Is the real world fair and just?
I added the word "real" to the title of this thread in order to eliminate an ideal Heavenly realm from consideration. Some people, when faced with the moral ambiguity and uncertainty of personal or world events --- especially when bad things happen to good people --- will express the belief or hope that "everything happens for a reason"*1. And they don't seem to be concerned that the "reasons" & purposes motivating Cause & Effect are seldom obvious, and must be taken on faith.
The topical question was raised in my mind by an article in Skeptical Inquirer magazine (vol48), authored by psychologist Stuart Vyse, in his discussion of Skepticism and tolerance for Uncertainty, as illustrated by movie plot spoilers. In his preface, Vyse noted that "religious and spiritual beliefs promote the assumption that the universe is fair". Then, he adds, "they find solace in the belief that they will be made whole in this life or the next". Perhaps, a non-Christian source of solace is the Eastern religious concept of Karma : that Good & Evil acts in this life will be morally balanced in the next incarnation. Ironically, both approaches to a Just World seem to accept that the real contemporary world is neither fair, nor balanced. As Vyse summarizes : "The universe has no interest in your success or failure, and things don't happen for a reason --- they just happen". For example, the current hurricane in the Caribbean is indiscriminately destructive. But is the obvious bad stuff offset by punishing an evil group of people : e.g. Jamaican politicians, oligarchs and landlords ; while poor innocent Jamaicans are just collateral damage? Are blessings & curses proportional?
Although I'm not comforted by scriptural assurances that "all things work together for good", I do infer a kind of Logic to the chain of Cause & Effect in the physical world --- and an overall proportional parity between positive & negative effects. Of course, that mathematical & thermodynamic symmetry may not always apply to the personal & cultural aspects of reality : to people's feelings about those effects. I won't attempt to prove that vague belief in balance, but it seems that philosophers have always been divided on the question of a Just World*2. Plato was not conventionally religious, but he argued from a position which assumed a Rational*3 First Cause, that he sometimes referred to as Logos*4. That philosophical principle was not necessarily concerned about the welfare of individuals, but only that the world proceed in an orderly manner toward some unspecified teleological end point. Rational humans are able to detect the general organization & predictability of physical events, and often refer to the regulating principles as Laws --- as-if imposed by a judicious king. Ironically, modern science has detected some essential Uncertainty at the foundations of Physics. So, we can never know for sure what's-what & where & when.
I get a sense that this forum has some moralists who feel that the physical world is morally neutral, yet organized human societies should be scrupulously fair & balanced toward some ideal of Justice ; and some amoralists or nihilists who think its all "just one damn thing after another" ; plus perhaps some nameless positions in between. Since my amateur position typically falls in the muddled middle, and as part of my ongoing education in philosophical thinking, I'd like to hear some polite, non-polemic, pro & con discussion on the topical question. :smile:
*1. Everything Happens for a Reason :
Firstly, it can be used to suggest that there is a cause-and-effect explanation for why something has happened. Secondly, and more commonly, it is often used to suggest that there is some greater purpose or meaning for what has happened which is determined by fate, a higher power, God, or the universe.
https://12stepphilosophy.org/2024/03/30/everything-happens-for-a-reason/
*2. Just World :
The just-world hypothesis refers to our belief that the world is fair, and consequently, that the moral standings of our actions will determine our outcomes. This viewpoint causes us to believe that those who do good will be rewarded, and those who exhibit negative behaviors will be punished.
https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/just-world-hypothesis
*3. Rational :
Synonyms: sagacious, judicious, wise, intelligent.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/rational
*4. LOGOS :
By using the term logos, he meant the principle of the cosmos that organizes and orders the world that had the power to regulate the birth and decay of things in the world. The cosmos was, as he saw it, constantly changing, and he conceived logos as the organizing principle of change.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Logos
The topical question was raised in my mind by an article in Skeptical Inquirer magazine (vol48), authored by psychologist Stuart Vyse, in his discussion of Skepticism and tolerance for Uncertainty, as illustrated by movie plot spoilers. In his preface, Vyse noted that "religious and spiritual beliefs promote the assumption that the universe is fair". Then, he adds, "they find solace in the belief that they will be made whole in this life or the next". Perhaps, a non-Christian source of solace is the Eastern religious concept of Karma : that Good & Evil acts in this life will be morally balanced in the next incarnation. Ironically, both approaches to a Just World seem to accept that the real contemporary world is neither fair, nor balanced. As Vyse summarizes : "The universe has no interest in your success or failure, and things don't happen for a reason --- they just happen". For example, the current hurricane in the Caribbean is indiscriminately destructive. But is the obvious bad stuff offset by punishing an evil group of people : e.g. Jamaican politicians, oligarchs and landlords ; while poor innocent Jamaicans are just collateral damage? Are blessings & curses proportional?
Although I'm not comforted by scriptural assurances that "all things work together for good", I do infer a kind of Logic to the chain of Cause & Effect in the physical world --- and an overall proportional parity between positive & negative effects. Of course, that mathematical & thermodynamic symmetry may not always apply to the personal & cultural aspects of reality : to people's feelings about those effects. I won't attempt to prove that vague belief in balance, but it seems that philosophers have always been divided on the question of a Just World*2. Plato was not conventionally religious, but he argued from a position which assumed a Rational*3 First Cause, that he sometimes referred to as Logos*4. That philosophical principle was not necessarily concerned about the welfare of individuals, but only that the world proceed in an orderly manner toward some unspecified teleological end point. Rational humans are able to detect the general organization & predictability of physical events, and often refer to the regulating principles as Laws --- as-if imposed by a judicious king. Ironically, modern science has detected some essential Uncertainty at the foundations of Physics. So, we can never know for sure what's-what & where & when.
I get a sense that this forum has some moralists who feel that the physical world is morally neutral, yet organized human societies should be scrupulously fair & balanced toward some ideal of Justice ; and some amoralists or nihilists who think its all "just one damn thing after another" ; plus perhaps some nameless positions in between. Since my amateur position typically falls in the muddled middle, and as part of my ongoing education in philosophical thinking, I'd like to hear some polite, non-polemic, pro & con discussion on the topical question. :smile:
*1. Everything Happens for a Reason :
Firstly, it can be used to suggest that there is a cause-and-effect explanation for why something has happened. Secondly, and more commonly, it is often used to suggest that there is some greater purpose or meaning for what has happened which is determined by fate, a higher power, God, or the universe.
https://12stepphilosophy.org/2024/03/30/everything-happens-for-a-reason/
*2. Just World :
The just-world hypothesis refers to our belief that the world is fair, and consequently, that the moral standings of our actions will determine our outcomes. This viewpoint causes us to believe that those who do good will be rewarded, and those who exhibit negative behaviors will be punished.
https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/just-world-hypothesis
*3. Rational :
Synonyms: sagacious, judicious, wise, intelligent.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/rational
*4. LOGOS :
By using the term logos, he meant the principle of the cosmos that organizes and orders the world that had the power to regulate the birth and decay of things in the world. The cosmos was, as he saw it, constantly changing, and he conceived logos as the organizing principle of change.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Logos
Comments (1059)
Quite succinct, and non-polemical. But I was hoping for some why or why-not discussion, that I could learn from. You could take your pick of a few comments or quotes that will illustrate a philosophical position or principle. For example, "No" could be construed as Nihilist. But is that just an emotional feeling, or a reasoned philosophical position, or a theory of how the world works? Please notice that I omitted a heavenly element from consideration. :smile:
A brief look around showcases a reality which does not offer the same predictable experince to every creature. It seems to be chaos on which we try to project a sense of order. It's daily painful death to countless children, heroes get cancer, a world based on predation and the immense suffering on a constant basis of billions of creatures who are eaten alive slowly by other creatures, etc.
I have encountered no good reason to superimpose a philosphy or religion upon this in order to make it seem less appalling.
First up, logic does say that balance is what emerges from the very possibility of a dichotomy or symmmetry breaking. If you have a dividing, this in itself brings the further thing of a mixing. There has to be a unity of opposites as the final result. The action going both its way has to arrive at its own equilibrium average state.
So forget good and evil for a moment. This just is the logic where a symmetry-breaking must play itself out to become a symmetry-equilibrating. The wrinkle then is that the equilibrium balance is then itself a new ground of symmetry now raised a level that can once again be broken and equilibrated.
Hierarchies of structure can arise in openly growing fashion as each level of symmetry-breaking below it becomes some closed and stable balancing act.
This is a tricky kind of causality to contemplate. It is not the reductionism of "cause and effect". But it was already where metaphysics started with Anaximander and his pre-socratic cosmology.
So there is a general metaphysical model of division and its balancing. And then the further possibility of stacking up these "phase changes" on top of each other in hierarchically complexified fashion. A rich cosmos can emerge from its simple dichotomous origins.
And then we get to the vexed issue of good and evil. Which is problematic because it replaces the complex systems causality of the natural world with the polarised story of a cause and effect world. A mechanistic viewpoint. Instead of a pair of actions that are complementary as in a dichotomy or symmetry breaking we have just a single arrow from a here to a there. There is a high and a low, a good and a bad, a wonderful and an awful. There is a place to leave behind and a place to approach.
So we have now the reductionist causality that seeks to encode reality in terms of a one-way traffic system. If you discover that two directions exist, one of the ways has to be the correct way, the other thus the opposite of the correct.
But the systems approach says the only way anything is caused to exist is by it going in both its directions in a symmetry-breaking fashion, and the place that this dichotomising "leaving behind" then approaches is the symmetry-equibrating thing of its overall dynamical balance. A holistic state of globalised order ... which then can be the ground of departure for yet another rung of hierarchical complexity in the form of dichotomising~rebalancing.
So in terms of human moral social order, good and bad would be arrows pointing between some lower level and some next step level of stabilised equilibrium balance. The arrows wouldn't be the simple and brutal monotonic ones of reductionism. One path mandated and the other path forbidden. The arrows would point the way from one state of naturalistic balance to the next more complexified state that might be attained.
The lower level isn't intrinsically bad as it has proven itself to be a stable platform for some kind of higher aspirations. But the goal is to break it as symmetry so as to step up to some higher equilibrium state that likewise is good to the degree it can prove itself a stable platform for steps even beyond that.
So in that organic or thermodynamic context which moral discussions can at least dimly grasp in terms of a Maslovian hierarchy of needs good is to be building community to a degree of stability that creates the potential of further steps, and evil is the back-sliding destabilisation of the teetering house of cards that already exists as the relatively stabilised platform on which we stand.
Good~evil is tarred jargon as it does speak to the simplicities of reductionist models of causality. But we can sort of get what the terms are getting at from a systems perspective and its ecosystem style, richness constructing, hierarchical complexity.
There is no need to climb an endless ladder of complexity or goodness of course. But for a natural system that must exist in an uncertain and destabilising world, there is a value in maintaining a potential for taking next steps as situations demand. We have to be able to step up because there is a reserve to spend.
This trade-off between stability and plasticity in organisms that live and act is certainly yet a further wrinkle in the whole causality deal. But who says metaphysics has to be simpler than it actually is?
Isn't that what philosophers have always done : to superimpose a reasoned worldview upon the myriad & contradictory details of the world we are "thrown" into? To make sense of what we sense ; to justify what seems unjust? To catch what is thrown at us, and throw it back with intention? To make choices that are not imposed upon us? :cool:
Not just philosophers - everyone.
I'm a non-philosopher and a minimalist, so I'm not particularly reflective, nor am I a searcher.
I superimpose interpretative values on everything like anyone else. I just haven't reached for a prepackaged system or someone else's complex thinking. And yes, of course, we all inherit values from language and culture. Everything is contingent upon these.
Yes. If we wake-up one day and find ourselves in a world of simple positives & negatives --- warm milk vs warm urine --- as helpless babies all we can do is cry that "this wet diaper is appalling". But over time, we learn to take the ups & downs of life with self-help philosophical equanimity. The mature world is no longer Good vs Evil, but a nuanced environment that can be managed by rational actors into a worldview where we can look forward to waking up tomorrow in a familiar place with new challenges to manage. "A place to leave behind, and a place to approach". :smile:
Yep. This is the general structure of cognition. The balance that is the rearview mirror of accumulated wise habit and the forward view of creative possibility. Automatism vs conscious deliberation.
Neither of these is inherently bad and thus "not-good". And the balance that is then "the good" is the arrow of action that arises out of the ability to flip from acting out of habit to acting out of attention.
Habits are the accumulation of simplicities. Attention is the exploration of complexities. And the "arrow of causality" points to the feedback balancing act where today's destabilising complexity is being turned into tomorrow's stabilising simplicities. We move along the gradient of cognition that pragmaticallyt assimilates the world to our model of the world.
and it never can be, but we could be fair to one another is we wanted to.
Yes; however, we h. sapiens have not been "fair and just" enough too often not at all to one another for the last several (recorded) millennia at least.
But does every individual have to be fair and just or should we build a social system that is on average fair and just?
To expect individuals to construct their world all from their own "goodness" is rather an unrealistic ask. Instead what works is for the world to impose its own "good balance" in the familiar form of a state, a justice system, a democracy, even a religious code that stabilises the individual actor in some "fair to all" fashion.
For goodness (or evil) to be a system property, it has to be embodied in the dynamical balance between the top down constraints and bottom-up freedoms of the collective organism.
It is notable particular from Fukuyama's trilogy on world political history that all stable societies have had to invent some transcendent principle that can stand even above its hierarchical rulers so as to close the system in a fair and just fashion. You have a people, a management, and a vision.
The King is the attentional focus dealing with the short-term and immediate. An army paid by taxes is what underpins that.
Then a God or some philosophical creed stands for the accumulation of long-run habit. The disembodied wisdom of generations of "the people" distilled into some kind of transcendent structure of belief.
Kings come unstuck when societies get too large and entropic for a person to actually both dispense justice and speak for the collective transcendental ancestor. Executive power has to be divided from priestly power so as to better organise the reciprocal things of immediate choices and long-term habits.
It takes a lot of political engineering to recreate the brain's dynamical balancing act at the level of a nation state able to act with the rationality of a self-aware people's collective. (And we already need to do that at the level of a whole planet, now that nation states are past their sell-bys.)
Quoting apokrisis
I agree too. But would you also agree with what follows:
That leaves three things - the good, the evil, and the nuance in between.
To have mature, reasoned nuance, and create a familiar, balanced starting point to make the simplicities and complexities out of the past and the future, even if nothing in the nuanced middle demonstrates anything that is absolute, we have to know good in itself (as best we can), evil in itself (as best we can), in order to claim some character to the nuance. The nuance cant now be absent the good and the bad.
We still have to define or assume the form of the good and evil to fill the form of the nuanced to be a mix (a third thing). So there are three parts to this explanation of how to live.
What I am trying to say is that. if we live in a world of nuance, we dont just live in a world of nuance; a world of nuance can only be so nuanced with its good and bad, and so these two are NOT nuanced but absolute.
And we can replace good and evil with reality and appearance (not that reality is good and appearance is evil, but utterly displacing good and evil such that reality is neither good nor evil, and appearance is neither good nor evil).
So we can say:
if we live in a world of nuance, we dont only live with nuance; a world of nuance can only be so nuanced with its reality and appearance.
Always needing logic to make these simplicities and complexities unified in the nuance.
[b]We cant have the nuance without the absolute. Just as we cant have the absolute because of all the nuance.
To have either nuance, or absolutes, we have both.
Both is a third thing. This third thing is a paradox.[/b]
So is the world fair and just? We have to find that in some senses the world is fair and just, and in other senss it is not, and we have to find what fair means and what just means (which I dont address here in the hopes of keeping up with the conversation).
The world is fair and just if you detach everything into individuals, and then reattach them to the whole again (detach to examine and reattach to let them be them). This is a physicalist, scientific, currently predominant worldview - it is just for steel to cut flesh, for the moon to orbit the earth, as it is for the electron to orbit the proton; all is fair and just, following along as if in perfect willingness to follow every law to the letter. You cannot detach any one thing from the law. Motion and its effects can never, so will never, be denied, for any motion, against any motion, all is unfolding as it must, or all is behaving justly as each is necessarily treated fairly.
But the world is NOT fair and just if you focus on what is fairness and what is justice first. Now we set impossible (absolute) standards first and value this one is good and that one is not - and with reason and conceptualized versions of fair and just in hand, we secondly see how our reasons apply to the world of acts and mixed nuances of moving things. If we impose judgement and value on the things, the world is clearly full of injustice and unfairness. Our idealizations of good and bad are used to make our ideals of fair and just, and only now (secondly) can we see the INjustice of a particular act, or its UNfairness.
If we try to take the world first, physicalism says yes, all is just as it must be for all the same. Similar to fair, justice.
If we take the fair and the just first, this conceptualism (idealism) says no, NOT all is just, and for some, unfair portions of this injustice are born.
AND, to have this second view (where one can see the necessities of the world as unjust), one must have the three things in hand, these being absolute good, absolute bad and nuance.
In other words, we cant even get to the question Is the world fair and just without there being fairness, justice, unfairness, injustice, the world, and the judge (agent), or the particular act in the world.
Its all there in the nuances.
Quoting 180 Proof
In a way, that reflects what I was saying. In a physicalist sense, yes, the world is fair and just. (In this sense you dont really need the words fair and just anymore.)
But humans, we construct good and bad, fair and unfair, just and unjust, and act back in the same world that was otherwise beyond these constructions, and so we now add to the mix unfairness in the world, injustice in the world, goodness in the world, justice in the world, etc.
It seems to me that every (human) "individual" is a (eu/anti)social being first and foremost.
It leaves three things. But in a fundamental sense, the systems view talks about balances that are complementary and thus "good" in that their contradictions (woo, bad!) are in fact the oppositions that can lead to the resolution or synthesis of a dynamical balance (hey, good!).
Are pleasure and pain the psychological equivalent of good and evil? Well pleasure is the signal to approach and pain is the signal to avoid. And between these two, we get steered towards the security of the safe harbour of a mental equilbrium.
Now feeling safe and sound neither overly pleasured or pain seems rather middling. But that is where our evolved neurocognition is channeling us towards. A mild and prolonged contentment ... which we know is going to get interrupted by perturbations from the world beyond anyway.
So having a baseline of a middling balance is what is "good". And being able to feel which way to go when we get jolted out of that to approach or avoid is also "good". Even it we don't say pain feels good, we know it is a most valuable and necessary part of the overall equilibrium-producing part of the cognitive equation.
Quoting Fire Ologist
The middling state of things being generally OK is just a whole bunch of tiny nuance. It is the feeling of not really knowing your are even happy or disturbed. There is a poised restlessness in both of these positions. We feel just OK. And that is a feeling that is vague.
Then pain and pleasure can kick in as oppositions that extremitise our mind towards the opposing limits of action. Absolute approach or absolute avoidance.
Good~evil takes this kind of natural dichotomy and politicises it in a religiously transcendent form. It indeed gets made an absolute constraint on individual behaviour which may have been of use in the age of kings but doesn't make so much sense in the age of self-aware democracy.
Why seek to attack or defend an ancient jargon that has anyway outlived its value as social construct? It is a debate now passed into history.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Nope. The synthesis is the resolution of the paradox or rather the equilibration of that which has been dichotomised. It is the fact that the division is complementary that gets proven by the synergy of the resulting coming back together at a higher level of organisation.
Quoting Fire Ologist
But this is speaking from the reductionist paradigm the rather religious view that the Church took of the scientific revolution and the need to maintain some separation of powers between an all-powerful God and an all-mechanical realm of material being.
Look into even Newton's laws of motion and you find the triadic structure of its three laws where the holism lies in the third law of action~reaction. To be a motion could only be measured in terms of the world that stood in resistance to that motion. A force could be impressed if a world was there to press back. The third law just axiomatised the fact this had to be a stable balance as its outcome.
And physics has since with general relativity and quantum field theory become explicitly holistic in this fashion. The cosmos emerges from the dynamical balance that is its complementary actions of expanding and cooling. It persists by doubling its distances and halving its energy density in a way that can run down the gradient of time for pretty much "forever".
So yes to triadic structure. But exactly where things go wrong is when you allow the physical to become separated from the ideal.
Aristotle is the saint of systems thinkers because he got this with his doctrine of hylomorphic form. Material potential and formal constraint are the two complementary limits that between them allow the rich and hierarchically complexfied "nuance" that is the kind of world fit for us to evolve within.
Eusocial doesn't quite cover it as that applies to a social organism and hive mind at the level of ants and bees.
Humans have their biology the eusociality of a chimp troop but then also the further levels of semiosis that result from language and logic. So it is this further level that arguably is first and foremost these days. Well it was language until logic started to take over once science could harness fossil fuels through technology.
So the question of political organisation what constitutes the fair and just has ramped up through some actual sweeping transitions. We have evolved from ape troops to agricultural empires to free trade/fossil fuel economic networks.
Good and bad, fair and just, are terms that take some redefining as we move on up this hierarchy of dissipative order.
How can you say middling if you place something at the far ends of the middle (where good is not evil and evil is not good), in the middle? The nuanced middle is not the same as either extreme at the ends; its a third thing of them both (paradox).
If good versus evil become good in the resolved middle, then what happened to evil? Why isnt the middle just as evil as it is good? In which case good and evil have no meaning and there never was a paradox to resolve?
We dont resolve paradoxes. If we could, they wouldnt arise in the first place.
I wasnt accepting good and evil as a useful set of terms in a discussion of moral extremes. I was saying good as a direction in which to move makes more sense as the return towards the balancing middle.
Evil drops right out of the vocabulary at that point.
I do actually find it REALLY hard to figure out what kind of question you are asking as I am not exactly a big believer in the terms 'justice' or 'fairness' in the world. What is, is. The world is what it is.
In terms of societal norms and such - not The World - I can say with some conviction that many people do not want justice or fairness. The reason for this being self-interest. This can present itself as someone acting to gain whilst disregarding others, or someone simply avoid the weight of responsibility.
A problem with the terms justice and fairness is many equate them with ideas like equality and human rights. These have inbuilt problems when faced with the reality of existence. Then what it boils down to is people expressing feelings and attitudes rather than presenting factual claims.
Then what are we in the middle of? How is it a middle? Between extremes?
Quoting apokrisis
Middle? Middle of what?
You cant say middle anymore without saying more than the middle, and you wouldnt say mid if not in between two others. Three things where there is a middle. You need them all to have one or the vocabulary you are using has no sense.
You can live in the middle, and never attend the extremes, but without the extremes you cant call it a middle.
If evil drops out, so does the good.
Just using your words.
build a social system that is on average fair and just?
apokrisis
Three things: fair/just, unfair/unjust, and on average.
Without any one of these, all three drop out. Thats what average is built of, and what the extremes build.
The resolution is not a new unity that dissolves the others. Its paradox, that is the impossible that is actual.
Heraclitus Logos did not resolve the paradoxes; it simply related them to each other. Identity, truth, the one/many, motion/stillness - these paradoxes relate to each other as spoken in a Logos. The logos cant resolve the paradoxes (nor would he seek to resolve them.) It rests with change mean what it means without redefining rest or change - the opposites remain. The rest comes after change AND the change comes after rest (unchanging stillness). If we resolve this, we lose both and have said nothing, provided nothing for the Logos to speak of.
Quoting apokrisis
Too extreme?
Across successive lives, life is fair.
If you suffer today, you did something sinful earlier in this life or in an earlier life. If you do something sinful today, you will suffer later in this life or in a later life.
It only adds up if you are patient enough. Patience is a virtue, especially in metaphysics.
There is no pure-reason explanation for suffering.
If you insist anyway, you will fight against the absurd until you give up and call the suicide prevention hotline.
The level of fairness and justice increases and decreases according to the amount of fair and just people, by sheer force of addition and subtraction. Further, since he cannot improve society by any other means, the best one can do to bring about a fair and just world is to be fair and just, to present a fair and just unit.
Is a river not a good example of a balancing of stability and plasticity? Is reality not in general a balance of logos and flux?
I think Heraclitus got it. But still not many get Heraclitus.
Although I'm quite surprised by this, in a pleasant manner I'll add, I here fully endorse Banno's laconic answer (thought doubtless we'll differ on the ontological details):
Quoting Banno
Yup.
Yes he got it. Nothing was dropped out of the vocabulary. The river and the not-river both are, or neither are.
Flux contains the paradoxes. The Logos is not within it, the Logos is about the paradoxes flux brings.
A post-scarcity, demarchic social system is as "fair and just" as I can imagine.
Flux is material chance. Logos is structural necessity. The hylomorphic formula.
This.
But, wait, such as system will not be an equilibrated balance between existential opposites - namely between that democratic system the quote affirms as an extreme, on the one hand, and the totalitarian extremes wherein scarcity proliferates because the totalitarian doesn't give a shit about the people, this as the existential/conceptual opposite of the former - so it can't be what we ought strive for. We must have moderate evil in order for the good to obtain - well, not good, since this is an extreme polar that is to be shunned, but that which is optimally beneficial to us without being itself good: an ideal balance in everything ... such that none are better in any capacity than any other. After all, good as the polar extreme of what is possible in the spectrum of good and bad is the enemy of what is good! (all this is sarcasm on my part, to those who are reading this a bit too literally).
A very pertinent satire regarding this whole notion of equality between opposite extremes (rather than equality in intrinsic value despite the differences which make some better than others in different attributes ... this latter being a completely different ball park as issue) can be found in Kurt Vonnegut's short story "Harrison Bergeron". I won't be quoting the entire summary, but to get the ball rolling:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harrison_Bergeron
... hence delivering an equilibrated balance between the best and the worst as opposite extremes pertaining to possible human attributes. A dystopia indeed.
----
Edit: just to clarify the issue of demarchy (and why putting a strike-though in the quote above might possibly have been an error made in haste by me): on second musing, to have a functional and thereby persisting lottocracy one must have all the ideal values of a democracy thoroughly instilled in, not just some, but all of the populace. Imperfect thought it was, as can be partly illustrated by Ancient Athens.
Here, though, were such an ideal state of human society to ever be obtained not just for some but for all within a society, one would no longer be able to differentiate between the literal democracy (likely no longer in any way a valid republic), a governance of anarchy (here strictly specifying a lack of any separation between the state and the people themselves, this such that governance is under the full sway of all people's voluntary cooperation at all times, even when differences occur), and, thirdly, a non-hypocritical governance of communism (wherein - as can be more or less found in kibbutz society - all economy, and hence ownership of goods, from social to personal, is in some way cooperative; resulting in a fully voluntary (rather than in any way imposed) economic system of community-ism). Considering that this state of affairs might be a bit over the top for most as to what is considered a possible global society from today's standards - while I don't claim that such system of demarchy, i.e. lottocracy, is logically impossible to fathom as an extreme form of fairness and justice - I merely prefer to sponsor strict democratic values as they can be found in any system comprised of a republic (i.e., representative democracy as democracies function in today's world).
Long story short, a "post-scarcity demarchy" might well be imaginable by some as a possible future state of being to ideally progress toward, and, if so, then there wasn't much warrant for me to replace it with the notion of "democracy". Still, I find the more general notion of a "post-scarcity democracy" to be hard enough to achieve as it is. So I used this notion instead.
All of this tangential ado mainly oriented toward @180 Proof. Just in case it might in any way matter.
It's something [s]you[/s] we do in the world.
(Edited for )
How does it make sense to ask which of these is closest to thermodynamic equilibrium?
Is "reality" fair and just? Is a tool created for one purpose unable to be used for the opposite?
Sure, there's a natural dynamic. It seems for one thing to live, another thing must die. This is the problem in thinking, sentient beings. It doesn't seem "right" or "moral". Even if one's "morality" is efficiency in disguise.
Nevertheless, we must abstract the fact we have the ability to recognize when a thing is wrong, immoral, etc., and from there choose what we wish to "do about it", per se. So, the possibility of such is there, as is the chance of the opposite. What happens next is up to you, I suppose it could be said. :smile:
A bit too laconic for accuracy's sake here. Since the world consists of multiple doers and not just oneself, one can and at time does come across fairness in world - for one example, by traveling to societies, communities, or else clicks that are far more just than one's own. (For a more concrete example, it's what at the very least once upon a time made the US a place where many a foreigner desired to reside as a national: the fairness aspect to life which certain foreigners did not encounter in their own home country. This before the American Dream became strictly that of becoming rich. Different can of worms though.)
Personally, I so far like the "only if we make it so" far better as an terse but precise answer.
---------------
Quoting Banno
I'll wait for an answer with bated breath. Kinda
Thanks, but this still dismisses a crucial facet. The relative fairness, or lack thereof, of the world we're born into - as another example - is not a result of something we do, but is what we come across.
I feel like this hotline makes ends meet solely off of TPF members.
:up:
Hah. That is the problem of argument by Hallmark card cutesiness. You would have to be thermodynamically-informed enough to tell the difference between a closed Gaussian equilbrium and an open powerlaw one.
So sadly, an F.
That is also my own facile answer to this thread's title question. The physical universe is not a God to be held responsible for my personal flourishing or perishing. Instead, the world in which I live & act is an amoral (neutral) context for my own moral choices. So, if I want the world to be more Good and less Evil, it's my job as a moral agent to attempt to "make it so". Unfortunately, as you noted, our personal Utopia votes are seldom unanimous ; because we all "differ on the ontological details". Hence, the necessity for a moderate philosophical attitude toward the extremes of Good & Evil. :smile:
Quoting apokrisis
Good vs Evil is indeed a religious concept, often expressed in dualistic terms of Gods and Devils. But the OP was not asking about such a two-value reductionist model. In the title, the question is about "Fair & Just", which are evaluations of the whole world from a "why me?" personal perspective. When Vyse noted that "religious and spiritual beliefs promote the assumption that the universe is fair", the premise seems to be that the moral playing ground is not tilted in favor of the black or white team. In other words, the game of life is not rigged. So, each of us can expect to get our "just deserts" : punishment for wicked acts, and blessings for virtuous behavior. To a secular philosopher though, it should be obvious that Nature is fair & balanced only in the sense that it has no agenda pro or con "poor little me".
However, some who say "everything happens for a reason" seem to believe that --- although the natural world does not reward or punish --- its equitable system of actions & reactions*1 at least gives each of us a fighting chance to get what we deserve. Yet, when our personal experience implies that we don't get our Just Deserts, some may look for a super-natural force to blame, or to petition. For example, monotheistic religions originally had only a single universal Cause for every Effect. So, a duality had to be invented : an imaginary adversary who opposed the "perfect" works of the Good God. The polytheistic Pagans though, had a slightly different explanation for the imperfections of the Logos-designed world : an inferior demi-god to be held responsible for any defects. Either way, the dualistic worldview tends to portray the universe as a battleground of praiseworthy Good vs reproachable Evil.
On the other hand, I'm inclined to interpret your "systems perspective" in terms of philosophical Holism. Which is not a reductive Either/Or analysis, but an all-things-considered frame of reference. When viewed as a unique system, the Cosmos is neither Good nor Evil, but morally neutral. So, it's the personal perspective that judges general causality from a local point of view : "why me?". However, some philosophical systems, such as Stoicism and Buddhism, advise taking a more Holistic view of whatever happens : "why not me?" Instead of praising or condemning the gods for picking me for pain, or not protecting me, I must learn to deal equitably with both pain and pleasure, both Good and Evil. From that "systems perspective", in which I am merely a cog in a big wheel, the world is Fair & Just, in the sense that I am not singled-out, but an integral part of the whole system. Fortunately though, we humans are moral agents, who have the power to design a sub-system of our own : an ethical society, which is intended to be Fair and Just. Given more time, perhaps we --- moral agents collectively --- will be able to evolve our own little whole/hale/healthy Utopia, where Peace & Justice reign on Earth. :smile:
*1. Proportional Action and Reaction :
Newton's third law simply states that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.
https://spacecenter.org/science-in-action-newtons-third-law-of-motion/
The problem here is perhaps expecting a rosy outcome in terms of a human social geography where all are winners. The natural dynamic at the heart of the human social order is a balancing of competition and cooperation. This is how the basic systems dynamic of global constraints in interaction with local degrees of freedom plays out in a biological species that then becomes organised by the greater entropic possibilities of language and reason.
So for a system to persist as an entropifying structure, it has to develop some set of global constraints - a way of life - that shapes the individual degrees of freedom within it - the people whose actions then reconstruct that way of life in its adapted and thus persistent form.
The human social system depends on having rational agents who can make creative choices as that is what allows sapiens to climb up the entropic ladder. We can go from being a few thousand foragers to a few million agriculturalists to billions of oil burning technologists. The ability to be strongly self interested in our actions is the kind of people that our social order is interested in producing.
But then to close the system as a persisting state of generalised progress, society must also have its long run political and cultural institutions. It must be able to place constraints on its people so that the individual energy is statistically at least managing to recreate the same way of life for a next few generations. A cooperativity has to also be prioritised to match the production of a useful degree of free self interest.
So neither competition nor cooperation are bad in themselves - something to be suppressed rather than promoted. But the art is in tuning the balance between individualism and institutionalisation.
The moral order is thus a negotiation between these two distinct imperatives. To foster the kind of rational agent who can live within a global order and play hard by the rules.
In a perfect world, that might look rather like social democracy. :razz:
But regardless, at least the debate over fair and just can start with this recognition that a system depends on this apparently paradoxical dichotomy of being a system of constraints that must be in the business of shaping up the degrees of freedom that can keep rebuilding that very same persisting state of generalised constraints.
Like a biological system, it is all about the capacity to repair and reproduce. The body of the organism is constantly falling apart. But it only has to rebuild itself a little faster than it decays to stay ahead in the entropification game.
So as a society, the same applies. You dont need perfect and idealised outcomes for all to succeed in the basic game of existing as a long run entropy system. You only have to achieve enough repair and reproduction of the fabric which keeps everything hanging together.
That is basically the philosophy of a social democracy with its free market and safety nets. It isnt a utopian vision of selfless and individually perfect beings. It is a recognition that the game just has to be kept going in a statistical fashion.
This is what pragmatism looks like from the political point of view.
Isn't that the role of Philosophy, to deduce both the Good and the Bad aspects of the Real and Cultural worlds, and to devise a new more Ideal social system that will be better for A> those who seek justice, or B> those who seek power? Perhaps to emulate Nature in its physical perfecting tool : survival of the fittest, by means of competitive selection. Or to discover a new metaphysical tool for increasing moral fitness.
Unfortunately, as Marx noted, the thinking philosophers usually leave the implementation of their Utopias to doing politicians, who tend to sort themselves into dueling dualistic categories, such as Liberals and Conservatives, or Nationalists and Communists. What can we learn from the failures of either/or political paradigms? :cool:
Karl Marx politics :
The philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways, he famously said. The point, however, is to change it.
https://blog.apaonline.org/2021/04/29/the-point-is-to-change-the-world/
To which I might only add that ethics may be of more help here than physics. For while physics tells us what is the case, ethics acknowledges that we might well make things otherwise.
Not that analysis is wrong. But maybe not quite right, either.
Nature should be our instructor for sure. Unless you are indeed a theist or idealist.
But Darwinian competition was the first draft of science. It was a reductionist view that certainly reflected the early harshness of an industrialising and capitalistic Britain.
Over in Germany, there was the alternative of Naturphilosophie. A search for a more systems view of nature.
Science got there eventually with ecology. The global cooperation of species was added to their "red in tooth and claw" Darwinian competition. And the third ingredient of thermodynamics was added in explicit fashion. An ecology is an organismic state of order, closed for causality, in being a balance of competition and cooperation that maximises a stable state of entropy production.
So if we applied ecological science to global human politics then that would be the sound basis for a long term human plan. You would have something concrete and measurable, not just a lot of pie in the sky ethical precepts and other idealistic imperatives which folk say are truths that all must obey.
Quoting Gnomon
Dichotomies must emerge to organise any system. Communism failed because it was an idealistic, one-sided dream of a workers' paradise. People would own the means of entropy production but only take from it according to their needs. There was no natural balance in this rosy vision so of course it tipped over into something else in practice.
The thing instead is to expect a functioning society to organise itself into dichotomies. Some version of a complementary division is going to emerge that will defeat any simplistic notions of "everyone lives fair and equal". But then ecology teaches us that what this looks like when it is in a healthy balance is that a society feels like a collection of interest groups or social institutions that exists over all its hierarchical scales.
Kant was quite an eco-thinker in the Germanic tradition and framed this as his triangle of peace. The social ideal is the community. And the challenge of a fast paced growing system like the modern techological world is to build community across all possible scales. From tennis clubs to leagues of nations.
Communities recognise rights and responsibilities. Private freedoms and public duties. They enshrine some balance of the two that works for their members. And the political trick is create a power broking system that doesn't get frozen into stand-off but which can negotiate towards whatever is the balance across all its levels and types of communities.
If you find that your nation is becoming entrenched in a competitive divide, you can engineer a different system where cooperation and negotiation force the two sides into mutual accomodation. A two party state the product of one vote for one party can be broken up by proportional representation or other ways of forcing political opponents into alliances of convenience.
You can never fix a broken society by applying more philosophical idealism. Communism proved that. Facism likewise. It is frankly the dangerous path.
But you can apply a pragmatic and technocratic systems science understanding. You can do what a Singapore, Norway or New Zealand does. Innovate politically it helps to be small and centralised. And figure out your competitive entropic edge are you the pitstop of the world's busiest shipping lane, the beneficiary of a one-time oil bonanza, or an empty place that can grow grass really cheaply?
Dichotomies are not bad. They are natural. A system naturally divides itself in a complementary fashion. That is the basis of any order.
But then dichotomies do have to prove themselves by being complementary and thus synergistic or "win/win" when correctly balanced. The system goes on to flourish as a collective.
Of course, flourish is how we talk about entropy production, as in the end, everything is grounded in the ecology that is organising a steady energy throughput. To repair and reproduce the fabric of a society, it has to be living off some kind of disposable income. It has to be able to direct a material flow to the task of maintaining the community.
Ethical choices then open up within this context. If a society feels safe and secure in terms of its food and shelter, it can start to look further up the chain of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. It can have interest groups organised around drag racing or flower arranging each free to have its ethical debates about what "good and bad", or "fair and just", means within their institutional settings.
But humans can't just wish away the realities of their ecological realities. Societies must blend the dichotomy of competition and cooperation. And they must acknowledge that entropy production is how nature across all its possible levels is how it pays its negentropic rent.
Doing the usual? Offering judgement and having no argument. Standing on the sideline, pretending you are winning when you aren't even in the game. :yawn:
Edit: just to be clear, here are my two contributions to this thread:
You do not appear to have even argued for them. So how could I know what you have in mind?
Quoting Banno
You never joined. And so won't be missed.
Quoting Banno
Oh yeah. A classic bit of your social manipulation. The mean girl asking if you really want to be seen hanging out with him. :up:
Can a planet be fair and just? Who's asking? Who or what could answer the question? Maybe our planet is indifferent?
'The world' has been in business for 4.543 billion years. Things have changed over time. Life started on earth about 3.7 billion years ago and filled the oceans with lots of microbes. Later, new organisms came along and wiped out the old life (killing it with poisonous oxygen). Fair? Just? The earth got hotter, cooler, wetter, dryer. and so on. Every change benefitted some things and ruined others. The earth is what it is--a dynamic rocky planet among many in the galaxy which is among many in the universe.
Fairness and Justice had nothing to do with it and such ideas didn't come along until VERY recently. Was it fair and just that dinosaurs were killed off? It wasn't their fault, after all. They were what they were. Big rock plows into the Yucatan Peninsula. Climate changes drastically. Sic transit gloria dinosaurs. Lots of other creatures survived. Birds, mammals, insects, plants, fungi....Will it be fair and just when our species dies out?
As allegedly sentient beings who like to toss around terms like "fair" and "just" when talking about planets and persons, we COULD do better. Why don't we? Because we are what we are, and being good, fair, just, honorable, kind, loving, thoughtful, humble, and so on, is not something we are able to be more often than some of the time, Some people have difficulty being good ever. One day we will be plowed under like millions of species before us by indifferent forces.
In any case, it does't matter, because fairness and justness applies to the species that thought of the concept and has spilt much ink on the matter. We could do better, and that would make life on the indifferent planet more pleasant, but don't hold your breath, because we are what we are.
Sounds reasonable.
Quick clarification - based upon this if fairness is not found in the world, then unfairness is not found either?
Fairness and unfairness are the perspectives of conscious creatures (well, humans specifically) who hold views subject to evaluative ideas?
Quoting Gnomon
Nothing could be further from the truth!
The world's terrain, climate, and natural resources were not created equal or fair. There is no reason, period. And yet, primates had found themselves distributed in regions where survival was close to impossible -- food is scarce, growing things would drain your blood, weather is murderous, and the climate hosts a whole bunch of deadly viruses.
The calamities and weather disasters are not created equal. The dinosaurs got wiped out unexpectedly. They themselves did not expect to be erased from the face of the earth just like that.
Oh yeah, the neanderthals -- to me it is bullshit to say that because they didn't have better social skills than homo sapiens, they perished. Perhaps, nature wasn't kind to them when it comes to developing their parietal region.
Quoting Gnomon
Sometimes I don't believe this. The neanderthals could have been the modern humans of today. What is the organizing principle?
Theres also a sort of latent animism in some of our expressions in that we do attribute intent to things around us as well as to people.
Your definition of just world itself is an unfair game being that no one born agreed to it. If anything, thats using people for an ends of whatever game of Justice, Karma, or otherwise this world represents.
We are used. Enough said about just world. Add to that contingencies of luck, cause-and-effect, our own striving nature, individual pathologies, and a self-reflective animal that knows its own condition- forget about it.
We may even gain some philosophical insights from Biology. My latest blog post is entitled : Synchrony : Small World Networks*1. In 1926, during the heyday of Quantum Physics, biologist Jan Smuts*2 intuited the general principle of Holism as an organizing force in biological Evolution. His acumen was immediately recognized by those who later became labeled as "New Agers". But it was overshadowed by the Atomic bomb builders, until the 21st century emergence of Complexity, Systems and Information sub-disciplines of science. As illustrated in the Oppenheimer movie, physics sans ethics can solve a temporary technical problem, but create an even greater moral dilemma.
Even Democratic politics, as currently practiced, is inherently us vs them dualistic. And a second American civil war is in the wind. But, are we ready for a more Holistic form of government? Will obedient robots, or common-sense-less AI do better than willful & selfish humans at self-government? Sigh! Idealistic Ethics has always been too feckless to overcome the predator/prey pragmatism of Politics. We must accept finite disappointment, but never lose infinite hope. Martin Luther King, Jr. :smile:
Gnomon reply to :
Fortunately though, we humans are moral agents, who have the power to design a sub-system of our own : an ethical society, which is intended to be Fair and Just. Given more time, perhaps we --- moral agents collectively --- will be able to evolve our own little whole/hale/healthy Utopia, where Peace & Justice reign on Earth.
*1. Small World Networks
http://bothandblog8.enformationism.info/page24.html
*2. Jan Smuts :
Albert Einstein counted Smuts as one of approximately ten people that truly understood his theory of relativity.
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/jan-smuts-reconsidered
I don't want to get in the middle of a spitting contest. But I'll point out that 's discussion of Ecology hardly qualifies as materialistic "scientism". Ecology does have practical applications, but its primary consideration is ethical & holistic*1 : the universe is more than an aggregation of objects & forces. For us earthlings, it's also an association of beings.
Regarding the ethical status of our world, Oughts and Values -- fair & just -- are not physical things to be studied by material scientists, but philosophical concepts that may even guide the investigations of biological scientists. It typically views the world as a holistic interactive integrated system. In which, only a few species are capable of ethical considerations. That's why homo sapiens are often viewed as the caretakers of non-human world*2 : the arbiters of fairness & justice.
The topical question of Fairness & Justice was not referring to the material world, as some have erroneously assumed. Instead it's about the "world" as an Ethical System of sentient beings. FWIW, I value the calm & rational inputs of both Banno and Apo. :grin:
*1. Ecological Ethics :
Ecological (or environmental) ethics is the study of what humans, individually and corporately, ought to value, ought to be, and ought to do in relationships with all other beings and elements in the biosphere.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/education/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ecology-ethics
*2. Who is the caretaker of the world?
Every generation serves as caretaker of this world | Secretary-General : United Nations in India.Apr 17, 2024
Quoting Banno
The physical analogy between a Fair & Just distribution of social states, and thermodynamic equilibrium (balanced measure) is a philosophical metaphor, not to be taken literally. :cool:
Why do people use the term, 'Equal' instead of the proper term, 'equilibrium'?
Equilibrium is the balance of dynamic interactionwhen the interactions being measured become equal.
https://www.quora.com/Why-do-people-use-the-term-Equal-instead-of-the-proper-term-equilibrium
Equilibrium : a state in which opposing forces or influences are balanced.
JUSTICE IS BALANCED : psychically, not physically
Yep. The holistic ecological perspective brings into focus our real world ethical concerns of today.
The obvious one is whether humans have some kind of right or mandate to transform the planet into an anthroposphere in our own image.
Are we just doing natures work in burning all the fossil fuel to build a world of pig farms, office parks and gardened public spaces? This is simply biosemiotic evolution stepping through its gears.
Or should we be hardline greenies trying to return nature to is prehuman state of grace?
It is a very practical question, especially if you are in green politics. How much social capital ought to be spent on winding back the huge loss of local species that has occurred just since the 1950s? Or should a greenie accept this loss as inevitable and not actually an issue as the anthropocene is just a stage in natures journey?
We face actual ethical concerns that cant even be widely discussed until you have some metaphysical strength grounding to your arguments. And the science to quantify and evidence the detailed political responses that would follow.
Then even beyond the general anthropocene question there is the political response to the 2050 bottleneck of too many people and not enough food. The dislocations of climate changes and economic collapse.
If you are not thermodynamically and biosemiotically literate, how can you even start to be part of an ethical discussion in this current stage of the fast evolving human story?
So justice is not reducible to thermodynamics.
But then this "equality" is itself dichotomised in thermodynamics. There is the conventional reductionist metaphysics of Boltzmann that is a closed system and yield the "dead" kind of equilibrium that has a Gaussian statistics. And then there is the open and evolving story the one Prigogine got going of dissipative structure theory that is about geometric growth and complexification. This attracts to a powerlaw or fractal statistical distribution.
So even as metaphor, we need to know the technicalities to be able to draw any proper conclusions. Folk are quick to dismiss the first and simply miss the relevance of the second.
Just not your idealist framing of justice as transcendent truth independent of its material basis.
Nor should it be.
Of course it is! Only the mathematical principles of thermodynamics can possibly determine whether, or else the extents to which, fascism is more fair and just than is democracy - or else vice versa, if the two are not in fact equally so. All you need to do is put in the numbers of these two competing systems into the right mathematical equations and one will obtain the scientifically valid answer.
Now, while I'm myself quite ignorant of how our sacrosanct thermodynamic laws might determine what is and is not fair and just to us, just as we are told, in one's lack of any rational comprehension one must then stringently maintain a blind faith in the absolute and global authority of thermodynamics ... and of those who [s]espouse[/s] preach it from their high tower of infallible and hence unquestionable knowledge. Else one won't do one's best to speed up the processes of entropy toward absolute equilibrium! As we all know, this being the ultimate bad.
Then again, if the aforementioned looks like, sounds like, and smells like bullshit, I see no reason why it in fact isn't unadulterated bullshit.
So does thermodynamics determine fascism to be any more, or else less, just and fair than is democracy? Or maybe these concepts/terms too are devoid of any meaning and importance when it comes to thermodynamics - as is the case with "good" and "bad/evil". Of course, I'm an acknowledged flunker when it comes to the "mathematically sound scientific truths" regarding whatever thermodynamics might infallibly determine. Just asking you the unquestionable erudite what system of governance one ought endorse on the basis of justice and fairness so as to maximize entropy in the long haul.
By my logic, people are different, and a truly benevolent God would have to make different people experience different trials for as many people as possible to be saved. Nowhere in there is a guarantee that everyone will receive the same treatment or rewards. Evidence seems to suggest that people do experience unfair situations in this life, and a benevolent God would make sure that all people who meet certain qualifiers (or not, there might be none depending on your religious beliefs) would grant infinite happiness to all (within the power of such a being).
If there is not a benevolent God, the conclusion is the same as you would reach as if there was no higher power. If the universe doesnt care about you, why would everything be fair?
The only situation I see in which everything ends up being fair is if there is no benevolent God (in which case everyone has different but all overwhelmingly good possible outcomes which are theoretically within their power to reach), but instead a force of karma (this could also be a fairness oriented higher power. This seems less likely to me.
Fourteen joys and a will to be merry.
That's all I want to say about that.
That isn't my argument. My argument is that it is the metaphysical principles which matter. The structural or architectural principles. So it is more about thermodynamics as a science of holistic (dissipative) structure. Even at the beginner's level of the Second Law, it is the science that encodes form and purpose as an irreducible "part of the world".
The maths has then developed from its original Gaussian atomism to match that general metaphysical holism. For instance, the maths that encoded the notion of entropy also dichotomously or reciprocally could encode the notion of information as its inverse operation. Order can be defined as the inverse of disorder with the kind of mathematical rigour that has proven rather foundational to the world we are actually making for ourselves.
So it is easy to scoff. But really, the facts are right under people's noses. Thermodynamics has rapidly evolved to become the holism reforming science. Even particle physics is no longer an exercise in atomism but about the maths of symmetry-breaking and thermodynamic condensates.
Quoting javra
And what is the right maths? Is it Gaussian or powerlaw. Indexed as entropy production or information creation?
We are talking about a rich and all encompassing body of theory when it comes to thermodynamics in the current era. Folk are arguing against some antique strawman, which itself was already warmed over LaPlaceanism.
Quoting javra
Does one political theory do a better job of self-organising in powerlaw fashion so as to become a superorganism of interest groups over all its social scales? Does one political theory thus have a better balance in terms of producing an ecological-style resilience and a maximising of its negentropic information flows?
The maths of thermodynamics actually now includes the kind of metrics one would need, like Friston's Bayesian mechanics and Ulanowicz's ascendancy.
So scoff away. You are laughing at the caricature you have constructed in your head rather than the meta-scientific enterprise I've been talking about.
Quoting javra
Well for a start, the solution we could have built in the 1970s when ecologists and systems scientists first rung the alarm bells with their mathematical models and crude but surprisingly accurate computer simulations, is now far in the collective rear view mirror.
We needed a world government for a world problem. Some of that governance structure was laid down, but only falteringly implemented.
So yes. The tools of dissipative structure wisdom were applied to the governance issue at a time when social democracy was in vogue precisely because of the recent experience of WW2 and the Depression before. Overpopulation, habitat loss, climate change and peak fossil fuel were all things we knew about as the maths made these realities crystal clear.
It seemed there was a mood to be scientific and technocratic about whatever "fair and just" might mean for a planet viewed through a holistic and naturalistic lens.
But then came the 1980s and regime change. No greenie could have imagined neo-liberalism becoming a thing. Most greenies have continued to fail to understand what their rosy models of human behaviour managed to miss which was the extent to which fossil fuels could reshape us in their own image through the co-opted political agency of corporate big business.
It was the short-termism of energy, agriculture and materials whose burning ambition to be entropified as quickly as possible that hollowed out our own more self-interested efforts to become a species with a long-run liveable future. Neo-liberalism arrived with its literalist slogans like burn, baby, burn, and greed is good.
So you can scoff at the need to get the ecological basics of life right. But that selective metaphysics dooms you to losing the very ethical/political choices you might have hoped to be able to make.
Metaphysical principles which, from previous conversations with you, inexorably start with the assumption of the Apeiron as ultimate beginning ... while with the same assumptive position at the very same time decrying the notion of a literally absolute/complete/perfect limitless state of being as ultimate end to be absurdity. Otherwise, sophomoric interpretations of the Good (which is not of itself justice but is claimed to determine justice) such as those mentioned in this following quote would not be affirmed so easily:
Quoting apokrisis
And I'll again point to Peircean metaphysics upholding the view that the "laws of thermodynamics" will themselves evolve as the (physical) cosmos progresses in it acquired habits.
So from whence this metaphysical fixedness of thermodynamics as they currently are known (and as they occur) being an absolute and literally immovable/permanent grounding for absolutely everything - including notions of justice and fairness?
(To not even address what metaphsycial justifications there might rationally or empirically then be for the Apeiron but not for the Good as the literally limitless ultimate end, else end-state, of being, this as per the Neo-Platonic notion of "the One" as one example.)
As to my scoffy-ness, it's intended to directly address posts such as this:
Quoting apokrisis
I do acknowledged in being one of these "F" receivers. I do not rationally understand how thermodynamics determines that while one man will deem the absolute obedience of their wife to be just and fair another man deem an equality of worth with their wife to be emblematic of justice and fairness - nor, if this must be added, how thermodynamics then determines that one such comprehension of justice and fairness is bad/wrong/incorrect while the contradicting understanding of justice and fairness is good/right/correct. And, if not yet apparent, belief/faith in certain matters though I might have, I'm not one to have blind faith in anything or anyone. Stupid me, I'm sure some would say.
As to the rest of your post in general, there's much there for me to agree with as to what ought to be the case.
In regards to global governance, we already are under an indirect form of this - not from the UN (almost laughable seeing how laws of war are nowadays addressed by some nations, this as one example) but from the current oligarchies of neo-liberal (might as well be "neo-capatilist") economy, which is global - and is indirectly governed by said oligarchy via, again as just one blatant example, lobbyists and candidate funding at both national levels and, where applicable, individual state levels.
No doubt we will have a formal global governance sooner rather than later. Irrespective of the gripes some may express at this. The only real question is that of whether this global official governance will be Orwellian and so in some way totalitarian or, else, be one of a global democracy-by-representation.
But again, I so far do not comprehend why a, in this case, global fascism ought be universally shunned on the rational grounds of the relative degrees of energy dissipation as compared to that of a global (I should add, "and earnest" rather than mere lip-service) democracy.
Coming from a different metaphysical vantage, I do endorse democracy over fascism on account of the optimal well-being of all the individual psyches concerned, this in both short- and long-term appraisals. But, here, the consciousness that holds awareness and which can both suffer and be content if not joyful is not appraised as some willy-nilly term that holds no true or real metaphysical importance to the grand picture of things.
You are making a confused argument. Anaximander posited the Apeiron as that from which a dichotomously structure ream of material complexity arises, but also then returns. Which rather nicely sums up the Big Bang with its trajectory from a quantum foam to a quantum void with right now being the Universe's high water mark of material complexity.
Likewise Peirce grounded his metaphysics in the tychism of firstness and its rational self-complexification that produces the cohesive equilibrium state of a synechic thirdness. But I would agree that he didn't offer a map of the downward unwinding that follows the wave that builds, peaks and then disperses. He did reflect the knowledge of science and the Christian mysticism of his time in that regard.
Quoting javra
As you admit, you don't understand thermodynamics so how could you understand how it might or might not apply to some "ethical" question or other.
I mean you should see that you are indeed questioning a dichotomy that appears to exist in the real world one where two opposite sides seem to passionately believe that their pole is the one that represents the idealised "truth".
A "thermodynamic" or systems science view of this social situation can see how it expresses the two extremes that compose a system its global constraints and its local freedoms. A functional system is one that can balance the two in a scalefree equilibrium fashion. That is, a fashion that is capable of being scaled and thus grow to fill its entropic niche in a persistent long-run manner.
Wives can be chattel in one kind of entropic setting such as say a nomadic pastoralist community where offspring are capital and fertility is to be guarded and then co-workers in another, like a neo-liberal white collar office place where careers are capital and offspring an optional luxury good.
Both would historically be fairly extreme points on the spectrum of social organisation. But both also clearly proved their local case by indeed scaling to fill their available entropic niches. A setting on the wife-constraining spectrum was picked and it could grow as it unlocked the entropy flow needed to sustain it as the sensible and "ethical" thing to be doing.
So an impossible dilemma becomes a trivial historical example of how a deeper "mathematical" principal scaling is at work.
All that moral philosophy posturing and agonising and ... it turns out to be this simple. :grin:
Quoting javra
Well yes. The well-meaning set up the key new post-WW2 institutions. UN, GATT, IMF, World Bang, EU, Nato, etc. And then they got corrupted as even in their design they had built in the smooth handover of currency sovereignty and Middle East oil from the Brits to the US. The modern empire package where capital and resources as the avatars of information and entropy became directly plumbed together in a rather human-excluding way.
We can't blame things on some evil force that snuck in from outside. Demonise some elite. We let fossil fuel grab the controls of the system we were building through its corrupting influence on a thinking class that hadn't really understood that humans are just another subsidiary branch of Nature's great entropification scheme.
The one that starts simple, complexifies like mad, then slides back down to ultimate simplicity again. As Anaximander outlined for us at the very dawn of metaphsyics.
Quoting javra
Again, the question is does it scale? Is it a powerlaw structure with equilibrium balance that has the legs to persist and grow. Or at least persist and repair.
Is it mature rather than immature or senescent? Does it balance the resilience of youth with the wisdom of experience?
These are questions that ecologists know how to frame and to measure.
Quoting javra
I see it the other way round. You have neither a model nor a measure to support any claim you might make. Thus you merely have opinions and anecdotes.
LIke many, you understand metaphysics as applied idealism the practical reason not to have to engage with the reality of dealing with life in some properly reasoned fashion ... as Peirce urged with his Pragmatist model of inquiry, the triadic feedback cycle of abduction, induction and deduction.
As facts go, we don't have much of Anaximander's perspectives but a few fragments of writing. And in these, we are told of a cyclical cosmology rather than the linear one which you here present and modern physics generally endorses - even though there are currently valid cyclical models of the universe. So this is not Anaximander's Apeiron - but apo's Apeiron which apo modifies from Anaximander's. Metaphysical justifications for presuming the Apeiron yet direly lacking - outside of because apo says so arguments. Till then, it might as well be magical thinking.
Quoting apokrisis
What does any of this have to do with what I asked? Once again:
Quoting javra
To which I'll now add, if the Apeiron, why the emergence of thermodynamics to begin with? Other than due to magic, of course.
Quoting apokrisis
As my previous scoffy-ness alluded to, this type of reply pretty much parallels the authoritarian theist who knows God or else God's Word, telling me I don't understand God/God's Word so how could I understand the answer to whether or not something like the enslavement of a person is ethical?
I find no reason to uphold your interpretations of thermodynamics as sacrosanct science. I do find thermodynamics to be model(s) regarding what is that is very much open to questioning and revision, just as any other model of science is, irrespective of the maths involved. As I also find the very notion of entropy to be. In your replies you however implicitly address both of these as though they were infallible scientific knowledge of what is as they're presently interpreted. And where from this infallibility?
What don't I understand?: the maths. But wait, its not the maths that are important but the metaphysics behind them:
Quoting apokrisis
Metaphysical principles which you do not justify much less address (see for example the question I've re-posted). And round and round we go.
Quoting apokrisis
Yea, no. Just words without meaning. Apropos, as to your example of opposites in this context, the opposite of women chattel for men would be not equality of worth (as is/was typical of hunter gather tribes) but that of men as chattel for women. Just as the opposite of polygamy is not monogamy but polyandry.
Quoting apokrisis
No, by any means we cannot blame others whatsoever for anything. So called (somehow always economic or else political - because cash and power-over is all that really matters in life) elites which are evidenced to either rape or else known to quite cordially mingle with those that pimp women for raping included. Not unless we introduce some Abrahamic notion of demons that somehow come from without. Poor innocent lambs that those elites are - especially when their greed succeeds in making them and their corporations too large to fail. But the poor, that's another matter altogether - the poor can be deemed biologically deranged in their misdeeds by the genes they've inherited, this as some have claimed of those incarcerated (who were obviously not "too big to fail' in their endeavors).
But just as long as it all assists entropy, hey, its all good.
( ... all this being indicative of faulty reasoning, to stupid old me at least.)
Quoting apokrisis
Ecologists as a group deal with the question of "Does it balance the resilience of youth with the wisdom of experience?" in addressing their field of research? We might be living in two disparate worlds.
And you provide no answer to my quoted question. Might as well claim only those in the thermodynamically-informed spheres of reality understand why murder is wrong ... this by mathematically addressing such questions as "did the killing of another human properly 'balance the resilience of youth with the wisdom of experience'". Which, if needs be said, is nonsensical reasoning.
Look, if my intelligence and/or sapience is beneath yours, you have two options: one is to freely choose to not talk to me - as any sane human ought to freely choose to not rationalize with a lesser animal on issues of metaphysics for example. The other is to address things at my comparatively reduced level of comprehension - this as might any sane parent explain things to their kinds. But to insist that so it is and that I should believe that it despite it making no rational sense to me is very much akin to the hallmark of authoritarianism. Your metaphysics are to me so far not rationally cogent. No math-understandings required. And your inability to make rational sense of ethics likewise follows.
As to your possibly lofty assumption that I am too far beneath you to warrant reply, don't worry. I don't name myself "javra" (i.e., "mongrel", to put it nicely) on this forum for nothing. But as mongrels go, that won't stop me from honestly expressing my views.
Quoting apokrisis
Let's see, I ground all my metaphysics in the reality that all presently occurring sentient beings necessarily occur as individual first-person points-of-view, or better worded "of awareness". Nothing new to the old-timers hereabouts. You claim this to be merely opinion and anecdote. And then you contrast this with the metaphysical foundation of Anaximander's Apeiron which, to be as charitable as possible, you reinterpret to suit your whims.
Stupid as I might be, I sill find far more confidence in the reality that I, as a first-person point-of-view, am than I do in the reality of the Apeiron, especially in the linear cosmology version which you endorse, from which, as you affirmed in other posts, we obtain the inference that "awareness" is a rather meaningless term.
Quoting apokrisis
Oh mighty unquestionable authority of reality and knower of other peoples' deepest turths and perspectives, this is emblamatic of the bullshit I addressed in a previous post I made in this thread.
Notice how I so far have not explicitly engaged in the psychobabble of what your true intentions and perspectives are as a person ... be this lack of engagement stupidity on my part or, else, some semblance of wisdom and dignity.
Express away. :up:
There, I've expressed.
Yes. Modern religions still preach hope for perfect justice, but may no longer teach that piety will be immediately rewarded with peace and prosperity. Instead, believers should expect to suffer patiently --- in some cases for a lifetime --- buoyed by their faith in an Ideal-but-remote place & time, and a non-physical body. Even though secular laws have reasoned that "justice delayed is justice denied".
Most world religions propose some solution to the obvious & pervasive injustices of this material & temporal world : "vale of tears". In the Old Testament for example, justice was not to be expected in a heavenly afterlife, but in a society governed by the miraculously-revealed laws of God. Since that earthly society, Zion, a "city set on a hill", was repeatedly deconstructed by invaders --- sent by God to punish the Chosen People --- the notion of a heavenly city of refuge emerged. After the Jewish Messiah was crucified by another set of foreign invaders, an offshoot sect of Gentiles changed their expectations from Justice in this world and this life, to a spiritual world and an immortal life. Moreover, the divine "reason" why bad things happen to good people, was blamed on an Evil god, who foiled & frustrated the best-laid plans of the Good god. Since then, the real space-time world has been re-imagined, not as a god-designed Paradise, or a god-governed city-set-on-a-hill, but a battle-ground of constant warfare between heavenly hosts and demonic hordes.
In the book of Job, that faithful sufferer of divine injustice was ridiculed by his neighbors, who espoused a Just World theory*1. Even today, when historically dominant traditional religions have splintered into more than 45,000 sects*2 around the world, hope & faith in a Just World survives. In the US and Latin America, "The just world fallacy*3 is commonly seen in theologies with some form of worldly reward system, such as in Prosperity Gospel beliefs." So, in the face of real world injustice, hope & faith abide, that God would never allow his truly faithful followers to suffer. After several millennia of faith & works religions though, human societies seem to be no closer to the prophesied Just World. Clearly, the old moral laws inscribed in stone, have failed to produce an ideal society of god-fearing people. So, they have been reinterpreted, mostly by Paul, to be only a temporary pale imitation of the heavenly world-to-come in an unspecified future resolution to the perennial injustice problem. :smile:
*1. Job's Justice :
It addresses theodicy (why God permits evil in the world) through the experiences of the eponymous protagonist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Book_of_Job
*2. Disunity of Religious Beliefs :
Estimations show there are more than 200 Christian denominations in the U.S. and a staggering 45,000 globally, according to the Center for the Study of Global Christianity.
https://www.livescience.com/christianity-denominations.html
*3. Just World Fallacy :
The just world fallacy, also known euphemistically as the just world hypothesis, is a naturalistic fallacy that states that the consequences of all actions are predictable and deserved. This implies (although sometimes only subconsciously) a belief in some sort of universal force that ensures moral balance in the world, in such a way that a person who exhibits good and moral behavior will eventually be rewarded, while evil and immoral actions will eventually be punished. It is both a concept in theology and considered to be a cognitive bias in psychology. It is summed up by the phrase "What goes around, comes around."
https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Just_world_fallacy
Although on the whole the lyrics to this song are a bit too materialist for my tastes, I yet very much agree with its primary message: the world, per se, is neither fair/just nor unfair/unjust, period. (And I conclude this as someone who nevertheless upholds the reality of the Good as per Plato and Aristotle, etc from where the very notions, or eidoi, of fairness (that aligned with the Good) and unfairness (that misaligned with the Good) reportedly emerge to begin with.)
At any rate, this pithy conclusion of the world is neither fair nor unfair as just worded might be somewhat too non-dualistic for many, but I find it in full keeping with previously mentioned notions of the world can be fair only to the extent that we make it so.
Thinking you might get a kick out of this songs lyrics:
Here is an argument:
If determinism is true, then there is no morality.
If determinism is true, there is no morality because it would not be just to hold someone morally accountable for actions that are outside their control.
But this is a moral reason for saying that 'if determinism is true then there is no morality.
Therefore, there is morality.
Therefore, determinism is false.
Fairness although in most cases non-enforceable is due to lack of empathy and compassion.
Also people can be fairly ignorant, judgemental and short sighted which creates all sorts of problems and on the other hand of the scale even wars.
In the singing birds song, is he saying, "another world" : perhaps a Garden of Eden? Or is he imagining this present world as Non-Dual? Hamlet --- the melancholy Dane --- recognized that Good & Evil are not features of the world itself, but a personal interpretation : There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so. Even so, Hamlet was driven mad by his pessimistic mindset. Can we be driven sane, by an optimistic attitude toward a world that can be interpreted either way? "It's an ill wind that blows nobody good". One person's misfortune is often another's good luck.
Back in my musically impressionable day, Bob Dylan concluded that the answer to unfairness and injustice and moral duality is "blowin in the wind". Does that mean there is no final solution to a world that blows both Hot and Cold, both Good and Evil?
My philosophical view is that the physical/material world is Monistic : a single dynamic causal force (amoral energy) that can have positive or negative effects, depending on the individual's me-centered --- or we-centered --- interpretation. That's why the Buddha preached a No-Self perspective, and the Stoics focused on self-control. Fairness & Justice are not of the world, but in the mind of the observer. The cosmos is what it is, but humans can imagine what it could be.
Apparently, homo sapiens is also the homo virtus of the animal world. Capable of seeing injustice, and of doing something about it, by working together toward the ideal of a fair & balanced society. By imposing moral structure on an amoral world. :smile:
Blowin' In The Wind
[i]And how many years can some people exist
Before they're allowed to be free?
Yes, and how many times can a man turn his head
And pretend that he just doesn't see?
The answer, my friend, is blowin' in the wind
The answer is blowin' in the wind[/i]
___Bob Dylan
Yes, he's saying "another world" - ultimately concluding with this other world being a place where "nothing ever dies". Which I think supersedes even the notion of a Garden of Eden. This is not what everybody deems to be the ultimate good - Buddhist notions of Nirvana without remainder as one (counter-)example, Plotinus's the One as another, in both these cases there being no world to speak of, but only pure being devoid of any existence (here in the sense of that which "stands out"). Still, to me at least, the song does get an emotive point across, an emotive point that many enough do share: we (most at least) do secretly want, or at least yearn for, more than the world makes possible to have even in principle. I suppose to a Buddhist, this however being indicative of not following the middle-path.
Still, at the end of the day, it's just one song among many, and I don't endorse a good portion of its perspectives. Just the part about the world being neither fair nor unfair.
Quoting Gnomon
I get that, and as I've previously mentioned, my own philosophical view is not one of materialism (i.e. a monism of physicality/materiality). Yet, do you find the "mind of the observer" to be any less real than the physicality which it observes and thereby knows? And, if not, are not both then equally real aspects of that which constitutes "the world" as-is.
If so, then I find that fairness & justice (together with unfairness & injustice) are as much of the world as are the minds of observers to which these notions are requisite. This doesn't then make the world of itself either fair or unfair in total. Nor does it address that by which fairness and unfairness is determined. Yet it does seem to avoid the inconsistency of a dualism - namely, between a) fairness/justice (and of the observers to which these properties often enough apply) which is claimed to not be of the world and b) the physical world itself - occurring within an upheld monism of materialism/physicalism, this however the latter be interpreted.
I don't know how this thread got off-track on discussions of Physics and Thermodynamics as the "grounds" for ethical concepts. But, a quick Google search found that some modern developments in philosophy have narrowly focused on Linguistics and Phenomenology, which analyze common words down to their presumptive atomic meanings. I don't know about , but personally, I have no formal training in technical philosophy, or in modern deconstruction of traditional meanings.
So, my language is mostly colloquial, and never doctrinal. When I use a physical metaphor, it's intended only as an easily understood analogy between observable physical things and abstruse metaphysical abstractions. For me, "thermodynamic equilibrium" is not a dogma, but a simile with ethical equality. They are not "grounding for absolutely everything". Apparently, some who are more erudite are reading into our words meanings that were not intended. :cool:
Metaphor and Phenomenology
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Continental philosophers such as Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida go further in adding a linguistically creative dimension. They argue that metaphor and symbol act as the primary interpreters of reality, generating richer layers of perception, expression, and meaning in speculative thought. The interplay of metaphor and phenomenology introduces serious challenges and ambiguities within long-standing assumptions in the history of Western philosophy, largely with respect to the strict divide between the literal and figurative modes of reality based in the correspondence theory of truth.
https://iep.utm.edu met-phen
Quoting apokrisis
Not something I recognise. Of course justice takes place in the world.
I'm just pointing out that it is not obvious how thermodynamic considerations enter in to the situation pictured here:
The boxes seem quite material, their distribution being the issue. Nothing here appears transcendental, but it's unclear how you are using that word.
Yep. And I pointed to how this reflects the two kinds of equilibrium distributions in statistical mechanics Gaussian and Scalefree.
Folk were objecting to thermodynamics because they could only think about it in terms of its original closed system Gaussian distribution and were unfamiliar with its more generic open system powerlaw or fractal distribution the one that better fits the actual Cosmos with its dichotomistic action of expanding and cooling.
Thermodynamics is flipped on its head once it becomes a model of self-organising growth rather than featureless death.
And familiarity with this would help in ethical discussions about things like income distribution for instance. Is it fair that wealth has become almost scalefree in its global distribution?
Folk with Gaussian expectations of life would see the current world as insanely unequal and thus unfair.
Folk better informed by power laws would think free growth is just doing its thing. It is a distribution of wealth that is not constrained by a mean. The billionaires can't be blamed. The system is not distorted. This is just the distribution that a free growth system based on its own problematic beliefs around endless fossil fuels and a free atmospheric sink for CO2 will arrive at.
Your cutesy Hallmark card is confused because fairness depends on which notion of equality or equilibrium is in play. In time, small kids grow up to be tall adults. But right now, they need taller boxes. Or lower fences. Although then that will be unfair to the adults as they will have nothing holding them back in the paying stands.
Are you claiming that the difference between fair and equal is the same as the difference between a normal distribution and one that follows a power law? If so, then some further explanation is needed. If not, then what are you claiming?
So far as I can see you have yet to explain the supposed connection between fairness and thermodynamics - you've just made the claim that they are connected, again.
More generally, there is a difference between what is the case and what ought be the case that also remains, so far as I can see, unaddressed. I know I have made this point to you previously, and I take it to underpin much of the comment on your posts at Pragmatism Without Goodness and elsewhere.
Supose science demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the universe is such that thermodynamics is a model of self-organising growth, or whatever it is you are espousing. How does this tell us what we ought do?
I've tried to hand you a simple example, for you to show us how this would work. How does it show us that we ought share the boxes in this way? You can choose another example, if this is too difficult: Why ought we keep promises? How does thermodynamics help with the trolly problem? How do scale-free equilibrium distributions apply to antinatalism?
You advocate pragmatism - show how thermodynamics helps with practical issues.
Clean out your ears. This was the OP that I was addressing. I was pointing to the third option of the pragmatic/semiotic view that stands beyond the impasse of the idealism vs realism debate.
Systems science fixes things with its holism that can include the whole world. Thermodynamics - as updated by dissipative structure theory - now founds science from cosmology to the mind.
Quoting Gnomon
So every time you say thermodynamics, you are not using it in the modern sense of self-organising cosmic order. You are still stuck in the metaphysical bog of idealist vs realist debates.
If you want to argue that equality and fairness are different kinds of distribution, then you have to start making that actual argument in a proper fashion.
And also show how the distinction is even relevant to the OP. Is justice on the equality or the fairness side of the equation? Or something else?
Whatever you think your case is, try putting that picture into words that make sense. They you might start to realise the confusions it relies on.
More spit. Much as is to be expected on your history.
Have you read the story of the emperor's new cloths? I think folk hereabouts are not too keen on your garment.
You and your eternal whinging. Just answer the question. What argument do you think your cartoon makes about "distributions" that might be dichotomously labelled "fair" vs "equal"?
Is this a difference that makes a difference somehow in relation to the further terms of "justice" or "balance", which were the terms of the OP?
I realise silence will be the reply. One can only hope you piss off permanently.
Can you explain, clearly, how it is that thermodynamics helps in understanding fairness?
What you are not answering is which equilibrium do you have in mind? Gaussian or scalefree?
In the meantime, help yourself to more spit.
I'm happy for you to choose. After all, it's you who claim that they are relevant.
Does it matter?
You and I can choose Gaussian or scalefree -- but that's not the philosophical question. the question is: Which do you choose?
Yeah?
Quoting apokrisis
It seems that all of this might indeed be the case, and yet we still would not be able to say if the real world is fair and just, or if it isn't.
Yet you seem to think that this somehow answers .
How?
But you have to clear up why your saccharine image illustrates anything in the first place.
You say it is something about distributions. And I agree. I can immediately see the familiar distinction between normal and powerlaw distributions, as found in the mathematically precise form given by statistical mechanics.
But in what sense is one distribution equal and the other fair? Such terminology seems to assume the idealist conclusion you are angling for. The one that says the realm of mind is ontically distinct from the realm of matter. Thermodynamics can apply to one, but not the other.
So I have asked repeatedly for you to make your case if you think you have one. I've already made my own.
Quoting kindred
Is unfairness or injustice really just the product of human action? Nature is not created equal or fair, and as a result, some human population had fared better than others.
So do we only address those unfairness caused by human actions? Or do we also address those that are the products of the natural world? Our judgment of fairness and justice clearly has a physical foundation -- whether caused by civilization or by the natural world.
From a human perspective, non-human nature can seem "unfair and unjust" ... to some less fortuitous "human populations".
Please provide an example.
So, if a volcano is about to erupt -- being that a volcano eruption is totally non-human caused, and the lives of people living nearby are in danger. Would you do something about helping those people? If so, what is your reason for helping? Is it because you don't want them to die?
This is a quite normal political question. Any fool would say we want a society that is balanced, fair, equal and just. The question then becomes well which version of a society is that which you have in mind? One that is steady-state or one that exponentially grows?
On the whole, folk have voted for growth. And yearned for steady state. They want 3% as a basic forever rate of economic improvement and then they bellyache at the yawning inequality gap that such a regime creates simply as its equilibrium outcome. They remember the good old days when incomes were almost Gaussian flat. The good old days being the post-war anglosphere and not the pre-industrial era when GDP had flat-lined for millenia.
So there is the moral conundrum. The physical world foots the entropic bill. Fossil fuels are the explosive basis of modern economics and its scalefree social complexification. Peasants and serfs can now be pickleball professionals and influencers.
We are theoretically all equal in terms of being able surf the same entropic wave gushing through human affairs. We all have the same starting opportunity just by being born into a deregulated entrepreneurial modern society, especially now there is the scalefree information medium of the internet to let anyone and anything "go viral".
But then we have the bellyaching that goes with wiring ourselves for accelerationism the wonders of exponential growth. Maybe the fossil fuels aren't such a free lunch and have an eco-services cost we never factored in. Maybe psychologically humans are still genetically programmed for the non-growth economics of stone age foraging. Fair and equal take on a different meaning within a different context of expectations.
Yesterday, the right was for every mouth around the campfire to have a feed. Three boxes for the adult and one for the child.
Today the right of every person is to be an influencer and star of their own superstar life. Equality comes in the form that the medium rewards the dipshits and victims as much as the beautiful and brainy.
So to draw a line from physics to moral choices is a complex and evolving tale, but perfectly doable.
My argument here is that to start the discussion, you first need to realise that we are indeed already caught in a choice between two poles of the "distribution game".
In one panel of Banal's diptych is everyone standing on the equality of a ground that never changes for anyone. The other panel represents the "fairness" of everyone being allowed as many boxes as take their fancy.
Assumed is that the world has some supply of boxes in the first place. And this particular world as pictured further assumes that only three boxes are enough to make everyone equally happy so long as the said boxes are distributed with the "fairness" of a maximum inequality.
So much to unpack as so much has been already assumed in the parable of the three boxes. As usual Bang-on pretends something is so obviously true it needs no further explication on his part. And as usual, he could not be more wrong.
[Querulous voice from the back seat] Dad, are we there yet? Are we there yet? Dad? Dad?
I think this expresses a good contradiction, and helps me understand between the two -- I really wasn't sure.
My guess is we're all on board with the Gaussian economy, yeh?
Enough of that, please.
No. Please answer my question. What is the act of saving those people for?
I am trying to get to that sense of something that we humans use when we're making a judgment call for fairness or just.
Given the context (our two posts at the top of this page), ask a question that makes sense.
Yes. If you define "real" as anything that can interact with other things, then the human mind is real. A rock is inert in itself, but can be used to break a window. An idea is subjective and invisible, but it can be used to affect other minds. For example, your post elicited this reply.
However, for philosophical purposes, it's often useful to distinguish Ideal from Real, even though both can be found in the "real" world. Ideas are not material, but are products of material brains. And Ideals, such as "Justice", are not located in some heavenly realm, but right here in this forum. :smile:
Pardon, my intrusion. But I suspect your failure to communicate with may be foundering on the notion of "transcendent" ideas. If he is an Immanentist regarding abstract concepts --- God being just the most common example --- any reference to something transcendent may be meaningless to him.
You can ask him if that is why your argument "tells me very little". Some philosophers seem to believe that abstract ideals, such as Justice, exist eternally in a transcendent realm of perfect Forms. But others think that Ideal realm is just a metaphor based on our experience with things we know are on the other side of a wall, but can't see or touch. Metaphors are the lingua franca of philosophy. But some speak different dialects, making communication complicated.
If I'm guessing wrong, he will tell you, in no uncertain terms. :smile:
I've been thinking along similar lines since my last reply to Quoting Banno
Human actions are what we have control over, and so we ask what we should do.
Quoting L'éléphant
The only way in which we can "address those that are the products of the natural world" is by human action.
I'm sorry if the image shows you nothing. For others, it shows the difference between equal and fair. There is considerable literature on this topic - you might be familiar with John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum. But of course these are but two in a multitude.
Your trivialising them does not do you proud.
Quoting apokrisis
The question then is "What do we do?". Answering that might well involve being clear about what is "balanced, fair, equal and just".
My repeated question to you is, how does thermodynamics help us here?
And while you have presented an interesting account of why economics might benefit from considering thermodynamics, you have not explained how this helps with equity, fairness or justice, nor shown how physics helps with the ethical problems commonly discussed hereabouts, such as antinatalism, run-away trams, and keeping promises.
There are profound and important issues here that remain unaddressed by mere thermodynamics.
My impression is he just wants to be a metaphysics basher and to avoid at all costs having then to address the metaphysical inconsistencies that are buried in what he then asserts about the world, the mind, truth, etc. He wastes your time and does no work in return. So is not worth the bother. He can't even say how equal and fair are different things, let alone in what sense they are not the same.
But my position is immanentist and I would argue that importing "the divine" or "the mind" is always to be a closet transcendentalist as it does raise these natural processes to the status of standalone existences. The idea can be named independent of the ground that is its genesis.
In the Aristolelean tradition of the systems scientist and natural philosopher, we assume reality to be the product of immanent creation. That is, it self-organises into being. It arises because order is what emerges when disorder starts to cancel away its own irregularity and start to fall into dynamical patterns "lawful" habits that it simply cannot avoid. In some sense, nature has to find its way to a fair balance that is good in the sense that it is self-stabilising and persistent enough to exist. It is a process that can run down some gradient, some direction, for a very long time.
And clearly the Cosmos, life and mind have turned out to have just that kind of self-organising logic. And thermodynamics as a general label for a vast field of maths and science now is all about systems that self-organise. So thermodynamics is how we can bring 21st C precision to a metaphysics of immanence.
Seems clear.
While I don't want to invoke the naturalistic fallacy, it's hard for a human to look at nature and think that we inhabit a fair world.
Nature is a bloodbath predicated on killing and suffering. Animals slowly devour each other alive over hours, enduring extreme pain. Babies of animals and birds are torn apart and eaten by predators in front of their mothers. The mere weather regularly freezes or burns to death scores of creatures. Something deplorable is happening in our backyards as I write. Imagine an omnipotent deity who decided that of all the methods possible for creating life, he'd settle on one where suffering and predation are built into the fabric of reality.
It's your thread, so your response is welcome.
I would not describe myself as an "immaterialist". I've argued that what are sometimes called abstract concepts are better understood as institutional facts. They manifest our intentions, so to speak. The "our" here is important. And the issues involved are complex.
I think the issue you raised in the OP can best be thought of in terms of direction of fit. The term comes from Anscombe, but has been developed by others, including Searle.
There are two directions of fit. The first is that we find the things around us to be in such-and-such a way. We can set out how things are in our theories and language, changing our minds to match what is going on around us. This is more or less the process of science. The second direction is that we can change how things are to make them as we want. We alter how things are in order to match our theories and language. This is not the province of science so much as of ethics.
We can change the words we use to set out how things are. And we can change how things are to match the words we use.
I take this to be what lies behind ideas such as Hume's guillotine and the is-ought problem and the naturalistic fallacy.
So a description of how things are, even if complete, does not tell us what we ought to do about it.
Hmm. I'm wondering what you think the naturalistic fallacy is. It is not an appeal to nature.
You probably agree, but I thought I'd check.
But I asked you to present your case in your words. As usual, that is far too risky. And now you are resorting to your usual defence of "everyone who is my friend agrees with me without further question."
Quoting Banno
The case was put. The burden is on you to explain how it does not.
Quoting Banno
These may be examples of the profound real world problems that are keeping you up at night, but really? Antinatalism, run-away trams, and keeping promises! Don't you just groan seeing these trivialities rehashed time after time on PF?
Let's get back to the issue you actually raised in this thread. By force of Hallmark card meme, you wanted to suggest that fair and equal are somehow distinct in some fashion for which you want a thermodynamic explanation.
I pointed to an obvious thermodynamic distinction the one between powerlaw and normal statistical distributions. Equality could mean either the closed system symmetry of one box for everyone, or the open system asymmetry of a 0,1,2 distribution of the three available boxes.
Now you want to continue to pretend I made no case and that I have to ring up Rawls and Nussbaum to explain your own counter-case to me.
What are you smoking?
I'm not enamoured with the description of "nature red in tooth and claw", with the emphasis on competition. I think it a culturally driven narrative. Studies of ecosystems also tell a story of cooperation. This is the bit of @apokrisis' account that perhaps has value.
The naturalistic fallacy in philosophy "is the claim that it is possible to define good in terms of natural entities, or properties". Saying that the good is what is pleasurable, or what makes the greatest number of folk happy, and so on.
Again, I'd analyses this in terms of direction of fit. Saying how things are - that they induce pleasure or happiness - is very different from saying how they ought to be.
I was waiting for that. The next rhetorical move, after abuse and ridicule, is to claim that you already answered the question.
You still have not shown how thermodynamics helps with ethical issues. How does thermodynamics tell us what we ought to do?
Except we have to live together in the actual world and so that roots any utopias in the realities of thermodynamics. Any action we take is going to have an entropic cost that has to be budgeted for in any ethical system.
The cost to ecosystems was something that humans living simpler and less techological lives could afford to ignore.
But now that human aspirations are about constructing a planetary level of civilisation, this thermodynamic reality is all up in our faces. To not have it front and centre of an ethical debate is itself unethical in any non-trivial ethical discussion.
Sure.
So what does thermodynamics tell us about the distribution of boxes?
It seems to me that your description of how things are does not tell us how they ought be.
Unless you claim that how things are is how they must be, that we cannot change what we do. But that does not seem correct.
Your one trick. Pretend there have been no answers so as to cover your own failure to respond in good faith.
You introduced fair vs equal as some kind of relevant distinction. You still haven't explained what that was except take the attitude of "its obvious from someone else's picture".
I, by contrast, have pointed out that an asymmetric distribution of boxes is what would constitute "fair and equal" as a powerlaw thermodynamic balance the one of a growing system. While a symmetric distribution is "fair and equal" as the Gaussian balance of a no-growth system.
I think the meme is trite as it mixes up two kinds of systems the growth curves of humans with in a "world" of a fixed number of boxes to distribute. Confusion follows, as is illustrated in just thinking how the same three figures would "fairly and equally" distribute food around a campfire. Etc.
There is much that could be unpacked if you really wanted a dissection.
But still that is where we are. You memed. I gave the obvious retort. You clammed up on why you thought there was any merit in this illustration of "what is equal vs what is fair". I gave a fuller explanation. You pretend there is no reason you should have to either tackle my approach or go back and fill in the blanks on the distinction you claimed to demonstrate that ethics ain't applied thermodynamics.
Proud of yourself?
Cool. That's the only one I have heard of.
Quoting Banno
Ok, that's interesting. I wouldn't know G.E. Moore from Dudley Moore. I've just read a ChatGPT account of it but I still don't quite understand the concept.
Maybe what I was thinking of was the is/ought problem.
You've made the claim. You have not presented a case. Nor have you shown why we ought adopt - what is it, a "powerlaw thermodynamic balance" over a "Gaussian balance of a no-growth".
But this is tiresome.
My description was of how things are fundamentally constrained. There are pragmatic limits that shape our individual degrees of freedom.
So is/ought is a false binary from the systems point of view. You just haven't understood the force of that.
Is/ought is a problem for a reductionist metaphysics that can't reconcile the divide it makes between mind and matter.
But for the naturalistic holism I argue, we are all contextual beings who have the right instincts because we are being shaped by our lived environments to make choices that on the whole statistically speaking lead to the continuing repair and reproduction of that system.
We reconstruct the system of constraints that are what shape us to be active agents of change in the first place.
Is/ought drops out of the equation. Constraints and freedoms become complementary rather than antithetical in the systems view of reality.
They are not unrelated.
But "naturalistic fallacy" is headed the way of "begging the question", losing its original meaning and so reducing our capacity to express fine distinctions. A bit sad.
seems to be one of the most philosophically knowledgeable posters on this forum. But his arguments tend to be rather terse, as if he has a canned answer for common problems. So, some fraught terms may be trigger-words for a succinct reply. Based on his dismissal of your arguments, I suspect that he equates both "Metaphysics" and "Transcendence" with other-worldly religion and spiritualism, instead of with abstract concepts and philosophical metaphors.
My own non-religious philosophical worldview is based on the notion of a "self-organizing logic" that serves as both Cause and Coordinator of the physical and meta-physical (e.g. mental) aspects of the world. For material objects, that "logic" can be summarized as the Laws of Thermodynamics : Energy ->->-> Entropy --- order always devolves into disorder. And yet, the Big Bang has somehow produced a marvelous complex cosmos instead of just a puff of smoke.
For philosophical concepts especially, that thermodynamic metaphor could be mis-interpreted. So, I have coined a neologism -- Enformy*1 -- to describe the positive force that physicists mis-labeled as "Negentropy". My coinage combines physical Energy and Platonic Form (design), to describe the ability of Nature to integrate isolated things into whole systems, including living organisms and thinking beings. I suppose you could call it a "metaphysics of immanence". But Banno might hear it as an oxymoron or paradox. :smile:
*1. Enformy :
[i]In the Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce complexity & progress. [ see post 63 for graph ]
1. I'm not aware of any "supernatural force" in the world. But my Enformationism theory postulates that there is a meta-physical force behind Time's Arrow and the positive progress of evolution. Just as Entropy is sometimes referred to as a "force" causing energy to dissipate (negative effect), Enformy is the antithesis, which causes energy to agglomerate (additive effect).
2. Of course, neither of those phenomena is a physical Force, or a direct Cause, in the usual sense. But the term "force" is applied to such holistic causes as a metaphor drawn from our experience with physics.
3. "Entropy" and "Enformy" are scientific/technical terms. Yet, while those forces are completely natural, the ultimate source of the power behind them may be preternatural, in the sense that a First Cause logically existed before the Big Bang, to program the potential for an almost infinite Cosmos into a sub-atomic Singularity.[/i]
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
But that does not tell us what to choose. At best it is to pretend that we have no choices. And so it leaves the whole issue of what we ought do unaddressed.
And in the end, that is most unsatisfying.
Why would I have to treat these as antithetical rather than complementary?
You haven't even said clearly if you view equal and fair as different, let alone exactly what that difference might be.
So yes, you are being tiresome. Let's hear what you case actually is here. Do the work. Use your words. Stop deflecting.
Nope. That is just you making shit up after I specified that I was talking about systems that grow, evolve and change ... as is possible in a metaphyical paradigm based on thermodynamical self-organisation.
You can play the dunce and pretend you can't follow what is plainly said. But then don't get upset by finding that hat being planted on your head.
This is why I thought Apo's approach might appeal to you. I hope that I've shown that how things are is not sufficient to tell us how they might be, and that there are broader issues here.
I've already answered over a dozen posts this morning alone, and have five more in my "in tray", so please forgive my terseness... :wink:
You do not do yourself a service.
But is determinism the case? How would we know? If humans are truly free, there is no guarantee that that freedom is analyzable. If freedom were analyzable in causal terms it would not be freedom.
Enough with the bully tactics meant to show that your audience stands with you in judgement of me. Either give proper answers to fair questions or bog off.
:rofl:
I might add that, even if determinism is true, what we do next is still undone... and so we do not know what we will do. The choice remains to be made.
And so, the need to examine what we ought do, remains.
:100:
I can spell out what I think it means -- I don't think it's very deep. I think it's comparing two versions of equality -- the equality of opportunity and the equality of outcomes.
I don't think it's much deeper than that, though. And if it needs be deeper then that's perfectly fine, but the question has less to do with the set-up -- boxes, firms, ownership, whatever -- and more to do with the question "How do we draw a line from physics to moral choices?" -- if it's doable, then can we do it?
Or is the statement of two sides enough to demonstrate that physics can draw a line to moral choices? What does this "drawing a line" consistent in?
Any scenario will do -- I'd be interested in hearing how you go from physics to ethics (as generally I don't think it can be done)
Yes. That's the role of Philosophy, not Science. As you noted, we will never have a complete comprehensive understanding of "how things are", or of ding an sich. All we ever know of the "real" world is the subjective sensations of our bodies, and the imagery (ideas) in our minds. But, without "objective facts", such as the contributions of physical Science, we might never be able to communicate from one mind to another.
The Facts of Science are intended to represent a hypothetical universal or god's view of "how things are". They may also be postulated as-if they are the common human experience. Unfortunately, the universal language of Science is Mathematics. Which is so abstract and idealized as to be incomprehensible to those who are not mathematically inclined. That's why a parent's smack on the rump of an unruly child is a directly sensible lesson, that can be easily understood as "you ought not to do that". It's close to a universal philosophical language. :wink:
Quoting Banno
Is that an indirect way of saying that you identify as a Materialist? The term I used was "immanentist", so your discussion of "immaterialist" misses the philosophical issue of Immanence vs Transcendence. I borrowed the term from another poster ; understanding it to mean something more like "realist" vs Idealist, or even "materialist" vs spiritualist in a different context. In other words, there is nothing --- no minds, no ideas, no spirits, no souls, no gods, and no philosophical metaphors --- that are not of this world : i.e. transcendent, hence not subject to verification or falsification. However, some Facts of Science (e.g. quantum quarks) are also institutional, and must be taken on Faith by those who are not members of the institution. :smile:
Immanentism :
any of several theories according to which God or an abstract mind or spirit pervades the world.
Note --- for this thread, I equate this term with "anti-supernatural", meaning that there is nothing out of this physical world. And "meta-physics" is sometimes interpreted as anti-immanent.
Institutional Facts :
In terms of Searle's theory, the facts he is puzzled by are institutional facts, i.e. facts created by assignment, performed by collective intentionality, of an agentive function of non-causal type to an object.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-0589-0_18
Note --- This is over my head, but it sounds like a reference to church dogma about such non-entities as The Trinity. You can't see it, or even understand it, you just have to believe it. Ironically, a three-flavored Quark is a sort of Trinity.
Yes, I agree with your second paragraph. It seems to me that free will may not even be conceivable when thinking of a deterministic universe.
It remains that you must choose.
If determinism is not true and we are somehow radically free to choose then on that assumption morality would be rationally justified.
Regardless, as @Banno says
Quoting Banno
Thats right. Which you can see is putting us into the frame of being growth predicated organisms. And yet then confusing things by pretending that there are sufficient boxes to go around to achieve every ones growth goals.
This is a metaphysics of infinite human potential without entropic constraints. It is the very modern worldview of a romantic/technocratic age where we can have our heaven on Earth rather than having to wait for the release of death.
It is a surprisingly toxic ethics when you dig into it.
Quoting Moliere
But my systems view doesnt draw one way lines. That is the reductionist expectation where reality is just a tale of bottom-up material construction.
The systems view says reality is a growth process in which a stable existence arises from a complementary balance of two polar opposites. It is dialectical. A system is formed by its lived interaction between its top-down constraints and its bottom-up freedoms. Global constraints shape the local freedoms that then in their turn - statistically, on the whole - reconstruct that prevailing state of constraint.
So a neoliberal political structure is a mindset that constrains the youthful mind in a way that is intended to shape that person as an entrepreneur. We are encouraged to take risks (and incur debt) so as to reap the self-actualising rewards.
The entropic cost of a planet of entrepreneurs is left out of this mindset. The success of a society is literally being measured in GDP - where tearing down things Is equivalent in value to the GDP involved in building them up.
But still, this can work for at least one or two generation of humans. We have a system that limits the choices of its parts so that their free action is ensured to be of the kind that rebuilds the system as it stands. At least to a statistically constrained degree.
This is the evolutionary algorithm in a nutshell. A genetic template that produces enough direction to rebuild the living body while also producing enough trait variation to incorporate the changes that work.
Entrepreneurship celebrates failure as taking a chance is even more important if you want to grow your lived world at an ever faster rate.
Conservative politics favours the other end of this risk/reward setting. So the constraints become more obvious, the agency more clearly ethically restricted in definite directions.
So the line here is not from some reductionist notion of physics or thermodynamic science to the human self-creation of utopias on Earth. It is a reframing of the whole tired field of classical ethics with its is/ought debates that arose at the intersection of the scientific revolution and its romantic anti-deterministic response.
It seems there is a rational debate to be had with is/ought safely demarcating ethics as its own cool little social enterprise, predicated on the open infinity of human potential. But yeah, nah. Times have moved on.
That's a bit of a misapprehension. Institutional facts are not mythical, transcendent or metaphorical. They are common everyday things like money, property, keeping promises and playing football.
This piece of paper counts as five dollars; this land counts as your property; this expression counts as undertaking an obligation; putting the ball in the goal counts as scoring a goal.
The physical thing has uses attached to it in accord with our shared intent.
There's a bunch of things in your post with which I disagree. So
Quoting Gnomon
No, but it depends what you mean by "materialist".
Quoting Gnomon
I don't think this notion can be made coherent
Quoting Gnomon
I don't think science looks for the gods-eye view from nowhere, but the general view from anywhere - Einstein's Principle of Relativity.
But maybe in other threads?
Let's try to answer the titular question with this in mind.
It sounds to me like you'd have to say that the real world is fair and just, and that fairness and justness have a counterpart of some kind. If it's dialectical then how do you intend "complementary balance of two polar opposites"? Mostly interested in what "opposites" are in this.
Are polar opposites [s]are[/s] simply the negation of some concept, like Justice/not-Justice, or if Justice is contrasted with injustice, or if Justice stands alone in relation to Fairness?
So if we take Hegel's philosophy we get a dialectic where the negation of the negation does not lead to the original concept, but instead is a process of sublation -- in which case I'd be inclined to think that Justness and Fairness are the teleological ends (top down constraints) and our human choices are the bottom-up freedoms. Or something along those lines.
But in a systems view I imagine that the dialectic must work differently? What is the system? What are the constraints and freedoms that would allow us to say something about the state of the world?
I'm guessing that we'd say something along the lines that you have to accept the good with the bad, so that the world is neither wholly just nor wholly unjust, and the same would go for fairness. Since we're always in a state of growth or becoming it's going to be the case that we'll find ourselves on the side of injustice as well as justice as we progress.
How does that sound?
Thanks for responding.
I am under the impression that we act on something -- in this case, out of our sense of justice or fairness -- because WE see the situation as unjust. So this much is clear. But as you and I know already, not only we act on unjust policies, treatment, and abuses by people in our society; we also do something about natural calamities and help those who are affected.
WE interpret the first as unjust or unfair (and we do something to remedy the situation), but what about the second scenario? Why do we save those people who are in danger by virtue of natural calamities and diseases if not out of moral judgment as well? There is no intent (nature has no evil intent) in the second, but we also do something about it. In truth, our moral sense works the same way whether the situation is caused by human action or by naturally occurring cluster fuck!
Quoting Banno
No objection there.
But in what sense? What context? Can you define these terms as you contextually understand them.
The slippery use of language shows folk are uncertain of their metaphysical assumptions. We have physicalist terms like equal and balance being thrown around with it remaining unclear how they either complement or challenge these other idealist terms such as fair, just and good.
So are folk building in the strong division that thus resist its ontological bridging? Or do they assume the opposite that Nature is a functional whole and so separation is part of the game that leads to eventual reconciliation as a dialectical unity of opposites?
My approach is the usual one of hearing folk agonising about some puzzling duality and then explaining that this is merely a symptom of a greater holism the triadic ontology of a holomorphic system.
If we are concerned that the Cosmos appears in some way fundamentally unequal and unfair, while humans have this idealistic potential for understanding fairness and constructing equality, then that dilemma is the place to start a larger ontologial reframing.
We can know that our terms make proper sense once they apply comfortably to both the polar extremes involved from the most brute physics to the most enlightened philosophy.
What do balance and equality look like at the sociocultural level of human "morality". And what do fair and just look like at the cosmological level of thermodynamics?
We are getting somewhere when we can see they are polarities that encode a spectrum of state that constitute "the world inbetween" their limiting extremes.
This is the power of metaphysical logic. It dichotomises to arrive at a unity of opposites. Mind and matter denote to opposing limits. A useful distinction which gives us the measure of all things inbetween to the degree they seem either more mindful or more material. Our definition of terms is precise to the degree it has been framed as a logical reciprocal relation.
Mind = 1/matter in being the least materially bound condition we can imagine. And matter is likewise 1/mind in being the least mindful level of any conceivable real world process.
Anyone who cares about their philosophy would make the effort to ground their use of terms in this dialectical fashion. They wouldn't just grunt and gesture as if pointing is enough and no explaining is required.
Proper definition is counterfactual and must point to what is present in terms of what is absent. But how does the grunter and gesticulator point to that which is the absent? What use is such a person on a philosophy forum?
Quoting Moliere
Right then. The work begins. And perhaps some terms are so soaked in idealism (or physicalism) that there is no rescuing them?
I myself tend towards systems jargon like constraints and freedoms, plasticity and stability, vague and crisp, chance and necessity, etc, etc. I already inhabit a dialectical paradigm where work has been done to create robust reciprocal distinctions. There are a ton of terms that bridge the divide that reductionism creates. Those in system science speak their own language for a good reason. That is how they can share the same general mindset as a community.
If the talk turned to justice, this would be understood as some kind of optimising balancing act as illustrated by a set of scales. Differences can be converted to equalities. A pound of cheese can be measured in terms of its equivalent some sum of money being what matters to the shop keeper with physical goods to trade for hard cash.
Weighing the value of goods is prosaic. The exchange of money acts as the most impersonal way of establishing a biosemiotic connection between a society and its entropification. Definitions of a fair, just, balanced and equal deal seem to be synonyms of each other as the gap being bridged is so habitualised and ritual. Just read the price and pay the money. Or don't.
But then where we get to "moral" decisions that weigh the individual and their actions against their society and its norms, the weighing of the scales becomes a lot more difficult and complex. Pile up the sin on one side and what then is the good that can be placed on the other?
Is it an eye for an eye or juvenile rehabilitation? Does a crime of passion deserve an automatic market discount?
You have to see through these abstracted notions fair, just, balanced, equal to discover the pragmatic complexities they are supposed to encode. And that is even simply in the everyday human social context let alone when someone poses the very broad metaphysical question of whether the real world in general is "fair and just".
Quoting Moliere
I find Hegel pretty clumsy. Peirce tried to tidy him up.
I think what needs to be added to the dialectic is the trialectical arc of rational development the steps from the firstness of vagueness, to the secondness of dichotomy, to the thirdness of hierarchy.
So we start just with a pure unbroken "everythingness" that is thus also a "nothingness". Counterfactuality ain't even born. We just have an Apeiron an unstructured potential.
Then there is a symmetry-breaking or dichotomisation. The hot separates from the cold in original Greek abstraction. It may start as a more seed of difference but then feeds on itself to become a general polarity. If we break the symmetry of 1 as the identity element, then we get both infinity and the infinitesimal as its logical extremes. Shrinking and growing arrive eventually at their own complementary bounding limits. Infinity = 1/infinitesimal and infinitesimal = 1/infinity.
So the antithetical arises not as thesis and its sublation a temporal order but is present right from the start as the other side of thesis in a more spatialised sense. It is already a pair of directions ready to unfold in mutual fashion.
But yes, in general the systems view is dialectic. But if you start in a pure vagueness of a structureless Apeiron, then you are thinking more thermodynamically as it is all about symmetry-breaking itself and not already into the realm of dyadic counterfactuality Peircean secondness.
The universal and the particular as logic-grounding concepts have to arise from "somewhere" that is their own ground. And a logical vagueness is how to get that triadic game going. Peirce defined vagueness as that to which the PNC doesn't (yet) apply. (And generality as that to which the LEM fails to apply).
So this is Hegel+, perhaps. Sublation is what an action reveals by managing to leave that further somethingness behind. But from a fully relativistic point of view, attention is drawn to the mutality or logical reciprocality of the deal. Both are revealing their other as a "leaving behind". One isn't the first move, the other the second. It is a dependent co-arising.
Quoting Moliere
The situation is hierarchical and so local~global is the most general view of it as a dichotomous symmetry breaking. We have the community as the social level of mindfulness and rationality. We have the individual as the local degree of freedom who is in fact having to juggle social diktat and personal biology as a microcosm of the same juggling act that society is having to balance its more general ecological equation.
Both global constraints and local freedoms are "being mindful" or making intelligent choices about the same basic issue staying alive by maintaining an entropic capacity for running repairs and reproducing growth. But their "cogent" scales are as different as possible. Individuals must be able to make split second choices. Communities might prefer to remain essentially recognisable and unchanged for as far back and far forward as they can remember or imagine.
Can fairness and justice be made terms that fit neatly into this kind of systems perspective? You can see that the local and global view might be quite different.
If I am a rich kid and my envious schoolmates force me to share my lunch "equally and fairly", whose perspective carries the moral absolutism? Am I being robbed or socialised? Your justice could be my injustice. So you need a model of social systems that can weigh the scales in some balanced fashion. Which is where I came in with that point about Gaussian vs powerlaw distributions.
It is not just about whether thermodynamics can apply to such scenarios, it is about knowing enough statistical mechanics to understand the dichotomies that polarise a thermodynamical point of view.
Just take climate change. We are already having many more extreme weather events than the models predicted. But the models were too Gaussian and the reality more powerlaw. A straight line was drawn and this assumed linearity proved to harbour more non-linearity and feedback than allowed for.
Science hasn't even had the final word on science let alone ethics. But that doesn't mean it ain't thundering down the line.
Quoting Moliere
I think that is a soft answer. We do have the power of choice and can vote for better. Back in the 1960s, science told us about all the terminal 2050 problems of climate change, peak energy, overpopulation, ecology destruction. The exponentialising and even super-expontialising of the growth curves had to be matched by their own exponentially-growing antidotes. Just to get back into a powerlaw regime, energy efficiency had to reduce demand just as fast as energy consumption was increasing it.
Computer chips are at least a technology hitched to such a curve and so are a pretty sustainable growth ambition. But most other things, like food, stable weather, cars, clean environment, are not.
But that is the world we are making which is arguably unnatural to the degree it is unregulated growth and not the kind of long-run ecological growth where we have had a gradual increase in entropification in terms of biology climbing its ladder of organismic complexity.
So again, the OP question has to make sense by its context being defined. And everyone just jumps to the idealism of the Platonic kind of fair, balanced, equal, just and good that inhabits a realm of contextless abstraction then wonders why they can't draw any kind of line back to the real world that must ground these as pragmatically useful distinctions.
In the context of a thread on TPF asking for a general reflection :)
So, yes, I think you're right to say: Quoting apokrisis
Is the question posed, and even highlighting difficulties in answering -- or highlighting possible ways of thinking about the question -- is enough of an answer.
So, is the world fair and just?
I'm going to highlight where I see you answering the question more directly, whereas before what I was reading looked to be so different from the question I was struggling to see how it addressed it -- basically it seemed that is/ought ought to apply, and you were firmly coming down on an "is", but now I'm seeing the possibility of a bit more.
Quoting apokrisis
Quoting apokrisis
Quoting apokrisis
's post strikes me as someone who does not have abstracted notions, and is wanting to see the limits of thinking on the subject, so this is a perfect sort of response, isn't it? Rather than my first guess, it sounds to me like you're saying the question cannot be answered without first answering some other things, such as the definitions we're using in the question or the context in which the question is being asked, and it cannot really be answered "in general" -- one has to go through the dialectical process, and as such, engage in the dialectic rather than ask for a final answer that let's us check a box "yes" or "no" -- "just" or "unjust"
***
Now, in my context, I'll just flat out answer that the world isn't just, but I'm a Marxist so there's that :D
OK. What do you mean by "materialist" or "materialism"? Is there a definition of those terms that you would apply to your own worldview? For example, I am a Materialist in the sense that I take the existence of sensible Substance for granted, for all practical purposes. However, for philosophical (theoretical) purposes the term is sometimes taken to an extreme : THE sole fundamental substance. Which no longer makes sense, since Einstein's equation of Matter with Energy and Math.
The Hard position of Materialism makes another thing-I-take-for-granted inexplicable : my own sentient Mind : the only thing I know intimately. If you assume that massy matter is the sole universal substance, whence the invisible massless things (e.g. ideas ; appearances) that we imagine to represent various parts of the non-self world? Chalmers called that question "the hard problem". But materialists call it "irrelevant". To me, it seems that Energy (E=MC^2) is a more likely precursor of both Life and Mind. Is there a philosophical monist position for an Energist? No, I'm not an Energist, but that might be closer to the truth. :smile:
Modern Materialism :
Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states, are results of material interactions of material things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism
Note --- "interactions" = exchanges of energy. Interrelations = exchanges of essence (ratios ; proportions).
Quoting Banno
To me, the notion of ding an sich, as a philosophical essence, seems coherent (rational) enough. Of course, materialist Science doesn't do essences. So the ding seems to be a Philosophy thing. That may be because essence, qualia, property are categories of our rational analysis of the perceived world. :nerd:
Why things may not be what they seem to be :
[i]The world as it is before mediation Kant calls the noumenal world, or, in a memorable phrase, Das Ding an sich, a phrase which literally means The thing in itself, but whose sense would be more accurately caught by translating it as the thing (or world) as it really is (as distinct from how it appears to us). . . .
Kant was sure that there was a great deal more to it than that. He held that thinking in terms of causes was not a philosophical aberration, but arises out of the very essence of the way the human mind is constituted, the essence of the way it is compelled to reason.[/i]
https://philosophynow.org/issues/31/Kant_and_the_Thing_in_Itself
Ask not what use a person is, but how beautiful the uses being pursued are and whether or not we ought to change the uses we're pursing. There's the pragmatic ground of active values, and there's the possibility of changing what we pursue: the beautiful allows us to say "while this is useful-for, I think we ought do something else" (or, perhaps, the ethical). I think it's the latter question that physics cannot give a good answer to, though of course -- in the dialectical sense -- one has to know things about the world we're in in order to make pragmatic choices, and values, in turn, constrain the world in the sense that we'll only find what we're looking for (and pass over what we're not), and many a metaphysician is in fact speaking about an ethic and vice-versa.
Quoting apokrisis
I find Hegel frustrating, but he's still sort of the guy to go to when talking about dialectic and process -- it's not the dialectic of Plato, but a process whereby one doesn't have a worked out syllogism but rather the syllogism is placed within a context which starts a dialectic (or, really, the syllogism is replaced by process, and one goes from one idea to the next in a dialectic)
He's very open to interpretation, and inspired all kinds of philosophy after him so he's a good reference point for thinking through these problems of process and big systems and what-not -- a touchstone, more or less, for you and I to think through dialectics. In a lot of ways I see his system as the last Big System really worth considering (because not even Marx's system is really complete, exactly, and Marxism spans across many writers -- but Hegel really did just write The Big Idealist Philosophical System, so if that's the goal of philosophy he's kind of the go-to)
So when you say:
Quoting apokrisis
I'm good with that. You can argue for co-arising in Hegel, as well. Your paragraph talking about Being and Nothingness sounds very much like Hegel in The Science of Logic -- so I mention him as a touchstone only, and Hegel+ -- so I believe -- is what every interpreter of Hegel has in mind :D
Quoting apokrisis
Heh, I don't see science as coming close to understanding science or ethics. Science understanding science is basically the 20th century philosophy of science -- what could be more consistent? -- and I believe it fails when it comes to ethical questions. I sometimes wonder about dithering is/ought, but then -- like The Subject -- it seems to come back around even if we "pass over" the distinction.
Quoting apokrisis
Good point. Though I'm fine with it being useless, :D -- in the end I'm not a pragmatist.
Since I have no formal training in philosophy, 's posts are often over my head. So, in that sense, I may not have extremely "abstracted notions". But Fairness and Justice are fairly commonsense notions aren't they? Yet some posts make it more complicated, by further abstracting the notion of what kind of world (Hegelian, Marxist) can be judged morally.
Perhaps, as you said, it would be helpful to place "limits" on our thinking : to define our terms. One definition of "world" in this context might be simply "human culture", as the relevant element of ethical concern. I'll leave it to you and Apo to define whatever abstraction you are arguing about. :joke:
They kind of are, until you start to get into the details it seems.
They're kind of like "Freedom" -- everyone loves freedom, but wars are fought over which version of Freedom is going to rule.
Quoting Gnomon
That definitely narrows the scope down from some kind of ontological Fairness or Justice, but there might be some difficulties here still.
What would your commonsense notion of Fairness or Justice look like, within this human world? Is it specifiable, exactly?
No. Im not arguing for open-ended dialectics. Im arguing for arriving at some suitably definite dichotomy where just is defined with precision in terms of its other.
Negation doesnt work as just vs unjust tells us very little about this still unnamed other. A metaphysical,strength dichotomy would be pairings like discrete-continuous, chance-necessity, local-global, vague-crisp, flux-stasis, etc.
If we cant think of something to pair with just in similar fashion - as that which is logically mutually exclusive AND jointly exhaustive - then this in itself an argument for it being not a metaphysically general kind of distinction. It aint working as a bounding absolute when it comes to our dialectically formed vocab of ultimate abstractions.
Equality and balance are more robust terms, more overarching terms, as same-different is one of those standard dichotomies that concretely arose out of Greek philosophy. Justice and fairness are more parochial terms. As we have discussed and agreed, you can have the confusion of whether we are meaning equality of opportunity or equality of outcome.
Opportunity implies the competition that will result in a statistical range of outcomes. Lucky for some, unfair to others? Outcome implies a range of individual differences will be averaged over so that none are different by the end. Is that kind of communism just? Does one dream of the kind of discipline that leaves us as equal as an army marching in lockstep?
It is amazing that anyone could bandy these terms around - good, fair, just - as if they were already metaphysically robust even if we can get by with them as socially coercive appeals in our everyday social politicking. Just claiming that goodness and justice is what your side represents and what your foe doesnt.
Ha! My commonsense solution to the Fairness & Justice problem would be to have a single-sovereign-supreme-superhuman judge to arbitrate between human definitions of My Justice and Your Fairness. Something like Molière's Tartuffe, relocated to heaven. But, since I gave up my religious solution years ago, I just don't worry about it. I'm certainly not a Marxist, except in the sense that he specified the problem for his day & time. His solution was missing the heavenly father to make the children behave. At my advanced age, I'm willing to let those who are more-concerned-&-more-able work-out the details of the next Utopia. :cool:
What if they're not doing metaphysics, though?
I'd situation "equality of..." within Liberal theory. "Equality" is understood within the thoughts of the likes of Hobbes and Locke. The liberals were so successful that the calls for equality no longer mean the same as they once did: Equality then was before the law, so that the King didn't have a separate court from the people.
But as Kings diminished and the bourgeoisie rose "equality" took on new meanings.
Now, on TPF, "fair and just" will have all those resonances coming along-with. We can clarify as we go along to specify what we mean in a dialogue rather than relying upon a wide system to define our meanings. But I reach for liberal theory because liberalism -- in the classical sense -- is the dominant political philosophy to the point that it's in The Background. So we are stuck with these notions of opportunity vs. outcome, for instance, by virtue of our own history and context that we come from.
I think that where you would say: "Equality and balance are more robust terms, more overarching terms, as same-different is one of those standard dichotomies that concretely arose out of Greek philosophy. Justice and fairness are more parochial terms", the person seeking justice or goodness will say "But equality and balance are not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about the parochial terms. That's ethics"
Do you see the difference there?
Utopia's shmopeya's :D -- the no place will not be as far as I'm concerned.
But I'll note that your commonsense solution runs into another commonsense solution: That Fairness and Justice would have to leave the supreme-superhuman judge out of our affairs, since we disagree on what the supreme-superhuman judge says, and so we should separate out church from state, and grant equal rights to all citizens.
I just mention my Marxism to lay my cards out on the table. There's a sense in which you could argue the opposite, that what we have can't be described as either just or unfair, but is just a process on its way to the next stage: to reject it for its injustice would be an idealism, whereas to struggle for a future freedom would be a materialism, or something along those lines.
Because Tartuffe tells us pretty things in order to seduce our daughters this lesser, material fairness is sought after as the highest real justice, even if it doesn't match what heaven is portrayed as.
It's a long off-topic story. But, if you have the time and the inclination, I have a thesis and blog to underwrite that philosophical inference. :smile:
Energy :
Scientists define energy as the ability to do work, but don't know what energy is. They assume it's an eternal causative force that existed prior to the Big Bang, along with mathematical laws. Philosophically, Energy is a positive or negative relationship between things, and physical Laws are limitations on the push & pull of those forces. So, all they know is what Energy does, which is to transform material objects in various ways. Energy itself is amorphous & immaterial ; you can't put it under a microscope. Therefore, if you reduce energy to its essence of information, it seems more akin to mind than matter.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
Note --- Ability is usually imputed to Agents, not Things.
How is information related to energy in physics?
Energy is the relationship between information regimes. That is, energy is manifested, at any level, between structures, processes and systems of information in all of its forms, and all entities in this universe is composed of information.
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/22084/how-is-information-related-to-energy-in-physics
Note --- Matter is only one of may forms of Energy. Mind is another form. Materialism ignores all those other forms of Causal Agency. In this context, Information Regime = Things.
Fine. But the OP set it out this way....
Quoting Gnomon
So a grander view was being asked for than a parochial one. Then Bono unhelpfully heaped on his confusion with a trite depiction that seemed to argue that equality and fairness are different things, or perhaps not. Not even a parochial clarification was attempted.
But as a case in point, we can see that it touches on a valid difference in terms of notions of "fair and just" life opportunities and "fair and just" life outcomes.
So we have then a problem of how to square the two. In the real world, people come with their biological variance and their social variance. In the old days, we were foragers. The biological variance was Gaussian and the social variance likewise. For a million years or so, bodies only evolved a bit, lifestyles only changed a bit.
Then we had the agricultural revolution. Folk still had the same genetic balance of equality/inequality. Luck could make you smarter or stronger than the average. But steadily populations grew and social outcomes became more of a hierarchical competition. You had the explosive growth of empires rising and falling.
Then the industrial revolution and now social outcomes could be hugely varied. And indeed, political structures were rejigged to make that part of the game. Liberal philosophy advocated for all to have the opportunity to get fat and rich, every person getting the just desserts they could earn.
But unfettered capitalism doesn't work. Some kind of balancing in the other direction an evening out if outcomes are too uneven has to be built into the politics. Marxism was one such response but better institutionalised by social democracies than communist autocracies.
So yes, there is some ethical meat in this. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". We can see that as the kind of formula which connects the biological variance and sociological variance, that connects the distribution of opportunities to the distributions of outcomes in the hope of approaching some happy medium.
But then the rub. The happy medium is in turn dependent on the underlying entropic foundations of that society. There is a burn rate that the political thermostat is attempting to regulate. The populace must produce or these days consume at a rate sufficient to keep the system on the road and growing, while also paying for the matching social safety net (including its state security apparatus) that stops the social fabric tearing itself to shreds.
If you neglect to discuss this deeper thermodynamic dimension to human affairs what it means to have moved from foraging, to agriculture, to fossil-fueled industry then it will seem as if social settings are decided within some ethical bubble. Politics can ignore the burn rate it exists to control and can just fluff about debating good vs evil, Marxism vs Liberalism, your whatever vs my whatever.
That is why the jargon used in moral philosophy has to become more openly thermodynamic and thus connect society to its real world basis. The life and mind sciences have already done just this. Even sociology, history and politics have schools going this way.
If moral philosophy is the last one to jump on the train well, I'd say that is probably damn well unethical. What use are these fools who insist on the abstract purity of their ivory towers.
Now let's get back to more pragmatic issues like the trolley problem and anti-natalism.... :grin:
If you neglect to discuss the. . . material conditions? :D
I think the social setting is not an ethical bubble, I agree -- I think of societies as organisms, but ones which we do not understand very well. That is, I don't think their patterns are just abstractions, though it's very easy to get lost in abstractions because there's not a very easy way to build falsification into social description: there isn't a science of history.
Which puts me in trouble with some variants of Marxism, and again, I really only mention it to put my cards on the table in answering the question: one could say I was giving the Humanist Marxist response, though there is this other, materialist-scientific side to Marxism that I believe your account gets along with fairly well: just in the place of "thermodynamic dimension" it's "Capital", which in a sufficiently generalized theory would probably have some kind of equality relations, but I don't think we're there yet. That is, I think when talking about Justice, Fairness, or even describing the political situation without reference to our ideals that we're still in a parochial bubble, rather than in the realm of scientific inquiry.
That is, I think we're doing philosophy in the vein of wondering about what is not known. Or, perhaps in light of current events, repeating ourselves because it's our value or something like that -- i.e. we might be doing politics rather than reflecting or some such.
But then, that gets to the deeper philosophy of Marxism, which changes what constitutes the real point of philosophy is to change the world rather interpret it. (but then, "Change it to what?" -- after you answer that, then we can speak of the use...)
Quoting apokrisis
What's the use of use? :D
Beauty, not use, is my stated aim. I at least think it's important.
I don't even need philosophy to be true to be worthwhile, much less do I need it to be useful. But that's a metaphilosophical point that will surely diverge from the thread topic
Quoting apokrisis
Well, I'm calling for less pragmatic issues, though those two are first boring and then ugly, so not my bag either. :D
Well, you might be disappointed. It's the view that the world is made only of particles, of bits of matter, bashing against each other. That's a view that went out of fashion with Newton's action at a distance. Matter is not "the sole fundamental substance".
There is a pop view that, speaking roughly, what science says there is, is all that there is. I think this view problematic. The implication is that there is one best way to talk about any issue, and that is from the point of view of science. The alternative, perhaps articulated most clearly by Mary Midgley, is that we can, do and indeed ought, make use of multiple ways of talking about issues.
Here's two descriptions:
Both are of Picasso's Guernica. Somehow matte house paint on canvas is the very same thing as a powerful anti-war statement. Two quite different ways of talking about the very same thing.
If we try to shoehorn everything into one type of discussion, we are going to miss many very important distinctions.
Who is this "we"? I've put a lot of effort into the literature that exists to explain history, politics and society this way. I could give you a reading list...
Quoting Moliere
Yep. Capital (or debt) is what becomes dichotomous to Material (or disposable entropy). This is what the systems view makes explicit.
The idea of value is abstracted to become a fungible relation. So as to make scalefree growth possible, we have to reduce the two sides of the dynamical equation to there complementary essence. The pure source of entropy that is a barrel of oil. The pure source of information (as the signal telling entropy which way to flow) that is the US dollar.
Or given that capital is now financialised as debt, US treasuries. The liquidity of all our mortgaged tomorrows mostly in the trusting hands of the oil producers to nicely close the petrodollar foundation to the modern economic world system.
Capital and Material speak to the fact that humans have made the basis of their existence a system of balanced liquidity. We value life in dollars and oil. One may seem the epitome of the ideal, the other the epitome of the material. But that is the dichotomy of our clever construction. We divided our existence towards these opposing limits so that we could indeed live within a world thus structured. Limitless growth based on limitless oil and limitless debt.
Capital used to be land ownership in the agricultural era. That is what eventually got idealised as property rights and so setting the scene for capitalism as a currency-based expansionary enterprise.
Land just gives you access to the photosynthetic bounty of the sun. Bags of gold harnesses first people, then horses, then steam engines and gun boats. Petrodollars create a system that will pump the ground for its last drop as civilisation has no choice but to service its futurised debts at the same furious eternalised rate of growth.
Look at how China got sucked into the vortex and ended up building ghost cities in despoiled landscapes.
Quoting Moliere
A pleasant sentiment. But how do you in practice aim for it? You would have to hash that out and discover what it really means in terms of a socially sustainable way of life for a biological creature in a thermodynamical world.
Quoting Moliere
Maybe you don't. But maybe that is because you can take your lifestyle for granted as something that is just magically there as a stable foundation.
Or maybe you are instead disillusioned with the world as it is given to you, but have little hope in changing it? Philosophy has to be a comfort, a solace, rather than a plan of action.
I would agree that civilisation does seem to be on its own mindless path. It does exceed our control. Oil just wants to be burnt and it doesn't care about us except to the degree we serve to accelerate that entropic purpose. We opened the Pandora's box and we are being swept along by the larger forces that have been unleashed.
But my attitude is that you only have the one life. And right now is the most spectacular moment in human history. We can see how the whole metaphysical deal got put together. So sit there and understand what is going on right before our eyes. Fluffing about with philosophical distractions is a waste of an opportunity when this is the moment that reality is becoming properly known to us for what it metaphysically is.
You mischaracterise science which in fact progresses by resolving the world into its metaphysical strength dichotomies. Quantum theory first dissolved atomism into a story of particle~wave complementarity. Then into the holism of fields with excitations. Now into thermally decoherent systems of contextual constraint and localised fluctuations.
So on the one hand we have the warmed-over Cartesian dualism of the meaningless painted canvas and its mind-comprehended meaning.
On the other, we have science that continues to do its best to close the semiotic circle between observers and observables. Add thermodynamics to the quantum mix and we are right there. Or at least that is what biosemiosis now argues with theory and quantum biology now supports with evidence.
Of course art appreciation and social fashion can be cocooned off in its own little bubble by a Cartesian separation of powers. The two cultures are alive and well in those who were taught that that was the way to think about reality in general. And they can get quite angry about their little world being challenged.
I was thinking "all of us", though understanding we could be wrong.
So perhaps you understand social organisms. I don't, and so the "we" is thems who don't understand it very well like me.
Quoting apokrisis
I have little hope, because I know we can change it. But the knowledge is not a scientific knowledge -- it's a historical knowledge.
Philosophy is certainly a comfort and a solace, but if it were not a plan of action then I could not claim Marxism. To do so I want to answer your:
Quoting apokrisis
Here (on TPF, on the internet, in conversation) I think all we can do -- materially speaking -- is exchange ideas, and that such places are rare anymore. We can be respectful towards one another's histories and find out just what and why others are saying what they do, insofar that we trust one another enough to do so in a public space.
Marxism, as you may be aware, is not exactly popular. :D -- it doesn't need to be by my reckoning of philosophy, but I can say that I've always benefited from spaces like that where we can exchange ideas and learn together. The point of the old problems is that they teach people and connect the young to the older and create a point of reference: they may be wrong, but we at least understand one another.
I think we have different attitudes, but not contradictory ones.
I only have one life, and so I like to help and see the future grow -- there will always be difficulties, and the horrors of the future scare me, but we can see it through.
But what is the plan? Beyond being polite and amiable to your fellow human?
I mean that is a practical personal plan. If things work out, then you are carried along in the flow of your community. And if things go to shit, stocking up on that kind of social capital is the smart move.
But big picture, what is the larger political and economic plan for that generally better future? What laws do we want enacted, what institutions do we want founded?
That's the level I am discussing things at. And any kind of -ism would seem also to be showing an interest in.
I mean, that's at least step 1, yes? If you can't be polite and amiable to your fellow humans, then it's unlikely anything will come of our efforts (though possible, in the case of the smarties out there who luck out)
I'm tempted to go anarchist here and say "Plan?! There is no plan -- only the impulse towards freedom and figuring out how we get there, but together!"
But really I don't mean that.
I'm somehow trying to figure out my own anarcho-marxism, whatever that amounts to. I suppose it's my own dialectic.
Perhaps I am too use to the cut and thrust of academia. Polite agreement is never the helpful response. That is like standing on a tennis court weakly patting a ball back and forth. You want to be stretched to your limits by the stinging accuracy of a superior opponent.
Quoting Moliere
And what does it amount to? You at least seem to be starting from a dialectical framing in somehow thinking anarchism and Marxism make for a productive unity of opposites.
But no need to answer. That would be a different thread.
I suppose. That is the title of this thread.
But yes, it doesn't matter whether it is human action or caused by the universe, we use our moral sense to judge.
Obviously you didn't take the time, or have the inclination, to "check" the off-topic & off-forum evidences presented in the thesis and blog. That's just as well, since your materialist or "immanentist" worldview might categorize the abstract, theoretical, mathematical, incorporeal grounding of Energy/Information/Qualia as over-your-head (transcendent), or off-limits (prejudice), and as the unreal, imaginary, statistical measurements of a rational mind. :joke: :cool:
Energy is not a material substance :
Explanations suggest that while some students may conceptualize energy as a substance with mass and volume, this idea is not consistently applied. In physics, energy is an abstract, non-material quantity associated with the state of a system.
Physics Education Research Central
https://www.per-central.org wiki File:1140
(2) And the philosophical corollary to the physics question: how does a non-material substance 'interact with material substance (re: substance duality)?
If your position makes sense, then you should be able to cogently answer both questions, sir years ago when I'd read your thesis/blog I didn't come across anything remotely resembling a cogent answer. :smirk:
Off Topic : You ask good philosophical questions, but you seem to expect Materialistic answers to Abstract inquiries. You expect 17th century deterministic answers, even though the foundations of post-classical physics are indeterminate. My understanding of Physics is post-classical, and entangled with Meta-Physics (the observer effect). Apparently, post-classical philosophy doesn't "make sense" to you. And your snarky (passive aggressive "sir") presentation is not good for communication.
(1) According to physicists, Energy acts on Matter because it has that "ability" --- by definition. Do you have a better answer to the "how" question? Apparently, the scientists don't.
(2) According to Einstein, Matter is a form of Energy*1 (monistic). Energy is Causation, and Matter is one of its effects : Noumenal Energy transforms into Phenomenal Matter. So, Energy is the fundamental "substance" (essence)*2 of the physical world. But "essence" is a philosophical concept, not a physical thing. It's similar to Kant's ding an sich. It's similar to Plato's Form*3, in the sense that it is pre-material.
Even more off-topic : Is your world view Nietzschean*4, in that you want to substitute phenomenal Will (local) for noumenal Essences (universal)? :nerd:
*1. Matter = Energy/C^2
"Energy equals mass times the speed of light squared." On the most basic level, the equation says that energy and mass (matter) are interchangeable; they are different forms of the same thing. Under the right conditions, energy can become mass, and vice versa.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/einstein/lrk-hand-emc2expl.html
*2. What is essence function in philosophy? : (Eastern Philosophy)
Essence is Absolute Reality, the fundamental "cause" or origin, while Function is manifest or relative reality, the discernible effects or manifestations of Essence.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiyong
*3. Form = Essence
One of the elements in Plato's theory of Forms is the claim that essences, or Forms, are necessary for, and provide the basis of, all causation and explanation; a claim that, famously, he makes and defends towards the end of Phaedo (95e ff.).
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/platos-essentialism/introduction/3DA8714A3BCF69E17E6AD7B6B41615E6
*4. Nietzsches criticism of the Thing-in-itself :
[i]Nietzsche's first disagreement is with Plato's ideal forms. In the parable of the cave, these forms were the ideals illuminated by the sun. Nietzsche claimed that rather than values illuminated from without, each person should make their own determination of values.
The idea that the value of something subsists in itself is Kant's thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich): noumenal essences that exist beyond human knowledge, like the forms, only shadows of which are seen in the cave.[/i]
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/88781/what-exactly-is-nietzsche-s-criticism-of-the-thing-in-itself-and-is-it-supplante
But this is simply nothing like how physics talks. You are projecting. It is your central misunderstanding.
An ontology of "stuff" is medieval science. Stuff as alchemy. Stuff as fluid stuff and corpuscular stuff. Stuff as a substance with inherent properties like gravity or levity. Stuff like calorie as the heat that flowed from one place to another.
Physics broke with this "essences" metaphysics by mathematical abstraction. Energy became no longer some vital force or basic substance but instead a description of changes in motion. Mass was inertia or a resistance to such change. Gravity was a universal acceleration between two masses. Heat was a thermal jitter or local acceleration.
Science kept on stepping back further into abstractions based on outward observables rather than. claims about inherent essences.
Now it talks about particles as excitations in fields. Fields exist by breaking mathematical symmetries. Reality is pictured as a pattern of interactions a structure of relations rather than a "stuff".
Then we get down to the terms that really trip you up entropy and information. These are not the new ur-substances. They are the language of statistical patterns. They are a further level of abstraction and the general move to a structuralist understanding of reality.
The world certainly seems like just a place of stuffs. Substances within the non-stuff of a spacetime void. The ontology of "medium sized dry goods" as modern-minded metaphysicians will joke.
But that is just how brains evolved to make sense of their worlds. An array of solid objects to be navigated which can be pushed and pulled around, or which instead might push and pull, acting on you.
Science started to go places by abandoning that very local and specific scale of experience and learning how to see reality through the lens of mathematics and measurement. What becomes real is the inevitability of reality's structure the rules of geometric symmetry it must ultimately obey. The Poincare group of invariances that define a relativistic spacetime which can even have its fixed locations. And the fundamental gauge symmetries that then grant these locations the internal chiral structure which results in the Standard Model particles. The mass that populates the void. Or rather the excitations that trace out their patterns in mathematically-constrained fashion.
Substance ontology gets stuck in a dualism of matter and mind. You seem to want to bridge them by saying they are two faces of the same more fundamental thing of a psychic energy. An ur-cause. And this is how the informational turn of physics ought to be understood. Information is the new name for substantial being.
But information is a measure of structure. It is the new observable for a new maths. We can start to convert "it" to bit. A physical event or interaction some detectable change can be converted into the more abstracted notion of a local degree of freedom. A countable bit of information. And from there, a more abstracted maths can be applied. We are lifted yet another step further from the human-centric view of living within a world of "medium sized dry goods". Substantial stuff that observably yields or resists our bidding.
You have either not understood my questions (as you conspicuously do not understand modern physics (e.g. conservation laws¹) or modern philosophy (e.g. interaction problem of substance duality², non-causal property of abstract objects³)) or you are disingenuously replying with gibberish to deflect from incoherent claims that "energy is abstract" and yet "by definition" somehow (via woo-woo) "abstract energy" "causes" non-abstract "matter". :lol:
https://www.britannica.com/science/conservation-of-mass-energy [1]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#VarDuaInt [2]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/#AbouAbstDist [3]
Off-topic : I normally don't reply to 's jibes, because his philosophical worldview specifically & disdainfully excludes my own. So, the sciencey stuff is necessary to provide some common ground for discussion. However, his questions were timely, as I am currently reading a book that, among other things, discusses the New Physics (Relativity & Quantum) of the 1920s.
On this forum, I am not "talking" as a physicist, but as an amateur philosopher with an unorthodox worldview : based on Holism, Quantum Observer Effects, Information Theory, and Complexity Theory. I'm not an expert in any of those fields, but I may be more knowledgeable than you think. However, as an outsider, I don't follow the official physics party line, so my presentation may sound strange to you. When I depart from standard physics language, I do so intentionally, not from ignorance.
For example, when I say "Energy is Causation"*1, it's a philosophical notion, not a conventional science concept. When I say "energy is fundamental"*2, I am including all of the various pre-material fields*3 that physicists postulate as foundational. For example, within an amorphous holistic electromagnetic field, a single Photon, the "carrier" of energy, can split into an Electron & a Positron, the primary elements of Matter*4. But, it's the energy field that is fundamental and essential, not the particles.
I am aware that modern physics carefully avoids terms such as "essence", but a mathematical quantum field is just an Essence by another name*6. Yet, I find the notion of pre-physical essences to be philosophically useful. For example, an electro-magnetic potential field of dimensionless mathematical "points" has no physical or material properties until it is converted into something real, by an "excitation", which in quantum theory may be an observation by a scientific mind. That may sound spooky, or medieval to you, but I try to accommodate such professional non-sense in my personal 21st century worldview. Ironically, some posters on this forum take a Scientism stance*5, which denigrates what philosophers do, as merely Lingustics. :smile:
PS___ Holism is another taboo term for pragmatic physics, that we can discuss at length in a separate thread, if you are so inclined.
*1. Is it true that energy is the ability to cause change?
Specifically, energy is defined as the ability to do work which, for biology purposes, can be thought of as the ability to cause some kind of change. Energy can take many different forms: for instance, we're all familiar with light, heat, and electrical energy.
https://www.khanacademy.org/science/biology/energy-and-enzymes/the-laws-of-thermodynamics/a/types-of-energy
*2. Is energy fundamental in physics?
[i]Energy is a derived quantity, not a fundamental one. Specifically, energy is an example of a conserved current derived from Noether's theorem. . . .
I would say that energy is more fundamental because matter is merely one subcategory of all types of particles/fields, while energy is not a subcategory of any broader concept. [/i]
https://www.quora.com/Is-energy-the-fundamental-basis-of-the-universe
*3. Energy Fields are Fundamental :
I would say quantum fields are more fundamental. Numbers of particles, what kind (i.e. which field they belong to), where and when they are and their state of motion, are merely ways of describing states of fields.
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/122570/what-is-more-fundamental-fields-or-particles
*4. Energetic Photons produce substantial Matter :
For electron-positron pair production to occur, the electromagnetic energy, in a discrete quantity called a photon, must be at least equivalent to the mass of two electrons.
https://www.britannica.com/science/pair-production
*5. The arrogance of modern physics :
[i]Ive just finished reading {theoretical physicist} Lee Smolins new book The Trouble With Physics, . . .
Smolin was of a philosophical bent, and initially put off:
The atmosphere was not philosophical; it was harsh and aggressive, dominated by people who were brash, cocky, confident, and in some cases insulting to people who disagreed with them.[/i]
https://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=451
*6. Math is Metaphysics :
I agree with you that the sources of truth in mathematics can't be physical. For it seems clear to me that there would be mathematical truths even in a world that contained nothing physical at all (for instance, it would be true that the number of physical things in such a world is zero and therefore not greater than zero, not prime, etc.). So the sources of mathematical truth must be other than physical: if you like, metaphysical.
https://www.askphilosophers.org/question/24527
Quoting 180 Proof
Fine.
Quoting Gnomon
But then if you cross over into a science-constrained metaphysical discussion, you have to take more account of what the science actually says.
For instance, a photon is a massless gauge boson. But the weak particles W+, W-, Z0 are gauge bosons with mass. So something more complicated is going on that has to explain why bosons may or may not count as matter in your book. And why indeed electrons and positrons were massless particles before the temperature of the Big Bang fell to the point where the Higgs mechanism could kick in.
If your way of thinking has any real advantage, it has to be able to lead to better answers than the scientists have already figured out. Explain what is observed in some self-consistent fashion rather than ignore the critical details that don't fit your essences story.
Matt Strassler has a good set of blog posts that explains how quantum field theory actually "thinks" about particles in terms of "ripples" in fields. You can see how it is based on an ontology of mathematical structure rather than material substance.
https://profmattstrassler.com/articles-and-posts/particle-physics-basics/virtual-particles-what-are-they/
If determinism is true, there can still be morality in that we can consider an action right or wrong. Further, we can still give moral reasons in a determined setting.
However, it seems that it would be wrong to hold anyone morally accountable in a deterministic universe (since all actions are not in the control of, or caused by, the actor). Then, in a deterministic universe, we would find ourselves in a situation where certain actions are wrong but where it would be unjust to do anything about those wrong actions.
But if I do hold someone morally accountable, am I myself morally accountable or not?
I guess I think morality breaks down and is incoherent within a deterministic world in a way that it does not if we take ourselves to have free will.
To Gnomon's original question - in a deterministic universe, if a wrong act is committed, then the world is thoroughly unjust because any attempt to punish is itself unjust.
Off-Topic : My "way of thinking" is characteristic of Philosophy, not Science. I've been trying to convince you that I'm not competing with scientists to produce practical applications of physical processes : atom bombs, cell phones, etc. Instead, I'm trying to update some ancient philosophical worldviews for application to the complexities of the contemporary chaotic world. The philosophical approach to understanding is Theoretical instead of Practical ; general instead of specific ; universal instead of local ; essential instead of detailed.
The primary distinction between my worldview and that of most physicists & chemists is Holism vs Reductionism. Holism*1 is not anti-science or religious, but merely a different way of looking at the physical world. In fact, a new branch of science, Systems Theory, has arisen in the 21st century to study Complex Adaptive Systems*2, which are mostly living things with emergent*3 properties that cannot be found in their subatomic particles. The Santa Fe Institute*4 was established --- by atom bomb physicist Murray Gell-Man, et al --- primarily to study CAS*5, because most other research facilities were still focused on the parts instead of the whole systems.
Systems Theory is especially applicable to Philosophy because it studies mostly living & thinking aspects of reality instead of dead matter. The Hard sciences can still profit from the use of Reductive methods, but the Soft sciences --- psychology, sociology, philosophy, etc --- will benefit from Holistic methods to study the behavior of Systems instead of Components. Unfortunately, those who still think reductively, may object to the unfamiliar terminology and concepts.
Getting back to the topic of this thread : I'm not asking if the atoms of matter are Fair & Just, but if complex adaptive humans as a social group can behave ethically. This is an ancient question, but a Holistic/Systems approach may shed new light on those old "hard questions", that have become muddled due to putting them under a technological microscope instead of just using the natural mind's rational faculty for "seeing" interrelationships.
By the way, you may be thinking of Essence as a reference to Spiritual stuff, but the Greek word ousia merely referred to fundamental "being' and "isness". Latin "Esse" (to be) is about Ontology, the philosophical science of Being. Can we get on the same page here? :smile:
*1. Holism is the interdisciplinary idea that systems possess properties as wholes apart from the properties of their component parts. The aphorism "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts", typically attributed to Aristotle, is often given as a glib summary of this proposal.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holism
*2a. A complex adaptive system is a system that is complex in that it is a dynamic network of interactions, but the behavior of the ensemble may not be predictable according to the behavior of the components.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complex_adaptive_system
*2b. "The study of complex adaptive systems, a subset of nonlinear dynamical systems, has recently become a major focus of interdisciplinary research in the social and natural sciences. Nonlinear systems are ubiquitous; as mathematician Stanislaw Ulam observed, to speak of "nonlinear science" is like calling zoology the study of "nonelephant animals" (quoted in Campbell et al. 1985, p. 374). The initial phase of research on nonlinear systems focused on deterministic chaos, but more recent studies have investigated the properties of self-organizing systems or anti-chaos. For mathematicians and physicists, the biggest surprise is that complexity lurks within extremely simple systems. For biologists, it is the idea that natural selection is not the sole source of order in the biological world. In the social sciences, it is suggested that emergence --- the idea that complex global patterns with new properties can emerge from local interactions --- could have a comparable impact."
https://www.santafe.edu/research/results/papers/1383-complex-adaptive-systems
*3. Emergence :
In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when a complex entity has properties or behaviors that its parts do not have on their own, and emerge only when they interact in a wider whole system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence
*4. The Santa Fe Institute (SFI) is an independent, nonprofit theoretical research institute located in Santa Fe, New Mexico, United States and dedicated to the multidisciplinary study of the fundamental principles of complex adaptive systems, including physical, computational, biological, and social systems.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santa_Fe_Institute
*5. What is Complex Systems Science?
Complexity arises in any system in which many agents interact and adapt to one another and their environments. Examples of these complex systems include the nervous system, the Internet, ecosystems, economies, cities, and civilizations. As individual agents interact and adapt within these systems, evolutionary processes and often surprising "emergent" behaviors arise at the macro level. Complexity science attempts to find common mechanisms that lead to complexity in nominally distinct physical, biological, social, and technological systems.
https://www.santafe.edu/about/overview
Do I understand you correctly to mean that : if the world is Deterministic, then a single wrong act makes the whole world system unjust : "a rotten apple spoils the whole barrel". And a single act of injustice makes the whole system unjust? No personal accountability?
That sounds like Old Testament justice, in which the sins of the king justified Yahweh's punishment of the whole nation with bloody invasion and exile in a foreign land. I would expect Determinism to be more like Cause & Effect? Would Libertarian or Random Justice be a better alternative? Would "Correction" be more just than "Punishment"? Is the world collectively Deterministic, or is there some freedom for individualized Justice? Maybe us sinners should hope for a little indeterminate leniency. :smile:
Aristotle Justice :
In the context of the death penalty, Aristotle's ethical stand can be understood through the lens of justice, which he considered to be the highest virtue. According to Aristotle, justice involves giving people their due, which means that individuals should be rewarded for their virtues and punished for their vices.
https://www.classace.io/answers/what-is-an-ethical-stand-on-death-penalty-base-on-aristotles-value-ethics
But the holistic systems view is hylomorphic rather than essentialist. There's that.
False dichotomy modern science (physics, chemistry, etc) is both reductive and holistic.
On a good day, your "worldview", sir, is merely a flavor of New Age pseudo-metaphysics (i.e. fact-free poor reasoning). :sparkle: To wit:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/916851
Quoting apokrisis
:100: :up:
Of course, that's not going to happen because Gnomon gets science conspicuously, incorrigibly wrong. :eyes:
Off Topic :
I suppose "that" depends on whether you view Matter or Form as fundamental, or as equal partners. For Plato, Form is abstract, ideal, and timeless. But Matter is concrete, real, and changeable (perishable). So, which do you think is more Essential (absolutely necessary) : the multitude of physical Entities, or the unique metaphysical Form*1 ?
I assume you are describing Systems Science from the perspective of a pragmatic, reductive scientist. But this is a Philosophy forum, so what do you think would be the description of Holistic Systems from the perspective of a theoretical, generalizing Philosopher? Does Essence precede Instance? Is the Extension more fundamental than the Intention?
All physical systems in the real world are indeed compounds of matter & form. So, for a Chemist, the Matter (passive) may be more important than the Structure (interrelationships). But, for a Physicist, the energetic (active) component may be more important than the malleable substance. And, from a philosophical perspective, Matter is local & particular, while Form is universal & general. So, there's that. :smile:
*1. Aristotle's Causes :
Formal Cause: the essence of the object. Final Cause: the end/goal of the object, or what the object is good for.
https://www.uvm.edu/~jbailly/courses/Aristotle/notes/AristotleCausesNotes.html
*2. Systems Theory :
In essence, systems theory operates on a simple guiding principle: The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
https://www.carepatron.com/guides/systems-theory-in-psychology
Note --- The parts may be material, but the whole is an interrelationship between parts. And it's the relations that bind the parts into an integrated system. So, which is more fundamental to the system, the interchangeable pieces or the whole puzzle picture?
Hmm.
Quoting Gnomon
Sounds a little self contradictory. Not what you would expect from an essence. More work might be needed.
What are you implying? That a non-space-time essential principle could not produce mundane Matter from scratch? Such a non-noumenal notion may be the basic unproveable presumption of Materialism. Hence, a materialist would not expect a material object to be derived from an immaterial essence.
Even Aristotle, the guy who proposed the notion of dualistic HyloMorphism, viewed Essence as Causal*1. What I would expect from causal Essence is that it would give Form (design) to the malleable clay of Matter. When a potter produces a beautiful pot from ordinary clay, where did the Form and the Beauty come from? Was it inherent in the clay on a river bank, or in the noumenal mind of the creator?
Perhaps your notion of a concrete & real Essence needs more work. How did Materialists*2 arrive at the conclusion that many-form Matter is the monistic fundamental substance? Did they just take it for granted*3? Even old Hylomorpher himself defined Substance*4 as Being Itself, and Matter as contingent & accidental*5. Did they, like most Reductionists, ignore the contribution of an immaterial Mind to the dualistic combination of hyle and morph? Are Minds too spooky for you? :cool:
*1. Essence as Causal :
Aristotle frequently describes essence as a cause or explanation, thus ascribing to essence some sort of causal or explanatory role. This explanatory role is often explicated by scholars in terms of essence making the thing be what it is or making it the very thing that it is.
https://philarchive.org/rec/SIREAC
Note --- The Essence (beingness) of a thing is not the particular instance, but the universal design.
*2. Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions of material things. ___Wikipedia
Note --- My thesis is based on an immaterial Monism --- causal Information (energy + form + action) --- which is an essential "substance" instead of a contingent "accident".
*3. Materialism is a Belief :
[i]a. The best argument against materialism is the observation that the word material has lost all meaning. Materialism does not exist anymore. . . . .
c. The third best argument is that syntax cannot be derived from physics and semantics cannot be derived from physics. . . . .
f. The fifth best argument is the observation that materialists, apart from not existing, do not actually argue for their cause, they merely assume it to be true.[/i]
https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/iyyto/most_compelling_arguments_against_materialism/
Note --- I suppose he means that Materialism, over millennia, was based on Atomism. But modern Physics has whiffed on each of its "fundamental" particles of matter : elements, molecules, atoms, electrons, quarks. Now their Essential substance is a holistic mathematical Field (cartesian Plenum) with no matter in its dimensionless points. Need references?
*4. Substance is being existing in itself; accident is being existing in another as its subject. -- Being is known either as something which subsists in itself without needing to be sustained by another, or as something which needs a subject in which and by which it may exist.
https://www3.nd.edu/~maritain/jmc/etext/cp26.htm
Note --- The modern notion of "Substance as material" is a reductive corruption of the original essential concept. Modern Science is necessarily Materialistic: Philosophy not necessarily.
*5. Matter is Accidental not essential :
Aristotle made a distinction between the essential and accidental properties of a thing. For example, a chair can be made of wood or metal, but this is accidental to its being a chair: that is, it is still a chair regardless of the material from which it is made.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accident_(philosophy)
Note --- The Essence of a chair is the concept of Chairness. Concepts are what we know with, not what we make chairs out of.
Would you agree that Scientific Laws and Philosophical Principles are only "approximations" of Universal Essences? Obviously those "Ideals" are not real material things, so why do "wise" men continue to seek out such non-entities? Are they ignorant or stupid or god-smacked, or do they know something the rest of us don't? Perhaps, that there is more to the world than what meets the eye.
No need to reply. This post is just something to think about. :grin:
Note --- Irving Copi was the author of Introduction to Logic.
CAN "ESSENCE" BE A SCIENTIFIC TERM?
JACK KAMINSKY
Harpur College, State University of New York
In a recent paper Copi has argued for the admission of the term "essence" into scientific terminology. His primary reason is that the increasing adequacy of scientific theories is evidence of a gradual approximation to the real essences of things. Copi is aware that the laws of modern science are not to be taken as formulations of essences. But, he claims, "that is an ideal towards which science strives... Centuries hence wiser men will have radically different and more adequate theories, and their notions will be closer approximations than ours to the real essences of things."
https://www.jstor.org/stable/185721
Wise Man and his Essences :
Albert Einstein reinterpreted the inner workings of nature, the very essence of light, time, energy and gravity. His insights fundamentally changed the way we look at the universe--and made him the most famous scientist of the 20th century.
https://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/einstein/einstein-s-revolution
To dissect in more detail, matter and form are terms needing more clarification here. But they are certainly equal partners in the deal as they arise together in dichotomous fashion. Each as one of a pair of complementary limits on enmattered and informed Being exists to the degree it stands in sharp contrast to its "other". They form a dichotomous relation, in other words. Logically speaking, matter and form are "mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive" as a pair of natural categories.
So matter and form become reifications in our mouths. They speak to the two extremes of Being that emerge when we apply our causal analysis. They are precisely what are not there right at the beginning, yet are what then emerge to create a state of substantial hylomorphic being. We can't speak of a world that is made of matter and form. We must speak of a world that becomes organised in the fashion we would call enmattered and informed.
Thus beyond the apparent duality of matter and form is their common origin in what Anaximander called an Apeiron, what Peirce called a Vagueness. A pure potential beyond any material or formal distinction. An essence without yet any essential. A vague everythingness that was equally a great nothingness.
What seems like a fundamental duality becomes instead a triadic relation where that duality is the hard outcome of a "soft launch". The beginning is where something first imperceptibly starts to happen as pure possibility begins to reveal the immanence of the sharp separation it can eventually become.
So you are talking in a way that takes matter for granted as that which already exists as a fact in its own ontic domain, just simply lacking the "other" of a shaping hand of a form. It is a primal stuff that thus concretely occupies a place and time. It comes with the inherent property of being able to sit still and unchanged. Or alternatively and rather confusingly to be squished and moved about. It is a stuff supposedly as maximally amorphous as potter's clay, yet still perfectly substantial in being able to take on form, or alternatively resist form, or even perhaps find its own forms if it gets a little more hot, a little more cold. Like the clay that gets baked or becomes too watery.
Then you pair this rather complicated "fundamental stuff" with an equally equivocal story on a matching realm of form. A place of mental stuff. A place that seems to be the mind of some intender or creator. It is the origin of both purpose and pattern. It can will any change, and yet seems mathematically restricted in what it can in fact impose. The Platonic solids are a good example of that.
This is the problem with a dualism of matter and form. It becomes an argument for two different domains of cause one in the material world and one beyond it. The domains themselves seem confused and self-contradictory in the jobs they are suppose to do. How the two connect is as much a problem. The metaphysics is shot full of holes. It is not the way hylomorphism can be done.
But what I am talking about is quite different. In the beginning there is a vagueness beyond all distinctions. However the one thing that can then result from this is the birth of a primal distinction the distinction we call the mutualising dichotomy of formal cause and material cause. It is a distinction that feeds on itself and so naturally grows to become a contrast that is sharp and strong. We quickly evolve to a state of being that is a general somethingness. A state of being that is fully substantial in being enmattered and informed. It has its complexity of materials and its complexity of structures. The two complexities between them compose a complexly realised reality.
Science now offers us concrete models of this kind of hylomorphic logic. It is the story of the Big Bang. It is the story of particle physics. It is the story of dissipative structure theory.
Everything begins in the systems dichotomy of a differentiation and an integration. A material possibility and its structural incorporation. The emergence of wholes that are more than the sum of their parts to use the clumsy expression. The incoherence of a quantum fluctuation and the thermal decoherence that then fits it into a growing pattern that is a history of actual particle events.
Science is rich with the proper logical and mathematical language to talk about a hylomorphic principle of Being. Unfortunately everyday speech is only rich in the language of reductionism. Even dualism is just reductionism doubled.
A systems metaphysics is triadic. It starts itself beyond the differentiation~integration that is the materiality of local energetic actions and the formal cause of globally cohesive constraints. It starts right before anything can be said to exist by the virtue of the fact that things might also not have existed.
So what is essential or fundamental is the everythingness that was a nothingness yet could then become divided into the somethingness of a substantial world becoming ever more complexified in terms of its material and structural possibilities.
No need for transcendence or duality. Spontaneous symmetry-breaking or dichotomisation is a self-organising and immanent process in Nature. Science sees that everywhere it looks, even if that is not a well understood fact as yet.
Off Topic:
Thanks for the clarification. But I like to take the dichotomous HyloMorph theory one step farther back in evolution. Even Aristotle seemed to imagine his Matter/Form*1 principle as an Essence. And, in my Information-based thesis, I labeled that essence as "Enformy"*2, working in the world as "EnFormAction" (the energy of causation), to counterbalance destructive Entropy, allowing Evolution to progress from Bang to Cosmos to Culture. Before the Bang, that creative causal essence was Monistic, like formless nameless Potential. But that's just a hypothetical postulation to explain how the chain of Causation got started from scratch. From that perspective, your "mutually exclusive" Matter/Form is not "jointly exhaustive, because it is a compound, subject to division.
My Monism is transcendent only in the sense that all abstractions and hypothetical entities transcend the realm of the senses. HyloMorph and Enformy don't exist in the real tangible world, but in the ideal realm of imagination. They are not scientific observations, but philosophical postulations. If you want a space-time model of eternal Potential, just look at the scientific notion of empty Space as brimming with Zero-Point or Vacuum Energy*3. :smile:
*1. Matterform :
The application of hylomorphism to essentialism is approached by Aristotle variously: as a way of distinguishing among changes; as a basis for the construction of scientific demonstration; as a principle of being in the science of being qua being.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/rhiz-2022-0002/pdf
Note --- As an Essence, hylomorph is not dichotomous & contradictory, but unitary & complementary concepts. In my thesis, the non-local timeless causal Potential includes the Possibility for both Matter and Form (Mind). Don't send out a space-probe looking for Potential, because it ain't there.
*2. Enformy :
In the[i]Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce complexity & progress.[/i]
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
*3. Vacuum energy
[i]An important concept in cosmology is that the 'empty space' between stars and
galaxies is not really empty at all! Today, the amount of invisible energy hidden in space is
just enough to be detected as Dark Energy, as astronomers measure the expansion speed of
the universe.[/i]
https://spacemath.gsfc.nasa.gov/universe/6Page87.pdf
Note --- This is not real detectable energy but mathematical hypothetical quantities to fill gaps in calculations. It's only indirectly detectable in the strange Casimir effect.
Quoting apokrisis
Actually, it was not Gnomon, but Aristotle, in his HyloMorphism theory, who seemed to be taking Matter and Form for granted. As if those ideal elements of reality were sitting on a shelf, until combined by an ideal Chemist into real things. That would be a dualistic theory. But my thesis is monistic, in that there is a single precursor to all real things. It's not a thing itself, but the Potential for things. This hypothetical infinite & undefined Apeiron, somehow splits into Form (creative causation) and Matter (the stuff that is enformed & transformed). In practice, it's what I call "EnFormAction" : the power to give form to the formless. This is not just wordplay. The thesis gives some background for the logical necessity of Potential as precursor to Actual things. It includes Information Theory & Quantum Theory along with some philosophical history of Platonic Idealism and Aristotle's Causes. :nerd:
Note --- I could respond in more detail to the rest of your post, but that would take us further off-topic, and it deserves a thread of its own. Would you like to continue in a new thread & topic?
Aristotle wasn't the final word on the systems view. He was notable for getting the debate properly started.
Quoting Gnomon
It is not logically a compound if understood as a Peircean vagueness. Peirce defined vagueness as that to which the principle of non-contradiction fails to apply. So that puts it beyond the compounds or mixtures that are what become possible after the symmetry-breaking of form from matter has happened.
Of course we can look back from where we have arrived to say the divisions we find must have been realisable possibilities of the potential. But the ur-division doesn't exist until it starts to happen, and individuated compounds that are mixes of the divided likewise only follow after that.
So there is an evolutionary sequence here. And things can't start to be divided unless there is some logical sense in which beforehand the division simply didn't exist. Although in retrospect we can see that the potential for it must have existed. And indeed given the choice between the split being accidental or necessary a starting division in terms of form and matter does seem the fundamentally necessary one in terms of there being anything at all for us to be looking back and talking about.
The Greeks of course were handicapped by not being able to imagine a creation event that includes spacetime itself. So that tended to make them more materialistic about the matter side of the equation and more transcendental about the formal side. Plato's forms came from some eternal place outside of space and time. Aristotle couldn't accept time had a beginning and so leant towards an eternalised past.
But this is the 21st Century. The maths of symmetry and symmetry breaking tells us how spacetime and its matter contents are two sides of the same quantum coin.
It is still very difficult to imagine dimensionality and materiality as not being ultimate substantial simples. We are everyday embodied minds having our everyday embodied experiences. Substantiality is all that we directly seem to know. But logic and maths allows us to explore these questions at their deeper metaphysical level.
Quoting Gnomon
So we agree at this basic level then?
Except I would find ways to avoid talking about a precursor thing or state as that retains to many substantialist/essentialist overtones.
What a modern QFT-informed metaphysics would emphasise, and what a Peicean semiotic logic would endorse, is that reality is always something being produced by the "monism" of a triadic relation.
So this says there is one ousia or principle of being. But it is relational and not substantial. It doesn't all boil down to one stuff even a precursor stuff as some kind of potential. Apeiron should not be taken so literally. Don't forget that Apokrisis as the dichotomising relation is what reveals the potential by the very fact of its separation, and then the further thing of its re-balancing or mixing. :wink:
So there is a monism of process. And the process is a logical arc of three steps. Or looking at it more holistically and less serially, it is a hierarchy where potentiality and necessity are the enclosing bounds and actuality the immanent and substantial outcome that arise in-between.
We are substantial beings. Looking down, we see the rapid and fine grain quantum blur that is the limit in terms of a raw material potential. Looking up, we see the slow and stately unfolding of a relativistic dimensionality that becomes so large as to be a continuity of form completely filling out view.
In dichotomous fashion, two limits on our being emerge. The limit that stands for local materiality, and the limit that stands for globalised form some universalised structure of laws or constraints.
So in the process view, complementary limits are what emerge. In ancient Greece, the division of form and matter is how we might have put it. Today it would be general relativity and quantum field theory. A theory of the global container coupled to a theory of its local contents.
The Big Bang is then the combined action that is a GR expansion and QFT cooling. Every doubling of the one producing a halving of the other in the simplest powerlaw fashion. The evolution of an act of dichotomisation in which the whole is divided towards its complementary extremes in a process persisting "forever" but already down to a couple of degrees of one of the limits and most of its way to its final full size in terms of the other.
Right. You see that echoed in the measurement problem and the ambiguous nature of sub-atomic particles....
Quoting apokrisis
...which likewise bears resemblance to Wheeler's 'participatory universe' idea (see Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking?)
Quoting apokrisis
But isn't the problem that these can't be reconciled with gravity? That this is the major obstacle to a GUT?
You mention 'top down constraints' - but what is the ultimate source of those constraints? Can they be traced back to Lloyd Rees' 'six numbers'? Because that has a satisfyingly Platonist ring to it, in my view.
This gets tricky as vagueness has to be beyond even quantum indeterminacy as it is usually modelled.
One thing to note though is that quantum field theory plugs in the dimensionality of special relativity as an operator. So the calculations start from already presuming a relativistic backdrop of spacetime is in place. Especially time as a classically fixed existent.
This means that vagueness (indeterminism, chance, ambiguity, probability, uncertainty) is constrained in quite a definite fashion. We haven't yet drilled down to a completely vague potential where time and space are fully emergent as well. This was what quantum gravity aims to model, with the help of decoherence to give time a direction in which to point and avoid the incoherence of Many Worlds-style interpretations.
These are live issues still.
Quoting Wayfarer
If you can't figure out where to place the epistemic cut, then sure, you wind up trying to put it in the "mind" of the individual scientist making the measurement rather than where it should be, which is out in the instruments designed to produce the mechanical click of a yes or no, an on or an off, an up or a down, etc.
Thank goodness that biosemiosis has now proven that case and the participatory universe stands debunked. It should impress that even life itself exists by being able to produce its quantum switches its enzymes and molecular motors that can informationally switch the world's entropic flows. DNA can tell metabolism what to do as an enzyme is a "classical" device that can dip its toe into quantum waters and use quantum tunnelling, superposition and other good things to direct the chemical traffic in a way that closes the causal loop to build and reproduce metabolising bodies that contain informational genes.
So forget old hat mysteries. Biosemiosis now places the epistemic cut between the measuring instruments and the quantum decoherence (or "collapse") out where it belongs. Right at the interface that allows life and mind to even be the thing of a semiotic modelling relation with the world.
We think of life and mind as the supreme examples of the organic. The irony is that it is the (thermodynamical) physics that has the lively and energetic self-organisation we know and love. Life and mind are then the trick of imposing a machinery a system of logic driven switches on the physics of entropy flows.
Life and mind are deeply mechanical and classical in their ontology when you get down to what is really going on here.
Quoting Wayfarer
GR includes gravity into relativity. It reconciles two of the three Planck constants in c and G or the speed of light and Newton's gravitational constant.
QFT then reconciles c and h - or c and Planck's quantum constant.
The trick is thus to unify all three constants, cGh, in one quantum gravity theory. And it exists for all sakes and purposes as an effective or emergent theory. The issue is that folk believe that gravity also ought to be quantum and so produce self-interacting gravitons as particles with mass. These on top of everything else would drive the mass of the Big Bang to unbalanced infinity and collapse it before it could get going.
So yeah. We are here. And maybe gravitons just don't exist. Maybe the fabric of spacetime has its gravity waves we've seen those now but not its self-interacting cloud of virtual contributions.
String theory and supersymmetry have pretty much bitten the dust. Again, the scientific consensus is moving on and Okun's cube that Planck triad of constants may be combined by some kind of metaphysics that is a little more .... systems thinking. :grin:
The clue could be in the threeness of the constants and the twoness of their reciprocal or dichotomising relations.
So sure. The science is a work in progress. It is where it is today. The popular science account is still recycling the familiar conundrums of 20 years ago. Popular understanding is then way back in the rear view mirror.
Quoting Wayfarer
The Planck triad are the fundamental constraints which as said have given rise to our modern Platonic structure of physical theories. Check out Okun's cube of theories. I've posted an explanation of that before a few times. See...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/586530
I should be getting on with my work as it is. :worry:
But instruments don't make measurements - or rather, whether they do or not relies on the measurement being observed. And that Wheeler article discusses the implications of his 'delayed choice' experiment, conducted on a cosmic scale, whereby observations taken on earth appear to have a role in determining the path of a photon that has already travelled millions of light years.
I listened to an interesting dialogue between Kurt Jaimungul and Amanda Gefter exploring Wheeler's concept of the participatory universe, where reality is co-created through measurement, involving both the observer and the observed. This idea is illustrated through an anecdote Wheeler often shared. He describes a game of 20 questions he participates in at a dinner party. The game traditionally involves one person leaving the room while the others choose a word. When the person returns, they ask up to 20 yes-or-no questions to guess the word. However, in this instance, Wheeler is unaware of a twist in the game. When he left the room, the group decided not to choose a specific word. Instead, they agreed to answer his questions on the fly, ensuring only that their answers were consistent with all previous responses.
As Wheeler began asking his questions, the answers were initially straightforward but became progressively slower, indicating the group's effort to maintain internal consistency. For example, he asked if the word was an animal (answer: no), if it was green (answer: no), and if it was white (answer: yes). Eventually, Wheeler guessed that the word was "cloud," and the group burst out laughing, affirming his guess.
The significance of this allegory lies in the fact that the word "cloud" was not predetermined. The word emerged through the interaction between Wheeler's questions and the group's answers. This scenario demonstrates Wheeler's idea of a participatory universe in quantum mechanics. In this context, reality is not fixed but is created through the process of measurement. The answers provided by the group were influenced by Wheeler's questions, just as measurements in quantum mechanics are influenced by the observer.
This participatory nature of reality is also a central theme in QBism (Quantum Bayesianism), an interpretation of quantum mechanics. QBism suggests that the act of measurement involves the observer updating their beliefs or probabilities based on the outcome. In the same way that the word "cloud" emerged from the interplay of questions and answers, the reality in quantum mechanics is co-created by the observer and the observed. But it calls into question the intuitive belief that the world really is a certain way prior to it being observed. The way it is comes into being through the observing of it.
Andrei Linde often argues along similar lines.
How does reading off a number make a difference to what the dial has recorded? Be as precise as you like.
You claim there is some difference but then throw in a lot of examples that immediately skate over this issue of what counts as a measurement. It is the doing or the reading?
Sure. The point is that we humans understand the world by imposing a yes/no counterfactuality on to it. That is the mechanical trick that elevated human inquiry to the level of hard science. So that is how as observers - humans who dont in fact construct their own personal lives with such logical rigour - we learn to be proper scientific observers trusted to be let free in a laboratory of sensitive and expensive instruments.
We are trained to apply a mechanical 20 questions yes/no rack on reality. But to implement that as a practical technical art, we have to make the instruments that actually do the interacting in the way we would like.
'The dial' or any instrument is an extension of the human ability to perceive the object. I know that the question of 'what is an observer' is a vexed question, as Robert Lawrence Kuhn has a whole playlist on it. And sure, we create the most exquisitely powerful instruments to make those observations. But the observer still has a fundamental role.
Partly, because the real world includes varying life conditions. We discover what's fair and what isn't, and respond accordingly, e.g. suffer, enjoy, form judgements and complain or praise the particular conditions in which we live. It takes discipline to remain indifferent to the reality of fairness.
Tosh. It is what allows a human to impose a subjective notion of measurement on the world. A logic of counterfactuality which is then confounded when quantum level reality doesnt quite seem to be playing ball in the way expected.
Complexity likewise doesnt quite play ball with its nonlinearity. No measurement can be exact enough to predict future turbulent states.
So in general, science has observer problems. Anthropologists have their observer problem of how their subjects react to outsiders and their questions.
It is not about us being conscious and that somehow being what reduces reality to the mechanical predictability of our triumphant scientism. Our keenness to project a mechanical ontology on to the world is just a fact of what it takes to be in a pragmatic modelling relation with the world. It is how we construct a machinery of control over its entropic flows.
I dont find Lindes approach convincing. In the thermodynamic view, time is relative to itself in the sense that it expands and cools at a constant powerlaw rate. Its beat is set by every doubling of its volume being a halving of its energy density. A thermometer tells you how old it is.
Humans are irrelevant. The Cosmos would be the same with or without us.
Time means nothing without perspective. It doesnt exist in itself, independently of the observing mind which provides that perspective. You might imagine the cosmos is the same without no observers, but that is also a judgement which relies on a perspective. Only an observer is capable of making it. Objectivity entails a subjective knower.
-Quoting apokrisis
because the observer can neither be eliminated nor explained!
My philosophical repertoire is limited, since I have no formal training in Philosophy or Physics. So a lot of 's discussion (and your replies) are over my head. My comments are necessarily more general and conventional --- except for my personal unorthodox ideas, of course. Besides, this diversion onto Materialism vs Metaphysics or Realism vs Idealism is off-topic for this thread. Do you think it should be moved to a new thread? I'll let you and Apo decide what to call it. And you can get as deep & techy as you like. :smile:
Yes. The physical world is unbiased ; neither Just nor Unjust ; but its variety affords chances for both kinds of effects. That's why I call my worldview BothAnd : it's both Fair and Unfair, both Just and Unjust, depending on the place & time & person. So, the OP question is really about Culture, not Nature, about Psychology, not Physics. :smile:
:100: A fact that terrifies 'anthropocentric antirealists' (e.g. @Gnomon @Wayfarer) to the point of despair or woo-woo denials.
No it isn't
Notice the implicit arrogance in the presumption are you able to grasp what the universe might be, outside and beyond the human conception of it. Scientism is the real anthropocentrism.
But that doesn't tell us which one to prefer. Or even which one I prefer.
I often disagree with Banno, but not on this. I can't discern an answer in your posts.
!
Fair enough, to be honest I only joined late in the discussion so I should add my two cents about the OP.
Quoting Gnomon
Notice the implicit assumption in the statement that the physical world is 'the real world'. This already assumes an empiricist perspective, that what is real is what we are capable of physically detecting and controlling. It's obviously true that traditional religions try to invoke supernatural assistance in managing it- praying for good fortune, blessings and religious ceremonies intended to maintain the empire or please the gods. But is that what it's really about? There's a sub-theme in religious cultures - that we do not know 'the real world' but only a simalcrum or an image of it. That due to the human condition, we're trapped in an illusory domain in which suffering and death are certainties, but that we possess a true identity beyond those, however conceived. That intuition has made its way into many science fiction films, like Matrix and Inception. I'm not claiming to be above or beyond it, only the belief that it's a perspective required to frame the discussion properly.
Quoting apokrisis
....leaving aside the existential question of 'why are we here?' or 'what is it all about?', which, even if you think them pointless, are questions that only h.sapiens is able to pose, so far as we know.
Silly ad hominems & strawmen. I/we have not claimed or implied anything "outside and beyond" anything, sir.
Really? Cite a quote.
Wrong. It "proposes" a synoptic view of "the universe" without supernatural entities or forces (i.e. woo woo :sparkle:) that is consistent with the Mediocrity & Uniformity Principles (i.e. not anthropocentric).
I think Ligotti had a nice phrase that characterized the world as malignantly useless. When its supported by tons of tedium, self-awareness of the buzzing of meaninglessness as its background radiation that we add our bits and bytes to, its quite distressing in its malevolent indifference.
Instead of like other animals, driven by the bliss of instinct sprinkled with some deliberation, experiencing in the moment, we are burdened with our own storm of deliberative thoughts. To form goals and habits and to choose to do so. We have gone beyond what is harmonious and we must always trick ourselves which is why things like values, and self-restraint and shame are what keep us from a kind of freedom that leads to hopeless madness.
I'm a big fan of Ligotti ... but what's your point in mentioning him?
Make of it what you will. I was riffing in the OPs question, albeit in the key of Existentialism.
In any case, that was the tail end of a point I brought up about John Wheeler's participatory realism presented in an online article, Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking At It? Without repeating all the detail, the salient point is the emphasis on a kind of constructivist idealism - that what we perceive as the objective, mind-independent universe is inextricably intertwined with our looking at it - hence the title of the article. It is mind-blowing, but then, as Neils Bohr said, if you're not shocked by quantum physics, then you can't have understood it.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/914646
You went for human-on-human fairness. Fair enough. I went for existence-upon-human.
Nonsense: "existence" is not a voluntary agent (re: category error).
Is it fair doesnt need agency on both sides.
The problem with such atheist philosophy is that it has no greater perspective within which to frame the nature of existence. Consider the Buddhist dictum, that existence is dukkha- suffering, sorrowful, unsatisfactory, unpleasing. But that is the first 'noble truth'. The second is the 'truth of the cause' - that dukkha has a cause - the third, 'the truth of the ending of suffering' - , the fourth 'the path of the way of ending suffering'. Of course atheism will merely categorise that as 'religion' and reject it, and then carry on whining about suffering, as if it were the only reality. :naughty: But that is the zeitgeist, isn't it?
Dont you dare mix average atheists with us enlightened pessimists :wink:
That is also my commonsense assumption, for all practical purposes. But, for philosophical purposes, I make a distinction between empirical Real world, and theoretical Ideal world. Even normally pragmatic scientists will imagine non-real scenarios as they try to make sense of the world-system as a whole. For example, since the semi-empirical Big Bang theory sounds like a taboo creation event, they may logically speculate about "what came before the Bang?" Some will dismiss it as a non-sense question, and dogmatically insist that this space-time world is one & done : no before or after. But others*1 seem to accept, as a matter of Faith/Fact, that an unverifiable/unfalsifiable Multiverse is the best answer. Presumably, in an infinity of worlds, random Good & Evil coin-flips will balance out. Some of us were just unlucky to be born into an out-of-whack alternate reality. Hence, the OP question for those of us in the contemporary world.
Since some very smart scientists accept the bizarre notion of an infinite chain of real-but-non-empirical realities, I can't find fault with ancient religious thinkers who took the "reality" of an eternal heavenly realm for granted. That unreal dual-world-view (enlightenment?) allowed them to make sense --- to balance the scales of Justice --- of their empirical temporal world. I don't think they were stupid to make such philosophical speculations. And apparently, such imaginary worlds have "made sense" to a majority of humans over millennia. They only differ, and argue, or fight, over the nit-picky details and the rules for navigating the Real and Ideal worlds. Some justice-seekers reach for the imaginary liberation of the elusive Nirvana emotional state --- picture yourself free from this suffering world ; while others piously or stoically endure the trials & tribulations of their empirical reality, in hopes of eventually enjoying eternal bliss in their imagined Paradise. Am I an idiot to entertain the optimistic notion that there's more to Reality than "first you suffer, and then you die"? :cool:
*1. Modern proponents of one or more of the multiverse hypotheses include Lee Smolin, Don Page, Brian Greene, Max Tegmark, Alan Guth, Andrei Linde, Michio Kaku, David Deutsch, Leonard Susskind, Alexander Vilenkin, Yasunori Nomura, Raj Pathria, Laura Mersini-Houghton, Neil deGrasse Tyson, Sean Carroll and Stephen Hawking.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse
But there is a difference between there being an "observer problem" as a general epistemic issue and then making it the motivation of some strong ontic claim. You haven't managed to show that quantum weirdness is somehow an ontic issue and not just an epistemic issue. You just jumped right to the conclusion you wanted to reach.
Fair enough that you cite Linde. But he makes quite a technical argument. And you should be able to see how my account of where to place the epistemic cut between observers and observables deflates the whole issue.
As an 80kg organism, Linde's biology draws that line down at the quasiclassical nanoscale boundary of chemistry where an enzyme is gluing or cutting some gene-informed sequence of amino acids. That is ground zero for life as a system that exists by modelling its world so as to regulate its entropic flows.
It starts with life. Then add on further levels of world modelling or semiosis in the form of the codes of neurons, words and numbers and then we get the really elaborate modelling exercise that we might call a conscious human, or even a scientist trained enough to set up experiments in a lab and report on it in journals ... revealing the world "as it exists" to that very mathematical and logically counterfactual level of mindfulness.
So it takes a certain kind of training to be a certain kind of observer. Quantum physics can train us to see reality in a different way to the way Newtonian mechanics might have trained our natural-seeming classical and reductionist preconceptions.
But even there, how many really understand Newtonian mechanics and why that was just as epistemically shocking in its day? I mean, the fact that a state of rest is derivative of a state of constant motion? Galilean relativity already applies?
So it is one thing to throw about these references to "the participatory universe". For sure, physicists are prone to say rash things about "consciousness" as they aren't properly informed of the relevant science. And the force of the biosemiotic answer is only a decade or so old. Biology has only just shifted from cells being bags of metabolic soup to cells being a hive of molecular machines colonising the nanoscale borderline between a classical and quantum version of "the real world".
But that answer is now in. A "consciousness did it" story no longer counts even as speculation that you might have risked your good scientific reputation on back when writing your book in the 1990s.
The line between observer and observables is the epistemic cut as Pattee outlined even back in the 1960s. We just now have a vast flood of new biological evidence hammering that reality home.
But that is not his point. I get that Lindes argument is quite technical - I dont know what Hamiltonian stands for - but the plain text summary of it I provided by Paul Davies is sufficient to make the point:
[quote=aready cited]without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead.[/quote]
Exactly the same point was anticipated in the Critique of Pure Reason, to wit:
I related that to Wheeler's participatory universe, which suggests that the world is fundamentally interconnected with the act of observation, implying that the observer plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of an observation. This idea challenges the instinctive view of a 'there anyway' universe, emphasizing instead that the participation of observers are integral to the fabric of existence. This is not woo-woo - it is also consonant with the realisation of cognitive science that the world as we experience it is a product of the constructive activites on the brain - as you yourself well know (see Is Reality Real?) That is why there is a upsurge of interest in the convergence of enactivism, cognitivism and idealist philosophy. Why it 'pushes buttons' is because of the way that it challenges the realist assumption that what is real is there anyway, regardless of whether anyone sees it or not.
Wheeler says elsewhere in relation to the observation issue:
[quote=Law without Law] The dependence of what is observed upon the choice of the experimental arrangement made Einstein unhappy. It conflicts with the view that the universe exists "out there" independent of all acts of observation. In contrast, Bohr stressed that we confront here an inescapable new feature of nature, to be welcomed because of the understanding it gives us. In struggling to make clear to Einstein the central point as he saw it, Bohr found himself forced to introduce the word "phenomenon". In today's words, Bohr's point - and the central point of quantum theory - can be put into a simple sentence: "No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered (observed) phenomenon".[/quote]
So - what I'm arguing is that the nature of reality has an ineluctably subjective pole, which is implicit in every observation about the objective domain. For all practical purposes the subjective can be bracketed out, so as to arrive at the putative 'view from nowhere', which will be the same for any observer. But that objectivity is never absolute. It is 'mind-independent' in a practical sense, but not in an ultimate sense (which incidentally is what allows Kant to say that he is at once an empiricist and also a transcendental idealist.)
Quoting Gnomon
From my readings of 'philosophy as a way of life' I learn that theoria was the contemplation of principles, praxis was living according to them. And also that the world you see is very much a product of your condition, the eyes with which you see it. Hence the precondition of moral purity for the pursuit of philosophical wisdom (an attribute I cant claim to possess.)
Quoting Gnomon
Not at all, but I think it is important to grasp the radical nature of the question. Again in traditional philosophy solace might have been sought in the harmony or identification with a greater truth - where are they to be sought in secular scientific culture? Were just another organism as far as science is concerned, and that's their fate.
Quoting Gnomon
Everetts interpretation of quantum physics is simply the conjecture that the wave function doesnt collapse. The corollary of that is that any observation only captures one instance of it, so there must be as many observers, hence 'worlds', as there are possible observations. See The Multiverse Idea is Rotting Culture.
Nonsense. One is an exaggerated ontic claim, the other a modest epistemic fact of neurocognitive processes, easy to demonstrate.
You conflate them. But no point taking it further.
There is no 'exaggerated ontic claim', other than to call into question a realist view of physics. There are plenty other than me that call that into question.
Im sorry but which of these interpretations say that human minds are what cause the Universe to be?
That the Universe resists the simplicities of our attempts to frame it as classical is something rather less problematic.
Some points from the ChatGPT outline:
Copenhagen Interpretation (Bohr, Heisenberg):
* Posits that quantum mechanics does not describe an objective reality but only the probabilities of different outcomes of measurements.
* The act of measurement causes the collapse of the wave function, bringing a definite state into existence.
* Emphasizes the role of the observer and the interaction with the measuring device.
QBism (Quantum Bayesianism, Chris Fuchs):
* Interprets the quantum state as a representation of an individual's personal belief or knowledge about the outcomes of experiments.
* Treats probabilities in quantum mechanics as subjective degrees of belief rather than objective properties.
* The wave function does not represent a physical reality but the observer's information about possible measurement outcomes.
Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM, Carlos Rovelli):
* Asserts that the properties of quantum systems are relative to the observer.
* There is no absolute state of a quantum system; instead, the state depends on the interaction between the observer and the system.
* Reality is considered relational, and different observers may have different descriptions of the same system.
Transactional Interpretation (Ruth Kastner):
* Proposes a time-symmetric view of quantum mechanics, where waves of possibility travel forward and backward in time.
* The transaction is completed when a wave function is confirmed by a future event, leading to the actualization of a particular outcome.
* The wave function is seen as a tool for calculating probabilities rather than representing physical reality.
They differ in details but call into question the mind-independent status of the objects of physics. I don't think any of them say that 'the human mind causes the universe to be', and I didn't imply that. What I said was
Quoting Wayfarer
which I think is a more modest claim. Recall Heisenberg's aphorism, 'What we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning'. Whereas the realist view that it is challenging is just that the domain of inquiry possesses a completely mind-independent reality. Again this is a philosophical observation, not a scientific hypothesis.
Coward!
So these are your words. They imply no observers means no fabric, no world.
The interpretations generally want to argue some position on observers participating in the production of crispy counterfactual properties, But where is some fabric of relations or probability in doubt?
Perhaps the wave function must be collapsed. But where is the argument that it needs our participation to even exist?
Take away that need to collapse the wavefunction and thermal decoherence gives you everything we see in terms of a reality that is classical or collapsed just by its own self-observing interference. The wavefunction simply gets updated by constraints on its space of quantum probabilities.
Humans then only come into this no collapse story as creatures who can hold back decoherence until some chosen moment when they suddenly release it with a suitable probe.
It is a bit of a party trick. Keep things cold and coherent enough and then let them hit something sharply interacting. One minute, they were entangled and isolated, the next as thermally decoherent as the world in general.
So we can mechanically manipulate the collapse of the wavefunction, or rather mix some isolated prepared state with its wider world. But that participation doesnt also have to collapse the entire wider world into concrete being. The self interaction of decoherence has been doing that quite happily ever since the Big Bang.
[b][i]"1. The quantum particle is driven by a Brownian motion where the coupling to the
stochastic background field is given by the diffusion coefficient D = ?^2/2. For macro-
scopic objects, the diffusion coefficient is expected to be negligible. Thus, for a particle
with mass, one can assume that it is inversely proportional to the particles mass such
that ?^2 = ?/m.
2. A properly defined stochastic acceleration of the particle is proportional to the classical
force F. This is a stochastic Newton law, also called the Nelson-Newton law, which
leads to a Brownian motion with drift.
3. The diffusion is non-dissipative and may be described by a time-reversible stochastic
process."[/i][/b] (these assumptions all described in
https://www.mdpi.com/2218-1997/7/6/166 but quote directly taken from same author's dissertation)
The process, at least under one account, can them be summarized as:
Write down the classical Lagrangian, augment all velocities by osmotic velocities and apply stochastic optimal control theory to the resulting Hamilton principle"
(quote from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/andp.202200433)
You can then get the Schrodinger equation and all its predictions from assumptions about particles that are always in one place at a time but moving about randomly. Two authors who have made good clarifications shown below:
(Barandes)
https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.10778
https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.03085
(Kuipers)
https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.05467
https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.07524
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stochastic_quantum_mechanics
Below is a paper that gets Bell violations and perfect spin correlations as predicted exactly by quantum mechanics from this model of particles that are always in one place at a time and moving randomly (The first Barandes paper above also directly describes how non-local correlations appear in general stochastic processes albeit not an exact spin experiment from quantum mechanics like the Stern-Gerlach one in the following paper):
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10701-024-00752-y
The author doesn't pretend to have a coherent interpretation of exactly how a model of randomly moving particles does this strange behaviour but the point is that they just mathematically follow in some circumstances when you start with some pretty unremarkable assumptions about random particle behavior. If these models can produce this behavior there is no reason to inject any additional exotic ontologies or significance for observers. By having particles always in one place at a time, the measurement problem and classical limit is completely solved and in the most intuitive way possible, because particles in one place at time is the commonsense view of the world. It can be noted that had a stochastic interpretation been adopted from the start there would have never been any real reason to introduce the collapse postulate. Its not necessary but at the same time collapse doesn't contradict the stochastic interoretation in any way because it can just be interpreted as statistical conditioning.
The only other thing you have to accept in this stochastic view is that particles move about randomly - and obviously any quantum interpretation always has to allow some kind of randomness somewhere even if it is like many-worlds "self-locating" randomness. Why do particles move randomly? The natural interpretation is that particles don't sit in an empty vacuum but in a sea of background fluctuations that disturb its movement randomly - this seems very compatible with the kinds of ontologies introduced in quantum field theory. It can be noted that the effect of quantum vacuum fluctuations in regular quantum theory on macroscopic objects has been experimentally observed:
https://news.mit.edu/2020/quantum-fluctuations-jiggle-objects-0701
So ontologies like the ones required in the stochastic interpretation already seem to be compatible with quantum field theory and empirical observations from it. The main differences is that under the stochastic interpretation, the wavefunction is not the same as the particle, but just a mathematical object used to predict the motion of particles over many many experiments. We can think of the particles in terms of contextual/non-locally behaving hidden variables.
The parallels between regular classical diffusion (e.g. a particle moving randomly in a glass of water) and quantum mechanics are already very explicit without even trying to derive one from the other.
Classical diffusions can be described by the heat equation which describes the evolution of a particles probability distribution. The Schrodinger equation is just a heat equation that uses complex numbers.
Like the Schrodinger equation, heat equations are deterministic, even though they are used to describe how a probability distribution changes in time.
Like the Schrodinger equation, the heat equation is linear and so the superposition principle applies even though you are describing statistical behavior and diffusions (albeit without the crucial interference):
https://math.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Differential_Equations/Differential_Equations_for_Engineers_(Lebl)/4%3A_Fourier_series_and_PDEs/4.06%3A_PDEs_separation_of_variables_and_the_heat_equation
It has also been known since the 1930s that the Born Rule and uncertainty principle both can be derived in classical stochastic diffusions:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1140/epjh/s13129-021-00032-7
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1140/epjh/s13129-023-00052-5
Commutation relations too have been found independently in classical stochastic processes:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304414910000256
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/24/10/1502
https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.0258
There's no reason to think we need anything more than particles, in definite locations at any time, behaving randomly to explain quantum mechanics. No need for observer, no need for woo. This interpretation is just not very well known despite having no fundamental challenges to it apart from being unintuitive. But it makes up for lack of intuition by having rigorous mathematical formulations.
Perhaps not quantum mechanics, but I dont see how this works for quantum field theory.
I am all for minimising the mysteries, but quantum properties like contextuality, entanglement, non-locality all speak to a holism that is missing from this kind of bottom-up construction view.
Off-topic :
I'm generally familiar with all those Observer World theories, but I'm not clear on one point. It should be obvious that observation of a physical object somehow creates a meta-physical world-view (mental image) in the mind of the observer.
But does anyone claim that your observation --- of a "collapsing" quantum event for instance --- creates the actual world that I personally routinely experience, apart from scientific experiments/measurements? Or that we collectively "participate" in creation of the world that we all more or less agree is out there?
Did Wheeler over-generalize from lab experiments to kitchen experience? Seems like we may be arguing about two different things here : my Ideal World vs everyone's Real World. :chin:
Participation in Creation :
He would say things like 'No phenomenon is a true phenomenon until it's an observed phenomenon,' said Robert M. Wald, a theoretical physicist at the University of Chicago who was Wheeler's doctoral student at the time. John Wheeler's participatory universe suggests that observers make the universe real.
https://www.quantamagazine.org/black-holes-will-destroy-all-quantum-states-researchers-argue-20230307/
Einstein to Pais :
Do you really believe the moon is not there when you are not looking at it?
It doesn't imply that the world doesn't exist in the absence of observers. That is 'imagined non-existence', imagining it going out of existence or not existing. Rather it is the insight that 'existence' is a contingent term without a univocal referent. It's not the case that 'the world' (or the objective domain) either exists or doesn't exist. Rather it is built up or constructed out of the synthesis of (1) external stimuli with (2) the brain's constructive faculties which weave it together into a meaningful whole (per Kant). So it's not as if in the absence of the observer, there is literally nothing, but in that absence, there is no sense-making facility within which concept of existence is meaningful. There are no things, as such, because things are designated, given identity, by observers.
The presumption of the mind-independence of reality is an axiom of scientific method, intended to enable the greatest degree of objectivity and the elimination of subjective opinions and idiosyncracies. But that doesn't acknowledge the fact that models themselves are mental constructs and what is designated as mind-independent exists within that context. Whenever we point to the universe 'before h.sapiens existed' we overlook the fact that while this is an empirical fact, it is also a scientific hypothesis, and in that sense a product of the mind. Only within ourselves, so far as we know, can that understanding exist.
See Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics, Charles Pinter: "Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxiesbut all of it is unseen. There is no human or animal eye to cast a glance at objects, hence nothing is discerned, recognized or even noticed. Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds. Nor do they have features, because features correspond to categories of animal sensation. This is the way the early universe was before the emergence of lifeand the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer."
An excerpt:
(Because the results of experiments and observations are interpreted within a model.)
[quote=Mind and the Cosmic Order] By assumption, the universe outside the purview of any living observer is not divided into separate objects. Moreover, rigid bodies have no shape or structure, because those things are created by observers. This universe has no inherent description: It simply is. Atom-for-atom it is exactly the universe we know. However, without living observers to give it form and structure, it is radically diminished compared to the reality we perceive. Its physics is not at all like the science we know. What, then, can we say about it? Surprisingly, we can say a great deal. The remarkable answer comes from the latest research in neuroscience, which aims to elaborate a theory called predictive processing. The underlying idea is a very simple one:
In order for animals to survive, they must find optimal ways of using the resources available in their environment. They learn by trying every path open to them: Along some paths they make progress, while along other paths they are turned back because they run into obstacles. Gradually, natural forces oblige them to distinguish whats possible from whats not. It is through the medium of these hurdlesthese natural constraintsthat organisms gradually learn the structure of their environments. The impediments which the natural world imposes on their efforts progressively shape their understanding of the world. In fact, thats what the real world is: It is the set of all the restraints and obstacles imposed on living beings striving to achieve their goals. For the scientist, the universe consists of matter and incandescent plasma. These, however, are images invented by the human mind. Behind these images, and evoking them, are the constraints of nature that channel the scientists thinking and determine the outcomes of experiments. In fact, what we regard as the physical world is physical to us precisely in the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions.[/quote]
So what I'm arguing is that the fabric of the Universe has an inextricably subjective pole or aspect upon which judgements about the nature of reality are dependent. That is the sense in which it is not 'mind-independent'. The point about quantum physics is that it has shown this up, in fact I think it places it beyond dispute. This is why it is controversial, as it appears to undermine the criterion of objectivity. However it really doesn't do that: it just shows that it has limits, as a mode of understanding.
Well that is just an epistemic issue and not an ontic issue. We can all agree that we are modellers of our world. Semiotics makes that point. What we experience is an Umwelt, a model of the world as it would be with us ourselves in it.
We don't just represent the outside world to our witnessing mind, and our mind might come with all sorts of preconceptions that distort our appreciation of what is out there to see. Instead, being mindful is to have precisely the kind of modelling relation that is imagining an "us" out there also in the world doing stuff. Imposing our agency and will on its physical flow.
The modelling relation which is pragmatically formed between the brain and its environment has to build in this ur-preconception that we exist as separate to the world we desire to then regulate. A belief in a participatory ontology is the basic epistemic trick. It is why we believe that we are minds outside a mindless world. That is why idealism has its grip on the popular imagination. It is how we must think to place ourselves in the cosmic story as conscious actors.
But then the job we give science is to deflate that built-in cognitive expectation. We want to find out exactly how our being arises within its being in some natural material way. Which is why biosemiosis matters as the sharpest general model of that modelling relation.
And applying biosemiotic principles to the wavefunction collapse or measurement issue sorts it out quite nicely. It doesn't turn quantum ontology classical. But going to the point you are making, it does explain exactly where we can draw the epistemic cut between the thermal decohering the Universe just does itself and the way we can manipulate that decoherence as semiotic organisms with a metabolism to feed and an environment to navigate. Or as technologists, how we can manipulate quantum decoherence to produce our modern world of cell phones and LED screens.
Quoting Wayfarer
As I say, that is the presumption that founds life and mind as processes in general. The modelling relation is based on the trick of putting ourselves outside what we wish to control, and that then gives us the main character energy not to just bobble about as the NPC's of the game of life. The model makes us feel as if we stand apart, and that is what then puts us into the world as a centre of agency.
How do you know when you turn your head fast that it is you spinning in the world rather than the world spinning around you? You subtract away the motor intention from the sensory outcome. And that neatly splits your world into a binary subjective~objective division.
The illusion of an ontic division in the epistemic model is so strong that this leads to the idealist vs realist debate that confounds philosophy. A constructed divide is treated as a real world divide a world which is now "mindless" in its materiality and lack of purpose, lack of mindful order. The world with us not now in it because we exist ... somewhere else outside.
The necessary epistemic illusion of being a separated self is promoted to the status of an ontic fact of nature. And endless talking in circles follows.
Quantum physics offers us enough new information on how the world "really is" not to have to deal with all the mind~body woo as well. We have to maintain a clarity as we work our way through the metaphysics necessary to ground all the twists and turns of our inquiry into Nature as the thing in itself. Before we evolved to take advantage of its entropy flows with our entropy regulating mindsets.
Quoting Wayfarer
OK. So you are still arguing epistemology and not ontology when it comes to the participatory hypothesis. Will we get to the stronger idealist interpretation shortly?
Quoting Wayfarer
Well yes. If it is our biosemiotic modelling that constructs a world of objects for us the world as it should be for an object manipulating creature then science must be right not to just take that humancentric view.
If objects turn out to be interactions in quantum fields from the point of view of the scientist trying to model the world "as it really is" then if that is what works as the model, that is the model which at least gets us that much nearer to the "reality" of whatever a cosmos is.
We are trapped in epistemology. Objectivity is wishful thinking. But subjectivity is such an elaborate social and neural construct that science of course would have to de-subjectify its models as much as possible. Even metaphysics has that aim. We can develop models that are able to revise their ontic commitments in a useful fashion as the application of science as technology shows.
Quoting Wayfarer
And now we slide from a generally agreed epistemic point towards the strong and unwarranted ontic claim?
Again you slip in "fabric" as the weasel word. Do you mean the fabric that is the general coherence of a model our experiential Umwelt or the fabric that is what constitutes the material of the actual world in which we place ourselves as the further thing of a locus of agency?
Likewise your leap to "an inextricably subjective pole or aspect". This implies that our subjectivity is necessary to the objective being of the cosmos. The ontic claim. Yet that then doesn't square with your apparent acceptance that the world would still exist if we hadn't been biological organisms around to impose our Umwelt of scents, colours, sounds, shapes, feels, etc, on it. The deflationary epistemic view of this debate.
So you provide a lot of words to support what seems you contention. But it all turns out to be making the epistemological points I already agree with and not making a connection to an ontic strength version of the contention that "consciousness caused its own universe to exist/the quantum measurement issue is the proof".
Epistemic idealism is sufficient in my view.
Quoting apokrisis
I'm not agreeing that 'the world would still exist in the absence of the observer' - what is, in the absence of any mind, is by definition unknowable and meaningless, neither existent nor non-existent.
Quoting apokrisis
I know that. We have points of agreement.
Quoting apokrisis
But it has no choice. The idea that it can transcend humanity is itself hubristic. Science has already discovered the means to completely obliterate all life on earth, and is quite feasibly meddling with powers that it really has no conception of. What is the quest for interstellar travel if not a sublimated longing for Heaven?
Quoting apokrisis
But that's not what I said. It's what you think I said.
Incidentally another Springer book that came up as a recommendation next to Pinter's, is part of a series on biosemiotics, edited Liz Swan, Origins of Mind. I'll have a look at that.
Quoting apokrisis
It has been applied to field theory! References for such application to field theory are given in (e.g. you'll find them if you search the phrase "field theory" and look through:
https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.05467
Mentioned in the formulation below too that it is general enough to be applicable to fields:
https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.10778
Quoting apokrisis
All occur in stochastic mechanics from assumptions of particles, always in definite locations, moving randomly. You can see that explicitly in the paper linked earlier which recreates Bell violations and perfect correlations exactly as regular quantum mechanics.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10701-024-00752-y
These weird quantum effects can be seen as very intuitive consequences of unusual statistical properties in quantum mechanics related to failures of certain assumptions concerning joint probability distributions / "global sections":
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1367-2630/13/11/113036/meta
Interestingly, these assumptions also fail in areas of social science because things like human decision-making often have a context-dependent nature to them. Somewhat appropriately, quantum theory has become a valid tool in social sciences and you can find phenomena like quantum-like interference effects and Bell-like violations in human behavior and even online data: e.g.
https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-psych-033020-123501
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10699-018-9570-2
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/24/9/1207
https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10146180/
Also classical computer science as well as logical paradoxes too strongly related to contextuality:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.7386
https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.03097
And classical light entanglement too:
https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=classical+entanglement+optics&btnG=
And classical Brownian particle analog of entanglement:
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0412132
https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/25/11/1565 (just revisits above arxiv paper)
All because they have unusual statistical properties of joint probability distributions as implied by commutation and uncertainty relations.
The point is that these unusual statistical properties are far more "normal" than we are led to believe and seem to naturally emerge under certain assumptions when talking about particles in definite locations but whose motions are random.
A nice summary of the kind of nature of this unusual statistical property (quote from: https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.13326):
For certain families of events the theory stipulates that they are commeasurable. This means that, in every state, the relative frequencies of all these events can be measured on one single sample. For such families of events, the rules of classical probability Booles conditions in particular are valid. Other families of events are not commeasurable, so their frequencies must be measured in more than one sample. The events in such families nevertheless exhibit logical relations (given, usually, in terms of algebraic relations among observables). But for some states, the probabilities assigned to the events violate one or more of Booles conditions associated with those logical relations.
This alludes to the fact that Bell violations are actually just a special case of inequalities discovered by Boole in the 1800s which decine conditions for a joint probability distribution (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fr%C3%A9chet_inequalities). The fact that a unique joint distribution doesn't exist doesn't mean the underlying statistics don't exist, just that they must be defined on separate probability spaces.
In the stochastic particle case this condition seems strongly linked to the uncertainty relations for position-momentum distributions - they cannot simultaneously be both concentrated. Naturally then sharp position and momentum measurement distributions cannot co-exist.
Then there is no ontic case to answer.
Quoting Wayfarer
Even if we are trapped inside our models, we can aspire to better models. And biosemiosis would remind this is also how we can aspire to be better as the humans populating our self-created dramas.
You hate on science. But what was the Enlightenment and Humanism but the application of the same more objectified and reasoned take on the human condition?
Through social science, political science, ecological science, economic science, we can finally imagine actors of a different quite kind.
Of course economic science is the problem child here. But that is another story, :razz:
Not at all. But, thanks for your constructive criticisms.
Quoting The MindCreated World
Remember this?
Quoting Banno
Nothing I've said calls that into question, though. I've said, I'm not questioning the existence of unseen worlds, other minds, and unknown facts. It's not as if before I open my eyes, the world doesn't exist, and that it begins to exist when I do. It is an empirical fact that a world exists independently of your mind and mine. But both you and I bring a perspective to any scene. We have a framework within which we agree on north and south, and much else - but that itself is constructed by the brain/mind. It's not a solitary perspective, as we share a world, a culture, a language model, and much else besides (hence, not solipsistic). So we will all agree on north and south and many other facts. But all of those agreements still rely on perspective, we're part of a community of minds agreeing and disagreeing. If I was a member of a different culture, I might see the vista in a completely different light, as a 'sacred site' or something similar. A geologist, I'll see it as mining site. Which is it? Is it "really" a mine site or "really" a sacred site? But I'm not endorsing out-and-out relativism, 'whatever is right for you'. I'm pointing out the mind's role in constructing our apparently- external reality. It's not simply given, but always interpreted by an observer, and there really is no 'outside' that interpretation. It is intrinsic to the nature of judgement and human existence. The sense that the world exists entirely outside and separately to us is part of the condition of modernity, in particular, summarized by the expression 'cartesian anxiety':
The term was coined in Richard Bernstein, in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis, and is subject of discussion in The Embodied Mind, Varela, Thompson et al.
(I will, however, add that in philosophy of physics, Qbism offers a compelling illustration of the perspectival nature of reality. This interpretation of quantum mechanics posits that the wave function does not represent an objective reality but rather encapsulates an observer's subjective degrees of belief about the outcomes of measurements. In Qbism, probabilities are personal and depend on the observer's knowledge and experiences, highlighting that reality is not a fixed, independent entity but is intertwined with the perspectives of individuals. This framework reinforces the idea that truth is not absolute but is inherently linked to the observer's viewpoint, emphasizing the integral role of the mind in constructing and understanding the world. Thus, Qbism aligns with the broader philosophical stance that perspective is crucial to the nature of reality, further undermining the possibility of an objective "view from nowhere." See A Private View of Quantum Reality.)
Sure, all that. You want your cake and to eat it.
On the one hand there is a world that is as it is 'independent' of us.
On the other, what we say, think, know, believe, conjecture, doubt or whatever is dependent on us - not us as individuals but us as a community.
But this just means that knowing, believing, conjecturing, doubting or whatever are dependent on us; but not that the world is dependent on us.
You cannot, from your argument, reach this conclusion.
If this were how the wave function is, unobserved, then there is a way that the wave function is, unobserved.
Or is it that there is no "way that the wave function is", unobserved?
Which goes against 's story.
You have a world in mind when you say that. Anyway Im out on family time for today.
Quoting Wayfarer
You've neglected the epistemic fact that an organism's reality modelling demands this twin move of generalising and particularising, abstracting and individualting, intergrating and differentiating, just to produce the symmetry-breaking contrast that renders the world intelligible in the first place.
You are trying to paint this modelling dynamic as a move from a subjective pole to an objective pole. Somehow big bad reductionist science with its epistemic system of laws and measurements is abandoning the personal for the impersonal. The particular is being sacrificed on the altar of the general.
But as Gestalt psychology and indeed neurobiology in general tell us organisms understand their world in terms of the construction of contrasts.
If we couldn't generalise, your landscapes would just be a blooming, buzzing confusion of specks of light. We would not parse into shapes and objects of some more generalised type. We couldn't imagine the land held stories that might connect it as a more general historical flow.
And equally, in generalising the notion of say a mountain or river, that allows us to be more particular about this or that mountain or river. This or that mountain/river in terms of its material potentials, or its tribal significance, or indeed its corporate significance.
So this all sits on the modelling side of the equation. It is part of the epistemology. Generalising and particularising is simply the crisp division that a mind would have to impose on its world to get the game of modelling going.
You say see that butterfly. Do I need to ask what a "butterfly" generally is? Can I now have my attention quickly drawn to some particular butterfly you have singled out for some reason"?
But if you exclaim, just look at that quoll, well then without being equipped with that general concept I might be equally lost to understand the particular experience being referred to.
So science arises in the same fashion as it is just another level of semiotic world modelling. It's encoding language is just mathematical rather than linguistic, neural or genetic.
Science takes abstraction and individuation to their practical limits at the communal level of human modelling. Science combines Platonic strength mathematical form with the specificity of marching around the world equipped with calibrating instruments such as a clock, ruler, compass and a thermodynamicist might add thermometer.
So nothing beats science for abstracting because nothing beats science for individuating. This why as a way of modelling reality, it certainly transcends our evolved neurobiological limits, and our socially-constructed linguistic limits. It arrives at its own physical limits those set by the current state of development of the mathematical generalisations and the sensitivity available to our measuring instruments.
But again, this is all on the epistemic side of the equation. We are getting to know the real world better by transcending our previous epistemic limitations, not by actually stepping outside them.
Nor are we abandoning the particular for the general. We are refining ours senses as much as our concepts.
Quantum theory draws attention to how much more sharply we now see. Look, a counter just ticked! We must have made a measurement and "collapsed a wavefunction". Whatever that now means in terms of a mathematical theory that folk feel must be transcribed back into ordinary language with its ordinary cultural preconceptions and ordinary sensory impressions of "the real world".
In sum, epistemology is organised by the dichotomy of the general and the particular. It is how brains makes sense of the world in the first place. The cognitive contrast of habits and attention. The gestalt of figure and ground.
Science then just continues this useful construction of a world the phemenology that is a semioic unwelt, a model of the world as it would be with an "us" projected into it at a higher level of generality and particularity.
Sure, after that you can start asking about what is then lost or gained for all us common folk just going about our daily lives. The difference between just being animalistically in the world in a languageless and selfless neurobiological sense vs being in the world in a linguistically-based and self-monitoring social agent sense vs being in the world in the third sense of a rationalising and quantifying "techno-scientific" sense well, this may itself feel either a well integrated state or you might be rather focused on its jarring transitions and disjointed demands.
So of course, there is something further to discuss about scientism and the kind of society it might seem to promote.
But the same applies to romanticism which wants to fix our world model at the level of the everyday idealism and even frank animism familiar in cultures dependent on foraging or agriculture as the everyday basis of their entropy dissipating.
And I don't think anyone really advocates dropping right down the epistemic scale of existence to becoming wordless creatures once more just animals, and whatever that level of reality modelling is truly like from "the inside".
So yes, modernity might create Cartesian anxiety. But that arises from a dichotomising logic being allowed to make an ontic claim mind and matter as two incommensurate substances, two general forms of causality and failing to see that the ontic position is that the cosmos just happens to have these epistemising organisms evolving within it as a further expression of the Second Law.
We are modellers that exist by modelling. There are naturally progressive levels to this modelling. Words and then numbers have lifted humans to a certain rather vertiginous point. Numbers as the ultimate abstractions variables in equations matched to squiggles on dials take the basic epistemic duality of generalisation and particularisation to their most rarified extreme. I don't really see what comes next, particularly once we get into the adventures of algebraic geometry and its ability to give an account of the world in terms of its fundamental symmetries, or the emerging maths of topological order that speaks to the breaking of those symmetries.
But how does that detract from what Im saying? Pinters book makes that precise point - that we organise cognition around Gestalts, meaningful wholes, precisely in terms of what is meaningful to our animal sensibility. He provides evidence that this is the case even in insect cognition (with the fairy-fly as an example, so small as to be imperceptible to the naked eye.) Mind does that, either animal or human, although only we can bring that fact into rational introspection. Gestalts, forms, dont exist outside of minds. (I recommend that book - he doesnt use it to argue for idealism, if thats something that would put you off, although there are references to Kant.)
The point about quantum physics, is that, had the realist vision come to fruition, we might have really located the imperishable point-particles of atomism, fundamental entities with an unambiguous existence. But we didnt. The debate between Bohr and Einstein was around Einsteins fervent belief in a realistic ontology, as opposed to Bohrs more philosophically subtle attitude. But then Im sure you know all that. The only salient point for my argument is the sense in which the measurement problem undermines the presumptively mind-independent nature of sub-atomic particles - that at some fundamental level, the separation of observer and observed no longer holds. And thats because in the final analysis, reality is not objective but participatory. Were not outside of or apart from reality - one of the fundamental insights both of phenomenology and non-dualism. Its easy to say, but hard to see.
Quoting apokrisis
I agree with your description of the problem, but your answer is biological, not existential. Youre not seeing the plight of modernity from an existential perspective. It always seems to me youre appropriating philosophical terminology for another purpose, to do with biology and engineering. Thats why youre quite happy to dismiss the idealistic aspects of C S Peirce while utilising his logic for those purposes.
First job was to wind you back from confusing cognition as epistemic method with cognition as some kind of ontological mind stuff that grounds mind-independent reality.
Then second I offered the expanded view of how the scientific method is just more of the same. All cognition follows the same rational principles.
If you looked at the Mind Created World piece, I explicitly state that I am not arguing for any such thing.
Quoting Wayfarer
(Bannos is the first objection.)
Do you assume that 'the wavefunction' is mind-dependent² (whether 'mind' is intersubjective (community of observers/instruments) or divine (deity))?
Do you assume something else?
[1] or subject/pov/language/gauge-invariant
[2] or subject/pov/language/gauge-variant
I think a few folk are frustrated that this is something you dance around. The implication always seems to be there in what you post.
Quoting Wayfarer
So here we go again.
Sure, the Copenhagen interpretation in the reasonable form I hear from its defenders is that if we cant draw a line between observers and observables then we do have to say the only certainty is that the outcome of the probabilistic prediction can only be found by somebody actually checking the reading on an instrument. That might suck, but it is where things stand.
Yet we also know that we are built of biology where our god damn enzymes, respiratory chains, and every bit of basic molecular machinery couldnt function unless they could collapse the wavefunction to get the biochemistry done. Nothing would happen without our genetics being able to regulate thermal decoherence at that level of cellular metabolism.
You could call this participatory, but it is only that in the physicalistic semiotic sense, the modelling relation sense - a sense far more subtle than the hoary old subjective/objective or ideal/real sense.
The deep question, to refer you to Pattee again, is how can a molecule be a message? How does genetic information regulate a metabolic flow?
Or at the level of the neural code, how does the firing of neurons regulate a metabolic flow at the level of intelligent organisms navigating a complex material environment.
Figure this out as a scientific story at the biophysical level and see how it then provides a physicalist account - that is participatory if you insist - at all levels of organismic structure.
Its not a question of whether the wave function is or isnt mind-dependent. The equation describes the distribution of probabilities. When the measurement is taken the possibilities all reduce to a specific outcome. That is the collapse. Measurement is what does that, but measurement itself is not specified by the equation, and besides it leaves open the question of in what sense the particle exists prior to measurement. The Everett theory avoids all of those problems by saying the collapse never occurs, but with the implication that there are infinitely many worlds.
Quoting apokrisis
It is a deep question but not the question Ive been addressing. Maybe that book Ive found on biosemiotics and philosophy of mind will have some insights.
This thread has strayed away from the relatively simple yes/no/maybe question of a Just World --- where your opinion is just as valid as mine --- onto the open-ended (infinite ; non-empirical ; unverifiable) question of Subjective vs Objective Reality.
To Wit : Various interpretations of Quantum "collapse" seem to split along the line of another non-empirical question : is there a truly general Objective Observer to maintain the cosmos in Potential (statistical uncertainty - probability) when no specific Subjective observer is looking (measuring) to make it locally certain (Actuality)? Is it true that, the quantum waveform, and the immaterial field within which it is waving, is a generalized mathematical abstraction (mental image), not an observed real event?
seems to view Empirical Science as the closest possible approximation of perfect universal Objectivity, which trumps your ideal philosophical notion of a human-mind-independent Reality. Is there any way to resolve that Ideal/Real gap? :smile:
Gnomon reply to Wayfarer :
"[i]I'm generally familiar with all those Observer World theories, but I'm not clear on one point. It should be obvious that observation of a physical object somehow creates a meta-physical world-view (mental image) in the mind of the observer.
But does anyone claim that your observation --- of a "collapsing" quantum event for instance --- creates the actual world that I personally routinely experience, apart from scientific experiments/measurements? Or that we collectively "participate" in creation of the world that we all more or less agree is out there?
Did Wheeler over-generalize from lab experiments to kitchen experience? Seems like we may be arguing about two different things here : my Ideal World vs everyone's Real World.[/i]"
. . . . . from this Fair & Just thread
Scientific Objectivity :
The ideal of objectivity has been criticized repeatedly in philosophy of science, questioning both its desirability and its attainability.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-objectivity/
One might even say that the latter has little if anything to do with the former - that how things are is a different type of question to what we should do.
:roll:
:zip:
" ...it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind."
yet
"...its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have"
Nevertheless, I'm not clear what Wayfarer's position is either.
Apo has nailed his colours to a mast, laudably, but those colours are in a part of the spectrum I'm struggling to see.
Cherry-picked. The full passage is:
Can you see the distinction? That what is empirically true is not the whole story?
What might help is to consider that "the measurement" involves both preparing the coherent state and then thermally interacting with the system so as to decohere it.
A deflationary understanding of the collapse issue is that first up, we accept our experiments demonstrate there is something to be explained. Quantum physics shows that entanglement, superposition, contextuality, retrocausality (as time entanglement) are all things that a larger view of the real world, of Nature in itself, has to take into account. A classical level of description only emerges in the limit of a grounding quantum one.
But then what is going on to decohere the quantum?
To demonstrate the quantum nature of reality in the lab, we have to first prepare some particle system in a state of coherence. So the scientist makes what is then broken. Nature is set up for its fall by first that fall being prevented from happening in its own natural way just by the fact there is always usually dust, heat, and other sources of environmental noise about at our human scale of physics and then allowed to happen at a moment and in a way of the scientist's choosing.
So a pair of electrons are entangled in sterile conditions that quite artificially create a state of quantum coherence. The scientist's artfully arrange machinery built with scientific know-how, but still a material device designed to probe the world in a certain controlled fashion manufactures a physical state that can be described by a probabilistic wave function.
Now this wavefunction already includes a lot of decohered world description. It assumes a baseline of classical time already. In quantum field theory, the Lorentz invariance that enforces a global relativistic classicality is simply plugged in as a constraint. So a lot of classical certainty is assumed to have already emerged via decoherence starting at the Big Bang scale that now allows the scientist to claim to have the two electrons that are about to perform their marvellous conjuring trick.
A state of coherence is prepared by the larger decohering world being held at bay. A wavefunction is calculated to give its probabilities of what happens next. The wavefunction builds in the assumption about the lack of dust, vibrations, heat in the experimental array. Those are real world probabilities that have been eliminated for all practical purposes from the wavefunction as it stands.
Instead the experiment is run and the only decohering constraints that the electron states run into are the specific ones that the scientist has in advance prepared. Some kind of mechanical switch that detects the particle by interacting thermally with it and then because the switch can flip from open to closed report to the scientist what just happened in the language that the scientist understands. A simple yes or no. Left or right. Up or down. The coherent state was thermally punctured and this is the decoherent result expressed in the counterfactual lingo of a classicality-presuming metaphysics.
Out in the real world, decoherence is going on all the time. Nature is self-constraining. That is how it can magic itself into a well formed existence. It is a tale of topological order or the emergence of complex structure. Everything interacts with everything and shakes itself down into some kind of equilibrium balance. Spacetime emerges along with its material contents due to the constraints of symmetrical order. Fundamental particles are local excitations forced into a collective thermal system by the gauge symmetries of the Standard Model SU(3)xSU(2)xU(1).
The quantum is already tightly constrained by the Big Bang going through a rapid fire set of phase transitions in its first billionth of a second. The wave function at the level of the universe itself becomes massively restricted very quickly.
So in our usual binary or counterfactual fashion, we want to know, which is it? Is the cosmos fundamentally quantum or classical. But as an actuality, it is always an emergent mix. The realms we might imagine as the quantum and the classical are instead the dichotomous limits of that topological order.
There never is a pure state of quantum coherence (and so indeterminacy) just as there never is a pure state of classical determinacy. The Big Bang quickly bakes in a whole bunch of constraints that limit the open possibilities of the Universe forever. Thermal decoherence reigns. The Universe must expand and cool until the end of time.
As humans doing experiments, we step into this world when it is barely a couple of degrees away from absolute zero. We can manipulate conditions in a lab to demonstrate something that illuminates what a pure quantum metaphysics might look like in contrast to a pure classical metaphysics. We can filter out the dust, heat and vibration that might interfere with the coherent beam of a laser or whatever, and so start to see contrary properties like entanglement and contextuality. Then we can erase that view by imposing the click of a mechanical relay at the other end of maze of diffraction gratings half-silvered mirrors that we have set up on a table in a cool and darkend air-tight room.
But the Cosmos was already well down its thermal gradient and decohered when we created this little set-up. And even our "collapse of the wavefunction" was bought at the expense of adding to that thermal decoherence by the physical cost of some mechanical switch that got flipped, causing it to heat up a tiny bit. Even for the dial to get read, some scientist's retina has to be warmed fractionally by photopigments absorbing the quanta of its glowing numerals. The scientist's brain also ran a tiny bit hotter to turn those decoded digits into some pattern of interpreting thought.
"Aha, it happened! I see the evidence." But what happened apart from the fair exchange of the scientist's doing a little entropy production in return for a small negentropic or informational gain?
What collapses the wavefunction? Well who prepared it in the first place. The Universe expended unimaginable entropy in its Big Bang fireball to bake in a whole lot of decoherent constraints into the actuality of this world. The needle on any quantum purity was shoved way over to the other side of the dial even in the first billionth of a second.
A complication in the story is that it is in fact right about now, 13 billion years down the line, that we are nearest a classical realm with its rich topological order. Matter has become arranged into gas clouds, stars, planets, and scientists with their instruments and theories. But in the long run, all that matter gets returned towards an inverted version of its original near-quantumly coherent state. The Heat Death de Sitter void where all that exists is the black body radiation of the cosmic event horizon.
But anyway, right now there is enough negentropy about in terms of stars and habitable planets to feed and equip the scientist who wants to know how it all works. The inquiring mind can construct a delicate state of coherence on a laboratory bench and run it through a maze that represents some counterfactual choice. Does the wave go through one or other slit, or both slits at the same time? A classical metaphysics seems to say one thing, a quantum metaphysics demands the other.
Which reality we then see depends on at which point we thermally perturb the set-up with our measuring instrument. If reading the dial and becoming conscious of the result mattered so much, then we would likely have to take greater precautions about keeping them well clear of the equipment too, along with the dust, vibration and other environmental disruptions.
The scientist of course finds the result interesting because it says both understandings of reality seem true. Particles are waves and waves are particles. Reality is quantum in some grounding way the Big Bang and Heat Death look to confirm that's were everything comes from and then eventually returns as some kind of grand dimensional inversion. Hot point to cold void. And then what we call classicality is the topological order that arises and reaches its passing height somewhere around the middle. Like right about now. You get electrons and protons making atoms, which make stars, which make planets, which get colonised by biofilms that earn their keep by keeping planetary surfaces about 40 degrees C cooler than they would otherwise be if they were left bare.
And so there you have it. Mindfulness is life doing its thing of accelerating cosmic entropification creating states of coherence and then decohering them down at the level of enzymes and other molecular machines. A scientist can play the same game on a bench top. Spend a little energy to construct a state of poised coherence. Report what happens when a little more energy is spent on decohering it within the contexuality of different maze configurations.
Well designed, a contrast between a quantum metaphysics and a classical physics can be demonstrated. We can take that demonstration and apply it to the entirety of existence as if that existence were entirely hung up on the question of which kind of thing is it really pure quantum or pure classical?
Or we can instead look a little closer and see that the quantum and the classical are our abstracted extremes and what is really going on is an act of cosmic decoherence within which we can roll the decoherence back a little bit towards a dust-free and isolated coherence and then let it catch up again rather suddenly at the click of a mechanical relay. The almost costless informational transaction that still nevertheless has its thermal cost, as would be measured by a thermometer attached to the mechanical relay.
Again, you mix two quite different things - the world, and what we say about it,
Yes, reality exists independently of any particular mind. But what we say about reality is inextricably dependent on us.
These are two quite different things.
"Put another way"?
And I agree that there is a division here that needs acknowledgement. For Way, it is the difference between the world and mind. For me, it is the difference between how things are and how they ought be.
Perhaps an analogy will help. In a corporate body, understanding the way things are is a job for the bottom level of management. Middle management at best looks at how to get what the corporation wants. But deciding what the corporation wants happens at the top. It is a far more difficult issue than simply describing how things are.
(Unfortunately those in charge of deciding what corporations want usually grossly simplify the problem by saying "more profit", thus denying their place and rendering themselves mere Apparatchik.)
Right, so just what claim is being made? We know, because it is obvious that experienced reality is transjective, but it doesn't follow that the real as such has any subjective element.
I would also ask as to why it matters to those it seems to matter to. Could it be because they cannot bear the idea that this life is all we get?
Take this as granted.
We can grant the point that we only know things with our minds.
Reality is just what is the case. It is neither subjective nor objective, it just is.
Neither here nor there.
This has not been demonstrated. What has been shown is that what we know "has an inextricably mental aspect".
What we experience and know, is about reality, but is not the whole of reality.
Indeed, what we know is mental, but that does not imply that the world is mental...
The argument attempts to show that the world is partially mental, but only succeeded in showing that the what we say about the world is "mental".
That is, the argument presented here does not demonstrate it's conclusion.
Compare this with my own response to
Quoting Banno
Which if nothign else has the advantage of not being dependent on collapsing wave functions.
Thanks for the compliment, appreciated. This forum has been a great learning experience for me. I had never heard of Davidson or Austin, for example, whereas I have at least now read their SEP entries. Where we diverge, I think, is that my overall approach is more counter-cultural, than oriented with respect to mainstream Anglo philosophy. But, I continue to learn and there is much more to be discovered. I do follow up on many of the topic discussed and debated here.
Quoting Banno
Note at the outset, I dont pretend to claim to show what the world really is. Physicalism claims that the world really is physical. Customarily, idealism is often taken to claim the world really is mental. But note at the outset I say I will concentrate less on arguments about the nature of the constituents of objective reality, and focus instead on understanding the mental processes that shape our judgment of what they comprise.
I will add that whatever we say about the fundamental constituents of the world and whatever they may be, when they appear to us, they do so as elements of experience, even if mediated by symbolic representations such as mathematics. As Apokrisis rightly noted, its an epistemological form of idealism. And actually its most closely related to Buddhist philosophy - Leontiskos correctly recognised its connection to the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism.
I asked ChatGPT to provide a brief account of the distinction between epistemological and ontological idealism:
Many grey areas and porous boundaries to be sure, but Im nearer the first. No coincidence that I discovered Kant through The Central Philosophy of Buddhism by T R V Murti, which has extensive comparisons of Kant and Madhyamaka philosophy (the middle-way school of Mah?y?na Buddhism). But there are many cross-overs and commonalities with Kant, phenomenology and Madhyamaka, exemplified for instance in The Embodied Mind and in John Vervaekes lectures.
Quoting Banno
Right. I should have said being has an inextricably mental aspect. But this requires a differentiation between being and what exists, which is itself contentious and which Ive had many arguments over.
Suffice to ask: who was the source of the well-known aphorism What we observe is not nature herself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning. Why, that was Werner Heisenberg, but here Im quoting him as a scientifically-informed philosopher, and in support of an overall Kantian attitude, recognising the distinction between phenomena (what appears) and the unknowable in-itself. Likewise Neils Bohrs In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to track down, as far as possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our experience. Examples could be multiplied.
Quoting Gnomon
The salient point is that were participants, moral agents, in our own lives, whereas scientific objectivity is predicated on the separateness of subject and object. Were behind the glass, or in the observatory, looking out, or looking up. And while modern science is one of humanity's most impressive achievements, we are not just knowers: we are also agents who make choices and hold ourselves responsible for our actions, and need to sense that we are participants in a meaningful cosmos, not just heat sinks doing our own little bit towards maximising entropy.
I think theres a resonance between Wheelers participatory universe and the pre-modern sense of the same, whereby youre related to the cosmos at large through the mythological re-enactment of creation (someone quipped in one of those YouTube videos Ive been watching, every observation in physics is a mini-big-bang). But the key insight I take from it is the realisation that reality, being itself, however you want to designate it, is not something were outside of or separate from. Its more than an objective reality, it includes both subject and object in a larger whole. That is what I think the shock of quantum physics has obliged us to recognise. Phenomenology has been more aware of that, as has its offspring existentialism. Thats why objectivity is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for truth. I requires more than objectivity - something like sagacity, an insight into the whole.
(I like to say naturalism is concerned with what you see looking out the window. Phenomenology is concerned with you looking out the window. In other words, it includes the experience of looking.)
Sure, we can construct our moral economies, but they are founded on entropic economies. We can't actually become detached from the world in practice which is kind of the Buddhist vision you are preaching? A monk must still be fed to muster the strength to sit absolutely still and attempt not to even think but just open up.
What I preach is then this connection that runs through life and mind all the way up through human social organisation and arrives at the technological state that is our mindsets today.
You don't have to like this outcome to accept that it just is a continuation of the basic thermodynamic imperative. But the moral debates have to recognise the reality upon which they are founded to have any real traction on our social worlds as they are.
We are hooked on burning fossil fuels like a drug addict on heroin. India and China homes to Buddhism are not notable as nations resisting the current moral order which is mainlining the stuff.
If the atmosphere was an actual heat sink rather than an insulating blanket blocking the exit route to out space, then this explosive leap into a technological age perhaps wouldn't even matter. To connect to the OP, it was just bad luck that reality had this practical limit.
So no one is saying that we must exist to entropify, even though we must entropify to exist. What I am saying is the second part of that relation must be grounding to any discussion of what we might actually want to do with the agency that entropification grants us.
We have lucked into technology and the fossil fuels that can rocket power us somewhere. But there are also these pesky limits on burning it all in as short a time as possible. It seems we have locked ourselves into the most mindless track because we haven't focused enough on the science that can see the two sides to the story. Instead, folk just want to dream about peace and love, truth and justice all civilisation's luxuries without regards for any of civilisation's costs.
Way off-topic :
As usual, 's discussion is over my head. But it may not be over yours. I had to Google A> "cognition as epistemic method"*1 to learn how it differs from B> "ontological mind stuff"*2. The "A" definition sounds like Ontology-as-usual, while the "B" version sounds like an Idealist interpretation of the traditional question of "what is Being?", but using a matter-based metaphor : "stuff". Which can be confusing for those who take metaphors literally.
Cognition is defined as 'mental activity", but that leaves open the question of how the human brain is able to metaphorically reach out beyond the skull into the material world, and bring back meaningful Percepts that can be transformed into useful Concepts. How do incoming photons (light energy) convey knowledge about the properties (redness) of the object that reflected the light? How does Cognition decode mathematical wavelengths into personal meanings? After several thousand years of argument and experimentation, a final answer to such questions seems as elusive as ever.
The notion of a "Mind Created World" seems to be another perennial conundrum that is not amenable to objective empirical finality. If so, is arbitrary Faith the only answer? I just read an article, in Beshara magazine, entitled Mind Over Matter*3. It's an interview with Bernardo Kastrup about his Analytical Idealism beliefs. One of his responses refers to Matter as an "extended transpersonal form of mind". Again, that sounds like Cosmic Mind-stuff (res cogitans) is a non-local ideal substance that can be molded into various forms of extended substance (res extensa).
Obviously, that universal mind-matter is not generated by my personal brain, so does it assume that the world is created by God-mind (panpsychism or cosmopsychism)*4? On one hand, Kastrup seems to deny most traditional Theology, but he is somewhat cagey about the nature of the god-mind-stuff that constitutes the world we personified-blobs-of-matter observe with our senses. If god-mind is not self-reflective, can it be intentional in its creative acts or just accidental? Sorry to unload on you, but such cosmic questions are pertinent to my own non-theological information-based philosophical theory of Evolution from cosmic Bang to local Cognition. :nerd:
*1. Epistemic cognition is knowledge about knowledge, especially knowledge about fundamental issues of justification and associated matters of objectivity, subjectivity, rationality, and truth.
https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-1-4419-1695-2_17
Specifically, individuals engage in epistemic cognition when they activate personal beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing
https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/education/articles/10.3389/feduc.2021.669908/full
*2. Ontological mind stuff :
To ask about the ontology of mind, from the Greek word 'ontos', or 'being', is to inquire into the most fundamental metaphysical categories to which the mind may belong. Is the mind a physical thing, in principle like other material entities, but with more complex properties, or is it somehow immaterial?
https://media.bloomsbury.com/rep/files/Jacquette_Introduction.pdf
*3. Mind Over Matter :
I ended up as a metaphysical idealist somebody who thinks that the whole of reality is mental in essence. It is not in your mind alone, not in my mind alone, but in an extended transpersonal form of mind which appears to us in the form that we call matter.
https://besharamagazine.org/science-technology/mind-over-matter/
*4. Cosmopsychism :
Bernardo Kastrup also tells Michael Egnor that he does not think God is self-reflective. That, he thinks, is a unique job for humans.
https://uncommondescent.com/intelligent-design/a-cosmopsychist-talks-about-the-universe-god-and-free-will/
I know that interview. Ive been reading and listening to Kastrup the last couple of years. Hes an articulate defender of philosophical idealism. (A lot of people think idealism is the belief in ideals, Its not. It goes back to the ideas of Plato, which are arguably the starting-point of Western philosophy,)
It is true that neither idealism or materialism are falsifiable in Poppers sense, but the point of falsifiability is not to establish what is true, but what is a testable claim. Classic examples Popper gave of non-testable hypotheses were Marxism and psycho-analysis, because they could accomodate any counter-factuals on an ad hoc basis - no claim could prove them wrong. Whereas a proper scientific theory is always open to refutation by new facts.
Philosophical ideas are not necessarily hypotheses in the scientific sense. Theyre more like frameworks. The subject is generally discussed under philosophy of mind so it might be useful to seek out primers on that topic. Banno points out that idealism is very much a minority position in the academic mainstream, but there are some.
I should add, that idealism itself as a philosophical term really only came into vogue after Descartes and his division of res cogitans and res extensia (customarily described as mind and matter in this context.) The Aristotelian matter-form duality was not divisible in that sense, as form and matter always co-exist in a particular. Theres an article by a Buddhist studies scholar that has a useful summary under heading 2a http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro.html
Cheers.
I am versed in anglo philosophy, with its emphasis on critique. It's not sufficient to learn about Buddhism or scientism, they must also be subject to analysis, which is roughly to see how consistent and complete they might be. But having said that it remains possible that any inconsistency I see is not apparent to those who are better versed. The trick then is to explain such inconsistency.
You are probably aware already of my disregard for the Kantian notion of the thing in itself. I can't see how to make sense of it in a way that enables it to be useful. If there is a way that things are that is outside of our comprehension, then it is irrelevant to that comprehension. The only practical consequence can be a nod to the mysterious, and silence. We cannot access "the world as it is in itself", not because it represents some profound fact about the world and our relation to it, but because the thing-in-itself is a useless metaphysical construct.
It is apparent that there is a distinction between what we believe and how things are. This distinction explains both how it is possible that we are sometimes wrong about how things are, and how we sometimes find novelties. In both cases there must be a difference between what we believe is the case, and what is the case. We modify what we believe so as to remove error and account for novelty; which is again to seek a consistent and complete account.
The "we" here is intentional. What is so loosely labeled "experience" only takes place in a mind and brain embedded in a community. There simply is no way to remove our communality, and any account that does not take this into consideration starts broken. It's not you looking out the window, but us. Something to be acknowledged if we would take into account the "experience of looking".
So there is a manifest difference between the way things are and the way we believe that they are. Yet we are, as you point out, "participants, moral agents, in our own lives", so to this we must add a difference between the way things are and the way we want them to be. It's this difference that is relevant to 's question. "Fair and just" is not found in the way things are so much as the way we want them to be.
Quoting Wayfarer
Et tu? I can't accept GPT as authoritative. In any case, if your idealism claims that the world is inherently mental, it must respond to the three puzzles - other people, that we are sometimes wrong, and novelty. If your idealism claims only that our beliefs are mental, it misses the relation between the world and what we believe.
I can't help but contrast your response to me and your response to @Gnomon, here: . Analytical Idealism is not, so far as I can make out, a form of Epistemological idealism. So again, you seem to me to want your cake and to eat it, by answering issues I raise from the point of view of Epistemological idealism while answering issues others raise from the point of view of ontological idealism.
Quoting Banno
This would make more sense if we paid attention to the dichotomistic manoeuvre involved.
How do we know we are wrong? That is measured by the degree to which we are not-right.
And how do we know then what is right? Well that is reciprocally measured in terms of the degree to which we are not-wrong.
That is how the mind works. It course-corrects from both directions as its seeks to zoom in on reality's true nature. It increases its resolution by minimising its errors of prediction. And what is believed to be true always harbours some doubt, what is doubted always can hold some germ of truth.
Pragmatism then says inquiry only has to reach the threshold of belief being predictive enough for the purpose in mind. We become right enough not to care about the wrong, and yet also still wrong in never quite reaching what would be some absolute and ideal state of truthiness.
Semiotics adds on top of that the fact our modelling relation with reality is never actually charged with capturing its full ontic truth. As biological creatures, we only need to insert ourselves into our worlds in a semiotically constructed fashion. The task is to build ourselves as beings with the agency to be able to hang together in an organismic fashion.
Which is where we get back to the "idealism" of embodied or enactive models of cognition that have finally become vogue after so many years. Philosophy of mind catching up with the psychological science in its own sweet time.
Theres no requirement to. I used it to generate a useful summary rather than going to the trouble of drafting one de novo. Like a glossary entry.
Quoting Banno
Knowledge of appearances *is* knowledge of phenomena. It can be and is consistent and effective without it needing to be all-knowing. The thing in itself is a boundary in Kant's system; it marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery.. Through that it serves to keep us humble. I see it as a modest claim, not as a sweeping declaration. What we see is not nature herself but nature exposed to our method of questioning.
As for as Kastrups idealism - I do question the mind at large idea in this essay - Is there mind at large? - although its quite a long piece so dont feel any obligation.
Youre selling us short ;-)
There is no reason to regard the Kantian ding an sich as anything other than a metaphysical construct a priori, the only usefulness of it being a representation of the limit of human experience.
Given the major premise, from a speculative metaphysical point of view, that human experience begins with the effect of things on sensibility, it does not follow that things that do not have an effect on sensibility therefore do not exist, for otherwise we must be sufficient causality for the existence of such things in Nature that are perceived, which is catastrophically absurd, but it does, on the other hand, follow without self-contradiction that things that do not have an effect on sensibility cannot be an experience.
So we cause nothing perceived, but experience only the perceived. Reason inserts ..er, manufactures .the thing-in-itself to reconcile the former with the latter, nothing more or less than that. Which does sorta make the concept, technically the transcendental idea, practically useless but nonetheless logically necessary, in order to invalidate any conclusion that affirms human perception is simultaneously causal.
Personally, I think it's just bad metaphysics. I already shared the critique of "things-in-themselves" in the nominalism thread, from the Thomistic, Hegelian, Patristic, and process philosophy schools.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/919006 (at the bottom of the comment where the quotes start). I find these arguments very compelling.
The semiotic view one gets from the Scholastics (Poinsot being a core example) or refined in the 20th century by Charles Sanders Peirce and John Deeley seem much more compelling to me.
In general, I think the types of "idealism" (if that is a useful title for them) that have no problem with Banno's three questions, e.g. Hegel, Plato, some interpretations of Aristotle, etc. avoid dealing with this Kantian false dichotomy.
Those three puzzles are more of a problem for solipsism than idealism. But I think you think that idealism readily collapses into solipsism. Is that right?
From my vague recollections of your views, sometimes you strike me as a kind of linguo-ist, such that the way the world is depends on our language use (as opposed to, say, Berkeley's perceptions). I may have misinterpreted you. But you are definitely a realist - that's your trademark if nothing else. You think there was a universe before language, no? Do you need some kind of (non Kantian) existence-without-categorisation for your own metaphysic?
Your use of the Cake metaphor sounds like you think it's a bad (magical?) idea to try to have it both ways ; perhaps like Jesus multiplying five loaves of bread into enough nutriment to feed five thousand people. But I view 's broadminded worldview as a useful philosophical attitude ; that I call BothAnd*1. It's a flexible binocular perspective that combines two conceptual frames into one philosophical worldview ; where you're not forced to choose one side to stand on.
Rather than viewing the Cake as either Material/Real or Immaterial/Ideal, he can see both sides of the equation. It's based on the traditional distinction between a physical Object (Terrain) and a metaphysical Metaphor (Map) : the idea/concept/synopsis/model of the terrain. Epistemology is about our sensory knowledge of real Objects. But Ontology is about our rational inference of ideal Essences. For example, Aristotle's HyloMorph combines a real material Cake (yummy!) and an ideal mental Cake (the abstract tasteless notion of cakeness).
Empirical Science specializes in practical sensable Epistemology, while Theoretical Philosophy focuses on impractical visionary Ontology. But, on this forum, in our search for perfect all-encompassing Truth, we often cross the line between the Cake you can eat, and the Cake you can only imagine. :smile:
*1. BothAnd :
Conceptually, the BothAnd principle is similar to Einstein's theory of Relativity, in that what you see ? whats true for you ? depends on your perspective, and your frame of reference; for example, subjective or objective, religious or scientific, reductive or holistic, pragmatic or romantic, conservative or liberal, earthbound or cosmic. Ultimate or absolute reality (ideality) doesn't change, but your conception of reality does. Opposing views are not right or wrong, but more or less accurate for a particular purpose.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html
In my last two posts on this thread, I responded to 's and 's challenges for you to state a firm either/or (cake or eat) position on the multi-faceted concept of Idealism. And one facet that you seem to waver on is the "mind at large" notion, which seems to imply some kind of God-mind ; although even Kastrup seems to be "of two minds" regarding the nature of that hypothetical entity.
In your Mind At Large article, you distinguished Scientific Materialism from Scientifically-Informed Idealism. And the latter phrase is close to my intention when I wrote the original Enformationism thesis. Yet invariably, posters on this forum insist that I take a stand for Scientific Materialism or for Philosophical Idealism. However, what I had in mind was more like your notion of "Scientifically-Informed Idealism" (SII).
Although your interpretation of SII may not be exactly the same as mine, I suspect that we both envision a middle-ground or transition between the poles of Mind and Matter. If so, then you and I are standing firmly on the bridge in between. For me, that Mind/Matter connection is Generic Information, as exemplified in physical causal Energy Fields, which Einstein linked to Matter in his E=MC^2 equation. Mathematical Mass is not the same thing as sensable Matter, but it's how our physical senses perceive Material objects in a gravitational field : resistance ; inertia.
If my guess is correct, then you and I are not vacillating between two poles, but stably standing in the middle ground, which some philosophers believe does not, cannot, exist. But we may still be unsure of the nature of the "mind at large" which serves as a Bridge Over Troubled Waters. For me, it's definitely not the God of Theology, but more like the Way-Path (organizing principle) of Taoism, or the Logos (rational principle) of Western Philosophy. Is my reckoning even close to your standpoint? :smile:
Matter and form make the better metaphysical ground zero. Aristotle's hylomorphism. Or what might be called ontic structural realism in modern metaphysics.
A world of enmattered form or substantial being must exist as a starting point. And then life and mind evolve out of that as something further.
So now a new higher level dichotomy becomes required. We must make a distinction between the inanimate and the animate. We have to have something that separates the tornado which can seem pretty lively in being a self-organising dissipative structure from an actual organism. Even if the organism is also still a self-organising dissipative structure, just now self-organising in a self-interested fashion by virtue of being able to encode information.
So an organism is just as substantial as inanimate matter. All matter being in fact dissipative structure with its potential for topological order (the ontic structural realism thesis).
But an organism then adds the new thing of a modelling relation. It can encode informational states that mechanically regulate entropy flows.
A river just throws its snaking bends across the plains to optimise its long-run entropy production. A farmer can throw a whole system of drainage ditches and sluice gates across that landscape so as to harness the water flow for a useful purpose.
So the mistake in terms of idealism is to treat "mind" as something as foundational as substantial being. Substantial being has to evolve first as enmattered form to then become a material potential that itself can be harnessed by the mind of an organism.
Yes, well put. That's exactly what I have in mind. A convergence between cognitivism and philosophical idealism.
Quoting Gnomon
:100:
Quoting apokrisis
I can see why you would say that, but your perspective is predicated on the physicalist notion that mind is 'the product of' the brain. I really don't know if your philosophical mentor, C S Peirce, would have endorsed that. I find his metaphysics hard to fathom, but he does say that 'matter is effete mind'. 'Effete' means 'degenerate' or 'depleted' or sapped of its original vitality. What 'mind' is in Peirce is nothing at all like the Cartesian 'res cogitans' which he views as completely mistaken. He proposes a continuum between mind and matter, where they are not entirely distinct but different manifestations of the same underlying reality (and which I don't think can be described in terms of physics). He suggests that mind and matter are fundamentally connected, with mind being a more dynamic and vital principle, while matter represents a more static and inert state. By saying "matter is effete mind," Peirce implies that matter is a kind of mind that has lost its vitality and dynamism. In other words, what we perceive as physical matter is, in essence, mind that has become fixed and less active. Kind of like your hair- or finger-nail clippings in relation to your whole body, or your whole body after death. I sometimes muse that matter consists entirely of fossils.
I note that in philosophy encyclopedias, Peirce is categorised as an objective idealist, positing that the physical world is not independent of the mind but is intertwined with it. In his view, reality consists of both mental and material elements that are deeply interconnected. He proposed that the universe has a mental or spiritual dimension that cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone. That is central to his idea of agap?-ism, that love, understood as a creative and unifying force, plays a crucial role in the development and evolution of the universe and is a fundamental principle that guides the growth of complexity and order in the cosmos. He believed that the creative and purposive aspects of evolution could not be fully explained by natural selection alone. In that he was a lot more like Henri Bergson than Richard Dawkins.
Quoting apokrisis
From an idealist standpoint, it is equally plausible to see the emergence of organic life as the first stirrings of intentionality in physical form. Of course primitive and simple organic forms have practically zero self-awareness or consciousness in any complex sense, but already there the self-other distinction is operative, as it must be, for the organism's first task is to remain separate. The dissolution of the self-other boundary is death. So then through the evolutionary process, what we're seeing is ever-expanding horizons of being. The appearance of life is the appearance of perspective - of 'what it is like to be' a bat or whatever else. Alan Watts' cosmic hide-and-seek, in which the Universe appears to itself in any number of guises. And in Nagel's 'Mind and Cosmos', he entertains the notion that in life, the universe is becoming self-aware, 'waking up', as he puts it. I find that more congruent with Peirce's philosophy than any form of physicalism.
That's a very nicely written essay which sits well as a companion piece to your first essay. Excellent work.
This seems to take us back to Kant's noumenal world, right?
I guess most of our great debates here seem to find their origins in the speculative thinking about this 'unknown, unknown'. Your solution to this is (as you put it) a convergence between cognitivism and philosophical idealism. Do you consider phenomenology, in some of its guises (perhaps the neurophenomenological of Francisco Varela) to be a compromise between your position and one shaped by embodied cognition?
Thanks! Not a compromise, but an inspiration, the subject I'm working to understand.
There's three paragraphs in your essay I need to consider more deeply and I'll get back to you.
I get it. I'm not entirely happy with it, that's one of the reasons I haven't written many more.
I'm kind of on board with Kastrup's terminology, but not unreservedly.
In what sense is that a notion? And don't forget that I treat mindfulness as a general term that would span the biosemiotic gamut from genes to numbers as levels of encoding. So it ain't all about the neurons says the true anti-reductionist here. :wink:
The brain doesn't generate consciousness. That is the kind of statement that betrays an idealist who wants to treat the mind as another kind of essential substance to stand alongside the substance that is matter.
What a biosemiotician would say that the nervous system is the mechanical interface between the organism's informational model of the world and the resulting self-interested metabolic and behavioural changes made to occur in that world.
It is the production of a living process rather than a material stuff or even informational state.
Quoting Wayfarer
Here we go. Just repeat the same old contextless quote. As I've said in the past, read Peirce and you can see he was absorbed by the way dissipative states of matter could look remarkably lively and self-organising. The line between the animate and inanimate looked rather small when you considered how matter could shape itself into orderly forms under the Second Law.
Peirce, who was Harvard's top chemistry student for his first degree, was up to date with materials science. But working quite a while before the genetic code was cracked. So he did not have the advantage of this epistemic cut to draw the proper line. His semiotics as a general triadic logic of nature as well as of speech as a triadic sign system simply anticipated what biology and neurology were shortly to discover within their own scientific domains.
Quoting Wayfarer
Again we can forgive Peirce for being of his time and place. He was under great social pressure to sound and behave suitably christian it was a requirement even of his Harvard position, and his only sponsor after being bounced out of academia for the scandal of living unmarried with a woman was also wanting publishable writings leaning in the same theological direction.
Replace love with cooperation or synergy and you can perhaps see why he might have focused on this as a missing aspect of the Darwinian evolutionary theory that was sweeping over his world at that time.
Quoting Wayfarer
Precisely. In the late 1800s, a good Episcopalian would frame a response to Darwinian competition that way. In the mid-1900s, the socially accepted frame became Marxian biology. And capitalists remain in favour of the original "red in tooth and claw".
Are your own views expressed here free from that kind of cultural entrapment? Isn't Eastern religious philosophy something that has swept through Western culture in a number of counter-culture waves over the past few hundred years.
Quoting Wayfarer
But then you would have to explain how exactly. What changes? What creates this epistemic cut?
Otherwise just hand-waving hand waving away the much better formed arguments that exist.
Quoting Wayfarer
How easily you slide from the germane to the ridiculous. This is the hallmark of your style as folk keep noting. One minute we seem to have some kind of foothold on a sensible story, the next we are whisked away into spiritualist noodlings. And you seem always baffled when this is pointed out to you as an illegitimate chain of argument.
While dialectic has a certain appeal, I'm not as enamoured by it as you. I see two major issues. First, and most obviously, in classical logic asserting something and its negation leads to contradiction, not to some third option. Priest and others have addressed this wonderfully by playing with the law of non-contradiction, developing some intriguing alternatives. But it remains that the sort of contradiction seen in dialectic is not the sort of contradiction found in formal logic. What a dialectic contradiction is remains, I think, ambiguous
And secondly, even if we supose that dialectic does not breach non-contradiction, the result is not clear. Given the Principle of Explosion, anything could follow from a contradiction, so given a thesis and an antithesis, the nature of the resulting synthesis is far from fixed.
So I would rather not glorify dialectic by calling it a "logic".
Quoting apokrisis
Why?
That "ought" thing, again.
If the PNC said it all, why does it lead on to the LEM as the third law of thought.
Peirce offered his answer. Vagueness is thus defined by that to which the PNC fails to apply, and generality is defined as that to which the LEM fails to apply.
Dichotomies arise out of monisms and cash out in trichotomous structure. The particular so beloved of logical atomism is thus always found betwixt the larger Peircean holism of the vague and the general. The logic of hierarchical order in its proper form. Not your levels of corporate management tale meant to conform to the brokenness of the is/ought divide.
Quoting Banno
The result is mathematically clear. Reciprocals and inverses are pretty easy to understand as approaches to mutually complementary limits of being. A dialectical othering.
The dialectic doesnt have to worry about breaching the PNC. It is how the PNC is itself formed. It is the division of the vague on its way to becoming the holism that is the general - the synthesis following the symmetry-breaking.
The part here that I'd like to better understand -- and is part of why I find Hegel frustrating -- is the "leap" from prior-to-PNC to PNC, or some variation thereof.
Basically I agree that the dialectic doesn't have "to worry" about the PNC in the sense that it's philosophically legitimate. But I'd like that "doesn't have to worry" spelled out more such that I can say how it avoids the principle of explosion.
That's where I get stuck still.
Without doubting that the scientific modelling of the biochemistry involved, the question remains, to what end? For what purpose?
You said upthread:
Quoting apokrisis
Maybe it's because the only aims in your philosophy are instrumental and pragmatic. No 'beyond'.
Quoting apokrisis
Don't mistake whimsicality for ridicule. There is a serious point about the reason for existence. I'm suggesting that life provides a means for the disclosure of horizons of being that otherwise cannot be realised. From a review of Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos:
That is something lacking in your account. Your deprecation of Pierce's idealism likewise, that it only existed because 'science hadn't yet figured out the physical causes yet'. The reason you're critical of reductionism is not philosophical, but technical - semiotics provides a better metaphor for living processes than machines. And yet your descriptions are still illustrated with 'switches' and 'mechanisms' and energy dissipation - it is still resolutely physicalist in a way that I don't think C S Peirce himself ever was.
Quoting Banno
Quite.
:up: :up:
Quoting Banno
:100:
Yes, it's the idealist (antirealist) conflation of epistemology ("what I/we know") and ontology ("all there is") i.e. a fly-bottle out of which @Wayfarer @Gnomon et al can't seem to find the way.
Jeez, youre right. Urging folk to wake up and smell the oil - understand what now drives our political and economic settings - is really pretty small beer compared to your uplifting moralising and and karmic acceptance.
You win the big prize for your heart being in the right place.
Quoting Wayfarer
Twist away but Ive made it clear enough that biosemiosis is talking literally about the interaction between mechanical forces - the way an enzyme can close pincers around two molecules it wants welded together - and quantum forces like entanglement and tunneling, or how clamping two molecules allows them to quantum jump the chemical potential threshold and weld them for free. Or even for profit.
Sure, technology is now human ingenuity repeating the same biosemiotic trick. But without actual switches and ratchets and motors at the nanoscale level where biology meets chemistry, you wouldnt even be here to dispute this as an essential fact about your being.
Its a recent discovery of course. Barely 15 years old as science. Philosophers may catch up in their own sweet time. If they have nothing better to do.
What do you call a Greek skydiver?
The result of contradiction in classical logic is not just vague - it's quite literally anything.
(p ^ ~p)?q. From a contradiction, anything goes. That is, if we allow contradiction then everything is both true and false, and we cannot explain anything. There are various systems of paraconsistent logic that accomodate or mitigate explosive results, so I won't rule out some form of dialectic, but I won't rule it in, either. (see what I did there...?)
There is a retrojective argument. For things to be crisply divided then they would have had to have been previously just an undifferentiated potential. A vagueness being the useful term.
Our imaginations do find it hard to picture a vagueness. It is so abstract. It is beyond a nothingness and even beyond the pluripotential that we would call an everythingness. It is more ungraspable as a concept than infinity.
Even Pierce only started to sketch out his logic of vagueness. That is why it excited me as an unfinished project I guess. One very relevant to anyone with an evolutionary and holist perspective on existence and being as open metaphysical questions.
You mean, any thing. Anything would be the generalising leap from the differentiated particular. And lets not make the modalist mistake of believing in infinite sets except as a pragmatic tool for taking limits.
:smirk:
.
There he is again.
:D
Yeah.
I got Marx so I gotta rule it in, in some sense at least, and figure that out. If possible.
I'm excited for your thoughts on the unfinished product. These are open metaphysical questions; I have no doubt on that. If you could do more than sketch out a logic of vagueness that'd be impressive, and I can see the connections to the perspective -- I think I'm less holist these days, but still on board with evolutionary perspectives.
So the "leap" is : things are individuated, and they can only be so if they were an undifferentiated potential.
Things are Individuated
Therefore, things were an undifferentiated potential.
How do you get to the PNC from there?
Quoting bert1
Long ago, in a previous forum, there was a long debate concerning the chairs at the end of the universe...
But few here would remember @Landru Guide Us...
It is not merely that they are individuated. Any particular thing would require some generalised dichotomy that allows it to be measurably this thing and not that thing.
So where is this particular thing on the scale spanning the gamut from chance to necessity, discrete to continuous, part to whole, matter to form, local to global, integrated to differentiated, construction to constraint, and so forth. All the grounding dichotomies that made metaphysics the generalised reality-modelling logic that it is.
In my discussions with fellow semioticians, a dichotomy of dichotomies emerged from this murk. The local~global and the vague~crisp.
The local~global encapsulates the idea of hierarchical structure in a pretty strong mathematical way. But it is the synchronic view. The view of everything as it is organised right now. You then need the developmental trajectory point from the vague to the crisp to capture the diachronic view. How things started and where they end as their reciprocal limit.
You can imagine the opposite also happening the crisp dissolving back into the vague. That was Anaximander's model. But the Big Bang does argue for a one way symmetry-breaking arrow. Which makes sense if the vague~crisp is indeed the most fundamental level as existence is really a self-organising process of coming into being by becoming more locally~globally divided.
It is what cosmology tells us. The Universe exists because it does just this. It begins in the radical vagueness of the Planckscale what could loosely be called a quantum foam. And then it expands and cools, becoming more definitely divided against itself which each tick of the cosmic clock. It doubles and halves, doubles and halves as its global expanse keeps growing while its local contents keep thinning.
So sure, the PNC can be applied to the particular individuated thing in the way classical logic likes to imagine. We can have one cow and then another cow, and indeed a modal infinity of cows. They seem to come ready-made as individuated. And each can be further individuated as substantial beings with any number of differentiated properties.
This cow could be black and this other cow white. But a cow couldn't be black and white all over. Or this cow could be in my paddock or in your paddock. Just not barring quantum superposition in both at once.
However I am talking at the level of universals. And what is a cow universalised? There we start moving into utterances that seem to have some vagueness about them. Or are generalised enough that we can see our working concept is suitably encompassing.
Is a cow still a cow if it has no legs? Is a cow still a cow if it is a hot air balloon flown over a rock concert.
What would it mean to have pinned down this vague~crisp axis of developmental or evolutionary ontology metaphysics' diachronic vantage point so as to make it a robust logical relation. The reciprocal or inverse relation that dialectics would suggest. A symmetry breaking taken to its opposing limits so that it indeed comes to be a fundamental asymmetry.
Can one see the cow in the larval sponge? Well we can think we find the first hazy vestiges of a creature having a segmented backbone. A vague potential now sufficiently differentiated to begin producing a whole host of further differentiations variations of the same new gene program to produce complex vertebrate bodies like a cow.
And can we see the crisp end outcome that factory farming puts on that continued differentiation the further individuating of cow-substance into non-contradicting types? The kind of cow which one might start to order up in engineered fashion.
"I want an A2 milker and not an A1 as those give people leaky guts. And you risk getting sued if you can't deliver exactly the type that was asked."
Specificity becomes an open-ended possibility once a dialectical spectrum of choices has been set out in a suitably logical fashion. One that is indeed already able to support counterfactuality.
Vagueness is then that which swallows all counterfactuality like a black hole. Creating the famous black hole information paradox.
This was perhaps partially answered by the stuff about dialectic. My worry is that @Wayfarer argues for what he calls epistemic idealism when talking to me, yet a form of ontic idealism when talking to other folk. To his credit he's addressing the tension here between beliefs and world. There is perhaps little difference between what he says and what I say, apart from where we place the emphasis - he on the beliefs, but I on the reality.
Some folk here (perhaps @Wayfarer is an example) have an interest in and sympathy for religious/spiritual metaphysics. I wonder if that sometimes engenders an uncomfortable loyalty to ontological idealist metaphysics of a Berkeleyan stripe. If so, it needn't in my view. Just as realism does not entail physicalism, even though they too are natural partners.
Apo's approach to bridging the is/ought gap and his approach to the hard problem of consciousness seem very similar if not the same. But I may have misunderstood. His response to me regarding the hard problem is to say that he has met his burden of showing what consciousness is in terms of making predictive models, and that the burden is now with me to show how that is wrong. And I think he has said similar to @Banno in this thread regarding the is/ought gap. However I don't see the theoretical bridge in either case.
An interesting topic might be "Is the is/ought gap and the hard problem of consciousness essentially the same problem?"
There are different kinds of idealisms. Subjective, objective, epistemological, and so on. You'll need to clarify exactly what kind of idealism you're talking about before you can argue its merits.
An old sparring partner ... :smirk:
From what I've read @Wayfarer takes care to separate his account of idealism from that of Berkeley.
In general I argue for a metaphysical holism in opposition to a metaphysical atomism. But complexly, it is a holism that must recover an atomism within it as its own contrary or dialectical limit. It is thus a holism as understood in modern hierarchy theory, systems science and Peirces triadic semiotic logic. A holism bounded in terms of its modal dimensions of the vague-crisp and the local-global. A holism where substantial actuality emerges from the hylomorphic pincer movement of structural necessity acting on material possibility.
So that is always the connecting thread. One finds every argument being polarised into two rival camps, two rival claims to truth. That is just how debates go. One must find a side and join it. Collectively the two sides use each other to drive themselves ever further apart. Those involved seem powerless to resist the logic of this dynamic. To arrive at agreement seems impossible because one must always pass first through some absolutising division. You joined one team and not its other. Intellectual peace becomes impossible. Indeed no one wants the game to end even though the disputes are long past being productive.
But a larger view can see that this is a pattern that has its resolution. The dialectic is not resolved by its dissipation in some third thing of a synthesis exactly. It is instead resolved by becoming a division - a dynamic - that now can be seen to be basic and foundational over all scales of being. The division is how the system develops in general rather than being something which simply exists in a problem creating way. At any point in a world, you should be able to see that it is based on the fact that it is balanced between two complementary tendencies. What is actual is emergent from the mutuality of a reciprocal opposition, or the logic of a dichotomy.
So an example would be our best model of a society or an ecology as a holistic state of order. At every point, at every level, we should find that the system is in that state of tension - of criticality - that is a balance between the actions of competition and cooperation. The society or ecology must always apparently be torn between these two opposing tendencies, these two teams they want to follow. But in being a polarity framed within a hierarchy, there is now a global equilibrium balance that can be struck. The system can have its optimising goal of balancing that fundamental tension, that fundamental dynamic, over all its scales.
This is why the natural theory of well balanced societies is to see them as hierarchies of interest groups. They can collectively optimise as they can become as differentiated as they are integrated. If you want an association of pickleball players, then go for it. If that impinges on the paddleball fraternity, then constraints will be exerted. Competition forces cooperation and cooperation permits competition.
So long as this is a fluid and emergent causal story, a system can seek its holistic equilibrium while also being composed of its atomistic interest groups that range from the most obscure to the most globally applicable.
The problem thus is one finds stale debates that have folk trapped. They are locked into a dilemma and feel they must simply now assert one pole or its other as the only acceptable monistic choice. I can point the way out of this bind. But their own atomistic reasoning is what wont let them free themselves.
Berkeley is an ingenious defender of idealism, but nominalism is his weak point. However nearly all the objections I read to him are no different in essence to Johnsons 'kicking the stone' which in my view fail to come to terms with his arguments.
I note that C S Pierce admired Berkeley particularly his arguments against materialism and his emphasis on the importance of perception and the mind. However, Peirce was critical of Berkeleys nominalism. He saw value in Berkeleys challenge to the materialist conception of reality, which aligns with his own semiotic and pragmatic views where meaning and understanding arise from signs and their interpretation.
Peirce criticized Berkeleys nominalism, the idea that universals are merely names without any real existence. Peirce, a classical realist, believed that general concepts and laws have a real existence independent of individual instances. He thought that Berkeleys nominalism undermined the reality of general concepts, which Peirce saw as essential for a coherent theory of knowledge and science.
Whenever I read Berkeley (the editions on Early Modern Texts are excellent) Im impressed by his rhetorical ingenuity and subtlety. However too much of his argument is underpinned by reliance on God as a universal agent and his vague notion of spirits. He blurs the line between philosophy and faith. And due to his nominalism, he is unable to draw upon the repertoire of Platonist philosophy (as did Schopenhauer and Kant) in support of his views.
Both the is/ought and the hard problem are to do with intentionality, but though related they are not the very same issue. In both cases there is the aspect of our bringing about various states of affairs, including the way we see the world.
I can't tell the difference between Wayfarer and ChatGTP anymore. :chin:
But this is another way of talking about that holism vs atomism division which a logic of vagueness hoped to resolve. The generality of form must be matched by the vagueness of matter. In this sense, matter can be seen as effete mind. Or rather less tendentiously put, the least structured form of Being.
I.e.: Finality. And the degree it can be both an epistemic assumption and an ontic commitment in our metaphysical schemes.
I would like to place some emphasis on the second criticism I offered above, that " even if we supose that dialectic does not breach non-contradiction, the result is not clear."
In Hegel the first moment, of "understanding", gives way to the instability of the second moment, the "negatively rational", and thence to the third moment, the "speculative" or "positively rational".
But somewhat notoriously, what that third moment consist in remains quite undetermined. Just as from a contradiction, anything follows.
This is close to Popper's criticism, that dialectic is unfalsifiable.
In effect dialectic provides the opportunity to invent a just-so story in support of your preferred third moment, by choosing your first and second. But such a method can explain anything, and so ends in explaining nothing.
Now this is a quite general criticism, and so needs to be explicated in some detail in particular cases, but more often than not it is possible to see in a writer's use of dialectic how they first reach their conclusion and then work backwards to the explanation using the dialectic. So in Hegel, The Prussian Court is the inevitable outcome of history, while for Marx, Communism is not so much deduced using dialectic, as justified.
Similar things occur elsewhere.
I use it as a reference source.
Quoting apokrisis
You have your way of carving up the territory, but it's not the only way, and it's more concerned with modelling and engineering.
Quoting Banno
And I can see why. It's a fluctuation between 'world' (ontic) and 'mind' (epistemic) - which is fundamental? My approach is like that of phenomenology - the world and mind are co-arising. My claim is that whatever we consider to be real has a subjective as well as objective grounding, but that the subjective tends to being ignored or neglected in the pursuit of objectivity.
Ok, whereas I - and perhaps @apokrisis - take mind to arise within the world. Quoting Wayfarer
Do you see how this crosses from the epistemic to the ontic, in the way I tried to encapsulate using cake?
And the better way to carve up this territory is semiotic. The enactive or embodied self that is sometimes the cognitive science approach you cite. Hence why you persist in a way that causes confusion.
In the semiotic story, the co-arising thing is the Umwelt. The view that has a self at the centre of its understood world.
The mind of a babe starts out vague. Self and world are not yet strongly formed as suitably dichotomised poles of its being. But learning quickly follows. A strong or crisp self/world duality becomes the regularising habit. That is the way mindfulness as a generality arises. In a nervous system set up to learn from experience that there can be both a world and its intentional master.
The conscious self is a construction that arises in the dialectical process that is a world-making.
But this is the remaking of the world as the thing in itself into our felt psychological reality.
And we know there is then also that world as a material reality as it stands in hard causal opposition to our intentions rather too often. Like when we kick a stone in fact.
To deal with this recalcitrant aspect of the world, we then seek to tame it via further semiosis. We eventually get to a scientific point of view where we become the technological gods whose every intention becomes exceptionless law.
We become not just selves but superbeings. Or just some kind of rebirth as supercharged and ill formed toddlers. Cant decide which. :razz:
Quoting Banno
Yes, there is no coherent way to render mind ontologically fundamental, since the notion has its roots only in our naively intuitive apprehension of our own experience. @Wayfarer claims he doesn't agree with Kastrup's "mind at large", which I would say is itself an incoherent idea, but he apparently cannot offer any coherent alternative. So, all he can do is vaguely gesture towards something he doesn't seem to want to give up, rather than being able to state a cogent position constituting an ontology.
I really can't blame him for this because I don't think a cogent (consistent and compete) ontologically is possible.
I do. But I also see that you have a pre-reflective world-model of 'self in world' - yourself as subject, in the domain of objects, other persons, and so on. For us, the world naturally divides itself along those lines. It is part of the mindset of modernity and of liberal individualism. (This is discusssed in detail in Charles Taylor's A Secular Age, where the 'buffered self' refers to the modern understanding of the self as the autonomous individual, sole arbiter of value, separate and apart from the world. He contrasts that the kind of 'participatory knowing' which characterizes pre-modern identity in which the self-world division is not nearly so impermeable, where the subject participates in the (re)creation of the world through ritual.)
The reason for my references to Buddhism, is that I look to it for a normative framework, one that is separate from the cultural mainstream (hence, counter-cultural) . As you introduced the subject of dialectic, Central Philosophy of Buddhism describes the 'madhyamika dialectic' of Mah?y?na Buddhism (and compares it with Western idealism for which it is criticized by later Buddhist scholars for euro-centricity.) But the over-arching perspective of that philosophy is non-dualism and a way of enacting it, a way of being in the world.
Now I really don't want come across as one of the holier-than-thou 'western Buddhists', most of my existence has been suburban family man mode (now also a grand-parent). I'm entangled in the hindrances and have attained nothing by way of higher states. But that's the philosophy or 'way' that I am attempting to understand in some degree. At least it provides, as it were, a vantage point, and also, however remote, a sense of there being a destination.
Quoting apokrisis
:100:
Quoting apokrisis
Wasn't that Nietszche's answer? I never warmed to him.
(I'm off to gym to spend an hour on the machines listening to a Chris Fuchs lecture on QBism.
Without actual renunciation such social entanglements are inevitable. And even with renunciation, complete disentanglement is not possible, because complete renunciation is impossible. If you attempt to understand Buddhism or any mystical way analytically you will fail they cannot be rendered as coherent and consistent philosophy, they can only be "lived' via faith. Philosophy itself ultimately consists in faith, not in knowledge or understanding in a scientific, mathematical or logical kind of sense.
A good job Peirce fixed Hegels stab at a systems story of logical development then. The dialectic became the semiotic. The tale of how dichotomies start from a position of mutualising advantage. It is then reasonable that they would continue to develop in being properly balanced.
Other Enlightenment historians and political philosophers of course saw the necessity of exactly this self-organising logic. Social democracy emerged as a balancing of the thesis and antithesis which is the win-win story of a system able to equilbrate its contrasting tendencies towards competition and cooperation.
Good politics is systems thinking in action. It just doesnt get called that as such reasonableness seems simply commonsense.
I should remind you of Joanna Macy who drew the parallels between systems theory and dependent co-arising.
https://www.amazon.com.au/Mutual-Causality-Buddhism-General-Systems/dp/0791406377
This is nice to think against, and I had a thought this morning about just accepting the principle of explosion as an outcome, but one which is somehow bounded by informal rules of practice.
At least, this is how I'd lay out Marx's dialectic, which I think I have a better handle on than Hegel's. The practice is the point so the dialectic continues on, but unlike with Hegel continuing on within the halls of philosopher's concepts forming the Prussian state and on upward towards human Freedom through this dialectic, Marx's dialectical pursuit of freedom occurs in collective practice which "bound" the contradiction from an arbitrary conclusion that the Principle of Explosion would allow. (at least, so the thought goes -- there may be disagreement later on, and the problem then is that there won't be any easy way to deliberate: the practices diverge and inform our ideas, and we diverge in practices so the ideas can be different, or you're not thinking dialectically enough :D )
It may be that the dialectic is not so much an explanation, but as recognition of the collective. I think Hegel is similar there in his emphasis on the community coming to define the self. But with Hegel I believe his motivation is more along the lines of defending an Ideal of Humanity as an agent of Freedom, and through the dialectic of concepts progressing towards this humanistic vision of the future (which surely starts in the Prussian state ;) )
Whereas with Marx Freedom is still the goal -- for all of humanity no less -- but the dialectic is historical.
So one way I think of seperating Hegel from Marx is to say that their domains of evidence are different. For Hegel the domain of evidence are the classic philosophical corpus, Christianity, and the political movements of his time. For Marx the domain of evidence is the records, the balance sheets, the newspapers, the reports from the workers front, and so forth (which is why it can dovetail pretty nicely into modern historiographical methods), with the philosophical influence, of course, to provide the intellectual frame for understanding said evidence.
Where I disagree with Popper is that something needs to be falsifiable in order to be valuable on pain that history is not falsifiable, and that this is the only way we understand how science works -- rather than a science of science we understand science contextually, by the records and practices of scientists and this knowledge is transmitted from one generation of scientists to the next even though it's not falsifiable.
I'd hazard that what's being chased after in Hegel and Marx is simply different from what Popper wants.
That is why I like the modern systems approaches to history. Fukuyama for example offers the counter-examples that would inform this debate about how hierarchical social order should pan out.
There are horses for courses. But then also the deeper balancing principles show through.
So paraphrasing Fukuyama, he says the growing agrarian inequality within a Europe moving towards a continent of nation states and organised capital/property rights a phase transition in terms of societies organised by the polarity of taxed masses and paid armies sees a triadic balancing act with the king as its fulcrum.
The king is meant to do the double job of being the chief decider of the day to day but also God's representative of the long-term good here on Earth. There was not yet a proper institutional division of these powers that suited the new sovereign nation political formula taxing agriculture for the surplus to feed the king's now centralised military. So kings struggled with this legitimacy problem and had to play off the aristocracy against the common folk.
Simply put, the dialectic balance from the king's point of view was deciding whether to side with the down trodden peasants or the entrenched aristocracy. Sweden and Denmark saw kings side with peasants when aristocrats were weak in 18th C. They pushed through land reform. But monarchs went the other way in Russia, Prussia and other parts east of the Elbe from 17th C. This saw the rise of serfdom with the collusion of the moneyed state.
Or giving a finer grain more hierarchically fleshed out account he says that during the general period of European state formation, the peasantry didnt really count as it wasn't organised. The monarch just faced the three levels of social power in the nobility, gentry and the third estate. That is, the lords, small landowners and the city rich. So a four legged balancing act was emerging as industry joined agriculture as the new entropic driver of a nation and its taxable surpluses.
Fukuyama then details the four outcomes of this more complex industrial phase transistion happening even as the agricultural one was still playing out.
First was weak absolutism like the French and Spanish kings. Their nobility kept them in check. Russia manage successful absolutism as the nobility and gentry were tied into the monarchy in way that allowed the upper class to ruthlessly enslave and tax the peasant class.
Hungary and Poland he classes as failed oligarchies where the aristocracy kept the king so weak he couldnt protect the peasants, who again got exploited to the hilt.
Then England and Denmark developed strong accountable systems with effective balances. Managed to organise militarily while preserving civilian liberty and property rights.
Beyond that, the Dutch republic, Swiss confederation and Prussian monarchy all add to the variety of outcomes seen.
So history does offer its retrospective test in that we can apply a dialectical (or rather triadic systems) frame on what occurred and find that it is all the same general dilemma getting solved in a natural variety of ways.
As the systems view emphasises, developmental histories are not deterministic. They are just constrained by the requirement to stabilise their entropy flows through optimising balances. Accidents of place and time just get either smoothly absorbed into the general outcome, or that particular historical offshoot goes extinct absorbed into someone else's general entropic flow.
As to Prussia more particularly, Fukuyama says it makes the point that it matters which comes first, the state building or the democracy. Prussia was an example of a strong autocratic state arising before then opening up to modern democracy.
The UK and US were instead democratic ahead of becoming statist, so in fact had a lot of corrupt patronage until they both found social coalitions that could enforced reform. The US heard business complaining about the state of public administration, farmers complaining about the railways, urban reformers complaining about public infrastructure. All coalesced to force institutional change.
Fukuyama says Italy and Greece are soft states that got democracy without a matching internal competition to drive out corrupt public service tendencies.
Or for the fun of it, I will tack on a larger chunk of my notes from his masterful trilogy. The point is that dialectics might be a start. But where we want to end up is being able to see the dialectical difference at the hierarchical or systems level of what is truly general and what is properly accidental in a logic of evolutionary development. And a close study of history does reveal that in terms of the evidence of a set of counterfactuals.
Perhaps not, but we could go for at least consistency. I'm not keen on faith... depending on how it is understood.
I've addressed that, in Is there 'Mind at Large'?, which I think is coherent, even if @Tom Storm says it needs more detail. (I'm planning further installments. And re-visiting it, I think perhaps rather than invoking the spooky 'mind at large', I would just use the term 'some mind' or 'any mind' or 'the observer'.)
Quoting Janus
I'd rather say that reason points to something beyond itself. But you will often say that anything that can't be understood in terms of maths or science is to be categorised as 'faith'.
Quoting apokrisis
Thanks for the reminder. I will re-visit her podcast.
I may be wrong, but I think his account is essentially Kantian. We know phenomena (it works for us; science can achieve extraordinary things, etc) but we can say precisely nothing meaningful about noumena. Noumena or the raw 'stuff' that somehow gives rise to our empirical relationship with the world does not require a god or some variation of cosmic consciousness to exist. I guess it is in this knowledge gap that we can insert any number of notions relating to higher consciousness - reincarnation, karma, spirits, clairvoyance, etc.
I can get behind a phenomenological account of idealism, in as much as our values and reality are shaped and codified by our experience, and is the contingent and intersubjective product of culture and linguistic practice. I guess that is a type of idealism - a constructivist account, perhaps. The big question is how useful is this perspective? What can be done with this frame?
Quoting Wayfarer
The problem I see is that without positing either some mind-independent reality or collective or universal mind it is impossible to explain how it is that we all see and hear the same things in the environment. Even animals see and hear the same things we do, albeit maybe not in just the same ways. That is what
needs to be explained, and reading your essay, I found nothing there that could explain it.
Quoting Tom Storm
I agree that we cannot know with certainty what lies beyond human experience. But it seems most plausible that whatever it is, it must give rise to the commonality of experience I mentioned in my reply to Wayfarer above. To my mind positing a universal or collective mind, or a karmic storehouse consciousness, or whatever to explain that commonality is way less parsimonious and way less in accordance with our everyday experience than positing a much less problematic mind-independent reality. All the evidence, all our knowledge and all our scientific theory indicates that the Universe existed for an almost unimaginable period prior to the existence of any humans.
Thats only a problem for solipsism - that only MY mind is real. I didnt explain it, because feel no need to.
No, it's a problem that goes way beyond solipsism. If there are mind independent existents that would explain how it is that we see and hear the same things. The only other way to explain it is to posit some kind of universal connection or collective of minds, and hence we have Berkeley's "mind of God", Jung's "collective unconscious" and Kastrup's "mind at large".
Quoting Wayfarer
I missed this earlier. How you have characterized what I often say is not quite right. I think the only things we can know are those things which are tautologous, or which we directly observe, and with the latter we know only how things appear to be. Scientific theories are never proven, only may be disproven or surpassed, so faith operates there as well when we place our provisional confidence in them. Of course, the fact that some scientific theories have been observed to yield accurate predictions countless times is a point in their favour. The same cannot be said for metaphysical speculations, because they make no predictions that can be rigorously tested.
However, and has been discussed many times in this thread, physics itself, the hardest of hard sciences, has produced an outcome where interpretations of quantum theory seem to be unavoidable. And those interpretations are themselves untestable and in some sense metaphysical. Furthermore, it's physics itself which has called the 'mind-independence' of what were thought to be the fundamental constituents of existence into question.
Most actual physicists can disregard all of this - 'shut up and calculate' - but surely it has philosophical significance.
The metaphysical speculations about the results of quantum physics are of course untestable as I already implicitly acknowledged, as is the idea that reality is mind independent. That's way I say that for me, and I think taking parsimony and accordance with experience, and the incoherence of idealist speculations into account, the mind independence of reality is simply the most plausible assumption; but of course, it remains a question of faith and individual assessments of plausibility.
The only "philosophical significance" I can see in these metaphysical interrogations and in metaphysical speculations in general is that it is a fact of the human condition that people cannot help but fall into continuing to speculate in those ways. And as I've said many times, I see no problem with that except where people begin to imagine that they could ever come to know the answer to such questions. Apart from that error, they may be creative exercises of the imagination (although it doesn't seem as though anyone has come up with much new material in the last couple millennia, except for semiotic, enactive and information theory and related ideas, which at least have some connections with science.
The progress hasnt quite been zero. Nobels have been handed out
Of course folk can still invent even more outrageous loopholes to preserve classical realism like superdeterminism. Which is pretty much equal to claiming we all exist in the mind of God.
But meanwhile, back in the real world, quantum theory explains more and more about supposedly metaphysical issues like how the Universe is structured as it is. Quantum contextuality says a particle is a sum over all its possibilities, and the answers turn out correct to as many decimal places as you can measure.
It can pose questions like whether the vacuum is stable or prone to another inflationary decay event - a Big Rip. The test becomes whether the top quark is more massive than the Higgs boson. And thankfully it is.
Wayfarer will protest that quantum theory is still incomplete. Just as Bert will complain neuroscience hasnt answered the Hard Problem despite the vast insight we now have into the fine detail of cognition as a process.
At least science acknowledges that it is all only pragmatic modelling and not a pretence at knowing the ultimate truths. But science can afford to humble brag having achieved so much in telling the structural story of Nature.
My complaint isn't that it hasn't. It's that people think it has.
No one believes in them.
EDIT: except eliminatavists I guess
seems to frequently criticize posts on the basis of incoherence. Which could mean that various statements & assertions in the post don't add-up to the postulated conclusion, or that the critic is incapable of following the implicit logic of the discussion. I Googled "philosophy -- coherence"*1 and found the page linked below. It says that "coherence" may imply Justified Belief, or may prove that the conclusion is True. I doubt that you are claiming that "Mind at Large" is provably true, but only that it is a believable possibility. So, his criticism may be saying that he doesn't agree with your conclusion, or that you haven't presented a detailed logical "system" to support your conjecture of a Universal Consciousness.
Over the millennia there have been many "systems" (theories) of philosophical Cosmic Consciousness : PanPsychism, PanTheism, PanEnDeism, . . . . ; and Kastrup's systematic & detailed worldview of Analytical Idealism is a recent addition. So, the easiest way to present a "coherent" theory pointing to the existence of some kind of intrinsic Mind in the Universe would be to simply accept one of those time-proven systems from the past as a label for your personal view. But apparently, what you have in mind is not exactly in accordance --- difference in detail --- with any of those older schemes of belief.
I'm in the same seemingly rudderless boat. Consequently, I was forced to produce my own personal thesis leading to the conclusion that our evolving world does indeed have a rudder. But few posters on this forum are willing to invest the time to plow through the details, evidences & arguments. So, they prefer to use prejudicial labels to characterize an unfamiliar system-of-thought, that they don't understand, as incoherent or simply untrue.
I continue to add "details" to my own thesis, as do you, but I doubt that any amount of itemization will convince someone who is not already inclined toward your point of view. If the general notion is abhorrent to their worldview, more particulars will not sway them. Concur? :smile:
*1. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification :
According to the coherence theory of justification, also known as coherentism, a belief or set of beliefs is justified, or justifiably held, just in case the belief coheres with a set of beliefs, the set forms a coherent system or some variation on these themes. The coherence theory of justification should be distinguished from the coherence theory of truth. The former is a theory of what it means for a belief or a set of beliefs to be justified, or for a subject to be justified in holding the belief or set of beliefs. The latter is a theory of what it means for a belief or proposition to be true.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/
Quoting apokrisis
Could another set of dichotomies emerge?
What I'm noticing from the primer on hierarchies is that it's a descriptive venture. It's purpose is to model phenomena.
But what if rather than modeling the world we wanted to change it?
Then the question: "To what?" comes up.
That's what the "ought" side of the is/ought distinction is asking.
The description of the hierarchies may be useful to this or that end, but without an end there is no ought, only description.
And yet you think it is your gotcha
Quoting apokrisis
Sure. You have the freedom to choose otherwise. Or claim you intend to.
Agency is what hierarchy produces. Constraints limit possibilities but then what is not forbidden is what is not just allowed but expected. It is the range of choices that are statistically likely to rebuild the systems as it is. Along with any adaptation that proves necessary.
So degrees of freedom are entrained to the general project. Keeping this body, this species, this society, this economy, going. It is what has worked before and - with some adjustment as circumstances shift - ought to serve it in the future.
Your political comments seem of that mind. It is fair enough to say the general human system doesnt seem well balanced and we ought to be making serious adjustments. You want to do your bit to serve the greater imperative of keeping the human project on the road.
But then comes the real work of understanding what has been making that system tick along and how pro-system change could actually be effected.
Your choices may be free - but also likely to fail if your analysis of how is and ought are connected is faulty. The past doesnt determine the future but it sure as hell constrains it.
This is captured in cosmology as the evolving block universe concept. It has physical generality.
You see, I don't think that this comment says anything. At least, not clearly.
Perhaps, , I do lack faith. I'm not convinced that's a bad thing.
You are so deeply confused on the issue that I thought I didn't offer you any reply. It seemed pointless to attempt to unravel your tangled thoughts.
Quoting Banno
Your standard phrasing, setting yourself up as the judge of the matter, then denying anything has been said that would require you actually giving your counter argument, ended with a grudging acknowledgement that perhaps not exactly nothing was said.
You are your own parody.
Sure, however I'm not talking about the science, but the various metaphysical interpretations of the implications of QM made by probably mostly non-scientists.
Quoting apokrisis
I agree with this. though I think the general existential problem is, as Margaret Wertheim puts it in Pythagoras' Trousers, that the scientific world picture is only really accessible to a tiny minority, whereas the older, much simpler religious and mythological models of the Cosmos and Humanity's place in it were much more readily comprehensible, despite that fact that, under critical examination, they prove to be incoherent and rife with inconsistencies. Shared worldviews allow a more closely bonded society, so the challenge for science is to make itself more accessible to the average person.
I suggest that contemporary physicists' obsession with a theory of everything is socially irresponsible. In expecting society to provide billions of dollars to support this quest, TOE physicists have become like a decadent priesthood, demanding that the populace build them ever more elaborate cathedrals, with spires reaching ever higher into their idea of heaven, Since a theory of everything would be not only utterly irrelevant to daily human life and concerns, but also incomprehensible to the vast majority of people, TOE physicists can be likened to the late medieval Scholastics. This is the twentieth-century equivalent of asking how many angels could dance on the head of a pin.
From Pythagoras' Trousers
If you don't take a metaphysical position then you haven't put your faith in anything. I also try to avoid taking any metaphysical position.
When it comes to the simple question about whether the world existed before humans, I think all the evidence suggests it did and acknowledging that does not involve metaphysics.
:up: :up:
Yep. Apo, Way and Moli are all attempting to answer the Big Questions with various stories. Much easier to point out the problems with their accounts, in my smug critical fashion, "setting myself up as the judge" - as if there were any alternative. (Choosing someone else to be the judge is itself making a judgement).
While the attempt might be admirable, and I have sympathy for each, none of them quite work.
"The conscious self is a construction that arises in the dialectical process that is a world-making" could be a quote from Edward Caird or T.H. Green.
I think the question about thermodynamics and value is to ask: How are is and ought connected?
And this also highlights a difference in our approach: I tend to think of these organisms in a historical model, meaning we come to understand them through political practice and study, of course. I'm not averse to description at all. And I'm trying to point out that what you say is pretty much what Marx is on about :D -- wanting to understand how the capitalist machine works through critique in order to supply theory for the movement.
One's freedom of choice is an existential condition more than a political one, I'd say. What position within a social organism you're born within has a lot more to do with the political situation than one's free choices.
For Marx if you're a proletarian then is/ought are connected through the teleology towards communism. It's the revolutionary program which "bounds" the dialectic: which in turn is bounded by the concrete conditions one finds oneself in, and what we are able to do together.
It's this latter part that gets more into the anarchy side. Marx's philosophy is a revolutionary philosophy much in the vein of progressive humanism, but anarchy supplies the positive vision which is at the same time presently practical in a prefigurative way or within collectives.
In order that I might understand ways in which to avoid such endings.
Though "confabulate" isn't the same as "making stuff up" -- if nothing is working then "making stuff up" is a necessity to continue.
So what is it that dialectic does?
Edit:Quoting Moliere
Quite a good point. My question is only partly facetious. Metaphysics does seem to play a sort of background role in our actions, somewhat like a catechism.
Even just keeping everyone on the same page in terms of general rationality would be good. :smile:
Quoting Janus
I think I've said that myself fairly often. It has become a widespread self-criticism within the field.
But humans are humans. CERN is an institution and so has develop the social skills to keep the funding rolling at the level to which it is accustomed. The same story as the Catholic Church or US military or Wall St banks.
At least CERN does remarkably little harm in its priesthood being so removed from the everyday of real life's temptations. The power bill is huge, but that is about it.
And if you shut it down, just cut it back to its mathematical department, it would be an absolute shoe-string project by anyone's reckoning. The bureaucracy and sizeable publicity machine would be gone. Just the metaphysical speculation could continue, as abstracted from the general populace as everything else vaguely difficult to understand would be.
I had to look up those two namesI don't know much about the British Idealists other than that they were followers of Hegel. Apparently, the early Bertrand Russell was of that ilk.
That said, I think there is a way of parsing the quoted statement that makes sense: 'The idea of a self co-arises with the idea of a world'. Both ideas are inherently vaguewe never actually encounter a whole self, or a whole world.
But you just mumble the same old opinion. "Meh". There is never work done to justify you even speaking out. Who needs your "meh's"? Keep them to yourself. Or expect a kick up the bum for rudely interrupting just so folk know you are there.
"The conscious self is a construction that arises in the dialectical process that is a world-making" is the sort of text against which Russell and Moore rebelled, Russell appealing to the newly formalised logic and Moore to common sense.
(Which do you prefer, "The conscious self is a construction that arises in the dialectical process that is a world-making" or "Here is a hand"?
That's often the case here. The basic insight of the 'mind-created world' is like a gestalt shift - a sudden shift in understanding. (As a whimsical aside, I often feel that Lewis Carroll's madcap adventures in Alice in Wonderland were a kind of presage of post-modernism - the absurdity and groundlessness of the post-modern situation. The Chesire Cat's grin - the grin without the cat - a very pregnant metaphor for the post-modern landscape.)
Quoting Banno
I agreed with it, in light of considerable earlier conversation. What resonated with me is the 'constructivist' perspective - the sense in which the mind is 'world-making', moment to moment. It can be said of mindfulness meditation that its aim is to gain insight into the mind's 'I-making and mine-making' proclivities, which are going on ceaselessly due to ingrained habits of thought. There are articles about the role of Kant and Schopenhauer in Freud's development of the theory of the unconscious. Then there's Andrew Brook, who says that Kant was the godfather of modern cognitive science.
Quoting Banno
Right. Which is why most of what they say is jejune and how modern analytic philosophy became part of Elliott's wasteland.
We don't encounter a world or a self, but we encounter many hands. And many hands make light workbut only if they work together.
Of course. Marx was a decent critic of his times. He took a systems view. He and Engels had their model of Dialectical Materialism.
But diagnosis did not produce the cure. Fukuyama points to the historical evidence that dialectics can't balance things. You need trialectics to achieve that.
After the madness of Stalin, the USSR achieved a stable political formula in having the triadic balance of the Politiburo, Army generals and KGB. An arrangement of power was institutionalised.
So we do know what makes systems work. And it ain't demolishing hierarchies. It is ensuring that hierarchical order does in fact have the two way information flow where top-down constraints exist in balance with bottom-up construction. A society is well balanced when it is a collective of interest groups formed over all scales of its existence.
Quoting Moliere
And what social purpose was that existentialism shaped to serve?
At what point did a revolutionary political idea become the basis of modern mass consumerism? The "because you're so individual and special" reason that you deserve a Lamborghini or Rolex?
At what point did it become the justification for neo-liberalism and the worker as entrepreneur?
Counter-culture mutates into mainstream culture to the degree that it fuels the end result fossil fuel burning and resource consumption. If it is a "good idea" in that sense, it becomes the norm. The new ought.
I don't see how you could transcend the "I-making and mine-making proclivities" as long as you cling to the idea that the mind (that is the self) creates the world. Insofar as this places the self at the centre of the world it is not a "Copernican Revolution" at all.
Again, something with which I have considerable sympathy. But not in terms of a dialectic, for the reasons I have given.
:wink:
Who is this "we" to which you just referred? Some form of self as a point of reference that suitably anchors some world in the passing pincer grip of a dialectic or dichotomised polarity? "I see this or that makes sense or nonsense within this or that world model or ontic framework."
Self and world never seem to be found apart, and yet never together either. Curious. It is almost as if each is the other's reflection somehow. An Umwelt almost.
Agreed. And with certainty on "clearly". Where such a "slogan" has to be explained in other words to mean anything at all, it is better to ditch the slogan and keep the other words, which is the actual, clear explanation of what the slogan meant in the writer's mind.
By 'we' you mean 'me'. Take Richard Conn Henry. He's a Professor of Physics and Astronomy at Johns Hopkins University, author of many publications on the topics of astrophysics and various forms of astronomy including optical, radio, ultraviolet, and X-ray. He had a kind of 'aha' moment in the 90's when he came to realisation that physics has undermined physicalism, which lead to him publishing an essay in Nature in 2005, The Mental Universe:
There are a lot of people in this territory nowadays. Kastrup's publishing organisation is called the Essentia Foundation - take a look at the list of authors and includes a lot of scientists. Essentia has a free online course on analytical idealism.
Quoting Janus
Again, 'I don't see how'. The fact you don't understand it is not a criterion. It's insight into a general process, one in which we're all involved. It's basic to the human condition, in fact it's basic to any form of organic life. It's the inveterate tendency to keep going. It's where there's convergence between Buddhism and Schop's 'will'.
This sort of stuff can't not remind me of Deepak Chopra.
Yes, it's true that stereotyping comes very easily.
The capacity for pattern recognition is a prerequisite for philosophy.
I would have been better to say 'a world or a self is never encountered'.
PerhapsQuoting apokrisis
That seems right, but no framework is THE framework. I think we agree that the nature of things is best given to us by science, which is, when it comes down to it, an extensive elaboration of everyday experience and observation.
Quoting apokrisis
Right, the ideas of self and world are conceptually inseparable. I like the idea of an "Umwelt" or as Jaspers would put it "an Encompassing".
Well, no. There are cats, too. And Forums. And promises.
Quoting Wayfarer
So does Scientology.
Physicalism is a major influence in philosophy, as you well know. So-called 'non-reductive physicalism' is probably the mainstream majority amongst academic philosophers. So the fact that physics calls physicalism into question is directly relevant.
's article seems to agree with your assessment, that a superhuman eye-in-the-sky worldview would be materially meaningless, but insists that the abstract notion may be metaphorically*1 relevant and symbolically meaningful. Before the 20th century, humans had never seen the world beyond their local horizon. But, they could imagine a bird's-eye-view, as evidenced by some of their ancient maps of the known world. {image below}
Where Kastrup aspires to prove logically that a Cosmic Mind must exist in some meaningful sense, Way says "there is no need to introduce a literal [i]mind-at-large to maintain a coherent idealism[/i]" {my emphasis}. What he does posit, in the article, is that a philosophical "paradigm shift from scientific materialism to scientifically-informed idealism" is currently underway"*2. And that new paradigm would not say "Abstract generalities can be said to only exist in their material instantiations" {my emphasis}. Which only makes sense from a Materialist perspective.
So, Way presents an alternative form of Idealism, which doesn't require an actual sensable God-in-the-quad to maintain the physical world in the absence of a human observer. For instance, a "cognitive shift"*3 in the observer/imaginer can be personally meaningful, even without an "instantiation". General Concepts and Universal Principles have no material specimen, only logical structure. :smile:
*1. Metaphor is figurative, not physical :
My favorite: Metaphor is a poetically or rhetorically ambitious use of words, a figurative as opposed to literal use. It has attracted more philosophical interest and provoked more philosophical controversy than any of the other traditionally recognized figures of speech.
https://www.quora.com/What-is-your-favorite-philosophical-metaphor
*2. Excerpt from Is there a mind at large? :
Without the organising capability which consciousness brings to the universe, what exists is by definition unintelligible and unknowable. The mind brings an order to experience in light of which data is interpreted and integrated into meaningful information this is an intrinsic aspect of the meaning of being. But the sense in which the universe exists apart from or outside that activity is by definition unknown, so there is no need to posit a mind-at-large to account for it.
https://medium.com/@jonathan.shearman/mind-at-large-169bb5f0c3a7
Note --- Plato postulated a universal logical force (LOGOS) in the world, organizing it into the orderly lawful physical system of parts that analytical Science can make sense of.
*3. The Overview Effect :
The overview effect is a cognitive shift reported by some astronauts while viewing the Earth from space. Researchers have characterized the effect as "a state of awe with self-transcendent qualities, precipitated by a particularly striking visual stimulus". The most prominent common aspects of personally experiencing the Earth from space are appreciation and perception of beauty, unexpected and even overwhelming emotion, and an increased sense of connection to other people and the Earth as a whole. The effect can cause changes in the observer's self concept and value system, and can be transformative.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overview_effect
WORLD AS SEEN FROM ABOVE THE LOCATION OF THE MEDIEVAL IMAGINER
Oh no. It's not that central to my thinking.
Mostly cause me a headache :D -- it's more that it's so undeniable to Marx's philosophy that it's something I have to contend with and figure out its boundaries in understanding that philosophy. Although I see value in understanding a thinker in his own time on his own grounds even where I disagree with him -- but here it's not clear enough yet for me to agree or disagree, but it's something I like to work out.
Quoting Banno
Heh, I don't mind. Without something to think against the thoughts kind of just drizzle away in the day to day. So pick away.
There is no point saying that I don't understand some idea if you cannot explain it yourself. I can simply retort that you don't understand it either and that it is just something you vaguely gesture at.
It seems obvious to me that the mind interprets the world, it does not create it. The mind (brain) as well as the language and culture also generate an idea of a self, but the idea is still vague if you want to say that the self is anything more than the body, including its ideas, emotions and its history. But even then, there always seems to be something left out.
Quoting Wayfarer
What, I should believe that just because it is said by
Quoting Wayfarer
I understand what is being said, and I think it is an unwarranted conclusion that is incorrect and not in accordance with human experienceobservations obviously are of things. I do agree with the last part that says that observations are not themselves things, if we define 'things' as 'what is observable or encounterable in some sense', because observations are not observable.
I can explain it to you, but I can't understand it for you. Over and out.
And I bet it's even less central to your Doing!
Wittgenstein and Anscombe are lurking in the background here, pointing out that it's the use of our metaphysics that has meaning.
My view is that you can't science your way into future social organizations -- I think it's the scientific claim of Marx's that fails. Though it describes a pattern we still are contending with fairly well, it's not at present a scientific theory in the sense that it wants to be.
So when I see these sorts of claims it looks to me that you guys are in the same camp: you have the Newtonian Laws of social organisms and from those Laws we can control the direction of development of social organisms. Something like Comte's positivism?
Quoting apokrisis
We can describe norms, but that's not the same as saying which norm we should pursue. The question isn't "What social purpose was that existentialism shaped to serve?" but rather "How shall we shape this existentialism?"
Sure. The next level dichotomy is deciding the pragmatic balance between generality and specificity - between laws and measurements in science terms. Each side contains information about the world. The balancing of what has been divided becomes a question of epistemic efficiency. Occams razor. What does the job of organising our behaviour in some useful and self-sustaining way?
You haven't and Wayfarer hasn't, said what that alternative form of idealism consists in. If it is only that the brain models a world, well I think that is uncontroversial. But to think that what is being modeled exists in its own right seems most plausible to me given all the evidence from our experience as it is given by everday life and by science.
If there are no mind-independent existents and if there is no collective mind to which we are all connected, then how would you explain the fact that we all perceive the same things, including at least some animals? I am yet to see even the beginnings of any such explanation coming from you or Wayfarer.
Quoting Wayfarer
See above. You have not explained it. If you had I would have no trouble understanding it, although of course I imagine I probably would not agree with it and would thus critique it. But you have not given me anything at all to work with, just hand-waving. If you don't agree, then respond to this and lay it our as clearly as you can, and then we might get somewhere.
Well, here's where we can get critical of ourselves and maybe don't realize what it is what we are doing. So the dialectic plays no role in my doing, I'll say, but I go to work and pay my bills and dance around the boss all the same: so the material dialectic would play a role in my doing even if it's not a part of my thinking.
But, I take your point. It's not clear enough to myself to say one way or the other -- I can give some nascent beginnings of an attempt to give clear distinction, but that's about it, so clearly it doesn't play a role in thinking or my conscious doing.
Quoting Banno
Heh. So Hegel's metaphysic is a good way to ensure the continuation of philosophy professors? :D (EDIT: I ought say this would be a point in its favor, for me)
Yep, a model is presumably a model of something.
The slobbering slave is living proof. (Too rude? I enjoy iek)
:up: I think that is what it all comes down to. Philosophy should be about how best to live. Whatever does not inform that, however interesting and creative it might be, is just a diversion in the form of speculation.
What was the Enlightenment all about then?
Quoting Moliere
Well exactly. And are you planning to do that individually or collectively? Do you expect it could be done collectively and not hierarchically? Is it some form of evidence here that you cant even advance anarchism or Marxism as politics that achieve their stated in advance goals?
If one ought not piss oneself does that not require one ensures he/she is not pissing into the wind?
Nature created human social order in its image. How you piss about starts from that thermodynamic foundation. The rest is the unfolding of history as an ever-enlarging and hierarchically complexifying growth project. With its own grumbling chorus of dissent.
Oh, the easy questions, eh? :D
Maybe I should say: I don't believe, at present, we can science our way into future social organizations, and I'm skeptical of the attempt due to the many attempts thus far.
I'd say the Enlightenment is over. I'm not sure where we're at now, but what could succeed in the Enlightenment as done so and what couldn't could do so again -- but that doesn't mean it's the only philosophical project in town either.
Quoting apokrisis
To take it back down a few notches of abstraction: Did Martin Luther King begin with thermodynamics? No of course not, but surely he knew something about how social organisms work. Or is everything he wrote and did parochial in the face of the new science?
Yes, there would seem to be little hope for us as a species if we don't find such a way.
I gotta make a lasagne.
Huh? It's political structures are largely still in place organising the world. Even in the US with all its current corruption and division.
Quoting Moliere
Were you referencing?
What ground is King calling upon here then? What balancing structural principle is this ancient Christian wisdom meant to invoke?
Even as religion it resonates. And that is because it is the systems view which you dismiss as "just thermodynamics". King was addressing the gross inequalities his social interest group faced, pointing at a systematic imbalance that a new politics of the US would have to address.
And various technocratic measures were implemented in the US as a result affirmative action, and end to busing, sensitivity training for law enforcement. Mechanisms designed to achieve outcomes. Even if the headwinds of self-protecting wealth and privilege, not to say engrained social prejudice, made it tough for America to live up to its original founding Enlightenment creed.
Yep. Time to fire up the thermodynamics and turn that entropy flow on. :fire:
No.
Though any other activist would do the job just as well, and I reached for King because he's familiar and a person who, no matter what we say here, did good things. And in order to do good things, so it seems to me, we must know something about the world.
Whatever King said his actions resulted in various good things, so we must accept that King knew something about social organisms since he had real effects upon them that continue on into this day.
At least, I'd suggest that. And so his writings on how to do things become interesting in light of that fact. They do not include thermodynamics as a base of thought to come from, though.
But he said you don't need good grammar, philosophy or science in general. Just Jesus. Or at least the plain commonsense that Jesus expressed in saying competition must be tempered by cooperation. The social and ecological organising principle that hierarchy theory captures with mathematical crispness.
You keep reaching for this word, thermodynamics, as if it were restricted to the dead realm of gone-to-equlibrium closed systems. But even the Second Law doesn't demand that reality. Prigogine got his 1977 Nobel for proving that and so launched the new age of thermodynamics as dissipative structure and "order out of chaos".
You might have approved of Prigogine as a person.
It is worth keeping an open mind and reading on. Your reaction to the term "thermodynamics" maybe because you view science and scientists as it they were some race apart from their worlds. Your lens is the one set to "scientism" as being dialectical to ... its righteous other.
In history I'd call this "cherry-picking" -- he says this in some context at some point, but what else did he say? What else did he do?
Quoting apokrisis
We definitely sound like kindred spirits :D
Quoting apokrisis
My reaction may be due to this. How would you know, though? I agree that keeping an open mind and reading on is worthwhile.
I think the question is more of a: where does the rubber meet the road? Same sort of question Marx receives. If we start from any thermodynamic paper, how do we get to "ought"?
But this was your choice of example. I just followed through with the historical facts. And these seem to tell another story.
Quoting Moliere
Yet again you simply ignore that I have already said that your disjunction is my conjunction. Is and ought wouldn't be separate, they would have to be openly complementary or reciprocal under a dichotomising systems logic.
A two-way mutuality is assumed as a condition of them being the larger thing of a causal-strength relation.
The top and bottom levels of a hierarchy must be in support of each other even if they are doing opposite things.
Even Bongo tried to make this point in his homily about corporate management where the board level ought must cash out as the bottom level office manager's is. The boss sets the strategy, the underlings beaver away at the monthly targets.
But in a fast moving world, underlings become closer to the changes that matter. The leisurely decision horizons of the board become a growing problem. Theories of flat hierarchies and the entreprenurial employee become the vogue.
Management science is another department of system theory. Like the rest of the humanities (even if the tap on the door hasn't quite been heard in the dusty forgotten corners of this large ramshackle institution).
Somewhere there are folk still sitting in their stuffed armchairs, digesting a belly of good lunch, basking in golden glow of their 1950s memories when philosophy had banished metaphysics, booted out the continental Marxists along with the irritating scientists too, so that all that counted was having a damn fine wrangle about the meaning of life in plain old ordinary language English.
That presupposes the separation between the model/construct and the world it attempts to represent. Presumably, from some point outside both of them ;-)
I must agree, but with a touch of irony, if it be granted the single most influential textual representation contained an offer of benefit to posterity, and at the same time, the cause of its demise.
-
Quoting Wayfarer
Sorry to intrude, but to say outside both is to invite that pathologically stupid homunculus nonsense, and to some lesser degree, Ryles Regress and a Cartesian theater, for which there never was any admission.
All for which sufficient account had already been given .ironically enough ..in that self-same Enlightenment textual representation, which one should hope isnt so much dead as neglected.
And that aint the height of irony, oh nosir-ee, bub!!! Simultaneity .misunderstood if not outright denied in its time as a justifiable albeit purely a priori condition in Enlightenment metaphysics, but subsequently given gasps of epiphanic revelation in post-Enlightenment/pre-proven therefore abstract, physical theory.
But I can dig it, donchaknow. We love our models, dont we. Model for this, model for that. Model for every-damn-thing. All of which fails miserably, when we try to model the modeling, in which case we usually invoke the principle of sheer parsimony, insofar as the validity of our models is their non-contradictory relation to some empirical condition, re: its use, or what is done with it, when the fact remains any model, empirically validated or otherwise, is only non-contradictory, hence its very validity is even possible, iff its construction is in accordance with a set of rules.
So I now assume Rodins posture, and ask however rhetorically ..does it work to combine rule simultaneity with model construction? At worst, such feasibility removes the notion of outside of insofar as models and the rules to which all of them must conform are inseparable with respect to time (insert A/B reference as proof here), and from there, at best, it is not contradictory to posit that models and their intellectual constructions are exactly the same.
Kinda cool, though, in the end, when the original question regards fairness and justice, which are, you know ..always in accordance with somebodys rules.
So as usual, you fail to understand what I said and make a strawman of it.
Let's breakdown what I said:
Notice I said "live in the world", NOT the world itself.
I also said "this world isn't fair and just a priori from any individual instance". That is to say, from the human perspective. If you boil it down, it just says that because we didn't choose to be here, the situation humans find themselves in is unfair from the start.
So stop fuckn whining about my whining. For some odd reason, your comments are unnecessarily vitriolic and ad hom.
They also take the least interesting parts of what I am saying and raising it to the main point and attacking that. I guess that's just more strawmen and red herrings.
I will not play into the conspiracy:
I've discussed this before, there are coping mechanisms of acceptance (Stoicism, Taoism et al.) and there are coping mechanisms of rejection (Schopenhauer, Buddhism, et al).
We have gained a consciousness not like the rest of nature. It creates immense burdens. Suffering in the present for other animals, becomes self-knowledge of suffering- suffering on steroids. There is a malignant uselessness hanging around our every decision, goal, desire, and action. The precariousness of contingency, loss, fortune, a fact that we are uniquely and acutely aware of, not just effected by, making it all the much crueler for us.
Yeah, but there's a but, but it goes into a digression on the differences between science and history which I'm guessing would diverge the thread from the original topic into, well, just that. Quoting apokrisis
How am I ignoring what you said? I'm asking a question for how you put it all together: How does the conjunct of is^ought work, in your view?
I mean every philosophy carries the seeds of its own destruction just by being philosophy :D -- no surprise. (EDIT: Well, maybe a small surprise given The Enlightenment project...)
It's still really interesting stuff and worth pulling from and developing. I just think it, like any philosophy, has limits. (where those limits are... well, that's the philosophical question)
That may very well be, but as far as Im aware, only one of any real significance puts the very ground of its own destruction in writing.
Gotta appreciate the forthrightness of the author of a philosophy, that says that even if one finds the supporting theory sufficiently justifies ones own a-HA!!! moments, hes still more than likely to ignore its lessons in toto.
I should have just said ontological idealism generally instead of specifying Berkeley. Berkeley is just the original ontological idealist. Religious/spiritual views sometimes find their philosophical justificatory wing (almost exactly like Sinn Fein and the IRA) embracing ontological idealism. Not that I have anything against that.
The point about zombies is not whether or not you believe in them (nobody except Daniel Dennett does), but whether a functionalist account like yours plausibly rules them out. Your account of an organism that models its environment and makes predictions based on that model is good, I like it. But the question of whether such a creature is conscious or not remains open. I see nothing in that account that rules out the creature being a zombie - it seems to me all the functions you have described could just as well occur in a creature with no experiences. Using the word 'zombie' is just a convenient and intuitively accessible way of making the point. And being lazy, I like that. As a theory of the self I think your account is much more plausible.
The neverending debate between mappers and terrainers.
I'm skeptical of the idea that Daniel Dennett believes anything these days, but anyway, that appears to be gratuitious slander.
From Wikipedia:
In terms of the OP though it seems that here we are wondering about how to make the real world fair and just while we are also the children of The Enlightenment. It's just that influential that even the appeals that matter changed.
At the time it makes total sense, but now, in light of its various successes, I come to doubt it.
Has been explaining his alternative form of idealism on this forum, and in magazine articles, for years. But his Buddhist-based metaphors & analogies do not translate into the vocabulary of Materialism or Physicalism or Scientism. My own worldview has more to do with ancient Plato & Aristotle philosophies, and little with Buddhism, but we have arrived at similar worldviews, that focus more on intangible Ideas than on corporeal Matter. My influences were mostly in 20th & 21st century Science ; especially Quantum & Information & Complexity theories. So, instead of calling my worldview Idealism, I labeled it as Enformationism*1. But I suppose you could style it "scientifically informed Idealism".
A recent development in science has been the notion that inorganic & organic Evolution is lawful*2. It proposes "a second arrow of time" which is positive & constructive, and opposed to the second law of thermodynamics : Entropy*3. The team of scientists haven't settled on a name for this anti-entropy law, but an old ironic label --- since the arrow direction is positive & progressive --- was Negentropy. In my own Information-based thesis, I refer to that "law" of gradual emergent evolution --- from a simple beginning (Singularity) toward more complex forms (Cosmos) --- as a natural trend, and label it as Enformy*4.
The Cornell University team called their "new law" of Evolution : "the law of increasing functional information.". And one member of the team calls it "a second arrow of time", pointing in the opposite direction from devolving Entropy. He also "explains that evolution seems to not only incorporate time, but also function and purpose". That latter term is provocative, since it seems to imply a Purposer, a Motivator, an Intender, an Organizer, a Designer, a Cosmic Mind. All of which are anathema to those who view the world as directionless & meaningless and destined for Nothingness.
Throughout history, most cultures have referred to that First Cause & Prime Mover as a God or Mind of some kind. But Plato gave it the less anthro name of Logos*5. You can call it whatever makes sense to you. But it's getting harder to deny that the universe was born in a burst of Energy & Law, then evolved toward sapiential maturity, and shows no signs of devolving into icy Entropy anytime soon. The world is not now, and never has been Ideal, in the sense of perfection. But since its most important feature so far, to us idea-sharing philosophers, is the emergence of creatures with Concepts, perhaps unrealistic Idealism is not too far off the mark. But I prefer the unfamiliar term Enformationism, which has no history of philosophical politics to elicit incredulity and knee-jerk reactions. :smile:
*1. Enformationism :
A philosophical worldview or belief system grounded on the 20th century discovery that Information, rather than Matter, is the fundamental substance of everything in the universe ; including ideas.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
Note --- Several blog posts explain in what sense Information can be considered an Aristotelian Substance.
*2. Scientists propose 'missing' law for the evolution of everything in the universe :
[i]The research team behind the law, which included philosophers, astrobiologists, a theoretical physicist, a mineralogist and a data scientist, have called it "the law of increasing functional information."
"This was a true collaboration between scientists and philosophers to address one of the most profound mysteries"[/i]
https://www.space.com/scientists-propose-missing-law-evolution-of-everything-in-the-universe
This idea suggests that while as the universe ages and expands, it is becoming more organized and functional, nearly opposite to theories surrounding increasing cosmological disorder.
https://bigthink.com/the-well/the-second-arrow-of-time/
*3. Entropy :
Refers to a state of disorder, but the term literally means Transformation. But if the Big Bang was followed only by disorder, it would have quickly disappeared in a puff of smoke. Yet, instead, the world system has gradually increased in organization, until now some of its offspring have evolved rational minds that are capable of imagining what the world was like 14 billion years ago. Many thinkers have interpreted Entropy pessimistically, to predict an eventual "heat death" in another 14 billion years. Yet, here we are, looking up at the stars, and wondering how & why we got to this point, and where we go from here.
*4 Enformy :
In the Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce complexity & progress.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
*5. LOGOS :
A principle originating in classical Greek thought which refers to a universal divine reason, immanent in nature, yet transcending all oppositions and imperfections in the cosmos and humanity.
https://www.pbs.org/faithandreason/theogloss/logos-body.html
Quoting Gnomon
:sparkle: :eyes: :lol:
:rofl:
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yeah, and then you draw an unwarranted conclusion about "the world itself" as if the living are the world's victims. Stop shifting goal posts and admit you've been caught poorly reasoning again (e.g. category mistake of "world as perpetrator of unfairness and injustice").
I must have missed something, somewhere down the line. Just wondering why one would doubt something despite its various successes. Must be some subtleties involved I havent accessed.
The Hard Problem pretends to have its ontic ground - zombies as a real possibility despite all that science and commonsense says - but it simply devolves to standard Humean epistemic issue that we will never really know that bedevils all rational inquiry and which became precisely the reason for pragmatism becoming standard as the way to move forward after that.
Did the sun come up this morning? It looked as though it did. But maybe you dreamt, misremembered or hallucinated that fact. One could always doubt your certitude.
One has to laugh. Astrobiology - NASAs fund-raising publicity department - reinvents the wheel. A new law that no one ever thought of.
I've just realised we may be talking at cross purposes. I've bolded the relevant bit. Eliminativism is exactly the view that nothing is conscious, so humans are philosophical zombies. Dennett oscillates (as far as I can tell) between eliminativism and perhaps a kind of functionalism. Not sure exactly. I only got about a third of the way through Consciousness Explained.
But the relevant bit is (as an ontological committment)...
Quoting wonderer1
I will add, by way of footnote, that scholars question the label of idealism applied to Buddhist teachings. The very brief reason is that Christian principles begin with the creation conceived as the actual origin of the Universe, in which God is the Creator of everything that is. Buddhism doesnt start with the origin of everything, but with the fact of dukkha (unease, distress, suffering), the cause of it, the ending of it, and the path to the ending of it.
[quote=What Is and Isnt Yog?c?ra, Dan Lusthaus;http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro.html] Yog?c?ra doctrine is summarized in the term vijñapti-m?tra, "nothing-but-cognition" (often rendered "consciousness-only" or "mind-only") which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating a type of metaphysical idealism, i.e., the claim that mind alone is real and that everything else is created by mind. However, the Yog?c?rin writings themselves argue something very different. Consciousness (vijñ?na) is not the ultimate reality or solution, but rather the root problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it can only be solved by bringing those operations to an end.
Yog?c?ra tends to be misinterpreted as a form of metaphysical idealism primarily because its teachings are taken for ontological propositions rather than as epistemological warnings about karmic problems. The Yog?c?ra focus on cognition and consciousness grew out of its analysis of karma, and not for the sake of metaphysical speculation.[/quote]
How the OP question is interpreted in light of that, is another matter. I think, suffice to say that the world in Buddhism is basically understood as transient and not what it seems (although, as the Lankavatara Sutra mysteriously adds, neither is it otherwise.)
[quote=Dan Lusthaus]To the extent that epistemological idealists can also be critical realists, Yog?c?ra may be deemed a type of epistemological idealism, with the proviso that the purpose of its arguments was not to engender an improved ontological theory or commitment, but rather an insistence that we pay the fullest attention to the epistemological and psychological conditions compelling us to construct and attach to ontological theories.[/quote]
Again, the aim being not to 'explain the world' but to untangle the Gordian knot of dukkha.
If your point is that "model" be used with care, I agree.
My point with respect to the 'mind-created world' theory is that many of the criticisms of it implicitly assume a perspective outside both. Like, 'the universe is so vast, and so ancient, how can that be something in my mind, when I'm only a few decades old?' But that perspective makes of an object of the very mind that provides the framework for the judgement of the vastness of space and duration of time. It's an abstraction.
I was going to add a point about 'dasein' although I tread warily as I've never read the entire work. But in my lay understanding, it is that our experience of the world is not one of the detached observer, where we build models of an external reality, but of direct involvement and engagement. It collapses the perceived dichotomy between self and world, as they're always intimately entertwined. We do not first exist as isolated subjects - islands! - who encounter a world of objects; instead, our very being is always already situated within a world we have imbued with meaning (or its lack). Even Wittgenstein touches on that in his Notebooks, with 'I am my world'.
There's a lot missing here.
And when pushed, he replies with somewhat obtuse quotes that do not seem to address the issue.
But we love him anyway.
[quote=Bryan Magee Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Pp 106-107]Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'
Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was ...that the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of [human] sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.
The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.
This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood.
Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. [/quote]
[quote=Wayfarer]According to evolutionary biology, Homo Sapiens is the result of billions years of evolution. For all these thousands of millions of years, our sensory and intellectual abilities have been honed and shaped by the exigencies of survival, through billions of lifetimes in various life-forms - fish, lizard, mammal, primate - in such a way as to give rise to the mind that we have today.
Recently, other scientific disciplines such as cognitive and evolutionary psychology have revealed that conscious perception, while subjectively appearing to exist as a steady continuum, is actually composed of a hierarchical matrix of interacting cellular transactions, commencing at the most basic level with the parasympathetic nervous system which controls ones respiration, digestion, and so on, up through various levels to culminate in that peculiarly human ability of discursive reason (and beyond, according to the mystics.)
Consciousness plays a central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ourselves - and also the apparent coherence and reality of the 'external world'. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness, the bulk of which are completely unknown to us.
When you perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is a considerable amount of work involved in creating an object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the light-waves reflected or emanated from it, your mind organises the image with regards to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment either acknowledging it, or ignoring it, depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc).
And you will do all of this without you even noticing that you are doing it; it is largely below the threshold of conscious perception.
In other words, your consciousness is not the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them (Locke's tabula rasa). Rather, consciousness is an active agent which constructs reality partially on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of an enormous number of unconscious processes, memories, intentions, and so on, not to mention the activities of reason, which allows us to categorise, classify and analyse the elements of experience.[/quote]
So remind me again, what, exactly, is 'incoherent' about these claims?
In the story I wrote for you, as we walked across the landscape we developed a way of talking about the movement of butterfly that became progressively less dependent on the place we were standing. That "perspective" was never outside of the landscape. It is nto about the view from nowhere, but about the view from anywhere.
Now this can be seen as a riff on Einstein's Principle of Relativity: that the laws of physics are to be written so as to be the same for all observers. While the observations may differ, the "laws" are consistent.
If Wigner swaps places with his friend, his friend will find himself in Wigner's situation.
The notion of a view form outside is a piece of rhetoric, not a valid criticism.
But I don't accept that your story does away with the requirement for an observer's perspective. It only compares perspectives between different observers. I'm not saying that it's reliant on a particular perspective, but that there is no perspective without an observer to bring it to bear. Absent observers, there are no perspectives.
...are incompatible with your contending that you are no ontic idealist. You are sayign that the world is, and isn't, the creation of mind.
Again, we only know stuff by using our minds, but that does not lead to the conclusion that the stuff we know about is mind-stuff.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sure. But so what? It's as if you were to say there is no vista without there being someone to see it, and that therefore the mountains depend on the tourist for their existence.
If you reject ontic idealism, then consciousness does not "create reality".
Sure, consciousness is not a passive recipient of the stuff in the world; nor is it it's creator.
Edit: Consider:
That is a gloss on a paragraph from Kant. The sorrounding text in Magee's book discusses how Kant himself didn't follow through on the implications of that paragraph, and that Schopenhauer does. And recall the opening few lines of Schopenhauers WWI:
----
Quoting Banno
But again, I address this. You think I must maintain that the vista (i.e. 'object') doesn't exist in the absence of the observer. But that is what I'm saying is the 'imagined non-existence', your imagining it as being non-existent. But the object neither exists nor doesn't exist in the absence of the observer. Nothing can be said about it. The object that you're referring to as existing (or not existing) in the absence of an observer is still a product of your mind.
And this is where 20th century physics is relevant. It has called into question the very existence of the so-called 'mind-independence' of reality. That is what the decades-long debate between Bohr and Einstein was about (reference - Quantum: Einstein, Bohr, and the Great Debate about the Nature of Reality, Manjit Kumar. Note the title! Another similar popular science book is David Lindley's 'Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science'. Why 'the struggle'? It is an argument between Einstein's scientific realism, which is precisely that 'the object is mind-independent', and the Copenhagen interpretation, which is that this can't be upheld.)
Quoting Banno
Again, you only say that, because you have something in mind.
Quoting Banno
The jealous God dies hard, eh? Hence the note about the distinction between Buddhist and Christian philosophy. Buddhist philosophy is not concerned with the origin of everything in the sense that Christian (and post-Christian) philosophy feels compelled to be.
...and therefore he has eyes and hands! Why are eyes and hands OK, but not the sun or the earth?
Quoting Wayfarer
So the cup ceases to exist when you put it in the dish washer? We can't say that it is being cleaned?
Quoting Wayfarer
So you have nothing in mind?
Quoting Wayfarer
That we the relevance of this, from another text you quoted:
Quoting Banno
Again, it seems ot me that you are an ontic realist until someone points out the problems with ontic realism.
The precise point Schrodinger was making with Schrodinger's Cat.
Quoting Banno
Gosh, I wonder. :chin:
That Chris Fuchs interview is here. You have excerpted the graph but not the commentary, which is that:
Read the remainder for more context. Also this documentary.
Well, no. The cat is either alive, or it is dead: therefore there is a cat.
Edit: this is not trivial; physics is based on the presumption that physicists have available a shared topic that they can prod and poke and about which they can talk - the world.
I don't see how this helps, except to push you further into the ontic idealist camp.
There are true sentences.
Some philosophers create Big theories about truth, "Correspondence", "Cohesion", "Pragmatism" and so on.
But regardless of whether any of these are right, it remains that there are true sentences. Any philosophy that tries to claim otherwise undermines itself.
You would benefit from reading those books I mentioned. They're aimed at a non-specialist audience. But once again, thanks for your criticisms. :pray:
In many cases it comes down to the point I just made, that physics is based on the presumption that physicists have available a shared topic that they can prod and poke and about which they can talk; but some forget this when they become more speculative.
'Shared topic', indeed. I have no beef whatever with science or scientists inter-subjective validation. My beef is with the over-valuation of objectivity as the sole criterion of truth.
Quoting Banno
None of the good ones, I would hazard.
Well, none I thought much good, at least. :wink:
Quoting Wayfarer
And on that we agree.
So... you like Ligotti's Conspiracy Against the Human Race, correct? Do you think that title means a "literal" conspiracy? And if you don't, why would you think how I am talking isn't also metaphorically describing the situation?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commons [1]
Quoting Janus
:up: :up:
Quoting Wayfarer
:roll: Schrödinger proposed this thought-experiment only to show that the 'Copenhagen interpretation' of quantum mechanics is, at best, paradoxical (i.e. does not make sense).
???
Yeah?
:100: How easily and how often that is forgotten!
The vast, vast majority of philosophy has nothing to do with this, despite best efforts to pretend it is about personal development. "How best to live" is an empty phrase.
Of course I understand that. Its an ironic way of illustrating the anti-realist implications of the very principles that he discovered.
Incidentally apropos the question you asked about the independent reality of the wave function, QBism says definitely not.
Schrödinger's overall attitude towards quantum mechanics was complicated. While he was one of its founding figures and developed the Schrödinger equation, he was also troubled by its philosophical implications and sought alternative interpretations that could provide a more intuitive and realistic understanding of the quantum world. His engagement with these questions reflects his desire for a theory that could reconcile the quantum and classical worlds in a more satisfactory manner.
This was the context:
Quoting Banno
Banno always returns to homely examples like kitchen utensils, not that there's anything the matter with that. In this context, 'cups' are just a stand-in for 'the object'.
Anyway, I merely said 'this was the precise point that Schrodinger was making with his famous cat'. So you're correct in saying that Schrodinger was sceptical about the Copenhagen interpretation, but I wasn't really appealing to Schrodinger for support of a particular view, only remarking that it is basically the same question. And hence the relevance of physics!
My understanding of the Copenhagen interpretation is that it's not a scientific hypothesis, nor a fully worked out philosophical framework. It's more like various aphorisms and writings of Heisenberg and Bohr on the interpretation of quantum physics. But I think it can't be disputed that it calls realism into question. Einstein's objections were not against the predictive powers of quantum mechanics, which are unarguable, but against its philosophical implications. He believed that quantum mechanics must be incomplete and that there must be underlying hidden variables that could restore a deterministic and objective reality. This viewpoint is encapsulated in his famous thought experiments, such as the EPR paradox (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox), which aimed to show that quantum mechanics could not be a complete description of reality. However the Alain Aspect experiments confirming the 'Bell inequality' went against Einstein's realist views (even though, of course, he didn't live to see that.)
Bohr emphasized the role of the observer and the fundamental limits of what can be known. Bohr argued that quantum mechanics does not describe an objective reality but rather deals with the probabilities of different outcomes of measurements. He maintained that questions about the underlying reality were not meaningful within the framework of quantum mechanics, as the theory only provides information about observations. I think he kind of 'bracketed out' questions about what it ultimately meant or pointed to. It is sometime said he was a positivist, but he didn't agree with positivism either. His quote 'if you're not shocked by quantum mechanics then you can't have understood it' came from a lecture he gave to the Vienna Circle positivists, who all applauded politely and nodded sagely at the conclusion of his lecture on quantum physics. (As told in Heisenberg's Physics and Beyond.)
The point I was arguing about was against the contention that the type of idealist view I'm advocating must imply that the world doesn't exist in the absence of the observer. I said that any statement of, or knowledge about, the object's existence or non-existence can only be made by an observer. Science has no trouble depicting the world as it was before the evolution of h.sapiens, for instance - an empirical fact - but the interpretive framework within which that description is meaningful, is still provided by the mind - which is transcendental idealism. That's the sense in which I think there can be a kind of Kantian attitude to the Copenhagen interpretation. If you or anyone is interested, Michel Bitbol has a lecture on that, Bohr's Complimentarity and Kant's Epistemology.
And that suffices, the rest is derivative (pace Kant) or superfluous. A more cogent and parsimonious description is, imo, more or less this one: "observers" are any aspects of the world interacting with abstracting stochastic patterns from any other aspects of the world.
I find the dichotomy interesting because "colonialism, racism" and the science for the "atomic bomb" were terms invented by (people of the) Enlightenment (or derived from Enlightenment thinking) in order to (self) critique their own practices.
That is to say, yes you had pseudo-science social darwinism, for example, leading to racist theories, but the very mechanisms to call this into question and the idea that theories are wrong and not just "tradition" or "the way of things" or simply "because power and our people want it", is itself from the Enlightenment. You cannot displace the wrongs of the Enlightenment from the self-criticism that is part-and-parcel of its ethos. For all intents and purposes it is literally the basis for "modernity" in that self-critique is built into the framework.
A tribal society conquering another one and destroying the village and taking wives doesn't generally have the language of social self-critique. Even the Aztecs, with all its mathematical and engineering feats and other amazing features, didn't necessarily have the self-critique of the Enlightenment thinking. Greece and Rome had nascent satire and cynical commentary, but it wasn't yet part of the ethos of the political and social fabric to have massive self-critique in a way whereby the political body itself was questioning its dialectic of conquering other tribes, and taking over massive regions, often wiping out cultures or force assimilating them.
Ha! You got something against the science of Astrobiology*1? Do you think Carl Sagan was looking through his telescope for little green men? Do you think NASA is a public relations tool for some nefarious evil-genius who wants to dominate the world? Well granted, Donald Trump or Elon Musk may want to put his name on the next rocket to Mars. And, Skepticism of "new" ideas is a truth filter. But, Scoffing is a creativity suppressor.
Dr. Michael Wong is indeed an astrobiologist, but the team included scientists from other specialties.The NASA article was just one of dozens of positive reviews of this proposed law. Besides, the linked publication doesn't mention Astrobiology. And the appellation of "new law" was applied by other science news publications. What "wheel" do you think is being re-invented here? What old law explained how Mind Functions and Human Purposes could emerge from purely materialistic evolution?
One reason I mentioned this particular scientific theory --- in this way-off-topic thread --- is that the postulated anti-entropy arrow-of-time puts Evolution in a new light. For years, scientists were able to picture Darwinian evolution as meandering, aimless, and ultimately doomed to a pathetic meaningless Heat Death. But now we have reasons for a more optimistic perspective : "his idea suggests that while as the universe ages and expands, it is becoming more organized and functional, nearly opposite to theories surrounding increasing cosmological disorder"*2. This notion is also in opposition to the presumptions of Materialism, which focuses on the Randomness & Chaos of the universe, instead of the Order & Organization that makes Science & Philosophy possible.
The other reason is that "renowned mineralogist" Robert Hazen refers to this second arrow of thermodynamics as the law of increasing functional information. Which dovetails into my own personal information-based worldview. Moreover, it expands Darwin's notion of biological evolution to include non-living aspects of the universe*3. Which may help to explain how the hypothetical quark-gluon Plasma of the Big Bang was able to develop into living & thinking lumps of matter, not by divine creation, but by natural processes. How could Mechanical Evolution produce creatures concerned about Fairness & Justice in the world? :nerd:
*1. Astrobiology is a scientific field within the life and environmental sciences that studies the origins, early evolution, distribution, and future of life in the universe by investigating its deterministic conditions and contingent events. ___Wikipedia
*2. Is there a second arrow of time? New research says yes
[i]At Big Think, we introduce you to the brightest minds and boldest ideas of our time, inviting viewers to explore new ways to work, live, and understand our ever-changing world.
"Big Think challenges common sense assumptions and gives people permission to think in new ways.[/i]
https://bigthink.com/the-well/the-second-arrow-of-time/
*3. New Law :
The core of everything we've been thinking about, in terms of the missing law, is evolution. When I say the word "evolution," you immediately think of Darwin, but this idea of selection goes much, much beyond Darwin and life. It applies to the evolution of atoms. It applies to the evolution of minerals. It applies to the evolution of planets and atmospheres and oceans. Evolution, which we see as being an increase in diversity, of patterning, in complexity of systems through time.
https://bigthink.com/the-well/the-second-arrow-of-time/
https://www.sci.news/physics/law-of-increasing-functional-information-12369.html
https://www.space.com/scientists-propose-missing-law-evolution-of-everything-in-the-universe
https://www.axios.com/2023/10/22/evolution-complexity-law
https://www.siliconrepublic.com/innovation/law-of-nature-research-selection-evolution-function-fittest-cornell-carnegie
https://www.reuters.com/science/scientists-propose-sweeping-new-law-nature-expanding-evolution-2023-10-16/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IngBEkg61_E
Three new laws of Nature, to account for complexity. Sabine is skeptical.
Is There a Second Arrow of Time?
Is the argument then that this complexity somehow implies (leads to, causes...) a fair and just universe?
The difference between how things are and how they ought be remains.
And crucially, Wigner's friend and Schrödinger will agree that this is the case. The rules of physics remain the same for both observers.
I'm not keen on philosophers indulging in speculative physics, but it's worth pointing out that "Shut up and calculate!" is itself a worthy metaphysical option:
Quoting Quantum Wittgenstein
No. I'm pointing out how the sociology of science operates. NASA wants to remain employed by the US taxpayer. The cold war arms race is over. The Mars colony or even Moon colony is no go. So it sponsors the new field of astrobiology because US taxpayers love aliens and their flying saucers.
I'm all for spending taxes on basic science research. But this Big Science story is also a problem.
Astrobiology has given some good researchers a new platform for working on the problem of abiogenesis. I follow this work closely. But that means also knowing what the field of abiogenesis had achieved before the tacit question how is this going to make folk want to fund another mission to Mars or a next generation space-scope? was hanging over its head. And a publicity department existed to make a rehash of old ideas sound all sparkly and new.
Quoting Gnomon
Sorry @Gnomon, I don't fathom how your brain works. What else have I been telling you for at least a decade?
Were this the limit of your claim, no one would be objecting. This is entirely compatible with hard realism.
But you take this as somehow demonstrating idealism. It just doesn't.
So a dialectic.
Quoting Banno
And a resolution that is comfortably within reach of its lasagne. :clap:
Well, ok, that's a way of describing it. So what. More Wittgenstein than Hegel. And the resolution is not a third option, not a synthesis, but adopting the thesis, so it's not a very good example of dialectic at work.
My suspicion is that dialectic is a way of narrating the way things are, of sense-making. As such it's post hoc. The argument agains dialectic that I presented above shows how it is that dialectic methods serve to choose the option preferred by the narrator. That critique stands.
Oh the irony!
Quoting Banno
It stands against a person and so also the method. Your suspicion has thus been justly confirmed?
Sounds legit, but what would Wittgenstein have said? See me after class, boy, for a good slap around the ears.?
I'll put the point more forcefully: Dialectic has more of rhetoric to it than of logic.
One might be hard pressed to find a case where dialectic cannot be applied. That's not a good thing.
Yet you seem to claim that for classical logic?
And just to remind, in case you really did miss it, I dont defend Hegel as the final word here. I defend the Peircean triadic systems view as the best metaphysical logic or model of causal being.
But keep on stabbing away at your straw man until it is time for lunch. Straw men are always a safer target than the real thing.
Well, no - see my thread on logical nihilism. The "Peircean triadic systems view" is, so far as it is comprehensible, just more Hegel.
It certainly is not physics.
What am I supposed to do with your solipsistic pronouncements? If you have comprehension failures then thats on you. Ill get out the worlds smallest violin if it might help.
I think this is very useful advice and well framed.
On the contrary realists insist that the object is as it is irrespective of the presence or absence of an observer. And that the understanding we hold of a world with no observers truly describes a mind-independent reality.
The reason 20th c physics undermined realism is precisely in respect of those claims. That is why books about it refer to arguments about reality. That is not a figurative description.
in respect of what is ultimately real.
Or let the maths decide what we might believe about that. Hence ontic structural realism as the new Platonic sounding metaphysics that has arisen out of a contemplation of gauge symmetry and quantum field theory.
Dissipative structure theory applied at the level of cosmology and particle physics in other words.
The fact we can calculate general particle properties to 15 decimal places, and also not measure everything about some particular excitation in the one act of measurement, ought to tell you something about how well we are in fact doing.
We can reach ridiculous levels of accuracy about the electron's dipole moment from just first principles. And we know why it has to be the case that you can't measure the two poles of a dialectic relation such as position and momentum in one go. Each variable is only quantifiable to the degree it is not its other.
But that's OK. We can capture all the information in a wavefunction. And then add in thermal context to narrow the probabilities to the point that they become pragmatically a classical description. A weak measurement gets close enough to certainty concerning one pole without driving its other pole to a reciprocal state of Planckscale uncertainty.
But instead of celebrating this quite remarkable success in fundamental science, you ... complain we're "not there yet".
Just as Bert does about an account of life and mind as biosemiosis in action.
Ive read about those guys but I really dont like them so far.
Quoting apokrisis
Complaint?
Quoting Wayfarer
The Statement can only be made by an observer. That's quite compatible with realism -at least, those realists who do not believe in disembodied statements.
Again, there is a difference between how things are and how we believe they are. A difference between how they are and how we say that they are. A difference that tends to dissipate in idealism. A difference that explains what it is to be mistaken.
I said any judgement regarding what exists. The position Im defending is near to Berkeleys esse est percipe, but the way I put it is that nothing exists outside a perspective.
Optical illusions and mistaken perceptions such as the bent oar are discussed by Berkeley. Ill dig up the ref although not right now.
Why do you think there is and has been an argument in physics as to what is real, were the issue so simple as you appear to believe? What is the argument about, do you think?
Sorry. Must have been someone else complaining about the fact science has arrived at the conclusion that reality is fundamentally irreducible in the dialectical or complementary fashion noted by Bohr.
Of course Bohr was more directly inspired by his education in the Lao-Tse than by Hegel. But same elephant, different philosophical traditions.
Bohr as you know incorporated the ying-yang symbol into the family Coat of Arms that was crafted when he was knighted by the Danish Crown.
Bohr regarded his principle of complementarity a major discovery in its own right.
This is quite a useful article - https://phys.org/news/2009-06-quantum-mysticism-forgotten.html
It points out that the pioneers were deep thinkers - cultured Europeans who understood philosophy. Schrödinger and Heisenberg both wrote perceptively on physics and philosophy. Post-war the action shifted to the US, big science and military/industrial research.
https://youtu.be/IBP1oxHxnpk?si=zXwj-n56sdUpBUHo
Shown in the video how the weird quantum phenomena like non-commutativity (and heisenberg uncertainty, measurement dependence), interference (thus coherence/superposition), decoherence, entanglement are all behaviors that occur in a certain (and only recently described i.e within the last 20 years) family of [stochastic processes, i.e. sequences of random variables that will always realize definite outcomes at any point in time]. Collapse appears purely as statistical conditionalization. The author goes through how you can bi-directionally translate between quantum and stochastic formalisms - the quantum representation is just a useful tool. Note, the author also says this is extremely generic and can be applied to any kind of quantum system whether particles or any ontology you like.
No many worlds.
No measurement problem.
No cat dead and alive at same time.
No Heisenberg cut.
No shoehorning deterministic trajectories and pilot waves.
No need to wonder if the moon is really there when no one looks.
No observer woo.
Parsimony demands one ignores these distractions because they are not required to produce quantum behaviors.
Quantum theory is precisely orthogonal to Kantianism or Berkelianism or Schopenhauerism or Dennettianism.
"The functional information of a system will increase (i.e., the system will evolve) if many different configurations of the system undergo selection for one or more functions."
... functional information increases if functions undergo selection"
... increases in functional information characterizes evolution"
This doesn't seem like some profound new law about the world to me; they just seem to be proposing another way of describing evolution as always been understood, just in a different and I guess more general way.
More than that I would say. I would point to how the logic of the Yin-Yang, co-dependent arising, Aristotelean hylomorphism, Hegelianism, Naturphilosphie, and all the other traditions of dialectical thought made the discovery of the quantum even possible.
Classical logic would seem to forbid one thinking in this fashion. It propels us towards a lumpen realism - a metaphysics of medium sized dry goods. Kitchenware and the like. The least critical mindset.
But a perspective widened by a relational view, a process view, a dialectical view, was necessary for science to make its great leap to discover quantum mechanics. It made the results observed thinkable.
What, you say particle mechanics and wave mechanics both seem to apply? Well as complementary descriptions - a local view vs a global view - maybe that should be no surprise.
The point is that what you call science does not rule them out, or indeed in. It has nothing to say on the subject of consciousness itself, although there's still plenty of interesting work to do peripheral to that, like scientifically studying the neural correlates of particular experiences. We don't doubt that other people are conscious because of commonsense (as you say), not science. We infer others are conscious because I am conscious and other people seem to be like me and do roughly similar things under similar circumstances. It's the best explanation of their behaviour. You don't have to do any science for this, and commonsense does it instinctively. So if we know that other people are conscious, but we can't derive that from their structure and function, then that is a clue that examining structure and function may actually be insufficient.
It's not about unwarranted doubt. We don't doubt. It's about finding a plausible explanation for what we don't doubt.
The problem of people deciding where they want to end up and working backwards for a justification is possible given any type of philosophical method (e.g. it seems hard to deny that Russell didn't do just this at times; rather than his scientism preventing this, it just served to obfuscate it). Nor do I think such a move is always unwarranted. If you have a good "project" it can make sense to try to find a way to save it.
But the larger problem here is that a genetic fallacy is still a genetic fallacy. Bad motivations don't make someone wrong. Falsifiability hasn't even proven to be a particularly good metric for demarcation of the sciences. Mach attacked atoms as unfalsifiable. Quarks were called, not without merit, "unfalsifiable pseudoscience." Plenty of work in quantum foundations is still regarded as unfalsifiable pseudoscience even as it results in tangible discoveries.
Popperian falsifiability itself ends up failing an empirical test of its own ability to properly demarcate "good and bad theory" or "good and bad science."
Very rich post with much that could be commented on, but I wonder if you might provide an interpretation of this graphic. Ive posted it here previously, its from John Wheelers paper, Law without Law:
The caption reads, what we consider to be reality, symbolised by the letter R in the diagram, consists of an elaborate paper maché construction of imagination and theory fitted between a few iron posts of observation.
What do you think the point of that simile is? Do you think it suggests something similar to what Im proposing as the mind-created world?
@Banno
[quote=Dialogue between Philonious and Hylas, Berkeley; https://beta.sparknotes.com/philosophy/3dialogues/section11/] Say we see an oar in water and it appears bent to us. We then lift it out and see that it is really straight; the bent appearance was an illusion caused by the water's refraction. On Philonous' (i.e. idealist) view, though, we cannot say that we were wrong about the initial judgement; if we perceived the stick as bent then the stick had to have been bent. Similarly, since we see the moon's surface as smooth we cannot really say that the moon's surface is not smooth; the way that it appears to us has to be the way it is. Philonous has an answer to this worry as well. While we cannot be wrong about the particular idea, he explains, we can still be wrong in our judgement. Ideas occur in regular patterns, and it is these coherent and regular sensations that make up real things, not just the independent ideas of each isolated sensation. The bent stick can be called an illusion, therefore, because that sensation is not coherently and regularly connected to the others. If we pull the stick out of the water, or we reach down and touch the stick, we will get a sensation of a straight stick. It is this coherent pattern of sensations that makes the stick. If we judge that the stick is bent, therefore, then we have made the wrong judgement, because we have judged incorrectly about what sensation we will have when we touch the stick or when we remove it from the water.[/quote]
Ok. Thanks.
What does NASA playing politics/ecomomics have to do with a scientific theory developed by Cornell University scientists? Do you think they choose to only back ideas that might be popular with voters? Is AstroBiology a popular use of taxpayer investments? Show me the aliens! :joke:
Quoting apokrisis
Refresh my memory. What have you been telling me? Have you been saying something like : "while as the universe ages and expands, it is becoming more organized and functional, nearly opposite to theories surrounding increasing cosmological disorder"*2. This notion is also in opposition to the presumptions of Materialism, which focuses on the Randomness & Chaos of the universe"? If so, please accept my belated welcome to the club. :grin:
So, you were underwhelmed by this revelation of Causal Information as the key to universal progressive & creative Evolution from almost nothing to everything? Apparently some scientists in related fields are more impressed. :nerd:
Scientists propose 'missing' law for the evolution of everything in the universe :
[i]# This new law identifies "universal concepts of selection" that drive systems to evolve, whether they're living or not.
# The research team behind the law, which included philosophers, astrobiologists, a theoretical physicist, a mineralogist and a data scientist, have called it "the law of increasing functional information."
# The law applies to systems that form from numerous components such as atoms, molecules and cells which can be arranged and rearranged repeatedly and adopt multiple different configurations, according to the statement. The law also says these configurations are selected based on function, and only a few survive.
# Theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman, professor emeritus of biochemistry and biophysics at the University of Pennsylvania, said the study is a "superb, bold, broad, and transformational article,"[/i]
https://www.space.com/scientists-propose-missing-law-evolution-of-everything-in-the-universe
Evolution, not just survival, but novelty & creativity :
# The third and most interesting function according to the researchers is novelty the tendency of evolving systems to explore new configurations that sometimes lead to startling new behaviors or characteristics, like photosynthesis
https://www.sci.news/physics/law-of-increasing-functional-information-12369.html
Philosophy :
Functionalism is a theory about the nature of mental states. According to functionalists, mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made of. Functionalism is the most familiar or received view among philosophers of mind and cognitive science.
https://iep.utm.edu/functism/
Note --- Doing is causal, not material
No. Where did you get that idea? One implication of this New Law of Evolution is that its progression of increasing complexity & creative novelty eventually led from a hypothetical Singularity Soup (quark/gluon plasma) to the emergence of complex brains & minds capable of asking questions about Fairness & Justice, that we world-observers call Philosophy. :smile:
Sticky this please mods!
So for some reason it is OK for you to use commonsense to make inferences about things you cant directly know, but science as a formal method for making such inferences does not enjoy the same privilege? It is defeated by the zombies in which you dont believe? Curious.
So what does your commonsense tell you about the consciousness of the chair you are sat on? Given the zombie argument that is so legit, how can you know it is either conscious or not conscious. It might be just keeping very quiet and still. It might be aware but suffering locked in syndrome.
Your commonsense is this magical power that transcends mere scientific inference. Please clear up these deep riddles of Nature.
The point is epistemic. And it reflects the semiotic fact that the mind must reduce reality to a system of signs. The world is a blooming, buzzing confusion of noise and we must distil that down to some orderly arrangement of information. A set of counterfactuals that impose a dialectical crispness on the vagueness of our experience.
So in Gestalt fashion, we turn sensory confusion into perceived order by homing in on critical features that would distinguish and R from an E or a K. We have to be sensitive to the fact that Rs have this loop that Es leave open. This becomes a rule of interpretation for when we start having to deal with a real world of messy handwriting and wild fonts. We have to see information that was meant to be there according to the rules and so ignore the variation that is also in some actual scribble or fancifully elaborate font.
Our interpretative experience of even the alphabet, let alone the world, has this epistemic character. We must divide the confusion dialectically into global formal necessity and local material accident. That is then how we can decode reality. That is how we can construct an understanding.
As I say, I am officially baffled about how you deal with information.
For example I made this comment in a post last year.
No need for the scare quotes around understanding. Which pretty well illustrates the point of the mind-created world.
I apologize for my ignorance and leaky memory. As I've mentioned before, I had no formal training in Philosophy in college, and I only began to get some experience with argumentation since I retired, and began posting on this forum. So a large percentage of your posts goes over my head, especially the long complicated ones. You use technical terminology unfamiliar to me, and refer to authors & texts I've never read. So, in many cases I just skim the posts. As you probably do with mine.
Regarding the Information and Arrow of Time graphic, I don't remember posting it, but it seems to fit my general understanding of the Evolution of Information. Can you explain to me what you think I didn't understand about it?
My personal philosophical concept of Information Theory is a departure*1*2 from that of Shannon, who seemed to equate it with disorderly devolving Entropy. Instead, I view the area between the red & blue curves in the Entropy graph as Negentropy, which is what I call EnFormAction (power to enform). You won't find that term in any science or philosophy texts, because I made it up to serve my amateur thesis of Enformationism. So, unless you are motivated to look into that unorthodox thesis, you'll probably remain "baffled by how I deal with information". :smile:
*1. The Information Philosopher :
My explanation of the cosmic creation process shows how the expansion of the universe opened up new possibilities for different possible futures. My work is based on a suggestion by Arthur Stanley Eddington and my Harvard colleague David Layzer.
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/
*2. Paul Davies on Information :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7EjwUp5krY
FWIW, here's my own chart of the evolution of Information (EnFormAction) since the universe began :
Not so quick. An understanding is an Umwelt. It is the manufacturing, or co-dependent arising, of the subjective and the object, the self and its world, as the one cohesive dialectic.
There is no ontological self that is the seat of consciousness. That is as much a useful epistemic construct as the world in which this self sees itself living within.
Quoting Wayfarer
As opposed to sentence? But there remains the distinction between how the universe is and how we judge it to be. On one side, we have what we state, judge, believe, know, expect, doubt to be the case; and on the other, what is the case. Things we do against how things are.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sure. Why? In , you didn't take the time to set out what it is you want me to take from the extended quote. I'll refer you to the thread on Sense and Sensibility, to a post that outlines the physics of the bent stick and others that sets out Austin'e response. "The sting, when it comes, is pithy and simple."
So here:
Quoting Dialogue between Philonious and Hylas, Berkeley
Seeing the stick as bent is exactly what we expect, given that the stick is straight and partially immersed in water. Nothing incoherent here.
There's a piece of apocryphal about a philosophy lecture in which the class is presented with an apparent straight stick in water, only later to have the lecturer draw the stick out to show that it actually is bent. I hope it is true, because it shows another aspect that needs to be taken into account. We are not passive observers. We interact with the world. We put sticks into water and take them out. So this is inaccurately passive:
Quoting Wayfarer
"What we consider to be reality". Again, what we do, not what is. So sure, we "divide" the world up so as to make sense of it. Therefore there is a world for us to divide up. Hence Idealism is insufficient to explain how things are.
Quoting Wayfarer
I spoke previously about speculative physics. Specificity is needed here. Folk think that it's all mins because quantum, but you and I want better arguments.
In previous discussions we reach a point where you seem to be pointing at stuff and trying to show something you see that I don't. We seem to be there again. I think we agree that there is a world, and that we have what philosophers call intentional attitudes towards that world, but you put all the emphasis on those attitudes, as if the world were not also part of what is going on. And again, what I am suggesting is not that idealism is wrong and realism is right, so much as that the juxtaposition of idealism and realism is misleading.
We might agree that we can make true statements about how things are.
But what else did Layzer label it in calling it "negative entropy/possible information".
Negentropy was the term Schrödinger popularised back in the 1940s with his What is Life?.
Did your astrobiologists remember that classic as they restated what has been well known among those who study these things for so many years.
This latter is shown explicitly in classical logic by the explosion ?^~???, that from a contradiction anything follows. But I don't see that (for example) moving to a paraconsistent logic helps dialectic - that move does not serve to fix the nature of the synthesis.
My suggestion is that in most cases the synthesis is fixed by other factors external to the dialectic, and the dialectic then used to justify that fixing. Which is an invalid move.
And it's this aspect I wanted to bring out, rather than Popper's criticism using falsification, which I agree is not quite up to the task.
Just as I said. Self and world are co-arising, just as posited by enactivism. That is why we see the convergence between phenomenology and Buddhism in The Embodied Mind.
Quoting Banno
Apologies if that was not clear. It was posted in response to your:
Quoting Banno
That argument was used against Berkeley: if our grasp of appearances can be mistaken, then how can he argue that the ideas and impressions which he claims constitute our knowledge should be trusted? How can there be a distinction between what appears the case, and what is the case if all we have are our ideas?
So the passage from Berkeleys imaginary dialogue was provided to illustrate how Berkeley deals with that criticism.
Quoting Banno
As I said in the essay, there is no need for me to deny that there are planets unseen by any eye, to quote myself. Again, the question is the purported mind-independence of the objective domain. As Ive acknowledged many times already, there are different levels of understanding - in the empirical sense, obviously the world and everything in it is independent of my mind, unknown to me. Heck, I only know about half a dozen people in my street. But on a deeper level, the world is a construct - not a confabulation, not an hallucination, but a construct of the mind. That is the sense in which its not mind-independent. And as soon as you posit an unknown object - the tree that falls in the forest - youre already bring a perspective to bear, attempting to illustrate the point with respect to some intentional object. (This incidentally I take to be in conformity with Kants understanding of the distinction between reality and appearance.)
The philosophical point behind the argument, is that naturalism tends to regard mind-independence as a criteria for what is real. It attempts to arrive at an understanding of what exists in the absence of any subjective elements whatever. In that world-picture, we view ourselves as objects, and miniscule, insignificant objects at that, epiphenomenal occurrences thrown up by unknowing physical processes in the vast universe. That is what I take scientific realism to be advocating. In addition to that physicalism posits that the mind-independent realm comprises physical elements, which are purportedly the objects of physics itself. That is what Im arguing against. Hence the emphasis on the observer problem in physics, which directly undermines that formulation of physicalism.
Arguably, science itself is now moving beyond that formulation, but regardless, that is what I have in my sights.
Just trying to work out what your claim is. So we have something like that the universe that, as it slides inevitably towards thermodynamic equilibrium, progresses towards increasing complexity & creative novelty eventually led from a hypothetical Singularity Soup (quark/gluon plasma) to the emergence of complex brains & minds?
It remains that the universe is fair and just only if those "complex brains & minds" make it so - is that right?
But perhaps not clearly? There is still this tendency to slide from an epistemic to ontic position in your choice of words. I add the scare quotes to try to maintain this distinction.
And it all matters. We might be just modellers of the world, but we also do attempt to then remake that world in our own image a point crucial to my take on the OP. The aim of consciousness is to construct the reality of our dreams. :grin:
So that divides the world into the part that resists our desires and the part which we have made materially conform.
Again the kitchen utensils and household furniture issue, the lumpen realist's examples of choice. The things we make that wouldn't otherwise exist. The unanalysed position where human intention and natural order are conflated in a caricature of metaphysical inquiry.
"Behold! A realm of medium sized dry goods. Chairs, pens, tables, forks, doors, fridges. Puppies that shouldn't be kicked but stones that you freely can."
Nothing of value comes from this kind of cherry-picking where only material objects with the imprint of human intentions are taken as the canonical examples of how reality as a whole operates. It is either intellectually dishonest or puzzlingly ignorant.
Which is why I have stressed that is/ought thinking can't be supported by such arguments. If we have already stamped material reality with our heavy imprint of form then we can't treat that as nature in itself. It is nature as now mediated by a semiotic modelling relation. And attention has to turn to the physical reality of how that works. Enter at this point, a modern sophisticated understanding of the Second Law of Thermodynamics recently rediscovered by NASA astrobiologists apparently.
Sure. I think I replied to that, using Austin. A straight stick appears bent in water.
It might help to try and look at why we keep coming back to these same arguments. I think it to do with the vanity of small differences. We agree on pretty much everything except that final wording, where you say that the world is a construction of the mind, and I point out that the construction is dependent on stuff outside the mind.
I am not at all convinced we are in any substantive disagreement.
Oh, the joy! Light dawns!
...and of course, you were always saying this...
As someone outside of philosophy, I find the debate about idealism to be somewhat pointless. What changes in our lives, either way?
Is it simply the case that idealists are able to accept more 'supernatural' claims because they have determined that nature is ultimately no longer limited by laws of physics?
If idealism is true, I still need to remain gainfully employed, walk to get anywhere, feed the cat, be kind to others. Its appeal seems to be located in it being a kind of conduit to mysticism and other often tedious pursuits.
Still sticking it to a strawman? Actually read Hegel why don't you.
Here for example an account....
And so on with of course increasingly less clarity in the attempt to pursue Hegel's essentially right ideas into their ever deeper thickets of prose. Thank goodness an actual logician like Peirce came along to sort things out.
But the point is that even Hegel, obscure that he is, wasn't arguing the kind of caricature of dialectical logic that you accuse him of.
While classical logic might well implode as it does with the Liar's paradox and anything else requiring a more holistic metaphysics, this is why Peirce sought to secure the force of the PNC as the way out of vagueness, not as the door to it.
From a vague potential, anything could possibly follow it might seem. But no in fact. Only dialectical division becomes possible as the self-organising, self-balancing, way to split possibility towards its mutually-opposed limits of being. Reality can be made safe for the counterfactuality of the laws of thought. The Cosmos can be understood by the light of natural reason. The PNC pragmatically works because the dialectic gets us there by locking in bivalence and allowing us to proceed to the third step of Peirce's logical holism. The place where even the general or universal becomes the real and so allows the LEM to pragmatically apply as a logical tool when talking about the particular or contextual.
Quoting Banno
Just as you were always agreeing I guess. :chin:
But the debate gives us something amusing for a quiet Sunday morning.
But it was worth it. :wink:
Between the iron posts and the paper maché, you mean?
It also had to do with ignoring much of what Ive been saying.
Ok, tell me what I ignored.
What was the Newtonian dream? A single act of measurement - the initial conditions of a logically determined system - would tell its story for all time. Indeed backwards or forwards in time with equal ease.
But then even that encountered the three body problem, the Galilean relativity problem, the spinning bucket problem, etc. The holism missing from the reductionism.
So the reductionist cant live without the holist to complete their schemes. But the counter logic of the holist is actually intellectually challenging. As a debate, the energy gets diverted into the trivialities of idealism vs realism or other mock-tournaments of metaphysical yore.
Holism means that epistemology and ontology can be divided, and yet they must also remain connected. There must be the two-way interface of the epistemic cut. An Umwelt. A point at which the informational models can do real work in their worlds in a way that is transparent and undeniable in its causal plausibility. That is, in the testable theories of biosemiosis.
In quantum theory, Copenhagen interpretation made the right kind of dialectical start. Decoherence brought in thermodynamics, but not the epistemic cut needed to stop the kind of classical logic splurge banjo is talking about in the way it seemed to entail a Many Worlds interpretation.
I have outlined many times how biosemiosis now adds the epistemic cut to the business of quantum interpretation. As a mechanism, a modelling relation, even our enzymes and respiratory chains are actually doing that - preparing states of coherence with the intention of collapsing them and so ratcheting the entropy flows of a Cosmos guided by the telos of the newly NASA-rediscovered concept of dissipative structure.
But as I agree, none of this is intellectually easy. So much always to be learnt!
Quoting apokrisis
Indeed, I didnt know what biosemiosis meant when I joined this forum, and Ive come to appreciate it. But theres also a spectrum of views in that community, Ive learned, and not all of the scholars in that field are as committed to physicalist principles. Ive found a recent book on biosemiotics and philosophy of mind which I mean to get back to. Meantime, grandad is being paged ;-)
Classical logic can't handle all sorts of stuff. Hegel's logic has generally been dealt with in a category theoretic framework. Or: here
Not that this makes a difference for the arguments about world history. Obviously we can't model out world history (or test such models for that matter). Classical logic would be even more useless here. You can however make a broadly empirical case for such arguments. For example, Fukuyama butchers Hegel, but he does provide better case studies and empirical support than most political philosophers. Honneth stays truer to Hegel and has a similar methodology.
Such an approach might be interesting, but the link has little content and I could find little else. Can you say more? It might be interesting to see some sort of formalisation of dialectic.
Ok. To my eye, it looks as if my critique has hit home and there is no difference to be given between your idealism and my realism.
I added a more detailed link. Lawvere would be the guy who got the ball rolling in this.
Anyhow, we both know "but it doesn't work in classical logic," is a terrible argument in most philosophical contexts. You seem to want to fall back onto formalism (and a simplistic one at that) thinking it can "set the record straight." But this is not what formalism can do for us. Hell, "it does work in classical logic," is not a particularly good one either.
Edit: The system in Spencer Brown's "Law's of Form" is another one that has obvious parallels to the Logics.
There you go. Sniffing after the idealist faction and so being able to set it against some realist counter-faction.
Finding the political divides as a distraction from the metaphysical meat. The bit that is the difficult chewing.
Thanks. I'm not reading that this morning. Maybe later.
I'm only using formalism in order to set out with some clarity the argument at hand. Putting Hegel's work in a model-theoretical formalism is presumably a way of set out more clearly what Hegel is up to. That's where formalism helps.
My critique is that dialectic approaches do not fix the nature of the synthesis. So given any thesis and antithesis, any of a number of syntheses are possible.
Can a model-theoretical approach show this not to be so, or in some way fix the positively rational moment? How, at least in outline?
There is a lot of interesting stuff on the contradictory nature of "sheer indeterminate being," or a "sheer something." A lot of time it's death with in an information theoretic context. Floridi writes a bit about this in his Philosophy of Information on "digital ontology" (although it's not specifically on Hegel). David Bohm's implicate order stuff, e.g. "why difference must be fundemental and come before similarity," is another.
From Terrell Bynum's chapter in the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Information, "Informational Metaphysics:"
Note: dedomena is Floridi's term. It means: mind-independent points of lack of uniformity in the fabric of Being mere differentiaedere (he also refers to them, metaphorically, as data in the wild).
Thanks for the reminder! I had quite forgotten that Lawvere had found Peirces antithesis between generality and vagueness to be a full categorical adjunction between the universal and existential quantifiers.
See Zelamea's Peirces Logic of Continuity. P41.
Or as he quotes Peirce on this move from the merely dyadic to the properly triadic:
Digging out the paper, I see Zelamea offers no proper source for this.
But generally speaking, being jogged on the connection is useful. Quantum field theory as our current nearest candidate to a theory of everything does set up this tantalising dialectic of free material potential and its necessary emergent topological constraints.
This is an emergent and holistic systems metaphysics. A particle exist in some substantial way as a topological constraint on an excitable field. Reality is hylomorphic. Ontic structuralism is its metaphysics. And our epistemic task is to reduce that to some mathematical model.
Dip into Peirce and you can see where he arrived as his own view of what this looked like and it was his existential graphs. Logic as topological order to be imposed on the vagueness of mere possibility.
And Lawvere on category theory as the follow on to topos theory. I can now see this in the same terms as again a bid to split the world into this dialectic of global topological order in the thermodynamic sense now entering maths and the vagueness or firstness of a simple tychic potential. An everythingness that in its own "sum over histories" contradictions must organise itself dissipatively and so arrive at some kind of global balance of tensions. An emergent topological order.
Zalamea writes on this in a more recent paper which I need to read Peirces Inversions of the Topological and the Logical.
But really for my current purposes, it is the fact that QFT encodes exactly this relation that matters. The dots are joined by the way gauge symmetry constrains particle physics, and even Poincare invariance constrains relativity, in an ontic structuralist fashion. Topological order is what shapes a world into being out of the vague potential that is what, for want of more precise terms, call the quantum foam. An everythingness that includes spacetime along with its supposed content.
Again, this could not be more wrong. Dialectical argument is no use unless it achieves the rigour of a dichotomy that which arrives at where it is going by showing itself to be "mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive."
A dichotomous distinction such as local and global has to show itself to frame the opposing limits of a reciprocal or inverse relation. How do you define local? As 1/global. How do you define global? As 1/local.
The point is that neither local nor global can exist alone as absolutes as generalities or unversalities. But they can exist together as opposing limits that then encompass the third thing of the action which is a moving towards one pole that is thus a complementary moving away from the other.
This is your mischaracterised "synthesis" step. Thirdness is where a dichotomy itself has become so generalised as the limits of a system that all the middleground is now a place of concretely-specified possibility.
The world that classical logic merely presumes to exist now in fact emerges due to a self-organising dialectical process of growth.
I've told you this innumerable times. One day I'm sure the penny will drop and you'll be able to happily exclaim: "See, you agreed with me all along!"
No more indigestion as lunchtime lasgna approaches. :ok:
My favorite!
To use your own example, where is the synthesis between global and local? Is it the nation? The state? The city? the neighbourhood? All of these - and what use is that?
And if anything will do, then nothing has been achieved.
Local-global bound the thirdness that is their hierarchically-ordered connection. A powerlaw or scalefree network is the mathematical model that describe its equilibrium growth. The balance that is a log/log statistical distribution.
So as an ideal, that is how we find societies organised as scalefree networks of interest. The world looks the same in its human essentials whether youre in your own home, living in a village, living in a nation, or forced to share the one planet in some orderly fashion.
A fractal world where competition and cooperation, lumping and splitting, integration and differentiation, etc, are present in the same way over all practical scales. If justice is a good, it is being implemented in ways suitably scaled from the toddler to the tantrumming president or nation.
Quoting Banno
Take your metabolism as exactly the same kind of dynamic, and one close to your heart.
Your body must have some ability to self-organise to be a body. If it metabolises, it needs a hierarchy that achieves an effective balance across all its scales of integration, from the solitary mitochondria to the whole person. And natural logic says that a sharp dichotomy is the route to allowing this systemic level of regulation. The metabolism must become metabolically switchable - to be crisply counterfactual in terms of its immediate aims - so as to be able to strike then a general balance of any useful kind at all.
And we see this dialectic built into the bodys structure over all its levels. Insulin to signal anabolism, glucagon to signal catabolism. Sympathetic nervous system to turn the knob down, parasympathetic NS to turn it back up.
The whole of biology, and neurology, becomes about understanding the organism in terms of its thermodynamically rooted dichotomies.
If you havent realised this about reality yet, you really have missed its essence. Youve been aboard the wrong logic train.
:roll: Back to abstruse verbosity.
I'll leave you to it; no doubt this post will be followed by another round of spit, but at least you now recognise that we are more than passive observers.
More spit from you as expected. You asked, I answered, you fled. :kiss:
Does idealism break physics?
What you often hear from idealists (Kastrup and Hoffman are good examples) is that materialism and a physical world is debunked and quantum physics tells us reality comes into being by the act of observation. Therefore idealism is a more reasonable and parsimonious explanation for our experience. I've often thought that the arguments in favour for idealism are actually more arguments against old school materialism than any great championing of an 'it's all consciousness' style metaphysics.
But I am neither a physicist or an idealist, so my comment was meant to capture the usual tropes provided.
I'm not sure if these questions are rhetorical or not. I'll have go anyway, I'm a sucker for a quiz.
1) You introduced commonsense and science, I was just going with your terms. The inference from analogy, which I suggested was done instinctively by most people (or maybe not, maybe people develop theory of mind some other way, it doesn't matter) might be called commonsense, or it might be philosophy. It doesn't matter. The point is that it isn't a theory of consciousness. It's a conjecture of which other things are conscious. Scientific theories of consciousness are typically functionalist ones, such as yours, the IIT, and others. They do make predictions about what other things are conscious based on the structure and function of those things (less so by analogy, although that may be part of it), but those predictions are not checkable except perhaps by reference to our instincts or common sense or philosophical arguments from analogy. It's entirely understandable that when commonsense and functional theories yield the same predictions, they are considered plausible. Neither are testable though, because we don't have a consciousness-o-meter. And the functionalist theories are wrong, and the inference to other minds is not taken far enough.
2) The functionalist theories are defeated by the zombies in which I don't believe, yes, because the functionalist theories seem consistent with there being no experiences present. So they might be valuable in some way, but not as explainers of consciousness.
3) That's an interesting question. My commonsense instinct is that they are not. Of course, what constitutes commonsense I suspect is somewhat culture-relative. I do think they are conscious though, just not in a way that particularly matters to me. I suspect that the content of the consciousness of my chair is so minimal to be of no interest to anything, possibly including the chair.
4) Several reasons. I have rehearsed the argument for panpsychism from the non-vagueness of the concept of consciousness many times on the forum. There may be an argument from psychological causation and non-overdetermination of the physical, but I have yet to develop that. It's important to keep in mind the broad landscape of theoretical possibilities. Out of those panspychism is the least problematic of the three basic possibilities: panpsychism, emergentism and eliminativism. Eliminatism is false by introspection. Emergentism is extremely problematic for a number of reasons already rehearsed. Panpsychism is problematic, but less so.
Quoting apokrisis
I think that the problem of this view is that it does not explain how those 'complex' objects/processes like 'enzymes' or 'respiratory chains' arose in the first place. Was everything in superposition back then? What happens when these kind of object 'cause' a collapse?
I think that all positions of what consitutes an 'observer' are susceptible to this kind of objection and it is a serious objection if QM is interpreted ontologically. I think that it is best to interpret it epistemically: wave-function, Born Rule etc are all useful concepts, computing techniques etc that enable us to make correct predictions. In this view the 'collapse' is just an update of knowledge and QM is silent about what 'happened' before the appearances of 'observers' (and it is also silent on what constitutes an 'observer'). QM is IMO best seen as a theory that does not make any ontological commitments: it does not give a 'picture' of 'how reality is'* and it does not say to us what an 'observer' is but is still very useful to make predictions, applications and so on. (My favorite interpretation is QBism, althought I think that, unfortunately sometimes its proponents seem to present it as an ontological interpretation of QM, perhaps unwittingly... especially when they talk about 'participatory realism')
As an aside, I do not think that 'decoherence' alone is enough to solve the measurement problem. It does explain (at least 'for all practical purposes') an appearance of a classical world, but it does not IMO explain why we observe a single outcome in quantum experiments (MWI supporters like decoherence because it explains why 'branches' of the wave-function separate. But MWI makes the additional assumption that all outcomes are actually observed even if they are inaccessible to us)
*I actually think that we tend to do that also in classical physics. For instance, an ontological interpretation of the concept of 'force' in newtonian mechanics is clearly inappropriate but it is an useful conceptual fiction that helps us to make predictions, build things etc (like, say, the concept of 'sunrise' or 'sunset'). The same IMO holds for QM.
Note, however that Hoffman does not really say that. He says, more or less that QM suggests that 'physical reality as it appears to us' comes into being by the act of observation. And he says that this is consistent with his 'interface theory of perception', i.e. the view that perception gives us a simplified interface of the 'external reality' which is useful for our survival.
Unfortunately, this is then mixed up with his 'conscious realism', i.e. his Berkeleyan-like view that conscious agents are the only reality. To his credit, he never say that the 'interface theory of perception'necessarily implies 'conscious realism'.
Note that his 'interface theory of perception' is a kind of epistemological idealism (which is actually compatible with the existence of a mind-independent reality). His 'conscious realism' is of course a form of ontological idealism. Unfortunately, sometimes his two theses are mixed up.
Nope. Enzymes are large mechanical structures. Decohered and classical for all intents and purposes. But they can dip their toe into the quantum realm, exploiting tunneling to jump chemical thresholds.
I posted this general story here - https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/679203
Quoting boundless
I make this same point all the time. :up:
:up: Glad to hear that! I think that, what is common to all physical theories is that they are predictive tools with an extraordinary range of practical applications. Physics per se does not give us any ontology IMO. I also think that many debates about topics like free will, reductionism* etc are due to an unneeded ontological interpretation of physical theories. In fact, I think that the most consistent form of 'realism' with all physical theories is actually what Bernard d'Espagnat called 'open realism' in his "On Physics and Philosophy" (p.28, emphasis in the original):
Of course this does not mean that is the only viable form of realism.
*I do believe, in fact, that even newtonian mechanics is not really 'reductionistic'. Conservation laws seems to me properties of a whole isolated system, not reducible to the properties of its parts. Of course, if one does not make any ontological commitments, newtonian mechanics is neither reductionistic nor holistic.
Quoting apokrisis
Thanks for the link. I'll ask more questions after reading it :)
What difference does that make? Do you imagine that astrobiologists are ignorant of Negentropy? Why are you trying to put-down this "new law" with nit-picky irrelevant comments? Does it contradict your personal worldview in some way? Do you read into it some outrageous religious doctrine? Is there some particular sore-point that it aggravates? Spell it out. What "well known" wheel are they reinventing?
My interest in this "new" perspective on Evolution is because it fits neatly into to my personal Holistic philosophical worldview, which underlies all of my comments on this forum. Biologist Jan Smuts, in his 1926 book Holism and Evolution, foresaw this expansion of evolutionary principles from Biology to Mineralogy and everything else : "The whole-making, holistic tendency, or Holism, . . . . is seen at all stages of existence, and is by no means confined to the biological domain, to which science has hitherto restricted it".
I doubt that the Cornell scientists "remember that classic". But they may have been influenced by its gradual percolation into the philosophical culture of science over the intervening years. Holism is currently known in science & engineering as General Systems Theory. The "missing evolutionary law" they postulated is merely one small step in the direction of a universal holistic worldview. And my renaming of the inappropriate term Negentropy as "EnFormAction", and negative Entropy as positive "Enformy" is just another increment in that trend away from classical scientific Reductionism toward general philosophical Holism*1.
Smuts asserted that Holism "is the motive force behind Evolution". It's what Bergson, grasping for a metaphor, called elan vital*2. But that was mis-interpreted as a religious concept similar to the Holy Spirit. The philosophical worldview of reductive Scientism might understandably be opposed to the notion of Holism, in that it pictures Evolution as a positive trend in Nature, instead of a downhill tumble toward entropic Heat Death. FWIW, my worldview is more optimistic. What about yours? :smile:
*1. I can't get my head around Reductionism vs Holism :
[i]Many articles present reductionism as the whole is the sum of its parts. Holism is presented as the antithesis, that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. . . .
According to wikipedia, an example of reductionism is that the solar system can be explained in terms of planets and the gravitational forces between them. What strikes me as contradictory, is that I would have thought that the gravitional forces constitute an interaction between parts, not a part in and of itself? Therefore, this example conveys to me that reductionism is the idea that the whole is the sum of its parts and the interaction between the parts?[/i]
https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/vrgba7/i_cant_get_my_head_around_reductionism_vs_holism/
Note --- The "interaction" between parts is what I call EnFormAction.
*2. Élan Vital is a term coined by French philosopher Henri Bergson in his 1907 book Creative Evolution, in which he addresses the question of self-organisation and spontaneous morphogenesis of things in an increasingly complex manner. ____Wikipedia
Matthew 20:1-16
Sure one can equate gene regulated metabolic networks to wind sculpted sand dunes in broad dissipative structure language and then apply Szostaks notion of functional information to both. But one system actually does have a memory in the semiotic sense, the other doesnt.
So this becomes another overheated exercise in the Santa Fe tradition where self organising dynamics or topological order are meant to explain everything, and yet they cant actually explain the key thing of how a molecule becomes a message and so how life and mind arise within the merely physical world.
For astrobiology perhaps especially, this is an amateur hour mistake.
Quoting apokrisis
So, I agree, I think it exactly the point of the diagram. As the response notes, the mind creates gestalts, meaningful wholes, by which recognise not only letters, but also the basic features of the world. Gestalts are fundamental to cognition. Here I also want to mention Mind and the Cosmic Order, Charles Pinter. His basic thesis is likewise that cognition operates in terms of gestalts, those elements, corresponding to categories of animal sensation, which it carves out from the background and recognises as meaningful wholes. This, he says, operates even in insects (citing research to this effect)
[quote=Chapter 3, Abstract]Everything you see, hear and think comes to you in structured wholes: When you read, youre seeing a whole page even when you focus on one word or sentence. When someone speaks, you hear whole words and phrases, not individual bursts of sound. When you listen to music, you hear an ongoing melody, not just the note that is currently being played. Ongoing events enter your awareness as Gestalts, for the Gestalt is the natural unit of mental life. If you try to concentrate on a dot on this page, you will notice that you cannot help but see the context at the same time. Vision would be meaningless, and have no biological function, if people and animals saw anything less than integral scenes.[/quote]
The question I want to ask is the sense in which gestalts are irreducible. (Maybe its here where I'm said to be constantly 'sliding between the epistemic (what is knowledge) and ontological (what are the fundamental constituents of the world.)) But if gestalts are fundamental to cognition, how can you get outside them to see what is causally prior to them? And isnt the so-called wave function collapse exactly analogous to the forming of a gestalt where there was previously only an array of probabilities? It must surely be something like that for Wheelers diagram, as it was presented in the context of his discussion of his baffling delayed choice experiment. But then, this analysis is naturally holistic rather than reductionist, as in this analysis the fundamental units are not physical but cognitive.
The title of this thread is not a "claim", but a question. In the OP, I did make one positive statement : "Although I'm not comforted by scriptural assurances that "all things work together for good", I do infer a kind of Logic to the chain of Cause & Effect in the physical world --- and an overall proportional parity between positive & negative effects". You claimed that the universe "slides inevitably toward thermodynamic equilibrium". If so, how do you explain the historical fact that the metaphorical Big Bang didn't immediately or inevitably evaporate in a puff of entropic smoke? Why, after 14 billion sol-years of wasted energy, due to disorganizing Entropy, is the "explosion" not only still expanding, but even accelerating, and creating a plethora of novel physical configurations, along with animated organisms, and a few metaphysical (mental) forms of cosmic stuff? How has the world evaded "inevitable" heat death for so long?
Astronomers, who traced the current state of affairs back to a pinpoint in the remote past, concluded that the Singularity began in a size smaller than an atom, and hotter & denser than any star. If so, how could inevitable heat-wasting Entropy produce anything more complex than a cold dark cinder? My philosophical hypothesis --- not a scientific claim --- is in agreement with anthropologist Henri Bergson's notion of Creative Evolution*1, in which he speculated that some then-unknown causal agency or principle, working counter to that of Entropy, is the explanation for the manifold exceptions to Thermodynamic Doom that we observe right here on the Blue Planet. In 400BC, Plato postulated an organizing force in the world, labelled "Logos". The term "Negentropy" was coined by Erwin Schrödinger in his 1944 book What is Life? In 1926, biologist Jan Smuts, presciently coined the term "Holism" to describe that same anti-entropy trend in natural evolution. In 2008, Gnomon, not a scientist nor a genius, coined the terms EnFormAction and Enformy to encapsulate all of the above principles.
None of these scientists relied on religious revelation for their belief in "creative evolution". Instead, they merely applied logical inferences of cause & effect, to explain how isolated things & events could combine into the whole integrated system of morphogenesis*2 (form creation) we call Evolution. Likewise, my own personal philosophical worldview is not grounded on any religious faith, but on rational reasoning from scientific & philosophical evidences. Therefore, I can agree with your assertion that "complex brains & minds make it so". But not with the implication that thermodynamic deconstruction could produce, or even allow, such complexity & consciousness by a random network of cosmic accidents. Entropy is always destructive of order, except when it is morphed into Enformy*3.
Instead, I agree with those geniuses from previous generations that there is some constructive creative agency causing positive form-change in the world. And I point the finger at the aimless Causal Force we call Energy. But energy alone can be either constructive or destructive. So, I follow those predecessors to conclude that raw Energy is directed & guided by internal cohesion & interaction to behave in coordinating cooperating Holistic ways. You next question, I suppose is : is that agency a god? My answer is : I don't know, but I currently treat it as an ordinary force of Nature, similar to abstract formles Energy, except working counter to Entropy. :nerd:
*1a. Élan Vital is a term coined by French philosopher Henri Bergson in his 1907 book Creative Evolution, in which he addresses the question of self-organisation and spontaneous morphogenesis of things in an increasingly complex manner. ____Wikipedia
*1b. Bergson's thesis is that Darwinian and Lamarkian evolution are only half the story and that there is a creative urge inherent in life that defines the direction
*2. Morphogenesis is defined as the suite of underlying biological processes orchestrating the dynamic formation of macroscopic shapes in biological matter.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/biochemistry-genetics-and-molecular-biology/morphogenesis
*3. Enformy :
In the Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, meta-physical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce complexity & progress.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
In being holistic, they would be irreducible to atomic events, but perfectly reducible to semiotic structures the triadic structure of a hierarchical order.
Semiotic logic says reality has irreducible complexity. You can't get simpler than as Gestalt theory puts it the relational view that is a figure and its ground. The hierarchical thing of the local mark within its global frame. Each holistically needs the "other" for anything to definitely be. And what exists to be talked about is that there is not just a difference, but a difference that makes a difference as it is a mark made in a way that has its answering interpretive context.
So holisism reduces, just as atomism reduces. But one finds its irreducible foundations at the level of a system of relations, the other at the level of naked actions in voids.
(And a holist will point out that "actions in voids" is still really a dialectical metaphysics. Atomism just likes to brush over this uncomfortable fact.)
Quoting Wayfarer
The "collapse" is reductionism jumping to its atomistic conclusion. The wavefunction is an encoding of how a quantum system has the holism of its relational context.
So a gestalt as a brain process does jump to find its atomistic events by equally abruptly turning everything around the event into the discarded information that becomes the "void" which makes the event now stand out in high contrast fashion.
You can actually measure this with electrodes taped to the skull. When a subject suddenly spots a target in "Where's Wally" fashion there is a characteristic P300 wave of activity. The brain attends by suddenly suppressing all the background buzz and so zeroing in on Wally where he has been hiding among to crowd. This takes about 300 milliseconds. One instant, you experience a confused sea of faces, the next you are exactly sure there is that bobble hat, specs and striped jumper just behind some random figure.
Quoting Wayfarer
Delayed choice says that at the quantum level, entanglement is across time as well as space. As you would expect from spacetime. So emergence must rule. In some physical sense, everything is connected in a global contextual fashion that stands "outside" our classically imagined spacetime.
But then, the Cosmos can have its P300 contrast sharpening event and Wally pops out as a collapse of the wavefunction. A particle appears "right here" in terms of some mechanical recording device having its logic state flipped. The particle could have been anywhere within the context of the bounds imposed by the constraints of relativistic spacetime. But all those other possible places become now concretely suppressed by the fact that energy got dissipate in precisely this one localised event.
Signal is created by noise being discarded. In Gestalt terms, the squiggled R stands out on the blank page as clearly being the mark that matters and requiring our full attention. Wally is plain and present. But what quantum theory says as does semiotics is that the making of the blank page is just as much what just happened as the sudden appearance of this distinctive mark. Voids can't be taken for granted. They appear along with the particles that are being manifested.
At the quantum level, the wavefunction greatly narrows the space of possibilities. It already adds enough constraints to roughly define the outcomes in terms of their probabilities. We are already looking for Wally either going through one slit or both slits, depending on how we choose to add our finishing touch in terms of an act of measurement a final thermal forcing of the situation that completely constrains things.
But then as I just said, preparing a system to the level it is now counterfactually poised between two equally possible outcomes is already a fairly decohered state of reality. Electrons fired at diffraction grating in a laboratory is hardly the same as even trying to find an electron-like action in the Planckscale fireball of the Big Bang.
We exist at a scale where the Big Bang has become almost its Heat Death void. The blank sheet of paper of the atomistic imagination has become pretty much the case as something that is "just there" and being scribbled all over by the marks of atomic events. The void is no longer hot enough to add the uncertainty that would make it hard to tell electrons and protons apart from the spacetime they exist in.
Wheeler's diagram of course is still just making an epistemic point. But given you want to connect to the ontology of quantum theory, this is how that same "holistic gestalt logic" applies to existence as a story of Big Bang decoherence. The emergence of a blank page and its marks from a hot roil of unbounded possibilities where neither could as yet counterfactually exist.
Right. the basic features of the world are not mind-created, but mind-recognized.
Still struggling with how this can be meaningfully said to be physical in nature. The appeal of atomism is the ostensible 'indivisible unit' which represents in atomic form 'the unchanging'. To say that reality is 'irreducibly complex' seems to omit something fundamental to metaphysics, the unconditioned or unmade.
And how is this incompatible with, say, Kastrup's form of analytical idealism?
Quoting Gnomon
Bergson.
Quoting Banno
It's only to rational sentient beings that the question matters.
Quoting Janus
There are no features without minds. In the absence of minds the universe, such as it is, is featureless, formless, and lacking in any perspective.
To my eye your account of energy is wishful thinking.
It certainly is not accepted physics.
How can you possibly know this?
I was just about to write "How could you know that" when I looked directly above and saw that Banno beat me to it.
Quoting Wayfarer
Lay out the reasoning.
I can't think of a better example of "whereof one cannot speak..."
[quote=Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics]The books argument begins with the British empiricists who raised our awareness of the fact that we have no direct contact with physical reality, but it is the mind that constructs the form and features of objects. It is shown that modern cognitive science brings this insight a step further by suggesting that shape and structure are not internal to objects, but arise in the observer. The author goes yet further by arguing that the meaningful connectedness between things the hierarchical organization of all we perceive is the result of the Gestalt nature of perception and thought, and exists only as a property of mind. These insights give the first glimmerings of a new way of seeing the cosmos: not as a mineral wasteland but a place inhabited by creatures. [/quote]
You see, this also provides a plausible grounds for why the 'unreasonable efficiency of mathematics in the natural sciences' and Kant's 'synthetic a priori'. As our cognition naturally operates in terms of gestalts, which are fundamentally cognitive in nature, and both logic and mathematics pertain to the relation between gestalts. So there's no longer a question of how what is apparently 'internal to the mind' can be so accurate with respect to 'the external world', as on one level, they're united.
Edit: Some rhetoric appeared above as I wrote...still waiting for the reasoning.
Or should that be "what..."?
Just to be clear: are you claiming that the world absent any perceivers could not possibly possess any differentiation whatsoever? If that were so, then how to explain the advent of perceivers in a world of difference and diversity?
How did the Great Amorphous Nothing give rise to the Immensely Complex Something?
Quoting Wayfarer
Even to say that "In the absence of minds the universe such as it is, is featureless, formless, and lacking in any perspective" is too much. Absent the mind, and you absent inference itself.
For us, the world is always, already interpreted.
But you will take this as implying that there is no world without mind. It doesn't. It implies only that there is no interpretation without mind.
You take one step further than your argument allows.
:up: That's an apt and succinct way of putting it.
No - because 'the world' that you imagine exists in the absence of any mind, is not 'a world'. The etymology of the noun 'world' comes from an old European word for 'time of man'. No mind, no world - not because the world ceases to exist, but it has no form, perspective, duration, and so on.
In order for you to establish what the world would be outside your cognition of it, you would have to stand outside that whole process of cognition. (This is even recognised in analytical philosophy, in Sellars' 'the myth of the given'.)
Shocking but true.
Quoting Wayfarer
I have no wish to "establish what the world would be outside your cognition"; it's a nonsense.
And that's not "the myth of the given"...
:roll:
I think it sets out my claim pretty well.
The triadic structure is now your "unconditioned or unmade". It is the inescapable outcome of anything striving to occur at all.
So rather than starting with some fundamental material, there can only be the vagueness of a "quantum foam" potential. And then that evolves in a natural way by suppressing its own variety to become a well-formed outcome a state of definite somethingness.
This is reality as encoded by quantum field theory (QFT) as well as Peircean metaphysics or Aristotelean hylomorphism.
That there is a world that may be different to our beliefs is shown, not said. It's not an "inference". It's demonstrated by the cup coming out of the dishwasher clean, and all manor of other interactions, with medium sized smallgoods and whatever else you might find. It's what enables you to say the car keys are in your pocket even when you can't see or feel them. And even when you are not thinking about them.
That was the very point of the passage from Berkeley's dialogues that I provided, in which this exact objection is made to Philonous/Berkeley. Hylas says 'if all you admit is the reality of ideas, then how come your ideas can be wrong, like when a stick in the water appears to be bent?' It's the same objection you're offering here, that our beliefs can be different to what we discover about the world. But notice that Philoonous qua idealist does have an answer to that, along the lines of coherentism.
Besides, this is something much deeper than a matter of belief. The cognitive process of world-construction is subconscious or subliminal. I'm talking about our whole 'meaning-world', the entirety of our sense of self-and-world. That is created by the mind but not the conscious ego or self. It goes much deeper than that, it is a process which informs all living things.
I think what you're instinctively defending is naive realism (no pejorative intended). You are shocked by the questioning of the reality of the sensable world. Damn it, can't he just see that my cups are in the cupboard even with the door closed?!? That they don't dissappear when I can't see them?!? I'm not saying that, but that is how you're reading it.
Cheers but there is nothing to excuse, it's an open forum.
Quoting Wayfarer
It has nothing to do with coherentism. The reality that we can be mistaken about. according to Berkeley, is the human mind-independent reality of what Goid has in mind, as opposed to the materialist reality of mind-independent existents.
You have been challenged to explain how it is that we all perceive the same things, if you reject both the idea of mind-independent existents and Berkeley's human mind-independent ideas in the mind of God. It seems you just don't want to admit you can find no alternative.
I don't deny the reality of objects. Heck, I myself have coffee cups, and some of them are in the dishwasher even as I write this. I'm not arguing for solipsism. My claim is that (1) reality has an ineluctably subjective pole, and (2) that no world can be [s]imagined[/s] real in which this is not the case (3) that this subjective pole or ground is never itself amongst the objects considered by naturalism, and (4) that the emphasis on objectivity as the sole criteria for what is real is deeply mistaken on those grounds.
Quoting Wayfarer
Cobblers. I'm showing how language works, rather than defending naive realism.
1) reality has an ineluctably subjective pole.
Our understanding of the world has an ineluctably "subjective" pole. Scare quote because subjective is a loaded term. The world just is as it is, regardless of what you think of it - as is demonstrated by error, novelty and there being other folk.
(2) that no world can be imagined in which this is not the case.
To imagine is to invoke this "subjective" pole; so this looks to be tautologous.
(3) that this subjective pole or ground is never itself amongst the objects considered by naturalism
Psychology does just that.
(4) that the emphasis on objectivity as the sole criteria for what is real is deeply mistaken on those grounds.
"Objective" is just as loaded.
You'll notice I struck out 'imagined' and replaced it with 'real'.
Quoting Banno
Of course you're defending naive realism. That is made particularly obvious by your homely choices of kitchen utensils to stand in for 'the object'.
Quoting Banno
It's a given, right?
Reality as experienced and interpreted by us has a subjective pole, so no disagreement there.
Quoting Wayfarer
We can imagine that the world without us has no subjective pole, in fact it seems to be the most plausible conclusion. We cannot imagine "what the world is like" without perceivers, because the idea of 'what it is like' is meaningless outside the context of perception and judgement. On the other hand, we can imagine that it is differentiated, that is that it is not amorphous, and the idea that it is differentiated has more explanatory power than the idea that it is amorphous, because if it were amorphous there would be no explanation for how we come to perceive difference.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. obviously not because it is a concept not a concrete thing.
Quoting Wayfarer
Objectivity is not a criterion, but a mode, of existence.
What is the alternative? That the world just is what it isn't? I have to say, Wayfarer, that I am yet, after all the exchanges we have had over the last twelve or however many years, to gain any clear idea of what it is you are actually arguing for.
No. I'm a bit surprised you think this of what has been said. The world is what is the case.
I agree with the general point that you are making, but it also has the difficulty that a perceptible world - a perception-enabling world - must come as the dialectical package of cohesion and its incoherences, or differentiations and integrations, its continuities and its discreteness, and so on.
So to see the local thing of some difference, we must also see how it is a difference that makes a difference. And now we get into how we see the globalism or holism that could make a mark meaningful. We seem to see directly the material event - the bruteness of the stone we kick or cup we smash - but not so directly the global organising purpose or finality involved.
It is thus correct to complain about physicalism or even logic that doesnt make the effort to wrap up both sides of the equation when it comes to the reality that exists in a fashion that does make it rationally perceptible.
That version of physics or logic is idealism promoting in itself. Not deflationary in the fashion it might wish.
For whom? And what was their purpose?
Always just half the story. Lumpen realism delivered from an egocentrically fixed view.
Quoting apokrisis
It seems plausible to think that there is much that is the case despite there being no one around to notice it, care about it, or comment on it, or even able to be consciously aware of it. I don't see that equating with "lumpen realism" if by that term you mean 'naive realism'. I think what we consciously experience always is "just half the story".
Erm. What are these and how would we know?
Well, not for the folk for whom the world is what is not the case.
It's important.
I would be less underwhelmed if you had a substantive counter to my claim that nothing novel is being said. The definition I quoted before is virtually tautology. What you have been saying about it looks like exaggeration to me.
Well, you said:
[quote=Banno]The world just is as it is, regardless of what you think of it [/quote]
Isn't that just another way of saying that its reality is a given? What else could it possibly mean?
Quoting Banno
But I've already addressed that very point:
Quoting Wayfarer
According to the classical tradition of philosophy, we do not see 'what is really the case'. Seeing what is really the case is the hallmark of sagacity, and it's generally considered very rare. We are too self-centred and our cognition is distorted by innummerable biases (encapsulated under the heading 'avidya' in Indian philosophy). The purpose of philosophy is to dispel the darkness of ignorance, to overcome our unconsciously self-centred view of the world. Science actually got it's start from this very same intuition.
Quoting apokrisis
:100:
No.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sure, "The cognitive process of world-construction is subconscious or subliminal. I'm talking about our whole 'meaning-world', the entirety of our sense of self-and-world. That is created by the mind but not the conscious ego or self" using the stuff around us.
Yawn.
So it is for the folk. But only if they are just like you?
Sounds accurate.
This is his problem. If the world reveals itself to the degree it can frustrate our desires, then dialectically this epistemology of truth demands the existence of those desires as the other half of its egocentric equation.
That half of the story is what had gone missing in the way his theory is set out. This is where a lack of rigour appears in the locutions.
More spit.
Quoting apokrisis
Are you suggesting that there are folk for whom the world is not what is the case?
More dribble.
'Not my will, but thine, oh Lord' is one way of solving that problem.
Incidentally I did a search on 'biosemiosis and idealism' which predictably returned a number of interesting articles, the top one of which is called The Idealistic Elements of Modern Semiotic Studies. So far it seems quite an approachable read. It starts with this quotation:
Which seems congenial to my p-o-v. Much of what I've read so far is on the contribution of Kant to Uexküll vision of the 'umwelt' but I'm still going....
What?
Quoting apokrisis
Then wipe your chin.
Why are you always so flustered when the weaknesses of your positions are itemised in public. Do think someone cares?
Well, you keep replying to my posts...
Odd, then, that so much of what you direct at me is spit and name-calling. You could just ignore me, if you think my arguments so poor.
Fairness and justice are things we do, not things we find. This is a core problem with the account you offer.
Along the way the thread went quantum, and you brought up dialectic, and I pointed out a couple of problems with it. Now Way's idealist confusions are in the mix, so a discussion about justice has morphed into ontology.
That "what?" above was quite genuine - I do not understand your purpose in saying
Quoting apokrisis
in response to my simple "Quoting Wayfarer
You are disparaging of "The world is all that is the case", but have offered nothing coherent, no alternative and certainly not a refutation. Instead you offer trivial disparaging comments.
I dunno, Apo. Seems to me you either haven't followed the thread of my discussion or can't address it adequately. That you are a smart fellow, let down by an inability to express yourself clearly and simply.
SO here is my first post:
Quoting Banno
And yours:
Quoting apokrisis
Have we made progress? I still think I'm right and you are not even answering the question.
I said, in declaring this, you are basically starting that the empirical world is a given, the reality of which can't be called into question. I said this is subject to the criticism usually described as the myth of the given. I regard that as a coherent criticism of your common-sense realism.
I know we're talking past one another. From my side, I feel I offer arguments, and they're often ignored. From your side, what I think are arguments seem to be meaningless or pointless. Perhaps our perspectives are in some sense incommensurable.
But this is not the Given. If you think it is you are welcome to set out your account. But I am reluctant to go into detail about Sellars in a thread that is already far, far removed from its main topic. Your invitation features a very large hole, and is declined.
Why the scare quotes around reality?
At issue is whether the world is mind-independent or is not. You claimed:
Quoting Banno
And I think that what you have in mind when you say that, is not what I mean by the term 'idealism', although I quite agree it's not worth another go-around.
I often wonder if this odd commitment of Banno's derives from his Wittgenstenianism:
Quoting Peter L. P. Simpson, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on Self and Object, p. 10
The bit where I pointed out the narcissism of small differences. I'm not convinced that what I call realism is not what you call idealism.
Quoting Wayfarer
Simply because the word was only needed in order to link to your comment. I would have been happy leaving it out: The world - things that are the case - cannot be called into question.
That can't be a serious question.
It has been many years now. Banno remains coy about what his metaphysics truly is. I have no idea what he wants to hide from us. But it is probably something to do with showing rather than speaking. Which isn't so easy a position to defend given this is a forum dealing in the currency of words. :smile:
Quoting Wayfarer
I understand that. You focus on your "ineliminable subjective pole" and I on my "true statements" and we argue past each other. I have agreed that there is an "ineliminable subjective pole" to our intentional states, as set out by propositional attitudes, (contra to 's claim), but argue that there are also true statements, and in reply you seem to hold that there are no true statements, only propositional attitudes.
But that summation, at least, might indicate some progress.
Pretty much silentism.
Only to point out how you keep failing to properly answer anything. The only concrete updates concern the height of your intray of urgent messages to attend, and how long before you can retire to your well earnt lunch.
What an important life you lead.
Quoting Banno
That is pretty outrageous given the reality is so easy to check.
Yes that was indeed your first post. @Gnomon's second reply. I'm sure he valued its razor insightfulness. No doubt the thread ought to have ended right there.
Then I offered four posts after that, approaching 2000 words, none addressed to you. I mean, what could one have said to counter a slogan that might have fallen out of someone's crumbled fortune cookie?
Then you cite a further reply I made to @180 Proof as if it were a reply to your only contribution to that point.
You seem to be trying to construct a scenario where you have been the egregious victim of some most foul attack. This suggest a loose contact with reality.
Quoting Banno
Of course you do. Or of course it is what you would say. But the facts speak for themselves. All you deliver is posturing and never a good faith answer. It has been that way forever. Do you fault me for finding it all so amusing?
Sure, but the difficulty occurs later, when the cheerleaders for Scientism are fast asleep and the real questions arise.
---
- Yep! :grin:
So maybe your confusion is that we all ought to be silent in your presence? If you say very little, that is already quite enough for everyone concerned.
Perhaps @Wayfarer could take you on a Zen retreat? All parties would be satisfied by that solution!
I don't make shit up like you just did. Wonder a bit more about the why of that.
But note the comment that Uexküll creatively re-interpreted Kant's transcendental idealism so as to make it more biologically realistic. Idealism had to be pulled back from the ledge Kant had left it on. The cognitive model was the part of the story that was stressed.
Quoting Wayfarer
The paper nicely makes clear that Uexküll was making the modelling relations point the story shared by other biologists like Rosen and Pattee. An organism forms its own bubble of psychology an internal informational economy that balances expectation and surprise. A sense of self arises to the degree this model achieves control over the world.
A newborn even has to discover it owns its hands and feet. The pole it starts from is neither subjective nor objective. It is just a vagueness. A blooming buzzing confusion. But very quickly a pragmatic connection to reality is formed. A strong sense of self emerges to stand opposed to an equally strong sense of living in a world, with even other such minds.
In all this, there is no real metaphysical tension between mind and reality. It is just all about developing an epistemic structure. An organism develops a habit of predicting its environment so as to minimise its surprise. In this way, it can impose its "will" on the world. The world can come to be seen as an extension of its own desires.
You can then say this means all we experience is the limits of our own mentality. The thing in itself is left out of the equation. And science makes a big mistake in seeming to claim otherwise. But while science often does seem to claim this, along with the lumpen realists, science just as much understands in great detail the way it is all a self-interested cognitive construct that we dwell in as our personal space. That other semiotic view has always been there and has grown stronger in recent years.
So there is epistemic idealism and ontic idealism. And epistemic idealism is easy to defend. That is the way cognitive psychology has been trending again.
You can see this enactive turn now casually cited as a paradigm shift. As in this random Nature paper I was reading:
I myself never went to a specifically Zen retreat, although I did do others, including the arduous 10-day Goenka retreat in the past. Anyway I don't have the temperament or self-discipline required for Zen, I'm what Buddhists call bombu (the foolish ordinary man. )
That Nature quote - sure, Ive been hearing about the 4E approach - enactive, embodied, embedded, extended. Vervaeke often talks about that. Kant is not the last word but there are aspects of his philosophy that remain essential (the fifth E?)
Quoting apokrisis
Totally. I get there are many scientists who have that insightful approach. Im arguing more against the residue of old-school materialism which is a very different thing, and still a very influential stream of thought. Its like the greening of America, the emergence of Consciousness III as that book had it. Im pretty well on board with all the biological theorists youve introduced me to, as theyre generally not what I have in mind when I criticize scientism.
Quoting Banno
I have acknowledged that there are empirical facts that can be objectively demonstrated. It's not as if theyre mind-dependent in depending on my believing them. Fire burns, medicine heals, knives cut and those who say otherwise are objectively mistaken. As Ive said, Kantian philosophy allows for the consanguinity of empirical facts with transcendental idealism. But the empirical realm is itself constituted by and in the transcendental subject (i.e. some mind, some observer, not myself or a particular individual).
Hi, I read your linked post and I enjoyed it. But still I don't understand how 'classicality' 'comes to be' in your view.
Let's consider a less crude version of the Schrodinger's cat experiment, where the cat is either awake or asleep. Decoherence IMO can only remove interference, not superposition, hence the cat is still, if we take the quantum formalism literally, awake and asleep at the same time. However, decoherence gives the appearance of classicality because it says that it is observed in a definite state.
Let's say that I observe the 'asleep' cat. In your view, what happened to the 'awake' cat?
In MWI, the superposition is always preserverd and each definite state is 'actualized' in a branch of the wavefunction (but observers have access only to one). The 'branching' can be seen as due to decoherence.
In epistemic Copenaghen-ish views, QM is not to be interpreted literally and the collapse is just an update of knowledge (these views do not make any ontological commitments to what 'happens' before the observation: the state of the 'unobserved' cat is beyond the range of descriptions).
In (non-local) hidden variables interpretations, the cat is always in an unique state and it is determined by these hidden variables
In spontanueos collapse theories (these are actually not interpretations as they make different predictions from QM), at a certain scale wave-functions collapse and give an unique definite outcome
In RQM, anything can be an observer and any interaction is a measurement. But, again, like in epistemic views the 'unobserved' cat is in an indefinite state.
And so on.
Spontaneous collapse theories - (Edit: or maybe some version of MWI) - IMO seem to me the most compatible to your views.
For instance, the concept of 'reference frames' is central to the theory. In fact, many physical quantities have undefined values before a reference frame is specified, i.e. this means that they are not intrinsic properties of physical objects but only relational ones. Reference frames are associated to physical objects but are actually abstract concepts of the theory - they more or less correspond to 'perspectives' where a given object is at rest. And all measurements happen in a given frame of references.
Anyway, even in classical, newtonian, mechanics the 'physical world as it is, independent from any perspective' is quite different from 'the observed reality', which is always associated to a given frame of reference.
Related to the above, I would ask: what constitues a 'perspective'/'reference frames' in physics?
And how is the physical world independent of all perspectives? Can we describe it?
Classicality comes to be in the limit. So reality never arrives at that ideal conception we have of it, but through decoherence, it approaches a classical state for all practical purposes. We can apply that brand of physics and logic to it.
Quoting boundless
But the cat is a hot body in a warm place. It went into the box decohered and not coherent. It wasn't converted to a Bose condensate. It remained always in a "thermalised to classicality state".
Now if you supercool and properly isolate some system of entangled particles or coherent light, then it goes into the box and remains coherent until the box is opened or rather, rudely probed by a thermalising measuring device. That is when the quantum description becomes a more appropriate theoretical account.
Quoting boundless
MWI is the kind of nonsense to be avoided. Spontaneous collapse fails if you demand that reality actually be classical rather than just decohered towards its concrete limit. Zeilinger's information principle captures some aspects nicely.
To be honest, I set the interpretation aside these last few years to let the dust settle. Youngsters like Emily Adlam are coming along and making more sense.
But as I say, biophysics puts it all in a new light. Something has been missing. It seems obvious to me that this is it.
Ok, I see. But IMO, while decoherence - for all practical purposes - explains why we see definite outcomes in experiments, it doesn't explain why experiments have a unique outcome. In other words, as far as I can tell, this is why decoherence is not taken as a complete solution of the measurement paradox. Decoherence gives the definiteness of the observed outcome but is not enough to explain the uniqueness of the outcome.
Quoting apokrisis
OK, you are right.
Quoting apokrisis
Ok, sorry for the misunderstanding then. I fully agree with you about MWI. I referred to spontaneuous collapse theories because they provide a consistent 'ontologically interpretable' (or 'realist') explanation for the uniqueness of the outcomes.
But, anyway, I concede that, in a sense, one can say that decoherence is 'enough': after all, it is enough to explain, for all practical purposes, why we get definite outcomes. As far as observations, applications, and practical concerns are concerned, yeah, you don't need other assumptions. Still, from a theoretical point of view, I think that uniqueness of the outcomes is a crucial assumption in physics and I do not see how decoherence can explain that.
Quoting apokrisis
Ok, I see! I don't know Adlam, thanks for the reference.
In a sense I think I agree with you. IMO, I see QM as a practical recipe, useful for predictions and applications. I favor epistemic interpretations like QBism. I think that it is impossible to make a literal interpretation of the 'orthodox' quantum formalism that makes 'fully' sense, so to speak.
Quoting apokrisis
Ok, I see, thank you.
Personally, I think that QM strongly suggest that we cannot describe physical reality as it is independently from a particular perspective and that physical theories are, in general, useful tools and 'fictions' (but as I said in my previous post, I think that this insight is actually present even in newtonian physics, albeit less explicitly). But this certainly does not mean that, in the future, it won't be replaced by something better.
P.S. I have a hunch that you might find interesting the Thermal interpretation by Arnold Neumaier. It is an 'ontologically interpretable' interpretation which apparently solves the measurement problem and other issues of other 'realist' interpretations (btw, it is also holistic: it sees entangled particles as a single extended objects, not reducible to its parts that have nonlocal properties...so some 'quantum weirdness' remain). Unfortunately, his papers are too difficult for me
To say the world is what is, presupposes world, yet still leaves what unanswered as to its case.
The world is what is the case is the analytical tautological truth we end up with, but says nothing about how we got there.
The world is all and any of that of which being the case, is determinable a posteriori.
Doesnt the same problem crop up in a relativistic context such as the simultaneity issue? No absolute reference frame and yet that can still be approached in the limit.
Events certainly happen in spacetime. But fixing them precisely is a problem for both the quantum and relativistic view. Which in turn leads us to a contextual view of things becoming counterfactually definite as a classical logic would seem to demand. It is enough that our uncertainty is tightly constrained.
Quoting boundless
Yes. It is perfectly acceptable to me to go full Copenhagen and say all we can know is the numbers we read off dials. If a proper ontic interpretation isnt available, quantum physics still works as instrumentalism. Copenhagen remains the sensible backstop epistemic position.
I am a Pragmatist after all.
Quoting boundless
Yeah. Heard quite a bit from him on Physics Forum some years back. But I cant remember whether I was agreeing or disagreeing with him at the time. I will have to check that reference. :up:
I agree with that. In fact, I believe that relativity has similar interpretative difficulties. On one hand, a 'literal' interpretation of relativity leads one to an 'eternalist block view', i.e. change and the 'now' are merely illusions. On the other hand, as Einstein himself said the 'now' is a great problem for relativity. After all, the experience of the 'now' is undeniable and so 'immediate' experience seems to contradict a literal interpretation of relativity. So what?
In relativity the 'branching' of space-time into space and time is associated to the choice of a particular reference frame, i.e. perspective. This is similar to what happens in QM with 'observers' (whatever one takes them to be): only at measurement/observation/interaction etc physical quantities assume a definite value. But hey, even in classical mechanics velocities etc have undefined value until a reference frame is chosen.
Like QM and like what I said about newtonian mechanics, this suggests to me that any description of the world must be made from a particular perspective/frame of reference. 'How the world is' independently from any perspective seems to get weirder and weirder as we get to more 'advanced' theories.
In a sense, I get that it can be seen as a disappointing view but, on the other hand, it is at the same time in a sense 'liberating' and 'awe insipring' (reality seems much more mysterious than it appears to be...).
I think that my view is close to the view presented by Bernard d'Espagnat in his 'On Physics and Philosophy' or of the late David Bohm (who wasn't an 'instrumentalist'). For the latter see e.g. this interview*: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mst3fOl5vH0 (yeah, I know that the late Bohm is controversial but still...also his concept of 'active information' might be congenial to biophysics)
Quoting apokrisis
Same as all theories. It does not matter that the literal interpretation of newtonian physics is right for its applications.
IMO Physics seems to assume that there are regularities in phenomena (but any ontological commitment of the theory is unneeded)
Quoting apokrisis
Lol, I 'knew' him there too years back. Seems to be a very thoughtful researcher. Unfortunately I found many of his works very complicated and well above my level. I do not know if his interpretation is actually accepted as a 'canonical' one as say de Broglie-Bohm, MWI, Copenaghen etc
*I do not think that he is completely correct in that interview, but I agree with his main message.
You continue to post snarky put-downs, without any relevant reasons. Do you think the Santa Fe Institute is a bunch of amateurs?
Maybe even astrobiologists have to take baby steps. The specific stages & causes in the evolution of Matter-to-Life-to-Mind are still far from being worked-out by terrestrial biologists. Do you know of anyone who can explain "the key thing" underlying the emergence of Life from Matter and Mind from Life? I have a theory, but I'm not a Biologist, and have no credentials, which makes me an amateur. :smile:
New Concepts of Matter, Life and Mind :
In the ongoing co-evolution of matter with the vacuum's zero-point field, life emerges out of nonlife, and mind and consciousness emerge out of the higher domains of life. This evolutionary concept does not 'reduce' reality either to non-living matter (as materialism), or assimilate it to a nonmaterial mind (as idealism).
https://www.physlink.com/education/essay_laszlo.cfm
Note --- Ervin Laszlo is author of The Systems View of the World
[i]Founded in 1984, the Santa Fe Institute was the first research institute dedicated to the study of complex adaptive systems. We are operated as an independent, nonprofit 501(c)(3) research and education center.
History. The Santa Fe Institute was founded in 1984 by scientists George Cowan, David Pines, Stirling Colgate, Murray Gell-Mann, Nick Metropolis, Herb Anderson, Peter A. Carruthers, and Richard Slansky. All but Pines and Gell-Mann were scientists with Los Alamos National Laboratory.[/i]
My "account" is not Physics, not "wishful thinking", it's speculative Philosophy ; on a Philosophy forum, not a Physics forum. Do you see some spooky implications of my Energy/Information/Mind hypothesis that you would not wish for? Einstein didn't like some of the spooky Quantum physics that resulted from his own not-yet-proven speculations, inferred from abstract mathematics.
Even all-knowing Physics must begin with speculations & conjectures & hypotheses in the absence of hard evidence. Einstein was a Theoretical Physicist with no laboratory experience. Was he doing physics or philosophy? Were his relativity speculations, and E=MC^2, "accepted physics" in 1905? Maybe other, more insightful, "eyes" will be able to see the relationship between Information & Energy & Mind : EnFormAction. :smile:
Is it true that Albert Einstein never did any experiments? :
Albert Einstein was a Theoretical physicist, not an Experimental Physicist. The interactions of matter and energy are studied by all physicists. Experimental physicists test ideas about how these interactions take place at the atomic level and their work has applications to medicine and nuclear technologies.
https://www.quora.com/Is-it-true-that-Albert-Einstein-never-did-any-experiments
Many Scientists Studied Relativity Before Einstein :
There were a bunch of relativity principles before Einstein: Galileo had one, Newton had a slightly different one. Even Aristotle and Descartes had claims that can be taken as similar principles. I find their respective theories of mechanics almost incomprehensible, so am going to ignore them in what follows.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2016/11/03/many-scientists-studied-relativity-before-einstein-so-why-does-he-get-the-credit/
Is much of theoretical physics nothing more than speculative assumptions? :
[i]Religion, spirituality, and other pseudoscientific theories are constantly seen as backwards and lacking of evidence. But if a lack of evidence before believing in something is considered irrational, why is so much of physics that is based on literally zero testable evidence taken seriously?
There is no direct evidence of a multiverse, certain interpretations of quantum mechanics, string theory, and many other things. Why are so many of these kinds of theories taken seriously?
There have been entire books written about some of these theories with people being fascinated about how intellectual they seemingly sound despite the fact that there is zero experimental evidence for any of these theories.
Should they be given the same treatment as other forms of pseudoscience?[/i]
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/100676/is-much-of-theoretical-physics-nothing-more-than-speculative-assumptions
Indeed, similar to what I said in a different thread:
Quoting Leontiskos
This goes to ' point thatas I would put itratiocination involves temporal succession. We do not arrive at knowledge except through a temporal, inferential process. This also starts to get at the difference between Artificial Intelligence and genuine, rational intelligence.
But we can have a theory of reference frames cant we? We continue on as we see with holography, de Sitter metrics, or twistor space. We can have general arguments that pick out 3-space as special as the only dimensionality that has the same number of rotational degrees of freedom as translational ones.
There may always be questions but they also can be new ones.
The Principle of Relativity asks us to set out the laws of physics in such a way that they apply to all frames of reference.
That is, to aim to set out transformations such that an observation made in one frame of reference will be true, of that frame of reference, in any other frame of reference.
Hence this suggests to me that any true description of the physical world can be made from any perspective/frame of reference.
All that, and it is absurd to then insist arriving at knowledge is something we do, as some post-moderns would have for us. The temporal, inferential process is the doing, the process merely belongs to us as a species-specific kind of ratiocination.
Hence all things being constrained by Poincaré invariance. Or stepping back further to a thermalising perspective, de Sitter invariance.
It presents Energy/Information/Mind, three quite distinct concepts, in a vague and inadequate way.
If you have no thoughts on this, wobble off.
Is that you agreeing that the question of what we ought do remains unanswered? That would be progress.
Quoting apokrisis
If your question is now "what ought we do", then you might well look to ethics as well as physics.
But ethics is complicated, and not reducible to slogans.
Which thread are you addressing? the answer here isQuoting Banno
One of the most common replies on this forum is : "I don't understand what you are saying". Yet sometimes not phrased so politely. I've seen such responses to your own posts. But that's OK. If you will note specific instances of vagueness & inadequacy, I will attempt to clarify them. I have the time, if you have the interest.
Are you not able to grok my abreviated 2 or3 paragraph posts on this forum? Or my 30-page Thesis on the net? Or my multiple Blog posts on specific topics? Admittedly, it's difficult for someone to make sense of an unfamiliar, even unorthodox, concept. My posts typically include links to scientific articles that discuss relevant topics in more focused & precise ways, and in technical scientific terminology, instead of arcane philosophical language. Besides, I have no formal training in abstruse linguistic philosophy, so my writing style may be too mundane for you :smile:
Grok : to understand (something) intuitively or by empathy or profoundly.
The EnFormAction Hypothesis :
As a supplement to the mainstream materialistic (scientific) theory of Causation, EnFormAction is intended to be an evocative label for a well-known, but somewhat mysterious, feature of physics : the Emergent process of Phase Change (or state transitions) from one kind (stable form) of matter to another. These sequential emanations take the structural pattern of a logical hierarchy : from solids, to liquids, to gases, and thence to plasma, or vice-versa. But they don't follow the usual rules of direct contact causation. . . . . . . . .
https://bothandblog3.enformationism.info/page23.html
No. It gathered a good bunch of people to drill into self-organising complexity in the broad sense. But then over-generalised that dynamicist view at the expense of the further thing which biosemiotics is focused on. Dynamics regulated by information. Systems with the added thing of an encoding memory. The genes to control a metabolism, the neurons to control an environment, the words to control a society, the numbers to control a world.
So a rookie blunder right there to the degree Santa Fe folk hyped up the dynamical half of the equation when it comes to the story of life and mind as it exists as a local exercise in informational modelling in a dynamically-unwinding, entropy-driven, world.
This paper might be useful to you here The Physics of Symbols: Bridging the Epistemic Cut
Well, in line with what I said, we don't know what they are. Do you really think the whole story consists in what we can be consciously aware of? I get it that if we can't know about something it, as Banno puts it, "drops out of the conversation", but I also think that it is a significant fact about the human condition that there is much that determines what and who we are, what we experience and how we interpret it, that is precognitive. Whether or not you acknowledge that determines your basic orientation towards life.
The irony is that someone like @Wayfarer who doesn't want to acknowledge that many things have happened, are happening and will happen that we can never know about, nonetheless believes that sages can "directly" know "what is really going on".
So there are the known unknowns and then the unknown unknowns which we can believe surely also must exist? That kind of thing?
Quoting Janus
For me, it would is a matter for empirical inquiry. As in how far does one really get by employing tunnel vision?
The dog that didn't bark could be the clue. The world as it "is" might exist as an optimisation algorithm such as we find at the base of all physics the least action principle. The "ought" that eliminated all the other worlds that felt they too might have been possible if we hadn't outcompeted them in the race to be the case.
Quoting Janus
But does he clearly believe either side of the proposition at any time? There are those who assert and won't explain. There are those who don't understand. Then there is this other thing of seeming to agree and then slipping back across the boundary towards the other side. A foot in both camps.
There are many ways that arguments are never won on PF. :wink:
A constant reminder that incomprehension of an argument doesn't constitute a rebuttal.
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting Janus
I had Parmenides in mind, but obviously a very difficult text to fathom. I was recently musing whether Krishnamurti has a similar insight to Parmenides:
[quote=Krishnamurti]If you see "what is" then you see the universe, and denying "what is" is the origin of conflict. The beauty of the universe is in the "what is" and to live with "what is" without effort is virtue.[/quote]
It's not that I don't understand what you are saying, it's that I don't agree with it, but you don't seem to be able to fathom that. You say "the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective", but from my perspective your mistake is that it is not that the existence of such realities "relies" on an implicit perspective, but that the judgement that there are (or are not) such realities is an expression of a perspective.
If you believe that there is a reality as to what is the case regarding whether such unseen realities rely for their existence on some perspective, then you are claiming that there is something mind-independently the case; that is that there are or are not such realities.
I don't see how you can escape from that. If you claim that sages can directly know what is going on you are claiming that something is the case regardless of any perspective, that is that sages either can or cannot know directly what is going on, or else your claim becomes meaningless.
You say it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any mind, which seems to imply that it is true only from that perspective. From what perspective do you imagine it to be untrue?
Yep.
Sure, why not?
Quoting apokrisis
I'm not sure what you are getting at with your first sentence. "The world as it is" is for us just an idea, but it doesn't seem to follow that the world as it is is just an idea. Do you think anything would exist if humans, or if you like, any other perceivers didn't exist? I'm not interested in the question as to what its mind-independent existence would be like, because I don't think we can answer that; it's kind of a meaningless question. "Optimization algorithm" is still an anthropomorphic notion, so perhaps we could rule that out?
Quoting apokrisis
Of course, I agree that these kinds of arguments can never be settled, and that people believe whatever they do for not purely rational reasons. So, we are all here telling others what seems most plausible, most salient, most important to us individually. We are all just one small voice in the greater cacophony that is human thought and belief.
But if we are here to argue sensibly it seems at least reasonable to be called upon to state a clear position. My complaint about @Wayfarer is that he cannot or will not do that. We don't all have to agree with one another, but it would help to at least know what the others' coherent and consistent standpoints are (if they have such). If the standpoints presented are not lucidly articulated and internally consistent then why should they be taken seriously?
But what can be expressed about anything without bringing a perspective to bear on it? As soon as you start to talk about 'whether the tree falls in the forest if no-one is there to hear it', you're already bringing a perspective to bear. As soon as you say there are unseen planets and unknown vistas, then you're already bringing a perspective to bear. The only way not to do that is to not say or think anything whatever.
Again, I'm making the distinction that Kant identified about the compatibility of empiricism and transcendental idealism. In Kant's philosophy, there is no inherent conflict between empiricism and transcendental idealism because they address different aspects of knowledge. Empiricism pertains to the content of our experiences, emphasizing that all knowledge begins with sensory input. Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, concerns the conditions that make such experience possible, positing that our minds actively structure and organize sensory data through a priori categories and forms of intuition, such as space and time. Thus, while empiricism provides the raw material for knowledge, transcendental idealism explains the framework within which this material is synthesized and understood, harmonizing the two by showing how empirical data is shaped by the mind's innate structures to produce coherent experience. That is the framework you can't get outside of, yet this is what you posit when you imagine a world with no subject in it.
Time and space are themselves projected by the mind onto the cosmos. They're not real independently of your perception of them.
It is why Kant says that we can't know the Universe (or object) as it is in itself, although @Banno has already declared that he rejects the idea (whereas I think he simply doesn't get it.) The "thing in itself" (which I'm saying is 'the Universe with no observers) represents the reality that lies beyond our perceptual and cognitive reach. This underscores the limits of human knowledge and reinforces the idea that our understanding is always shaped by the conditions of our cognition, making any direct knowledge of the "thing in itself" both impossible and meaningless within our conceptual framework.
Now I question Kant on that score, and there have been plenty of objections raised by generations of subsequent scholars. But I still say the substantive point remains.
There was a mention earlier in this thread about Kastrup's 'mind-at-large', and my questioning of that in a Medium essay. On further reflection, I am beginning to see that this could be conceptualised as 'the subject' or 'an observer' in a general sense. It doesn't refer to a particular individual, nor to some ethereal disembodied intelligence that haunts the Universe. But I wonder if it might also be plausibly understood as represented by the 'transcendental ego' in Kant and Husserl. Also, quite plausibly, the role of 'observer' in physics, which is never something included in the mathematical descriptions.
Quoting Janus
What is clear from ten years of interactions, is that you don't understand what I write despite repeated efforts on my part to lay it out as clearly as I can. I'm about at the end of my tether as far as you're concerned.
Sure. Lets not confuse epistemology and ontology once more. It would be handy to have some kind of highlighter button to mark the switch in register.
Quoting Janus
This is an ontological commitment we might make as part of an evolutionary metaphysics. Such as Big Bang cosmology.
The reason inflation seems a must at the start of the Universe is eliminate all other geometries except the very flattest. The Goldilocks balance of being not too positively or negatively curved but instead just right as that which can then dump its energy into particles and continue on its way, expanding and cooling as infinitum.
One cant believe in physics without going along with its least action principle. Optimisation of dialectical balances just is the reality physics describes.
Right, and this is just what I've been saying except I don't think the fact that we must acknowledge that there is a reality beyond our perceptual and conceptual capacities is without significance, since it is a fact about the human condition. What I don't agree with Kant about is that we are (by dint of practical reason) warranted in populating that "realm" with the artifices of our own imagination and faith in the context of intersubjective argument. What we choose to believe in our own hearts is another matter; the point is that something seeming right to me cannot constitute an argument for why anyone else should believe as I do.
Quoting Wayfarer
I cannot make sense of the idea of an "observer" apart from individual observers. We are finite temporal observers. Is there an infinite atemporal observer? Do we even know what that could mean? So, for me the "transcendental ego" is just an idea, I can't imagine how it could be a reality. I don't deny that it might be a reality, but I don't see how we could understand what such a reality could be, any more than we could understand what the reality of the in itself could be.
When it comes to imaginable possible more or less coherent explanations for how it is we all perceive the same things I can only think of 'actual mind independent' existence in the form of actual mind independent existents or ideas in a collective or universal mind, which is Kastrup's solution. I personally find the actual mind independent existents more plausible, but I can't mount an argument for that because there is no objective measure of plausibility. What is one person's plausibility is another's incredulity.
Quoting Wayfarer
I understand what you write, but I don't see just what is your reasoning for thinking what you think, and also it is not precisely clear to me just what it is that you do think. Your reference to a "transcendental ego" above is an example; I think that is a much less clear idea than the idea of a collective mind, or the idea of mind-independent existents.
There is the myth of the given; that mere observation, uninterpreted, is a given foundation for knowledge.
Better yet, we can subtract the human from the epistemic equation as best we can. That is, apply the scientific method, or Peirce's logical arc of abduction, deduction and inductive confirmation. Arrive at the view that represents the limits of inquiry for a community of rational thought. Act as if it were the Comos that is contemplating its own Being.
Quoting Wayfarer
So once the direct route is accepted as forbidden to us, then what becomes the best indirect route? That is what pragmatism is about. We can subtract the psychological individual from the equation and make it about a dispassionate community of reason.
Social cognition based on the scientific method.
I believe the Universe evolved, and I think this belief entails that there were an untold number of events and processes that occurred before there were any perceivers..
Quoting apokrisis
I don't have the background to understand what you are saying or hinting at here.
I agree with what you say, and I think it follows on from what I said. It's the best we can do.
No worries. It just goes to the larger Peircean project which argues that reality as the thing in itself would have to have this Darwinian logic. And that this connects to the position I expressed as the answer to the OP.
For reductive science, the principle of least action is both a necessary axiom a universal principle and not just a law but also something to be a little embarrassed about because of its teleological overtones. The very idea that is and ought could be connected in this finalistic fashion!
But for a larger holistic view of science, as the Big Bang demands, the action of least principle becomes itself a matter in want of a decent explanation.
Well I don't see any connection whatsoever. Can you demonstrate this?
That would be consistent with your rejection of quantum temporal entanglement I guess.
So you can't demonstrate it?
What has that got to do with 'temporal entanglement'? When did I say when I apparently rejected it?
I don't know if 'forbidden' is the right word.
There's a relationship between 'subtracting the psychological individual' and the idea of detachment or disinterestedness. The 'dispassionate community of reason' is what the scientific community aspires towards, striving for objectivity and minimizing personal biases and emotions to gain an accurate understanding of the natural world through empirical observation, repeatability, and falsifiability. Detachment in the earlier, pre-modern sense esteemed by philosophical spirituality demands self-effacement and the abandonment of personal desires and ego to achieve insight into universal truths. They're historically related, in that the scientific developed out of the pre-modern, but as it did so, it also assumed a more anthropocentric perspective. (Maybe that's discussed in the Peter Harrison book on the foundations of science. )
Quoting Banno
I see your point, but it's not too remote from my argument. My bad for bringing up Sellars. But nowhere have I said 'there is no world', only that we can't see it as if we were not a part of it, that the objective stance is treated as if it were an absolute, which it isn't.
So you acknowledge that unperceived things exist, and you are only denying that we can see things as they are when unperceived? In that case there would seem to be no argument since our being unable to see things as they are unseen would seem to be a mere tautology.
You mean experimentally? - https://www.nature.com/articles/nphys3343
As a bone of contention? - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-023-04251-x
Set out your objections.
If you look at the OP again, you will notice that I've worded it very carefully. I will draw attention to a specific passage:
Quoting Wayfarer
Beyond that, I'm unwilling to try and re-state and re-explain what I think is stated and explained quite clearly in the OP.
@Banno - 'taking for granted the reality of the world as it appears to us, without taking into account the role the mind plays in its constitution' is what I took to be compatible with 'the myth of the given', although I didn't have that in mind when I composed it.
The only ambiguity there is "a kind of inherent reality". I presume you are referring to a naive notion of reality, and if so I agree with you that thinking that the world is in itself just as we perceive it to be probably is the default, unexamined response. But I would suggest that anyone with a basic level of philosophical training or understanding would not fall for that one.
So, it seems that we have cycled around to the familiar point where it appears that we are not disagreeing about anything. But then I won't be surprised if the cycle repeats because you seem to vacillate as to whether you want to make an ontological claim or merely an epistemological one.
It is one thing to say that things unperceived are not the same as we perceive them to be and altogether another to claim that when unperceived they don't exist.
This link:
Quoting apokrisis
Refers to Wheeler's 'Delayed Choice' experiment. I haven't read that particular article, but there's another on Discover Magazine about Wheeler and this famous experiment. That magazine article is called Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking?
That seems to be making 'an ontological claim'. Or wait - is it an 'epistemological claim?'
You tell me.
Quoting Banno
Correct. But this only says that physical laws are the same in all reference frames. Invariant properties in all reference frames are not necessarily property of a 'physical world independent of all reference frames'
Quoting Banno
I disagree, if the 'phyisical world' here is meant the 'physical world as it is independent from any reference frame'. On the other hand, yes, I agree if this is taken to mean that any reference frame can be used to discover/find some truth that is valid for all other reference frames.
Quoting apokrisis
Yeah, I guess that we can but I am not sure how this is an objection to what I said earlier, if you meant that way. I am perfectly fine, for instance, with what you say about 3-space. But this can be IMO understood as a pointer to a property in common to all reference frames. Regardin holography, de Sitter ant twistors, well as I said, they all seem all quite far as the 'physical world as it appears to us', so to speak. As I said:
Quoting boundless
I see it as a sort of 'evidence' for this kind of tendency.
Quoting apokrisis
Agreed.
Anyway, to put in another way what I am saying, I think that a distinction can be made between 'intrinsic' and 'relational' properties. Relational properties are not properties of 'a thing in itself' so to speak, but is a property that arises in a relation. As an example, the apparent height of a tower seen from a distance is a relational property, not an intrinsic one (it cannot be assigned to the tower, without taking into consideration something else). If we do not know intrinsic properties of objects we do not know them 'in themselves', but only in relation.
According to, say, Galileo all 'primary' qualities were intrinsic to physical objects. But his own 'principle of relativity' actually showed that velocity is a relational property. In special relativity, for instance, even distances and temporal durations are not intrinsic properties*. In QM this 'relationality' is even more explicit.
*Yeah, the speed of light is the same in all inertial frames in special relativity. But it does not follow that it is an intrinsic property: after all, velocity is a concept that makes sense only when a particular reference frame is considered. I think that the same can be said even for rest mass. Rest mass is a quantity that tells us how an object 'responds' to some interactions. BTW, after all the operational definition of all physical quantities is in fact relational. So, maybe it might not be surprising if it turns out that they are not intrinsic.
So like gauge invariance vs Poincaré invariance? Constrain spacetime to a manifold of points and it still has degrees of freedom in that the points may spin rather than sit still. They may be vector and chiral rather than scalar. Quantum spin arises as an intrinsic property and the rest of particle physics follows.
What relativity doesnt forbid becomes what QFT exploits.
Yeah, that bit. The principles of physics are to be formulated so that the frame of reference being used does not change those principles. Any frame will do. This was intended to head off the common notion that science seeks a "view from nowhere" - perhaps the view you described and disagreed with as "independent from any reference frame". Rather, science seeks a view from anywhere. A point worth making in a philosophy forum.
It depends on the interpretation of this type of things. In epistemic interpretations like, say, QBism or some form of Copenaghen-ish interpretations, such an experiment results in an update of the knowledge of the agent/observer, not in the 'coming to be' of some kind of reality.
At best, it is an 'ontological claim' in the sense that 'the world' that the agent 'observed' is not 'the world in itself', but the 'world observed'.
These kind of theories do not make ontological commitments, i.e. do not attempt in describing 'how the world is in itself' (from a 'view form nowhere', if you like).
Unfortunately, concepts like 'participatory realism' IMO kind of muddy the waters. They seem to imply that 'the observer changes reality'. This in QBism, as I understand it, actually means 'the observer gets a new experience'. Other similar interpretations say that 'the observer knowledge its updated' and so on.
I guess that 'participatory realism' was developed in other to defend QBism and similar views from the charge of solipsism. But I do not really see the point of that. It only complicates the issue.
Christian Fuchs who developed QBism was one of Wheelers (many) students but I think Wheeler had passed on by the time he started publishing. I listened to a long interview with him recently, I find his account of the interpretation of the physics quite understandable.
Well, maybe 'symmetries' are the only intrinsic properties that can be discovered by physics.
But even quantum spin after all is a quantity that describes how an object responds to an interaction. So I am not sure that it can be said that it is an intrinsic property of a particle (I admit that this does not 'conclusively' shows that it isn't lol...).
(IIRC there was a paper by philosopher Michel Bitbol that discussed this kind of things. If I find it I'll link or quote the relevant parts)
Quoting Banno
Completely in agreement with this :100:
As did Schrödinger. But its metaphysically embarrassing, isnt it, because it implies the observer, who is not in scope for the objective sciences. (If you bother to read the OP I wrote on idealism, you will notice I reject any notion of consciousness as substance right at the beginning.)
Bitbol one of the great discoveries Ive made reading this forum. Hes written a book on Schrodingers philosophy of physics, which is a bit difficult without advanced physics, but many of his other papers are well worth reading, such as It is Never Known but it is the Knower. (By the way, during your absence I wrote an OP on idealism which you can find here.)
Hence:
Quoting Wayfarer and Quoting Wayfarer
But how can you have it both ways? You both physicalism and dualism.
Thank you for that question. It is only taken about five years of argument to get to this point. I will carefully compose a response in due course.
I do not doubt their credentials. I am merely saying that an ontological reading of certain ideas can be misleading. Of course it also depends on how 'ontology' is defined.
Yes, for instance QBism does require that 'observers' can 'experience', i.e. are conscious. But this does not imply that consciousness 'affects' the 'external reality' when a measurement, observation or anything like that is made.
If 'consciousness causes collapse' is taken as meaning that 'an experiment updates the knowledge/degree of beliefs' of a conscious agent, I do not see anything 'weird'. On the other hand, if it is taken as implying that an observation of a conscious agent changes the 'fabric of reality' or that 'consciousness causes a drastic change in external reality' and so on, then yes it becomes a problem IMO.
Thanks for the link, btw, I'll read it. Anyway, I do think that your own idealism is actually a form of epistemic idealism, rather than ontological (based on what I read in the past). Ontological idealism treats consciousness as the sole substance.
As far as QBism is concerned, it says that each individual has a separate observation, and to that extent, it undermines the claim that theyre all observing the same thing. In other words, it calls objectivity into question - which is too high a price for its critics.
:up:
Quoting Janus
:up: :up:
Actually QBism is a form of 'consciousness causes collapse' interpretation as I understand it. But given that in such an interpretation the wave-function is merely a tool that allows one to calculate probabilities to have some kind of experiences, I do not see how it can be problematic or how can it give a 'special' role to consciousness. It certainly does not mean that when a conscious agent makes an observation something in the 'fabric of the universe', so to speak, changes. The only thing that happens is an update of knowledge (in QBism this is expressed as an upddate of a probability, which in turn is interpreted as a quantification of a degree of belief).
I do not think that QBism or similar views are in contrast with your own view.
On the other hand, Rovelli's RQM holds that all physical objects can be considered as 'observers'. To be fair, I prefer QBism or similar views because, after all, what a 'physical object is' is extremely vague. Is a table a physical object? Are its legs physical objects? Does each atom of a table have its 'perspective'? Do all its atoms and the whole table have their own perspective? How they are related?
My problem with such a view is its vagueness.
Quoting Wayfarer
Ok :up: Note, however, that if one thinks that the delayed choice experiment shows that a measurement can change the past (rather than our knowledge of it), then one enters in some serious difficulties. That's why I don't like the expression 'partecipatory realism' even if respected physicists use it.
Cheers.
What's odd is that this is a thread about justice and fairness, yet it contains page after page of speculative quantum physics.
If we needed QBism to fathom justice, presumably the courts would be teaming with physics grads.
So I'm left with the impression that something is seriously astray here.
I think that it is a good way to put it :up: That's would be an 'epistemic' claim, consistent with epistemic interpretations. So, I don't think that is a controversial statement.
Quoting Banno
Lol, yeah, I see your point. Is it possible to 'split' the thread?
As I said at the beginning of mind-created world, my argument is perspectival. So long as youre trying to treat consciousness, or mind, or observation, as one among the other objects in the world, then youre adopting a faulty perspective. The mind/observer/subject is not an object in the world, one factor among others, to be considered alongside gravity or radiation. It is that which discloses such things as gravity and raditation and sub-atomic particles, amidst innumerable other things. It is the subject to whom all this occurs or appears. The unknown knower.
You will recall I quoted the first para of Schops WWI a few pages ago:
To which you responded:
Quoting Banno
I thought this response was so comically off the mark that I replied with an emoji. So trying again, and possibly for the last time - the reason the mind (observer, subject) is not in scope for science IS NOT that it is a mysterious spooky substance, but because its the subject of experience. Which is never included in the scientific reckoning, for the obvious reason that its not amongst the objects of perception.
Quoting boundless
This thread is well beyond that. Its like the many worlds interpretation where every possible variation happens. :lol:
No, but you can always start a new thread on the speculative physics. Trouble is, folk here seem adamant that the physics is somehow apposite to fairness, so I think they woudl probably stay here rather than join you. Might be best to go with the flow.
It was indeed facetious, since the quote had so little to do with the issues at hand. And so we go back to where we were half a thread ago, the challenge before us becoming more endurance than enlightenment.
Ok I see :lol:
The way you see them, anyway .
Quoting Wayfarer
The subject of my present experience is the laptop screen and text...
Language on holidays.
your claim:
Quoting Banno
I have explained the sense in which the mind is not a thing among other things. It is perfectly clear.
and there youre referring to the object of your present experience appearing to you as subject (although it shouldnt have to explained.)
This "knower" (i.e. perceiver) Bishop Berkeley calls "God" which, not by coincidence I'm sure, is functionally indistinguishable from @Gnomon's "Enformer". An infinite regress-of-the-gaps. :sparkle: :eyes:
Quoting Wayfarer
Agreed. Mind(ing) is something sufficiently complex brains do a (meta)activity, not an entity.
I'll read these after you have stood on your head for half an hour. I want a video to prove it.
Surely that would be the object of your experience? I suppose either would work. Brits abroad.
I don't follow Santa Fe Institute in general, because my interest is primarily in their work on "dynamics regulated by Information" as you put it. Here's two books by authors & editors, some affiliated with SFI, that approach Complexity and Self-Organization from an Information perspective. :smile:
From Matter to Life: Information and Causality :
Recent advances suggest that the concept of information might hold the key to unravelling the mystery of life's nature and origin.
by Sara Imari Walker, et al (Editor) SFI
https://www.amazon.com/Matter-Life-Information-Causality/dp/1107150531
Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics To Metaphysics :
Many scientists regard mass and energy as the primary currency of nature. In recent years, however, the concept of information has gained importance. Why? In this book, eminent scientists, philosophers and theologians chart various aspects of information, from quantum information to biological and digital information, in order to understand how nature works.
https://www.amazon.com/Information-Nature-Reality-Metaphysics-Classics/dp/1107684536
Note --- It has a chapter specifically about Semiology and Biosemiotics
Are you demanding a "clear position" expressed in Materialistic terminology? I can't speak for , but I suspect that he "cannot or will not do that", because it would completely miss the meaning of his Immaterialist*1 philosophical Position. Any "sensible" Material aspects of his worldview are covered by Science, not Philosophy. :smile:
*1. Immaterialism :
The term 'immaterialism' was introduced by George Berkeley in the third of his Three Dialogues (1713), to designate his own opinion that there was no such thing as material substance, and that bodies were not to be understood in terms of qualities that inhered in an independent, unthinking substratum, but rather as ...
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk Immaterialism
Note --- This may not be how Way would characterize his views. So I show it here only as an example of an alternative worldview to Materialism, which could not be "clearly" & "sensibly" expressed in Materialist language.
Sorry to butt in again. But your disparagement of "mere speculation"*1 is a knock on theoretical Science and Philosophy, and not appropriate for a post on The Philosophy Forum. I suppose, like many TPF posters, you view Philosophy as a red-headed step-child of Materialist Science, with aberrant genes inherited from its disreputable parent of institutional Religion.
But probably views General Philosophy*2 (born in ancient times & cultures in opposition to irrational beliefs & gossipy rumors) as the parent of Modern Empirical Science, born in the 17th century in direct opposition to Authoritarian Theology, and focused on Reductive rather than General understanding.
A materialist measurement views the physical yardstick as the judge of accuracy and factuality. But who made & marked the stick with arbitrary increments (meters vs yards)? The etymology of the word "to Measure", comes from Latin "mensura", and the root "mens-"*3 refers back to the Mind that created the the concept of rational regulation of an undifferentiated world*4. So, Way is philosophically correct that, absent a "conscious being", no measurement takes place in the material world. :smile:
*1. Science and Speculation :
"Despite wide recognition that speculation is critical for successful science, philosophers have attended little to it. When they have, speculation has been characterized in narrowly epistemic terms : a hypothesis is speculative due to its lack of evidential support"
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-020-00370-w
*2. General philosophy, also known as metaphysics or ontology, explores fundamental questions about the nature of reality, existence, and knowledge.
https://www.quora.com/How-can-I-distinguish-the-general-and-technical-world-of-philosophy
*3. The Latin word mens expresses the idea of "mind" and is the origin of English words like mental and dementia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mens
*4. Measurement problem :
A thought experiment called Schrödinger's cat illustrates the measurement problem.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Measurement_problem
What @Wayfarer does on here seems to me to be more social commentary, a kind of moral crusade, than philosophy.
Anscombe points out that the terms swapped roles some time around the 1950's
He did and he deserves a lot of credit for that. I wish he'd gone panpsychist like Sprigge instead of wheeling God in to look at things when we weren't.
"The mind is the subject of experience" is inept or even deceptive. Experiences are had only by minds, so what might seem profound is little more than tautology.
Oh, go ahead and speculate. Just don't mistake speculation for fact.
When was the last time you saw a philosopher present an idea that was not ambiguous to someone? Empirical observations can be unambiguous when the physical object can be pointed to. But the topics we discuss on this forum, such as Justice, are inherently ambiguous due to the difficulty of transferring an idea in one mind to another mind, by means of language. Linguistic philosophy was proposed as an answer to that very problem. Unfortunately, just as empirical scientists have been frustrated in their search for the material Atom --- can you point to a hypothetical quark or its constituent color or flavor? --- philosophers have been seeking the linguistic or logical Atom for millennia.
Do you really think Berkeley's "clear position" was unambiguous, when it was immediately attacked by Materialists and Deists for its unstated assumption of miraculous interventions? You set a high standard for philosophy to meet. Years ago, when I left my church, a few members to ask "why?". When I gave my crude philosophical answer, one responded that "you are setting a high standard for God to meet". To that, I could only reply that the Monotheistic religions themselves set a rigorous standard for the "true God", so He could be distinguished from idols and false gods.
Materialism also has a clear position : if I can't see it or touch it, it doesn't exist. Which is why physicists persist in their quest for the fundamental Atom of Materialism. Today, mathematical physicists are resigned to the notion of an immaterial mathematical Field as the fundamental ground of reality. Yet, even that amorphous hypothetical entity has, in practice, been divided into four or five sub-fields, and dozens of sub-sub-fields. And you accuse of ambiguity? Hasn't philosophy itself, from the beginning, been a moral/ethical crusade? :nerd:
Linguistic philosophy is the view that many or all philosophical problems can be solved by paying closer attention to language, either by reforming language or by better understanding our everyday language. The former position is that of ideal language philosophy, one prominent example being logical atomism. ___Wikipedia
Thank you once again. I will bring it to bear on the topic of the OP. The basic point of my argument is that we do not really see 'what is'. We're unaware of our own sub- and unconcious machinations and as a result we project them onto 'the world', an inevitable consequence of our ego-centred individualist culture. That is the point of 'awareness training' and philosophy as a spiritual discipline, is the attainment of self knowledge. Much of what goes under the heading of philosophy nowadays comprises methods to rationalise the human condition, although what philosophy really should be doing is critiquing it. That is the context in which the question of the fairness or otherwise of 'the world' should be assessed.
Quoting Banno
That humans and other sentient beings are subjects of experience is both obvious and central to any philosophy, but somehow you still manage to obfuscate it.
There's a current article on Aeon about the wasteland of analytic philosophy, Philosophy was Once Alive.
Philosophy reflectively-critically examines whatever is assumed to be "obvious and central" (e.g. intuitions, folk psychological ideas, values, etc) no?
I meant demonstration of your claims about is/ought. I am not sure what you mean to convey from that teleology link as it's conclusions seem weak and non-committal to me. Points it mentions about equivalences of least action to dynamical laws seem notable in this respect.
I generally don't like the idea of teleology in terms of purpose. I will comment on how they define in the article:
"Teleology involves the invocation of final causes, or ends, in the explanation of some
target explanandum."
I am not sure what "final cause or ends" here means but I am not directly opposed to explanations that in some sense zoom out or appeal to higher order or more global or more abstract patterns and regularities or to longer time-scales, etc, etc, etc. However, I am inclined to think that these explanations are emergent from blind, dynamical behavior at the local level and zooming out as opposed to something else (i.e. more top-down, however you would want to think of that).
That said, I don't see how talking about patterns of phenomena with more abstract, global descriptions implies anything about oughts. The fact that a system tends to behave in a certain way doesn't imply that the system ought to behave in a certain way.
Quoting apokrisis
I have no issue with delayed-choice or any other kind of entanglement scheme. I advocate an interpretation of quantum mechanics which has formulations fully capable of producing these behaviors. What makes delayed-choice paradigms seem metaphysically strange or problematic is the collapse postulate; but in a stochastic interpretation, particles (the hidden variables) are already in definite states and there is no physical collapse. No physical collapse? No problem.
We must remember that collapse was added to quantum mechanics in a completely ad hoc fashion because physicists wanted definite measurement outcomes in the theory; but it was never a necessary part of the development of an empirically adequate quantum theory.
From the stochastic perspective, this ad hoc addition happened because physicists conflated the quantum state with a physical object when it is should be seen as a piece of machinery that is really talking about probabilistic behavior and nothing more. The Schrodinger equation evolves the quantum state like a diffusion equation evolves a probability density function for some Brownian particle's diffusion behavior, the kind of probability distribution that can be realized empirically by repeating an experiment ad infinitum. Anyone can see that a diffusion equation and probability density function is not in conflict with Brownian particles occupying definite positions.
If what this says is that people have experiences, then we agree, and I don't think it's me doing the obfuscating.
That's fine. In line with those articles, the shift is to understand finality in terms of global constraints, not as some kind of futurised effective cause.
Cause must come before the effect, never the effect before the cause, right?
But as a systems science proponent, I work with the expanded causality that started with Aristotle's four causes analysis. A system is a hierarchical structure of relations where global constraints shape the local degrees of freedom, and those local degrees then act in their generalised statistical fashion to (re)build the world-system that gave rise to them.
So global constraints are the embodied version of Aristotle's formal and final cause. And local degrees of freedom are the embodied version of his effective and material causes.
Good old "cause and effect" is just how all this complexity looks at an average scale of observation, such as would exist in our own world as we imagine it to "really be" a place of medium-sized dry goods.
Looks like a gem of an article, but I can only see the first page on JSTOR. 1974, well before Chalmers. Makes the same point I did about skepticism raised by @apokrisis.
The 'Dan' he refers to...
While I largely agree with you here, I think that we can still make correct judgement about the 'unfairness' of the world that actually help us to better our awareness of our 'sub- and unconscious machinations'.
For instance, if we consider, say, the 'unfairness' of diseases, the fact that this world actually does not match many of our idealisations - 'how we wish we it should be' - we arrive at a more disillusioned and mature view of both ourselves and the world itself.
The fact that the world is 'imperfect' is actually a good motivator for spiritual practice, I think.
I disagree. It depends on how you interpret the 'subject of experience'. It might just be a formal property of experience. The subject never appears as an object of experience but this does not mean that it is non-existence or a substance that is independent from experience.
Quoting Banno
Yeah, after all an 'experience' is something mental. So, in a sense, I can agree what is said.
But let's consider the structure of our experience. Experiences of course have contents, which might be called the 'objects of experiences'. But they all share a quality, a 'privateness', a 'sense' (for a lack of a better word) that they are experienced by 'me'.
Let's start by this: what is this 'me' according to you? does it ever appear as a particular content/object of experience? If so, when?
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting Wayfarer
The first two are logically obvious and metaphysically central, yes. That being said, there are various ways to affirm the conceptions of subject and experience, but I for one, am having trouble affirming the conjunction of them with each other:
superficially, iff it is the case there is only and ever objects of experience, from which there must be as many experiences as there are objects, it is self-contradictory for there to be subjects of experience, for the I which represents the cognition of self or subject, must always be singular;
while notoriously forbidding .a euphemism for the likely-ness for mistaking its intent ..the Kantian exposition detailing the cognition of the self as subject, re: B407, Paralogisms ., prohibits self from being thereafter cognized as extant object, it does not follow, at least from such exposition, that self is subject of experience, and self, being already denied as object of experience, leaves an apparent transcendental paralogism;
taken at face value, subject of experience is a synthetic proposition, insofar as the conception of subject or self cannot be found merely in the conception of experience itself, but on the other hand, the proposition is an a priori judgement, insofar as the concern is the synthesis of abstract conceptions. Synthetic a priori propositions are first and foremost principles regulating understanding by the use of the categories in relation to appearances. But the self or subject is never an appearance, hence cannot have empirical conceptions subsumed under it as schemata, hence cannot be regulated by the categories, from which follows the impossibility of it being a judgement with respect to experience, for which the categories are the necessary ground.
All that being said, I admit your reasoning for humans (minds, selves, subjects) are subjects of experience is probably justified from the mere historical scarcity of your making of unjustified claims, if only I were to understand how such reasoning comes about, my personal cognitive prejudices notwithstanding.
I was merely trying to point out that the concept on an 'unknown knower' doesn't necessarily entail a form of ontological idealism but it is, in my opinion, fully compatibile with some forms of epistemological idealism and some kind of phenomenology that does not make ontological commitments about the 'knower'. If I misunderstood you, I apologize for that.
And I wasn't trying to imply that you thought that the 'mind', 'subject' do not exist.
But anyway if you think that my questions were inappropriate I'll leave at that.
P.S. I do not consider myself an 'antirealist'. I do not deny the existence of a mind-independent reality (and actually I think that some kind of epistemic idealism or phenomenology are actually comptabile with realism). Not sure why you assumed that I'am an antirealist...
Thanks!
Thanks for your blessing. I don't see many empirical "facts" presented on this philosophical forum. However, I do see quite a few unfounded assumptions, especially about material reality, that are used as-if factual to validate disparaging remarks. :smile:
I'm not the one that raised the question of ambiguity in this thread. So, it should be incumbent upon the raiser to give examples. However, for a starter, the article below gives an analysis and examples of a common bane of philosophical discussions.
You seem to think that 's posts are "rife with them". Admittedly, his somewhat Idealistic worldview seems, not just ambiguous but dead wrong, to those who are committed to a worldview of Materialism and Scientism. That's the ambiguity of opposing perspectives on reality. Is that where you are coming from? :smile:
Ambiguity :
Fun fact: the word ambiguous, at least according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is ambiguous: it can mean uncertainty or dubiousness on the one hand and a sign bearing multiple meanings on the other. I mention this merely to disambiguate what this entry is about, which concerns a word or phrase enjoying multiple meanings. In this sense, ambiguity has been the source of much frustration, bemusement, and amusement for philosophers, lexicographers, linguists, cognitive scientists, literary theorists and critics, authors, poets, orators and pretty much every other being who uses language regularly to communicate.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ambiguity/
Philosophy, Linguistics, & Semiology :
Saussure had a major impact on the development of linguistic theory in the first half of the 20th century with his notions becoming incorporated in the central tenets of structural linguistics. His main contributions to structuralism include his notion of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_de_Saussure
I said that Wayfarer does not present an unambiguous position. It looks like I misread you to be suggesting philosophy is commonly ambiguous, whereas I now see you were suggesting it has largely been a moral crusade. So, my bad for hasty reading.
In any case I don't agree with the latter. Apart from moral philosophy, the focus has mostly been on ethics, in the sense of how best to live, with the focus not principally on relations with others, but on personal flourishing and/or getting it right epistemologically speaking.
And I didn't say Wayfarer's philosophy is "rife with them" (ambiguities) but rather that I didn't think philosophy generally is.
Scientism and materialism don't seem very popular on this site and I would be hard pressed to recall members here who identify this way. Can you name any?
People who find idealism dead wrong also include Christians, Muslims and other theists who are far from sympathetic to science or to materialism.
Personally I would not say ontological idealism is 'dead wrong'. How can we demonstrate such a claim? I would say that the hypothesis makes no practical difference to how I conduct my life. That said, I am sympathetic to epistemological idealism in as much as we can argue that the reality we know is likely to be the product of our mental and cognitive structures and frameworks - a more Kantian approach, perhaps. I am skeptical of the notion that there is a capital R reality which we can uncover. Reality seems to have replaced God as a subject of transcendental hope.
That's not my experience on TPF. Although the few zealots for philosophical materialistic Scientism may just be more vocal and quick to attack any Idealist ideas than those who are less doctrinaire. When I disagree with their 17th century classical physics worldview, I call them out directly. But I won't name them for you. Ironically, they are hard-pressed to come-up with a label for my own unorthodox worldview, for which I created my own label --- and it's not Idealism. Also, I don't think would limit his own worldview to any Idealist doctrine, although he seems to be favorably inclined toward Kastrup's Analytical Idealism.
What Christians would find "dead wrong" about philosophical Idealism-in-general, and Analytical Idealism in particular, is the lack of specific Christian doctrinal elements*1. Also Kastrup's rejection of a literal interpretation of its mythology & symbology would be a deal breaker*2. Besides, Way's personal philosophy seems to be closer to secular Buddhism, which disavowed intervening gods in favor of self-help . My own personal worldview is closer to secular Deism, which for Christians is "not even wrong", because it relies on human Reason, instead of divine Revelation, to conclude the logical necessity for a First Cause of some kind, to avoid an infinite tower of turtles prior to the Big Bang. However, my worldview is completely compatible with Materialism (chemistry) and Physicalism (physics) in a scientific context, apart from Philosophy, the science of ideas (metaphysics). :smile:
*1. Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief :
At the heart of the idealists discussion of God and the absolute, is the difficulty of defending the notion of a personal or relational Judaeo-Christian God with the absolute, which, as the purer Idealist philosophers of the day, Bradley and Bosanquet, pointed out, must be beyond our knowledge and fellowship.
https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/review/philosophical-idealism-and-christian-belief/
*2. Kastrup on Religion :
In my book, More Than Allegory, I have stated my views on religion: I think it is a valid and important part of human life that we neglect at our own peril. Religious mythology, although obviously not literally true, is symbolic of something that, while transcending our rational faculties, is integral and critical to being human.
https://www.bernardokastrup.com/2019/12/a-suggestion-for-church-reform.html
Christianity vs "false-teaching" Deism :
[i]Deism teaches that all people can know and believe in a Supreme Beingthe prime mover of all thingsmerely through the vehicle of reason. Historically, deists often held to a modified form of Christianity that emptied the faith of any supernatural elements while allowing its moral instruction to remain. Though it is more of a philosophical and religious set of ideals than an organized religion, deism offers an antisupernatural worldview as an alternative to Christian theism. . . . .
Scripture teaches the following:
The Supreme Being: There is only one true and living God, subsisting in three distinct persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.[/i]
https://www.ligonier.org/learn/articles/field-guide-on-false-teaching-deism
Note --- Modern Deism typically makes no assertions about the nature of the hypothetical First Cause.
No, the subtly denigrating term "moral crusade" --- implying a holy mission? --- characterization of 's posts, was yours, not mine. I said he was just doing Philosophy. Was Socrates on a "moral crusade" in Athens? If so, then maybe all of us petty philosophers should emulate his mission for reason. :smile:
What is the moral crusade theory?
moral crusade A social movement which campaigns around a symbolic or moral issue such as alcohol or pornography. Classic sociological accounts of moral crusades include Joseph R. Gusfield's study of the Temperance Movement, Symbolic Crusade (1963), and Louis A. Zurcher et al. , Citizens for Decency (1976)
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/moral-crusade
From the TPF Site Guidelines :
[i]Types of posters who are not welcome here:
Evangelists: Those who must convince everyone that their religion, ideology, political persuasion, or philosophical theory is the only one worth having.[/i]
Isn't this where the 'transcendental ego' and 'transcendental apperception' figures?
[quote=Brittanica] Transcendental ego, the self that is necessary in order for there to be a unified empirical self-consciousness. For Immanuel Kant, it synthesizes sensations according to the categories of the understanding. Nothing can be known of this self, because it is a condition, not an object, of knowledge.[/quote]
As for transcendental apperception:
///
Quoting Mww
The centrality of 'the subject' is fundamental to phenomenology:
[quote=Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology, p144]In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sensethis would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effectbut rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousnesss foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl. Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental oneone which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, though, of course, Husserl believes the Kantian way of articulating the consciousnessworld relation was itself distorted since it still postulated the thing in itself.[/quote]
"Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place" pretty well sums up the whole point of the 'mind-created world' OP. I acknowledge at the outset, my approach is based on what I've learned from both phenomenology and non-dualism, and also from meditation.
Quoting boundless
:up:
Quoting Gnomon
Not least because he's current, and because he's part of the scene - he's debating and appearing on panel sessions etc. He gives voice to an idealist perspective, not that I worship the guy or anything, but his output is pretty impressive, in my view.
Just wanted to expand on this point. We instinctively want to be in a positive state and be from pain/suffering/unease. Also, we have a natural instinct of survival. And yet, our own nature contradicts those innate insticts. That, I believe, leads to a perception of 'unfairness' in this world, which can itself bring pain (and we, by instict, seek distractions from it...). So, I think that the awareness of the 'unfairness or imperfection of the world' doesn't come from reflexion but it is pre-reflexive*. We feel this unfairness, so to speak because our fragility and our being liable to death contrast our instinct.
I think that the religious 'seeking' of an escape/liberation/salvation is therefore ingrained in us.
So, yeah, I would say that the 'world as unfair' is a pre-reflexive awarenss which is rooted in our most central instincts. That's why, I think, the 'need of salvation/liberation' that is found in religions has been universal in all cultures. It can be elaborated upon in a religious doctrine or even seen as a paradoxical, delusional feeling that is maybe best to try to ignore in all possible ways. But it is IMO undeniably there and even if it is denied it remains in the background.
In fact, I believe that this feeling or this pre-reflexive awareness of the tragicality of our predicament is the main motivator for any kind of spiritual practice.
*I think that some 'spiritual' experiences are, indeed, experiences where there is a stronger-than-usual awareness of this paradox and this kind of experiences can IMO be the strong motivators for a 'drastic change' in both views and actions. I think that I had an experience of this sort in the summer of 2016 where I felt an anguished awareness of this paradoxical condition of living beings and I really felt it as something that indeed is of my concern. In my case, this experience caused a shift in views but not in actions.
For Spinozists, reality (Deus, sive naturans) is ineluctably immanent the encompassing horizon that reason necessarily cannot encompass (i.e. explain, or transcend) and exhausts all of our other rational ideas, concepts & categories. Absurdists might say "reality is the subject of transcendental despair" (i.e. void, anicca, dao, sunyata). Also, faith (i.e. "hope") isn't needed because in practice denying or ignoring reality tends to be hazardous. :smirk:
On the contrary, with all due respect, perhaps the world (naively) seems "imperfect" to us only because each one of us is "imperfect" ... Philosophy can be a practice "spiritual exercise" (Hadot) for learning (again) to see the world as perfect and thereby, like Sisyphus, always striving to perfect our communities and ourselves (e.g. ethics-as-tikkun olam).
Yeah, I might have worded it badly...
For example, Spinoza himself distingueshed two ways of contemplating reality: sub specie temporis and sub specie aeternitatis. To 'transcend' pain and suffering, one must contemplate reality sub specie aeternitatis.
So, I guess that, yeah, I might erred in implying that the 'world is unfair' (after all, 'unfair' cannot be something that is applied to something insentient and that has no moral agency) in my previous post. I was, in fact, trying to verbalize the 'instinctual' reaction to the pre-reflexive or reflexive awareness (unfortunate? delusional? maybe 'enlightenly delusional'*?) of the paradoxical predicament in which we are.
So, yeah, the 'feeling' that the world is imperfect or unfair might well be understood, in some ways as a delusion. But is IMO still the starting point of even an immanentist 'solution' of this problem a la Spinoza, at least in some interpretations (although, I actually interpret Spinoza as a sort of 'acosmist', so not sure I would call him an immanentist in the literal sense of the term). But IMO it can be also the starting point of diverse philosophers like Epicurus and Pyrrho, who seeked and thought they found a solution of the human predicament. So I don't think that this anguished reaction is actually found only in religious/spiritual thinkers but it is a reaction, a 'splinter' that motivates one to actually find some kind of solution. Yes, I think that it is most explicit in religious concepts of 'liberation/salvation' but not entirely absent in skeptic or even 'fully secular' thinkers. After all, I think it is something that be vivdly felt by anyone.
*By 'enlightenly delusional' I mean an intuition that is wrong but it is the starting point for a 'more enlightned perspective', so to speak. To borrow a famous metaphor from Wittgenstein and a certain (inappropriate) liberty to decontestualize it, it is like a 'ladder' that is to be taken seriously IMO.
Well, fwiw, I see no other way but to interpret Spinoza as both an immanentist and acosmist sub specie aeternitatis (though sub specie durationis also as a pandeist, which (for me) ontically relates him to that other great immanentist Epicurus).
Why Sisyphus? Sisyphus is an icon for futility and pointlessness. Sisyphus cant strive for anything, only repeat the same pointless action forever.
In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was a denizen of Hades. According to the myth, Sisyphus was condemned to an eternal punishment in the Underworld (Hades) where he was forced to roll a massive boulder up a hill, only for it to roll back down each time he neared the top, compelling him to start over indefinitely. This punishment was given to him for his deceitfulness and trickery during his lifetime, which included cheating death twice.
[quote=IEP;https://iep.utm.edu/hadot/#SH5a] For Hadot, famously, the means for the philosophical student to achieve the complete reversal of our usual ways of looking at things epitomized by the Sage were a series of spiritual exercises. These exercises encompassed all of those practices still associated with philosophical teaching and study: reading, listening, dialogue, inquiry, and research. However, they also included practices deliberately aimed at addressing the students larger way of life, and demanding daily or continuous repetition: practices of attention (prosoche), meditations (meletai), memorizations of dogmata, self-mastery (enkrateia), the therapy of the passions, the remembrance of good things, the accomplishment of duties, and the cultivation of indifference towards indifferent things (PWL 84). Hadot acknowledges his use of the term spiritual exercises may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion than typically done (Nussbaum 1996, 353-4; Cooper 2010). Hadots use of the adjective spiritual (or sometimes existential) indeed aims to capture how these practices, like devotional practices in the religious traditions (6a), are aimed at generating and reactivating a constant way of living and perceiving in prokopta, despite the distractions, temptations, and difficulties of life. For this reason, they call upon far more than reason alone. They also utilize rhetoric and imagination in order to formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the most striking and concrete way and aim to actively re-habituate bodily passions, impulses, and desires (as for instance, in Cynic or Stoic practices, abstinence is used to accustom followers to bear cold, heat, hunger, and other privations) (PWL 85). These practices were used in the ancient schools in the context of specific forms of interpersonal relationships: for example, the relationship between the student and a master, whose role it was to guide and assist the student in the examination of conscience, in identification and rectification of erroneous judgments and bad actions, and in the conduct of dialectical exchanges on established themes.[/quote]
As an aside, now that I think about it, I realize that reading your posts (I think in the old forum?) convinced me that Spinoza was a kind of acosmist (I think it was you who compared Spinoza to Advaita Vedanta and used the wave/ocean analogy). So, kudos for that :up: and also for considering him a pandesit sub specie temporis (here he markedly differs I believe from Advaita Vedanta, where in the 'lower level' of truth, Advaita is theist I think...)!
I can see why you can call Spinoza an 'immanentist'. But at the same time it is a peculiar form of immanentism where the 'true reality' has an element of transcendence. Not in the sense that 'Natura Naturans' is something 'separate' from the modes but 'sub specie aeternitatis' only God is real (at this level the modes in some sense 'disappear', are transcended).
I never would question the centrality of the subject, irrespective of the discipline used to describe it.
My contention is the relation of subject to experience, in which subject of experience makes no sense, under the assumption that subject here was meant to indicate a rational intelligence.
Since you mentioned these concepts, in Indian/Far eastern philosophy, many religious traditions developed a version of a 'two truths doctrine', the 'conventional truth' (what we might call 'consensual reality') and the 'ultimate truth' (only known by the 'liberated'). Of course, they differ in their conception of what these two truths are, even among the same religion there are many versions (it would be simply to long to view them...).
The difference between the two truths is epistemic, i.e. the 'conventional truth' arises from a distorted perspective we have on 'what is real', whereas the 'ultimate truth' is seen by those who transcended this deceptive - even if useful in most contests - perspective. So an 'epistemic transcendence' is needed to overcome suffering/pain (and in some versions this leads to an 'ontological transcendence', but I digress...)
But IMO even if what is required to overcome 'pain/suffering' is a radical 'epistemic transcendence' I think that, maybe initially, what motivates this kind of search is actually that anguished awareness that I mentioned before.
Spinoza's 'sub specie temporis' seems the perspective of 'conventional truth', whereas his 'sub specie aeternitatis' is the perspective that 'reveals' the ultimate.
But even among the greeks, we actually find some versions of the two truths (IMO among the presocratics, the Eleatics are the best example...)
What I find fascinating is that in Ancient Greece even those who actually held a more 'materialistic' view employed something similar. Democritus for instance seems to have developed a philosophy which is structurally similar: on the one hand, composite objects which are seen as a whole because our understanding is incomplete and on the other hand, atoms and the void which can be seen as the 'ultimate truth'.
But this is not surprising if philosophy was, in the ancient times was combined with a practice as Pierre Hadot said.
@Wayfarer
I can't understand the distinction you're trying to make here. Persons are subjects of experience, are they not? That you and I are both subjects who have experiences is hardly controversial is it?
Quoting boundless
Quite true, but there's no conceptual equivalent to liberation (mok?a, Nirv??a) in Western philosophy.
And I cant understand the distinction that has been made for me.
Color of ball
Size of box
Meaning of phrase
Intent of speaker .
in all of those, there is a condition assigned to a representation. Doesnt matter what the condition is, only the relation it has to that which is represented by it. Color, among other conditions, belongs to the representation of ball; size belongs to box, meaning belongs to phrase, intent belongs to speaker, ad infinitum ..
..but subject DOES NOT belong to experience, but is presupposed by it. A ball is never presupposed by its color, or any condition which represents it, as opposed to that condition by which it was even possible in the first place.
Minutia: that which Everydayman ignores but with which the critical thinker amuses himself.
Sure. But how does that bear on the common-sense observation that a person is the subject of experience? I mean, it is a grammatically correct expression. 'I believe you were involved in a serious traffic accident recently. That must have been a terrible experience.' So, this is something you can't say?
What if the person is me? Does common sense then say I am the subject of experience, or does it just say, I experience?
.til tomorrow .
I can still refer to you as being a subject of experience. It's innate to language - 'the subject' is a fundamental component of English grammar. In grammatical terms, the subject in a sentence is the person, place, thing, or idea that is performing the action of the verb or being described by the verb. For example, in the sentence "I did that," 'I' is the subject who undertakes the action of doing. It also ties into the philosophical notion of the subject as the agent or experiencer in discussions about consciousness and experience. So, in both linguistic and philosophical contexts, the idea of 'the subject' as the one who acts or experiences is well established.
Ok. Thanks for your time.
Understandably, the Catholic Church labeled Immanentism as a heresy. Which may add to its appeal for anti-catholic Immanentists. What was the "element of transcendence" in his reality : Eternity/Infinity? How can you transcend Infinity? How are modes-of-being transcended?
I'm not a Spinoza expert, but regarding unbounded space-time, he seemed to assume that the material world, and his Nature God, was Eternal & Infinite*1. So how would he deal with modern Cosmology, which says that the universe had a sudden & inexplicable beginning of Space-Time-Matter-Energy? Where or when was boundless Natura Naturans before the Bang?*2 :smile:
*1. Spinoza defined God as "a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence", and since "no cause or reason" can prevent such a being from existing, it must exist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza
*2. Eternity is a property that substance and modes have in common. Spinoza posits in E5p23 that the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal. Thus, men have both an indefinite existence or duration, and an eternal one.
https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28070/chapter-abstract/212085978?redirectedFrom=fulltext
I was musing on the well-known saying of 'thinking outside the box'. As is common knowledge the origin of this expression is a cognitive test wherein the user has to connect five dots arranged in a square shape with a single unbroken line. The only solution is to extend the line 'outside the box', hence the expression. The intention is to test the aspirant's problem-solving skills.
So it occured to me that religion provides an analogous, 'outside the box' solution to the intrinsic suffering of existence. 'The box' in this analogy is 'the natural world', that is, the world that can be known by the natural senses (and their extensions in the form of scientific instruments.) In Christianity this beyond takes the form of belief in the afterlife or the future Second Coming. In Hinduism and Buddhism, it is understood that over the course of lifetimes, the aspirant can be released from the cycle of re-birth.
It is of course true that a secular culture doesn't recognise any such possibility as matter of principle. Hence in this context any solution to the suffering of existence is ameliorative, through medical, economic, political and technological means to treat illness, inequality, and so on. Which, as far as natural life is concerned, is obviously hugely advantageous - none of us would want to go without these advantages and it is in this respect that secular culture has dramatically improved the quality of life for billions.
But from a philosophical perspective, as naturalism excludes the possibility of consequences in another life, then justice is only meaningful in the sense that it can be administered by society.There are no consequences possible beyond natural life. Secular philosophers such as John Rawls address this through the concept of fairness and equity. But it takes religion to provide a sense of cosmic justice.
As I interpret Spinoza, there are two ways of 'seeing' the 'world'. First, there is the usual perspective, 'sub specie temporis' which does not contemplate 'Reality' as a whole. This perspective, for Spinoza, has the unfortunate 'side effect' that it suggests that the 'modes' are actually distinct entities, substances.
However, when the world is seen rigthly, Reality is seen as an 'undivided Whole', the only One Substance, God, in a way that is actually reminiscent of Parmenides IMO or indian advaita Vedanta. He says that the human mind is eternal, but only when seen as a mode, not a substance. It's a bit like saying that a particular ocean wave belongs to the whole history of the ocean, which is seen as a single undivided entity.
I sort of agree but I would put it in a different way.
The 'box' refers to the condition of everyone that is not saved/liberated from death, pain, illnesses, cruelty etc - let's call all the negatives as 'evil'. This does not mean that the 'box' is wholly evil - at least not necessarily. In our natural world, for instance, there are pleasant states of course. But evil is an undeniable aspect of it.
Now, I think we could say that according to most religions we not only are in a 'box' but that we do not know its extension, its 'depth', so to speak. For instance, Buddhism teaches the doctrine of rebirth and all realms of rebirth are subject to at least death, even the most lofty ones (whereas the 'lower realms' are seen as pervaded by an evil greater or much, much greater than the 'human realm').
Clearly, the conception that one has of the 'box' clearly influences the conception of the 'outside the box' and the way of escaping the box. To continue with Buddhism*, not only one must escape of the 'human box', so to speak, but to be 'fully liberated' one must escape from the incredibly larger 'box' of the 'whole samsara', so to speak (but since human are seen as potentially being trapped in samsara forever, if not liberated at some point, the 'human condition/predicament' in Buddhism refers to the whole samsara).
On the other hand, Epicurean philosophy and its related practice was clearly influenced by the belief that death is an annihilation for all and while it can be said that annihilation is a negative for all, one at least does not have to be preoccupied with 'what might happen after death', in the Epicurean view. And not just that, but Epicurus clearly saw IMO pain as the 'box', so to speak, to which one might want to escape. So, coherently with his view of the 'human condition', he tried to find a way to minimize the pain, the 'evil'. I might say that this 'minimization' is actually an evidence that his solution is not really a 'true escape' from the 'evil'.
As I said, what I found interesting is that even ancient 'secular' perspectives on the human conditions actually had a way of 'dealing with' the human condition ('the box') that had spiritual overtones, so to speak. And despite being seen as a 'symbol' of hedonism, Epicirus was quite 'moderate' in it and in fact compared to many 'hedonists' today he was certainly not one.
Anyway, I think that the religious/spiritual search of liberation/salvation is actually one of the most impressive forms of human creativity ('thinking outside the box') and the more 'radical' the 'search' is the more 'creative' the searcher is, so to speak (this doesn't mean he/she is necessarily right, of course). That's why to all 'conventional purposes', say, the Buddha's choice of 'becoming homeless' was seen as a 'foolish choice'. Consider the buddhist Epic 'Buddhacarita':
(source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Life_of_Buddha/Part_One/11._Siddhartha_is_Eager_to_Know_the_Great_Truths)
I would say that a strong amount of 'creative impulse' is present here.
Note that I used Buddhism as an example. I would say that an analogous 'argument' could be said in relation to other spiritual/religious schools (and subschools).
To return back to what I said earlier, the perception of the 'unfairness/imperfection' is the perception of being trapped in the 'box', which IMO also is itself a creative type of thinking.
*I personally think that 'Buddhism without rebirth' is nonsense. If nothing happens after death, I do not see why a person would actually have to choose Buddhism, why seeking the 'liberation from suffering' would be of paramount importance and so on. Of course one can make argument for Buddhist practice being still relevant, but IMO it would be completely arbitrary.
Quoting Critique of Pure Interest (Blog)
Personally, I think that this kind of 'search for the eternal' is probably what differentiates a 'spiritual' than a 'secular' search. Of course, what the 'eternal' is, is something that is debated among traditions, even within them (is it a metaphysical Absolute that is the source of all things? some other kind of transcendence of transiency and suffering?). As your quote says, pursuing 'perishable' things worsens the situation (the dependency IMO might be rooted in a fear of losing them...maybe this is in turn based in a sub-conscious intuition of their transiency).
Anyway, despite some claims that I have read about 'early Theravada Buddhism' where some argued that Nibbana is never said to be 'permanent' or 'eternal', in the Kathavatthu, a book inclueded in the Abhidhamma in the Pali Canon (so quite early), one can found this quote:
(source: https://suttacentral.net/kv1.6/en/aung-rhysdavids?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false)
curiously, the string of adjectives 'permanent...eternal...' is the same as that used by the 'eternalists' views criticized in the Buddhist scriptures
Of course, I am not proposing a 'perennialist' view here and I am not saying that the authors of the passage were 'eternalists'. But I would say that such a 'search for the eternal' is IMO compatible even with Theravada Buddhism, a tradition which is quite adamant in deny the existence of a 'true self'.
I'm not very familiar with Parmenides or Advaita, so my own terminology would characterize the "two ways of seeing the world" as Holistic (Philosophy ; Idealism ; Holism ) or Particular (Science ; Physicalism ; Materialism). So, as an amateur philosopher, I try to view the world "as a whole". And IMHO the best summation of that worldview is the 1926 book by Biologist Jan Smuts : Holism and Evolution. It's intended to be a science book, but since it focuses on Wholes instead of Modes, it is basically a philosophy book. Are you familiar with that book, or the concept of Holism?
In my previous post, I asked you "I'm not a Spinoza expert, but regarding unbounded space-time, he seemed to assume that the material world, and his Nature God, was Eternal & Infinite*1. So how would he deal with modern Cosmology, which says that the universe had a sudden & inexplicable beginning of Space-Time-Matter-Energy? Where or when was boundless Natura Naturans before the Bang?" Do you have an opinion about Spinoza's opinion on that vexing modern question?
The typical Materialist/Physicalist answer has been some version of an infinite space-time Multiverse, with many re-starts or re-births : Godlike, except mindless. How else can we reconcile the circumstantial evidence for a particular space-time beginning, with the notion of Reality as an undivided and timeless whole? Personally, I think the key distinction is, as you noted, between single Substance or boundless Being or unmanifest Potential, and its many Modes or Instances or Things. But that sounds too close to traditional god-concepts for some of us. :smile:
PS___ For all practical purposes, I am in a space-time box. But, for philosophical purposes, I try to think outside the box.
No, I never heard of Jan Smuts and I am not familar with his work. But I am familiar with the concept of holism, though. Not sure if Spinoza's philosophy can be said to be 'holistic'. After all, the modes are not the Substance's parts (the Substance is IMO partless in his philosophy...if it had parts, after all, it would be ontologically dependent from them).
Quoting Gnomon
Lol, sorry for my short attention span :sweat: I missed your question
Anyway, IMO Spinoza's philosophy is unaffected by the beginning of our universe. In fact, maybe Spinoza would said that our 'universe' is merely a mode and therefore it can have a beginning.
Quoting Gnomon
Some interpreters seem to think that Spinoza was a modern 'scientific pantheism' who identified 'God' with our physical world. I am not saying that they cannot be defended somehow, but IMO they are implausible because Spinoza did not see himself as an 'innovator' and used in a different ways the concepts of 'classical philosophy' (derived mainly from Plato and Arisotle). Also, Spinoza's substance had infinite attributes. Only one of them was extension (the analogue of our 'phyicality' at this time) and another attribute of the Substance was actually mind. Also, he endorsed the view of psychophyical parallelism*, so mind could not be generated by matter (in his terms 'extension') in any way.
So, yeah, while not a Personal God like the one present in classical Theism, Spinoza's God was quite incompatible with a merely 'physical wholeness'.
Quoting Gnomon
Yeah, I think that the same goes for me
Obviously, Spinoza's identification of God with Nature, sounds like both Pantheism and Immanentism. But, I interpret his deus sive natura as more like Plato's Logos : an essential principle, not a material thing ; an amorphous Ideal, not a space-time Object. That essence could be interpreted as the immaterial Whole of which all material things are parts ; or the unbounded Aristotelian Potential of which all physical objects are Actualizations.
As a creative causal Essence, though, this Logos or Potential might not create intentionally*1, but more like accidental Evolution. However, even Darwinian evolution has created material things (us) with philosophical minds. Moreover, as a scientific concept, Evolution is guided by "natural laws" and powered by physical Energy. Which may be merely two of God's "infinite attributes", but are of prime importance to creatures who seek to understand how & why this creative process works. Those directional Laws & Causes --- understandable to humans only metaphorically*2 --- are necessarily limitations on Infinity and Eternity. :smile:
*1. In fact, Spinoza's God is an entirely impersonal power, and this means that he cannot respond to human beings' requests, needs and demands. Such a God neither rewards nor punishes and this insight rids religious belief of fear and moralism. Second, God does not act according to reasons or purposes.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/feb/21/spinoza-ethics-god-human-traits
*2. Natural Forces & Laws are not material things, but general principles. Metaphorically, like a quantum particle that exists only as undefined non-local statistical Potential until "collapsed" into finite local reality by an intentional probing observation. We humans only know those non-things by inference from their effects, not by direct knowledge of their essence or substance.
No doubt. :sweat:
Wtf :confused:
.
:roll:
Sub specie aeternitatis "the universe" is only an (unbounded, though finite) mode, not substance itself, that "modern cosmology" (provisionally) explains sub specie durationis. Read Spinoza's Ethics, Part One: "Of God" (iirc only 31pp in E. Curley transl. paperback).
:monkey: Sub species aeternitatis, "where or when was" and "before" do not pertain to natura naturans (only to natura naturata (e.g. finite modes) sub speccie durationis).
Your jabberwocky, Gnomon, merely amounts to asking 'How did Spinoza get somewhere north of the north pole?' because, as usual, you opine about subjects you've barely skimmed and thereby wantonly misinterpret. We're all "amateur philosophers" here (no experts needed) but that's your usual prefatory cop-out not license to routinely spout your uninformed opinions free of some critical blowback from those of us who are not, unlike you, too intellectually lazy to have informed ourselves (beyond mere pedantry) on various topics like Spinozism, materialism / physicalism, modern cosmology, etc.
:up: :up: Thanks.
Forgot to say that Neumaier indeed argues the same position I take, down to the biosemiotic point about measurement being a matter of imposing metastable mechanical switches on larger patterns of thermal decoherence.
We impose a logic of yes/no on a reality that is always larger or vaguer than that classical binary state. And this is where the epistemic confusion arises. Why the idealists and realists believe they have some real argument going.
(By way of footnote - the question of what is eternal and/or persists in Buddhism is a very interesting one, against the background assumption of the impermanence (anicca) of all dharmas (moments of existence). The way I understand it is that 'eternalism' is very much the view that *I* will persist forever, and so it is criticized by the Buddha as basically a self-oriented attitude. That was in the context of a culture which accepted the reality of continued re-birth - the critique was of those who believed that the goal of the path was to be forever re-born in favourable states of being, distinct from the complete cessation (nibbana) of re-birth. However, as you point out, I don't think any of that ought to be taken to imply that nibbana itself is something transient. 'Ignorance has no beginning but it has an end. Nirv??a has a beginning but it has no end' ~ traditional aphorism.)
I dont think the world is fair or just. I think we humans make up those ideas and apply them to nature. To say everything happens for a reason is kind of true, but not for some big plan or something. Things just happen and its mostly luck. Thats my view anyways
I agree, the descriptors fair, just and lucky are all subjective, post hoc labels to help humans make "sense" of individual events by making them appear to be part of a universal "plan".
The modes are not parts of the substance! If they were, the Substance would not be an absolute. As @180 Proof correctly said 'our physical universe' itself is merely a mode of the substance. Modes are just 'aspects' of the natura naturata which from our 'point of view' seem discrete objects or 'parts'.
Regarding the 'actualization'... maybe the whole 'natura naturata' can be thought to be an actualization of 'natura naturans'. There is absolutely nothing outside God in his metaphysics. So IMO saying that God is a 'Potential' misses this.
Regarding his 'immantenism' and the supposed identification between God and the physical universe (as some like to interpret him), he said in a letter to his friend Henry Oldenburg in 1675:
(italics mine)
Note two things here: first he seemed to agree with - or at least seemed to be very close to - the scholastic Christian tradition that God is the sustainer of all creatures (God always sustains their beings and the creatures exist by participation) and this amounts of being the 'immanent cause' and second he explicitly rejects a materialist/physicalist interpretation of his views. Of course, he was no traditional theist but he accepted many elements of the 'traditional' Christian metaphysics.
Quoting 180 Proof
To elaborate on this, IMO 'sub specie aeternitatis' was also the correct way of seeing natura naturata, which transcends time. In this perspective one must see all the past, present and future, all times and all phenomena as aspects of an 'undivided unity' which has an ontological priority over them.
As a hopefully not too misleading analogy, natura naturata is like, say, the book 'the Lord of the Rings'. Each 'event' in the book is a 'mode' and the plot is the temporal relation between them. So, the plot itself is an aspect of the book and the 'story as a whole' transcends its plot, so to speak.
Ok, I see thanks!
I agree here!
Quoting Wayfarer
I think that 'eternalism'* means any kind of view that posits the existence of an eternal substantial self (so a view that posits that the 'cessation of rebirth' implies a sort of 'static' eternal bliss enjoed by such a self would be considered eternalism).
Quoting Wayfarer
Regarding this aphorism:
(edit: I forgot to link the source of the quote: 'Nibbana and Anatta' by Nyanaponika Thera, found e.g. here: https://www.bps.lk/olib/wh/wh011_Nyanaponika_Anatta-and-nibbana--Egolessness-and-Deliverance.html)
After all, if one accepts that 'Whatever is subject to arising is all subject to cessation' (sutta reference), if Nibbana had a beginning it would mean that it also has an end.
If you like, I'll send you some other quotes via PM (to avoid to derail the thread even more, unless someone else is also interested).
*and annihilationism is the view of the destuction of an impermanent self.
Ok!
I agree that Spinoza's notion of "Eternity" is not to be interpreted in a space-time sense. But modern interpreters might conclude that a transcendent or supramundane God (beyond space-time) could only be known/imagined via speculation or Faith : like the infinite-eternal Multiverse hypothesis. :smile:
What does Spinoza mean by eternity?
For as I have noted, Spinoza there defines eternity as existence conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing (E1d8), and he adds the explication that eternal existence cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end.
https://academic.oup.com/book/2287/chapter-abstract/142414886?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Quoting boundless
As I mentioned before, I'm not an erudite Spinoza scholar --- unlike , who haughtily agreed with my deplorable ignorance. But, since my amateur philosophical perspective is similar in some ways to Spinoza's, I'm still trying to learn where his 17th century model and my 21st century worldview differ.
Regarding my use of the term "Potential", it's a generalization & abstraction of the concept of causal Power ; not necessarily a god. Yet, if Spinoza's all-encompassing "God" has creative power*1 , then it is also the boundless Pool-of-Potential from which all space-time material things and immaterial statistical Modes are manifested. That doesn't mean the Eternal Substance is diminished in any way by the distinction between temporary & local Modes (attributes) and eternal & infinite Essence. The particular Modes are contained within the holistic Substance, not separate things. Hence, my notion of Creative Holism. Which is generally compatible with Bergson's Creative Evolution*2. If Spinoza's Nature is neither creative nor intentional, I don't understand why he would call it a "god".
But, is Evolution creative? I suppose that depends on your definition of "creativity". Some say it's only an aimless Algorithm ; but cosmic history certainly seems to reveal the emergence of features like Life & Mind that are not explainable by a simple explosion & expansion of space-time. Evolution from simple to complex goes against Entropy, and seems more like a purposeful program. Whether Natura is intentional or not is also debatable, and a topic for a different thread. But, according to the link below*3, Spinoza's Deus is more like a blind erratic force of Nature than a traditional creative God. Which may be why likes that literally absurd lawless worldview. But my worldview attempts to explain the apparent --- dare I say "obvious"? --- creativity of nature in philosophical terms that go back to Plato. So, it seems that my Panendeistic Nature God*4 explains the progressive "arrow of time", while Spinoza's might better define the orderless background of Chaos from which Plato's orderly Cosmos, including Life & Mind, emerges. Am I missing something here?
Back to the holistic nature of Spinoza's Natura, I tend to think of the Modes, not as parts of a multi-part assembly, but as various expressions of boundless Power/Potential. In that dynamic definition, a changeable mode is like a temporary State*5 of an eternal Substance. By analogy with the hypothetical universal Quantum energy Field, any Particle is merely a local disturbance or manifestation or mode or actualization of the general creative causal power of the continuous energetic system. Is Spinoza's "God" an eternal-infinite-universal energy field from which all Modes emerge? :nerd:
*1.Mode vs Substance :
'That which is in itself,' i.e. that, the reality of which is self-dependent, is what Spinoza calls 'Substance': 'that, which is in something else,' i.e., that whose reality is dependent, is called a 'mode,' or state of substance.
https://academic.oup.com/book/32374/chapter-abstract/268649395?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Note --- Does "God" divide Modes from Substance, or do the modes-we-call-human create such distinctions? If the latter, whence the human ability to create that-which-is-not-given?
*2. Bergson's Creative Evolution :
The theory presented an evolution in which a free emergence of the individual intelligence could be recognized. It was thus wholly distinct from previous deterministic hypotheses that were either mechanistic or teleological and represented evolution as conditioned either by existing forces or by future aims.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/creative-evolution-philosophy
*3. Spinoza's God : accidental or intentional?
This builds on a point he made earlier when he said that if God were to act with a purpose he would be making decisions based on something outside himself, like a person setting up a target and aiming at it. For Spinoza this is absurd; there is nothing outside of God and nothing that God could lack.
https://matthewzgindin.medium.com/spinoza-in-plain-english-pt-10b-god-acts-without-purpose-book-1-appendix-eda9d48cba67
Note --- Is a human's Purpose something outside himself, or an expression of his human nature, and his creative ability? If comprehensive Natura is able to change, the novelty would have to be internal : as a man changes his mind.
*4. God as eternal Potential, Nature as space-time Actual :
Is Space-Time Nature a mode of eternal Potential ; perhaps born about 14 billion years ago, for no apparent reason? "Panendeism" : look it up.
*5. States are not things or objects, but snapshots of continuous processes. Hence, mental or subjective. Only an analytical mind can imagine an ongoing physical process as-if momentarily halted. That talent was codified in the mathematical concepts of Calculus and Differentials, as applied to dynamic systems and non-linear geometric curves. The fundamental idea of calculus is to study change by studying instantaneous bits of change, that only exist in imagination.
Fine, but those 'modern interpreters' have no ground to assume that Spinoza had a world-view like theirs. It is a mere arbitrary assumption. It makes much more sense that Spinoza was actually closer to the classical metaphysical tradition of his time rather than, say, Laplacian materialistic and mechanicistic determinism (Spinoza's determinism was actually probably even stronger but of a completely different kind).
And when one consider the letter I quoted, it would be quite striking that a crypto-materialist would say that he thinks he agree with Saint Paul. Nowhere, as far I can say, he says that he thinks his views are closer to, say, Democritus.
Quoting Gnomon
Yes! Spinoza's eternity is timelessness, not infinite duration.
Quoting Gnomon
Ok!
Quoting Gnomon
I think that it is an interesting endeavour but I am not sure how Spinoza's philosophy helps here (David Bohm's* is far more interesting for this kind of questions). Spinoza's wasn't interested in such kind of questions as far as I can tell.
*I would suggest to consider the views of David Bohm, especially the one found in his later books. I think that you might like his concept of 'active information', his views on creativity, his views about the implicate and explicate orders etc (I may share some useful links later, via PMs if you prefer).
Or also Schopenhauer. In his main book lays out a 'proto-evolutionary' theory so to speak, according to which the 'struggle for existence' between living organism is seen as an expression of the conflicts of different ways in which the thing-in-itself 'Will' manifests. IMO I think you'll find both thinkers interesting for your philosophical search.
Quoting Gnomon
No, Spinoza's claim was that God does not have a 'telos', an aim, because it is already perfect so God doesn't need to 'do' anything (interestingly, most Christians philosophers agree that God is perfect but this doesn't imply that God cannot act). It's also part of the reason why temporal change is ultimately illusory in his views. Your reading is much closer to Schopenhauer's conception of the purposes, blindless 'Will' (but also he criptically says that the 'Will is the thing-in-itself for us', so it is possible that he meant that it is only a 'blind Will' in our distorted perspective...note that Schopenhauer's philosophy deals with the notion of salvation/liberation found in both western and eastern religions and tries to explain them in the context of his philosophical position).
Yes, but : us space-time creatures can only imagine essential timelessness, by analogy with the contingent & ever-changing world of matter & energy. So, the Necessary Being is a metaphor, logically defined into existence as the exception to the natural rule of Change & Contingent Existence : here today and gone tommorrow. My own analogy is with 1 & 0 (all or nothing) in computer code. which serve as brackets or bookends (beginning & end), yet are not countable numbers themselves, but conceptual placeholders. The static eternal "brackets" stand in contrast to the fleeting events of sensory reports.
So God is a concept to define temporal existence, not a mundane material creature like ourselves. Hence, Materialists deny such Ideal imaginary existence as literally Unreal, Immaterial, and Irrelevant to flesh & blood creatures. Consequently, the only justification for belief in an invisible nothingness is to serve as a logical Background against which to "see" the figures & forms of reality. Reductive scientists, like Laplace, have no need for such superfluous hypothetical notions. But Holistic philosophers find such concepts necessary for their quest to probe the limits of reality : the General, the Principle, the Whole, of which all real things are mere specks of dust.
Do you think Spinoza would agree with the label : "god of the philosophers", as contrasted with the God of theologians, and the godless-but-fecund Material World of scientists? :chin:
I believe in a God who is Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Just (by Just I mean It delivers Good and Evil in the right proportion). Therefore, I think that life is Just.
At the least, in a philosophy forum, you might provide some sort of support for your beliefs.
Otherwise, we can point out that life is not fair and just, and therefore by reductio, that there is no Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Just God.
Did you come here to prove God does not exist?
I have some arguments which provide support for part of my belief. Another part of my belief is based on my spiritual experiences which we cannot discuss here since here is a philosophy forum.
Quoting Banno
Ok, let's start from this list: 1)There was a beginning since infinite regress is not possible, 2) Nothing to something is impossible, and 3) Therefore, there was something in the beginning.
I didn't discuss (1) in this forum but I am open to discussing it. If you agree with (1) we can then move into (2).
For (2) I have a thread you can find it from the list of my threads. The essence of this thread however can be explained in two arguments A (A is my argument) and B (B is from Bob Ross).
A:
P1) Time is needed for change
P2) Nothing to something needs a change in nothing
P3) There is no time in nothing
C1) Therefore, change in nothing is not possible (From P1 and P3)
C2) Therefore, nothing to something is not possible (from P2 and C1)
B:
P1): If an entity is the pure negation of all possible existence, then it cannot be subjected to temporality.
P2): Nothing is the pure negation of all possible existence.
C1): Therefore, nothing cannot be subjected to temporality.
P3): Change requires temporality.
P4): Nothing cannot be subjected to temporality.
C2): Therefore, nothing cannot be subjected to change.
P5): Nothing becoming something requires change.
P6): Nothing cannot be subjected to change.
C3): Therefore, nothing cannot be subjected to becoming (something).
(3) Follows from (1) and (2).
If we agree on (3) then it means there was something in the beginning. I divide things into two sorts, changeable and changeless. Changeable substances such as material, matter and energy for example. I call changeless substance the mind. It can be shown that the mind has the ability to experience and cause. It can also be shown that change is not possible without the mind. So reality to me, including the beginning, is a mix of changeable substances and changeless substances. Let's see if can agree on what is stated here. We can move further later on.
Quoting Banno
No.
But the world is not fair and just.
Therefore you are mistaken. There is no god.
If god exists, then the world is fair. The world is not fair. Therefore god does not exist.
Hence your arguments are all of them faulty.
But does not God create humans to have free will? And if so, can choose in such a way to create an unfair and unjust world?
Also, there are unfair things not caused by human action - tsetse fly, child cancer. These are not so easily explained by free will.
That the world must be fair is an act of faith on 's part. Realising it isn't involves denying an omnipotent, omniscient, fair and just god.
MoK might take the argument a step further - as was done by a former prime minister dow nunder - and argue that we needn't, even ought not, worry about famine, climate change or environmental catastrophe, because god ensures the world is fair and just whether we act or not - our actions are not just unnecessary but potentially contrary to the will of the Lord... that we ought not work towards a fair and just world, but instead spend all our spare time happy clapping his praises. :roll:
Yes, it closes itself off form further investigation, safely ensconcing the victim in theological cotton wool.
Quoting Gnomon
You said:
Quoting Gnomon
I do see Wayfarer as prosecuting a moral crusade, so yeah, I did introduce the term. It was you that suggested that the whole of philosophy has been a moral crusade and I asked you for examples and to explain why you see the chosen example(s) as constituting a moral crusade.
Also it now, looking back, seems I did not misread you in saying that you suggested that all philosophy is ambiguous:
Quoting Gnomon
? I would say that Spinoza is far more closer to classical theism than this kind of view.
Quoting Gnomon
Yes, but note that for Spinoza and for many of the 'holists' the 'Whole' is, in fact, ontologically independent and its existence does not depend on its 'parts'. This is why IMO a fully consistent pantheism might necessarily lead to some kind of acosmism, where the 'parts' are merely illusions.
BTW, Spinoza also, if I recall correctly, believed that absolutely everything was inevitable. This is a form of 'determinism' which is stronger than Laplace: Laplace's determinism doesn't fix the initial conditions. In Spinoza's way it is even impossible to think that things could have been different, even in principle. When I was a sort of committed 'spinozist' (back in 2011-13), for a while it lead me to have a sort of calm acceptance of the events in my life. But then I couldn't deny the appearance of my own 'free will' and I accepted that my choices weren't all 'inevitable'.
To return to the topic of the thread, Spinoza's surely believed that justice and fairness were human constructs and the world could only appear 'unfair' or 'imperfect' due to a deluded perspective (a perspective which according to him was to be understood in order to be transcended, paradoxically).
Quoting Gnomon
Yes. But note that he viewed his God as a refinement of the 'God' of the philosophers and theologians of his time. Certainly not a 'material source' of everything.
I didn't say must. God is a free agent so God can act Unjustly. All I want to say is that excluding you there is also God who can read your thoughts and can experience your feelings. So excluding you, it is only God who can judge you properly. I believe in Karma which is imposed by God so your wrong action is not without consequences.
Quoting Banno
Prove it.
Quoting Banno
You need to prove your second premise.
Quoting Banno
Show me what is wrong with my arguments.
God didn't create humans. We know that human is the result of evolution.
Quoting Richard B
God is a free agent so God can act Unjustly but that is not what an all-wise agent does.
No. The term "moral crusade" sounds like a militant Christian concept, not a peaceful Philosophical quest for an ethical society. The bloody medieval crusades were "prosecuted" by physically and legalistically attacking unbelievers, as directed by the crusader's "king" in heaven : "in hoc signo vinces". I doubt that would think in such terms ; I certainly don't. And I don't know of any comparable philosophical "crusades", involving sword-wielding metaphysicians. The idea sounds absurd.
However, Way does have an erudite personal worldview, that is much less ambiguous than many that are "prosecuted" on this forum. And he defends that philosophical position astutely, without attacking with swords drawn. But yes, the work of Philosophy is inherently ambiguous, due not to any personal uncertainty, but to the difficulty of postulating metaphysical concepts in a materialistic language. :grin:
Hmmm. That sounds like Fatalism --- or as Spinoza might put it : Necessitarianism. If so, did he also deny that introspective rational philosophical humans have some degree of FreeWill, not completely driven by innate animal urges? :chin:
Quoting boundless
There is another version of Cosmic Holism --- PanEnDeism : all in god --- which views what humans call "God" as merely the Whole of which we humans are minuscule moving parts. Unlike Theism, this view does not presume that the parts have any inkling of the mind of God. And it does not imagine that humans are the darlings of the deity. So, any natural injustice or unfairness is not personally directed, but merely the nonpartisan workings of a material physical world, in which some creatures live on the life of other creatures. And some creatures develop moral qualms about killing other living things.
PED does not necessarily "divest itself" of a thinking god --- I suppose that's a Christian put-down --- but merely denies that the Whole reveals its thoughts, if any, to the parts. So the philosophical "parts" can only speculate about knowing the "Mind of God", as Steven Hawking put it. And the Prophets just make-up ideas & opinions that they think God could/should have regarding his Chosen People. As I understand it, PED does not go so far as to assume that finite dependent creatures are mere powerless cogs in the cosmic machine. If you feel & act as-if you are morally free, then you have some degree of FreeWill. But that's a whole n'other thread. :nerd:
Quoting boundless
The philosophers of his time were just beginning to depart from the party line of Catholic theologians. So Spinoza's deistic deity must have seemed radical to many fellow philosophers. Was his causa sui not deemed to be the First Cause of all material things? :smile:
Panendeism vs Panentheism :
Panentheism holds that God exerts a controlling effect on the universe; this opposes panendeism, which denies that God is involved Panendeism divests itself from an explicitly thinking God. Panendeism specifically holds that there is an aspect of reality, different from physical reality, extending into a non-thinking formless and changeless, awareness realm.
https://religion.fandom.com/wiki/Panendeism
Acosmism, in philosophy, the view that God is the sole and ultimate reality and that finite objects and events have no independent existence. Acosmism has been equated with pantheism, the belief that everything is God.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/acosmism
Quoting MoK
Some further problems then: is an unjust god worthy of worship? And ought you do as an unjust god commands?
We were not talking about worship. Who said that God needs worship? I said that God can act Unjustly since God is free. That however does not mean that God would act Unjustly since God is all-wise.
Quoting Banno
Sure not.
Good.
I don't think you have addressed the main line of thought here. That is, that if one thinks the world is just, despite the evidence to the contrary, the result is to excuse oneself from moral responsibility to make the world more just.
That is, it is a theology of moral inaction. As such it is reprehensible.
This deserves its own response. Fear of divine judgement is a way of ensuring your conformity.
Quoting MoK
Not sure what this means. Would you be willing to go against divine command, or ought you do as an unjust god demands?
Is it fear of retribution that keeps you from recognising the injustice in the world?
That may be the implication raised in the article that motivated me to start this thread. But I didn't express it so succinctly. Some Theists seem to take the attitude : "let go and let God". Ironically, a few respondents seem to have assumed that's what I was trying to say. If so, what would be the point of philosophy? :smile:
What evidence do you need? Do you think that all things done in the name of humanity are right?
There is no other solution to it while not all humans are not all-wise. Could you imagine what our lives would be like if we didn't submit to human-made laws? Some people are wise so they follow the laws with respect and without fear of consequences. But the laws are needed for those who are not wise enough. So, fear should be in place until we educate all people well enough so they act by wisdom rather than fear.
Quoting Banno
All-wise God wouldn't demand an unjust action. I wouldn't act according to the demand of an unjust god though.
Quoting Banno
No, it is not fear.
Let's go over it again. The world is not fair and just. We can make it more fair and just. Proposing a god who makes the world fair and just both denies the fact of injustice and excuses lack of action.
Is the real world fair and just?
Quoting Banno
What might be novel for you here is the idea that faith in god can lead to immoral acts. But if you think on it a bit more, you might see that it is fairly obvious.
I don't think so. But he would not say that a 'sage' is like someone 'driven by innate animal urges', for obvious reasons.
Quoting Gnomon
Is this Whole eternal and not dependent from its parts?
For instance, a dog's body is composed of cells. Even if one adopts a 'holistic' view of the 'dog', the dog is still dependent on its cells. But this cannot be the case for the 'Whole' if it is to be called 'God', even in the most liberaly way. Otherwise, why use the word 'God' in the first place?
Quoting Gnomon
Actually, the denial of free will is quite pertinent for the thread, at least with respect to the 'moral' evils. If there is no 'free will', can we still speak about moral evils?
Also, IMO Spinoza's 'solution' to the problem of suffering is to see everything sub specie aeternitatis and thus transcend every individual perspective. In the distorted individual perspective the world might appear 'unfair' but when the world is seen sub specie aeternitatis, such a judgment is transcended.
Quoting Gnomon
'Causa sui' means uncaused and yes it is deemed the ultimate 'cause' of all material things like everything else, as said in other posts.
The world is just.
Quoting Banno
Yes, we can make the world a right place to live. But we don't. That is why the Karam is in place and people are suffering. If any individual gets enlightened then there would be no need for Karma.
Quoting Banno
That is not God's duty to make the world the right place for living. It is our main duty.
Just curious, why would an all powerful god outsource that? And if the answer is he wants to see some puddly apes play out some vision, why would an all knowing god care to see this? Isnt planning and carrying out ones vision a very human like trait? Seems like the most powerful and all knowing thing would have no need for plans or need to be happy or satisfied that they are carried out or not. It all seems conveniently anthropocentric :chin:.
I was not familiar with Spinoza's concept of a "Sage". Apparently it's a human who "participates" in the divine nature. Is that something like the "wisdom" that philosophers seek? Does such wisdom allow a Sage to find ways to work around fatalistic Determinism, in order to exercise Free Will? Does that semi-divine willpower make us the "little gods" of this world, who break free from physical limits and animal urges? :chin:
Quoting boundless
Yes. The hypothetical all-encompassing source of all possibilities is assumed to be transcendent and Holistic : more than the sum of its parts. This is in contrast to the immanent deity of reductive PanTheism. Moreover, the notion of PanEnDeism, although metaphorical, is intended to be amenable to rational science & philosophy, although its transcendence makes it inaccessible to empirical evidence. :halo:
Quoting boundless
So, from God's timeless perspective, human suffering is inconsequential? The Christian "solution" to suffering is to give some humans a remedial do-over (second life) in a timeless heavenly Paradise. For non-Christians though, maybe Stoic acceptance is the best we can hope for? :cool:
Quoting boundless
I may have to add Causa Sui to my lexicon of First Causes and Prime Movers. Some Forum posters don't believe in ultimate causes or principles ; preferring to think in terms of observable serial Effects rather than a hypothetical (imaginary) unique self-existent Ultimate Cause. I guess that's the main distinction between the worldviews of practical Science and theoretical Philosophy. :nerd:
I think God cannot create humans in one instant since God cannot cheat life. So we have to get through, evolve, and grow.
Quoting schopenhauer1
To make sure that the outcome of life is proper.
Quoting schopenhauer1
What do you mean?
Quoting schopenhauer1
It is not about being happy or satisfied. It is about performing the duty. And it is not about humans, since animals, plants, and other species matter.
Quoting MoK
What do you mean, "proper"?
Quoting MoK
So, according to some theologians, God is omnipresent, and omni everything else--meaning that God is aware of and present in everything that happens in creation. So, when the first molecules formed the first cell, God is there and is present and is aware of the first cell and the death of the last cell, and everything in between. Time, as creation experiences it, is not a thing God experiences, God being eternal.
God, being eternal and all-powerful after all, gets to do that.
Quoting schopenhauer1
How could God NOT be anthropomorphic, anthropocentric, anthropic in all ways, since God is OUR creation? Even if we ditch the hairy thunderer in the sky and go for the elevated omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent all-loving God (which is some sort of wishful thinking on our part) God is still ours.
Even if a divinity actually exists. we evolved apes don't have anything remotely close to direct access to this divinity. We have to "make it up", which we have done several times over.
To be fair, I think that more than 10 years passed since I last read his 'Ethics' (but he did have a strong influence in my life) and right now I don't have his work available. By 'sage' I meant a person that contemplates sub specie aeternitatis.
Anyway, no the 'liberation' of the 'sage' doesn't lead to some kind of autonomy of the will but 'simply' an understanding that leads to the cessation of any kind of suffering, according to Spinoza. For instance, if one sees things 'sub specie aeternitatis', one cannot grieve for any kind of loss because he understands that such an event is part of the necessary expression of God (and this 'understanding' is not simply an 'intellectual understanding' of the doctrine). This 'insight' brings peace and serenity, according to him.
Quoting Gnomon
Ok. But if its parts are totally depenent on the Whole - and not distinct to it - and the viceversa is not true, how can we say that they are not 'illusions'? I mean, if the Whole exists and it is ontologically independent and there is absolutely nothing 'outside' it, the 'parts' seem more like an useful abstraction of our intellect. If ultimately, there is only 'the Whole/God', I cannot see how this isn't acosmism.
If 'reductive pantheism' affirms that 'God' is 'nothing more' than its parts, then 'God' is dependent. Being dependent, it cannot be called 'God'.
Quoting Gnomon
As I interpret Spinoza, in a sense yes, it is 'inconsequential'. The world appears to be 'injust', we get frustrated by the 'unfairness' that we see etc, but all these judgments are transcended in the highest perspective (and the same is valid for their opposites). They simply do not apply.
BTW, Spinoza has been dubbed 'the Stoic of the 1600s' by some, so yeah there are some similarities.
Anyway, what's the 'solution' in your view? And, also, what is the problem about which we should seek a solution?
IIRC, Spinoza's 'solution' was a state of blessedness/peace of mind that according to him came with the 'understanding' of the 'sub specie aeternitatis' perspective. The 'problem' was 'mental suffering', i.e. the suffering due to fear, grief, despair etc which he believed we could solve by 'adopting' the aformentioned 'transcendent perspective'.
Quoting Gnomon
I am somewhat conflicted about the idea of a 'First Cause'. I don't believe that it is something that is amenable to empirical research.
Why would God, all knowing, powerful, perfect being care about duty of his creation to himself? Seems again like a petty human trait :chin:. Odd, how God seems so human- almost like humans would invent something like this...
Well you said the point I am making much more clearly, you keep doing that :D. :up: But yep, I hope is paying attention!
I too, am surprised at the mississippi river length, and off-topic delta, that the OP's yes or no question has prompted. I suppose its a sign that Fairness & Justice are touchy topics for philosophically and religiously inclined posters. One post above came close to summarizing the contentious issue behind an ancient philosophical conundrum. :smile:
Who's responsible for fairness & justice, us or god?
"[i]I don't think you have addressed the main line of thought here. That is, that if one thinks the world is just, despite the evidence to the contrary, the result is to excuse oneself from moral responsibility to make the world more just.
That is, it is a theology of moral inaction. As such it is reprehensible.[/i]" Banno
Fairness and justice are, after all, the values which animate most people's political and social thinking. Even the most unphilosophical and irreligious person is bound to have strong views on these ideas, perhaps because they are the building blocks of most discussions today, from trans rights to MAGA, golden-era romanticism.
No, it isn't.
But perhaps you can't bring yourself to see that, because your faith depends on it.
If the world is already just, then there could be no "duty" for us to make the world just. Another contradiction in your position.
With the aim to the perfection of life.
Quoting BC
God as an omnipresent agent experiences everything in the present and past. Our experiences are however local in space and time (present only). We can however have access to our past experiences, so-called flashbacks.
Humans and God share common traits. Traits like Wisdom, Justice, and the like are traits of many different agents. If an agent does not have any trait then how she/he/it could interact with reality?
I said this to another poster and I think it is proper for our discussion too: "I think God cannot create perfect humans in one instant since God cannot cheat life. So we have to get through, evolve, and grow."
I like to drop in a Latin phrase every now and then too, but it's helpful to provide a translation or English definition, especially when one's Latin gem is NOT common knowledge (like et cetera).
Thomas Nagel says "If sub specie aeternitatis [from eternity's point of view] there is no reason to believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony instead of heroism or despair."
Is that what you meant? Were you being ironic? Just guessing, probably not.
If god cannot create perfect humans then he is not god. In the bible it said that he created man in his image therefore perfect. Yet we have children who are born disabled how can you explain that ?
In that case the perfect creator cannot exist. So no god.
And what do you think are the problems with this view?
Quoting MoK
These statements suggests that your concept of God is too small. A being who is present in all times--past, present, and future; and in all places, knows all, and has unlimited power can't be contemplated using humanoid traits, like thrift or duty, or by comparing God's omniscience to our measly flashbacks.
An altogether unlimited God presents problems. We ask, "Well, why didn't God create a world without suffering? Or, why didn't God make people who were good from the start and stayed that way? And so on. We look at this unlimited being from our extraordinarily limited being's perspectives, and think we see God's mistakes. Highly presumptuous.
Look, I don't know any more about God than anybody else. It's just that if we want to CLAIM that god is unlimited, then we have to accept that we will never understand such a being, will never understand the Divine plan of Salvation, or anything else about God. We don't have to reject the existence of this unlimited God, but our severe limitations in understanding God put the ball back in our court.
In other words, our problems are our problems.
Perhaps theres a reason to earthly suffering and is as it should be. Of course we cannot discern any more motive in his creation as we are creatures caught up in such a creation where suffering is inevitable and yet theres happiness and joy to so perhaps these two opposites cannot exist without each other. How could we appreciate health without sickness or happiness without suffering ? Justice without injustice etc Utopia while at first sounds amazing would be boring after a while without any challenges to be overcome.
I think, BC, that this question reveals an even more disturbing question- what kind of god wants his creations to suffer?
This is where the Lovecraftian notion comes into play.. God's morals would have to be so far removed from what humans deem as moral, OR God would have to be so CLOSE to the whims of human sadistic glee, that it would be a disturbingly amoral God (from the perspective of anything considered normative ethics). If "Higher Morality" (God's morality) is so sadistically bad for its creatures, what does this say?
How would you know the concept of joy without suffering? How would you know what sunshine is without the rain, justice without injustice. These things dont point to a sadistic god but to a creature that is simply beyond our discernment.
A perfect agent is God and not a human with all human limitations. Humans have to get through, evolve further, and grow to become perfect (if that is possible at all). Therefore, humans are not perfect yet. If God can create a perfect agent then God should only create God!
Quoting kindred
As far as I remember from the Bible Adam looks good in the eyes of God and not perfect. I don't interpret the Bible literally. I don't know what image means. Do you? In regards to humans, we know that humans are the result of evolution and humans were not created at once.
Quoting kindred
Bad Karma from the past life.
Quoting kindred
What do you mean by the perfect creator?
But if God was all loving and all knowing and all powerful, could he not create a universe whereby pure joy and satisfaction does not require his subjects to suffer? It seems a kind of weak tea to only have a universe work whereby suffering is necessary for joy. In fact, this is one of my main arguments against most forms of anti-pessimistic philosophy, but that's another thread..
I don't think that there is any problem with this view. If you think that there is a problem then please tell me.
The definition of god is of a being that is perfect in every way. All knowing all good all powerful. Perfect in all aspects.
That's wisdom.
The trouble with making stuff up about god is that the story quickly becomes inconsistent. The way to treat those who claim to know stuff about god is to bring out those inconsistencies, displaying the irrationality of god-talk.
Quoting MoK
And that is a problem. You are not critical of your own beliefs. It seems you are here to tell us what you believe, but not to listen or think about things in a new way. Not to do philosophy.
Challenge yourself.
Think of this analogy, rain (a bad thing) is required for plants to grow. Without rain the plants would wither and die.
Joy then would not really be joy without pain and suffering because it would not be appreciated for what it is.
There are several points to be made JUST here. The main one is that 'everything happens for a reason' is both true and NOT RELEVANT to this issue.
'Reasons' are, like any other choice humans make, mostly immoral. That is to say, EVERY choice is immoral to some degree, not being perfect.
Just like so many issues in philosophy you can get the best indication of the type of person you are dealing with based on their general response to such a question. But all these answers impinge upon the singular general question of 'is morality objective?' Those who answer 'yes' too easily are often fear-centric (order driven). Those who answer 'no' too easily are desire-centric (chaos driven). And those that answer in detail are wiser (more balanced). Note that just answering in depth with excuse after excuse for an apologist point of view either way IS NOT wise, but, can be camouflaged as such.
Also, as another issue in this paragraph, the assertion that 'bad thing happen ...' is not quite accurate either. If a weakly moral partner leaves a relationship or a tenuous social issue cascades within reality to conflict, that is not actually bad. We would almost universally take the Pragmatic shortcut and incorrectly name it 'bad'. But that is not wise. Of course, again, wisdom, is a rare quality, and most people are not wise and would indeed take such situations as 'bad'.
{Cue Monty Python's 'Always look on the bright side of life ... (whistles)}
Quoting Gnomon
I love this take. Even the way you write it about someone else writing about it SEEMS to be saying that 'fair' means something akin to NOT 'good for you', but MORE LIKE 'easy and perfect for you'. I think it is safe to presume, to infer, that most people will interpret the statement or idea that way. And THAT is the problem.
The truth that is objective, (ha ha), shows us that the fairness is only in the allocation of universal truth equally to all. How then can anything not be 'fair'? It's all fair by definition. Each maker of a choice has the same moral duty to live up to. That is fair, of course.
But that AVOIDS the real issue. The real issue is how hard each choice is to make. And if a choice is hard and there is a right answer (and an objectivist believes that there is a right answer), then usually in any situation the chooser is NOT wishing for understanding so much as they are wishing for EASE. That wish in and of itself is immoral.
My own belief is that morality is clearly objective. This universe would literally disintegrate in relatively immediate time if morality were subjective. And if that is true, we SHOULD all want to suffer hard choices to earn wisdom and grow by making the right choices, even so.
Quoting Gnomon
And THAT specific delusion is morally repugnant to me. Acting or choosing in the name of GOOD, is ... evil, if you do it for any reward other than the sake of the perfect moral GOOD within any moment. That means that clearly, ANY AND ALL transactional efforts towards morality are highly immoral.
All reward and punishment is immoral. This is my belief. The only reward or punishment that happens morally in the universe is the reflective result of the choice and that is immediate as the choice is made. In other words the universe and objective morality make it (life and choice) such that in the act of making it you either reward yourself with genuine happiness by aligning with objective moral truth (the GOOD) or you fail and by degrees and then by those same degrees suffer genuine unhappiness therefore. The only 'punisher' is you yourself. That is quintessentially fair. So, duh, it's a fair universe.
Quoting Gnomon
No, indeed not. The concept of karma is deeply silly. It again assumes an immoral transactional nature to actions and choices. I suppose if one approaches the moment of now, of choice, as an asymptote, a limit, then that is still ok. That would mean what I already outlined above. The reward or punishment (still somewhat transactional) happens immediately.
But, this to me is not quite accurate AS IN I mean to say that because of the immediacy and more to the point the OBJECTIVE nature of morality, there is no 'bartering', which would characterize a transaction. Instead, choice is non-transactional and objective even as it is immediate. So, if you follow, the concept of karma to me is nonsensical overall and immoral in its suggestion.
Quoting Gnomon
No, that is incorrect. Such a conclusion can only be drawn if one is blatantly incorrect (subjective) and transactional in outlook (again incorrect). I guess an easy way to say this is that such a person has NO IDEA what fairness really is.
Quoting Gnomon
Again, this is incorrect faithless subjective nonsense.
The universe clearly IS DEEPLY and INHERENTLY interested in your (moral) success. The whole universe is NOTHING BUT an objective theater for simulation (experience). Within that theater you choose. Nothing else is happening but choice. All choices are punished or rewarded by the nature of the universe, the system. And the only punisher or rewarder is YOU, because what is moral, what is GOOD, what is perfect, is objective. It does not change.
Thus, because things ARE fair, you may then earn wisdom and grow, progress, towards the GOOD in understanding and action (choice). If this was not ALL true, there would be no point to anything and indeed, as mentioned, matter cohesion itself would fail and the universe would cease to exist.
What convinces us of this tempting lie you suggest here is that we are above all aimed at ease. Interest in and preference for ease is effectively the sin of laziness.
We are tempted to believe in a subjective universe because that 'eases' (not really) the pressure on us to choose wisely. If morality is not objective then we are just hapless victims and our choices make no difference. But objectivity is empowerment. Blame is healthy! But don't be a clown and blame the universe and disempower yourself. Blame yourself.
If we get into the right habit, of blaming ourselves (for literally everything), we are then empowered to choose and encouraged, DESPITE ALL FORMER FAILURES, to try again to make things better. I know which side I am on. Fair universe, choice matters, and it's all you.
Tied to this idea is the unity principle. That is the classical 'we are all one' idea. Literally, you are me and I am you. So, indeed EVERY choice in the universe is YOUR fault, finally. You are not JUST a representative of the godhead, but the godhead itself.
Quoting Gnomon
I would define this conclusion, as constructed, as blatant sophistry of a very low order.
Quoting Gnomon
You should change your mind. The mind and all fear constructs are prisons, limits, by definition. They NEVER arrive at perfection. Only by balancing the transcendence of desire and the being of anger into fear, is moral choice made wise.
All things DO work together for the GOOD. But it's so damn hard to reach the GOOD (perfection) that both the unwise Pragmatist and the unwise Idealist turn away exhausted by the effort. It is not called perfection lightly. The wise understand the exponentially increasing effort required to be wiser and wiser than the mean in society and amid humanity and ALL.
Quoting Gnomon
Philosophers are not only divided. Taht rather implies a duality. Instead it is a multiplicity of infinite variation of failure.
Essentially ANY sliver of difference between objective understanding (reality) and subjective wishes or fears (delusion) is a lie, comforting though it may be. Logic is a prison on one very large DUALISTIC side of that multiplicity. If you want equal halves of failure to choose perfectly, then choose your camp in life, the fear and order side, or the desire and chaos side. And then to convince yourself that you are even more erudite and correct, waffle back and forth pretending towards balance, rather than actually BEING in balance.
Logic is just fear. All thought is fear. That is an order side failure of moral choice. Pragmatism as a whole arises from that flavor of failure.
Quoting Gnomon
And see then how Plato was waffling. And then how modern science waffles.
But the truth is still objective and that is orderly, finally. So the orderly INCLUSION of chaos by law is still lawful. Wisdom is NOT easy. It's the hardest skill there is.
Quoting Gnomon
Nonsense! Politeness, as most often portrayed colloquially, is an uncommitted position. It is THE quintessential waffling mistake, an immoral choice.
Peace is finally delusional. Conflict is eternal and ubiquitous. The struggle IS AS IT SHOULD BE.
That means though that it is POLITE to be in synch with this truth and struggle, get involved, 'Participate', as Joseph Campbell would say. In fact, a wise person will cause suffering intentionally to be moral. That suffering is distinct from other forms of suffering in this one way: that suffering is NECESSARY to allow yourself and others the opportunity to earn wisdom. Evil is properly defined as a choice for UNNECESSARY suffering. And then we have a whole new debate!
Anyway, my two coppers are just a tiny penny rolling up the walls inside. You have to look for the ghost of real cause and real effect. It's only you again, the chooser.
Right, that's how it works in this universe, let's say. But I am not arguing that this universe (at least for the sake of this argument) doesn't work like that. Rather, I am arguing why an a loving/perfect/powerful/knowing god would not create a universe that doesn't need suffering in order to "feel" the relief from suffering, or joy.
Arguably, even this conception of joy needs suffering is off. Schopenhauer proposed that joy/satisfaction/happiness is actually negative in nature. That is to say, it always works as simply a relief from the normal suffering of dissatisfaction. But this brings us far afield.
Its a good question I mean its like asking whether a Utopian society is possible. I dont know, it may be but I bet it would be boring.
Every citizen in such a utopia would be happy, there would be no suffering, no death, no injustice, no disease, no poverty, perfectly possible given Gods omnipotence.
Yet such a society would be impoverished in other aspects for if they did not know what the opposites of happiness or what suffering or disease were such citizens would be ungrateful and they would lack the experience of ever having experienced sorrow or unhappiness. These are all palettes of human emotion: happiness sadness pain joy etc, without them the palette would be small indeed and unable to paint a human being in all aspects of existence.
Therefore whilst suffering is not necessary its needed for a fully fledged human being to exist.
Not in a universe that was perfectly attuned such that being happy and not suffering wasnt boring. Seems odd to trade boredom for suffering and not reconcile the two :chin:
Quoting kindred
Uh oh, then not all loving and all good :sad:
Quoting kindred
Ah yes, but then we are back to two things:
1) god CANT create a universe where humans can have this knowledge without suffer
2) god is a sadist who wants to see his victims learn a lesson, very humanlike this god is :brow:
I don't know all the attributes of God. I think that humans are not perfect so they don't psychologically have access to all the possible attributes including attributes of God. We have instinct. We can think logically. We have the impression of intuition. I don't know what wisdom is but people talk about it. People talk about meaning too but I don't think that any human has ever experienced it yet. And so on. To complete I don't think that God has access to the future since the future is not decided yet.
Quoting BC
Without suffering no organism can evolve. So suffering is an inseparable aspect of life. Why God didn't create a perfect agent? God couldn't since a perfect agent by definition is God.
Quoting BC
Yes, our problems are our problems but that does not mean that God is not in charge.
Knowledge of something and the experience of something are two very different things.
Take for example a sweet tasting beverage like orange juice or Coke. The knowledge of how it tastes like is not the same as actually tasting it.
Of course god is capable of creating a universe (or at least a planet) without suffering yet how could you appreciate the beauty of it. If all you tasted is milk and honey how could you truly appreciate that compared to starvation?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Brings me back to my first point, gods objectives are not easily discerned by man. You paint a bleak picture of human existence ignoring the countless joys (ie music) that is expressed by the human condition. Sure theres suffering too, whether thats balanced heavily on way or another is irrelevant because the human condition is meant to experience opposites perhaps as god intended. And whether youre grateful or ungrateful about that is personal opinion but the world is not as bleak as that theres rays of sunshine after the rain, remember that.
Then back to my points earlier about a god that cant create a universe where joy and no suffering exist. God wants this universe to have suffering. And he could make a universe without it. Thats all the info you need.
Who says he hasnt. It just so happens that we live in a world with suffering but also with joy.
Back in the garden of Eden it was such a world without pain and suffering but you wanted the knowledge of what an apple tasted like, only way to do that im afraid is to experience it which is to try it and taste it. Our fault really, but thats the price you pay for knowledge.
We experience the good things in life in parallel with the bad things, not in a sequence of contrasts. The good and bad things come and go in our lives, sometimes at the same moment. One day we are robbed, but we enjoy robust health. One day we win $1000 at the casino but a week later we feel very depressed. One day we we feel very happy but the killing in Gaza goes on. One day we are diagnosed with cancer, and two weeks later our body is sliced open, causing great pain. One month later we feel great, lose $1000 buy lottery tickets, our cancer is cured, the cat runs away, and we discover our daughter is turning tricks.
We don't need bad thing to experience good things, and conversely, we don't need the good things to experience bad things. Both of them "just are". There is gladness, good health, and joy. and there is depression, sickness, and misery.
When I am in great pain, how good I felt a week ago doesn't help. When I feel on top of the world, last month's sadness doesn't hurt me.
That we're wrong. That's baked into the description, really. If God's morals differ from ours, we are necessarily wrong.
YesI think we can. I think its up to us though to first decide whats unfair or unjust. Most of us can agree though so thats good.
So I guess its the supposition. What if a god likes seeing his subjects navigate various forms if suffering like a game? From the human pov, that could be questionable. Is something good because the gods will it or the gods will it because its good? If X is not X then something is off perhaps.
Can we? Sure, we already have. It's a laudable goal, thus I support continuing down that path.
Why?
Yes, I've often wondered why too. I guess if your definition of god holds that god is necessarily the foundational source of all that is good then there's the answer. But when you read some religious works like The Koran or The Bible, God is more of a bellicose, vain Trump-like figure, an incompetent mafia boss who seems to think genocide is a solution to problems he created.
'Sub specie aeternitatis' is a technical phrase coined by Spinoza and it can be translated as "under the perspective of eternity". According to him, the 'world' could be contemplated in two ways:
- sub specie temporis (under the aspect of time): this is the 'usual' way we contemplate the world, from our limited perspective. Our perspective is, however, partial and our knowledge is incomplete. This 'partiality', according to Spinoza, causes feelings of anxiety, grief, loss (i.e. mental suffering) etc because we do not understand the 'great scheme'. We also believe that the events are not inevitable, according to him.
-sub specie aeternitatis (under the aspect of eternity): this is the 'higher' way of contemplating the world. According to Spinoza, this kind of way of 'seeing' the world could be attained by philosophical reflection*. Once this insight is obtained, everything in the world is seen in relation to the whole and, instead of interpreting the world as a collection of separately existing entities (substances), the 'world' is actually seen as an unique substance, an unique entity, which is absolute and eternal. All particular things in the world are seen as 'modes' of the Substance (i.e. God), not individual substances themselves (in the first Part of the 'Ethics' he argued that a 'substance' must be eternal, ontologically and conceptually independent). At the same time, all the 'modes', our finite mind included, are seen in a way eternal, not because they are eternal in themselves but they participate in the eternal Being of God/The Substance - that's why he says: "The mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things from the standpoint of eternity" in Part V of the 'Ethics'. Since the mind is seen as eternal, it is also in a sense free from death and therefore, and for a mind that understands this, it becomes fearless and free from suffering (i.e. 'salvation' as he understood it). Also, any kind of judgement that arise from the 'lower' perspective is transcended. So the world is neither just or injust, neither imperfect nor perfect (at least as we usually understand the terms)
*This kind of thought that a 'higher' way of contemplating/knowing/understanding the world wasn't introduced by Spinoza. Nor Spinoza was particularly 'original' in his metaphysics. Parmenides for instance IMO argued for more or less the same metaphysics and the same view that a 'higher perspective' is salvific/liberating. Spinoza, however, was maybe original in his conviction that philosophical reflection could lead to 'salvation'.
Anyway, as I said, I was presenting Spinoza's thought (as I understood it). I was actually a Spinozist in 2011-2013, but now my views are quite different. For instance I am neither convinced by his metaphysics (especially I quite disagree with his complete denial of any kind of free will) nor by his convinction that philosophy is 'liberating'. I do find his views fascinating and they did left a strong impression in me.
edit: @Gnomon, I think that this post might be of your interest too.
What if, something like Christian universalism is true? Do you think that in this case suffering is still unacceptable if God exists?
Cool. The next question that you have to ask yourself is whether such a God can create another God.
I am critical of my beliefs. I thought you could find a problem with my belief.
A God who wants evolution in life. Suffering is an inseparable feature of life, without it we don't learn many things, and without it we don't evolve.
Do you think that this 'evolution' has an 'end'? Or is endless?
Yes, suffering can teach many things but I would hope that life is not an inseparable feature of life. Why should I want to suffer if I have no chance to somehow find an escape from it?
So to answer the question, yes I it would be.. Here is my reasoning:
Contention: An all knowing, all perfect being would be nowhere near anything like the characteristics like a human. He wouldn't be a petty self-absorbed, narcissistic, sadistic tyrant-spectator-king. He wouldn't be curious. He wouldn't be like a teenage genius game designer who wants to see how his game plays out, not knowing the tiny variations, but understanding the overall outcome.
So there is a well-established tradition since at least the time of Judaism around the Greco-Roman era (300 BCE- 600 CE) that God (that is to say Israel's deity, the one and only) created Man as a sort of experiment in how a free-willed entity would act if given the choice, and not the certainty of knowing God and his Will. This article explains it well, and I highly recommend reading all of it to get the sense of the main beliefs and debates surrounding it:
Quoting Free Will Judaism Wiki
So, with all that being said.. We have a pretty good outline of what is going on here in the theological conception..
God is a curious designer type who sort of poses an experiment to himself. What would it be like to have entities that have to make "the right choices"? Presumably, if we are being REALLY charitable and include Kabbalistic thought [which came much later in history versus the orthodox religious claims of it being as old as the Torah, etc.], what this means is that godliness is in doing the commandments. They are like holy sparks to be revealed by playing out the commandments set out by God. The commandments are the written words along with all the oral traditions surrounding it (which is akin to following all the laws of a written Constitution and all the judicial interpretations surrounding its application). Thus keeping kosher, following the 10 commandments, keeping the sabbath holy by not working, etc. and doing it in correct fashion are revealing the sparks. No doubt, worshiping god through prayer or sacrifice is also part of this, especially at defined parts of the year. Sin would be straying from the knowledge and practice of the written and oral commandments. It is tempting to not follow these, as it is the easier route, but it isn't what God wants..
[Now mind you this is for a Jewish framework. This can easily be reconfigured for the supercessionist Christian framework whereby the "Old Covenant/Testament" of the Law (written and/or oral) is thrown out and the New Covenant of Jesus' sacrifice and belief in his death and resurrection and his teachings (along with whatever variation of church doctrine/theology) is what God wants.. I am just keeping with the OG Jewish conception, as it is well-laid out and makes the same point for both]
Here's the thing, even with ALL of these considerations that God wants to see these "lower realm" creations that do not "know God" make the right choices and "reveal" him through praxis (divine actions elevating the lower realms to God), even with all the fancy theological and ideas of Biblical, Post-Biblical (Talmudic), and Kabbalistic thought, still boil down to a very human like quality that does not pass this initial contention:
Contention: An all knowing, all perfect being would be nowhere near anything like the characteristics like a human. He wouldn't be a petty self-absorbed, narcissistic, sadistic tyrant-spectator-king. He wouldn't be curious. He wouldn't be like a teenage genius game designer who wants to see how his game plays out, not knowing the tiny variations, but understanding the overall outcome.
That is to say, God is STILL suspiciously all too human. He wants suffering so that "holiness" (himself basically in material form) can be revealed to his own creation. It reads too much like a game designer that wants to see his cool creation play out. It is especially odd when adding in elements like "reward and punishment" for these players.. wiping people out, condemning them, exiling them, cursing them, rebuking them.. etc. etc. This seems again all too human...To WANT punishment and reward, let alone meeting it out as divine dispensation. YOU get the World to Come, YOU get the World to Come, not YOU though.. The little creations ENDURE the negatives, because I'm curious to see how you overcome them... All too human. Obstacle course for the piddling creations. A game. Is it divine boredom then? Does BOREDOM, yet again rear its ugly head?
Mainlander has a darker version of this. The boredom leads to creation, but not so that it plays out in some game-like fashion, but because of a sort of the need to break out of its own boring unity.. He had to individuate himself to carry out a sort of suicide, akin to the "Heat Death of the Universe". Oddly, the ideas of entropy play much more into that notion.
Quoting Mainlander
It depends on what the state of perfection is. If the state of perfection is boundless we will ever suffer. If the state of perfection is bounded then we will soon find peace.
Quoting boundless
Fortunately or unfortunately, suffering is an inseparable feature of life! Fortunately, because we have a way to evolve. Unfortunately, because we have to suffer.
Quoting boundless
You need to get enlightened if you want to reach a state of relative peace.
That is of interest to me. Especially because, on this forum, the harshest critic of my personal worldview, Enformationism, also claims to be a Spinozist. I wouldn't call myself a Spinozist, since I only know of his ideas via second hand accounts. I told him (the critic) that my philosophical world model is, like Spinoza's, more akin to Science than Religion, but it also assumes that cosmic Evolution is not aimless & accidental, but governed & directed by logical/mathematical internally-coded laws similar to a computer program.
I know nothing of the implicit lawmaker/mathematician/programmer --- or He/r telos --- but I like Plato's notion of Logos as a label for the ordering principle of the universe. Apparently, even such a non-theological notion as Logos or First Cause or Prime Mover is too close to his despised Catholic dogma for his comfort. And any intimation of transcendence (i.e. pre-big-bang) offends his Immanentist beliefs.
Since at least one species of gradually evolved creatures has developed a somewhat objective & rational understanding of world events, I conclude that A> the ability to stand outside our emotion-driven animal nature, and B> the power to generate unique personal ideas (abstract representations, images, models, goals) of our own, allows us to become local centers of Will within the universal "Willpower" (motive force) of the universal thermodynamic system, otherwise dominated by destructive Entropy. Which, in effect, makes us humans the "little gods" of the world. Hence, we have begun to create sub-human creatures of our own, such as complex machines and artificial intelligence, that execute the will of their programmers.
How do you think Spinoza would judge such a 21st century update of his own 17th century worldview? :smile:
Enformationism :
A philosophical worldview or belief system grounded on the 20th century discovery that Information, rather than Matter, is the fundamental substance of everything in the universe. It is intended to be the 21st century successor to the ancient worldviews of Materialism and Idealism. An Update from Bronze Age to Information Age. It's also a Theory-of-Everything that covers, not just matter & energy, but also Life & Mind & Love.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
Enformy :
In the Enformationism thesis, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend or force, that counteracts Entropy & Randomness to produce complexity & progress. Physicists inappropriately labeled that positive force as "Negentropy".
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html
Thanks for the response. I'll answer you tomorrow.
Quoting MoK
I don't think that it is necessary that a 'boundless' state of perfection contains suffering. But IMO, why seek it if suffering is literally endless? Seeking an end to suffering seems to be the most natural thing to seek (even if it would be impossible).
Quoting MoK
I see your point, but IMO everyone desires to be from suffering in a very intimate level. Why should I seek a state of perfection if I will still suffer?
I saw your response as I was typing. I'll answer tomorrow to you too!
I don' know if your use of "evolve" is meant to refer to biological evolution, but if so, no we as individuals don't evolve. Species evolve.
So do you think it is the case that we simple aren't the species that God wants, and God is waiting for some species to come, and doesn't care about the suffering it takes to get there?
I read your long post twice and here you can find my response to it: I think it would be fruitful to discuss the idea of God in the first place since I don't believe in the concept of Jewish God that for example has foreknowledge. Apart from the paradox (the paradox that our fates are fixed) you mentioned there is another paradox that I can summarize in the following. Let's assume that I meet God in Heaven face to face and I can ask questions to God. I can simply challenge God's foreknowledge by asking a simple question of whether I am going to do a certain act. If God answers that I am not going to do then the question is whether I can do the opposite or not. If I cannot then I am not a free agent which is problematic. If I can then God does not have foreknowledge. That is one problem aside: God does not have foreknowledge. The second problem is related to the fact whether God can create God or not. It is against wisdom if God can create God but wouldn't create God, instead creating creatures who must undergo all sorts of troubles and sufferings. Therefore, I believe that God cannot create God therefore the creation, like it or not, looks like the things that it is, people suffering but evolving, and people do wrong so they get punished... So here we are involved in something people call life, like or or not, we have to play it out.
Well, that is unfortunately not completely up to us. If perfection is boundless then we suffer eternally since we cannot possibly achieve it. If perfection is bounded then we can achieve it hence there will be an end to our sufferings.
Quoting boundless
Well, if we achieve perfection we won't suffer anymore. That is the goal of our lives!
By evolve I mean both spiritual growth and evolution which only occur in species.
Quoting wonderer1
I think humans can enlighten so we can reach a state of harmony and relative peace if each individual puts into practice to achieve enlightenment. I think that humans are subject to further evolution as well. I also think that God cares about the level of suffering that we receive. Too much suffering can lead to the extinction of humans. We won't evolve further if the suffering does not exist at all. So suffering should be in the right proportion.
Quoting schopenhauer1
In my view, this discussion (Euthyphro, Liebniz) is fundamentally erroneous. We have the texts. Either see to the texts (which in Judeo-Christiandom are extremely clear - God dictates ethical truth, not recognises it) or accept that they are not foundational texts. I don't really understand why one would ask the question, unless you're seriously considering a supernatural God and want to square your discomfort with that position. In that case, navigating one's discomfort might be required to live a fulfilling life, but it clearly flies in the face of the texts.
Fair enough. A comprehensive series of accounts. Boredom seems as good a reason as any. Perhaps a desire to share boredom and to see what ridiculous things creatures will do to distract themselves.
Then of course there is the idea that our flawed universe is the product of a Demiurge. The Gnostic accounts suggests a creature of some malignancy.
I have never read an account of god which makes much sense to me or one which resonates. Which is why I think belief in god is a bit like a preference or predisposition, not unlike sexual attraction. You can't help what ideas you are attracted to. The reasoning and justifications come later. For me the god hypothesis doesn't offer anything useful when it comes to sense making.
As an aside, god has no explanatory power - we don't actually know why or how creation was made or to what extent god has any control over creation or, in fact, how many gods there might be. We don't know if god is good or to what extent they care. The events on earth suggest a negligible commitment to the welfare and happiness of creatures.
Is god good? Is god love as many believe? The idea that god is good seems to come from the fan fiction and just because an old book says a thing, doesn't mean would believe it.
As noted earlier though, if any personal God is 'true', we are wrong to think this way. We are simply not listening.
My preferred claim for the nature of God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent.
There is another contrary claim about God that deletes the "omni" prefixes, leaving God with only some power, some knowledge, and some, limited, presence. This God is still a creator, but not the manager of the expanding universe. This God is profoundly loving, but doesn't have perpetual patience and isn't above getting very angry with us paragons of animals, us crowns of creation, and smiting us when He just can't stand us any longer. The ultimate expression of this very loving God is that He became man in Christ. God ceased being God.
This theogony hasn't been very popular, because among other things, if God isn't God anymore, Who is in charge and to Whom have we been praying to for the last 2000 years? What about the Holy Ghost? Is the Holy Ghost the ghost of God, hovers over the world?
So, God didn't create a perfect world. Apparently, it wasn't clear to God that all the things that could go haywire in creation definitely would, and they definitely have. We paragons of animals, we crowns of creation don't perform all that well, either. From the POV of God we probably come off as ungrateful hateful fbastards. Not only do we suffer, we are the authors of a lot of our own suffering. God probably didn't foresee the unbridled growth of cancer cells which causes suffering, and evidently didn't see any problem with running the urethra through the prostate which eventually swells up and causes all sorts of annoying problems. That's for men. For women he unwisely made the urethra so short they get UTIs easily causing more suffering.
At least God foresaw the futility of plants and animals that reproduce but don't die. The world would have long ago suffocated itself under the weight of it all. So death and rot was absolutely necessary. Good call on that one, God! Maybe death could have operated differently -- like after 50, 60, 70, or 80 years--whatever--we would just drop dead. Splat! Healthy up to end, then dead. God decided to let nature, such as it is, keep things under control over the long run. Nature has, and--paragons of animals take note--will keep things under control. If fossil fuel companies heat the planet up too much, then one of the species that will be weeded out will be ourselves, and many others too. Nature plays a very long game and our esteemed species becoming extinct is conveniently doable! God has almost certainly rethought the advisability of granting great intelligence to primates.
Eventually this train of thought moved on, out of sight and earshot.
You remind me of a philosophical David Sedaris :rofl: . Witty, yet insightful. Here's a more recent article of his from The Atlantic: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/06/17/notes-on-a-last-minute-safari
Quoting BC
A god with out the "omni" oof. This is indeed a very human god, and I guess we are created "In his image". An imperfect god is one you don't want to fuck with, because like a petulant child-king, he has an ego that gets pissed if you don't recognize him and play his game. Take your pick: cursed, damned, exiled, obliterated. I know we've had this one posted before but apt:
The darker version of this is Mainlander's god:
Quoting Tom Storm
But perhaps most notions of god are actually like a meme or mind virus with inbuilt mechanisms. If you convince people that god will CURSE or DAMN YOU, it would be harder for you to resist in talking bad on him.
Quoting Tom Storm
Fan fiction is a great label for it.
The idea of a god who is not all powerful, who sacrificed himself to become Jesus, who in turn was sacrificed as the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world, belongs to a respectable theologian whose work I read and whose book title and name I can't remember.
I do like to write with some levity and in a jokey way. I'm not trying to make my "thought" more accessible -- I'm expressing an idea which includes the advisory that we should not take all this stuff too seriously.
I don't know whether I believe in god -- omnipotent, hairy thunderer, or cosmic muffin -- or not. Most years not, some days yes. The family and institutional programming we receive early on is generally hard to overwrite. So, I used to like to read theology (a limited sample, anyway, mostly very liberal stuff). I haven't read any for maybe 20 years. Is there a Theology Anonymous group? I could get a 20 year pin.
ding ding ding ding ding ding.
Quoting BC
Seems so, but I've always found this claim dubious. I think it's hard to accept that your view needs rewriting. I don't think rewriting it is difficult (scary, though).
:naughty:
I am not sure how this response relates to Christian Universalism. Please, do not get me wrong, it was a very interesting. The first part was very informative about the Jewish background.
But, as I said, I am not sure how is relevant to Christian Universalism. Did you intend to show that it is inconsistent as a view?*
Quoting schopenhauer1
I see, but note that Christian Universalism has a quite peculiar 'take' on this. As I understand it, these thinkers see the whole history as a sort of educative process and the whole creation is seen as a pure act of love. Punishments are not seen as retributive but as remedial, educative, purifying, i.e. a corrective punishments. So, the suffering that human beings endure is seen as having a purpose, a particular aim.
Also, human beings are rational creatures and choose what they think is good for them. The 'corrective punishments' are, as far as I understand, seen as a way to learn what is really good for them (i.e. that God is what is really good).
Considering that the aim is an 'eternal blessedness' and that we finite creatures cannot have it by our own efforts and merits, according to these christians (on this point they agree with the traditional view), suffering, endurance etc have all an ultimately good purpose for all human beings (although the 'corrections' can be very long, hard etc according to them). Also, in my understanding, they see Jesus' (and therefore God's) own suffering as a necessary step for salvation.
Of course, I guess that you can retort that God may have chosen to create human beings in an even different way, where even these corrections are not necessary. But, again, how can we know that it is even possible to do that?
Finally, regarding the whole thing being being 'all to human', I don't know. On the one hand, I do understand why you would think so. On the other hand, I think that, after all, if one accepts a Personal God, the relation between he/she and God must have some kind of analogy with the relation with another human being. So, the spiritual 'journey' and the relation between humans and God might necessarily be framed in an apparently 'too human' way in order to be useful to humans.
*Regarding this point, as an aside, I think that the universalist position can be argued for from a scriptural basis (again, I am saying this because I am not sure if your point was that the universalist view is completely incompatible with the Bible). For instance, 1 Timothy 2:1-6 and 2 Peter 3:9 say that God 'wants all people to be saved' and does not want 'anyone to perish, but everyone come to repentance'. If one assumes that God's will will be realized, these two passages support the universalist view. Of course, for instance, the Catholic view accepts the eternal hell doctrine, despite agreeing that God doesnt want anyone to perish (e.g. here) - I cannot see how this wish can be realized if the fate of human beings is 'sealed' at the end of this brief earthly life (after all, putting such a brief time limit seems to me quite an obstacle to that wish, especially when we consider that during this life our knowledge is limited, as Saint Paul says).
But, again, this is not a discussion forum about Christianity and I think I'll end my digression here.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Well, I have no arguments against this view. If suffering is intrinsic to any kinds of 'existence', clearly seeking a total end to suffering leads to an end of existence. But, honestly, while I can agree that it can be argued for, I think in us there is also a deep desire, a deep hope that existence is not so meaningless, that suffering is not so intrinsic to existence etc... now it would be quite a paradoxical desire/hope if the best we can desire/hope is pure non-existence (while the desire/hope itself is also an intimate hope to be 'free from' death). Of course, I reckon that this is not a compelling philosophical argument, but our existence would be very absurd if the best we can hope is non-existence. (BTW, I do respect philosophical pessimism. I agree, for instance, with Schopenhauer's view that a true satisfaction/happiness cannot be achieved by seeking satisfaction in the 'pleasures of the world'. But IMO it is incomplete...also, it could be argued that Schopenhauer's pessimism doesn't invalidate the hope that we can transcend suffering - after all, in the Part IV of the World as Will and Representation, he does argue for that, albeit in a bleak way. Mainlander's pessimism, on the other hand, simply leaves no room for any kind of 'freedom from suffering' that is not non-existence as I understand it. He is more radical than Schopenhauer)
I think that this view would, in a way, solve many philosophical conundrums of the traditional picture of God. For instance, if God is not omniscent and not omnipotent, it is easier to accept that God might intend to save everyone but, at the same time, his wish is not realized, despite his best efforts.
But the 'price to be paid', so to speak, is that this kind of God seems to be in a way limited and too much 'human'.
Quoting BC
I think that the main problem here is that if God ceased to be God, it cannot save anymore.
Quoting BC
Yeah, Ok. But what if we could not exist in a perfect world?
Ok, I think that your view shares some similarities with Spinoza's but isn't compatible with it. After all, there is no 'real' cosmic evolution in Spinoza's view. Change is an illusory appearance that we percieve because of our limited perspective. In the highest way of seeing the world, there is no change.
Quoting Gnomon
I see your point here. But Spinoza would deny any kind of autonomy for human beings. He would say that if we have free will, we would have some kind of independence from God and, therefore, we would be individual substances (after all, a 'substance' in classical metaphysics means something like 'a truly existing individual/entity'). But he would argue that if we were substances, we would be totally independent and therefore be like God, which is absurd. Our ontological dependence forbids our free will, according to him.
He would ask you to prove how we can be autonomous if we are 'modes' of the One Substance. He would only grant an illusion of free will, not a true free will.
In brief, how can be free will in human beings, if human beings are not separately existing entities?
Quoting Gnomon
See above.
Ok, I see. But if suffering is literally endless, how can such an endless effort be something desirable to us?
For instance, IIRC, Kant's view was that the progress to ethical perfection is endless but I don't think that after a certain point, it involves suffering.
This leads to me to another question. Do you think that any kind of 'dynamic progress', so to speak, necessarily involves suffering? If so, why?
Quoting MoK
But if such a goal is utterly unachievable and suffering cannot be eliminated, why we should seek it?
This all makes no sense, so I'll leave you to your own musings unless you want to explain your use of "against wisdom" here. Also, why would a perfect deity care about creating anything?
The only way to get around this is to define God as everything that ever exists in every possible mode that can ever happen. It is akin to the Many Worlds hypothesis in physics. We are playing out one mode of existence out of an infinite array. In this world, we have suffering. In this world, there might even be a hidden deity that enjoys creating beings that have to overcome obstacles and realize he exists, but this would just be one world out of many worlds, as clearly, a perfect God would have no need for creation, so perhaps there is a world where there is a perfect god and a creation set of nothing. So if a perfect god exists, it is not THIS world, but it MIGHT BE some world of all the infinite sets of worlds, perhaps even most of them. Maybe we are of the lesser variety of God's infinite set, that has deities with imperfect NEEDS to see creation play out in a "right action leads to rewards and wrong action leads to punishment" (or its cousin, the Eastern version of Karmic causal effect for that matter). In that sense, we would be living out in a sort of Spinozist world of infinite modes, sort of. Our world would be of "the lower-than-average suffering and deity that has needs that need to be met" variety.
@Joshs and @boundless
I think the Gnostics were simply unintentionally early advocates of the Many Worlds Hypothesis in theoretical physics :D. As I said to MoK:
Quoting schopenhauer1
This is a fun theology (not for Jesus I guess). Good fanfiction if you will (they are all varieties of fanfiction of course). But what does it even mean to "take away sins of the world"? If we are talking Pauline sin of Adam's eating of the apple and getting kicked out of Eden, then okay.. What did this change? If god sacrificed himself for human sins, why did he need to do that perfunctory act if he could have just did it without killing poor ole Jesus- or I guess himself (?). At this point, it's like we are just interpreting poor rules made up by a Dungeon and Dragons designer on a poorly thought new early edition...
The whole point is why would a perfect god create this kind of game of hide-and-seek of his "blessedness" and "good and evil"? It doesn't matter if the game ends in eternal damnation/bliss, or temporary purification/purgation, or whatnot. The idea of eternal damnation or temporary (the rules of the game) don't matter here, just that THERE IS A GAME.
Quoting boundless
But this is quite evasive of the question I am asking and putting on the human. Why would God give a shit to have creations that need to go on a journey? He's perfect right? He has needs to see this VERY HUMAN STYLE game play out? This isn't very lofty. Kinda what a human would make up if playing a game of "do good" variety. And GUESS WHO IS THE CENTER OF ATTENTION IN THE GAME- HUMANS!! OF course! We truly are images of God, who is a reflection of us, that is.
As I said in a previous post:
Yes. I'm aware that Spinoza's 17th century worldview predated both 19th century Darwinian Evolution, and 20th century Big Bang theory. So I have updated my own worldview to include those challenges to the standstill world of Spinoza-God. Perhaps God's omniscient view of the world is like Einstein's Block Time*1, in which all possibilities exist concurrently, yet unchanging. But humans, observing only from inside the world system (limited perspective), can only see one snapshot at a time, then merge those stills into an ever-changing illusory movie. For all practical purposes, I assume the "persistent" illusion of ever-changing Time is true. But for philosophical interests, I can imagine a god's-eye-view of the Cosmos, as illustrated in the image below*2 {note --- Enfernity is my mashup of Eternity and Infinity}. Of course, these imaginary metaphors should not be taken literally. :smile:
PS___ The small gray circles represent hypothetical multiverses that only an infinite-eternal God would have "time" to create. Again, not to be taken literally.
*1. Block Time or Eternalism :
[i]In the philosophy of space and time, eternalism is an approach to the ontological nature of time, which takes the view that all existence in time is equally real, as opposed to presentism or the growing block universe theory of time, in which at least the future is not the same as any other time. . . . .
It is sometimes referred to as the "block time" or "block universe" theory due to its description of space-time as an unchanging four-dimensional "block", as opposed to the view of the world as a three-dimensional space modulated by the passage of time.[/i]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternalism_(philosophy_of_time)
Quoting boundless
Again, this is a matter of perspective. From God's perch outside the physical universe, all things, including humans, are totally dependent on the Source, the Potential, the Omnipotent. But, from a human perspective inside our little world bubble, rational creatures have developed some independence from Absolute Determinism. We "little gods" are indeed dependent relative to God/Omniverse, but independent relative to our local environment, as indicated in image *3. That doesn't make us Autonomous substances, but Relative instances. We are Free only relative to other creatures. :wink:
*2. GOD EXISTS IN ENFERNITY
*3. GOD OUTSIDE SPACE-TIME
The juxtaposition of the multiverse versus the limited universe of the ancient Near East is amusing.
The whole point is why would a perfect god create this kind of game of hide-and-seek of his "blessedness" and "good and evil"?
Quoting boundless
But this is quite evasive of the question I am asking and putting on the human. Why would God give a shit to have creations that need to go on a journey? He's perfect right? He has needs to see this VERY HUMAN STYLE game play out? This isn't very lofty. Kinda what a human would make up if playing a game of "do good" variety.
If suffering is endless then we cannot reach the state of absolute peace but we can reach the state of relative peace.
Quoting boundless
If suffering is endless then we cannot achieve a state without suffering.
Quoting boundless
Well, it depends if experience is necessary for any sort of dynamic progress. If progress can be achieved without experience then there would be no suffering otherwise there would be. Change to me however is not possible without experience. The argument for this is very long and technical. If you buy this argument for the sake of discussion then it follows that suffering is involved in any sort of dynamic progress.
Quoting boundless
We can reach a state of relative peace even if suffering is boundless.
Quoting schopenhauer1
It's the Great Apostolic Blunder Machine***, made of patches, work arounds, bridges to nowhere, arcana, fog machines, heresies even to the heretics, schisms and scandals, drama, mysterious goings on, holy holy holy, books piled upon books, rituals in the dark, all the way to bright shiny aluminum Christmas trees and chocolate bunnies. WTF
Why would anyone bother with it? The whole thing, though, has been powerfully inspirational to any number of very highly motivated preachers who were determined to convince us pagans that THIS IS THE TRUTH. Believe it, or else! Jews, Christians and Moslems, have gotten roughly 1/2 to 2/3 of the people to more or less believe it.
Because the world is an unsatisfactory place (referencing the title of this thread, "Is the real world fair and just?" -- clearly not) there is religion, and...
There is a reason why religion is the opium of the people, and--dragging in chemical dependency--why giving people opium for 2000 years is a bad policy.
What we must do is change the heartless, oppressive, world. There--just like that. Simple, right? Just fix the world and people won't need religion. Good luck on that, he says to himself.
***The title of an unpopular book by John Fry.
It may be amusing to you because you have seen images of Earth from above the Firmament, and no God in the picture. That's because God was standing behind the camera. :joke:
First of all, I have to say that I don't have an argument for a God who is the creator of everything from nothing at the beginning of time. All I am saying is that if there is a God who is perfect, whether perfection is bounded or boundless, in all his attributes would not create any lesser agent than God who is subject to suffering since the suffering cannot be justified. This however requires the existence of a God who can create another God and It is Just. If these two conditions (a God who can create another God and a God who is Just) do not meet then we are dealing with a variety of Gods so creations also look different depending on the type of God. For example, we can have a God who is Just but cannot create another God. So, such a God can create a universe in which agents within are subject to suffering. Such a God however only creates a universe if suffering can be justified. This however requires that suffering is fruitful and something positive would come out of it. There could be a God who is Evil or Good too. A God could also be malicious. What could we do with a malicious God? Nothing but accepting our fates and suffering eternally.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Well, that depends on the definition of God (the types of Gods as it was discussed in the last comment) that we have to agree on. The act of creation is positive if something positive comes out of suffering for example.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I think that the whole, what you call God, is boundless and I have an argument for it (you can find the argument in my threads). So, any sort of agent that can be imagined exists if the whole is filled with stuff. Therefore, I agree with this part of your statement that there could be spiritual agents that for example in charge of enforcing Karma.
All we have to admit then is that THIS god you describe, the one Just-Centric god that rules this universe is not perfect. Our disagreement comes from our definitions of perfection. For me, a perfect being has no needs, is not dissatisfied with its own supernal nature. Thus, whatever deity it is that devises a plan whereby they play out acts of goodness and badness, and acts of godliness and sins and acts of "Holy Hosannas!" and repentance to appease the God. A god that has a plan for a universe whereby people must act in a way to bring about a future World to Come apocalypse, where he then reveals himself in his full glory after an absence.. Whatever else it is, that is not perfection in that it is a designer of a game that it is playing. He creates the players, he creates the systems, and wants to see the players play ball in the system and see how it turns out.
That is a very human-like god. That makes sense since humans created it. A god that needs humans (to play his game), is a god that NEEDS things. That is not perfect. As far as humans needing god, I can think of plenty of reasons for that:
Psychological:
The fear of death, pain, trauma, meaninglessness, and the unknown, combined with the desire to avoid punishment for wrongdoing and find justification for good deeds, are all aspects of a collective version of individual conscience. This collective conscience addresses its own issues by providing a means for individuals to repent and alleviate guilt over their misdeeds within a communal context.
Historical/cultural: The Judhites, on their return from Babylonian Exile used previous myths, traditions, and prophetic literature of a prior literate class that centered around Jerusalem to create a more systemized belief system, shaping a henotheistic system into a strictly monotheistic one...
Anthropologically: To explain natural phenomena and life's mysteries. It helps societies establish a shared set of beliefs and narratives that promote cohesion and continuity across generations.
I understand that a perfect God does not need anything but that does not mean such a God would not want to create a universe with positive outcomes. The creation of the universe does not add anything to a perfect God but it adds to existence if existence is positive. So I don't understand why a perfect God would not want to create.
You just contradicted yourself. It doesn't matter what the outcome is. So here we have the following:
1) A perfect god wouldn't have needs
2) A good god wouldn't want suffering
Now you can contest this, but then that's my point, what is a perfect and good god? Generally, a perfection doesn't lack anything.
Now if I was to be real abstract about it, I would again point to the idea of a multiverse whereby everything that exists is god, and thus, at the least, one of the universes has to have the shit end of the stick with suffering. If not one, then vastly infinite amounts perhaps, and we are but one of them.
I don't understand why you continue to use the 'game' analogy. It is more like a training or a learning process in my opinion.
The reason why I brought Christian Universalism here (a view that lately I feel drawn to BTW), is that ultimately in that view the end result is positive*.
But anyway, for your first question... well, I don't know. Maybe a 'loving, perfect God' creates because it is an expression of its nature (this doesn't imply that God is ontologically dependent on created things but creating is an expression of God's nature...). If this is the case, then, creation doesn't come from a 'need' or a 'lack' in God but it is simply an expression of the nature of God.
But also you might ask, why such a God created a world structured like ours and not another. Well, I don't know how to answer that, to be honest. Did God create other worlds, different from ours? Well, I don't know and I don't know how a universalist might respond to that (same as before).
(*also, I don't think that an universalist must say that all suffering has a 'purpose'. In my previous post, I was speaking about the concept of 'punishment' in this kind of view)
Quoting schopenhauer1
Well, if oneaccepts a Personal God with Whom a person can have a relation, I would say that, yes, persons have a special relation with God - it seems obvious to me. BTW, the 'journey' is not something God needs but something that people/human need (see above).
Of course, if one doesn't accept the existence of a Personal God... but, even if this is the case, I think that religions with a personal God have a lot to teach about human beings as persons, how they relate etc.
Quoting schopenhauer1
This is more or less the Spinozist solution (although, I would say that if the MWI were corrrect, it would describe an infinite mode of the Substance/God). Everything that can exist, does exist necessarily and it is a mode of God. 'We' are also modes, not really 'created things'.
Interestingly, in MWI the only thing that really exist is the 'universal wavefunction'. We, our particular world are convenient abstractions. That's why calling MWI a theory of 'parallel universes' is incorrect, BTW. At the same time, even if MWI were true, it would hardly describe 'everything'.
But as an analogy for pantheism/acosmism where the Deity is an impersonal 'source', I think that MWI is apt (of course, all analogies are limited etc).
I think that, if one adopts the view of an 'impersonal God', yeah I would think that this is a good way to get around.
Well, that's not Spinozism anymore IMO, lol. But of course, you still have a right to call your philosophy a modification of Spinoza's (there are after all analogies) or even say that it is 'Spinozist'.
Quoting Gnomon
Well, the problem of 'omniscence' is, indeed, a difficult one. If God (whatever S/He or It is) already knows everything, how we can avoid an 'block time' and also the conclusion that free will is a mere illusion? It's indeed a quite difficult question.
Quoting Gnomon
Einstein maintained that the distinction between past, present and the future is an illusion, albeit a persistent one, but nevertheless considered the 'now' as the main problem of physics. If the passage of time is illusory, why we do have such a 'persistent illusion'? Our immediate experience is a strong argument against the block time, after all.
Quoting Gnomon
So, you seem to agree that free will is an illusion, after all. And also the cosmic evolution is merely pespectival and ultimately illusory. If so, your philosophy is closer to Spinoza's than I thought before.
I thought that you asserted that the cosmic evolution is 'real', not illusory. Apparently, I misinterpreted.
Ok. But if this peace is 'relative', as you say, what guarantee we have that we do not lose it?
Also, is this scenario desirable because suffering is less than pleasure in this 'relative peace'?
Quoting MoK
All I see here is an assertion that change always entails 'suffering'. For instance, the reason why I believe that transience entails suffering in this world is that there isn't an unbroken continuum of pleasurable/positive experiences. Sooner or later, the 'continuum' of positive experiences will have an end, due to illnesses, other kinds of suffering, and death. On the other hand, if there were only positive experiences and the succession of these experiences would continue forever, I would say that there would be no suffering in this case. This is to say that I don't think that logically change necessary entails suffering.
It matters.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Well, God could be both good and evil. Such a God however is Just. By Just I mean God delivers good or evil in a proper amount depending on the situation. So the existence of suffering in the universe is not a problem for such a God as far as suffering leads to a positive result. That is correct that a good God wouldn't want to see suffering but even such a God might want to create a universe full of suffering if the outcome of suffering is positive and good.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I agree that a perfect God does not lack anything and creation does not add anything to a perfect God but that does not mean that such a God wouldn't want to create a universe if the outcome of creation is positive.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I agree that the whole is boundless and there could be any agents one can imagine.
There is no guarantee that we don't lose it. It is a constant challenge to stay in a state of relative peace.
Quoting boundless
I don't equate a state of peace with a state in which we experience more pleasure than suffering. A state of peace is neutral. By neutral I mean you neither suffer nor have pleasure.
Quoting boundless
Yes, we cannot avoid suffering if perfection is boundless.
Quoting boundless
Correct. But you ask whether we can make any progress without suffering. I mentioned that there could be progress without suffering if there is no experience. I then mentioned that change is not possible without experience. Progress is a change. Therefore progress is not possible without experience. I also don't think that you can make progress without suffering. That is how life is!
Why should humans care how much BALANCE of suffering occurs in the universe, when it is him/her that is being subjected to suffering in various amounts, perhaps on the more negative end of the equation? In other words, for humans, why should it matter how the "overall picture" looks from their point of view, if they are the ones suffering!?
Quoting MoK
Same critique as above.
Quoting MoK
But are specifically discussing the "Abrahamic" God from the Biblical narratives here or is this just MoK's own version of things?
That's the GAME then.. training, learning, etc. It doesn't have to look like Chess or Monopoly or Basketball! It's an obstacle course of choosing between options, and sometimes the game puts participants in vicariously tragic positions, despite seemingly good decisions. So, it's a game of obstacles, suffering, learning, etc.
Quoting boundless
Same critiques as MoK's then:
Why should humans care how much BALANCE of suffering occurs in the universe, when it is him/her that is being subjected to suffering in various amounts, perhaps on the more negative end of the equation? In other words, for humans, why should it matter how the "overall picture" looks from their point of view, if they are the ones suffering!?
Quoting boundless
God's nature? That makes it seem like God himself is following a rule he cannot escape. There goes the all-powerful part. Again, do you see why this God looks very human to me? And as with my question to MoK, are we talking the Biblical/Abrahamic God or some personal notion?
An unending challenge is not IMO a state that we should hope, but I'm going to leave at that.
Quoting MoK
Well, in any case, your conception of 'relative peace' cannot be a real 'peace'. If we have to continue to struggle to maintain it, it inevitably involves suffering.
Quoting MoK
Well, at least hypothetically/logically I think that it isn't true. I can imagine an interrupted continuum of neutral and/or positive experiences. At least I do not see a logical impossibility here.
I don't make any claim to be a "Spinozist". That would be absurd, since I have never read any of his work first hand, and I don't regard him as my Guru. I merely identified with his break from traditional religion without rejecting the logical necessity of a non-empirical preternatural First Cause of some kind. Since my "critic" did claim to be a Spinozist, I just noted that my personal worldview seemed to be generally compatible with Spinoza's, yet making allowance for advances in historical and scientific understanding since he wrote his "radical enlightenment" manifesto. :smile:
Quoting boundless
I don't waste much time trying to imagine what Omniscience would be like. Since I have no direct or scriptural "revelation" to go by, I can only guess that Block Time might be something like omniscience.
Regarding Free Will, I can only agree with Einstein's comment on past-present-future Time --- that it's a "stubbornly persistent illusion" --- which 99% of humans accept as a pragmatic assumption. :joke:
Quoting boundless
Since, unlike Einstein, I am incapable of imagining omniscience, I would say that an ever-changing world is not an illusion but an empirical Fact of human understanding. To deny real world Change might be a sign of dementia, or of extreme Idealism. Why do we persist in such an illusion? Because it makes sense to our senses. Only philosophers waste time trying to imagine non-sense. :cool:
Quoting boundless
Evolution and FreeWill are only illusory relative to Omniscience. Relative to mundane human understanding it's an undeniable verity. Since I have almost 8 decades of personal experience, I can't deceive myself that Aging & Death are figments of imagination. From my imaginary personal perspective, Death looks like a skeleton in a black hoodie holding a mean-looking scythe. :wink:
Ok, I see. Well, normally we do not call, say, school as a 'game'. But, if you want to use that word, ok.
Let me rephrase your question, then: why God created this 'learning process' (or 'learning 'game'' if you prefer)?
An answer might be: "well, considering that we are created as finite and imperfect rational beings, the 'learning process' (again, you can use the word 'game') is what is needed to such a being to be able to know God"
So, at this point, you can make the following question: "why did God created us in the way we have been created, as finite and imperfect rational beings that need such a learning process in the first place?".
Well, actually, I am not sure how to respond to that. But again, is it really important to have an answer to that question? Let's say that we can't find an answer. Does this invalidate the hypothesis 'creator, personal God'?
Quoting schopenhauer1
Because that, maybe, it's part of what humans really want? For instance: what do you think that is the most basic desire? What do you think would the best hypothetical state of affairs to you? See, for instance this post or this other post.
Given that our present state of affairs is not the 'best', the search of a final, positive state might be what is really important.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Yes, I was thinking about a Personal God.
Anyway, God's nature is not an imposed 'rule'. So, I cannot see how God would be following a rule, if God's activity is not constrained by something external.
We are curious creatures so we are wondering why life looks like this. I don't think that there is any sort of suffering that leads to a completely negative end whether you believe in a God or not who is in charge of enforcing Karma. For a moment think that there is no God. Think of a situation in which a child is born with cancer. Both the child and relatives suffer in such a situation. What is the human response to such a situation? We try to find a medication to cure the child. So our overall state of life improves with time as we face challenges and sufferings.
Quoting schopenhauer1
The same answer as above.
Quoting schopenhauer1
We can discuss other sorts of Gods as well. I am open to discussion. I however have problems with Abrahamic God.
Well, I mentioned that if perfection is boundless then we cannot possibly reach the state of absolute peace but relative one. There is nothing we can do about it.
Quoting boundless
Well, I can imagine a state of peace and harmony (what I call perfection) as well but our current state of affairs is not like this.
Ok!
Quoting Gnomon
Ok, what worried Einstein, however, is that such an illusion seems so 'persistent' that it strongly suggest that change is real and not only perspectival? As I said before, I stopped to dis-believe in free will and the supposed illusory nature of change, when I decided to take what my experience suggested to me at face value. Of course, I am not saying that I am necessarily right. But, after all, science is an empirical subject and in order to refute something that experience so strongly suggest there must be a 'sufficient evidence'. To date, I don't think I found one.
Quoting Gnomon
I disagree. One can say that change is illusory and at the same time admitting that he experiences change. I can still experience an optical illusion even if I suspect or know that my experience isn't veridical.
Quoting Gnomon
But note that as I said, something can 'feel' very real but at the same time can be illusory.
For instance, in a dream I might go to a city. At the level of the dream, I went to that city and I had that experience. But the experience was illusory.
So, the experience of change might be 'dream-like' but for us can seem real.
Sorry I think I misinterpreted your questions. But I won't edit my previous post because I am actually curious to see your answers to my questions that I made before about the 'basic desire' and the best hypothetical state.
Anyway, well... I am not sure how to respond to these questions and also I am not sure how they are related to the point I was making. I was merely saying that at least in the 'universalist' view, all the suffering might be seen as part of a non-ideal process that was necessary to complete in order to arrive to a result that we 'really' want. This doesn't imply that every instance of suffering is seen as a necessary of the process... in other words, a learning process is necessary but this particular process we experience isn't inevitable (unless one is a rigid determinist, I guess).
Sorry in case if also this answer is unstaisfying.
Quoting MoK
Ok, fine. But the 'relative perfection' you mentioned earlier didn't sound as something desirable, something to seek etc if it is a constant struggle.
Well, the state of relative peace is better than nothing. The better you understand life it becomes easier to achieve relative peace.
Is there a downside to accepting that "feeling" of change in the objective world and the practical effects of willful behavior? I feel older and wiser than I did at 18. Am I just naive, or deceiving myself that I can be an agent of change in the world? When I imagine that I'm driving my car to the grocery store, was that destination destined by God or Fate 14b years before I was born? If my free agency is a mirage, will I go hungry waiting for the world to bend to my will? :snicker:
PS___ My personal experience of change is not "dreamlike", but realistic. By contrast, my dreams are dreamlike and unrealistic.
Henri Bergson on Evolution :
Bergson begins with the entity we know best : the Self. The existence of which we are most assured and which we know best is unquestionably our own. Then he discusses Evolution : Change is far more radical than we are at first inclined to suppose. For I speak of each of my states as if it formed a block and were a separate whole. Yet, The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change .
Creative Evolution from a post I'm currently working on
But if there is nothing that guarantees that I may not fall from such a state of 'relative peace' (assuming that it is a positive state), then such a state is not possible (for instance, in traditional theism, God is the foundation of the stability of the beatitude of the blessed).
Also, if it is too similar to the present life - after all, if it is seen as a perpetual struggle, the comparison is IMO apt - I am not sure how it is better than nothing. If I really think that this life will last forever, well I think it will be at a certain point unbereable (due to boredom... after all, finite goods can give finite happiness).
Quoting Gnomon
The problem IMO is that you seem to want it both ways. On the one hand, the Whole, i.e. God in your view, is ultimately changeless. On the other hand, you seem to think that change is ultimately real for us and that we are free.
But my question is: how can our perception of change be veridical if the Whole (of which we are mere aspects or maybe 'parts') is changeless? how can we have free will, i.e. a degree of autonomy, if we are mere aspects/modes/parts of God, who is changeless?
Yes. I think we can have it both ways. But no, unlike Spinoza, I don't think G*D/Whole/Enfernity/Logos is changeless. A static do-nothing deity could not be creative, and our evolving world would not be compatible with an inert cosmos-creator. I don't have any empirical knowledge of anything outside of our space-time world. So anything I might say about Enfernity (eternity-infinity) is pure speculation. But, I would interpret Enfernity as unlimited & boundless, hence free to change in all possible ways. For all I know, a boundless Supreme Being might have created an infinite number of universes, with all possible modes of existence. But I don't waste my time trying to make sense of such literal non-sense.
Instead, I prefer to imagine the First Cause of our universe as an unlimited Pool of Potential, within which anything is Possible, but only certain things are Actual. And the process of Actualization is what we call Creation or Evolution. So, in the space-time world we actually know something about, homo sapiens seems to be the current highest-ranking mode of existence. But evolution is still on-going, so who-knows what kind of creature might, in the future, replace humanity at the top of the food chain (AI ; aliens)? At this point in time though, earthbound humans seem to have a much higher degree of freedom to choose from the menu of options the world has to offer. For example, brainy dolphins eat only fish, while we omnivores eat veggies, fish, beef and chicken.
That's not the FreeWill of an all-powerful deity, but it's enough to allow our species to be the dominant force in the real actual world. As the most invasive species, we even make our own night light to show aliens or gods where we live. In the 21st century, the whole Earth is our habitat, including the moon, and maybe Mars. So, we are not "mere modes of God", but the only "aspects" of God that rule the Real world with our god-like magical technology. :smile:
A state of relative peace is possible.
Quoting boundless
Correct. Life becomes boring if it is eternal.
In other words, every possibility is a necessity, modal collapse? Good post btw, keep it coming.
And maybe also by other phenomena?
In other words, God 'fixes' all thepossible histories but the actual one is co-determined?
I'm not sure how this doesn't lead to a theistic or theistic-like perspective (i.e. that God creates and sustaines but at the same time the creatures maintain an identity that is distinct from the Creator), but I'll wait your answers before delving into this.
Quoting MoK
To be fair, I should have added that boredom would not the only one reason that after a certain point such an endless life would be unbereable. But in any case, I'm not sure how you have not conceded my point, i.e. that such a 'relative perfection' is undesiderable. We seem to agree that an endless life with only finite goods becomes after a certain point unbereable. Yet, you seem to say that a state of 'relative perfection' is 'better than nothing'. How can an 'endless unbeareable life' be better than 'nothing'?
Quoting Lionino
Thanks!
Yep, but note that in Spinoza's philosophy such a necessity is not an 'intrinsic characteristic' of the modes, but when considered as 'modes-of-substance', i.e. when seen 'under the perspective of eternity' (sub specie aeternitatis), all modes are actually necessary 'manifestations' of the attributes of God. In other words, when seen as themselves - i.e. abstracted from the Substance/God - they are contingent. But this perspective is ultimately illusory and therefore, ultimately, according to Spinoza, it is true that even the modes are necessary (but seen in this perspective, they are not individuals anymore).
I wanted to elaborate on this point, again.
Let's assume, for the sake of the argument, that God exists and created the world and humans as finite rational agents who have an essential desire to be united with the Good (i.e. God if some kind of theism is true), even if they are not aware of fully aware of it.
Now, as I understand it, the philosopher Thomas Talbott makes a very interesting argument: maybe it is impossible to come into existence as fully developed rational beings, maybe in order to fully develop as self-aware rational agents we need some kind of contrast and frustration. For instance, I need to be aware of the distinction between 'me' and what is 'not me' in order to develop a rational mind. However, this awareness might only develop due to some kind of contrast: what is 'not me' doesn't respond always to my wishes. So, the frustration I experience is actually a way to learn, to be more self-aware. Also, at least the awareness of the possibility to make evil or bad choices makes me aware of the distinction between good and evil, good and bad. Also, seeing bad outcomes of evil/bad choices is actually a way to learn why bad choices are bad. And so on.
So, maybe some amount of suffering as well as at least the possibility to do evil and to make bad choices, is inevitable in order to develop into truly rational beings.
Note, of course, that this argument doesn't say that all suffering and the evil we experience in the world is 'necessary' or 'meaningful'. Also, it's not meant to be a complete 'theodicy' but only a possible explanation to why a 'learning process' might be actually necessary.
Interesting. There is a revised version of Gödel's ontological proof of God that entails modal collapse because of the given definition of God.
Thanks for the reference. Anyway, for the sake of completeness, some scholars disagree with the 'necessitarian' interpretation of Spinoza. However, IMO necessatarianism is the consistent way to interpret is thought.
Perhaps good is not finite. If it is and life is eternal then we are in trouble.
Quoting boundless
Well, either the state of relative perfection or the state of suffering. Which one do you pick? By nothing I didn't mean permanent death.
That's not what I'm saying. I assume that all actualities/realities can be traced back to the beginning of space-time. Beyond which we can only conjecture. And the Cause of that sudden appearance of limited spatial volume and temporal change from whatever came before that beginning (Enfernity??) is what we humans typically call "G*D" or "Multiverse".
During the expansion of space-time most emergent Actualities result from natural energy exchanges. But, since the recent advent of homo sapiens, some novelties in the world have been caused by human choices. That's what we call Culture as contrasted with Nature. Therefore, you could say that Cultural Evolution has been "co-determined" by rational agents. But I would not say that all actualities, or all phenomena, or all "actual histories" are determined by the "demi-gods" of the world.
I don't view that co-creator scenario as Theistic, but it is Deistic. It's specifically PanEnDeistic*1. And the causal agency in the world is what I call EnFormAction : causal energy + formal definition + actualization. The "hidden" source of that creative power is unknowable, except by inference from circumstantial evidence. So, any characteristics of the postulated Enformer are knowable only by philosophical speculation and rational deduction*2. Would Spinoza disagree? :smile:
*1. God Models :
Theistic : Direct revelation of divine will to humans.
Deistic : Indirect revelation of divine source via empirical observation of the creation. The Deity is assumed to have created an autonomous world that can run itself without divine intervention.
PanEnDeistic : First Cause is known by reason, not by revelation. Space-Time Reality exists within the scope of Enfernity (Infinity + Eternity). The material world and its inhabitants are participants in divine essence, but are not identical with the divine. We living thinking beings are distinguishable parts of the Whole Being, and not identical to the whole. For more information, Google "Mereology".
*2. Reason :
According to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, reason is the power of synthesizing into unity, by means of comprehensive principles, the concepts that are provided by the intellect.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/reason
Note --- The necessary existence of a First Cause is a prime example of "synthesizing into unity" from observation of its knowable parts.
Of course I would pick the 'better' choice. But none of them seems 'desirable'. Also, why do you think that death is impossible?
Quoting Gnomon
Neither did I want to say that, in fact. Even the 'co-determination' of some actualities is enough. It is something like Tolkien's concept of subcreation, in a sense.
So, the Whole determines all the possibilities/potentialities. Natural processes - either random or deterministic - co-determine most actualities. Then, humans (and maybe other beings) co-determine some actualities with some degree of autonomy. I use the 'co' prefix because, after all, this kind of determination is not from 'nothing' but both from previous actualities and potentialities themselves. Is this now an accurate assessment of your view?
Still my question is: how can we have some degree of autonomy if we are not separate from the Whole?
Quoting Gnomon
Yes, to some extent. And to some extent he would agree. For instance, I think he would ask the previous question, I think.
I.e. if we are more like droplets of spray from a wave of the ocean (or rays of sunlight from the sun) than e.g. passengers riding on a moving train...
For Spinoza, no doubt an "inadequate idea" (i.e. imaginary, illusory) sub specie aeternitatis.
Quoting Gnomon
Yes, because sub species aeternitatis Spinoza's immanent-monist (unbounded, self-organizing vacuum field-like) metaphysics is acosmist and your "pan-en-deistic" whatever, Gnomon, implies an unparsimonious, transcendent-dualist (Pythagorean / Neoplatonist / Leibnizean / panpsychist monadic-like) metaphysics.
Fwiw, my view is that sub specie durationis (e.g. Husserl's "natural attitude") acosmism seems cogently pandeistic (or consistent with classical atomism). :fire:
I didn't say that death is impossible.
From the perspective of the Whole, the parts may or may not have any freedom, depending on the rigidity of rules that bind the parts. But from the perspective of the parts, our degree of freedom is relative to the other parts. Since I am unable to speak for the Whole, I can only judge based on the current state and history of human actions. As to "how", I must assume that the binding chains of natural Cause & Effect have some "gaps" or "loopholes" that can be exploited by Autonomous Agents. Otherwise, we would all be locked-in rocks.
In his book Freedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett concluded that some degree of Free Will*1 is compatible with Natural Law. He refers to certain "abilities" of homo sapiens that allow us to make choices that are not dictated by physical laws. Among those abilities are Logic and Language. Regarding the rigidity of natural law, I'll just mention that Thermodynamics is based on statistical averages not specific instances*2, and Quantum physics is also statistical, not mechanical. So some slack (statistical loopholes) in the chain of Cause & Effect seems to be allowed.
In Biology, a cell, which is a part of an organism, can have some degree of autonomy*3, if it creates its own constraints : such as a cell wall. Humans create their own "constraints" in the form of Cultural Laws that do not contradict Natural Laws. :smile:
*1. Free Will :
Dennett's stance on free will is compatibilism with an evolutionary twist the view that, although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_Evolves
*2a. Limitation of statistics are :
[i]Statistics is not concerned with individual observation.
Statistics do not analyse qualitative phenomenon.
Statistical generalisation are true only on average.[/i]
https://www.toppr.com/ask/question/what-are-thelimitation-of-statistics/
*2b.The Second Law of Thermodynamics is a statistical law of large numbers.
https://www.compadre.org/nexusph/course/The_2nd_Law_of_Thermodynamics_--_A_Probabilistic_Law
*3. Autonomous :
An organism is autonomous because it creates the set of constraints responsible for its own constitutive activities that maintain its existence.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10539-021-09829-8
PS___ Pay no attention to dogmatic Spinozist . He doesn't make philosophical arguments, just haughty assertions and Trump-like political attacks. :joke:
Good analogies. But this 'separateness' leads to deism or theism IMO.
Quoting 180 Proof
Agreed!
Quoting 180 Proof
Well, Spinoza's Natura Naturata would be cover both the 'vacuum' and the 'atoms', the union of them (also, according to him, the attributes are independent from each other, so emergentism is not compatible with Spinoza).
Quoting Gnomon
Ok. But how these 'gaps' arise in a pantheistic/panentheistic/pandeistic/panendeistic system?
Quoting Gnomon
The problem I have with 'compatibilism' is that it redefines 'free will' and 'free agency' in a way to render them meaningless. For instance, if a compatibilist argues that my choices are 'free' because they do not have 'external' causes but they are still deterministic, I fail to see how this can be true 'freedom': actions and choices would be still inevitable. Even if one includes the (apparently) probabilistic nature of QM into play, nothing really changes IMO. Our choices would be determined by a combination of deterministic and probabilistic processes. Something more is needed.
Of course this is so ... sub specie aeternitatis.
If not conditionally "deterministic" (i.e. constrained by your (my) nonlinear dynamic, ecology-nested, embodied cognition), then what makes any "choices" yours (mine)?
Ha! You'll have to ask the Deus why He/r system of Cause & Effect is not strictly dictatorial & deterministic, but statistical, and frivolously creating novel arrangements of matter & energy as a basement hobby. Apparently you think the Deity is incapable of internal change, or oblivious to the little independent-minded creatures running around inside the Whole. Either our evolving world is accidental or intentional, or Deus is just having a bad dream.
All I can do is guess : that the evolutionary system was intentionally designed to produce living & thinking creatures, with abilities that allow for some self-determination. Or, that our universe is a divine experiment gone disastrously awry. Why would an eternal/infinite/omnipotent Being have unruly pockets of space-time scrambling around in He/r bosom? Why would an absolute Entity allow little bubbles of evolving matter to grow inside He/r womb? How could Omniscience/Omnipotence have statistical "gaps", unless they were designed to provide opportunities for creativity?
During my fleeting time here in sub specie aeternitatis, I could try to speculate about timelessness and thinglessness. But I can't imagine such non-sense, except by means of analogies & metaphors drawn from personal experience, and the imaginings of other matter-bound speculators. Perhaps, , as an authority on Spinozism, can provide a definitive answer to your question.
Speaking of speculation, Einstein's Relativity gives us one way to construct analogies of the Whole vs Part perspectives. My sensation of autonomous & independent action in space-time might appear to be static & dependent to Enfernal (infinite/eternal) Being. :nerd:
Quoting Gnomon
Yes, of course, you can't even bother to rationally speculate or honstly admit you have no effing idea what you/we are talking about. wtf :sweat:
I am not sure if you say this is true according to Spinoza. IMO Spinoza was a parallelist, he would never say that 'mind' emerges from 'matter' (extension) even sub specie durationis.
Of course, this is not necessarily means that he is 'right'. Can you give some reference/arguments to argue that he was an emergentis?
Also, I would say that the holistic character present in Spinoza was absent in Democritus, Epiricurs, Lucretius et al. This doesn't mean that one can build a 'Democrito-Epicurean Spinozism' of sorts but I believe that the ontological primacy of the 'whole' was completely foreign to the classical atomists.
IMO a better example would be actually Friedrich Nietzsche who at least in his private notes seems to endorse the possibility of a 'pantheism/pandeism':
(It was a note the wrote in 1884. In his unpublished and unfinished book 'Philosophy in the tragic age of Greeks', written in 1873, he wrote his interpretation of Heraclitus.
Edit: I borrowed the quote about the 'divine play' from this thesis that I randomly found online, at page 34 of the pdf. I didn't read the thesis and I actually found the quote in another source online that I wanted to share but I didn't found it...)
Quoting 180 Proof
In a sense, yes. But if 'compatibilism' is strictly deterministic then it is incompatible with any meaningful notion of free will or free agency. A free agent necessarily has some degree of control on his or her choices and such choices aren't predictable by either a deterministic or probabilistic model.
For instance, a 'Laplace demon', if determinism were true, could be, in principle, able to predict all of my choices. Since compatibilists often remark that determinism and free will are consistent, they must redefine one or the other in some ways. Problem is that this 'redefinition' renders one of them ininitelligible. If the 'Laplace demon' could predict all my choices in advance, how can I say that I am a free agent in a meaningful sense?
On the other hand, yes, choices must be in part deterministic (after all, if a free agent makes the choice A instead of B, his or her actions deterministically follow, unless there are other causes that prevent those actions).
Quoting Gnomon
Well, I wasn't talking about my ideas on the matter. But anyway, the 'standard' philosophical position about God (even for the classical theists) is that God is simple, unchanging and transcends time. Spinoza accepted this kind of view. If you say that 'Deus' changes, then yeah I think that my objections do not apply strictly speaking. Still, by 'statistical' you don't mean 'probabilistic'. Probabilism is just as incompatible as determinism to free will/agency (choices are not random).
Quoting Gnomon
The problem is IMO that the 'Whole/Deity' is or contains, according to you, the whole universe 'sub specie aeternitatis' - where past, present and future are fixed - and yet you also claim that change is real. IMO you have to let go one assumption or the other.
Either the 'Deity' evolves, changes in some way and therefore it's not 'outside time' or change is ultimately illusory.
The definition of God as "simple & unchanging" may or may not be true ; but it's irrelevant to you & me. I have no way of verifying that "standard position". But, in the evolving space-time world, where you and I are operating, Complexity and Change are the context from which we vainly try to imagine a First Cause capable of producing an evolving world. Presumably, enfernal G*D does not evolve, but He/r space-time creation may be a machine for evolving little gods.
I disagree about the relevance of Probability to Free Will*1. Calvinistic Classical Physics assumed that the fate of the world is pre-determined by the absolute Will of God. But Quantum Physics has undermined the philosophical certainty of that presumption. According to 21st century science, the physical foundation of reality is Relative, not absolute, and Uncertain, not pre-destined, and Organic, not Mechanistic. The Probability "gap" in quantum physics is anywhere a mind makes a measurement. No minds : no gaps in Determinism.
So, either G*D screwed-up and left some accidental statistical gaps in the mechanism of Fatalism. Or Sh/e programmed our little bubble of space-time with teleological options that allow some brainy organisms to choose from the Possibility menu as it suits their own purposes. The link below points out that Determinism is a debatable guess about ultimate reality, while indeterminate statistical Probability is as close to certain knowledge as human science can get*2. :smile:
*1. Is FreeWill Fake Agency? :
After those scenic side-tracks, he finally gets around to unpacking free will. For his analysis, you can read the article. Here, Ill only mention a couple of points. 1) Trying to account for choice at the level of neurons . . . wouldnt provide any causal account. That would be like looking for Meaning in the circuits of a motherboard. 2) Voluntary behavior . . . Is an emergent phenomenon at the level of the entire organism embedded in physical reality. Thats what I call Holism, or Systems Theory. Finally, he looks at Freewill as Phenomenal Experience, and says Although this naïve view has largely been abandoned by serious thinkers, it can still be useful : what difference does it make if you believe that free will is an illusion? Would you no longer make any choices at all?. In his considered opinion, free will is a puzzle but it is not an illusion. To that, I say amen.
https://bothandblog7.enformationism.info/page26.html
*2. Probability vs Determinism :
Determinism coexists as easily with probability as it does with ignorance. This is because determinism is an ontological* matter while probability is an epistemological one.
https://www.quora.com/If-determinism-is-accurate-does-probability-exist
I don't know as an empirical matter whether or not Spinoza is an "emergentist"; metaphysically he's certainly not.
and, I think, "foreign" to Spinoza as well (re: infinite =/= "whole"). Anyway, apparently I wasn't clear enough:
Quoting 180 Proof
Quoting 180 Proof
In other words, sub specie durationis I interpret Spinoza's natura naturans as ontologically deterministic and unbounded (i.e. unmanifest ... vacuum ("void")) and natura naturata as ontically chaotic and bounded (i.e. manifest ... fluctuation-patterns ("swirling recombing atoms")).
For the sake of discussion, boundless, I concede your "holistic" point about Spinozism but only sub specie aeternitatis.
... which is why I describe compatibilism as conditionally deterministic. Neither strict determinism nor strict indeterminism are compatible with "free will / free action" (i.e. human agency).
I think that the argument goes like: if God weren't simple, i.e. it God was composed of parts (which themsleves are entities) then it could not be eternal, or at least God would be contingent. God would be ontologically dependent on its parts.
In other words, God's ontological necessity and eternity requires an ontological simplicity.
Anyway, maybe you could say that some aspects of God/Whole evolve and some aspects do not, in order to accept both a panendeistic world view and God's eternity and necessity. But I am not sure if this helps.
Quoting Gnomon
But note that, even if we assume that mind is somehow required to make a 'quantum' measurement, the measurement itself is a probabilistic, i.e. random, process. So, while I agree that probabilism is, in a sense, closer to the kind of indeterminism that is required by free agency, it's still not enough. Our choices are neither fully determined nor random.
QM might not be 'mechanicistic' as newtonian mechanics is, but is still not enough.
OK, I see.
Quoting 180 Proof
Maybe we disagree about 'natura naturata', then. IMO 'natura naturata' is the totality of modes, but this totality is not reducible to the mere collection of them, so to speak. By this I meant that it 'holistic', i.e. the whole is 'more' than its parts and its relations (that is enough for a 'holism', but IMO 'natura naturata' has also an ontological primacy over the 'individual modes').
To give an analogy, I believe that if the 'ocean' is 'natura naturata', a wave is a 'mode'. Regarding 'natura naturans', maybe water itself. But I'm not sure how much the analogy makes sense.
Quoting 180 Proof
:up: Ok, we seem to agree then here!
Other possible analogies:
let's say that there is a house totally made of wood. The house itself is 'natura naturata'. Doors, rooms, walls etc are modes (both finite and infinite modes). The (totality of) wood is natura naturans.
Also, let's say that a statue of a man is made out of a block of marble. The 'man' is 'natura naturata'. Each 'part' of the statue is a mode (for instance the 'nose' or the 'arms'). The marble is 'natura naturans'.
In both cases, there is a sense in which the 'manifest whole' (natura naturata) is 'more' than the sum of the 'parts' (i.e. the modes, both finite and infinite).
What do you think about these analogies?
For me it doesn't make sense ...
Quoting boundless
Well, imo they don't work. In each case "ocean" "house" "statue" are manifest, finite modes (natura naturata) and yet you claim that the corresponding infinite modes of "water" "wood" "marble", respectively, are not manifest which clearly doesn't fly. Analogously it's the 'laws of nature' causing and constraining modes such as "water [ocean [waves]]" "wood [house [rooms ...]]" & "marble [statue [male-figure]]" to manifest which themselves are not manifest and which reason attributes to (i.e. conceptualizes as) natura naturans. All analogies are limited in application, of course, much more so when used to 'illuminate' a metaphysics as subtle as Spinozism.
Lately I prefer "the sun, its rays of light & their heat" (rather than "the ocean & its waves") as an analogy because "the sun" is so remote and not visibly manifest at night even though its effects of "light & heat" are always manifest on Earth (e.g. gravity-well, climate, weather, seasons, photosynthesis); and also, that staring directly at the sun with naked eyes is blinding more or less like fully comprehending 'eternal & infinite substance' with temporal, finite reason is impossible. So for me, in this limited (physical) sense, analogously "the sun" is naturing and Earth, etc are natured ... even though our local star is, according to Spinoza, just another mode (of the attributes of substance (i.e. 'laws of nature')). :fire:
What do you think?
I don't agree with that arbitrary conditional hypothetical if-then scenario. It seems to be placing restrictions on what an omnipotent deity can or cannot do*1. If there are no parts or aspects, then what is G*D*2 the Whole of? That negative definition of Perfection seems to be a bunch of nothing : no boundaries, no parts, no change. no properties, no place for an evolving world with imperfect creatures. Nothing to do : Eternally Boring.
The idealistic concept of a perfect deity --- who is also good, merciful, and loving? --- is a nice neat geometric notion, with no content : an ideal empty sphere that is infinite & unbounded. And it leaves open the question of how such timeless perfection could possibly create a space-time world where good & evil are in constant combat. To maintain their ideal geometric deity definition, the philosophical argument of Theodicy was forced to blame the creatures (victims of evil) instead of the Creator of the Cosmic System. Which is also how monotheistic Judaism was transformed into polytheistic Christianity. Henceforth, theology had to reconcile the existence of dueling dual (or a Trinity) gods, forever fighting over the fate of the creation.
I can't make sense of either argument, A> Monotheism :God is a perfect faultless Whole, and He/r relationship to the imperfect faulty Parts is all top-down. Hence God's perfection is uncontaminated by the limitations of space-time and good/evil. B> Polytheism : God is all good, but He/r evil twin is competing for the crown of world ruler. And spoiling the ideal simplicity of indivisible Oneness. Therefore, I can't accept the notion of G*D as Necessity without Possibilty.
On the other hand, I can only guess that G*D is not frozen into a boundless timeless changeless blocktime popsicle, but is instead a dynamic entity capable of creating an imperfect world internally without compromising He/r own boundlessness or wholeness. Just as a human mind can imagine a Utopian or Dystopian world without reducing its own unity & wholeness, a G*D-mind could move imaginary chess pieces around without compromising its own integrity. As some have expressed the idea : G*D is dreaming our world, so our "real" existence is imaginary or fictional from the perspective of the dreamer. :smile:
*1. How can you define Infinity or limit Eternity? :
Einstein liked inventing phrases such as "God does not play dice," "The Lord is subtle but not malicious." On one occasion Bohr answered, "Einstein, stop telling God what to do."
https://history.aip.org/exhibits/einstein/ae63.htm
*2. G*D :
[i]An ambiguous spelling of the common name for a supernatural deity. The Enformationism thesis is based upon an unprovable axiom that our world is an idea in the mind of G*D. This eternal deity is not imagined in a physical human body, but in a meta-physical mathematical form, equivalent to Logos. Other names : ALL, BEING, Creator, Enformer, MIND, Nature, Reason, Source, Programmer. The eternal Whole of which all temporal things are a part is not to be feared or worshipped, but appreciated like Nature.
I refer to the logically necessary and philosophically essential First & Final Cause as G*D, rather than merely "X" the Unknown, partly out of respect. Thats because the ancients were not stupid, to infer purposeful agencies, but merely shooting in the dark. We now understand the "How" of Nature much better, but not the "Why". That inscrutable agent of Entention is what I mean by G*D.[/i]
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page13.html
Well, I see your point but maybe it is a 'middle way', so to speak, between the two kinds of analogies.
Natura naturans and Natura Naturata IMO are two aspects of the Substance - an unmanifest and one manifest. The modes are particular features of the manifest aspect, which we erroneously take as independent substances.
I don't know. Maybe a further analogy might be that natura naturans is like a code of a program, natura naturata is the 'manifest' execution of that program and the 'modes' are some 'steps' of the execution, which cannot be thought as separate from the whole execution of the program.
But if G*D is not simple, i.e. if G*D is composite, then it necessarily depends on the parts. If those parts were to 'separate', G*D is no more. BTW, G*D being simple doesn't mean that G*D has no properties, just that G*D has no parts.
On the other hand, it has also been a historical philosophical problem how to explain an evolving world that originate from a timeless and changeless Creator/Source etc.
Quoting Gnomon
I have some sympathy for this kind of view, BTW. Anyway, if G*D is a 'dynamic entity', then it is easier to explain changes. Maybe G*D has some changeless aspects and some dynamic aspects. Don't know.
Yes. To portray G*D as a "composite", of which we humans are the parts, seems to be a materialistic/physicalist notion. It views G*D as a mechanism with interdependent interacting parts. A machine (e.g. a watch) is indeed dependent on its constituent parts. Take away one cog and the machine no longer functions properly.
But my hypothetical god-model is more meta-physical, and imagines G*D as Enfernal (infinite/eternal) Potential, and our space-time world as one of infinitely many possible Actualized systems. Potential is not a thing that can be divided into smaller things. Instead, Potential is more like a Whole which is more than the sum of its parts. The "more than" is not more Parts, but more Potential. Just as physical Energy is not a material object, meta-physical Potential is infinite and inexhaustible.
So, G*D/Potential is simple in the sense of not being composed of many inter-dependent mechanical elements. A quantum physics metaphor is the hypothetical Universal Energy Field*1 (or Vacuum Energy*2, or Dark Energy). It's a mathematical continuum, not a material mechanism. Since the field of empty space is boundless, and its "grid points" are only mathematically defined --- no extension in space or time --- the Field is not diminished or increased by the popup particles that we interpret as electrons, etc. :smile:
PS___ Since our language is Materialistic, that Holistic notion may be hard to wrap your mind around, but It was presented back in 1926 by Biologist Jan Smuts in his Holism and Evolution.
*1. The Universal Field Theory :
The U F T is not a physics theory in a classical sense. It is rather a philosophical theory explaining Why and How physical phenomena appear.
https://theuniversalfieldtheory.com/
*2. Vacuum energy is an underlying background energy that exists in space throughout the entire universe
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vacuum_energy
VACUUM ENERGY IMAGINED AS STORMY SEA OF POTENTIAL ENERGY
Nothing there until Potential is Actualized
:clap: :lol:
The section (in the full article) on how to test this "theory" is nothing but vacuous bs. Like "The Force" in the Star Wars movies, "UFT" is just more pseudo-science (woo-woo) stuffed inside a shit-"philosophy" sandwich. :sparkle:
Haven't you espoused Spinoza's philosophy in the past? Just saying
You seemed to be objecting to a post because of materialism but Spinoza wasn't a materialist. He thought you and the world were God's mind. Do you have cotempt for Daoism or is that ok as well?
"There is a thing confusedly formed
Born before heaven and earth
Silent and void
It stands alone and does not change
Goes round and does not weary
It is capable of being the mother of the world
I know not its name
So I style it 'the way'"
Lao Tzu as quoted in Primal Myths by Barbara Sproul
When applying philosophy to physics the lines can become blurred
Nor Spinozism. My point was that you pick and choose rather randomly what is woowoo and what is not when it comes to the philosophy of physics
Well, the ontological dependence is also true for an organism, even if one accepts an holistic model. If a living human being is more than his parts, the human being qua human being still seems dependent on them.
Quoting Gnomon
I think that 'holism' per se is not enough to answer this objection.
Also, IMO 'energy' is a property rather than a 'physical substance'. A rock is not 'made by' mass-energy but has mass-energy. Unfortunately, I think that even physicists themselves sometimes indulge in some confusion about this.
We can't say that 'fundamental physical reality' is 'energy' because 'energy' is a property.
IMO rather than 'parts' it would make more sense to speak of 'manifestations' or 'features'. Something like Heraclitus' fragment 67 (source):
Or maybe something like 'God' in Whiteheadan process philosophy (but I am not really familar with that).
:100: :fire:
I believe that the confusion is also due to an incorrect interpretation of Einstein's 'mass-energy equivalence', which in fact is due to a misunderstading of 'mass'.
It is somewhat instinctive to regard 'mass' as a measure of 'the quantity of matter'. After all, this is the very first definition one hears in middle school (which is of course appropriate for the age). But even in high school, this definition of mass is replaced by the more sophisticated definitions like 'inertial mass' and 'gravitational mass'.
It's unfortunately simple to misinterpret the concept of 'mass' - and, consequentlly, the concept of 'energy' via the 'mass-energy equivalence' - in a substantialist way. But 'mass' and 'energy' are physical properties/quantities, just like 'momentum', 'angular momentum' or even 'velocity', 'acceleration' etc. Any kind of substantialist interpretation of 'energy' or 'mass' errs due to an incorrect process of instinctive 'reification'. Physical objects are not made of mass, energy just like they are not made of momentum or velocity.
Yes, Ontology is the most debatable aspect of Philosophy*1. Anything created from scratch is indeed dependent for its existence on the Creator. But I don't see how the self-existing Ontological creator --- what I call eternal/infinite Potential --- could be dependent on the space-time creature. Anyway, we're getting into some esoteric & metaphorical concepts here, that might snidely label as "BS". And, as he might pointedly point-out : "it's way over Gnomon's little pointy head".
In the links below*2, Energy is described as a "property of a system", and Holism is about Systems, not things. So, systemic properties can only be rationally inferred, not physically observed. Hence, we don't know what Energy is, in a material sense, we only know what it does. Likewise, we don't know what G*D is, only what it does : to serve as a hypothetical explanation for the existence of everything in our world. :smile:
*1. Varieties of Ontological Dependence :
A crucial notion in metaphysics is that of one entity depending for its existence upon another entitynot in a merely causal sense, but in a deeper, ontological sense
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence-ontological/
*2. Is this correct 'energy is a property of matter?
No, energy is a property of a system, and work is done when the system energy is re-distributrd among the bodies of mass in the system. . . . .
Yes and no. We do not know what energy is. It is invisible. We only find it as a number that emerges from specific calculations.
https://www.quora.com Is-this-correct-energy-is-a-pro...
SNIDELY WHIPLASH
On the contrary, g/G is an empty name that
pacifies the superstitious. :pray:
If this "hypothetical explanation" is testable, then cite such a test or what one might be in principle; however, if it is not testable, then there is not any reason to consider g/G an "explanation" for anything at all.
I hate to bring in Wittgenstein here, but some of his ideas can be useful in these debates. That is to say, you must try to not mix "language games" of the personal god variety and the philosophical god variety.
Generally, in everyday usage, "God" is referred to as a personal deity. In Western tradition, it is of the Abrahamic variety, and has a certain theological baggage that goes with it.
Your use of "God" here is rather derived from the Greek philosophical tradition of a sort of "Ground of Being". There is The Good, there is the Demiurge imperfectly creating from the divine Source, there is the One of Neoplatonism and the manifestations of the One that go from darkness to Light, etc. With Gnosticism and Neoplatonism, you had a proto-notion of "Many worlds". Perhaps with Spinoza, this was advanced even further. With modern theoretical physics, you have it more empirically correlated, as a theory to solve things like quantum superposition in experimental physics.
So in this case, "existence of everything", can indeed open ideas.. For example, the possibility of worlds more "perfect" than ours. These universes, I would contest are NULL set universes. That is to say, there is no need for anything, as it is an absolute perfect state. Its everything and nothing. Imperfect universes, like our own, have individuation, forces, movement, "things happening". Certainly ones with "sentient life" represent a variety of imperfect universe with "wants", "needs", "pain", and "suffering". These are less than average universes.
Anyways, it is important to know this distinction, as it is easy to move from "God is what exists", to "God is that being that directs us and commands, and has a Will for us to follow, in his divine plan". In these debates, people often try to combine them. And I get why, in the Middle Ages, the combination of Neoplatonism and Gnostic notions were combined to create Judaic and Christian forms of mysticism that expanded the Personal deity to "The philosophical deity". And so the category errors and language game confusions continue.
Can it be thus the case that if an infinite set of infinite set of universes exist, then some of these have deities.. that could be said, yes. If that is the case, then we must add in EVERY possible thing that can ever possibly exist, including the Spaghetti Monster. That is to say, in this logic, the Spaghetti Monster exists in one of the many universes. But, is that really where you want to go with the conclusions to your reasoning?
Yup. That's why I think that the view that the 'Creator' is 'simple' is the right one, independently of the particualr idea of the nature of this 'Creator'. If the 'Creator' weren't simple, then its 'parts' would be uncreated themselves.
The problem is IMO that even panendeistic systems at the end of the day must renounce the view that, for instance, 'we' are 'parts' of the 'Creator'. But if one accepts that the 'Creator' is unchanging, then all change is ultimately illusory.
In order to overcome this problem, I think that something like 'process philosophy' is needed if one wants to save both the 'absoluteness' of the 'Creator' and the 'reality' of change. Heraclitus' probably was the first known attempt in this direction.
Quoting Gnomon
Not sure how this is relevant. Yes, we cannot take 'energy' to be something real if we do not take the 'system' as a 'reality' that bears the property of 'energy' (the confusion arises when 'energy' or 'mass' is taken as a fundamental substance and physical systems and objects are seen as a sort of 'manifestations' of 'particular configurations' of 'mass' or 'energy'). And yes, 'energy' seems more a 'collective property', so to speak, rather than the property of an individual 'object', when systems of interacting 'objects' are taken into account.
But IMO, the only systems that can be considered as 'distinct realities' in physics would be isolated systems (i.e. systems in which conservation laws apply). But again, can we give a non-fictional example of an 'isolated system'?
@Gnomon, I was a bit obscure here. The 'truly' isolated system seems to be the 'whole universe', after all. So, if anything, I believe that the 'whole physical universe' is more fundamental than its 'constituents'.
Thanks, but on an open forum like this it's not easy to avoid crossing invisible linguistic lines. I am not familiar with Wittgenstein "language", but I am well-versed in Judeo-Christian idioms. And I have some knowledge of philosophical terminology dating back to the Greeks. So, my use of the non-traditional spelling "G*D"*1 --- along with a variety of other terms, such as "First Cause" --- is a reference to what became known, derisively, among enlightenment era Catholics, as the "god of the philosophers", (an oblique reference to Spinoza). What I'm referring to is the perennial conundrum*2 for abstract thinkers since the first language emerged among men.
That still unsolved mystery dates back to the clear-sky Mesopotamian Astronomers --- perhaps the first mathematical scientists --- who wondered why most stars wandered aimlessly across the "firmament", but others moved in neat cycles that appealed to the order-seeking human eye. Since such circles are not found in Nature, apart from human constructions, they attributed the controlling influence to humanoid gods, and developed a geometric language for discussing the mystery. But the inherent problem of epi-cycles confounded even the mathematically talented Greeks, until one man on a cloudy-sky island, intuited a mathematical controller that he called "gravity" (heaviness), which is a Quality, not a material object, or deity.
A couple of centuries later, another singular thinker introduced a new, counterintuitive, way to think about Gravity, as the influence of "warped space". Which is just another spooky way of talking about the "remarkable effectiveness" of immaterial Mathematics in the material world. So, what ancient Astrologers attributed to humanoid gods, we now just take for granted as the organizing power of Nature, imagined as a pure abstraction. Yet even Einstein felt the need to use taboo "G" terms to describe something that is immaterial, but effective in organizing the material world into the "endless forms most beautiful" that Darwin saw in Nature, and attributed to an unspecified "creator"*3.
Thus, the language of Science has evolved over the millennia. But keeps coming back to the Central Mystery of philosophy : the cause of all order & beauty in the world. Yet some, who think of themselves as philosophers or scientists, are afraid of certain taboo terms, and still run away from the ghostly invisible Causes of the world. And blame their aversion on the historical tendency of the common people to think in Materialistic & Humanoid language, instead of the Mathematical & Holistic abstractions of philosophy. They think they can define the problem away, by calling it "Religious BS". :nerd:
*1. G*D :
[i]An ambiguous spelling of the common name for a supernatural deity. The Enformationism thesis is based upon an unprovable axiom that our world is an idea in the mind of G*D. This eternal deity is not imagined in a physical human body, but in a meta-physical mathematical form, equivalent to Logos. Other names : ALL, BEING, Creator, Enformer, MIND, Nature, Reason, Source, Programmer. The eternal Whole of which all temporal things are a part is not to be feared or worshipped, but appreciated as the organizing mind of Nature.
I refer to the logically necessary and philosophically essential First & Final Cause as G*D, rather than merely "X" the Unknown, partly out of respect. Thats because the ancients were not stupid, to infer purposeful agencies, but merely shooting in the dark. We now understand the "How" of Nature much better, but not the "Why". That inscrutable agent of Entention & Causation is what I mean by G*D.[/i]
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page13.html
*2. What is the perennial problem of philosophy?
The problems connected with the meaning of life, a providential order, political ideals, control over how we live, and the justification or criticism of legal and moral practices are perennial and philosophical.
https://archive.philosophersmag.com/perennial-philosophical-problems/
*3. Darwin's Creator :
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.
http://www.age-of-the-sage.org/darwin-quotes/grandeur-view-life.html
Ok, it looks like you are indeed discussing the "God of the philosophers" rather than the theological/Abrahamic variety and the baggage therewith.
So that being said, I can only add at the moment regarding this philosophical deity, is that if I was purely speculating, I can propose that this universe is indeed one of an infinite variety, each with a tiny variation of a variation of a variation perhaps, which indeed, would be infinite beyond anyone's wildest notion and unfathomable for human comprehension. I don't know what that means for determinism, for the block universe, versus partial block, etc.
Certainly, there are "laws" that we have harnessed and used for tools in our pursuit of survival and entertainment. All the mathematical formulations which you alluded to mean there is something for which this universe is "about", and not just constructed, and thus a "realness" to it. Surely, a Schopenhauer would balk at this, and for good reason, being the Kantian he was. That is to say, the universe sans mind is an interesting prospect to ponder. What is that? Pure potential? Pure information? What does that even mean? Of course, people like Berkeley and Descartes thought it was all derived from God's mind, Logos, as you might put it, so there is a "pat" solution, it seems, but doesn't seem satisfying either.
You seem to be promoting misinformation, given the title of the book being On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection.
At least the link you provided corrects the record:
Indeed, I think in any of these conversations, we have to think of a god that is not "having a hand in creation" so much as "the ground of being" for which the universe exists. Think metaphorically of Vishnu here.. Some modern scientists might argue this is akin to recognizing the Multiverse (if that theory is even correct.. of course there are many scientists that assign this as too speculative, though it does have an answer for quantum physics questions like superpostions). The Multiverse would be all that was is and would be perhaps, and that could be an infinite array of universes. It seems like @Gnomon is going to say that, without the animal/human observer, this Multiverse is simply information. But in my last post, I questioned what that really means. Just like the Multiverse, "Information" seems to be a "catchall" for the "ground of being". @apokrisis for example, will have a grand Peircean version of this consisting of a triadic grouping that must always be in the equation, and explains how existence exists without animal observers (as signs, signifiers, object aka information). Of course, this all begs the question too much if carefully examined, at least to me.
:rofl:
I think "Procrustean" would fit as well as "Peircean" a lot of the time.
:smirk:
Yes indeed, @apokrisis' philosophy is indeed a totalizing one, perhaps to a fault. But I do value his attempt to order the world in such a way, even if it is ultimately missing something or wrong. By seeing his logic of synthesis of various fields, it might provide some insights into other things along the way, even if simply thinking of contrary perspectives to its totalizing tendency. One should be charitable first, and then see the breakdown. It looks good from a certain angle for a second, and then vanishes when looked at again. His command of some technical fields does make it more impressive though. I have fought with him on areas which his totalizing view doesn't seem to penetrate, but I still think it interesting, even if he is wrong on issues, and frustrating to debate with in this setting at least.
Agreed. :up:
If you are "purely speculating", the notion of an infinite eternal Multiverse is just as viable as that of an intangible self-existent deity, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster, . . . . and just as unfalsifiable. Hence an infinite nonsensical hall-of-mirrror-gods might raise more questions than it answers. But it offers no rational solution to the Perennial Question or the Central Mystery that causes humans to seek for philosophical answers : i.e. wisdom.
I don't know how "pure" Schopenhauer's speculation was, but his notion of Cosmic Will at least has something in common with human aspirations*1. And sounds like Kant's ding an sich, or a God "by any other name". One purpose of Science is to make the world somewhat more predictable, and controllable, than coin-flipping. And an intentional Mind/Will similar to our own would be more comprehensible than infinite God-verses "playing dice" to determine human fate*2. Apparently, Schop was content to be a closet-Pessimist ; I'm not. :smile:
*1.Vindicating Schopenhauer :
[i]Schopenhauers metaphysics is characterized by a partition of the world into two categories,
which he called Will and Representation (I shall capitalize both terms to differentiate their usage in Schopenhauers sense from other denotations of the words). Representation is the outer appearance of the world: the way it presents itself to our observation, on the screen of perception. The Will, on the other hand, is the worlds inner essence: what it is in itself, independently of observation.
Schopenhauers Will is roughly equivalent to Immanuel Kants thing-in-itself, or noumena,
whereas Schopenhauers Representations are equivalent to Kants phenomena. However, unlike Kantwho thought of the noumena as fundamentally unknowableSchopenhauer thought that there is a way to know the noumena : when it comes to our own selves, we are not limited to perceptionthat is, Representationbut have direct, immediate, first-person access to what it is like to be us. As such, there is precisely one case in which we do know the thing-in-itself simply by being it: our own selves. By introspecting, Schopenhauer thought we could make valid inferences about all the noumena.
.
After all,since our own bodies are made of the same atoms and force fields that constitute the world at large, by pinning down what it is like to be us we can infer what it is like to be the world at large as well. And when he introspected into his own self, Schopenhauer found something he thought appropriate to call Will.[/i]
____https://blog.apaonline.org/2020/03/12/vindicating-schopenhauer-undoing-misunderstandings-of-his-metaphysics/
*2. Schopenhauer On The Idea Of Fate :
In Schopenhauers essay Transcendent speculation on the apparent deliberateness in the fate of the individual (I KNOW, thats a title and a half), he explores the idea that our sense of free will changes as we age. His basic premise is that we are more likely to believe in fate, destiny, providence, or predetermination as we get older because we have seen the different acts of our life come together.
https://rcabbott.medium.com/amor-fati-schopenhauer-on-the-idea-of-fate-dab38711be7f
Note --- "Governments are instituted among men" to avoid being subject to the Will of one man. But governments are intended to give each of us a fair chance at "happiness", not a royal road for anyone in particular.
This is because (A) "why" (i.e. goal, purpose) only pertains to intentional agency an unwarranted, anthropomorphic assumption and therefore does not pertain to "Nature" itself (re: teleological / transcendental illusion (i.e. a metacognitive bias aka "pure reason")); and (B) the only answer to the foundational/ultimate "why of Nature" that does not beg the question (i.e. infinitely regress) is There Is No Why of Nature. :fire:
Although, professional philosophers, who get paid for their learned opinions, might be loathe to admit it, most of our amateur "reasoning" on this forum consists of justifications for believing as we are naturally inclined to do. As Lady Gaga sang about homosexuals : "I was born this way". I didn't reason myself into an optimistic worldview with a god-like Enformer to make things "work together for good".
Instead, late in life, I found a Holistic explanation for why the apparent positives & negatives vary depending on your location on the curve, and on your personal attitude. While some feel the weight of Entropy holding them down, I feel the inner Energy pushing me forward. Those who "carefully" examine the news of the day will go to bed depressed. Stoicism is not Pollyanna Optimism, but thick-skinned Pragmatism.
Some thinkers seem to view the world from a me-centric perspective, but I see no reason expect the world to conform to my personal preferences. I suppose I was born this way : able to sleep in a bed of roses, smelling the soft sweet petals, while ignoring the occasional thorn-pricks . On the other side of the philosophical hill, a few pessimists, laboring on the uphill slog of the Normal Curve, justify their one-sided worldview by imagining that there is no upside to this dynamically-balanced good/evil world. So, they justify their dismal worldview by labeling the "goodys" as Idiots, blind to the obvious Truth that is clear to all "right-thinking" people. Does that self-righteous attitude remind you of religious fundamentalists?
Meanwhile, Sisyphus just does his unavoidable task of keeping the ball (Life) moving. Whenever you are looking for evidence, there is always something better or worse on the other side of the hill. Like Sisy, I don't examine life too microscopically ; you might miss a chance to smell the roses along the path. Meanwhile, I'm just biding my time, waiting for rigor mortis to set-in. What was the question again? :smile:
What is the moral of the story Sisyphus?
Sisyphus's eternal labour underscores the importance of embracing the present moment and finding joy in the process, regardless of the outcome. Despite the repetitive and seemingly futile nature of his task, Sisyphus persisted in his efforts, finding purpose and meaning in the act of pushing the boulder up the hill.
https://www.thepilgrims-school.co.uk/the-myth-of-sisyphus
THE NORMAL CURVE OF A WORLD OF POSITIVES & NEGATIVES
THE SNOWBALL EFFECT OF OPTIMISTS
Though I appreciate you trying to use a possibly archaic word I recently used on the forum, I have to call a language foul. There are two different words, "loath" and "loathe".
You might say, "might be loath to admit it"
or, "might loathe admitting it"
but "might be loathe to admit it" is right out.
It depends. For example, procreation imposes life onto someone else, making it an act of force. In this sense, it can be viewed as a self-righteous attitude, where the belief in one's justification resembles that of religious fundamentalists. The newly born are like the forcibly converted, not (can never be) consulted, in someone else's vision of what life should be. What could be more controlling and fundamentalist and "me-centric" than deciding for others what you deem to be the necessary way of life, that others simply must follow? :smirk:
So at what point does anti-natalism become just another social interest group telling me what I should think?
As an evangelist, do you believe you have the truth on your side? Yours is the view I simply must follow, and not some more generally held view in society?
You would have a point if natalism and antinatalism were symmetrical- but theyre not. Antinatalism at the end of the day is an ethic/philosophy that you can take or leave. Natalism advocates for forced conversion.
Source?
Anyone birthed.
Natalism is a population ethic concept, whereas AN doesn't apply to that set of concerns/issues. Using 'Natalism' as an ethical argument toward any small group, or individual is completely inapt and inhumane (largely).
What does that mean? You were birthed. Does that force you to be a natalist?
Use whatever word you want for wanting others to live out X way of life. Pro-birth, procreationists, etc.
You're reading backwards. Any parent that forces a child into life is 'Natalist' on that account there, but Schop is wrong about what Natalism is. He's wrong in his recent reply too, because that particular attitude is not capturing Natalism.
I mean that at the end of the day antinatalists dont force a way of life unto others. Natalists (or whatever term youd like to use for it), de facto lead to forced outcomes for others. They want to see someone else live out X and they make it happen. They force the hand.
I already said you can use what term youd like.
Not true. Natalism is a population ethic concern and has to do with population growth. We no longer need people to 'have children' to grow the population. This 'guilt' can be lumped on a singular social functionary: The doctor.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Ok. But you're talking about an established population ethics concept. It would be more reasonable for me to say "pick a different term". THe one you've chosen is taken.
Cool. Again, I dont care what term is used here. Im aware of natalism as a population ethic term.
Any ethical argument that pushes for monistic absolutism is going to be inhumane just in denying that humans are organised by dialectical balances. We have to have complementary limits in mind so we can arrive at the choices that are the most optimal the most win-win that can be achieved.
@schopenhauer1 creates a caricature "natalist" to match his caricatured anti-natalism. He constantly encounters folk who indeed seem exactly like his imagined natalists as that is what anyone would be driven to by his monomaniac peddling of the an anti-natalist agenda.
To me, whether to have or not have kids was always in the balance. It was easy enough to see that it would be irresponsible of me to have them to the degree the risk was strongly in the direction of a lose-lose outcome. And so also perfectly responsible to the degree the chances were of a win-win outcome.
That's real life lived in an ethical and humane fashion where things happen. Not a life lived in terms of catastrophising absolutes.
Quoting schopenhauer1
So you positively want to stop me having babies and I don't feel particularly strongly about whether you do or not. I only feel strongly about you being suitably thoughtful about this important choice. I'm perfectly fine if you decide the proposition is a lose-lose in your circumstances.
And yet for some reason your feelings about my procreation are what must be the case here? You have decided that all births are only a losing story? And that is what must be forced on me? And now on my own children too? You will be chasing after my descendants til the end of time with your philosophy?
Quoting AmadeusD
In practice, societies sometimes want more kids, sometimes fewer. Not sure that any society was ever blindly natalist, or even anti-natalist, in the way schop requires. But certainly a society would want to send its people a clear signal about the average target number it is seeking for demographic reasons.
Turn the tap on. Turn the tap off. The current direction must be made clear even if aiming at a responsible balance is the ultimate goal.
The operative word is "forced" here. That is exactly my point. Antinatalism's main gripes revolve around causing others unnecessary suffering and the fact that something as important a decision can never be consented. Procreationists/natalists want to see a FORCED outcome for other people. Antinatalism has no outcome as such. And we can go in circles about consent (and I would make arguments why this is different than getting shots or educating children or government taxes or whatever other strawmen that I've seen about that thousands of times before.. at that point, I'll just pull up the old comments). The point for THIS conversation (again trying to avoid previous debates surrounding consent or "forced"), is that precisely the claim you are making about antinatalism, is what anti-antinatalists are doing- that is to say, "FORCING" others. I claim that procreation is a political move. It is VOTING on ANOTHER'S BEHALF that one must carry out X.
So quite literally, antinatalists cause no FORCE, simply propose arguments while pro-procreation people quite literally FORCE situations upon others. So it is the natalists that cause the force, not the other way around.
They are not because "natalism" is not an ideology or doctrine or dogma "unlike antinatalism. Natality is a biological function that animals can prevent or terminate. Having been born does not in any way entail procreating. Thus, "antinatalism". (i.e. natality : antinatalism :: mortality : denialism¹)
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denialism [1]
Natality isn't. I said to use whatever term you want for it.
Agree.
Quoting apokrisis
I think you're wrong, so I can't agree here. Your objections are linguistic in nature and do not affect his actual reasoning (though, I think he's not clear on his own tbh).
Quoting apokrisis
They have, but under weird guises like 'economy' when in reality, they wanted a bigger army or whatever. It's never been a bare goal though, I'd cop to that.
Quoting 180 Proof
"troll someone else". Caricature of a thinker.
Well these gripes are covered by it being a responsibly-informed decision. You have to catastrophise the average life to make life itself seem always an intolerable burden and thus never justified in its starting.
Your argument collapses right there. Exactly where there are those of us who are indeed quite glad to have had the chance to be born and live out a life even if we failed to sign the correct legal papers in advance of the fact.
Quoting schopenhauer1
People can want to have children. It is perfectly natural. And they take responsibility for their choices. Or at least that is where their ethical duty lies.
But you want to invent some kind of monstrous fertility cult taking perverted pleasure in producing miserable souls. Weird.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Your hysteria rises. You want to take what is just an everyday part of most lives a pragmatic decision about what suits some couple and turn it into a legalistic, and now politicised, burden. Some kind of ballot rigging or election fraud for which a couple must be charged. Or at least shouted at in capital letters.
Again, do you accept that people are allowed make their own informed risk-reward choices or not? Are they allowed to express the potentials of their own bodies or do their preferences require your consent as the fertility police. The fertility police who will anyway only ever say no.
Quoting schopenhauer1
But why do they get so shouty when told their argument is based on the false premise that life is inherently only for the worse, never for the better? That they would deny as many good lives as the bad lives they might hope to prevent.
If you polled a 1000 people a proper cross-section of society how many would say it would have been just better never to have been born than to have lived at all?
I would expect an antinatalist to at least be able to offer this data to show there was any kind of genuine consent issue.
This is one list of death bed regrets.
1) I wish I'd had the courage to live a life true to myself, not the life others expected of me.
2) I wish I hadn't worked so hard.
3) I wish I'd had the courage to express my feelings.
4) I wish I had stayed in touch with my friends.
5) I wish I had let myself be happier
So at the end of the journey, the issue is not that the journey was started but that more could have been done in terms of personal growth.
If you want to have some grand position on ethics/politics/life, that seems a more fruitful focus for a conversation.
You really, really do not. Your position is that of most people, even one's aware of hte burden of living so there are no surprises here. Just, not a lot of analysis.
Given you find yourself alive, is it then better to have a positive or a negative mindset about that fact? Regardless of the "truth" that you might hope to find by an exhaustive analysis.
We can argue about which position would be more an illusion later.
But simply as pragmatics, is your situation going to be made better or worse if you believe your fate is in your own hands, or if you instead believe the hope has already gone?
Which ought to be our default mindset, all other things being equal?
You'll need to let me know what this has to do with AN first (i can save the time: It does not have more than an aesthetic resemblance to the issues AN wants to deal with). In the meantime, I think I can address the question your asking, noting it is a non sequitur from defending/objecting to AN.
Quoting apokrisis
I don't think the question is that easy. Having one's fate in one's own hands seems to overwhelm (literally) the majority of people to psychosis.
I don't think any mindset 'ought'. That seems an extreme move to make.
AN would be the aesthetic pose in my book. I prefer to move on to the pragmatic meat of the issue of whether to have children. And how to approach life in general.
Quoting AmadeusD
Hyperbole.
Checking your comments on the other AN thread, I can explain better. You were arguing as if the higher consciousness of humans were something neurobiological rather than sociocultural. This makes a difference.
If you believe that human self awareness - our feeling of being a self and thus able to suffer in an existential sense - is something neurobiological, then that is something that cant be fixed by a psychological intervention. Therapy cant address the source of the distress.
But if instead you understand human consciousness as a socially constructed habit of thought - one based on the narrative power of language and societys need for us to be socially self-regulating - then you can see how the inner narrative is something that can quite authentically be rewritten.
This is the shift in mindset behind the positive psychology movement. A new style of therapy for helping people realise they have internalised certain scripts and, if they want, they can rewrite them to better suit their own lives.
This addresses the five death bed regrets I mentioned. The fact that people felt their life was alright but really they should have made it more their own life. They shouldnt have lived it so much in terms of what their parents, peers, employers, etc, felt it should be.
So we are not rooted psychologically in the deeper soil of our emotions and values. These are often just attitudes and frames that we grew up surrounded by and thus became merely our unthinking habits.
This makes all the difference. If we have a negative mindset, why not learn instead to have a positive one.
It is not the gift of life that is our unconsented burden. It is the attitudes we were surrounded by that could be the reason for a life of burden and suffering. That which we could not help internalising as it was how we were treated, the circumstances of our early rearing. But that which we can grow out if we have a clearer idea about how the human mind is shaped.
While I am not a committed antinatalist, I'm not sure about the relevance of this objections.
Let's assume for the sake of the discussion, that 99,99% of people are relly happy of their life, despite the fact that death is inevitable, the tragedies that have happened and so on.
There is still the 0,01%, however, that would prefer to 'have never been born'. Their perspective is not 'wrong' only because they are a minority.
Let's say that it there is a vanishing small probability that a human being might prefer to 'have never been born'.
Then, when parents decide to give birth to a human being, they are doing this by accepting the chance, however small, that, in fact, such a human being might regret have been born. Let's say that we do accept that it is indeed a tragedy that someone wil regret his or her life.
Is it really morally acceptable to 'take this risk' for someone else, however small it might be because it is 'small'?
Is it morally acceptable for me to 'give birth' on the chance that my son or my daughter might be unsatisfied with his or her life? If his or her life is good for someone else, even for many people let's say, but would turn out to not be good for his or her, is it morally acceptable for me to give birth?
@schopenhauer1
So because of this round up error, humanity should end itself forthwith as some kind of supreme ethical act?
:chin:
Well, I see what you mean. But the decision is not taken by 'humanity' but by individual human beings in their singularity.
If I am not certain that my son or my daughter will be happy, it seems to me that I am accepting a possible tragedy (his or her regret for having been born) as an acceptable price for some good, which is external for them. If I am 'justifying' his or her life (which he or she might not see as a 'good' for him or her) as a mean to a possible 'higher good', it seems that I accept to treat him or her as a mean to an end (let's say also that his or her actions benefit for many people, but they do not percieve any good from that).
I am wrong?
I am very conflicted about this issue, anyway. I am not an antinatalist but IMO this is the strongest argument for it.
Also: is there a percentage under which it is 'acceptable' to take the risk? And, in case, what is the justification for this threshold?
Edit:
Quoting boundless
Of course, here I am assuming that this 'regret' is something irreversible, i.e. that this human being would regret to 'have been born' and would not change his or her mind.
Remember I have already agreed that one ought to make responsible choices. One can tell if one is really in a position to do a good job of it.
Im not a natalist in the sense Schop pushes. I think it perfectly sensible not to have kids if you see a highly likelihood of things turning out bad. Climate change could be a good enough reason. Not liking responsibility could be another,
But antinatalism is claiming this transcendent principle that no chances should be taken at all. I dont get to choose what is right for me in my circumstances. The antinatalist has assumed the ethical high ground that trumps any choice I might make. Which seems a little fascist.
So it is THIS mindset you speak which I think to be an exemplar of the root of the ethical dilemma AN brings up, at least in the deontological sense.
For deontologists, it would be wrong to use people. Birth uses the person who will be born to fulfill a need of the parent. The person did not exist in the first place to need anything. Rather, the person being born is purely for reasons outside the person themselves.
And thus, thus boundless was right here to say:
Quoting boundless
And thus the house of cards that the pro-natalists puts up crumbles from there. Causing unnecessary harm to someone else, didn't need to occur. Breaking non-autonomy principles to cause unnecessary harm, all the worse.
And then these arguments below end up being hollow strawmen because the AN is not making these claims:
Quoting apokrisis
Quoting apokrisis
The antinatalist is providing a suggested ethic, and giving you reasons such as not causing unnecessary suffering, not using people, not breaking non-autonomy principles. They are not forcing the situation. Pro-natalists actually advocate for forcing life unto others, and how is that not a little fascist? Antinatalists simply provide a strongly suggested ethic that you can take or leave. However, the pro-natalist action LITERALLY lasts a lifetime, and NOT on one's own behalf but for another person. You mentioned "fascism", how is THIS not controlling, dictatorial, and forceful- all markers of fascist regimes? Fascists have a vision of a "way of life", and want others to be forced to follow that vision. Pro-natalists also want to see a "way of life, and want others to be forced to follow that vision. And indeed, the issue becomes political as one stance does not force one's vision on another, and another's outcome surely does.
Then you suggest various forms of therapeutic balancing to ones that are already born. You say things like:
Quoting apokrisis
But the burden was already laid upon the person born. These now are mitigating what was already started (not prevented from happening). It is odd to provide the problem to someone only so that later they can mitigate it. Again, this strikes me as using people to follow a sort of game (life itself!) and thus wanting to see others maneuver in this game that YOU want to see FOR THEM. Again, how is this notion itself not dictatorial, forceful, and commanding- fascist? And if you don't like it the regime wants you dead or stricken from the record. How dare one question the regime, right? All hallmarks of fascist thinking.
It might be relatively wrong but then also relatively right. You of course will do your usual mad thing of talking in exceptionless absolutes.
I don't think you're reading these responses.
Quoting apokrisis
Not in any way, whatsoever. The number of people who cower into an ideology that saves them from head-on dealing with the complexities and pains of life is far higher than the number of people who do not. This is not hyperbole, it just may be uncomfortable to confront. I am speaking here of religious people, New Age people and the like. It is not common to intellectually "raw dog" life, as it were.
Quoting apokrisis
You may need to clarify as this is across threads, and I don't quite recognize anything here?
Quoting apokrisis
Quoting apokrisis
Im not sure you're making anything of this. Humans are capable (in fact, predisposed) to suffer. Therapy can't make us inhumane. Okay?
Quoting apokrisis
You'd be a very, very weird person to deal with. Bordering on nonsensical, imo.
Quoting apokrisis
This sounds like Frankfurtian nonsense to me I'm afraid (not your fault, I'm sure - you'll have seen at least some of my responses to Constance illuminating why this is so, for me)). The two points you're trying to contrast aren't related in my view (in this discussion, anyway. Others, sure). The fact of self-consciousness has very little to do with (other than as a required premise) inner monologues. Our self-consciousness predisposes us to suffer. We have the ability to talk ourselves around. Okay. This is, again, not related to AN concerns or positions. You're talking about living people dealing with their already-extant lives. Not. Relevant.
Quoting apokrisis
And you take this seriously, I take it, as opposed to nifty social trend designed to make money off people's mental health?
Quoting apokrisis
This is the majority of all therapies throughout time. This is not 'new'.
Quoting apokrisis
Yes it is. Unfortunately, nothing you've said comes close to altering this position.
Quoting apokrisis
The strange part about this exchange (again, not you... some free-floating attribute) is that I basically agree with this. Once alive, we can do all sorts of things to alleviate suffering. Some people genuinely enjoy a life with less suffering and more pleasure (as it were - that's a bit black/white). No issues with what you're getting across here - which is an argument against existential dread, or suicidality, or even defeatist attitudes of the living. It does not engage with AN concerns.
Quoting AmadeusD
Who could care about AN concerns? They are ridiculous given that there is plenty enough of pragmatic importance to be getting on with in our already extant lives.
A fashion statement and not a philosophical conundrum.
So, you mean to say, you've been arguing with (i think) three people about antinatalism across two threads, and you don't care about, or understand the concerns of antinatalists? Interesting approach my guy.
I've had schop bleating in my ear for a decade. And you are not striking me as someone who is suddenly going to make it an interesting subject.
This is more than a bit of bad faith argumentation being that you didn't address any of my points, and only left a sweeping general claim, don't you think?
Quoting apokrisis
Well, I didn't mean to say that you thought otherwise. I see what you mean, but I don't think you are answering to the objection.
Even if there is a very small chance that life won't be a 'good thing' for my kid, then, given this uncertainty, how can I justify my decision to give birth? If I give birth on the chance that it will be something bad for him or her, then I have to find some other reason to do it - but note that if a person is a good-in-itself, then I cannot really find it acceptable.
Maybe there is something like a 'deontological' duty to preserve the species. But even if it is were true, then, we have the conflict between two 'ethical duties'. On the other hand, we have to preserve humanity. On the other hand, we have to act towards the future human being as a good in himself/herself. If we choose to 'give birth', we follow the first ethical duty and we accept the risk that life might not be something good to the individual that will be born. If we stop reproducing, of course, we choose to ignore the first ethical duty.
I do see it as an ethical dilemma, BTW. The 'best outcome', of course, would be that humanity never goes extinct and every human being sees and will see their own life as something good. Only in this case, the dilemma disappears. If, instead, it is possible that someone doesn't see life as something good, the dilemma arises.
Personally, one of the reason that I am not an antinatalist is that the above - it is true that each individual is a 'good in himself/herself' but I also think that we have a communal duty, i.e. we also have to act in a way that is good for humanity, which seems to imply that as a community we shall seek to avoid extinction (this doesn't imply that everyone must have kids, of course).
Also, another reason why I am not an antinatalist is that I am open to the possibility of an afterlife. I am not sure how the possibility of the afterlife would influence the dilemma of antinatalism (I guess that it also depends on how the afterlife is, if there is one).
As someone on the autism spectrum, the question arises for me of whether in an afterlife I would be autistic.
If not, then it doesn't seem like it would be me in the afterlife.
If so, and for eternity, I expect I'd think the afterlife kind of sucks.
Fair enough, as the other poster said. I'll just leave you with the idea that some things are just principles, not everything in human actions have to be about some "greater good" outcome. A lot of injustice happens in the name of that mentality. Deontological basis may be seen as inflexible, but it's not when considering the procreational decision against post-birth considerations. Once born, you have a child that has rights to not die in your care, for example. I call this "mitigation ethics", as the harm is done, but now it's trying to trade the greater for lesser harms (all the "raising" part). But to create the harm, to thus mitigate it is indeed unnecessary, and thus misguided. And, as I was saying, it is aggressively paternalistic ("fascist" if you will). For some reason YOU want to see something and SOMEONE has to dance to the tune you want to see happen. With birth control, there is no real "it's just what people do" aspect (not that they had no choice or couldn't take actions prior either). It now makes it purely a political choice, even if out of negligence. One knows the possibilities.
You assume some holistic system, but these are decisions made by people within the system. Life is a choice one makes on another's behalf, it is not an inevitability to choose that someone else needs to be born into this life. Using people in order to serve some "systemic view of things", makes no sense in light of ethics that considers individuals, and their pain. People aren't pieces to be moved around such that some grand narrative plays out. That is circular logic, whereby the descriptive aspect (entropic gobblygook, etc.) becomes a sort of naturalistic fallacy and a violation of the is/ought gap.
That aint philosophy. It is reason eating itself.
Interesting - I would never had thought to ask this, though, I am essentially not open to an afterlife that retains any personality whatsoever. INteresting, nonetheless.
Quoting apokrisis
Is a more apt description. You may still think this is inapt for life in general, but it is certainly bad faith to attribute behaviours you're, in the sentence, deeming problematic, when that's not established - its just an appearance from your POV :)
If you think looking for only problems is not a problem, then you would have to supply your argument for why this lack of balance is not in fact problematic.
Quoting apokrisis
Quoting AmadeusD
Your POV that we're 'looking for problems' is simply not the case. ANd, it is not for you to decide whether or not it is. We see things differently. You are not right. We are not 'right'. You are, however, wrong about the motivation. Recognizing, not seeking. If you do not accept this, that is pure bad faith. There is nothing to explain, from our position. You are simply wrong about what we are thinking, or motivated by. And you couldn't possibly know, so... yeah.
It could have been better written.
Quoting AmadeusD
Well who gives a fuck when you put it like that.
LMAO, possibly, but your response seems to just be inapt, even on review. The core point was missed.
Quoting apokrisis
You're trying to assert that mind-reading is a sound practice. Far be it from me my friend :)
Quoting apokrisis
If one is simply recognising problems then that is a quite different mindset. But once you declare no line can be drawn, no balance of interests can exist, then that becomes reason eating itself.
If you have an argument against that argument, rather than some further deflection, Im happy to hear it.
So you say you are a signed-up member of the AN charter. Being responsible for a birth is deemed a sin as it is impossible for the resulting infant to have given its explicit consent to this reproductive act in advance of the fact.
But having sex is always going to carry this risk. Even contraception as a sign of your good faith can fail. So does your AN charter need to add the clause of no sex at all as that is putting you at risk for breaking the faith? Do you need to go out and get sterilised because you could always get drunk one night or duped into performing a service for some cunning natalist?
One could go on seeking such risks to your hardline AN stance. The risks might be diminishing, but even a vasectomy fails 1 in 10,000 times. At some point do you not eventually get a pass on this? Does even the AN extremist accept that imperatives have their pragmatic limits?
Well if reason is allowed back into the conversation, this becomes the point where we can start winding back towards the practical notion of risks being balanced against rewards. We can get back to my commonsense position that what matters in regard to approaching reproduction ethically is not whether the prospective parents can have the baby sign off on the whole exercise in advance, but that the parents are wholeheartedly engaged in making it a turn of as a positive choice.
One can have a productive ethical debate where there are two complementary imperatives in play like risks and rewards and so the way that we "ought to behave" is in the way that aims to arrive at an optimised win-win balance.
But if you set up your ethics on the side of a slippery slope fallacy, then why would you expect that to be useful or persuasive?
:up: :up:
ANists hysterically confuse 'preventing possible lives' with 'preventing (and reducing) harm to / suffering of actual lives'.
You've already started off the argument then in bad faith argumentation as its about the normative. 1st degree murder isn't 2nd degree murder isn't manslaughter isn't a random accident. None of your scenario matters to the normative claim of the deontological basis being presented.
Quoting apokrisis
No, this isn't a slippery slope fallacy because the debate is at the normative level. Murder isn't somewhat wrong, it's wrong. That different scenarios can occur surrounding murder doesn't make murder itself NOT wrong.
But that is because I am sensible and don't buy that as a basis. Wrong premise and thus a pointless argument.
It would be bad faith to pretend I went along with your scenario for any other reason than its passing curiosity value.
Quoting schopenhauer1
But what is murder? What acts fall into that category without involving shades of grey?
Perhaps you have a conviction in black and white thinking to a degree I cannot even fathom? I sort of suspect that deep down you must be kidding. That a little reasonableness will soon penetrate the pose. I'm still kind of giving credit to the possibility that you aren't completely in the grip of your own rhetoric.
The point is that you would not WANT murder because it's wrong, even if, for practical purposes, such as law, we can differentiate punishment and blame based on various pragmatics surrounding the normative principle.
One doesn't WANT to cause another unnecessary suffering is the normative principle. That there are various scenarios of degrees for which negligence towards this can be hashed out, doesn't take away from that core principle.
What you are trying to do is deny that there is a core principle, but that is exactly what I am pushing back on. Negligence and pragmatics are de facto how things play out in the world, but that doesn't change the principles.
But that is just your failure to understand my position. My core principle is that there is always a dialectical balance in anything that could matter. A trade-off. And trade-offs ought to be optimised in a win-win fashion. That is the answer that is worth seeking.
Your approach drives you to angry dogmatism. My approach leads me to pragmatism. We do the best we can by reasoning. We should always expect a complementary balance to exist in nature. Complementary balances is after all how nature can even exist.
So my approach is rooted in natural philosophy. That is its metaphysical basis.
Yours seems to be some kind of Platonic notion of perfection. A one-note "good". A leap to an extreme that ends all debate.
The slippery slope fallacy, as I say. All answers must arrive in the one place, whereas for me they have many possible balancing points between two complementary notions of "the good".
It is good to take risks as it is good to get rewards. Pain is good as pain tells you what to avoid. Life is good because after that you will have plenty of oblivion in which to rest.
Nature has set us up genetically to think in this natural way. To understand life as a spectrum of possibilities that we must then navigate in a reasonable fashion.
The primary dichotomy of human social organisation is the balancing of competition and cooperation. Individual striving and collective identity. Both of these imperatives are good to the degree they are in a fruitful balance.
So perhaps my way of thinking is a little more complex. But not sure I have to make excuses for that.
This might be a fatal mistake in your reasoning as it is literally the naturalistic fallacy, but not even hidden, but embraced. You'd have to seriously qualify this for me to show which version of the fallacy this would be violating..
Quoting apokrisis
Deontology generally seems to work this way, yes.
Quoting apokrisis
So then, can you balance murder being wrong? You would not want murder, whether 1st or 2nd degree, surely. There is something that makes the core principle behind it a bad act, and it isn't because of a negotiation or balance. If you jump to manslaughter, that isn't murder. And surely, if someone was very negligent to cause manslaughter, you wouldn't want that either, even though that is perhaps less "blameworthy" or would be in need of a "lesser punishment". That is to say, with all these principles, whatever feels "just" in a pragmatic sense, there is a core with which you at some point say, "This should or should not happen".
Quoting apokrisis
But at this point, we are then arguing about the core principle of "Do not cause unnecessary suffering", or "Do not use people if it can be avoided". Or perhaps, "Don't allow your version of what is good violate someone else's negative ethic to not be harmed unnecessarily".
Quoting apokrisis
No, humans are deliberative creatures. You make it seem like what we choose is a foregone conclusion.
Quoting apokrisis
It just seems you are taking appeals to traditional values as THE values one should follow. Tradition is not "nature" per se, but contingent upon a bunch of choices made, which even if helped with survival, is not anything like "nature" in the sense of pure instinct. It would simply be "what takes place" making nature a rather impotent idea then.
:100: :fire:
Quoting AmadeusD
Quoting AmadeusD
Quoting AmadeusD
Quoting AmadeusD (this one I've picked, because it clearly shows me saying something stupid, but still attests to your error.
There are plenty more i recall, but I don't want to go through pages, and pages when the search function isn't picking everything up...
Quoting 180 Proof
So, in light of all the above, it is clear you're either misinformed or trolling, as these are standard AN fare. The suffering of those alive doesn't lead to any position for hte AN-er, other than to say most people already living have a rational interest in continuing to exist. For the most part, that isn't part/parcel of the AN position any given person might hold. It's an externality due to the A-symmetry argument. It seems you either reject, or don't understand it. It makes it almost impossible for an ANist to be motivated by extant human suffering because the purported results of hte view have nothing to do with those living people (except to the extent one might want to discourage procreation - but that's clearly not a motivating factor for the view). Perhaps it's just time you step away from a thread all you do is drive-by and say things that aren't quite right in lol.
Quoting apokrisis
It has literally nothing to do with what's going on in this discusison. Its a total non sequitur. 'argument' against is inapt. You are simply putting words in people's heads. Sorry to tell you, but I don't look for problems. YOu need to just accept that, or accept that you're trying to mind-read.
Quoting apokrisis
True, and completely irrelevant. The balance is in the a-symmetry, for most ANists.
Quoting apokrisis
One of those options would be preferable. This is not controversial. Non ANists do these things all the time for plenty of reasons - many, ethical (are you(not you, but rhetorically) aware you child might be missing a chromosome? Likely, you wont procreate. What's the difference there, but degree?)
Quoting apokrisis
It is almost certain you're arguing with a ghost. I've already addressed this. Certainty is not involved here. You are once again, wrong about the position and are arguing with no one
Quoting apokrisis
I don't think even you know what you're talking about now. The only relevant point I could make, though it actually isn't relevant to what you've said - is that an ANist is concerned with not causing more suffering. Nowhere in AN does it posit that there is a 100% fool-proof way to do this. If your point comes down to the infantile suggestion that we can't guarantee that sex wont result in a birth, I have no idea why you think this matters. I can't answer for the extremist, but as Weinberg put its "the risk of a life time" is the risk we're talking about. The risk of sex resulting in a birth/pregnancy is irrelevant unless you're already an ANist. So, perhaps stay on topic. It is getting really tedious having to bring you back to something sensible in every reply.
Quoting apokrisis
Hooo boy haha, there isn't a heads or tails to reply to here The bolded (whcih is the distilled claim from your POV) is absolute fucking nonsense and so the paragraph is empty. (no, I don't "not get it". You are literally talking non-sense).
Quoting apokrisis
This is one of hte stupidest claims about ethical discussion i've ever seen in my life. That's... that's cute.
Quoting apokrisis
Haven't. You just are wrong in pretty much all the meaningful ways one can be in this discussion. You literally don't understand (or care) by your own admission what's being discussed. And your replies make this extremely clear. It feels like a child at the adults table, tbh.
Quoting apokrisis
You don't understand, or apparently care about ours... Yet you're constantly making sweeping, general proclamations about it, and then saying pithy but empty nonsense like this:
Quoting apokrisis
Sorry to say, but this is the form preaching takes. The bolded doesn't actually present any sense whatsoever. It's metaphysical speculation in the most strangely uninteresting form i've seen in a while. It's impossible to know why you're doing this, but it's enough now kiddo. Either get educated (and actually give a fuck) about the subject, or post in another thread. It is utterly bizarre that you would, several exchanges ago, point out that you don't get, or care.... and continue replying. I smell some rather obvious self-loathing, or dishonesty.
Or else you have no idea what natural philosophy is - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/
The rest is just too dull to address.
Oh yes, THAT natural philosophy :roll:. This is a non-sequitur. Besides the fact that you would then have to justify Aristotle's philosophy in regards to causation as somehow "THE" metaphysical view (less interested in that debate so don't worry), this just shows your disregard for the is/ought gap if you're somehow trying to justify these ideas in some overreaching way as it applies to ethics. I'm not going to try to fill in what I think you're implying, that's your job. Even so, after your whole explanation, my guess is that is/ought gap will be violated yet again as is your wont.
Quoting apokrisis
Ah yes, just dismiss. This is one way not to engage (dodge?) the issues I raise. You haven't even explained why it's "dull", so your comment falls flat and dull. My guess is because I do not mention your entropic yadayada philosophy and shoehorning of the notion of "balance" and "two complimentary sides" to create a basis for ethics. But I already addressed that in the last post. And I think what I brought up suffices as an objection to this non-foundation that you propose. You will call it "black-and-white" thinking, but that is misconstruing what normative ethics is. Ideals can be separated out from pragmatics. You don't ditch the ideals though. And that is the crux of the debate. Are ideals the basis for normative ethics? And from there, you are most likely going to go into a relativistic aspect to it. At the least, you can go with some Hegelian "revealing" of ideals which I would entertain. But to simply be a Sophistic relativist to the extent that you seem to be will reveal our main disagreements.
Even the Hegelian ideals would be "real", even if revealed in stages, to the extent that it reveals itself over time. Slavery was seen as tragic but perhaps, a part of life in the not-to-distant past. But various beliefs and events coalesced around the idea that freedom to not be enslaved is not just pragmatic, but the ideal. The same with many ideals we cherish. So, you can justify perhaps a systems approach, but it would odd to then ditch the ideals that come about from it, and either willfully or unintentionally replace the negotiation process (as revealed over historical time) itself with the ideals that come from them.
However, at the bottom of this might not even be Hegelian idealism, but simply idealism simpliciter. Equality and fairness and non-harm and autonomy can be said to be very ancient notions competing with other things. Negative ethics battles positive ethics in various ways. Your positive ethical impulse for X might violate someone else's negative impulse to be prevented from Y. But there are times when this conflict itself doesn't simply "balance out" in an equation.
And with all this being said, we are indeed sidetracked, as AN represents a uniquely different scenario than almost any other one that happens, as everything else that happens happens AFTER someone is already born. Thus they are in "mitigation ethics". Now, indeed the ideals have to be engaged in a sort of trading of greater for lesser harms. But uniquely, prior to birth, in consideration of future people, the ideal becomes much more stark as a "Yes" or "No". Do you cause unnecessary harm? There is no one alive already for that consideration to matter for. This changes the pragmatic aspect of the ethical consideration, and indeed does move it to a more digital ideal than the usual negotiations one must play between people's positive and negative ethics. Now, indeed we are in "preventative ethics". You can uniquely prevent ALL harm, with no collateral damage to an individual.. the one in question being so harmed. And here there will be more disagreement, as you will somehow consider positive projects more important than negative harm in these considerations. Thus the ideal rears its head again, "Do you use people to the extent that you can harm them when you don't have to because you want to see X positive project play out?". And of course your answer will be in the affirmative. But then, you this is where you play 'fast and loose' with ethics to allow for such things by ditching the ideal of non-harm for some positive project, which is not justified other than circular logic whereby the whole system justifies what is done to an individual by using the very system itself as a basis, which again, is circular logic.
This question addresses the subject of moral concern: actually living, present persons, n o t possible, future persons (which is AN's category mistake).
AN's "asymmetry argument" is based on a misconception of ethics ... which your trolling is too lazy to pick-up on or too disingenuous to acknowledge my references elsewhere in this thread (as well as on @schophenhauer1's other "AN" threads), so STFU, STFD and maybe you'll learn something, kid.
I think AN can only be understood as a social tactic to justify ineffectuality. One is a victim of life itself and so can't be held responsible for ... anything.
The choice to have children is a big responsibility. So let's reframe that as a fundamental ground of victimhood. The original sin of society and its large collection of consequent responsibilities. All that must follow from being born.
Dude, your point is not valid. Buck up buttercup. Future people can be considered. Its just how things work. If a future person could exist, they could suffer.
Quoting 180 Proof
:lol: clearly triggered. If you see trolling, look in the mirror. All your posts are drive by troll posts. Ive never seen you make an attempt at civil dialogue. Toxic AF :mask: :death:!
keep avoiding my arguments for a straw man argument no one made.
Its here if you need it:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/928608
My sense is similar, namely that anti-natalism is a kind of second-order malady rather than a first-order thesis. It seems to stand on the circumstantial situation of the proponent rather than on its own intellectual legs, and my guess is that anyone who holds it on purely intellectual grounds could be dissuaded in time. It's hard to understand it any other way when the arguments are not sufficient to justify the conclusion, nor the tenacity with which the conclusion is held.
I think this would be one man's assertion without intellectual "legs" to refute it. You say that AN isn't intellectual but a symptom of a diseased mind or whatnot, but then anyone can believe anything they want. I provide my justification. Where's yours?
You have proved yourself incapable of reading a simple response. AS always, proving you're not a serious person. It gets easier and easier. Maybe if you stopped behaving in a way that squarely fits th definition of trolling, you'd say something sensible.
Quoting Leontiskos
Why not just admit you don't get it? That's what all of what you've put forward in this thread amounts to. As those who hold the view attest, consistently.
@schopenhauer1 would seem proof this ain't so. :grin:
You say this kind of thing so much that it has no bite. You can't seem to decide whether to love everyone or hate everyone. And all your accusations seem better fitted to describing your own behaviour.
Why not just chill and enjoy the friction of lively debate? Let the quality of your arguments be your testament. It is not as if anyone can win or lose in an internet forum where no one is really invested in the outcomes or any independent party keeping score.
Presumably where I left them, and whatever other threads you were then drawing anti-natalism into.
I do.
Quoting apokrisis
We often turn to shoot the messenger, don't we :)
Quoting apokrisis
For sure. Which is why I woulkd ask again: Given you're (by your own admission) not understanding, or caring about what this thread is about - how come you're here laying out post after post of stuff that doesn't seem properly on topic? Surely it would make more sense to spend your time elsewhere on this forum?
Quoting apokrisis
Neither. I don't know any of you. As a general disposition, Love is far closer to the mark though. I certainly enjoy my time here, and most interactions I have.
Yes, but it should go without saying that schopenhauer1 is the exception to that claim. :grin:
I enjoyed your recent posts, beginning on page 32. I suspect schopenhauer1 regrets pulling you into the thread.
Schop keeps requesting my presence. No matter how many years its been. It seems to energise him judging by the caps lock shouting.
(And this thread wasnt even about antinatalism.)
Quoting Leontiskos
He loves it. It feels like old times. :grin:
I'm not an antinatalist, but x has to exist before it can suffer.
That you made a mistake
Well assuming that autism is an essential feature of 'who you are', it might be possible that autism is not a cause of suffering in an afterlife, eternal or not. Not sure why you think it is necessarily bad, unless you think that the 'future life' will be very similar to this life (as I said before, I think that an eternal 'earthly life 2.0' would be bad for everyone, not only for some people)
I'd recommend avoiding such stereotyping, unless your goal is to be seen as an insensitive douche bag, in which case :up:
I see... Again, fair enough lol. No idea about your history
Quoting wonderer1
I thought it was really funny. I'd recommend he keep making jokes.
I'm not much inclined to use the word "essential" because of the amount of baggage that tends to come with it.
"Autism" is an apt word for describing an aspect of my particular biological nature. Evidence suggests that (from a certain perspective) it looks something like:
Given I've read relatively few posts from you, I don't suppose that image means much to you. However someone who has put some thought into how information processing occurs in neural networks, might recognize that image as pointing towards some substantial differences in thought for the possessors of those different brains.
Now I'm certainly 'less autistic' than Temple Grandin. I can pass as normal enough, and have even had to deal with skepticism towards the idea that I'm ASD on the part of people who know me well. Still, I know what Grandin means, although the social effects have been less profound for me than for her.
Anyway, I know I'm getting longwinded. I feel that since I'm on the autism spectrum and can speak out about it, I should do so in the hopes of greater understanding for people less or unable to talk about it.
Getting back to speculating about an afterlife...
Are we imagining a situation where social interaction between people plays a prominent role? If so, what reason would there be to not expect autistic people in this afterlife to experience a painful sense of being an outsider? How do you imagine things being different?
Well thanks for the interesting info, actually. Anyway as a personal note, I was strongly suspected to be autistic when I was a young kid but I wasn't formally diagnosed (...it's a long story. I am not really interested to getting diagnosed nowadays, although for a 'self-understanding' it would be cool,but for adults the diangostic process is demanding.). BTW, I actually believe that studying the brain can be insightful to understanding our minds. I do not accept physicalism, though.
Quoting wonderer1
FWIW, I also related very strongly with the 'anthropologist on Mars' analogy. I do feel 'estranged', 'out of synch' with others etc. So, I think I can 'get' the feeling (although this 'alienation' can be caused by other factors). I also do 'appear normal' but I do certiainly live in an 'atypical' way, so to speak. I also notice that I 'socialize' in an atypical way etc.
I did in the past read info about autism, took some tests (and actually got scores compatible with autism).
As I said, however, other reasons can explain that and I am not formally diagnosed...
Quoting wonderer1
Well, actually, I only hope that it will be 'good' (and BTW, I am agnostic about that). But even despite my own social difficulties, I recognize that some of the best moments in my life have been when I interacted with people (either online or IRL) and I do have a deep yearning for be part of a comunity (despite often seeking solitude because, well, company is overwhelming, and what seems natural for me is alien for others and viceversa. This 'disagreement' is actually exhausting and can be painful). So, I believe that discomfort/suffering that one can feel due to social interaction is due to contingent causes.
Hence, I believe that if the afterlife will involve a 'communal life' of some sorts this doens't imply that people who have social difficulties right now will suffer.
I've actually been through testing twice. Once in my mid twenties, after having a physicalist epiphany that lead to me thinking I should have myself tested for learning disabilitites. I brought up social issues with the person conducting the testing, but his response was, "I think that is just your style." I don't think knowledge of Asperger's or high functioning autism was very widespread in the US yet.
The second time was in my late forties after my wife recognized that a diagnosis of Aperger's made sense and I (somewhat reluctantly) came to agree with her.
The first round of testing, even without a very informative diagnosis, was very beneficial for me. The way I saw it then, is that I had been going through life walking into glass walls that everyone else seemed to walk right through. As a result of the testing I was able to get at least a sense of where the glass walls were, and develop work arounds. So I'm inclined to recommend getting the testing, despite it taking some substantial time, and possibly money.
Quoting boundless
I know what you mean about communities. I tend to fade into the background (aside from the occasional smart ass remark) in real life groups. Internet forums, going back to Usenet newsgroups, have been very valuable to me because I can interact at a pace better suited to me. (Although even in internet forums I can often get involved in more discussions than I can really keep up with.)
I was telling a friend very recently how reading the book The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace has played a role in my somewhat unorthodox forum behavior. I call it practicing grumpy zebra style center's mind. :wink:
It's been very nice to meet you.
Thank you very much for sharing and for the advice. I am not american but italian BTW, and here it seems that is generally assumed by the general population that 'autism' is always a very, very serious condition. Even 'Asperger's' is seen as something that must be 'self evident' (at least in hindsight) and 'serious'. Forms of autism that are 'not obvious' seem an impossibility.
Of course, this is different for therapists, neurodiversity movements and so on. I think that here we are '10 years behind' the US, so to speak.
Quoting wonderer1
Curiously enough, I manage to both 'fade away' in 'real life' and be very talkative, sociable, humorous and so on. But even when I am talkative/sociable/humorous I still feel 'out of synch' and in fact I do not do that in a 'ordinary' way so to speak.
Regarding online discussions, yeah, I find generally easier to speak about my interests and make discussions online and I too risk sometimes to spend too much time in them. This is due to both shyness and, so to speak, a lack of motivation to speak about my interests if I am not sure that the other person shares them.
Quoting wonderer1
Thanks!
Quoting wonderer1
Thank you very much. The same goes for me.
I appreciate your response. I'm kind of in a dark place right now, and I'm not sure when I'll have the equanimity that I want to have in responding to you, but I will get back to you.
I don't think things are so different in the US, although for some time now there has been ongoing effort in the US to communicate that there is an autism "spectrum".
Thinking about this prompted me to take a look at the Wikipedia page for Hans Asperger. Not a very flattering picture. I wonder if Hans Asperger's association with Nazism and eugenics impeded the propagation of his insights.
Quoting boundless
I'd be very interested in hearing more, if you are comfortable elaborating.
I know for me there are confounding factors, resulting from being more intellectually inclined than many people I'm around, and having a reticence towards letting people see that aspect of me because of early experience with it being alienating to do so. One thing I like about TPF is that I feel comfortable here using whatever vocabulary comes to mind, rather than feeling like I need to consider whether the person I am talking to will see me as ostentatious if I am not circumspect in my use of language.
I guess I say this to point out that there may be psychological and/or neuropsychological issues involved, and it may not be easy to disentangle them.
Quoting boundless
I can very much relate to this.
Quoting boundless
I'm still experiencing occasional PTSD 'aftershocks', but I am much better now. I can't think of anything that has come along so 'out of the blue' and triggered a reaction in me the way that self defense thread did.
Well, I sort of agree with that: the difference is not so great, but IMO there is. Anyway, I don't think that Italy is 'late' because of some pecularity of my country. Actually, I think that the main problem is linguistic. Scientific research (included the one in 'neurodivergence') is all written in English. There is simply much more information in the 'anglosphere' than in other areas.
Quoting wonderer1
Yeah, agreed!
Quoting wonderer1
The way I socialize and my sense of humor are just very peculiar. They are generally appreciated and I am considered somewhat 'original'. This originality is both something spontaneous and an ironic result of my attempt to try to 'fit in' and being more like others. Consciously monitoring my behaviors, thinking about 'what I should say' to be friendly/entertain etc has the result of me being seen as 'original', weird in a positive sense, I would guess (note that I do all of that in a somewhat automatic way, I have an instict to do that...). I don't consider it a negative trait, of course it has its 'perks', but is not something that renders social relations really satisfying.
I can have friendships, having a very good time with others but the a nagging sense of 'alienation' is still present, like say if I belonged to somewhere else. There is a difference in how I communicate, what I consider natural/obvious and so on.
Well, if you want I can share something more 'personal' in PM, if you are interested.
Quoting wonderer1
I fully agree with this. How much I would like that 'real life' is like this forum, lol...
Quoting wonderer1
I see, I am sorry for that, it must be very difficult to handle.
Quoting 180 Proof
... a quick summary of a dark pandeism¹ (e.g. contra 'Spinoza's God') rather than mere bourgeois 'pessimism' (A. Schopenhauer) or ascetic 'nihilism' (Kitar? Nishida, Keiji Nishitani).
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/718054 [1]