think it's possible to get any more sexually explicit than 2 Live Crew's hits like "Pop that Pussy," or something like Notorious BIG's "Unbelievable." White Zombie's 1995 hit single "More Human Than a Human," literally opens with a clip from a porno, and Nine Inch Nails 1994 hit "Closer" was all over the radio when I was growing up. At the very least, MTV's "The Jersey Shore," maxed us out on hedonistic degeneracy many years ago, lol.
I think it is a valid question, but Aristotle is on to something. The reason humans want to be happy is because it is the most intrinsically (positively) valuable "thing"...Aristotle just never quite mentions this and starts instead with his idea that what is good is a thing fulfilling its nature. I would say it should be reversed.
CC: @Count Timothy von Icarus, @Lionino
By moral decay I mean that we are in a period of time where morality is being by-at-large supplanted with hyper-individualism; and this leads, as is being seen as it is currently developing in the modern world, to an unstable and bad society.
I can agree with some of the points many of you have been saying (such as that now is arguably the best time to be alive than any point in the past); but I disagree nevertheless that we are still morally progressing. Dont get me wrong, we have progressed morally throughout history, but now we are starting to go too far and this hyper-extension of individualism and tolerance is causing our societies to rot.
My crude and basic outline of history is as follows:
The first stage is the recognition that there is actual goodness. This is the older time periods mainly marked by the development of religions and older philosophical works (like Aristotles and Platos).
The second stage is the violent, inhumane, and brutal contest of competing theories of actual goodness. This is the time period of marked by complete intolerance and disregard for human well-being; and lots of torturing, prosecution, and wars (in the name of The Good).
The third stage is humanity learning that this bloody contest is by-at-large not good, and needs to stop. This is when people start looking down upon those who rage wars for the soul purpose of spreading the word; torturing people for being of a different religious sect; etc. They start realizing that what humanity has been missing, is that caring about the well-being of other humans is more important than whatever conception of The Good one has.
The fourth stage is to disband from this contest and look towards well-being of individuals as most concerning (instead of what is actually good). This is the stage where people start saying things like even if it is immoral, why do you care? It is not like they are hurting anyone doing it. This stage starts to lose its sense of why progressing towards The Good matters, and starts substituting it for the well-being of living beings.
The fifth stage is the denial of actual goodness altogether, and leads to hyper-individualism and hyper-tolerance. This is the stage where people start transitioning into caring solely about individuals achieving their own desires, so long as it doesnt impede on other peoples pursuit of theirs, instead of the well-being of people: this is the stage where its it common for people to say hey, whatever floats your boat: you do you, man. This is where mental illnesses start being largely unrecognized, because a normal person is now viewed as simply a person that abides by their own desires; and this is where people start condemning people who try to help other people against their will (for the well-being of that person) as intolerant. Likewise, people start losing their sense of rights in this stage; and start to see certain obvious violations of rights (such as abortion) as a grey area.
The sixth stage is significant losses in happiness, and various unhealthy tendencies are developed in an attempt to counter-act it. We are starting to transition in the modern world to this stage, and its mark is that of active shooters, chronic depression, people butchering their own bodies, substance abuse, sexual self-indulgence, etc. This is stage is the consequence of hyper-individualism leading by-at-large to hedonism which, in turn, leads to a giant void that a person feels like they can never fill as they grow old.
Obviously, history is much more complex than my synopsis here; but I think it suffices.
EDIT:
If we continue down this historical path, then stage seven will more than likely be complete Nietzschien thought: the individual will grow weary and tired of being so superficially happy, will begin losing their sense of respect for other people, and start pursuing their own passions at all expense. This is when the "Ubermensch" would most likely start emerging.
If DNA tests are to be believed, there are no Protestants in my genealogy, so I guess I would be the one doing the burning. That aside, yes.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
We can bring up degenerate songs all the way back to the 1700s (do not look up "Mozart and shit"). The question is: were those songs being played in teens' parties back then? My knowledge of that is no. On the other hand, I know for a fact equally degenerate songs are being widely played pre-teen parties today.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Zeroes in on the very first graph as if the others aren't there
Not that it would matter, we know all of my graphs are correlated either way :^)
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That is the unfalsifiable excuse people give. Were they braver, they would make the positive statement that "No, you were more likely to be r*ped 30 years ago in Paris than you are now!". Which is a statement that they would not be able to substantiate lived experience and common sense would tell you before any statistics.
It's probably a reasonable variable that there is a distinct difference in persons who voluntarily complete surveys, versus those who do not.
That is to say, there are countess variables to consider that could reasonably throw any sort of absolute or intrinsically-correct/accurate data out as far as (f)actuality. Note I specifically avoid "usefulness" as that is subjective to those who seek a purpose beyond actual legitimate aggregation of data.
I think I'm done with this thread.
Right. Political nominees in the last 8 years would also be worth noting.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't think these assessments of changes from 1995 to 2024 are really on point. Presumably the OP is thinking far beyond a 30-year period.
But I think the thread has mostly been a distraction. The OP is about Aristotle and the claim that his moral ideas are better than those that prevail in our own time.
Quoting Lionino
I agree.
It seems you are saying that things have gotten worse/decayed since Nietzsche with the rise of moral anti-realism. But in the 120 years since Nietzsche, we have seen an expansion of civil rights that has been unprecedented. Which pre-1900 societies would you say are morally superior to society now?
:up:
Now one powerful response to this sort of tyranny of the objective is Kierkegaard's view that it is ultimately the subjective that has any relevance to our lives. I won't try to summarize this, since I figure many may already be familiar with it. I did find a free anthology of his work here: https://web.archive.org/web/20230514232930/http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Kierkegaard,Soren/Provocations.pdf
Sections 15 and 19, both of which are quite short, offer up the core argument against the "obsession with the objective."
I am skeptical of the way in which he sets the two against each other, but I do think it is instructive. I think the two "types of reflection" (subjective/objective) are intricately connected and always inform and mutually co-constitute one another. They are part of a unified, catholic whole, reason as the Logos in which "all things hold together." Without the contents of theoretical, objective reason, the striving of practical reason towards the Good becomes contentless. That said, his argument isn't without merit. If one type of reason should be held up above the other, we have probably picked the wrong one.
So ultimately, I think Kierkegaard's solution risks falling into a sort of pernicious fideism that risks even making the Good (God) set forever out of reach by a sort of all encompassing equivocity (something he tries to fix, but doesn't IMO diffuse). However, it's worth bringing up because it's a popular and powerful critique of modernity.
* Of course, telos is also seemingly indispensable so it gets resurrected in biology as "function," shows up in physics as "constraints," and then shows up in economics and the other social sciences as "utility," "well-being." But often these have to be instrumentalized in order to fit under the tyranny of the theoretical. Thus you end up with the absurdity of policymakers and doctors advocating for certain sorts of interventions "because they are associated with 'self-reported well-being,'" as if the goal was to change how people respond to surveys and not to change how they live.
You could have said the same thing vis-á-vis serfdom at the peak of the industrial revolution. Yet while it certainly would have been true that the abolishment of serfdom was a very positive step forward, it's far from clear that this offset the alienation of people from their labor, massive increase in hunger, and general collapse of social institutions that prevailed among the lower classes in that time period (nor the massive wars and colonial projects motivated by the same era defining forces).
I don't think the thesis that society is experiencing decay in some important aspects can be easily written off by pointing to progress in other areas.
I don't know . . . possibly I've hung out with the wrong people but the idea that "humans necessarily want to be happy" is extremely implausible to me. Here, for instance, is a person named Pat. Pat suffers from a variety of psychological, physical, and spiritual maladies that produce a kind of chronic frustration, depression, resentment, and lack of ease -- in short, what we mean by "unhappiness." If you ask Pat if they "want to be happy," the answer you will get is: "Nonsense. What you call 'being happy' is for sheep. I operate on a higher plane. Of course I'm miserable, but that is what happens when a person of true intellect sees the world aright. I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces." Pat, you could say, would rather be Happy (their sense) than happy, but surely that's stretching what "happy" means. Let's face it: Pat just doesn't want to be happy, and they can give you their reasons why.
Or here, for another instance, is a person named Robbie. Robbie suffers from the same brood of ailments that Pat does. When we ask Robbie the same question -- "Do you want to be happy?" -- the reply is: "Of course I do! I'd give anything to be happy." We then recommend some basic steps that might begin to relieve Robbie's misery -- a thorough medical evaluation, perhaps, or therapy, or philosophical study, or more exercise and pleasant activities -- to which Robbie replies by explaining in great detail why none of those suggestions are options that would work for them. We go around this circle several more times and finally conclude what we must: that Robbie, despite what they say, doesn't really want to be happy. Robbie has a false self-image, that of a person who truly desires happiness, but it's easy enough to see through it.
I submit that neither Pat nor Robbie are extraordinary types, or even all that unusual. But perhaps the more important point is this: Aristotle doesn't mean "everybody" when he talks about the human desire for happiness, and we mustn't misunderstand him in that way. I believe he's speaking about a telos of the type or species "human," and asking us to conceive of a person in harmony with themselves. Such a person would understand the relation between the good and happiness; would desire both; and would have the practical knowledge to achieve them. This is very different from "All fish necessarily want to be in the water."
If we could bring him into this conversation, I think Aristotle might say: "Yes, sadly, there are those whom you have to actually convince to desire their own good, but that doesn't put the idea of 'the good' up for grabs in any important way." But wait a minute, Ari, we reply; we're talking about happiness, not the good. Aristotle smiles serenely . . . "Oh, are you?" he asks.
That's not really my point. My point is that, on balance, there isn't some past society or time period that is morally superior/less decayed than the societies in today's first world countries. Do you think there is? If so, when and where?
I'm not sure I agree that I see a strong connection between individualism, moral anti-realism and people's ethics in modern society. At least not in the way you are saying.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Telos was cast aside by Democritus about 50 years before Aristotle. 'Things do not come into existence for a purpose, but having come into existence, they find a purpose.' Both outlooks are parts of our heritage, and they're both still with us. I expect that if humanity exists 2400 years from now, that will still be the case. Don't you agree?
An overall comment - a really thoughtful and well-written post.
Another overall comment - you make a lot of definitive statements about things that are matters of opinion. For instance...
Quoting Bob Ross
To start, saying that whatever decay there is in our society is the result of moral anti-realism is unsupported, and I think, wrong. Philosophy follows society, not the other way around. Also - no society has ever functioned rationally and none ever will.
Here is a definition of moral realism from Wikipedia.
Quoting Wikipedia - Moral Realism
Let me know if that matches your understanding. Also, I assume that moral anti-realism is the position that moral statements have no objective reality. As for that, I don't see that you've provided any evidence or argument that Aristotle's moral formulations are in any way objective.
Quoting Bob Ross
As I see it, impossible to implement, unlikely to solve the problem you've identified, unnecessary, and damaging to societies and individuals.
Quoting Bob Ross
Maybe this is the my biggest disagreement with you and Aristotle in this regard. The meanings of "good," "virtue" and "happiness" are in no way objective facts.
Quoting Bob Ross
Happiness without play? That is not my experience or, I think, that of most people.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, you haven't really defined the key words in this statement. Does Aristotle?
A broader statement - I recently started a thread - "My understanding of morals." In it I described a set of beliefs about behavior quoting Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu, the founders of Taoism, and Emerson. This is from Chapter 8 of Ziporyn's translation of the Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi).
By "intrinsic virtuosity" Chuang Tzu means our true nature, to oversimplify - our hearts, conscience. My first take is that this is exactly what you meant when you said "moral anti-realism," but as I thought about it, it struck me that's not true at all. They really are very similar, at least as you've described Aristotle's ideas.
Nietzschien thought did not take rise during or immediately after Nietzsche published his works; and I already conceded that now is arguably the best time to be alive when comparing to the past.
The recognition of The Good as legitimate and well-being as good for humanity, and this only being achieved through fulfilling one's nature, is an aspect of past societies that is superior to our own; but this in no way implies that, as a whole, there has been a better society than the ones today. I was suggesting that we are in a state of moral decay, not that we should revert completely back to a past society.
Do you see how society is shifting towards viewing what is good as people just being autonomous...to the point of extremity?
For example, there are movies being produced now, which depict putting "furies" (viz., people who think they are a different animal than a human being and mimic that animal's behaviors) in mental illness rehabilitation programs as if it is a form of persecution; because they don't want to be changed: they don't need a cure (according to them).
Another example, transgenderism is no longer a mental illness (called gender dysphoria) and is viewed, instead, as normal; because they are rationally achieving their own desire of imitating the other gender.
Another example, women by-at-large, in the younger generations, think it is self-empowering to have an only fans and find it wrong when people call them out as online prostitutes.
Etc.
I think telos is still important today, and Aristotle was right to view everything through its lens. It is essential for living a wise life, because a wise person fulfills their nature exactly because they are self-conscious of their nature and the nature of things around them.
It is misleading for many people to think of themselves as having no design and instead having to create their own purpose: that leads to radical individualism.
Quoting J
Im trying to distinguish happy from want, desire, preference. When we get what we want, doesnt that automatically make us happier than we would have been had we not achieved that thing that we wanted? Is it possible to will misery, or is that a contradiction in terms? I recognize that some believe consistent happiness is impossible , or that no growth comes without pain and suffering, or that misery brings with it its own insights, but thats not the same thing as wanting unhappiness as the immediate goal of a desire.
I think creating your own purpose is more likely to lead you into society because humans are synergistic. For most of us, the greatest expression of selfhood is found in the company of others.
But if you object to the creation of purpose, where do you advise people find that?
It isn't, actually. I wish it had been, because then this thread wouldn't have lost itself in the swamp of amateur social history. The OP makes a claim about society which would require hours of deep research to verify/modify/reject. That set the agenda for this thread, which at times has seemed less like a philosophy debate and more like old farts in a pub whinging about the state of the world. And Bob, for whom I have a great respect, has unwittingly cast himself in the role of the guy who knocks on your door and says, 'Don't you agree that the world is in a terrible state?', and then, if you are unwise enough to agree with him, hands you a copy of The Watchtower or some other brand of snake oil.
If Bob really wants to pursue this angle, he should write a book a thread in a forum is not the right vehicle.
Let's by all means talk about whether Aristotle's moral ideas are better than later ideas, but let's keep it at the level of ethical theory, albeit illuminated with examples (such as our old friends the trolley and transplant problems). Social history is for sociologists and historians.
"Happiness" is the common translation for the Greek term eudaimonia used by Aristotle. It's not a great translation. Eudaimonia could also be translated as "flourishing" or "living a good life." So:
Pat clearly thinks he is pursuing some higher good here. He thinks happiness, which seems to be taken as "pleasantness" is not conducive to true human flourishing. That's exactly what many later monastic/ascetic commentators on Aristotle have thought as well; true flourishing implies a victory over the body and its pleasures (or something like that). Indeed, he sounds not unlike Aristotle, who calls the life pursuing simple pleasure a "life for grazing animals," (although Aristotle is more sanguine about pleasure generally).
The point is that people pursue some good when they act unless action is to be completely arbitrary. We can't have an infinite regress of motivations. People can, of course, pursue counterfeit goods, disordered goods, or merely relative goods. The ethics is about how to avoid this.
Even Milton's Satan acknowledges this with: "evil be thou now my good." It doesn't make sense to say "evil be evil for me me," if you're going to pursue it.
Robbie's behavior seems pretty well summed up in the Ethic's discussions on virtue versus vice and incontinence. It is not the case that Aristotle thinks we always prefer virtue. One can fall into vice. One can also recognize vice as vice and still prefer it, even as one knows they should try to rise to virtue. When a person is unsuccessful at overcoming desires they know are wrong this is incontinence, whereas if they do the virtuous thing but do not enjoy it they are merely continent. But for Aristotle it is possible, with time and proper education, to come to love virtue and hate vice.
I should note though that his use of vice is very different from today's, which recalls mostly drugs, gambling, etc. For Aristotle virtue is a golden mean between extremes, so rashness or cowardliness are vices, whereas courage is a virtue. Profligacy and grasping are vices, whereas generosity is a virtue, etc.
I am not sure what you mean here? Nietzsche talked about acquiring happiness through fulfilling desires?
It is one of the most backwards things I have ever read. I think he is confusing Existential Ethics with Nietzsche maybe?
@Bob Ross The general existential view of of ethics is based on creating your own virtues in light of an absurd existence. You seem to be conflating this with one or two cherry-picked points made by Nietzsche maybe?
Confusion is all I got from reading the OP. I only managed to get a few paragraphs in before giving up.
Please outline where and why. I don't follow, and I don't want to go on a derailed spiel on Nietzschien ethics: I'd rather contend with whatever complaints you have to offer.
Philosophical idealogies are the guiding forces behind societial norms; so I dont know how you could think the roles are reversed.
This thread was not meant to provide an argument for why Aristotelian ethics is a form of moral realism: thats common knowledge.
You will have to elaborate more on this for me to respond adequately.
Ah, so you are a moral anti-realist?
Aristotle is noting that the happy life consists in hard work, in being virtuous, and not chasing desires or passions; he is clarifying for those who conflate happiness in the richest sense with the superficial kind that kids have.
Aristotle kind of doesit depends. What words do you need me to define for you?
I saw your OP, I just havent had time to comment in there yet; but I will.
Following ones moral intuitions is not necessarily incompatible with moral realism, and, as a virtue ethicist, Aristotle is going to agree that a moral compass is more important than moral principles; but he will warn against blindly following ones heart: one has to cultivate a virtueous character or otherwise they have no reason to believe they are morally sensitive and wise enough to intuit properly in nuanced situations. A psychopathic narcissist probably isnt going make the right decision following their heart, without first reshaping it.
I am getting a bit lost: I never suggested people should create their own purposes, so I am confused why you asking me about that. Am I missing something?
Nietzsche's moral philosophy is that there is no morality (in the traditional sense) but, rather, we create our own values and subject ourselves to our own created moral law. Our own created law is based off of our values, and our values, according to Nietzsche, on our own subjective tastes which do not reside as cognitive (but rather conative) dispositions.
I would suggest reading, if you haven't already, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: it outlines very well his "solution" to morality by way of radical invidualism.
Nietzsche also, throughout all his works, praises Epicureanism as a way to live life properly (and usually contrasted to the rigidness of Stoicism). Nietzsche's view is essentially a rationalized form (Apollonian) of Dionysian thought.
I completely agree that this was not what Aristotle meant, but of course Aristotle did not speak English. Eudaemonia is close to untranslatable, but "flourishing" or "good spirit" will have to do, and it's a far cry from English-language "happiness." It's much closer to that sense of harmony within the human being, the identification of inner well-being with outer virtue, that I tried to hint at. And that's why I gave Aristotle that cryptic question at the end of my post, seeking to remind his interlocutor that happiness and the good are not separated in the way that English speakers believe they are.
Quoting Joshs
This is a psychological question, not a philosophical one, I would say. For what it's worth, my answer is No. All too often, as I know from my own experience, getting what you want can be a bitter disappointment (and bad for you too!).
I'll do another post about Pat and Robbie later today, responding to Count T's placement of them in an Aristotelian framework.
He was correct as far as I can see. As for "happiness" ... I cannot recall him focusing on that at all (other than in a dismissive light I imagine?).
You said:
Quoting Bob Ross
Are you saying people should see purpose as something they receive? From where?
Its both a psychological and a philosophical question. It would be strictly a psychological question if I were looking only for an empirical explanation. You said getting what one wants can lead to disappointment. Understood in terms of temporal sequence, I begin with a desire, which already has in mind its object, at least in a vague way. What I have in mind is a source of happiness for me in the instant I imagine it. If I achieve that desire, if what I actually get reasonably matches my expectation, it will make me happier in the instant I get it, just as generating the image of it in my imagination does. What youre talking about is a situation where what I actually achieve doesnt reasonably match my happiness-producing expectation. The real thing doesnt stack up against what my expectation produced in my imagination. Your point seems to be that reality often falls short of our dreams. I dont disagree with this. Im simply saying that, strictly speaking, it is not the case that we dont want to feel happy, since the feeling of being happier is built into the very concept of desire. Desire is the expectation of obtaining an object or achieving a goal that will make us happier than we would be if we didnt obtain that object.
Ha!! I like that. On the other hand, much of philosophy is exactly that.
Good post.
For example https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15250/if-existence-is-good-what-is-the-morality-of-life starts by setting a premise and establishing that the thread is not the place to discuss that premise. The first reply to that thread is in fact praising it for the way it was set up and "making the boundaries of the discussion clear". I think the boundaries of this thread were clear, Leontiskos thinks so too.
The book comment applies to every thread here that puts forward a thesis. It is silly.
With a bit of Swift's Battle of the Books, pitching the Ancients against the Moderns, thrown in for extra flavor.
Grumpy old men fight on both sides of that battle.
[Not saying that to diss this thread]
I don't think this is true, but I don't think I have the ammunition to shoot it down.
Quoting Bob Ross
If by common knowledge you mean something known by most people, I disagree. I think if you started a thread to discuss the meaning of any of these three terms you would get quite a few differing opinions, and that's just among us amateur philosophers. The answers would be even more diverse in the general public.
If, on the other hand, you mean it is common knowledge among those familiar with Aristotle's works, I don't have a response, since I don't know enough to have a meaningful opinion.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think that human values are a reflection of human nature, whatever that means. I would have thought that means the answer to your question is "yes," but now I'm not so sure.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm have never been an especially happy person, by whatever definition you use. That being said, I have never been happier than since my retirement. Now I have the freedom to follow where my intrinsic virtuosities lead me, although that's something easier said than done. I find many of the things I do are playful, participating in the forum is one of those.
Quoting Bob Ross
Happiness, virtue, and good as objective standards without making a circular argument by using each word to define the others. Actually, I think that will take us down a long and winding path, so we can leave it for now.
Quoting Bob Ross
This feels like an escape clause. Yes, follow your heart, but let me decide if your heart is up to the task.
This is an interesting discussion. Thanks for that.
As a [s]grumpy old man[/s] wise elder I agree.
Nietzsche did not like the idea of happiness because he viewed it as anti-thetical to working on a noble project; but in a deeper sense "happiness" fits well into his theory, because working on a long-term project, which one imposes upon themselves out of passion, is a way, according to Nietzsche, to find a deep and persistent sense of fulfillment...he just doesn't call it happiness.
It is something they have. "Receive" and "create" presuppose that purpose only comes from an agent.
Fair enough. But this pushes us back to the question of whether any of this should be phrased in terms of happiness. And, considering the Aristotelian framework of this thread, we have to ask: "English-language happiness" or something more like eudaemonia? It seems true enough that I experience something positive when a desired expectation is met, but in English, at any rate, I really don't think "happiness" is going to cover it a lot of the time. I don't mean to pick a controversial example, but it seems well suited to capture the problem: If Ellie finds herself unwillingly pregnant in the 1st trimester, she has a choice to make among (at least) three options. Even granting that the result of whatever choice she makes does meet her expectations, can we say she is "happier" without doing violence to the language? She may believe, correctly, that her condition would be worse if she had chosen either of the other two options, but simply being "better than the other alternatives" doesn't equate to happiness, I would say. Especially in a fraught case like this, happiness seems a bridge too far.
Interestingly, I think you can make a much stronger case for the result of Ellie's decision (no matter which it is) promoting her eudaemonia, her overall well-being. Sometimes doing the right thing doesn't, and can't, make us happy, though we may see that it is the right thing, and will work toward our eventual good. But here is where my example becomes controversial, so perhaps ill-chosen, because in order to acknowledge that Ellie's eudaemonia could be furthered regardless of which decision she makes, you'd also have to agree that giving birth, early abortion, and adoption are on a moral par, which many do not.
What purpose do you have?
Yes indeed, but that good may not be named as, or experienced as, happiness; we see this in Pat's case.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think you're right to place Robbie in this general context, but I don't think their situation is quite described here. Robbie has "fallen into vice," yes. But they don't recognize vice as vice, because they don't believe they are making wrong choices. Nor is Robbie failing to overcome self-acknowledged "wrong desires," for the same reason; so Robbie's not incontinent. The missing piece from this attempt to describe Robbie is lack of self-knowledge. What does Aristotle say about this? Is there a term, or an ethical condition, that can describe a person who has "fallen into vice" but not only doesn't know it, but is convinced that they desire the exact opposite?
As I think is in keeping with what @Bob Ross is saying:
Same purpose everyone has: the obtainment of optimal eudemonia as end. (?)
But this won't be a purpose/end which I (or you) created for ourselves, instead being something that just is in so far as being intrinsic to our being; we can't choose against it, even when granting some form of free will. Nor would it be something received from another ego (whose very ego begs the question of what end(s) it itself has) in a cosmos devoid of an overarching/superlative purposer/creator.
This would be the state of vicewhich involves the enjoyment and pursuit vice and ignorance vis-á-vis true virtue.
Incontinence is the state where a person can properly distinguish virtue from vice but still acts according to vice due to weakness of will.
Continence is knowing virtue as virtue and acting according to it, but still desiring vice.
Perfected virtue entails that one acts virtuously and enjoys/prefers virtue to vice (e.g. Socrates prefers to drink hemlock as opposed to acting against virtue in the Crito).
So you can see an immediate contrast here with Kant, who would have it that we are in a way being most good when we "do the right thing," despite having no desire to do so.
Virtue is key to true self-determining freedom. Obviously, we are not born with this freedom. Education and training in the virtues is thus essential, and Aristotle at times likens the way we learn to practice the virtues to how we learn and perfect trades/skills (techne).
Part of the incoherence in the modern tradition that Nietzsche picks up on is the way in which acting morally can seem like a burden that makes life less worth living. It is "life denying." Yet he backwards projects this onto Plato and the classical tradition. Plato by contrast has reason reaching down into and coloring the desires, and speaks of ecstatic eros for the Good, or even "coupling" with it. Likewise in St. Aquinas we have the intellect coloring all of the lower faculties given the proper orientation. Asceticism then isn't about denying the desires tout court, but rather training them in order to fulfill them more fully (freedom as giving birth in beauty). The charioteer of reason in the Phaedrus trains the two horses (appetites/passions), he doesn't kill them or pen them in a stable, but ideally has them running at full gallop as he takes off towards the sun in an act of self-generating reflexive freedom (this of course doesn't obviate Nietzsche's critique more generally, it's just that it seems a bit off the mark when ascribed to the classical tradition). Kierkegaard is often grouped with Nietzsche despite having an entirely opposite view of Christianity in part because of this same sort of insight.
I am not a historian either, so perhaps I dont either; but it seems pretty clear that society is like a wave, and the flow is marked out by someone (or a group of people) gaining sufficient influence on the masses...this starts with an idea.
I mean the second.
This doesnt necessitate a yes or no: it is indeterminate with the information you have given so far.
Moral realism is usually a three-pronged thesis (at a minimum):
1. Moral judgments are truth-apt.
2. Moral judgments express something objective.
3. There is at least one true moral judgment.
Prong 2 is the most important one: moral objectivism. I cant tell if you hold there are moral facts or not.
Engaging in fun is arguably an essential aspect of becoming happy, but it is not an element of being virtuous. I am not acting, in any meaningful sense, virtuous by intending to merely do something I enjoy doing.
The concept of good is identical to the concept of value; and the property of goodness is identical to the property of valuableness. Actual, or intrinsic, goodness is actual, or intrinsic, valuableness; and thusly the highest (intrinsic) good is what is the most (intrinsically) valuable.
Happiness is the most intrinsically valuable; because it is the most intrinsically motivating (and I leave this intentionally vague for now); which makes it the chief good. It is a persistent state of supreme fulfillment and well living. It is essentially well-being.
Virtue is a habit of usually character which is excellent (relative to what is the subject of discussion). Excellence here is NOT a morally loaded term, and is kind of confusing for the modern man. This can be readily seen by how confusing it can be to the modern man to encounter Aristotle splitting virtues into moral and intellectual virtues; which seems odd since most people think of a virtue as inextricably tied to morality. Virtues are excellent habits of character; and this is not limited to the moral domaine.g., the particular traits required to be a good runner are virtuous running traits because they are excellent for running.
It has to be that way: a conscience is not necessarily naturally morally sensitive and well-grounded. Wouldnt you agree? A child conditioned by Nazi propaganda that follows their heart in their adulthood are going to make really morally egregious decisions.
You too!
I have created my own purpose of being good (to your point); and thereby commit myself to the purpose, which I have independently of my created purpose, of being a eudaimon (because that is what I was designed for).
The first is merely a decision I made, and the latter stems from what is good.
More or less, yes. We are designed a particular way, and we can choose to go against it; but we will only be damaging ourselves.
OK, thanks for the comment. I'll myself shy from the term "designed" for, unlike the notion of purpose/end, the concept of "designed" does to me seem to logically entail a designer in aprioristic manners (akin to a bachelor being unmarried). This ascription of a designer being a belief I so far find erroneous due to the logical contradictions I so far find in the concept.
Evidencing logical contradictions would be a far longer argument (which I'd rather not here engage in) but, to keep things simple, as I previously alluded to: A designer of me and you, etc. would yet either a) have a purpose/end in so designing or else b) not have any purpose/end whatsoever in so designing. (A) then entails there yet being an uncreated/undesigned purpose/end which the designer him/herself pursues in their designing of our own essential nature as human beings - hence yet entailing an uncreated objective Good which this designer is yet perpetually subject to, and can in no way modify. The very same existential Good which we ourselves can either approach or deviate from via our innate impetus to pursue optimal eudemonia/well-being. While this terse argument doesn't illustrate the logical contradictions of a global designer, it does evidence how such a designer is utterly superfluous to the innate purpose of our own being. So, then, why even bother with the notion of a grand designer when addressing issues of the Good? Whereas just stipulated option (b) implies chaotic/random effects stemming from the designer as cause to our being, which is incongruous to what we know about, at the very least, the static nature of our being: that of our seeking out what we best believe to be our optimal well-being in both short- and long-term appraisals.
In short, rather than stating that we are designed in a certain way, I'll rather say that "we all unalterably are a particular way (innate seekers of optimal well-being) as human beings", this despite our otherwise innumerable differences. But maybe this quibbling with words is besides the point?
Ok. This is just the opposite of what I thought you were saying. Your purpose is to live in accordance with your nature.
For my part, although this can have a nice ring to it, it doesn't seem to accurately convey my own take. For me, my/our purpose is simply to actualize an optimal well-being, but this is not something I can in any metaphysical sense deviate from. This of itself is existentially fixed in all of us. What I can (and often enough inadvertently do) deviate from is the very actualization of this end via the choices I make. So, in the sense you are here addressing, I'd then say my purpose - in the sense of end-driven striving I consciously engage in (rather than in the sense of an end upon which all my actions are necessarily contingent) - is to remain true to the very end of an actualized optimal well-being, something that can well be deemed identical to the notion of the Good.
I could then say that this is not the consciously upheld purpose of many - toddlers for instance - even thought they are nevertheless teleologically driven by the same telos/end, even if ignorant of it on a conscious level.
So, once this overall picture is accommodated - such that the "nature" here addressed is properly understood as the "will toward optimal eudemonia" (rather than say, one's nature of either being inclined toward selfishness or selflessness, etc.) - then, and only then, I could affirm something like "my purpose is to remain true (in the sense of accurately aiming, conformant in this way) to my true (in the sense of genuine, else genuinely immutable) nature". This, furthermore, then implies that one's true nature is, underneath it all, good, for it is in tune with the actualization of the Good. And it is this underlying nature that one can deviate from due to oneself as ego and the choices oneself as ego makes - sometimes in ignorance of what is best relative to the Good as ultimate end.
All this might be in some measure of accord to what you've quoted @Bob Ross as saying - although, as per my previous post, I myself don't subscribe to having been in any way designed/created by a global designer/creator. And so I dislike the choice of words which Bob Ross has made.
Quoting J
My objection to Aristotles concept of happiness as eudaemonia, and this whose ethical theories are influenced by it, is that it conflates the hedonic and the cognitive aspects of experiencing. As a result, it fetishizes intent over sense-making. One can allegedly want suffering , pain or misery instead of pleasure and happiness. We make decision all the time between short term reward and long term benefit, between the thrill of the moment and an eventual good. But in doing so, we are not dealing with different forms of the hedonic, but different ways of making sense of the situations that will produce happiness. In other words, it is the cognitive aspect of goal-seeking that is involved when we choose none route to happiness over another. Choosing the longer term benefit over the immediate reward requires construing this far off reward within the immediate situation.
These are two outlooks we've inherited about the innateness of goodness:
1. Hebrew: You're born blank. You don't know good from evil, and must learn it. Jews see the Mosaic Law as the only description of good and evil available to mankind. You're specifically warned about the dangers of taking your own council. You can tell if a person is good by their circumstances because if they're good, God rewards them.
2. Persian: The universe is divided in half between good and evil and you're born knowing the difference between the two. To be good, you have to actively reach out for the good side and push away from the evil. It's a journey. This is the origin of the idea that progress is good. You can't tell if a person is good from their circumstances. A poor person can be good if they're progressing. A rich man can be evil if he's in stasis, and since the poor are more inclined to want change, they're more likely to be good.
There are other ideas we've inherited, like the idea that goodness is about revelation. This is a companion of the idea of original sin. We're born bad, clothed in flesh, and we're on a mission to return to a heavenly state, so goodness is about bringing the truth out into the open, or the Roman idea was that they were on a mission (given to them by Mars) to bring peace to the earth. In both cases, good is always just out of reach. All you get is doses of it from time to time.
Of all of these viewpoints, the Jewish one is the only one that allows you to be satisfied with what you've got. You studied the law. You put it into practice. You're doing ok. Anyway, it's a way to analyze the emotional tones in your viewpoint.
Masochism as one extreme example of this. Running a grueling marathon so as to successfully arrive at the finishing line as another. But both these cases will make ample equivocation of "happiness" and "suffering". The masochist consciously suffers only when they cannot obtain their conscious happiness in - consensually it must be added - experiencing physical pain or else some form of physiological discomfort, such as humiliation. They will however be consciously happy when their masochistic acts are fulfilled as intended. Same can be said of the marathon runner (here even placing aside the issue of runner's high). Or else of someone who desires to experience misery so as to feel repentant for what they deem to have been a former willfully committed wrong. And so forth.
One however cannot at the exact same time and in the exact same respect both consciously want X (as one's end/goal) and consciously want not-X (as one's end/goal) - as will, for example, be the case when X = one's own future misery. This irrespective of the myriad possibilities regarding the at times discordant agencies we experience as felt emotions which can on occasion occur within the preconscious or else un/subconscious mind in whole.
Quoting Joshs
That affirmed, are you here arguing that at least some sense-making is non-intentional (be it either conscious or unconscious)?
There are other ways to appraise the mentioned viewpoint, but fair enough. As to the Jewish perspective you've mentioned, full satisfaction does not occur. Otherwise there would be a complete cessation of will/desire in all respects culminating in literal bliss, which does not happen to egos.
It sounds like you're asking Pat if he wants to be happy at the cost of naivete, and he says no. Naivete is for him a very pronounced form of unhappiness.
Of course, in our culture "happiness" has become much more psychological than eudamonia. For example, lots of people will skip the "happiness pills," but it's not because they don't want to be happy, it's because they don't think the pills produce happiness. They don't think psychological ease is happiness. Pat seems to fall easily within this group.
Quoting J
Robbie, by your own admission, does not believe that your advice will make him happy (because it is not achievable for him). This doesn't mean he doesn't want to be happy; it only means he doesn't think you are giving good advice.
Quoting J
I think he surely does.
Quoting J
In the very first pages of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle connects happiness with the good. You could say that for Aristotle not everyone wants to be virtuous, but not that not everyone wants to be happy. Everyone does want to be happy, and they try to do so within their unique circumstances.
Quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.4
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Edit:
Quoting J
If "exact opposite" means virtue then we are speaking about the akrates. On the other hand, someone who desires vice is the akolastos that you read about in Kevin Flannerys paper, Anscombe and Aristotle on Corrupt Minds.
Quoting J
Robbie is the akrates. Generally we say about Robbie that he is conflicted. See my post <here>:
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting javra
If it matters to us, if it is important to our goals, then we are implicitly aware of it, even if we dont know how to articulate it explicitly in words.
I don't yet see how this answers the question I asked. Consider cases of non-wanton addiction where the addict consciously knows better, wants to cease the addiction, but can't on account of their total mind's goading to persist in the addiction. Yes, quitting an addiction is possible, but the greater the addiction the more difficult so doing becomes. Here, then, the conscious being in question holds a sense-making wherein quitting is deemed beneficial. But the same person's unconscious mind (to simply a complex issue) for the most part at least engages in sense-making wherein continuing the addiction is held onto as beneficial. The consciousness concerned must then navigate between the long-term good of ceasing the addiction which they consciously acknowledge and the short-term bad of experiencing a potential horde of bad consequences (from physical pain to lack of mental clarity which would then destabilize the tasks which the person knows they must do, etc.) that would result where the person to in fact cease the addiction. A thousand and one complexities and variations ensue; I know. But, to get back to my initial question:
Is any of this sense-making - both on the part of the consciousness involved and on the part of their own unconscious mind which stands in opposition to their conscious will - in any way independent of some form of intent ... and, thereby, non-intentional in quality?
If not, then I don't understand how Aristotelian-ism "fetishizes intent over sense-making" ... this since the later is then fully contingent on the occurrence of the former.
Yea. The Jews have never caught a break from holocausts long enough to disappear into the oblivion of bliss.
Bob presented us with a supposed evil (the moral decay of modern society) and offered Aristotelian ethics as a cure. That was his justification for promoting Aristotelian ethics in the rest of his OP. If you remove that justification, all you are left with is a neutral precis of Aristotle. Bob was not being neutral: he was being passionate. Whether you agree with him or not, he had a serious point to make. Let's not take that away from him just to save his blushes.
Interestingly, Bob's justification is consequentialist: "if we were Aristotelians, the consequence would be an improved society". Bob has in the past pooh-poohed consequentialism, yet here he is arguing like a true consequentialist. As a partially lapsed consequentialist myself, I note the fact with a certain wry enjoyment.
Quoting Lionino
Well, of course any philosophical debate can fill a book. But sometimes you can have a useful debate in a much smaller space. The problem with Bob's thesis is that because it makes sweeping claims about social history, the present state of society, and the supposed cause of that state (rampant moral anti-realism), it needs a lot of space in which to provide evidence and arguments to support these claims. There just isn't the space to do it here.
Dude, have you mingled with any Jews? They too have familial troubles, etc., to not even get in trite dis-satisfactions such as being occasionally hungry or thirsty.
"Full" satisfaction in the sense of "complete" ... hence in literal lack of any want whatsoever. I was under the impression we are here addressing philosophical issues - rather than colloquial sentiments and affirmations. And, since you "understand me", who the hell ever said that literal bliss equates to oblivion? This being a rather materialist/nihilist interpretation of the issue - which I do not hold.
Quoting javra
As I wrote to Philosophim in another thread, addiction is so powerful because the rewards are immediate and the detrimental effects are more gradual. The drug makes one sicker and sicker, pulls one of out of social world and into isolation more and more completely, but one also knows that the immediate effect of one more fix or hit or drink is to make one forget about all anxieties. One has to learn to see immediate repercussions of the long-term harm, immediate repercussions that are so powerful they override the immediately gratifying effects. They used to call this hitting bottom in alcohol addiction , but many never hit bottom.
The more you talk about Aristotle the more convinced I am that you have never read him. Perhaps you should try to produce texts which you believe support your claims. Aristotle's account of pleasure is rather complicated, and his theory of practical reason is not "hedonic." It would be almost as odd to say that Plato is "hedonic."
Quoting javra
What I mean by fetishizing intent is the assumption that intent can be ethically incorrect, that one can want what one shouldnt, in addition to success or failure at intelligible sense-making.
Aristotle allows that bad fortune can make people miserable. This is actually an argument in favor of the virtues, and ultimately for the life of contemplation, in that other goods are less stable. One can always experience bad fortune, e.g. the rock star whose next album flops and then realizes they've saved none of their great wealth and are essentially broke. They were dependent on good fortune that was ultimately largely outside their control for their happiness.
Some people might indeed be made quite content through luck or good fortune, but this is of course the least stable sort of happiness since it isn't sustained internally. It's also a state of less freedom since the person is dependent on extrinsic goods. Whereas happiness of the ascetic who is serenely content with much or little is not subject to the same contingency.
Later thinkers like Boethius would however argue that true flourishing essentially comes from knowing and actualizing the Good, and view the happiness that comes from good fortune as a mere counterfeit good. Happiness steming from this sort of self-determining drive towards the Good would be best in part because it seems immune to the vicissitudes of fortune. The further one ascends towards the center from which all things come (the Good, God) the less one is cast about by the whims of Fortune.
This is Aristotle merged with Neoplatonism (and less explicitly, Christianity). Boethius for his part wrote his great work on moral philosophy (the Consolation) while awaiting his execution for cracking down on corruption too hard, having seen a tremendous fall from grace after essentially being the deputy of what remained of the Western Roman Empire. It's actually this text of late antiquity that forms the basis of medieval ethics. Aristotle was largely lost, while Boethius' text was the most copied work outside the Bible for an 800 year span.
By this view the martyr saint seems to be the paradigmatic case of happiness precisely because of their absolute freedom (at least at the over of their own persons) to embrace the Good.
So ... a mass-murdering and torturing rapist's intent to torture, rape and murder as many as possible cannot be ethically incorrect. He cannot thereby want what he shouldn't. (This irrespective of the success or failure that he might have in respect to this personal "intelligible sense-making" he engages in.)
Is this what you're claiming?
Because to me this kind'a speaks to that whole bemoaning of modern-day ethical standards as being in a state of decadence, demise, or however one ought best term this. And to the totalitarianisms at home and abroad that are fastly catching sway as a likewise detrimental counteraction to the post-modern ethical mindset just affirmed.
A central claim in that previous thread was that a serial killer need not be acting immorally:
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting javra
Yep. :up:
Again, I think the idea comes second, after the fact.
Quoting Bob Ross
I vote no on all three. So, for me there are no moral facts.
Quoting Bob Ross
Fun and play are not exactly the same thing, although play is often fun. Play is inseparably tied up with creativity and creativity is, if not inseparable from, at least strongly connected to doing good work. Here's the last stanza of Robert Frost's "Two Tramps in Mud Time" that says it just right:
Quoting Robert Frost - Two Tramps in Mud Time
Myself, I do strongly take to heart this blatant aspect of current reality as we know it, which I'll here emphasize by restating:
Quoting javra
I like the value structures of democracy and dislike the authoritarianism I see spreading in the USA and in many another country worldwide. And, in case this needs to be at least pragmatically addressed, the "no moral facts (of ethical rights and wrongs)" approach to ethics doesn't have a chance in withstanding the oncoming slippery-slopes toward what could well become a global fascism.
That's a very good op Bob. If I remember correctly, "good" for Aristotle is a principle of utility, what is often translated as "that for the sake of which". From this perspective, an action is designated as needed, for the sake of an end, "that for the sake of which", and this is the good. So the action itself is "good" because it is the means to a further good, which is the end. However, an end turns out to be the means to a further end, and we must designate an ultimate end to avoid infinite regress, something desired for itself alone, and that is happiness.
Design and purpose are inextricably linked, and can be used to two ways: the intentionality of an agent and the expression thereof in something, or the function something. I mean it in the latter sense when it comes to humans.
That my eye was not designed by an agent, does not entail it does not have the function, developed through evolution, of seeing. In that sense, it is designed for seeing. If you wish to use "design" in the former sense strictly, then I would just say that one should size up to their nature, and their nature dictates their functions.
The conflict between them is whether knowledge of the good is innate or learned. I think Aristotle was a little of both.
This is impossible: society is based off of social constructs, which are ideas people have hadideas through action (at a minimum). Human beings develop their living structures on ideas, even if they are not entirely able to explicate it to people through language what those ideas are, and so the idea which is embodied in the society must come first.
According to your logic, rights came before the idea of rights; which makes no sense. People started formulating an idea of a right and started implementing it into society (largely because they were fed up with being mistreated).
I believe, if I am understanding you correctly, Aristotle would say it is always learned; because virtuous activity is never on accident. Aristotle thought that we are morally responsible for our rationally deliberate actions; and those are never innate.
Again, I don't agree. We can leave it at that. I don't think we'll get any further here. Maybe in a separate thread sometime.
Quoting Bob Ross
Sure it does.
Feudal lords - "Hey, king!! Stop overtaxing us and throwing us in jail!!
Fighting takes place.
King - "Oh... ok then. We'll lay off on the tariffs and dungeons. We'll write that down if you insist."
Feudal lord #1 (whispering to the other lords) - "Hey, this is great. The king has promised us... what has he promised us? What do we call them?"
Feudal lord #2 - "We can call them "rights." All in favor..."
Feudal lords - "Aye"
I think it would be better to say that your eyes have purpose, the purpose of seeing, but they were not designed by an agent. This demonstrates something very interesting about intention. Intention creates things, but not necessarily by design. So for example, abstract art is created intentionally, but the artist doesn't necessarily follow a design, and does not know what the outcome will be prior to the act of creation.
This sheds light on the nature of accidents. Accidents are created by intentional acts, but they are outside any design, and are not actually intended. Further, many intentional acts have no real end in mind, as when you kind of "go with the flow". In a party, you follow the party, and this may become what is known as "herd mentality". It is very clear that the ideas of intention and purpose cover a lot more area than simply design.
We seem to be inquiring into, and differing about, the meaning of the term "happiness" here. As you know, Sally Haslanger (and others, I'm sure) has suggested a useful way of schematizing possible approaches to this kind of inquiry. Heres a quick summary, with liberal unattributed quotes from Haslanger.
When asking about the meaning of F, we can broadly take three approaches:
Conceptual analysis elucidates our concept (that is, the concept as employed within a certain group of language users) by exploring what we we take F-ness to be. It is, more or less, a priori, or at least armchair; the assumption is that the analyst is already in a position to know how the relevant community uses the term. A more genealogical approach here would include considering the variety of understandings and uses of F-ness over time, and among different individuals.
Descriptive analysis elucidates the empirical kinds into which our paradigm cases of F-ness fall, in an attempt to derive a definition of F-ness through examples. For this, we usually have to do some research, especially if the question of natural kinds is involved. (To jump ahead a little bit, a descriptive analysis of happiness would probably include paradigm cases like contentment, satisfaction, fulfillment, pleasure, sense of meaningfulness to others, etc.)
Ameliorative analysis elucidates, more or less, what F should mean, what it ought to mean in order to best serve our philosophical needs even, perhaps, our moral needs. Its a normative approach, and usually results in recommendations to precisify a term, or to reorganize a series of related terms in a new way, so as to add perspicacity to what they can say.
Very rough and ready, but lets see how it applies when F = happiness. Back to your original statement: In our culture ?happiness has become much more psychological than eudaemonia. For example, lots of people will skip the ?happiness pills, but it's not because they don't want to be happy, it's because they don't think the pills produce happiness. They don't think psychological ease is happiness.
This, on Haslangers view, reports a confusion of approaches. The statement begins by offering a (partial) descriptive analysis of happiness: in our culture the word is used to pick out certain psychological states (probably including the ones I listed above). Youre not saying that this is what the concept in fact entails that would be a conceptual analysis nor are you recommending (or not) using the word happiness in this way that would be an ameliorative analysis. Youre simply pointing to an empirical fact about language users right now.
But next you say that many people will skip happiness pills -- that is, refuse to be made allegedly happy by some reliable means because they dont believe such means do produce happiness. So the people in question have performed (in some loose sense) a conceptual analysis of the term happiness -- they know what it means to them and are disputing whether happy-pill happiness is in fact covered by the definition of happiness, properly understood. And of course by bringing in a judgment like properly understood, we reach ameliorative analysis; the pill-skippers may want us to reform our thinking on the matter and stop using the term happiness in this inferior way.
In conclusion, They dont think psychological ease is happiness. But were entitled to ask, given the blurring of approaches used so far, in which sense do they disagree with this? Are they saying that they dont believe psychological ease is enumerated among happy states by language users in our culture? (descriptive approach) This would mean that a person who says I feel happy because Im at ease is using the language incorrectly, and others would have trouble understanding why he would say this. Or are the deniers saying that, upon analysis, happiness cant be reduced to psychological ease? (conceptual approach) This would mean that the person who declares I feel happy because Im at ease is not wrong about language use; this is in fact how people talk; theyre wrong per se, about the concept of happiness, and this can be demonstrated analytically. Or, lastly, are the deniers saying that one shouldnt equate psychological ease with happiness? (ameliorative approach) that there are good reasons for recommending a different use of the term and/or understanding of the concept. This would mean that I feel happy because Im at ease can be both coherent and true, but on the recommended revision that would no longer be the case.
Ill stop with a bit of generalization. I think the discussion on this thread, and throughout much of moral philosophy, is largely ameliorative, and rightly so. What we have here are competing recommendations for how a cloudy term like happiness might be better understood and used. Indeed, one recommendation is to abandon entirely its common usages in philosophy and substitute eudaemonia. The reason for this recommendation is important: Its because happiness in English is found philosophically wanting. It doesnt seem up to the job that weve asked it to do. Using it, were led into contradictions and unlikelihoods. Eudaemonia, in contrast, offers much more clarification the claim is that it better captures a coherent moral stance, fits better into a larger metaphysics, and great philosophers like Aristotle are brought in to testify to this.
I say this is the right approach, but with a caveat. We need to keep Haslangers analysis in mind, and be very careful when we seem to say that English users dont know what happiness is, or that someone really wants to be happy even if we cant find any examples on the ground of how to use happy in this way. The language, and the way people use it, is what it is. Speakers arent (usually) making mistakes. My character Pat doesnt want to be happy, on either a descriptive or a conceptual understanding of the term. At best, you might convince them that they ought to ameliorate what happiness means (call it happiness*) in order to include the kinds of things they do want but then you cant also say that they really wanted happiness all along. Competent English users would begin scratching their heads. The whole point of ameliorative analysis is to show that happiness and happiness* are not the same thing, and that one is preferable to the other -- if not morally, then at the least in terms of philosophical usefulness and insight.
Instead of trying to respond to the different arguments you give, I am going to opt for instead pointing out that I do not take Haslanger to be an authority. She may be an authority for you, but she is not for me, and I dont find her approach promising. For example, I dont know why we should accept her dichotomy of how terms are used, why we should take it to be exhaustive, why we should frame the whole question in terms of her taxonomy, etc. At first glance it would seem that she is trying to create a taxonomy of term use in order to answer a contentious societal question about the terms race and gender, and as I have said recently, I think that trying to set out out general principles on the basis of a controversy is a fundamental philosophical mistake (see <penultimate paragraph>). Haslanger's taxonomy might be more useful in that limited context.
I would opine that when someone wants to leverage a non-mutual authority on a philosophy forum what they need to do is argue that authoritys arguments rather than appeal to their authority. If you can find a way to give in your own words a Haslangerian critique then that would be an appropriate way to bring her into the conversation, but at the moment you are imposing her as an authority. Note too how crucially important her taxonomy is. A metaphysical taxonomy of all the mutually exclusive ways of using terms would be more or less on par with divine revelation, and to put forward such a taxonomy on the basis of authority would require a very powerful authority indeed. My favorite philosophers never even attempted such a feat (i.e. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas...).
The thread is about Aristotle and I think it is much better to begin with Aristotle. I think he touches on the same sorts of questions in a more natural way. Let me quote the larger context of what I already quoted in EN I.4, although it is also important to read the first three chapters:
Quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.4
EN I.5 directly follows by raising epistemic considerations, not entirely unlike those that you raise via Haslanger. Chapter 6 then begins considering the concrete views of what happiness is.
Quoting J
I think you are overstating this case. Eudaimonia is usually translated into English as happiness, and there is a reason for that. Let me quote Jonathan Barnes introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics (Penguin) for some similarities and differences:
I would say that Haslangers strongly analytic approach is inappropriate because there is a complex relation here between analysis and synthesis. Happiness is living well or doing well, but there is an epistemic quest built into the term insofar as often the same person actually changes his opinion [about happiness]. Happiness simultaneously represents a unity and a multiplicity. Everyone aims for happiness, and yet they disagree as to what happiness is, or how happiness is achieved, and they at times change their minds.
What is at stake is not Haslangers terminological dispute, but rather that, But when it comes to saying in what happiness consists, opinions differ, and the account given by the generality of mankind is not at all like that of the wise. It is an argument over man's final end, not an argument over words. The idea is that everyone wants happiness and yet they disagree as to what happiness consists in. It is important to handle the subtle distinction between happiness per se and what happiness consists in, and not to mistake disagreements over the latter for disagreements over the former. Aristotle is already talking about happiness per se long before he introduces the actual word, namely by talking about mans last end (and this is why it is crucial to read the chapters that precede I.4). Aquinas follows Aristotle very closely in his own treatment (link).
Now is Aristotle saying, < ?x(Human(x) ? DesiresHappiness(x)) >? He probably does believe this, but he doesnt commit himself to the claim. Why not? Presumably because trying to place the inductive conclusion beyond dispute is beside the point. If someone wants to dispute the universality of the claim then Aristotle would presumably say, My book is not for you. Have a nice day. There is really no point in arguing with them. (I think Aristotle would be much more interested in observing people who do not seek happiness in their actions. I dont think there are such people, and I suppose one could argue that this is because they destroyed themselves in their quest to live and do poorly, but that strikes me as farfetched.)
But we could still ask whether such a person is saying something true. Do they want to live well and do well, or not? Probably they do and they are just confused or contrarian. The question is whether they want to be happy; it is not a semantic quibble about whether they are willing to adopt this or that word.
Quoting J
It seems to me that the first problem here is a conflation between real people and fictitious characters, and weve been over that before. Fictitious characters are not infallible about their desires. And even if your fictional characters are based on real people, they remain somewhat fictitious insofar as they are not present and available for dialogue. It becomes a kind of argument from authority by proxy, where you speak for someone who is not present and who I am not allowed to contradict.
The second problem is that your claims about your fictitious characters seem incorrect, and that is what I argued in my reply. For example, your fictitious Pat said, I wouldn't trade one minute of my unhappiness for a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces. I said:
Quoting Leontiskos
Pat has obviously interpreted your question about happiness as a question about a fools paradise of Smiley Faces. He says he doesnt want that fools paradise. Does it follow that he doesnt want to live well or do well? Surely not. Like Aristotle, he doesnt think that happiness consists in what others say it consists in.
Now I think there are people who despair of happiness and no longer really seek it, but it does not follow that they do not desire it, and even then they still seek out some small measure of it. I think the more central objection is really the objection that the idea of happiness (or also goodness) is equivocal to the point of uselessness, or as Aristotle says:
-
Let me comment on just one part of your Haslanger section:
Quoting J
Quoting J
A large part of the problem is that you are preferring a secondary definition of happiness. Merriam-Webster gives:
Contrary to your claim, eudamonia is not eclipsed in English. In fact something close is still the primary definition of happiness, where wellbeing is involved (1a). There is a more transient and superficial sense (1b) but it is not primary. Long-term, sustainable happiness is still part of the English lexicon. If you wish to talk about happiness as something in the same genus as, a fool's paradise of Smiley Faces, then you are preferring an English sense that is both contrary to Aristotles term and also is not the primary English sense. This seems to be a quibble over words rather than a substantial objection. In any case, the Aristotelian context of the OP suffices for determining something like 1a rather than something like 1b. It should not be hard to understand what Aristotle means by happiness, and his usage is not at all foreign to English speakers.
Gosh, I seem to have riled you re Haslanger, which was certainly not my intention. I said this about her: "Sally Haslanger (and others, I'm sure) has suggested a useful way of schematizing possible approaches to this kind of inquiry." I don't think it's fair to say that "suggested a useful way" involving "possible approaches" equates to "imposing her as an authority" or claiming that she's given a "metaphysical taxonomy of all the mutually exclusive ways of using terms" in a way that's "more or less on par with divine revelation."
I'd hoped my use of Haslanger would be helpful in teasing out some of the intricacies of "What is F?" questions. I'm sorry it wasn't, for you.
That approach in general strikes me as a faux pas, but it becomes tricky when you assume that your taxonomic move is innocuous or unobjectionable and launch into a long post on the basis of that presupposition. I did begin responding to the individual arguments of your post, but after tripping over Haslanger's taxonomy enough times I began wondering why I should labor under a strange taxonomy that had been forced upon me. Ergo: I don't accept that taxonomy. You assumed I would, but you know what they say about what happens when we "assume."
Does he, though? In the very first sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines good in terms of what is aimed at.
What you just described is the idea of over-taxation and its mitigation/eradication being manifested into society through action; which is impossible under your view, since ideas come after what happens.
What you are forgetting or misunderstanding is that action is the manifestation of ideas; and I think you may be thinking of an "idea" as something sans action.
Accidents are never intentional; but evolution doesn't operate on accidents.
Saying it is "intentional", "purposeful", etc. is tricky with non-agency; and I understand why people oppose it. It is usually associated with an agent of some sort; but, in that case, I just call it "function".
I'm not sure how helpful this is if the question is the adequacy of Aristotle's moral philosophy. The Ethics and Politics make it fairly clear what is meant by "happiness." Aristotle himself calls a life spent pursuing mere pleasure "slavish," and a life "for grazing beasts," just a few pages into the Ethics, so the distinction between "flourishing" and something like Huxley's "utopia" in A Brave New World comes into stark relief quite quickly.
To your earlier question re your second example, "vice" has taken on a particular sort of connotation in English were it is either associated particularly with evil or with things like smoking, drinking, prostitution, gambling, etc. Aristotle's use doesn't have this connotation. The virtues are "excellences," and vices are simply the opposite.
So with the person who has overwhelming issues with anxiety, we would say that have a "vice" in the sense that their anxiety keeps them from "living a good life," "acting virtuously," and perhaps even "doing the right thing." A vice is a sort of habit. The idea that vices like cowardice or gluttony could be ameliorated with training á la cognitive behavioral therapy is right in line with Aristotle's philosophy.
Personally, I don't think Aristotle's philosophy is totally adequate. Alsdair MacIntyre advances the "Aristotlean Tradition," as opposed to Aristotle because there are problems extending Aristotle's common good outside the limits of the polis. For my part, I think Aristotle only obliquely gets at why self-determining happiness is superior to mere "good fortune." The connection between happiness and the good (and then the Good and freedom) becomes tenuous in places, in part because Aristotle advances "common sense" arguments based on utility instead of his deeper arguments (which come around in Book X of the Ethics and other places).
Plato does a better job highlighting how the search for knowledge and the pursuit of the Good are what allow a person to transcend what they already are, which means that these serve as the engine of self-determination and freedom. I think later thinkers do a better job refining Aristotle and keeping this thread in Plato from being submerged, but unfortunately these authors have become unpalatable in contemporary secular philosophy due to how their thinking on this is colored by the language of Christian theology.
Hegel is part of this tradition and can offer us a better reason for dismissing the solution of something like Huxley's A Brave New World or even similar, less offensive "utopias" (e.g. human society in Dan Simon's Ilium and Olympos). There is an epistemic element to freedom, best covered in the Phenomenology, that requires the unification of subject and object (Absolute Knowing). Lessss opaquely there is also the demand that the fulfillment of freedom requires that freedom itself becomes the object and content of the (collective) will"the free will that wills itself."
Anything less is ultimately contingent and arbitrary, and so unstable.
I don't agree, but we've probably taken this as far as we can.
The very first sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics: (or the second, depending on your translation)
Quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, First sentence
Right. The objection seems to be, "Someone could say that they do not desire happiness so long as they use the word 'happiness' in a way that is not in accord with what Aristotle means; therefore it is false that everyone desires happiness." This sort of objection would only make sense in a non-Aristotelian context. But this thread is literally about Aristotle and among other things Aristotle's approach to happiness and our final end.
(@J)
I second (or maybe, third) that. Brings to mind a poem that seems to me to illustrate the case:
I find the poem to be fairly easy to emotively comprehend, despite the possible variations in interpretation. The personally held good aimed at here can then be said to be, to paraphrase, the uncertainty of the storms, or of the strife, that calls out to one as though in them one finds ones further development and, hence, one's possible future flourishing as a being, i.e. eudemonia, or being in accord with the highest virtue - this rather than seeking a certain good fortune or the like. In the case as illustrated, one could then say that ones intent is not that of obtaining happiness in the sense of easygoing joy or some such but, instead, the obtainment of ones further possible flourishing despite the uncertain risks such that were this actively held intent to pursue the uncertainty of the storms to become obstructed, only then would the individual addressed experience suffering. And, then, such that approaching such storms would then be in line with Aristotelian notions of happiness - this while shunning happiness in the sense of easygoing joy and so forth.
At any rate, Im in agreement.
That's not a definition of the concept of good: he just mentioned that it has been rightly (according to him) said that what is good is what everything aims at. That's an entirely different claim than what good itself is.
EDIT: To elaborate more, to say that everything aims at what is good does not elaborate at all on what good itself is nor what is supremely good. Firstly, what can be supremely noted as good could be anything at all, and it could still be true that everything aims at it (depending on what it is); and Aristotle's statement leaves it an open-question entirely. Secondly, even if he would have elaborated on what is supremely good then it would still be an open-question what the concept of good refers to (e.g., if everything aims towards what is intrinsically valuable, then it is still an open-question--without further elaboration--what the concept of 'good' refers to even if it is good to aim at what is intrinsically valuable)
Aristotle makes zero attempt to define what the concept of good refers to; but he alludes to what is supremely good being that which is aimed at (which is an allusion to intrinsic value).
I've made my case, you've made yours. Neither of us has been convinced. I think we're down to un-hunhs and nuh-unhs.
Quoting Bob Ross
If I knew what that meant, perhaps I would feel insulted.
"Accidents are never intentional" needs clarification. An accident can be the unintended result of an intentional action. As the result of an intentional act, it is cause by intention, just like the intended goal is also the result of the intended act, and caused by intention. So, from the point of view of efficient causation, there is no difference between the accident, and the successful end. However, since the accidental effect is said to be unintended, we need another way to talk about this type of effect of an intentional act, so it's called accidental. Therefore we have two types of effects of intentional acts, those intended, and those not intended.
If there is a foreseen effect to one's actions, then it is intentional. If it isn't foreseen, then I agree that it is accidental but that doesn't entail that it is intentional. So I am not following what you are contending with here.
From what you said, it follows that accidents are never intentional; even if accidents can arise from intentional acts.
I think it is a matter of two different ways of using the word, "intentional". In one sense, we say that an accident is not intentional. However, in another sense, when something is the effect of intention, we say it is intentional regardless of whether the effect is accidental.
For example, I swing the hammer at a nail, and accidentally hit my thumb. The act of swinging the hammer was intentional, regardless of whether I hit the nail or my thumb. So whether the nail is hit or my thumb nail is hit, is irrelevant to the fact that the act which results in one or the other is an intentional act. So even though it is my thumb which is hit, the act which has that effect is intentional.
What we have therefore is a separation between the act and the effect of the act. This is the separation between the means and the end. Both "means" and "end" refer to what is intended, but the effect of the chosen means (the act) is not necessarily consistent with the intended end, so the effect of the action may be unintended. Since the act is intended (swinging the hammer) yet the effect (hitting my thumb) is not intended, we must assume a separation between cause and effect, a lack of necessity in that relationship, to allow that the one is intentional and the other is not.
Not necessarily. If the side effect is not easily foreseen, then we typically don't consider it intentional; or we might say that it was intentional insofar as the person was aware that there was a chance of it happening and accepting those odds. However, in the case that it is foreseeable or was foreseen (with high probability)(all else being equal), then I completely agree it was intentional: it as indirectly intended, which entails it was not accidental.
You can't say some accidents are intentional: that's like saying some orange squares are not orange.
The hammer hitting your thumb was not intentional whatsoever prima facie in your example. The act of swinging the hammer, intending to bring about the end of hitting the nail into something, was intentional. Now, let's say you foresaw that the hammer might hit your thumb and new this with 20% probability and still decided to carry it out: we would say that you intentionally swung the hammer knowing it may result in an accident, but we would NOT say that you intentionally caused that accident. Now, let's say you foresaw with a 99% probability that you were going to cause the accident instead of what you really intend, then we might say you intended it because of the probabilistic certainty that you had of bringing it about. It depends though, because we might say you are just stupid and didn't realize that it doesn't make sense to carry it out with that high of a probability; or we might say you are unwise (unprudent) for doing it anyways out of (presumably) passion or desire to hit the nail.
My main point is just that accidents, by definition, cannot be intentional. That's categorically incoherent to posit.
But is something accidental if it not only could have but should have been forseen? People manifest different degrees of "epistemic responsibility." Is there an objective standard separating accident from culpability?
Unintended consequences are not necessarily accidental, only unforseen.
Here's J. A. K. Thomson's translation:
Here is W. D. Ross:
Quoting Bob Ross
The Nicomachean Ethics is precisely this elaboration.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, it's pretty clear that Aristotle does this at the very beginning of the book. You may take exception to his definition, but it is there all the same.
Aristotle's definition straddles the line between "objective" and "subjective" and this rubs us the wrong way, but to fault him for involving what we call "subjectivity" in his definition would be anachronistic.
I'm talking about things totally unforeseen. I agree that we do not commonly call them "intentional", but in the sense that they are the direct effect of the intentional act, just like the desired end is the direct effect of the intentional end, there is fundamentally no essential difference between them. That is why we are just as responsible for our mistakes as we are for our correct actions. Do you agree that you are responsible for your mistakes, as they are the results of your intentional acts?
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't agree with this. The first premise is that the act of swinging the hammer was intentional. Do you agree? You claim that the effect of the act can be separated from its cause, to say that the cause was intentional but the effect was not intentional. The point being that when things are set in motion by an act of intention, and we allow that more than just the immediate act itself is intentional, that an effect is also intentional, then we need consistency, and say that all the effects are intentional.
What we are talking about is misjudgment, mistake. The fact that a person misjudges the effects of one's actions does not make the effects any less intentional. It just means that the person made a mistake in judgement. A mistake in judgement does not remove intentionality from the act, nor does it remove intentionality from the effects of the act.
Quoting Bob Ross
This does not make any sense to me. A judgement as to the probability of success of one's intentional acts, is not useful toward determining whether the effect of that act is intentional or not. Suppose I flip a coin, and the probability is 50/50. No matter what the outcome is, that outcome was intended, because I flipped the coin for the purpose of having an outcome, and the particular outcome which occurs is irrelevant to that intent. Likewise, when I make any intentional act, the goal is that the act will have an effect. It's true that I desire a specific outcome, like when I bet on the coin toss, but the fact that one outcome is more desirable than others, does not make that outcome more intentional than the others. Does it make any sense to say that when I bet on heads, if it lands heads, that was intended, and if it lands tails that was not intended?
Quoting Bob Ross
I do not agree with this. I think that we simply misuse "intentional" to say that the desired outcome is intentional, and the undesirable outcomes are not intentional. Each effect is essentially the same, of the same type or category, the effect of an intentional act. It is inconsistent, and therefore incoherent, to say that one effect of the intentional act is intentional, and another effect is not intentional.
I cannot agree with the teleology of being. It is a form of preformism that in my opinion is already well refuted.
To illustrate this, one can take the example of genetic transcription in biology: If we have a DNA sequence, this in itself does not possess genetic expression; it is only in its relation to the RNA and the process of transcription that something like an expression takes place. The idea here is that what we believe to be the prefigured result does not actually exist but only takes place in the relationship of the DNA to an other that interprets and translates it in its own way. The information of who we are is not in the genes, but, strangely enough, in the unprecedented process of transcription, interpretation, translation, etc., itself.
In a similar way we can see ourselves: "I am I and my circumstances" (Ortega y Gasset), "Existence precedes essence" (Sartre). The end of our existence is never prefigured and is always about to happen, and it is to the extent that we develop in our circumstances that we become what we are. Nietzsche entitled one of his books as follows: "Ecce Homo: How one becomes what one is". We can say of ourselves that to a large extent we become what we are. We become. Which means that the end is not at the beginning (as teleological thinking presupposes).
Quoting JuanZu
Excellent point.
Yes. No one would say I intentionally killed someone by drunk driving if they knew for certain that I genuinely did not foresee the serious possibility of killing or injuring someone by drunk driving. For example, a severely cognitively challenged person who gets their hands on some alcohol and ends up drunk driving probably isnt capable of foreseeable the obvious possibility that they may injure or kill someone. In practicality, most people cannot get away with claiming they did not foresee it (because we do not believe them) or, if they can, we hold them responsible for their negligence (as opposed to their intentions).
What do you think an intention is? If a consequence of something intended is accidental, then it was unintentional: thats what it means for it to be accidental.
Your translations help clarify a bit. My translation says:
Which is, compared to your citations, a poor translation (apparently). Irregardless, if I take it that his second sentence is a definition (and not an assertion that about what nobility think), then:
1. He is defining what he thinks the good is, and not what good is itself. 'The good' refers to what is supremely and ultimately good, which he seems to be claiming is whatever all things aim at. This is not a definition of the concept of 'good'.
2. If I assume he means to define "good", as opposed to "the good", as "that which all things aim at", then this seems like an incredibly inadequate definition. Firstly, there seem to clearly, even by Aristotle's own admission, be things which agents aim at which are good but are not universally aimed at by all agents (e.g., pleasure). Secondly, if "good = that which all things aim at" then when someone says "well-being is good" they are saying "well-being is something that all things aim at" which is both false and does not capture the essence of what they are trying to express with the word "good".
I don't think yours is a bad translation. The point is that Aristotle is setting out the meaning (or at least his working meaning) of 'good' in that phrase. In colloquial terms this is a kind of definition. Scholars will argue whether it is a properly Aristotelian definition, or whether it should be translated into English as 'definition'. Regardless of those debates, Aristotle won't take up the use of a central term without giving some kind of explanation of what he means by it, and that is where he does this with 'good'.
Quoting Bob Ross
But this is where Aristotle disagrees with Plato. Aristotle thinks there is no Platonic Form of the Good.
Quoting Bob Ross
I mostly want to save this debate for another day. What I will say is that 'good' is notoriously difficult to define, and that Aquinas goes about the psychological angle in this way:
Quoting Aquinas, ST I-II.94.2
The difficulty with defining 'good' is that it ignores our subjective/objective distinction and it can act as a grammatical modifier of pretty much anything.
If I push someone around because I am bigger and stronger, and that person then goes and pushes another because he is upset that I pushed him around and that third person then kills himself, there is arguably a causal link there. I think it is very salient to recognize that actions inherently transcend intentions in their scope. Hence Descartes' observation that the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding.
It is completely unrealistic to envision that when we intend to do something the results will be exactly what we envision. Some corporations entire business model is structured around "externalized costs" - i.e. things that they cause to happen but don't happen to want to assume responsibility for.
Quoting Bob Ross
Note that the cognitively challenged person is not capable and therefore, for Pantagruel, would be causing an effect accidentally.
Quoting Bob Ross
I think you two are talking past each other. Pantagruel is saying that we can at times be held responsible for unintended consequences. You seem to agree, and you rightly call this 'negligence.'
You just described the essential difference between them.
Yes, the cause and the effect can be separated in this way because, you are forgetting, intentionality is an idea (end) being aimed at; so it is entirely possible for a person to aim at something and completely or partially misslike an an archer trying to hit their mark. If an archer misses and hits a deer instead of the bullseye they were aiming at, was killing the deer intentional? Of course not. If I take your position seriously, then it would be; because your view attaches the intentionality of an act to all causality related effects.
Before we dive into this, I need you to define what you mean by intention; because you are using it in very unwieldy ways here.
The point is that what one knows is relevant to what one is aiming at.
Sure, but that doesnt negate anything I said. My point was that, e.g., you intentionally let a person die if you foresee that there is a 99% chance that the mere act of flipping the coin, which you intend to flip, will directly result in the death of a person. Was is intentional is not solely about the causation that occurs from a given act: it is more fundamentally about what the person is aiming at.
This doesnt negate in the slightest that we are biologically predetermined in various ways: which is just to say that our bodies have functions. Those functions dictate our design in a weak sense of Telos.
Likewise, someone who wants to go for a strong version of Telos could say that evolution is a process ultimately with a designbut this is not something required for my position. My eye, even with everything you said, is designed to see; and to see in a particular way.
This is the consequence of failing to see Telos in thingseven in a weak sense. One resorts (typically) to radical individualism.
Man clearly has an essence; and just because it isnt eternal doesnt change that. My eye is designed to see and in such-and-such a manner: does that mean that it isnt undergoing a process of evolution, and partaking in a broader process of evolution as it pertains to procreation? Of course not.
You are trying to go from everything is transitory to nothing has an essence.
I dont think he is. I think he is clarifying what is most good and noting that goods are what we aim at.
Even the first sentence would contradict his second sentence if I accepted what you are saying:
The first sentence clearly states that we aim at things that are good; which implies that there is a difference between aiming at something good and aiming at something bad; but if what is good is just what we aim at, then there is no such distinction.
I wasnt suggesting otherwise: the good, in the sense Aristotle is using it in that sentence, refers to what is most good. the good does not, as a phrase, exclusively refer to the platonic Form of The Good.
It is clearly a bad definition, and I think it is clear Aristotle is not trying to define it there. The concept of good is not identical to the concept of aiming at something or that which is aimed at.
Likewise, your quote of Aquinas does not define good as that which everything aims at:
He is just noting, rightly, just like Aristotle, that beings aim at perceived goods: no man aims at what is bad, except insofar as it is a means towards the good.
Does it, though? I would say the concept of good is identical to the concept of value.
I think Aristotle is just using the concept of good and claiming that what is good for a thing is for it to be excellent at what it was designed to do.
Just because something is caused by something done intentionally, it does not follow that that effect was intentional. You are forgetting or omitting that intentionality is about what is being aimed at---not what happens.
If I am aiming with a bow an arrow at a bullseye target, and I miss fire and hit a deer of which I had no clue was somewhere behind the target; then I did not thereby intentionally hit the deer even though it follows from the causal chain which derives back to an intentional action. According to you, it would be intentional.
I think we are just disagreeing on what 'intention' is.
You have misdirected my rebuttal by mis-characterizing it. Intentionality is not just about what is aimed at, it is also about what is the reason for a certain type of action. My point is that, whatever action you do, you are not always - not often - in a position where you can determine that exactly and only what you want to happen will happen. You may intend to help a co-worker get a promotion by doing some of his work for him. Only to have the boss discover you did it and give the promotion to you instead. Or, as I said, you may hit someone because you are mad at him. Then he goes home and hits his wife because, after a bad day, your blow was the straw that broke the camels back.
Intentional causality is often done with an imperfect knowledge and therefore, even when it "works" often has additional unexpected effects. This is exactly what companies who choose to disregard "externalized costs" do. And it is a poor choice all around. If a company disregards externalized costs, then the explicitly choose not to manage the ongoing consequences of their actions. Which means that, the system in which they are involved (the ongoing project of exploiting resources for example) they have elected not to manage some of the results of their actions, the consequence of which can only be that that system can never be made stable (by their actions).
Yes, the externalized cost model pays penalties as the price of doing business rather than changing behavior to avoid them.
Another side of accidents that touches upon consequences well beyond our view is reflected in Aristotle saying there could be no science of them. That is oddly echoed in Chaos theory and the delicate efficacy of the butterfly effect. The big garden is not being tended.
This is to ignore foreseen effects (and also to ignore foreseeable effects). Bob's point is presumably that unforeseeable effects are not intentional. The business you are talking about is intentionally ignoring a foreseen effect. The person who strikes out in anger is ignorant of a foreseeable effect, and therefore possibly guilty of negligence. An unforeseeable effect is a pure accident, and cannot be intentional. I still think you two are talking past each other.
I would say conditioned but not predetermined. As I said, predetermination implies foreshadowing, or rather, that assumes that the future is implicit in the past in some way. But that is undemonstrable and is easily refuted by people who are born with eyes and yet are blind. Did we say that their eyes had the Telos of seeing and not seeing? Then the prefigured nature of something is not something that can be verified other than a posteriori and is just a possibility. For example, we can say that the Sun will be extinct in X years exactly, that is a Telos that we understand, and we can do all the tests we want and that will not prove that it will be extinct in X years. Since thousands of things can happen that can make the Sun explode, what would happen to the Telos? Telos is a simple possibility, perhaps more minor plausible than others, but not a predetermination, neither an essence which can encompass all possibilities . You can say that the telos of life is to reproduce and survive. Do we say that people who do not want to have children have no life? And people who commit suicide? Thousands of similar examples can be proposed. The point is that you cannot take as a necessity that which is a possibility.
There is no "standard" of foreseeability. Some people act carefully. Others act recklessly. Many people think that they know what they are doing and do not. We do not live in a world where we go around executing "transactional" events that are over and done with. It isn't realistic. It is an invalid abstraction to view intentional action in this "A causes B and over" sense.
This is exactly the kind of false "insular causality" reasoning that leads to the debacle of externalized costs destroying the biosphere. Along with whatever other unfortunate accidents you'd care to add.
:up:
Therefore...?
Quoting Pantagruel
How would you know, given your curious claim that, "There is no 'standard' of foreseeability"?
Quoting Pantagruel
Obviously.
Quoting Pantagruel
What isn't realistic? Constant ignoratio elenchus?
Quoting Pantagruel
I don't think you've managed to understand what you are attempting to critique, because you surely haven't managed to contradict it. If you want to substantially disagree with the classical view of intention you will have to argue for the absurd conclusion that someone who causes an unforeseeable effect has intended that effect.
Quoting Pantagruel
When you commit an equivocation by pretending that a company which intentionally ignores foreseen consequences is somehow supposed to be acting unintentionally, you are whipping up faux disagreement and enmity. The question is not whether some person or some company professes that an effect was unforeseen or unforeseeable, the question is whether it actually was.
There doesn't have to be a standard for there to be a spectrum. There is no "standard" of colour, but there are lots of colours.
I personally know lots of people that live their lives recklessly and whose "intentions" routinely cause all kinds of havoc and produce all kinds of "unintended consequences". One such person was directly responsible for the death of my fiance by being an unfit driver. I'm not inclined to pursue this further because it is so trivially evident. We are not masters of intentionality and causality such that we are capable of surgically creating only the results we intend. The consequences of our imperfect intentionality abound in the tragic mess that humans have made of their world.
Yes, that is what I am arguing. We ought to associate intentionality with the act itself, which is the means, rather than with the end. Intention is a cause, and what is caused is action. Within the mind, there is a process of reason which links the end to the means, and the decision is made that a particular act is required to bring about a specific end. So the relation between the means and the end is a product of the mind, and this may be mistaken.
The convention (as derived from Aristotle) is to associate "intention" with the end. But when we analyze the nature of "an intentional act", we see that intention causes an act, which is understood to be the means to an end, and intention does not necessarily cause the end (as the case of mistakes). Therefore, we can establish a direct relation between intention, (as cause), and the means, but we cannot establish a direct relation between intention and the end. So despite the convention, which is to associate intention with the end, we'd have a more true representation if we associated intention with the means, instead.
Quoting Bob Ross
I am using "intentional" to signify something which is cause by an act of intention. "Intention" refers to that part of a being which causes activity, which is commonly represented as the free will. This is slightly different from the convention, which associates "intention" with the aim, or purpose of a freely willed act. I am using it in this way, in an attempt to demonstrate that we can produce a better representation of the nature of intention, if we associate it with activities rather than the common convention which is to associate it with a thing intended.
I referred briefly to human responsibility for one's acts and one's mistakes, because the fields which deal with these acts, morality and law, are more advanced in this subject. They recognize "intentional acts". Intentional acts are supposed to be acts which are guided by an aim, or purpose, directed toward an end, but since it's often difficult for an observer to identify the goal, we often do not require that in designating an act as "intentional" in the fields of morality and law. Plato would call the intended goal "the good" toward which the act is directed, and Aristotle termed it as "that for the sake of". This is the goal of the intentional act. Intentional acts then, are understood as directed toward those goods which appear to the mind of the being.
However, this perspective runs into a problem exposed by Plato, and later discussed more extensively by Augustine. This is the question of how a man can know what is good, yet act otherwise. Quite often, the human mind apprehends a good, but does not act accordingly. This creates the issue of what exactly does direct the conscious actions which are not consistent with the apprehended good. The common explanation is that the actions are directed toward some other good. But such an "other good" is often not identifiable, and this is very evident in the case of habitual actions. So when we associate "intention" with "the good", end, or goal, we have a whole category of actions from conscious agents which cannot be classed as "intentional". These are actions of habit, and apparently random acts, which cannot be associated with any goal or end.
That is the reason why I propose that we could obtain a better understanding of the acts of conscious agents if we associate intention directly with the act, rather than with the aim of the act.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, knowledge and the aim are closely related. Reason, of some sort, tends to determine the aim, and even the goals of confused or "irrational" people are determined through some sort of faulty knowledge. The problem though is that many acts carried out are not consistent with any reasoned goal. This was the argument Plato brought against the sophists who claim to teach virtue, insisting that virtue is a type of knowledge. There is a definite separation between virtue and knowledge because virtue requires control over those habitual acts which are carried out without guidance from a reasoned aim, knowledge.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is what I am disputing. You get that idea because the convention is to associate intention with the aim. But what I am saying is that this convention is based in a faulty description of intentional acts. When we stipulate, that to be intentional, it is required that the act is associated with an end, then we leave a whole lot of actions of the conscious agent which cannot be categorized. They are not caused by determinist causes, nor are they directed toward an identified goal. So, I propose that we bring these acts into the category of "intentional", and this requires that we change the meaning of "intentional" to include acts which are not directed toward a specific goal.
Precisely. I believe this is essentially identical with my observation:
Quoting Pantagruel
I have no problem with the idea that our intentions are actualized imperfectly; and I don't deny that people can be held responsible for their negligence. So I am not following what you are contending with.
This is just an example of a thing not fulfilling its end properly; and NOT that it had no end. It is uncontroversially true that the body develops the eyes for seeing all else being equal. When the circumstances impede, then there can be an eye which is developed in an impoverished manner.
The sun has as its end, albeit not intentional nor intelligently designated, to do exactly what a start does, and the particular one it is. We would say that sun, as per its nature, will eventually become a neutron star or a black hole.
With evolution, it is much clearer and we treat biology as if it has Telos: the doctor determines how healthy your body is by-at-large relative to what it is supposed to be doing and how it is supposed to be developing.
No, the end is to realize the nature of a human; which does include procreation, family, etc.
Theres a lot more to being a human than reproduction and survival.
Theres absolutely no relevance of these statements and our conversation.
Aiming at an end, is always to say that the end is not actual nor necessary (per se) and that it is merely a possibility which is attempting to be realized. This objection is just an obvious misunderstanding of what teleology is.
Then you are not talking about intentionality as it is commonly and predominantly understood. So we are talking past each other. I am only interested in intentionality as it is largely understood. Your view of intentionality strips out the essence of intention and swaps it for causality; which of no use when we analyze the intentions of someone.
The intention is wrapped up, inextricably, with the action; and what is caused is an effect.
Intention is an act; and does not cause it. The intention is no where to be found in physical causality.
What is intentional is what is related to the intention; and the intention is the end which is being aimed at. You cant implicate someone as intentionally doing something they entirely did not foresee happening just because it resulted from an act of intention towards something else. That makes no sense.
I dont understand what you mean by a conscious act which is not intentional (in the traditional sense of intentionality); and this seems to be the crux of your argument. If I consciously decide to do X, then I intentionally did Xeven if X is the end I am trying to actualize.
Think about how you discover for the first time that an eye is used to see. You obviously don't know that a priori, until it is actually functioning. And the assumption that "seeing" is somehow magically contained in the development of the eye is actually conditioned by elements external to the eye (e.g. the light that the eye needs for vision, and this is evidently external to the eye, it cannot be said that light belongs to the teleological identity of the eye); but mainly it is never demonstrated a priori, only a posteriori. An eye can always fail to see, and it is not necessarily a failure, it is just one more possibility of the eye. But why a posteriori? Because what we call the function of the eye is externally determined by other identities (such as light), which can no longer belong to the essence of the eye. So: light is not the eye, but light is necessary for the vision of the eye. If light is not the eye then light is not part of the teleology of the eye. And consequently vision is not something that is somehow prefigured in the eye. So there is no teleology called "vision" in the eye.
Quoting JuanZu
Reminds me of Nietzsches analysis of purpose:
I strongly disagree with this. Our most reliable access to a person's intention is through observations of the actions which that person causes. This is because often if we ask a person what their goals were when they acted they do not answer honestly, they might just make something up. Furthermore, the issue I described already is that the person often does not even accurately know one's own intentions when actions are carried out. This is the case with habit. This boosts the inclination to make things up. Therefore the most accurate way to analyze the intentions of someone is through the actions which they cause.
Quoting Bob Ross
Exactly, what is caused is an effect, the effect of the person's intention. The effects of a person's intention are observable and analyzable. Because of this we can produce a reliable science of intention. On the other hand, if we ask a person what one's goals were, we generally do not acquire reliable information.
Quoting Bob Ross
That is your preferred definition of "intention" because it is most consistent with the convention which associates intention with purpose. What I am saying is that if we define "intention" as the cause of one's actions instead, this provides us with a more scientific approach toward understanding purpose, aims, and goals. This is because, as I described in the last post, a person's actions are often not consistent with the person's goals. There are many reasons for this inconsistency, the force of habit, the force of mental illness, and the common example of faulty reasoning. In many cases, the person's determination of the means to the desired end, is faulty.
Because of these factors, which produce inconsistency or incoherency between one's actions and one's goals, and the fact that for moral/legal purposes the person's acts must be considered "intentional" even when the acts are not conducive to the desired end, we need to associate "intention" with the act rather than with the end which is aimed for. This indicates that "intention" ought to be associated with the act rather than the goal.
Quoting Bob Ross
Of course you can. For example, if someone thinks that burning the front lawn is a good way to cleanup the yard, and lights it on fire, then lighting the fire is intentional, regardless of whether the yard actually gets cleaned up, or if the whole neighbourhood gets burned. What is significant is that the fire started from an intentional act. What the person's actual goal was when lighting the fire is insignificant. And even if the fire is started by carelessly throwing away a cigarette, that is an intentional act, so the person is responsible for the damage caused by the fire.
Quoting Bob Ross
You don't understand because you restrict "intention" to the end on your understanding. Take my previous example of tossing a burning cigarette. Suppose the person just does it by habit, having no goal in mind when the action takes place. The person does not consciously develop the goal of tossing the butt, just does it. That is what I mean by a conscious act which is not intentional (in your sense). I believe there are many such haphazard, whimsical type acts, which the average person does every day, which cannot be said to be goal-directed. You might try to say that the act itself is the goal, but it cannot be truly expressed the way you say, "X is the goal", because there is no goal, just the urge to act in a specific way. So anytime the answer to "why did you do that", is "I felt like it", this is an example. It's very common in the way that people converse (speaking being a conscious act), many times we speak without thinking, no deliberation at all. And after speaking, in these situations, I cannot say that it was my goal to say what I said, it just came to my mind in the circumstances. Young children are also more prone toward acting this way, before they learn to control themselves.
Good stuff in there!
Right, but that's why your original objection doesn't hold. All that is needed is a spectrum. I would actually consider a spectrum a standard.
Quoting Pantagruel
This is emotional reasoning. The problem is that you apparently don't know anyone who struggles with the opposite vice of scrupulosity, and so you run to the opposite extreme. Just as there are people who think too little about the effects of their actions, so too there are people who think too much about the effects of their actions. As I noted in my first post:
Quoting Leontiskos
Modern moral theories always forget about the mean. That is what you are doing. You think "Conscientiousness = Good and Indifference to Effects = Bad." What you don't see is that too much conscientiousness and too little indifference to effects is its own vice: scrupulosity. It's not black and white.
But if one knows about the butterfly effect, are such effects still accidental? In any case, it would be difficult to know about the butterfly effect without going mad.
I do think the sublimity of Christs teaching comes in at this point. It seems clear that Christ wants us to produce second-order goodness (exactly opposite of what is produced when the boss strikes his employee). That is, we are to become the sort of people who produce goodness in excess without knowing it.
Christ upholds the paradox, again and again, wherein we are not to know it, and are certainly not to focus upon it. Consider:
At times he ups the ante, pushing the paradox very near absurdity:
The key to all of this is that we are to become like unto God, and not only like unto Plotinus God, but unto a god who is very strange, even foreign to the second temple Jews. "I am the vine, you are the branches. He who abides in me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit, for apart from me you can do nothing" (John 15:5).
I dont think the butterfly effect was as foreign to the ancient world as it is to ours. They understood that the spheres interrelate and interpenetrate. They understood that no one thing acts independently of the rest. Christs teaching comes into this bed of knowledge and raises it up to a pitch unheard.
Of course, to the modern mechanistic mind, both the ancient worldview and Christs teaching are rubbish, or at best useful fictions. For them it looks to be a science of accidents, for the ancients it is a science of what is known only with great difficulty, and for the Christians it is a science that could not have been known if The Scientist had not shown it to us.
Christs teaching does not contradict or invalidate Aristotles, but it does go beyond it. Today we face the odd reality of a West which would reject its Christian inheritance but which unknowingly continues to hold deeply Christian principles while at the same time failing to recognize their sublimity, and especially their paradoxical nature. When a high morality is not seen to be high, and when the paradoxes it contains are not properly recognized, it is wielded with devastating effects.
No, it's a fact about human intentionality.
Decaying from what to what?
To attribute the cause to some philosophical jargon that no one cares about except philosophy hobbyists seems far fetched.
Essentially, traditional religious values provided a morally realist framework. Durkheim's anomie is the state of normlessness that arises from alienation from fundamental values of life, including the decline of traditional religious morality. So this isn't a new idea, at all. Just something recloaked in modern jargon. Which seems to be a favourite strategy of modern thinkers. Which, unfortunately tends to alienate them from the philosophical history of ideas, producing a state of normlessness, leading to the decay of civilization....lol.
I understand and try to practice a version of reducing harm by changing what is in my power while knowing that it is hopefully a kind of subtraction of bad from consequences I will never learn about. That is how I hear Hillel saying: "do not do unto others what you would not have done to you." The criteria are immediately available.
I recognize your interest in saying Christian experience is different than others. I am not going to try and address that here. The view of history of what has been lost is clear to you and a question for me. My participation in theology does not make that sort of thing necessary. In any case, my energy is in other thoughts right now so I will not defend my statement today. I need to get back to Plotinus and Aristotle that the recent discussions have caused me to dive back into again. I have a tiny mind.
As a parting shot, chaos theory is trying to bring into a Logos what Aristotle had written off. There is something about emergence which is more "universal" than our previous models imagined. But that observation is stupid if Aristotle was not actually interested in what happens in the "physical" world.
If you concede that our intentions can be imperfectly realized, as you said, then it follows that what we are trying to do is at least as well exemplified by our actions as by our putative objectives. It is in this sense that Aldous Huxley, for example, argues in Ends and Means that the end cannot justify the means but, rather, that the means employed must be consistent with (representative of) the intended ends.
I have no problem with the fact that we can reverse engineer, usually, the intention from the actions; but it does not follow that all the effects of those actions were intentional.
And there's nothing wrong with that, although it does deviate from the previous topic of the butterfly effect, chaos theory, and the "tending of the big garden." You said that the big garden is not being tended. Should it be?
Quoting Paine
Okay, interesting.
According to one particular story, we were kicked out of a tended garden and forced to struggle hard for our survival. There is still an order to the world that favors the good in many ways but they are faced with the harshness of nature and the effects of wicked people.
It comes from different stories about the beginning, but Aristotle underlined the uncertainty of outcomes because the order prevalent to make life possible and more tolerable did not determine what ate what or who killed who on any given day. Plato's Timaeus also approached a boundary of the undetermined.
You mentioned Plotinus' god. In a number of ways, he defended the "creator" for the hardships we experience by putting forth a particular vision of immortality. Maybe I should make an OP about that.
In any case, what is seen as the horizon of what is possible for human beings is the world or absence of one that is imagined for it.