The Principle of Double Effect
I have changed my mind about the Principle of Double Effect (or PDE for short), which I owe mainly to @Leontiskos, and now accept a form of it. The version of PDE that I accept is that it is permitted to bring about a bad effect in the case that:
1. The action in-itself is good;
2. A good effect is foreseen from that action;
3. The foreseen bad effect is not directly intended (from that action);
4. The good effect cannot be brought about without the bad effect;
5. The alternative means for producing that good effect also cannot be used without bad effects;
6. The bad effect for the means chosen is less severe than or on a par with the alternative bad effects from the alternative means (consequentially); and
EDIT: 7. The good effect significantly outweighs the bad effect.
Although directly intending something bad for the sake of something good is always immoral, it is not so apparent that it is always immoral to indirectly intending something bad which is not for the sake ofbut a rather bad side effect ofsomething good. Sometimes it is less respectful of human life, in the case that one has to choose between bad side effects, to let something bad happen than to do something good (viz., than to avoid that bad effect by way of an action) which has a bad side effect.
A good example is a tactical bomber: anyone planning on bombing an enemys military base can foresee, as a statistical certainty, that they will kill at least one innocent human being, but refusing to bomb the said base (and presumably all others like it) will have worse side effects than the bad side effect of killing that innocent person; and so, when comparing bad side effects of each possible action or inaction one could take, it seems better to go with the least bad side effect.
This version of the PDE gives an astute account of many ethical dilemmas, and I will go through just a couple of them for now.
1 vs. 5 Trolley Problem
The morally relevant difference between throwing some bystander onto the tracks to save the five and pulling the lever (thereby killing one person) to save the five is that:
1. The former scenario uses an innocent person as a means to save the five, thereby making the killing directly intentional and (thereby) immoral; whereas
2. The latter scenario uses the lever as a means to saving the five but that means has a side effect of killing the one, thereby making the killing indirectly intentional.
In the case of the latter, it is morally permissible [s]and obligatory[/s] to pull the lever because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either the deaths of five or the killing of one) and the bad side effect of pulling the lever is consequentially less severe than the bad side effect of not pulling it.
Traditional Abortion vs. Hysterectomy
The morally relevant difference between killing an unborn human being to be rid of an unwanted pregnancy and killing an unborn human being by performing a hysterectomy to save the mother from cancer is that:
1. The former scenario uses an innocent person as a means to bring about the desired end (of not being pregnant), thereby making the killing directly intentional and (thereby) immoral; whereas
2. The latter scenario uses the hysterectomy as a means to saving the mothers life from cancer and doing so has a bad side effect of killing an unborn human being, thereby making the said killing indirectly intended.
The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer.
Thoughts?
1. The action in-itself is good;
2. A good effect is foreseen from that action;
3. The foreseen bad effect is not directly intended (from that action);
4. The good effect cannot be brought about without the bad effect;
5. The alternative means for producing that good effect also cannot be used without bad effects;
6. The bad effect for the means chosen is less severe than or on a par with the alternative bad effects from the alternative means (consequentially); and
EDIT: 7. The good effect significantly outweighs the bad effect.
Although directly intending something bad for the sake of something good is always immoral, it is not so apparent that it is always immoral to indirectly intending something bad which is not for the sake ofbut a rather bad side effect ofsomething good. Sometimes it is less respectful of human life, in the case that one has to choose between bad side effects, to let something bad happen than to do something good (viz., than to avoid that bad effect by way of an action) which has a bad side effect.
A good example is a tactical bomber: anyone planning on bombing an enemys military base can foresee, as a statistical certainty, that they will kill at least one innocent human being, but refusing to bomb the said base (and presumably all others like it) will have worse side effects than the bad side effect of killing that innocent person; and so, when comparing bad side effects of each possible action or inaction one could take, it seems better to go with the least bad side effect.
This version of the PDE gives an astute account of many ethical dilemmas, and I will go through just a couple of them for now.
1 vs. 5 Trolley Problem
The morally relevant difference between throwing some bystander onto the tracks to save the five and pulling the lever (thereby killing one person) to save the five is that:
1. The former scenario uses an innocent person as a means to save the five, thereby making the killing directly intentional and (thereby) immoral; whereas
2. The latter scenario uses the lever as a means to saving the five but that means has a side effect of killing the one, thereby making the killing indirectly intentional.
In the case of the latter, it is morally permissible [s]and obligatory[/s] to pull the lever because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either the deaths of five or the killing of one) and the bad side effect of pulling the lever is consequentially less severe than the bad side effect of not pulling it.
Traditional Abortion vs. Hysterectomy
The morally relevant difference between killing an unborn human being to be rid of an unwanted pregnancy and killing an unborn human being by performing a hysterectomy to save the mother from cancer is that:
1. The former scenario uses an innocent person as a means to bring about the desired end (of not being pregnant), thereby making the killing directly intentional and (thereby) immoral; whereas
2. The latter scenario uses the hysterectomy as a means to saving the mothers life from cancer and doing so has a bad side effect of killing an unborn human being, thereby making the said killing indirectly intended.
The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer.
Thoughts?
Comments (93)
I am glad to see that you have revised your position on this. Truth be told, PDE is an unwieldy principle. There are cases (such as the hysterectomy) where it seems to obviously apply, but it has often been noted that in other cases the principle can be easily abused. Our topsy-turvy discussion in the other thread got at some of the nuance involved.
Two simple points regarding that nuance:
Quoting Bob Ross
In the other thread I ended up in the end saying that it is not permissible to pull the lever, but I think it is uncontroversial the PDE does not make it obligatory to pull the lever. Thus:
Quoting Bob Ross
The key here is that the PDE does not apply to omissions, and this is because omissions (non-acts) do not have proper effects. So I would say that you have two principles operating: the PDE which renders the act permissible, and another principle regarding omissions which renders the act obligatory.
In the other thread you were quite adamant to distinguish commissions from omissions, and you got a lot of pushback. I never actually opposed that distinction, but I put it off as a separate topic. What I would say is that there is a morally relevant difference between a commission and an omission, but this does not mean that we are never responsible for omissions, or that omissions are always permissible.
Classically speaking, you misstate the proportionalist/consequentialist condition of PDE:
Quoting Bob Ross
The proportionalist condition classically compares the good effect(s) to the bad effect(s) of the single action, not the effects of different actions. For example, in the case of the tactical bombing the circumstances will determine the proportion of good effects to bad effects, and if the bad effects are significantly greater than the good effects then the bombing should not be done, even if the other conditions are met.
This second principle you are utilizing is distinct from double effect, and involves a comparison between multiple acts or between positive acts and omissions. Double effect is more restricted, and has nothing in particular to say about that. It is only about the moral permissibility of an act which has more than one effect, some of which are undesirable.
gave six different conditions and only one of them is consequence-based. For the consequentialist good consequences are sufficient to justify an act. For the PDE good consequences are necessary but not sufficient for the justification of an act.
Which still leaves me asking what this thread is about? Consequentialism is necessarily entangled with utilitarianism, they do not exist in a separate voids.
It's much more complex than that. If anything, it's Catholic...
Not a strong recommendation in my opinion.
That is impressive in itself - intellectual honesty on display. Cudos to you, brother Bob.
And the dialogue between you and Leontiskos has been very instructive.
I agree that the PDE is instructive of good morality when making certain decisions. But I also think one needs to be rigorous when essentially justifying bad effects. Its a real tightrope with real pitfalls.
I like the pilot problem (to crash where less people are or not) or the car crash problem (4 or 2 must die) better than the trolley problem to think through the PDE.
For the trolley fiasco, I still think it is ridiculous to suspend the rest of the context and hand the lever or the seat over to someone on the trolley and ask them what is the right thing to do.
My inclination is that, without some context the choice of tracks cannot be made morally - neither is the right move. You need context, like for instance, the trolley driver passsd out, you happen to already know how to drive a trolley so you take control, which basically puts you in the same seat as the car driver and the pilot. NOW you see 5 people on one track and 1 on the other and can be asked - what would you do? Thats enough to ask a question like this. Because without the context, you have to decide to take any control and responsibility for any outcome by becoming a trolley driver. You have to instantly become a trolley driver and choose who dies all at once. Thats dumb. Like being pushed out of an airplane with 5 other people and four parachutes, with no prior experience and being told its all up to you who lives and you have to be one of the people who lives. Just ridiculous, and if that situation actually arose I would never blame any of the falling people for any outcome. Too surreal to inform a question of morality.
If I was magically placed near the helm of an out of control trolley and saw all of these people on the tracks, the moral decision is to yell who is driving this trolley - what is supposed to be done - what do you want me to do! And with no answer, besides a moral dilemma (you get to decide by pulling that lever or not), why would anyone have a duty to make any decision on that trolley? The trolley problem is too unrealistic and so presents an unfair question. Its like a trick question where the answer should be I wouldnt do either, which although it has the effect of not pulling the lever is not my intended outcome.
So maybe the PDE sneaks in as a justification for choosing not to participate in the trolley problem. You arent morally responsible for choosing to let 5 people die or choosing to kill 1 person, you are morally responsible for choosing not to take on a duty to make any decision given those facts, and the bad effect of 5 people dying is not intended by you. The right thing to do is say I reject this demand which up until I was asked belonged specifically to the trolley driver and what the hell is with all of the people on the tracks - is that normal for trolley drivers?? The outcome is bad effects either way, but none are the intention of your decision to reject that there is any sense at all to asking you to jump up and grab the lever and decide any next steps.
So I dont pull the lever not because it commits an act of killing one, and I dont think pulling the lever is justified by PDE either. But the act of rejecting such a crazy scenario that results in 5 people dying, may be justified by the PDE.
I dont know. I may never take a trolley ride. Because if I do, it seems I might have a duty first to learn the controls and levers, and learn how to manage foot traffic on the tracks in case of emergency - because I like being moral.
Good conversation.
Curious if Im still way off in either of your estimations.
The nuances of specific situations make such decisions difficult to measure against each other for obvious reasons, but the underlying principle is pretty straight forward.
This is why I was puzzled how anyone can 'change their mind' about this. It is like saying I have changed my mind about hedonism being about pursuing pleasure. It is doesn't matter. That is true, so your opposing opinion on the matter is irrelevant - there is no 'mind changing' only agree or disagreement with the principle.
It was nurtured in a Catholic context, but that is true of more philosophical concepts than you would care to know. The principle is common parlance in bioethics and has arguably always been part of medical ethics. The seeds of the principle are traced back to Aquinas, but he doesn't take himself to be stating anything novel:
Quoting Aquinas, ST II-II.64.7: Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?
Regarding the common use in medicine, see for example:
The principle of double effect points to where intention exists. In one single act, having multiple effects, intention can lie in all, or only one, or some of those effects. Intention draws a direct line from a precise agent to his/her specifically intended effects, and that line may not exist in all of the effects that exist.
Within my formulation, I think it would be obligatory; because, as you noted, my version compares the bad side effects of each foreseeable means (towards the end) and not just the good effect (of that end) and the bad side effect being considered (of an action).
I agree that there is a morally relevant difference between omissions and commissions; but, for me, it is when considering doing something directly intentional bad vs. directly intentionally letting something bad happen. In the cases I expounded in the OP, it is about doing something directly intentionally good with a bad side effect vs. directly intentionally lettings something bad happen.
E.g., the driver that swerves to save the two at the expense of the other two, instead of killing all four, is choosing to directly intentionally save the two with a bad side effect of killing the other two; whereas if they chose to do nothing and kill all four they are directly intentionally respecting the two with a bad side effect of killing all four. In both cases, they are intending something good but both have bad side effects; so the less severe one should be chosen. On the contrary, a person that refuses to kidnap and harvest the organs of one person to save five ill patients which results in the five patients dying, is letting the five die because they cannot directly intend something bad (like using the one as a means to save them).
Agreed; but I think, now that I have refined my understanding of an intention, my distinction only applies to direct intentions.
Yes, I agree. I just see that as a weakness in the classical formulation: it is completely silent on if one should pick the means with the least severe bad effects, and instead only comments on whether the bad effect does not outweight the good effect. Both are arguably important.
You too, brother. It is always a joy conversing with you (:
Very true, indeed; and this is why I had to be more specific with my PDE in the OP than the classical definition.
To a certain extent I agree; but I would say that one, as I am understanding it, should pull the lever because:
1. They have two options: let the five die to directly intentionally respect the life of the one or kill the one to directly intentionally save the five;
2. Either option is an action or inaction which is a result of directly intending something good but is accompanied by a bad side effect;
3. The option with the least bad side effect, in the instance that they all have bad side effects, should be taken; and
4. The killing of the one is less severe of a bad side effect than the deaths of the five (all else being equal).
So pulling the lever is obligatory; because I make no distinction between the inaction and action in #2. Now, perhaps it is relevant and I am missing something.
I only see omissions as a morally permissible when one can only directly intend something bad by performing an action; and so any other case one is equally morally responsible for the results of their inactions.
Why not? What are your thoughts, Banno?
That's fine, but what you're describing is not the principle of double effect. The principle of double effect never obliges, because it determines whether an act with a bad effect is permissible. You are giving a principle which tells us what to do given two or more legitimate choices, and this is not the principle of double effect.
Quoting Bob Ross
I will continue to call this the second principle (as opposed to the principle of double effect). This second principle of yours is more straightforwardly consequentialist than the principle of double effect, and @I like sushi's comments make more sense in light of this.
Quoting Bob Ross
They are two different questions. Suppose you are going golfing and you take a club to the golf pro, and ask him if the club is fit for use. This is the first question. Then you go on to show him a second club, and you ask him which of the two clubs should be preferred. This is the second question. Answering the first question does not answer the second question, and an answer to the second question is not the same as an answer to the first question. It is not the job of PDE to compare acts one to another, or to determine whether something is obligatory. To call this a "weakness" of the PDE would be like calling it a weakness that a rake cannot cut down trees. It was never meant to cut down trees. A rake is not an axe.
-
Edit:
The frame of your definition is correct:
Quoting Bob Ross
I.e. "It is permissible to bring about a bad effect if..." Note that, by your own words, the matter is not one of positive obligations or of choosing between acts. If your version of PDE tells us what is permissible then it does not tell us what is positively obligatory, for what we are permitted to do is not the same as what we are obliged to do.
Foot points out that It is not always rational to give help where it is needed, to keep a promise, or even always to speak the truth
Which to my eye serves to somewhat undermine deontology as a feasible approach to ethics.
The problems with taking Catholic Doctrine as worthy of taking into account in one's ethic considerations have become fairly explicit in the last few decades.
My present inclination is to "reject the demand that moral actions fit with a preconceived notion of practical rationality" - SEP
It's just more complex than that. Hence, again, doing ethics might better be seen as seeking growth rather than seeking rules to govern our behaviour.
The problem with "dreaming up convolute circumstances" is that the contrivance that has been dreamed up is superficial. Moral principles pertain to human life, and those who are playing games by dreaming up artificial scenarios are not involved in human life.
In real life we are made to go beyond daydreaming. If, say, conjoined twins are sharing an organ that cannot support them both, then you're bound to think about the principle of double effect whether you want to or not, and no moral platitude or genetic fallacy regarding Catholicism will help you in that case.
This could be used to justify knowingly causing preventable harm. 4, 5, and 6 presuppose omniscience of all means capable of bringing about the desired 'good' effect.
And the formulation of the PDE was occasioned by encountering new problems. The PDE is a result of that encounter.
Quoting Banno
Do you mean algorithmic, or rational? Presumably when we encounter a novel problem we may need to formulate new principles, because if we make unprincipled decisions then we are not being rational. It is not so easy to roll one's eyes at principles without also rolling one's eyes at rationality. One can think about morality too algorithmically, but one cannot think about morality without principles.
Algorithmic. Following an explicit rule.
Or principle.
Quoting Leontiskos
Buridan's Ass will die unless it makes an arbitrary decision. So sometimes it is rational to make arbitrary choices.
Quoting Leontiskos
Why not instead think about morality in terms of values?
But is eating arbitrary? When we decide to finally stop deliberating and make a decision our decision is not arbitrary, even if certain aspects of it are underdetermined. The way you and other's assess Buridan's Ass involves a rather odd way of specifying the act, as if the act lay in choosing this rather than that, instead of simply choosing to eat. Technically speaking we should say that the choice lies in eating, and that it is an open question whether choosing this side rather than that side is even a choice or a deliberation at all.
Quoting Banno
In that case one must still provide principles for the interaction of those values.
Quoting Leontiskos
Demonstrate why, rather than values being needed in order to choose between conflicting principles...
For Aristotle you would be misusing the word "decision." Here is what Aquinas says:
Quoting Aquinas, ST I-II.13 - Article 6. Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?
Presumably then we could opt for one side on the basis of chance or a mental coin flip, seeing that we are hungry and both sides are equally capable of satisfying our hunger. There is no proper decision because our opting is not the consequence of deliberation.
"Why did you choose the left side?" "Because I was hungry and wanted to eat." "But why did you pick the left side rather than the right side?" "For no particular reasononly because the coin showed 'tails'."
Indeed. No "principle" led to choosing this trough and not the other.
And thus you falsely conclude that we require no principles to make decisions, because you think a coin-toss is a decision.
No principle can be used by Buridan's Ass to choose which trough to go to. Yet it would be irrational not to make the choice. Therefore it is sometimes rational to make choices that are not governed by principle.
Upon thinking about it more, I updated the OP: now it resembles the traditional PDE.
Couple updates to note:
1. My PDE no longer mandates anything as obligatory, as I was thinking of when there is no action or inaction one could take which didnt have a bad side effectand that is a separate question from whether or not it is permissible to do good sometimes when there will be a bad effect;
2. My PDE accounts for the comparison of the good effect and the bad effect (of the currently selected means of achieving the former): this is an essential aspect that my PDE was completely missing; and
3. My PDE still finds comparing the alternative means (towards the end) necessary (because if there is a means that has no bad side effect to bring about the same good, then that is the best option even if the good effect significantly outweighs the bad effect of the currently selected means) but it does not obligate anyone either way; and
4. The good effect must significantly, as opposed to merely, outweigh the bad effectotherwise, it resembles too closely (although it is not) directly intentionally doing something bad as a means towards a good end (e.g., if there are two sick people and there is a means which could cure the one but kill the other, then it seems immoral to use that means).
Number 4 gets me into dicey waters, because I am uncertain if I can still hold my expounded position on the hysterectomy: is saving the mother of cancer significantly outweigh the death of an unborn child? I am not sure.
I am not a deontologist either; so I can appreciate that. By the principle of PDE, I am referring to a generally applicable moral principle. There might be a situation where I would oppose using it, even as I depicted it; but it seems to work well in most controversial situations, and I certainly am not about to become a straight up particularlist about morals (;
That's fair: I meant to depict the foreseeable effects, and not all of them.
CC: @Herg
I see a mention was made in this discussion board (OP) by Herg, but when I visit the link it says "not found": https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/915150 . Did a moderator remove it?
I think you just need to think a bit harder about what it means to make a choice. You can of course think of a choice as whimsical opting for no reason, but that is not how we usually use the word. Regardless, your argument seems rather silly,
Quoting Leontiskos
Whether or not we want to say that you are equivocating on 'choice', your inference is not at all plausible.
This question is reminiscent of the age-old question about the number of the stars:
Very good. It now seems much better to me. :up:
Quoting Bob Ross
Good point.
Quoting Bob Ross
This is the sort of ambiguity that seems to always follow the PDE, namely cases which are hard to decide. So this is in line with the tradition of the PDE, and I think it is good to recognize such limitations.
Are you arguing that rationality consists in following rules?
Maybe for entertainment, as a somewhat different perspective on this matter: Most of our volitions as conscious beingsthough willed freely, here in the strict sense of there being no obstruction to our consciously willing, else intending, as we doare nevertheless not deliberative. Here, we as conscious agents effortlessly inhere into, or else with, the volition of our unconscious mindresulting in a unified volition/will relative to the total mind concerned. This often acquired, i.e. learned, and habitual means of acting and reacting to stimuli then makes our typical behaviors quite functional in their efficacy: e.g., we dont deliberate between alternatives on how to move our fingers, wrist, etc. when reflexively catching a ball that was thrown to usbut our so catching it will have nevertheless been freely willed/intended (hence, with disappointment resulting were our will/intention to catch the ball to not be fulfilled as willed/intended).
It is only when our unconscious mind is torn between different possible intents that we as conscious agents consciously experience alternatives (brought up to consciousness from our unconscious processes of mind), alternatives between which we as conscious agents then in one way or another choose via deliberation (this being the process of weighting two or more alternatives possible benefits and costs and then determining that one ought proceed with one alternative at expense of all others).
With the Buridans Ass thought experiment, one will typically in no way deliberate between which side to move toward but, instead, will effortlessly inhere into (or with) the subliminal volitions of ones unconscious mindwhose reasonings for so determining to go either leftward or rightward (here granting that ones unconscious mind is not of itself utterly irrational in its activities) will be beyond the purview of ones conscious awareness.
Yet, were we to at any point actively deliberate between two alternatives which we at a conscious level appraise to be of equal value to our longer-term intent, Ill venture that there will yet occur subliminal appraisals and reasons which the unconscious aspects of our total mind engages in that will tip the scale of the given deliberation. For example, maybe one side holds a background of sky and clouds (which we do not consciously appraise) that seems more inviting and hence auspicious than the other. In effect re-taking the choice from the conscious being (who finds no preference for either alternative being selected) back to the unconscious mindwhose volitions the conscious being once again effortlessly inheres with.
While clarifying and justifying all this would take a considerable amount of time and effort, Ill simply affirm that in real life no human (or lesser animal for that matter) ever dies of hunger or thirst from an indecision between alternatives which seem to be of equal worth or import. And I find the perspective just offered to be reasonable enough as-is in providing an explanation for why this is.
Here, then, all reasoningbe it conscious or else unconsciouswill yet be principled by, at the very least, the laws of thought: hence "following the rules/laws of thought". However,again, many if not most of our voluntary behaviors will not be deliberated upon at a conscious level of awareness. As regards at least some of these latter, our rational justifications for performing these, again, nondeliberative yet freely/unobstructed-ly willed behaviors will be both post hoc and ad hocwhich doesnt necessitate that the explanations we then provide will be wrong but does allow for false conclusions to occur. E.g., a person is hypnotized to not sit down on a chair and, when asked why they dont take a seat, provides a justification that seems rational but has nothing to do with the facts of the matter.
I acknowledge that the philosophy of mind is very complex and that this perspective only skims the surface. Still, to sum up this partial perspective in a few words: the vast majority of our voluntary behaviorsfor which we yet typically hold direct responsibility for on grounds of being that which we willed/intendedare not deliberated upon at a conscious level, such that the selecting of one alternative between two alternatives that to us conscious agents appear of equal value will, most often, not be consciously made.
p.s. This, acknowledgedly incomplete, perspective in many ways accommodates what can be termed a bundle-theory of mind or, maybe more directly, of volition taking into account both conscious and non-conscious aspects of a total mind. And this without in any way dismissing the possibility of metaphysical (i.e., libertarian) free will pertaining to us conscious agents whenever we do consciously deliberate between alternatives (hence, a free will wherein we as conscious agents solely determine the effect of the alternative which we choose, such that we as conscious agents are in practice metaphysically free to choose differently than what we will end up choosing ... but then this same libertarian free will could also be conceptually extended to the sometimes disparate volitions of one's unconscious mind, volitions with which one as conscious agent/will most often effortlessly unifies sans any conscious deliberations).
At any rate, all this being one way to address the paradox presented in the Buridan's Ass thought experiment.
This no more than I or you are consciously deliberating on which words to use in our expressing ourselves most of the time. Our conscious choice most of the time being strictly limited to whether or not we ought to express those concepts which we hold in mind. Nevertheless, the specific words we use (and their placement, etc.) still being chosen by us as total beings, this subconsciously.
A direct intention is anything which is a part of the directional flow of what is aimed at (as the end); whereas indirect intention is anything which is still aimed at (for the sake of the end) but not a part of that directional flow towards the end.
I would suggest reading through this thread and specifically the exchange between @Leontiskos and I.
A good diagram for explaining this is Leontisko's V vs. 7; and a good example is how the one dying, by way of pulling the lever, in the trolley dilemma (to save the five) is a side effect which is not a part of the directional flow of the aim towards the end, which can be evidently seen by removing the one sacrificed person from the hypothetical and still seeing that that direct flow towards the end (of saving the five) is untainted. The killing of the one is still intended because it is foreseen and aimed at (insofar as it is a foreseen effect of using the means of saving the five), but is not intended in the same manner as using the lever (i.e., means) to save the five (nor is it intended in the same manner as kidnapping and harvesting the organs of a healthy person to save five sick people).
I don't necessarily disagree with your analysis, though it bears noting that humans are pretty well versed in decision making while weighing relative personal risks. Though human perception of risks are often skewed. Similarly, substituting societal benefits and risks for personal ones is not much of a stretch.
Part of the problem with the traditional trolley problem is that it assumes (which is reasonable in a Thought Experiment) that there is a completely accurate prediction of various outcomes.
As to the abortion example, your comments make the (common) error of omitting the immorality of trampling the bodily autonomy of an adult human should abortion be outlawed.
Quoting LuckyR
I didn't follow this part: what do you mean by that?
I am saying that a choice or a decision only properly exists when it is a consequence of deliberation or ratiocination.
More generally, I am saying that the argument I am attributing to you fails,
Buridan's ass always strikes me as a bit off given that we are almost always concerned with rational agents in these sorts of discussions, not donkeys. I am saying that in such a situation a rational being is capable of flipping a coin, either literally or metaphorically, and that they are so able to opt without ratiocination does not prove that choices do not involve ratiocination. Strictly speaking I would not call such a thing a choice, but if it is a choice it is a meager shadow of what we usually mean by the word 'choice'. The argument which uses this idea to make a generalization about choices or decisions surely does not hold.
As for 's point, for me it is not a matter of conscious deliberation. Suppose grandma asks me to pick one of two cookies that she offers, and they appear to me identical. I enter into deliberation or ratiocination for a number of seconds, trying to decide. In the end there is nothing to decide given that there is nothing to differentiate the two. I say, "Grandma, I can see no difference. Give me whichever one you like." I am letting grandma flip the coin in this case, but whatever form the coin flip takes, it is not a consequence of deliberation. The deliberation had no effect on the outcome (except perhaps in an indirect way, by failing as an exercise of deliberation).
To use an example I have given before, suppose I am driving and I quickly swerve when a deer darts out in front of my car. Was I involved in deliberation or ratiocination? For the Thomistic school of Aristotelianism, I surely was. Perhaps it was not conscious, but there was deliberation and the discursivity of the rational intellect. It was "quick thinking," perhaps a kind of rationality infused into my driving habits. In this case a choice or decision was truly made, and this is different from the case of the cookie because in the case of the deer there is legitimate matter for the rational intellect to fasten and work on, albeit quickly. In the case of the cookie there is ample time but insufficient material for a true decision to be taken. So the question is not so much one of whether there is time for reflection or self-conscious mental activity occurring. Bona fide choices or decisions do not require such things, even though it is often helpful to have them.
The word "abortion" is for ideologues what a squirrel is for dogs. When they see the word they forget themselves immediately and are compelled to make a pro-choice argument. It cannot be denied that they have been well trained. Yet it's at least lucky Lucky didn't launch into a violin solo. :grin:
This bodily autonomy was trampled the moment a decision was made to create another body that has its own rights among others the right to live. Even then, the argument is not about law-making.
I meant that declaring that killing is immoral while ignoring that violation of an adult human's body autonomy is also immoral, is missing the key issue of the topic of abortion.
Perhaps you're unfamiliar with the existance of sexual assault. Whose "decision" are you referring to? The rapist's?
I don't entirely disagree. Bringing up abortion to make one's point is akin to bringing up Hitler to accomplish the same thing. It's not a sign of a well thought out argument. But it is what it is.
Most abortions don't have pregnancies resulting from rape.
While statistically accurate, philosophical logic/arguments should cover all eventualities.
The OP is NOT contending with whether or not a standard abortion is wrong or not: it is just using it as an example for the principle of double effect, and presupposes that it is wrong and offers a relevant difference between it and the permissibility of performing a hysterectomy.
With respect to whether or not abortion is wrong, which is a completely separate topic, I would say it is immoral because directly intentionally killing an innocent person is always wrong. One cannot do something immoral for the sake of producing a good end: so even if it is good to uphold the autonomy of people, it does not follow that one can kill an innocent person as a means towards that end; just as much as someone cannot violate the autonomy of one person as a means towards saving the life of another (on the flip side).
Likewise, to just anticipate the first response, abortion is not a case where one is violating the autonomy of the mother as a means to saving the life of the unborn child. There is an unborn child and its mother who does not want to be pregnant (for whatever reason) to start out, and now one must decide whether they are going to (1) kill the unborn child as a means towards respecting the mother's wishes or (2) let the woman's wishes be violated. In the case of the former, they are committing an immoral act; in the case of the latter they are letting something bad happen (at best) because they cannot do anything that is morally permissible to remedy the situation.
Again, this has nothing directly to do with the OP; but I am more than happy to discuss it.
So if I've understood, what the ass does should not properly be called making a choice, because the ass does not indulge in ratiocination or deliberation.
And yet we would say that, for instance, the ass chose the trough on its left.
So I'm suspicious. It looks to me as if you are obliged to discount the ass's choice in order to avoid your thesis being falsified.
Quoting Leontiskos
The suggestion that you must "enter into deliberation or ratiocination for a number of seconds, trying to decide" strikes me as contrived. I bet you just pick one of the cookies, without the "deliberation or ratiocination".
But maybe that's just me. Or just you.
I suggest that we do make decisions - even most of our decisions - without such "deliberation or ratiocination". Our justifications tend to be post hoc.
Moreover, I contend that rationality is less about following rules and more about seeking consistency.
Hence, making decisions is not always algorithmic.
@Leontiskos is using a very Aristotelian concept of choice; whereas @Banno is using it in the modern sense.
For Aristotle, an act can be voluntary without being a choice; but it sounds like Banno would deny this distinction altogether. It seems like a mere semantically disagreement in the end. When speaking to Banno, I would just clarify that by "choice" I am referring to what they call "deliberate choice". At the end of the day, I don't think such a dispute amounts to anything but semantics, but maybe I am misunderstanding.
Yep.
In recent work it is called Structural Rationality.
To some extent it underpins my preference for virtue ethics over deontology. Deontology concerns being rational by following rules, while there is virtue in attempting to achieve consistence in one's thoughts and acts. So there is more here than just semantics.
Again, I find your work most impressive.
I know that. My point was/is that the abortion/hysterectomy example is a particularly poor demonstration of the Principle of Double Effect because abortion already has two effects (maternal and fetal impacts, positive and negative) and therefore hysterectomy (as cancer treatment) adding another, makes it it a triple effect.
Most interesting. I am also a virtue ethicist; but wouldn't you agree that even a virtue ethicist needs to formulate generally or even absolutely applicable moral principles, and adhere to them, in order to cultivate and maintain a virtuous character as well as to guide them through life?
E.g., I find it hard to envision how a person could deliberately cultivate a character such that they are kind, if it were not for the fact that they knew that they generally or absolutely should be kind (which is itself a moral principle). Likewise, e.g., having instilled a disposition (i.e., a habit) of being kind is not enough to know how to act kindly in every situation; or, if it is, then it is impractical for the common man with an average intelligence. It seems like, to me, a person who holds moral compasses primal over principles still will have to, as a secondary aspect of their theory, accept the necessity of the latter.
I am not following: please outline the three effects of a standard abortion that are relevant to the end of ceasing the pregnancy.
You're a shill. :roll:
I've put you on ignore. You reek of the ideology of OnlinePhilosophyClub.
Why are we still talking about asses? We could say that the earthworm made a choice to cross the road, and yet we would clearly be using the word 'choice' in a highly metaphorical sense. The most basic confusion would be cleared up if we started talking about humans rather than non-rational animals. I don't know if Buridan ever actually spoke of an ass, but the idea seems a non-starter for our purposes.
Quoting Banno
Yes, I think so. But you missed the heart of the post where I noted that the temporal aspect is unnecessary.
Quoting Banno
That's an interesting assertion, but you didn't really engage anything I said in that last post.
Quoting Banno
It's odd that you would peruse an ethics forum if you think practical rationality is post hoc.
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Quoting Bob Ross
I would say that the substance of the dispute lies in whether rationality is involved in choice. For Banno it would seem that we make choices no more than donkeys or earthworms make choices, and that deliberation does not even exist except as post hoc rationalization. This is an exceedingly odd view.
Banno latched onto the part of my post where I spoke about deliberating "for a number of seconds" (I had in mind a child and their grandmother). He ignored the latter part of the post where I explicitly noted that extended deliberation is unnecessary. We choose for reasons, even when we make a fast choice. In the example I gave we swerve away from the deer for reasons, and our habits and actions are informed by our rationality. For instance, we know that by turning the steering wheel the car will turn, and that by turning away from the deer the car will turn away from the deer, and that by pressing the brake the car will decelerate. The way we use tools is highly rational, pertaining to ratiocination. Further, a person who has had a stroke or who is very old may press the gas pedal instead of the brake pedal, and this is a rational failure on their part.
In modern English we would not usually say that we deliberated in order to swerve the car, but we would say that the swerving was a deliberate choice. This is the kind of thing Aristotle is concerned with: deliberate choice. And it is the kind of thing that differs from the cookie situation. With the deer a choice was made for reasons, and the choice is potentially justifiable via those reasons. With the cookie none of this holds, and consequently there is no real responsibility that attaches to the "choice" between the two cookies. Whether grandma makes the "choice" for me or I make it myself, that 'opting' is not something that comes from anything within me.
Many on this forum labor under the idea that where there is no duration there is no ratiocination, and this is why they conflate humans and animals. For Aristotle or Aquinas even a human act which is not preceded by a temporal duration of deliberation is a rational act and the consequence of a deliberate choice. In essence, our inferential apparatus can be instantiated into habit, and this is the heart of virtue ethics.
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Quoting Banno
I don't think it has anything to do with virtue ethics vs. deontology. Virtue ethicists don't generally deny rational deliberation. The idea of deliberation that I am positing comes from Aristotle, the father of virtue ethics.
You are now claiming that hardly any of our choices involve deliberation (before they are made). I think you are just being contrarian, as is sometimes your way.
--
Quoting Bob Ross
Strong points. :up:
Well, in the OP you wrote:
"The latter scenario is morally permissible because either choice (of action or inaction) will result in a bad side effect (of either letting the woman die of cancer or killing the unborn human being) and the bad side effect of killing the unborn is on a par with letting the woman die of cancer." Thus separating hysterectomy from abortion, in your description, which only has the negative effect of fetal death. 2 vs 1, double vs single.
When in reality abortion already has two negative effects (which are in conflict), the fetal vs the maternal interest (survival vs bodily autonomy). Hysterectomy as cancer treatment in pregnancy adds a third, maternal cancer treatment. 3 vs 2, triple vs double.
Name calling?
I will specifically continue to follow your postings as you're obviously well versed in Philosophical theory. As a non expert in theory (but with practical expertise in certain areas of philosophical interest) my expectation when posting (typically with a practical slant) is not that my arguments will win the day. Rather I look forward to theoretical critiques as I find the confluence of theory and practice to be significantly more interesting (and important) than the perspective of either in isolation.
Well, the distinction between the various accounts is not so hard-and-fast. Deontologists will still act to produce the best consequences, other things being equal, while consequentialists will choose to do unto others if that produces the best outcome.
I supose the issue here is one of which is to be king. Deontology is about what we ought to do, while virtue ethics is about who we choose to be. I take it that we can maintain a distinction between being kind because it is the right thing to do, and being kind because one would be a kind person.
The difference is in background, in whether one is choosing one's actions because of a duty or because those actions make one a better person.
Quoting SEP
Much of your post simply twists this into something you can attack. I'm not interested in responding.
Nice succinct overview of important to understand matters. Bookmarked.
They are not unrelated. One performs an algorithm by following set rules - principles.
You equate rational thought with following a principle. Yet there are rational choices that do not rely on principles, we do not always make use of principles when we solve problems, it is often the case that we must act despite not knowing which principles to apply, and counter-instances can be provided for any given principles. After Philosophical Investigations §201, any action can be made to conform to any principle by the ad hoc addition of suitable assumptions.
I offer coherence over obedience as a guide to rationality.
You are welcome.
They are not the same. To utilize a principle while reasoning is not to "perform an algorithm." You are creating a caricature.
Quoting Banno
No, I don't. In fact no one does that. A computer or a robot is equated with following a principle. Humans apply principles in acting.
Quoting Banno
And nevertheless when we do act we apply principles in so acting. That one can apply post hoc rationalization does not mean that rationality was not involved in the decision itself. You seem to keep falling into this invalid inference.
When the child chooses a cookie they apply a principle, "I want to eat a cookie, therefore I will flip a coin." They need not say it out loud or say it to themselves in order for the practical syllogism to be operative. When you sit down at the restaurant you apply a principle to your tastes, "I like duck therefore I will choose the roast duck from the menu." More difficult choices require more complicated principles and interactions of principles.
Quoting Practical Reason | SEP
You said we must act.
And you said act despite not knowing the principles.
So there is acting based on principles,
and there is also acting despite not knowing the principles.
Putting aside the use of the words must and knowing for a second, it seems to me a decision or choice is a kind of act that only occurs when one deliberates among principles and objects chosen (or not). You need all of those things to have a choice, an act of choosing.
Like an instinct, or a reflex, some acts are not deliberate. Reflexive acts are not choices made despite not knowing which principles apply. They are not choices at all. They are other acts.
If you want to put acts on a spectrum where choice is on one side and reflex is on the other, you can, but this just judges how deliberate the act is, not whether a deliberate act is a choice, and a non-deliberate act is not a choice.
So if an ass appears to pause and deliberate, and then choose this hay or that food but the ass does not deliberate, then the outcome, whatever it may be, is not a choice, but some other effect, some other act. Like a heartbeat, its an act not involving choice. Nor involving principles (like must). Or deliberation (reasoning, or knowing).
Basically, if we act despite not knowing principles (along with the objects we know now deliberated as options), we dont act based on choice; we, like the ass, may not be choosing anything, though we act.
And all of this can be done in an instant, because we are quick thinkers. Or some of us are.
Have a read of PI §201 and consider if a single principle ever implies a certain action, or whether a given action can be explained by any principle, given suitable ad hoc hypothesises.
Or look at the discussion between Lakatos and Feyerabend about what constitutes a rational methodology, and apply it to choosing what to do.
Or consider how the DuhemQuine thesis might apply to explaining an action in terms of a principle.
Fair enough :up:
I separated the hysterectomy abortion from a traditional abortion; and each were outlined with 1 good effect and 1 bad effecttotally two effects each. I dont understand where you got the 2 vs. 1 from.
They are in not in moral conflict, like I noted before: one cannot do something immoral to produce a good end. The good end of respecting the interests of the woman with respect to her body cannot be achieve at the expense of killing someone.
The bad effect of not respecting the womans interests in the case of a traditional abortion is not a result of an immoral action or inaction; so the agent deciding whether to carry it out cannot be morally responsible for it. On the contrary, an agent carries out the traditional abortion to produce the good effect (of which is the negation of your negative effect you referred to), then they have done something immoral because they intentionally killed an innocent person as a means towards that good end.
You said you understood this point I made earlier; but I dont think you did, because you seemed to skip over it without addressing it.
Why would we have to choose between deontology or consequentialism?
This kind of distinction, where what we ought to do is squarely in the realm of deontology, seems false to me: living a virtuous life is about being good, and this is about how we ought to live to be good. The way youve separated them, it seems like virtue ethics borrows from deontology to figure out what one ought to be doing.
I would say that ones duty to what is good comes first, and from that one realizes that the best way to align with what is good is to think about normative ethics in terms of living a virtuous life and not in terms of duties to preordained rules. So I guess deontology secretly wins (: even though it is still getting negated as the result. Still, though, the same can be said of consequentialism: right and wrong behavior being views solely in terms of which consequences maximizes the desired outcome is itself an absolutely applicable moral principle. So I guess deontology, in a trivial sense, wins; but this doesnt take away from the fact that consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics are fundamentally contrary to one another.
Looks a lot like deontology to me. You are suggesting that we ought be virtuous because it is our duty.
That's not how I understand virtue ethics. It's claim is more like that we ought be charitable, we ought be courageous, we ought be forgiving, and that's an end to it; there is no further step to duty, no "because".
Quoting Banno
I would discount the ass made a choice. If I could ask the ass what his deliberations were that led him to his choice, and the ass didnt say with his mouth full of trough food, A what? I just started eating, then I couldnt say whether he choose anything. I have no idea if the ass recognized options, considered one and the other, and therefore deliberately determined one, not the other, before eating.
We should stick to an example where we know a choice can possibly be made, as in the act of a human, not an ass. Its just a bottomless pit of but what if.. that will illuminate nothing. And why go beyond our own experience as potentially deliberate choosers to find material to hypothesize about?
Quoting Banno
A principle implies a certain action.
I wouldnt say a principle implies any action. Thats backwards. Choices imply deliberations using principles. Principals dont imply choices.
If you know a person is reasonable, and they appear to make a choice (or say they made a choice unlike an ass) would say, you can imply from this that they considered principals while deliberating and making that choice. But the principles dont require any action or implication in themselves. We need principles, objects to choose, and deliberation among these to end up with a choice.
But you said Quoting Fire Ologist
This implies deliberation, and other acts where sometimes we do know which principals to apply, or at least think we do as part of our choice when we act.
And you said an action can be explained by any principle, which sounds like an action might also be explained by no principle, and really, therefore, that we may as well avoid discussing any principles when discussing all acts.
So is there a such thing as an act based on principles or not?
If you say no then all of your statements above that you say address my point that use the word principal to make your point, dont signify anything. If you say yes then I am simply saying that a discussion about choice starts where there is an act involving deliberation among objects and principles.
You cant deliberate without the choices and the balancing between them, which balance is equivalent to some principal. You dont choose without deliberation. You do something else maybe, but not by choice.
Quoting Banno
Im familiar with Lakatos and Quine. But Id rather hear your take on it addressing my take. You make sharp clear points at times. Maybe Ill learn something.
Quoting Banno
You cant talk about must act as in a more deterministic act, like a reflex, and say act without knowing the principles, as both involving choice. AND then talk about simply needing a suitable ad hoc, after the fact explanation using any principal, as if there need be no such thing as an act based principal, and retain that there are any acts based on any principals.
Seems to chase its tail in order to devour the whole possibility of a chosen act.
Maybe thats your point - we never actually deliberate or ever choose. But if we do, principals have to be in the mix, inside the deliberation, with the optional objects chosen.
I think it's a good story for introducing a problem to rationality.
The "ass" can be just any decision-maker at all. It's not particular to the animal.
The important bit is that the ass only holds to a few principles or rules in making decisions.
So as wiki points out: the ass dies because the ass holds one principle (eat when hungry, drink when thirsty, and follow the shortest path) that they starve to death. The "ass" is hungry and thirsty and the pile of hay is equidistant, with respect to the ass, as the pool of water.
Or, the example I think of first: if the ass follows the principle "Go to the closest pile of food with the most food" and both piles of hay are equitable, and the ass cannot introduce another principle (here the important bit is that the ass is an animal following a particular code of rationality which cannot be changed -- ie like an animal, in the traditional sense where humans and animals are distinct) then the ass will die while following a particular rendition of rationality.
The problem becomes: insofar that rationality is following rules, how do you introduce new rules? If there is a rule for rules, then it will fall to the same point Burridan's Ass is meant to bring up.
The idea is: Don't be an Ass.
But how to not starve while still being rational?
I suppose one might say that the example limps with respect to rationality and free will. My question is: what is the worth of this example which limps with respect to the very things in question? There's a really, really good reason why Aristotle, Al-Ghazali, Averroes, Aquinas, Spinoza, Bayle, and Leibniz talk about human beings and not asses. Did Jean Buridan ever talk about moral determinism in this way? I somewhat doubt it, as no one seems to be able to produce the source.
Wikipedia gives us the answer:
Quoting Buridan's Ass | Wikipedia
It's satire that many simply haven't noticed is satire. Perhaps the original idea was that Buridan failed to account for the freedom or dynamism of the will, hence the ass. But now it seems that the joke is on us. :nerd:
I think it's a good story to highlight how we can get into a bind about decisions if all we do is follow some rules in the mode of obedience to them: sometimes the rules tell us to do both things which cannot be done. What is the rule to follow when we find ourselves in contradiction?
If we reject those rules then we won't die -- but it'll take an act of creativity and choice.
Burridan's Ass, at least as I mean to use the story, is meant to highlight how you have to make choices that don't appeal to rules (such as which rule to follow, or what rule to introduce to resolve tensions -- such as when you'll die by following a rule)
EDIT: Also, I ought say: I think it's a good story for highlighting a problem in rationality. That's the real conversation.
That's sort of where I disagree. See:
Quoting Moliere
Quoting Moliere
The idea here seems to be that it is a good rhetorical device. It is a good parable or lesson. Indeed, it was originally crafted as a rhetorical satire. Fine, I can see that. I can see the "lesson." The problem is that what is good as a parable or lesson or sermon is not good as being conducive to impartial reasoning. Philosophical examples are supposed to be conducive to impartial reasoning. Satire and lessons are designed to beg the question, philosophically speaking.
The other problem here is that those who appeal to this example are literally paying philosophical honor to a satirical mockery, hence the irony that, "The joke is on us." The image is meant to mock Buridan's theory of moral decision, not to be conducive to impartial philosophical argument. It is meant to be ridiculous, not instructive. Or rather, it is only meant to be instructive insofar as it is seen to be ridiculous. It is highly incongruous that today we take up the piece of satirical mockery as if it is a perfectly good philosophical example, and the problem that I have seen is that those who wield it fail to understand how it begs the question, as a lesson.
Edit:
Quoting Moliere
Quoting Leontiskos
Saying "we ought to be virtuous" is expressing a duty to being virtuous: I take those to be the same thing, so I am not following your distinctions here.
Basically rationality can't just be reduced to a set of deterministic rules. Though I'll admit I've not read the original text or anything -- it's certainly an example that's been "handed down" to me that I think through as an example that demonstrates how one cannot hold to just one principle or two principles or something along those lines. At one point we may find ourselves in contradiction and if all we do is hold to two contradictory principles we'll do nothing but compute them (if that is our true desire), and die.
Since we fall into contradiction, at least strictly logical determinism is false?
I think this relevant due to
I think in Aristotle there is a "because", but it's based upon roles -- and the only roles he considers as truly eudemon are the politician and the philosopher. (and, in the end, notes how the philosopher is actually better lol)
The bit where I get hesitant is where he considers the slave as having a properly moral place within society, and that the master ought have slaves to direct them towards their good.
EDIT: At least with respect to virtue-ethics that focus upon character to a point where you can have what are almost two types of being among the same species due to one being the ones who say "bar bar bar bar" and the others being clearly virtuous.
This strikes me as a strawman, but perhaps we can let it stand as a warning. Perhaps you wish to warn, "You may not be doing this, but be sure that you do not do this." This is fine as far as it goes, and I have said similar things:
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Leontiskos
Now a parable is able to do what a rational argument could never do, and parables certainly have their place in ethics. Yet as I see it, this parable of yours stands, but only on one foot. In the world of parables, it feels a bit flat and one-dimensional, perhaps because its roots go no further than satire; its target has no more depth than the determinist or monomaniac.
The better parable as I see it is not Buridan's Ass, but Balaam's Ass. At times wisdom will speak through the beast, from the source it is least expected, and it will cut through the rationalizing foolishness of the rider. Granted, there is no good reason why Balaam's Ass cannot speak through Buridan's Beast (and yet we have now left syllogistic).
Lastly, I will point out that lessons and parables and warnings have their place, but of all things they are least helped by repetition. To beat the drum of a parable or a warning again and again does no good, especially if it stands only on one foot. It will tire and collapse, and lose what efficacy it might have had. Confusing the parable for a philosophical example causes it to fall prey to this form of repetition.
(You often give voice to a tongue that should not be foreign to philosophy but is nevertheless opaque to the analytic philosophy that dominates English-speaking forums like this one. Your style of pacifism is a potent example. I am not averse to speaking in this tongue, but only rarely would I expect it to bear fruit in a place like this. It's hard to speak about parables in a place like this.)
Yup. We agree there, and that's basically what I mean with the story. It's just an introduction to a thought with a funny conclusion, not an argument or anything of that sort.
A more current but exactly the same example is Chidi from The Good Place :D Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Leontiskos
Thanks that's very high praise :) -- It's all just me working out my own thoughts that I'm willing to share, though, and it's part of what I consider to be in fair trade: I like to read others' thoughts, and so share in kind.
Parables are hard anywhere I think. What makes them difficult is what also makes them attractive. I'm very much attracted to stories, though, because I think they set out nuances [s]better than[/s]well even though the difficulty is that the nuances aren't specified and there's a certain amount of interpretation that has to go into them.
I agree they cannot be counter-examples or examples, so much as stories which set out an idea. Sometimes that idea can be as powerful as Balaam's Ass. I think that a stronger story than Burridan's, at least :D -- at least for thems who like the old book, which I do when I can use it as a touchstone.
Though maybe the distinction is between the sublime and the humorous? Chidi Anagonye, at least, is a lot of fun to watch, and there's something to him that we can relate to (unlike the ass, since we'd surely not die but make a choice)
I never thought to interpret Balaam's Ass like that, though, which adds an interesting layer: "Get out of your head, dork!" is the kind of message I imagine which unites these. (EDIT: Not that I'd know anything about that... ;) )
Okay, fair enough. :up:
Quoting Moliere
I was told to watch it by all sorts of people but never did. :grimace:
Quoting Moliere
Makes sense.
Quoting Moliere
Yep, and probably also because it is impossible to express all the nuance of certain things. In that case to even try is to show that you don't understand what you're dealing with.
Quoting Moliere
Yes, and that line can get fuzzy, too.
Quoting Moliere
Haha - well the interesting thing about "the old book" is the presuppositions that are brought to it. I don't wish to reduce the value to those presuppositions, but when a text is approached as sacred or inspired it eo ipso comes to possess an unmatched power to express nuanced ideas, such as parables. This is something like Kierkegaard's idea that the believer measures himself against the infinite, and for that he stands taller.
I recommend it if you're in the mood for a comedy which dances across various philosophical distinctions in constructing a plot, as one does ;)
It's good! check it out!
Quoting Leontiskos
Yeh.
Though every once and again a bright idea pops up.
Quoting Leontiskos
Heh. I call it "the old book" because I'm not comfortable calling it the good book. But that is part of my presuppositions that I'm bringing to it.
I don't know if it's sacred or inspired, but I definitely see its poetic value -- which in my way of looking at the world is a very high place to put it, though my understanding might disappoint some interpreters.
But the parables are great touchstones I think just by virtue of how the book is treated. In some sense its poetic value is derived from how it's treated, to dovetail with your:
Quoting Leontiskos