Devil Species Rejoinder to Aristotelian Ethics
Aristotle thought that what is 'good' is a thing fulfilling its end (i.e., purpose: final cause); and, so, a 'good' human is a human which is properly fulfilling their Telos. It seems like Aristotle thinks that the nature of the human species is such that we should care about each other and seek to be just, but what about a devil species? Since Aristotle is attaching the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing relative to its nature, wouldn't it follow that a rational species, S, which had a nature completely anti-thetical to justice and altruism be a 'good' S IFF it was unjust and egoistic?
I am having a hard time fathoming how Aristotle is avoiding this glaring issue, even after reading his Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics. Does anyone understand how Aristotle avoids or deals with this issue? Does anyone have any solutions to this problem?
At first I thought maybe tying the nature of rationality, in the case of a rational species, would dictate one should be just (to fulfill that nature); but I am failing at coming up with a good argument for that.
I am having a hard time fathoming how Aristotle is avoiding this glaring issue, even after reading his Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics. Does anyone understand how Aristotle avoids or deals with this issue? Does anyone have any solutions to this problem?
At first I thought maybe tying the nature of rationality, in the case of a rational species, would dictate one should be just (to fulfill that nature); but I am failing at coming up with a good argument for that.
Comments (75)
Then consider his conception of form ? intelligibility ? divinity. All things, in tending toward their own actualization, their own fulfilment, are tending toward divinity, realizing form in their own greater and lesser ways. The form in anything is divine and good and desirable (Phys.?.9, 192a17). The form which is the reality of anything is its limited, imperfect share of what the Unmoved Mover is purely and perfectly, that is, idea.
Your problem seems to come up because you are thinking of the good as defined primarily in terms of an organisms' form. This is correct, but then we have to ask "from whence and why this form? You seem to be presupposing a sort of indeterminacy lies prior to form. The form of an organisms just is what it is.
It might be helpful to consider why Aristotle's mentor Plato thought the divine could be neither hostile nor indifferent to what is other to it. Indeed, on Plato's account the Demiurge creates out of love and a desire to share its own self-determination and reality with an 'other,' to "give birth in beauty."
If the divine is hostile to what lies outside of it then it will be determined by those things; it will exist in response to them. But if the divine is determined by that which lies without, then it is not fully self-determining and thus not fully real as itself. Likewise, if the divine is merely indifferent to that which lies outside of it, the divine is nonetheless still defined by "what it is not." It is only in love, in a transcedent identification of the self with what is other, that the divine can be fully determined by what lies within the ambit of its identity and self, as opposed to being defined by and in terms of the other.
This is of course Plato's view, laid out most clearly in the Timaeus, but I don't think Aristotle rejects this part of Plato.
In Metaphysics XII Aristotle expands a bit more on the relationship between the human good and the divine.
All goodness for organisms is filtered through their forms, but the forms themselves are not ordered to nothing at all, but to being itself. This is why Aristotle is often seen as presenting the germ of what would become the Doctrine of Transcendentals, the convertibility of Unity, Truth, Goodness, and sometimes Beauty, with Being.
The life of contemplation described in Book X of the Ethics is not good only in virtue of an arbitrary essence that man happens to have. It will be the highest good for all rational creatures in so much as they are rational.
Aristotle's ethics is about the human good, not some imagined devil species.
Very true. Man is the rational animal though and presumably "demon men" would be rational as well, so it's hard to see how they could have entirely different in terms of what springs from rationality and how this orients the person.
There is the issue of what springs from an evolved nature though. In our case, what we find to be good is substantially a matter of our ancestors having evolved as members of a social species.
We might imagine a devil species which evolved from relatively asocial ancestors. (Though I think the plausibility of human level intelligence evolving in an asocial species is pretty low.) Assuming something like human level intelligence evolved in an asocial species. I would think it quite surprising if such a species had a morality very similar to us.
What do we know of this imagined demon species? Why assume that they are men? Why assume that they are rational? See the following in reply to Bob Ross.
:up:
It's worth noting that Aristotle explicitly rejects Anaximander's theory of natural selection in De Anima, but I don't think that leaves his philosophy rudderless in the face of modern evolutionary theory. A different species would have a different form of life, different needs, etc. However, they would be the same as respects their rational nature (on Aristotle's account of rationality).
What is the relation between nature and the nature of a species? Can they be at odds?
I don't know.. Warfare, torture, tribalism, narcissists, anti-social personalities, all of these things have been advantageous if we were to look at "purely" traits that led to increased survival. This is why I tend to reject naturalistic explanations for any ethical actions. You can argue anything is natural, and you might be right, but informs little on what is ethical other than possibly vague descriptions of mechanisms that might be the physical substrates for which ethical considerations are made.
Good exposition of Aristotle's thoughts; but it doesn't really address the OP: it seems to sidestep it. From what I can gather from your comment, you are not denying that "if a devil species existed and 'good' is defined as ~'excellence at one's nature', then a devil species would be 'good' IFF it is unjust, cruel, etc."; instead, you seem to be saying that God wouldn't allow the devil species to exist. This doesn't contend with the hypothetical, unless I am missing something.
It seems to me that this is an inconsistency in the approach. An evil animal would be an animal that does not follow its nature. Consequently, no animal can be evil (but neither good) by nature but by accident or by a deviation from its nature. As I understand it, to be good or evil cannot be something proper to the nature of a being. To be good or bad is something external in relation to nature.
Of course it's relevant! It is not a "glaring issue" that Aristotle is avoiding. The question of the ethics of a species that is by its nature unethical makes no sense. It is asking how something bad is good.
I'm saying that a being oriented towards evil is a contradiction in terms. Evil is a privation. How can a being be oriented fundamentally towards non-being? It would have to be "most what it is" when it is not.
On the evolutionary view, we might also consider how a species could ever evolve that prefers sickness to health? Strife and crisis to homeostasis? Destruction as an end in itself?
The closest Aristotle gets to your question is the contrast between vice and being bestial in the Ethics (Book VII IIRC). The bestial man is pretty much a psychopath, what you seem to have in mind. But the bestial man, unlike the man in vice, is incapable of rationality, or is at least a partially rational man beset by beastial urges that deprive him of his rational nature.
We might imagine rational creatures who are more solitary or quarrelsome than man (although man himself is pretty damn quarrelsome lol). But we can't have a creature fully oriented towards non-being as an end, since this would imply it most is when it is not.
Sadism might be another example you have in mind, but the sadist is attracted to causing suffering and destruction because of a sense of power or pleasure(a good), not for its own sake. Even if we suppose a species that acts like many spiders, where females attempt to eat the males that mate with them, it will be the case that this is done for a good (extra calories). Lack of concern for other's good is not being directed towards evil. Beings cannot be oriented towards absence, although they can face competing goods.
I am not sure if a creature whose end is specifically the thwarting of human ends is precluded. But such a thing: a. doesn't exist, b. wouldn't come to exist in the whole order of things.
:up:
Quite right. From an organic perspective, the only analog to a "devil species" would be "some species that human beings don't like". Which means nothing. Every species is integral to the biosphere in some way. It is a meaningless investigation, either of species or of ethics.
I think this is right idea. Most "vices" only make sense in the context of their being a corresponding virtue associated with them. If prudence is simply not a virtue, then rashness isn't a vice, it just is how you act. E.g., it's not vice for a beetle or a snake to operate purely off instinct and impulse.
Whereas for any rational creature, prudence will always be a benefit.
Aristotle thought we should care about each other, or seek to be just, in the right way at the right time for the right reasons. This is subtler and more limited than the more general claim you're making. It's also his proposal that we should make a quilt of these virtues with others like self-love, philia of friends; indeed it is virtuous to be 'magnanimous' in the right way etc., and to be angry as appropriate, for example. Eudaimonia is a complex of right behaviours.
It seems as if there is the shadow of the later Christianised Aristotle falling across your thoughts, in the generalised claims about caring and justice, and in the very notion of a 'devil' for instance, and your passing reference to 'God'.
Aristotle was a mentor to Macedonian future kings, most notably Alexander the great. He advocated Alexander's conquests and thought Athenians might in their wars treat other peoples as 'beasts', which has a bit of a devilish air to me.
This is a mischaracterization of evil as privation. No one reputable denies that a person can aim at being unjust, cruel, etc. It happens all the time. Now, with what you are noting is:
Which is correct insofar as a person cannot aim at what is bad in the sense of it being done for its own sake; however, it is wrong insofar as the devil species I outlined is doing bad things for the sake of their own well-being. So they are doing it for the sake of something good, being that it is in accordance with their nature to gain well-being through the suffering of other species, but must aim at bad things to achieve it. So your counter here seems to miss the mark, dont you think?
My point is that, the devil species would be right to commit unjust acts for the sake of their own well-being, since there is nothing about their nature that relates them to doing just acts, and this would be entailed by Aristotles viewwouldnt it?
Thats not the point: the point is that a living being having their status of being good relative to fulfilling their nature opens up, in principle, the possibility that what is good is for a living being to not care at all about other living beings if their nature is such that they gain the deepest sense of happiness from it. Wouldnt you agree?
With respect to point B, Aristotle kind of confusingly defines good in a two fold manner: what is done for its own sake (i.e., intrinsic valuebleness), and what is excellence for a particular thing. I couldnt really decipher which definition he holds, and they are not compatible with each other. When you say it cant exist in nature, what you are referring to, I would guess, is your example of a being geared towards unhealthiness (decadence); which is besides my point (as I already noted).
I think he definitely keeps definitions entirely too vague; but I don't see anything wrong with the concept of an essence or final causes (telos): do you?
It seems like human beings have an essence insofar as they can be subsumed under one shared concept of 'human being'.
Yes, in this context "telos" is fallaciously anthropomorphic (à la animism). Aristotle mistook literalized / fetishized / reified his causal mappings for the territory and called them "essences".
Sure, people act devilish. This is different from a species whose telos specifically non-being. Like I said, a species whose end is specifically to thwart human good is perhaps coherent taken alone, although it makes no sense in the natural order of our world. A species whose end is evil tout court doesn't make sense though.
I don't think this makes sense. How does a species survive if its end is sickness over health? It cannot be fully oriented towards evil. It can be oriented towards goods that conflict with man's.
And for any sort of rational schemer, prudence still seems like a virtue. They won't get far doing evil if they act stupidly. Likewise courage will still be preferable to rashness or cowardice. You can't do your evil if you get yourself caught or are too scared to engage in evil acts. Etc.
A tiger is right to attack and eat people. I don't think the idea of a rational creature oriented wholly towards evil works the same way. Tigers' good is indeed fairly opposed to man as one of man's few natural predators. The good of the Bubonic Plague bacteria might be another example.
Have you read the Metaphysics yet? That's mainly the reason why I don't think this sort of thing is going to make sense from Aristotle's perspective (IIRC Book XII has most of the relevant stuff).
You are describing humanity.
Except that on the scale we now inflict suffering, degradation of environments, extinctions of other species and so on is not rational at all, because even from the point of view of a "selfish rationality" what we are doing will not be to our ultimate benefit.
Also, there is really no "selfish rationality" because from a purely rational perspective one's flourishing or suffering are no more or less important than the flourishing or suffering of others.
It can be; but I think Aristotle is very clear that Telos is just contingent on an agents intentions or purposes for things. Wouldnt you agree that a member of a species gravitates towards fulfilling what it is to be that species?
Yes, but, then, wouldnt all of reason, concepts, and the understanding be about the territory? Why cant we use the map we have to speak of the territory, which could include essencesno?
You are reading the OP too literally: let me clarify. What I meant by devil species is what you are calling a devilish species. I am talking about a species of which they fulfill their nature necessarily at the expense of other species.
The critique I am making in the OP is an external criticism about how morally counter-intuitive it would be to say that devilish species member is being good when they are torturing a human being for their own pleasure. Dont you agree?
Thats not what is being stipulated in the OP: e.g., it is the sickeness of other species for the health of the devilish species that I am discussing.
Agreed. But this by no means entails virtues like kindness, liberality, etc. A devilish species would have no use for those with respect to other life.
Yeah, so this is what I am talking about. You see it as internally coherent with Aristotles ethics (and you are right), whereas I agree and merely add that it is morally counter-intuitive to think of the Bubonic Plague as being good by fulfilling its nature (of presumably infecting and killing as many people as possible). That seems to scream out: this ethical theory has problems!.
I havent, but I will.
You'd have to go awfully far back in time, to find an ancestor of ours that wasn't a member of such a species.
For f*ck's sake ... :roll:
No. Maybe. Yes, but whatever we use "to speak of the territory" (including "essences") is not the territory itself.
:up:
This OP is about Aristotle's Eudemian and Nichomachean Ethics; not his Metaphysics, Politics, or Physics.
If anything in those books is relevant to the discussion, then please feel free to bring it to my attention. As far as I am aware, Aristotle does not deal with what is good in his Metaphysics (but I could be wrong). I am currently reading the Metaphysics.
With respect to your critique about the conflation of the map with the territory: this critique applies to all philosophies, including your own. We always talk about the territory by way of the map. This doesn't seem to negate the validity of talking about essences. By your reasoning, we are stuck in a cartesian style dualism between the map and the territory such that we cannot know anything about the latter.
What is it to be a member of this species? Is it to torture other species? By saying they do so to maintain their society implies that it is a means to an end and not an end in itself. If there were no external threats from another social species would they continue to torture other species? In a
Aristotle's terms, is the energeia and entelecheia of this species to torture other species? Does it cease to be when it is not torturing other species?
A map is something used to know territories themselves, no? It is "that through which we know," not "what we know," (or at least not "all that we know.) It would be strange for a chemist to say: "I know a lot about words, language games, diagrams, theories, and models," and then to leave it at that.
The idea of "essence" might be explained quite differently from how Aristotle goes about it, but the idea that there are different kinds of plant and animal and that they each thrive in manner that is, in part, determined by "what they are," seems pretty unobjectionable. Even on a view that "species aren't real," something very much like species must still exist; the evidence for it is everywhere.
And yet you begin with his metaphysical terms "purpose" "telos" "final causes" & "essence". :roll:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
No. Maps are used to facilitate taking paths through a simplified abstraction derived from specific types of aspects of a (factual/formal/fictional) territory.
Yet the OP concerns only Aristotle's notion of "essence".
Of course. All branches of philosophy are interrelated; but we tend to focus on one or the other for the sake of the conversation. Ethics presupposes metaphysical commitments, no doubt.
How could you maintain your society by torturing others? Unless you are talking about something like torturing slaves to keep them in line? If so, you are again talking about humanity, not other animals.
It is a species that, as per its nature, can only achieve a deep and persistent sense of happiness, flourishing, and well-being by committing egregious acts on other species (e.g., torture, abuse, mass genocide, etc.).
This is contrary to Aristotle's understanding of nature. Since the thread is based on your claim that:
Quoting Bob Ross
you should not be avoiding what he says about nature and telos. for when they are taken into account there is no glaring issue that he is avoiding. For Aristotle the nature and telos of a species is in accord with the whole of nature.
Quoting Bob Ross
OK, humans torture, abuse, commit genocide, but it is arguably on account of aberrant social conditioning. Other social animals don't have symbolic language, and thus being free of the potential for ideology based aberrant social conditioning, they are generally good to their own species.
So, what is it that causes this "devil species" to torture, abuse and commit genocide? Do they do these things to their own species, or only to other species? If they do it to other species, what is the explanation for why they do it?
The reason I say it is incoherent is because I can't imagine such a species, more intelligent than we are and in possession of symbolic language, not being bedeviled by ideologies, just as we are, which would mean such aberrant behavior would not be universal among them, just as it is not universal with us.
How so?
I dont see how a devil species, as outlined, would be contrary to nature anymore than lions eating their prey, diseases killing people slowly & painfully, etc.
To keep things simple, I was saying they do it to other species; and this is how they are biologically wired to do in order to achieve their own well-being. If it helps, you can think of an entire species of the equivalent of the most brutal of psychopathic humans. Arguably, the particular nature of some human beings is such that they cannot achieve the richest sense of well-being without torturing other people.
I was trying to avoid using humans because Aristotle is going to say that the general nature of humans is such that it is antithetical to the occasional freak-accident psychopath that pops up. To object properly, I have to rise the evil to the level of the species, and not any particular member.
The whole of nature and each organism in the hierarchical order of species works toward maintaining that order according to its nature. But it is not just any order, it has as its end, according to Aristotle, the good. A species whose sole purpose is to cause harm can play no role in this well ordered whole.
:up:
It makes no sense from a naturalized view either. Predators don't benefit from the suffering of their prey, nor from their deaths; at least not in any direct sense. What the predator benefits from is calories, energy stored in the prey; any suffering is ancillary. Indeed, predators who over reproduce end up facing starvation (and the same is true of prey who over reproduce in the absence of predators). In either case, the population collapses due to it outrunning its food supply. The good of the predator and prey are linked.
Even if a species was oriented towards thwarting human ends, it would nonetheless need humans around to fulfill its ends. But nature would never create such a straightforward negation. Creatures might be in competition but there is no way for them to evolve such that "whatever is bad for x is good for y."
There is no 'the good' in Aristotelian ethics and, consequently, there is no universal good which all species are geared towards. So I don't think Fooloso4's account is actually Aristotelian at all. What they have done is supposed that all the natures of each species are united insofar as they work towards some ultimate good, which is something Aristotle adamantly denies. Good simpliciter does not exist in Aristotelian ethics; and what is 'good' for a thing is for that thing to fulfill its nature: there is no room in Arisotle's ethics, thusly, for a separate 'good' which fulfilling one's nature works towards. By definition, what is 'good' is just for a thing to fulfill its nature.
Perhaps there's a 'good' for nature under his view? But this would not negate the fact that the devils species' 'good' would be to fulfill their nature, even if they are bad for nature. This is what happens when 'goodness' is relativistic like Aristotle claims.
If it is true that 'good' simpliciter simply does not exist (viz., 'the good' does not exist) and 'good' is relativistic to the nature of a being such that a being is good iff it fulfills its nature, then this 'devils species' fits fine into the moral hierarchy. What are the odds of such a species coming into being naturallistically? Not likely at all, which is what I think @Count Timothy von Icarus's response was getting at.
I will defer to Joe Sachs, a leading scholar and translator of Aristotle:
("Three Little Words")
What Aristotle says in the passage cited from Nicomachean Ethics is:
As previous pointed out and regarded by you as not relevant is that ethics is about the human good. The good for nature as a whole transcends the human good or the good of any other species. Its energeia and entelecheia, its "being at work" and "being at work staying itself" are for the sake of itself. It is its own arche and telos. Its own source or beginning and its own end or purpose. Whatever aims for some end or purpose aims for some good.
I see three basic answers, and at least the first two have already been given:
1. Aristotle was writing about humans. If he had known of a devil species, perhaps he would have written about it. (Cf. @Fooloso4)
2. Humans are social animals, and require cooperation and social virtue for their flourishing. (Cf. @Janus)
3. Departing a bit from Aristotelianism per se, presumably any rational species would be interested in optimizing flourishing via cooperation, and this would involve moral/social virtues.
Aristotle is not simply writing about humans. He wants to teach them. Would he be able to teach a devil species? I assume such a species would not care or pay any attention to ethics, except perhaps to attempt to undermine it.
the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good
Aristot. Pol. 1.1252b
He applies this to horses, a household, the state, as much as human beings.
If the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good, it follows that if its end is evil, that is its chief good.
Who are these people who seek what is good for themselves at the expense of the good itself?
I've been reading through Aristotle's "Metaphysics", and I think I understand Aristotle's points enough to start tackling this post you made.
This is exactly where I begin to have my doubts with Arisotles ethics: if what is good is just a thing realizing its form, then there cannot be a further question of why is it good for a thing to realize its form?. It seems like Aristotle is deploying good twofold: a thing fulfilling its nature and its nature being determined by an omnibenevolent God. The problem is that this seems, under an Aristotelian view of good qua formal fulfillment, like a nonsensical and internally incoherent question to ask, let alone to answer it with ~God is omnibenevolent, and is the cause of the form which is good for a being to realize: if goodness is just the fulfillment of ones form, then whence is God omnibenevolent other than good insofar as God fufills their own form?
It seems like a consistent account would be to say that God is good insofar as God realizes Gods potential; and since God has no potential (being an pure actualization), God necessarily is absolutely realized qua Godbut what is good for God, which is to be God, does not entail that whatever form God has for a given being is good for that being, nor the rest of nature, other than that that being, analyzed relative to themselves, is good when it realizes its own potential. You seem to be saying that God being a good God, and being so absolutely and necessarily, somehow adds something morally relevant to the good, e.g., human being: I am failing utterly to see that connection being made there.
Ive never understood why this pure actualizer would have an intellect; nor why it being essentially the ultimate substrate of existing things would make those things imperfect images of itself. Can you explain that further?
This is an interesting thought: if God is affected by, e.g., us, then God is not purely actualized; since, e.g., we have caused God to actualize a potential in themselves. Good point.
Wouldnt the first actualizer have to be distinguishable from what is being held up by it, though? If not, then everything is the pure actualizer, which undermines the whole argument, doesnt it?
It seems like this is asymmetrical to the previous quote (above) because God can lack potentials without losing their ability to be purely actuale.g., God can lack the potential to be me, not be me, and still be purely actual.
Again, by Arisotles concept of good, the goodness of God does not imply any significance to the goodness of an organism even if God is the one that ordered the forms in a particular way; exactly because what is good for one being is not necessarily good for another: so what is good for God is not necessarily good for, e.g., a squirrel.
Let me know what you think.
The fact that you think you understand Aristotle's points is probable evidence that you do not. See Book ll.
Quoting Bob Ross
These are two parts of the same question, that is, what is for a thing to be what it? What is the good that each thing seeks? This is a question, not an answer to the question of being . What does it mean for a man to realize his nature? What does this look like? With this last question we begin to get closer to the original sense of eidos, which has been buried under centuries of divergent sedimented meaning.
You said:
Quoting Bob Ross
You take what is for Aristotle the question of the Metaphysics, the question of being, and treat it as an answer. Things do not realize their form as if it is something they do not already have, something that they are not already. It's form or eidos is not something that comes after it already is.
Added: This posted before I was done. I continue below.
The form of a thing is its nature (i.e., its essence), and its nature is not fully realized upon beginning to exist nor arguably ever. The form is its design in terms of its essence, and this design can be realized to different degrees. E.g., not every man has realized their nature to the same degree--some are more excellent at being a human being than others.
Its form is what it is to be what it is. What differentiates it from other things or kinds.
Aristotle points out that there are various meanings of good. The NE begins by saying that all things aim at some good. A "devil species" is bad, no matter how good it is at being bad. In fact, the better it is at being bad, the less good is.
The good of a thing cannot be determined apart from what it is to be that thing, apart from its telos. In his translation of the Metaphysics Joe Sachs points out:
We are back again to the absurd notion that a natural thing's telos, its place is the cosmos is to harm other species. Such a cosmos would not be a well-ordered whole.
Quoting Bob Ross
A things form is inherent to it. It is the being at work (energeia) of a thing If it was not continually being at work staying the same (entelecheia) from its beginning it would cease to be.
It's nature is not separate from nature. It is a part of not apart from nature. To understand the nature of a thing is to understand its place and activity within nature.
Form (eidos) and nature (phusis) are not two terms with the same meaning. In Book V, chapter IV, of the Metaphysics he says:
Nature encompasses both form (eidos) and matter (hule).
Quoting Bob Ross
'Essence' is an English translation of the Latin 'essentia'. A term coined by Cicero to translate 'ousia'. Literally it is the the what it was to be of a thing. Ousia refers to some specific being. Aristotle or Bob Ross.
In short, to realize one's nature is not to realize one's form of being.
Whether or not such a species would fit well into the ordered whole of nature is irrelevant: if the good of a thing is relative to its telos such that it is good equally to how well it fulfills it, then it plainly follows that a species which has a telos which involves torturing other species is, in fact, good IFF it is excellent, apart from other things, at torturing other species. You are accepting Aristotles concept of goodness (as underlined) and then turning around and irrelevantly commenting that it is absurd for such a species to exist as a coherent member of naturethat doesnt address the hypothetical I have presented. You would have to demonstrate how the hypothetical (stated above) is inconsistent or incoherent with Aristotles concept of good. I understand the point is that Aristotle thinks that the telos of each species is well-ordered, but I think it doesnt help his case because of how he defined goodness.
The devil species would be aiming at a perceived good: their well-being.
Form is the idea of the essence of a thing; and the nature (in the relevant sense from the many definitions Aristotle gives of nature) of a thing is the intrinsic source of the primary process of each growing thing just qua the growing thing that it is (Metaphysics, Book Delta, IV, p. 118). Form and essence are one: the form of a human being is the essence of a human being.
Likewise, like I stated before, the form, or essence, of a human being includes things which a human being may not have actualized (yet or ever); e.g., the form of a human being includes having two arms, but not all human beings have two arms. If I take your argument seriously (that a human beings form is fully realized immediately), then a human being with one arm is not a human being (which is implausible); or, if I dont, then it follows that the form of a human being is not fully realized in a human being per se.
You are just going around in circles, trying to distinguish these terms when they are clearly the same. You literally circled back around to saying that a form and essence are the same thing without realizing it.
Mistake the part for the whole. You insist that:
Quoting Bob Ross
but claim that nature, which is the source of species, is irrelevant? You are now reading the Metaphysics and claim to understand Aristotle's points but fail to understand a fundamental point: it is an inquiry into the arche, the source or beginning of things. The question of the goodness of a species cannot abstracted from the question of the goodness of the whole of which it is a part.
Quoting Bob Ross
The hypothetical you present is incompatible with Aristotle. That is not an irrelevancy. Aristotle was a pretty smart guy. Do you really think that he would not have seen what you see so plainly? It is not that Aristotle failed to consider this hypothetical, it is that such a creature has not place in his understanding of the world.
Quoting Bob Ross
I have already done that.
Quoting Bob Ross
It is not that the telos of each species is well-ordered, it is that the whole, of which each species is a part is well-ordered. Once again:
Quoting Fooloso4
To take one meaning as is it applies to all or the whole leads to your confusion.
quote="Bob Ross;921928"]
If by idea you mean a concept then that is wrong.
Quoting Bob Ross
No. A human being is not a disembodied entity.
Quoting Bob Ross
The species form "human being" is why the offspring of human beings are human beings, whether they have one arm or two.
Quoting Bob Ross
Aristotle distinguishes these terms. Aristotle comes to us through Latinized translation. Because of this the meaning of the Greek terms is obscured. See the section Translating Aristotle from the IEP article on Aristotle's Metaphysics and Selections from Joe Sachs's Introduction
to His Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, here
You are sidestepping the hypothetical. It is akin to if I asked you "if you had $1,000,000,000,000,000, then what would you buy?" and your response was "that's not actually possible, given how the economy as a whole works.". That's not an answer. I statement was "IF something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species, then a member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species": to contend with this hypothetical, you will have to point out which antecedent is false and why.
You are sidestepping Aristotle! It has become increasingly apparent that for you Aristotle is irrelevant. This thread is not a "rejoinder to Aristotelian ethics".
So we can further the discussion, please point out what is wrong with this claim within the context of Aristotelianism:
P1: If something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species, then a member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species.
P2: Something is 'good' IFF it fulfills its nature and a species exists which has in its nature the need to torture other species.
C: A member of that species is 'good' IFF it is, among other things, properly torturing other species.
For intents and purposes, assume there exists such a species; even if it immediately goes extinct for whatever reason. If we can find common ground on the 'good' of this species, then we can move on to how well they would fit into the ecosystem of nature.
Suppose someone invents a knife. As a knife it fulfills its function - to cut. As such you might say it is a good knife. It is so "good', in fact, that it can cut through anything, and does. It cuts right through the cutting board, the table, and everything else it comes near, leaving behind a path of death and destruction. Having witnessed this from what is at the moment, a safe distance, would you still say it is a good knife? Now before answering too quickly, consider the other attributes of a good knife, most importantly, how well it handles. This knife literally cannot be handled. It would cut off your hand.
You wish to discuss your species in the context of Aristotelianism but you ignore the context of Aristotelianism in order to discuss your imaginary species. The part, a species, cannot be understood apart from or in abstraction from the whole of which it is a part. The whole is intelligibly prior to the part. This is fundamental to Aristotle's Metaphysics, to the problem of what is first, to the problem of first philosophy.
Quoting Aesop, Aristotle, and Animals: The Role of Fables in Human Life, Edward Clayton
The need for nurture to become what is our 'special' nature is integral to our place between the beast and the divine. We need each other to become who we are. The hypothetical you propose suggests "natures" can be arbitrarily injected into life forms. Aristotle rejected that possibility in De Anima:
How we came into being is inseparable from what you call, "fitting into the ecosystem of nature."
The problem with your example is that a knife has more than the function of cutting; but lets hypothesize a new tool which has only the purpose of cutting. You are correct that this tool, lets call it X, is good in the highest sense IFF it is optimal at cutting, and so an X which could cut through anything whatsoever would, indeed, be the best X.
Now, it does not become a bad or lesser good X because one cannot grab it; because we stipulated its sole function is cutting. Therefore, this example is not helping demonstrate your point.
A knife would be bad if one cannot hold it without getting cut because it is designed to cut a specified thing via a person who wields it with their hands.
However, to be charitable, I think this is really what you are getting at:
It seems like you are denying that what is good is for a thing to fulfill its nature and instead it is for a thing to fulfill its nature if it is a proper part of the whole.
This doesnt seem accurate to me; because then a thing could be bad which is fulfilling its nature. For example, imagine a species which is a freak accident and perishes quite abruptly. A member of that species would be good if it is fulfilling its nature, but would not be a fitting member of the whole of Nature. Likewise, for example, a being or tool which cuts through everything would not fit well into the universe (and, in fact, would probably damage a lot of it) but if it did exist then I see no reason to say that it isnt a good X. See what I mean?
Moreover, the relation of a thing to a bigger whole isnt necessarily an aspect of its nature: is a part of a rabbits nature to get eaten by a fox? No.
I wasnt talking about injecting souls into other bodies: I was talking about the essence of a thing. Likewise, just because a thing has an essence at birth it does not follow that they have fully actualized it. So I completely agree that we tend to need other people to help us realize our full potential.
I am assuming you are referring to our ability to sufficiently reason, correct?
Now you are catching on! Just as a knife has more than one function, a natural species does as well.
There is a difference between something that is in a species' nature and what that nature is. You misunderstand what he means for the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing to be relative to its nature. What is relative to its nature and what its nature is with regard to its telos is not the same. It is good for birds to fly, but as Icarus learned, not for men to fly. Hubris and violence may be in our species, but that does not mean it is good for us to be hubristic or violent.
Quoting Bob Ross
The example is meant to illustrate the problem of postulating an intelligent species with only one function. If intellect is, as Aristotle says in De Anima, the part of the soul by which it knows and understands, then any species that is intelligent must have as part of its nature the capacity to understand. Any species that has a mind, has more than one function. At a minimum, it has the function of thinking, or reasoning. An intelligent species that is not intelligent is a contradiction.
Quoting Bob Ross
That a species is a proper part of the whole is essential for understanding what a species is, that is, for understanding its nature. It is not as if these are two separate things - its nature apart from nature and its nature as part of nature. We can, when discussing such things, make a distinction, but the distinction does not exist in the nature of things.
Quoting Bob Ross
Right! That is the problem with your devil species. One more once:
Quoting Fooloso4
and:
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Bob Ross
The whole of nature is not an event in nature. What it is to be a fox or rabbit is not to eat or be eaten by the other. What it means to be your devil species, on the other hand, is as you would have it, to destroy other species. Just as we do not understand foxes and rabbits in terms of eating and being eaten, we cannot understand your devil species in terms solely of destroying and being destroyed.
How does an essence come into being in the language of Aristotle?
I may have been too loose with my terminology: a knife does not have more than one functionit has one function which is comprised of lesser functions which constitute the sole function (e.g., the function of a knife is for people to cut things, and this function requires the lesser function of being grippable).
I see your point here, which is, notwithstanding the above critique, that the parts are considered relative to the whole; however, we must be careful by disclosing which whole we are considering. E.g., the atoms function can be considered separately from the function of an organism which is, in part, that atom.
I dont think this negates the idea of a devil species, because I am analyzing the goodness of such a species within the context of their species qua whole and not nature qua whole. You have to demonstrate why I should think of it in terms of nature and not the species; as, for me, both are capable of separate analysis since goodness is relativistic.
I completely agree insofar as what you are trying to convey is correct. I would just describe it differently: I would say that it is not in human nature, in the sense of nature qua essence nor Telos, to have, e.g., hubristhat is not in the species nature nor a part of what the nature of that species is.
Firstly, how does this negate the devils species? It seems perfectly capable with their nature to have rational capacities.
Secondly, I was not defining such a species as solely functioning towards rape, torture, etc.; I was saying that such acts are incorporated into their nature such that they flourish by doing so. It is a hypothetical meant to tease out the consistent conclusion of Aristotles concept of good: you are trying to migrate it to actuality or practicality.
They are completely separable: I can analyze the function of a liver in isolation to how the body, as a whole, works. Likewise, if I take your argument seriously, then you would have to go further and analyze everything in terms of the largest contextwhich would be the good of reality (whatever that may be).
Thats exactly my point: one can determine the nature of a rabbit without understanding nor determining how rabbits relate to the whole of natureexactly because the relations to other organisms, lives, and environments is not a part of their essence.
CC: @Fooloso4
Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that an essence, or form, is per se being (as opposed to per accidens being); or, in other words, what-is-was-to-be-that-thing per se with itself, as it applies universally to all cases [of that thing].
The essence comes into being by physical production, and Aristotle gives the example of a man begetting another man. For Aristotle, the forms are not acausal, inert, and atemporal abstract objects but, instead, are manifestations of essences in things in the real world which hold universally insofar as they can be instantiated in different places to imperfect degrees.
Is that your understanding as well?
Yes, and that is where your analysis fails.
Quoting Bob Ross
I do not think it necessary to demonstrate why a part cannot be adequately understood without regard for the whole of which it is a part. The problem of wholes and parts is fundamental to Aristotle, as it is to much of Greek philosophy. Where in Aristotle does he reject this?
Quoting Bob Ross
For you that might be the case, but unless you want to sidestep Aristotle you need to show that for him the good is relative. In the Nicomachean Ethics, which is about the human good, Aristotle says:
A distinction is made between some good, which is relative to some thing, and the good to which all things aim. What the good is to which all things aim is not simply a question about any one thing but all things. It is a question about the whole. This is not relative to any one thing or species.
Quoting Bob Ross
It does not negate the devil species, it negates your claim that it has only one function.
You said:
Quoting Bob Ross
So too your devil species. But why say that it is a problem for the knife example unless you are claiming that the devil species has only one function? There seems to be some things that were n that exchange that are now missing.
Quoting Bob Ross
In that case you have failed. As you said:
Quoting Bob Ross
That is not because Aristotle is avoiding it, but because 1) Aristotle is not concerned with fantasy creatures, but with the nature of things as they are, 2) you fail to see why it is incompatible with Aristotle's view of nature, 3) you assume that there is no question of the good for Aristotle, only some good relative to some thing.
Quoting Bob Ross
They are not completely separable! Livers do not function apart from the body they are in. They are not some separate thing that just so happens to be in a body but have a purpose of their own unrelated to the body.
Quoting Bob Ross
Right! In the Metaphysics he says:
(982a)
As far as possible means there is a limit to what we know. We cannot know all things. More specifically, it is the beginning and ends, the arche and telos, of all things that we do not know. With regard to each thing too, however, it requires knowing its arche and telos.
The beginning or source of your devil species is your imagination, but if we are to treat it as if it were a real species without knowing its true origin and end we cannot claim to know its nature. To take its being as its end or purpose is to miss the big picture. The good of an intelligent species is not simply to exist. Its nature as an intelligent being must be taken into consideration. Taking the example of man, his intelligence leads him to the question of his aim. It is not some notion of mindless happiness, but the realization of what is highest in man