10k Philosophy challenge
This challenge has now closed. A solution I am satisfied with has been found. While the solution was found by me, someone did partly inspire me with what they said, so they received 5% of the money as an inspiration fee.
Comments (479)
Quoting Dan
Isn't this a bit unfair? In most contests or 'challenges', the final decision of who is the best applicant is usually determined by the vote of at least three members. The quality of each solution will only depend exclusively on your criteria. Don't get me wrong, I respect it.
On the other hand: If the winner happens to be a TPF member, could we know who of us won this challenge, or will the decision be kept confidential?
Do we enforce a protection of choices against the will of such people? If so how can you justify this as it seems contradictory to the claims made for freedom consequentialism.
How far does paternalism factor in here if we are assuming rational and able people who are well informed and educated? I understand that it would likely enforce loss of freedom if it was judged such an action would reduce net Freedom?
This is a bit of a stretch considering people need a pretty high degree of understanding to contemplate possible consequences. This makes the whole scheme of Freedom Consequentialism ( as you frame it here) as somewhat elitist.
Regarding Satisficing Consequentialism I think this has better grounding when we define the 'minimal' as a kind of buffer zone rather than as an actual definitive line ... obviously this does not really help you as this is the very problem you posed that you wish to find a solution to!
If it is unsolvable then a cautious approach would make the most sense and then we find ourselves trying to resolve by Occam which side we should cut off or not. The qualitative aspect is really tricky so I do not see any simple work around that would outright counter the demandingness objection.
For these reasons I think a fresh approach may be warranted.
Interesting stuff :)
I'm not sure what you are asking.
Isn't this dilemma just a situational curiosity which underpins human life - particularly in multi-cultural, pluralist societies? Can there be a just way to resolve disputes when peoples rights or preferences clash? Would there not be a number of 'mechanisms' one could implement?
Are you expecting there to be a correct answer and how will you know it when you see it? How do you determine what is just? Is there an underlying assumption that for this to work you need to be a moral objectivist?
So the challenge is, I guess, proving it.
I don't think the challenge is in principle possible to provably solve, because value doesn't seem to be a universally objective measure. In other words, I don't think there's an objective answer to "How many lives are worth exchanging for how many peoples freedom?" just like there's no objective answer to "How many scoops of chocolate are worth 5 scoops of vanilla?"
Yes, I agree with you.
I don't beleive in moral facts (I don't deny them, but I have heard no good reason to accept the notion) and any underlying axiom we select as foundational for our moral thinking is likely to be a matter of personal preference. The moment we identify some 'foundational truth' isn't it the case that this is built out of values we already find appealing?
Turning morality into a spreadsheet or a flowchart of equations seems to be a futile endeavour. While I am not a philosopher, it would seem to me that moral decisions pivot on empathy, context, and deep ethical considerations (built from culture, experience and language) that go beyond what can be captured in formulas and algorithms.
I think, these days, the professionals are less inclined to accept mere transcendental ideas as sufficient explanatory devices, and those of common understanding never heard of them anyway, so ..
If the problem is .
Quoting Dan
.my view is there isnt a problem, or at least there isnt this problem, insofar as I do not treat freedom as weigh-able or relatively differentiated. It is merely an altogether fundamental, hence necessary condition, by which certain types of relations are possible, and these relations pursuant to aesthetic judgements alone.
On the other hand, even if Im entitled to a personal view, Im fully aware that not having any letters after my name sorta limits my scholastic value.
I haven't noticed scholastic value being a priority here.
Quoting Mww
So is the OP an attempt to provide a foundation for morality which somehow manages to quantify or capture freedom as something more than a contingent set of relations?
Yeah, a team of experts would be great, but I haven't got one, so I'm afraid you're stuck with me.
Currently in the process of writing an essay on Liberty so this kinda thing is in my field of vision.
Im not really sure. It is described as a theory ( ) (that) has advantages over other moral theories so it attempts to construct a moral foundation, yes, albeit predicated on consequentialism.
As for freedom arising as something more than a contingent set of relations, Id agree with that. As I mentioned, I think freedom is that by which relations of a certain kind are even possible, which removes it from being a member of all such relations, which in turn makes it more than any set of them, contingent or otherwise. I just dont know if thats what the OP, as you say, manages to capture.
I wish I could help with this challenge, but I am far from being a trustworthy philosopher/thinker. I am a total novice. :lol:
In general, I think defining ethics in terms of freedom can work, since free beingsunconstrained by ignorance or circumstancewill chose what is good, what causes them to flourish, etc.
However, it seems to require a certain view of freedom for this to work. Whereas if freedom is primarily defined in terms of potency"the ability to choose anything" then we seem to be open to all the critiques of post-Enlightenment morality as defined in terms of "rational agents" (e.g. Nietzsche, MacIntyre, etc.)
So my question is, why does the "rational agent," care about other's freedom? I didn't catch this.
And then some other thoughts that may or may not be useful:
Is the assumption that any adult is "free?" I am just not sure how this works with experience. It seems that "weakness of will," or incontinence are ubiquitous human experiences, as is acting against our goals out of ignorance.
I personally like a slightly modified definition of free acts based on Lynn Rudder Baker's definition. I would say an act is free when:
We want to do x and we actually do x.
We want to want to do x. (i.e., Frankfurt's second order volitions)
We do x because we want to do it (it is not a coincidence, our wanting is causally involved in the process)
We would still want to do x even if we understood the full provenance of why we want to will x (i.e., there is not some fact we might discover that would make us no longer want to do x)
These conditions, particularly the last, are difficult to meet entirely. This is no issue, an act can be more or less free, people more or less self-determining; freedom is not bivalent. But then it seems to me that freedom is exactly the sort of thing that needs to be "promoted," through education, self-discipline, etc.
There is a sense in which the virtues can be trained (Aristotle), and this seems to allow for greater self-determination. There is also a sense in which techne, knowing "how to do things," is essential to being free to do things. One isn't free to "tutor kids in calculus," if one doesn't know calculus for instance, and a society isn't free to traverse continents in a day if it has not discovered jet engines and the principles of lift. But techne in particular tends to be something that must be fostered, promoted, and taught, and it also often requires various "things" to be put into practice.
It also seems to me then that property is going to be very relevant to freedom. Hell, that's a big reason why people covet money, they think it will "make them free." A retired person who loses all their savings might no longer be "free to stay retired," for instance. Leisure must give way to work; they are coerced into an action they do not want to engage in by the loss of their property (and this could obviously work in reverse with gaining property).
But, to answer your question, a rational agent may not care about others freedom. There's a longer discussion to be had there, but suffice to say that I wouldn't assume that moral facts are motivating to others, and if people fail to care about what is moral, then so much the worse for them.
While I disagree that one is not free to tutor kids in calculus if one doesn't know any calculus, I take your point. However, as I pointed out, it is not all freedom that is to be protected, only the protection of those choices that belong to you. That kind of freedom is not violated by jet engines not having been invented yet.
And again, it is likely that questions on this forum will not recieve prompt replies and may go unreplied to entirely. It is not the best place to ask them.
Quoting Dan
This is unfair and I don't think it is in the spirit of the forum.
You were happy enough 8yrs ago to participate and reap the rewards of your discussion:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/284/a-new-normative-theory-and-a-phd-thesis
I was curious to see how the 'PhilosophyNow' forum members responded to your OP:
The first post from FlashDangerpants ( I remember him well!)
You have clearly worked assiduously with follow-up on your thesis.
And it is good that you did as promised and referenced a forum poster on p131 of your thesis pdf:
https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/server/api/core/bitstreams/e2660406-4892-435f-bd0a-17b8ee5318c4/content
And now, you will benefit from more insight offered by people perhaps initially attracted by prize money but mostly who also have experience and knowledge and generously share their thoughts and ideas.
It would be a pity if you didn't continue in active discussion. It is in interaction that we learn...
Just my thoughts. As someone who doesn't appreciate so-called 'prize money' and rules being set as inducement. But will follow the various comments with interest...
Yeah, that is bait to get people to do free work on your theory.
The $10,000 is in New Zealand Dollars. Seems legit. The prize is not in virgin-bitcoins or loser ethereum scam at least. Everything that comes from NZ is rather reliable to me.
It also doesn't follow TPF Guidelines for 'Starting New Discussions' and writing an OP. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/480/site-guidelines/p1
Despite engaging so far, it seems he is unwilling to do much more. This is ' not the best place to ask questions'. Relying on the email he has set up.
Quoting Lionino
You think hes counting on reaping the rewards in terms of career advancement? Or maybe hes a trust fund baby with nothing better to do with his cash.
Quoting Dan
Hey Dan.
Honestly, I dont know what the problem precisely is. Id have to make it up based on some assumptions. Can you state the issue more clearly?
You said:
freedom over different things
how to weigh
within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism
You restated this saying:
how do we resolve conflicts
freedom of different persons over things choices
that belong to them
I feel unable to really get started without filling in blanks.
I would think it should take you a paragraph or two to clarify precisely what the objects are on this playing field, what the conflict is these objects in relation to each other pose, and what, in your own words you would think the answer must include.
This is a discussion forum, not a bulletin board. If you are not prepared to have a discussion, you should not post here.
By the way, what is your current affiliation to University of Canterbury? They don't seem to know about you, though it appears that you were once a grad student there.
There is a link in the first post to a detailed write up. It's on the word "here."
I'm making them knowingly. I would tend to sum up the vision of freedom common in Western philosophy before the early-modern period as "the self-determining ability to actualize the good," (act over potency). This leaves open the problem of "what is goodness?" but avoids the collapse into emotivism that seems to plague modern ethics.
Seems so much the worse for an "objective theory of goodness," if people can look at it, understand it, and reasonably say "but that goodness isn't good for me."
Anyhow, it seems like a serious issue to me if goodness is defined in terms of freedom but then freedom is left vague. Perhaps you have addressed this elsewhere. You allow that coercion limits freedom but there is a lot of coercion that falls short of pointing a gun in someone's face. When a family holds an intervention for an alcoholic they are being coercive, but it's unclear to me that they are limiting freedom. When someone reminds us to do our duties and fulfill our obligations it is a sort of coercion, but it seems that can be good. Children and spouses have a lot of leverage when it comes to softer forms of coercion, but it has always seemed strange to me when theories of freedom would have it that our careers and familieswhat makes us who we areis a limit of freedom.
The trade off thing seems like it could lead to some unpleasant conclusions too. If a man has a chance to save a girl from a fire, then he is better off doing that than "vanishing as a moral agent." But this seems true even if he saves her from a fire only so he can rape her afterwards. On the mathematics of "maximizing freedom," his act still ends up at a net positive, but calling this "good" seems absurd to me.
My solution would be that the problem is best solved by abandoning the idea of a "mathematics of morality." I imagine that's not prize material though :rofl:
I work there doing a combination of tutoring, marking, and some lecturing. If anyone is interested in taking some distance courses, I can say that environmental ethics and ethics today are both just great. Heh.
Why do you say this? Can it be demonstrated?
Not sure where you find someone who is unconstrained by ignorance.
Those examples don't coerce with a threat to reduce one's morally relevant freedom though, so don't put the agent in the position to choose between doing the thing or having their freedom reduced, so don't pose a problem.
You don't think that someone can understand what's good or right and choose against it? That someone can intentionally do what they know is wrong?
My issue is not just this notion of 'ignorance', but also flourishing and good? Can we demonstrate that these are any more than abstracts used to loosely describe contingent matters of social practice , etc.
Flourishing strikes me as an enormously nebulous category.
To some extent, yes. But how do they understand 'wrong'? It will be in the context of some aspect of culture. One they might not care for much. Something may be 'wrong' as far as mainstream culture and the legal system is concerned, but how does this ultimately matter? I've worked a lot with hard core criminals and they have a very strong principles. They are just (as far as the mainstream is concerned) the 'wrong' principles.
This still seems to have it that a marauding soldier who rescues a girl for the sole purpose of raping her would have performed a good act. And supposing he gets killed by a stray artillery shell as soon as he is done pulling her out of the building he has only been "good."
And if coercion is only problematic if it involves violence and threats against property that seems to allow a whole host of troubling manipulative behaviors to be morally neutral. Yet if the goal is something like a mathematical equation the edge cases seem troubling.
Let me ask, would Aldous Huxley's "A Brave New World" be a utopia on this view? What if we ignore intentionally cognitively impairing the Gammas?
No, weakness of will and incontinence exist. Also relative gradations of ignorance about what is truly good.
Suppose no weakness of will, a person is able to make themselves so whatever they deem to be choiceworthy (e.g., no "I really shouldn't eat that donut, but it looks too tempting," type situation).
Suppose no ignorance about what is truly best.
Why does the rational person choose the worse over the better in this situation? Imagine their internal monologue: "yes, this is most choiceworthy. I know this and am confident of that knowledge. I will now go choose something worse when I could choose something better."
Of course these conditions are never met, but we can come more or less close to them.
I have no idea. I'm not sure if I have met any rational persons. Or even what this means. I have met people who use reasoning and have post hoc justifications for their choices. I suspect most people's choices are informed by emotion.
Quoting Dan
No. I wonder what it means to know a moral truth?
Quoting Joshs
I'd be very interested in your general view of this project? To me it seems to be built around a series of old school foundationalist assumptions. Thoughts?
I'm afraid I haven't read it, so I can't comment with certainty.
Yes, manipulation, so long as no one is deceived about about morally relevant choices they are making or threatened with having their morally relevant choices taken away, would probably be permissible. Feature not a bug.
Putting weakness of will to one side, do you think it's possible for people to choose evil over good intentionally? It seems at least possible to me.
Assumptions from Dans paper:
Likelihood of truth (including internal consistency and not relying on propositions that we have good reason to believe are false)
Universality
Objectivity
Applicability to all free, rational agents
Action-guidingness
Achievableness (possible to live up to)
Consequentialism
Simplicity (in the sense of not postulating entities beyond necessity)
Extent to which the theory is in line with commonly held moral intuitions.
Thats a ton. In the interest of simplicity, how about three:
1. Objective, universal (applicable to all), truth.
2. Achievable consequences guiding action
3. Extent it is already normative (compare against the prevailing wisdom).
(I agree as well we should seek simplicity, not for simplicitys sake, but for claritys sake. Why complicate assumptions you are not going to question anyway?)
With that said, I like (my) assumptions 1 and 2. As for consequentialism, Im not an expert. I prefer the more immanent telos to the more distant consequence as a term for what is action guiding, but that may be quibbling over assumptions.
It is only the freedom over things that already belong to a person that matters, so getting more stuff over which a person can have freedom is not morally valuable. Things are bad, on this measure of value, when they prevent a person from being able to understand and make their own choices. Doing goodwhich I will discuss more in the following sectionusing this measure of value, is just a matter of preventing or reducing bad things from happening.
there is sometimes a distinction drawn between positive and negative freedom, where positive freedom is freedom to do, have, or be something, whereas negative freedom is freedom from some external constraint. I do not think this distinction is particularly helpful...
While I have now explained the measure of value that freedom consequentialism uses.
More feeedom good; less freedom bad? Is that the measurement we are taking? Freedom itself is the value we measure?
An action is bad if scenario one has worse consequences than scenario two. An action is good if scenario one has better consequences than scenario two. And .is good to the extent causes no bad
Are we saying anything when using better and worse to define good and bad? Seems better sits on a scale between good and bad; so we need to define good and bad without using better and worse, because better and worse are tautologous with good and bad. Scenario 1 and scenario 2 may bring good and better and so bad and worse with them, but if we are trying to bring the measuring stick with us to the table and measure Scenario 1 against Scenario 2, using our good better - bad worse measuring stick, we may need to define them in themselves a bit, absent all scenarios.
This sounds like consequentialism. Im not yet seeing what freedom consequentialism is. Im not seeing the need for universal applicability or objective truth yet either.
(10,000 prize? -I hope I dont get fined for not understanding the premise! :yum:)
[Freedom consequentiialism] is a form of satisficing consequentialism that treats the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices as the measure of consequences moral value.
The ability to make choices is the measure of the consequences value. Sounds like freedom IS the value.
When faced with a decision between funding a drug that saves one life every ten years and a drug that restores eyesight to five blind people within the same timeframe, how do we know which to fund? The obvious answer is whichever protects the most freedom, but how do we know which that is?
You say whichever protects the most freedom. This is interesting to me. We assume agency and freedom exist; and then we are faced with a decision. The good choice is the choice we must make if we are to be moral. But I just said must which sounds like a limitation on freedom. (If there is something I must do it can be said that I have no choice.). So admittedly, morality (the objectively good choice) limits freedom. BUT, when that morality bases the good on whichever protects the most freedom, it can be said by doing what I must do, what I have no choice in doing, if I am to be good, if what I must do is good, my freedom is saved in the fact that what I have determined is most good is the most protective of freedom that existed in the first place.
Interesting.
I think is most promising, that of determining the relative importance of freedom over different things by reference to a preferred order of wrongs.
Preferences need not be valuable in order to use them
this does not tell us what to do when preferences conflict.
I think your question here can be simply stated as what are the objectively good rules?
Conflicting preferences, how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism what I see as missing are the objective rules.
We assumed universal, objectivity, but then did not identify it or use it as part of the movement of comparing scenario 1 to scenario 2 on the scale of valued freedom, applied to conflicting preferences. These applications do not get beyond the subject-agent to the objective community of agents who conflict. Meaning, the consequentialism youve described starts to show the process of acting free, but cannot apply that process any further where the free act is directed against the freedom of another agent. So basically, we have two free agents in conflict with no objective measure to settle the dispute (possibly limiting both of their freedoms) - so you are basically asking what are the rules?
If there were rules carved in stone, then we could really pay no attention to preferences. But since there are no rules, the preferences (which prefer incorporates a good-better bad-worse measuring stick to even say prefer, so is tautologous) are still vital in the measurement of good and bad.
This is why I dont find utilitarianism satisfactory in general. Its a method to solve disputes, that requires rules to employ, but has no rules (using synonyms and tautologies for good and bad to beg the presence of rules). Utilitarian theories cant tell you what to do - they tell you how to determine what to do, but leave it up to your preferences and pain and pleasures and betters and worses to make your own temporary rule and fight through what to actually do.
So I dont see how to solve your problem. Its an age old problem of now that I know how to make a decision, what am I supposed to do now?
But I liked the idea that whichever protects freedom is itself a measure of good. I just still dont know what specifically truly is good in the end.
IDK, it seems like some consequentialists consider the intended consequences of acts. To totally ignore them makes our marauding soldier a hero so long as he is killed before carrying out his assault, while a doctor offering to treat the poor for free becomes equivalent with a murderer if he accidentally kills a patient.
You might be interested. It's quite short and not very dense, so it would probably make for a good audio book for driving too. I bring it up because its society is a stunning success if it is judged by the common metrics of public policy studies, economics, medicine, or many contemporary ethical theories. There is no crime or poverty, people are largely allowed to "do what they want." But it's intended to be entirely abhorrent, devoid of substantial freedom or beauty, and most readers agree that it's very successful in this respect.
It depends on how evil is defined, but generally I would say no, at least in as much as the person is a "rational agent," is not ignorant of what is good, and is confident in their knowledge vis-á-vis the good. Why would someone knowingly choose the worse over the better?
Well, the question of people's rationality is a different issue. I don't know if I've ever come across "the rational agent"homo economicusin the wild. That said, people aren't entirely irrational either, so the limit case is instructive.
It seems to me someone might care about something more than what is morally good, or perhaps not care about it at all. That seems imaginable.
Yes, freedom itself is the measure of value, though by "freedom" I mean specifically the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make those choices that belong to them.
Hi Dan,
I believe there's a very simple answer to this problem. Because you contextualize "value" in relation to freedom, freedom must be your highest value. And the choice which gives one the most freedom is the decision not to choose. This is because each judgement which a person makes acts as an intentional restriction on one's capacity to choose, by having already chosen in relation to that judgement. This choice, not to choose is what enables deliberation, and Aristotle's highest virtue, contemplation.
Consequentialism however, is a judgement of one's actions from the perspective of an observer, and the observer cannot see one's contemplations or deliberations as actions. This excludes the action which has the highest value in relation to freedom, from the possibility of even being considered as having any virtue in the consequentialist's value structure.
Therefore the "freedom" perspective and the "consequentialist" perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible. The freedom perspective has as its highest act, something which is not even an act, from the consequentialist perspective, because it is an act with no observable effect. Deliberation, or contemplation, is an act without a decision or choice, therefore without the manifestations of moral consequences, yet it provides one with the highest degree of freedom. However, as Aristotle indicated, contemplation must be considered to be "an act" with causal capacity, because of its temporal nature, and the effect which it has on one's choices. Therefore it must be given the highest position, denying the truth of the incompatible consequentialism.
Yes, this is the problem I mentioned vis-á-vis defining freedom purely in terms of potency.
Etc. The contradictions continue up to a level of social freedom, because someone who possesses the lower sorts of freedom can always choose to deprive others of their freedom. This is where, for Hegel, institutions come in to shape people's identities and incentives such that they want to promote the freedom of their fellow citizens.
This lies in contrast to this theory, which doesn't seem to offer any reason for why people should be good or why they might decide to be good under various differing conditions.
Right. It's conditioned on expectations about the future in many forms.
If I press an elevator button not knowing someone is stuck in the shaft (and having no good reason to think this is the case), and this kills someone, I have hardly committed murder. I have performed a trivial act that couldn't possibly have been known to result in someone's death; it's a mistake a saint could make.
Now as suggests, we might divorce goodness and praiseworthyness and solve this problem, although this seems somewhat counterintuitive to the extent that we tend to praise people precisely for attempting to do good, and even more for actually achieving it. We praise the virtues because they help to achieve good, not because they involve intending good for instance.
As I read, I asked myself, how do you define "good?" It seemed to me that you went on to answer this question. It is as if you had said, "the good is when someone is maximally free, and free of any constraints on their choices; the freedom to make choices is good." But then you asked a question about weighing freedoms and about the "importance" of choices. And I found myself very much with the same question I had started with. The "freedom is good" paradigm seems to require further criteria that make the consequence good that is quite separate from the freedom derived as a consequence, an independent standard for the rightness or wrongness of a consequence. But isn't that antithetical to the freedom consequentialist project? If freedom does not make a consequence good, what does?
That being said, it is easy to be a critic of another's writing and there may be nuances to your view that I didn't catch.
Anyways, thanks for sharing the idea.
P.S. This comment is from someone who is skeptical that a comprehensive moral theory is ever forthcoming.
You may object to the sky being blue. Instead of paying philosophers for their work, you want them to do work on you theory for the slim chance that they may get some mysterious 10 grand. Who unilaterally decides if they get the money? The person paying, of course.
Even if you do actually give that money away, all the philosophers who provided meaningful, qualified input spent their time for your exclusive benefit.
It is not even a lottery, just deception. This thread should be closed.
:down:
Yes, if we divide practical and moral reasoning into two discrete things. I see no reason to do this though.
When someone cares more about something other than "moral good," it seems to me that they are simply seeking one good over another. The thief prefers the good of what they can get from stealing. The parent who neglects their child prefers the good they derive from going to the bar, playing video games, etc. Yet in all these actions people are still motivated by a good they seek to attain through their actions.
Part of what makes contemporary ethics intractable is denuding "moral goodness" into some sort of esoteric property cut off from the rest of existence.
I took the meaning of "freedom" directly from your article. Check it out:
[quote=Freedom consequentialism primer]For freedom consequentialism, the measure of value is, unsurprisingly, freedom. However, since freedom can mean a lot of different things, I should explain what I mean by it here.
When I use the word freedom in this context, I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make the choices that belong to them. [/quote]
As I said, not choosing, rather than choosing, provides the most freedom, because every choice made restricts one's freedom with respect to that choice already made. And, since the measure of value is freedom, as you say, then the highest value is to not choose, because this provides the most freedom. And, not choosing is what enables deliberation and contemplation. This is consistent with Aristotelian virtue, which places contemplation as the highest activity.
Quoting Dan
Consequentialism definitely does require the observational perspective. It is a system which derives principles for moral action, from observations of similarly classed actions, and the effects of these actions, just like empirical science. It is an observation based theory, inductive principles concerning the utility of different types of acts, are produced, to guide in decision making.
[quote =SEP: Consequentialism] Instead, most consequentialists claim that overall utility is the criterion or standard of what is morally right or morally ought to be done. Their theories are intended to spell out the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act to be morally right, regardless of whether the agent can tell in advance whether those conditions are met. Just as the laws of physics govern golf ball flight, but golfers need not calculate physical forces while planning shots; so overall utility can determine which decisions are morally right, even if agents need not calculate utilities while making decisions. If the principle of utility is used as a criterion of the right rather than as a decision procedure, then classical utilitarianism does not require that anyone know the total consequences of anything before making a decision. [/quote]
Since not choosing cannot be empirically observed and the activities derived from not choosing, contemplation and deliberation, cannot be observed as the effects of not choosing, the value of not choosing cannot be considered by consequentialism because it has no observable utility. However, it actually provides the highest value when value is measured by freedom. Therefore value measured by freedom, and value measured by consequentialist principles are two incompatible value structures. In other words, a person has the highest level of freedom to act, when not currently acting. So not acting receives the highest value when freedom measures value. Consequentialism only judges the value of actions, and therefore cannot value inaction, nor can it properly value freedom.
That being said, I suppose one might insist that one choice is more important because it is a freer choice.
I'm not sure I follow this Metaphysician Undercover. You mean to say that when I act according to my free choice, I am actually less free than when I am figuring out what I want to do?
Also, consequentialism refers to a broad range of theories (or, if you prefer, the feature common to a broad range of theories) that share the common feature that they evaluate actions by reference to their consequences. That doesn't necessarily require observation, certainly not external observation. Also, it does seem as though you could, at least in some cases, observe contemplation
It may even be beneficial to reduce freedoms too in some circumstances. The more freedom people have the greater the weight of responsibility.
This is besides the point to the problem you set out though. I am fairly sure you are more concerned with this as a potential use for AGI regarding a robust moral system to protect humans rather than cause undue harm?
I am not really sure what you mean by "solve ethics entirely" here? Sounds a bit like attempting to count to the highest possible number. Needless to say where I think that will end.
Finding better methods is certainly possible though I think. I really do not think it takes much to show how irrelevant it is to try and offer up a tangible proof of moral absolutism. If I do then all I can say is where doubt exists doubt exists.
As I have noted to you already, there is scope to push the means of measuring further but there will never be any 100% validated methodology, only one that will work well enough under almost every circumstance (in the manner you framed the problem).
From what I have read fairly recently of Bernard Williams in 'Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy' I am inclined to view morals of obligation and such as not really within the realms of philosophy. There can be a philosophy of anything, but just because there is a philosophy of morality it does not mean there is anything essentially philosophical about Morals.
For the potential problems of the kind of non-sentient AI systems that may arise in the relatively near future, this is a worthy aim for sure!
I am certainly more inclined to look toward Moral Scepticism myself btw.
Yes, that's exactly what I am saying. You are constrained by the situation you are in. If you are not presently doing anything than you have more freedom to choose than if you are engaged in an activity which is effectively restricting you already.
Quoting Dan
I don't understand this difference, between protecting and promoting freedom. Bad habits are morally relevant, and habits guide our decisions when we do not take the time to deliberate. To protect one's freedom of choice requires that the person resists the formation of habits in one's thinking. To be inclined this way, i.e. to resist habitual thinking, requires that freedom be promoted, because choosing not to choose is an intentional skill requiring will power to develop, and the desire for freedom is the required intention. This is where consequentialism really fails us. It does not properly provide for the value of will power.
Quoting Dan
To evaluate actions by reference to their consequences requires observations of actions to know the likely consequences. It is a matter of having general principles which provide predictive capacity. The principles are produced from inductive reasoning derived from observations exactly like empirical sciences. Consequentialism is an attempt to characterize moral philosophy as an empirical science.
Quoting Dan
This is more relevant, but no less problematic. Since these thoughts are internal, cause and effect relations cannot be properly justified. Justification requires demonstration. Wittgenstein approached this with the private language example, and decided it's better just to make judgements according to observable externalities, rather than consider internal aspects.
As psychologists know, within this internal 'realm' there is an interplay of thoughts and feelings. We can, in principle, associate thoughts with the conscious mind, as somewhat controllable, and feelings with the subconscious, having a source in sensations, and uncontrollable. However, it is quite obvious to anyone who has observed their own contemplation, that thoughts have an extension into the subconscious, and feelings extend into the conscious. And, the interplay between them is more rapid than the conscious mind observing can apprehend. This leaves determinations of cause and effect as impossible. All this indicates that consequentialism, which bases judgements on a cause/effect relation has no real merit in the internal 'realm'.
You don't need to know the likely consequences of actions in order to evaluate actions by their consequences. It is certainly a good idea to discover the likely consequences of actions if those consequences determine the morality of those actions. Consequentialism is not itself empirical, but if accepted, it allows us to determine the morality of actions empirically(ish, the kinds of measures of value that consequentialist theories use range from very difficult to measure empirically to very, very difficult to measure empircally).
This last seems a bit dubious. First, it seems like I can observe cause and effect relationships within my mind at least as easily as I can in the world, probably more so. To use an example that would be morally relevant to any kind of hedonistic utilitarianism: If I remember something funny, I experience happiness. In fact, given that almost all consequentialist measures of value appear to evaluate effects that occur within the mind of people. And that's putting aside all of the psychological models that are specifically about the cause and effect relationships between emotions, thoughts, and actions. Second, it is you who is claiming that contemplation increases freedom, not me, which suggests to me that you have at least some basis for thinking that there is a cause and effect relationship between the one and the other, which you now appear to be claiming is impossible to know.
If freedom is conceived of as a pure power/potency, then even good habits are deleterious to freedom since they still constrain possibilities of action.
But the virtues were generally thought to perfect freedom precisely because they allow one to act in accordance with what they think is "truly best," not because they allow someone to act "in any way at all." This would amount to mere arbitrariness, which is sort of the inverse of freedom.
The assumption that most adults understand their own choices transparently, or that they understand the likely consequences of their actions, seems problematic.
People who are intoxicated, suffering from head injuries, or dealing with age related cognitive decline might show an increasing inability to meet these conditions, but it is in no way a binary distinction. Yet if we can be more or less able to meet the conditions for freedom, it seems like this should make us more or less free.
I suppose this assumption is what allows manipulation to be a non-issue. However, someone indoctrinated into a cult from birth seems to be facing some constraints on their freedom even when they aren't actively being threatened.
With the bar set low for "understanding" then most adults, most of the time, should be able to understand their choices.
Yes, I agree that people in those circumstances may not be able to understand the nature of their choices. People are capable of putting themselves in situations where they aren't really functioning in their full capacity as moral agents for a time and that isn't a problem. As for head injuries and significant cognitive decline (simply having a poorer memory than one used to isn't likely to affect one's freedom in a morally relevant way very often), yeah, those things seem to reduce a person's ability to understand their choices. I submit to you that this is a bad thing. Depending on what you mean, then this could be something of a binary distinction.
That being said, people can be more less free in the sense that more or less of their freedom is being reduced/violated/etc. For example, an alligator biting my toe off reduces my freedom somewhat, but not as much as if it bit my head off. The whole point of this exercise is to figure out how to determine which action violates the least freedom (or perhaps the least important freedom) or, conversely, protects the most.
As for cults, that depends on what the cult has taught them. If, for example, they think that they are going to be punished be an omnipotent being if they do the wrong thing, then that ignorance is reducing/violating their freedom in a morally relevant way as they are essentially always under threat.
You have a completely different understanding of "morally relevant" from what I have. A habit inclines one to act in a specific way, and if that way is morally bad, or morally good, then the habit is morally relevant.
Quoting Dan
Switch out "go read a book" with an activity which is considered to be morally bad. When a person acts on impulse, and the impulse is related to habit, then the person's freedom is very clearly restricted. The person's ability to understand is restricted due to the force of habit. If that person decides to engage in an activity which is morally bad, due to the influence of a "bad habit", then that person's ability to choose what is good is affected in a morally relevant way.
Quoting Dan
This seems contradictory. You can evaluate consequences without knowing them?
Quoting Dan
Sure, you can provide all sorts of examples like these, but they are simply manufactured, and do not actually justify the claim as to your ability to make such cause/effect judgements. You say, remembering something funny causes you to experience happiness, by ignoring the possibility that being happy may be what causes you to remember something funny. So your claim is merely self-deception, by framing things in a way which supports what you happen to believe.
Quoting Dan
This is a misrepresentation. I did not say that contemplation increases freedom, I said that the freedom derived from not choosing enables contemplation. The two are entwined in a mutual feedback relation. We might represent not choosing as the cause of deliberation, or vise versa, it really doesn't matter. And, that is why it escapes the consequentialist conceptual structure, cause/effect is not relevant. So, just like in your example,( happiness/remembering something funny), whichever is the cause, and which is the effect needs to be taken as irrelevant, because it cannot be decisively determined. Because of this consequentialism is inapplicable.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That's right, if "freedom" is assigned the highest value, then no habit can be good, as it detracts from freedom.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
What you are showing is that perhaps freedom ought not be the measure of value. This can be approached from another direction as well. Living beings such as humans have a natural tendency to be active, so acting is a natural good. From this perspective, doing something is better than doing nothing. And, "doing something" means that your freedom is restricted by the inclination to do something, what we call "good". So "good" is an action. And doing nothing, deliberating and contemplating, is a means toward determining the good action.
What I was hoping to show is that freedom can't be thought of purely in terms of a power/potency. Nor can it be thought of something standing over and against the good. What you describe isn't just counter intuitive, it is contradictory.
A freedom defined in purely negative terms, as "freedom from any constraint," collapses into its opposite, a "total inability to choose anything." Any determinancy in thought or action becomes a constraint on freedom. In this way, "absolute freedom," the "freest we could possibly be," turns out to be a state where choice is impossible since any determinant choice is a fall from absolute freedom as pure potency.
Yet "the inability to choose anything," is the exact opposite of what is meant by "freedom." The term has collapsed into its own negation. Hence, the concept must negate its negation. We need a synthesis, a conception of freedom in terms of the self-determining capacity to actualize determinant ends.
However, total self-determination reveals its own contradictions. For we can imagine an individual with preternatural self-control and self-knowledge and still rightly ask, "but what will they choose to do?"
If freedom is defined without any reference to the Good, then there is no determinant end to which the "perfectly rational and self-determining agent," should tend. Why do one thing over any other? If this question can be answered with reason, there is no issue. But what if we claim that it cannot be answered by reason, that the (practical and moral) Good is unrelated to freedom? Then it seems that our perfectly self-determining agent must, in the end, be determined by what is wholly arbitrary. Their judgements of "what is truly best," do not flow from reason, but from "nowhere at all." Perfectly rational agents will all tend towards different goals because their goals are ultimately undetermined. But arbitrariness is the opposite of self-determining freedom.
Again, freedom has become its own negation.
Thus, in the end, perfected freedom must tend towards the Good, towards a determinant end, towards what is considered "truly best," and not towards what is chosen for "no reason at all."
We have here skipped over the issue of social freedom. Since any agent can deprive others of their freedom, or the chance to develop their freedom, there must also be some degree to which the freedom of agents is harmonized for freedom to be perfected. And this sort of social freedom must tend towards some determinant end as well. A society that organizes itself based on no determinant end would ultimately be ordered by arbitrariness. A society organized around "maximizing freedom," will be a society oriented towards arbitrariness when freedom is conceptualized as mere "freedom from constraint/determinancy."
This is a fairly Hegelian presentation of the problem, but the vision of freedom is widely consistent with Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, etc. as well as the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox/Coptic conceptions of freedom one finds in the Philokalia.
It is really more with Locke and other early moderns that we see the collapse of conceptions of freedom towards arbitrariness, and this sort of view became dominant by the 20th century. I consider this to be a major part of the "crisis of ethics."
To your second point, and using the same example, murdering someone as a habit would violate my victim's freedom, but it wouldn't violate mine. In this hypothetical, could have not done that and should have not done that.
Claiming that I am merely deceiving myself about my own mental states, or their order, if it conflicts with your claim that I can't observe cause and effect relationships in my mind seems like the classic, unfalsifiable refrain of the psychological egoistic when faced with altruism. It seems like if a specific memory (or for that matter a specific experience) reliably and repeatably evokes specific emotional states in me, then it would be reasonable to say one caused the other.
A mutual feedback relation appears to be a cause and effect relation, at least regarding the persistence of the thing, if not it's initial inception.
Also, regarding not knowing the likely consequences of an action, are you assuming expected value consequentialism? Because it seems that actual value consequentialism doesn't need to know the "likely" consequences of an action to evaluate it, only the actual consequences that followed from an action. That's not really relevant to the main point though, and either one would have issues if you really couldn't evaluate the consequences of actions if they involve mental states. Luckily, that appears to not be the case.
To say that there is nothing they "should" choose is different. They should choose what is morally right. Not because that is what rationality dictates but because that is what it means for something to be morally right. Morality is the categorical imperative, the thing we should do regardless of our desires. Why should we do what's right? Because that is what "should" means.
Right, I don't mean to deny all particularity here. There are relative goods and these will be assessed by different people based on their own unique context. In the real world people also operate under significant constraints: imperfect information and finite reasoning capabilities.
However, look at your last sentence. If people's choosing what they choose is "based on what they want," and this is to fix the problem of arbitrariness, then what people desirethe good they seek in actionhas to be something determined rationally. Such "wants" have to follow from something, to be grounded in "reasons."
People should choose to do what is right because "right" means "you should choose this?" IDK, this is precisely the sort of thing that makes people say contemporary ethics just collapses into emotivism. "It just is," sounds unconvincing.
Plus, I'd tend to side with Aristotle on the intuition that the virtuous person should enjoy their virtue, or even Plato's view that the good person loves being good. If the good is not desirable then goodness is a limit on freedom. Goodness ends up being an unpleasant thing that constrains our freedom to the extent that we find it bindingwhich is strange if goodness also just [I]is[/I] maximizing freedom. This is especially odd if we think one of the good things about freedom is precisely that it lets us avoid what we dislike and attain what we find good.
Less "it just is" and more, "if morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act regardless of their wants, then asking why they ought to follow it is a bit pointless".
Goodness isn't a limit on our freedom. If I have many options and am free to pursue any of them, but only some (or one) of them is the right option that I should pursue, that doesn't limit my freedom at all. It may be helpful to think of freedom as allowing moral agents to determine what they do with their lives. Rather than proscribing that there is a good life everyone should pursue, the good is in each person being able to determine what they pursue, or don't pursue, by being able to make choices regarding what belongs to them. If you want to pursue creating great art at the expense of your own happiness, that's fine, it isn't morally better or worse than pursuing your own happiness, it's just personal preference. Where morality comes in is if someone takes away your choices (the ones that belong to you) that allow you to do so. The good is really just removing the bad, and the bad is in moral agents not being able to make use of the faculties that make them moral agents in the first place.
Yeah, I think that it is incorrect that people will necessarily enjoy their virtue (that is how I am interpreting your use of "should" here, correct me if I'm wrong) or doing the right thing. Doing what is right might well be a pain in the proverbial. It seems entirely plausible that one might not wish to help someone, but do so because it is their duty. Further, while their motives would not be morally relevant, I might think that the person who does the right thing because it's right (What Kant might call acting from duty) even when they don't personally want to more praiseworthy than the person who does good and always wants to and enjoys it.
Right, this is truth, determinacy is a constraint on freedom. Why try to deny it?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Nothing I said makes choice impossible. It's just a matter of recognizing as fact, that to choose is to intentionally limit your own freedom. What's wrong with that? Our freedom is significantly limited by the circumstances in which we live, so there is never the issue of "absolute freedom" anyway. Where do you get that idea from? However, it is the case, that not choosing is a way to sustain one's maximum freedom.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
You are misrepresenting what I said. It is not "the inability to choose anything", it is a case of willfully not choosing anything. The ability to choose remains, therefore choice is not impossible as you claim, it's simply a matter of none of the possible choices appearing to warrant being chosen at the present time. As a result of not choosing, one maintains the freedom to choose, and perhaps as time passes, one choice may appear to warrant choosing, or another possibility, which hadn't been apprehended earlier may enter the mind. The latter is the obvious benefit of not choosing. One's freedom with respect to that specific choice is maintained, and at a later time a better option may appear, and the person is still free to choose that, having not already chosen something else.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Right, this is the exact nature of "freedom", there is no specific end toward which the agent "ought" to be inclined. This allows the agent maximum capacity to act according to the circumstances, not being constrained by any sense of "ought". What's wrong with that? That is what survival requires, the maximum capacity to act according to the circumstances. So if survival is important to the agent, then freedom from "the Good" is justified.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
You seem to be forgetting about the natural constraints of the circumstances within which one lives. The existence of such is obvious. The agent's judgements are not arbitrary, nor do they flow from "nowhere at all", they are produced in accordance with the agent's understanding of one's circumstances. Furthermore, since no two sets of circumstances are the same, the agent must have maximum possible freedom of choice to be able to best deal with any possible set of circumstances.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Like I just explained, it is not a matter of arbitrariness, because the circumstances we find ourselves in are not arbitrary. The circumstances are however, to a large degree, unpredictable and often dangerous. This necessitates that the agent must have maximum freedom of choice to be able to best deal with whatever comes one's way. Your conclusion of "arbitrariness" is completely unfounded because you completely ignore the natural constraints of circumstances.
Quoting Dan
Acting out of habit clearly does restrict one's freedom. The habit forms an inclination which prevents the person from choosing to do otherwise, in a way contrary to what the habit inclines, therefore restricting the person's freedom of choice to do otherwise. That is why habits are so difficult to break. The person's freedom to choose an activity other than the habitual activity is greatly restricted due to the force of the habit. Notice that the habit is described as an acting force of influence. It doesn't make the contrary choice impossible, but it still acts as a restriction.
Quoting Dan
I don't quite understand "murdering someone as a habit", unless you are saying that the person is in the habit of murdering people. If so, I agree that the person could have not done the murder. But that is not the issue. The issue is that to have not done a murder, the person would first have to break the habit. And breaking the habit requires the will power, and forcing oneself not to choose (as I explained earlier) what one is inclined toward choosing. So the person is free to not murder, but to exercise that freedom, the person, being influenced by habit, first needs the will power to abstain, and not to choose to murder. This restraint from choosing is what enables the person's freedom not to murder, because the person is already inclined to choose to murder. So the person's freedom to not murder is only actualized by the person's will not to choose, because if the person allowed oneself to choose the choice would be to murder, by the force of the habit.
Quoting Dan
None of this justifies your claim that one might have a clear determination of which is cause and which is effect.
Quoting Dan
By deferring to "the actual consequences that followed from an action, you are further demonstrating the reliance on observation and inductive reasoning.
I'm still waiting for you to show a reliable way to demonstrate the likely consequences of mental activity. An angry person for example might yell, or get violent, or turn and walk away. How could you know which is most probable?
I mean, I think I can have a reaosnably clear understanding of mental causes and effects in the same way that I can have a reasonably clear understanding of causes and effects outside of my mind. By observing that one follows the other, theorizing a causal mechanism that explains how one might cause the other, and then testing that casual mechanism in ways that attempt to falsify it. Obviously our minds are complex, but so is the world, there are plenty of confounding variables to be had in both. The assertion that we can know causes and effects in one but not the other seems unsupported.
Whether the consequences of an action are good or bad is not the same as whether we know whether they are good or bad, but I agree that the latter does rely on observation (though induction is less clear). I would say that describing what is "most probable" in terms of an action leading from a mental state is probably inappropriate as it involves a choice. But predicting how a thought might lead to an emotion seems doable. Also, I fundamentally disagree that not choosing increases ones freedom, so all of this discussion about whether or not we can see the consequences of not choosing and instead engaging in contemplation (which does seem to be implied by what you are saying), is really just debating an ancillary claim you made.
Perhaps I should have spelled it out a bit more, it is not that action is physically impossible. Rather the issue is that at it is impossible for any determinant thought or action not to make someone less free. I would maintain though that a vision of freedom where maintaining one's freedom requires a flight from all definiteness is contradictory, for the reasons I have stated. Here, the exercise of freedom itself makes one less free.
I'm not ignoring constraints, although I was speaking in abstract terms. Being determined by circumstance seems like a definite limit on freedom however.
I am not really sure how this is supposed to be a rebuttal. Freedom seeks no determinant end, but that's ok because the free individual will be prompted along by circumstances outside of their control?
And to the extent that we try to control our circumstances it seems we will have to have some end in mind, no? But if our ends are not determined rationally, but rather as a coping response to circumstance, then it seems to me they are less than fully free.
It seems like "survival" is functioning as the overarching end here. But sometimes it seems like some ends trump survival, e.g. Socrates' acceptance of death. If we are always oriented towards survival rather than what we think is truly best, that will be a constraint on freedom of action. We could consider here the case where Socrates succumbs to cowardice and flees even though he knew he ought not do so. Here, he is not free to do what he thinks is best, but is rather ruled over by circumstance and fear.
If an agent is "oriented towards no specific end," but rather the ends are "determined by circumstance," then how is it not circumstance in the driver's seat? No doubt, we have to deal with the circumstances we face, but freedom would seem to come from mastering them to the extent possible.
I think Plato has a very good argument for why reason has to guide free action. We can't very well be fully free if we don't understand why we are acting or why it is good to do so. But the "rule of the rational part of the soul," would seem to require determinant aims.
I for one think this is great fun, and will definitely be submitting an answer. Some people are being way over-cynical. No one here knows whether you would ultimately follow through or not, but even if you do not, it is an enjoyable dream, and great motivation to put our best philosophical foot forward.
That being said, I do hope for your own sake that you follow through. Being dishonest impairs our ability to freely make a rational choice on whether to expend the time and energy in participation, and so is deeply immoral :P
Do you plan on engaging with your respondants?
I am indeed very happy to pay out the money if someone comes up with the answer. I have it sitting in an account waiting for just such a person. Yeah, I must admit that I find that cynicism frustrating. Scepticism is great, and you certainly shouldn't believe everything you read on the internet, but automatically assuming that everyone is out to get you seems like a fairly poor filter as well. I like to run an assignment in my environmental ethics class where students submit arguments on where I should donate a thousand dollars of my own money, with the winning charity recieving that money, and there have definitely been some in the past who just assume the money isn't real.
Yes, I do plan on engaging with respondants.
Note, we are not talking about individuals' willingness to pay here but the aggregate willingness to pursue say "a cure for blindness," versus "a life extending treatment for such and such a disease." Here, the demand curve represents society's total willingness to pay (i.e. to forgo other goods and services) vis-á-vis a choice. This has the benefit of piggybacking off people's free choices in the market.
Now, there is the issue of inequality here but I feel this can be dealt with in a two-pronged fashion:
1. The theory in no way has to endorse current levels of inequality. It is perfectly consistent with much higher levels of redistribution, a strong safety net, inheritance tax, etc. In a more equal society, people's willingness to spend on enhancements of freedom will be a better proxy for goodness.
2. You can equalize individuals' willingness to pay by looking at it in terms of the % share of their total net worth and likely future income.
A third point might be that, all else equal, economic development has been key to securing freedom. It is a great proxy for life expectancy, lower crime, education, etc. In the aggregate, high wealth individuals tend to do much more to spur economic growth (or at least this is a common assumption). As such, the fact that they receive a higher weighting here is not necessarily a bug but rather a feature.
We need not say the invisible hand of the market is perfect here. We need only argue that it is the best measure, that emergent market dynamics direct us towards the greatest promotion of freedom.
And indeed this could also be used to make a strong moral case against oligopoly collusion, rent seeking, etc. while making a good argument for the regulation of monopolies and externalities.
This is only an outline. You could draw on a lot in welfare economics to make this case. It might make more sense to pair such an idea with the concept of a social welfare function so that inequality itself is dealt based on the free choices of members of the society.
Mental constraints are just as much a restriction to one's freedom as physical constraints are. Mental constraints of habit are how social conformity works, and how laws, and rules and training in general, work to restrict one's freedom. It is a very real restriction, because understanding our environment is what prevents us from choosing to do what is physically impossible, also it helps us to avoid mistakes, and all sorts of unnecessary risks.
You might think that there is a clearly delineated separation between physical constraints and mental constraints, but that is not the case. When we start to consider the material body of the human being, and how the physical constraints of the human body influence mental constraints, we see that the two are intertwined, just like feelings and thoughts are, and one is not easily separable from the other.
Quoting Dan
The opposite assertion seems unsupported as well, only supported by some preliminary theory you have presented. Let's compromise then, and agree that we can have some degree of understanding of cause/effect relations in both, the external world observed through sensation, and the internal world observed with the mind. I think you'll agree that the issue is the causal relation between the two, not the causal relations of one or the other.
Suppose "free" means that there is not a direct cause/effect relation from the external to the internal. If there was such a direct relation, all of our thoughts would be directly caused by our sensations of the external, consequently our decisions and actions as well would be, and we'd have no free will. So, we assume that there is no direct relation of causal necessity, this supports "free will". Also it serves as the foundation for "freedom" which you say ought to be protected.
To be able to protect it, don't we need to be able to understand it a bit? Would you agree that we need to assume a source of activity within, which is not caused by external activity, as the base, the foundation, which makes "freedom" possible, and therefore that which needs to be protected?
Quoting Dan
I now believe I understand why you disagree with the principle that choosing restricts one's freedom. You do not believe that states of mind, or mental activities in general, can be constraints or restrictions on one's freedom. Consider for example, that choosing X restricts my freedom to choose not-X, not in an absolute way though, until I carry out actions associated with X, because I could still change my mind. But once I choose X, the likelihood of me choosing not-X is greatly reduced, because I will no longer consider not-X as a possibility.
Do you agree that free will requires an internal source of activity, without external causation as proposed above? If you do, then you'll see that there must also be internal restrictions to this internally sourced activity, or else it would have no direction, and be random in its effects. But it does have direction, and this is due to the restrictions imposed by mental activities like thoughts, decisions, and states of mind. As described above, the restrictions are not absolute, and do not make the contrary action impossible, they just guide the actions in a favourable direction. This is the way laws work, they do not make the illegal activity impossible, they just serve to guide activity in a favourable direction. But just because they do not make the restricted activity impossible, this does not mean that they are not restrictions on freedom nonetheless.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't see that your "reasons" were well thought out. You assumed an absolute freedom, which is clearly not what I was talking about.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Circumstances are not "definite" though, as things are constantly changing. That's the issue, we live in a world of constant change, where many things are by nature indefinite.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
How are these two different? Coping with circumstance may be the end which guides the rational mind.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
What one thinks is "truly best" is subjective, meaning that one's "good" actions are dependent on the opinion of the subject. Coping with circumstances is objective, making one's "good" actions dependent on the activities of the object.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't see why you think that this puts circumstances in the driver's seat. When you drive a car, and you avoid obstacles which come up in front of you, the objects are not in the driver's seat.
But you're right, freedom comes from mastering the circumstances, that's exactly the point. So if freedom is the highest value, then mastering circumstances is the means. And, if we get to the point where the circumstances are completely mastered, not just "to the extent possible", then we can set another goal, produced from this new perspective.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think that using reason to deal with circumstances is a very good example of using reason to guide free action.
My first questions are:
1. What about things that people don't generally think of "paying" for?
2. Isn't aggregating in this way functionally the same as using a majority to resolve conflicts, except with economic flavor?
I'm not sure what you take the opposite assertion to be in this context, so I dont know whether i agree or not.
I mean, I certainly wouldn't go so far as to say that external states can't cause internal states, but yes I would agree with the general point that free will requires our actions to be caused by us in a way that is not just a part of a deterministic causal chain. And yes, I would agree that we need to be able to understand it a bit. And I think we do understand it a bit. Not fully, but given that what we are trying to protect is a person's ability to understand and make choices, and we can understand the ways in which that can be prevented from happening (or many of them at least), then it seems like we can get some good protecting done without having a full understanding of how free will works.
No, I'm perfectly happy to say that a state of mind could reduce freedom. I just don't think that the ones you are talking about do.
Perhaps I can clarify with an example. Let's say I choose to chop off my leg. This prevents me from doing a bunch of stuff with it in the future, but this is not problematic. So long as I am choosing to remove/destroy the thing, then I am choosing to give up those things and therefore my freedom over them.
In the same way, if I choose to have a sandwich for breakfast instead of eggs on toast, I might be giving up the other (I mean, I could have both, but I wouldn't want to), but it's my choice to make (assuming some things about access to the foods in question). The making of the choice doesn't restrict my freedom, it exercises it.
Money is just used as a proxy for opportunity costs. Money is a good proxy because society is, in an important sense, organized around it. Moreover, we have lots of data on it. Yet it isn't a perfect proxy.
Ultimately, what you "pay" for [I]any[/I] experience or thing is what you give up to get itthe "opportunity cost." For instance, walking with your sister at the park doesn't cost money, but it does mean giving up everything else you could have done during that time period (including earning money).
Wealth itself has decreasing marginal utility. Going from earning $20,000 a year to $120,000 is life changing, huge. Going from $120,000 to $220,000 is still a big deal, but it doesn't totally shift your options in the way the first move does. Whereas moving from $1,120,000 to $1,220,000 is not going to be super noticable and for the very rich an extra $100,000 is a rounding error they won't notice (even if they do care a lot about it due to the vice of pleonexia, "grasping.")
You see this in the backbending labor curve. As people make more money per hour they want to work more to get that high pay. But at a certain high level of pay they will start wanting to work less, to have time to enjoy what that money can give them.
This also helps fix the problem of inequality, in the money is "worth more" (in terms of utility) for those who have less of it.
As to the second point, I am not sure if this necessarily leads to democratization. People who aren't directly affected by something like a cure for blindness don't really participate in that market. There is a sort of aggregation here, but it is, at least according to most economists' assumptions, the aggregation of rational agent's choices based on their opportunity costs.
Obviously, I think this is open to critique at the level of how freedom is defined and the assumption that people are automatically "rational agents," making choices in an unconflicted manner. On the standard economic account, we end up assuming the heroin addict has simply made a rational calculation based on how much utility heroin is worth to him, versus other opportunity costs. This seems to be a bad assumption to me, but it is common (or at least we assume this is unproblematic in the aggregate, that movement away from rationality is just random noise that still tends to some mean).
Right, but mastering circumstances [I]towards what end?[/I] Presumably we want to take control of circumstances to direct them towards some end we find good, else why bother trying to shape them at all?
Why do we find such ends good in the first place? Instinct? Passion? Taste? It seems to me that we will be most free when we fully understand why we pursue the ends we pursue and when we understand these ends to be good ends through a rational process.
Perhaps the natural end our behavior tends towards is survival, but once survival is assured how are new ends chosen? If it's not via a process involving some sort of rational reflection, in which ends are chosen based on what truly best, it seems like the problem of arbitrariness creeps back in. For example, to be determined by instinct alone, without any understanding of why the way one acts is choiceworthy, seems to be a less than fully free action. To be ruled over by instinct is to be ruled over by a mere part of oneself, to not fully fathom [I]why[/I] one is acting. For it seems totally possible that we might judge the ends the passions and appetites drive us towards as inferior ends, as not truly choiceworthy.
And it seems to me that survival can be superceded as an endthat we can recognize higher ends (e.g. Socrates, St. Paul, Boethius, Origen, etc.)
The point though, is that the way that laws work is through social conformity and habit. It doesn't make sense to say that laws are a restriction, but the means by which the laws work to constrain us are not restrictions. Do you see what I mean? The law says I better not steal, and it's a restriction on my freedom because it threatens me with jail time. So I decide that I better not steal, and I create habits which always incline me away from that idea of taking the thing, if such an idea ever starts to come into my mind.
Why do you think that the law qualifies as a restriction on my freedom, yet the ideas and habits which the law helps to form in my mind, and which is what actually causes me to behave in a restricted way, are not restrictions on my freedom? The "real" restrictions are the ideas and thinking patterns within my mind, in the realm of ideas and mental activity. The external law just provides incentive for me to create those restrictions within my mind. This is what Plato showed in The Republic, the realm of ideas is more immediate to use, and so it is where the real causal power is. Today we understand this as "ideology", an the effect which ideology has on the actions of human beings.
Quoting Dan
I follow your example well, but I think that what you need to consider is the effects of training, ideology, and even what we used to call brainwashing. Human beings are mostly not leaders, but follows, staying safe in the midst of the herd. As such they are very gullible. When we see all the many institutions which direct people in a good way, like educational institutions, and legal institutions, we overlook how all these things are really robbing people of their freedom, because the institutions are set up to do this for "the good". But people who do not get drawn in, and persuaded by that ideology, might become wayward, and they may be directed in many different ways.
The point being that when a person makes a bad choice, you say that was their freedom to make that bad choice, and now they must live with the consequences of having made that bad choice. But this does not get to the real issue, which is why the person made the bad choice. Something misled them. The "why", why did they make that choice, I classified under "ideology", their ideology misled them. Now freedom and the goal of protecting that underlying principle which provides for freedom becomes very problematic because the lazy mind likes to follow the herd and is therefore gullible to be misled by ideology. So the underlying inclination is to neglect that principle of freedom which you wish to protect, follow the herd, and be led or misled accordingly.
Suppose I am raising my children, and I homeschool them, and do everything I can to promote free thinking and a very open mind. This I do to protect their freedom of choice from the ideologies of "the system", as i am in disagreement with that ideology.. Unless I feed them some other ideologies about "good behaviour", and instill an acceptable ideology within their minds, they may develop a hole there, which amounts to a lack of direction. Then they would be exceptionally gullible, and could be preyed upon by others with bad intentions.
What i am saying is that there's a risk going to far in protecting the principle of freedom. We want a person to develop a good strong capacity to reason, and make one's own choices from an open mind, but at the same time we want that person to be directed so as the choices are within a specific range of "good" choices. And to determine "good choices" we look to something like consequentialism.
I think we might apply Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. The principle of freedom which you want to protect is at one end of the scale, one extreme. To protect this implies allowing the person to be free from ideologies which may be harmful, to have an open mind and not to be influenced by prejudice. At the other extreme is the ideological "good" of consequentialism. We see that there is a need to have a person trained to be naturally inclined toward what is considered as good. Virtue, lies somewhere between these two extremes as the mean between them.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think it's like I said. Once we learn how to master the circumstances, then we might be able to understand why this is good.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't think that these are examples of people recognizing higher ends rather than that they recognize that there is higher ends. I do not deny that there is higher ends, I just think that we need to address the issues which are present to us now, fulfil the immediate ends. It's a matter of taking things one step at a time. We know that we need to climb the ladder. We cannot see the top, and we have no idea where the ladder leads. However, we can always see the next step and we can work to get to the top of it. After that, we'll be able to see the next step.
I mean, the type of freedom is quite a limited one already. It isn't the freedom to do anything that is to be protected, it is the freedom to make choices over what belongs to the person in question. If you want to steal my car and prevent you doing that, that hasn't violated your freedom in a morally relevant way (depending on how I do the preventing) because stealing my car was not your choice to make.
So, the law is a threat to restrict one's freedom, the habit is an actual restriction of one's freedom.
Quoting Dan
What is the principle you are claiming here? People attempt to steal cars all the time. Clearly, to steal your car is a choice which can be made. Are you saying that since you believe that you have the capacity to prevent me from stealing your car, (dissuade, threaten, kill me, or whatever it takes), this means that I cannot choose to steal your car? I think that if you really believe that, you are delusional.
Obviously you are confusing potential (theoretical) restrictions to one's freedom of choice, with actual (practical) restrictions to one's freedom of choice. In practise, my freedom of choice is primarily restricted by the internal workings of my body, brain, and mind, through things that influence my thoughts and feelings. Your potential actions of persuasion and threats have a secondary position by being able to influence my thoughts in a secondary way, through my use of my senses. And if you act in a way of physical violence to prevent me from carrying out what I choose, then this is not a restriction on my freedom of choice, it is a restriction on my freedom to act. In this case, my freedom of choice allows that I can choose to do what is physically impossible to do. That is actually a common situation in the case of mistaken actions.
I believe I mentioned this distinction between the freedom to choose and the freedom to act, earlier, briefly. If someone chooses to do what is physically impossible for that person to do, and this is evident to the person, this is an indication of irrationality, being unreasonable. So if it is the case that you have made it clear to me, that if I move to steal your car, you will physically prevent me from doing this with an act of violence, then I would be irrational to continue with that act. However, in some cases of demonstrating a point, one might rationally choose what is known to be physically impossible, to bring attention to one's conditions, as an instance of protest or something like that.
No, a habit isn't a restriction of one's freedom.
No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. As I mentioned in the primer, the kind of freedom being protected here is specifically over those choices that belong to you. Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car.
Freedom of choice vs freedom to act is not a distinction I am drawing. When I talk about "freedom" in this context, I mean the ability of persons to understand and make those choices that belong to them. But that does include being able to actually do the thing. But yes, this includes freedom to actually do the thing, rather than just choose it in an abstract sense.
So says you, but I say you do not understand freedom and the true nature of its restrictions.
Quoting Dan
When you say "morally speaking" you imply that I ought not make that kind of choice. But oughts, moral principles, do not restrict one's freedom, they give us rules which serve as guidance in our decision making. The actual decisions are what restrict one's freedom.
Therefore I get to make choices concerning your property whenever I want, and I refer to moral guidance whenever I do. Nothing restricts my freedom to do this, even though some would say that I ought not covet any property of anyone else. However, it is the responsibility of each individual to follow the moral principles, and establish ways of curbing one's own inclinations toward making choices which one ought not make. The principal way of restricting one's own freedom of choice is by developing good habits. This is begun when we are very young, being trained by our caregivers, and it continues through schooling, and to some extent throughout our lives.
Quoting Dan
Whether the choice "belongs" to me or not, is irrelevant. The issue is whether I have the capacity to freely make that choice. And clearly I do. Therefore it is incorrect for you to say that I don't get to make a choice on this matter. If I didn't get to make a choice in this sort of matter, then every time I was inclined toward taking someone else's property, I would, and every time that I wasn't inclined to take someone else's property I wouldn't, because there would be no decision making going on, no choices, I would be acting on impulse. However, what is really the case, is that every time that I get inclined toward taking someone else's property I decide not to. Therefore I truly do make choices concerning whether or not to take someone else's property. Because I am morally responsible, I decide not to. But for you to say that I don't get to make choices in this matter is nothing but a falsity.
Quoting Dan
I've noticed that. However, I think it is very important to make this distinction if you desire to understand freedom. Otherwise you'll believe that just because I am not free to actually steal your car, because you will kill me if I try, I am also not free to choose to steal your car, which the act of you killing me would demonstrate that I am free to make that choice. See, the very nature of "punishment" demonstrates that we are free to choose what we are not free to do. Therefore the distinction is a requirement if we want to understand freedom.
It doesn't matter whether you are habituated to good action or bad action, both are still available to you. You have free will and your habits do not get in the way of you exercising that to choose to do good, or do bad.
Whether that choice belongs to you is very much morally relevant, because that is the type of freedom that FC is trying to protect: that over those choices that belong to the person in question.
Now you've lost me. You appear to equivocate with "belong". Your car belongs to you. A choice which I freely make has no moral value because it does not belong to me. Are you insinuating that a choice I make is not my choice?
Quoting Dan
I think you are in denial, refusing to recognize the reality of the situation. When a person is habituated in a specific way, that person naturally proceeds in the way of the habit any time that the circumstances warrant that activity. Your behaviour in this discussion provides a real example. Through your education you have been inclined to think in a specific way about freedom. This habituation of your thinking patterns closes your mind to what I am saying, so you continually deny that what I am saying is the truth.
Maybe it will help to understand if we characterize habits as neural patterns. Once initiated, the pattern is followed, restricting the possibility of choice in that thought. That habituated way of thinking is a restriction on the person's freedom to choose and to act.
If you studied Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas, instead of whatever philosophy you did study, you would understand that habits truly do get in the way of one's freedom to choose and do what is good. Directed by Socrates, Plato questioned the relation between virtue and knowledge. It was claimed at the time, that virtue is a form of knowledge. However, Socrates demonstrated that a person can know what is good, yet not do it. Augustine, delved much deeper into this subject, how it is possible that a person knows what is good, yet may consistently act in a contrary way. Aquinas developed the role of "habit" in restricting one's capacity to choose to do what one knows is good. In other words, the person has the knowledge of what they ought to do in the circumstances, yet does otherwise, because the person's freedom to choose to do what is good is compromised by the person's preexisting habits.
Quoting Dan
This statement appears to rely on an incoherent sense of "belong". You appear to be saying that when a person chooses to do something while under the influence of habit, the choice does not "belong" to the person. I assume that criminals will be using that defence in court. "I am not responsible for my criminal activities because those choices don't belong to me." Are you saying that a person is not responsible for one's habitual actions because the choices involved don't belong to the person, they come from the teacher? is that how you account for education? A person acquires ways of thinking from one's teachers, such that the ways of thinking involved don't actually belong to the person who acquires them?
No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property.
I am not "in denial", though I am denying the truth of your assertion. I do not lack understanding, your claim just isn't so.
You can characterize them as neural pathways if like, but a reinforced neural pathway does not prevent a person from choosing to think differently.
People are able to act against their habits and, in some cases, they are morally required to do so. Knowing the right thing to do and not doing it does not show that you were unable to do it.
No, I am not saying that being "under the influence of habit" affects whether a choice belongs to a person at all. I am saying that habits are not a relevant factor because they don't restrict freedom. I am also saying, seperately, that the only freedom that is morally relevant is the kind over those things which belong to us. These are two seperate claims.
No, no, no, this is not true at all. The most morally valuable choices we make are concerning others, when we help them, or choose to hurt them. You know, like "love thy neighbour". The choices derived from that principle concern other persons.
Quoting Dan
Remember, I didn't say that a habit restricts freedom in an absolute sense, it restricts in the sense of facilitating one specific decision at the expense of others. It doesn't make it impossible to choose otherwise, as will power, and the will to break a habit demonstrate. It restricts by making one choice the easy choice and anything else much more difficult.
Quoting Dan
I've been through this already. I'm not talking about absolute restriction, making something impossible. I am talking about restrictions in the same sort of way that laws restrict us. Laws don't make criminal activity impossible, yet they are understood to restrict our freedom.
Quoting Dan
You are inconsistent, because you say that laws restrict our freedom, but habits do not.
I mean, I think I disagree, but I'm also not saying that the choices can't involve other people.
What I am claiming is that the measure of moral value is the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. By "their own choices" I mean choices over those things that belong to them, their minds, bodies and property.
I mean, a choice being "difficult" in that sense is morally irrelevant. It's not a real restriction on the choice.
Again, laws restrict our freedom because they come with threats attached. If laws didn't carry the threat of punishment, they wouldn't restrict our freedom either.
I really do not think that this could suffice for a foundation of "moral value". It requires a determination, or judgement as to what qualifies as "one's property". This begs the question of the right to ownership. This would place laws and government, which determine ownership, as logically prior to moral principles. The principles which determine ownership would be amoral, being outside of morality. Then those with power would dictate who owns what.
Quoting Dan
I don't know about you, but I find that difficulty is a very real restriction on choice. If there is a very easy way, and a very difficult way, to achieve the same end, no one would choose the difficult way. Clearly the degree of ease or difficulty is a real restriction on one's freedom of choice. Look, if I apprehend something as so difficult that it is impossible, the restriction becomes virtually absolute, I will not choose to do what I know is impossible.
Quoting Dan
I know, but you are not paying attention to the way that threats can restrict freedom of choice. The threats only act to deter the deciding agent, through the person's mind, via thoughts. The threat of punishment makes me think twice about stealing your car. It is this activity of thinking, I might get caught, I might get punished, which is what really restricts my freedom of choice. Threats of punishment don't deter, and therefore don't restrict the freedom of, the person who doesn't care, or who doesn't think about getting caught. Therefore it is not the threat of punishment which restricts freedom, but the thinking of the person who apprehends the threat of punishment, which restricts the freedom. This is no different from the restriction of freedom involved with the choice about something which is difficult to do. One restricts freedom with the thought of "I can't do that, I might get caught and get punished", while the other restricts freedom with the thought of "I can't do that, it's too difficult".
Difficult and impossible are not the same thing. Further, people do choose difficult things all the time. Further, not wanting to do something and not being able to are not the same thing.
That is like saying that nailing your hands to a wall doesn't restrict your freedom, since it is your hands that are preventing you from moving. The two thoughts are not morally similar, as one requires the person to choose while their freedom is at risk (due to the threat of punishment) while the other is just someone choosing not to do something.
You know, there is always reasons behind one's choices, whether it's a threat, a deadline, love, friendship, hate, revenge, or one of a myriad of personal goals. Your characterization of "the other is just someone choosing not to do something", appears to be intended to mislead. There is no such thing as "just someone choosing", choices are made for a reason, or reasons.
The issue is whether a choice is unduly restricted. We live in a dangerous world, one's freedom is always at risk, that is why we ought not take decision making lightly. However, the issue is not the ways in which one's freedom is at risk, it is the ways in which one's freedom is actually restricted. Nailing a person's hands to a wall is not analogous with a threat. This is why you need to differentiate between the freedom to choose and the freedom to act. It's one thing for you to deter my freedom of choice with a threat, and quite a different thing for you to restrict my freedom to act on a choice I've freely made, with physical violence.
No, the threat really does restrict your freedom. It isn't just a reason to act, it is coercing you to act in a way by threatening your freedom. Choosing to do someone for the other reasons you mentioned is not the same, as the choice is free and not coerced.
A threat to one's freedom is not an actual restriction of one's freedom.
So we're right back to square one. Coercion restricts one's freedom by having an influence on the way one thinks, and therefore one's choice, just like habits restrict one's freedom by influencing the way that one thinks, and therefore one's choice. It is the person's choice which actually restricts the person freedom to act, not the threat, because the person could choose to disregard the threat. Therefore the threat is not a real restriction. You say that a threat coerces, but only if it succeeds, and the fact that it may fail demonstrates that it doesn't actually restrict one's freedom to choose. The necessity required for causation is lacking. It's something else (how the person who is coerced responds to the threat) which actually does the restricting.
Your refusal to acknowledge the reality of the restrictions on the freedom of choice, and the freedom to act, is just evidence that the habits of a closed mind restrict one's freedom to adequately judge an hypothesis.
:lol:
It's not hard to get people here to do your philo work. You don't need to offer them money. Just say, "hey, I have this neat new ethical theory. Try and rip it to shreds." And engage honestly and without ego.
I explained why the person's choice is restricted by habit. The habit prevents the person from properly considering other options. This is a very real and very strong restriction to one's freedom to choose. The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. The person is free to choose any option, but literally cannot choose an option which doesn't come to mind. The best option may not come to mind, due to the person\s preexisting habits of thinking, so the person's freedom to choose that option is restricted accordingly.
And, back to the point we started with, making a choice restricts one's freedom in much the same way. The choice is made, and the person proceeds accordingly. Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise.
This isn't a restriction. I'm with Dan on this. A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I wouldn't be surprised if Dan just laughs at this. It's nonsensical.
But that is exactly the case with Dan's perspective. Dan thinks laws, and the threat of punishment are restrictions. But these do not prevent one from carrying out those acts. Neither of us assumes that it is necessary that a restriction prevents in an absolute sense, to be a "restriction", so this criticism is completely irrelevant.
This is why we need to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act. Here we have the basis for impossibility, restriction in an absolute sense. Some things chosen are impossible to achieve in actions due to physical restrictions. This is the case when someone is physically prevented with violence for example. Physical impossibility is an absolute restriction, making the chosen act impossible.
And, in the context of freedom of choice some options are impossible for a person to chose because they are not present to the person's mind. Do you agree that a person is unable to choose an option which is not within that person's mind? This would be the case when the person has a lack of knowledge for example. An observer with more complete knowledge would say that the person should have chosen X, but in reality it was impossible for the person to have chosen X because the person did not have that knowledge. This impossibility of choice is comparable to physical impossibility of action.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yes, suggesting a further option makes that option available, and the restriction is no longer complete, absolute, in the sense that this choice is no longer impossible for the person. But that is irrelevant to the fact that this choice was impossible at the prior time.
Now the force of habit is very relevant. If choosing the newly presented option requires thinking in a way not familiar to the person, the option will automatically be rejected. This is very evident in discussions at TPF. People are firmly entrenched in their habits of thought, so that it is extremely difficult to teach them to accept a new perspective. This relates to the attitudes underlying one's use of language, which Wittgenstein talked about in On Certainty, as bedrock propositions or something like that. These underlying principles, which are actually attitudes, are what a person assumes cannot be doubted. This makes it extremely difficult to change a person's habits of thought, and accept a new option which is unacceptable from the perspective of the existing attitude. Therefore mentioning a further option brings that option into the realm of possibility, but existing habits still restrict one from choosing it.
What do you mean by "not really" in this sentence?
"Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really."
Your habits dictate the information available to your thinking mind, information in memories. This is a very real and absolute restriction, you simply cannot dig up information which has been forgotten. And, the way that your mind works, in its habits, greatly restricts your capacity to take on new information. The new information must be taken up in a way which is consistent with the existing way of thinking. If it's not, it's rejected as incomprehensible, or nonsense. This fact is very evident at TPF.
It's a lot more than simply not thinking about something, it's knowledge not held, information not available to that thinking mind. An observer might say option X was available to the person, but if the person was lacking in that information, the option was not available to the person.
I think you're somewhat glossing over the difference. The thread of enforcement creates a materially different scenario. You can - literally - have your freedom removed, rather than be unable to access it (for lack of a better way to delineate). I'm not saying this is the best take, but I think there's a difference here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
These don't follow, to me, so back to my original objection. Though, this goes someway to clarifying:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Just because it didn't occur to you in the moment doesn't mean you aren't capable of having made that choice. Something as simple as having encountered a slightly different shade of green prior to making the decision might have put you in mind of the 'other' option/s.
I think if you were to make your point as one about things you don't know then it could be run, but in it's current form its basically saying "it's in the shadows, so it can't be real" as regards these other options' availability.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
While I think this, and the surrounding notes are great points and well-put, I don't think it affects the difference being noted here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, you very much can. There are entire therapies dedicated to this mechanism. Memories are very, very rarely actually lost. This is why I made the point earlier that, sure, if you didn't know the thing you couldn't drag it up even with the aid of environmental triggers.
This is also a very direct response to your last quote to Dan there. He is 100% correct. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps this is the case for you.
Why do you say that not knowing a specific option doesn't restrict your freedom to choose it? I don't understand what you think freedom is. Do you think freedom is the capacity to do the impossible? That's what it seems like, if you think that a person can choose an option which is not present to the individual's mind.
Quoting AmadeusD
You're not getting anywhere. The threat to -literally- remove one's freedom does not remove the person's freedom. You are jumping from the possibility of loosing one's freedom, to the conclusion that this is an actual restriction on one's freedom. A threat is just that, a threat. It is not an actual restriction to one's freedom, just a threat to it, that is plain and simple. The possibility (threat) of me being locked up in jail if I steal Dan's car, in no way limits my freedom to choose to steal Dan's car. I have a very difficult time believing that neither you nor Dan can understand this. I think that both of you are simply denying the facts because the facts are inconsistent with what you believe.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yes it does mean exactly that. If you truly believe what you say here, explain to me how you think that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the person's mind. If the option did not occur to the person at the moment when the person is making the choice, then the person was not capable of making that choice.
This is actually the issue which Dan and I started with. I said that making a choice restricts your freedom, because you are constrained by that choice made, while not choosing, deliberation and contemplation, provides you with greater freedom. At the moment when the choice is made, a person is constrained, and restricted, by that choice, and being only capable of choosing the options present to mind at that time. But it is only the act of choosing which forces those restrictions. If the person does not choose, one is allowed to find other options at a later time. If the person chooses, and something comes up later, it's too late to alter the choice already made.
You ought to see that it is logically impossible for a person to be capable of making a choice which does not come to one's mind. "Choice" requires something that is chosen, and the one choosing can only choose from the options present. Therefore it is impossible that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the one's mind.
Quoting AmadeusD
Sure, if something different had happened, then the options might have been different. But we can only take into consideration what actually did happen. Counterfactuals are irrelevant because they refer to what did not happen. And, it is impossible to change what has already happened. Therefore counterfactuals deal with what is impossible, and are therefore irrelevant when considering these possibilities.
The different shade of green did not happen. The other option did not come to the person's mind. It was impossible for the person to choose that other option, when the choice was made, because that option was not present to the person's mind. The person's freedom to choose that option was therefore restricted.
Quoting AmadeusD
I don't understand what you\re trying to say. The other options are not "in the shadows", they are simply not present to the person's mind at the point in time when the decision is made. Since they are not present to the person's mind it is impossible that the person can choose them. It's very simple and straight forward. I really cannot believe that you guys have such a hard time to understand something so obvious.
Quoting AmadeusD
It doesn't even matter if it is possible to drag up the memory or not. What matters is whether the person actually does drag up those particular memories. If the memories are not pulled up, then the person cannot use the information (which may be deep in the mind somewhere anyway) in the decision making process. Not pulling up the information restricts one's freedom of choice by leaving options concealed. It is impossible for the person to choose an option not revealed. This is why habit is so important as a restriction to one's freedom. A lazy habit inclines one not to pull up all the relevant information which is stored in the brain, and this restricts the person's freedom to choose other options.
It's very clear, that lazy thinking habits restrict one's freedom of choice. I find it very difficult to believe that intelligent people like you and Dan actually dispute what is so obvious. Do you not agree that prejudices, biases, and ideologies in general are real restrictions on one's freedom of choice? What about religious faith? Is this not a restriction to one's freedom in your mind? Where would you draw the line? Prejudice, ideology, and religious convictions do not restrict one's freedom, yet respect for the law does restrict one's freedom? How so, by threat? As explained above, threats don't actually restrict one's freedom of choice. I think you and Dan need to reconsider.
For a clear example of how not knowing about an option does not restrict one's choices, let's consider how I might get to work tomorrow. Let's imagine that I am considering driving or walking, but I don't know that a bus route has opened up near my house and goes right by my work. My lack of knowledge about the bus route here doesn't make my choice less free. My freedom isn't restricted by the fact that I could have done things that I didn't know about or just didn't consider. I am still able to apply my rationality to the choice in question and make it freely. That there were other options I didn't consider is not a problem.
OK, so your principle is that freedom of choice is restricted by threats, because a threat is an act of coercion. It appears to me, like restricting one's freedom is something which one person does to another person. And a good example of this is through threat. I have a couple questions.
First, are there specific types of threats which qualify as restricting one's freedom, and other types which do not? For example, if I threaten to not be your friend if you do not share your desert with me, is that a restriction of your freedom? To put it simply, does every instance of "I will punish you if you do not..." constitute a restriction of freedom? Further, does the threat to withhold a reward, or deny a pleasure, constitute a restriction to one's freedom? Suppose for example, a man's wife says "no sex unless you...", does this constitute a restriction to the man's freedom of choice? If it isn't the case that every threat is a restriction to one's freedom, how would you draw the line between ones that are, and ones that aren't?
The next question concerns the possible situation where the person doesn't care about the threat, so that the threat has no effect. Suppose the person puts a gun to someone's head and demands the wallet, and the person says "fuck you" and keeps walking. Is the threat still a restriction to the person's freedom of choice? It doesn't appear like it restricts the person's freedom of choice whatsoever. But this produces a problem. The very same threat might restrict a person's freedom in some cases, and not restrict the person's freedom in others. This becomes more evident in the other examples I gave above, where the punishment threatened is milder. Depending on how the severity of the threat is perceived, some people will respond to the threat, others will not care about it. Then the very same act may or may not restrict the person's freedom
It appears to me, like threats restrict freedom sometimes, but do not restrict freedom other times. Is that a fair conclusion? Depending on how the threatened person responds, freedom may or may not be restricted by a threat. If this is the case, then the restriction of freedom is really an attribute of the response to the threat, not an attribute of the threat itself. This is what I have been arguing, it is the thinking of the threatened person, which follows from the threat, rather than the threat itself, which actually restricts the person's freedom. This is very evident from the fact that some threats "work" while others do not.
Quoting Dan
Obviously, your freedom of choice is restricted in this example. The freedom to choose the bus as your mode of transport was denied from you. That is a restriction to your freedom of choice. Another person who knew about the bus could choose the bus, and therefore that person's freedom has less restrictions than yours.
I think that we need to recognize that in no situation is a person's freedom of choice absolute, it is always restricted to some degree. We always say that a person's choice "is free", but it is also always implied that there are restrictions to a person's capacity to choose. So a person is always capable of making one's choice "freely", but there is also always restrictions to that freedom. Whether or not you knew about the bus does not affect the fact that you made your choice freely, but it does affect the degree of restrictions to your freedom. Not knowing about the bus made your freedom of choice more restricted than someone who knew about the bus, regardless of the fact that you both chose freely. Knowledge affects the restrictions to the freedom, not the freedom itself.
In the case of putting the gun to the person's head, it does restrict their freedom if they think you are actually going to kill them. If the person doesn't believe that, then they haven't really been coerced. That would be a good example of how a threat might restrict someone's freedom or not. That is no more a problem than a bullet not restricting someone's freedom if it missed them. If they believe that you will kill them and don't care, then they have been coerced and their freedom restricted, but they just don't care about the freedom you are threatening.
In the case of the bus, no. My freedom is my ability to understand and make my own choices, which I have here. None of my choices are taken from me, I just don't have all the information I might wish for. I don't need to agree that someone's choices are always restricted because I am setting a much lower bar for being free than you are.
It will become clear why I think two things here:
1. This is unanswerable, as between the two of us (my answer is "no" prima facie, though); and
2. You are not adequately understanding much of what im saying, or overblowing it to caricature.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. Yes it does. The only other option is to say that one is prisoner of their own moral outlook. Which would be weird, to say the least.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Im unsure we're using these words in the same way, if this is your response.
"could have done otherwise" is the metric generally used, and the fact that you know something means it could have come to mind. There's not much more to that, in terms of what we're talking about.
Otherwise, we are never free to choose anything, at any time. We are restricted by our current conscious access to whatever is in our minds and this changes drastically from moment-to-moment depending on environmental triggers (or lack of, i suppose). If you have a different metric you're using, please outline it. You seem to be using post-hoc "Well, it happened in way X therefore way Y wasn't possible" which is clearly wrong. If it's not that, i'll need some help.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
PLainly wrong, pending a better explanation of your fundamental position.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This one is true, but is not what I'm talking about. Once a choice is made, you're not free to choose otherwise due to the law of identity (though, that gets muddled when we're talking about intangibles, but you get the point i'm sure).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, as above. Perhaps this is the issue. You're conflating post-choice with pre-choice. I doubt Dan intends (and I dont) to suggest one can retroactively change one's decision. You could override it, but you can't undo it. Obviously.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, not at all. You're just, for whatever reason, assuming that the example is one in which nothing brings the option to the subject's mind. I have been explicit that this isn't what I'm describing. I've given examples of what, and how that could be, also. I wont repeat here as it looks, weirdly, like you've actually addressed that. We'll see how that goes..
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. It would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time, say after a concussion. It is possible that anything could bring something not currently in ones waking consciousness. Again, your bar is way the hell too high.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Bingo. The bolded response above is exactly what's happening. This explains a lot about our disagreement, and everything you've said is reasonable in light of that. However, that's not what i'm talking about and very clearly so.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This only makes even basic structural sense in a post-hoc description. And it's still essentially wrong, because you're referring to circumstances that could have been otherwise, in a pre-choice world. Clearly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
They are. No idea what you're getting at here. Seems like desperate flailing to get through the conflation of the two scenarios, unfortunately, being cross-discussed. In the pre-choice world they are options that anything could bring to mind. This makes it possible prior to the choice being made. A gust of bloody wind could've done it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, your entire objection seems to be about whether it's possible or not. So, this seems like an admission that your point isn't holding water? If it's possible that another option could occur to the person, then their freedom wasn't stymied. Again, you're retrospectively applying the rigidity of time and its unidirectionality to a clearly in-the-air proposition which at the time was indeterminate. It is only determinate from the post-hoc perspective.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Now we're coming to terms a bit better - so those options are, in fact, 'in the shadows' which you denied earlier in this response. With that on the table, we clearly see the implication differently. That these options are available, but not present, doesn't stymie freedom of choice to me. It seems to, for you. That's fine, but I don't think you're making good arguments for it basically.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. They are obstacles, I'd say, but not restrictions. Having no legs is a restriction on your choice of mobility. Being white restricts your choice of skincare product (or, can). Being a female restricts *insert a laundry list, no pun intended*. Being a dick doesn't (trying to catch your examples, not trying to assume what you mean). But, i see we disagree here. Fine. I don't htink you've made good, or even coherent arguments for it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I literally scoffed. Take that as you will. These aren't facts. Not meaning to be rude - but there are no facts being discussed.
Let me see if I follow you. A threat against one's freedom to act constitutes a restriction to one's freedom of choice, but a threat concerning anything else does not. Does this mean that a threat to take one's property, or threats against other rights which a person has, which do not involve one's "freedom", do not qualify as coercion? Sorry Dan, but your restricted definitions are getting too convoluted and difficult for me to understand.
Quoting AmadeusD
Why do you say this is weird? I think it's not only reality, but obvious. Are you familiar with the concept of original sin? We are all prisoners of our moral outlook, that kind of goes without saying.
Quoting AmadeusD
We must adhere to the facts though. The fact is that the other option did not come to mind. This implies that the reason why the person 'could not make the appropriate choice' is because the person did not put enough effort into the decision making. It does not absolve the person from responsibility, it simply provides an explanation as to why the person made a bad choice. The person has lazy decision making habits which restrict one's freedom of choice.
Quoting AmadeusD
We are always free to choose, we are just not free to choose our restrictions. You seem to believe that a person is free to choose the restrictions which one's own body serves up, as if one could choose one's own body, or one's parents or that kind of thing. There are restrictions to our decision making capacity, which our physical bodies force upon us, which we cannot overcome no matter how much effort we make. So in the process of decision making there is two extremes, the rash, quick decision (which I called the lazy decision above), and also the overly extended, lengthy effort of trying to consider every possible relevant piece of information, when this is impossible for a person's mind to do anyway.
Quoting AmadeusD
No, that's not what I'm saying at all. So I'll repeat. When the person makes a choice, there are specific options present to that person's mind. And; it is impossible for the person to choose an option which is not present to one's mind at the time of choosing. To state it very clearly, in the terms of your example, I am saying that it was not possible for the person to choose Y, if Y was not present to the person's mind as an option at the time when the choice was made.
You look at the situation and you determine Y was possible. I agree, Y was possible. Further, you might judge and say that the person ought to have chosen Y, and I might agree, yes, the person ought to have chosen Y. Further, we might agree that the reason why the person did not choose why is because Y, as an option was not present to that person's mind, if we agree that Y would have been the obvious choice for the person. So, our only point of disagreement seems to be that I say it was impossible for the person to have chosen Y at that time, because Y was not present in the person's mind, as an option, at the time when the decision was made. You seem to think that it is possible for a person to choose an option not present in the person's mind at the time of making the choice. I think that this is impossible.
Quoting AmadeusD
You seem to be agreeing with me, that choice occurs at a point in time. Now, do you understand that weighing options occurs pre-choice? Then a choice is made. Do you see, that when the choice is made, the chooser cannot then proceed to weigh options not brought up, as if the choice wasn't yet made? At this point in time, the point when the choice is made, it is impossible for the chooser to consider options not brought up, because the time of considering options is pre-choice. Therefore it is impossible for the chooser, at the time of making the choice, to consider any options not already present in the mind.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yes, so this is the key point. A choice is made at a point in time. After the choice is made one cannot choose otherwise (except by changing ones mind, reversing the choice). So, at the point in time when the choice is made, if the person has not brought all the relevant information into the decision making process, then the decision making capacity of the person is impaired, restricted, by that failure to bring up the relevant information.
You can argue all you want, that the person could have brought more information to bear on the problem, and therefore could have made an unimpaired, or unrestricted choice, but the simple fact is that in the example, the person did not, and therefore when the person acted to choose, the person's choice was restricted by that habit or laziness, or whatever it was which caused the person to not bring forth the pertinent information.
Quoting AmadeusD
It's my principle, my description, and that is exactly what I am describing, a case when nothing brings the other option to the person's mind. You and I look at the person, and say the person should have seen option Y, but the fact is that the person did not. Now, we have to separate the act of choosing, as a point in time, from the act of bringing forth and analyzing the information, which goes on for a period of time. In that period of time when the person is analyzing the information, for some reason option Y did not come to mind. Then, at a point in time, the person chooses, and I am claiming that the person's freedom of choice is restricted by the fact that option Y did not come to mind. The person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted by not having all the possibilities present. Therefore the person's freedom to choose is restricted The reason why option Y did not come to mind is irrelevant. .What is relevant is that at that point in time, when the person makes the choice, the person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted, therefore the person's freedom of choice is restricted, because that option is not there, in the person's mind.
Quoting AmadeusD
You are not distinguishing between the process of bringing options to mind, and the point in time when the decision is made. You recognize that when the decision is made, it cannot be otherwise, by the law of identity. You also recognize that "it would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time". Now, you need to also recognize that the possibility of something bringing up a thought "not currently" accessible, is an irrelevant possibility, because it would be post hoc to the choice being made. At the point in time when the decision is made, only currently accessible information is relevant. So it does not matter that something could potentially bring up some other information. At the point in time when the choice is made, all the bringing things up in the mind is in the past. Because this is all in the past at that time, it is impossible that something else could enter into the decision making process. It's in the past, therefore it is impossible for it to be otherwise.
Quoting AmadeusD
You are not recognizing the difference between freedom to choose and freedom to act. Having no legs is not a restriction on your freedom of choice, it is a restriction on your freedom to act. Without legs you can still choose to stand up and walk, you just cannot actually do it. People often choose to do things which are physically impossible. And, it is very important to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act because threats appear to restrict one's freedom to act, but they do not restrict one's freedom to choose.
Quoting AmadeusD
We are very clearly discussing facts, the facts about the temporal order of the process of making a choice. It is a fact that a person cannot choose an option not present to one's mind. And, it is also a fact that at the time when the person makes a choice, other options not considered are irrelevant to the choice which is made. What is a matter of opinion is whether this constitutes a restriction on one's freedom of choice. Once we get the facts sorted out we might be able to reasonably discuss the matter of opinion.
I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way.
I don't think this is convoluted in the least. I think I have been fairly clear from the beginning that what is morally relevant is a person's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. If you keep that in mind in reading my responses, I think it will be clear what I mean.
I have a problem with this approach. We are attempting to define "freedom" for the purpose of setting moral principles. If we proceed by reference to what is "morally relevant" then we produce a vicious circle. We define "freedom" by what is presupposed as "morally relevant", and this produces moral principles based on those presuppositions. To put it bluntly, this is the fallacy known as "begging the question". You are basing what constitutes a restriction to one's freedom on your preconceived ideas as to what is "morally relevant", consequently the moral principles derived from your conclusions will simply be a reflection of your preconceived ideas of what is "morally relevant".
Instead, I have proposed that we analyze the nature of "freedom", and proceed from there toward determining moral principles which would respect a person's freedom. This would utilize an understanding of "freedom", with a true definition of the word, based in an analysis of the human condition, rather than a definition based in one's preconceived ideas about what is and isn't morally relevant.
So, I proposed that we start with a distinction between the freedom of choice and the freedom to act, as I think that understanding the difference between these two could assist us in understanding the nature of freedom. However, you seem to have no interest in understanding the nature of freedom, only a desire to define "freedom" relative to some preconceived notions of morality. That sort of discussion, where the person demonstrates oneself to be completely unwilling to free oneself from the constraints of one's own preconceived ideas does not interest me.
Quoting Dan
As I said already, in my opinion, restricting "morally relevant" to the "choices that belong" to the person, simply excludes the true essence of "moral value". "Moral value" is a principle of judgement aimed at judging choices which we make concerning what belongs to others, how we treat others, including respect for their goods and chattels. We cannot restrict "morally relevant" to choices which concern 'one's own' body, mind, and property, without losing track of what morality truly is.
Furthermore, as soon as I mentioned that this would require principles to determine what is truly "one's own", this started a seemingly infinite regress of principles required for a person to accurately determine what is "one's own". You started with body, mind, and property, but then you had to make exceptions to include freedom and rights which refer to a person's position relative to the public world, rather than what is "one's own". As soon as you included freedom you produced the vicious circle by defining "freedom" with "morally relevant", in an effort to bring it into the category of "one's own", having already defined "morally relevant" in reference to "one's own".
Simply put, you are trapped within your own ideas of what is morally relevant, refusing to accept, and denying the relevance of the ideas of others, because "morally relevant" for you implies that the ideas must be your own ideas to be morally relevant. As soon as you accept that the ideas of others might be morally relevant, and open your mind to them, freeing yourself from the restrictions of your self imposed solipsism, we might make some progress.
I am not defining freedom by reference to what is morally relevant. I am defining what is morally relevant by reference to freedom. I'm not begging the question, you have just misunderstood what I said.
As to things being morally relevant, you have gone down completely the wrong track here. Just like the utilitarian isn't concerned only with the happiness of the person in question, I am not suggesting that only "your own" freedom is morally relevant to your decision making. I am saying that everyone's freedom over that which belongs to them is morally relevant. So the moral status of an action depends on the extent to which it protects persons' freedom to make their own choices and/or the extent to which is restricts/violates persons' freedom to make their own choices.
I didn't have to make any such exceptions regarding the "public world," and I'm not sure when you think I did so.
Is it the term "morally relevant" that is causing confusion? I'm happy to use different language, but I'm not sure how I can be clearer in what I mean here.
You've referred to "morally relevant" in relation to freedom of choice, a number of times. Here are some examples.
Quoting Dan
Here, you appear to be limiting the meaning of "freedom", to a "type of freedom" which you believe to be relevant, which you call "morally relevant". In this example, you claim that your act of violence which prevents me from doing what I have freely chosen to do, does not violate my freedom. You make this claim by saying that I am not free to make such choices over your property See, you are restricting the meaning of "freedom" to circumstances which you believe are "morally relevant", in order to say that you can physically prevent me from carrying out an act, without violating my freedom. That is clearly a highly restricted sense of "freedom". A person is free to choose what is morally good, but not free to choose what is morally bad. So "free" and "not free" are defined by reference to what is morally good and bad.
Quoting Dan
Here again, you refer to a "kind of freedom" which is being protected, the freedom to make choices about things which belong to oneself. So, as I pointed out, in order to determine which free choices qualify as those which need to be protected, we first need some moral principles to determine property ownership. Therefore you are producing a very special definition of "freedom", a special type of freedom, and this is the only kind of freedom which qualifies as "freedom" to you, in relation to your proposed principle that freedom ought to be protected. That other forms of free choice do not qualify is evident from the fact that you proceed to argue that a person does not have the freedom to make choices about someone else's property. In reality, you want to protect the freedom to make good choices, but not the freedom to make bad choice, so you argue that making a bad choice is not a free choice, (in a morally relevant way), so that you can claim to be protecting freedom of choice.
These bad choices, the choices to do things with others' property (steal for example), you claim are not "morally relevant", but this is blatantly false. Clearly the choice to steal someone else's property is a choice which is morally relevant, as morally bad, and it is a choice which one freely makes.
Quoting Dan
Now you continue with that blatant falsity expressed above. Clearly, the kinds of free choices which are morally relevant extend far beyond choice concerning what belongs to the person making the choice. As I explained, a very large portion of morally relevant choices actually concern other people's property, such as when I decide whether or not to steal your car, in the example. Clearly, this is a morally relevant choice, which I freely make, concerning someone else's property. Restricting the meaning of "freedom", such that I am not "free" to choose to steal your car, because you assert that this choice is not "morally relevant" is complete nonsense. You have totally distorted the meaning of "morally relevant", to support your unjustified opinion that this sort of "freedom" ought not be protected, therefore it ought not be classed as a choice which can "freely" be made. Obviously, that is nonsense.
Quoting Dan
Here, we find the crux of the problem. Any threat to restrict one's freedom is morally relevant. However, you have totally distorted the meaning of "morally relevant", to say that restricting one's freedom to do a morally bad act is not morally relevant, so that this form of restricting one's freedom is not a morally relevant restriction of freedom. This allows you to hang on to your principle that freedom (in the morally relevant sense) ought to be protected. In reality though, the very nature of "freedom", what it means to be free, implies that one may freely choose to do what is morally bad just as much as what is good. And choosing to do bad is just as morally relevant as choosing to do good. But you do not want to protect that sort of "freedom", true freedom, you only want to protect "freedom" by some twisted distorted definition which suits your morality.
I am not limiting the meaning of "freedom". I am saying that only a certain type of freedom is being used as the measure of value, specifically the freedom of persons over their own choices. Only this limited kind of freedom is what ought to be protected, rather than freedom of all kinds.
I didn't say that commiting an act of violence to prevent you stealing my car wouldn't violate/restrict your freedom. When I said "stop you from doing so" I wasn't implying that I was going to physically attack you. Commiting violence in such a circumstance would restrict/violate your freedom, though of course it may be justifiable to do so as long as it prevents greater violations of freedom.
I am not arguing that a bad choice is not a free choice. You seem to be taking "this is the kind of freedom we should protect" to mean "this is the only true kind of freedom" and those do not mean the same thing.
Again, I think you may have misunderstood what I am claiming is morally relevant. The choice to steal from someone is morally relevant in the sense that it is a choice to do something morally bad but the freedom to make that choice is not morally relevant in the sense that it does not have moral weight that we need to consider when making decisions. We don't need to weigh your choice to steal my car against my choice to not have my car stolen, because one choice is the sort that should be protected morally and the other isn't.
Again, I am not defining "freedom" generally as only the kind I refer to here, but I am using "freedom" within the context of freedom consequentialism as a shorthand for "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". That is the thing that I am claiming is morally valuable, and I will sometimes say the freedom to make one's own choices to make that clear. I am using the word "freedom" because it seems like the most applicable of the available options, but if you have a better suggestion, I'd happily use that instead.
Ok, so this is what I am saying is problematic. To protect the freedom for a certain type of choice, while excluding the freedom for other types of choices as having no value, is really a matter of restricting one's freedom rather than protecting it. Those other types are denied value so as to deny the possibility of choosing them. So what you are proposing is that freedom ought to be restricted rather than protected.
Quoting Dan
Well, how else would you stop me from stealing, with a threat? And of course the threat would not constitute a restriction to my freedom of choice, because that choice does not belong to me (not one that I am free to make under your proposal because it has no value).
Here's a question. Why the inconsistency in your principles, between one's freedom of choice, and one's freedom to act? If you physically prevent me from stealing your car, with the use of violence, you accept that this is a restriction of my freedom. Therefore I am fundamentally free to act in that way. However, when we discuss my choice to steal your car, you say that I am not free to make that choice, because that choice does not belong to me. Therefore I am fundamentally not free to make that choice.
Do you apprehend the inconsistency I am talking about? In the case of making choices, I am not free to make certain choices (let's say bad choices), so persuading (by threatening for example) me to change my mind does not violate my freedom, because that sort of freedom has no value in this context. However, when it comes to acting out choices, using violence to prevent one's actions is a violation of one's freedom, even if the act has no value (is a bad act) in this context.
To physically prevent me from stealing your car, with the use of violence, requires that you restrict my freedom to act. You do not apply your principle that I am fundamentally not free to make that act, because it has no moral value. But to persuade me not to steal your car, does not restrict my freedom of choice, because you apply the principle that this is a choice which I am not free to make in the first place because it has no value.
It appears to me, like your principle is a reversal of what is really the case, if we made a real description. What is really the case, is that I am completely free to make the choice to steal your car, and nothing (neither persuasion nor threat) can actually prevent me from making that choice. But I am not free to carry out that act, because I may be prevented with physical violence. Furthermore, the prevention with violence is not a restriction on my freedom because principles of law dictate that I am not free to act in this way, so the prevention is justified therefore not a restriction of my freedom. However, there are no principles of law which dictate that within my mind I am not free to decide to steal your car. So long as I do not end up acting in that way, nothing will restrict that freedom.
Therefore you really have things reversed. People are fundamentally not free to make certain actions, because they will be prevented with violence, and this violence is not a restriction to their freedom. And these free actions of authority over one's own body and property are the type of freedom which serves as a measure of value. Other actions (bad acts), we are not free to make because of physical prevention, and such prevention is not a restriction to our freedom because it is justified, and so these acts cannot be admitted into the freedom value scale. In the case of choices however, we are inherently free to choose anything because and nothing justifies a restriction to the freedom of choice, therefore all choices must be allowed some value. We can use means of persuasion and even threats, but these do not qualify as a restriction on one's freedom of choice. And freedom of choice is fundamentally unrestricted.
Quoting Dan
This is precisely the example of why your principle is a vicious circle. The good choice ought to be protected. Which is the good choice? The one which "belongs" to the person to make. How do we know which choice "belongs"? It is the morally good choice.
In reality, we need to question which choice "should be protected morally". And this means that we need to weigh one against the other. You seem to assume that we can just take for granted which one ought to be protected. But this locks us in the vicious circle produced by 'what has been taken for granted', in the moral context. And as you demonstrate, we are not free to make decisions outside of this moral enclosure because they are designated as void of moral value. In other words we get entrapped within our own preconceived moral principles, what we take for granted morally, and deny ourselves the freedom to make any moral choices outside those preconceived boundaries by designating them as having no moral value.
Quoting Dan
It appears like what you are actually doing is giving priority to moral consequentialism over "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". You take one type of choice, which has been designated by some preconceived moral principles (taken for granted) as "the sort that should be protected morally", and you propose that the ability to make this sort of choice ought to be protected. But this is not at all a matter of protecting "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices", it is a matter of protecting their ability to make a certain type of choice. In fact, what you are proposing is that the freedom of rational agents to make their own choices ought to be restricted in a way such that only those which are consistent with the preconceived moral principles ought to be protected.
What I am proposing is that a certain type of freedom should be protected. Not, for example, the freedom to assault others. That sort of freedom should not be protected.
You have misunderstood. It is not the fact that my violent act prevents you from stealing my car that is worth considering, it is the other freedoms of yours I have violated in doing so (such as your freedom over your body).
No, the way we know what choices belong to a person are determining what things belong to them. Self-ownership is easy enough to establish, and if property can be owned, then we own that too. It is not a matter of referring to the "good choice" at all.
It is true that I am claiming that a certain type of choice should be protected, specifically those choices that belong to the person or persons in question. I have discussed the reasons for this in the primer I provided and more deeply in the material referenced within.
No, I don't think I have misunderstood. You state explicitly what I have already acknowledged, there is only a specific type of freedom which you believe should be protected, the freedom to act in a way which is acceptable by your moral principles. To me, this is not "freedom" at all. In reality, freedom of choice allows one to make choices with complete disregard for any preconceived principles, moral or otherwise. So if one wants to protect freedom then this is what needs to be protected. Your proposal to protect a certain type of freedom, and disallow that there is any moral value to the other types of freedom, as not morally relevant and therefore valueless, is nothing but a proposal for a veiled restriction to freedom.
Quoting Dan
OK, so do you see that preferring one type of choice to be "protected", over the other types, is not an instance of protecting freedom, but the very opposite?
It is an instance of protecting a specific type of freedom, the freedom to make your own choices. I agree that I am not promoting the protection of the freedom to take other people's choices from them, to physically attack them, to steal from them, etc. It is true that I am not promoting the protection of freedom to do those things.
This is why my first post on this thread stated:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The fact that you want the right to choose which of my choices ought to be protected indicates that you are interested in restricting my freedom rather than protecting it.
I mean, that's true if by "freedom" you mean the freedom to do anything at all. I am not interested in protecting that. I am interested in protecting free, rational, agents ability to understand and make their own choices. "Freedom" seems an appropriate word for this, but if you don't think so, feel free to suggest another.
The problem is that a free rational agent may completely understand, and make a choice which you think ought not be protected because of your moral preconceptions. The situation would be such that you do not understand the agent's free rational choice, as "a rational choice", due to those preconceptions. In this case you would not be interested in protecting that agent's "freedom". In the interest of claiming that you actually want to protect the agent's "freedom", you moved toward portraying such an act as not free (in the sense of morally relevant freedom).
I believe "freedom" is not an appropriate word here. What you want to protect is better known as "moral restraint". You are interested in protecting free rational agents' ability to understand and make choices which are consistent with specific moral principles. In other words, you would encourage people to think in a way (develop good thinking habits) which inclines them to freely choose good behaviour through what is known as "moral restraint".
Notice my earlier argument that habits constrain one's freedom. But habits can be classed as good or bad, and in this case you are interested in cultivating good habits. I believe that we ought not portray this as "protecting freedom", as this is really a deceptive slogan, because what we are really doing is curtailing freedom in a good way.
If you are with me so far, then we might take a step further to look at freedom itself, as something outside of, transcending, moral principles. That freedom truly transcends moral principles is evident from the fact that we can freely make choices with complete disrespect for any codes of ethics. However, because you are inclined to understand freedom as something which needs to be curtailed by moral restraint, I don't think you really want to consider freedom itself as something which ought to be protected. Notice, if we properly allow that freedom transcends moral principles, we cannot truthfully say that it ought or ought not be protected. Would you agree?
Again, I haven't said that such an action would be not free or not rational.
What I am suggesting ought to be protected is not moral restraint, and you have again moved from "we don't need to protect people's choice to take others' choices away from them" to "we should only protect the choice to do what is right". These are not the same.
What I am protecting is not the developing of good habits or the curtailing of freedom in a "good way". It is the protection of a specific type of freedom.
Also no, that wouldn't show that freedom "transcends moral principles".
Did you read the primer that I included in the initial post?
Hey mate.
Just want to note whether or not you're using religious reasoning to support your positions here? This seems a bti of a curve ball otherwise.
In the substantive, if we're all prisoners of our moral outlook, that's the end of that. We get no free choices. Nice (Y).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is a retrospective fact, and I've been extremely clear to the point of feeling a bit silly that this isn't what's on the table right now. The position that the past (having happened) could, now, have been otherwise, is utterly preposterous. Luckily, that's not what's being discussed here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover....
It doesn't imply that. It implies there was a reason which was not that the person lacked that knowledge (or ability to act, I suppose, it's just as apt here).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I cannot make sense of this, I'm sorry.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is clearly incoherent. Our bodies prevent us from acting in whatever ways (well, most ways lol so the point is not lost). Unless you want to get specific about neurological disorders, this doesn't hold water for me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So, a perfect decision is not available. I can accept that and change nought else in my position. And, I do ftr. I don't see how this relates to various options being in the person's, call it, lexicon, at the time a decision was made. Not being in their conscious mind is just not enough for me to dismiss those options come choice-time.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hmm, I understood this to be what you were saying already, for whatever that is worth. I am not seeing an "impossibility' though. It seems to me you're putting the choice ahead of a set of possible choices thereby ipso facto making them unavailable because the choice is already made. But...
I also note this is specific to certain types of choices, but it doesn't change our disagreement - just want to be clear a lot of choices are better-made the second time around, despite every option being, in some sense, available the first time. Most courts acknowledge this. The concept of "adducing fresh evidence" in it's various forms relies on that information being plainly unavailable and not just "not before the court". It may be that the issue comes down to not being able to know one from the other, scientifically. The fact that you didn't think of it simply isn't something that makes it impossible. It makes it unlikely, at best.
Perhaps even restrictively unlikely - and here you're going to get some definite truck and likely, if worded well, some concession from me. The problem is that, what is restricting it? If the idea is that one's mind restricts one's mind I think there's more work to be done... but I certainly see a way to my backing down if this is zoomed in on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
(there are comments on the preceding, but they're not that interesting so I deleted them)
*conscious mind. And therefore, I have no issue with just standing on the disagreement. If you see that as enough-of-a barrier to the choice to relegate X option to 'impossible' so be it. I don't. Otherwise, I think that's probably a relatively good overview.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're still conflating the two points in time, but trying to use preciseness to make it coherent. I'm sorry, but your position as-stated in this paragraph seems to boil down to "every single choice is of one option" which isn't even an argument to do with what we're discussing. What I would say here to bring it a little more into focus is that, one version of your position is:
(my comment: surely true).
(an aside - one can retroactively weigh options - you just can't reverse a decision made.. immaterial here, but crucial at other points of the discussion)
As you'll note, that's entirely agreeable. I haven't thus far understood this to be your argument, or what we're disagreeing about. What I've disagreed with is that one not having an option consciously in mind while weighing options makes that option impossible to be made. It doesn't. All of our language, reviewing the exchange, indicates this version of the problem. The choice to be made, not a choice already made. I have, again, tried to be excruciatingly clear about this.
If all you're saying is that once a person has settled on (to make this easy...) 2 out of 10 options to deliberate about, then they are now precluded from choosing the other 8. This is for several reasons, but none of those reason are because it is impossible.
So, it's possible I'm agreeing with you and feel as if some time was wasted talking about two separate issues imprecisely. But i've had fun. Having just skimmed the remaining in your post, forgive some glib replies - they run the same risks as the above.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This statement is clearly true, but its much softer than the bar you set earlier. Potentially making some serious sense here now..
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
re-tro-ac-tive.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Restricted, certainly. I am also restricted by cling-film, but it isn't a real obstacle to my movements.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
While I think this is a bit of a lazy way to approach the disagreement, this entire paragraph relies on 'restriction'. Not 'impossibility'. I'm fine with that.. No disagreements. Impossibility just isn't int he discussion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is actually exactly what I did because it seemed clear to me you were having a pointless discussion about not being able to reverse time. I made it painfully clear, which i've also noted in this response several times, that you are conflating the post-choice issue with the pre-choice issue. No one, in any circumstance, can re-do something they did in the past (1:1, that is). And I acknowledged this pretty clearly, even in some of the quotes you've used. Confusing my man...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Bingo bango bongo. Im unsure why you got through several hundred words from each of us before noting this clear distinction between what you're claiming and what actually is..
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I did so, quite clearly and have needed to remind you of it a couple of times.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This explains a lot of your responses..
You explicitly said you are only interested in "protecting a specific type of freedom" , and this type of freedom is qualified by moral principles. Do you agree that this is a moral principle which you use to determine the type of freedom which you are interested in protecting? That is the reason why I conclude that what you are interested in protecting is really moral restraint rather than freedom. You want to protect a certain type of free choice, but not another, and the distinction is based on a moral principle. so I conclude that what you are promoting is moral restraint, not freedom.
Quoting AmadeusD
As I said, I'm the one who set the table. It appears like you want to replace it with your own setting
Quoting AmadeusD
Correct, the choice has been made. That's what I've always been talking about, having made a choice. We are looking backward in time from the point when the choice has been made. By definition, at the point in time when the choice is made, the choice has been made. Notice the past tense, "the choice is made". I was not ever talking about the time prior to making the choice, when options are being considered, that is your changing of the setting of the table, I was always talking about the time when the choice is made.
Quoting AmadeusD
Do you, or do you not agree, that at the point in time time when the choice is made, it is impossible for you to have made a choice which you did not think of? If you do not agree then there is nothing for us to discuss. If you do agree, then quit making statements like this, which makes it appear like you do not agree. Very clearly, the fact that the person did not think of the option at the time when the decision was made, makes it impossible that the person could have chosen that option at that time.
Quoting AmadeusD
Roughly speaking, I think that this is the case. One's mind is a system which acts to restrict one's actions. And, as i said earlier, by restricting one's actions a being increases one's freedom. This is commonly known as will power. In general, the mind serves to prevent us from proceeding on reflex, impulse and habit, and this "will power" allows us greater freedom.
Quoting AmadeusD
See, this is how you are changing the setting of the table. I was not talking about the time spent "weighing options", I was very explicitly talking about the point in time when the decision is made.
Let me review the point I made. I said that every choice which is made, restricts one's freedom. I said that not choosing allows one to deliberate and contemplate. Notice that "weighing options" is consistent with deliberating and contemplating, and this is enabled by not having made the choice. Having made the choice puts an end to weighing the options. By putting an end to the weighing of options, making the choice is an act which restricts ones freedom
The process of "weighing options" is clearly not what I argued is what restricts one's freedom. What restricts freedom is the act of judgement, which is the choice itself, the decision.
Quoting AmadeusD
Perhaps you misunderstood what you engaged with when you engaged me. But if you look at my discussion with Dan, you'll see that I was very clearly saying that every choice made is a restriction to one's freedom. And, I said that not choosing enables deliberation and contemplation, what you now portray as "weighing options", and this enhances freedom, as not passing judgement.
Quoting AmadeusD
You have reversed the causal order here. I am not saying that when you make a choice it is because other choices are impossible, I am saying that when the choice is made this causes other choices to be impossible. What I am saying is that the choice makes it impossible to choose otherwise, because the choice is an act which occurs in time, and when it is made it cannot be undone. If we ever get to the point of agreement on this, we could look further at the possibility of reconsidering.
You need to consider the context of the statement. The argument was that when you make a choice, (and this means when the decision is made) this is an act which restricts your freedom. It restricts your freedom because you exclude the other possibilities, by having chosen what you chose.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yes, I think we actually agree on the first part, but now to the significant part. Do you agree that each time you make a choice, you are actually restricting your own freedom? This is what deciding, making a choice is, restricting your freedom to choose otherwise. It is a self-imposed restriction, and adhering to the decision prevents you from reconsidering or choosing otherwise.
Further, as I described above, I think the mind actually works as a system which is constantly imposing restrictions. By restricting choices it increases freedom, and by making choices it restricts freedom.
Quoting AmadeusD
"Impossibility" is the key principle, it is the centerpiece of the discussion. It is a very significant feature of our temporal existence. As time passes it is impossible to alter what has already occurred. This is the basis for the reality of "impossibility" in this context. When a decision is made actions are carried out accordingly, and this creates impossibility where prior to this was possibility. Without this "impossibility", making a choice would not restrict one's freedom.
Quoting AmadeusD
it seems you misapprehended the setting of the table, thinking it to be something other than it was.
If this is your feeling, that also explains a lot and I apologise if that's the vibe that's coming through. As noted elsewhere in my response, I have reviewed the entire exchange to avoid this being the case - so, either you've been a bit off in your wordings or I've been a bit lazy in my readings - either way, I think further down my response it will be clearer what's going on, and where we've converged...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As noted elsewhere, this is a bizarre revelation to me, given what's been being discussed and how it's been worded, but it sorts some stuff out and I have no issue with how you're approaching this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I may leave off similar responses, so as to just clear a crystal clear response to this version of the position: This is uninteresting and there is no argument. If the choice has already been made, there's no discussion to be had. I think, in this sense, it's basically "I agree, but why did you bring this up then?" haha.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This question conflates the two possibilities of what we're talking about. Asking it indicates you want me to answer to my version of what we're talking about, but the rest of the context indicates you want me to respond to yours which would result in a bit of a 'gotcha'. Given I was not indicating what you were, with some trepidation I will answer to both:
Obviously, yes. The choice has already been made. Any shred of time prior to the act of 'choice', i disagree. Anything can get in between the two. So, hopefully this answers both 'versions' relatively succinctly and clears up what I was apprehending vs what you were wanting to hear.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hmm, I don't think that even on your version this the case (but I note this is different to the question at the top of this para, which i've answered directly). The thing which makes it impossible in the above is having already made a decision. Any amount of time prior to Choice Point A (lmao, i love doing that) then impossibility isn't in the picture. Unlikelihood is. Once the choice is made (which, I now take is what you're wanting me to address) there isn't a discussion. It is definitionally impossible. It wouldn't matter if the options were in mind at the time. They weren't chosen. End of. There's no philosophy there.
So, in short - I agree, but that's just uninteresting and there are not valid objections - It's like the "water is wet" argument (well, no - water makes things wet, but im sure you get me) - it's a non-issue. If we can get clear of the current crossed wires, I would (without a shred of incredulity) like to know what's being seen as an interesting discussion there :)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It certainly seems I did, regardless of my view on your wordings. Apologies for any tension as a result.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is what I illustrated, to my mind - so, your answer is clear regardless :)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, we agree.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is a different issue, again. I'm not implying you've conflated, just that this is separate. My response here is essentially "Not until you act, but once the act takes place, that choice is made "in time" with no recourse". The freedom to re-choose, or change one's mind prior to acting is clearly available in essentially any situation where we're not considering some form of mind-reading. Again, this is only go to apply to certain types of decision, but this is at least a separate issue to the one we've come to terms on (as I see it).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. I don't think it's possible to choose otherwise (it seems you also?) therefore freedom isn't relevant. "Could have done otherwise" seems to be required for freedom in these types of contexts (choice, ethics etc..). Again. perhaps I'm missing something but this seems clearly a state-of-affairs about the direction of time and not a philosophical point about freedom or choice. Every single moment hat passes precludes us from altering the prior moment/s ad infinitum. Self-evident and uninteresting.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I see what you're doing here, and I think there's a interesting meta-discussion to be had, but i refrain so we're not muddying water again (and perhaps, getting off-topic). It would result in a fair few exchanges, I think.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You'll need to go a lot further before this formulation makes too much sense to me, and given i've clearly gotten some crucial aspects of your posts wrong I will refrain from forming any view on it right now other than that it seems bit of an aesthetic claim, rather than a neurological or philosophical one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
B= (for me) "acting on the decision". Maybe there's a disagreement we can starting working on here after all! :D
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Those are two distinct events, as far as I'm concerned (goes to the above, i guess!) which somewhat materially changes the implications made out in your comments.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Definitely agree that once an act (pursuant to a decision) has been carried out or initiated, you cannot then "re-choose" what to be inspired by (in the strict sense) as regard the act you just did. You can merely over-ride by further action, whatever result the previous decision caused by way of your actions in pursuit of it. But, i see them as distinct events so there's a twinge of disagreeing with the overall view, despite probably assenting to most discreet elements.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, regardless of my views on your wording (or noticing what wire were crossed, lol) this seems quite clear to me now and I apologise for whatever level of tension or irritation came from that.
I agree that it is moral reasoning that is being used to determine what kind of freedom we should protect and what we shouldn't, though I'm not sure that is quite what you mean when you say "moral principles". Even if it were, it still wouldn't follow that what I'm suggesting we protect is moral restraint.
Also can I take it from you not answering that you didn't read the initial primer? Because that would really help to clear a lot of this up.
To be clear on what the subject of discussion is, this is what I said to Dan:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
When you engaged me I had said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Notice the last paragraph.
You replied to me with:
Quoting AmadeusD
It seems like a lack of context produced a misunderstanding of what I was talking about.
What I am claiming is that in the case of acting by habit, the choice is made, the person proceeds accordingly, and it is not possible for the person to consider other options because the actions which follow from the habitual choice have already been initiated, by that act of making the choice.
To avoid further misunderstanding, here's a concrete example. When I'm sitting in my house, and I hear my dog barking at the door, my habit is to immediately get up and let the dog in. So, as soon as I hear the dog barking, I respond with the decision to let the dog in, and I proceed accordingly. This is my habit.
Now here's the issue. When I act according to my habit I do not consider other options. It's true as you say, that at the time when I hear the dog bark, I could consider other options. But this, considering other options, is not what I am talking about, I am talking about acting by habit, in which case other options are not considered. Furthermore, I am saying that when the person does act by habit, it is impossible for the person to consider other options because this actually contradicts what is meant by "acting by habit". So, if when I hear the dog barking, instead of automatically getting up to let it in (acting by habit), I consider possibilities, "is that my dog?", "does the dog want to come in?", "should I get up, or ask someone else to let it in?", etc., then I am not acting by habit, I am deliberating.
Here's a couple more examples to help elucidate what I am talking about.
Consider the use of logic and mathematics as habits of decision making. Whenever we apply mathematics we exclude other possibilities through a learned habit of thinking. So for example, if I'm having some people over for a dinner party, and I want to determine how many people to prepare for, I might think four couples are coming, so four times two is eight. At this point I decide that eight is the tally and I proceed accordingly. Notice that by applying that habitual way of thinking, I accept the conclusion and I exclude all other possibilities. I know that there are other possible ways to determine the number, I could go through each name individually for example, but I do not do this, I name the couples and multiply by two. That way of thinking is a habit for me, and if I started thinking about other ways to figure out the total number, i would not be acting by habit, but deciding from options.
Here's an example which is more relevant to the moral principles which Dan is talking about. When I leave the grocery store, my habit is to look for my car in the parking lot, get into it and drive home. I never once consider the possibility of taking another car from the lot, because my habit is to look for my own. I do not think about my key only allowing me to use my car, so this is irrelevant to my decision making, that decision to find my car and drive it, is completely habitual. If I started consering other possibilities, like taking someone else's car, I might be dissuaded from that by the fact that my key wouldn't work, but I would only consider these other factors if I wasn't following the habit of looking for my car to drive home in.
The point is that when you act by habit you do not consider other options, that's what acting by habit is. If you consider other options before choosing, then the choice is not an habitual one. This is not to say that the person could not have overpowered the habit, and considered other options, it is to say that the person did not do this. And, as we've discussed, the fact that the person did not consider other options at the point in time when the choice was made, implies that it was impossible for the person to choose any other options at that point in time.
Quoting AmadeusD
So, the reason I brought this up is described in my earlier posts to Dan, as reproduced above. I was arguing that making a choice restricts one's freedom to choose.
Quoting AmadeusD
Now, relate this to habit, and freedom. When the habit kicks in there is no time prior to the act of choice, during which the person deliberates. The person finds oneself in a specific type of situation, the habit kicks in, and the person acts accordingly. If the person prevents the habit from kicking in, and creates a "shred of time prior to the act of 'choice'", for the sake of deliberating, then we cannot say that the person's act is habitual, it is deliberate. So in these situations which I am talking about, the habitual decisions, this idea of a shred of time prior to the choice, is irrelevant. It's very similar to a reflex. You ask me "what's 2+2?", and I say "4". There's no deliberation on my part. Through some sort of reflex I apply the process I know will produce the answer. Then I state the answer.
Quoting AmadeusD
I believe that we need to consider even the thinking process itself as a type of acting. In this way we can understand ways of thinking as habits, and we can see how habits restrict our freedom of choice. Take the example of applying a mathematical solution to a problem. When the problem is presented, the person will apply mathematics as applicable, and this is a habit. The person goes straight to the habitual way of solving the problem without considering any other ways.
It's true as you say, that after solving the problem in the habitual way, the person can still re-choose to do it in another way, and in grade school this was called checking your answer. However, in practise we most often don't bother to do this checking, we tend to just work out the answer in the customary way, then continue on. Because the habit is generally quite reliable, we often do not doubt it.
Quoting AmadeusD
It is a freedom related issue. At the time when the person is making the choice, the person has freedom to consider more options. At the time when the choice is made, the person does not have that freedom. Therefore we can conclude that the act of judgement is an act which limits one's freedom. Furthermore, "making the choice", (and this is when the person has freedom), exists as a duration of time, but the habit limits that amount of time to the very minimum. So the habitual choice, as a type of choice is a type which restricts freedom even more.
Quoting AmadeusD
The point is that when the decision is made we stop actively considering options. Making a decision always has consequences, of some sort.
Quoting Dan
To put it bluntly, I do not agree that you can properly call what you are claiming to protect, "a type of freedom". Really what you want to protect is a type of choice, choices which belong to a person. To ensure that the person's choice is within the criteria of that type, requires that the choice be constrained. Within those constraints the person's freedom is protected. This is not protecting a type of freedom, it is protecting freedom as long as the free agent respects certain boundaries. And this is what I call moral restraint.
Quoting Dan
I read some, but I didn't get too the end.
It's a bit of both. Your wording clearly leaves me open to give the response I did, but subsequently I definitely veered away from what you were getting at. The distinctions between action and choice are pretty directly on point there, so my last response should be pretty apt.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not at all the case, and I can't see how you don't see your conflation - The Choice and The Act are clearly different things, and inserting the speculative, and indefinite 'habit' aspect again, reduces likelihood only. Nothing beyond having already carried out the act prevents you from making what would, in the moment, be considered 'other' choices.
Habits aren't in-stone, repetitive neural connections that cannot be altered. A gust of wind could do it, to go back to my original line of thought. Only hte act precludes anything from possibility here. That's clear cut. I'm unsure how you're getting to the choice (i.e internal delineation between options) or habit (a vague, not-well-defined series of neurological actions that usually follow each other to an end) could be doing the same job. They aren't metaphysical obstacles so possibility shouldn't be being spoken about there imo.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You can delete the rest of this sentence, and your mode of description works perfectly. Why you acted isn't relevant to possibility (i am likely to have to back down from whether I consider threats a curtailing of freedom here). In your description of the case the "habit" is doing precisely zero for possibility. It is making it less likely you would consider other options - nothing to do with whether you could. Again, these aren't facts about anything, other than that time proceeds unidirectionally and we cannot change an act that already occurred.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then you're simply using a phrase which has your conclusion baked-in. Not philosophy. This is just pointing out that once someone acts, you can't change the act. This remains in the position of being entirely self-evident, and uninteresting. It isn't a discussion.
However, it seems you're trying to imply that from the post-choice position of "It was habit that caused me to act in X way" this somehow retroactively places the now-extant impossibility of considering other options at the time of decision/choice. It doesn't, though. So, again, you're 100% correct in what you're literally saying but It seems you're trying to get much more out of it than is actually there. Time moves in one direction. Big whoop.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is incoherent to me. Making a choice doesn't restrict one's freedom to choose in any sense other than that time moves in one direction. Freedom isn't in play. You already chose. There's no 'restriction'. It's plainly not open to you to make that same decision again. Restricting is both inadequate and inapt. The general fact that time moves in one direction restricts your choices to one's that operate in the same direction. But this isn't at all what you've tried to say.
I'm truly not understanding what lifting you think these ideas are doing?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, there is. The rest of this sentence is an empirical speculation that is required to support your claim but I think is plainly wrong. You are, again, speaking from the post-action world to the pre-action world to try to impugn the obvious freedom to break out of one's habit prior to acting.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correct, and this, I think, ironically, is what most of the rest of your comments are not sufficiently parsing out from one another. If your position is simply that if (Habit)->(Act) actually occurs then, retrospectively, that person was restricted in their choices. But that is wrong, and incoherent. What actually occurred doesn't inform what could have been.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's because you have necessarily removed the important part of the process from your claim's supporting struts. Whcih is fine, if the point you're making literally boils down to "Time moves in one direction" but it feels, at least, as if you're trying to wring more from it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is one possible sequence of events and is not at all bounded logically or even empirically. This is retroactive claim couched in present-tense words.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This seems to wipe away from debris. These are, then, heuristic claims and not at all claims about the possibility of deliberation. That's fine, and insofaras (that goes) I agree.
We often do doubt it. This is how most specialised areas of thought develop. Habits are as you describe them, but they don't get close to preventing anything from happening in the metaphysical sense. Habits are loosely held sequences of thought in response to common stimulus. Not pre-recordings.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The choice is no longer extant to be made. It is in the past. There is no consideration of Freedom. You would not say that my not having gills restricts my freedom to breathe underwater. I am simply unable to do so. Freedom isn't relevant. The present case is the same, as far as I see it. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Exactly the opposite - it is one's freedom to choose made manifest (unless we're back at "time passing restricts freedom" type of inanity).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is certainly true, and acknowledged. I wouldn't say 'very minimum' though, I think you're speculating far too much in some of these claims. But, overall, vibe is on point imo.
I mean, I would also be happy to say that I am protecting freedom to make certain types of choices, if that would be more agreeable to you linguistically.
Our disagreement appears to two twofold. First, we disagree as to the causal efficacy of habit. Second, we disagree as to the metaphysical significance of the passing of time. Each of these disagreements has an affect on how we individually understand freedom and its restrictions.
Concerning the first subject of disagreement, I cannot tell you exactly what a habit is, or how it works, but I've given you examples as to how, when we act through habit, we do not consider other options, and I've explained how it is logically impossible to choose another option if the other option is not present to the mind. Therefore I conclude that it is impossible for one to choose another option when the habit is in force. You, on the other hand, define "habit" as "loosely held sequences of thought in response to common stimulus" or, "a vague, not-well-defined series of neurological actions that usually follow each other to an end". By these terms, "loosely held", and "usually follow each other", you exclude the necessity of the cause/effect relationship which I assume to constitute a habit, and you thereby deny the necessity which I attribute to "habit". I conclude therefore, that this aspect of our disagreement is based in a difference in understanding of what "a habit" is. You deny the necessity of the cause/effect relationship within a habit, which I assert.
The second part of our disagreement is a bit more difficult for me to understand. Clearly the passing of time imposes significant restrictions on our freedom, and we seem to agree on this. However, for some reason I cannot understand, you dismiss the importance of this as "entirely self-evident, and uninteresting", and you refuse to allow it as a point of discussion. In metaphysics, the self-evident is of the utmost importance, because it is used to form the base, the foundation of ontology, and from this we construct an understanding of reality. Therefore we cannot dismiss the self-evident fact that the passing of time imposes significant restrictions on our freedom, as "uninteresting" in a discussion of freedom, just because it is something which as "self-evident". We ought to agree on this self-evident fact, and use it to form the base for a wider understanding between us. It is therefore the most interesting to "us".
What I propose therefore, is that we concentrate on our points of agreement, what we take as self-evident. If we can agree on the way that the passing of time bears on possibility and impossibility, and therefore on our freedom, we can proceed toward applying these agreed upon principles to the nature of "habit", and by this means we might overcome some of our points of disagreement about how habit affects our freedom.
So, after giving it some consideration I will address the points of your post, beginning with the aspects concerning the self-evident fact about the passage of time, From this, I will try to build an understanding of points of agreement between us, and bring this to bear on the larger point of disagreement, the nature of habit. I'll get back to you later.
Quoting Dan
This does not address the problem. Since you are employing your principles to dictate the "types of choices" which you are protecting, then all you are really doing is proposing a restriction to my freedom of choice.
I don't think that's a problem. I don't think we need to protect your freedom to go and stab people in the throat. In fact, I think we should restrict your ability to do that. That is very much a feature not a bug.
So let's define "act" to make sure we agree. An act is a process, something being done, or happening, an action. As such, we can say that an act always occurs in time, it requires a period of time, such that there is an earlier part of the act, and a later part. "An act that already occurred" has both parts in the past. "An act occurring" has its earlier part in the past and its later part has not yet occurred. And, to some degree we can talk about future acts, having both parts not yet occurred.
We agree that an act already occurred cannot be changed. Do we also agree, that a future act is somewhat indeterminate, having not yet occurred, and subject to "possibility"? Can we agree that future acts are better known as possible acts? If so, this leaves "the act occurring" in a precarious place. The past part of the act occurring cannot be changed, but the future part exists as possibilities. A determinist would say that it's not only the past part which cannot be changed, but the past part determines the future part, and so the future part cannot be changed either. They claim a necessity here, known by cause and effect. However, you and I allow that the future part consists of possibility. But this gives us great difficulty to account for the observed reality that many acts appear to have a necessary relation between the past part and the future part. We call this causation, and this necessity allows us to make accurate predictions.
Quoting AmadeusD
As you seem to be having problems with this idea, let's take it very slow. First, you seem to agree that time moving in one direction is a restriction of some sort. How can you say that this is a restriction but not a restriction on one's freedom? What does it restrict if not one's freedom? In any case, you seem to want to dismiss this type of "restriction" as irrelevant, and unimportant, when I see it as being the most important.
Put yourself in the middle of an act occurring, for example. The past part of that act cannot be changed. The future part exists as possibility. Further, the past part, since it cannot be changed, serves as a restriction on what is possible in the future part. To choose is to do something, make a judgement, and is therefore an act itself. What that act does, is selects from apprehended possibilities, as time passes, such that when this future part of the act, existing as possibilities, becomes past, and cannot be changed, the choice has had an effect. Notice, that this is not the past part determining the future part in the determinist way, it is the choice itself which has efficacy. Therefore, in the same way that anything in the past is a restriction, because the past cannot be changed, any choice which is made, since it is an act, has an effect on what comes to pass, and so it contributes to the restrictions of the past, in that same way.
Quoting AmadeusD
I cannot understand the sense of "freedom" you are ascribing to. If something is impossible for a person to do, then the person's "freedom" is restricted accordingly. If not having gills makes it impossible for you to breathe under water, then your freedom is restricted accordingly. Of course I would say that. And so, the reason why you do not have the freedom to breathe under water is that your freedom has been restricted by you not having gills. What does "freedom" mean to you? If it means the ability to do whatever is possible, then it must be restricted in some way, and that would be by what is impossible. The principal restriction on one's freedom, the most significant restriction to one's freedom, is that which we are "simply unable to do", for one reason or another. Why on earth would you say "freedom isn't relevant" here. Is it because you take such restrictions to your freedom for granted?
So, I believe there is significant disagreement between you and I on what is meant by "freedom of choice". You seem to think that even though the past is fixed and cannot be changed, and it poses significant restrictions on us, these restrictions are simply impossibilities, and these impossibilities have no relevance to our freedom of choice. In other words, all the arguments which determinists make about the past having causal influence over us, you dismiss as irrelevant. Because this is a very significant difference of opinion, and very important to the subject of how habits restrict our freedom, I don't think there is any point in proceeding to discuss "habits" until we sort this out.
Quoting Dan
Sure, I agree with you. But what I also think, is that we cannot have a moral principle of protecting freedom. This is why I argued that moral consequentialism and the principle of protecting freedom are incompatible. I offered a solution recently, which was to understand freedom as something which transcends morality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Consider that freedom is logically prior to morality, as that which enables there to be such a thing as good or bad acts. This implies that freedom itself cannot be judged as good or bad, because it is the way that a person uses one's freedom which is what is judged in that way. Therefore we cannot say that freedom ought to be or ought not be protected, it is just something which is taken for granted by moral philosophers.
For example, consider that "many" is logically prior to number. It enables the idea that there is a number which can be assigned to any group which is many. However, we cannot assign a number to "many". In the same way, we cannot assign good or bad to "freedom", it simply enables the idea that acts can be classed as good or bad. So in the same way that "many" is an idea which is taken for granted by mathematicians, "freedom" is an idea which is taken for granted by moral philosophers.
I'm not really clear on what you are trying to solve. You haven't shown at all that protecting the kind of freedom that I am discussing is incompatible with consequentialism and the kind of freedom you think is incompatible with consequentialism isn't the kind I'm trying to protect. I don't think there is a problem there.
The former seems certain, but I am unsure it will turn out we disagree about hte latter. The passing of time is absolute. There can be no disagreement if we're both accepting that it is a unidirectional 'force' and cannot be adjusted in any way whatsoever (particularly as regards changing it)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do not think you have done this. I think you've explained the *empirical state in which it is highly unlikely one would consider 'other' options. Perhaps were seeing through a lot of daylight there.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hmm..I deny this necessity in most scenarios - much more strongly here, and I think it is empirically incorrect to assert. Not philosophically. There is no such thing as a closed loop of thought which cannot be altered - something your position seems to suggest. The fact that habit obtains doesn't prevent it from being interrupted. It does not make any other course 'impossible', but improbable. Again, i see this to be an empirical wrong, not a philosophical one (*relates to the first response I've made above)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do not.
Your conception of freedom is, in my view, plainly wrong. Impossibility has nothing to do with freedom. Freedom only obtains when choices are available ("could have done otherwise"). The passing of time negates this, as it is a metaphysical barrier to choice at all. Time does not restrict freedom. It prevents choice. If you do not have gills, the 'choice' to breathe underwater is not open to you. Freedom doesn't enter the discussion on my view.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
While I understand what you're saying here entirely, I don't think is a good point. If it's self-evident, stop labouring it. We're already in agreement. There's is no reason to invoke something we already agree with to support further assertions as they plainly cannot do so. This is my point. The passage of time is not an interesting factor in the assessment of Freedom. It is something in light of which we must consider Freedom. We have no choice. There is no discussion. It's not to do with with any denial - it is inapt.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not to me, no. If this is the practical basis on which your argument relies (i.e, you posit the passage of time as a support for a lack of freedom to choose) we're at cross purposes and I wouldn't be able to understand what you're trying to say.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I can't really get on board with this. Technically I acknowledge it - there is a moment of time at the 'initiation' of an act, and then it;s 'completion' let's say. Noted. But, this does not, imo, make present anything knew. An act occurs in totality. You can't be half-way through an act and leave an act half-done. The entire act is carried out, regardless of the content and consequence. An act is whatever is done in a single action. And I would be extremely clear (at the very least for discussion purposes) that mental acts and physical acts need to be treated separately.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, we agree.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As above, I cannot understand what you're trying to describe here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I also agree this is roughly my understanding of how determinism treats choice - but its even dryer than your charitable account lol.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This doesn't do anything for me. It leads to no mental changes in my processing these ideas. "appear" to be means almost nothing without further investigation, and on further investigation, that "appearance" to me, is clearly heuristic and not 'actual'.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
While I note you're trying to teach egg-sucking here (lol, i'm not offended) constant conjunction does. Not necessity. There is not a logical relationship between the two, just a very, very close speculative expectation. Hume rears his head.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, understood. My first exposition of our difference in approach above should explain this discrepancy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't understand the question. It isn't a restriction. It's a fact of hte matter which prevents any choice being made in respect of it. Freedom requires available choices. Preclusion isn't a restriction on Freedom, it's a lack of ability to choose. Not a restriction on one's freedom to choose. This is a stark and incredibly important distinction that I think is lost here... (though, If i'm argued out of the position, perhaps not).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No idea what this could refer to. An act is a total action. You can't be in the middle of it other than retrospection (because you can denote the exact time the act took to carry out - in the act, there is no such distinction of time - but this supports my view) is my view.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, what (the heck) are you saying here? This makes no sense to me unless in retrospective speculation. It's uninteresting and does nothing for the conversation imo. There is no "past part" of an act while it is occurring (why is noted above - we're treading the same ground several times in all of these replies to one another).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. The Freedom doesn't obtain. There is no Freedom to be restricted. Freedom requires that one could (in the case of restriction) otherwise have done so/done otherwise. When the option is empirically, metaphysically not open to you, invoking freedom is empty and meaningless.
I do not have my choice to breathe through gills restricted. I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit. It is not open to me. I could not possibly choose that option. Freedom (to do so) does not obtain, and cannot be restricted.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it plainly is not. To Choose is to adopt a mental disposition. To act pursuant to a choice is to 'do something' (though, this exact formulation of the distinction assumes the delineation between mental and physical acts mentioned above - if you reject that, fair enough).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, this explains a lot but I have to simply say I cannot grasp what you could possibly be thinking to get there. There is no freedom to act. Therefore, it cannot be restricted. It doesn't exist.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For sure :P
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is not what has been discussed. Restrictions on freedom can only obtain where a choice could be made. In the scenarios you've asked to address (ones where a choice in the past causes a current state of affairs - which you call a restriction to choose for no reason, as far as I can tell) one is unable to choose the thing you are using as an example of a restriction on freedom. But, given that you said you would call my not having a gills a restriction on my freedom to breathe underwater I can only conclude by saying;
I think it is pretty clear your version of Freedom is inapt, and unable to describe how humans actually choose and act in the real world. You cannot deliberate between choices you cannot obtain. Your position denies this, and I'm not willing to do so.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, this is a complete and utter misrepresentation of what i'm saying. What I have said is 100% concordant with determinist thinking. It is just an oddity of that position.
I don't think I'm trying to solve anything, just pointing out a problem with what you are doing. I believe that the phrase "the kind of freedom that I am discussing" is oxymoronic. To speak of "a kind of freedom" is to restrict freedom to a specific "kind". But "freedom" means unrestricted. Therefore your approach is incoherent. And you seem to be unwilling to acknowledge this.
Quoting AmadeusD
We are fundamentally opposed here. "Freedom" does not necessarily imply options, it means unrestricted. It is the rational mind which thinks, and in that activity it apprehends "options". When freedom appears as options, it has already been restricted being constrained to those options which the mind apprehends. Therefore "choices are available" is not how freedom actually exists, it is how it appears after it has already been constrained so as to appear as options.
You and I have a fundamental disagreement as to what "freedom" is, just like Dan and I have a similar disagreement. Dan wants to limit "freedom" to a specific "kind of freedom". But restricting "freedom" produces incoherency because freedom means unrestricted. Each of you wants to restrict "freedom" in your own way, so that it no longer means unrestricted, and I believe yours are both corrupted definitions. You are defining "freedom" as already restricted, and that is incoherent in relation to how we actually understand "freedom".
Quoting AmadeusD
We agree on it, but you insist that this point which we agree on is irrelevant. I believe it is of the highest relevance. Therefore our agreement ends abruptly in disagreement. This disagreement. concerning the relevance of the point we agree on, is due to the fact that we have a fundamental disagreement as to what "freedom" is. Because of this fundamental disagreement about "freedom", I think the point is highly relevant to freedom, and you think it is not at all relevant.
Quoting AmadeusD
The problem here is that you simply refuse to acknowledge the relevance of the distinction between past and future. Therefore "the present", which is very often partway through an act ( as I am partway through the act of writing this post at the present time), is irrelevant to you. And you refuse to allow that it has any bearing on "freedom".
Quoting AmadeusD
I can't grasp your denial. Have you never found yourself in the middle of doing something? If an act is "a total action" to you, doesn't this imply that all acts are in the past? But this is contrary to experience, which demonstrates to us that acts take place at the present.
Quoting AmadeusD
Haha, you reject 'empirical fact' when I bring it up, with reference to Hume, now you employ it. Sorry Amadeus, I have no idea what you mean by "freedom" here. Freedom does not mean 'one could have done otherwise', it means 'one can do whatever one wants'. Why push "freedom" which is a property of the present, into the past? All you can do by pushing "freedom" into the past, is misrepresent it.
Your proposal is fundamentally incoherent. You say "I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit", and you pretend that this does not mean that your freedom is restrict in that respect. If not having freedom in that pursuit does not mean that your freedom is restricted in that way, then what does it mean? Suppose you simply do not have freedom in any pursuit. What "kind of freedom" would you have? Or maybe you have freedom in only one or two pursuits. Wouldn't you think that simply not having freedom in all those other pursuits constitutes a restriction to your freedom? The way you are using "freedom", like Dan, is simply incoherent.
Quoting AmadeusD
As far as I know, mental activity is activity. Why deny it?
Quoting AmadeusD
I find that a joke, considering that the way you use "freedom" is simply incoherent. And, the fact that you refuse to recognize that acts are occurring at the present, instead of insisting that all acts are in the past. .
Talking of "kinds" of freedom is not oxymoronic at all. There is a huge literature on different types of freedom, and I think we can reasonably understand different freedom claims using Gerald Maccaullm's triadic relationship, that some agent X is free from some constraint Y to do or become some thing Z. When people talk about "freedom" they very often mean different things from one another, and specifying what kind you mean is very helpful in avoiding talking at cross purposes to one another. You seem to require that "freedom" only be used to refer to freedom of people from any constraints to do anything, but that is by no means the only sensible way the word can be used. Further, the discussion of how the word ought to be used is far less interesting than the moral discussion of what has value, what are responsibilities are, and how we ought to solve moral dilemmas.
Try looking at it this way. We begin with the idea that a free agent has freedom, where "freedom" is defined as "without restriction", no constraint. Then, when you say "that some agent X is free from some constraint Y to do or become some thing Z", you place the free agent within a context, or environment described as being "free from some constraint Y". The described context, or environment, is "without constraint Y". Notice, that the property described as "without constraint Y" is attributed to the environment, not to the agent or the agent's freedom.
Accordingly, constraints and restrictions are correctly understood as properties of the agent's environment, they are not properties of the free agent, or properties of the agent's freedom. It is simply incorrect to say that various different kinds of constraints constitute different "types of freedom", because the constraints are properties of the free agent's environment, not properties of the agent's freedom. To represent the constraint as a property of the agent, which is what is required in order to say that the agent has a specific "type of freedom", would necessarily negate (as contradictory) the primary premise of the "freedom" of the agent, that the agent is free, without restriction or constraint. Therefore the reason why it is incorrect to propose "types of freedom" is that it is self-contradicting.
Your appeal to authority doesn't really provide anything, if the philosopher referred to is making the same mistake. That's a common problem with appeals to authority in philosophy. However, if this is your preferred way to approach moral dilemmas and discussions of responsibilities and values, to start with a premise which is fundamentally incorrect as being self-contradicting, then you can proceed without me, because I think it would only create dilemmas, rather than solve them.
Yeah, that doesn't work.
First, we don't "start" with the idea of freedom being without any restriction or constraint. We "start" with a lot of different understandings of what people are free or should be free to do or be, and what they should be free from, and we make sense of that so we can have a sensible conversation.
Second, constraints and restrictions are not properly understood as only the properties of an agent's environment. One could make a freedom claim that people ought to be free from their habits. I wouldn't agree, but that would certainly be a "constraint" (in the sense that it is what you are claiming the person should be free from) that would not be a part of the person's environment, but of them.
Third, there is absolutely not any requirement for constraints to be a part of the agent in order for them to have a type of freedom. I'm not sure where you have got that assumption, but it clearly isn't true. It is entirely coherent to say that my freedom of movement is constrained by being kidnapped and locked in a the boot of a car.
Fourth, I haven't really made an appeal to authority, though I'll admit one might be inferred from what I said. I certainly don't mean to say that just because there is a large literature discussing something, that thing is worthy of discussion. However, it may be a literature you could benefit from examining, because I think you are mistaken about the issues you are raising regarding types of freedom.
Then you have no objective definition of freedom, just a lot of different understandings. Conversation between people with a lot of different understandings inevitably produces misunderstanding, unless you have some objective principles to start with.
This is why I suggested to Amadeus, that we start with something which we both agree on as self-evident truth, the fact that the past cannot be changed. This would have provided us with a fundamental principle as a base determination of "impossible", which we could agree to as the most basic restriction to freedom. Instead, Amadeus insisted that this 'type of impossibility' is irrelevant to freedom. This is very similar to you insisting that only some 'types of freedom' are morally relevant.
Quoting Dan
If you start with an objective definition of "freedom", and protect the concept of "a free agent", you will find that it is contradictory to say that constraints or restrictions belong to the agent, if the agent is truly free.
I totally agree, that a human being is not "free" in the absolute sense of "a free agent" as defined, but the objective ideal concept of "a free agent", being absolutely free, provides a definitional starting point to make judgements concerning the different types of restrictions. Notice that from this perspective, of starting from an objective definition of freedom, "type" belongs to the restrictions, not freedom itself.
Quoting Dan
You say it right there, for the agent "to have a type of freedom". "To have" means it is a property of the thing which has it. If the agent has one type of freedom, and not another type of freedom, as properties, then the restrictions which make the type of freedom this type instead of that type, are also property of the agent. For example, if a thing is red and not green, then the restrictions which make the thing this type of colour rather than that type, inhere within the thing, as property of the thing which has this colour rather than that colour. Likewise, if an agent has this type of freedom and not that type, then the restrictions which make it have this property rather than that property, inhere within the thing.
You are approaching the issue from a backward direction. Instead of assuming "a free agent", as a base "ideal", and then proceeding to look at the different types of restrictions which make a real living human agent's freedom less than ideal, you start with a less than ideal concept of "freedom", and wrongly call this a "type of freedom", when there is no real "type" here to be understood. This is because "type" properly belongs to the restrictions, and by assigning it to "freedom" instead, you have no principles to understand the true types of restrictions. You only have a whole lot of different understandings from different people about "different types of freedom" which are essentially arbitrary, with corresponding arbitrary restrictions. If instead, you started with a pure absolute freedom, as your objective ideal, then you could look at the true, real, natural and artificial restrictions, and understand their different types accordingly.
Quoting Dan
I already see right through the principles supporting that literature, to recognize the inherent contradiction underlying them, the mistake which I've pointed out to you. There would be no point in me reading it unless I wanted to decisively refute it. However, I'm fairly certain that it is upheld by people similar to you, who would not recognize the refutation when thy saw it. So that would be a much bigger waste of my time than what I am doing here
I'm not really sure what an "objective definition" would even be. The definitions of words are either explicitly stated within specific contexts (such as within a particular discipline, or even within a particular conversation) or they are determined by usage.
Is the fact that the past can't be changed self-evident? Even if it were, what does that have to do with anything?
I agree that saying some types of impossibility are not relevant to freedom is similar to saying that only some types of freedom are morally relevant, in the sense that both are reasonable things to have a discussion about.
To "have" something doesn't just mean to have it as a property. I have a red car, but a red car isn't a property of me. Also, even if I have a property, then the conditions that allow me to have that property do not have to be inherent in me. For example, I might have the property of iridescence, but only under specific lighting. The lighting conditions would be a restriction on my having that property, but they aren't a part of me.
You keep getting caught on the idea that "freedom" must mean freedom from all restrictions to do anything. It certainly can mean that, but it's a word, it can mean lots of things. For example, when I talk about a free, rational agent, I don't mean an agent who has complete freedom, or even an agent who has much freedom at all. In that case "free" refers to the agent having free will, which is different from freedom (one doesn't lose any free will if they are chained up and kept in a box, but they certainly lose a lot of freedom).
I don't start with a concept of freedom that is less than ideal. I start with one that is compatible with all free, rational agents being capable of being entirely free, which seems far more ideal than.
This supposed contradiction seems to be predicated on you not allowing people to use words differently from how you want them to be used.
"Freedom" is a noun, so we need to treat the word as if it refers to a thing, even if that supposed thing is an abstraction. In this case it is an abstraction, and that's why I referred to it as an ideal, it's like other ideals, "circle", "square", "triangle", etc.. When we recognize "freedom" as an ideal thing, an abstraction, then we see that in order to understand it and use it as a premise for logical proceeding, it needs a definition. That would be what I called the "objective definition". And I propose the very simple ideal definition, "without restriction".
What you appear to be doing is proceeding from the assumption of different "types of freedom" without a definition of "freedom" itself. To me, that's like talking about different types of triangles without a definition of "triangle" itself. See, if we did this, the meaning of "triangle" could vary, meaning something different in each different type of triangle being talked about. That's what I think happens when people talk about different "types of freedom", The meaning of "freedom" changes according to the proposed t type of freedom. It's not a matter of a different type of freedom, rather a matter of a different meaning for "freedom". This makes logical consistency and coherency impossible.
So what I've been trying to tell you is that if you took a good look at how "freedom" is used by most standard conventions, you'll see that it is similar to, and consistent with, what I propose, "without restriction". Furthermore, I think you'll also see, as I've been explaining, that the defined thing, that abstraction or ideal, is not the type of thing itself, which could be divided into types. Divisibility into types would imply that there are restrictions which inhere within the thing defined as "without restriction".
Quoting Dan
Sure, "freedom" can have lots of different meanings, and that is evidence of the freedom which we have in using words. However, for coherency and consistency in logical proceedings it is imperative that we adhere to one definition, or else we allow ambiguity and equivocation to produce fallacy.
Quoting Dan
That's what Amadeus suggested, that the past cannot be changed is self-evident. So I went along with it, as a principle or premise which we could agree on. What it has "to do with anything" is where we disagreed. I think that as what "cannot be changed" it forms the foundation for the concept "impossible", and this provides the basic principle of "restriction", which is what is contrary to "freedom" (by my definition). Amadeus would not agree, insisting that this sense of "impossible" is not at all related to "freedom", referring to something which one could never have freedom in relation to in the first place. So Amadeus takes the sense of "impossible" for granted, and since it is taken for granted it is not allowed to have any bearing on Amadeus' sense of "freedom".
However, I showed Amadeus how the past relates to the present and the future, in determinist principles, and as such has the greatest restriction on our freedom, by completely denying it. So this is another type of abstraction, ideal, the conceptual structure which relates all events in the world through cause and effect, saying that even future events are predetermined by past events. From this conceptual structure, the "impossible" which we associate with the past as "what cannot be changed", has the greatest possible relevance to "freedom", by completely denying the possibility of any freedom, all future events being predetermined by what cannot be changed. Amadeus simply dismissed such cause/effect relations with reference to Hume, but I pointed out that even if such relations are not real, our capacity to predict is real. Notice also that such a dismissal would incapacitate consequentialism.
Quoting Dan
Are you proposing that you "have freedom" in the same way that you "have a car"? Or are you just trying to produce ambiguity, confusion, and equivocation with this proposal for the meaning of "property"?
Quoting Dan
I know, "freedom" can mean lots of things. But allowing "freedom" to mean many different things is not conducive to valid logic, or good philosophy. It is one thing to look at many different proposals for definition, then decide on one, as the method of Platonic dialectic, but if we don't ever decide on one, we don't ever make any progress.
Notice how this position you've taken, actually supports what I've been arguing, that not choosing, provides the most freedom. By not choosing a definition of "freedom", we can consider all the different ways "freedom" is used, and actually have all that freedom of choice, but once we choose a definition, we must adhere to it in the logical process which follows or else we equivocate, therefore we are restricted in that sense. If in the logical process our chosen definition of "freedom" is shown to produce a problem, as Plato demonstrates with "knowledge" in The Theaetetus, then we might be inclined to look for a better definition.
So, in your examples, "free" means the same thing for an agent with "free will", and also when that free agent has one's "freedom" constrained by chains. The agent with free will has specific restrictions on one's freedom implied by "will" (including the nature of time etc.). Also the agent has specific restrictions implied with "constrained by chains". These do not imply different meanings for "free", if "freedom" is the subject of our logical investigation, they imply different ways that freedom is restricted.
Quoting Dan
It is not a matter of using specific words differently from how I want then to be used. It is a matter of consistency and coherency, so that we can proceed with logic, and avoid equivocation. So it is a matter of the overall way that words are used in general, which I am concerned with. I want "freedom" to be used in a way which supports valid logic, rather than equivocation. If you do not like my proposal for a definition of "freedom", then be my guest and propose your own. But for the reasons explained, we cannot proceed logically toward an understanding of freedom, when "freedom" means something different in the various different contexts, such that each different time "freedom" is used it refers to a different type of freedom (a different meaning of "freedom").
So long as people are being clear about what they mean, equivocation doesn't seem to come into it. I agree that freedom certainly has something to do with being unconstrained, but there are lots of types of freedom, lots of ways of being unconstrained from various things, that we might want to discuss. It seems that we could simply specify what we mean (which I have, numerous times) and then discuss whether that type of freedom is important or not, rather than getting hung up on linguistics.
I wouldn't say having freedom is quite the same as having a car, but I would also say that it isn't like having the quality of greenness.
No, in my examples, "free" can be used to two ways. To say that some agent is free to act in some way is using "free" to refer to the person having freedom to act in that way. To say that someone is a free, rational agent, is using "free" to mean that the agent has free will. By "freedom" I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. I offered to use a different word, but you offered "moral constraint" which is so far divorced from how either of those words are used as to be completely inappropriate.
Also, it doesn't support your position. Even on your account of freedom, which I think is not a good one, then not choosing a definition of the word would keep some options open to us, but others would be closed until we did.
I have clearly defined how I am using the word "freedom" and why I am using that word rather than another. If you think it would be more productive, we might use another word, or simply refer to the ability of free, rational, agents to understand and make their own choices. If you like, we can just use that term (the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices) in the future and move past the whole linguistic debate.
If this happened more often here, half of the discussions would never happen.
Ambiguity, and the possibility of equivocation is only the tip of the iceberg. The problem is much more extensive. Suppose we identify a number of different types of freedom, and we agree that these are all types of freedom which ought to be protected. However, there is a possibility that having the freedom of one type may cause people to restrict other people's freedom of another type. This would be where the different types of freedom overlap. Sorting this out would require reference to higher principles, and then "freedom" would not be our principal value anymore, because all the various types of freedom would need to be restricted according to the higher principles.
Look at what Plato said about justice in The Republic, for example. After questioning all the different participants in the discussion, about the nature of justice, Socrates offered a sort of definition. Justice he said is having ones own place in society, to do one's own thing as determined by oneself (freedom), but not interfering with another in the other's position of doing one's own thing. Notice, that under this description, the members of society are not working together, as "parts" of a cohesive whole, working toward a common goal, or common good, each person is working on one's own goals or goods. This I think, is where we find "freedom", the person is allowed to choose one's own ends, one's own activities, and is not at all persuaded to work toward an ideological "common good", or the good of the community, the good of the state, or anything like that, but still may choose this freely. "Freedom" inherently involves the capacity to choose ones own goods, ends, objectives, or goals.
Now look at the other half of the proposal. a person ought not interfere with another's freedom to choose one's own goods, ends, objectives or goals. This implies that there is, inherent within the nature of "freedom", the potential for conflict. This cannot be avoided, one person's freedom will conflict with another's My contention is that identifying different types of freedom cannot remove this potential for conflict.
Quoting Dan
I perceive this passage to be faulty in a couple ways. To "be free to act in some way" is completely meaningless if not oxymoronic. Say we name a specific type of activity, as the specified "some way", and say that the agent is free to act in this way. This means that we allow this option. But the agent being free, may choose not to act in that way, but to act in a contrary way. In that sense, "to be free to act in that specific way" is completely meaningless, because the agent is also free to act in any way. And if we impose constraints to ensure that the person does not act in the contrary way, then the statement becomes oxymoronic. The person is not "free" to act in that way, but is constrained so as to act that way.
Furthermore, if we are all free rational agents, with the ability to make our own choices, as you say here, there will very clearly be conflict amongst us, as I pointed out already. So then you earlier defined one's "own choices" as choices concerning property which belongs to the person. Limiting freedom in this way still does not remove conflict because there would be conflicts concerning rights and actions in public spaces rather than concerning properties. You might insist that "rational agent" means one who reasons morally, but then you actually would be adopting "moral constraint" as a principle, not freedom.
Quoting Dan
You really have not defined how you are using "freedom". Look, you define "free" like this: "To say that someone is a free, rational agent, is using "free" to mean that the agent has free will." When you say that agent has "free will" you predicate "free" of "will". But this doesn't say what "free" means. And when you define "freedom" you say: "By "freedom" I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices." But this is clearly not how you use "freedom" when you talk about protecting freedom. You only want to protect certain types of choices, and you claim that this is protecting the person's freedom. Obviously, the "freedom" you claim to be desiring to protect is not "the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices", but the ability to understand and make certain types of choices. That is why I said what you are trying to protect looks a lot more like moral restraint than freedom.
Why don't you just come around to admitting it. It is not "freedom" you are trying to protect, but moral restraint. Moral restraint is the means by which a person is said to freely make choices consistent with moral principles. It supposedly involves no restrictions to the person's freedom because the person supposedly chooses freely, the moral choice.
As I've pointed out already, your use of "freedom" appears to be self-contradicting. And, as I've shown above, the only way to make it not self-contradictory is to remove all meaning from it. So now I think I have the proper understanding of how you use that word. It's just a word that you like to throw around because it looks good, having positive connotations, but your use of it really shows that it has absolutely no meaning for you. You allow that "to will something" has meaning, but predicting "free" to the will does absolutely nothing. And, concerning the choices people do make you, only want to protect a certain type, so "freedom" as the ability of a rational agent to make one's own choices is not what you want to protect. So the "freedom" you claim to be protecting has no meaning either, being divorced from your definition.
Yes, I would agree that thinking that lots of different types of freedom should all be protected could easily lead to conflicts which might not be resolvable without reference to some other value. People tend not to do that though. Generally when we talk about different types of freedom, we are debating which one is really worth protecting or promoting. Certainly in my case I have advocated for protecting a specific type.
Again, you seem to be defining "free" in a very strange way. It seems entirely reasonable for the police for example to say of someone "you are free to leave". It is clear what this means: there are not restrictions being placed on you leaving. It doesn't require that it also be true that the person is free to go to the moon.
I defined own choices as concerning those things that belong to a person, their mind, their body, and their property. I agree that there could be some conflicts specifically with property and movement, but it isn't clear that there would be many. What conflicts in the public sphere are you concerned about? And I wouldn't insist that a moral agent is one who reasons morally, assuming that by "reasons morally" you mean something like "reasons in a morally good way".
Having free will definitely doesn't mean being free of will. I had assumed that you were familar with the term "free will", but I will clarify it for you if you like. There are a lot of ways one might define free will, and I suspect there are those who think my definition is claiming too much, but I would say that to have free will is to be able to act in ways that are caused wholly be the agent, not determined by preceding events or scripted responses, and not in-principle predictable ahead of time.
The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices is exactly how I use "freedom". I agree that I do only want to protect certain choices, specifically persons' own choices. The choices that belong to them. I am not being inconsistent at all.
I think this is a red herring on your part. We are clearly talking within a context. We are not randomly picking out versions of 'freedom'. We're talking about hte 'freedom to choose'. If a choice is literally not metaphysically possible, how could you apply a metric like 'freedom' to whether or not one chooses it? This seems to be practically nonsensical.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Absolutely not. We have both made extremely clear why this is erroneous way to approach this issue. It makes it look (pretty heavily) as if you're wanting to define-out any version on which Dan and I are relying for our positions, instead of simply noting that they don't cohere and so we're probably talking at cross-purposes. I tried to solve this in my previous reply.. No matter.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it isn't. This is such a bizarre claim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As I have noted, even on your conception of Freedom (or, from my POV, your restricted version) this doesn't hold any water whatsoever. If your version of 'Freedom' is 'unrestricted' then you are frollicking in the AI world. We are, in fact, metaphysically bound to accept the 'restrictions' of time on our ability to make choices. This removes possibility. It does not restrict freedom. It removes, entirely the possibility to chose anything at all. This last pair of sentences holds in both of our accounts. I have no idea how you think you're getting around this by simply saying "Freedom is unrestricted". Then again, you did agree that my not having gills "restricts my freedom" to breath underwater, so I may just need to walk away from this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This isn't a problem and the quote you've used to respond to aptly dispatches this objection.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I can't quite understand what you're asking, based on the other content of the responses to this point. It seems you're wanting me to agree that a moment in time can be, in fact, a free-floating 'something' in pursuit of another free floating 'something' ad infinitum such that no act is ever complete because you're always acting (the other possibility, below my response to this).
Again, I have answered the objection within the quote you've used. An act is noted in totality. Either you made a cut (let's say into an apple) or you didn't. You didn't "halfway" cut through the apple. You either didn't get to it, or you cut exactly how deep you cut. You are never 'part way through' the act.
The other version you might be asking is "Doesn't your psychology pick out the timespans of acts as you carry them out?". The answer to this is "sometimes" and yet the previous objection holds. Just wanted to make sure I didn't ignore this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is actually direct, on-point support for what I've just responded with. Acts happen "in the present" and are not divided into "past" and "present" parts. That is correct, experience tells us this quite directly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have a fairly big hunch you're making this part up.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Good grief. Okay, this will be my last reply because this is out the gate wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because they are not coherent points to have made together. If Freedom does not obtain, it cannot be restricted. This is plain language now, come on.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I means exactly what I've pointed out several times (beginning to think you're skimming these posts on your phone maybe?). Freedom does not obtain in that scenario. There is no freedom. It cannot be restricted. But, you seem to think that Freedom applies to things like "I want to be one of several Water Gods of a Triverse that doesn't exist". Hehe.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It isn't. If you do not understand it, so be it. I really don't mean to sound rude in these posts, but its becoming obviously I do/will come across that way. I think you're being a bit obtuse.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is both an incredibly bad reading of all that's been said, and a pretty good indicator you're not looking to understand.
So be it. Take care my friend :) I shall not engage this one further, I don't think.
Look at your statement "free to leave" means "no restriction being placed on you leaving". "Free" is interpreted as "no restrictions being placed on", "to leave" is interpreted as "you leaving". Remember my definition for freedom? It was "without restrictions, no constraint". Why would you think that if "freedom" is defined as without restriction or constraint, then "you are free to leave" which clearly means that no restrictions or constraints are being placed on you leaving, by that definition, would also mean "you are free to go to the moon"?
If someone said "you are free", that appears to imply an absolute sense of "free" and this would mean that you are not restricted or constrained at all. But statements like this are often dependent on context to derive the true meaning, and are also often metaphorical. No one would say "you are free", meaning that the person is capable of doing things beyond the natural constraints of the physical world, these restrictions are accepted as implied.
But in a philosophical inquiry we ought to be very clear about what we are saying, and leave nothing like that as taken for granted. So we might start with the most common definition of "freedom" as without restriction (as you seem to agree now), then proceed to clarify exactly how a human being is not free, what restrictions are in place, which makes a person less than free. First we have the natural restrictions, starting with the fact that we cannot change the past, then the restrictions of our physical bodies and the physical world around us, and also the artificial restrictions like laws and codes of ethics. All these various types of restrictions make a person less than free.
Quoting Dan
There are a number I can think of. The right to speak is a matter of freedom over one's own body, but threats and hate speech need to be controlled. This problem extends into lying, deception, brainwashing, and some cases of preaching ideologies. Immoral use of language is a significant problem. A person's freedom to use one's body to communicate (to speak), conflicts another's freedom over one's own mind, and that's simply the basic nature of communication. It's very evident in children, as the mode of education. We can say that children don't really have freedom over their minds, because their minds must be constrained through education, but we still don't ever get to the point of having our minds free from the influence of others.
And the other categories can be seen to overlap negatively as well. Freedom to do what I want with my property can restrict your freedom to do what you want with your body, like if I hit you with my car, And problems like these are extensive.
Quoting Dan
I couldn't understand this, so I looked at my posting and saw a typo. I didn't mean to say free is "predicted" of will, I meant it is "predicated" of will. So, what you say here is consistent with what I meant You would say that "free will" means that the will is not restricted in the way of determinism, so it is free in that way. When you say "to be able to act in ways that are caused wholly be the agent". you mean that the will is "free" (as in unrestricted), up to the point of the restrictions which are natural to "the agent" referred to. From my perspective then, those restrictions cannot be taken for granted, and must be understood as limiting or restricting the agent, so that it's freedom is qualified. "The will is free" uses "free" in the same type of qualified sense as "you are free to go". In this case freedom is qualified by the nature of the agent referred to as the free agent. A human being is restricted in natural ways (such as unable to change the past). But this is where habits may also enter the picture, as natural restrictions. And habits may come about from training as well, like when a child is educated.
Quoting Dan
For a rational agent to constrain one's own choices such that one only makes choices which belongs to oneself, is not "freedom", but moral restraint. You can call it 'freedom", and define "freedom" in that way, but what you describe is better known as moral restraint. This would be the capacity to restrict one's choices to "choices that belong to them". Since you are explicitly wanting to protect the capacity to make certain choices, those which belong to the agent, and not wanting to protect the agent's freedom to make other choices, what you describe is moral restraint.
Quoting AmadeusD
This is the only part of your post worth replying to Amadeus. I think you've made a fine decision, something I can readily agree with you on.
In your last post you said "To "be free to act in some way" is completely meaningless if not oxymoronic. Say we name a specific type of activity, as the specified "some way", and say that the agent is free to act in this way. This means that we allow this option. But the agent being free, may choose not to act in that way, but to act in a contrary way. In that sense, "to be free to act in that specific way" is completely meaningless, because the agent is also free to act in any way."
It was this that I was taking issue with. Hence pointing out that being free to act in some specific way is a perfectly sensible thing to say, and doesn't require freedom to act in all possible contrary ways or that freedom be completely unrestrained by anything.
I agree that there are... some cases where we might need to constrain what someone is saying. Generally threats, fraud, and incitement to violence. Quite a lot of other things, like just deception generally or hate speech, needs no constraint as it doesn't restrict others freedom. Children are an interesting case because they aren't really persons yet. It's better to think of them as the same agent as their future self and so deserving of moral protection, but not currently able to understand most of their own choices so those choices need to be protected for them by guardians. A lot of these supposed problems aren't really problems though. There are some interesting conflicts, but the more obvious ones seem to amount to someone trying to put their property or themself in a place where they have no "right" to be (eg, their car on top of my foot) and the answer seems to be "no, you can't do that".
Without getting back into why habits aren't restrictions on the will, I'm not really sure what kind of restrictions you are concerned about. A person's free will is not diminished by being locked in a cell, so being unable to change the past just doesn't seem like a concern.
I mean, it really isn't. Moral restraint might well be what people ought to show in order to stick to only their own choices, but it isn't what is being protected. What is being protected is the ability of persons (free, rational agents) to make a certain kind of choice (those that belong to them). That isn't to say that all other choices ought to be restricted. There are lots of choices that I might want to make that don't need protecting, but also don't require prohibiting.
An alternative way of thinking about the kind of freedom that freedom consequentialism seeks to protect is that it is plausibly the same thing protected by some rights theories. Would conceptualizing it as a consequentialism of rights help you?
What I meant is that it is meaningless without a definition of "free"'. If "free" is defined as unrestricted, then "you are free to leave" is meaningful, as you will be unrestricted in the act of leaving. But if we try to define free from the context of the statement "free to leave", then "to leave" is a restriction on the concept of freedom expressed. By that expression, freedom is allowing you only that one named act, "to leave". That is why I said this way of looking at things is oxymoronic. You are proposing "freedom" but only to do one specific thing.
If you insist, that this is what freedom is, this entity, capacity, or whatever, which allows you to leave, in that instance, and then proceed to propose different types of freedom, "free to run", free to hide", "free to speak", "free to choose" "free to go to the moon", etc., then "freedom" becomes totally meaningless, because you just name any activity and say that there is a different type of freedom which is designed to capacitate that specific activity. In reality though, this is not the way that we use "freedom". We use it to mean "unrestricted", and then we name the restrictions which are lifted in application
This is why I say your approach is backward. In real practise we name the types of restrictions which are applied to freedom, not the types of freedom. So "free to leave" names a specific restriction, that was placed on you leaving, and signifies a lifting of that restriction. This allows that all the other things which one is naturally free to do, or not do, are irrelevant and not mentioned. What happens in theory though, is that we name specific activities which we want to protect, as being allowed in a sort of unrestricted sense, and call those "freedoms" as if they are specific types of freedom. These are things like freedom of thought and belief, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of property ownership, etc..
In these cases, we name the type of restriction which we desire to to prevent, and in In doing this we create what in theory might be called "a type of freedom". But that's really just a simple name which represents a complex conceptual structure, intended to facilitate communication with those people uneducated in this type of complex conception. The name "freedom of speech" appears to represent a type of freedom, as do "freedom of belief", and "freedom of association", but that is not what is really the case in the conceptual structure which these words refer to. What is really meant if the theory states that "freedom of speech ought to be protected", or, "you ought to have the freedom of speech", is that restrictions against speaking should not be applied. Notice that what's really referred to is not one's freedom to speak, which is also one's freedom to be silent, and one's freedom to do whatever else is desired at that time, but the restrictions against speaking. What is referred to is that specific restriction. So "freedom of speech ought to be protected" says nothing about freedom itself, or any supposed "type of freedom", it says something about a specific type of restriction, the restriction against speaking, which it claims ought not be applied. This is the same way that "you are free to leave" refers to a specific restriction which is lifted, a restriction against you leaving, but it says nothing about the meaning of "free" or "freedom" or any "type of freedom". To know what "free" or "freedom" means in this context, we must refer to a definition, or a preconception.
Quoting Dan
But don't you think that hate speech incites violence? And don't you think that deception is a restriction on a person's free thinking. This is the issue I described, how communication in general, which extends from learning right through to general discussions about solving problems, restricts free thinking. How would you draw a line between threats (restricting one's freedom) and hate speech (not restricting), and how would you draw a line between fraud (restricting) and deception (not restricting)?
This is why I say that what is really the case is that all instances of influencing one's thinking through communication, from education right through to simple day to day conversation, are instances of restricting one's freedom of thought. Then we need to distinguish good restrictions from bad restrictions, and perhaps even indifferent restrictions. It makes no sense to say that the same type of communication, deception for example, in some instance restricts ones freedom, as fraud, but in other cases it does not, when what deception actually does to a person's free thinking is the same thing (some kind of causal change to a person's thinking) in each case. Instead we ought to look at under what conditions is deception (as a restriction to one's freedom) good (Plato's royal lie possibly?), under what conditions is it bad, and under what conditions is it amoral.
I believe that this is much more consistent with the reality of the situation. Restricting one's freedom of thought is what is done to a person throughout the person's life. It is most significant when the person is young, and the person slowly grows into a position where one is allowed more and more freedom of thought, but laws, bosses, and families, still impose significant restrictions.
Once we understand that having our freedom restricted, is a basic fact of life, then it is much easier to understand and accept all the aspects of society which actually restrict our freedom. That is why I suggested that we start with the basic restriction, that we cannot change the past, and also the restrictions which the past imposes on us through the laws of nature. When we start by taking these very significant restrictions for granted, such that they are not considered to be restrictions, instead of understanding the way that they restrict us, then we have no coherent approach toward understanding the way that restrictions actually work to restrict us.
To simply say restrictions are bad, and claim to protect freedom, then go through all the real restrictions classifying some as restrictions and others as not restrictions, because you want "freedom" to be good, and something to be protected, is to totally ignore the true human condition which is to be restricted. This "true human condition" of restricted is what I replied to Amadeus as represented in many religions as the result of original sin. Following from original sin is "knowledge", and knowledge restricts us in a new way which is completely different from the way that the past restricts us, as it contains a view toward the future, which we become respectful of. We can reject religion, as fundamentally outdated, and reject the representation which it gives us, but the true human condition, which is represented in that way, as fundamentally restricted, cannot be rejected, as Amadeus pointed out, it is self-evident.
Quoting Dan
The issue is what I was going through with Amadeus, was that the free will can choose to do what is physically impossible to do. That is a simple representation of "mistake". The "mistake" in its fundamental character is a misjudgement of the restrictions in the circumstances. If we do not class restrictions as restrictions, saying that they have no influence of one's "freedom" (in this odd sense of "freedom" you are proposing as deserving to be protected) then we do not have the principles required to avoid mistake. If you say that one's past (childhood experiences, habits, etc.) actually do restrict the person, but they just do not restrict one's freedom, then what principles can you propose to establish consistency? Is there one type of restriction which restricts freedom, and another type of restriction which restricts something else, something other than a person's freedom? What would be restricted by this type of restriction?
Quoting Dan
This might help. Representing what you call "freedom", as "rights" instead, would probably help me to explain to you that in your principles you are not at all proposing to protect freedom. A "right" is very different from "freedom".
No, in practice we both specify what people are or ought to be free to do or be and what restrictions they ought to be free from. Both are sensible ways of discussing what is meant by "freedom" in a specific context and what kind of freedom (or definition of freedom if you prefer) is valuable and which isn't.
No, I don't think deception is a restriction on free thinking... most of the time. As I've said, there are some cases where it is, such as fraud. But most of the time, no. And, for the same reason, education is not a restriction on freedom in the way you describe. Hate speech can indeed incite violence, and it is possible that in some circumstances there is an argument for restricting it, but it does not itself violate anyone's freedom, so restricting it is (if and when it is ever appropriate) a case of doing something bad to prevent something worse from happening.
You are ascribing motives to me that are unfair. I think the "restrictions" you are suggesting, such as education, simply aren't restrictions. It isn't a matter of not thinking they are because I want restrictions to be bad. It is a matter of not thinking they are because they aren't.
I'm not totally sure what you are talking about regarding childhood, but I will attempt to answer what appears to be the core question. Specifically, I would quite happily say that there are all sorts of things that restrict a person's choices, their "freedom" if you like, but don't restrict the kind of freedom I have identified as morally relevant. For example, my lack of a private plane "restricts" my choice to take my private plane when traveling. But this isn't a choice that belongs to me, so the fact it is "restricted" in this way isn't morally relevant.
No, a right is not very different from freedom. I think, properly understood, rights are ultimately about the kind of freedom I have been discussing. To have a right to something is to have a choice of whether to do that thing, or what to do with that thing. For example, a right to life entails a right to die, a right to speak entails a right to stay silent. I'm very happy have any future discussions without the language of rights. I should say now that doing so wouldn't quite be accurate, as I would say my theory aims to protect the thing at the core of rights theories, rather than rights themselves, and there is some baggage associated with rights that isn't applicable, such as rights being trumps and each right being kind of seperate from each other one, rather than a single underlying value as I would suggest. But, bearing that in mind, we can talk about freedom consequentialism as a consequentialism of rights from now on.
I don't understand how you can think that you could take a specific type of actiion, like deception for example, and say that most times it is not a restriction to freedom, but sometimes it is. If we take the act itself, which is to intentionally mislead a person, and we assume that in each case the deception is successful, how is it that sometimes misleading a person restricts one's freedom of choice, and sometimes it doesn't?
I believe you are not judging by consequences, because in each case the consequence is the same, the person is misled. Therefore you must be seeking to distinguish different types of the act itself, different types of deception. This means that there must be something within the intent of the deceiver, which makes the specific type of deception qualify as a restriction of freedom. You mentioned "fraud". Am I correct to assume that by "fraud" you mean when a person falsely represents oneself in an attempt to wrongly extract gain, financial, property, or whatever type of gain, from another. Is it this, the intent to attempt to take another's property, which constitutes a restriction of the other's freedom of choice?
If so, I do not understand how taking one's property restricts one's freedom. In actuality, owning property is itself a restriction to one's freedom, because the person is constrained to take extra measures to protect one's property from theft. It is commonly said that people are tied to their property, because owning property produces the responsibility of maintaining, servicing and taking care of that property. Ownership of property is actually a burden to one's freedom, as a weight to be carried.
It is for reasons like this, that I do not understand how you can take a specific type of act (deception in that example), and say that in some cases it restricts freedom and others it does not. This seems to me, to be a totally arbitrary distinction, not based in any real description of what it means to restrict a person's freedom. Can you give me such a description? Describe to me, what it means to you, to have your freedom of choice restricted.
Quoting Dan
So, in explaining what it means to have "one's freedom of choice restricted", you fall back on this idea of "morally relevant", which seems incoherent to me. Notice, you allow that things which I call restrictions to one's freedom of choice (and this extends to all instances of deception, and even honest education) actually do restrict one's freedom, and you say you'd happily admit to this, but this type of restricting freedom is not in a "morally relevant" way.
This implies that the distinction you make is not a distinction between restricting one's freedom, and not restricting one's freedom, it's a distinction between restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way, and restricting one's freedom in a way which is not morally relevant. The problem is that the name you attach, what you call these instances, "not restricting one's freedom", is not properly representative of what you believe, that these instance do restrict one's freedom, but not in a morally relevant way. And, when what you say does not properly represent what you believe, you leave yourself open to the charge of deception, yourself.
Keeping this in mind, take a look at your example. Your principle of discrimination is "a choice that belongs to me". Then all possible choices which you designate as not belonging to a person, if they are restricted from that person's freedom of choice, you insist that such a restriction is not morally relevant, and from this principle, you proceed to assert that this is not a restriction of one's freedom of choice. So, from my example, we can start with the fixedness of the past, and the forces expressed by the laws of nature, and I say that these are fundamental restrictions to one's freedom, while you claim that they are not restrictions because they are not morally relevant. And we can look at your example in the same way, not having a private plane restricts your freedom of choice to travel in your private plane, but you say that this is nor morally relevant because that choice does not belong to you, so you dismiss it as not a restriction to the "type of freedom" which you are concerned with.
Remember my objection though, the reason why I think this is incoherent, which you still haven't adequately cleared up for me. You could choose to steal a plane, then you would have a plane in your possession, and therefore the choice to travel in your private plane would belong to you. So it seems very clear to me, that the choice to travel in your private plane, when you do not have a private plane, if it inclines you to steal a plane, is very much "morally relevant", even if we can say that the "choice does not belong to you". And so it appears to me like your principle, by which you determine which choices are morally relevant, and which are not, upon which you base the distinction, and naming of, "restricting one's freedom" and "not restricting one's freedom", is fundamentally flawed, and incoherent. Choices which 'do not belong to you" are clearly morally relevant because they are the type of choices which incline one to do something bad.
Quoting Dan
This demonstrates very clearly the problem with your proposal of "a kind of freedom". To have a right to something is not to have a choice about that thing, it is to have your choice protected by legal principles. The thing is, we make choices about all sorts of things, and only some of those choices are protected by rights. So "rights" refers only to particular types of choices, and freedom of choice extends far beyond those choices which we have a right to make. Your proposal, to restrict the concept of "freedom of choice" to those choices which we have a right to make, is simply not representative of reality. It is a false proposition, and ought to be rejected as such. The following is that false proposition.
"to have a right to something is to have a choice of whether to do that thing, or what to do with that thing." See, people freely choose to do things which they have no right to do.
Quoting Dan
I still think you have things reversed. Freedom is logically prior to rights. Rights follow from freedom, and we only have rights because we have freedom. This means that freedom is fundamentally independent from rights, and not determined by rights. You can tie rights to freedom but you cannot tie freedom to rights.
I mean, I am not sure how to be more clear about this. I contend that a specific type of freedom should be protected, specfically that of persons over those choices that belong to them. By "morally relevant" I mean that the ability to understand and make such a choice (one that doesn't belong to you) does not have moral value. I don't mean that there is no moral content in the choice. And no, the choice to travel in the plane still wouldn't belong to you because the plane doesn't belong to you. What you do or don't have in your possession isn't at issue, what matters is what belongs to you, what choices you (for lack of a better phrase) have a right to make.
No, to have a right (a moral right anyway, which I assume is the kind we are talking about) to something is not about whether your choice is protected by legal principles. Women had a moral right to own property (assuming that people have such a right) in the same way as men before they were granted a legal right to do the same. It is very much one's moral rights I am concerned with, not their legal ones.
I am not sure what you think I have reversed. I am saying that I think the thing that rights theories ultimately protect is the type of freedom I am proposing is morally valuable. That is very much tying rights to freedom and not the other way around. I just thought that using the language of rights might be helpful as you seem to be having trouble with the language of freedom.
This supposed "bar to clear" is extremely problematic. For the person who is "understanding", there is no difference between understanding and misunderstanding, it all appears like understanding. So, I "understand" my choice, but it later turns out that it really was a misunderstanding, due to deception. Then we can see that misunderstanding seeps into our thoughts in all sorts of different ways, in various aspects of thought, and various degrees. Therefore to "understand" one's own choice is not a practical bar at all, because within the various aspects which enter into any particular complex decision, there is likely to be some degree of misunderstanding.
This is where "habit" is very influential. When it becomes habitual, the misunderstanding passes as understanding without any further consideration, and the decision is immediate despite the presence of misunderstanding. The person believes oneself to "understand" one's own choices, but really misunderstands. That is a feature of the attitude known as certitude, and it allows misunderstanding to be abundant within one's own assumed understanding of one's own choices. On the other hand, the person who is of the skeptical mindset who is keenly aware of the possibility of misunderstanding, will deliberate, analyzing every aspect of the complex choice, to determine any possible spot where misunderstanding may lie hidden. That is why "habit" robs us of our freedom, by making misunderstanding appear to be understanding. So if you insist that to "understand" is the bar to freedom, then it is clear that habit restricts freedom in this way.
Your examples do not really serve the intended purpose. Decisions are in general, very complex, involving many aspects, so the effects of deception may be far reaching. If you make dinner for the supposed guitar player, isn't that fraud? What if you buy the person dinner, or buy tickets to their show? You seem to be trying to set a boundary which cannot be upheld. Deception is intentional, and if the intent is to take advantage of the other, then isn't that fraud? Some deception might be for entertainment, a joke or something, but don't you think that laying a trap for a person with the intent of laughing at them, is a case of restricting their freedom?
Quoting Dan
And I don't know how to demonstrate more clearly, that your course here is deeply flawed. We cannot restrict the meaning of "freedom" to the point of having a specific "type of freedom" which is to be protected, because then it is not "freedom" at all which is being protected. "Freedom" means unrestricted. So all you are really doing is proposing a slew of restrictions which ought to be enforced, in order to produce the concept of "types of freedom". Then you use convoluted (and deceptive, as shown in the last post) language to make it appear like you are talking about "types of freedom" rather than what you are really talking about, types of restrictions.
It appears like the two of us are simply set in our own ways "determined" you might say, by our respective habits, to see things in a way opposed to how the other sees things. I could argue that you misunderstand, and that restricts your freedom, and you could argue that I misunderstand, but this sort of choice is extremely complex with abundant misunderstanding on both sides.
Quoting Dan
This statement is very indicative of what I am arguing. By referring to the "choices you have a right to make", all you are really talking about is specific restrictions being applied to my freedom of choice. So the "right to make" this choice, and not that choice, is not at all a feature of my freedom of choice, it is a feature of a structured set of restrictions being applied to my freedom of choice.
Quoting Dan
This is an ontological proposition, to assume that rights have an ontological status independent from the human beings which determine those rights. That's a sort of platonic realism, which assumes independent existence of rights, known as "natural rights". But that ontology would need to be supported with principles and evidence.
Quoting Dan
You have reversed the logical priority of "freedom" over restrictions, to make restrictions logically prior to "types of freedom". In reality, "restrictions" imply "freedom", as what is restricted, meaning that freedom is logically prior to restrictions. But you refuse to talk about "freedom" in the general sense, in its true definition of "unrestricted". Instead, you choose as your subject of discussion "types of freedom", which implies necessarily restrictions, such that restrictions are logically prior to "types of freedom".
From this reversal, it appears to you, like rights are what protects a person's freedom, the person's freedom existing only as types of freedom. But in reality, from the perspective of "freedom" in the general sense, meaning unrestricted, rights are what restrict one's freedom. So you do not tie rights to "freedom", as you claim, that is your deceptive proposition. You tie rights to "types of freedom". But "types of freedom" implies that one's freedom is already restricted.
So, as I've been saying, if we want to start with the assumption that one's freedom is already restricted, we need to look truthfully at the manner in which it is restricted. That is why I proposed that we look at the nature of time, and determine how temporal existence restricts one's freedom, to provide a foundation for that assumption.
Again, you are demanding more of "understanding" than I am. I am simply requiring that a person knows what choice they are making and what it means to make that choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it, not that they understand every aspect of that choice and everything that might lead from it. Also, the fact that someone might think they understand something and be wrong isn't problematic in the sense of causing a problem for my or other moral theories. People are wrong all the time, that's not really an issue.
No, it isn't fraud if you buy someone dinner because you think they can play guitar. It might be if you buy tickets to their show and their show doesn't exist. And no, laughing at someone you've tricked also isn't restricting their freedom (specifically, when I say not restricting their freedom here, I mean the specific type of freedom I have been advocating for). This isn't a vague or ill-considered distinction, it's fairly clear.
Yes, you can restrict the meaning of freedom to a specific type of freedom within a specific context. You're just wrong on that front. It is indeed a type of freedom, and I'm not sure how I could make my language much more clear. Without wishing to be rude, it does sometimes feel as though you are intentionally misunderstanding me.
I mean, you definitely do misunderstand, but it isn't a misunderstanding that restricts your freedom in this way. You are free to continue using your device to express your views whether or not those views stem from a misunderstanding.
It is the freedom to make certain choices that I am advocating for, I don't think I have ever been less than clear about that.
I mean, yeah I am very much assuming that all moral facts are true whether or not anyone knows them, including any "rights" that people have. I feel like I explained that before, certainly in my original primer. Have you been under the impression that I was taking some position other than moral realism and objectivism?
You keep talking about true definitions, but the definitions of words aren't terribly important. If you wish to call the thing I am promoting schmeedom, then that's fine. What is at issue is the ability of moral agents to exercise the things that make them moral agents in the first place (free will and rationality) over those choices that belong to them.
I think we are at a standstill here. Neither of us will budge. I strongly believe that when you say "it is the freedom to make certain choices that I am advocating for", this is not any type of freedom at all. What you are saying is that one ought to be allowed to make this choice and that choice, but not any other choices. That is actually to tell people what choices they are allowed to make. To say that this is a type of freedom is nothing other than deception.
Quoting Dan
Yes, I think that would be much better. The concept you are presenting as what you are advocating for is not freedom at all, so it's better if you choose another word for it. This would avail you in avoiding the charge of deception.
Should we leave it at that?
I'm not being deceptive, I'm simply using a term in a way you don't seem not to approve of. Also, to be clear, I'm not saying that people aren't allowed to make any choices that don't belong to them, simply that their ability to do so does not require protection.
I'm happy to leave it there though.
Then it should be very clear to you, that you are not seeking to protect freedom of choice. Likewise, you are not seeking to protect freedom to act. Nor are you seeking to protect freedom to speak, freedom to assemble, or any other supposed "type of freedom", because some choices made within each of these categories might turn out not to "belong" to the person. What you are seeking to protect is the right of people to make certain types of choices.
To put this in context, you ought to be able to see now, that your op proposes a false dilemma. You are asking for a way to evaluate, or prioritize "freedom over different things", but you've already provided your own answer. Choices which "belong" to a person, in the most complete and absolute way, are of the highest value, while choices which do not belong to the person, in the most complete and absolute way, are of the least value. And all choices can be judged as to the degree that they truly "belong" to the person.
Further, if you replace "freedom" with "right" and acknowledge that what you are seeking to protect is rights rather than freedoms, the solution becomes even more obvious. In making a choice, the thing which the person has the most complete and absolute right to, is of the highest value, while the thing which one, in the most complete and absolute way, does not have a right to, is the least valuable. And every choice falls in between, and can be judged as to what degree the person has the right to make that choice.
Notice though, that this does not address the real problem of "freedom consequentialism, and that is that freedom and consequentialism are incompatible. Once you come to notice this, you might instead try to figure out how to make a value system based in rights compatible with a consequentialist value system. That problem is difficult enough, without even referencing freedom.
No, it is freedom of choice, rather than rights, as I've already explained many times. Yeah, I agree that it is very easy to resolve conflicts between choices that don't belong to someone and those that do, but this isn't the problem I outlined in the initial primer. I was concerned with how to weigh different amounts of freedom (over those choices that beong to people) against each other. For example, how many people's eyesight is worth one person's life if we are in a position to only save group or the other. This isn't resolved by what you suggest. Further, I'm not sure how you tell which choices people have a "more absolute right" to. If there was a clear and simple way of doing that, then that would go some way towards solving the problem (though it still wouldn't solve it completely as there is still the issue of how much of one (in terms of number but also in terms of duration and possibly even intensity) is worth how much of another. We might think that people have "more of a right" to live than to see, but that doesn't tell us how many of one is worth how many of the other.
If the choice truly "belongs" to the person, as you have been using this term, then the person is free to use whatever method of deciding which on wants to use. Therefore you cannot say objectively which is the better, or more highly valued choice, because that is a matter for the person who is in that particular situation, whom the choice actually "belongs to", to decide. In other words, if the choice truly belongs to the person, and the person is truly free to choose, then which choice is the correct choice is completely subjective, as being a conjunction of the person's freedom of choice, and the fact that the choice belongs to the person. If you tell the person that they must follow X hierarchical system in deciding, then the choice no longer belongs to the person, it belongs to you telling them what they must choose, and that's what I've been arguing is a restriction on the person's freedom of choice.
Quoting Dan
That a choice "belongs" to a person is your principle. And I do not understand your need for it, nor do I accept it. But if you apply the principles whereby you determine whether a choice belongs to a person or not, you will find that in the various situations there is either strength or weakness in that "belonging". This will tell you whether the person has a more or less "absolute right" to make that choice.
Quoting Dan
No, this is not a good analogy. We are talking about a person's right to make a specific choice. When you say that a certain choice does not belong to the person, so the person is not free to make that choice, I interpret it as the person does not have the right to make that choice. So when you take a look at some of the rights which exist, you'll see that some are more universally accepted, and are therefore higher than others. For instance, compare the right to live, to the right to speak freely, to the right to move freely around the globe. The first has almost no restriction (only the death sentence), the second has some restrictions, and the third has many restrictions. So the first is the highest freedom, having almost no restrictions, while the others are placed lower in the scale, depending on the strength of the right.
The issue isn't with determining which freedom of an individual that individual should value over any other. The issue is with deciding how to balance different people's freedom to do different things against each other. Such as the blindness vs death example given. I really think this discussion would go smoother if you read more of the primer I wrote to begin with.
I'm not sure what you mean by finding either strength or weakness in belonging or how we would find that. Also, I'm not sure why how often people's freedom is restricted would determine the extent to which that choice belongs to them.
I have made it through to the end of the primer now.
Quoting Dan
I don't understand how this could be an issue. You have already claimed to restrict "freedom" to those choices which belong to the person. If the choice involves doing something "against" another, how could that choice belong to the person?
Perhaps I misunderstand, but a person making a decision must use one's own thoughts, therefore one's own principles (whether they are common principles or not), so a person can only make one's own choice, and if another influences that choice, we'd have to question whether the choice made, truly belongs to the person. So we really cannot balance one person's freedom in relation to another's because freedom only relates to choice which belong to oneself. Don't you think so?
Quoting Dan
The problem here is that you have introduced me to this concept, of a choice which "belongs" to a person. It is entirely new to me, and you have really not made it very clear. For example, what exactly are the criteria which determines that the choice belongs to the person? Because you haven't provided me with clear meaning on that concept, I'm sort of playing a guessing game as to what constitutes a choice that belongs to the person.
No I don't think someone else influencing my choice makes it no longer mine.
But to your core question of how this could be an issue, let's return to the example I gave before of saving one person's life or several persons' sight. In both cases someone's freedom over those choices that belong to them will be violated, and we are seeking to choose the better option. The question is, how do we decide? How do we determine how many people's sight is worth one person's life. This is comparitively a fairly simple example, but I think it demonstrates the issue quite well. How do we well how many persons' choice to continue seeing is worth one person's choice to continue living.
A choice that belongs to someone can be thought of as a choice of what to do with something that belongs to that person, specifically their mind, body, and property.
Let me ask you this. How does that choice, in your example "belong" to the person in the example? The choice which belongs to the person, is one which concerns what belongs to the person. But the choice in the example concerns the life and sight of other people. Therefore by your principles the person in the example is not free to make that choice.
This is the problem of basing freedom in choices which belong to the individual. You say that this restricts freedom to choices which are morally relevant, but in reality it does the opposite. By already restricting "freedom" through the application of moral principles, such that a free choice is a correct choice by those principles (a choice which belongs to the person), you have placed "moral relevance" as logically prior to freedom. Now you want to apply a second level of moral relevance as posterior to your defined sense of "freedom" which is already restricted by a moral principle.
However, your primary restriction, which restricts a free choice to one which belongs to the person, disallows any real moral relevance for such a "free" choice. "Moral relevance" refers to choices which one makes concerning others, and the property of others (should I steal your car?). But you've already excluded the possibility of any moral relevance from any free choice by defining a free choice as "a choice of what to do with something that belongs to that person, specifically their mind, body, and property". Now, by the terms of your conditions, a person is not free to make a choice concerning the life or sight of others. And your example is of a choice which the person is not free to make.
A person's eyes are something that belong to them, as is a person's life. Of course neither belong to the person making the decision, though I think you may have misunderstood when you say that they therefore aren't "free to make the decision". Assuming that the people all want to keep their sight and their life, then the person making the decision is faced with a choice between protecting the freedom of some people to make one kind of choice, or protecting the freedom of some other people to make a different kind of choice, and they must decide which they should protect.
Again, I haven't said that a free choice is the right choice. I have said that only the freedom to make certain choices ought to be protected. You seem to keep getting caught on words that you insist I am using in ways that I'm just not. In this case, the person's choice between people dying and people losing their eyesight isn't something that belongs to the person making it, so them being able to make that choice is not inherently valuable. If they weren't able to make that choice (say, because no one's sight or life was in danger) then that wouldn't be a bad thing. But none of that means they can't or shouldn't make it or that such a choice is not morally relevant in the sense that you are using the term. When I was saying that someone's ability to understand and make a certain choice wasn't "morally relevant" I meant that their ability to understand and make that choice did not have inherent moral value, not that the choice did not have moral content and could not be good, bad, right, wrong. I'm fairly sure I explained this earlier.
Quoting Dan
OK, the choice is not the type of choice which ought to be protected, nor is it inherently valuable, so why care about it? The example is a ruse. You are asking how to evaluate a choice which inherently has no value. That's illogical.
Quoting Dan
We cannot switch to my sense of "morally relevant", that would be equivocation. If we adhere to your principles, the choice has no moral value, it need not be protected, therefore we do not care about it. The person can choose to do anything in that situation, or even nothing, and it really does not matter to us. We would be wasting our time considering this example, thinking about a choice which by the conditions of your principles, has no value. Likewise, if a person was actually in that situation, they could choose whatever they want, even nothing, because the options cannot be evaluated from moral principles, inherently having no moral value.
If you want to create a system for evaluating this type of choice, you need to propose other principles, and a completely different system. That's what I mean when I said that you have made morality prior to freedom, by using moral principles to determine "free choices", now you want another system posterior to freedom to judge choices which have now been excluded from the class of "free choices". But we cannot use "morally relevant" here, or any of those terms, "rights" etc., which have been used in the system of prior logic, because then there would be ambiguity and equivocation.
Quoting Dan
See what I mean? If the choice has no inherent moral value, then we cannot evaluate it using moral principles. Moral principles apply to situations which have moral value. Now that you've removed the moral value from that type of situation, if you want a system for evaluating it, we need a system other than a moral system. What should we propose?
I'm not quite sure where to begin with your first question. Imagine asking the same question of a utilitarian only pointing out that making the choice itself doesn't make them happy, so why should they care. What you are doing is much the same thing. The choice to continue using one's own eyes, or to continue living, are both valuable, and we are faced with a choice between protecting one or the other. Choosing between one set of consequences and another, both of which will result in some people being negatively impacted in a morally relevant way. This is not a ruse, it is exactly the kind of thing moral theories deal with.
Your second point is again, completely misunderstanding everything I have said up until this point. I do wonder whether it is intentional. First, me explaining how I was using morally relevant in a specific context and pointing out that it is not the same way you were using it in your objection is quite the opposite of equivocation. Second, and more importantly, you are conflating the measure of value and the moral decision. Again,it is as if you are claiming that a utilitarian shouldn't care about a decision (no matter how important) if it doesn't make them happy. That is beside the point. There are other people in the world. In this case, it the freedom of the people whose eyesight and/or life is in the balance that is important, but the decision is important because it leads to one of them being protected or not.
To your third point, it is completely and obviously not true that if a choice as no inherent moral value, we cannot evaluate it using moral principles. First, determining that it has no inherent moral value requires evaluation using moral principles. Second, it might have instrumental value. Third, it might have disvalue. Fourth, under most consequentialist theories, moral decisions don't themselves have inherent value, but they can still be evaluated inasmuch as they lead to consequences which have moral value (this isn't really the same as having instrumental value in terms of being able to make the decision being instrumentally valuable). Also, there is a lot of moral value at issue here, specifically value of persons to decide whether they want to continue seeing/living that we are deciding between.
That's not true though. The choice is not about one's own eyes, or one's own life, That's why the choice does not belong to the person, it's about what belongs to others.
Quoting Dan
We are not talking about utilitarian principles, we are talking about the principles you have presented in your freedom consequentialism primer. You very explicitly stated that a person only has freedom to make decisions which belong to the person. This did not make sense to me, so when I questioned this principle, you said that a person is actually free to make those decisions concerning things not belonging to oneself, but such decisions are not morally relevant, they have no moral value, and therefore this is not the type of freedom that you are interested in protecting.
Now, you've turned everything around, and you seem to be arguing that decisions which do not belong to the person, decisions about the belongings of others, do have moral relevance, and ought to be valued, so that certain decisions would be valued over others. I'm sorry to have to bring this to your attention, but you just do not have the principles required to answer the question of the example. In fact, your principles actually exclude the possibility of there being an answer. You have explicitly excluded moral value from choices not concerning what belongs to the decision maker.
Quoting Dan
I can't believe you are actually saying this now. You have very clearly stated that decisions which do not belong to oneself have no moral value, and are therefore excluded from the type of freedom of choice which is relevant. Now you are trying to say that this type of decision can be important. I think you need to go back to the drawing board And please take my advice. You need to allow that choices which do not "belong" to the person are morally valuable, morally relevant, and also constitute a part of a person's freedom of choice which needs to be protected.
Quoting Dan
This is not true at all. Prior to evaluating something through the use of a value scale, we must judge the type of scale which is applicable. This is a different sort of judgement, a judgement of category, and once the category is decided, the scale which is suited to the category can be applied. So the judgement that something has no inherent moral value is a judgement that the moral scale is not applicable, it is not a judgement derived from the application of a moral scale. When the scale is applied, what is returned is a value, unless it is found out that the scale is not applicable. But when the scale is found to be not applicable, this cannot be said to be an application of the scale.
Quoting Dan
These two do not seem relevant.
Quoting Dan
This is the issue with consequentialism which I brought up, way back. This issue points to the incompatibility between a freedom based morality and a consequence based morality. One bases its principles in the act of choosing, while the other bases its principles in the observed effects of choices. The act of choosing is a view toward the future, while observations of effects is a view of the past. We cannot say that they are two sides of the same coin because neither can account for the reality of the present, and this is what keeps the two as incompatible.
Quoting Dan
Again, you repeat the same falsity, the misrepresentation. It is not a question of do I want to continue seeing and living, it is a question of deciding whether others ought to continue seeing and living. And by your stated principles this is a very big difference. The former is a question which belongs to a person, and the latter does not belong to the person. By your principles, the latter has no moral value and is not morally relevant.
No I mean, the choice that belongs to the people whose eyes and lives are at stake is valuable because their eyes and lives belong to them.
At no point do I say either explicitly or implicitly that a person "only has freedom to make decisions which belong to the person". What I have said is that the measure of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. This ability to understand and make one's own choices, which I call freedom is to freedom consequentialism what happiness is to utilitarianism. It is thing which determines the value of consequences. There are a great many decisions we need to make which are morally important precisely because they affect the freedom of others.
Again, I have been saying that decisions which belong to other people are valuable all along. What I have been saying is not valuable is one person's ability to make choices which don't belong to them. I can see why you would disagree with me given the bizarre view which you think I have been espousing. I would suggesting reading back over some of what I have said now that isn't what I said or meant and I think you will see that some of the disagreements probably melt away.
By "value scale" do you mean any moral principles at all, or do you mean something else? Those two definitely are relevant, as both make the application of moral principles relevant. That isn't what consequentialism is and there isn't really a conflict there.
Again, the choice of the persons' whose eyesight or life is at stake is the measure of value that makes the consequences of them losing their eyesight or life against their will morally bad. The decision between one happening and the other is morally important because it leads to bad consequences, not for the person making the choice, but for other people.
Isn't this what the example is, a person faced with making a choice which does not belong to that person, because it concerns the lives of others? And isn't this what you say is not valuable?
Quoting Dan
Yes, for the person making the choice, the choice does not concern this person's life, or eyesight, so the choice does not belong to the person who is making the choice. Therefore by the principle stated above, this choice is not valuable.
Quoting Dan
I mean any type of value judgement, from moral to numerical. The thing to be judged must first be categorized to determine what sort of scale is applicable. So for example, are we judging temperature, weight, volume, etc..
In the case of your example, the person is faced with making a choice concerning the life and eyes of others, so that choice does not belong to that person. Therefore, as you say it is not morally valuable. However, I suggest that perhaps there is another type of scale by which it could be judged.
Yes, the person's ability to make this decision is not inherently valuable. However, the value is in the choices that belong to the people who may lose their sight/life. Again, to compare to another form of consequentialism. The decision whether to flip the switch in the trolley problem isn't valuable according to utilitarianism. The world wouldn't be missing out on any value were you not able to make that decision because no one was on the tracks in the first place. Rather, the value is in the lives of the people being saved. Likewise, the value here is not in your ability to make a decision regarding other people's freedom, it is in those people's freedom.
You seem to think that I am claiming that only choices which belong to a person have any moral content, which is not at all what I am claiming. What I am claiming is that the measure of whether consequences are good or bad is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. In the case given here, with persons' eyes or lives on the line, the decision of which to save has a great deal of moral content/weight/import because it has consequences for the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It isn't because the choice itself is morally valuable that we should care which option is picked, it is because of the consequences.
If I am not missing your point, I think this distills it well in a way that clears the air for what MU has been saying (if not, for them proper).
You're talking about two different values. The value of the choice made (by the 'external' chooser) and the inability of the subjects to make choices about that which belongs to them (life, eyes) due to the choice made by the 'external' chooser.
The former only has moral value inasmuchas it restricts (or doesn't, depending the choice) the freedom of the subjects to make their own choices about that which belongs to them(eyes, life).
Is that right? I've been trying to follow but it gets a bit weedy at times.
I think there is basically some ambiguity in the term "moral value" as it is being used here. So I'll try to be as clear about what I mean as possible:
The choice between whether one person loses their life or five lose their sight is morally important because it leads to consequences which are good and/or bad. They are good and/or bad due to the gain and/or loss of freedom (by which I mean ability of persons to understand and make their own choices) involved.
Hopefully that is nice and clear. I think it is a fairly simple concept, but I think some confusion in the discussion between myself and MU has led to it looking a lot more complicated than it is.
Quoting Dan
All the bolded creates a murky, insufficiently direct sort of paragraph. By number, the questions I would ask to clarify (this, meaning I've understood you to be aligning with what I've said, just linguistically uncomfortable, so are re-stating):
1. Which person? The chooser, or (any one of) the subjects?;
2. For whom? The chooser, or (any one of) the subjects?;
3. For whom? The chooser, or (any one of) the subjects?; and
4. Whose choices?
-- ----- --------- ------ -----------
my stab at the answers, which, if true, mean you are saying what i'm saying:
[i]1. Any one of the subjects;
2. Any one of the subjects;
3. Any one of the subjects; and
4. Any one of the subjects.[/i]
So, it seems the choice being made (i.e by the Chooser, not one of the subjects) has no moral value other than the way in whcih is adjusts the ability of the subjects to make their choice. This seems an exact, contextual, instantiation of:
Quoting Dan
This is all to say, if so, it was sufficiently clear in my first attempt, as I see it. But, I think you are not being particularly clear and I can now see how MU is getting what they're getting.
1: In the example given not the chooser, just a person. But it doesn't make any difference which person it is. Any one of the subjects is a fine answer here.
2: Morally good to bad. Not for anyone. Good or bad objectively.
3: The freedom is lost and/or gained by the people whose eyesight or life is preserved or lost. Again, in the example we were talking about not the chooser. Any one of the subjects is also a fine answer here.
4: I'm not sure I totally understand question four. When I say the "ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" I mean that person's choices, the choices that belongs to the person whose freedom is being discussed. It's possible that any one of the subjects is a fine answer here, but I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the question, so I'm not sure.
Yes, it would be reasonable to say that the choice being made has no moral value (at least, no intrinsic moral value). But it is morally important because it affects the freedom of the subjects involved.
I mean, I think I'm being clear and using plain language whenever possible.
I think I now see what's going on, thanks to @AmadeusD. You have two distinct value systems. One is "moral value" based in consequentialism, and the other is the value of a person's ability to understand and make their own decisions. The problem is, as I've been saying from the beginning of the thread, that these two, consequentialism based principles, and freedom based principles, are "incompatible". But now that we have progressed toward looking at these principles in terms of "values", the better word might be "incommensurable". So, we have the situation where the value of one cannot be measured by the same scale as the value of the other, and this indicates the the two are categorically different.
To put this in perspective, with your example, let's consider that all people have freedom to understand and make there own decisions. And, any individual can scale and value the decisions which one makes. That is how a person decides, through some priority system. Also, since everyone has such freedom, and one's own system for deciding, we need a scale of value to relate one person's freedom and decisions to another person's. These two are very different, how I value and scale my own freedom and decisions, and how I relate two or more people's freedom and decisions.
Let's call the latter, relating a number of peoples freedom and decisions, to each other, as "moral" value. The reason I got so confused was that you were saying that the former, the value of one's freedom to make one's own decisions constituted "moral relevance". So let's give this value a different name. I propose we call this "intellectual value". So the value of a person's ability to understand and make ones own decisions, is called "intellectual value", and the value of one person's decisions in relation to others is called "moral value".
Would you agree that it might be helpful if we look at things under these distinct terms, so that I don't get confused? Then in your example, each person involved has one's own intellectual value, and the question you are asking does not concern the intellectual value of one person, the person in the position of making that choice, but it concerns moral value, which is a relationship of the intellectual values of all the people involved.
No, everything you just said is incorrect. There aren't two systems of value at all. I think you have gotten very much the wrong end of the stick again, but somehow it's an entirely different end than you had before. I'm starting to wonder what shape this stick is. Let me try to explain again.
What is of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad. For example, if I steal your car, then i have restricted your ability to understand and make choices regarding your car, which you own, so this is bad. If I save your life from an alligator, I have protected your ability to choose whether you want to live, so this is good.
When I said that only some choices are morally relevant, I meant that we only need to worry about protecting and not restricting persons' ability to understand and make their own choices, not choices that don't belong to them. For example, my ability to understand and make the choice to steal your car is not one that needs to be protected, because it is your car.
Essentially, as happiness and lack of unhappiness is to utilitarianism, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is to freedom consequentialism.
I don't know Dan, you presented me with the stick. I tried both ends, and still get it wrong, maybe it's time to go sideways.
Quoting Dan
Now we're right back to the original problem. I think the stick is circular, we've gone right around the bend, and we're back at the beginning What is of moral value to me, is to make my own choices, my free choice. But that includes the possibility of choosing to steal your car, or throw you to the alligators. When I told you this, you wanted to restrict this value, to choices which "belong" to me, meaning concerning what is mine. So that is how you define "one's own choice".
But this means choosing to save you from the alligators has no value to me, because it is not a choice which belongs to me. Now you include others, and say that their ability to make their own choices is also to be protected, and, " The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad." But this still does not provide me with the principle require to save you from the alligators. What gives me the right to make a choice which does not belong to me? Making such choices is not protected, and if you move to protect them, I may choose to throw you to the alligators instead.
Do you see what I mean? My freedom to choose what belongs to me is protected. But for me to choose to protect someone else's freedom to choose what belongs to them, this is not a protected choice. However, it is necessary for me to make choices which do not belong to me, in order for me to do morally good deeds. So that restriction, the restriction which limits my protected choices to those which belong to me, must be bad itself. And now we're right back to the beginning, where protecting one's freedom of choice meant protecting ones right to choose anything.
We can't have it both ways. If restricting one's freedom, to only choices which belong to the person, is good, then we cannot base good and bad on whether or not a persons freedom is restricted. You first assumed that this was not a restriction, just a type of freedom, but when I pressed you, you recognized that it really is a restriction. Now, since it is a restriction, and it is a good restriction, we cannot base moral good and bad on whether freedom is restricted.
You ought to see the vicious circle you put us into. First you say that a person's freedom to make one's own choices is good. Then you say "one's own" means concerning only their own body and property. Then you want to allow that saving someone from the alligators, a choice which is not one's own choice, is also good, so you allow that making a choice which does not belong to the person is also good, so long as it protects another's ability to make own's own choice. But this circling back has undermined your primary principle, because we now we have to allow that making a choice which is not one's own choice, is also good, and might even be better than making one's own choice. Therefore we must conclude that the primary premise, that a person's ability to make one's own choices is what needs to be protected is faulty. We need to premise instead, that one's ability to make choices, whether the choices belong to them or not, needs to be protected, if we want to proceed with consequentialism.
First of all, it isn't a matter of what is of moral value "to you" it is a matter of what is of moral value. Second, I very much restricted it to only the choices that belong to the person in everything I have said up until now, including the quote you have just made. Their "own" choices.
I think the problem might be that you are thinking of things having "moral value to you" or "to me", but that isn't the case. Your choice to not be eaten by alligators has moral value. Objectively, universally. It's not a matter of who it has value to. The reason I should save you from the alligators is because it protects your choice not to be eaten by them (assuming you aren't trying to get eaten by alligators). The choice to save you from alligators doesn't itself need to be protected. It is right because it protects a choice that ought to be protected and doesn't violate other choices that ought to be protected.
I didn't say it wasn't a restriction. It is a type of freedom, specifically one restricted to only those choices that belong to a person. We can absolutely base morality on whether this type of freedom is restricted.
This is not a vicious circle at all, rather it is a misunderstanding on your part. I say that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices (which I have always maintained are the choices that belong to them) is the measure of moral value, the thing that determines whether the consequences of an action are good or bad. Actions that protect that thing are good, actions which violate it are bad. The action of saving you from alligators protects this thing (the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, in this case yours to continue living), so it is good. That's not a contradiction, that's the difference between determining a measure of value which is used to evaluate actions and evaluating an action.
Oh, I see. You're yelling into the ether then...
You surely can't only be realizing that I'm an objectivist now. And less yelling into the aether and more determining what moral truths if any there are to be had.
Is the position that ethics are objective, whether or not we apprehend them? And that we actually don't apprehend them? This is somewhat confusing. One would think, if you're an objectivist, it's because you've come up against an objective ethic?
Your example is of a choice which an individual must make. And, your principle is that what is valued and protected is the individual's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. How do you introduce this other sense of "value", "moral value" which is neither a value to me in my decision making, nor to you in your decision making?
You've been saying that my ability to choose is protected, and valuable, as well as that of others. Now you are claiming another type of value, "moral value". This is an indication of what I've been telling you, you have to distinct scales of evaluation.
Quoting Dan
How can you say it isn't a restriction to freedom, and then proceed to say that it is a freedom which is restricted to...? Don't you see this as explicit contradiction?
Quoting Dan
But now you are saying that moral value is independent from anyone's choices. If it's independent from the choices people make, then on what principles do you value a person's ability to choose? This would just be a random choice as something to be chosen as valuable. If the ability to choose, the ability to make my own choices, is not a value to me, and not a value to anyone else, then how can you claim that it is something valuable? You're making no sense at all now. You are proposing values which are not valuable to anyone. How can you even call them "values"?
The position is that moral facts are objective facts. That leaves open the possibility of moral realism or moral error theory. It may be that there are no moral facts at all. I don't think this is the case, but it isn't ruled out by the claim that moral facts are objective facts.
It's been moral value all along. What is morally valuable (or rather what is the measure of moral value) is persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't about whether you value your ability to do so or not, or whether that provides some value to your life, the claim is that the extent to which that ability is violated or restricted determines the goodness or badness of the consequences of some action (and therefore the morality of that action).
No, there isn't a contradiction there at all. It's the ability to understand and make some decisions that ought to be protected, but not the ability to understand and make others. That is entirely coherent.
Again, you are getting caught up in things being valuable "to" people. What I am claiming is that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value. The thing which makes the consequences of an action good or bad. It is not about what is valued by people, it is about what matters morally, objectively, universally, whether or not we care about it.
I'm going to draw a comparison with two other types of consequentialist theory so that it is really clear what role the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is playing in freedom consequentialism.
In preference utilitarianism, the measure of moral value is the satisfaction of preferences and the lack of dissatisfaction of preferences. This is what is what determines the moral value of consequences, their utility. Now, if a preference utilitarian had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do (according to their theory) is whichever satisfies the most preferences/dissatisfies the least. It doesn't matter if the preference utilitarian doesn't have a preference for either one occuring, because the people who are going to lose their sight and/or life sure do, and their preferences matter morally.
In classical utilitarianism, the measure of moral value is happiness and the lack of unhappiness (or pleasure and the lack of pain if you prefer). This is what determines the moral value of consequences, their utility. Now, if a classical utilitarian had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do (according to their theory) is whichever leads to the greatest overall happiness minus unhappiness. It doesn't matter that the person in question is made neither happy or unhappy by making the decision, because the people who are going to lose their sight or lives are going to be made happy/unhappy by it, and their happiness/unhappiness matters morally.
In freedom consequentialism, the measure of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. This is what determines the moral value of consequences. Now, if a freedom consequentialist had to choose between five people losing their sight and one person losing their life, then the right thing to do is whichever protects the most freedom (or perhaps the most important freedom? This is very much the problem that I haven't solved yet. How to weigh freedom over different things in such a way). It doesn't matter that the choice in question doesn't require protecting, because the choices of the people not to lose their sight or lives do, and their ability to understand and make their own choices matters morally.
Does that clear things up?
It seems to for me.
As far as your response to me, that's relatively clear as to the position - but I find it really hard to believe anyone could hold to moral realism, but not that there are moral facts (note: Not "there are no moral facts" but you do seem open to that too. Error Theory I guess. I see that as a cop-out personally). That seems contradictory. Well, not entirely contradictory, but the fact you are not committed to any moral facts seems to fly in the face of being committed to moral realism. I say that as someone who was a moral realist for basically comfort reasons, but have utterly failed to find anything even remotely resembling a moral 'fact'. The idea is incoherent to me at this point.
It's not contradictory at all. Moral objectivism vs subjectivism vs whatever else is about what kind of things moral facts are. To be a moral objectivist is to say that moral facts are objective. That doesn't mean there are any. Similarly, we can sensibly say that all facts about the length of unicorn horns are objective and that all the claims we make about unicorn horn length are intended to point at objective truth, but there aren't any unicorns, so there aren't any unicorn horns, so all of these claims are mistaken. Unicorn error theory, as it were.
That being said, I am a moral realist, I was just pointing out that moral objectivism doesn't entail moral realism.
OK, so let's call this premise #1, a person's capacity to make one's own choices is what defines "morally valuable". That is the premise which lays out the measurement scheme for "moral value". We can say that a person's ability to make choices which belong to them defines "moral value", and moral valuation is a judgement as to the degree that this ability is enabled
Now, you want to allow a second premise, that a person's choices which are not one's own choices (as per your examples), are also morally valuable. Do you see that the two proposed premises are inconsistent? We cannot say, without contradiction, that the measure of moral value is a person's ability to make one's own choices, and also say that the person's ability to make choices which are not one's own choices also has moral value. The latter, premise #2, the person's ability to make choices which do not belong to them, has already been excluded from the possibility of having any moral value, by premise #1.
At no point am I saying that their choices are themselves morally valuable, I am saying that they can be good or bad because they produce consequences that are good or bad. And those consequences are good or bad precisely because they lead to the protection/violation of persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Please see my above examples of different kinds of consequentialism for a clear explanation.
You say that the ability to make "one's own" choices is the measure of moral value. Then, you want to allow that a person making choices which are not one's own, also has moral value. This is contradictory.
It is the measure of moral value, the goodness or badness of this choice is precisely because of how it affects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Just like if the person shot a lion that was about to eat someone, it isn't that shooting lions is intrinsically valuable it is good because it protects the ability to understand and make their own decisions of the person who is about to be eaten. This isn't contradictory, it's consequentialism.
The problem is that the choice being made does not belong to the person making it. It is not one's own choice. It is a choice concerning the life of another. Therefore, by your principle, goodness or badness is irrelevant because these are concerned with the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, and this is a different type of choice. It is a choice which is not one's own.
No, the goodness and badness of an action are determined by the extent to which that action protects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices/violates persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't that only your those choices that belong to you can be good. In fact, they mostly can't since whatever choice one makes that concerns only those things that belong to them, it will presumably be permissible. It is the protection/violation of the ability to understand and make these choices that determines whether an action is good or bad.
You're still not making any sense. Let's assume that there is a whole lot of people, and each one has the capacity to make one's own choices, and so we value each such capacity as one. The capacity to make a choice which does not belong to the person is given a value of zero. Doesn't this imply that making a choice which does not belong to you, has no value? The capacity to make such a choice is not at all something to be protected, it has no value.
Now, you say that making a choice which does not belong to you can be good. How do you value this designation of "good"? It cannot be that it is valuable because it protects the capacity of others to make their own choices, because no matter how many things with the value of one that you add up, it still cannot remove the value of zero from the choice which does not belong to the person. So you base that value of good in some supposedly objective moral principles.
This is why Amadeus and I have both told you that you have two distinct value scales. And I believe that the two are incompatible. The primary scale of value, as stated by you, is the value of one's ability to make one's own choices. The secondary scale of value is the scale which we assign to choices that do not belong to the person. This is the scale of good and bad, and it's based on moral principles.
If the secondary scale, the one that applies to choices which do not belong to the person, is the one for good and bad, then what is the primary scale based in? What is the reason for protecting one's capacity to make one's own choices? "Good choices" are in the category of choices which do not belong to the person, so how is there any reason to protect choices which do belong to the person? Do you see what I mean? There appears to be no reason why the capacity to make one's own choices ought to be protected. This appears to be just an arbitrary designation by you. You could have chosen the capacity to eat, or the capacity to breathe, or to walk, or to sleep, or to grow, etc.. Why choose "the ability to understand and make their own choices" as the thing which needs to be protected. What value system do you apply, to give this type of activity the highest position?
There isn't two scales or value systems. The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.
If you add one to zero, you don't get zero. You get one. Similarly, something not having intrinsic value doesn't negate the value it produces through its consequences somehow. The value of the action is in the consequences it produces (consequences which protect or violate the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The choice being made doesn't need to be valuable for it's own sake in order to be good. It's good because it produces good consequences.
I'm happy to answer why this is the best measure of moral value (though I think it is covered in the primer), but I'd like to make sure we have pinned down the misunderstanding you seem to be having with the measure of value first.
Take this principle, "the extent to which it protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". We have to justify it by saying why understanding and making there own choices is something which ought to be protected. This means that we need to place that principle "the ability to understand and make their own choices" in relation to other potential first principles, and scale it as the most valuable, in order to justify it as "the best measure of moral value".
Now the problem is that "the good acts", which are acts that protect another's or a multitude of others' ability to make their own choices, are not derived from a person's own choices. Since these good acts are ones which come from choices which are not one's own choices, it appears like this is contrary to the chosen principle, that protecting the ability to make their own choices is "the best measure of moral value".
So this is the way that it looks to me. You have two distinct types of choices, those which are one's own, and those which are not. The two produce a dichotomy. There is a scale for evaluating the one type, those which are not, as to bad or good. That scale is based in the assumption that the other type is valuable. The problem is that the two are dichotomous, "one's own", and "not one's own". And, since the primary category labeled "one's own" is the basis for scaling the acts of the other category as to bad or good, then no matter how good an act which is not one's own gets on the scale, it can never reach the level of one's own act. We will always have to say that one's own choice will trump any moral value of good or bad, assigned to an act which is not one's own.
The important thing to acknowledge is that there is a dichotomy produced by the principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". This principle turns making one's own choices into an ideal, in relation to the other category which is judged for good and bad. "One's own choices" is the highest goal, a sort of perfection, and it is set off from the other choices which are not one's own, in a special ideal category, as distinct, and incompatible with, the other choices, not one's own, which are judged for degrees of goodness.
It is my opinion, that you need to dissolve this dichotomy. The principle which sets the high (good) or low (bad) of the scale needs to relate to something within the scale, instead of something which the scale cannot provide for, because the dichotomy. For example, in a temperature scale, the boiling point of water, the freezing point of water, are "ideals" which the scale is modeled on, but they relate to points within the scale. So for instance, suppose we class all free choices together, including one's own and not one's own, in one class, as free choices, and scale them as to bad or good. Notice, we cannot say that as the choices get closer and closer to being totally one's own, they get better and better. This indicates that "the ability to make their own choices" is not an acceptable principle to scale good and bad. It is not a valid ideal. Therefore, I can conclude that you have arbitrarily placed that principle as an ideal, and the dichotomy which it creates between the acts which fulfill the criteria of that principle, and the acts which are judged for goodness, are incompatible. And, unless you dissolve this dichotomy you will always have inconsistency in your ethics.
One's own choices often aren't really good or bad. If I choose to key my own car, that isn't good or bad, it just is. These choices certainly aren't "the ideal". What is important is the ABILITY of persons to understand and make their own choices. Their freedom. That is what needs protecting. Since most choices of my own choices don't protect that freedom or violate it, they are generally fairly neutral actions.
Again, I'm very happy to discuss why I think the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the best measure of value we have available, but I really want to make sure you have understood what that is first. I don't want to move on if we are just going to be back here in a few posts time with you suggesting that I can't call choices that don't belong to the person making them good or something similar. That is not an implication of anything I have said, and it is not my position. Those words don't belong in my mouth, and I'll thank you to stop trying to put them in there.
If such choices, "one's own" are generally not good choices, then why seek to protect that ability. I think it's incorrect to say that these choices are not the ideal, according to your principles. If protecting the ability to make such choices is the standard whereby other choices are judged as good or bad, than this type of choice is named as the ideal choice, the one which all others are measured against in relation to their capacity to enable that type. If this wasn't the case, then you could simply posit as your principle, "to protect the ability to make good choices". But you didn't propose "good choices" as your ideal, you proposed "choices which are one's own". So you talk about protecting the ability to make that type of choice, rather than the ability to make good choices
This is where the inconsistency lies hidden. You want to protect freedom, because you think that it has some value. However, freedom allows for both good and bad acts, and what you really want out of personal freedom is good acts. So valuing freedom is inherently inconsistent with valuing good acts because freedom allows bad acts As a sort of compromise to "freedom" you posit a "type of freedom", which is the freedom to make one's own choices. This is a type of choice which is generally neutral, removed from good and bad. But, like I already explained, this is not a type of freedom at all.
It's a highly compromised, restricted sense of "freedom", specifically formulated so as to make it appear like there is a type of freedom, which the protection of, would be consistent with the desire for good acts. In other words, if true freedom was what your principle sought to protect, this would not be consistent with cultivating good acts, because freedom allows for bad acts. So you posit a false freedom, the freedom to make one's own choices, which is not any type of freedom at all, because it consists of a very restricted, narrow and limited, range of choices. Then you state that one's own choices are neutral choices, to ensure that protecting one's own choices would not result in bad choices, in which case this ability ought not be protected. Therefore you end up with an extremely contrived sense of "freedom" which you are seeking to protect, the freedom to make choices which are neither bad nor good, i.e. choices which are morally irrelevant.
To support your enterprise, you need to produce some solid principles as to why the ability to make morally neutral choices ought to be protected at all. And, if this is supposed to be a form of freedom, what kind of freedom is it really. Is it the freedom from moral principles? If we all made only this type of choice, then we wouldn't have to concern ourselves with good or bad anymore. Is this the ideal?
Quoting Dan
Go right ahead, I really want to know how you justify what I believe to be a false freedom. This is what it's all about. You have specifically designed what you call a "type of freedom", the freedom to make choices which belong to oneself, in an effort to make the value of "freedom" consistent with the value of morality. Now I would like to see you justify the value which you assign to this "type of freedom"
No it isn't. The whole idea of these choices being "the ideal type" is an invention of yours. It is not reflected in anything I have said. I suggest that you are interpreting all of this through the wrong lens.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are ascribing motives to me which I do not have.
It is a type of freedom consistent with all moral agents having the same freedom, which is surely the type that we should want in a consequentialist moral theory.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
They are neither good nor bad because they are your choices to make, and the only good or bad choices are those that take that same freedom away from others or protect it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is the freedom to understand and make your own choices. Not the freedom from moral principles, the freedom from things that would prevent you being able to understand and make your own choices. Also you seem to be trying to find some buried ideal, but I think I have explained the moral philosophy fairly clearly. There isn't a hidden value under the hood.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what you mean with the value of morality. This is what I am suggesting has moral value.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, I'm happy to, but I'm not moving off of this topic while you are still misunderstanding the measure of value under discussion. If you don't understand the measure of value, then I think any conversation about why it is our best candidate for a measure of value is likely to be doomed from the off.
You said:
Quoting Dan
If you cannot understand that this means that this type of choice ("their own choices") is the ideal in relation to what makes any action bad or good, then I don't know what else to say.
Quoting Dan
I'm afraid it's you who is having difficulty understanding "the measure of value under discussion". The principle by which value is scaled is "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". This implies that "ones own choices" is the ideal which the scale for valuation, is modeled on. You very clearly said that the extent to which the ability to make their own choices is protected or violated is the thing which makes an action bad or good. "The thing" here refers to an ideal, the ability to make their own choices. Therefore their own choices is an ideal.
Good luck trying to get Dan to understand that. He seems to think that by representing "relative to the agent" as "types of freedom", he can get around that issue. So he ends up with types of restrictions, and then proceeds with a compromised "freedom". I' am now trying to show him that even with his compromised sense of freedom, the problem still cannot be resolved because the compromised freedom cannot be justified as something valuable.
The ability to make those choices is the measure of value that determines whether actions are right or wrong. That isn't the same as those being the "ideal choices". Is it possible I am misunderstanding how you are using the word "ideal"? I took you to mean that you thought that one's own choices were morally the best, though this is unlikely to be the cases as they don't, by themselves, often protect or violate one's ability to make one's own choices. If you meant that they were "an ideal" in the sense that they were a principle or a concept to be strived for, then I think that is probably also wrong, but perhaps less so.
Think of it this way. The ability to understand and make choices constitutes use of our rationality and our free will, which are the things that make us moral agents in the first place. It is the ability to put these things to use which I am suggesting is valuable, and I am restricting this to only over those choices that belong to us rather than those that do not on the principles that this allows for morality to be appropriately action-guiding, not result in constant conflict, and align with our intuitions somewhat. I am not having any difficultly understanding the measure of value under discussion.
Also, as to your post replying to Punshhh: Are you suggesting that the freedom to do absolutely anything is valuable? Your freedom to, for example, torture a child to death? Not just to make the choice to, but to actually do so without the police stopping you? I do not agree. Am I wrong in how I am reading this? Are you in saying that no kind of freedom can be valuable perhaps? Or just that freedom to make certain choices cannot be valuable but not making any further claims? What exactly are you suggesting here?
I'm not sure what you mean by relative in this context. Relative to what?
Also, I'm not sure I'd describe freedom as an attribute. It's not necessarily wrong, it's just... not terribly precise. I would say that "freedom," as I'm using it, refers to the ability to persons to understand and make their own decisions. So yes, certainly something that belongs to an entity with agency. But I'm not sure why you think that means there can't be a solution. Could you fill me in on the reasoning from one to the other?
Also without knowing the goal, or purpose of humanity as an example of an entity, the consequentialism cant be established. (I accept that in an isolated case, or circumstance, one could establish something that could be described as freedom)
Do we know the role, or goal, or purpose of humanity in the wider universe?
Are you assuming that morality aims at humanity's goal, role, purpose, or telos generally? Or are you assuming that consequentialism requires the starting assumption that utilitarians make that we humanity aims at a goal and that goal has moral value? I would reject both of these assumptions. Further, I would say that morality is about how persons ought to be or act, not just humans, so it should encompass all possible persons/moral agents.
It would certainly be true that different entities would value choices differently and could plausibly own slightly different choices (a species with two bodies for example), but the ability to understand and make choices is really just the ability to use one's free will and rationality, which are both necessary conditions for moral agency. So this measure of value does only happen in some entities, but it happens (or can happen when it isn't being violated/restricted) in all and only all entities that are moral agents, so I'm not sure that is really a problem.
What I mean by "ideal", is a thing upon which a standard is based. For example in the temperature scale, the freezing point and boiling point of water, serve as ideals
The issue I am trying to point out to you, is that in scales like temperature, the ideals have a position within the scale, so that the scale is properly related to the ideal. In the case of your moral principle, the scale, good and bad is related to choices which are not one's own, but the ideal (the thing which serves as the standard of measurement) is choices which are one's own. So the ideal is outside of, and not properly related to the scale.
Now, you assign a value to the ideal, as that which ought to be protected, but this value is extrinsic to the values expressed by good and bad, and the value is not within the scale. So, unlike the scale of temperature, where the ideals are values within the scale, and other values are related, the value assigned to "the ability to make one's own choices" is not part of the scale of bad and good. Therefore you need to refer to another type of value, other than moral value (bad and good), to justify that this is something which ought to be protected, i.e., has value.
Quoting Dan
The freedom to be evil, is equally the freedom to be good. That's the nature of free choice. So the freedom to torture a child to death, is the very same freedom as the freedom to save a child from being tortured. That's the point with free choice, it is the ability to choose freely from a vast variety of possibilities. Plato said that the man who is capable of doing the most evil is also capable of doing the most good. So when we look at knowledge as power, it can be used for bad or good. These are not distinct types of knowledge, the same knowledge might be put toward good actions, or it might be put toward bad actions. Likewise with "freedom". The same freedom allows a person to be good or to be bad.
In your temperature analogy, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is not like the boiling point of water or the freezing point of water. It would be more like the average amount of kinetic motion per atom (not a perfect analogy here, but certainly closer). Which is to say, it's the thing we are using as the measure of value.
To your second point, that doesn't answer my question. Is you issue that your don't think freedom can be valuable because you don't think it is coherent to talk about being free to do something but not free to do something else?
Presumably you are talking about freedoms within moral frameworks. So this is a discussion about morality, not freedom?
Yes, that is the point I am making, the two are dissimilar, because in the case of your ethical example, the ideal is not something which relates to the scale.
Quoting Dan
OK, so you are saying that the things to be judged (in this case choices), have a specific property, and we can measure the quantity of that property. The specified property is "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". So, it appears like what you are saying is that we must look at choices made by people, and evaluate these choices as to the quantity of this property which they display.
The problem which I've been trying to bring your attention to, is that the choices being judged, or evaluated, are explicitly not "their own choices". So you are asking to evaluate choices for a property which they have been stated as not having. We cannot get anywhere like this.
Therefore, you need to propose a different way that the ideal, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", is related to the things being judged. But as I pointed out already, the two are dichotomous. The things being judged are "choices which are not their own". So you'll find, that the two are only related as opposing ends of the scale, like hot and cold.
Quoting Dan
I'm saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X, but not free to not choose X. Further, I am saying that if freedom is supposed to be valuable, some reasons must be given which respect this fact, that freedom means both, the possibility that X will be chosen, and also that X will not be chosen. That is to say that if you want to assign moral value to freedom, you must respect the fact that freedom provides the possibility of bad acts, just as much as good acts. So if we say X represents something which is good, freedom allows for the possibility of bad. Because of this it is impossible to say that "freedom" is valuable, from the perspective of "value" assigned by a system of morality. That's why I suggested earlier, that "freedom" must transcend the moral system, as something taken for granted, which makes the moral system both possible and necessary (in the sense of needed).
I would say that morality is about how persons ought to be or act in a universal and objective sense, though I would concede that if you wanted to use "ethics" to refer to that and "morality" to refer to the norms and codes that exist, that would be fine too. This is very much a discussion about my attempts to discover the correct moral theory and solve the problem of how to weigh persons' freedom to make different decisions against one another.
No, I would say that we should judge the morality of choices by reference to their consequences and that the measure of goodness/badness of those consequences is how ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated. I feel like I've said this many times, and you are still attempting to interpret what I'm saying to mean anything other than what I am saying.
It sounds like you are saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X but not free to choose Y. Or free to do what you like with X (in this case, your own mind, body and property) but not with Y (other people's).
Maybe it would help me if you told me what you think it is I am claiming as simply as possible. Then maybe we can get to the bottom of where this misunderstanding is coming from.
Ok, so we're back to where we were a few posts ago. The goodness or badness of an intentional act is judged according to how the "ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated" by that act. Now I will ask again, the question you refused to answer. Why do you believe that the moral value of all intentional acts can be based int this principle, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", when you have explicitly said that good acts come from choices which are not one's own choices? How do you justify the value of this type of choice, "one's own choice", when this is not even the type of choice which produces good acts?
Quoting Dan
As I said, the issue is that freedom to choose X is also freedom to not choose X, or to choose not X. If a person is free to do something, then the person is also free not to do that. If X signifies a good act, and good implies moral value, then it is incoherent to say that there is moral value in freedom. Good and not good are equally the consequences of freedom.
Quoting Dan
That's what I'm doing, trying to understand what you are claiming. I indicated a long time ago, that your entire system makes very little sense to me. To begin with, I could not at all understand how you used "freedom", and "types of freedom". When I got beyond that, I found the key to understanding the entire system was in your principle "one's own choices", or choices which belong to the person, Now that I am beginning to understand, I am beginning to see the reasons for your strange representation of "freedom". I've come a long way, but I still cannot tell you what I think you are claiming. I think I need to know why you place such high value on "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". To me, this is not valuing freedom at all, because freedom is equally the ability to make choices which are not one's own.
As I have said, I am happy to answer why I think that is the best candidate for moral value, but I would like to ensure we are on the same page first and that you understand what I am claiming before I explain why I am claiming it. As for "How do you justify the value of this type of choice, "one's own choice", when this is not even the type of choice which produces good acts?" That is simpler to answer - that is a complete non-sequitur. The fact that these choices are not the ones which are often not the ones which are morally praiseworthy has nothing to do with whether it is a good measure of value. Just like choices don't need to be enjoyable ones in order for the utilitarian to think they morally good, choices don't need to be our own in order for the freedom consequentialist to say the same.
I would agree that the freedom to choose X includes the freedom not to choose X, but that isn't an issue here because that is entirely consistent with the idea that only freedom over those things which belong to a person ought to be protected. The freedom to speak includes the freedom to stay silent, the freedom to live includes the freedom to die, etc.
Again, you seem to be getting worried about the word "freedom." Feel free to just say "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" if you prefer, as that is what I mean by "freedom" here.
You need to justify this. We are talking about moral value here, moral praiseworthiness. If these choices are not necessarily morally praiseworthy, then what makes the ability to make them a "good" measure of value? See, "good" here must have a meaning other than morally good, and this other meaning causes ambiguity and invites equivocation. This is what I mean when I say that your principles imply two distinct scales of value. One value system judges acts for moral praiseworthiness, and the other scale of value places the ability to make one's own choices" as "a good measure of value", therefore implying that which 'ought' to be protected. The latter, as the measure of value for the former, serves as the ideal for that scale.
The problem I apprehend is the issue of establishing compatibility, commensurability, between the two systems of value, the one which assigns moral value, and the other which assigns value to the ability to make one's own choice. You appear to have created a dichotomy between making one's own choices, the ability to do which, serves as the measure of moral value, and making morally good choices, which are inherently not one's own choices. Such a dichotomy would leave the two scales of value as incompatible.
Quoting Dan
Sure, but we literally have no place to go from here. Making only choices which belong to the person would lock one into one's own self=created solipsist world of private property. As soon as we enter the public sphere, even just to open our mouths to speak, we have an effect on the property, or minds, of others. Therefore the freedom to make one's own choices is not any type of freedom at all, it refers to a severe restriction. Because of this restrictive nature of "making one's own choices", I don't see how it could ever be something valuable.
When we take into account the fact that anytime an intentional act has an effect on others then it is not properly called "one's own choice", there is significant doubt as to whether this type of choice has any value at all. So to give "freedom" any value we need to release the restrictions beyond that of the self-imposed solipsism of "making one's own choices". However, when we move into the public sphere of making choices which affect others, we need to respect the fact that the freedom to make a good choice is also the freedom to make a bad choice. The freedom to say something good is also the freedom to say something bad. The freedom to take what is necessary for my subsistence may be the freedom to rob you of what is necessary for your subsistence. Consequently, the inability to assign value to "freedom" is extended accordingly.
A good candidate for a measure of value is one that is likely to be correct. In order to consider what is most likely to be correct, we make some assumptions, or theory selection criteria. For example, utilitarianism selects happiness based on the assumption that whatever humans pursue for themselves they should also pursue for others based on the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself and doing that would be immoral, and that humans all pursue their own happiness. As I've pointed out before, this doesn't mean that right choices have to make the person making them happy, just as my theory claiming that the measure of value we should use is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices means that right actions need to be one's own choices. There is no conflict here.
Moral value and praiseworthiness are very different things. When a tornado changes course and doesn't destroy someone's house, that is morally good, but the tornado isn't morally praiseworthy. When it comes to judging actions, it would be more accurate to say my theory judges them as right, rather than praiseworthy, since whether we should praise something is another action that we would need to evaluate the consequences of. I did in fact explain how to judge whether actions are right or wrong, permissible, impermissible, obligatory, or supererogatory in the primer you read.
I mean, there is a sense in which we affect others by like breathing air that touches their stuff, but it is reasonable to assume consent to this by them taking their stuff outside with all the people who need to breathe. And, as we have previously discussed, quite a lot of the things you think of as restricting someone's freedom just don't. For example when you say "When we take into account the fact that anytime an intentional act has an effect on others then it is not properly called "one's own choice"" this is just wrong. There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. It wasn't your choice whether you won the contest or not, so my denying you that opportunity doesn't affect you in a morally relevant way. These restrictions you are worried about are of your own invention.
I don't know Dan, we're not making progress. In fact, what you write now, is making less and less sense to me.
Quoting Dan
For instance, this appears to be totally backward to me. When you say "correct", wouldn't it be better to say "true"? The thing about correctness, is that it is theory dependent, so that "correct" is relative to the theory, therefore determined by the criteria set out by the theory. This leaves no principles for comparing one theory to another. So, your specific theory places "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as the principle which sets the criteria, but we still need a way to judge that principle. That is what I am asking you for. Justify that principle, give me the reason why it is the one you have chosen, why you think it is the best measure, the ideal. "True" implies corresponding with reality, and since you claim to believe in objective morality, then we ought to be able to look for some form of truth to serve as judgement for that principle. Can you tell me why you think it is true that "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" makes a good candidate for a measure of value.
Quoting Dan
The key aspect of this utilitarian principle is "the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself". Happiness is a personal thing, just like making choices is a personal thing. That it is irrational to place one's own happiness as more important than that of another, is a principle which needs to be justified, just like a claim that it is irrational to place one's own choices as more important than the choices of another, would need to be justified. It seems to me that the opposite is really the case. Only I can do the things most required to make me happy, eat, sleep, etc., so I think it would be irrational to think that I should place other persons' happiness as just as important as mine, when another cannot give a person what is most required for happiness. If everyone had that attitude, that the happiness of others is just as important as one's own happiness, we'd end up with no one being happy, because no one would properly look after themselves, us all sinking into misery not be able to give oneself more than we are capable of giving to others. In reality (truth), happiness is a deeply personal thing. brought about by a person's relationship with oneself. It is not provided by others. And it is irrational not to make an exception of oneself.
Quoting Dan
This makes no sense. Morality is associated exclusively with the intentional behaviour of human beings. It makes no sense to say that the behaviour of a tornado is "morally good". That's a terrible category mistake.
Quoting Dan
We haven't discussed "consent" at all. But, by your definition of what constitutes a choice which belongs to a person, consent from another would not suffice to convert a choice which is not one's own into one which is one's own.
Quoting Dan
This is contrary to your definition of "one's own choice". You defined this as a choice concerning only what belongs to the person, one's mind, body, and property. A contest is something public, so choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices. Whether or not your choice restricts my ability to understand and make my own choices, is not an accurate indication as to whether or not your choice is your own choice. There are many choices which are not one's own choice, and so they have an effect on others, but the effect is not to restrict another's ability to make one's own choices.
I would say the correct moral theory is the one that's true. I was using "correct" to mean true. Happy to sub in the word "true" there if you prefer.
I think you're probably wrong about no one being happy if we all cared about our everyone's happiness, but I also am not making that assumption. I was merely using it as an example of an assumption that underlies a different moral theory.
To say the tornado acted in a morally good way would be a category mistake. To say the outcome, that of not having your house destroyed, is morally good, in the sense of having high moral value, is entirely sensible. To say that it was a morally good thing that happened that the tornado didn't destroy your house is also sensible.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Nor would it need to? I'm not sure what you are taking issue with here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what you are saying here. You said that protecting only those choices that belong to a person means that any choice that affects others must be restricted. I am pointing out that this isn't the case and giving an example where this is clearly not the case.
I disagree. The moral value is in the act itself. Consequentialism measures the act by the outcome, but it does not place the moral value in the results of the act. The outcome is judged as an indication of the intent. The tornado has no intent, there is no moral value in the outcome of its activities. The "good" in not having the house destroyed is a different sense of good, like "good fortune". This sense of "good" is judged by a scale other than a moral scale.
Quoting Dan
We were not talking about restricting choices, we were talking about the type of choice, the ability to make which, deserves protection; one's own choices. I asked you why the ability to make these choices merits protection. If the choices concern only what belongs to the person, then what good are they? The tornado example is clearly not relevant. Also, in your other example, choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices, by your definition. A contest concerns others, so this means that the choices are not one's own, and that example is no good either.
I was objecting to this statement you made:
Quoting Dan
A person's own choice concerns only what belongs to that person, by your definition. Therefore when the choice effects others, like your example of the contest, the choice cannot be said to be one's own choice. So I am still waiting for you to justify this standard of moral value, your ideal, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices".
The problem being, that "good", "right", and "correct", when used in the moral sense, are applied to actions which are generally not the result of one's own choices. These are the result of choices which intentionally affect others. This leaves us with the problem I have presented to you. Why does the ability to make this type of choice deserve to be protected? That they may be good in an accidental way, like the tornado's acts are, does not merit protection, because the acts would be just as likely to be accidentally bad. Isn't it a far better principle to protect intentionally good moral acts, than to protect the possibility of an accidentally good act? But then we must completely rid ourselves of the misleading idea that this is some sort of freedom which is being protected. This is really moral restraint through the application of restrictions.
No, it is a good outcome in the sense of a morally good outcome. One we should aim to acheive. If we could have turned the tornado, we should have. Consequentialism tends to derive the right (the morally right action to perform) from the good (the thing which has value), so while it isn't right that the tornado didn't destroy your house because that implies moral agency, it is good.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Okay, I understand what you are taking issue with now, but you're just wrong. My choosing to enter those contests that will have me is a choice that belongs to me. There are a bunch of choices like this, such as choosing to have sexual intercourse with someone. The whole thing isn't one person's choice, but each person chooses to consent to such an act and this choice belongs to them. Entering contests is not much different. You don't get to choose to enter a contest that won't have you, but you can choose to sign up, to do your best to win, etc.
Again, my point with the contest analogy was that choices that belong to me (or you, or anyone) can indeed affect others, and that's not a problem. If I own a piece of art that I have on display, but one day decide to destroy it instead, that affects others, but it is still my choice to make. Your claim that choices that belong to a person can't affect others is just wrong from the off.
I mean, I think we are likely to get tied in knots with this since you still seem unclear on what I am saying, but fine, I'll say something about why the ability to understand and make our own choices is the best candidate for moral value. I'm not going to go over everything, but I'll give what I think is the best reason:
If we assume that morality applies to all free, rational agents, then it seems that what we want is a measure of moral value that applies to all free, rational agents. The ability to understand and make choices fits this bill, as it essentially the ability to exercise one's free will, rationality, and, in a sense, agency. If we don't include measures which make up part of this one (such as just being able to understand choices), then it is essentially the only measure of value which applies to all moral agents, possible as well as actual.
As for why it should be constrained to their own choices, rather than any choices, this is more of a modus tollens. If we considered all possible choices, then this would lead to constant moral conflict and may render the moral theory unable to be action-guiding. Given that that is rather that moral theories are for, where the ability to understand and make choices should be protected is limited to choices over things that a person owns, specifically their mind, their body, and their property.
There, that is why I think this is the best candidate for moral value: it applies to all moral agents and allows for morality to be action-guiding.
You are still not making any sense. If people intentionally turned the tornado, then that act could be judged as morally good or bad, perhaps based on the outcome of the act, or perhaps based on the intention, or a combination of both, depending on one's ethical principles. In my understanding of morality, what the tornado itself does, or the consequences of what it does, is never judged as morally bad or good. It appears like we may have an unsurpassable difference as to what "morality" implies. You allow that morality can be assigned to the consequences of the activities of inanimate things, whereas I believe that when inanimate things are judged to have caused good or bad outcomes this is a completely different sense of good and bad.
Quoting Dan
OK, but now you need to go back and redefine "one's own choice", and the outcome of weeks of discussion has been to change your mind about what "one's own choice" means. You now allow that making a choice which belongs to a person can be a choice concerning the mind, body, or property of others. So what is left for "one's own choice", other than a choice which a person understands and makes. Then why is my choice to steal your car not my own choice? How does consent from you, that I may borrow your car, change the nature of my choice to use your car? They are both freely willed choices which I understand. Why does one belong to me, and the other does not? How do you now define "one's own choice", and what distinguishes it from a morally good choice? Why not just say that one's own choice is one which is morally acceptable?
Quoting Dan
That was your definition. A choice which belongs to a person is one which concerns only that person's mind, body or property. If you now allow that a choice which belongs to a person may also concern the mind, body, or property of others, then this means the decision to do anything is one's own choice. If I decide to steal your car, it's a choice which involves my own body and my own tools which I will use, and also your property. How is this fundamentally different from deciding to play a game with you, other than that it is morally bad, and against the law? Why not just say that a choice which belongs to a person is one which is morally acceptable?
Quoting Dan
Going by the new sense of "the ability to understand and make our own choices" which you have now presented me with, I will simplify this with "the ability to make choices", as all decisions to act now appear to be one's own choices. And I will assume that this is what you are arguing is the best candidate for moral value, the ability to make choices.
Quoting Dan
But how do we get moral value out of this? As I've been telling you, the freedom to choose is just as likely to produce bad acts as it is to produce good acts. You can say that the freedom to choose ought to be protected, but why, if it's just as likely to produce bad acts as good acts? It's like you are saying that the tornado ought to be free to go wherever it goes, and no one ought to attempt to interfere. So it misses this house and destroys that house, and it's all "good" because the principle is that it is best to allow it to wonder freely without restrictions. And if you want to apply restrictions to human choices, then you are not protecting freedom. And if you qualify "choices" with "one's own choices", such that it means nothing other than choices which are morally acceptable, then all you are preaching is moral restraint.
Quoting Dan
Now you finally admit it. What you are arguing for is moral restraint, and this is not a matter of protecting freedom at all. What you really mean by "their own choices" is choices which are morally acceptable according to principles like "consent", and what you are arguing for is not freedom of choice, but restriction of choice according to some moral principles. Why don't you just accept that this is what your principles are all about, instead of trying to create the illusion that you are trying to produce principles for protecting freedom?
When judging the consequences of an action, you can say they are good or bad in a moral sense there something morally valuable being increased/decreased/promoted/protected/restricted/violated. The tornado wasn't "right" to turn away, but the outcome was good.
I haven't changed my mind at all. All of these choices are choices about what to do with the mind, body, and property of the person making them, not that of others. What you seem to be missing is that choices about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property can affect the interests of others without in any way restricting their ability to understand and make choices regarding their own minds, bodies, and property. This isn't a different definition. I have been saying the same thing the whole time, and it is the same thing you will find in the primer you read or sources referenced in it that explain this in greater depth.
That was not my definition, that was how you incorrectly interpretted my definition. The choice to steal a car isn't yours because the car isn't yours. The choice of what to do with my car is mine because the car is mine. The choice to play a game with me isn't per se yours, but the choice to agree to play a game with me, to play games with those who will play them with you, is yours because it is a choice of what to do with your own mind and body (maybe property depending on the game). If I don't want to play, like in the case of you taking my car, you don't get to make that choice for me. But if we are both choosing to participate in the game, we are both making choices about what we do with our own minds and bodies, and that's no problem.
Again, it's always been the same definition. You just seem to be having trouble grasping it. I feel like I've been pretty clear, so I must wonder if it is in some way intentional.
I am not "admitting" anything, let alone "finally" given that all of this was in the thesis that I referenced in the initial primer. What I am arguing for is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. That is limited in the sense that it only concerns persons' own choices, not all choices, but that isn't even slightly the same as "moral restraint". It is very much freedom.
You keep talking about which choices are morally acceptable as if that is something we can know in advance, but the whole of a normative theory is to determine what choices/actions are morally acceptable (and unacceptable, obligatory, supererogatory, etc). It is fair to say that choices which are not morally acceptable shouldn't be protected, but what determines whether a choice is morally acceptable is down to its effect on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.
We have a deep difference as to what constitutes "morally valuable" In my understanding, what provides moral value to the consequences of an act is the intent of the conscious agent. If you remove the necessity of intent, then choice is only relevant in an accidental way. This would make it very difficult to justify your principle that choice is the best measure of value. If we can produce morally good results without making choices, why should we protect the ability to make choices?
Quoting Dan
As I said, all decisions to act, or do anything at all, are choices about what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. That someone else's property might also be involved is accidental. This includes my decision to steal your car, as an example you said was not a choice which belongs to me. It now appears to be a choice which belongs to me because I am using my own body and tools. However, now you insist that stealing is not a choice which belongs to me because there is no consent. You really have provided absolutely no principles to distinguish between a choice which belongs to a person, and one which does not.
Quoting Dan
You simply introduce these terms, "consent", "agree", and you act as if whatever it is which is referred to by them magically converts a choice which appears to be one which does not belong to a person into one which does. We are talking about the ability of a person to understand and make one's own decisions. How does you giving me consent to borrow your car, affect that ability of mine, in relation to my choice to use your car without your consent? You are making no sense.
Quoting Dan
You have not been clear at all. First, you insisted that "one's own choice" was a very special sort of choice, such that if I chose to steal your car this is not my own choice because it was a choice which involves your property. Now you insist that all choices I make which involve my own mind, body and property are my own, even if they involve your body or property as well. This implies that any choice I make, to do anything at all, including stealing your car, is my own choice, because it involves doing something with my own body and mind. But now you've arbitrarily added a constraint, "consent", or "agree", as if this makes a difference. How many other arbitrary constraints are you going to add, to mold and shape this concept "one's own choice", to suit your purposes? Will you make a new exception every time a situation comes up which your principles cannot deal with?
No, the moral value in the consequences does not require intent. This is very much the point of consequentialism. Whether you meant to push the kid out of the way of the bus or whether you just thought it would be funny to push a child over, the consequences are just as good. I've already explained why I think we should use the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices as the measure of value, and that reason wasn't because intent is necessary to result in good consequences.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It isn't a choice which belongs to you because it is the choice of what to do with my car. It doesn't "accidentally" involve my car as you put it. It is precisely about what happens to my car, specifically whether I keep it in front of my house or you take it and sell it for scrap metal. It's not that complicated.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Consent doesn't "covert" the choice from belonging to one person to belonging to another. In the example given, the consent is the relevant choice to participate in a game or contest. What you have quoted there doesn't include anything about consent and cars. That being said, if you did obtain my consent to use my car, then that would make the use of my car morally permissible because I have made the choice that you can use it and it is my car, so you haven't taken my ability to understand and make those choices which belong to me away from me through your use of it (which you would have in the case where you stole it)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't insist that. The choices which belong to you are the choices of what to do with your mind, body, and property. That doesn't mean that because you murdering something "involves" using your body, it is your choice to make. Whether or not your murder someone isn't choosing what you do with your own body, but with theirs (and their mind).
Sorry, are you really surprised that in a theory that focuses on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, that what those persons agree or consent to is relevant to what it is morally acceptable to do to them?
I haven't been making exceptions, I have been attempting to quash the strange ways you have interpreted my theory. But it is like playing whack-a-mole. I keep trying to clarify the same points and you keep intepreting that as me claiming something different and often bizarre. Without wanting to sound like too much of a jerk, I think if you look over our previous conversations with the assumption that I have been saying the same thing the whole time, they would make more sense to you.
This example is not comparable. Pushing the kid is an intentional act, whether or not the intent is to kill the kid. Since it is an intentional act, the perpetrator is held accountable. If it was done as a joke, and the possibility of death was completely unforeseen, then the punishment would likely be less than if it was a planned murder. Regardless, the joke and the murder are both intentional acts. In you other example, the tornado does not act intentionally, so the consequences of its activities are not judged for moral value.
If this is what you really believe, that the consequences of inanimate activities can be judged for moral value, then it constitutes a significant difference of opinion between you and I.
Quoting Dan
See, your principle of "a choice which belongs to the person" is exactly as I say, based in moral judgement. When the choice is to do something "morally permissible" with another's body or property, then it qualifies as "my own choice". When the choice is to do something not "morally permissible with another's body or property, then it does not qualify as "my own choice". Therefore, just like I told you earlier, your goal to protect persons' ability to understand and make their own choices, is not a goal of protecting freedom at all, it is a goal of protecting moral restraint, i.e., to choose only what is "morally permissible".
Quoting Dan
This is not true. You now admit to allowing that choices of what to do with another's body or property also qualify as choices which belong to you. This consists of things like a shared game, consensual sex, using borrowed property, etc.. It seems like so long as the choice is to do something morally permissible, it is one's own choice. So it is becoming more and more clear that your principle is not to protect the ability of people to understand and make their own choices (to protect some sort of freedom), but to protect the ability to understand and make choices which are morally acceptable (some sort of moral restraint).
Quoting Dan
No, I was a little surprised that a theory which claims to protect one's freedom of choice, is really a theory which only supports morally permissible choices. I'm not too surprised now, because I brought this to your attention, at the beginning of our engagement. I thought I'd give you a chance to explain yourself though, but we're not getting anywhere.
Quoting Dan
You aren't saying the same thing though. Before, you said that choices which belong to a person are choices concerning one's own mind body and property. You continue to assert that, but your examples show clearly that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others are also choices which belong to the person. This appears like inconsistency, but it's not necessarily. If we surmise that your principle is really "the ability to understand and make choices which are morally permissible", rather that "the ability to understand and make one's own choices", then the appearance of inconsistency is resolved.
I mean yeah, those consequences can still be judged for moral value in the sense that they can be consequences that are morally good. It doesn't make sense to say the tornado "acted" rightly, but the consequences that occur, the situation which results, has higher moral value than what would have occurred in the situation where the tornado destroyed your house.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That doesn't follow at all from what I said. My ability to understand and make my own decisions isn't restricted by me freely making a decision to allow you to use my car. Rather, it is exercised.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is neither what I said nor what I meant. Consenting to sex is a choice that belongs to you, but having it is not (in the sense that if no one is keen to participate in that activity with you, your ability to understand and make your choices has not been restricted.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is a theory of what choices are morally permissible, but that all flows from whether those choices protect or violate the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. Making their own choices is (usually) morally permissible, but not all morally permissible choices are choices which belong to the person making them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you are reading things I'm not writing. You seem to be finding additional meaning between my words that I'm not putting there and, I submit, isn't there at all. For example, I haven't said that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others belong to the person at all. I think if you'll look back over those examples, you will find I didn't make that claim and didn't use those words. I certainly talked about choices involving the minds, bodies, and properties, of others, such as when those choices might be morally permissible and when they might not be. I also talked about things like sex, in which I said that the choice that belongs to you was to consent to such an act, but that the choice to have it with someone (in the sense mentioned above in this post) was not yours. It is not yours specifically because it requires the body of another person. This inconsistency isn't between my views, it is between what I am writing and what you are reading it to mean.
I really do not understand what you could possibly mean by "higher moral value" here. Perhaps you could explain. Suppose I\m watching the approach of a tornado. I see that it misses all the houses in the neighbourhood, and rips through a forest instead. You say that there is moral value in this situation. Can you explain what you mean? Is it because the tornado could have killed people, but didn't? I could have got hit by a bus yesterday, but didn't. Does that mean there is moral value in the consequences of the bus not hitting me? Does any situation which can be judged as either negative or positive have moral value?
Quoting Dan
But the example does not concern your ability to make your own decisions, it concerns the question of whether deciding to use your car in this situation is a choice which belongs to me or not.
Or, are you now distinguishing whether a choice belongs to me or not, by how it affects others' ability to make their own choices? That's what it appears like. If my choice doesn't restrict your ability to make your own choices, then the choice belongs to me. That would be very problematic.
Quoting Dan
Again, it appears like you are defining "one's own choice" in relation to whether the choice restricts the ability of others to make their own choices. This would lead to an infinite regress without ever determining what it means to make one's own choice.
Quoting Dan
Sure, but in order for this principle to have any meaning, and to be able to be brought to bear on any real situations, we need to know what "their own choices" means. First you said that these are choices which concern one's own mind, body, and property. Then you allowed that in some situations, such as consent or agreement, choices concerning another's mind. body, or property also belong to the person. Now you seem to be saying that so long as the choice doesn't restrict another's capacity to make one's own choice, then the choice is one's own choice. This gets me no closer toward understanding what you mean by one's own choice.
Quoting Dan
OK, so we've gone around a big circle. Let me get back to the issue as it was then. In general, choices which are judged as morally good, are not choices which belong to the person at all, if this means concerning one's own mind, body, or property. This is because morally good choices are about the mind, body, and property of others. So, how do you justify wanting to protect choices which belong to the person? And please, don't go off on a tangent again, speaking about how choices which belong to the person may affect the body or property of another in an accidental way, because the morally good acts, which we want to consider, are when we intentionally act in a good way. Why have a principle which promotes protecting the ability to make one's own choices, when a much better principle would be to protect the ability to make morally good choices. Neither of these principles is about protecting freedom of choice, so that idea is just a ruse anyway.
Yes, in the sense that it has higher moral value than some other set of consequences that could have occurred. Consequentialism is all about judging the consequences of actions by their moral value in order to determine if that action is right/wrong/permissible/etc. You can't judge the "actions" of the tornado, because it isn't a moral agent, but you can certainly say that the set of consequences which has occurred is morally better (more moral value is realized) than the set of consequences which would have occurred were it not for the tornado changing its direction.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. When I said that me giving consent to allow you to borrow the car makes it morally permissible to do so, that is not me saying that it makes it a decision which belongs to you. The use of my car is a decision that belongs to me, because it's my car. Which is what I said previously. I then made an offhand remark about the difference between borrowing and stealing a car, and how this is due to the difference in whether my ability to understand and make my own choices is restricted/violated or simply exercised. These are seperate points.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not accurate to say that is how I am defining one's own choices.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I did not say the second and am not saying the third. The choices which belong to a person are the ones concerning what to do with one's own mind, body, and property. I did not say, and do not think, that in cases such as consent or agreement, choices concerning another's mind, body, or property belong to anyone other than that person.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what you mean by "morally good" choices here. I am presenting a theory of what morally good choices are, specifically the ones that protect the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. I have posited that this is the best candidate for a measure of moral value because it is applicable to all persons and bases moral value on the very features that make us moral agents in the first place.
Also, it is about freedom, specifically the freedom to make your own choices. That is not in any way a ruse.
Well, I do not agree with this, I think consequentialism is all about judging the moral value of actions through an assessment of the consequences. Moral value is attributed to the actions not the consequences.
Nevertheless, if we uphold this principle, that moral value is attributed to consequences, then your inconsistency becomes even more clear. The following is what you said about a person's own choice:
Quoting Dan
If moral value is attributed to the consequences of an action, then it is very clear that if a choice affects others, it affects them in a morally relevant way, whether the person intends to have an effect on others or not, and so this cannot be said to be one's own choice. If the person understands it as one's own choice, then that person misunderstands, not realizing the affects it will have on others.
So if you think that the choices which you make in that contest, are your own choices (concerning your own mind, body, or property) to make, then you misunderstand what your choice is really about. In reality the choice you make affects my mind as much as yours, so it is not really a choice which belongs to you. This is no different from if I decided to smash my car into yours, or even if I decided to drive over people. You would say that it was a choice that did not belong to me because I am destroying your car, or the ability of others to make their own choices, if I run people over. In reality, I just misunderstood, thinking that the choice did belong to me, because it is something I am doing with my car, and I am not considering the consequences which my actions have on others. This means I am inconsiderate. Likewise, when you beat me in a contest, and you think that that was the result of choices which belong to you, you simply misunderstand. Those choices do not belong to you. because it was me who you beat, and my mind, and the ability to make my own choices, which you are imposing suffering on, not your own, even though you are doing it with your own mind. Just like I am being inconsiderate when I impose suffering with my own car, you are being inconsiderate when you impose suffering through the contest.
The choice to have ones organs crushed (as in your example of being hit my a car) belongs to me, and by taking the ability to make that away from me, you have acted wrongly. The choice to not lose a contest does not belong to you, so I have not taken your ability to make choice away from you. A choice can indeed affect others while still being one's own choice. Because these are your own choices, mostly these won't affect someone in a morally relevant way, (though it is possible that they could and then there would be a genuine moral conflict). You being unhappy about losing a competition is not morally relevant because your happiness is not morally relevant. Only your ability to understand and make your own choices. Winning the competition was not your choice to make, and me beating you in it certainly would not constitute me taking away your ability to make your own choices.
The issue is how to determine which choices belong to a person and which do not. The ability to make "one's own choices" is what you desire to protect. Your criteria of concerning what to do with "one's own mind, body, and property" is very doubtful as to applicability, because most actual choices in practise, concern activities in the public sphere, and so choices concerning one's own mind, body, or property, have varying degrees of influence over the mind, body, and property of others.
You seem to have some sort of arbitrary guideline in your mind, as to the degree that a person's actions will affect others, which is supposed to act as a divisor between the categories of choices which belong to the person, and those which do not. If I understand correctly, the divisor itself, is the degree to which an act effects another person's ability to make one's own choice. So, if I choose to use my own body and my own property, and the effect is to crush your body, to the extent that your own capacity to make your own choices is restricted, then this is not a choice which belongs to me. However, if my choice simply makes you emotional, unhappy because I beat you in a competition, then this is a choice which belongs to me, because I have not robbed you of your ability to make your own choices.
Dear Dan, I think you ought to see this as extremely problematic. I could perform an act which injures you in a bodily way, cuts you, or breaks a bone, and this would not impair your ability to make your own decisions any more (perhaps even less) than causing you emotional distress would. Furthermore, since all choices concern doing something with one's own mind, body, or property, and there is almost always effects on others, then the determining factor, as to what qualifies as one's own choice, amounts to a decision based on the application of the arbitrary divisor you have in mind. The arbitrary divisor seems to be the degree to which other peoples' ability to make one's own choice is affected. But there is no clear definition of what constitutes "one's own choice", so there is an infinite regress of vagueness. To determine whether a choice is "one's own to make", we must refer to whether it affects the ability of another to make one's own choice, but we haven't yet determined how to know what "one's own choice" actually is.
Because of these problems with defining "one's own choice", I suggest that you drop this requirement, that the type of choice you want to protect the ability to make, is "one's own". Why not just start with the principle that you want to protect the ability to make choices? This would be a much better representation of "freedom", the capacity to make any choice whatsoever without restriction, and so you could start with this as your fundamental principle. Then you could apply your structure of necessary restrictions, due to moral relevance, to this freedom to make choices, in the most general sense.
I have explained why the choices to be protected should be restricted to one's own choices. I don't think it is vague to say you get to decide what to do with your own mind, body, and property. I think the limits of that (eg, your mind, body and property, not mine) are pretty clear.
You breaking my bone very much affects my ability to understand and make choices about my own body, such as whether I want my bones broken. You causing me emotional distress by, say, revealing a secret I would prefer stay hidden, does not. It is not my choice to make to keep the secret hidden. Pain is kind of a weird one, and one I discuss in my thesis somewhat but I'm not sure I ever perfectly nailed. It's a relatively minor issue though. Emotional distress, on the other hand, just isn't in itself morally relevant. If someone is made sad, or happy, it doesn't matter morally. What matters is whether they are able to understand and make their own choices.
That is overwhelmingly false. As we've discussed, every choice which an individual makes concerns what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. There is no limit intrinsic to that definition of "one's own choices". However, since our world is a communal world, what one does with one's own mind, body, and property, often has significant effect on the mind, body, and property of others.
As the examples we've discussed demonstrate, your goal is to impose a very arbitrary, and not at all well defined distinction between different types of "effects on others". Based on this ill-define distinction, you say that some types of choices belong to a person (are one's own), and other types of choices do not belong to the person (are not one's own). Your claim, that these "limits" are "pretty clear", is blatantly false. As evident from the examples, the proposed limit is arbitrary and weighted to your personal preferences. For example, when I damage your property (steal your car) this is weighted towards "not a choice which belongs to me", but when you damage my ego (beat me in a competition), this is weighted towards "a choice which belongs to you".
Please refer back to our earlier discussions about how education, and the establishing of habits of thinking, is a means by which people exercise considerable influence over the minds of others. The effects which education has are very significant, therefore choices made to educate others ought not be classed as one's own choice. Furthermore, any time that a person asks another for assistance, this would not be based in one's own choice.
The issue is, that since we live in a communal world, then once we start to apply your proposed principle of distinction in a consistent way, we end up with very few choices which are actually "one's own". This leaves the question of why do you want to protect the ability to make such choices. How are such choices at all valuable?
Quoting Dan
You appear to be totally neglectful, and ignorant of the temporal nature of choices, which was discussed earlier. Choices relate to future possibilities, we must consider the past as determined. After you've had a bone broken, you cannot choose not to have it broken. You can wish that it did not happen, but such wishes must be separated out from, and dismissed as irrelevant to, the decision making process of a healthy mind. In Christian ethics, the separating of the past, from decisions toward the future, is very important, and this manifests in the confession/forgiveness process. "Jesus died for our sins" is a proposition which allows us to separate ourselves from the mistakes of the past, and move forward with a clear conscience.
Quoting Dan
Like the beginning of your post, this at the end, is also blatantly false. Emotional distress is of immense moral importance. Anger for example is a contributing factor to a vast array of immoral acts. The angry person may act in a vengeful way, and this would mark a turning from making "one's own choices", toward choices which do not belong to the person ( even by your standards). Therefore it would be very foolish to dismiss emotional distress as not morally relevant. For example, if I injured you (broke a bone in the other example) this may send you into a condition of emotional distress (anger), and even though you maintain the ability to understand and make your own choices, you start to make choices which do not belong to you (revenge).
The issue being that choices are freely made, and a turning away from making one's own choices toward making choices which do not belong to oneself (by your proposed distinction), does not indicate that the ability to understand and make one's own choices is impaired. It simply means that the person has decided on other choices at that particular time.
Do you really want me to explain why stealing my car prevents me from being able to make choices about what to do with my stuff, but beating me in a competition does not, or are you just being facetious?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But just like when you said this the first time, you're just wrong that habits and education reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (though miseducation of the kind that leads to people not understanding their own choices would obviously be morally relevant).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You aren't simply applying it in a consistent way, you are insisting on applying it either in such a way that our own choices can't affect others at all or in which any choice that you make with your own mind (which is presumably all of them) are your own choices. These are not the only options, and neither is one I would endorse.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There's a few issues here. First, what choices one has access to and what choices one ought to have access to are not the same thing. Second, the choice is taken from me in the moment of arm breaking. It's no use saying that I don't have the choice once you've taken it from me, that is precisely the problem.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Christian ethics also relies on supernatural entities which almost certainly don't exist, human sacrifice, and eternal punishment, often for "crimes" which harm no one, so you'll excuse me if I don't take my cues from that.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, we are getting into trouble because I am saying that the emotional distress is not morally relevant in the sense that it does not have moral value or disvalue that contributes to the consequences of an action being good or bad, are you are reading that as saying something else. Hopefully I have cleared up that misunderstanding.
That is not the issue. "One's own choice" is defined as a choice concerning what to do with one's own mind, body, and property. It is not defined as a choice which does not prevent someone else from making one's own choice. The latter is not a definition, it is a fallacy of a "circular definition", a self-referential definition. And I've already explained to you why the choice to steal your car is just as much a choice concerning my own mind, body, and property, as are the choices which lead to beating another in a competition.
Anyway, I explained to you how hurting another emotionally may lead to anger, or other feelings which could result in an attack on the person, or some other vengeful activity. So I do not think you have any argument there.
Quoting Dan
Again, you misrepresent the issue. It is not a matter of whether teaching a person "reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices", it is a question of whether the decision to teach a person is a choice about one's own mind, body, and property. Clearly, the choice to teach a person is just as much a choice concerning someone else's mind, as the choice to steal a car is a choice concerning someone else's property.
Quoting Dan
Sure, there are other options, like making an arbitrary distinction like you have, which as I explained, has principles weighted by your personal preferences. You think for example, that stealing a person's car has more moral significance than educating a person does. I think it is very clear that the opposite is true. Stealing a person's car has a one time, flash-in-the-pan effect on the person, which is very minimal in the scale of a person's lifetime, but educating a person has a lifelong effect on the person.
Quoting Dan
I spent a long time, at the beginning of this thread, trying to explain to you how any choice which a person makes limits that person's options, therefore restricting the person's freedom. Now you seem to be starting to understand, expressing how another person's choice may limit one's freedom. To fully understand this principle you need to recognize that a person's own choice limits one's freedom even more than the choice of another does.
Quoting Dan
Oh sure, earlier you refused to distinguish between the choice, and the action which follows from the choice. Now, when it serves your purpose, you separate the act from the choice, to say that emotional distress does not contribute to the goodness or badness of the consequences of an "act". However, it is simply trickery, sophistry, to dismiss emotional distress in this way. Anger clearly contributes to the choices a person makes, producing consequences which are bad, bad actions. Therefore it has moral value in relation to choices. I am surprised that a person of your intelligence level would resort to such a sneaky trick, just to try and support a failing theory.
First, it isn't circular to suggest that the limits of rights (or freedoms) should be where they abut upon those same rights (or freedoms) of another.
Second, anger doesn't "result" in attacks on other people, or other vengeful activity. People are morally responsible for their actions even when angry. Anger doesn't "make" people act violently, they choose to.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you choose to say something on the street corner, that thing might affect me, but it is a choice of what to do with yourself, not what to do with me. If you steal my car, it is a choice of what to do with my stuff. As I said before, whether someone is affected by your choice is not the appropriate measure of whether that choice is yours to make or not. Certainly, if they were affected in a morally relevant way (by which I meant their ability to understand and make their own choices were reduced/protected/etc) then that would affect whether it was morally justifiable to make that choice whether or not it was yours (though the choice whether to steal my car or not is pretty clearly not yours).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have not made an arbitrary distinction, but a principled one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
All of that is incorrect. A person's freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) is violated when those choices are made for them against their will (such as my choice to have my arm broken or not). It is not violated/restricted/reduced if I choose to break my own arm. In this second case, my freedom is exercised.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There's no trick here. Again, I think you have misunderstood. Actions (or choices if you prefer), in any consequentialist framework, are judged by their consequences. What I am saying is that emotional distress is not a consequence which is relevant to determining the morality of an action (or choice). Does that make sense?
As for anger, it might contribute to someone making a bad choice. It might also contribute to someone making a good choice. Either way, the anger itself is not morally valuable. The consequences of that choice (or action, if you prefer) are what make it good or bad. Specifically, whether it protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.
Yes it is circular. It's a self-referential definition, as I described. And that's a huge problem for the concept of "rights" in general. The definition of any specific right is always having to be reinterpreted because of that circularity. It's not a rigorous definition because every time that it reflects back on itself in an unwanted way, the definition has to be adjusted to the situation. This is why it's not a real definition, it is intentionally allowed to be adaptable because a rigid definition would run into problems.
Quoting Dan
Dan, you continue with the very same trickery, to turn things around. Anger is the consequence here, not the cause. The question is whether a choice which causes another person emotional distress is one's own choice. I believe that causing another person emotional distress, such as anger, is just as morally relevant as causing another person to lose one's property, through theft. In fact, I would go even further, to state that I believe that the reason why things like theft are morally relevant, is because they cause emotional distress. If theft did not cause emotional distress, no one would care about it, and it would not be designated as bad.
I am starting to think that you are being ridiculous. Instead of listening to the problems of your ill-fated theory, you have gone into denial about its problems, and are now resorting to trickery in an attempt to get around the problems.
Quoting Dan
This is blatantly incorrect. When I choose to say something to you, this is a choice of what to do with you. When I engage you in this way I am anticipating a response. The act of engagement is not about itself, it concerns the eliciting of a response. The intent of the act is to get a response from you, therefore it is "a choice of what to do with you". This is even more evident in my example of education, which you seem intent on ignoring. "To educate" is what you do to another.
Quoting Dan
Your principles are arbitrary. You assign greater moral value to a person's property than you assign to a person's mental well-being. Stealing a person's property is "morally relevant", but causing a person emotional distress is not "morally relevant". Not only are your principles arbitrary, they are completely backward from accepted moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
No, this makes no sense at all, for the reasons explained above. One's emotional well-being, and mental stability is of the highest value. Therefore emotional distress is a consequence which is of the highest degree of relevance to determining the morality of an action. As I said above, the reason why stealing one's property is morally bad is not because it leaves you without a specific object, it is because it causes emotional distress.
Self reference does not, in-itself make for circularity. Eg, the moral relativist might coherently say that there are no objective normative truths and no objective metaethical truths except this one. That references itself but is clearly not circular. Likewise, it isn't circular to say that one's freedom of movement does not include blocking someone else in such that they cannot move. Especially given that other people's choices are not the extent of what defines what choices belong to a person.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You haven't raised problems, you have raised misunderstandings. You might well be right that people migth not think theft was bad if it did not cause emotional distress, but they would be wrong. What is wrong would still be wrong even if all the world thought it right.
Also, you were the one who brought up anger causing immoral actions. I was simply pointing out that this isn't so. That isn't a dodge, that is addressing another thing you said.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, no it isn't. You don't do things "with me". You say some words and you might well hope for a response, but I might also walk on past. Unless you're chasing me down and tying me up, you haven't decided what to do with me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
They are not aribitrary, they are based on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. It is certainly true that I am going against accepted moral philosophy but accepted moral philosophy is wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Do you actually mean it doesn't make sense in that you don't understand, or do you just not agree?
The problem I pointed out involved using self-reference in a definition. What happened was that you first defined "one's own choices" as a choice relating what to do with one's own mind, body and property. Then I pointed out that every choice which a person makes, relates to what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. And, what is really at issue is how one's choice to do something with one's own body, affects others. You moved to define "one's own choice" based on how a person's choice of what to do with one's body, affects others. So you came up with, if the choice doesn't limit another's ability to make one's own choice, then it is one's own choice.
Clearly, what you have proposed is a self-referential definition. I prefer to characterize it as infinite regress rather than circular. Q. How do we know if the choice is one's own? A. if it does not limit another's ability to make one's own choice. Q. How do we know if another's ability to make one's own choices has been limited if we do not know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it is a choice which does not limit this ability of another? See, we cannot ever get anywhere because we do not know what it means to make one's own choices, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice. But we cannot make that judgement as to whether it affects another in this way, because we don't know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice.
Quoting Dan
You have been unable to even adequately define your primary principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". Your attempts have been reduced to a meaningless self-referential definition.
Anyway, I don't think we are making any progress. I've come to see that what qualifies as "morally relevant" to you, is very different from what qualifies as "morally relevant" to me, and we seem to be completely incapable of bridging this gap. This is probably due to the attitude you disclose here, "accepted moral philosophy is wrong".
According to the op, you have spent the better part of ten years trying to resolve the issues of your moral theory. You have become so stymied that you now offer $10,000 to anyone who can resolve the problems with your theory. I suggest that it is high time for you to consider that the reason why you cannot solve the problems is that your theory is simply wrong, therefore there are issues which are impossible to resolve.
I'm fairly sure I didn't propose any of that. I think I pointed out that choosing to steal my car is a choice of what to do with my car, not your body. It's a choice that belongs to me, not you.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think I've been pretty clear on what I mean and given a fairly clear and consistent definition. You seem intent to interpret what I'm saying in a strange way, then when I clarify that was never what I meant, you take me to be changing what I'm saying and interpret what I'm saying in a different (but no less strange) way.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have of course considered that I might be wrong, but I think we have good reason to think this is our current best bet. Certainly you misunderstanding me is not good reason for me to change my mind.
We're very far apart on this. What I pointed out to you, is that to steal your car is a choice of what I want to do with my own body. That it is your car being stolen, is completely accidental. I want to get myself from A to B, so I grab a car, or I want to make some quick cash, so I grab a car, and sell it. Whatever the case, what I want, and what I am doing with my own body, is the primary motivation here. Theft is fundamentally a selfish act. That it is your car which enters into my plans and not some other thing, or things, is purely accidental. There is no essential relation between my choice and your car, so my choice to steal your car is not at all "about your car", it is about my own selfish wants and desires, what I want, for myself. The choice shows complete disregard for you and your property, rather than your representation of it, as a choice about what to do with your property.
Quoting Dan
You are simply in denial, refusing to accept that I completely understand you, after weeks of quizzing you, but I also completely disagree with you. You have demonstrated very clearly that the concept of "one's own choice" which you propose, cannot be made to be coherent. That you insist it to be coherent, when I've demonstrated its incoherency, shows not a misunderstanding on my part, but denial on your part.
You are confusing the motivation for the act with the act itself. Your stealing my car is very much about what happens to my car.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I only don't believe that you understand me because in almost every post you have made, you have misrepresented me dramatically and/or accused me of making a claim I have not made.
You have not demonstrated anything of the sort. You may have claimed it, but you have not in the least demonstrated it. You have asserted that some definitions that aren't the same as what I have said don't work and you have insisted that stealing my car constitutes your own choice because you use your body to do the stealing. I am still not sure if you would like a clear explanation of why this isn't so or if you are being facetious in this case.
Your principle, "one's own choice" states that the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. This implies that the motivation for the act, as that which concerns one's "mind" is just as much a determining factor as one's property. The car thief uses one's own mind, one's own body, and one's own tools, to achieve one's own ends. As I said, most all choices ought to be considered "one's own choices", by the dictates of your primary definition.
However, you do not accept your own definition. You realize that such a definition would require a multitude of exceptions to produce the result which you desire. The example above, of a thief using one's own tools, is one such exception. This is because 'what you desire', is to make how one's own choice affects other people, as the true defining feature of what constitute "one's own choice". So, when I make my own choice (according to your definition), to use my own mind, body, and property, to steal your car, you override your definition, to produce a new defining feature, how one's own choice affects the ability of another to make one's own choice. Accordingly, this overriding definition becomes the true definition which you utilize. The definition of "one's own choice" is no longer a choice which concerns ones' own mind, body, and property, it is now, "a choice which does not limit the ability of another to make one's own choice". However, this new definition suffers the problem of being self-referential.
Furthermore, you then place undue restrictions on your judgement as to which ways that one's choice affects others, are to be prioritized, to match the prejudice of your preference. You dismiss affects on one's mind as not morally relevant, and emphasize affects one one's property, as morally relevant. So your guiding principle of "one's own mind, body, and property" is thrown right out the window. It is now replace with how one's choice affects another's property, body sometimes, and never the affects on one's mind. Affects to one's mind being dismissed as not morally relevant.
I doesn't imply that at all. Motivation is not important in FC. I certainly didn't suggest that any choices one makes that in any way involve things that belong to you therefore belong to you. You are free to choose what happens to your body, but not to my car.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It isn't my definition. It is your definition. Again I did not define it this way. I am not overriding anything, I was never suggesting that anything you do that in some way involves your mind, body, and property is your choice. I was suggesting that you get to choose what happens with your own mind, body, and property, and not what happens to the minds, bodies, and property of others.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I dismiss feautres of actions that do not involve protecting or limiting the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. I do not dismiss effects on one's mind. There are quite a few effects on one's mind that one could have which would be morally relevant. But someone being upset is not one of them. You are, again, putting words in my mouth that do not belong there.
Motivation is a large aspect of "one's mind". If it is not important to FC, then your principle, "one's own choice", defined by you as a choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property is not consistent with FC.
Quoting Dan
You are changing the goal post. You spoke about protecting a person's ability to make one's own choices. When I suggest that stealing your car is a choice I might make, you said it is not my own choice to make, because it concerns your property. Then you defined "one's own choice" as a choice about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property.
Now you have turned things completely around, saying "you get to choose what happens...and not what happens to...". You are now not talking about "one's own choice" in any stretch of the imagination. You are now telling everyone what they must and must not choose, so you are imposing your own choice onto the minds of others, "you get to choose...". How could this be a choice which belongs to you, to impose such restrictions on the choices of others?
Quoting Dan
As discussed, I strongly disagree with this. And it is things like this, and your complete disrespect for conventional moral philosophy, (saying that it is wrong), which make me realize that you truly are way off track.
I'm not sure what you mean by this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, the goalposts are where they always are. I'm not sure what you think I am turning around here. Is it "you get to choose" that you are taking issue with? What do you take that to mean that is different? I think you may be reading something different than what I am writing as I have been saying the same thing (though sometimes in different ways in order to clear up any confusion) from the off.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This seems to be to be the fallacy of appeal to tradition. Also, on a related note I'm not sure I would consider saying something is wrong to be "complete disrespect"
Before, you were qualifying types of choices. The choice to steal your car was a choice which does not belong to me, and this judgement was made based on principles of "one's own mind, body, and property". Now you seem to be saying that there is something to prevent me from making such a choice; I do not get to make a choice which does not belong to me.
It's a "turn around" because at first you were just distinguishing between choices which belong to a person and those which do not, and claiming to protect the ability to make the one type. Now you imply that there is a mechanism in place which would restrict one's decision (therefore one's mind), to only make choices which one gets to make. So instead of looking forward to the future "I want to promote the ability to make one's own choices', you are now looking back at the past 'there is a mechanism which has been put in place which prevents one from making choices which are not one's own'.
Quoting Dan
Now it's my turn to say that you misunderstand me. Saying that a specific approach is "wrong", and dismissing it without demonstrating why it is wrong, is showing complete disrespect for it. However, you may actually understand it very well, and have very good reasons for saying it's wrong, and therefore actually have respect for it. But dismissing it as wrong, without showing these reasons, is to show complete disrespect.
The same principle goes the other way to claim tradition is correct, without showing why, is apprehended as an appeal to tradition. What I am claiming is not that tradition is necessarily correct, so I am not making an appeal to tradition. What I am claiming is that there is much information to be learned from the study of traditional principles, and your off-hand rejection of tradition as wrong, instead of demonstrating the faults in tradition, indicates that you have probably not taken the time to understand these principles. And this inclines me to think that you really do not have a good grasp of the principles which your theory attempts to deal with.
No. I am not claiming any such mechanism. I meant "you don't get to" in the sense that it is morally bad for you to make my choices for me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Is it? Again, I'm not sure that's true. Further, given the depth and breadth of traditional moral philosophy, explaining why it, as a whole, is wrong would be quite the undertaking, and we seem to have trouble even communicating what seem to be fairly simple ideas. If you would like me to explain why I think why much of moral philosophy is barking up the wrong tree, I can do it, but that might be getting rather off topic.
But it isn't morally bad to make another's choice. That's what we already went through. It is generally good to save a person's life, for example. That's where your theory ran into problems, and you had to make all sorts of exceptions to allow that making another's choice is sometimes good. So, you do "get to" make choices which are not your own. Then this whole distinction (choices which do belong, and do not belong to the person) falls apart as meaningless, because what you are really trying to protect is choices which are morally good.
Quoting Dan
Actually, I think that might be very helpful if we are to get anywhere in this discussion, because it might help me to understand why we are so far apart. On the other hand, you seem firmly attached to your beliefs, and I to mine, so it's unlikely we will get anywhere anyway.
You've made a category mistake. Making someone else's choice for them, taking it away from them, is bad. It might not always be wrong (for example, killing one to save five) but it is always bad. It always counts against the action. There are lots of choices that aren't yours that would be good and/or right to make, but not belonging to you is not the same as belonging to someone else.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In briefest of brief, moral philosophy tends to rest on assumptions that I think are either incorrect or at least unfounded. Some of those include but are not limited to (and not all moral theories rely on the same assumptions of course, I'm just giving a few examples):
* That there is some end that all humanity is aimed at or some goal that all humanity pursues
* That if there were such an end or goal, it would be morally valuable (which in turn can often rest, though not always, on metaethical assumptions about what the point of morality is)
* That it is rational to do what is moral (and sometimes vice versa)
* That is is irrational to make an exception of yourself or treat your own ends as more valuable than those of others (this one can be a bit more complicated than this and the extent to which I have an issue with it depends a lot on how this is fleshed out)
You're really losing me Dan. How can there be a choice which does not belong to me , and yet does not belong to someone else? Who's choice is it? What type of existence does this choice have? I can see how it might be considered as a possibility, but how is it a choice?
Quoting Dan
Wow, you do have strange beliefs, don't you?
Quoting Dan
How could you justify cooperation without common goals?
Quoting Dan
Since human beings are rational animals, how could they be inclined to do what is moral, if it is not rational to do what is moral. Your claim makes not sense.
Quoting Dan
This is the issue I took up with you already. I do not see how your position could be justified. When one decides that another's end is as valuable as one's own, this is just to make another's end one's own. It is logically impossible to make the ends of others as valuable as one's own, because all this means is to adopt another's as one's own. So only the ones judged as being valuable enough to be adopted as one's own are truly seen to be as valuable as one's own, and this is only by way of actually making them one's own. Therefore to keep moral principles aligned with truth, we must hold that one's own ends are always the most valuable to the person.
Cooperation is derived from common ends. But there is a big difference between taking another's end as one\s own, in cooperation, and allowing that there is no difference of importance in any goals of all others, like the principle you propose. The former (holding one's own as the most important) encourages rational judgement of any ends before passing judgement on importance on them. The latter (what you propose), provides no basis for judgement of the ends of others, because they already must be assumed to be just as important as one's own.
The choice to say, write your name on the moon, does not belong to anyone. Nobody has a "right" to do so, so we not need to protect anyone's ability to make that choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, strange in the sense of uncommon, sure. But you did ask what my problem with traditional moral philosophy is and many disagreements come down to starting assumptions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't say people don't have common goals. I said I take issue with the idea there is a goal or end that all of humanity is aimed at. Big difference.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, in brief (and heavily simplified) I think Hume is broadly right that we should consider rationality more in terms of means-ends, rather than specificying rational goals.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you taking issue with me disagreeing with this assumption, or are you claiming that I'm making this assumption?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think I have ever claimed or implied that individuals need to consider the ends of others as important as they consider their own ends.
I really don't think I am understanding what you are saying, but maybe this is the key to why I am having difficulty. Are you proposing a third category of choice here, those which belong to no one? And, any choices made which concern "public property" are choices which belong to no one?
So I conclude that when you say "one's own choice" is a choice which concerns one's own mind, body, and property, "property" is really the defining feature. So if I choose to write my name on the moon (as your example), or just to take a walk in the park, this concerns public property, and so it is no one's choice to make. I would have thought, that walking in the park, or going to the moon, since it concerns doing something with my own body, is my own choice to make. However, I'm now starting to understand that "my own mind and body" are accidentals in the judgement of whether the choice is mine, and property is the essential determining factor. So regardless of the fact that I am using my own body to walk in the park, the property is public, therefore it is a choice I make which does not belong to anyone.
Now, when you say that we need to protect the ability of people to make their own choices, what it means to people like me (who value their mind more than their property), is that you want to protect their rights to do what they want with their own property. To me, this is very problematic, because "one's property is not something static, and we need principles by which one can come to own property, and accumulate it.
Quoting Dan
Sure it's different, but the difference is insignificant. Instead of having individuals divided by distinct goals, as I described, your proposal divides by distinct groups, sects of humanity. Individuals cannot cooperate without common goals, and distinct groups or sects cannot cooperate without common goals. So the very same problem persists, but instead of consisting of individuals who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals, it consists of groups pf people who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals.
Quoting Dan
Oh, that's very problematic. Means are deemed as "good" in relation to goals. If there is no system for judging ends then differing ends will produce inconsistent and conflicting "goods". If we couple this with the principle you propose, of no common goals for all humanity, then humanity becomes disunited, unable to resolve the question of who\s goods are the real goods.
Quoting Dan
Sorry, the double negative threw me off. We may agree here. I disagree that it is irrational to treat your own ends as more valuable than others, but I think this is consistent with traditional moral principles. I do not think it is consistent with your principles. Since, as described above, you value property higher than an individual's mind, you restrict one's choices (and ends) according to property based principles (what we get to do in relation to property). And property based principles require an assumed equality of individuals. Equality of individuals reduces to an equality of ends, what I desire is equal to what you desire, therefore we have equal access to ownership of property.
Mind and body are not at all accidental. Choices about what to happens to do with your own mind, body, and property, are yours. Choices which aren't about that aren't yours. Unless someone has built a park around you such that you can't go for a walk at all without crossing it, then yes walking in the park is a choice about how to use some public property, not about what to do with your body. A choice about what to do with your body might be, for example, whether you want your arm amputated. I would be inclined to agree that one's mind and body are more important than one's property (though exactly how that works I'm not sure, hence the original post).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it's not insignificant. I think a lot of people share some common goals, but not that all people share one common goal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not at all, because I don't think morality is the same thing as rationality, so there can be moral good without it being something that all rational agents would agree on as their goal/end.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, all of this is wrong. I don't 'value property higher than an individual's mind' at all. This is exactly what I mean by you misunderstanding me to such a degree that I wonder if it is intentional. I have never said that, and I think I have been pretty clear that I don't think that. But you keep insisting that I do think that and then running with that assumption. I mean, I don't think what you've said here follows either, but that is all secondary to the fact that the core assertion here, that I value property over individual's minds, is just incorrect.
This makes no sense at all to me. How is it that choosing to amputate my arm is a choice of what to do with my own body, but choosing to take a walk is not? Is it only choices to injure myself which qualify as choices of what to do with my own body? How can it not be the case that choosing to take a walk is choosing to do something with my own body?
Quoting Dan
Your principles clearly demonstrate that you value an individual's property higher than an individual's mind. As we discussed, by your principles, stealing another's property is a choice we do not get to make, it's not one's own choice, but teaching, or corrupting, another's mind is a choice we get to make, as one's own. See, another's property is considered in the judgement, but another's mind is not considered. You argued that teaching is irrelevant, so I assume that giving false information, and lying are also not morally relevant. You argued that making someone angry has no moral relevance.
The latest thing you said, to indicate that you value property higher than body and mind is that a walk in the park is not a choice about the health of one's own mind and body, it's a choice about the public property, the park. You prove this by saying that the choice is no one's because the property is public, even though the choice is about doing something with one's own mind and body. You continually demonstrate this, judging whether a choice is one's own or not, by reference to property, and with complete disregard for what the person is doing with one's mind and body, and how the choice will affect the minds of others. It's very clear evidence that you value property over minds.
I didn't say choosing to take a walk isn't a choice that belongs to you, but choosing to take a walk in a specific park, as opposed to somewhere else, does not belong to you.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them. There are certainly things that might do this, but simply lying to someone, or teaching them something, does not take away their choices about their mind. You might well disagree with me about what constitutes the choices that belong to a person regarding their mind (and it certainly seems that you do) but that doesn't mean I don't value the choices a person has over their minds as much as I do those over their property. I simply don't agree with you that some of these things, such as teaching someone, constitute taking away someone's choice regarding what to do with their mind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, this is just incorrect. The choice to take a walk in a specific park very much relies on that specific park. The person doesn't own that park, so that choice does not belong to them. If the park is removed to make way for something else, that person is not wronged by no longer being able to walk in that specific park. If they were not able to go for a walk at all that would indeed be reducing their ability to make their own choices regarding their body, but the choice to go for a walk in a particular park clearly isn't a choice that belongs to the person. It isn't about property mattering more than one's body or mind, it is about being specific about what choices belong to a person and which don't. You are very quick to interpret what I'm saying in a way that supports your assertion that I value choices over property more than choices over body and mind, given that I am telling you that I don't, perhaps it would benefit you to consider whether you might be interpreting me wrong when you keep coming to those conclusions?
This makes no sense to me. Choosing to take a walk, is a choice of what to do with my own body, how does choosing a specific place to walk change this? Don't we always choose a specific place to walk?
Quoting Dan
This is a fine example of the problem you create by discarding your stated definition of one's own choice, and taking up a new problematic self-referential definition. Now, all of a sudden, "one's own mind, body, and property" has no definitional bearing, because you've replaced it with not "taking someone's choice about their mind away from them". But in doing this you negate the original definition as inapplicable, so I have no idea what "someone's choice about their mind" actually means, just a self-referential definition.
Quoting Dan
See, now you've gone completely to the new definition, if the choice one makes "does not take away their choices about their mind", then it does not rob them of the capacity to make their own choices, and therefore it is a choice one can make. However, you've negated the original definition "choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property", so that we cannot even refer to it in our judgement as to whether the choice is truly one's own (by the original definition).
Clearly, by the original definition, the choice to teach someone, just like the choice to deceive someone, is a choice about what to do with another person's mind. But we cannot discuss this, because "one's own choice" has been given a new definition, "does not take away another's capacity to make one's own choice", Furthermore, "another's capacity to make one's own choice" is strictly qualified with "one's own property", such that another's choice always concerns one's property, and one's mind is completely irrelevant, as your attitude toward teaching and deceiving reveals.
Quoting Dan
It's very clear, that in your judgement, as to which choices qualify as "one's own", property is valued higher than one's mind and body. Look at the example of taking a walk. That's a choice concerning one's own body. However, as soon as we determine the specific property upon which the walk will be taken, the nature of that property takes precedence and becomes the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. And this is the case in all of your examples, stealing etc., as soon as there is property involved in the choice, ownership of the property overrides all other features of the choice, becoming the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. But, things involving another's mind, like teaching and deceiving, have no such determining influence.
Quoting Dan
See, very clear evidence that you prioritize property ownership. The person doesn't own the park so the choice automatically does not belong to them, no exceptions. However, in the case of teaching or deceiving, where the choice clearly involves an intentional effect on another's mind, there is an exception imposed, it is judged as not morally relevant. Why is the choice to use the public park not provided the same exception of not morally relevant?
By the principle you demonstrate here, the choice to speak is not a choice which belongs to a person. The air we breathe is public, just like the park, and choosing to speak into it is not a choice which belongs to the person, just like choosing to walk in the public park does not belong to a person. This is the problem you've caused yourself by giving priority to property as a principle for judgement as to what constitutes one's own choice. Much property is public, and if people have no ownership over their choices to use public property, then the middle category of neither one's own choice, nor not one's own choice, becomes extremely inflated, to the point where the principle "one's own choice" becomes useless.
Quoting Dan
This is exactly the problem you have created by replacing the definition of one's own choice, "choices concerning ones own mind, body, and property", with the self-referential definition of not interfering with another's capacity to make one's own choices. Now, it is impossible to be specific about which choices are one's own, because there is no definition. So the judgement is just based in arbitrary, subjective principles and prejudice. You say that having an effect on property which is not your own makes it so the choice does not belong to you, but having an effect on a mind which does not belong to you does not bring about the same judgement call, because you provide an exception. There is no rule, because there is no longer a definition.
It's a matter of what constitutes reducing your ability to make a choice. Your choice is to take a walk, so stopping you taking a walk would take that choice away from you. Your choice is not to take a walk in that park, so that park not being there does not reduce your ability to make a choice that belongs to you.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not changing any definitions. Again, you seem to be interpreting me in a very strange way. When I say "Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them" I mean that none of the actions you have mentioned reduce the person's ability to understand or make their own choices.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, no new definition. The choices one can make are not only their own choices (choices that belong to them). Rather, only one's ability to understand and make one's own choices (choices that belong to them) needs to be protected. You seem to be bulling past this distinction and it is causing confusion. Neither of the things you have mentioned involve taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices, so they aren't morally problematic.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is not "very clear" at all. It is simply not the case. Whether or not other people lie to you is not a choice that belongs to you, so lying to someone does not reduce their ability to understand or make their own choices (by itself, obviously it could in some circumstances). The case of the park is not a case of choices over property trumping choices over one's body, it is simply a case of the choice to do something being different from the choice to do something with a specific thing that isn't yours. For example, the choice for you to swing your arm might be a choice that belongs to you, the choice for you to swing your arm into my face is not. Me not providing my face to be swung into does not reduce your ability to understand and make your own choices, just like your local authority not providing you a park does not reduce your ability to understand and make your own choices. I am merely being specific and you are infering things I am not implying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
An effect is not what is at issue. What is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not. In both the case of not providing a park and the case of lying to someone, it is not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, much like choosing to go for a walk is a choice that belongs to a person, choosing to speak also is a choice that belongs to someone. Choosing to speak into that specific air isn't a choice that belongs to someone. If a wind blew past and they were suddenly speaking into different air, that wouldn't wrong them, just like choosing to walk in that specific park is not a choice that belongs to them such that they would not be wronged were that park not there. Seriously, you would find it much easier to understand what I'm saying if you stopped assuming I was suggesting something lunatic. I'm not. I am saying that the choice to walk in a specific park is not one that belongs to you, but the choice to go for a walk is.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, I haven't replaced any definitions. I have been consistent in how I am using these terms throughout.
I don't agree with this. I think choices are very specific, while desires may be more general. I believe the proper representation is that my desire is to take a walk (something general), and my choice is to take a walk in that specific park. The choice is what inclines one to act, and it is always specific, never general. For example, hunger manifests as a general desire to eat, but when a person decides to eat, it always must be a specific thing which they chose to eat.
I believe this difference between the general desire, and the specific choice is very important to moral philosophy. Since desire is general, and choice is specific, this allows us to mitigate the effects of desire, because we can entertain numerous possibilities as to the specific thing which will fulfil the desire. So, in the example of taking a walk in the park, the general desire is to take a walk, but it is not a choice until I choose an actual pace to walk. In the meantime, between desiring to walk, and actually choosing to walk (which requires a specific place to walk), I can consider the moral consequences of the different specific possibilities.
Quoting Dan
You're obviously not understanding my criticism, so let me put it in another way. When judging whether a choice is one's own or not, you often refer to how the choice affects another's capacity to make one's own choices. This is an overriding principle, it overrides your definition of one's own choice, as a choice which involve one's own mind, body and property. It overrides your definition, because many examples I have given you, of choices which concern my own mind, body, and property, you reject them as my own, on the basis that such a choice would restrict another's ability to make one's own choices. So do you agree, that the true definition of one's own choice, the one which you are actually applying, is a choice which does not limit another's capacity to make one's own choices? But that definition suffers the problem of being self-referential
Quoting Dan
It is you who is continually ignoring the fact that lying and deception actually do take away peoples' ability to understand and make their own choices. Lying and deception creates misunderstanding which is clearly contrary to someone's ability to understand and make their own choices.
Quoting Dan
This is obviously wrong. That's exactly what lying and deception does do, reduces their ability to understand and make their own choices, through the means of misunderstanding. How is it possible that misunderstanding does not reduce a person's ability to understand one's choices? To put it in terms of property (which seems to be the only terms you understand), imagine if I give you a car, and I say here, I bought this for you. So you drive it and it turns out that you are driving a stolen car. Doesn't this "misunderstanding" demonstrate clearly to you, how lying and deception reduces the ability to understand one's own choices? And it isn't just in some cases, it's in all cases, because that's what deception is, the creation of misunderstanding for the purpose of manipulating the person's choices.
Quoting Dan
You are ignoring the comparison. Choosing to deceive, and choosing to educate are both choices concerning doing something with something that isn't yours. You are doing something with the mind of another. Yet you allow that choosing to do these things with the minds of others are choices which belong to a person. However, when it's something like walking in the park, you say that it is not a choice which belongs to the person because it involves property which does not belong to the person. Clearly, "property" is valued higher than "minds". To do something with property which does not belong to you is not your own choice, but to do something with a mind which doesn't belong to you is your own choice.
Quoting Dan
See, there you go, switching definition. What is important, according to your definition, is whether the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. Now you say, "what is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not". Which is the defining feature? They are not the same. You simply switch back and forth, as convenient, and in this way you avoid the criticism. When it suits you, one's own choice is a choice concerning one's own mind, body and property, but then other times it serves you better to say that one's own choice is a choice which doesn't reduce another's ability to make one's own choices. The latter is a self-referential definition.
Quoting Dan
I'm starting to think you really are suggesting lunacy.
But the choice which belongs to you is the choice to take a walk, not to take a walk in that specific park. Though any exercise of that choice might involve a specific destination, the destination is not the thing that belongs to you, and no particular destination (as opposed to any other) is required for you to exercise that choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure that I do this at all. I'm not necessarily opposed one's own choices being in part determined by whether those choices belong to someone else, but I think I have been fairly consistent that your own choices are those regarding what happens to your own mind, body and property. I don't think I have introduced an overriding principle so much as you have claimed that you stealing my car is your choice to make because it involves your own body, when it is clearly a choice of what to do with my car.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is only contrary when the person is decieved about the nature of the choice they have to make. Decieving them about other things (even things that might influence what choice they make) does not reduce this ability. There's quite a good paper by Hallie Liberto regarding sexual consent that could potentially help clarify this discussion a bit if you don't mind some homework.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is a fine example of deception being wrong. The person thinks they are making one kind of choice but they are actually making another. That's fine. I have no issue with deception sometimes being wrong, I'm just pointing out that it often isn't. To use a different example, imagine you buy me a car which I accept because I believe it to be a gift in good faith. Unbeknown to me, you have chosen this car because you wish to ruin my reputation. Perhaps it has been recently voted the worst car for the environment and you intend to smear me for being irresponsible. You lying to me about your reasons does not reduce my ability to understand and make the choice to accept the car. Your reasons were never my choice to make.
This is a bit of a silly example, but there are plenty of sensible ones we could use too. For example, imagine you tell people at a party that you are an olympic athlete so they will think you are cool. This does not reduce their ability to understand or make their choice to spend time with you (I think I would say that the nature of this choice that belongs to you is de re, rather than de dicto). This is a much more realistic example of lying not reducing a person's ability to understand and make their own choices.
Further, I think it is you who are getting too caught up on property. You keep asserting that it is all I care about, but it just isn't.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I wouldn't categorize choosing to try to decieve as a choice regarding what to do with someone else's mind. It might affect them, but it isn't a choice of what to do with them. Same for education. For example, I might continually tell you that I don't value property more highly than mind or body, but I can't make you learn that.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not switching the definition, I'm talking about two different things. Whether a choice belongs to someone is about whether it is a choice of what to do with their mind, body, or property. Whether a choice is right or wrong (or good or bad) is about whether it reduces or protects (or neither) someone's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. Same definitions as always.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Given what you are inferring from everything I say, I don't doubt it. What I would ask is to read what I've written with the assumptions that I am being consistent and am at least moderately intelligent. This will likely lead to fewer misunderstandings.
I don't agree with your description of "choice", as I explained. I choose to take a walk in a specific place, the specific place is an essential part of the choice. Without it, I would not walk anywhere because i would not have decided on a place to walk. Since I would not walk anywhere, this cannot be a choice to take a walk. What you call "the choice to take a walk" is not a choice at all, it's just a general desire, the desire to take a walk, which does not become a choice until a specific place to walk is chosen. Only when I have a specific place chosen to walk, do I have a choice to take a walk, because without choosing a direction, a walk will not follow.
Quoting Dan
The issue is as I've shown, that not every choice regarding what happens to one's own mind, body and property, is one's own choice. In many cases (examples I have provided), you have said that a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, will have an effect on others, which makes you judge the choice as not one's own, due to that effect. So you negate your own definition, with a whole slew of exceptions, principally if the choice restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, then the choice does not belong to the person. You really do override your own definition. How does it make sense to you, to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body and property, and then proceed to dismiss a whole bunch of choices regarding one's own mind, body and property, as not qualifying to be one's own choice, for some other reason.
It might be more accurate to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, which does not interfere with another's choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property. But this would be very problematic, because most choices interfere with others, in some way or another. That would leave "one's own choice" as a rather useless principle. So you have described a special type of interference, and this becomes the base of your exceptions. The problem which you and I have, is that we do not agree on when the named boundary, outlining the exceptions, has been crossed. And, there can be no clear solution here due to the issue of self-reference. Therefore we will likely always disagree and there will be no principles available to resolve the disagreement.
Quoting Dan
We clearly disagree about the nature of deception. I think that you do not understand it at all, trying to belittle its effect. I don't think homework on my part will resolve this, I think you need to look more closely at what deception really is, rather than just considering one very uncommon type, being "deceived about the nature of the choice they have to make". This doesn't even make sense. Convincing a person that they "have to make" a specific choice, is an act of deception itself.
Quoting Dan
The issue is not whether deception is "wrong". The issue is whether it restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. And, regardless of the fact that your refuse to recognize this, the answer is yes, it does. Deception creates misunderstanding therefore it restricts a persons capacity to understand and make one's own choices. On the contrary, education increases one's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, but faulty education, even if it's not intentional deception, restricts that capacity by creating misunderstanding.
Quoting Dan
Of course it does. Can't you see that? Me lying to you about the car caused you to misunderstand the gift, which you accepted, but you may not have accepted it if you knew the truth. You had a lack of understanding within your own choice to accept the gift
Quoting Dan
Of course it reduces their ability to understand and make their own choice. When they believe the lie, their choice is based in a misunderstanding. This explicitly means that their understanding has been reduced. How can you think otherwise?
Quoting Dan
You are flatly denying what is obvious. A choice to educate another person is a choice to do something with that person's mind, just as much as a choice to steal another's car is a choice to do something with another's property. That it must makes sense to the person to be able to teach it to the person, does not imply that teaching isn't doing something with another's mind. It's just a condition, like in order for me to steal your car I need to be in the proximity of it.
Quoting Dan
This is incorrect. You very clearly said that when I use my own mind, body, and tools, to take your car, this is not a choice which belongs to me, even though I am using my own mind, body, and property. But when using my own property has an effect on your property which is morally irrelevant, then you allow that it is my own choice. Clearly you allow whether you believe that a choice is right or wrong, to influence your judgement as to whether the choice belongs to the person.
Quoting Dan
I always assume consistency until I encounter what appears to be inconsistency. Then I ask the author to clarify. If the author cannot clarify, I conclude inconsistency. What I've discovered with you is that you have proposed a concept "one's own choice", with specific precepts. However, the concept is not viable under the precepts you assume ought to constitute it. So the proposed concept gets lost and is not viable.
I'm not sure you have shown this. There are potentially some complicated cases, but I don't think the ones you have suggested, such as stealing my car, are among them. These seem pretty clear.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not "have to" in the sense of must. "have to make" in the sense of the choice that they have. I can give some examples that don't involve property if you like, though they can get a bit distasteful as sexual consent is the next most obvious case.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It might create misunderstanding, but unless it creates misunderstand about what choice the person is making (or what it is to make such a choice), then it doesn't reduce their ability to understand and make that choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't misunderstand the choice to accept the car though. I understood what I was accepting, which was the choice that belonged to me. I didn't understand your nefarious plans to ruin my reputation and, had I understood this, I might not have accepted the gift, but whether or not you set out on such a plot was not a choice that belonged to me. The choice that was mine to make was whether to accept the car you are presenting me with, possibly in a certain condition specified by you, and your deception didn't make me misunderstand that choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
They might make their choice based on a misunderstanding, but it is not a misunderstanding of what choice they are making. It is only the person's ability to understand and make the choices that belong to them that is being used as the measure of value here. I think you think I am setting a higher bar here than I am.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If I choose to educate you, you might simply walk away, or not check my post, or simply ignore what I'm saying. Unless I am strapping you to a chair and forcing you to listen, then I'm not taking your choice away. Can you see how this is quite clearly different from you taking my car?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, because it's a choice about what to do with my stuff. Choices of what to with your own stuff belong to you, choices of what to do with mine (or anyone else's) don't. Think of it this way: There are things that belong to you, specifically your mind, body, and property. Where only those things are concerned, you get to make all the decisions. When it comes to other people's stuff, such as their minds, bodies, and property, those choices belong to them. Is that a clear way of thinking about it? I can give you a more formal definition if it would help.
I used that example, as an extreme, to bring to your attention the complexity of human interactions with "property" as the medium. If you dismiss the car stealing example, because the intent of the thief is to do something with the other's property, even though the thief is using one's own property (tools) to do this, then we also need to dismiss cases of purchasing, where on uses one's own property (money) with the intent of doing something with another's property (what is purchased).
"There are potentially some complicated cases" is a gross understatement. The reality is that the vast majority of human interactions are "complicated cases", making your simple principle "one's own choice", completely ineffective, and unsuitable for the task you assign to it, due to the subjectiven, and arbitrary principles which you are forced to apply in your judgements as to whether a choice fulfills the criteria of "one's own". In reality, you simply apply some preconceived ideas about morally good and bad, to make that judgement, even though you insist that it is not. Then, "protecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices" turns out to be nothing more than encouraging moral restraint, as I pointed out earlier.
Quoting Dan
The point I am making is that we do not need to involve property or human bodies in these examples. We have three distinct items named, mind, body, and property. Without involving property, or body, we can discuss mind to mind relations, which occur through the medium of communication. These interactions consist primarily of one mind affecting another mind, and as such are morally relevant.
However, you dismiss these, and refuse to discuss them as morally relevant because (I assume), you cannot see and observe the consequences of these interactions (that is your consequentialist bias). The only observable part is the physical symbols (language) used in these intentional acts, and it is apprehended as innocuous. But these physical symbols are simply the tools by which the perpetrator carries out the intended act, just like the thief uses tools to steal the car. Therefore to be consistent you need to consider the intended consequences within the other's mind, in the case of communications, just like you consider the intended consequences to another's property, in the case of stealing the car. It is apparent, that since these consequences are unobservable, you dismiss them as not relevant.
Quoting Dan
Obviously, deception creates exactly that type of misunderstanding. For example, when I am choosing which park to walk in, you lie to me and tell me park X is currently closed, this creates misunderstanding about the choice I am making, reducing my understanding of the choice I am making. I would go so far as to say that all cases of deception do this or something similar, that's what deception does, creates misunderstanding in the person concerning choices they are making. Even in the innocuous joke deception like April Fools day, the "joke" is brought about by making a public display of how the person misunderstands one's own choice in reaction to the deception.
Quoting Dan
This goes back to what I said at the beginning of the thread, which you seemed to have difficulty understanding. Every choice which an individual makes limits the person's future choices, by determining the person's current situation. So, if you offer to educate me, just like if you are a scammer and offer me something but it's really a scam, I can choose to proceed with you, or turn away. That choice is a reflection of my attitude toward future relations with you, and the choice hardens my position, one way or the other, thus limiting my future choices.
If I walk away, then you have not educated or scammed me. That is not the situation I am talking about though. I am talking about the situation when I do not walk away. After choosing to engage you, I have limited my own future choices accordingly. I can proceed with extreme caution, exercising principles of skepticism, or I can throw care to the wind and suck up everything you say. Again, this is an attitudinal choice which I must make, and most of us are inclined toward the principles described by Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, following an intermediary path, not too skeptical, not to rash.
Now, my examples concern cases where you actually do educate me, or you actually do deceive me, so all those past choices, where you say that I could have walked away, and I limited my own freedom through my own choices, are irrelevant now, even though your approach had a great effect on this limiting. We are in the position where you have engaged me and I have chosen to listen.
It is unwise for you to dismiss this situation, when a person is listening to another to be educated, as the fault of the student, for allowing oneself to listen to the other. When an individual "takes one's own choices away", due to the attitudinal nature of being human, with the desire to know, this is no less forceful than strapping the person to the chair. In fact, in this situation it is much more forceful, because strapping to the chair does not force them to listen and accept, but the person's disposition does force them to listen and accept.
So, I don't see the distinction you are trying to make between my mind, and your car. In one case, the object of my intention is your property, your car. In the other case, the object of your intention is my mind, to educate it. In the former case, if you are worried about your property, you will go through extreme measures to protect it from my advances, and I will simply find another easy target. In the latter case, if I am extremely worried about false information, I will take extraordinary measures to resist all attempts by you to educate me, and you will end up leaving me alone. In principle the two are very similar.
Quoting Dan
As I said, this principle you are trying to impose, "one's own choice" is not viable for the reason's I have described. In your attempt to make it viable you give preference to a person's property rights, "stuff", and you completely ignore what one person does to another person's mind through communication, claiming this is not morally relevant. I believe that this is due to your consequentialist bias. When the effects of a person's acts are within another's mind (education, deception, etc.), these consequences cannot be observed, and so they are dismissed as not morally relevant (effectively, there are no consequences). Then, when the person who has been so affected (educated, deceived, brainwashed, etc.) acts in the world, the consequences of the person's acts are judged as the products of that person's choices, without respect for the "education" which that person underwent to get into that attitudinal head space.
You ought to be able to conclude that this is very problematic because it provides no bridge between "final cause", which is the product of one's wants, desires, ideologies, and other immaterial, "mental" principles, and "efficient cause", which is the results of one's actions in the world. The results of one's actions in the world (efficient cause) are judged as morally relevant. However, the results of a person's actions which affect the minds of others, to influence the ideologies, desires and wants of those others, which ultimately have great influence over the person's actions in the world, are dismissed as not morally relevant.
This is neither obvious nor the case. People are capable of misunderstanding a great many things beyond just the nature of the choices that belong to them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes it is. It is entirely less forceful. Making your own choices is not being forced. It is not reducing your freedom. It is using it. I feel like we have been over this point quite a bit, and we are in danger of devolving into nuh-uh territory, but I absolutely do not agree to your categorizing of someone making a choice as them being "forced by their disposition". Rather, I think they have free will, and have exercised that free will in this case.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't ignore this, nor is my view due to any "consequentialist bias". Rather, I simply disagree that these cases constitute taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices. As I have explained to you. That you seem to be dismissing my stated reasons and asserting that I have hidden motives for this (and other things) is, to my mind at least, not a very useful way of discussing something. Imagine if I were to dismiss your stated reasons for everything you have said and ascribe to you some sinister ulterior motive, perhaps one you are not even aware of. I think this is unlikely to further the discussion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not necessarily. It might be morally relevant if a person convinces someone else to do something immoral by providing them misinformation. This information doesn't need to cause them to misunderstand their choice, it could still be immoral if it leads to bad consequences. This is entirely consistent with consequentialism. But giving other people information, whether true or not, is not in itself taking away a choice that belongs to them.
You're working from a false assumption. It is not force which restricts freedom, it is impossibility which restricts freedom. We can find our way around force, and even use it to our advantage toward getting what we want. This is the case with our use of "energy". Force is power, which may be used to assist us with our freedom when we understand it properly. To portray "force" as that which restricts freedom is a mistaken conception which demonstrates the misunderstanding of "freedom" which you have, and I've been trying to help you to see, and to address.
Quoting Dan
You clearly have a "consequentialist bias". Your stated moral framework is consequentialism, and you refuse to think outside the box, closing your mind to the possibility that consequentialism is woefully inadequate as a moral philosophy. See below.
Quoting Dan
We disagree because you present an ill-defined concept of making one's own choices. As I said you override the stated definition with principles which force the employment of subjective and arbitrary judgement. Naturally we disagree.
Quoting Dan
This is more evidence of the consequentialist bias in your moral principles. It is not the act of providing false information which you judge as immoral, it only becomes immoral if it has observable consequences which are judged as immoral. This is the gap you create between final cause and efficient cause. Whenever a link between the teaching (misinformation), and the acts which follow, cannot be adequately established, so as to be able to decisively say that the person "convinces" someone else, then the teaching is judged as not morally relevant, due to an inability to establish the link between the teaching and the acting. This renders the majority of teaching (all that is not forcefully "convincing" another to make an act with bad consequences) as morally irrelevant. But in reality, teaching is the most morally relevant thing there is, and you simply turn a blind eye to this fact, refusing to accept the significance of ideology.
My last post shows the two significant problems with your thesis, the faulty assumptions you work from.
1. You misrepresent "freedom".
2. You misrepresent "morality"
You seem to be claiming a consequentialist bias because I am a consequentialist. I suggest that this is not bias but rather a considered evaluation that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take. You seem convinced that consequentialism must be concerned with "observable" consequences. While it is certainly the case that observable consequences are much eaiser to measure, they are not the only ones which can be morally relevant for a consequentialist theory. Also, you accuse me of not considering an act itself immoral regardless of its consequences. Well yeah, no kidding. That is not a consequentialist "bias," that is just what consequentialism is. The morality of actions is determined by their consequences, that's very much the whole thing.
Force very much does restrict freedom. It does so very often. When people are murdered, when they have their bodies maimed and their property destroyed by explosives, when they are captured and held against their will, these are all examples of their freedom being reduced by force employed by another party. But presumably all of this is obvious.
Again, I have not had to overide any definitions. I have offered to provide a formal definition, but heard nothing back on the matter.
I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. We have already discussed at length your issues with me using the word "freedom." I have attempted to be specific in what I mean, but you still seem to be caught on the word, rather than the concept. I think "freedom" is the most appropriate word for the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, but you are welcome to disagree (and indeed you have). However, I have been pretty clear in how I am using the word throughout this discussion.
Can i clarify something here (not realated to any previous discussions)?
Is this to insinuate that you can only conceive of "universal or objective" morality, or simply that the concept of Morality is this - and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant?
I suggest that your conclusion, "that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take" restricts your ability to understand the true nature of freedom. "Freedom" in it's normal usage, also the sense of "free will" denies the necessary relation between posterior and prior (after and before). This means that the concept of "freedom" does not accept as true, the determinist proposition that after is determined by before. Because of this, consequentialism, which bases its judgement of before, on after, is not suited to any moral philosophy which accepts "free will" as true,
What you do, is that instead of accepting this incompatibility, which ought to force you to choose one or the other (freedom or consequentialism), or neither, you propose a compromised sense of "freedom". This is a restricted sense of "freedom", qualified by "to make one's own choices". Here, "one's own choices" is defined by consequentialist principles. So your proposition is a sense of "freedom" which is defined by consequentialist principles. However, since "freedom" in the sense of "free will" is incompatible with consequentialist principles, your proposition consists of a freedom which is incompatible with free will.
Quoting Dan
Here's a fine example. In this statement, "very often" is the important, or significant qualifier. The truth and reality that force very often restricts freedom does not necessitate the inductive conclusion "Force restricts freedom". The qualifier "very often" does not provide the necessity required for a valid inductive conclusion. So the evidence you present as cases in which force does restrict freedom, do not serve to justify your proposition "force restricts freedom", as a valid, evidence based, inductive principle.
This is an example of how consequentialism relies on faulty inductive propositions. The determinist principles at work here, are as follows. We see that in the particular case, and even specific cases, the posterior is determined by the prior. In these cases, force is what restricted freedom. Because we see a causal relation we say that force caused restricted freedom. This is a case of looking backward in time. We can look at a multitude of such events which have occurred, without comparing the type of force, degree of force, and a slew of other factors, and we see that force "very often" restricts freedom. This commonly referred to as "cherry picking" which supports faulty induction. Then we see the cause/effect relation which creates the appearance of necessity, and we are inclined toward the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom".
But if we look toward the future, instead of looking toward the past, we see the inevitable nature of "force". Force itself is necessary, as inevitable, an unescapable aspect of reality. However, we understand ourselves as beings with free will, who can understand, and often avoid the restrictive aspect of force. We can even strategize and use force to our advantage. Looking at the future, from the perspective of "free will", nullifies, and invalidates, the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom". This is because from the perspective of "free will", what happens after what is happening now, is never necessitated by what is happening now. The concept of free will breaks that necessity, that the posterior (the after) will be determined by the prior (the before). The concept, "free will", allows that a freely chosen choice, at any moment in time, can affect what occurs afterward, in a way which is not determined by what occurred before. This breaks the inductive necessity of the cause/effect determinist assumption, that the after will be determined by the before. Without this necessity, inductive propositions like the one in your example, and similar one's employed by consequentialism, do not qualify as valid moral principles.
This is commonly understood as the gap between is and ought. The inductive principles state what "is the case", at the present, based on observations of the past. But moral principles look to the future and state what ought to be. So moral philosophy seeks to have an effect on the approaching time, in a way which is not determined by past observations, "what is", but by freely chosen choices, guided by knowledge and understanding, which produces "ought".
Quoting Dan
What you call "universal and objective sense" has been revealed as faulty inductive reasoning.
This is to clarify that when I am discussing morality and theories thereof, this is what I am talking about.
There is almost quite an interesting point here, but free will doesn't require that nothing is caused by anything, only that our choices are not wholly caused by preceding factors. It is not incompatible with consequentialism (and in fact, I would say that consequentialism is incompatible with a lack of free will inasmuch as all morality is) because the consequences of our actions are still caused by those actions. Though, admittedly, consequences such as other people acting immorally is quite weird to determine given that you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information (false or otherwise) without which they would not have made that decision. For example, providing the whereabouts of a abused spouse to their abuser would contribute to the immoral action of that abuser continuing to abuse their victim or indeed killing them etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Lot going on here. First, necessity is not required for inductive reasoning. Second, "force restricts freedom" does not imply that force always restricts freedom and is in fact technically true if it occurs even occasionally, let alone very often. Third, you kind of lose me when you start talking about force itself as this seems very divorced from the concrete reality of examples like "if you cut off my arm, you reduce my freedom over my arm". Fourth, as mentioned above, free will isn't incompatible with consequentialism because consequentialism doesn't require everything to be casually determined, only that consequences can result from actions. There might well be breaks in causality when it comes to free agents decision points, and what we should say about this is potentially an interesting topic, but it certainly seems that we can agree that actions can have consequences, so it seems that those actions can be assessed by reference to those consequences. Fifth, that isn't really what the is-ought gap is at all.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not even sure what you mean by this, but I'm fairly sure it's incorrect.
I was trying to clarify what you think the Bold is. It is getting less clear as this discussion goes on. I've taken long leave, re-read the parts I was involved in, continued through pages and still cannot grasp exactly what you're getting at.
It may be the case that you are, in fact, being insufficiently clear, or not noticing hte flaws in your grounding such as to make it really, really difficult to actually discuss what you're trying to discuss (because it is insufficiently clear what that is, in the same sense as the 'this' above).
Onward, I guess..
Quoting AmadeusD
What I mean to say is that this (the definition given in the quote you have used here) is what I take morality to be and what I mean when I am discussing morality. I do not mean to insinuate that this is the only definition of the word "morality" I could concieve of, though I might say that morality defined thusly (or perhaps very similarly) is the kind worth discussing.
I'm not sure what you mean by "and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant" so I've left that alone as I feel you might need to explain your reasoning a bit more there before we can discuss it.
We can take this as a true proposition, that the consequences of our actions are caused by our actions, and apply it as the foundation for a moral philosophy, but that would produce an inadequate moral philosophy. This is because of the gap between efficient cause and final cause, which I've been referring to.
There are causes of freely willed actions, which are "not wholly caused by preceding factors". We understand these causes as intentions, or in the classical terms, "final cause". Since these causes, final causes, are the principal causes, the most significant causes, of a freely willed act, they are the subject of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy seeks to induce good actions, therefore the subject matter of moral philosophy, is the cause of those freely willed actions, which we know of as intentions, or final cause.
In your portrayal of consequentialism, you describe the consequences of an action as the subject of moral philosophy. From an examination of the consequences, one can make a judgement as to whether or not the act was good. Notice that this is a judgement of something which has occurred, in the past, a fact, what "actually is". From this perspective, there is nothing to induce us, persuade us, or even force us, to do what is good. It simply provides the means by which we can judge actions as good or bad. Because of this, it is not a moral philosophy at all, it is more like a science of morality. There are theories concerning what constitutes good and bad (such as your principle of protecting one's own choices), and there are principles provided, by which actions can be judged according to consequences, but there is nothing to incline or inspire people to act in the way which fits the description of good. To incline and inspire people to act in the way which fits the description of good, is the goal of moral philosophy.
This is why consequentialism is not a moral philosophy. It offers us no way to shape or form a person's disposition, one's character, attitude toward actions. And that is what defines moral philosophy, it's capacity to provide us with formative principles, upon which we educate human beings so that they are inclined to act in the way that we believe is proper. The difference between moral philosophy and consequentialism, is that the former has as its subject, intentions and final cause, while the latter has as its subject, the consequences of actions, and the efficient cause relation of the consequences to the actions.
Quoting Dan
This is how the focus on efficient causation, which is taken for granted as the principal form of causation by consequentialism, completely misleads us into misunderstanding. Since the "necessity" which is required for a judgement of of "cause" by the concept of efficient causation, is not present in the case of final causation, due to the fact that the will is free, then we cannot allow final cause, or intention, to be a valid cause. This is an issue with the "scientific" approach to morality, as science focuses on efficient causation. On the other hand, moral philosophy apprehends intention or final cause as a valid form of causation, it seeks to understand this type of causation, and work with it to inspire goodness in humanity.
So for example, you state here, "you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information". In this statement, you simply exclude final cause as a real form of causation when you say "you can't really cause other people to...". However, when I have a specific goal, or intention in my mind, and I communicate this goal to you, so that you carry out the means to that end for me, (I may offer to compensate you, or we may just have a friendly relationship), then I have caused you to do something. That's plain and simple, if final cause is accepted as causation. However, restricting causation to efficient cause, and not allowing final cause as a real form of causation, induces you to say that this is not "really" a case of causing.
Now there is a serious hole in your moral philosophy, which I will call it "the abyss". Your scientific approach to morality has inclined you to exclude final cause as a real form of causation. However, your common sense, and intuition, allow you to temper your scientific approach with an appeal to "libertarian free will". Your real, lived experience, 'forces you' to accept the reality of freely willed choices. Now, your adherence to the idea that efficient cause is the only real type of causation, makes libertarian free will completely incomprehensible. People influence the choices of others all the time. However, this cannot be "causation" or else your idea of libertarian free will would be excluded. That reinforces the belief that all real causes are efficient causes. But it also renders a libertarian free will choice as nothing but random chance. You see, you have no way to account for the supposed "influence". Libertarian free will excludes the possibility of it being causation, and so it is morally irrelevant to you. A person still chooses freely, despite being "influenced", so the "influence" is not morally relevant.
The abyss is this "influence". The scientific approach denies that it is causation, because it's not efficient cause, and the libertarian free will approach endorses this scientific approach, by saying that it cannot be causation or else free will would be negated. But that renders the "influence" as completely unintelligible, and dismissed as irrelevant. It doesn't fit into the scientific approach of efficient causation and consequentialism, nor does it fit into the libertarian free will side of things. So it's discarded as not morally relevant, and dismissed, even though it is what moral philosophy considers as its subject. Therefore you loose the entire content of moral philosophy into this abyss you have created by rejecting final cause as a real form of causation. What's the point to your project, morality without content? Al the real content of moral philosophy has been rejected as not relevant.
Quoting Dan
If you are stating "force restricts freedom", as a proposition, a premise for a logical proceeding, then it is implied that force always restricts freedom. And if what you meant was "force sometimes restricts freedom", then please state it that way. The problem though is that if you did state it that way, it wouldn't carry the logical force required for your argument, and that's why you stated it the other way.
I think calling intentions a final cause might be quite different from how that term is generally used. I confess I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the term in this context as you seem to be using it in quite a different way from the teleological sense. Also, I don't think intentions are or should be the focus of morality (which will come as no surprise given I am a consequentialist).
Consequentialism does indeed judge whether actions are good based on their consequences, but consequentialism by itself isn't a moral theory. Utilitarianism, freedom consequentialism, even egoism, give moral guidance for what actions should be done based on either their consequences or their expected consequences (there's a whole discussion to be had about expected value vs actual value here, but let's not get into that).
I don't think the primary goal of moral philosophy is to incline or inspire people to act well. I think it is determine what it is to act well. While it is reasonable to say that a goal of moral philosophy is to share moral truths with people, I would say its primary goal is to discover them in the first place.
I don't think I said that influencing people to do immoral things is not morally relevant. I think I said that libertarian free will makes this complicated as the consequences of someone else's actions are caused by them, not by you, though you seem very clearly to have contributed to them. It's potentially a difficult question to pin down, and I would freely admit that I don't really know how free will works (assuming we have it). But I don't think the issue is in not having enough causes in our proposed ontology, I think it is that free will is weird.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am fairly sure that what I said, and what I meant, was that force very often restricts freedom. You were the one that suggested that force does not restrict freedom, I was simply pointing out that this is not the case because it often does. I need not show that it always does to show that you are wrong, only that it sometimes does. In this case, it often does.
Final cause is defined by Aristotle as that for the sake of which. The example given is that health is the final cause of the man walking. Why is he walking? To be healthy. The reason he is walking is to be healthy, he is walking for the sake of his health. That really seems like "intention" to me. It's what Plato called "the good".
It seems we're very far apart as to what moral philosophy is. I think its principal function is to teach, you think it's principal function is to learn. I suppose it must involve both, because learning is necessary for teaching, but until you recognize the importance of teaching, there's not much for us to discuss.
In Plato's cave allegory, the philosopher escapes the cave out into the sunlight, and recognizes the sun. The sun is analogous with "the good", as that which makes visible objects visible, in the same way that the good makes intelligible objects intelligible. After seeing the light, the philosopher does not just sit around and bask in its glow, he must return to the cave, and teach the others what has been revealed to him. That, I believe is the position of moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
The point is, that we cannot proceed from this proposition "force restricts freedom", as a premise, because it is a false proposition. Therefore if we want to understand how freedom is restricted, and proceed with a true premise about this, we really need to look elsewhere.
I think 'goal' might be more appropriate there as I think Aristotle would say that things can have a final cause without the capacity for intentions, but for moral agents I think I see what you mean. Though I wonder whether that means you think you can't have a final cause you are unaware of, or if you think this amounts to being unaware of your intentions.
I don't think I dismissed the importance of teaching.
In Plato's cave the prisoners refuse to listen to the escapee. They think the sun has ruined his eyes for he cannot see the shadows with the same clarity they can. Plato seems to be making the point that the enlightened cannot necessarily share their wisdom with those who see only shadows. I'm not saying I agree, just that I'm not sure you analogy is doing the work you want it to.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, the point is that you claimed that one thing does not cause another. I pointed out that it often does.
As for understanding how freedom is restricted, it seems that it is restricted in lots of ways, and that an understanding of what it means for it to be restricted is probably more useful to recognizing them than making sweeping generalizations. That being said, as a broad generalization, we could do a lot worse than 'force restricts freedom'. As a heuristic, this seems like it would get us to the right answer more often than not, given that 'forcing' someone to do something is pretty directly opposed to them having a choice in the matter.
That's human nature, people hold fast to the beliefs they have. Because of this, I think moral philosophy is the most difficult field You are not listening to me. I am not listening to you. I think the analogy is good.
Quoting Dan
Are you not listening, in denial, or do you seriously not understand this point? The fact that force often appears to restrict freedom does not justify the proposition "force restricts freedom".
Exceptions to the rule indicate that the rule is faulty. What is required is a comparison of cases where force does restrict freedom to cases where it does not restrict freedom, and this will reveal what really restricts freedom, and why there is the appearance that it is force which restricts freedom.
What I suggest, is that if you look closely at the relationship between force and freedom, you will first see the inherent contradiction, (which I referred to earlier), inhering within the idea that force restricts freedom. "Free" implies a state of being unrestricted, yet we are surrounded by forces. So if forces are restrictions, we could not be free. Therefore, if our primary premise is that the agent is free, we need to assign freedom to the agent, and then develop the relationship between the agent and forces from this premise.
That the agent is free implies that it is impossible that forces restrict the agent, because this would contradict the agent's freedom. Therefore we must conclude that the free agent's response to forces, (which create the appearance that the agent is being restricted by the forces), are really free choices made by the agent, decisions made as to how deal with the forces.
See how the contradiction is resolved? The agent remains free. Forces surround the free agent. The agent responds to the forces freely. The free response of the agent to a force creates the appearance that the agent is being restricted by that force. This is the first lesson from Plato's cave allegory, to learn how to distinguish appearance from reality. The sensible world which we observe is the realm of appearance. We need to look into the mind to access the real.
Well, I think you're half right.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am not suggesting "force restricts freedom" as a rule. You suggested a rule and I am pointing out that it isn't accurate.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe.
When someone forces someone to do something, they are using the physical forces of the universe to their advantage. So from the perspective of the person who is said to be forced, the two are the same in principle. In the first case, the person being forced by physical forces has to understand and deal simply with those forces of the universe. In the other case, the person has to deal with the forces of the universe being directed by another's intent. This makes the latter type of force more complex, therefore more difficult to understand and deal with, because intention is an integral part of it and intention is difficult to understand.
This is why I say that you need to look closely at the relationship between the free agent, and force, to understand that force cannot actually restrict the free agent. And this is regardless of the type of force. So if the free agent is restricted, this is a feature of the agent itself, making it not truly free. And this feature creates challenges for the agent in dealing with forces (that includes all types of forces, including physical and the intent of another). It is not the case that a specific type of force restricts the agent, it is the case that the agent has restrictions inherent within (making it less than free), which renders it vulnerable to specific types of forces.
But if this is the case, then we must drop the premise that the agent is free, and adopt the premise that it is inherently restricted. Then we would need to analyze the nature of the agent to see what sort of restrictions inhere within.
Again, to be a free agent is to have free will, even if your freedom is restricted.
Also, I think this way of thinking about restrictions is just incorrect. If someone has locked you in a room, that is not a restriction inherent within you. That is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you. I mean, there's a sense in which you wouldn't be restricted by this were it not for your inability to pass through solid matter. Is this the kind of thing you are raising, that the things that restrict our freedom are contingent upon various physical facts about us?
OK, but since "freedom is restricted" is a blatant contradiction, and you seem to believe that "restricted" represents the truth in this matter, we need to start with the premise that the agent is not free. The agent is restricted. Whether or not you believe in free will is irrelevant now, what you believe is that the agent is restricted, and therefore not free. Now we can proceed to outline the nature of the restrictions.
I believe, as I said earlier, the most important and significant restriction is the nature of time. It is impossible to alter the past. And, it's not the case that this type of restriction is not morally relevant, because this restriction affects everything we do, that which is morally irrelevant, as well as that which is morally relevant.
Quoting Dan
That's a good example. What you signify is that something has happened to the person, "someone has locked you in a room". This past act has created a describable situation now, the person is locked in a room. No one can change the past, so as much as "you" dislike the situation you are in, you cannot change it. The restriction is a feature of time.
However, going forward in time, such restrictions can be dealt with. "You" can pull out your phone and call someone. "You" can look around the room for a tool to get you out. "You" can look at leaving through a window. "You" can try to kick a hole through the door, or wall. These are all possibilities, choices which the person who is locked in the room might consider, and many others depending on the particulars of the situation.
Now, notice that all the choices reference the future. They all concern what the person might do in the future. Also, notice that in this specific example, what is indicated is a desire to be rid of a particular restriction. That is a key point in relation to freedom, as much as we premise that the agent is not free, (is restricted), there is a desire for freedom. This desire is reflected in the agent's intentions. So, having a desire for freedom, the agent makes choices from a multitude of future possibilities, with the intention of ridding oneself of various restrictions, in the quest for freedom.
The other significant point is that most thoughts about the past, "I wish I hadn't done this or that", "I wish so and so hadn't done this or that, are completely useless in relation to this desire for freedom. This is not to say that they are all useless, because a few select ones are extremely useful. These are the ones that indicate something important about how the restrictions were applied to the restricted person. Therefore another selection process is required from the agent. From one's past experience, memories etc., the agent must select from a vast multitude, a very few select thoughts which are applicable to the present situation, and the quest for freedom.
Quoting Dan
This qualification, "that someone has imposed upon you" such and such restriction, is generally insignificant, and unimportant. Consider that you suddenly find yourself locked in a room. And, your desire is to be free. Look at the possibilities for the means to freedom, which I mentioned above. That someone has imposed the restriction on you is completely irrelevant. However, when we look at the memories from the past experience, this qualification may be significant. If you think you might call the person on your phone, and get them to let you out, then it would be important. But this is unlikely, so the qualification that it "is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you", is probably completely irrelevant to your desire for freedom.
Again, you seem to want words to only mean one thing, and they don't.
A free agent is one that has free will. Their freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) might be restricted, or it might not. If it is restricted, I would say that was a bad thing. But such a restriction would not stop them being a free agent in the sense of having free will.
I'm not really sure what point you are making in your discussion of the person locked in the room.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Whether it is relevant to your escape attempts is a seperate issue to whether the proper way of thinking about it is a restriction inherent to you or a restriction someone has imposed on you.
I'm not entirely sure what points you are making as they seem to bounce around a lot.
That is because I want premises for the purpose of proceeding logically. If we allow the ambiguity of words meaning numerous different things, then we open ourselves to equivocation and logic becomes useless. Then there is no point to proceeding. That's why I'm now looking for some clearly defined terms to provide for us some agreeable premises for logic.
Quoting Dan
This is self-referential. You define "free agent" with "free will", but nothing tells us what "free" means.
Quoting Dan
Now "freedom" becomes totally meaningless. "Free" to me, as the common dictionary definition indicates, means unrestricted. Now you say freedom might be restricted, or it might not. That leaves "freedom" itself as nothing.
And as I've shown, the "ability to understand and make their own choices" is not freedom at all. Because you qualify "their own choices", with moral principles, this phrase, as you define it, just refers to a type of restriction. And as far as I understand "free", restriction is opposed to "free".
Quoting Dan
The point is that you have named a special type of restriction, one which is imposed upon a person by another, and you have singled this out as if it has special moral significance. What my explanation of your "locked in the room" example shows, is that whether or not a restriction is imposed by another person is usually very insignificant relative to the required decision making at that time. If you find yourself locked in a room, the issue of whether or not someone imposed this upon you intentionally ought to have very little significance over the choices you need to make at that time. And in general, in cases where we find ourselves confronted with unwanted restrictions, whether these restrictions are natural, or artificially imposed, ought not have a serious affect on our decisions making. We must work to understand the restrictions, and free ourselves from them, not worry about who, why, or if, someone laid them on us. Therefore "imposed by another" is not a species of "restriction" which is important to distinguish at this time. We need to first understand what "free" and "restricted" mean, in their basic sense.
I think we can be clear about what we mean even if words have more than one possible meaning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is not self-referential at all. I define "free agent" with reference to free will. I feel like I already explained what I mean by free will but I can do so again if you would like.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, freedom is not meaningless, it is simply different from being a "free agent" in the sense of an agent with free will. To have free will and to have the freedom to express it are different things.
Second, you haven't shown that. You have insisted it, usually backing it up with a misunderstanding of what I've said or the assertion that I should be using words the way you would prefer. It is freedom to make a certain kind of choices.
Third, I'm not saying that what freedom is could be restricted or not. I am saying that being a "free agent" in the sense of having free will is not the same as having freedom to express that free will (as mentioned above).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, aside from the fact that someone has acted wrongly in this case, I am generally inclined to agree. But I don't think I ever suggested or implied that someone's freedom being restricted or violated by another person was in some way more significant than it being violated by something else. You said that restrictions were inherent to the person, and I was simply pointing out that this seems like a silly way to conceptualize restrictions. In this case, there was another person involved, but there need not be. We might imagine a similar case where a rock has fallen on your leg and trapped you under it, thereby restricting your freedom. It would be very strange to categorize the rock on your leg as an restriction that is inherent to you or in some sense internal. It is a thing that has happened to you that is restricting your freedom.
Quoting Dan
Yes, that would be a good idea. I cannot follow what your saying now, so maybe a definition, or even a description of what you think free will is. You said something about libertarian free will, but to me that doesn't seem at all consistent with the principles you are arguing. But maybe you have a different idea from me, about what constitutes libertarian free will.
Quoting Dan
So are you saying that the "free" in "freedom" has a different meaning from the "free" in "free agent"? I assume also, that since you assert that defining "free agent" with "free will" is not self referential, then the "free" of "free will" has a different meaning from the "free" of "free agent". This is getting very confusing to me, and the likelihood of equivocation is looming large.
Quoting Dan
You were attempting to make a distinction between the physical forces of the universe, and the force someone uses to force a person to do something. You said: "This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe."
Now, when we analyzed your example, of when a person uses "force" on another, by locking one in a room, there is no significant difference between the restrictions applied by the forces of the universe, and the restrictions applied when someone is locked in a room. In each case, the restrictions are the same, and it is generally insignificant that in one case the force is intentional imposed.
Now that we seem to agree (somewhat) about the nature of restrictions, and "force", we might be able to go back and start from the principal restriction I mentioned, that of the passing of time, and the nature of the past. Do you think so? I'll wait until I see how you define "free will", and "free agent". This might give me an idea of how you understand "free". Your ideas seem totally foreign to me.
Ok, bingo. Thank you (no impugning - just that this answers me directly).
Fair enough. I would suggest that for an agent to have libertarian free will, it must be the case that their actions are caused by the agent themselves and not wholly determined by preceding events (I think I'd also add that they aren't random but that's maybe a debate for another day), and that their actions are in-principle not wholly predictable with 100% accuracy prior to their occurance (Lapse's demon is impossible).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I think freedom and free will are different things. As I have said before, I would say that freedom is the ability to understand and make choices (and I would say that the kind of freedom that we should care about morally is the freedom to make one's own choices). To understand and make choices is the use of one's free will and one's rationality. Having free will is not the same as being able to use it to make your choices (since those choices might be restricted in some way). When I talk about a "free agent" I mean an agent possessing free will. I am not making a claim about how restricted or unrestricted their freedom is.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, because "forcing" someone to do something means something different than the "forces" of the universe, and I was very confused that you seemed to be using them interchangably.
OK, so the key phrase is "not wholly determined by preceding events". I would say that "determined" is the type of concept where we would say that an action is either determined by preceding events, or it is not. That's my understanding of "determined". It wouldn't make sense to say that an act was partially determined, because determined is an all or nothing sort of concept. So, I will assume that by "not wholly determined by preceding events" you mean not determined by preceding events.
Quoting Dan
I would not make the distinction in this way. What I described earlier, is a difference between choosing and acting. I would say that "free will" involves choosing freely, and "freedom" involves acting freely. Notice that this distinction is necessary to account for the reality of cases where people choose to do something, and it ends up that they cannot do it, or they fail for some reason. So for example, if I choose to steal your car, that's a freely made choice, of my own free will, but if you shoot me, or if I'm arrested, then obviously I did not have the freedom to carry out that act.
Quoting Dan
This seems to be similar, to what I said, but I think you really need the distinction between choosing and acting. We need to recognize that distinction because choices are made within one's mind, and the factors which restrict one's choice, lack of education, inattention, rashness, desires, and all sorts of emotional things, are completely different from the factors which restrict ones actions. The things which restrict ones actions are those things which are expressed by the laws of the physical world, the activities in that world.
Because of this difference, one can choose all sorts of fantasy things, which might never come true. So there is often an inconsistency between what one chooses and what one actually receives from the world. But this facet of free choice is very important to theoretical thinking, like pure mathematics, and the creation of scientific hypotheses. The physical world is full of things which appear to us as restrictive, but our ability to transcend all those restrictions, with our minds, allows us to dream up ways around the apparent restrictions. That is the essence of problem solving. This ability to "dream" is what lifts us beyond things which appear to us as physical restrictions to our freedom, but which we may ultimately find a way around because the free will of our minds, to choose, is not restricted by those "apparent" restrictions. Here we have technology.
Quoting Dan
I believe this distinction between "free will", which which refers to the capacity of the mind to understand and choose, and "freedom", which refers to the capacity of the human being to act in the world, is very important to maintain in moral philosophy. Once we clearly define this boundary, we see that "freedom" is inherently restricted in many ways which "free will" is not. And since in moral philosophy we must start from the most base level of restriction, the restrictions to free will, as restrictions to the mind's capacity to understand and choose, we need to start with those things I've mentioned, education, deception, and even genetic disposition which is a form of restriction more base than learning.
The most base restrictions are the strongest and most influential restrictions. After this, we can move to the higher levels of restrictions, the restrictions to our freedom. And, the reason for maintaining a distinction between the two, is to allow for interactive relations between them, as a true model needs this separation to allow for reciprocation. These interactive relations are well exemplified by the process known as "trial and error". The mind comes up with an idea (a choice) and has to try it out in the physical world. In science, this is experimentation. Notice how this is representative of different types of free will choices, ones which are based in untried and very uncertain speculations, and ones which are based in proven and very certain principles.
Quoting Dan
The "forces" which a person applies to another, in forcing that person, are the "forces" of the universe. There is no other type of "force" available to the person, to use when "forcing" another, so the word has the very same meaning. The difference is as I explained, we can be restricted by force, or we can use force to our advantage. In the case of "forcing another", the person is manipulating the forces of the universe to take advantage of another.
However, you use an ambiguous and deceptive phrase, "forcing someone to do something", in order to veil your underlying inconsistency. When a person persuades or coerces another into carrying out an act for them (forces someone to do something), they use words, gestures, or other actions, to influence a person's decision making (to get them to decide to do the thing), they "cause" the person to decide on that act. But your stated principles of libertarian free will do not allow that a free agent's choices can be caused in this way.
Therefore you propose that "force" has a different meaning. This is a type of meaning which allows that a freely willed choice can actually be caused, "forced", by another person. But it's really nothing but contradiction. The free agent's choice is not caused, and cannot be caused. That's what being a free agent means. The proposed use of the word "force" is to signify a cause, which does not qualify as a "cause" because that would negate "free agent". So the word "force" is used instead of "cause", because if you said that a person could cause another person to do something, the contradiction between this and the principles of libertarian free will would be blatant.
This I believe is the most significant problem you've shown to me, in your principles, the above inconsistency. You dismiss all sorts of communications, teaching, deceiving, etc., as not able to have any causal effect on another's choices, because people have "libertarian free will", which means that their choices are not caused. However, then you allow that one person can "force" another to do something. But this proposed type of "force" is nothing other than persuading or coercing through teaching or deceiving, and it's really just an instance of communicating with another.
The glaring problem is that you deny the moral relevance of all sorts of communicative activities, saying that the agent is free, and these activities are not causal. Then, you cannot help but notice the reality that communicative activities really obtain the highest level of moral relevance, so you give this a special name "force someone", and separate it off, as completely distinct. Then you argue as if there is no similarity, no continuity between them, not allowing for some sort of scale of degrees of difference, between teaching, deceiving, and "forcing", all being activities of the same category. This is because of that above mentioned inconsistency. You really want "forcing" to qualify as "causing", and the others not to qualify as "causing". But "causing" cannot be provided for by libertarian free will, so you give it a different name, "forcing", and you speak as if it is something in a completely different category, when really it's nothing other than a matter of influencing a person through the means of communication.
I don't think it has to be quite so all or nothing. I'd be open to the idea that certain preceding events were necessary but not sufficient causes of some action being undertaken.
After that, I am going to have to disagree with you that things like lack of education or rashness count as restrictions on one's freedom (and certainly not restrictions on one's free will). But presumably you know that I disagree on that count since we have discussed it quite a lot by this point.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you go to a police officer and tell them that you just witnessed someone being forced into a car and they respond with a question about whether you're discussing the weak nuclear force, the strong nuclear, force, magnetism, or gravity, that is not an appropriate understanding of how you are using the word 'force'.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Persuading someone to do something is not forcing them to do it. Coercing someone by threatening them could plausibly be considered forcing. What you are doing in such a case is restricting their choices through a threat (for example, give me your money or I will shoot you). This is not inconsistent with thinking that one's actions are not wholly determined by preceding factors or in-principle predictable with 100% accuracy.
This is also fairly obvious in the case where you are literally forcing someone to do something, such as by grabbing them and physically making them do it. This is not the same thing as persauding someone or educating someone.
I am not making any special categories here. Some actions restrict someone's ability to understand and make their own choices and some don't. The use of force is often in the former category, and the use of deception or education is often in the latter. But, again, this is consequentialism. The type of action is not what is important. It is the consequences which determine an actions morality. In cases where education restricts someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (generally this would involve teaching them something incorrect about the nature of those choices or about some threat etc) then that education is morally bad. But, for example, teaching someone how many wives Henry the 8th had does not restrict their ability to understand and make their own choices.
We could take that route, but I think it would prove disastrous to consequentialism. Consider that if we maintain such principles, that there are necessary conditions for an effect, but none of these can suffice as the cause of the effect, then we do not have what is required to tie the voluntary act to the consequences, as the cause of those consequences. The circumstances which a human being finds oneself in, are all equally necessary for the resulting consequences, and "causation" has been reduced in this way, such that the voluntary act cannot be said to suffice as "the cause" of the consequences, it is necessary but not sufficient.
Quoting Dan
The issue is that threatening is a matter of persuading someone through the use of communication. The question for you, is how is this substantially different from any other form of persuading someone through the use of communication, teaching and deceiving in general?
My criticism is that you employ an arbitrary division whereby sometimes the use of communication is morally relevant, and other times it is not. And the principles you employ in making this division are not based in whether the use of communication is good, bad, or indifferent, as they should be for a true determination of "morally relevant". Your principles are based in harm or benefit to body and property, with complete neglect for harm or benefit to one's mind, even though your claim is that the principles are based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices.
Quoting Dan
This is nonsense. You cannot grab a person and make them act out a procedure. How could they be performing the request while they are being held? What are you insinuating, that you could grab a person and move their arms and legs like a puppet, making them carry out an act? You are slipping into nonsense Dan.
Quoting Dan
You really haven't taken a look at what the word "understand" means. If you truly believe that deception and education do not, in general, effect one's ability to understand one's own choices, you have a lot of reading, and thinking, to do.
Quoting Dan
You've fallen into a trap. Just last post, you distinguished between "free will" and "freedom". And, I explained how "free will" as you defined it related to decision making, choice, (which is mental), and "freedom" as you separated it from free will, related to (physical) actions in the world. Then, to avoid having to deal with causation in the realm of the mental, decision making, and free will, you proposed a distinction between sufficient and necessary. Now you want to focus on consequentialism, and the world of physical actions, but your proposed distinction between sufficient and necessary, in the terms of causation, completely undermine your consequentialist principles.
I mean, surely we are in a world where events can have multiple necessary but not individually sufficient conditions, aren't we? For example, if you provide the location of an assassin's target and I provide the asssassin with a sniper rifle (assuming they couldn't get either of these things otherwise), and the assassin then assassinates said target with said rifle, surely we all bear some responsibility here. I think we have to accept that responsibility for consequences is often a bit more complicated than we might like.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is different because in the case of coercion it leaves the person with the choice to do as you say or have their freedom violated in some way.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do not employ an arbitrary division. The divison I employ is whether the communication in question restricts/violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You could grab someone and carry/push/otherwise bundle them into a car. That would be forcing them into a car and different from persauding them to get in. I was thinking more that kind of thing, rather moving someone like a puppet.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You can decieve and educate people on a lot of things that aren't the nature of their own choices.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Okay, pretty much all of that is wrong.
First, freedom isn't related only to the physical. There are mental freedoms also. That is not how I distinguished between free will and freedom.
Second, I didn't introduce a distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions to avoid having to deal with anything. I assumed we were all happy with that distinction already. Further, I simply pointed out that I was open to the possibility, rather than asserting it.
Third, I have been focusing on consequentialism the whole time, and consequentialism is not wholly concerned with "the world of physical actions". As an example (and let me be clear that this is just an example using a different theory of consequentialism and not something I am proposing as true) a utilitarian might say that you ought not to think of things that make you needlessly sad and should instead focus on things that make you happy instead as this will lead to a better outcome.
Fourth, the idea that things can have necessary and/or sufficient conditions for their existence/realizement does not undermine consequentialism. It certainly makes it more complicated than asserting that every event has a single well defined and understood cause, but surely no one would make that assertion because it's pretty obviously wrong. Consequentialism in the world in which we live must by necessity deal with events which multiple people seem to share some responsibility for.
OK, so now you accept that teaching someone something (providing the location in your example), actually is causal in a morally relevant way. I'm glad you've come to understand that.
Now, you need to justify the boundary you impose between some acts of teaching, and others. Why, for instance is the person who taught the assassin morally responsible, yet the person who taught the arsonist how to light a fire, is not. Your principle of understanding one's own choices seems completely inadequate. The difference to me seems to be a difference of intention.
Quoting Dan
I don't see the difference. A threat involves the possibility of having freedom restricted. Likewise,
when someone offers to teach you how to swim, there is the possibility that your freedom will be violated in the future, by drowning, if you choose not to accept the offer. Your claim of a difference is unsubstantiated. The forces of nature are all around us, violating our freedom in many different ways, and learning helps us to make choices which avoid these violations. So I really believe your claim of a difference is completely unjustified.
Quoting Dan
As I said, if these are your claimed principles, you obviously do not know what "understand" means, or you are using the word in a very unusual way.
Quoting Dan
Kidnapping a person is not forcing them to do something. You were talking about forcing a person to do something, as distinct from persuading or threatening them to cause them to do it. I do not see how anyone could force someone to do something other than by some form of persuasion, such as a threat. But all these are instances of using communication to tell people something. By what principle do you distinguish some cases as morally relevant and others as not?
Quoting Dan
It's not a matter of learning about the nature of one's own choices, it's a matter of how education effects one's ability to make one's own choices. You seem to have no respect for how a difference in the number of possibilities present to one's mind, at the time of making a decision, affects the person's ability to make decisions. This is what I've been telling you about since the beginning, and why habit makes a significant difference to one's decision making ability. Lack of relevant knowledge makes a choice difficult, decreasing one's ability to make choices. Increased knowledge which is relevant to the situation makes the choice easier, increasing one's ability to make the choice. This has nothing to do with whether the knowledge is about the nature of making a choice.
You need to take a good look at what "the ability to make a choice" means. Clearly the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability. This is a principle which is applicable to any type of decision making. Now you propose a special type of decision making, making one's own choice, and my principle, "the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability", is clearly applicable, just like it is applicable to any other type of choosing.
This is knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances, it is not knowledge about the special type of choice you are proposing. Further, there is another type of knowledge which aids a person in determining which knowledge is relevant to the circumstances, and this is where habit is very important. If the person's mind goes only toward some specific information, avoiding other information which is actually relevant, excluding it as irrelevant, this severely restricts the person's ability to make the choice. Therefore, if one were to apply the principle (or habit) that only knowledge about the nature of making one's own decision is applicable, in any set of circumstances where the person wants to make one's own decision, this would actually be extremely restrictive to a person's ability to make one's own decisions. That is what you are proposing, a severe restriction to one's ability to make one's own choices.
Quoting Dan
Of course it is all wrong. You described for me specific things, like a distinction between "free will" and "freedom", and I proceed on that basis to show inconsistency in your thesis, so now you must take back what you said, as "all of it is wrong".
So let's go back then, and you can try again. Please define "free will", and "freedom", so that I can have some sort of understanding of what you are talking about.
I have at no point said that teaching someone something is never morally relevant. Simply that being taught something does (in most cases) not constitute restricting your freedom. "Causal" is a bit of a difficult claim to make here. Rather I would say that it certainly seems to be a contributing factor to the action occuring and it seems like the person who taught the assassin bears some responsibility. The arsonist is a very odd case, as presumably they would have learned to light a fire without that person's intervention so they (the teacher) aren't a necessary condition for them (the arsonist) lighting fires.
Again, it isn't the nature of the action that I am concerned with, it is the consequences.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose someone is at some threat of being drowned in the future if they don't know how to swim. There are quite a few differences between that and the case of someone pointing a gun at you and saying 'your money or your life' though, don't you think?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am using the word "understand" regarding a specific thing. Specifically one's own choices. I am not requiring that people understand everything, just what choice they are making and the nature of that choice (assuming that the choice in question belongs to them).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Kidnapping someone is absolutely taking them somewhere by force, against their will. It is forcing them to be there.
Again, I would distinguish which actions (of all types) are morally relevant by reference to whether they restricted/violated someone's freedom or not (or removed/prevented some restriction/violation of someone's freedom).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, I don't think any of that is right. Finding a choice difficult to make because you aren't sure which option will be best for you is not the same thing as being unable to make it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. I am very capable of investing all my money into some new business. How much I know about that business's future profitability does not affect whether I am able to do so or not. I might like to know that, but not knowing it does not restrict my ability to do so.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have defined both of these things many times for you. What I have said, each time, is what I meant. I went on to explain why everything you said in that section was wrong in several points.
Sure, each case has a number of differences from every other. That is why I think your procedure of singling out specific cases and claiming "morally relevant" , and claiming others as "not morally relevant" is unjustified. You have not provided any reasonable principles for making that distinction.
Quoting Dan
I do not see any other possibility for being unable to make a choice, other than that it is too difficult. How else could someone be unable to make a choice?
I haven't singled out cases. I have said that the morality of actions is determined by the extent to which they lead to consequencesthat protect or restrict/violated the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For example, you might be able to choose to leave the house if you're locked in a room. You might be unable to choose to go for a walk if you've had your legs broken by local mobsters. You might be unable to choose to sell your car if it's been stolen. Lots of things might prevent you being able to make those choices that belong to you.
As I've shown, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as explained by you, is not a reasonable principle. This is because you fail to properly account for the meaning of "understand" in your explanation. So you make that principle into something which neglects the moral value of understanding one's choices.
Quoting Dan
None of these restrictions provide the force required for your claim. I can still choose to leave the room if I am locked in. Whether or not I am locked in the room only changes the probability of success or failure in carrying out my choice. Likewise, I can still choose to take a walk after my legs are broken. And I can still choose to sell my car even after it's been stolen.
This is what I've been telling you, these physical restrictions which might restrict one's freedom to act do not restrict one's ability to choose. This is very important to understand because it is fundamental to the advancement of science, that we can use our imaginations to hypothesize ways to get around things which appear to be physical restrictions. Look, we can now fly in airplanes, and human beings have gone to the moon. A few centuries ago these things would have seemed impossible due to physical restrictions.
Your examples simply display your failure to recognize the distinction between making a choice, and carrying out the chosen activity. As I told you, it is necessary to maintain this distinction to account for the fact that we often make mistakes or for some other reason do not succeed in carrying out the choices we make. Because of this we must conclude that the choice to act is distinct and separate from the act itself.
Another proof of this separation is the fact that I can choose today, what I will do tomorrow. The act does not necessarily follow directly and immediately from the choice. And in the meantime I might even change my mind, so the original choice is never even acted on. This clearly indicates that there is a separation between the choice, and the act which follows from the choice.
This is all very strong evidence that you misrepresent what it means to understand one's own choices.
You have not shown that. You have asserted that. I have properly accounted for understanding.
Very often, you seem to want words to correspond with concepts in the broadest possible sense. For example, when I say that being able to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value, you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think this discussion was related to force at all, but rather being unable to make a choice.
You seem to be interpretting making a choice as an entirely mental exercise. I don't think it is sensible to say you are able to choose to do something that you cannot do. If you would prefer I use a different word rather than "choice" in deference to your view on choices, feel free to suggest one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, this definitely isn't very strong evidence of anything. I think it is reasonable to say that your choices are limited by not being able to action them and that the way you are using the word "choice" is perhaps a bit nonstandard. Certainly your example of choosing what you will do tomorrow is quite odd, since it seems even in your example that the choice to do the action happens at a later time, and that a better word here might be "planning".
But basically that's all fine. I don't really mind how you're using the word, so long as everyone is being clear with their communication. But, more importantly, my question to you is whether your objection is a normative one or more a linguistic one?
We obviously disagree on this point.
Quoting Dan
I am not saying that by your claim, "understanding" is the only measure of moral value, I am saying that the ability to "understand" must be given equal weight with the ability to "make" one's own choices, by the statement which is your principle. You clearly give preference to the ability to carry out the act which is representative of the choice (because of your consequentialist bias), and when I give you examples concerning a person's ability to understand one's own choices you simply dismiss them as not morally relevant.
Do you not understand, that it is illogical for you to proceed in this direction? You have defined "moral value" with the principle "able to understand and make one's own choices". Therefore any situations which affect a person's ability to understand and make one's own choices are necessarily of moral value. It is contrary to logic (illogical) to then turn around, and approach from your consequentialist moral principles, and say that since this instance of inhibiting a person's ability to understand one's own choices appears to have no consequences in actions it is therefore not morally relevant. Moral relevance has been defined by that principle. So you cannot logically override your definition to say that in these cases, affecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices is not morally relevant.
This is the problem I've been showing you since the beginning. You have two incompatible principles, moral value based in freedom, and moral value based in consequentialism, and you are trying to display them as being compatible. So you sometimes approach from the side of freedom (the ability to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value), and you sometimes approach from the side of consequentialism (only specific actions are morally relevant), and when you meet in the middle, you annihilate the one side (the side of freedom) in preference of your consequentialist bias.
Quoting Dan
Again, you are displaying gross misunderstanding of the nature of "choice". You are appealing to common usage of the term instead of accepting a rigorous logical analysis of what a choice is.
Consider that any time a free agent initiates an act, the existing physical restrictions are immense. The agent must make a "choice", a selection, as to the nature of the act which will be attempted. This may involve a sort of decision. When the agent makes such a selection, the choice is conditioned by the agent's desires (intention), and the agent's knowledge of the immensity of physical restrictions. The immense physical restrictions, themselves, do not at all play a role in the agent's choice. That's the essence of "free will", the agent's choice is completely free from these physical restrictions. What plays a role in the agent's choice is the agent's understanding of the immense physical restrictions.
It may be the case, that in common usage we simplify the situation, for the sake of efficiency of communication, and say things like "I cannot choose that, because it is impossible to do that", but this is just that, a simplification. What it really means, is "I will not choose that because I understand it to be impossible". Notice that the latter is the true representation. It shows that the choice is made by a free will, which could still make the opposite choice, and it shows that the thing which is viewed as "impossible" is not necessarily impossible in an absolute sense, but is understood as impossible, by the agent making the choice.
Quoting Dan
So what? "Planning" is just a specific type of "choosing".
This is the fault of your way of understanding "understanding" which is clearly deficient. You relate things to the more specific, and claim that this constitutes "understanding". You say to me "you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made", and so you fail in your denial of the relevance of the general.
Here's a simple example. Consider what it means to understand what "human being" means. You could point to many specific examples, showing me, those are human beings. But this does not demonstrate an "understanding", because you need to refer to the more general concepts, "mammal", "animal", "living", the concepts which inhere within the concept of "human being", as the defining features, to demonstrate a true understanding.
So when you point to a choice made about what will be done tomorrow, and you say 'that's not a case of making a choice, it's a case of planning', it's like pointing to a child, and saying 'that's not a mammal, it's a human being'. All you do here is demonstrate a gross misunderstanding.
Quoting Dan
As it is a case of pointing to a true and real separation, according to the concepts involved, (the separation between making a choice, and acting on a choice), my objection is normative. You ought to respect this difference which I have described, in order that we can go forward with our communication, and this discussion.
So here's the situation as I see it.
I have been telling you since the beginning, that freedom of choice as the measure of moral value, is incompatible with consequentialist principles as the measure of moral value. This make the challenge of your op irrelevant. You are offering 10k to anyone who can solve a problem which a sound understanding would designate as impossible to solve.
The real issue then, is your motive for doing this. If it is true, as you say, that you've spent close to ten years studying this problem, then by now you should have come to the conclusion that the two are incompatible. This presents the possibility that you are being dishonest, either you did not spend that time studying this problem, or you already know that a solution is impossible and your challenge is a trick of some sort. Another possibility is that you have a disability in relation to your capacity to understand and make your own choices. This would mean that there is some kind of restriction, a force of habit or something similar, which is preventing you from understanding that your choice, to attempt to achieve compatibility between these two, is a choice to do something impossible.
Since intellectual dishonesty is a very serious moral flaw in my mind, I am inclined to stay away from the former possibility, and choose the latter, that you have a disability in your capacity to understand and make your own choices. The two factors are your believe in libertarian free will, and your believe that consequentialism provides the best moral conceptual structure. The former is very intuitive to me, so I accept it readily, but your adherence to consequentialism is not intuitive. So I conclude that your disability is most likely associated with your acceptance of consequentialism. This is what I call your consequentialist bias, it is a force of habit which is restricting your ability to understand and make your own choices.
Based on this assessment, I will ask you to justify your belief in consequentialism as providing the best conceptual structure for moral philosophy. To explain what I mean, consider the following example. Suppose you spent ten years trying to solve the problem of making the conceptual structure of libertarian free will compatible with the conceptual structure of consequentialist morality. In this time you were not able to solve this problem, and your philosophical studies only strengthened your believe in libertarian free will. Why would you continue to believe that the conceptual structure of consequentialism provides the best principles for moral philosophy?
I do not ignore things that affect a persons ability to understand their own choices. You want "understanding one's own choices" to include more than I think it does. I would say that the cases you have presented as problematic simply aren't. I am not annihilating the side of freedom, I am simply pointing out that not having the information you might wish is not the same as being able to understand one's own choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Planning to do a thing and choosing to do a thing are different, wouldn't you say? But either way, we seem to be getting bogged down in the words chosen, rather than the meaning thereof.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have offered to use different language regarding this in deference of exactly this disagreement about what constitutes making a choice. You're welcome to suggest what it is. Would you prefer we discuss "actioning one's choices" would that be more beneficial? I think within the context of this discussion that is likely to mean something close to the same thing in most contexts, so I'm happy to use that language instead if you'd prefer.
I agree you have been telling me this, but your reasons are unconvincing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is a bizarre claim because it seems to rule out the possibility that I am just wrong, which is a common affliction among us humans. It also doesn't make room for the possibility that you are just wrong, which appears to be the case here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your question relies on the fallacy that if a problem is hard to solve, you should abandon the theory or position that spawned it. This seems fairly obviously not true.
It also relies on the idea that libertarian free will is somehow incompatible with consequentialism or that that is what I have been struggling to solve. Neither is true. I would say that libertarian free will is necessary for consequentialism as I think it is necessary for any moral philosophy since ought implies can do otherwise. What I have been struggling with for the past decade (though I will say that I have been doing other things too, not just sitting in a room trying to solve this problem) is how to determine what to do when freedom to make different choices conflicts.
As to why I think consequentialism is the best approach to moral philosophy, I have a few reasons, but perhaps the most compelling is that I don't think we can make a principled distinction between choosing to make something happen and choosing to let it happen. To put it another way, between acting and allowing. Without such a distinction, consequentialism seems like the only really tenable position. There are other discussions to be had, about why we should think someone's motives should matter and how action-guiding consequentialist theories can be compared to some others, but the lack of a principled reason to draw a distinction between acting and allowing is I think the most compelling reason to be a consequentialist rather than adhere to other intuitively-appealing and seemingly action-guiding types of moral theory.
More generally, I suggest that your approach of assuming I am victim to a bias or indeed a disability may be an instance of engaging in a mode of thought that is perhaps not helpful. It seems, and feel free to disagree, that you are starting with the assumption that I am wrong and preceding from there. I suggest that this may be the cause of the strange understandings of what I mean.
Do you recognize the difference between misunderstanding, and understanding? Any time that not having adequate information results in misunderstanding, then there is a case of not being able to understand one's own choice. Therefore any time deception influences one's choice, or any sort of falsity influences one's choice, there is a case of a person not being able to understand one's own choice. Furthermore, since a well educated person has better knowledge about a situation relevant to what the person's education is, than does a not well educated person, and can therefore better understand one's own choice in that situation, then that person is better able to understand one's own choice in that situation. I think it is very clear that having better information is of great consequences in relation to being able to understand one's own choice.
I really cannot understand why you deny this. Is it really the case that your ability to understand your chosen principles is that deficient? Or, do you actually understand this and are simply denying it for some other reason?
Quoting Dan
This would not help. I believe that moral philosophy is concerned with making choices, and the assumption is that actions naturally follow from the choices accordingly. Focusing only on actions, with complete disregard for the process of decision making, which leads to those actions, would be pointless in relation to moral philosophy because it would ignore the substance of moral philosophy, which is decision making.
Quoting Dan
There is always a reason why someone is wrong. It's already become extremely evident that you are wrong, so now I've moved along toward looking at the reasons for your mistakes.
Quoting Dan
That's not the situation here. There are two theories involved, not one, the moral value of freedom and the moral value of consequentialism. It is very obvious that the two theories are incompatible. I pointed that out to you when I first participated in this thread. If, after ten years of studying this subject, you still do not see what is very obvious, then there is a problem with your approach. If you insist that there is only one theory, your theory, that the two are compatible, then the ten years of study should have proven to you that they are not, and that theory is incorrect. I mean, I recognized the incompatibility after less than a half hour of reading your material.
So I am not saying that you should abandon a problem because it is difficult. I am saying that if after ten years of studying something, you cannot see what others see as obvious about that thing, then the problem must be with your approach. The solution to the problem is to change your approach, allow the possibility that the two are incompatible, and understand each of the two separately. It makes no sense to manipulate the concept of "freedom", or "free will", just to make it fit with consequentialism, because all this does is force you into expressing a misunderstanding of "freedom".
Quoting Dan
I think I see the problem with much more clarity now. You never learned the distinction between choosing and acting on one's choice. This distinction is necessary to uphold, for the reasons I explained. Because you never learned this distinction, and the great importance and significance of it, you did not have the principles required to make the distinction between choosing to make something happen (choosing to act), and choosing to let something happen (choosing not to act). Not recognizing the distinction between choosing, and acting, has made it impossible for you to understand a choice which is not an act, "choosing to let something happen". Choosing not to act is equivalent to acting for you, because you do not distinguish between choosing and acting..
Because of this misunderstanding, you have chosen consequentialism as the only tenable moral position. Clearly your ability to understand your own choice has been crippled by this misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is that you do not differentiate between choosing and acting. And so you understand your choice of consequentialism, as the only tenable choice, when this is actually a misunderstanding. Your own ability to understand your own choice in this instance, is seriously deficient, due to this misunderstanding.
Quoting Dan
I am simply employing your primary principle, "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". I am demonstrating how your ability to understand and make your own choice concerning the best moral philosophy, has been compromised by a failure to understand the distinction between choosing and acting.
To not have the information you might wish to have is not to misunderstand (or fail to understand) the choice you are making. To borrow and example of Hallie Liberto's paper "Intentions and Sexual Consent", imagine you are wanting to buy a secondhand shirt, but you only want to buy it if it is 100% cotton. Sadly, as it is secondhand, the shirt you like is missing any identifying tags that would tell you this and the person working at the secondhand clothes store doesn't know. If you knew that it was a cotton blend, you wouldn't buy it, but if you choose to buy it without knowing one way or another, you have not misunderstood (or failed to understand) your choice. You are making a choice with incomplete information (which is presumably how we make basically all choices we ever make) but you understand what it is you are choosing and what it means to make that choice, even if you don't know what the consequences will be from it in the future (such as whether you will have a shirt you are happy with).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It appears obvious to you, but you are just wrong. You have a lot of strange ideas about consequentialism and freedom which are incorrect. For example, consequentialism is not a "moral value" it is feature of a moral theory, specifically related to how said theory evaluates actions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeeeeah, I don't think there is a principle to make a serious moral distinction between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen. I agree that I didn't learn such a principle or recognize it, but I think that's because it doesn't exist. I think you may be suffering under a misapprehension. However, this doesn't prevent you from understanding your own choices, it just makes you wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are very clearly not employing my principle, as mine would certainly not suggest that a) one of my own choices is to know the best moral philosophy, or b) that not understanding what the best moral philosophy is consitutes not understanding my own choices. Also, this is a broader criticism than simply of your most recent post. You seem to proceed from the assumption that I am wrong and also, seemingly, a moron. I suggest that making such an assumption is hindering you from understanding what I am saying. I suggest trying to read what I am saying with the assumption that it is consistent and makes sense, as this will likely cause less confusion if I use ambigious words like "it" in a sentence.
This is actually a very good example of a misunderstood choice. The initial choice is to buy a secondhand shirt, but only if it is 100% cotton. The second choice is a changing of the mind, a choice to take a risk on the unknown, instead of adhering to the initial choice, which was only to buy in the case of certitude. So the second choice is the one of concern here. It is representative of a change of attitude, from the attitude of the initial decision to proceed with caution, only if there is certitude that it is 100% cotton, to the secondary decision, to take a risk on the unknown. This choice, to take a risk on the unknown is the one which is misunderstood because it is contrary to the original.
We can see that it is a misunderstood choice, because there is no explanation, no reason given, as to why the change of mind was made. In other words, this choice was made without any reason, and without a reason for it, it cannot be understood. If the example stated a reason, 'it was so cheap it was irresistible', or, 'it looks so good I forfeit the 100% cotton rule, or the person decided that if they bought it and didn't like it they could give it to someone else, then the choice would be understood. But that's not what happened in the example. The person had a clear choice to only buy cotton, then suddenly dismissed that choice and for no reason at all, bought a shirt of unknown material. Since the person did this for no reason at all, it is very clear that the person did not understand one's own choice.
Quoting Dan
But the issue of the example is not a matter of making a choice with incomplete information. As you say, we make all choices this way. The issue of the example is that a choice is made without a reason for it. Here's a similar example, which might help you to understand. Imagine that you have decided not to ever buy lottery tickets, because the odds are so bad, you think it's a waste of money. Then, you are in the corner store, and lights are flashing, bells are ringing, and there's a big sign saying $100,000,000 grand prize, and you are suddenly overwhelmed with emotion, and buy five tickets. There is no reason why you went against your rule, you were suddenly overcome with the urge to buy. So you clearly do not understand your choice. This is known as impulse buying, and in a more general sense, it is called "whimsical", and a similar concept is "overcome by passion". They are all concepts which refer to cases of not understanding one's own choices. And, you ought to see that acting by habit fits right in with these, as a case of not understanding one's own choice.
Clearly, the person does not understand what they are choosing nor what it means to make that choice. The person acts in a way which is contrary to a prior choice (changes one's mind on the spur of the moment) with no understandable reason for doing this. When a person chooses to change one's mind for no reason, that person does not understand what they are choosing (how could they, because there is no reason for it?), nor what it means to make that choice.
Quoting Dan
Do you recognize that a person can choose to do something, yet fail in doing it? If so, then you need to recognize the distinction between choosing and acting. If you continue to avoid this issue I will be forced to conclude intellectual dishonesty.
Quoting Dan
I must admit, it is starting to look like you are a moron, and so I'm headed toward that conclusion. This was never an assumption of mine, I assumed you to be quite intelligent, that's why I engaged. Talking to morons gets boring so I try to avoid it. I'm not quite convinced yet though. I'll allow you to rethink the distinction between choosing and acting.
This looks like you are claiming something lunatic here. Could you please clarify what you mean.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Putting aside that I didn't give a reason because it isn't the point of the example, you are wanting way too much in order for someone to understand a choice. If people change their mind on a whim, that doesn't mean they don't understand the choice they are making. They might not understand their motives for making it (though this is also debatable) but that isn't the same as not understanding the choice they are making. In this case, they understand that they are making a choice with incomplete information to buy a specific shirt.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, that is the point of the example. I think the original version had a reason given since it had more of a complete story. I was just giving you a brief version and the reason behind the choice really isn't the point.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah I would also say that in this case of buying lottery tickets on a whim, that the person seems to understand their choice perfectly well. They seem to understand what they are choosing and what it means to make that choice. Again, you want a lot more from "understanding one's choice" than I do. But, hopefully, that difference is now cleared up from these examples.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, it depends what you mean by "choose", but yes I suppose I would agree that someone can choose to do something but fail to acheive it. However, I've already offered to use "actioning choices" or some similar language if you would prefer. Also, I really don't know what this has to do with what you are responding to here. You seem to be saying that choosing and acting are different, but that is a whole different kettle of fish from acting and allowing being different.
Look, the original decision was to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton. Then the person has a change of mind, and chooses to take a risk on a shirt of unknown composition. That change of mind results in a choice which is contrary to the original choice. The original choice: 'buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton'. The second choice: 'buy the shirt of unknown composition'. Can you see how one is contrary to the other? Unless there is a reason for the change of mind, then a misunderstanding of one's own choices is indicated by the fact that the person has made contrary choices.
Quoting Dan
As I said, you demonstrate a misunderstanding of "understanding". By my OED, it means "perceive the significance or explanation or cause of". Unless a person apprehends the reason why they discard an earlier choice that they have made to adopt a contrary choice, it is impossible that they could perceive the significance or explanation or cause of that change of mind.
Quoting Dan
If the point of the example is merely to show an instance of making a choice on insufficient information, then it would not be relevant to what we are discussing. We are discussing "understanding" one's choice. Understanding is not simply a matter of having information it also involves applying the relevant information to the situation at hand. This is the point which you just don't seem to be getting. When a person has relevant information, they do not necessarily apply it. And that is why habit is so important as a source for misunderstanding one's own choices. It inclines one to act (often taking risks) without considering all the relevant information which is available. Failure to consider all the relevant information does not necessarily lead to misunderstanding, it often does not. But it can lead to misunderstanding.
So, in the case of buying the shirt, the person knows that they only want to buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton, that is information which they possess. However, in the act of shopping, they do not apply that very relevant information which they possess, and, by the force of habit or some other whimsical feeling, they choose to act in a contrary way. Acting in a contrary way to how one previously decided that they would act, without a reason for making this contrary choice, implies that the choice is not understood.
Quoting Dan
I really do not know what you could possibly mean by "understanding one's choice", if it's not to perceive the significance or explanation or cause of one's choice. How would you define "understand" in this context?
Quoting Dan
No, this makes no sense. I am telling you that there is a distinction between acting and choosing, and you are now starting to agree with me. Yet you propose "actioning choices" as a way to deny the evidence which demonstrates your misunderstanding of "choice". Look at the shirt example. The choice to only buy if the shirt is 100% cotton, would be excluded as not an "actioning choice", because the person ended up acting on the contrary choice. Then we would be left unable to consider the very important condition of changing one's mind.
Why not recognize the real separation between choosing and acting, and then proceed to recognize that you were wrong to conclude that there is no serious distinction to be made between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen? From here we can properly assess your reasons for believing in consequentialism.
Okay, so you mean that this indicates a misunderstand?
That is less crazy, but I think still wrong. I don't think it is a misunderstanding to change your mind. Or even to do so on a whim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, there are a ton of definitions of words, and all of those are just based on common usage. Words are just ways of conveying meaning to one another. I think "understand" is a good choice to convey the meaning I am attempting to convey here, of being able to comprehend the nature of a choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to a choice and can respond to reasons for making it. Not knowing why you changed your mind does not preclude that one understood that choice in this way as one can clearly still know what the choice is and what it means to make that choice. In this case, that it is exchanging money for a shirt of an unknown material that feels like cotton.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is definitely relevant. To understand the choice someone does not need to have all the information they might wish to have, never mind needing to apply it. My point is that the bar I am setting for understanding here is much lower than what you are talking about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't. They might well have changed their mind on a whim, which would not be considered misunderstanding the choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To comprehend/recognize the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I would also quite happily describe the shirt example in terms of having a desire and then making a choice to buy a shirt that doesn't necessarily fufil that desire. I am not worried about whether the person wanting to get the shirt in the first place should be considered a choice or not. I just don't think it matters.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have no idea how you have gotten from one to the other there. Let's say we agree that there is a difference between choosing and acting (mostly this seems linguistic to me at the moment). I'm not sure why I should think that choosing to act in a way that brings about some outcome, let's say the death of a person by my flipping a switch and sending a trolley to crush them, and me choosing to act in some other way which leads to the death of five people, in this case, not flipping the switch and watching while the trolley crushes them, are somehow different. Both of them could be considered a choice or an action, or both. The terminology isn't what's important. What's important is that there are two possible worlds (in this hypothetical) and I can pick one in which one person dies or one in which five do, and I can't see a principled reason why the fact that I have to flip a switch (or whatever) to get to the better world but only have to stand around twiddling my thumbs to get to the worse one should make a moral difference. This has nothing to do with whether or not there is a difference between acting and choosing.
Also, for what it's worth, I think choosing is definitely a type of action, even if it is a mental one. Though I don't think that has anything to do with whether there is a principled reason to draw a distinction between acting and allowing. The two things just don't seem to be related at all.
Changing your mind does not constitute misunderstanding one's choice, that's what I said. However, exchanging one choice for a contrary choice, without any reason, must indicate that the person does not understand one's own choices. A whimsical choice, if it is contrary to a prior choice, must be a misunderstood choice, because there is no real reason why the person negates the prior choice in favour of the new choice. The person can give no explanation for the choice. "Whim" means precisely that, without explanation.
Here's another way of looking at it. Lot's of people make New Years' resolutions, then many end up breaking them. Suppose a person resolves to quit smoking, then two days later is lighting up a cigarette. Notice that the two choices are contrary, first to not smoke, second to have a cigarette. One of the two choices must be misunderstood. Either the person doesn't misunderstand the force the addiction has on oneself, making the first choice misunderstood, or the second choice is misunderstood for the reason above. Usually we would not say that the first choice was misunderstood, we'd say that the person was not strong enough to overcome the addiction.
Quoting Dan
So, don't you agree, that changing one's mind to a contrary choice, without a good reason for doing such, constitutes not being able to comprehend the nature of the choice? Take the shirt example, there is no reason given for the change of mind, therefore the person cannot respond with reasons for making that choice. Imagine the person told someone else, a spouse or someone like that, that they were going to buy a shirt, but only if the shirt is 100% cotton. Then the person brings home a shirt of unknown composition, and the spouse asks, why did you buy that. I don't know. There is no reason given in the example. That's a common answer for children when asked why did you do that, I don't know. Adults give that answer sometimes too.
Quoting Dan
As I said, making a decision without all the relevant information is not the issue. The issue is failure to apply the information which one has. When the person makes the choice only to buy a shirt if it's 100% cotton, there are reasons for this decision, and those reasons are available to the person within one's mind, the memory. Likewise, when the person decides to quit smoking there are reasons for this. When the person decides to buy on a whim, or decides to have a smoke because of an urge, that person does so without reconsidering all the information within the memory, which lead to the decision in the first place. That's why we say that it's a "whim", or the result of an "urge", the person is not applying the available information in making the choice. I'm not talking about not having the information, I am talking about having the information, but not properly applying it. That's why it's called "misunderstanding", it's a failure to apply the available information correctly.
Quoting Dan
I think you are missing the essence of the example. The decision to only buy the shirt if it's 100% cotton is clearly a choice. It's stated as that in the example. It's not a desire to have a cotton shirt, it's a choice to buy a used shirt, but only if it is 100% cotton.
You can rewrite the example, so as to call it a desire for a shirt, or a desire for a cotton shirt, but then you miss the essence of the example, which is the act of changing one's mind for a contrary choice. Please take note that this is just like your proposal to only consider "actioning choices". By doing this you exclude all the choices which do not end up in action, the choices of inaction, which is will power, and the choices which later get changed and do not end up in action. You can call all these choices "desires" if you want, but what's the point?
Why do you want to exclude all these choices from your consideration of choices? Obviously it's because this type of choice doesn't fit within you moral principles, your morality cannot deal with them. So instead of changing your moral principles to be consistent with the nature of choices in general, you choose to ignore all these choices, and hang on to defective moral principles.
Quoting Dan
Sure, anyone can contrive an example where choosing inaction is just as morally reprehensible as choosing to act. I do not see how this is relevant to the issue of the distinction between choosing and acting.
Do you recognize that choices very often define conditions of inaction? Don't buy lottery tickets. Don't buy the shirt if it's not 100% cotton. Don't have a cigarette. Don't have a drink before driving. Thou shalt not... And so on. These are reasoned choices which serve as principles, rules which are designed for the purpose of preventing the urge to act, when the specified act is understood as unreasonable. Such choices do not produce observable acts, though they can change our attitudes. Since a judgement of one's moral character is a judgement of one's attitude, these choices which produce no actions turn out to be very important choices, morally.
I don't think either was misunderstood. I don't think we need to say much about either one morally, but if I was to describe them, I would say that the person had competing desires and that they gave in to their urges rather than stick with the better course of action long-term. I don't think either one of these constitutes them not understanding their choices in the way I have described though.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I don't agree at all. The person still understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it. That's all that is required.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
None of these things are inconsistent with my moral principles. As I said, I don't think the language used here really matters.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That isn't remotely the distinction that is important for whether or not we should be consequentialists or not. Whether there is a distinction between acting and allowing is what matters. If you agree that it is incredibly easy to imagine a case where it is as blameworthy to act as it is to allow (and not even a case where the situation is somehow your fault in the first place), then how can there be an important distinction to be drawn between acting and allowing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let's say, for the sake of argument, that I agree that these are cases of inaction (which I'm not sure I do as it seems like they could also be framed as actions). I would say that I am the one who is treating inaction is morally relevant here. I am saying there is no important difference between acting or allowing, so "inaction" is as morally relevant as "action". Further, I would say that the reason these things are good, to the extent that they are, is their consequences. To borrow one of your examples, the reason it is good not to impair yourself with alcohol before driving is that doing so increases the risk of harming yourself and others, wouldn't you agree?
Quoting Dan
I think I see what you're saying here. What I call "choice" you call "desire", and what I call "act" you call "choice". So when the person decides to buy a used shirt only if it is 100% cotton, you call this a desire, and insist that it's not a choice, because it's not acted on, and the person's choice (act) is to buy the shirt of unknown fabric. I find this to be a very strange and confusing use of words which precludes the possibility of a person changing one's mind. What I call changing one's mind, you call "competing desires". I find this to be a very deficient description, but I'll try to follow you.
So here's the scenario you describe for me. A person has competing desires, then the person acts. The act is the choice. Where do you place thinking, decision making, in this process? We have to address this because you refer to "understanding" one's own choice, and "understanding" describes this thinking process. Is it fair to say that thinking, decision making, is a sort of medium between desires, what you call "competing desires", and the act which is the choice? (I intentionally say that the act is the choice rather than say that the act is representative of the choice, because you explicitly do not distinguish between these two.) And would you agree that "understanding" and its contrary "not understanding", are terms used to describe a judgement against this medium process, thinking, decision making? "Understanding is a judgement of correctness, and "not understanding" is a judgement of incorrectness in the associated thinking process.
I assume that in all cases of acting (choosing), there are competing desires, otherwise a desire would lead directly to an act, without any medium, and there would be no choosing. Do you agree? And would you agree that the medium, consisting of thinking, could be judged as either understanding or not understanding?
Now, the important point, who would make this judgement? The judgement of whether the thinking process was correct or incorrect, understanding or not understanding, must be made by someone. We cannot say that the person engaged in the thinking process, making that choice, also makes the judgement of correct or incorrect, or else all cases would be judged as correct, because the person would not make the choice unless they thought it was correct. Their judgement would have to correspond with the thinking process, because the choice actually is that judgement. Therefore the distinction of understanding/not understanding would be meaningless. In all cases of making a choice, the person would understand the choice, and there would be no question of the possibility of not understanding.
That would be the case if the person making the choice was the one who judged whether the choice was understood or not. All choices would be understood, and none not understood, and the use of "understand" in your principle, "the ability to understand and make one's own choices" would be redundant and meaningless. Your principle would be more clearly stated as "the ability to make one's own choices". Is this what you mean with that principle? Or do you want "understand" to hold some significance?
If the latter is the case, then we need to look to a third party, an observer to make the judgement of understood or not understood. Do you agree with the reasoning here? This means that we have to ask the acter, why did you do that, or something similar, and access the acter's thinking process in some way. From an analysis of the thinking process we can judge correct or incorrect, hence understanding or not understanding.
Do you agree with this Dan? If not, tell me please what you mean by "understand" in the context of the principle "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". I think that if we say a person understands one's own choice, this is a judgement we pass on the person, not a judgement that a person would pass on oneself, because that would be meaningless. If you agree, then could you name some criteria which would be used in that judgement? When we ask the person "why did you do that?" what sort of guidelines ought we to follow in our judgement of whether it is a case of the person understanding the act or not understanding the act?.
Quoting Dan
But the examples I mentioned are cases of disallowing, i.e. preventing one's one actions. This is distinctly different from "allowing". So the difference I am talking about is the difference between acting and disallowing one's own actions. It is not a matter of "allowing" the actions of others, those are irrelevant. What is relevant is the choices (actions) of oneself, and the difference I am talking about is the difference between allowing oneself to act, and disallowing oneself to act. In the shirt case for example, adhering to the principle "I'll only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton", is a choice (I believe it is a choice anyway), which would have disallowed action in the circumstances of the example. However, in the example the person allowed oneself to act.
As I said in a previous post I would say that to understand one's choices it to comprehend/recognize the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I'm not insisting that it isn't called a choice. I'm not worried whether it is called a choice or not. I don't think choosing one thing and then later on choosing something that goes against the goal expressed by that first choice implies misunderstanding of either choice. Also competing desires isn't the same thing as changing one's mind.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this, particularly this last sentence. But, as mentioned above, I wasn't insisting on a specific choice of words here and how I am using "understand" in this context can be found earlier in this post.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No I wouldn't say that in all cases of acting there are competing desires, but again I wasn't using "competing desires" to mean a whole lot of extra stuff. So no, I don't think if you just want one thing and then choose to pursue that thing you have somehow not chosen.
Also no I don't think the process of thinking about a choice is itself the understanding or not understanding of that choice. Me deliberating on whether to make some chicken for dinner isn't the understanding of that choice, that understanding of that choice is the thing which allows me to engage in that deliberation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is all based on the false premise that there needs to be a judge in order for their to be a fact of the matter. This just isn't the case. The truth is not determined by the judgment of an observer. The truth simply is, and it is up to us to find it as best we can. Also, this all seems to come from you seeming to think that I was claiming a bunch of stuff that I wasn't.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I don't. As mentioned above, in that context I am using understanding one's choice in the sense of to comprehend the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If we say it then yes, I suppose we are passing that judgement. But no, it wouldn't be meaningless for a person to say that they understand their own choice. For example, in cases of euthanasia, the person might need to affirm that they understand the choice to end their own life and they would, presumably, judge this for themselves.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Why did you do that" probably wouldn't be high on my list of questions in order to determine if they understand their own choices. I might ask them about the nature of the choice they are making, and try to ascertain their general level of mental competence. I might also check whether they are suffering from any delusions which lead to them not knowing what choice it is they are making.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Does this have anything to do with whether or not there is a distinction between acting or allowing which I suggested is the reason consequentialism is the best approach to morality? I can engage with this if you want, but it appears to be divorced from what we were talking about.
Quoting Dan
We are not talking about "truth, "or "fact", we are talking about "understanding". Whether or not something is understood is a judgement which must be made, otherwise anytime someone thinks that they understand, and claims to understand, that would constitute understanding, even if the person really misunderstood.
I mean, you can say that there is an objective fact of the matter, of whether the person understands one's choice or not, but this is not relevant because we do not judge according to the fact of the matter, we judge according to what we think is the fact of the matter. So, we need some principles as to what constitutes "understanding", so that we can make the judgement as to whether one's ability to understand one's own choices is enhanced, or limited by specific factors.
This is where you and I have significant disagreement, as to which factors play an important role in one's ability to understand one's own choices.
Quoting Dan
So, as a demonstration of our disagreement, if I apply this definition which you provide above, to the shirt example, I think it is very obvious that the person in the example does not understand one's own choice. This is obvious, because the person has two contrary choices, (or a choice which is contrary to a desire if you wish to express it that way), and there is no reason given why one results in the selection rather than the other. Clearly that there is no reason, indicates that it is impossible to "apply one's rationality to it". When the choice that the person made is contrary to the desire that the person had, and there is absolutely no reason given for that choice, then we need to accept that there is no rationality to that choice either, and therefore the person did not understand one's own choice.
Quoting Dan
Then why do you not accept that the shirt example is a case of a person not understanding one's own choice? The person has the desire to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton, and then for no reason at all buys a shirt of unknown composition. If we ask the person "why did you do that?", there is no answer provided in the example. We can only conclude that the person did it on a whim or something. However, you deny that choosing on a whim is a case of not understanding one's choice. But "whim" is defined as "caprice", an unaccountable change of mind.
You say you want less from "understanding" than I do. In reality you want nothing from "understanding". Your principle is really "the ability to make one's own choice", and "understand" plays no role at all. So long as the person is capable of speaking and can give an answer to "why did you do that?", such as "I felt like it", this qualifies as "understanding" the choice, to you.
This is because you do not want to deal with all the real issues concerning "understanding" one's own choices which I've been bringing to your attention. These issues are the role of habit, education, deception, and things like that. Further, since your principle of "understanding" is to be able to "apply one's rationality", you would accept all different sorts of what is known as "rationalizing", and other specious forms of explanation as "understanding".
Do you think that if we asked the person why they bought the shirt, and they said because they thought it was 100% cotton, even though there was no tag or other indication, that would qualify as understanding one's own choice? And, if we asked the person why they thought it was 100% cotton, and they answered because that's what I wanted it to be, that would qualify as understanding, wouldn't it? This is because "applying one's rationality" does not mean the same as applying sound logic, nor does it even imply being "reasonable", as "rationalizing" indicates.
Quoting Dan
Yes, it's very relevant, that's what I've been explaining, and why I've been saying that you ought to reconsider your belief in consequentialism. The simple fact is that "allowing" does not require a choice. The vast majority of things which occur do not require any choice from me. Disallowing does require a choice, as does acting. So disallowing is classed with acting, and allowing is something completely different.
You can give many examples which create the appearance that allowing is a choice, but these are false for the following reason. All choices are personal. The choice to act is personal, something I do my self. The choice not to act is personal. The choice to allow something else, not of my choice, to occur is a choice not to act in an attempt to prevent it. So, like I explained a choice not to act is a choice of disallowing myself to act. So what you call "allowing" is really a choice of disallowing. "Allowing", in a true sense of allowing something to occur, is something completely different which is neither a chosen act nor a choice to disallow action. We can carry this principle to our personal selves, just like the others, to consider how we allow things like habit, impulse reaction, whimsical buying, etc.. These are personal actions which occur without real choice, nor are they disallowed by choice. They require a special category because they escape the reason which guides our choices which either disallow us from acting, or cause us to act. This type of action, the ones which are simply "allowed", can never be understood.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, "why did you do that" doesn't really factor into it. I might ask them if they know what choice they are making (in this case, giving up ownership of some money in exchange for a shirt) and what it means to make that choice (eg, if you give up this money, you won't have it in the future etc), but why they want the shirt is more or less beside the point (except in some niche cases where they think it will protect them from aliens that are chasing them because they are suffering from a delusion, or something to that effect).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would accept not applying one's rationality also. So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient. If they then decide to do things for no reason or just because they felt like it or whatever, then that's fine.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There are a great many things that we allow to happen which do require a choice. When bad things happen and we watch on with indifference when we could prevent them, we are allowing them to occur. I'm not suggesting that people are morally responsible for things they couldn't prevent (ought implies can and all that), rather I am suggesting that the whether you are actively doing something or simply letting it happen when you could easily prevent it doesn't make much of a difference.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, it seems very odd to say that you choosing to walk on past rather than saving the drowning child is "disallowing yourself to act". Yes, allowing something to happen does seem to be choosing not to try to prevent it. My question is, why does any of this matter? Does any of this lead to us not being blameworthy for things we let happen? Does any of this make us more blameworthy for killing the one to save the five? What does this mean in terms of how we should live our lives? This would be my question generally, as quite often I will point out something wrong with your argument and you will respond by picking at a detail of the example that I didn't include because it wasn't relevant or a word I didn't define give a formal definition for. My question is, what are you claiming I am wrong about when it comes to evaluating moral decisions or giving moral guidance?
Like, I can disagree with all the things you've said and point out all the strange assumptions and dubious logic there, but I think it would be better to clarify what is actually being disagreed about clearly.
The question is why did the person buy a shirt which they know is of unknown fabric, when the person's desire was to only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton. Do you not see that the action as contrary to the person's desire? How can you claim that a choice which is contrary to the person's desire, is understood by the person?
Quoting Dan
How does that make any sense to you? You are saying that the person understands the choice, even if the process of understanding it hasn't occurred yet. That makes no sense at all. You are allowing that the person can look back in time, after the fact, and say I did that for X,Y, and Z reasons, when those reasons really did not enter into the person's decision making process at all. This is nothing but allowing yourself to be lied to, and deceived by the person's rationalization.
The person can make up an excuse, after the fact, for acting in a specific way (what I called "rationalize" above), when the excuse does not at all represent the real thought process of the person at the time of making the choice, they are just applying their rationality to it after the fact. And you would accept this 'after the fact' rationalization which is really a false representation of what thoughts actually led to the act, as proof and justification that the person knew what they were doing at the time.
Quoting Dan
That's exactly what I said, and very clear evidence that your claim that there is no distinction to be made between choosing to act, and allowing things to happen, is false. The claim that there is no distinction to be made is your reason for choosing consequentialism as an acceptable moral philosophy. Clearly, you need to revisit that choice.
Quoting Dan
But there is clearly a huge difference. The type of "understanding" employed in each of these two distinct types of situation is completely different. Do you not grasp the fact that watching something happen, "observation" only allows you to understand what has happened after it has happened? We can watch an act in process, extrapolate from principles of cause/effect, and make predictions about how it will play out, or end, but when these predictions involve the actions of a free agent they are extremely unreliable. On the other hand, when you are actively doing something, you can, and ought to apply these principles of cause/effect, and make such prediction prior to even beginning the act.
Do you not see the difference between having the time to understand, and make the required predictions prior to acting, and observing an act in process, with absolutely no prior knowledge about it, and having to make predictions concerning it 'on the fly'? This is an indication of why the nature of time is of the utmost importance to moral philosophy, but both you and @AmadeusD refused to accept this fact.
Quoting Dan
Why do you say this? The natural human urge, or tendency, is to have compassion and sympathy for a crying child. It is an instinctual response. This is the evolutionary reason why the child cries, and the mother attends. It is also why big aid charities such as UNICEF used to play television commercials showing children in horrible conditions in an effort to get you to donate. To prevent yourself from responding to a child in need requires will power, control of one's emotions.
Quoting Dan
It matters because the thought process, the "understanding", which supports the disallowing of actions, (known as "will power"), and the thought process, the "understanding" which produces actions (choosing to act) is completely different. Furthermore, once you allow these two differences of thought processes, and come to recognize the distinction, you'll see the need to provide a third category, simply "allowing" oneself to act. And this type of action, is devoid of any real thought process. Therefore we cannot say that it is a choice which is understood. This type of choice is driven by things described by words like instinct, emotion, passion, urge, whim, habit, etc.. And, there is a vast multitude of them occurring all the time, they are morally relevant, so we need to be able to account for them in a moral philosophy.
This is the true representation of "things we let happen", that category of choices which we do not understand, things that we just happen to do, like buy the shirt. And, we must be blameworthy for such things if we want to be able curb the mistakes which often follow from such choices.
Your representation of "things we let happen" is really meaningless, because this type of situation you mention, is reducible to a reasoned, or understood, choice of not to act. Reasoned choices, whether to act or prevent acting, are always blameworthy or praiseworthy, so there is no question, or issue here.
There is simply a requirement for different principles of judgement to be applied due to the temporal reality of the nature of acts in general. As explained above, planning an act is prior to the act, and responding to an act is posterior to observation of an act in process. That is why there is a big difference between first, second, and third degree murder, for example.
Quoting Dan
As I've explained, your adherence to consequentialism is based in misunderstanding. This misunderstanding inclines you not to make a distinction between choosing (mental process) and acting (physical process). Further, your belief in libertarian free will inclines you to deny that mental processes are "the cause" of physical actions, and this reinforces your refusal to make a distinction between mental processes and physical processes.
So you have a vicious circle of unsound logic. There is a belief in libertarian free will, which denies the causation between mental processes and physical processes, but this is based in a false representation of causation. Then, your incoherency is to unite the mental choice with the physical act, making them one and the same, as if the physical act is a necessary effect of the mental choice, and this supports a unity of the two as simply a physical act. The mental choice is divorced from the physical act as 'not the cause of it' by actually uniting it to the physical act as 'one and the same', leaving the mental choice gone, irrelevant by that incoherency. Then, in your consequentialism you focus on the physical act only, having illogically shown the mental thought process as irrelevant. But this is a misunderstanding.
Because people are capable of acting contrary to their own desires and/or having contrary desires. That really isn't what understanding a choice is about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I am saying that the kind of understanding of a choice I am discussing here isn't about what reasons one has for a specific choice, it is about knowing what the choice is and what it means to make that choice such that one CAN respond to reasons regarding that choice. It is prior to what you are discussing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think we are close to agreeing on a point here. Except that it's not just reasoned choices. The choice to act some way can be praiseworthy or blameworthy regardless of whether one has made a reasoned choice or acted out of habit or on a whim or what have you. Seems to me that you could do away with considering these differently at all and just look at the consequences.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah but you were wrong on both these counts. The second count also misrepresents me completely as I have not claimed that mental processes are not the cause of our physical actions. I would say that they definitely are. So everything further said on this can be directed at someone else as it certainly doesn't apply to me.
On a different note, I'm going away so expect no replies for a while.
Yes it is what understanding a choice is about!
If a person goes out to the second hand store with the desire to only buy a shirt if it's 100% cotton, then comes home with a shirt of unknown composition, and can give no reason for making that choice which is contrary to the desire, clearly it is impossible that the choice is understood.
Quoting Dan
Obviously, the person buying the shirt does not know "what it means to make that choice". They've made a choice to do something contrary to what they wanted to do, which they will likely regret in the future.
Being able to "respond to reasons regarding that choice" is irrelevant because such questioning is after the fact, and the person can make up any sort of fictional rationalization in that response. To "understand a choice" is to know the truth about the choice.
Quoting Dan
I think the difference is that the reasoned choice is always either blameworthy or praiseworthy, but the non-reasoned choice does not necessarily fall into one of these two categories. When there are reasons for the choice we can judge the reasons, and we can always make a decision as to whether the choice was correct or incorrect, based on an interpretation of the reasons. (The fact that you and I might disagree as to that judgement is irrelevant, having the reasons simply enables a judgement.)
Without reasons for the choice, the choice may or may not be judgeable. Many instinctual responses are judgeable, many are not. The ones which are not, are generally not judgeable because the context by which a judgement could be made is not evident. The judgement of good or bad, correct or incorrect, is relative to the context of the act, the circumstances. When reasons for the act are available, the context is explicit. When there are no reason available, the context must be inferred. The problem is that there is two distinct types of context which one could consider. One is the physical conditions of the choice, the other is what is in the person's mind at the time of the choice, and this includes one's perception of the immediate physical circumstances, as well as the person's intentions, mental associations, and memories etc. And things like mental illness become a factor.
Now, what I believe is the important factor, and this seems to strike at the heart of our disagreement, is that the primary, and I'll say "correct" context for judgement of a choice, any choice, is what is in the person's mind. This is because that is what is evident to the person when making the choice. And, any perception of the immediate physical circumstances is subjective, so that limits the reliability of "the physical conditions" as the context. So when we go to judge the person's choice, and we put the person's choice into the context of "the physical conditions", this presumed context is a product of the judge's perception, not the choice maker's perception. That, in my belief, taints the judgement.
I think I can represent our disagreement in the following way. You think that the primary context of a choice is the physical conditions in which that choice is made, and I think that the primary context is the mental conditions in which that choice is made. So, when a decision is made, which is completely divorced from the current physical conditions, this choice will be completely irrelevant to you, yet it may prove to be extremely relevant to me.
Imagine, a person is sitting at home, thinking about going shopping tomorrow, and deciding to buy a used shirt only if it's 100% cotton. The next day the person is shopping, and buys a shirt of unknown fabric. For you, the context of this choice is the person walking around the store looking at shirts, deciding which one is comfortable, and buying that shirt. There is no issue of the decision which the person made yesterday, because it is not part of the physical context. For me however, the context is the mentalscape, and here, that contrary decision, even though it was made yesterday, is very relevant.
Quoting Dan
Yes you did make that claim. You explicitly stated that your belief in libertarian free will excludes the possibility that choices or actions are "caused". And, the act of volition, which causes a choice, or a physical action, separates the mental processes of thinking from the physical acts. Therefore it is impossible that mental processes, thinking can cause physical actions. This is the means by which you separate decisions made yesterday (to buy a sort only if it's 100% cotton) from decisions made at the current time, as not relevant.
So you decided on the term "influence" instead of "cause". This is the root of your incoherency. You keep wanting to portray actions as united by necessity to choices, as if choice necessitates the action. However, your belief in libertarian free will does not allow that there is anything which necessitates the action. This inclines you to leave no separation between choice and action, such that volition constitutes a choice, which is one and the same thing as an action. Choice and action are the same, because you refuse a causal relation between them but you still need that necessity to uphold morality. But this places volition, the act of the free will, as separate from mental processes, thinking. And by your belief in libertarian free will it is impossible that the act of volition could have a cause, so mental processes, thinking, cannot be the cause of our physical actions.
The whole problem here is that your belief in libertarian free will does not allow you to understand causation in the terms of final cause, which allows that thinking is the cause of free will choices, in that sense of "cause".
Quoting Dan
Thanks for the notice Dan. It's been a pleasure.
Whatever you're talking about has nothing to do with me. This is not a position i hold/deny/have had much thought about.
Since you've mentioned it, I agree. No f-ing clue how anything else came across. The problem with what you're saying is that its an empirical aspect of any given moral decision and cannot be a guiding, formal aspect of moral thinking in the abstract.
Still, you're not wrong. The literal stretch of time in which one can weigh up options bears heavy on any moral decisions (that are adequately considered, anyway).
I mean, we are devolving into nuh-uh territory here. I disagree. That isn't what I am talking about when I mention someone "understanding their own choices".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Responding to reasons to make such a choice is very much something that happens before making the choice. Responding to as in being responsive to, being able to make a decision based on reasons. Further, it making a choice that is contrary to what you want, or especially contrary to what you wanted in the past, does not mean the person didn't understand the choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think you might be conflating multiple things here. I would agree that it is a person's mental state that is at issue for both whether their choice is praiseworthy/blameworthy and whether they understood their decision.
Whether a person understands their choice is all about what is going on in their mind. The disagreement here is that you think acting in a way that is counter to one's desire is proof-positive that one did not understand the choice in question. I don't agree. I think people can act counter to what they want while still understanding what they are doing.
I would also point out that whether a choice is praiseworthy/blameworthy is not, on a consequentialist understanding, the same was whether it was good/bad or right/wrong. It would be entirely reasonable to praise someone for making the best decision they could while acknowledging that it turned out to be wrong due to factors they couldn't have known about. It would also be consistent to blame someone for their ignorance if they should have known better. I would say that whether either of these things should be done depends, of course, on the consequences of doing them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No I didn't. I said the actions of agents with free will were not wholly caused by preceding factors but rather by the agent themself and were in principle not predictable. It's absolutely fine for actions to be caused by the person performing those actions making a choice. I would say that is exactly what I think causes them. It's not that I don't think actions have causes, it's that I think the agent is generating new casual chains rather than is just a link in a casual chain that stretches back to the origins of the universe.
I know that isn't what your talking about when you mention "understanding their own choices". In your usage "understanding" appears to have no meaning at all. As I explained, when you say "the ability to understand and make one's own choices", "understand" is completely redundant. We could pull it out, and simply proceed with "the ability to make one's own choices" instead, without changing your intended meaning.
However, you do seem inclined to give "understand" some meaning in a retrospective sense. If a person can look back in time, and say "I made that choice", then the person "understands". the choice. This appears to be your usage of "understanding". If a person looks at the choice after the fact, in retrospect, and recognizes oneself to have made the choice, then would say that the person understands the choice. The problem is that this is unrelated to the ability to make a choice. The ability of a person to make a choice is to look to the future and choose accordingly, and the ability of a person to "understand" (by your usage) a choice is to look to the past and recognize that a choice was made.
Is this what you are proposing, two distinct aspects of decision making? One, the ability to make a choice, looking to the future and choosing, and the other the ability to understand a choice, looking to the past and recognizing that a choice was made?
Quoting Dan
I think you really need to clarify this, because it is not consistent with what you've been saying. Making a choice on a whim, or impulse, clearly does not include responding to reasons to make that choice, before making it. Making a choice on whim or impulse is exactly the opposite of this, choosing without considering reasons before making the choice. Yet you say so long as the person can give reasons in retrospect, then the person "understands" the choice. This is why I propose the separation above, between looking forward in time, and looking backward in time, so that there is no ambiguity in our use of "understands".
Quoting Dan
Clearly this is wrong. If the person wants X, and on a whim chooses not-X, then it is impossible that this choice could be "understood", in any sense of the word, because "whim" implies that the choice was made without reasons. Looking forward in time, prior to the choice, "whim" is given as what inclines the choice, and whim distinctly means without a reason. So the person chooses what is expressly not wanted, without reason. That cannot be understood. And, looking backward in time, after the fact of the choice, any reasons given for choosing what was not wanted would be fictional, made up as rationalizations, because acting on a whim clearly denies that there are reasons for this behaviour. Therefore, from both perspectives of "understand", it is impossible that the person could understand that choice.
Quoting Dan
What is at issue here is not "acting in a way which is counter to one's desire". We do that all the time, for good reason, in an understandable way. This on its own, in no way implies that the person did not understand one's choice. Often this is simply a case of changing one's mind. And changing one's mind occurs with reason.
What is at issue is acting in a way which is counter to one's desire, without a reason for that act. This is what is known as acting on a whim, impulse, caprice, emotional urges, being overcome by passion, etc.. There are subconscious forces which incline one to act without considering reasons. We can understand the reality of this type of act through the reality of habits and addictions. We cannot ignore the reality of these causes of action, because they are very commonplace. When these inclinations to act lead to actions which are contrary to what an individual has expressed as one's desire, then it is clear that the actions cannot be understood by the person who chose them. The choice is made without considering reasons, and it is contrary to what has been expressed as what is desired. How do you think that such a choice could be understood?
Quoting Dan
This makes no sense. If the person made the best choice that they could, you cannot say that the person made the wrong choice, unless you are judging "best" on a different scale from your judgement of "wrong". If "best" and "wrong" are consistent in principle, then it is impossible that the person's best choice is the wrong choice.
That is a problem you've consistently demonstrated since the beginning of the thread. You employ two distinct scales of moral value, and this statement is perfect evidence of that fact. One scale allows you to say the person made "the best decision they could", while the other scale allows you to say this same decision which was "the best" decision in that set of circumstances, was also the wrong decision.
This problem is indicative of the general problem with your approach. You are attempting to reconcile two incompatible moral scales, one which values the freedom of choice of the individual (providing the basis for the judgement of the person's "best choice"), and the other which values the moral principles of consequentialism (providing the basis for the judgement of the "wrong" choice).
As soon as you recognize that these two value scales are incommensurable, and fundamentally incompatible, then you will give up on your attempt to establish compatibility between them. However, as you've indicated, you've already wasted a good part of ten years on this problem, and you also seem completely unwilling to admit that this was wasted time, so you forge onward. Therefore I conclude that you will most likely continue in your futile effort, refusing to admit to yourself, that your time has been wasted, and so you dig yourself deeper and deeper into an endless pit, by wasting more and more time.
Quoting Dan
OK, we can work with this premise if you like, that choices cause actions, but then you need to respect the separation between choice and action, as the separation between cause and effect. In the case of cause and effect, the cause necessitates the effect, but occurrence of the effect does not necessarily mean that the associated cause occurred. This is because different things can have the same effect (raising the temperature causes water to boil, as does lowering the pressure, for example).
This implies that the occurrence of human actions does not necessarily mean that a choice was made. Would you rather deal with the type of actions mentioned by me above, acting on a whim, caprice, impulse, emotional urges, being overcome by passion, and even habit, which are contrary to one's expressed desire, as actions which occur without a choice? This way, instead of classing such actions as ones which are not understood, we'd call them actions which are caused by something other than a choice.
No, what I am suggesting is that a person understands their choice if they understand the nature of that choice and what it is to make that choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it. This is very much to do with what happens before the choice, not after it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, I don't say anything about what reasons they give in retrospect. I say that what reasons one has for making a choice are largely irrelevant. What matters is that the understand what choice they are making and what it means to make that choice so that they can respond to reasons regarding that choice. If they then decide to make their choice on a whim then that's fine. What matters is that they know the choice that is being made and what it means to make that choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, I would say that when someone makes a choice on a "whim" they are likely responding to the reason of "I felt like it", but this is neither here nor there really. Second, and much more importantly, this is not wrong because what someone wants has nothing to do with whether their choice is understood. Understanding a choice isn't about what reasons one has for making it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, because understanding one's choices is not about what reasons one has for making them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It does make sense. It may have been the best choice in terms of expected value from the perspective of the person and the information they had at the time, but turned out to be the wrong choice due to information that they didn't have access to. Since we want people to continue making the best decision in terms of expected value (since that's really all they can do) then we might praise them for such, while acknowledging that it turned out to be the wrong choice based on what we know now. None of this has anything to do with incompatible moral values or scales, and is a fairly standard consequentialist way of thinking about things (at least, on an actual-value consequentialism approach. On a expected-value consequentialism approach this may or may not be sensible depending on whether the expected value is from the perspective of the person making the decision or from some perfect-observer kind of perspective).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would agree that there is a sense in which human action can occur without a choice. Certainly reflexive movement appears to not involve making a choice. But, no, I would say these are cases of someone making a choice. I would also say they are made for a reason, but whether or not they are made for a reason makes very little difference between understanding one's choices (as I have said many times) is not about what reasons one has for making those choices.
OK, so how can a person be said to understand the nature of a choice, and have applied their rationality to it, when the choice is contrary to what they desire, and made for no reason (whim or caprice), like the example of buying the shirt?
Quoting Dan
This would be contradictory though. To make a choice on a whim explicitly means that the person cannot respond to reasons regarding that choice. That's what "whim" means. the choice cannot be accounted for. So if the person understands the choice one is making, prior to making the choice, so as to be able to respond with reasons regarding the choice, it is impossible, by reason of contradiction, that the person could then make the choice on a whim.
Quoting Dan
It's very clear to me, that the person in the shirt example does not know "what it means to make that choice". Why is this not clear to you? The person wants to only buy a shirt if it's 100% cotton, yet chooses to buy a shirt of unknown fabric. Obviously the person does not understand that buying a shirt of unknown fabric means that there is a very significant probability that it will not be the desired 100% cotton.
Again, this is analogous to my lottery example. If a person has the policy of not buying lottery tickets because they know that the odds of winning are terrible, yet they are persuaded to buy into a specific lottery because the prize is much bigger than others, clearly they do not know what that choice to buy the ticket means. A lottery with a larger prize does not indicate that the odds of winning are better. In fact the reverse is usually the case. And since 'bad odds' is the reason for abstaining from buying in the first place, the person clearly does not know what that choice, (to buy into a lottery with the worst odds) means.
Quoting Dan
This entire paragraph is absolutely senseless. How can you say the response "I felt like it" even resembles a type of understanding of one's choice? Further, and much more importantly how can you even think that what someone wants can be divorced from any understanding of one's choice? Isn't it the case, that a choice, any choice, and every choice, is in some very significant way, related to what the person wants?
Understanding a choice is about what reasons one has for making it. In fact, that's what understanding a choice is, knowing the reasons for the choice. If the reasons are not consistent with the choice, then the choice is incoherent and it is misunderstood. That is why understanding a choice is very much "about what reasons one has for making it". And if there are no reasons (whim or caprice), there can be no understanding nor misunderstanding. I really cannot even imagine what you must think "understand" means. Your use is totally foreign to me, appearing like you just sort of make up random shit as you go.
Quoting Dan
You do not appear to have understood my criticism. You can argue that "it does make sense", but this requires two distinct values systems for judging the same decisions. The first is "the perspective of the person...at the time". The second system for judging the same decision, includes "information that they didn't have access to".
The two are very clearly incompatible, in a very strong sense, contradictory. The first explicitly does not include information which the second explicitly does include. So the two systems for valuing the judgement are based in contradictory principles. This allows you to say that according to the one system of valuation it is "the best" decision, and from the other system of evaluation it is a "wrong" decision.
As I said, you've been demonstrating this problem of employing two incompatible systems for evaluating decisions, from the beginning of the thread. One system employs a consequentialist evaluation scheme, while the other values freedom of choice, and bases judgement on your stated principle "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". As I've told you a number of times now, these two systems of valuation are incompatible. Consequently, you distort the meaning of "one's own choices" twisting and turning it in all sorts of fantastic ways, in your attempt to establish compatibility. Of course no amount of twisting and turning will allow you to put that square peg into the round hole. You are attempting to make contradictory principles (the square thing and the round thing) compatible.
Quoting Dan
Of course it does! You clearly expressed two distinct (and contradictory) scales for judging the person's choice. By the one scale (the perspective of the person making the choice), the choice is judged as "the best". By the other scale (a perspective which takes into account information which the person does not have), the choice is judged as "wrong". Clearly the two judgements contradict each other, the best decision cannot be the wrong decision. And the obvious reason for this contradiction is that the two scales, upon which the judgements are based, employ contrary principles.
Quoting Dan
What could you possibly mean by "understanding one's choices" in this context? If whether or not a choice was made for a reason makes very little difference to "understanding one's choice", what does "understanding" mean. It cannot mean "what it means to make the choice", as you say, because "the reasons for the choice" is implied by "what it means to make the choice". "Meaning" implies what is meant, and this implies intention. How could one know the intention behind the choice without knowing the reasons for the choice?
I didn't say and have applied their rationality to it. I said such that they understood it such that they could apply their rationality to it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. To be able to respond to reasons and actually responding to those reasons are different things. That being said, I would also say that "I felt like it" is itself a reason, even if it is perhaps not a good one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are making the assumption that the person doesn't understand, but the evidence for that is not sufficient. It seems entirely plausible to me that someone can understand a choice and make one counter to their desires.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't say the former. I said that "I felt like it" is a reason that one might respond to.
As for the latter, no, understanding one's choices is not about what one wants, it is about knowing the nature of the choice being made and what it means to make that choice. It seems entirely plausible that an entity with no desires could nevertheless understand its choices.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That might be what understanding the choice someone else made is about, but understanding one's own choice prior to making it is, I submit, about knowing the nature of that choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply their rationality to it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think I have understood your criticism, it was just misplaced. There aren't "two different systems". What is praiseworthy and what is right are entirely different from a consequentialist perspective because what is praiseworthy is a judgment of what should be praised to achieve good consequences, and what is right is a moral judgement. There is one system, it's just that praiseworthy is not really a moral judgment on a consequentialist account in the same way that it might be on some other account of morality.
You have indeed been accusing me of employing two incompatible systems from the beginning, but this has been due to misunderstanding on your part.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, just one scale. Being "praiseworthy" isn't a seperate moral scale, it is a judgment of whether we should praise something, which relates to whether praising it would be right, rather than whether the initial action would be right (again, on a consequentialist account of morality).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't imply that at all. Would you prefer I say "what it is to make that choice"? I would say this is less clear, but you seem to be getting snagged on a word again and ascribing claims to me that I just haven't made.
This is where the problem is then. This phrase "such that they could apply their rationality to it" implies that applying rationality to it is done post hoc. This means that "understood" here means absolutely nothing. There is no requirement of an act of applying rationality, or even any sort of thinking whatsoever, prior to the choice, only a requirement that the person can 'rationalize' the choice after the fact. Such rationalizing generally consists of fictional excuses, specious, and fabricated with the intent of creating the illusion that the choice was rational, and understood, when it really was not.
How can you believe that "such that they could apply their rationality to it" implies any sort of understanding? What you are describing is the potential to be understood, the possibility of applying rationality. But the potential to be understood is equally the potential to be misunderstood (as in the case of rationalizing), and so it is not any type of understanding at all.
Quoting Dan
It is very possible to give reasons which demonstrate a lack of understanding. This is often the case with rationalizing, but rationalizing may also give reasons which are intentionally misleading. So, even though "I felt like it" may be classified as the reason for the choice, it is a reason which expresses that the person does not understand the choice. In this way it is similar to "I don't know", which is a more explicit way of saying that the choice is not understood.
The person who does not understand one's own choice, when asked why the choice was made, may answer "I don't know". If pressed further, for a better answer they might say "I felt like it". If pressed even further, one might rationalize, and fabricate fictious reasons. All of these types of "reasons for the choice" indicate that the person did not understand the choice when it was made.
Quoting Dan
How can you possibly believe this? The choice of a human being concerns what one wants, therefore understanding a choice necessarily involves considering its relations within that context. This is the context of the person's intentions. Understanding a choice ("knowing the nature of the choice being made and what it means to make that choice") is to properly position the choice within the context of the person's intentions.
Do you even think about what your words mean before writing them? I cannot believe that you could actually believe some of this stuff you are writing now. Are you the same "Dan" as whom I was talking to before you left on break? It seems like you've gone off the rails now. How do you think that something which selects (say a machine or something), without any sort of desires or intentions which guide its selections toward an end, could possibly "understand" its selections? To "understand" a choice is to place it as the means to an end. The words "meaning", and "means", which are used to describe understanding a choice, all imply reference to intention. You Dan, are using "understand" in some random ad hoc way, which varies with each time you use it, rendering the word completely void of meaning in your overall text.
Quoting Dan
Why do you refuse to acknowledge the fact that you have expressed two very different systems of valuation? You even name those two systems as 1)"praiseworthy" and 2) "moral judgment". The former is a system for producing a judgement as to whether a choice ought to be praised for its likelihood of producing good consequences, and the latter is a system for producing a judgement as to whether a choice is morally correct.
Can you not accept the fact that these are two distinct systems for evaluating the same type of choice? And, since the same choice may be high on one scale, and low on the other scale, the two valuation systems are incompatible. Why is this so difficult for you to acknowledge?
Quoting Dan
Your use of "understanding" doesn't seem to allow for the possibility of misunderstanding. Any sort of rationalizing after the fact demonstrates "understanding", so where could "misunderstanding" enter the picture? Accusing me of misunderstanding is hypocrisy on your part.
And, your continued denial of the fact that you employ two distinct systems for evaluating a choice, when you even name the two, describe them as different, and show that the resulting judgements of the same act are contrary to each other, is just impossible to understand. This is not a misunderstanding on my part, because I profess no understanding at all of such denial. Your actions appear as completely irrational therefore not at all possible to understand, therefore misunderstanding, which is a belief of understanding that is false, is excluded.
Quoting Dan
You are missing the point. Of course "praiseworthy" is not a separate "moral scale", the other scale is already called "moral" judgement. This would create ambiguity right in the title, you'd have two "moral" scales which are blatantly contradictory. What I am saying is that you have two distinct scales for evaluating the same act, one is the "moral" scale, and the other is the "praiseworthy" scale. According to the principles of these two distinct scales, the same choice which is of high value (favourable) on the one scale is of low value (unfavourable) on the other scale. Do you see how that contradiction, favourable/unfavourable, is implied?
This is the same issue as your moral scale based in consequentialism, and your praiseworthy scale based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices. You use two distinct scales which produce contradictory judgements.
Quoting Dan
This is nonsense to me, and that's why I avoided it. No one knows what it is to make a choice, in general, that's why there is an ongoing debate between free willies and determinists. And we have even less of an idea of what it is to make a particular choice. So using this phrase would be completely pointless, it would simply mean that no one understands any of one's own choices, or any choices in general.
It doesn't imply that at all. The applying of one's rationality happens prior to the choice. The understanding that is at issue here is a prerequisite to the applying one's rationality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First "I felt like it" seems a perfectly sensible reason to do some things in some cases and it definitely isn't the same as saying "I don't know." Second, neither of these show lack of understanding of the choice because, as I have said several times now, understanding of the choice is not about what reasons one has to make that choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. It is (within this context at least) to know the nature of the choice being made and what it means to make that choice. That is what I am talking about when I talk about understanding and making one's own choices.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am using "understanding" in the same, consistent way. I have been saying it isn't about what one wants from the off. I am certainly capable of imagining a free, rational agent which (at least for a length of time) has no desires. Such an agent could nevertheless understand the choices available to it, even if it doesn't care to make them one way or another. The understanding is, as I have mentioned above, a precondition to the application of one's rationality. It does not require the person to know or understand what they want, only to know and understand what the choice is and what it means to make that choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am using one system for evaluating actions and their morality. Praising an action is, itself, an action, so it is evaluated based on its consequences (or its likely consequences). Punishing an action is the same. The initial action is evaluated for whether it is right or wrong based on its consequences and praising that action is evaluated separately based on its consequences. Punishing that action would also be evaluated based on its consequences. There's one system of evaluting the morality of actions. It's just that there is more than one action to evaluate here (the initial action, and the action of praising that action).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That does not demonstrate understanding. That is not what I said. What I said was that understanding one's choices is about knowing the nature of the choice being made and what it means to make that choice. It is certainly possible to misunderstand one's choices.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's all based in consequentialism. As mentioned above, praising something is an action. There isn't a seperate "praiseworthy" scale, there is simply a judgment of whether praising that thing will lead to good consequences. There is certainly information commonly used to make that judgment, but it's all about the consequences of the action (or likely consequences of the action). Just like we might make a judgment about what charity to donate money to based on features such as scalability, cost-effectiveness, transparency, etc. That doesn't mean there is some other scale of donationworthiness that is incompatible with consequentialism, it is simply using information about the action in question to determine whether it will likely have good consequences.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I think you're just wrong. I think we can easily know what it is (or "means") to make a specific choice. For a fairly simple example, if I choose to give away my car, I understand that this would mean I wouldn't have it anymore (and a bunch of stuff that that entails).
Perhaps, but the point is that "I felt like it", as the post hoc answer, indicates a lack of understanding of what the choice meant to the person at the time it was made. Therefore the person did not know what it meant to make the choice, and did not understand the choice.
Sorry Dan, I just can't follow what you're writing now. The following passage is just unintelligible to me.
Quoting Dan
And the following in no way explains how a praiseworthy action could also be judged as wrong without two distinct valuation systems. I mean, you appear to be saying that the system of valuation which is used to judge the act as praiseworthy could be judged as wrong itself, but that still doesn't mean two distinct systems is not implied.
Quoting Dan
I've already said that understanding a choice isn't about one's reasons for making it so I don't think we need to go over that ground again. Quite apart from that, you're the one who is suggesting that this is all post hoc rationalization. I wasn't suggesting this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, this seems pretty easy to understand to me. I was pointing out that an agent that has no desires seems imaginable and therefore possible and that such an agent could still understand the choices that belong to it/them. What part tripped you up?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because being "praiseworthy" isn't really an evaluation of the action itself, but rather an evaluation of the action of praising that action. Let me try to explain this a different way:
Person A performs action 1.
We evaluate action 1 to be wrong due to its consequences.
Now we consider whether we should perform action 2 (praising action 1) or actino 3 (condemning action 1).
We determine that, though action 1 was wrong, praising it will lead to better consequences than condemning it (perhaps it would usually work out well, but did not in this case due to perculiar circumstances).
Because of this, we decide that we should perform action 2 (praising action 1).
We might call action 1 to be "praiseworthy" in the sense that we have decided that we should praise it, but this isn't really a judgment on action 1, but rather on the likely consequences of action 2 (praising action 1).
Both actions are evaluated by their consequences (or likely consequences).
There isn't two systems of evaluation, but there are two actions here being evaluated.
Fascinating thesis and congratulations on your professional success in higher education, and by the looks of it, life itself. Assuming I live long enough, it'd be an honor to reach even a nominal fraction of said status in life myself. And I consider myself religious. :grin:
I've been following along, somewhat latently to the best of my ability (which isn't particularly note-worthy).
Might I ask: Could it be said that to sufficiently provide an acceptable answer to the following example in your thesis: "We might reason that the freedom over ones eyes is less important than the freedom to live, but the question is how much less important. Five times? A hundred times? A thousand? Presumably, there is a number, and it seems unlikely that it would be morally correct to blind the world to save one life, but it is not clear what that number is.", would be considered a total or partial solution? Or is there perhaps a greater, singular hypothetical question/example that more fully encapsulates the essence of the conundrum? And if permitted, a second: what would you say would be the closest opposite of freedom consequentialism?
Regards,
Outlander
(Just some personal ramblings here, feel free to disregard. It's often stated that "it's the thought that counts". For example, say a person who, unbeknownst to me, is about to commit a heinous mass murder happens to be just about to walk by my house. I, completely unaware of said person or their intentions, decide to myself, "Hey, I'm at my wits end. I am contemplating self-harm. But before I do, I want to take one innocent person with me. I will harm the next person I see." before opening my front door and engaging in said action. Said action is performed, I, again, unbeknownst to me, just prevented a historic mass shooting without realizing it. Freedom consequentialism would say I did the right thing by choosing to do what I knew to be wrong, is that correct?)
I just cannot grasp what you mean by "understand". As I think I've shown, your use of the word does not match what you say it means. If "understanding" a choice requires knowing what that choice means (as you state), this implies "what it means to the person making it". And knowing what it means to the person making it is to position it within the context of the person's thoughts. That means the reasons for it. Therefore knowing the reasons for the choice is a requirement to "understanding" the choice, by your stated definition of "understanding a choice".
Quoting Dan
I cannot imagine an agent who chooses, and also has no desires. We could imagine it making a random selection, but then we'd have to question what causes it to act on one possibility rather than another. And we'd see that the cause of the acting would be external to the so-called "agent" which is supposed to act in this way, therefore this would not be the act of an agent at all. If we are to assume an agent which actually chooses one possibility over another, (rather than being caused by an external force to make a random selection) then we must assume some sort of desire, or reason, for this agent to choose one possibility rather than the other.
Quoting Dan
Dan, if action 1 is judged as wrong, due to its consequences, then how is it possible that praising action 1, because this could lead to better consequences is correct? It's already been determined that action 1 led to bad consequences, that's why it's judged as wrong. We cannot praise that action because it "could lead to better consequences", because the action already occurred, and it led to bad consequences. The only way to make a future 'similar act' lead to better consequences is to recognize the mistakes, so as to avoid them. But this is not praising the action, it is recognizing that it is not praiseworthy, and looking for ways to change it for the better.
The specifics of the act, the peculiarities of the circumstances, are part of the overall information and identity of "action 1". If you remove those specifics, to say that in other circumstances a similar act could lead to better consequences, then this similar action no longer qualifies as "action 1", the identified act which was judged as "wrong". So to say that this 'type of action', in other circumstances, might be praiseworthy is not to say that action 1 is praiseworthy. You are clearly making an error of misidentification, and not actually saying that action 1 is praiseworthy, but that a 'similar act', in other circumstances might be praiseworthy.
I really think that you have fallen into deep denial Dan. Instead of recognizing the problems with your theory, and trying to iron out those wrinkles, so that the theory might correspond with reality, you are making different sorts of fantastic imaginary scenarios, fabrications to provide evidence for your theory. But these are purely fictional scenarios, which are demonstrably impossible, so they have no correspondence with anything which could actually occur in the real world, and it just demonstrates how your theory is out of line with reality.
You have here in the preceding post, a scenario involving an agent which makes choices without any form of desires, in order to justify your claim that "understanding" a choice does not require consideration of what a person wants. This leaves you with an unintelligible definition of "understanding".
And, you also have in that same post, an imaginary scenario where an action which is judged as the wrong choice, could actually be praiseworthy because it might produce better consequences in different circumstances. But obviously this is an impossible fictitious scenario, because in different circumstances it would be a different action.
It doesn't imply that. It implies that the person knows what it is to make that choice. Let me give you an example of someone not understanding a choice that I have been avoiding because it's a bit grim.
Imagine a child claiming that they want to die. However, the child does not understand what it means to die, they do not appreciate that such a thing is permanent and that it means an end to all experiences. This child does not understand this choice because they don't know what it means to make it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I think I probably can imagine this sort of agent, but that doesn't really matter as what you are describing is different from the kind of agent I posited. Specifically, the agent I described does not need to actually choose, it just needs to understand the choices it has.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, lots of ways. Can you really not imagine actions that led to bad consequences but which would, under most circumstances, lead to good consequences? Do you need me to provide some examples?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Confusion around the word "it". The "it" that is leading to good consequences in this case is the praising of the original action, not the original action itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We are presumably praising the action because we want people who are in identical-appearing circumstances to act the same way. If the person performing this action did not know about the reasons why it would turn out to be wrong, and we would not want people in future to take the time to check for those specific circumstances (perhaps the action in question is time-sensitive), then praising that action seems entirely reasonable.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The scenarios we have been talking about here are pretty simple and certainly not outside the bounds of plausibility. Most of this current discussion hasn't even been about my theory, but a fairly simple point related to consequentialism generally.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do not have such an agent. I have one that understands choices without having desires. Also, I don't need such an agent in order to justify my definition of understanding. I was simply pointing out one of the reasons that your claim that understanding a choice related to the desires one has regarding was incorrect. Even if agents without desires were impossible, it would not show that your point was correct but the fact that they seem to be possible shows that it is incorrect.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It would appear to be the same from the point of view of the person performing it though, and so praising wrong action because in most circumstances doing the same thing (or, you might say, performing the same action) would be right, is entirely sensible. One doesn't even need to think particularly hard to think of cases like this.
For a simple example, imagine a doctor administering a medication to save a patient that is rapidly dying. This patient, unbeknownst to the doctor, is deathly allergic to that medication. That information was not on any of their charts, but instead tattooed on the sole of their foot. Assuming that we don't want doctors to be checking patients' feet for tattoos in the future (due to any delay potentially proving fatal), we might well praise what the doctor did in this scenario. Their action led to bad consequences (the patient died), so on an actual-value view (and some expected-value views) of consequentialism, what they did was wrong. However, in seemingly identical circumstances, we would want doctors to act in the same way, so we praise the initial action as the best call available given the information that the doctor had.
I do not see how this is substantially different from the shirt buying example. The child does not know that death is contrary to what is desired, more experiences. That is what you describe as not understanding the choice. This is equivalent to the shirt buyer not knowing that choosing the shirt of unknown fabric is contrary to what is desired, only to buy 100% cotton. In both cases, what is called not understanding one's choice, is a matter of not recognizing that the choice is contrary to what is desired.
Quoting Dan
I don't follow, and don't see how this makes a difference. To understand the choices which one has, requires that the person put them into the context of the desires which one has. This is exemplified by your example of the child who wants to die, and fails to understand this choice by not putting it into the context of wanting more experiences.
Quoting Dan
No, as I said, this statement demonstrates a failure of identification. All actions are context specific. An action under one set of circumstances is a different action from an action under a different set of circumstances. The doctor who acts without checking information within the file does not make the same act as the one who acts after checking the file but not the foot. You talk as if the same act could be bad under one set of circumstances, and good under another, but clearly these would simply be two different acts, one praiseworthy the other not.
You can produce all the examples you want, but I think that once you start trying to describe these various acts, you'll quickly understand what I mean. The praiseworthy act requires a different description from the condemnable act, to justify these distinct judgements, and is therefore a completely different act.
Quoting Dan
How is this logical. The act was judged as wrong. How could it be possible that we would want to encourage people in identical-appearing circumstances to act the same way? That's totally illogical.
Quoting Dan
If you bring into the discussion other circumstances, which were not apparent to the decision maker, then you are not dealing with "identical-appearing circumstances". You are introducing other circumstances.
How could you ever conclude that praising the action of the person who failed to take the time to check the specific circumstances, and this resulted in a wrongful action, is a reasonable thing to do? It's completely illogical.
Quoting Dan
That is what I insist is impossible. To understand that a choice is "a choice" is to associate it with what one wants or desires. Without any desires or wants, an agent would not apprehend possibilities as "choices" because there would be no motivation for the agent to select anything.
Quoting Dan
Again, this suffers a failure to properly identify the supposed action, and it is completely illogical for the reason I explained. In another set circumstances it would be a different action, and that different action might be praiseworthy. The other action, in the other set of circumstances, which is judged as wrong, is not praiseworthy.
Quoting Dan
This example demonstrates very well the illogical nature of your dual evaluation system approach. In reality, the doctor has a standard protocol to follow. If the doctor follows the protocol the actions were correct and praiseworthy. If the patient then dies, this does not mean that the doctors actions were wrong. You are judging "wrongness" here by a different valuation system. You are saying that the patient died, and this is bad, therefore there must have been something wrong about the doctor's actions. But if the doctor followed the proper protocol then the actions were not wrong, and so your "actual-value view" (the second evaluation system) is completely irrelevant.
Do you still not see how these two systems for evaluating acts, are fundamentally incompatible, leading to contradiction such as the one in this example? Since they are incompatible, they are incommensurable, and it is illogical to attempt to bring one to bear on the other. Either we praise the doctor's actions for following protocol, or we condemn the doctor's actions from an "actual-value view", but to do both is illogical. Another option you might be interested in, is that we praise the doctor's actions, but condemn the protocol, arguing that a doctor ought to take stricter measures on determining such information. But condemning the protocol is distinctly different from condemning the action of the individual as wrong.
In the child's case, it is a matter of not understanding what the choice entails, what it means to make that choice. In the case of the person buying the shirt, so long as they understand what it means to buy the shirt and understand that they are buying it without knowing that it is 100% cotton, then the choice is understood.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It does not require this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This seems confused. We are talking about whether something can be wrong but praiseworthy and, in the example I gave, the doctor checks the file but not the patient's foot. I agree that not checking the file would be a different act, but I'm not sure what it has to do with what we are talking about. I was suggesting that this is a praiseworthy act in the sense that we want doctors to keep acting this way so we praise the act. I was not suggesting the action would be both condemnable and praiseworthy, but rather praiseworthy and wrong, so I'm not sure how condemnablity (or blameworthness) comes into this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not illogical. I mean, I gave you a fairly obvious example of this. There are many other classic cases of a similar sort. Basically, the act is wrong due to weird circumstances that the actor didn't know about at the time. In circumstances identical to the ones the actor was in (including what they knew at the time) we might want actors in the future to act in the same way because, even though acting that way occasionally leads to bad consequences (such as it did in this case), it usually leads to good consequences.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it's reasonable. You shouldn't always take the time to check for weird niche circumstances. Sometimes, you are in a time-sensitive situation and you need to act quickly and not check for all the things which could make that action wrong. I'm really not sure what you're struggling with here. Surely you agree that there isn't always time to check for every possible complicating variable in emergency situations?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I don't see any reason why we should think this is true. If I suddenly stopped wanting anything, I don't see any reason to think I suddenly wouldn't understand that I could choose to go check the mail (or whatever). I might not feel motivated to do it, but why would stop being able to recognize it as a choice? This just seems like something you are asserting without support. Do you have some reason to suppose this? Do cases of anhedonia where motivation is reduced show signs of not understanding what they can choose to do in an intellectual sense or something?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it is praiseworthy. We should praise it because we want people who are in seemingly identical situations to act identically.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, are you genuinely suggesting that if someone follows protocol, their actions cannot be wrong? I mean, I have a lot to say about what a silly view that is, but I just want to confirm that this is actually what you are suggesting before I start tearing into it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not suggesting we condemn the action. You're bringing condemning into it. Condemning, like praising, is another action we can take after the fact, which might be right or wrong based on its own consequences. The action can be wrong, and yet praiseworthy. That is also seperate from whether the protocol is praiseworthy. It might be that the doctor followed protocol and it is a sensible protocol and we should praise their actions but, nevertheless, their action in this case turned out to be wrong (on an actual-value or some expected-value view). It might also be the case that the doctor didn't follow protocol because the protocol is stupid, and we should praise their actions, but they were still wrong in this case, and we should condemn the protocol. There are not multiple systems of evaluating here, there are multiple actions to evaluate.
"What it means to make that choice" in the case of the child, is to acknowledge an end to experiences. That's what you said. "Experiences" is the desired thing, and if it were not, it would be irrelevant to knowing what it means to make that choice. It is only by being the desired consequence of staying alive, that experiences are relevant to the child's choice of dying, and therefore essential to "understanding" what it means to make that choice.
Otherwise, you could replace "end of experiences" with end of anything which the child does, eats, cries, sleeps, etc., and claim that understanding the choice requires understanding any one of these. This means that the child might think that what the choice means, is the end of crying and suffering. Generally, we'd call this "misunderstanding". That's why you framed "understanding the choice" as recognizing it to mean the end of experiences, because experiences are what is desired.
Likewise, "what it means to buy the shirt" is to understand that buying it is contrary to the desired thing, to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton. The two cases are very similar. In each case, there is a choice which is contrary to what constitutes the desired thing; 1) continued experiences, 2) to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton. "Understanding" of the choice, i.e. "what it means to make that choice" describes the situation in which the person recognizes that the choice is contrary to what is desired.
Quoting Dan
Yes, by definition, to follow protocol is to act in the right way.
Quoting Dan
Your use of these words is amazingly confusing. That's because you do not stick to definitions, and you introduce ambiguity.
There clearly is multiple systems of evaluation. There is one by which you judge the act to be praiseworthy, and another by which you judge the act to be "wrong", what you call the "actual-value view". You clearly say "the action can be wrong, and yet praiseworthy". Why can't you acknowledge that such a statement requires two systems for evaluation?
That it is an act which judges praiseworthiness, and this act can itself be judged, is irrelevant to the fact that this is an act of judgement, which requires a system of evaluation. Without a system of evaluation, the judgement of praiseworthy would be random and irrelevant for that reason. But it clearly is not irrelevant in what you write. Therefore the judgement must be based in a system of evaluation.
No, it does not need to be a desired thing. Someone might not care about whether they continue to experience things or not, but still understand that their death would stop them from doing so.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean yes, you could absolutely do that. The point is that if the person doesn't understand that if they die, they can't keep doing stuff, then they haven't really understood what death is.
It really isn't about what is desired and what isn't.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is profoundly incorrect. Following protocol is very much not the same as acting rightly. Protocols are often wrong, as you can see by simply looking at protocols through history that were based on terrible reasoning or poor understanding of the world. Even when the protocol itself is good, it may not have taken account of the circumstances people find themselves in or may be designed to avoid the dodgy judgment of idiots.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There aren't two systems of evaluation. There is one system that is evaluating both the rightness or wrongness of the initial action and the rightness or wrongness of praising that action (which is another action).
I would say I am using language pretty clearly and consistently. I've tried to explain things in several different ways when you don't understand the first time, but perhaps you are having trouble because we are discussing too many points at once. Would it be easier to prune this discussion down and tackle one point at a time?
But that's not knowing what the choice "means" which is your definition. "Meaning" is defined in relation to purpose, intention.
Quoting Dan
Again, this would be not knowing what the choice "means", consequently not "understanding", by your definition.
Quoting Dan
This just demonstrates the dual evaluation you employ. Notice that you replaced "right" with "good", later in the paragraph. "Good" and "right" are not equivalent. The doctor is right, correct, not mistaken if protocol is followed, but the protocol itself maybe judged as bad. Notice the two valuation system. 1) How closely was protocol followed? 2) Is the protocol good?
Consider the difference between the validity of a logical argue, and soundness. Validity requires only that the protocol (rules) be followed. But soundness requires also that the premises be judged for truth. Judging the logical procedure for validity, and the judge the premises for truth, are two distinct types of judgement requiring two distinct evaluation systems.
Quoting Dan
If this were the case, it would be impossible to say that the same act was both wrong and praiseworthy. The same system which judges the act as wrong could not also judge praising the same act as right, without self-contradiction. Your examples are faulty because you replace "the same act" with "the same type of act in different circumstances". So in the case of your examples, the praising is of a type of act, it is not a praising of the act which is judged as wrong.
Quoting Dan
I don't see any point. We simply disagree on fundamental principles and progress appears impossible..
Meaning is also defined in terms of definition. But more importantly, I've defined the term as I'm using it here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean those are both two questions we could ask, but neither one is about whether the action is right.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that those are two different evaluation systems, but when making moral decisions, we don't need to consider how closely some protocol was followed, we just need to consider the consequences (or possibly the expected consequences) of the action.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It could. I am very much saying that the same evaluative system could say that an action was wrong, but we should nevertheless praise it. Not praise a different action, praise the action that took place in this instance, regardless of the fact it was wrong.
We have significant differences of belief concerning "meaning" and "understanding" which makes further discussion on that issue rather pointless.
Quoting Dan
The glaring problem here, is your reference to "how closely some protocol was followed". This means a judgement after the fact, as does "consequences". However when judging a person's decision, and the decision making process, we must acknowledge that the person decides to the act before the act occurs. In the person's decision making process, and consequently in the judgement of that decision, protocol is very important.
You can limit "moral decisions" to judgements made after the fact, and exclude the relevance of protocol, but this will not provide us with principles for decision making. Your morality will consist of after the fact judgments, essentially excluding the possibility of "ought" statements (being the basic protocol), if you insist that whether or not protocol is followed is not relevant to moral decisions.
Quoting Dan
This is incoherent. And, your explanation for it referred to the same act in different circumstances. As I explained, different circumstances make for different acts. You could mean "the same type of act". Otherwise you still have not provided any explanation as to how this statement might be coherent.
No, protocol is not not important in considering decisions before the fact. A consequentialist would say that the way we should make our moral decisions is by reference to their likely consequences. But even someone with a different method of evaluating moral actions need not include protocol (except inasmuch as their method of evaluating moral actions might be in a sense a sort of protocol).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is coherent because praising the action is itself an action. We can evaluate the consequences of the first action and determine that it was wrong. Then, since praising it is a seperate action (that will have consequences for future actions conducted in different circumstances) we can determine that praising this action will likely have good consequences and so praise it. I'm not really sure what part of this you are finding difficult to understand.
If there is relevant protocol, the method for producing the desired consequences is to consult protocol. If in situation A, and desired outcome is Z, then protocol M is to be followed. That is the purpose of protocol, it is the convention for producing the desired consequences.
I don't understand how you can argue that protocol is irrelevant in decision making. Protocol is produced from experience with consequences. It's a form of science science, empirical evidence from experimentation.
Quoting Dan
This is incoherent. If the action is evaluated as "wrong", it is impossible to conclude that simply praising that action would have good consequences. Thi is because the elements which make the action wrong are praised equally with any other elements. "Future actions conducted in different circumstances" are irrelevant in this context, because "different circumstances" implies different actions.
What is required is to analyze the action and separate the good from the bad, such that the good can be praised and the bad condemned in order to avoid similar wrongful actions. But analyzing and separating good from bad is completely different from simply praising the wrongful action.
Is it possible you mean something non-standard by protocol? Like, something like "the best available methods of achieving the desired ends based on all known information" or something to that effect? I mean, I think you'd still be wrong, but that would be at least less egregious than suggesting that following a protocol was the same thing as acting rightly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I've already explained this. They wouldn't seem like different actions from the perspective of the actor because they would have identical information.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I am suggesting that in some cases we may conclude that the wrongful action should be praised and we should not try to avoid it happening again because doing so would have worse consequences.
No, "protocol" means something like "standard rules for any procedure". It does not mean "best available method", just the conventional or standard method. There may be other ways available if one seeks them, judgeable as better or worse.
The issue is that this is the common practise in many cases, to simply follow protocol. Since it is the common practise, and it is also very "morally acceptable" that it is the common practise, this means that it is "morally acceptable" to just follow standard rules rather than considering whether the standard rules represent the "best available method". Protocol therefore is the means by which we simplify decision making, and we increase efficiency of actions. by accepting that seeking other options is unnecessary. And, as I've been arguing, while you seem to disagree, following protocal is very clearly morally acceptable.
Compare this to what I said earlier about "habit". Following protocol is a sort of habit, a habit designated by social constructs as a good habit. What I said was that habit restricts our freedom, by inclining us away from considering options. What we have here is that the person follows protocol (acts by habit), and since this is the morally accepted way of acting, the good habit, it is morally acceptable that the person does not consider whether this is the "best available option". The person simply does not even consider other options, and therefore has one's freedom to choose other options restricted. By choosing "protocol", the person disallows other options to enter one's mind, to be considered, and therefore the choice for actions in the situation are restricted to the actions indicated by the protocol.
The point now is that the choice of using "protocol", which is a self-limiting of one's freedom to choose, is very much morally acceptable. In fact, it is often the norm. And, the things which we call "norms" often serve as a sort of protocol. So I think it is pointless for you to argue that following protocol is not the right thing to do, as what you claim is not consistent with reality. Any situation where it is claimed that protocol is wrong would require that such a claim be justification, because the correctness of protocol is otherwise taken for granted.
Quoting Dan
I think this is impossible. Never does a person find oneself to be in the exact same situation twice. Even the experience of Deja vu has some differences. Furthermore, we are talking about the perspective of the person who is supposedly judging the act to be both wrong and praiseworthy, so this would be irrelevant anyway.
Quoting Dan
This makes no sense. If not allowing the action to happen (I cannot allow the qualifier "again" because the same action cannot happen twice) would have worse consequences, how could the action be judged as "wrongful" in the first place. You explicitly state that not allowing it to happen would have worse consequences. Therefore we need to conclude that the action produced the best possible consequences, when the choices are restricted to 'make action A or do not make action A', and therefore it cannot be judged as wrong.
The only way to make it wrong is to propose that there was a better course of action. But this implies that the action is not praiseworthy.
Do you mean something non-normative by "morally acceptable"? I mean, it's very clear that following the standard procedure is not always morally acceptable in the sense that it is morally permissible, but perhaps you mean something like "people will generally be okay with it" or something to that effect. Is that the case?
Surely you would agree that what people would accept, or what people would think is the right thing to do, is not the same as what actually is the right thing to do, right?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, the consequences of praising the action are going to depend on the future actions of those that find themselves in the same situation, so their perspective is very relevant. Also, yes, the situations wouldn't be completely identical. They would be happening at different times for a start. But they may be identical in terms of relevant information that one might use to make the decision at hand.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sometimes the cost of trying to prevent something bad happening is worse than letting the bad thing happen. To use the same example I gave before, perhaps the call that the doctor made would be correct most of the time and, in the time-sensitive situation they find themselves in, checking for the niche circumstances which caused it to be the wrong call here would cost more lives than it saves. I'm not really sure what you are finding difficult about this.
Quoting Dan
There's nothing non-normative on my part. You are the one who has already admitted to having non-normative principles. Look, if people are ok with it, then it is morally acceptable. Isn't that obvious to you?
Quoting Dan
No. How could there be a difference?
Quoting Dan
If the situations are not identical, then it is false to refer to them as "the same situation". You just contradict yourself by saying "the same situation... wouldn't be completely identical".
If you call it what it is, "a similar situation", then you ought to understand that what I said earlier applies.
Quoting Dan
You haven't provided me with the principle by which you judge the doctor's action to be wrong. You simple assume it to be wrong, and say that it is wrong by "an actual-value or some expected-value view", but this gives me no principle, therefore no reason to believe it was wrong. As far as I can see, the doctor followed protocol, therefore we can judge the actions as right, even though the person's life was not saved.
Are you suggesting that a doctor ought to look to see what is tattooed on the bottom of one's foot before attempting to save a person's life? What else do you think the doctor ought to do before proceeding, look through one's car, go to the person's house and rummage through all files and bookshelves? Your conclusion that the doctor's action was wrong makes absolutely no sense at all. The person died, but that does not make the action of the doctor trying to save that life, wrong.
You need to provide a reason why you think the doctor's action was wrong. I gave you the reason why I think the doctor's action was right, the doctor followed protocol. Now you need to give me the reason why you think the action was wrong. That the person died accidentally while the doctor was working, does not make the doctor's actions wrong. Otherwise every time a person died in surgery the doctor's actions would be wrong. A doctor's actions always involve risk of something bad happening, so probability dictates that a bad thing will happen from time to time. Unless there is negligence the doctor's action is not wrong.
No. What people are okay with and what is right are very often different. What's right is right regardless of whether people agree.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In the same way there is often a difference between what people think is true and what is actually true in any other context.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, it's the same in terms of relevant factors used to make the decision. I think that's what we'd normally call the same situation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The doctor acted wrongly because their actions led to bad consequences that were avoidable had they acted differently. On an actual-value view of consequentialism where an action is judged based on the actual value of it's consequences, this makes the action bad and also wrong (in that the doctor should have done something different). In this case, the doctor gave the patient something to which they were deathly allergic and which led to their death, and the doctor could have learned this and acted differently. So, the action turned out to be wrong. But, we might still say that the doctor acted as we would want them to act in the future, and so praise the action. None of this is incoherent or even very complicated.
Again, following protocol is not a reason to think an action is right. Protocol has very little to do with right or wrong.
That "X is right" is a judgement, just like "this thing I'm typing on is a keyboard" is a judgement. Are you assuming "God" to make this judgement "regardless of whether people agree? If so, I will dismiss it, just like you dismissed my reference to religious principles earlier in our discussion. Therefore there is nothing to justify your claim "What people are okay with and what is right are very often different".
Quoting Dan
Again, "X is true" is a judgement. So this statement is dismissed on the same basis as the one above.
Quoting Dan
We cannot use an appeal to common vernacular in the use of "same" to support rigorous logic. This is why we have a "law of identity" to support logical procedures.
Quoting Dan
This is untenable as a working principle. If this was an accepted moral principle, then any time which someone could apprehend a better possible outcome than what actually occurred, they'd have grounds to say that the action had "bad consequences", and was therefore wrong. And since there are always accidentals involved in any situation, every act would be arguably "wrong". Therefore, as a moral principle, your proposed "actual value" perspective is completely useless.
It's very clear that this type of consequentialism is absolutely inadequate to provide principles for moral judgement. What is actually required to make a moral judgement is to consider the situation of the person prior to the choice, one's intentions, the specifics of the circumstances, along with the consequences. As is very evident from your example, basing judgement solely on consequences is woefully inadequate, and may be considerably misleading.
Quoting Dan
You paid no respect to my counter example. If "the doctor could have learned this" is a principle acceptable to the judgement of whether the doctor acted wrongly or not, then we'd have to allow that the doctor should have gone off and rummaged through the patient's car, one's house, all files on record anywhere, even keep searching all information in the universe, before acting. This principle is nonsense and completely unacceptable.
Quoting Dan
Wow! I've never heard that before, not even in the "In praise of anarchy" thread. Following rules has very little to do with right or wrong? What planet are you from Dan?
I am not assuming any gods at all. What I am assuming is that there are moral truths objectively of our views. When we claim that something is right (in the moral sense), I suggest we are making an objective claim about that thing which can be either true or false.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It isn't a subjective judgement though. It is a claim that can be objectively correct or incorrect. As a simple example, if I say that the world is round (or you know, roundish) and you say it is flat, we aren't both right.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is another case of you getting very concerned with language where it really isn't necessary. I could instead say that we should praise the initial action because we want other people in situations that seem identical with regard to relevant factors to act in the same way with regard to relevant features of the action. That's a bit of a mouthful, and I think saying "the same action" was pretty clear as to what I meant. Sure, if we are defining terms, we should try to be precise, but if we're just having a discussion on a forum, could you try to engage with the core point, rather than nit-pick over terms?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What you have suggested is a common criticism of maximizing consequentialism called the "Demandingness Objection". I agree it is a big problem for such theories. Satisficing forms of consequentialism can, potentially, avoid this problem by claiming that one need not act in the way with the best consequences, but simply good enough ones. There are some pretty big issues with this too, as you can see if you read Ben Bradley's paper "against satisficing consequentialism". However, if you read "solving satisficing consequentialism" you will see how these can be solved, though that solution leads to a few problems of it's own so I have adapted it for the primer I provided.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, you don't need to consider any of that. If someone does the right thing for the "wrong reasons", it's still the right thing. In terms of deciding what we should do, obviously the consequentialist (including me) is going to say that we need to base our actions on the likely consequences of our actions, rather than the actual consequences of our actions (because they haven't happened yet).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, what it means that someone could have done something is potentially an interesting thing to discuss, but not terribly relevant here. It seems pretty clear that the doctor could have given the patient a physical exam which, in this example, would have led to them discovering the problem. And, in this case, based on what happened, it seems reasonably to say that they should have (on an actual-value view. Of course, on some expected-value approaches to consequentialism, this isn't the case). To say that checking the patient themselves is the same as checking throughout the universe seemed somewhat disingenuous to me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, this is surely obvious. What's right is right regardless of whether there is a rule that says its right. What's wrong is wrong regardless of whether it is prohibited. I find it very difficult to believe that you haven't heard that sentiment before.
As a fairly easy-to-understand example, do you think that killing a child for fun would become less wrong if the laws prohibiting it were repealed or the social norms prohibiting it were no longer held by the majority?
"Truth" is a judgement we make of a statement. Without a god, who do you propose, makes these statements and judgements?
It appears we may have a similar issue with "truth" to the issue we had with "understanding". You assume a meaning which is completely incoherent to me, and continue to use the word that way as if I ought to understand you.
Quoting Dan
I don't see how the example serves the purpose. In order for one of us to be correct, we need someone to judge the meaning of "world", and the meaning of "round", "flat", etc.. It is actually very possible that we both are correct, because I could be using "world" to refer to something which you would never agree to.
This is exactly what has happened in this thread. You use "understand" and "truth" in a way which makes no sense to me. And, you might actually be correct in your argument based on that meaning. The meaning is like a premise though, so to prove your argument unsound, I must prove the falsity of your meaning.
So in your example, if I say "the world is flat", and I hold a conception of "the world" in which it is flat, then "the world is flat" is correct, and to prove me wrong you need to prove that my meaning (conception) of "the world" is false. Likewise, to prove your moral position to be unsound, I am faced with the task of proving that the meaning you assume for words like "understand", and "truth" are false. This is a sort of dialectics. But if in such a debate, a person adheres to the false definition, fails to understand the falsity of it, or for some reason refuses to accept the falsity of it, argumentation becomes pointless.
Quoting Dan
Based on what I presented above, "getting very concerned with language" is necessary. I can define "the world" as what can be seen within the horizon that extends 360 degrees around a person, and the world is "flat" by that definition, even if "the world" of multiple people overlap to make a universal flat world. Likewise, you can define words like "truth", "understand", and "same", in absurd ways to support your theory. The only way to show you that your theory is wrong, unsound, is to demonstrate that your use of language does not reflect reality, is therefore false.
Quoting Dan
Sure, but if this is the case, then on what basis do you say the action was wrong? You are saying that people ought to be taught to always act "the same way" in any situation which appears to be to a significant extent "similar". But then you are also saying that in this particular case the person's act, who acted "that way" was wrong, yet you are using it as an example of how people ought to act. Can you not see the inconsistency? It's blatant, and blatant inconsistency is not productive in teaching because people dismiss it as ridiculous, and counterproductive.
Quoting Dan
Another nail in the coffin. At what point do you give up on providing exceptions to the rule, trying to prop up a deficient rule, and simply bury the faulty rule?
Quoting Dan
That's a faulty judgement, based in your misunderstanding, of an objective, independent "truth", or "right", outlined above. You really need to work on this misunderstanding, figure out the reality of the situation.
Quoting Dan
That is not clear at all. The person was dying. The doctor acted in an emergency situation. You only say that the doctor could have, and should have, "given the patient a physical exam" because that is consistent with discovery of the information, according to the contrived example. Maybe in another example, the patient's spouse was standing in the hall with the information, and the doctor 'could have and should have' asked the spouse. The problem is glaring. The doctor has no way of knowing which of the countless possible options are going to reveal the information, and cannot proceed toward pursuing them all until information is revealed, or the patient dies.
Quoting Dan
Again, clear indication of a faulty use of "right". I'll be waiting for you to either dispense with this idea altogether, or support it with some sort of god. I mean you might try to support it otherwise, but I've seen enough of that to tell you it's all smoke and mirrors of sophistry. So rather than have me make fun of your attempts, let's just get on with the either/or option.
Quoting Dan
This is a question of do I believe in God or not. If I believe in God, then I assume an independent God who interprets, understands, and upholds judgement on this rule, "killing children for fun is wrong", as correct, regardless of what human beings think. If I do not believe in God, then so long as not every human being agrees that killing children for fun is wrong, then the proposed rule remains debatable. So the issue is more complicated than the way you present it, because even if the majority thinks that it's not wrong, and the laws are repealed, then it is not wrong by those laws, but to the minority who do not agree, it is still debatable.
I don't see any other possibility.
We can make a judgement of whether some claim is true, but whether it is true or not is a fact about that claim, not merely a judgement made by us.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Surely we can clarify that we are talking about the same thing though, can't we?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Definitions are not like premises, and rarely need to be disputed. You don't need to "prove someone's meaning incorrect". If someone was using terms in such as way as to make their claim meaningless, then you might point this out, but generally speaking what is much more interesting is to focus on the substantive claims being made. If someone says "the world is flat, and by the world I mean this piece of paper in front of me", then sure, they are probably right, but also that's a broadly meaningless claim. We can just clarify what is meant and then roll our eyes at someone being a prat.
What is almost always more interesting is to deal with substantive claims being made. If for example you say "the world is flat", me arguing that "world" really refers to a complete spacio-temporal manifold rather than a planet isn't really very helpful. Instead, I should show that the planet earth (as you hypothetically mean by the word "world" here) is not, in fact, flat but is rather shaped like an oblate spheroid. If you say "well, I define the world as something that's flat", then I might need to change my argument a little, and instead say that the thing you are referring to doesn't exist, and certainly isn't where we are living, but I still needn't spend all my time trying to convince you to define the word differently.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you defined "world" in that way, then I might well point out that it's a very strange definition that isn't connected with how we normally use the word. But, if you persist, then it doesn't really matter. We can make clear exactly what you are arguing (that what can be seen to the horizon line is flatish) and discuss that claim specifically. We can also make clear that you aren't claiming that the planet itself is flat, or not roundish,
Also, I'm not defining these things weirdly at all. I am using "truth" in a fairly general sense, but I think I'd be happy with something like "corresponds to reality" as a basic definition for the purposes of this discussion. I don't think it's strange to suggest that claims really are true or false, and that this isn't merely a judgement made by people. I also think using "understand" in a similar way to "comprehend" is pretty normal and that using "the same action" to mean actions that are identical in their relevant features, even if they are not identical in all their features is pretty normal too. For example if you said "oh, I went to the mall yesterday and checked out the food court, then I went Christmas shopping" and I said "oh, I did the same thing" then you presumably wouldn't say "no, I went at noon, but you went at half-past, so those are different things". It's quite wordy to say "future actions that seem to share all morally relevant features from the perspective of the person making the decision," don't you think?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It really isn't. This is exactly the point I am trying to make here. From a consequentialist perspective (actual-value and some expected-value at least), then it is entirely consistent to say that this person acted wrongly but that we still want people to act the same way in the future. That sometimes you do something that looks like it's the right thing to do, but it turns out to be wrong due to circumstances you didn't know about. This is sometimes raised as a criticism of actual-value consequentialism generally, since the consequences of an action can ripple far into the future so it is sometimes charged with not being able to determine if an action was right or wrong, since the consequences of it have not been fully felt yet. You need not agree with actual value consequentialism, but there is not an internal inconsistency here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have no idea what you mean by this. This is a big problem for maximizing consequentialism. I am not a maximizing consequentialist.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, do you not think that things are objectively true at all? Or do you not think moral claims are objectively true (or false)? There is a big assumption hiding behind this statement, and I'd like to get it out in the open.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, that is very much the point of the example, and why we don't want people to do that in the future.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm fairly certain gods don't help. They aren't a tenable solution at all. But it seems we are getting to the assumptions behind some of these misunderstandings. You seem to think morality is not objective true (or false) at all, is that fair to say? As mentioned above, I'd like to get this assumption out in the open, because I think I've been pretty clear about my meta-ethical assumptions here. So, could you please state for the record what your meta-ethical position is. Do you think morality is constructed? Subjective? Relative? What's the story?
Also, as linguistic claims go, "right" and "wrong" being objective facts about actions is probably the standard usage. I think moral objectivism is still the standard pre-theoretical position, though I will admit that this is in flux at the moment with a reasonable amount of relativist nonsense floating around.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It really has nothing to do with any gods, but I think we have gotten to some dodgy meta-ethical assumptions underlying your views. I have some questions about how you can argue that there is anything wrong with any moral views if you hold in the meta-ethical beliefs that you appear to, but I'll let you state them explicitly before ripping into them too much.
HUGE yikes.
As I said, this is incomprehensible to me because whether or not a statement of claim is true, is dependent on interpretation of the statement, and comparison with reality. Such comparison only minds can perform.
As I said, whether a statement of claim is true or not is a judgement. In no way can truth or falsity be understood as the property of the claim itself, which is simply an ordered collection of symbols.
Quoting Dan
You seem to be missing the point. What I claim is that you use terms in such a way as to make your claim valid, but if analyzed, the meaning required is really unintelligible, such as your use of "true" above.
Quoting Dan
Right, and that is what I am pointing out about your use of "understand", it is not comprehensible. And now, your use of "true", and "right", are simply unintelligible.
Quoting Dan
Can you not see that "corresponds to reality" refers to a type of judgement? Whenever someone says "that corresponds to reality", this indicates a judgement. How could it mean anything other than this?
Quoting Dan
OK, you're saying that you want people to act wrongly. That's exactly why I am arguing that this type of consequentialism really does not suffice for providing moral guidance.
Quoting Dan
As I said, such objectivity requires God. Since truth is a judgement, we need something other than a human mind to make that judgement, if we assume such "objectivity".
The issue is not whether or not I agree with objectivity, the issue is that it is incoherent to believe in such objectivity, without a belief in some type of god for ontological support.
Quoting Dan
You've been clear, but the assumptions which you clearly assert prove to be incoherent.
Quoting Dan
This is not about what I believe, we are discussing the coherency of your theory. My beliefs are only relevant so far as they bear on your theory. Whether or not I personally believe in God is irrelevant here.
Quoting Dan
Again, "right" and "wrong" are judgements. If you want to provide support for your claim that a judgement can be objective, without a God who makes that objective judgement, then be my guest.
Quoting AmadeusD
HUGE yilkes,
Is what I LIKES
I would just suggest to you that if morality is objective, this is plainly false to claim.
If it is subjective, thats a strange framework Id think. Heh
The claim is the meaning of the symbols or vocalizations, not the symbols of vocalizations themselves, and a claim can indeed be a true or false.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The way I am using "true" is a pretty standard usage.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would say I was very much using them in the normal way here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
When someone says it, that is them making a judgement. But whether it does or not is not a judgement, but a fact. When I claim the world is round(ish) that is a judgement, but my claim is either true or false depending on the actual shape of the planet, and would be true or false regardless of whether I (or anyone else) judged it as such.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I am saying that in circumstances that were identical from the point of view of the actor (since the doctor didn't know about the weird niche circumstances at play here), the same action (by which I mean the same in all relevant regards) would not be wrong, but right. At least from an actual-value consequentialism view. It's really not that complicated.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, that a) is basically all incorrect, and b) isn't really an answer.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, God, a god, or gods have nothing to do with it, but it seems that a lot of your issues with my theory come down to issues with some fairly basic assumptions of moral objectivism and moral realism.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, not judgements, but properties.
A lot of what you are claiming seems to be steeped in highly dubious meta-ethical assumptions, possibly ontological ones as well. So I'll ask you again, what are the assumptions that are hiding behind these points? Are you claiming that there is no objective truth at all? Or that there is simply no objective truth regarding morality?
The meaning of symbols, is as interpreted by an individual mind, and is therefore subjective. Therefore true or false is a subjective judgement. I explained this already, with the examples of the meaning of "understand", "truth", and "world". But you don't seem to understand.
Quoting Dan
This would be a useless fact, if true. Whether or not the claim actually does correspond, as "fact", would be impossible for anyone to know, so even if this were true, these "facts" would be useless and irrelevant to our discussion. Furthermore, also if what you claim is true, then as human beings, only having access to our subjective judgements, we could never know whether it is a fact that what you claim is a fact. So the claim does nothing for us.
So we have a dual level of irrelevance. We could never know the truth (the fact) of any claim, so our subjective judgements would guide us anyway. On top of this, we could never know whether the claim that there is such facts is itself true. So the claim is completely useless and does nothing to aid us in finding truth because it makes truth necessarily beyond our grasp.
Quoting Dan
You are completely ignoring what I explained. The words "world", "roundish", need to be defined, interpreted for meaning, and the reality itself needs to be judged as fulfilling the conditions of the interpreted meaning. Therefore your claim here is completely incoherent.
Quoting Dan
Then it's incoherent to judge the doctor's actions as wrong. By "all relevant regards" the doctor's actions were right. See, you excluded the consequences, (the patient's death) from "all relevant regards". However, it is the consequences by which you made the judgement "wrong", so clearly the consequences cannot be irrelevant. You are providing a very good demonstration of incoherency, and why you need to accept the fact that you employ two distinct, and incompatible, valuation systems..
Quoting Dan
The ontological principle involved here, is the conclusion that the assumptions of "objective truth", and "objective right", require God for justification. This conclusion is derived as I've explained, from the true premise that "true" and "right" are judgements. I invite you to propose another form of justification, other than God, but simply asserting that this is "fact" is not justification.
True and false is not a subjective judgement. Our claims are either true or false independant of what we think (in many cases. There are of course subjective matters).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, that is the world we live in. We are behind the veil of perception and certainty about the truth of the world (in at least most cases) is forever denied to us.
Second, it isn't quite as hopeless as you make it out to be. We may never know for sure if we are seeing the world as it is, but we can certainly take steps to make better guesses about it. Also this really applies to observable facts more than deductive arguments, so presumably isn't such an issue for discussions of morality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The words do indeed need to be defined in order to have a coherent discussion with someone else, but the claim itself (the meaning of the words) is either true or false regardless of anyone's judgement.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Are you being facetious here? I also said "from the point of view of the person making the decision". Do you think that perspective involves knowing the future? I'm not employing two valuation systems at all, I am explaining a fairly simple point about actual-value consequentialism.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, true and right are not judgements. They are properties which we often make judgements about. Just like we make judgements about the chemical composition of a substance. It's actual atomic makeup is not the same thing as our judgement of it, and our judgement can be more or less accurate depending on how closely it matches reality.
Whether things are true, or right, is a matter of fact that exists independantly of anyone's judgement. Even if it weren't, God wouldn't help with this as that would be just another person making a judgement, rather than something being objective. God couldn't even be correct in His judgement because there would be no objective fact of the matter so correctness would be nonsensical. Unless of course you are defining true and right as just whatever God says, which leads to Euthyphro problems immediately as this would be horribly arbitrary at best.
There are a whole host of reasons why not believing in objective truth is not a viable position, but the easiest to explain is that there is no point in anyone talking to you about anything if you don't think there is an objective fact of the matter. You say the world is flat, I say it's round. I can try to convince you using various pieces of evidence, but if you don't think that there is a world out there that contains the answer and we can at least try to compare our beliefs to (though of course there are challenges to doing so given that we cannot see outside of our own perceptions), then there is no point having the discussion in the first place. Or any discussion for that matter.
I'm sorry to keep pestering you on this matter, but that is an assertion which needs to be justified. You can claim this over and over again, but repetition does not constitute justification. So you give me no reason to even consider this claim: "Our claims are either true or false independant of what we think".
Quoting Dan
If, the truth about the world is forever denied from us, then how do we know that there is such a thing. This is the problem. You assume, and claim, that there is such a thing as "the truth of the world", but since it is denied from us, we have no real evidence that there is such a thing. This renders your claim as completely unsupported, nothing but a baseless assertion. Furthermore, theories in modern physics, "multiverse", "model-dependent reality" etc., are contrary to this assertion.
That claim you make is most likely just a reflection of your intentions. You want it to be, that there is a "truth of the world", because that would represent a very complex reality in a simplistic way, facilitating an easy moral philosophy for you. But if that assumption you make is wrong, then so too is your moral philosophy.
Therefore we need to start with a principle which is a recognition that the assumption that there is a "truth of the world" is not a known fact. And this is why religion provides a better starting point than what you propose. Religion proposes that we have "faith" that there is such a thing as "the truth of the world", and this is distinctly different from what you propose, that there is such a thing as the truth of the world.
Quoting Dan
Deductive arguments need to be grounded in premises which will be judged to be true, or else the arguments will be dismissed as unsound. Therefore discussions of morality which are based in principles which will be judged as false (eg "there is a truth of the world") will be dismissed accordingly. The solution is to replace the faulty premises with better premises (eg "we can have faith that there is a truth of the world").
Quoting Dan
I really can't believe that you do not see that you employ two distinct valuation systems. It's so clear and blatant, how can you not understand this? Are you so deep in denial, that you cannot even stop to look at, and understand the meaning of what you write?
You have one system which evaluates from the perspective of what you call "from the point of view of the person making the decision". Evaluation from this perspective does not involve knowing the future, i.e. the consequences of whatever act is chosen. From this perspective, (this proposed evaluation system), your judgement renders the chosen act as "right". However, you also apply a judgement produced from the evaluation system described as the perspective of "actual-value consequentialism". From this evaluation system, the consequences, therefore the future of whatever act is chosen is known. And from this perspective you judge the act as "wrong".
This demonstrates very clearly what I argued much earlier. A clear understanding of the nature of time is of the utmost importance to moral philosophy.
Since the two judgements here, "right" and "wrong", (one including the future from the act, the other not) are contrary, it is impossible that both could be the product of the same system of evaluation. That would imply contradiction within that system, and incoherency. Therefore we must conclude that there are two distinct systems of evaluation being employed, and the contrariness of the respective judgements implies that the two are incompatible.
Quoting Dan
These are all judgements. "Properties" are judgement we make about things. That X is "the chemical composition of that substance", is a judgement, "the sky is blue" is a judgement, "the grass is green" is a judgement. These judgements reflect our perceptions, and our usage of words, such that if we agree, we conclude that we are saying something true about the world. But "truth" in this case is dependent on agreement, convention in word usage, corresponding with our perceptions. There is nothing to prove that the said properties are actually independent of our perception. (This is a common theme here a TPF, you ought to look over some other threads, like Wayfarer's "The Mind-Created World" for example).
Quoting Dan
This is not at all reflective of reality, and it is actually a very clear indication of how your misunderstanding greatly misleads you in your approach to moral philosophy. Human beings are intentional creatures. We move around with wants, desires, aims and objectives. What you call "objective truth" is irrelevant to most human choices and actions. In most cases, we don't care about any supposed objective truth, we just want to get what we need or desire. Therefore our interactions, communications, are shaped and formed around these intentional activities rather than any assumption of an objective truth.
So the above paragraph of yours expresses the opposite of the reality of the situation. Human beings can, and do in most cases, have all sorts of discussions and other sorts of interactions, with the belief of whether or not there is an objective truth about the matter of their interactions remaining completely irrelevant. As long as we have adequate understanding of meaning, allowing us to communicate our wants, desires, and goals, also allowing us to produce, and work together toward common goals, "objective truth" is irrelevant.
The question of "objective truth" generally only arises when there is disagreement. So our moral philosophy needs to reflect this. Our choices, actions, and consequently interactions, are based in our wants, desires, and intentions. They are not based in a belief in "objective truth". As it is very clear that moral philosophy deals with human choices, actions, and interactions, it is also very clear that moral philosophy needs to be based in an understanding of human wants, desires, and intentions, rather than a belief in an "objective truth". The faith in "objective truth" is a mechanism employed to deal with disagreement.
I mean, few ways we could go about this. Probably the easiest way is to entertain the idea that the idea that opposite proposition is correct and realize that this would be self-defeating (saying that "truth is subjective" would itself be a claim that would be, if truth were indeed subjective, be objectively true). This also works for "there is no objective truth" and other similar propositions
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Absolutely no theory in physics is contrary to the idea that there is an objective truth about the nature of reality. If it is the case that the observer effect is more than just the effect of relatively clumsy measuring tools and that someone observing something does in a real way change the thing (for example) then that would be a fact about the world that is true. If there is really more than one universe (though exactly what that means is a bit messy and it's not clear that we are all using the same meaning when we talk about a "multiverse") then that would be a true fact about the world.
More generally, I think we can get at some truths about the world, as the veil of perception is only really relevant when it comes to empirical knowledge. We might still be able to determine, for example, mathematical truths without this causing any problem.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is just a misunderstanding. A better way of describing this is that instead that from the point of view of the agent, it appears right. In fact, it isn't, but I think "do what appears to be right based on the information you have" is a pretty good rule of thumb, and so one we might want to promote, even if sometimes it leads to doing things that are wrong (in an actual-value consequentialist sense at least).
This is also my response to your comment regarding me pointing out that the person doesn't know the future. Again, I think you're assumptions are getting in the way of you understanding here. I suggest that you try reading what I have said again while assuming that I am not in denial and that what I am saying is coherent.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is bollocks. We (or at least, a lot of us) absolutely do care about whether what we believe is true. You can see this when, for example, asking why people would not want to be hooked up to an experience machine.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Certainly we have some. We do talk about subjective things. But a) I think you're just wrong about human's attitudes on this front. And b) if you were right (which I'm fairly sure you're not) then that would be so much the worse for humanity.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are making claims about the world while also claiming that objective truth isn't important. This is nonsensical. Imagine that I agreed with you that there is no objective truth in the world, how would we discuss whether people believed this or not? We can't check the world, since there would be no objective truth to it. Further, how could you be sure that we don't agree? Sure, you could check the things you think I've written, but there would be no objective truth to a) whether I wrote them, b) whether I believe or don't believe what I wrote, c) whether I'm right or not about what I might or might not believe. So the discussion would quickly become completely meaningless.
I put it to you that if you walk into the road when a car is coming it won't matter whether you believe that the car is going to hit you, whether you judge that the car hitting you will kill you, or whether you define getting hit by a car the same way I do: you will be just as dead.
Haha, that's funny, but obviously incorrect. If the claim "truth is subjective" is true, that in no way implies that the claim is objectively true. Such a conclusion would require defining "true" as "objectively true", which of course is what "truth is subjective" denies. So your stated conclusion implies self-contradiction, or at best requires begging the question by proceeding from the premise that "true" is defined as objectively true.
Quoting Dan
Are you serious? Have you heard of "relativity", "multiverse", "model-dependent realism"? These theories are all based in principles which assume no objective truth.
Quoting Dan
This is an indication of the inclination to beg the question as explained above. If you start with the assumption (premise) that "truth" means "objective fact about the world", then any time that someone claims to make a true statement you will conclude that this means that the person has stated an "objective fact about the world". However, this would simply be a misunderstanding, caused by the inapplicable, and unstated premise which you decide to insert just to support your ontology.
In other words, you take a principle which supports your ontology "truth means objective fact about the world", and you apply it toward understanding another ontology which is incompatible, based in principles which contradict this principle of yours. The result can be nothing other than a misunderstanding of the ontology which you apply the incompatible premise toward understanding. So, in the example which you state, "multiverse" implies a multitude of worlds, therefore it is impossible that statements referring to a "multiverse" are statements about "the world". You have simply applied an ontological premise which is inconsistent with the ontology proposed, and the incoherency produced by the contradiction demonstrates that it is impossible for you to understand the "multiverse" ontology in this way.
Quoting Dan
Now you are saying something completely different. You are no longer judging the act as "right" ("you" being the third party observer to the doctor's act), You are judging the act as wrong, and saying that it appeared to be right to the person making the choice, at that time. This is very different from saying that the act "is" right from that perspective, it is saying that the act "appears to be right" from that perspective.
If you are familiar, this is the ancient distinction outlined by Aristotle, between "the apparent good", and "the real good". The goal of the moral philosopher is to shape (conform, or in terms of this thread "restrict") an individual's mind so as the apparent good becomes consistent with the real good. Now, the problem is as we've discussed, that the real good always stays in the category of unknown, at the time of decision making, because we cannot foresee the future. And, as the theologians demonstrate with their ontology, and what I'm trying to impress on you, the concept of "the real good" requires a divine mind "God" to support the validity (justification) of the concept.
Quoting Dan
From the principles described above, the distinction between real good and apparent good, you are taking things in the wrong direction here. Moralists do not encourage people to "do what appears to be right based on the information you have". That would encourage rash judgement, proceeding immediately without taking any time to look for other options. This is exactly the issue I pointed to concerning habitual actions. The information which comes immediately to mind is very limited, inclining one to act quickly according to the habit, without seeking any other information, even though further information is very often right in the memory somewhere, it is just not brought to bear on the immediate problem due to the force of habit. Instead, the moralist encourages individuals to recognize and acknowledge the difference between the apparent good and the real good, and make a judgement as to the likelihood of it being the case that what appears to be right in the current situation, is consistent with what is really right.
For your reference, "what is really right" needs to be grounded in sound arguments, or else the entire system breaks down. In theology "God" provides the ground. Your portrayal of consequentialism does not provide such a ground. This is because "what is really right" is based in the outcome, the effects of the act, and there is always an element of "unknown" due to accidents. So in the example, the doctor's actions will always be judged as "wrong" if the patient dies, no matter what precautions are taken. This means that there are cases where there is no "right" choice. Furthermore, to acknowledge that there is a "right choice" in any situation requires applying determinist principles, 'X will necessarily cause Y', and this denies the reality of freedom of choice. In short, because of the determinist principles, consequentialism is defeatist, fatalist.
Quoting Dan
What are you insinuating here? Are you saying that the fact that no one can know the future with certainty, is irrelevant? If I read your work with this assumption, and that assumption makes your work appear to be incoherent, and I explain this to you, then the onus is on you to dispel this assumption. Prove to me that this assumption is irrelevant, or false, like I prove your assumption of "objective truth" is false. The problem is that proving my premise false requires determinism, which renders choice making irrelevant, and proving my assumption irrelevant requires a false representation of choice making. So we are left with the conclusion that you are in denial.
Quoting Dan
Sure, there is a vast multitude of situations within which the idea of "what we believe is true" is given priority. And so, it is not hard to find examples. What I pointed out, is that in the vast majority of time, what we want or desire is given priority over "what we believe is true". In general, "what we believe is true" is only prioritized in cases of disagreement.
It's hard to see how your example demonstrates that "what we believe is true" is prioritized over "what we want or desire". We would have to actually examine the reasons why the decision was made,
Quoting Dan
This is consistent with the majority of your replies now. You simply assert that you think I am wrong, but you provide no support or justification, the reasons why you think I am wrong. And, it's becoming increasingly clear that these reasons are that you are applying faulty premises, as explained above. These are ontological premises about reality, "objective truth", and faulty premises about how a person's belief in "objective truth" ("what we believe is true") effects one's choices and actions.
Quoting Dan
I don't see why you claim this. People express opinions all the time, and others recognize them as opinions. A problem arises when people express opinions as fact, and people wrongly recognize the opinions of others as fact. Once you acknowledge that opinions about "the world" are opinions, and opinion will never obtain to the level of "objective truth", then you will understand that "objective truth" is irrelevant when discussing opinions about "the world".
Quoting Dan
i don't see any of these problems. You are making up imaginary problems, by misapplying faulty premises as explained above. We do not need to make any of those judgements which you claim are required. Those are only required under your faulty premise, that objective truth is necessarily important to discussion. But this is clearly not the case. We can discuss what we want, our goals, agree and produce common goals, we can proceed to discuss opinions about the nature of reality, while recognizing that these are opinions, and we can agree on these opinions when this is conducive toward achieving our goals, all without ever considering anything about "objective truth".[
quote="Dan;948828"]I put it to you that if you walk into the road when a car is coming it won't matter whether you believe that the car is going to hit you, whether you judge that the car hitting you will kill you, or whether you define getting hit by a car the same way I do: you will be just as dead.[/quote]
That's your opinion, but you clearly haven't considered all the possibilities. The driver of the car may hit the brakes, or swerve, to mention a couple other possibilities. What you've demonstrated with this example is how the force of habit restricts your thinking and decision making (limits your freedom), so that you jump to a conclusion ("you will be just as dead"), without considering all the relevant information.
I agree it implies self-contradiction, because the position that truth is subjective is itself contradictory.
Would you instead say that your claim, that truth is subjective, is false for me? If so, why are you trying to convince me of something false?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So model-dependent realism isn't a theory of physics so much as the philosophy of science, and it doesn't assume a lack of objective truth so much as thinks its the wrong thing to be focusing on. As for relativity and the multiverse, neither of these assume a lack of objective truth at all. You have badly misunderstood these theories.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If we assume that truth is subjective, then what the heck do any of these claims mean? What are you claiming when you claim I am begging the question? Are you claiming I am actually begging the question, or just that you believe I am?
I am very happy to state right now that whenever I make any claim about the world or logic, I am assuming that objective truth exists. I think that assumption underlies any sensible discussion, as I have mentioned earlier.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I never said the action was right. I said the action was wrong. I would suggest that a way to check your belief here against morality would be to go back and read what I said again, but if you don't think there is any fact of the matter about what I said, then I'm not sure what use this would be.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Do what appears right based on the information you have" is pretty reasonable advice and is not the same as "rush to judgement and don't gather more information".
No, God does not provide the grounds. Even if he existed, that wouldn't show anything about morality at all. That being said, if truth were subjective, I'm not really sure what the claim "God exists" would mean. Would he just exist to the faithful, but not to the nonbeliever?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, no, that isn't what I'm saying at all. I am saying exactly what I said: that you are jumping to strange conclusions again and that perhaps you are making some unhelpful assumptions.
Second, you haven't provided the assumption of objective truth to be false. What the heck would that even mean? Wouldn't it mean, in your view, that it is just false to you? What the heck does it mean to prove something on a worldview where there is no objective truth?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not entirely sure what point you are making here. You said that objective truth is irrelevant to most human actions, I pointed out it isn't. Are you saying that what you really mean is not that it is irrelevant, but that people care more about what they want than what is true? That is a less obviously wrong claim, though I'm still not sure it's correct. Also, again, I'm not sure what it even means for it to be correct or not on a world view where there is no objective truth. When you say "this is what human beings care about" what does that even mean? Does it mean "this is what I think they care about" or "this is what they care about, in my world". If the truth is subjective, then aren't we just arguing about our favorite dinosaurs here (and everywhere)? If I think that this isn't what people care about, aren't I right? In what sense could I be wrong?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have made a claim with no evidence and now seem annoyed that I am dismissing it just as easily. If you want to make a point about what people believe, I suggest you back it up with some form of evidence. Though, again, I'm not sure why you would be trying to convince me of anything if truth were subjective. Are you just trying to recruit me to your worldview? Not a matter of correct or not, but just a kind of intellectual tribalism?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Opinion" here is a little vague, so I'm going to clarify. Do you mean to suggest that everything you have been saying up until now amounts to nothing more than a matter of taste? You may as well have been telling me why I should like tomatoes? Is that your position here? I want to be sure.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How exactly do we discuss goals if there is nothing to judge against whether the goal has been met beyond opinion? What the heck does "reality" mean without objective truth? This is not a faulty premise, this is very much the premise that underlies any sensible conversation. Otherwise, we are essentially arguing with the hypothetical turtle, that can accept all the premises but deny the conclusion. Without the assumption of objective truth, all inquiry and logic is meaningless.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm going to borrow your worldview here to demonstrate how it prevents sensible discussion:
I did consider that and in fact wrote all of those assumptions out in full. My post is seven pages long and details all possibilities surrounding this. If you don't think so, perhaps on the basis of reading it, then that's just your opinion and it isn't true for me.
There is another solution, as I've indicated, "God".
Quoting Dan
Relativity very clearly assumes a lack of objective truth about motion. All temporal concepts, velocity, momentum, etc., are frame of reference dependent.
Quoting Dan
Obviously, from what I've written, the claim is what I believe about your premises. When I say "you are begging the question" it means I believe you are begging the question. I mean that's pretty obvious isn't it? That's what any such statements of claim consist of, expressions of what one believes. Sometime we emphasize the strength of such a belief by saying "I strongly believe...", even we might insist "it is true that...", or "it is a fact that...", but in reality these are statements of what is believed. Surely you must recognize this. Don't you?
Quoting Dan
Clearly, the phrase "based on the information you have", instructs one not to seek more information. And, the reason why the doctor's act, in the example, ends up being judged as wrong, is the failure to seek more information. So your instruction "Do what appears right based on the information you have" is very faulty, as it encourages the type of decision making which produces the wrong decision in the example.
Quoting Dan
As I said, "God" provides the grounds for what you call "objective truth", and "objective right". What I explained is that "true", and "right" are judgements, and if we assume that there is such judgements independent of those made by human beings (this is what constitutes your meaning of "objective truth" and "objective right") then we must assume an agent which makes these judgements. That is commonly known as "God".
Quoting Dan
I know I have not proved the assumption of objective truth to be false. I have very clearly demonstrated that the assumption of objective truth requires the assumption of some sort of divine mind (God), to justify it. Therefore the assumption of objective truth implies the assumption of God.
This is due to the fact that "true" and "right" are judgements, and judgements are only made by minds. You have asserted, and insisted, that such judgements exist independently of minds, that it's simply "fact" that X is true, or Y is right. I have asked, to no avail, for you to justify these assertions.
Quoting Dan
You provided one example. I explained why your example is not representative of "most human actions".
Quoting Dan
Yes this is a fairly good representation. You just need to refine it a bit to understand what I am showing you. If you switch "aren't we just arguing about our favorite dinosaurs here" with "aren't we just arguing about God here", then you would be on the road to understanding clearly.
What I am saying is that by claiming "objective truth", and "objective right" to support your moral philosophy, this means that God is what supports your moral philosophy. However, you insist that your moral philosophy is not supported by God. So, I am showing you what a moral philosophy which is not supported by God actually looks like, and this is "subjective truth", and "subjective right".
You really do not seem to like moral philosophy which is not supported by God, you find concepts like "subjective truth" and "subjective right" to be incoherent. So I ask you, why not just accept the fact that you really do believe in God? If moral philosophy without God is incoherent to you, and you profess a moral philosophy which relies on God, then doesn't this mean that you believe in God?
There is another option I've given you, "an out". This is to justify your claim that there can be objective truth, and objective right, without God. Simply asserting that a statement corresponding with reality is a fact rather than a judgement, does not justify. You need to show how there could be a correspondence between a statement, which consists of a bunch of symbols, and the way things are in the world, without a judgement being made.
Quoting Dan
I've given you very clear demonstration of how "objective truth" requires God. You dismissed God. So I showed you what "subjective truth" consists of. Now you dismiss that. What do you choose at this point?
Quoting Dan
I wouldn't call it "taste", I'd call it "belief". Tastes are generally not justifiable. Beliefs are often justifiable, but sometimes not. When a belief is not justifiable, it may be classed as more like a taste. I have justified my belief, that objective right and objective truth require God, but you have not justified your belief that these do not require God. So I assume that to be a sort of "taste".
Quoting Dan
Where's the problem here, it's a matter of agreement, and agreement forms convention. Has a particular goal been met? If we agree, then the conclusion is accepted and we move on. If not then we decide what else needs to be accomplished, we do that and then we agree. If there is disagreement about what needs to be accomplished, then we might look into the possibility of an "objective truth" on the matter. Why is this difficult for you to understand?
Quoting Dan
I agree with you, "subjective truth" is very difficult to wrap one's head around. You asked me what I believe in, and I did not answer you. I told you that the choices are two, God or "subjective truth".
I want to get a clear indication from you, as to what the premise are for our procedure, which is to analyze your theory. We need to take one approach or the other. I have no problem to choose "objective truth", "God", along with a shit load of baggage which weighs us down like a ball and chain, but I also have no problem to choose "subjective truth", which frees one of all that baggage, but also makes morality extremely difficult to understand. I do have a problem with any attempt to combine these two incompatible perspectives because that produces incoherency.
No. I've had a few genuine submissions emailed through, and a couple of them have presented some ideas that are interesting, but nothing that solves the problem yet.
The claim "God exists" to me seems to imply that God actually, objectively exists. Without the assumption that truth is objective of what we think of it, then I'm not sure what to make of this claim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, it doesn't. It assumes that these things are relative, rather than absolute. But that, if true, is taken to be objectively true. Physicists aren't suggesting that if people just believed hard enough, then they could have launched their GPS satelities without taking account of relativity and they would have worked just fine for them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This goes deeper than that. What do you mean you believe this? When I say "tomatoes are disgusting" I might plausibly be not really making a claim about tomatoes, but about myself, or I might be trying to claim something objective and failing because there is no objective truth to the matter (I could also be trying to claim something objective and probably just be wrong depending on what I mean by "disgusting" but that has very little to do this with point). When you say "I think/believe you're begging the question" does that belief really relate to me? Is it a belief about a world that you think doesn't objectively exist. If so, by what criteria can the belief be true? Is it true for you that I was begging the question but false for me?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I can see how you'd get that, but it doesn't really imply this. We all act based on the information we have. Sometimes, the right action, based on the information you have, is to gather more information.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, I think all of this judgement stuff is completely the wrong way to be looking at things and is very much putting the cart before the horse. However, I'm not sure what it even means to say that God exists if we can't discuss the objective truth of the universe. Like, if God can exist for some people, does that mean those people get to have objective truth, but it only exists for them? Because that's not really how something being "objective" works.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You haven't demonstrated this, you have asserted it based on the dubious assertion that truth is a judgement. Although, if there's no objective truth, then what you are saying is true for you (which strikes me as an incredible patronizing thing to say by the way).
I mean, I think we are demonstrating right now that without the assumption that there is a right answer, this discussion is entirely meaningless. To return to the example of God, without assuming that whether He exists or not has a correct answer, then all of these claims about Him providing a basis for objective truth are meaningless.
There are certainly other arguments, but I think this one is both good enough and fairly standard enough that we need not get into the weeds on it too deep. Also, if there were no objective, truth, then I would presumably be right, wouldn't I? I mean, right for me? So when you attempt to "criticize" my view, I'm not really sure what you're doing. Are you just trying to spread your worldview like a kind of virus? Given that it wouldn't be correct to those who don't currently believe it, I'm not sure why you are trying to convince me of something that is incorrect.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I provided an example of specifically people being asked whether they would accept a false version of the life they wanted. It seems pretty relevant, wouldn't you say?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You aren't "showing me" so much as asserting incorrectly. What's more, your worldview presumably agrees that you are asserting this incorrectly "for me", right?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I suggest that what is morally right is right in all possible worlds, the ones that have a god and those that don't. I think that moral truths (assuming they exist at all) are necessary truths. So no, I don't believe in your God, but even if I did, it would make no difference. He would just be another agent subject to morality, He certainly wouldn't get to decide what it is through His judgement.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, the claim isn't the symbols that communicate it. It is the meaning being communicated.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You haven't. You have incorrectly asserted that truth is a judgement, rather than something that people make judgements about. But, without the assumption that there is some correct answer here, I'm not even sure what you mean by that. Do you mean that truth is a judgement "to you"? Presumably "to me" truth is a thing that judgements can be made about?
Also, what do you mean by "demonstrate" without the assumption that there is a right answer to be demonstrated? Do you mean "asserted"?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You haven't justified it, you have asserted it. But again, what the heck does it mean to justify something when there is no objective truth? What are the criteria for justifying a belief on that assumption and why are those criteria any better than any other? Normally, we think of theory/belief selection criteria in terms of criteria that are more likely to lead us to the right answer. But you seem to be asserting there is no right answer (and also that there is but only for some people), so how do we go about coming up with theory or belief selection criteria or justifying anything?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Right now I am finding it hard to understand the part where you just said we look into the possibility of an objective truth on the matter given what you have been claiming. What do you mean by that?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
God doesn't provide a basis for objective anything. You've got things backwards. In order to assert that God exists (in the sense of existing for everyone, rather than in the sense of tomatoes being disgusting), then we must assume that things can objectively exist.
I wouldn't say that "subjective truth" is so much difficult to wrap one's head around as it is an incoherent mess.
I think we are pretty much at an impasse Dan. We have no hope of understanding each other, as we go deeper and deeper in opposite directions.
I said "objective truth", like "objective right", implies a mind independent of human minds (God) in order to interpret a statement and to judge whether it is right or true. You said that is not the case, because a claim, or statement is the meaning of the words, and this either corresponds with reality or not. I say that a statement or claim exists as symbols, and that meaning is only determined by a mind which hears or reads them. Then this mind may make a judgement about corresponding with reality.
Quoting Dan
This is another excellent example of how your begging the question misleads you into misunderstanding. Relativity theory assumes that motions are relative, as you say. However, physicists do not take this "to be objectively true", they take it, and use it as a useful theory. Relativity theory was developed by Galileo who noticed that planetary motions could be described by either the geocentric model, or the heliocentric model. Even though he recognized that the true model is the heliocentric model, he realized that truth was not necessary in representing motions. As long as we produce a model which is useful for the required purpose, truth is completely irrelevant.
Your faulty premise, that people look for truth in theories, statements etc., rather than usefulness, misleads you into believing that physicists apply relativity theory as if they are applying objective truth. This is a mistake, because the founding principle of relativity theory is that truth is not important, and completely irrelevant, because all that matters is usefulness. Then your argument, which concludes that relativity would be objectively true if taken to be true, is a matter of begging the question from that faulty premise, because in reality "true" if applied to relativity theory would mean useful. Science uses a pragmatic theory of "truth", where "true" means useful, especially for prediction.
Quoting Dan
The issue is "choice", therefore the nature of "judgement" ought not be dismissed in this way.
Quoting Dan
"Objective truth" has no meaning for you, it's just something you assert. You assert that statements of claim have "objective truth" independent of any minds judging them as true. But this is unintelligible, meaningless nonsense.
Quoting Dan
There's a lot more to my claim than that. A statement needs to be interpreted, compared to the thing which it is a statement about, and then it can be judged for truth or not. You seem to believe that a statement either corresponds with something, or it does not, and that's all there is to it. That belief is both useless and meaningless.
Quoting Dan
You are intentionally ignoring the point. Whether or not there is a correct answer is what is the meaningless question. You know, like we discussed already, we could assume that there is an "objectively correct" answer, but we''ll never know whether we have it, so the assumption is meaningless to us. So the assumption of a "right answer" is completely useless because ti makes no difference to us whether we assume it or not.
What is at issue is whether we can agree on something. If we agree, then we have something to work with. If we are working on it then we must believe it is right, each of us individually with a subjective belief. Whether or not the thing we agree on is "right" in some transcendent (objective) sense, is irrelevant. All that matters is that we agree, because agreement allows us to get things done. And we don't need to stop and worry about whether we are doing "the right" thing, because we've already agreed that it needs to be done therefore we do believe it is the right thing. But if someone else comes along, and disagrees, then we need to start all over again, and look for agreement with that person.
Quoting Dan
The criteria for justification is agreement. Isn't this obvious to you? If you demonstrate your reasons for believing what you do, and the other person agrees, it has been justified. If the other does not, it has not been justified. If some agree and others do not, then there is more work to be done, to complete your justification.
Quoting Dan
OK, then let's dispense with all ideas about "objectivity" here. You've been claiming "objective truth", and "objective right", and I've explained that these terms only make sense to me in a religious structure. To me, assuming such things as "truth exists", and "rights exist", is just as bizarre as the religious claims of "God exists". So for the sake of agreement, and having a starting point, can we get rid of all such bizarre statements about "objectivity", and start from the bottom, the subject?
People do often look for usefulness, but you are assuming that scientists are not interested in getting at the actual truth of reality. I would say instead that they are, but they are aware that they are always making their best guesses at truth and can never be completely certain that anything they have discovered is correct or not. This does not imply that the truth of the matter is not sought, but rather an acceptance of the limitations of the discipline.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what you mean by this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, it has very clear meaning. If you are unable to understand it, I don't think that fault lies with me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I seem to believe that there is something to correspond to. That there are facts about the world that would be true whether or not we believed them. I think this assumption also underlies a lot of your claims, but you seem to disagree.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, it makes a big difference. If we assume there is a right answer to questions, we might have reason to seek it. If we don't assume there is a right answer, or that anything is true independant of our believing it, then we need not search for evidence, or engage in logical reasoning, we can just make up whatever shit we like instead.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, what matters is whether it is right. Even if we all agreed that killing children for fun was the right thing to do and set about trying to accomplish this end, we would still be wrong and we still shouldn't do it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How do we tell if others agree if the fact of their agreement is determined wholly by our beliefs, as is, presumably, the fact of their existence?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Objective truth is the bottom of any subject worth discussing. Assuming that there is a right answer to get to, that there is a world beyond just whatever we believe, is necessary to have any kind of sensible discussion. So no, we can't avoid this assumptions. We must make them. I've been willing to allow a lot of silly assumptions and definitions for the sake of argument, but I'm afraid I cannot make any assumption do away with the assumption that truth is objective.
As for "right" being objective, that is what I mean by "right". It is possible that such a thing as objective morality doesn't exist, that moral error theory is correct, but "right" as I understand the term, isn't subjective.
On an entirely different note, looking into something like Logical Armageddon (also called Logical Explosion) may be helpful in seeing that the idea that truth can be subjective (inasmuch as this implies contradictory premises) is problematic. I'm not going to get into the argument here though, as this discussion is already fairly bloated.
But "facts about the world" are statements about the world. Who judges what qualifies as "about the world", and makes the appropriate statements rather than some other statements, if not "we"? Do you not see that someone must choose "the correct" statements about the world, and make them, for there to be existent facts about the world? Or do you believe that every possible statement is already made, so that includes all the facts and also all the falsities?
Quoting Dan
If we did not assume that there was an objectively "right", or objectively "true" answer, then "usefulness" would be what we seek in our theories, our answers, and reasoning. And, for the most part the evidence of modern science supports that this is the case. The capacity to predict is what is generally sought in science, as the means toward usefulness.
Quoting Dan
It's not hard to tell that others agree, they say so, just like you and I say that we disagree with each other.
Quoting Dan
OK, let's assume that there is such a thing as "objective truth", as you insist that this must be the starting point. Do you agree that we are on the path toward objective truth if we recognize that objective truth is not what directs us in our actions? What directs us, is our wants, needs, desires, our intentions.
No, facts about the world are not statements. The world is as it is, regardless of what we say about it. Statements and facts are not the same thing. Things aren't "chosen" to be true, they just are.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what this kind of "usefulness" even means. Things like predictive power don't make sense if there isn't an external world that has phenomena in it to be predicted.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But presumably they only exist to they extent that we believe in them on your view, and agree or disagree to the extent that we believe that. If I decided that you agreed with me, would that mean there was no sense in discussing the point anymore?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what this means, so I don't know whether I agree.
I don't see why you can't understand the problems with what you are arguing. "Facts about the world" implies two distinct things to make it coherent; what is referred to with "facts", and what is referred to with "the world". Likewise, "the world is as it is" implies a similar subject/predicate division. There is "the world" which is referred to, and there is "as it is" which is referred to. These two referents, "the world" and "facts" in the one case, and "the world" and "as it is" in the other case, are the two things which are judged to correspond, in a judgement of "truth".
Now, the "facts" cannot be a part of "the world", because then we would need facts about those facts, and facts about those facts, and this would cause infinite regress, denying the possibility that any facts are complete, because no facts could include facts about themselves without implying a vicious circle. This means that we must assign to "the facts" a separate realm, a separate part of reality from "the world", in a form of dualism, allowing "the facts" to transcend "the world". We could say that "the facts" exist in God's mind, or we could just assign to them their own separate realm distinct from the world without even invoking God. However, this choice, at this time, is not important.
What is important though, is for you to recognize that if we deny the existence of "God", because we do not understand what it would mean for God to "exist", then to be consistent we need to exclude the existence of such objective "facts" for the very same reason.
Therefore, when you choose to proceed from principles which exclude God, for the reasons you describe, we must also exclude "facts" in as similar way, by applying those same principles. This we must do, to maintain consistency. Then we must revise statements like the following:
We cannot assume that there is a "right answer to get to", because we've excluded the reality of a "right answer", with the argument that we do not know what it could mean for the right answer to "exist".
I propose therefore, that we start with a different principle, something like this: 'The individual subject ought to try to do one's personal best, in the particular circumstances, of one's unique situation'. Notice, that this principle does not require the assumption of "the existence of the best possible answer" in an objective sense. It requires only the assumption of "one's personal best", which is a subjective sense of "best possible answer".
Quoting Dan
The issue is not whether there is "a world". That we can take for granted. So there is no problem with the term "usefulness", it refers to the means we employ toward achieving our ends within our world.
The question is whether there is such a thing as "facts about the world". This produces a dualism between "the world", and "facts about the world". You imply that you accept such a dualism when you refer to "an external world" here, already implicitly invoking the internal/external division.
Quoting Dan
Generally yes, an agreed upon principle becomes an established "fact", so to speak, forming the grounds for conceptual structure. That thing we call 'the sun", that is "the moon", "1" stands for the numerical value of one, and "2'" stands for the numerical value of two, for example. Once we have agreement we can quit discussing what we ought to call these things, and move on toward more elaborate conceptual structures. But if we meet someone who does not agree, then we need to either discuss again, to justify our principles, or change and adapt the principles to allow the other's perspective, or simply exclude the other as not reasonable.
Quoting Dan
What I was saying, is that we might assume "objective truth", if you insist. But then as we work toward our goal of understanding and obtaining the objective truth, as you describe our goal ought to be, we would come to understand that the goal of objective truth is not what guides and directs the vast majority of human beings in the vast majority of actions. In reality even philosophers who seek objective truth in philosophy, do not seek it in their mundane activities, which is the majority of their activities. And the majority of people are not even philosophers seeking objective truth in philosophy. They only appeal to "objective truth" in cases of disagreement, as I explained. But the majority of human actions are carried out without interference or objections from people disagreeing, causing the need to appeal to "objective truth".
You seem to want our judgements about truth, or facts, or anything else, to be the thing itself, and they just aren't. I put it to you that there exists a world beyond what we believe in. And that world is some way. I'm not sure why you think that having facts about facts would be a vicious circle. I think we could certainly say there are facts about facts (eg, if "the earth is round" is true, then it is also true that the earth is round is true, but this seems largely meaningless and inoffensive). That's not a regress, that's just a case of there being infinitely many true propositions, but only some of them really telling us anything worthwhile.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I only don't understand what it would mean to discuss the existence of God without the assumption of objective truth. I do assume that the truth is objective, and so I understand what it would mean for God to exist. The reason I don't think He does isn't that I don't understand the claim. I was pointing out the incoherence of your worldview, not expressing my own.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have no idea what this "ought" means in this context. Also, I don't know what it means to do one's best if one is right no matter what.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think it does produce a dualism. Your argument above certainly doesn't show that.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, objective truth isn't the main goal behind most of our mundane actions. I'm not really sure why that matters though.
Also, the assumption of objective truth does matter quite a lot when it comes to our mundane activities given that we presumably care about their outcomes etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, you aren't being reasonable. The view you hold here is not reasonable. But, good news, I have decided you actually do believe in objective truth so there is no further need to discuss the point.
OK, so you propose a dualism, what is referred to by "the world", and what is referred to by "some way" that the world is.
I put it to you that this dualism is fundamentally incorrect. Time is passing, and as time passes things change. Therefore there is no such thing as "the way that the world is". Your claim that the world is "some way" is demonstrably incorrect through demonstrations of empirical evidence. The theory of special relativity shows this quite clearly. The fact that time is passing makes "the way that the world is" best understood as perspective (frame) dependent, and this way of understanding, is to assume that there is no such thing as "the way that the world is".
Furthermore, since moral philosophy deals with human activities, actions, which require the premise that the world is actively changing, in order to properly understand human actions, your proposal (the "world is some way)" would leave us incapable of producing a moral philosophy. Your premise that the "world is some way", is inconsistent, and incompatible with the true premise, that the world is active and changing. Therefore this premise of yours that the "world is some way", would seriously mislead us, make moral philosophy unintelligible, leaving us incapacitated in that faculty.
This is why I tried to explain to you, that first and foremost, prior to proceeding into any moral philosophy, it is necessary to have a very clear understanding of the nature and reality of time and change. This provides the ontological basis which makes moral philosophy intelligible. Without this, one might start from a faulty ontological principle such as that the "world is some way", which would make true moral philosophy impossible.
This problem commonly manifests as the is/ought distinction. The premise "the world is some way" is an "is' premise. The "ought" premise assumes that the world is actively changing, and there is a way which we as human beings, should act within this active world.
Quoting Dan
As I've been trying to tell you, "objective truth" is irrelevant to moral philosophy. If there is such a thing, it falls within the category of your ontological assumption that the "world is some way". This is an ontological assumption which is fundamentally incompatible with the ontological assumption required for moral philosophy that "the world is actively changing".
Quoting Dan
You state it yourself, as a dualism. There is "a world", and there is "some way" that the world is. Obviously these two are not the same, because then you would just state "there is a world". However, if this is really your desired starting point, we can apply Aristotle's law of identity, and claim that by the law of identity (a thing is the same as itself), the world, and the way the world is, are one and the same.
If you take this approach, you still need to allow for the reality of change, activity within the world to be able to proceed into moral philosophy which deals with activities. And change requires potential, the possibility of change, so we still need a basic dualism which allows for a separation between "the world" (the way that the world is, being one and the same as the world), and the real possibilities for change. The way that the world is, is changing, and this implies real possibility, potential.
Now, the dualism proposed here is not the traditional dualism of "the world", and statements or ideas about the world (the world and the way the world is), it is a dualism of "the actual" and "the potential". We must allow that both of these aspects of the world are equally real, but mutually exclusive, in the way of a dichotomy. Also, each must be accepted as equally important to any moral philosophy.
This, I propose to you, is the way to deal with the two incompatible principles which you desire to employ, moral consequentialism (based in the assumed reality of what actually "is"), and the freedom of the individual (based in the assumed reality of potential, possibility). But you need to understand the dichotomy, and how the two are based in incompatible principles, due to the difference between "being" (what is), and "becoming" (change). So we represent them as a dichotomy due to the reality that they are incompatible.
This is nonsense. To the extent that time is relative to the speed one is going, that itself is a fact about the world.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm really not proposing any dualism. I'm proposing there's a real world and we're just living in it, rather than making worlds all our own from whatever tosh we happen to believe.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to be taking "there is some way the world is" to mean "there is some way the world is and nothing ever changes". I'm fairly sure the two don't mean anything like the same thing. You are infering things that I am not implying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you are arguing with a claim I haven't made.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm fairly sure that isn't an assumption required to make a normative statement, though I suppose it depends what you mean by changing. Either way, it is an argument against a point I haven't made.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
One, it isn't irrelevant, it is necessary to have any discussion about what if any moral truths there are. Two, I haven't claimed that the world doesn't change.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, they aren't different things. I suppose you might think of them as qualitatively different inasmuch as the world might be one way today, but something might change tomorrow, but this is mostly nit pickery. Further, there are lots of things that we might say are different from the world without implying a dualism. I have a pen on my desk, and the pen isn't the world, it's just a part of it, but this isn't a dualist claim. Similarly, saying that the world has properties or there are facts about the world to learn isn't a dualist claim. It is all entirely consistent with physicalism.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what you mean by claiming that the possibilities are equally real but I'm fairly sure I don't need to claim that. Further, I'm not convinced this is dualism in any sensible sense of the word.
Again, there is no incompatibilitiy there at all. I would suggest that all moral theories, including consequentialism, require the freedom of the individual to work at all, as ought implies can and, presumably, "can do otherwise". Without freedom, there can be no normative force. Further, consequentialism is all about change, all about the consequences of some action.
Do you not agree that moral philosophy deals with human activity? And, to adequately understand "activity" of any kind requires an understanding of time.
Quoting Dan
No, that's not the meaning I am assuming.
I assume that in the phrase "the way the world is", "is" implies the present time. However, our sense observation (empirical data) indicates that the world is always changing at the present time. Since the world is changing (in flux) at the present time, it is impossible that there is a specifiable "way that the world is", because "is" implies the present time. This is the basic fact which Einstein takes advantage of with his principle called "the relativity of simultaneity".
I don't know how this relates to what I said. I would say that moral philosophy deals with the activity of moral agents, which includes but is not limited to, most adult humans. Whether I would say that understanding an activity requires an understanding of time depends on what you mean by this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't really imply that as we can zoom out temporarily rather than trying to specify a present moment which as past by the time we express the point. Though, this is largely irrelevant as, again, points such as whether time is relative to speed are themselves claims about the way the world is. Even being in a constant state of flux is a claim about the way the world is.
I mean, that since time is an essential aspect of activities, then to correctly understand any activity requires a correct understanding of time. For example, animality is an essential aspect of being human, so to correctly understand what it means to be human requires an understanding of what it means to be an animal.
Quoting Dan
You are attempting to avoid the issue rather than address it.
If we "zoom out", such that "the present" is a day, a month, a year, or a million years, then the changes which are occurring at the present, get increasingly significant as we zoom out, and it makes less and less sense to even think that there is "way that the world is". And if we zoom in, the changes get faster and faster, and it becomes more and more clear that change is of the essence of the world, rather than any assumed state of being (way that the world is).
So if we "zoom out" the maximal amount, like you suggest, we end up being able to make the most general statement only, "the world is changing", or " a constant state of flux". That is supposed to be "the way the world is". This is just like your claim, that even if there is no "objective truth", that there is no objective truth would be an objective truth. Then we could choose to interpret "the world is changing" as indicating that this is the way that the world is (your interpretation), or that there is no such thing as the way that the world is (my interpretation. We'd both be right, with contradictory meaning.
All this does is provide a good demonstration to justify my claim, that "objective truth", or "the way the world is" is completely irrelevant to moral philosophy. This is because "objective truth" can only refer to the most zoomed out, general statements, while moral philosophy needs to apply to the particular actions of here and now.
Again, this is the separation between "is" and "ought". "What is" is a general statement indicating a static condition of things, while "what ought to be done" is a specific action unique to the particular circumstances of individual persons here and now. Until you demonstrate how one might be related to the other, your starting point of "what is" remains irrelevant" to "what ought to be done".
Eh, I'm not sure that this is true. Perhaps to fully understand an activity requires an understanding of time, but I think this is a very high bar you are setting for understanding an activity. I think one can understand making scrambled eggs with a fairly low-level of understanding of the nature of time itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If that is indeed true, then that is the way the world is. I am not assuming a staticness.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Mine would be right. Yours would be silly. If the world is constantly changing, that is a fact about the world that is important to know.
Also, I didn't suggest zooming out to the maximal amount. Again, that is something you have added in there. I suggested that we could zoom out. For example, when describing a river, it is silly to describe the position of each water molecule because (apart from practical considerations) they're moving. Likewise, we might seek to describe the physical laws of our universe, the phenomena we find in a particular location (for example, on earth), the logical laws that apply in all possible universes, etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, none of that is correct. I'm not totally sure what assumptions are lying behind this, but this claim is fairly obviously just wrong. A claim about something happening at a particular time and place can be true or false just as a claim about something happening throughout the universe can be true or false.
Also, I would say that moral truths, if they indeed exist, are necessary truths so are true in all possible worlds at all possible times, and we ought to apply those truths to the situations we find ourselves in.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What is, especially when it comes to the is-ought gap, does not indicate a static condition of things at all. That is completely wrong. It indicates a descriptive claim as opposed to a normative one. "Ought" when it comes to the is-ought gap, refers not only to specific actions, but also general moral rules and indeed normative claims of all types. This is just a misunderstanding of the is-ought gap.
As for how one might relate to the other, there are some ways in which they relate. The most obvious being that ought implies can (and can do otherwise), so the situation one is in and what actions they are capable of taking limit the space of things it can be the case that they ought to do.
Also, I would suggest that normative claims are also claims about objective facts, just objective moral facts. That an action being right, or wrong, or good, or bad, is also a part of objective reality to be discovered.
I know, I expected a reply like this. You and I have significant difference in how we understand "understand". You seem to think that if a person can recognize a thing, and call it by the appropriate name, the person "understands" that thing. That's how you described "understanding one's choice".
But you are clearly inconsistent with your usage of the term. Now, to suit your purpose, you want a "low-level understanding of the nature of time" not to qualify as "understanding", though you insisted on an extremely low level, in the other case.
To understand "making scrambled eggs" one must understand temporal order, which action is first, second, and after this and after that. In "understanding" any human action, it is necessary to recognize the temporal order of means to end. The means are carried out as the actions necessary to bring about the end, which follows the means in time, as the effect of the causes. Also, in the case of your example, scrambled eggs, as in most cases, the means are most often very complex, requiring a temporal order of causes and effects within the means required to bring about the final effect, the end, which is named "scrambled eggs".
Quoting Dan
You contradict yourself. "The way the world is" implies a staticness. That is unavoidable, "the way it is" indicates one unchanging thing "the way". Any change and it could no longer be called "the way" it would be a different "way". We cannot say "the way it is" without implying staticness because "the way" implies one unchanging "way".
This is why, if someone says "changing is the way that the world is", it's meaningless incoherency which can be interpreted in the two opposing ways I explained. You say that this means "change" is the one "objective truth" that we have about the world. I say that this means that that there is no "objective truth" about the world. I say that the statement "changing is the way that the world is", ought to be interpreted as a descriptive opinion about the world, rather than an objective truth. But you do not seem to understand what it means to accept a statement as meant to be a subjective description which people can either agree or disagree with, rather than as meant to be an objective truth.
This is where we have significant disagreement concerning the actions and communications of human beings. You think that communications and actions are in general, directed and guided by ideas about objective truth, while I think that actions and communications are guided and directed by subjective opinions concerning personal wants and desires. What I tell you is that the idea of "objective truth" only starts to influence our actions and communication when there is disagreement.
Quoting Dan
The requirements for the description are context dependent. When attempting to understand flow patterns, erosion, etc., it is very beneficial to understand the activity of individual water molecules. This is studied in hydraulics and wave features.
This is the point. The most general statements, (most zoomed out), "the world is this way..." are completely useless in guiding human actions because they have no applicability. Applicability is determined by the particular circumstances. And, the particular circumstances are a feature of the individual's wants, needs, desires, or intentions. So if the person's intent is to make a map of the river, the description required is completely different from the description required if the person is trying to understand flow patterns and erosion.
Therefore "context dependent" refers to the person's intentions. The context which determines what is required of the description, is the person's intentions. So the requirements for the description, whether zoomed in or zoomed out, are "context dependent", where "context" is intention.
Quoting Dan
Since you are going to keep insisting this, without explanation as to how this is possible, as you've done in other instances, I'm going to ask for justification. How does "what is" refer to anything other than a static unchanging situation, without the attempt at justification reducing the statement to meaningless incoherency? As I said above "the way it is" refers to one unchanging way, as does "what is". If "change" is invoked, then a before and after in time is also implied, and this negates "is", which refers to the present, "now". Then you no longer have "is', but a temporal distinction between two distinct times, before and after.
Quoting Dan
You haven't justified "objective moral fact". Nor have you justified that "the situation one is in" refers to anything other than the context of one's intentions, as I explained above. So none of this has any bearing on the understanding of human actions until these assumptions you throw around can be justified.
That isn't remotely how I described understanding one's choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not being inconsistent in the least, but if you mean a low-level understanding, then I'd probably agree. Given your history, I thought it was unlikely you would be setting a low bar for understanding.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I'm not sure whether I understand time or not, but I have a reasonable guess. I think if this is the bar you are setting for understanding time (assuming that this understanding is correct, but let's not get into a discussion of time) then I think I would probably agree that understanding something like scrambing eggs probably implies some understanding of time.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't imply that. You are inferring that inappropriately.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't say it is the "one" objective truth. I said that if the world is in a constant state of change, then that is something that is true about the way the world is.
It's not a subjective description at all. It is an objective claim which may or may not be true. People certainly disagree about things that are objective all the time, it's just that some of them (sometimes all of them) are wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean this is fairly obviously not true. There are plenty of general statements about the way the world works that are also of practical importance to the individual and their goals. Further, whether something is useful to the individual and their goals is a completely different issue to whether it is correct.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Is" in the is-ought gap refers to descriptive claims, rather than normative claims. The point of the is-ought gap is that you cannot derive a normative conclusion from non-normative premises. Premises can be descriptive without refering to only a single time, for example they might describe a process that occurs over time.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Are you asking me to justify the words or the claims here, I'm unclear? Do you really need me to justify what "the situation one is in" refers to in the context I've used it here?
OK, It looks like we finally have some agreement on something. Understanding of human actions "implies some understanding of time". From this, we can also conclude that a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human actions.
Since moral philosophy is an attempt to understand and evaluate human actions we can conclude that the moral philosopher requires sound premises regarding the nature of time. Therefore "a discussion of time" is not to be avoided, but is a necessity.
Quoting Dan
Again, you keep making stupid assertions like this without any justification. I explained very clearly how "the way the world is" implies staticness. Allow me to reiterate:
"The way" implies one way. And "one way" implies unchanging. If the world was changing (unstatic) at the time designated by "is" (now), we could not truthfully call it "the way" the world is, we'd have to say "the ways" which the world is (now).
I'm really tired of such stupid assertions, where you simply ignore my logical demonstrations and make a contrary (stupid) assertion.
Quoting Dan
This is simple begging the question, in the way I explained. You assume that the statement "changing is the way that the world is" is meant to represent an objective truth, rather than what the author claims, that it is meant to represent a subjective opinion. And this assumption provides the conclusion you desire "if the world is in a constant state of change...". That's begging the question, making an assumption which produces the desired conclusion.
You do not seem to have a firm understanding of ontology and metaphysics. Propositions in these fields are speculative, and not meant as "objective truth". These are like unproven hypotheses in science. They are not proposed as objective truths, they are proposed as theories to try with evidence and logic, in a procedure which would hopefully lead toward understanding.
So we can take your representation "the world is in a constant state of change", or my representation, "changing is the way that the world is", and analyze such propositions for the potential of truth. Now we can see that each representation is self-contradicting in the way described above. "State of change" is incoherent by contradiction, as well as "changing is the way" is incoherent by contradiction, as explained above.
Therefore opinions like those, which appear to express what is intended as "objective truth" must be rejected because of incoherence. This leaves us with two distinct and incompatible approaches, the approach of staticness, "the world is in a constant state", and the approach of activity, "the world is changing". Empirical evidence supports the latter, "the world is changing". Now we must dismiss all such propositions which appear to express opinions intended as objective truth, as inadequate for an accurate ontology, metaphysics, and consequently moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
Right, but can't you see that "descriptive claims" are essentially claims about "the way the world is"? These are claims which are intended to purvey an "objective truth". And, as explained above, this approach is inadequate for ontology and metaphysics. And, because this approach produces faulty ontology and metaphysics, it is also a faulty approach for moral philosophy.
So ontology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy must assign priority to change, as changing is how we actually know the world. Once the world is understood to be known as changing, rather than misunderstood to be known by descriptive claims, which imply "objective truth" (is), then we seek normative claims which involve judgements concerning good and bad changes (ought).
Quoting Dan
Yes, that's exactly what you need to justify. And, the problem is as I've explained above. The "situation" is always rapidly changing, Therefore, in reality, what is actually happening in any real circumstances, is that there is activity which cannot be understood through descriptive claims intended to represent an "objective truth" concerning "the situation".
Furthermore, since this is what is actually going on (rapid changes), and the subject is conditioned to deal with what is actually going on, through evolutionary forces, these changes are understood through the context of intentions, wants, desires. Therefore reference to "the situation one is in" is meaningless and irrelevant. The person is in the midst of rapid changes, which are understood by that person in relation to (within the context of) what is intended, wanted, or desired by that person. The proposed "situation one is in" has no relevance.
If you really believe that "the situation one is in", is of any relevance here, you need to justify that opinion.
That doesn't follow. Requiring some understanding of something does not imply that having a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human action as one might have some understanding but also misunderstand something to with time
Also, I wouldn't agree that moral philosophy is an attempt to understand and evaluate human actions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
These are not stupid assertions. You keep claiming things that are blatently wrong and I am just pointing it out. It is as if you said "well obviously, 'time' implies the use of an armadillo as a sundial" and I am simply pointing out that this is obviously incorrect.
The way something is does not imply it is the only way it ever will be. You are asserting that it does, but it just doesn't. That isn't a reasonable thing to infer from what I said.
Also, while I have been granting your assertion that the world constantly changes for the sake of pointing out that this would be a feature of the way the world is, there are plenty of things about the world that presumably do not change, such as the fundamental laws of physics, and things which don't change across all possible worlds, such as necessary truths.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If you genuinely mean that as a subjective opinion similar to "I don't like tomatoes" then why are you telling me and why should I care?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is just incorrect. Certainly there are some metaphysicians who are happy to spout similar nonsense, but it certainly isn't the case that metaphysics does not aim at objective truth as a rule. Also, unproven theories in science are proposed as suggestions of what the objective truth might be, or at least some approximation of it, to be tested when possible.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's not a contradiction because you are adding an assumption of staticness which you aren't entitled to.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
None of this makes a lick of sense. Even if it were the case that what I said implied staticness, which it doesn't, none of this would follow from it. To say that truth is objective certainly does not imply that the world never changes. That is fairly clearly silly.
Also, I'm not sure you get to appeal to empirical evidence as support for a position without the assumption of objective truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The claims of ontology and metaphysics are descriptive claims about the way the world (or possibly worlds) is (or possible are). They are very much concerned with objective truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what any of this means. It looks to me like you don't understand what many of the words you are using mean.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think you have understood what I was talking about at all here as you seem to have gone off on a weird tangent that has very little to do with it. But sure, I will explain why how the situation one is in relates to what it can be the case that one ought to do.
Hitler killing millions of Jewish people was a bad thing. One might think that I should prevent him from doing so. However, the situation I find myself in is that this happened many years before I was born and, alas, I have no time machine. Thus, I cannot do this. Because I cannot do this (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to do it.
Similarly let's say I come across a child drowning on my way home from work. One might think that I ought to jump in and save the child. However, for the sake of argument, I am paralyzed from the neck down and so cannot do so (also there is no way I can use my hypothetical wheelchair to push a stick over to them etc etc etc). Since I cannot jump in and save the child (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to (though perhaps I ought to call for help or something else that I am capable of).
These examples demonstrate the way in which ought implies can and how the situation we find ourselves in is relevant to this.
It doesn't follow, for you, because you didn't follow the argument. That is evident from this misrepresentation. Allow me to restate it please.
The argument starts from the primary premise which you and I agreed on, "understanding of human actions implies some understanding of time". "Implies" here, indicates that "some understanding of time" is necessary to understanding "human actions", as an essential part of the concept indicated by "human actions". That word "implies" indicates the logical relation, some understanding of time is required for an understanding of human actions. Do you understand the premise?
Now the second premise is "a misunderstanding of time". "Misunderstanding" means something other than understanding, as we've discussed earlier. A person thinks oneself to understand, and appears to oneself as having an understanding, but the thing which appears to the person as an understanding, is not an understanding at all, it is something other than an understanding, and actually opposed to understanding, so it is properly called "misunderstanding".
The conclusion drawn from those two premises is that the person who has a misunderstanding of time will necessarily have a misunderstanding of "human actions". This is because the concept "human actions" is dependent on "some understanding of time", and "misunderstanding of time" signifies a lack of understanding, something other than understanding. which appears like understanding but is not. Therefore, what appears to the person as an understanding of "human actions" would really be a misunderstanding, according to the extent that "understanding time" is required, necessary, or essential to, "understanding human actions", indicated by that word "implies".
Quoting Dan
There you go, backing up your use of stupid assertions with more stupid assertions. We'll have an infinite regress of stupid assertions, with nothing justified. How is the statement "you are blatantly wrong" supposed to indicate anything to me other than how stupid you are?
Have you ever been in this situation? You demonstrate to someone what you believe to be sound logic, premises backed up with good evidence, and arguments of valid logic, and the person replies "you're blatantly wrong". So you provide more evidence and logic, and the person persists with "that's simply incorrect". Wouldn't it occur to you, that the person is just countering sound logic with stupid assertions?
Quoting Dan
I made no such assertion, that's a complete misrepresentation. I said "the way something is" refers to something static, unchanging, as "the way", and "is" refers to the present time, now. I never said that this implies that it hasn't changed in the past, or that it implies that it will not change in the future. So your representation of what I said is clearly wrong.
But I also said that the proposition "there is a way the world is" is contrary to evidence. This is because evidence indicates that the world is changing at the present time, now, which is what "is" refers to. So your statement "the way something is" indicates something unchanging at the present, now, while allowing that this static condition of now, might change in the future, or past.
This statement is clearly contrary to reality. In reality, known by empirical evidence, things do not change in the past, nor do they change in the future, they change only at the present, now. That is the only time when change occurs, at the present. So the evidence is clear, you are the one who is blatantly wrong. Things are not static now, as "the way something is" indicates, with the possibility of change in the past and future, in reality things are changing now, with the possibility that the named thing might be the same in the past or future.
Quoting Dan
I'm adding no extra assumptions, "constant state", were your words, and "state" implies static.
Quoting Dan
Again, an unsupported assertion, which is the basis of the fallacy of begging the question, that you commit.
Quoting Dan
Are you presenting this as evidence of how important an understanding of time is to moral philosophy. That's what I argued since the beginning. And I also said that the biggest, most significant restriction on one's freedom is that the past cannot be changed. Both you and Amadeus dismissed this fact as irrelevant to moral philosophy.
Now I see that you are starting to understand how time actually does restrict one's freedom to act. You call it "the situation", but if you keep looking at your example, you'll see that the description names time as applying the restriction. This is indicated by the condition "I have no time machine". This shows that if you had a time machine, the restriction would not apply, therefore it is time rather than "the situation" which is limiting your freedom.
Quoting Dan
I don't see your argument. What you "ought to do" is determined by intention, not the situation. As I said, the context is the intention, the context is not the situation. Intention dictates the end, the situation dictates the means. So if "ought to save the child" indicates the good intention, then you ought to do this regardless of the situation. This means that if the situation limits your means, it only makes the task more difficult. You can't swim, so you think of the stick method. That doesn't work so you try something else, etc. etc. etc., maybe even call for help.
The fact that you provide all these different alternatives indicates that you recognize "ought" belongs to the intention, "save the child" in this case, and not to any particular one of the specified means, which are dictated by the situation. "Ought" therefore, is not restricted by the situation, nor is it restricted by what is apprehended as what "can" be done. We must allow that it transcends the situation, as intention transcends the situation, inspiring us to find the means to get through seemingly impossible situations.
This issue of "ought" being restricted by the situation is very similar to the issue of "ought" being restricted by "the information which one has". This is a defeatist attitude which allows "the good" (what is intended), to be compromised unnecessarily by the way that one perceives "the situation". This is is conducive to cop outs, excuses, and rationalizations as to why one did not do what ought to have been done. Sorry, I was limited by the circumstances".
When you allow "ought" to be restricted by the situation, or by the information which one has, then you need a whole slew of other principles applicable in all the different circumstances, to determine, at what point do I stop trying to find ways to save the child, at what point do i stop seeking further information. To properly deal with this problem, we need to allow that "ought" transcends the situation. Therefore, "situation" is irrelevant, as I said.
I mean, I don't agree that implies indicates necessity, but putting that to one side, are you suggesting that to misunderstand something is to not understand it at all surely there are degrees of understanding?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'll thank you to keep your rudeness to yourself.
Also, that isn't remotely the situation you find yourself in. I am denying obviously incorrect claims that you haven't backed up properly. You haven't provided logic and evidence, you have provided fallacious arguments, usually backed by improper definitions of terms. Further, I am often explaining why you are wrong, but you seem to not be listening. For example, your points about the is-ought gap. I pointed out this was wrong and then explained what the is-ought gap is, and that you were using it improperly. You then responded "well how can the situation one is in affect morality?". Which a) was obvious from what I had just said, and b) wasn't remotely related to the point I was making. I could address the original point you were taking issue with as well, but that is discussed in the next paragraph.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, this seems both pedantic in the extreme and probably just incorrect depending on how we flesh out "now". But let's take a fairly everyday usage of "now" and say that the physical properties of the universe (where things are, what state they are in, etc etc) are changing now. That is a claim about the way the world is. The way it is, assuming you are right, is a state of flux. Also, there are a bunch of features of the universe that presumably aren't changing, such as the laws of physics, and things that hold true across all possible worlds which aren't changing, such as the laws of logic. None of this means we can't talk sensibly about the way the world is.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, that begging the question requires more than unsupported assertion. Second, I haven't committed that fallacy. Third, this is less an unsupported assertion, and more an explanation. I have pointed out the goal of metaphysics and ontology and explained that that is a goal directed at objective truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am using this as an example of the situation I am in, which includes the time I am in, meaning I can't do something and how this relates to the principle of ought implies can.
There is not something I am starting to understand here, so much as something I have understood from the off and am trying to explain to you as you seemed to misunderstand what I was saying.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, ought is not determined by intention. Ought is determined by morality, regardless of your intentions.
The reason I provided other explanations was I thought you might immediately start trying to dispute the example rather than addressing the point, which I can see you have done as well.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm fairly sure I didn't say that ought was restricted by merely the information that one has, as I very much left room for people to be wrong due to ignorance.
Further, it isn't defeatist to say that you only ought to do things you are able to do. It is realistic. Are you suggesting that people ought to do things that are impossible for them to do?
In my understanding, there is two distinct senses of "implied". One means what is indicated by evidence, the other means what is indicated by logic. The first sense does not produce necessity, because "evidence" does not provide the required certainty. The other sense, being valid logic, produces logical necessity. So for example, All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, "implies" that Socrates is mortal, by logical necessity.
The latter sense, the one of logical necessity is the one used in the argument about the relation between understanding time and understanding human actions. When we say that an understanding of human actions "implies" some understanding of time, it is a logical relation being referred to. We are saying that any understanding of human actions necessarily consists of some understanding of time, through a logical relation between "the understanding of human actions" and "the understanding of time". In the example above, when we say Socrates is a man "implies" that Socrates is mortal, we are referring to a relation of logical necessity between "man" and "mortal", in the very same way. Understanding human actions implies, due to logical necessity, some understanding of time.
With respect to the relation between degrees of understanding, and misunderstanding, this is what I tried to explain to you earlier, as two distinct things. When we are learning things, mathematics in school for example, we go through degrees of understanding as we increase our knowledge. Never can this be classified as "misunderstanding" unless the student learns a wrong thing, goes in a faulty direction. "Misunderstanding" consists of mistaken knowledge, when someone learns something which is wrong. Since it is mistaken, and wrong, it cannot be any degree of understanding.
Quoting Dan
I'll try, but since it is the lounge, inhibitions loosen, then spontaneity and habit guide the tongue.
Quoting Dan
Uh, continuing with the ...assertions. Look Dan, you assert that what I say is incorrect, and my arguments are fallacious, but you do not address them. You just assert, assert, assert.
Quoting Dan
This is incorrect for the following reasons. You explained how you interpret the meaning of the "is-ought gap", and I proceeded to show you how that understanding of the principle was completely consistent with what I was arguing, how I was "using" the is-ought gap..
See, I produced an application of that principle, the is-ought gap, I applied it to what we were arguing. Then you provided an understanding of the is-ought gap, and I showed you that your understanding is consistent with my application. However, instead of accepting my application, or even trying to demonstrate that it is not consistent with how you understand the principle, you simply denied my application, and asserted that I am wrong. Then you topped that off with something extremely rude, and downright stupid:
How can you proceed from the premise that you cannot understand me, to the conclusion that I do not understand myself?
Quoting Dan
This is an invalid implication. Consider how I explained the logical sense of "implies" above. Now, take a look at your proposition "the physical properties of the universe are changing now". Your claim is that this proposition implies something about "the way the world is". It does not, for the reasons I've already explained to you. Simply put, "the way the world is" implies that there is a way that the world is, while "the properties of the universe are changing" implies that there is not a way that the universe is, because it is in a condition of changing. There is no logical relation, therefore no logical necessity, because the two are incompatible.
See, you simply ignore the logic applied to the meaning of the terms, and insist and assert things which if accepted, render the words incoherent and meaningless. What's the point? We wouldn't be able to get anywhere if we accepted things like that.
You say this is pedantic, but pedanticism is extremely necessary here. We are trying to get a handle on moral principles, a field in which the deeper we delve into it, the less relevant empirical evidence becomes, due to the is-ought gap. Therefore the only thing we have to guide us, to keep us on the straight and narrow, is strict adherence to rigorous principles. Without that, we can claim anything as ought, right, good, etc..
Quoting Dan
No, you have merely asserted that. It is nothing but your opinion, and as I said, it's a principle you assert for the purpose of begging the question. If you know Plato, you would see that goals are named as "the good". And, you'd understand that "the good" is distinctly other from "objective truth". Again, the difference between the two denies the possibility of logical implication.
In that case I don't think I would agree that understanding human action implies understanding time in the sense you have said here.
I mean, one can absolutely misunderstand some element of mathematics yet still have a good understanding of mathematics generally. It seems that we can understand something reasonably well, but still misunderstand part of it, can't we?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then I suggest keeping your tongue off the keyboard.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have addressed them again and again. If you wish for evidence of this, I suggest looking at my many posts replying to you. You will find many examples of me addressing your assertions, pointing out dubious uses of words, etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You really shown that so much as made a bunch of dubious assertions about normative claims vs descriptive claims which seem to be rooted in misunderstanding and the implication that descriptive claims must be about something static, rather than something that may be dynamic/changing. If you did not mean to imply this, feel free to correct me and explain what you meant instead.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't say you didn't understand yourself, I said you don't understand what many of these words mean. These are clearly not the same claim (you are not equal to the definitions of words, in case that needed justifying). If you are using them in some way completely divorced from how they are generally used, feel free to provide definitions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you want "the way the world is" to mean more than it does. And, again, the condition of changing is a claim about the way something is, because "the way something is" does not imply that the thing is not changing.
"Is" can be used to refer to the state something is in at a particular time, or it can be used to refer to the state of something throughout time. On the first definition, it is entirely reasonable to say a number of things about the way the world is (for example it contains chairs). On the second, that it is in a state of constant flux (assuming that it is) would be a claim about the way the world always is. Further, as mentioned previously, there are a number of features of the world that do not change
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not ignoring the meaning of words, you're just incorrect about them both in the particular case of assuming that "the way something is" must refer to something that is unchanging and in the general case of assuming that words can only have a single meaning, rather than being context sensitive and capable of picking out multiple concepts depending on how they are used.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It really isn't. What is important is careful consideration of concepts, not nit-picking over words. I could have, by the same token, pointed out that the universe is not changing "now" if "now" is taken to be a specific moment, since everything is always exactly equal to itself so whatever state the universe is in within a specific moment is exactly what state it is in. Alternatively, I could have disputed the idea of a present moment by way of relativity. Neither of these would have been good points though. Better to deal with what you meant, rather than fretting over your word usage.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Putting aside to what extent Plato's views matter, are you genuinely claiming that Plato was not concerned with or aiming at objective truth?
Also, I've already explained to you that any worthwhile discussion relies on the assumption of objective truth. When Plato claims that the form of the good exists in the realm of the forms, he is claiming that this is objectively true, not just that he finds it fun to believe so. Whether he is right or not has an answer. There either is a form of the good somewhere in a Platonic realm, or there isn't.
It seems this is a hang up in the last couple of pages.
Fwiw, this (Dan's description) is patently true. Reducing "the way X is" to only ever apply to static description is not reasonable - particularly in the face of the user of the phrase telling you that's not baked in.
The digression has helped me to understand why you've spent the better part of a decade trying to do something which I quickly apprehended as impossible. Your approach is to 'loosen up' definitions, or the meanings of words, when two principles are incompatible, believing that using words in this sloppy way will make the two incompatible principles compatible. So for example, (I'm not saying that this is what you have done, I'm saying it's a similar example), if the traditional way to understand "free will" is incompatible with the traditional way of understanding "determinism", then if one could 'loosen up' the meaning of one or both of these terms, that person might create the appearance that the two are compatible. And so we have what is called "compatibilism".
I think that this is best described as sophistry. But the loosening up of definitions allows ambiguity and equivocation, which propagates misunderstanding. Further, the loosening up of the meaning of "understanding" allows you to say that you have a good understanding even though misunderstanding inheres within what you assume to "understand" ( "one can absolutely misunderstand some element of mathematics yet still have a good understanding of mathematics generally").
What you demonstrate is that you allow the incoherency of contradiction to penetrate deep within what you assume to be "understanding". You allow that a person might be judged as having a good understanding of X even though there are elements of misunderstanding within that supposed "understanding". This is a sneaky, sophistic way of violating the law of noncontradiction, by allowing that the contradictory property inheres within the affirmed one. 'Blackness inheres within the white of that objects.'
By not performing a proper analysis, and distinguishing which elements are understood, from which are misunderstood, and simply allowing the incoherent notion that misunderstanding inheres within understanding, you deny yourself the possibility of a true (real) understanding. You refuse to purge yourself of misunderstanding by accepting this incoherent idea that misunderstanding may be a part of a good understanding.
So, in summary, what you have demonstrated is that you "loosen up" definitions in the sophistic way. You do this to make opposing, incompatible principles appear to be compatible. This produces misunderstanding of basic, fundamental, and foundational, ontological principles. Then you argue that even if there is misunderstanding hidden deep within my claimed "understanding" it might still be a good understanding.
Back to the op. Succinctly stated, your belief that there is such a thing as "objective right" is incompatible with your belief that there is value in free choice. If there is such a thing as "objective right" then there must be an objectively right thing to do in every situation, and the objectively right thing to do would be assigned the highest value. Freedom of choice, which would allow a person to choose something other than the objectively right thing, therefore cannot be assigned any value.
So you 'loosen up' the meanings of these terms, to use them in a way which promotes the appearance of compatibility, but all this does is foster misunderstanding. The misunderstanding which is evident within your use of terms like "free choice", and "freedom", disables you from recognizing the incompatibility because it was designed to hide that incompatibility. However, the incompatibility cannot be vanquished by hiding it, so it persists and prevents you from adequately resolving the problem you present n the op. Now, instead of recognizing that this sloppy use of words has propagated misunderstanding, and this misunderstanding has veiled the true nature of that problem, you choose to argue that your "understanding" might still be a good one, even though misunderstanding inheres within it.
Sure, someone can use "square" in a way which does not exclude a circle from being a type of square, and assert "this is the way I choose to use that term", insisting that the other person in the discussion must accept such incoherency if they want to continue discussion, but what's the point? How could this be conducive to understanding?
In reality, if understanding is our goal, we must seek out such sloppy usage, define the boundaries of contradiction and adhere to them, thus annihilating the sloppy usage. So if someone insists that they want to use "state" or "the way X is" as a descriptive term which would include "actively changing" into the category of being a "state", I would simply dismiss myself from the discussion, recognizing it as conducive to misunderstanding rather than understanding, therefore not a productive discussion.
The matter of what the user of the phrase is demanding is not relevant. Each individual must make the judgement of what is reasonable, and what is not reasonable, for oneself. You judge what I am insisting on, two incompatible categories, as unreasonable. But I judge what you and Dan are insisting on, describing (what I apprehend as) two incompatible features of the world by the same terms, as unreasonable. We judge each other to be unreasonable, refuse to agree, and this makes discussion of that subject pointless.
As evidence of the pointlessness of accepting Dan's demands, and adhering to my principles, I point to Dan's claim of having spent close to a decade trying to resolve this problem. I argue that it is Dan's failure to establish clear boundaries of contradiction, thereby allowing contradiction and incoherency to permeate the usage of words which is being demanded, which creates the illusion to Dan, that an unresolvable problem might be resolved. Therefore Dan obliviously trudges onward failing to recognize where the unreasonableness really lies.
I'm not using words in a sloppy way. I'm using them in a precise way, just not the way you want them to be used.
My difficulties solving the problem of weighing freedom over different things do not come from dubious definitions, but from difficulty. Moral philosophy is hard and, while I am not dismissing the possibility of incompatibility completely, the reasons you have given for thinking that weighing freedoms is impossible in the way I have described are grounded in fundamentally misunderstanding the claims being made and the words used to make them, as well as untenable meta-ethical and meta-physical beliefs.
Objective right also does not conflict with freedom being valuable. For example, if the thing which is objectively right is the thing which protects the most freedom (which is not my view, but is an example of a maximizing view with the same measure of value) then that is surely treating freedom as valuable.
Further, I am not using terms in a way similar to defining square in a way that can include circles (though there are certainly contexts in which this could be entirely reasonable, eg "a square meal"), I am using words in a fairly common way to communicate sensible points.
You have not used "understand" in a precise way at all. In fact, you complained about my request for precision in meaning when we discussed what it means to understand one's own choice. You wanted to allow 'understand" to mean anything from being able to provide a reason for the choice, after the fact, to simply being able to describe the choice with words. Now, you state that a good understanding can consist of elements of misunderstanding. That's incoherency, and clear evidence of sloppy usage.
Quoting Dan
Your example only demonstrates the incoherency which results from the incompatibility. If "objectively right" is taken as a general principle, "protect the most freedom", then each person in each situation which one finds oneself in, must have the most freedom to choose, and this implies that there is not an objectively right choice to be made.
The incompatibility is between the general and the particular. If there is an objectively right choice in particular circumstances, then the value of freedom must be denied in favour of the value of the objectively right choice. The freedom to choose can have no value relative to the need for the objectively right action. And if "objectively right" is taken as a general principle to state "the most freedom is what is objectively right", then the person must be allowed the most freedom, to choose whatever one wants to do in any circumstances. This leaves us no principles to determine what is "the right choice".
Of course you try to find your way around this problem by restricting "freedom of choice" to "freedom to make one's own choice", where the meaning of "one's own choice', we've already seen, gets lost in sloppy usage.
Quoting Dan
"The way the world is" indicates a static unchanging thing signified as "the way". To affirm that you use "the way" with meaning which could include change, is no different, in principle from saying that you use the word "square" in such a way so that it could include circles. If we say that there is such a thing as circles, then it would be contradictory to say that all figures are squares. Likewise, if the world is said to be changing then it is contradictory to say that there is such a thing as "the way the world is". What would be the purpose of the usage you propose, if not to create misunderstanding and/or to deceive?
I did not want that. You were the one that claimed I was including "providing reasons after the fact". That is not something I claimed at all. Also yes, I think you can have a good understanding of something that you misunderstand elements of. However, that is discussing understanding in a general sense, rather than the specific sense of understanding one's choices, which I gave you a precise definition for, which you completely ignored.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
None of that is correct. First, I'm not sure what it means to take "objective right" as a general principle. There being a right choice does not limit one's freedom.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The objectively right action would be the action which protects the most freedom. There isn't two different measures of value here, there is one measure of value to determine what is action is right (and again, this isn't what I would say, as I am a satisficing consequentialist, so I would say there are often multiple morally permissible actions, I'm just simplifying it for you).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not sloppy at all. Really quite clear. I would indeed limit the right to only protecting the person's own choices, but that isn't necessary in order for the two not to be incompatible. The reasons for doing that are different.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you're just wrong. That doesn't imply that. It doesn't imply that not just when I use it, but when people use it generally. If someone says "the river near your house is polluted, I know you may not like it, but that's just the way it is" that does not suggest that said river has always been or will always be that way. That being said, I have also made numerous claims about the features of the world that presumably do not change, but you have ignored those points and instead focused on how I am using the words "is" and "the way". In both cases, the way I am using them is consistent with common usage as well as coherent for explaining the points I was trying to make, which you seem to have largely ignored.
That's incoherent. "Misunderstanding" explicitly indicates the incorrectness of one's assumed understanding. It does not signify an incompleteness of understanding, it signifies an incorrectness of understanding. By acknowledging that there is incorrectness within the proposed understanding, you implicitly acknowledge that it is not a good understanding.
This is very similar to your idea that the doctor's action (in your example) might be the correct choice from the doctor's perspective prior to the action, but the wrong choice from a perspective posterior to the action. Just like the person with the supposed "good understanding" does not recognize and acknowledge that aspects of this understanding are incorrect, and therefore it is not a good understanding, the doctor does not recognize and acknowledge the information which makes the choice wrong.
However, you, in presenting the examples do recognize the misunderstanding which inheres within the proposed understanding, and you do recognize the doctor's failure to ascertain the patient's condition. Therefore you, are making an incoherent description when you judge the understanding which contains elements of misunderstanding, to be "good", just like you are making an incoherent description when you say that the doctor's action is both correct and wrong.
What is indicated by the nature of these examples, is that you are consistent in your incoherency. This demonstrates a deeply entrenched habit of illogical thinking. You have a way of thinking which accepts contradiction and incoherency. I suggest that this is likely the result of many years of attempting to reconcile incompatible ideas. When an individual takes up the challenge of attempting to reconcile contradictory ideas (which is really to do the impossible), the resolution to the problem often appears to the person to be a sloppy use of words (which I've exposed), so that the incoherency of uniting two contradictory ideas is hidden underneath that sloppy use of words. It then appears like contradictory ideas have been united We might conclude that the person appears to have "a good understanding", in uniting incompatible ideas, but what lies underneath is a misunderstanding of the elements, which makes such a union impossible, so it is not a good understanding at all.
Quoting Dan
I really can't believe that you do not see the incoherency here. I think you are glossing it over, in an attempt to hide it under a sloppy use of words. Let me state the situation clearly and succinctly. If it is the case that "the most freedom" is what is valued the highest, then it is impossible that there is an "objectively right" choice in any situation. Absolute freedom, which is what is signified by "the most freedom", if assigned the highest value, denies the possibility that any value can be assigned to any choice for being "the right choice". This is because that value, assigned to "the right choice" would detract from the person's freedom to choose anything (which is stated as the most valuable by "the most freedom"), by making that specific choice 'weighted' with more value than any of the other possibilities. Therefore assuming a "right choice" negates the value assigned to "the most freedom". The two are simply incompatible.
Quoting Dan
You have a very strange way of misrepresenting what I say, to deny the logic of my argument, and then you persist with your incoherent way of using words.
In the phrase "the river near your house is polluted", the static "way" that the river is, signified by "polluted", is indicated by "is", to exist at the present time, now. This in no way implies that the river always will be, or always has been polluted (as your strawman), it indicates that at the present time, there is a static, unchanging condition, signified by "polluted".
This is simple predication. "the river is polluted". The predicate "polluted" is assigned to the subject "the river", and "is" signifies that there is a specific time, now, at which the proposition is meant to apply. By the law of noncontradiction, we cannot make the opposing predication with the same time, now, indicated. We cannot say that the river is not polluted. However, the law of noncontradiction provides for us to make the opposing predication at a different time. We can say "yesterday the river was not polluted". If we take these two propositions as true, it is implied that "a change" occurred between the two times which are indicated, yesterday, and now. Yesterday there was a static condition of "not polluted" and now there is a static condition of "polluted", and a change occurred in between.
What is important for you to recognize, is that the two predications each signify a static condition "is polluted", and "was not polluted". That is the nature of predication, a "stated" property is assigned to the subject. The subject cannot be changing with respect to that property or else it could both have and not have. or neither have nor not have, the same property at the same time. So in order for the law of noncontradiction (which states that the opposing property cannot be assigned for the same time), and the law of excluded middle, to be applicable, a time must be indicated. The present, now, is indicated by "is".
Now consider the predication "is changing", "the river is changing". Again, a static condition, a property, is indicated by that predication, according to the nature of predication as described above. And, a time is indicated as now. We cannot propose the opposing predication, "not changing", for the same time. That's fine, we can predicate "changing", as a static property, all we want, but to understand what is being said by this predication we need to understand what "changing" means.
If "change" is understood as becoming different, and becoming different is understood as what happens in that time period between having some property and not having that property, then "changing" as a predication, presents us with very peculiar difficulties. What it means is that a period of time is indicated as the present, now, with "is", and within that period of time, the same subject may be said to both have, and also have not, some property, or properties, or to neither have, nor have not, that property or those properties which support the predication "changing" (becoming different).
I propose to you that this is a very sloppy form of predication. It is sloppy because it is a form of predication specifically designed to avoid the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Instead of determining whether it is correct or incorrect to say whether the subject has a certain property at a specific time, we simply predicate that the subject "is changing" at that time. This is meant to imply that the proper predication is not required, thereby averting the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.
I agree that misunderstanding implies an incorrectness in one's understanding. What I am saying is that you can have an incorrectness in your understanding and still have a good understanding of the thing as a whole. Every expert in every field worth discussing will have incorrect beliefs about that field, but they could still be said to have a good understanding of it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, that isn't what I said at all. What I said was that it might be wrong (on an actual-value consequentialist approach) but the doctor might have every reason to think it's right and we may want future doctors to continue to act in the same way in the same (in terms of relevant features) situation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is no incoherence in what I said. But what I said and what you are claiming I said are different things. I am not using words in a sloppy way, you are adding in extra claims which I haven't made or implied.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, what I said wasn't the same as "the most freedom", but that's not really the point here so I'll move past it. A choice being right does not impinge on anyone's freedom. That is similar to saying that there being a right answer to questions impinges on people's freedom of thought.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I put it to you that it is entirely reasonable to say that something is changing and that if you think this violates the law of non-contradiction, then you are not using "changing" appropriately. Off the top of my head, I'd suggest that we might understand changing as being in an intermediate stage of some process that will continue toward some state that is different from the current one in the future. For example, we might say that something is at a certain temperature, but we might also say that it's temperature is increasing. This seems like an entirely sensible claim to make and not one that violates any of the laws of logic, so long as it is properly understood.
Also, and again, I have also pointed out many features of the world which seem not to be changing, which we could describe as features of the way the world is without any reference to a specific time period. You must agree, even on your restrictive use of "is" and "the way" that unchanging facts about the world can be considered facts about the way it is, right?
We're getting nowhere.
Quoting Dan
This is a sloppy use of words designed to cover up or veil the incoherence in your belief. You use "field" which has a very broad an ambiguous meaning to produce the equivocation required to accept your statement. The equivocation is between the specific "field" which the person is an expert "in", and the more general "field" which the expert has beliefs "about".
An expert "in" a field has a specific area of expertise and this is known as one's field of expertise. Within that field of expertise, there can be no misunderstanding or else we cannot say that the supposed expert has a good understanding of that field, and is therefore an expert. However, the "field" in general extends far beyond the expert's specific field of expertise, and so the expert's knowledge "about that field" in general, may contain misunderstanding concerning areas which are not a part of the specific field of expertise.
In other words, if we clear up the ambiguity you introduce with your use of "field", "in a field" and "about that field", we'll see that your claim cannot be accepted. A person may claim to have a "field of expertise", or may be judged to have a "field of expertise". If the person is judged to have misunderstanding within that field we cannot also judge the person to be an expert in that field. The one judgement excludes the other. The judgement of misunderstanding excludes the judgement of expert, and the judgement of expert excludes the judgement of misunderstanding.
Quoting Dan
This does nothing to validate your incoherency. You are claiming that we ought to encourage others to carry out an act which has been judged as wrong.
Quoting Dan
What I said is that we cannot value both principles, "there is an objectively right choice", and also the principle "a person ought to choose freely". The two principles are implicitly incompatible.
If there is an objectively right choice, then the person ought to make that choice and no other choice. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the person ought to choose freely.
Quoting Dan
I agree that people state things about the world, laws of physics, etc., which are intended to be eternal unchanging facts about the world. However, I would also argue that the latest evidence, and what numerous physicists agree to, is that this is not an accurate representation.
I am not using words in a sloppy manner. We absolutely can and do consider people to be experts in a specific field in which they misunderstand (or misunderstood) some element of that field. One judgement does not preclude the other at all. There is a big difference between knowing a lot about a subject and having a good understanding of it, and having a perfect knowledge of a subject and not being wrong or misunderstanding any part of it. I suggest you go ask scientists about their area of expertise and ask whether they think it is likely that they are wrong about some element of that area, or that something they have thought they understand will one day turn out to be misunderstood, I think you will find that those who are intellectually honest will say that this is very likely indeed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, not incoherent at all. A little odd to consider, but entirely coherent and consistent.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, this isn't true, as we might think that it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely. I imagine Kant would take this view for example. Second, I'm fairly sure what I said was that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value, which is rather different to "a person ought to choose freely". In this case, the objectively right choice would be the one that protects the most freedom (again, this is a simplified maximizing verison, which I don't agree with, I'm just pointing out that these things aren't inconsistent)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what this means. Further, laws of physics which adhere in our world are the very least of the truths we might point to as unchanging. For example, we might point out that the laws of logic are true in all possible worlds (if they are true at all).
Speak for yourself then. If I knew that a particular person misunderstood some elements, or even one element, of a specific field, I would never call that person an expert in that field.
It appears like you would. And that is why I say you use words in a sloppy way. You see no sloppiness in speaking this way. And that's why I judge you as unreasonable.
Quoting Dan
The issue is not a question of whether the person might be called an expert even when there is the possibility of that person being "wrong about some element" in that field. The issue is having judged the person to actually be wrong, about a specific element in that field.
Quoting Dan
You are missing the point. If the person apprehends the choice as the objectively right choice, then they must choose it necessarily, according to the apprehension that it is objectively right. So when you say "it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely", it is implied that the thing chosen is not the "objectively right" thing, because it is chosen freely. So "right" here does not mean objectively right, and "objectively right" would remain irrelevant.
This is the principle which produces the incoherency in your doctor example. The doctor chooses freely to do what is believed to be "the right thing". However, from the actual-value (objectively right) perspective, it is the wrong thing. You refuse to acknowledge the incoherency and insist that it can be both, the right thing to do, from the free choice perspective, and also the wrong thing to do, from the objectively right perspective.
Quoting Dan
This makes no sense. If, "a person's ability to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value", how do you make this consistent with what you posit as the objectively right choice, "the most freedom"? The 'most freedom" implies not being restricted by those conditions, "understanding", and the restriction you described earlier as the person's "own" choices.
That is a ridiculous bar to set. I am not using words in a sloppy way, you are using them in a way that is divorced from both common usage and, in this case and others, reality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
When it turns out that someone was wrong about some aspect of their field, and they come to a better understanding, we don't say that they weren't an expert previously. Expertise, and indeed understanding, is not the same as perfection. There is a story that Richard Dawkins tells about a colleague zealously defending a view on some niche aspect of in evolutionary biology and then, one day, being shown to be wrong by a visiting academic and thanking the academic in question for showing that he was wrong all these years. The point of the story is about science admitting it can be wrong, but it would be a very different story indeed if all those present said "well, I guess he wasn't an expert in evolutionary biology after all". Again, this is not a sensible bar to set when it comes to expertise.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, this just isn't true. Knowing the right thing to do and actually doing it are entirely different things. Also, while we're on the subject, there being a right thing to do and knowing what the right thing to do is are also different things, but that's secondary to my point here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
All incorrect because knowing what the objectively right thing to do is does not mean they must choose it necessarily. It means they should, but not that they will.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Actual-value consequentialism isn't the same thing as claiming there is objective right at all. These are not the same claim. Both actual-value consequentialism and expected-value consequentialism can claim there is an objective right and, likewise, neither of them are any more required to than the other (though I may suggest they are both required to depending on how "objective" is fleshed out here)
Also, I'm not in any way claiming it is the right thing to do. If you're going to keep putting words in my mouth, I'm going to start asking for quotes where I have said these things.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, again, I'm not a maximizing consequentialist so I wouldn't say this, but for simplicity's sake: The right choice would be the one that protects the most freedom of persons over their own choices where "freedom" is understood as the ability of persons to understand and make choices. And no, the most freedom does not imply this if freedom is understood as the ability of persons to understand and make choices and specifically only freedom over those choices that belongs to persons is taken to be the measure of value.
Common usage would not say that the doctor's action was wrong, yet we ought to encourage others to act this way because it was also right. Nor would common usage say that an expert has misunderstanding within the field which one is an expert in.
Quoting Dan
That's exactly what we do say. "I thought that guy was an expert, but he fucked up, now I know otherwise."
Quoting Dan
You somehow seem incapable of understanding the issue. The point is not that we exclude the possibility of misunderstanding from the judgement of "expert", to hold that the person must be proven to perfection to be called an expert. The point is that we don't judge the person to be an expert, and also judge the person to have misunderstanding in the same respect, at the same time. This is an implicit violation of the law of noncontradiction. "Expert" implies understanding. "Misunderstanding" is the predication opposed to "understanding". By the law of noncontradiction, we cannot judge the person to have both these properties, understanding and misunderstanding, in the same respect, at the same time. The "same respect" refers to the specific field of study. If we judge one to be an expert in some field, we judge that person to have understanding in that field. We cannot also judge that person to have misunderstanding in that field without contradiction..
Quoting Dan
People don't say things like that, because they are polite. I'll say it here though. Clearly the guy fucked up. Everyone thought he was an expert until some smart ass came along and proved him wrong. Then the truth was revealed, he was not an expert at all, and inside, everyone was laughing at him, but too polite to say anything rude.
The true situation is exposed by the phrase "zealously defending a view". What drives a person to zealously defend a view, is an unhealthy type of self-confidence, often known as "conceit". The conceited person creates an air of expertise, which is a false expertise. This is a deceptive attitude designed to give others the impression that one is an expert, when it's not really the case. In the example, it required a special individual to demonstrate the conceit to the person who had it. That's not an easy task, to get someone to see oneself as conceited. The others most likely could already see through the conceit, so it probably came as no surprise to them when the guy was outed as phony, and the false expertise was demonstrated.
Quoting Dan
I know, this is exactly the problem with your dual evaluation system approach. If you value free choice, ('the ability to make one's own choice' or however you represent it), then you also value the ability to choose something other than the "objectively right" choice. But this robs the value from "objectively right", by allowing that the possibility of choosing something other than what is objectively right has a higher value than actually choosing what is objectively right. Then how would the concept "objectively right" be supported as a valid concept, if there is something of higher value (freedom to choose)?.
The two valuation systems are incompatible, yet you want to employ them both. This results in incoherency, contradiction throughout your examples. The doctor's action was both right and wrong, depending on the valuation system employed. The person ought to be able to choose, even when that means choosing what is wrong.
If we employ "objective right" as the value system, then the highest goal is to do what is objectively right. But you also want to assign value to making one's own choice", and this would mean often choosing other than what is objectively right. If doing what is objectively right is the highest value, then you cannot also hand value to the possibility of doing something other than what is objectively right, without contradiction. The two values are simply incompatible.
First, common usage is useful for definitions, but not so much for actual claims of what is correct and isn't. Second, common usage would absolutely allow for an expert to have a misunderstanding within the field they are an expert in. That is absolutely how people use "expert". There is a big difference between knowing and understanding a lot about something and having no misunderstandings about that thing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We absolutely don't do this. If you stop thinking someone is an expert in a field when they get something wrong about that field, then I suggest you should not think there are any experts in science, or for that matter any field broad enough to be worthy of the title of "expert" in the first place. Everyone gets things wrong. Everyone misunderstands things. What you are looking for is not expertise, but perfection, and you will not find it amongst humans.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I understand what you are claiming, I am telling you it's wrong. We absolutely do judge people to be experts while knowing that they are probably wrong about/misunderstand some aspects of their field. Again, it isn't a violation of the law of non-contradiction because having a good understanding of some subject does not preclude misunderstanding some element of that subject. There's not a logical issue here, just an issue with your use of words.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you're just badly mistaken about what it means to be an expert. Also, I think you're badly mistaken about what bar people who aren't you are holding others to.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
None of that is accurate. This isn't a story of someone who didn't know what they were talking about being exposed as a fraud, it's a story of someone being shown to be wrong and accepting that because every expert in every field worth discussing is likely to be wrong about some of their beliefs. This is especially the case in empirical pursuits. It certainly doesn't make those people not experts. What you are claiming here is just silly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The ability to choose is the measure of value here. It is very much the thing which determines what is objectively right. Objective rightness isn't some other system. I could offer some specific examples that may clarify this if you'd like, but you'll need to stop asserting that I claim things that I don't.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you are inventing the idea that there are two systems here. There really aren't.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again "objective right" isn't a value system. What is objectively right is determined by reference to the freedom of persons to understand and make the own choices (though again, this isn't quite my view as I'm a satisficing consequentialist, this is just for simplicity's sake).
This is, I think, a pretty clear indicator you're either not connecting with what's being said, or are simply avoiding it.
Your analogy is entirely inapt, to the point of ridiculousness.
"the way it is" simply has no static restriction. Plain and simple. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This explains the entire exchange. So be it.
I don't know what you are talking about. A "field" is not something broad like "science". When we say that a person is an expert in one's field, we mean the subject of one's study or education, so even within the various branches of science, like biology, chemistry, or physics ,there are many fields of study, which an individual can be an expert in.
You are not making any sense, because you still want to make "the field" something broader than the person's area of expertise, like "science" in general, so that the person can misunderstand things in "the field" which are outside the person's area of expertise. But if the misunderstanding is not part of the person's area of expertise, then it is not part of the person's field of expertise, even if it might be in the same branch of science. And if the misunderstanding is within the person's field of study, then that person is obviously not an expert in that field.
Quoting Dan
Again, you strawman me. How many times do I have to repeat myself, concerning the same misrepresentation?
I am not talking about believing that an expert "probably" has some misunderstanding. I am talking about judging that the person actually does have misunderstanding, and also judging at the same time, that the person is an expert in that field within which the person has misunderstanding. This implicitly violates the law of noncontradiction, because expert in the field implies understanding in that field.
The reason why your strawman is irrelevant is as follows. To say that a person is an expert in a specific field implies that the person understands that field. To say that the person has misunderstanding in that field contradicts this. To say the person is an expert in such and such field, but probably misunderstands something in that field, is simply a way of stating that you judge the person to be an expert, while admitting that you are probably wrong in judging the person to be an expert. So all you do by stating that the expert probably has some misunderstanding, is to devalue your own capacity for judgement, by saying that you make that judgement but also asserting that the judgement you've made is probably wrong.
Quoting Dan
Irrelevant due to your strawman.
Quoting AmadeusD
I am both, not connecting with it, and avoiding it like the plague, because, as I've demonstrated, it is nothing but contradiction.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yes, Dan is demanding that I accept contradiction, and I refuse. We have freedom of choice, and we do not need to give what the other person demands. If this leaves me incapable of connecting with what Dan is saying, then so be it.
I agree. I definitely didn't intend to suggest that someone would be an expert in "science".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I would say a field of study might be something like evolutionary biology, astrophysics, biochemistry, etc. I don't want it to be something like "science". This is just a misunderstanding. I was just saying that there would be no experts in any field worthy of the term, I wasn't suggesting that we should consider someone an expert in "science". And of course people have misunderstandings within their own field and are still experts, what you are asserting here is just silly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I understand what you are claiming, and it's silly. We absolutely do say that someone is wrong about something, and yet they are an expert in the field. Having an understanding of some topic does not imply not being wrong about or misunderstanding any aspect of that topic, so there is no contradiction here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it doesn't. There is no contradiction here because having a misunderstanding about your area of expertise does not contradict either having expertise in that field or having a good understanding of that field generally.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. I might go as far as to say that all experts in all fields worthy of study misunderstand aspects of their field.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not a strawman, it's just that the point you are making is very weak. To suggest that someone cannot both be an expert in a field and misunderstand some aspect of that field is to set a bar that essentially no one can clear. To know something very well, to be an expert in it, is not to be wrong about no aspects of it. You are confusion expertise, or understanding, with perfection.
Ok, I suggest the misunderstanding lies within ambiguity in these terms, "field", and "expert". So "field" can be used to refer to anything from "science" in general, as a field of study, down to a much more specific branch of biochemistry, like the study of "nucleic acids". This difference is a type of ambiguity.
Furthermore, there is similar ambiguity in the use of "expert". When a person develops an expertise, it is usually cited as a very particular aspect of a specific branch of a field. So we might say, "the person is an expert in the way that nucleic acids convey genetic information". The field of expertise is usually stated as a very narrow practise which the individual is involved in, and this way of speaking which narrows down the area of expertise, is the result of intentionally avoiding the problem I've been showing you.
So for example, when a person takes a doctorate, one chooses a specific area of a field, and "specializes" in that area, then becomes a "specialist". Notice, that if a person is a "specialist" in the study of the activity of nucleic acids, someone might still be say of the person, that they are "an expert in biology". That would be a very sloppy use of "expert", because there would be much in the broad field of biology where the person lacked understanding, and likely even had demonstrated misunderstanding. Such a judgement of "expert", where the person's area of expertise is stated as broader than it really is, would be a faulty judgement of "expert", as explained above. Therefore it is sloppy usage.
It is far better to know the person as a "specialist", as this avoids such faulty judgements. We can call the person a specialist by reference to the specific area that the person specializes in, without the value judgement which "expert" implies. "Expert" implies a quality of understanding, 'goodness', and this excludes "misunderstanding, which is 'badness'. But when we say that the person is a specialist we just acknowledge that the person's attention is focused on a very specific aspect of a field, so it is implied that the person is possibly an expert in that specific aspect. An accurate judgement of "expert" though, is much more difficult than a judgement of "specialist", because the latter only requires that the person has specialized one's study, but the former judgement, "expert", is best reserved until after the person proves oneself through experience, practise. Notice the difference between theory and practise here. The judgement of "expert", if rigorous standards are employed, requires practise as acts of proof, to demonstrate the quality of the person's education. And this is why many fields employ apprenticeships and internships.
Quoting Dan
I know you think it's silly. You think adhering to strict rules of definition is unnecessarily pedantic, and doing such in the field of moral philosophy is a ridiculous way of proceeding. So you'd rather go around in your circles of vagueness and principles with self-referential definitions which lead nowhere. This enables your intention of hiding contradictory statements in your illogical endeavour of attempting to show how two incompatible systems of evaluation are compatible.
Quoting Dan
I will readily grant you this, "every expert has aspects of misunderstanding within one's area of expertise". To claim that understanding in the area of specialization excluded the possibility of misunderstanding in the parts, would be a sort of inverted composition fallacy, a division fallacy.
However, if I agreed that this is relevant I would just be supporting your strawman. How many more times must I reiterate? This strawman is irrelevant!!! Please read, and at least make an attempt to understand the following.
We all know that "expert", a predication of quality as described earlier in this post, does not imply perfection. However, what is at issue is the situation where a defect of understanding is exposed, and
known as "misunderstanding". Since "expert" signifies the highest possible quality, then, when a defect of understanding (misunderstanding) is exposed, it is illogical to judge the individual as an "expert". This is the point of programs like apprenticeship and internship, to expose misunderstandings, and deny the judgement of "expert" to someone who is already a specialist.
The fact that we make the general judgement that experts are not perfect, and all experts have misunderstanding, is irrelevant to the judgement of whether an individual with a known misunderstanding ought to be called an "expert". This is because the former is concerned with unknown misunderstandings while the latter is concerned with known misunderstandings. This makes the type of :misunderstanding of the two examples categorically different. Because of this difference it is acceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of unknown misunderstandings, yet unacceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of the person's known misunderstandings.
I recommend that you learn, understand, and consider this principle very closely, because it is extremely relevant to your example of the doctor's actions, and probably other issues you've pointed to. Notice, we can judge the doctor's actions as good, right, and correct, the actions of an expert, acknowledging that no expert is perfect, and the patients death was accidental. And, we can judge that when there is a lack of information there was an accidental, or incidental, misunderstanding of the situation, where these terms, accidental, incidental, refer to the doctor's area of expertise, because "misunderstanding" refers to the situation, not the field of expertise.
However, when the lack of information (misunderstanding of the situation) is exposed, after the fact, we are obliged to review the judgement of good, right, and correct, and therefore the judgement that the doctor is an expert, to confirm that the misunderstanding truly was accidental or incidental.. This calls the doctor's practice into question. We can either conclude that the doctor did follow protocol, did do what is good, right, and correct, and is an expert, or we can revise our judgement, and say that the misunderstanding was not accidental or incidental, the doctor should have done something different, therefore did not do what is good, right, and correct, and is therefore not an expert. But we cannot do as you propose, and have it both ways, saying that the doctor's actions were both right and wrong, that in itself would constitute misunderstanding in the field of moral philosophy.
It clearly, patently isn't, and you're just digging your feet in. That's not Dan's problem. He's being an absolute gentleman trying to walk you through this. Your refusal doesn't reflect anything on he or his arguments. All of my comments about your posts stand, entirely. Your responses are just re-assertions of the same tired cop-outs at this stage.
I was with you until this part. This part is just incorrect. Expert implies a quality of understanding I agree, but this does not exclude misunderstandings. What I am saying is that those who are experts in their field, who have a strong understanding of it, can and do still misunderstand aspects of that field, even narrowly construed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do not think that adhering to the strict rules of definition is pedantic at all. I think that quibbling over the defintiion being used rather than addressing the point is sometimes pedantic. I have been clear and precise in how I have defined terms and am not hiding anything. The supposed incompatibility comes entirely from your misunderstanding. But your point here, that expertise is mutually exclusive with holding a misunderstanding in one's field, is just wrong. That's not how we define "expert" and, further, defining it in such a way would make the term essentially useless.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, there isn't a substantive difference here. If we judge someone to be an expert knowing that they likely misunderstand something, then later on we find out what it is that they misunderstood, we don't say "oh, well they weren't an expert then". Also, there are people we judge as experts now despite judging them to be wrong on some aspect of the topic. When two experts in a field disagree about something, they don't no longer consider one another experts because they judge the other person to misunderstand. Expertise is not mutually exclusive with misunderstanding.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, that's not what I claimed. What I claimed was that (from an actual-value consequentialism perspective) the doctor's actions were wrong, yet those same actions would be right in most circumstances, so we may want to praise the doctor's actions in this case because we want to encourage future doctors to act the same way in the same (in terms of the relevant information they have available to them) situations.
Thanks, Amadeus. I have been endevouring to answer everyone's questions and criticisms, whether or not they are relevant. I am asking for help on a philosophical problem after all, so it seems the polite thing to do.
Well then what is Dan's problem? He's been fruitlessly working on the same problem for almost ten years. If it isn't the case that he's trying to unite two incompatible principles, so he gets lost in contradiction, then what do you think his problem is?
Quoting Dan
I dealt with this already. I agree "expert" does not exclude misunderstanding, we all know that no one is perfect. However, "expert" implies the highest level of understanding, and that means no known misunderstanding. "Expert" signifies the highest possible level of understanding, and this means "no known misunderstanding, in the area one is an expert in.
And, "no known misunderstanding" is substantially different from "some known misunderstanding". If the misunderstanding is known, then the person cannot be judged as "expert", because this is not the highest level of understanding which is "no known misunderstanding". The fact that we know that no one is perfect, and even the expert has unknown misunderstandings, is irrelevant.
Quoting Dan
This does not address my post. There is a substantial difference between known misunderstanding and unknown misunderstanding. We readily allow that even the expert has unknown misunderstandings, because no one is perfect. However, if the person has a misunderstanding which is evident, and known, we do not judge the person as an expert.
You deny that there is "a substantive difference" between "known misunderstanding" and "unknown misunderstanding" but this is incorrect. There is a substantive difference because "unknown misunderstanding" allows for "no known misunderstanding" within that category, and this is directly opposed to "known misunderstanding". Therefore "unknown misunderstanding" allows within its category something which is directly opposed to "known misunderstanding", i.e. "no known misunderstanding". This opposition indicates a substantive difference between the two.
Quoting Dan
I already explained to you why this is incoherent. "Different circumstances" implies different acts. Therefore it is incoherent to refer to the same act in different circumstances. And when we consider the difference of circumstances we can understand why similar acts are judged in different ways, because they are not the same act, they are different.
You seem to have no respect for the law of identity. But of course, denying one of the three fundamental laws of logic incapacitates the other two, so this violation of the law of identity is a tool which enables your contradictory argumentation.
I mean, this reads like a contradiction. However, I will assume you aren't intending a contradiction here and assume you mean that experts can believe things that are wrong so long as we don't know what those things are. That is also silly. If we are sure that someone believes something incorrect about their field but but don't know what, I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you are drawing a really odd distinction here. If we are willing to accept that experts can misunderstand some element of their area of expertise, then why does it matter if we find out what it was they misunderstand/misunderstood or not?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Is it possible you are using "known" in a different sense here? Because my first thought it "yes we do, of course we do", but perhaps you mean "known" in some other sense. Perhaps you mean that if someone misunderstands something about their field, and everyone else in the field knows this to be wrong because it has been proven to be false a long time ago, then we wouldn't call them an expert? Is that what you mean?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, I have explained why you're wrong here. The doctors are in circumstances that appear the same to them (at least in terms of relevant features, I'm not counting things like what day of the week it is or other trivial details).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Would you prefer I didn't use the phrase "the same action"? Because I can explain the point without it. I think it's a very sensible way of talking about two actions that appear in all relevant ways to be the same, but I will happily concede that they aren't identical.
Instead, I will say that the doctor's initial action, which we will say was proscribing Drug X (from an actual-consequentialist perspective) was wrong. However, we may want to praise the doctor for proscribing Drug X because in most cases of patients presenting the way the patient presented in this instance, proscribing Drug X would be the right thing to do. Is that easier to grasp?
And I'm not trying to unite two incompaitible principles at all. No part of the problem comes from the inconsistency you have imagined.
Recognizing the general principle, "no one is perfect", therefore acknowledging that someone who appears to have impeccable understanding must still have some degree of misunderstanding, even though that misunderstanding is not apprehended, is not at all silly. It is actually a very common precautionary approach.
As i said earlier, we have a significant difference as to the meaning of "understanding", which makes discussion extremely difficult. I should never have come back to this subject.
Quoting Dan
Obviously, if an individual puts on a great air of expertise, such that people are fooled into judging the person as an expert, then it is later revealed that it was a pretense, any rational person would revise that judgement, and admit that the person is not an expert. The Socratic method is designed to expose such "false expertise", in the effort to reveal sophism
Quoting Dan
Dan, how can you seriously ask this? It's the issue of "available information", and how it affects a person's judgement. If the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert, and the person is persuasive in one's actions, then the judgement is "expert". But if the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert is available to the one making the judgement, then the judgement is "not expert". How is this not obvious to you?
This distinction is very relevant to your example of the doctor. However, for some reason, you appear to have a mental block, or an attitude of denial, which seems to make you incapable of considering this very important distinction.
When a person makes a judgement, one is limited, restricted in one's freedom of choice, by the restrictions which are imposed as the limitations we express as "available information". Increase in information increases one's freedom of choice, by revealing more options.
Now, the distinction I am making is the distinction between "I know there is more information but it's not available to me", and "I know there is more information, I will uncover it and I will consider it". You can see that the former attitude acts as a real restriction on one's freedom of choice, by limiting the possible choices through the acceptance of a lack of information.
This goes back to what I said about the force of habit. Habit inclines the former attitude, and rash actions, "additional information is not available to me, move forward". This is clearly a restriction on one's capacity of free choice because it limits the possibilities available to the person.
Quoting Dan
"Circumstances that appear the same" is insufficient for the conclusion of "the same action". That's the violation of the law of identity I referred to, which supports you contradictory approach. If we ignore enough information, because it's "not available", a whole slew of actions will "appear the same".
Quoting Dan
You are missing the point. I will use "type of action" to explain. If there is a type of action which is subjected to moral evaluation, judged as good in relation to moral evaluation, in a vast majority of situations (as your example), but in some situations, or even one situation, this type of action is judged as bad in relation to moral evaluation, then we must reject the judgement that it is one "type of action" in respect to moral evaluation. "Bad" and "good" are irreconcilable types imposed by moral evaluation.
Look, the predication is made relative to moral quality, and this is a judgement of two distinct types of act, "good", and "bad". The two predications of "type of moral act", bad and good, are opposed to each other, such that "good" is necessarily a different type of moral act from "bad". If an act at one time is judged as "bad", and an act at another time is judged as "good", these two distinct acts cannot be judged as "the same type" in relation to moral evaluation.
What you propose is that there is a type of act, which is sometimes good, and sometimes bad. The problem is, that moral standards of evaluation set "bad" and "good" as opposing, contradictory, and incompatible types of actions. Therefore it is impossible, by way of contradiction to say that the same type of act, in relation to moral judgement could be sometimes bad and sometimes good. Your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge them this way, indicates that your judgement "they are the same type of act" must be a faulty judgement.
However, what I've been trying to tell you, is that the judgement "they are the same type of act" is really a correct judgement. What is really faulty, is your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge the acts as sometimes good, yet sometimes bad. This inclination is produced from your application of two incompatible systems of moral evaluation. If you rid yourself of this inclination to try to make two incompatible systems compatible, you can judge the acts as I do, all of the same type, always good, and the death of the patient was incidental, not judged as the result of a bad type of act.
I think at this stage I would be entirely justified in saying "please, stop, for your own sake".
I literally said it is not Dan's problem.
If you could, perhaps, not entirely change the subject to attempt a further pointless and badly-worded impugning of Dan's work... That would be nice. But, it speaks to exactly what i"m saying - that's not his problem. It's yours. He's being a gentleman even giving you the time of day. That this has gone on months baffles me, as it probably does both of you - but for me, its his patience and your density that's baffling.
I mean let's not pretend MU is not providing logical (and very intriguing, personally, I might add) points and arguments. I have been following this exchange for several weeks. Both are incredibly intelligent people who make indisputably rational points. Any denial of that places one's self in the proverbial "hot seat".
I think, at least as a reasonable starting point, a single agreed upon "point of contention" or "argument" should be framed/established where other people can jump in and say what they have to say based on empirical facts and basic truth, really. (Particularly some of the logically highly proficient mods)
What is the main "disagreement" here? Why? What does it keep being shifted to and why?
I've seen MU be a bit less than becoming of his intellect in stating Dan has "Wasted 10 years". Perhaps he means such in the truest earnest form of communication. Perhaps he's just frustrated. Perhaps a bit of both?
I just think this whole exchange is a marvel of human endeavor, no matter who is "more correct" or I suppose "ultimately wrong". That aside, truth must remain truth. So, if I could ask each of the participants, what, in explicit detail, is the singular most "hard problem" the others view has in their eyes? Just so perhaps others who are a bit less entrenched in one or the other's particular "view" might have a crack at sharing their own perspective on the matter.
That isn't at all what I was saying was silly. I completely agree that we should think experts probably have some misunderstanding. The bit that is silly is the bit where you seem to think that if we find out what they misunderstand/misunderstood, we then judge them to have never been an expert at all.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That definitely isn't what I said or implied. There is a big difference between acting like you know a lot when in reality you know very little and actually knowing a lot, but still misunderstand or being wrong about some aspect of the thing you know a lot about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The information that the person in question misunderstands some aspect of their field does not preclude them being an expert. That's my whole point and it seems you are willing to accept that so long as we don't know what they misunderstand. You are now framing this in terms of thinking they are an expert until it is revealed that they have a misunderstanding regarding their field, which is a different thing entirely.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, such an attitude does not by itself restrict someone's freedom of choice. Moreover, neither has much to do with the case of the doctor as searching for the information in similar circumstances is likely to get the patient killed and is exactly the kind of behaviour we want to discourage.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it doesn't. Feel free to reread my earlier posts as to my views on this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The "same action" in this case refers to proscribing drug X in this case (or whatever set of medical tests and treatments are enacted in the initial case)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ah, I think I see where some of your confusion is coming from. Any act consequentialist, actual-value or expected-value wouldn't judge a "type of action" as good or bad at all. They (and indeed I) would judge an individual action as good or bad, but not generalize this to the type of action.
Let me try to put this in a way that avoids the issues you having with the words I'm using:
Doctor Bob proscribing drug X to his patient. This action is bad (on an actual-value consequentialism view) and leads to the patients death. However, in the set of possible actions that includes all and only proscribing drug X to patients who present with the same symptoms, have the same available medical history as it relates to this drug, and are of a similar age, weight, etc, most of those actions are good ones (and indeed right ones). We praise Doctor Bob for performing the wrong action because we want to encourage other doctors toward that set of actions, which contains many right actions, and away from the set of possible actions which includes all and only all the instances checking the patients' feet for clues, because most of those actions lead to the patient in question's death, and are bad (and indeed wrong).
This is a bit rough, but hopefully it is helpful to frame it not in terms of actions being good and bad, but actions that share similar qualities not having the same moral status because they occur in different circumstances, and aiming to produce the best outcome with our praising.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What is faulty is that you are judging "types of act" as good or bad, and I'm judging specific acts as good or bad (or indeed right or wrong). There aren't two systems here at all. There's one, it's just that you seem to be under the misapprehension that it is aimed at "types of act" rather than specific acts.
I expect you'd have to ask MU. This discussion started because they (he?) claimed I was trying to marry two things that were supposedly inconsistent (freedom and consequentialism). It has since exploded into what feels at times like a game of philosophical whack-a-mole. Let me try to list some of the things we are disagreeing on, though you'll have to forgive me for missing some:
* Whether an action can be wrong but also praiseworthy (on an actual-value consequentialist account)
* Whether one's freedom is restricted by one's habits
* Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom
* Whether an understanding of the nature of time is of critical importance to the project of ethics (and indeed, what that means)
* Whether someone can be an expert while also misunderstanding some elements/aspects of their field of expertise
* The existence of objective truth
* Whether God is in some way necessary for objective truth
* The meaning and appropriate usage of a laundry list of words, and more generally to what extent words should be allowed to be used to mean different things in different contexts (so long as that meaning is made clear)
I don't know what MU considers the central disagreement here, and would happily address just that if it was clarified.
They certainly have easily perceived inconsistencies. Freedom being a lack of constraint, consequentialism being an ultimate fate of such. A layman's perspective being such is what life and therefore intelligence is (Goldilocks anyone?). Which one can exist without the other? Only one. Though that doesn't necessarily defeat the ultimate truth and relevance of the other. The disagreement appears to be based, or at least of some notable relevance, to this dynamic.
Quoting Dan
"Wrong" has several definitions that can reasonably be sided with. "Incorrect" (per procedure), "immoral" (per subjective zeitgeist, perhaps based on objective damage or similar aspect), or "imperfect" (not quite hitting the bull's eye but with every reasonable attempt to have done so).
Actual-value is tricky. What seems to work immediately and perhaps for 1,000 years may actually be proven to have been a failure in 10,000 years. Surely you account for this.
These are all great and amazing points. Thank you for replying, *ahem*, finally. I will continue with the following bullet points shortly
I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this. Perhaps you could try explaining it another way?
As to percieved inconsistencies, there really aren't any. Consequentialism is simply the view that the morality of actions is judged by reference to their consequences. This doesn't at all conflict with either the idea of freedom or the idea that freedom is valuable.
Quoting Outlander
I agree that actual-value is tricky. I think expected-value is also rather tricky and am not sure which is the better approach really. That's why I keep adding the qualifier, on an actual-value view, though to be fair, what I've said can also apply to expected-value consequentialism depending on how "expected" is fleshed out. All I was pointing out that on an actual-value approach, an action can be wrong, but still worth praising (since praising is a different action that can be evaluated by reference to it's likely consequences etc etc). This is a fairly obvious implication of the view of actual-value consequentialism, and I'm not really sure how it has gone on so long.
"Wrong" in this case meaning morally wrong (definitely not as per subjective zeitgeist, as I'm sure you've noticed I'm a moral objectivist).
When you say "finally," have you posted something here before and not recieved a reply? If so, I can only apologize, I almost certainly didn't see it.
From an outside perspective. Freedom meaning "sans" restriction. This is not inherently "good." Humanity with "freedom" from an oxygen-rich environment results in a pile of bones. I mean, perhaps that's good for the planet in the long-term freeing it from pollution. But, as human persons, that would be, you know, kinda bad, wouldn't you say?
Allow me ample room to make mistakes as I attempt to become acquainted with this "Consequentialism". As I. and I would attest most if not many would understand, this, to put things in extremes for purpose of understanding, would mean, the person who dedicates their life to human welfare yet say, gets drunk, and accidentally burns down their dwelling in which they stored their life's work before they have yet to actualize such time, effort, and resources into such a goal, lived an "immoral" life. While, on the same hand, the person who spent a lifetime killing, robbing, and let's just say much worse, also got drunk and accidentally gave a slip of paper that contained the access code to his crypto-currency that contained the sum of his ill-gotten goods to one who immediately either gave it to the police or psychically accessed it themself, then donating it to charity, lived and died a "moral" person. Is that correct?
I agree that "freedom" doesn't automatically mean good. But, to be fair, I never claimed that it did. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make choices (which I called "freedom" to save time), specifically, their own choices, is morally valuable, which I think you will agree is a much more specific claim.
Quoting Outlander
I mean, sort of. Consequentialism isn't really about determining whether people are moral so much as actions. Also it's not clear that the person who was trying to do good has actually done anything immoral, rather than failed to do something moral (and this is less clear in the case of the thief). But, broadly speaking, I think you've more-or-less got the right idea. Certainly this intuition pump is close enough to describing consequentialism in order to express a common criticism of consequentialism, which is that it doesn't care about intentions and this seems to run counter to commonly held moral intuitions.
As an aside, and as it relates to the point that I was trying to make to MU, we might still praise the person whose "life was immoral", since we want others to act in a similar way, and blame and even punish the one whose "life was moral" since we don't want others to act in a similar way.
Right, and that's likely what MU's resistance is fueled by. Understandably enough, yes?
Quoting Dan
See this is where things get, understandably, a bit "trippy". Your declaration of someone who hypothetically literally breathes morality and compassion being written off as "immoral" because something outside of his control happened in 2 seconds at the last minute. I mean. It just leaves a bad taste in one's mouth, philosophically speaking. Morally, at least. Surely you understand that. So, the difference or "point of contention" appears to be how you can simply look past that, in your view, likely as a service to a greater truth or logic, while others see such a hang-up as, well, to put it bluntly, a non-starter as far as any sort of validity as far as the subject at hand goes.
Does this make sense to you? If not, surely the otherwise common opposition does, how far off am I and for what reasons?
I mean, MU has not expressed that point in this context as far as I can tell, and has instead accused me of inconsistency and incoherency, which is quite different from saying I'm wrong because intentions matter.
Quoting Outlander
I wouldn't quite say that I am suggesting you write someone off as immoral, I did use quotation marks there as that was your phrasing. Also, the kind of consequentialism I outlined in the initial primer is a bit more sophisticated in terms of blaming people for things outside of their control. And validity is probably not the right word here as it isn't the reasoning between premises you're taking issue with.
All that being said, I get what you mean and I can certainly see how it runs counter to commonly held moral intuitions. Not considering intentions is, as I mentioned, one of the most common criticisms of consequentialists theories.
But all of that is surely beside the point as to whether consequentialism can consider something to be both wrong and praiseworthy (in the sense that we should praise it). That is fairly obviously the case as praising the thing is an action that can also evaluated by reference to its likely consequences to determine if we should do it.
A "habit" is by definition not ultimately restrictive. Now, an "addiction" or otherwise "mental complex" is in fact a debilitating factor. Perhaps I have a bad habit of ogling any attractive woman in the vicinity. That's independent from a ultimate deeply rooted lack of self-control. If one's freedom is "restricted" it is not by a mere "habit" but by a deeper rooted cause. Let's assume this to be true. There's, let's call them "inclinations", that can be realistically minimized to the point of non-existence by willpower (say in the mentioned example) and those that cannot (say a serial killer who hears voices or is impinged by some other truly dramatic action-controlling factor).
So we have to specifically determine if one has a "habit" or a "reasonable disablement" as far as what is expected from the average person.
Furthermore, what is a habit? In the animal kingdom, to be "afraid" or otherwise change one's behavior in the presence of a much larger animal is a natural inclination, present regardless if one is a genius or mentally disabled. Understandably, for biological reasons of survival. Now if we cast all habits or inclinations as "human nature" we inevitably reach a point of rightful discernment. Say you're looking for a place to sleep for the night and you have three options. One is brightly lit with lively and friendly human activity, the other not so much but well off the beaten path the natural seclusion seems to offer reasonable guarantee from anything one wishes to avoid, and the other a rundown hovel with shady characters coming and going. Naturally in the majority of cases one chooses the first or perhaps the second. Is this really a habit or an intrinsic reality of human existence? Sure, one might call the person who chooses the third option a "dullard" and "worthy of whatever he has coming to him". Is one's ultimate preference based on any number of things, perhaps things that would conscript us to at least consider such a way of thinking, a mere "habit" or something far greater?
Quoting Dan
A good metaphor is to imagine two kingdoms or lands or realms or what have you where said hypothetical is the ultimate law of the land or "reality", casting all current aspersions and understanding into oblivion. And from there, see what would happen and why if the two were to ever meet.
Even before that however, one must be reminded of the fact there is a litany of ways to interpret such terms from the get-go. Even before we get to the individual meaning of either.
Some might view the two as inseparable or perhaps better said, a prerequisite to the other or description of one or the other's affinity. Say we take consequentialism as meaning human efforts ultimately matter in a world and reality that seems to place such far beneath any sort of functional status quo. This is indeed the sole monument of "freedom" for those who believe we are otherwise bound to randomness with any such attempt at definition or value literally as sound or constant as the predictability of the tides. You can even reverse the two and find relatable sentiment.
This is I think is the ultimate point of contention simply for the fact there are so many valid views or understandings that even from a passing glance come to mind.
I would, at last preliminarily, say, certain views of how reality ultimate is (consequentialism) remains a world of difference from how reality ultimately can, should be, and at times is as far as the limited time and ability of human observation goes (freedom).
Quoting Dan
There's a lot to unpack here. Before even attempting to do so, I would have to assert, understanding of anything that intrinsically has to do with some sort of "ultimate reality" is critical by its own definition. I guess to put it low brow, if one doesn't understand or know what time is, one isn't really talking about ethics or anything coherent. It's so relevant it becomes comical or frivolous to point out, like reminding someone "to understand the relationship between circumstantial cause and effect one must know how to dress oneself in the morning." Yeah. No kidding.
Quoting Dan
Obviously this frame of putting the previous spat is without possibility for scrutiny. It resolves to effectiveness. Proficiency or "hitting the mark when asked to consistently" is the dynamic I feel is not being addressed here. There is expertise (perhaps wisdom) and cold, robotic calculation (perhaps knowledge). Perhaps you may find the two inseparable.
Quoting Dan
Well, if it exists. Prove it. 2+2 = 4. Unless I take 1 by violence. Now your 2+2 = 3. (I'm not trying to be funny or difficult, just, I mean, for all reasons of argument, is such a realization any less to the point?)
That's a bit of a poor example. There are natural laws, water has a boiling point of 100 degrees celcius and a freezing point of 0. So what? Sure, it tells me how long to wait before I can make a bowl of rice or what temperate I can expect to preserve future meals from, which are required for me or anyone to not starve. That's great. But what of it? How certain are we are of the things we declare as indisputable and what would it mean if such things were to change? Would we survive?
Quoting Dan
For most, absolutely. Why do anything unless I have to? Is the unfortunate mantra of man. One's "god" is either spiritual or scientific (see above laws that apparently 'govern' reality).
Quoting Dan
People have ideas and inclinations that are better expressed to the point they find agreement toward. Not all are perfect, but they fit the bill at the time. Brevity means concision, I suppose.
I'm going to avoid quoting except where necessary to avoid excessive length.
Habits: Whatever we might say of people choosing to sleep in different circumstances, they are surely still free to do so. The dangerous option was an option, their inclination not to choose it wasn't a restriction on their freedom. This would be a very strange way to talk about this, right?
Also, as an aside, hearing voices probably isn't terribly restrictive either. The percentage of healthy people who will at some stage experience auditory hallucinations is surprisingly high. Delusions, rather than auditory hallucinations, are probably more of a concern (or at least, they could be, depending on the delusion), but that's really neither here nor there.
Quoting Outlander
I'm not totally sure I understand what you mean by this. Perhaps you could explain it in another way?
What I will say though is that consequentialism isn't a theory of what reality is. It's a type of normative theory (or perhaps a feature a normative theory can have depending on how you think about it), it is very much about how the world should be.
Time: Well, maybe. I'm not convinced we have a very good understanding of what time is or how it works, but yes I'd say that a basic understanding, like how the future follows the present etc, is certainly very useful.
Experts: No I think wisdom is very different from intelligence and both are different from knowledge. But I think we should all agree that just because someone has turned out to be wrong about something, it doesn't mean they weren't or aren't an expert in that field.
Objective truth: Well, there's a few options here. The first is to consider the alternative, that no truth is objective. What then? Subjective perhaps? If so, wouldn't "truth is subjective" be objectively true? And if not, then I can presumably get away with arguments such as this:
P1: Truth is subjective, whatever I think is true is true
P2: I think truth is objective, and not subjective
P3: The truth is objective, and not subjective (from P1 and P2)
Conclusion: The truth is not subjective
Actually, I can get away with rather a lot more than that. There's a thing called logical explosion or logical armageddon that occurs when you allow both classic logic and things to be both true and false at the same time where you can prove and disprove everything with logically sound arguments. It's bad, we don't want that. And the truth being intersubjective just shifts the problem to a bigger group but doesn't solve it. There are other reasons to think we should accept objective truth, but this seems the easiest to express in this context.
God: Science isn't a god, but more importantly, gods aren't necessary or even helpful for the existence of objective truth. If we suppose that a God were required to ground objective truth, then that God would need to exist objectively, surely, so we must first presuppose that things can exist, or not exist, objectively, before we can discuss whether such an entity does indeed exist.
Further, whether people care is not the same as whether something is true. The world is as it is, regardless of whether we pay attention.
Further further, I don't think people do only do things because they have to. I think most things people do because they want to (or because they get them something else they want).
Words: I think the point of words is to enable communication. While definitions are important, I think that if we all know what we're talking about, we are generally better off talking about it rather than spending all our time discussing whether we should use different words.
You stated, and I quote you: "That's not Dan's problem."
So I asked you, quote: "Well then what is Dan's problem?"
Do you have an answer for me?
Quoting AmadeusD
That is blatantly wrong. Dan is refusing to give me the time of day. As you did already, Dan refuses to consider the nature of time, thinking that this is irrelevant to moral philosophy.
Dan wants to make "freedom" a fundamental principle, then refuses to consider what makes freedom possible. If a person makes statements similar to "freedom is valuable" and "we ought to have freedom", then that person needs to be prepared to consider the means by which freedom is enabled. Otherwise it's a case of "talking through one's hat". If you, Dan, or anyone else, fails to see that human actions are a type of action, and all actions require "time", making "time" logically prior to human actions, this would seriously impair your moral philosophy.
Quoting AmadeusD
Why should a few months of this baffle you? Dan claims to have already spent the better part of a decade pursuing this "problem". I'm working to demonstrate that the reason why his pursuit appears to go on endlessly is that he has a faulty approach. Let me tell you something AmadeusD. A man who's been on a specific quest for ten years, is not going to be convinced by a couple months of discussion, that his quest has been fruitless. The longer one remains on a mission the harder it is for that person to accept that it is impossible, because the amount of time wasted mounts. A few days wasted... "oops that was a mistake, glad I caught it". A few years wasted.. "after all this time I must be close to a solution by now".
So please, quit with your attempts to twist Dan's problem into being my problem. Clearly, after all these years, it's Dan's "density" which is the point of discussion, and I am the one showing patience in letting him persist with his zealous defense of his "impossible dream".
Quoting Dan
Why is that "silly"? Sophists fool us into thinking that they are experts. When the sophistry is revealed, we have to admit that they are not experts at all, and never were. You say it's silly, because you want to refuse to look back at your mistaken judgement as a mistaken judgement.
You want to have it both ways. The doctor was an expert, and "right" at the time that the decision was made, but when the patient dies, the doctor is wrong. You refuse to let the posterior judgement reflect on the prior judgement, to see that if the doctor was wrong in his actions, then it was a mistake to have judged him to be an expert in the first place.
Quoting Dan
Look, you are saying it "does not preclude them being an expert", as if there is some "objective truth" about whether or not the person is an expert. In reality, we are talking about a judgement as to whether the person is an expert or not. This is all we have to go on, our judgements of whether the person is an expert. And, to the people making that judgement, "information" about whether the person understands or misunderstands, is all we have to base the judgement in. Therefore "thinking they are an expert" is what is being discussed here, and there is no such thing as "they are an expert until...". The latter refers to an imaginary "objective truth". And, if after the judgement is made, additional information becomes available which demonstrates that judgement to have been wrong, we must accept that the judgement made at that time, was wrong, due to a lack of information.
Your ideas of "objective truth", and "objective right", are obviously misleading you now. You seem to think that since you can bring this into the example, "there is an objective truth as to whether the person is an expert or not", (your imaginary idea that there is such a thing as "being an expert", which is beyond simply being judged to be an expert), that it has some bearing in real life situations. It does not! We look at the information we have about the person and make the judgement. Whether or not the person is an expert is a matter of judgement alone. There is no "...being an expert", nor is there any "they are an expert until...", there is only "being judged to be an expert", and "they are judged as an expert until...".
How do you support your claim of "a big difference between acting like you know a lot when in reality you know very little and actually knowing a lot, but still misunderstand or being wrong about some aspect of the thing you know a lot about"? All that the person making the judgement has to go on, is that the one in question acts like they know a lot. You assert "a big difference", because you assume some kind of "objective truth" to the matter, but this is all just imaginary. The "big difference" is in your imagination, because you are imagining an "objective truth" in the matter.
In reality, there is absolutely no difference to the people judging whether one is an expert or not, between "acting like you know a lot", and "actually knowing a lot". This is because the people making the judgment have nothing but the individual's actions to go on. So your claim of "a big difference", is only based in your imaginary "objective truth". Accordingly, you ought to conclude what this demonstration clearly reveals, your idea of "objective truth" is severely misleading you.
Quoting Dan
Sure, but if you are talking about "an individual action", then you need to respect the law of identity, therefore accept your own judgement that the doctor's act was wrong. You cannot now say that this very same "individual action" which you judge as wrong, should be praised and encouraged. You say "in most circumstances" it would not be wrong, but that's to remove the act from the circumstances and treat it as a type of act. You only move to praise and encourage it by removing the circumstances, thereby making it "a type of act", and now you claim tht you are only dealing with an "individual action". Therefore, what you state here, that you would "not generalize this to the type of action", is inconsistent with what you actually do in the example which is to generalize.
You generalize to say that the type of action the doctor made (a similar action in different circumstances) is praiseworthy, even though the identified "individual action" is judged as wrong because of the circumstances. The one judgement judges the type of action, "right", while the other judgement judges the individual action, "wrong". The mistake you make, which I pointed out, is that the category of judgement, the principle of predication is "moral value". And, since the individual act is predicated as "wrong", it cannot be predicated as "right" in that same category of moral value, because that would be contradiction. This means that if you adhere to those principles which judge the individual action as "wrong", you must recognize the differences which make it wrong, and not predicable with that property "right". Therefore you need to recognize it as not only a distinct individual act, but also different with respect to that property, "moral value". Therefore the (individual) act which is judged as wrong is not the same as the (individual) act which is judged as praiseworthy. That I tell you is what reveals the problem with your enterprise.
Quoting Outlander
Look at the situation, Outlander. Dan asks in the op, if anyone can "solve a philosophy problem that I have spent the better part of a decade working on". I replied right after reading the op with "Therefore the 'freedom' perspective and the 'consequentialist' perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible.' So it was very clear to me, right away that Dan was tying to do something which is impossible, and I mean in the truest most earnest form of communication, that Dan has wasted that time.
We might, therefore, ask what drives Dan to continue. Possibly, it is the case that Dan has come to recognize that the problem is impossible to resolve, and has posted a significant reward money as a sort of hoax. Possibly, Dan has gotten so frustrated in his endeavour that he is willing to give up substantial money ownership to anyone who can get him out of that mess. 'I'll give you everything I own if you'll just solve this one problem for me. Please!'.
Quoting Outlander
If you look at my first reply on this thread, it pretty much answers your question. Dan has two perspectives, what I've come to call two systems of evaluation, one values freedom, the other values consequentialist moral principles. The two are incompatible in a way similar to how the free will and determinist perspectives are incompatible. Not only does Dan not recognize the incompatibility, but he refuses to even accept that he uses two distinct systems to determine the moral value of human actions
Quoting Dan
This I would say is quite a good summation. The issue is clearly not that you misunderstand me, it is simply that we have different beliefs. The question might be, why do you adhere so strongly to your beliefs, and I adhere so strongly to my beliefs, yet they are very different. On top of that, we might also add that these beliefs which are so different, concern a very important subject, moral philosophy.
Suppose you and I were both asked to judge a particular philosopher, to say whether that person was a good moral philosopher. I'm sure we would not agree. Since whether or not a person is an "expert" is a similar judgement, why do you think there is such a thing as "being an expert", rather than simply judgements made by people as to whether a person is an expert or not. If you think that there is such a thing as a good moral philosopher, independent of judgements made by people, how do you think we would ever know whether or not a person was this, so we could ensure that our judgements would correspond with this reality.
Quoting Dan
This shows where you really do misunderstand my argument. Remember, we had a big discussion about what it means to "understand" one's choices. I gave a clear description, to understand one's choice is to put the choice into the context of one's wants, needs, desires, and intentions. You rejected this, complaining that I expect too much from the term. But then you could not give any coherent description of what it means to "understand" one's choice, slipping around from one half-baked idea to another, like a chameleon. That's when I gave up and said that what "understand" means to me is just too far away from what "understand" means to you, to accommodate any reasonable discussion on this subject.
Quoting Outlander
For reference, the point I made is that a habit restricts one's freedom by inclining one to act without considering other available possibilities. Not looking at information limits the possibilities which are present to the person's mind, therefore restricting the person's freedom to choose (specifically the possibilities not present to the mind). There was some question about what constitutes "available" information. If the person has to seek the information does this qualify as "available"? And in the most simple case, if the person has to search through one's own memory, does this qualify as "available"?
When you consider this problem, of what qualifies as "available" information, the power of habit to restrict our freedom becomes even more evident. Since even searching one's own memory requires a directed "seeking" of information, the issue is not the availability of information, the issue is the inspiration or ambition to seek the information. Habit robs us of this inspiration, or ambition, by inclining us to act directly and immediately without seeking any further information to guide us, which might instill the desire to act in another way.
Quoting Dan
More precisely, the point I make is that valuing freedom is inconsistent with valuing consequentialist moral principles. This ought to be quite obvious, in principle, so I can't understand why it's so difficult for you. Freedom is the capacity to choose and make any action. Consequentialist moral principles stipulate that only specific acts ought to be valued, those with "good" consequences. It is incoherent to say that only acts with good consequences have value, but the capacity to make any act (including acts with bad consequences) is also valued.
Quoting Outlander
This, I believe is the route toward solving Dan's problem. I explained this to him a while ago. We do not value freedom of choice, we take it for granted as a fact of life. This puts free choice in a position where it transcends any system of moral evaluation, as the prerequisite for even needing such a system. The issue is that Dan cannot understand "freedom" by these terms, terms which describe freedom in an absolute way. Dan conceives of "freedom" as already restricted, so he talks of this type of freedom, and that type of freedom, according to the restrictions which signify the type. Then this or that named type of freedom is valuable, while the freedom to do immoral things is not valuable. To maintain his principle, that freedom of choice, in general, is something to be valued he is forced to exclude the choice to do immoral things as not a free act at all. Of course this leaves us with no principles to apply toward understanding the reality of freely choosing bad acts.
Quoting Dan
All this demonstrates is that one can state premises which contradict each other, like P! and P2, and draw absurd conclusions. Notice, that if P1 is true, this means that you think it is true, and that denies the truth of P2. So the two contradict.
No, my point is that someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, I didn't say that the doctor was right at the time the decision was made.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think I have implied some objective universal standard of expertise. I'm perfectly willing to grant that expertise as a standard may be either intersubjective, relative, or objective but invented.
I also agree that we might think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one. No problem on that.
But heres the thing: Someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise. In fact, I would go as far as to say that all experts do. These are exactly the people that we all refer to as experts and, I suspect, so do you, and we're not wrong to do so. They are experts, and they misunderstand a part of their field. These things are not mutually exclusive.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I can say exactly that. I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised. There is no inconsistency here as I've explained many times.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The actual-value consequentialist can praise it because doing so will likely lead to good consequences. That's it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As this is a direct impugning of my character, I'll respond: I am not committing any sort of hoax. I am offering money to help solve a problem in the hope that someone will do so, because the solution is worth more to me than the money. I am indeed frustrated with not being able to solve the problem. So far a couple of people have put some effort in and sent me their thoughts that they have worked hard on via email. No workable solutions, but I appreciate their effort and have enjoyed discussing their ideas with them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's because there are not two systems. There is one system that uses freedom as the measure of value and consequentialism as the method of evaluating actions. I do not recognize the incompatibility because it doesn't exist.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is nonsense, and you seem to have your tongue on the keyboard again. I'll thank you to put it away. I gave a fairly clear definition of "understand" when it comes to what it means to "understand one's choices". I have used the same definition of what it means to "understand one's choices" not only for the duration of this discussion, but for years before hand and you will also find it in the linked works mentioned in the initial primer.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think you'll find that I didn't say that the capacity to perform any act should be valued. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of value by which we evaluate the consequences of actions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is not an accurate representation of me or my views in any way. I didn't say that doing immoral things is not a free act, I didn't "conceive of freedom as already restricted", and I didn't say freedom of choice "in general" is to be valued at all.
This, I think, is the core of the problem. I make a claim, and you start arguing against some other claim which I've never made.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree the two contradict, but this is the position you are proposing, not me. My position is much simpler and doesn't turn to custard as soon as you think about it for five minutes. I think that some propositions are objectively true, and some are objectively false, and if you think something false is true or vice-versa, you're incorrect.
As I explained, "be an expert" really has no meaning in the context of this discussion. What we are talking about is "being judged as an expert". So what you are saying is that you would judge a person as an expert, even if that person demonstrates misunderstanding in aspects of the field which you judge that person to be an expert in.
Am I correct here? If so, that's fine, it is an indication of how you would make such a judgement.
Quoting Dan
If the doctor was not "right" then on what principle do you say that the doctor's action is praiseworthy? To say it is "praiseworthy" is to express sincere approval of the act, to indicate that you think the act is commendable. You have judged the act to be "wrong" by actual-value consequentialism. How do you then turn around and express sincere approval of it?
By actual-value consequentialist principles we cannot approve the act, because it is judged as wrong. What principles, what value system do you apply when you judge the act as praiseworthy? Whatever principles (value system) you apply, to judge the act as praiseworthy, clearly it is incompatible with actual-value consequentialism, which forced the judgement of wrong.
Quoting Dan
Will you accept my interpretation of this ( "...think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one") as well? If you judge a person to be an expert at one time, you might later judge the person not to be an expert. And, in retrospect, you might admit that your earlier judgement was wrong. In this case "turns out not to be one" really indicates that whoever made the judgement has had a change of mind.
Quoting Dan
And here, by "intersubective" you mean agreement amongst a number of individuals don't you? So if there is such a "standard" which you refer to, it would be a rule of criteria by which we would judge whether a person is an expert. This way, if we all followed that specific rule, there would be significant agreement about whether a person is an expert or not. I assume that this is what you mean by "objective" in this context. You do not mean the same thing as when we discussed "objective truth", which referred to a sort of correspondence with reality which existed completely independent of all human judgement. You now use "objective" to indicate that there is a "standard", or conventional criteria for judgement, which many people adhere to, and this forms a sort of agreement between people, which you call "intersubjectivity".
Now, what do you think is the "standard" for expertise? Is it not, as I suggested earlier, the highest possible level of understanding? To me, this means that the person can carry out actions within one's field of expertise, for an extended period of time, without showing any mistakes. I still allow the possibility of mistake at some time, but such a mistake would not be conducive to the judgement of "expert", and it would carry with it the need to reevaluate an earlier judgement of "expert".
Of course, we really don't have any such "standard". We don't say that the person must be mistake free for a year, or six months or anything like that. This is because there is a whole lot of other factors which we take into account, the person's education, the type of mistake, degree of severity, and all of this even varies significantly from one area of expertise to another.
Therefore, it ought to be very clear to you, that there is no such thing as "objective expertise". Such objectivity requires "a standard" and clearly in the case of "expertise" we have no such standard. This is why you and I have no agreement about what constitutes an "expert". Just like you say, I want way too much from the word "understand", you also think that I want way too much from the word "expert". On the other hand, I accuse you of a "sloppy" use of words.
You don't employ any rigorous definitions, which I told you is required for logical proceedings. You simply use these words in whatever way strikes you as convenient for the situation. This makes the meaning of these words, in your usage, context dependent. And what I also told you, is that logical procedure (consequently rigorous definition) is very important to moral philosophy. That is because in moral philosophy we are required to go far beyond the world as revealed by the senses and empirical evidence, "what is", into the realm of "what ought to be". Since "what ought to be" cannot be revealed to us by the empirical evidence of "what is", we must be guided by logic rather than sense observation. This implies that rigorous definition is essential to moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
I know you can "say" this, you do a lot of that. You assert many things which I show to you to be incoherent, through logical demonstration. That is known as justification. I support my claim that you are incoherent with justification. You simply assert, 'you are wrong, and I am right', and when I ask you to justify, you either continue with your assertions or attempt to justify your position through a sloppy use of words which amounts to equivocation.
So, with respect to this particular claim, I've already shown how your previous attempt to justify it violated the law of identity, which allowed you to equivocate the meaning of "the same action". That equivocation was the basis of your supposed justification. You showed that the particular action referenced was "wrong", yet similar acts (which you termed "the same action" in different circumstances), would be praise worthy. Through equivocation between "the same action" referring to the particular, individual act, which is judged as "wrong", and "the same action" referring to any one of a number of similar acts of a general type, you supported your assertion that "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised". That is not justification though, it is fallacious logic due to equivocation.
Quoting Dan
You need to support this claim. The actual, individual act, was judged as "wrong" because it led to bad consequences. It is impossible that the very same act would "likely lead to good consequences" because by the law of identity, the same act is the act itself, and that act has those consequences which are judged as bad.
If the "actual-value consequentialist" removes "the act" from the circumstances, through abstraction, then that person is no longer talking about "the same act", one is making a generalization, and talking about a type of act. And if the person proceeds to argue that this "type of act" would likely have good consequences, that would produce the problems exposed by Hume, the problem of induction, and the is/ought gap.
Quoting Dan
I have swiftly and effectively "solved" your problem, by pointing out that you are trying to establish compatibility between two incompatible principles of valuation. That is logically impossible. You refuse to acknowledge the solution, insisting that the impossible is possible, and persisting in your determination to do what is logically impossible. Since you've been trying to do what is logically impossible for close to ten years, and have now even offered a substantial sum of money to anyone who can do the logically impossible, and you persist even after that logical impossibility has been demonstrated to you, this justifies an impugning of your character.
Quoting Dan
What you are saying here is that freedom is the end. The thing by which value is measured is the end, what is desired, and values are assigned (measured) according to the capacity of the act, to produce the end. The stated "method" of evaluating is the means by which that measurement is made.
Do you see what I mean? Since freedom is the measure of value, it must be what is desired as the end, because the goal is what makes any act valuable. The act is "valuable" in relation to an end. A method, is a means, the way that the end is brought about. The end is to have acts evaluated according to their capacity for freedom, and the means to this end is the application of consequentialism.
The problem is that the means (method of evaluating) is not consistent with the end (the stated "measure" of value). In other words the means will not produce the end. Justification of this claim is as follows. The method of measurement evaluates (measures) according to the moral restrictions of the principles of consequentialism. "Freedom" as the measure of value is a lack of restriction. Therefore the stated "method" is not a means to the end at all, being inconsistent with the stated end. The proposed method measures value relative to specific restrictions, while the stated "measure", "freedom" is a lack of restrictions.
Therefore the proposed "method" must be apprehended as a distinct end, it is not conducive to the stated end, therefore it is distinct in its assignment of value. This means that you have two distinct ends, two measures of value, therefore two evaluation systems, one which has "freedom" as the measure of value, and the other has "consequentialism" as the measure of value.
Quoting Dan
No you did not. For example, first you said that the ability to give reasons for one's choices, in retrospect, to rationalize one's choice after the fact was sufficient to qualify as understanding one's choice. Later you denied that this was what you said. You gave a number of such "definitions" which upon questioning demonstrated that you did not know what the definition you stated, meant. This is your habit, to make assertions such as the above "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised" without being able to explain what the stated claim could actually mean.
Quoting Dan
Sure, but as I showed, your use of "their own choices" is not consistent with "freedom" at all, being a severely restricted type of choice. Further, your definition of "own choices" was inconsistent with your application. The application required a circular self-referential definition in order to avoid the charge that "their own choices" was just a consequentialist restricted form of supposed "free choice".
Quoting Dan
Well then what is the "measure of value"? You state above, "freedom is the measure of value". This implies a general sense of "freedom". Then in application you utilize a restricted sense of "freedom" in an attempt to make "freedom" consistent with your consequentialist moral principles. In your application of "the method", "freedom" means the capacity to understand and make "their own choices". Here, "their own choices" is severely restricted by moral principles which define it as choices relating to their own body and property. You claim "their own mind" is included here, but you exclude the relevance in application, because many thoughts do not show up in actions. Therefore the conception of "freedom" which you use in the application of your method, is severely restricted by the moral principle of "their own choices".
Quoting Dan
I did not propose that at all. That was stated as your presumption. Obviously, anyone can state contradictory premises, and contradictory statements, as you consistently do. Whether or not you can "presumably get away" with this depends on whether or not you presume you will be called to justify such claims. You seem to presume that you will never be called to justify your contradictory claims so you can presumable get away with such arguments.
Quoting Dan
I am still waiting for you to justify this belief, without an appeal to God or some other divine mind which makes the judgement of "true" and "false". You do recognize that such predications "true" and "false", like "expert", are judgements don't you?
Yes, I would happily say that I would judge someone to be an expert even if they demonstrate misunderstandings in aspects of the field I judge them to be an expert in. While we're on the subject, I would say that this is also how most people make such a judgement, and that to judge someone not to be an expert (despite evidence that they are) based on a single misunderstanding would not be a very useful way of judging expertise.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because expressing approval of it is an action, and if expressing approval of a wrong action will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism (of the types under discussion at least) would recommend.
If it helps you conceptualize this, it might be easier to imagine that the act consequentialist could just lie about the moral status of the action when they praise it (they don't need to actually lie, but they certainly could).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I'm not sure the judgement of expertise is subjective, it might well be intersubjective or objective but invented etc, but sure, I think I am probably fine with accepting that way of talking about expertise.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, objective but invented is more like the rules of chess, where as intersubjective is more like whether someone is attractive or not. In one case, there are clear, objectively correct rules, but they are just made up by some group. In the other, it's more a general agreement or opinion. But I'm not particularly married to either concept when it comes to expertise and in neither case am I proposing there is some objective standard of expertise irrespective of people's opinions on the matter.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do employ rigorous definitions. I have given several. I also use words differently in different contexts, since that is how words work. I completely agree that rigorous definitions of key terms and concepts is very important for moral philosophy, or indeed any philosophy, since we only have words to communicate our ideas to others. However, I think you often want to pick over terms that have very little to do with the point I'm making and/or take issue because I'm not using words the way you want them used, despite me giving a clear and rigorous definition of how I am using them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I'm not saying similar actions would be praiseworthy, I am saying THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF is praiseworthy. There isn't any contradiction here because rightness and praiseworthiness (or wrongness and lack of praiseworthiness) are not the same thing. You are, one again, attacking points I haven't made, rather than the one I have.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not logically impossible. These things are not inconsistent in any way. You are just wrong. I understand that you have tried to show that they are incompatible, but what you have said (as I have pointed out and explained before) was based on a faulty understanding of freedom (both the kind I am referring to and generally), consequentialism, and what constitutes a system of evaluation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have gotten a couple of things wrong here. First, this connection with desire. That's getting awfully "the end which all mankind aims at" for my liking, and I do not make any such assumption. But, assuming that was just imprecise use of language, the other issue here is that you are treating consequentialism as a means to the end of freedom, and that's all wrong. Consequentialism is a way of evaluating the morality of actions, specifically by their consequences. The correct moral theory should either be consequentialist or not, but it isn't a means to some other end. If my theory were not consequentialist but instead deontological, then it would presumably look a lot like a classic deontological theory of rights, where we must not violate someone's freedom over those choices that belong to them no matter what. Instead, it is a consequentialist theory, that evaluates the consequences of actions by reference to the extent to which they violate or protect the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them. Everything which you say following on from this is wrongheaded due to this mistake.
Although, and keep in mind that this isn't what I am doing and I am not suggesting for a second this is what I am doing, your assertion that you cannot produce something with the use of something that is fundamentally different, or opposed, to that thing seems demonstrably false.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I absolutely never said that it was the ability to give reasons for one's choices in retrospect. I absolutely denied that is what I said becuase it isn't. I have explained what I meant by "understand" many different ways to you because you didn't get it the first time, or any of the subsequent times. Likewise, I have tried to explain what I mean by "the action is wrong and also praiseworthy (from an actual-value consequentialism perspective)" many times, which should be very easy, because I mean exactly what I said. But you keep assuming I mean other, bizarre things, and then claim I'm flip-flopping when I say I don't mean them. But I never said or meant them in the first place. You grabbing the wrong end of the stick and then getting annoyed that the stick and then claiming that I am offering you lots of different sticks. In fact, it is the same stick every time, but you keep finding a way to grab a new and incorrect part of it (which is very strange as the stick I offered didn't have that many ends in the first place)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you want to use "freedom" in a very general sense. I have used the word "freedom" specifically to refer to the ability of persons to understand and make choices, and then further specified that it is only the ability of person to understand and make their own choices that we ought to use as a measure of moral value.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It only implies that if you haven't read the many, many times I gave a specific, precise definition. Which I did in the initial primer that I provided. No, "freedom" doesn't mean that. "Freedom" as I've used it here, means the ability to understand and make choices, and I have specified that it is freedom over one's own choices that matters. Though I will concede that, with that established, I do often shorthand to "freedom is the measure of value".
Also, I don't exclude mental freedom at all. Many of the most important freedoms are ultimately mental ones. I'm not sure which stick you grabbed there, but I'm certain you got the wrong end of it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I do not state contradictory premises except when parodying lunatic views such as truth being subjective. As I was doing here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I do not recognize that "true" and "false" are, themselves judgements, much like "expert" isn't a judgement. An expert, is a person. We make judgements about whether people are experts or not. Those judgements can be right or wrong in some way that I will happily agree is not objective in the sense we have been discussing. True or false are characteristics of propositions, theories, etc. We make judgements about them, which are either correct or not in a way which is, sometimes, objective. I have justified this belief by reference to it being really the only workable option. When it comes to truth, objectivity is the only game in town.
OK, you and I have different ideas about what constitutes "expertise". That's not surprising.
Quoting Dan
So you accept my demonstration of how your use of words is very deceptive, when you say "be an expert" and "not be one". There is no such thing as being an expert, or not being an expert, there is only instances of being judged to be an expert.
Quoting Dan
You give "several" definitions for the same word, or phrase. You gave at least two for "their own choice", a choice concerning one's own mind body and property, and, a choice which does not restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. The problem was, that if we adhered to the first definition, I made it clear to you that most choices concerning one's own body and property also affect the body and property of others, so you had to switch definitions to a choice which doesn't restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. But this definition is meaningless, because it's self-referential. So you use both definitions, switching back and forth in equivocation, however it suits you.
Then, when we discussed what it means to "understand" one's own choice, you made several attempts to define this. And, you switched from several different meanings for that word, in our discussion.
Quoting Dan
Yes, words have different meanings in different contexts, and that is how words work in common vernacular. Relative to a different subjects the same word has a different meaning. In reasoning, we stay within the same subject, and we must adhere to one meaning even in different contexts within that subject, to produce valid conclusions. Otherwise, "the work" that the words are doing is equivocation.
Quoting Dan
I don't see how expressing approval of a wrong act could possibly produce the best consequences. To me, doing this would only produce the conclusion that your judgement of "wrong" is faulty. Well, I might agree then, "the best consequences" are denial of "actual value" moral principles. Is that what "the best consequences" are in this case, recognition that the principles by which you judged the praiseworthy act as wrong, are faulty principles?
Quoting Dan
As I said above, I cannot accept this, even though I am quite sure that you can explain it through your equivocal ways. "Wrong" means mistaken, in error, incorrect. "Praiseworthy" means admirable, commendable, favourable. Both are judgements. One is a judgement of the quality of the act, the other a judgement of how we ought to respond to the act. You are claiming that in some cases we ought to respond to a mistaken, incorrect, wrong act with admiration and praise. That makes no sense if we adhere to moral principles which praise good, correct acts.
This is like your judgement of "expertise", but inverted. We can praise a person as "an expert", and you say that even when the so-called expert makes mistakes, we continue to praise the person as "an expert". What we do, is remove the person from the context of those mistakes. We do not praise the person for the mistakes.
Now, in the inverted sense, we have the mistaken act itself, as wrong, incorrect. You want to praise the act itself, which has already been judged as mistaken. In your previous explanation, you removed the act from its context, to say that the act in "most circumstances" would not be wrong. This would put the blame on the circumstances, for the mistake, not on the person. But then it is not a case of saying "THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF" is praiseworthy, it is a case of saying that the circumstances were wrong, and the act itself was actually correct, therefore praiseworthy.
So, the "actual value" principle by which you judge the act as wrong is faulty because it puts the blame on the acter, saying that the act (as property of the acter) was "wrong", when in reality the mistake was caused by the circumstances, not the choices of the acter. It wrongfully blames the acter with a "wrong" act, and you recognize that this judgement of "wrong act" is wrong (you recognize the actual value judgement as faulty), therefore you proceed to praise the acter, knowing that the act was not really wrong, the mistake is properly attributable to the "accidents" of the circumstances, not the act itself.
Therefore, in the inverted context, the context of the judgement of "expertise", the person is judged as an expert, and praised as an expert. Yet, the person demonstrates "misunderstanding" by making a mistake. In order that we maintain the judgement of "expert" we attribute the mistakes to the circumstances, not to the field of expertise. The expert continues to display an impeccable understanding of one's area of expertise, yet fails in understanding specific circumstances, "accidentals", and this produces mistakes. The mistakes cannot be judged as "wrong acts" of the acter, because that would negate the praiseworthiness of the the person called an expert, so the mistakes are attributed to a misunderstanding of the circumstances, and "circumstances", or "accidentals" are something external to, not part of, the area of expertise.
Quoting Dan
OK, I grant to you, that by strict deductive logic, it is not "logically impossible". This is due to the is/ought gap. The is/ought separation makes it impossible to demonstrate logically that it is incoherent to say that we "ought to praise an act which is wrong". This is because judgements of "ought", and judgements of "is" are categorically distinct, and no logic can bridge that gap. Instead, we bridge the gap with rules of moral philosophy, ethics. These rules are definitional, like axioms of mathematics.
So, we might say, "we ought to encourage correct acts, and discourage wrong acts", as a moral axiom. Rules like this make up the conventional principles of moral philosophy. However, you do not want to accept these conventional principles, and you propose a system which leads to situations such as the described one (we ought to encourage a wrong act) which contradicts conventional moral principles.
What i say now, is that your system may not be "logically impossible", but since it negates and denies the conventions of moral philosophy, we cannot call what you are proposing "moral philosophy". What is "logically impossible" is for your proposed system to be called "moral philosophy". That what you propose is incompatible with conventional moral philosophy, and that you present it as "moral philosophy" is what produces incoherency, and this makes your enterprise "logically impossible". It is logically impossible that what you present is moral philosophy. It's like for example, if someone proposed new axioms which are completely inconsistent with accepted axioms of mathematics, and presented them as "mathematics". It would be logically impossible that what the person presented is mathematics. Therefore, to avoid the judgement of "logically impossible" you need to quit representing what you are doing as moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
You can proceed with your own definition of "freedom" and your own definition of "system of evaluation" which are completely inconsistent with how the words are conventionally understood.
Quoting Dan
You are going off on your own definition of "value" now. If "value" is not assigned in relation to what is wanted, desired, as "the desirability of a thing", then you have completely separated yourself from moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
This furthers the evidence that what you propose is not "moral philosophy". You have separated "value" from "what is desired", and assume some form of consequentialist valuation. However, consequentialist principles are still based in the determination of a "good" outcome. And "good" in moral philosophy is grounded by what is desired. If you do not ground "good" in what is desired, then how do you judge whether the consequences are good or not?
You posit "the ability to understand and make their own choices" as the ground. But this becomes circular when the definition becomes self-referential. When are the consequences judged as "good"? When that ability is enabled. But why is this principle the measurement of "good". I suggest to you, that it is because it is consistent with the "type of freedom" which you personally desire. Now your moral philosophy is grounded in desire, what you desire, and as a oral philosophy it becomes logically incoherent.
With this proposition, "the ability to make their own choices is the measure of 'good' which you desire", I bring your proposal into the system of conventional moral philosophy to judge your desire as incompatible with moral philosophy. You claim to overrule my subjective judgement with an appeal to "objectivity". You insist that your system is not grounded in what you personally desire, it is grounded in an objective understanding of "freedom". But that's false, you define "freedom" as you please.
Now you propose a so-called "moral philosophy" which does not ground "value" in something fundamentally subjective, what is desired, but you ground it in something you propose as objective, "freedom". And we're back to the start, this is not "moral philosophy" at all.
Quoting Dan
The correct moral theory is necessarily a means to an end. This is because "value", "worth", and ultimately "good" and "right" is determined by what is desired. And what is desired is the end. So the system of valuation, which is the moral theory, is the means to that end. With each passage you write, you demonstrate more and more clearly that what you are proposing is not moral philosophy at all.
Quoting Dan
Here, you make an attempt to present your theory as moral philosophy by designating "the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them" as the end, what is desired. However, when you try to make it into a moral theory in this way, it proves itself to be incoherent. This is due to what I've already demonstrated concerning your proposed concept of "those choices that belong to them".
Quoting Dan
That is not what I claimed. I said that when the proposed means is not conducive to the end (no cause/effect relation), then the means becomes an end in itself. This is what happens with your proposal of using consequentialist morals, as a method (means) to produce the desired end of "freedom" (your stated measure of value). Consequentialist morals cannot produce freedom because moral principles are fundamentally opposed to freedom as forms of restriction. Since the consequentialist morals are not conducive to your desired end (freedom) then the morals become an end in themselves. But morals cannot be an end, as moral principles are designed as a means to an end, so your theory is left as wanting an end. So you try to ground these morals in "objective right" rather than a true end, what is desired, the good.
Quoting Dan
I refer you back to the example of buying the second hand shirt. First you said "to understand" ones choice is to know what the choice means, and to be able to apply one's rationality to it. When I explained that "what the choice means" implies meaning, what is meant, and this implies what is intended, and this implies putting the choice into the context of what is desired, so that the choice to buy the shirt was contrary to the intention to only buy a shirt if it was 100% cotton, the contrariness implying a misunderstood choice, you then altered the definition. The new definition became the following:
Quoting Dan
I think it's obvious that "able to apply their rationality to it", means to be able to give reasons for the choice in retrospect.
This was the significant sticking point between us, which made agreement on what it means "to understand one's choice" impossible. I wanted this to mean applying one's rationality prior to making the choice, and put the possibilities to be selected from into the context of what is desired by the person, but you want simply "able to apply their rationality to the choice", which signifies the ability to rationalize the choice after the fact.
Actually, I don't think you even understand this difference, and the failure to agree, between us, because you deny that the nature of time is important.
Quoting Dan
Your definition of "freedom", like your definition of "their own choices" becomes incoherent when someone requests that you explain what the definition means.
Quoting Dan
OK, so you only use contradictory premises when someone proposes a view which is contrary to your view, and the only way to demonstrate that the other person's view is wrong is to use an argument with contradictory premises. This would appear to indicate that really, the contrary view, your view is the one which is wrong.
Quoting Dan
This makes no sense, and indicates that you do not understand predication at all. If we make judgements about whether a person "is an expert", this means that we judge the person to have this quality, "is" signifies predication. It does not mean that there is such a thing as "an expert", and the expert has the quality of being a person. That's what "the expert is a person" would signify. That would be a switching of subject and predicate.
Quoting Dan
As indicated above, it is "the only workable option" for your moral theory. You seek to ground your moral principles in some fictitious, fantasy, "objective truth", rather than accept that a true moral philosophy grounds its principles in intention, what is desired, the good.
No, I didn't say that at all. For example, there is such a things as the rules of chess, though they were invented.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No I didn't. I used the same definition throughout, and you assumed extra definitions when they weren't given. When it comes to one's own choices, they are those regarding that is done with one's own mind, body, and property, but this is more of an outcome of the assumption that there are choices which belong to someone, rather than a definition. I'd suggest reading some of the initial material for further discussion of this. I also didn't define them as those that don't restrict other people's choices. That was you assuming, rather than me stating. I also gave a single definition of what it means to "understand" one's choice, these other definitions were not made by me, but incorrectly read into what I said by you.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We haven't remotely stayed within the same subject here though. Since there are often five disagreements about different topics covering different fields, words need to be used in different ways.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I've already explained how it could lead to the best consequences: by promoting people acting in similar ways in situations that appear similar to them as the wrong action did to the actor in question but which are in fact different and will lead to good consequences rather than bad ones.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ah, I think I see the assumption that is leading to confusion. You are assuming that moral principles must praise good, correct acts. That just isn't so. If praising a bad, incorrect act will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism recommends we do.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Praising a wrong act might well, such as in this case, be encouraging good acts. The world might be such that the best way to encourage good actions in future is to praise a bad action that has already occurred.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, that is fairly true of "freedom," as I am using it in a fairly revisionist way as a shorthand for "the ability of persons to understand and make choices", mostly because the latter is a mouthful. This is not the case for "system of evaluation."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Is it often assumed that what people value has moral value, certainly by the utilitarians and the virtue ethicists, but this is not a required assumption, and not one that I think we ought to make.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, it just isn't. It's often assumed that what we value is moral valuably, but I am not making that assumption as a) I don't think we do all necessarily want the same thing, b) even if we, as humans did, that is no reason to think that all persons do, and c) even if they do, as a matter of fact, that would merely be a contingent fact about them, rather than a necessary one. Instead, I would say that I begin with simpler assumptions, which I detailed in the initial primer, and then from there try to determine what is the best candidate for moral value.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, nope. Moral philosophy, as I understand it, is about how we ought to live our lives, where ought is understood in a universal, objective sense. To borrow a concept from Kant, think in terms of the categorical imperative, what we ought to do regardless of our desires (Kant is making some other assumptions I also don't make, such as morality being about rationality, but this concept is hopefully helpful in terms of expressing the general character of what I'm aiming at here).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, you haven't demonstrated any such thing. Second, I am not presenting the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them as desired by people. I am presenting it as valuable whether or not it is desired.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, consequentialism isn't really a "means to an end". Also, I think you are taking consequentialism to include a lot more than it does. A consequentialist moral theory is one that evaluates the morality actions by reference to their consequences. That's it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There aren't two definitions there. The second one is a clarification as you seem to have thought that to be able to apply one's rationality to it is to actually do so, and those are not the same thing. Also, being able to apply one's rationality to a choice is definitely not the same as giving reasons in retrospect, it is being able to recognize and respond to reasons for making that choice. And, in case it wasn't clear, the time you need to understand the choice such that you are able to apply your rationality to it is the time you are making it, not some time after the fact. This is a perfect example of me defining something consistently and you reading some bizarre new definition into what I have said.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't. Any percieved incoherence is likely the result of you reading additional claims I haven't made into what I have said, or else misunderstanding either what I'm saying or the fundamental concepts needed to discuss these points.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is not what I said. Since the view that truth is subjective allows for contradictory propostions to both (or all) be true, I demonstrated how this leads to problems using an argument that included contradictory premises to demonstrate why this position is not acceptable.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To judge someone as an expert indeed judges someone as having a quality, but "an expert" is a person who has that quality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is the only option for any sensible discussion of anything worthy of serious consideration.
Quoting Dan
Obviously then, you are not praising the "same act" which was judged as wrong, you are praising, and promoting, what you clearly describe as "similar" acts.
Quoting Dan
I'm still waiting for a logical explanation of how you believe that praising a bad, incorrect, act could lead to the best consequences. You've switched from your equivocation of "the same" to acknowledge that you are praising and promoting "similar acts". But now there is no principle whereby you would praise the bad act itself, you only praise and promote similar acts. The difference however, is that one is bad, and the others good. I suggest to you, that since bad and good are opposing predications, they aren't really "similar" at all, you just illogically claim this for argument sake.
Quoting Dan
OK, I'll see if I can follow you with this assumption. I would say that moral value is based in "what people value". We proceed logically from determinations about what people value, to make conclusions about moral value.
You think that is not something we ought to do, you think it's a bad approach.. So now I want you to justify this claim that it is a bad approach.
Quoting Dan
None of this justifies your claim.
a0 It is not necessary that we all want the same thing, to base moral value in what people value. In fact, it is in wanting different (though many are similar) things rather than the same thing which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If we all valued the same thing we would just fight over it, and we couldn't get anywhere with moral values. But since we may value different things, we can structure moral values in a way which allows us all to have what we need.
b) This is Irrelevant, because "moral value", as derived from what people value, does not assume that we all value the same thing. In fact, the opposite is the case.
c) The fact of the matter is as you say, when people value "the same thing", this is only contingently true, not a necessity. Because of this we can base moral principles in a system which allows people to value different things, and each have the different things that they value, without fighting over the same thing. So it actually is this "contingent fact" about "what people value", that they do not necessarily all value the same thing, which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If it was a necessary fact that we all valued the very same thing, we'd all fight over it and we could have no moral system based in what people value. Since what people value is contingent, we can all value different things and not fight over the same thing.
So your claim is not justified by your statements, it simply shows a lack of understanding of what it means to base moral value in what people value.
Quoting Dan
Wow, you really do have a lack of understanding of moral philosophy. Do you really believe that moral philosophy dictates that we ought to all live our lives in the same way, according to some "universal, objective" sense of "ought". This is exactly the opposite of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is designed to allow us maximum freedom, for each person to seek after their own goals, in a way which doesn't interfere with others. We might employ universal principles, like love thy neighbour, but these are not employed in an objective sense, they are employed as a tool, the means toward allowing people to live their lives in the way they want, seeking the goals they want to seek, while allowing others the same capacity.
Quoting Dan
But you need to ground "value". By common definition "valuable" is defined as what is desirable, therefore value is grounded in what is desired. When you deny this relation, this grounding of "value" , you need to replace it with something else, otherwise you just make an arbitrary assertion, "X is valuable" without any reason as to why anyone might value it.
So, if "the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them" does not have value because it is desirable, then what makes it valuable. If you cannot say what makes it valuable then it's just an arbitrary random assertion. And, arbitrary random assertions do not produce moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
You stated that consequentialism is the method. As method, it is the means.
Quoting Dan
The view that truth is subjective does not allow that P1 and P2 are both true, as I explained. If you believe P1, therefore P1 is true by the subjective perspective, then P2 must be false. A person who thinks that truth is subjective cannot also think that truth is objective. And if you start with P2, "I think truth is objective", you cannot truthfully state P1, truth is subjective. No matter how you look at it, from the "truth is subjective" perspective you have sated two contradictory premises. It is only from the perspective of "truth is objective" that the two contradictory premises appear to be coherent, and that demonstrates the faultiness of that perspective. It makes two contradictory premises appear to make a coherent argument.
No, the wrong action is being praised in order to promote the right ones.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have not equvocated so much as clarified since you seemed to be stuck on the term "same act". I have absolutely given you an example of this that used neither of these terms in the case of "proscribing drug X to a patient who has a specific medical history, set of symptoms, etc". In that case, praising the wrong action (from the perspective of actual-value consequentialism) of proscribing drug X to that patient is done because you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think there may be a clash of underlying assumptions here. I am assuming that things that any moral facts that exist are objectively true, in fact I would go as far as to say necessary truths. It seems as though you are treating moral values as something we invent? Is that fair to say? I think this might be the source of this disagreement.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm struggling with this one, because a lot of what you've said is dead wrong, down to the bones wrong. But, on the other hand, I would agree that moral philosophy should allow us maximum freedom (over our own choices) in a way which doesn't interfere with others' (possessive apostrophe added as I obviously mean others' freedom over their own choices). Let me say a few simple things then, rather than getting bogged down.
Having to live our lives "the same way" is not the same as all being subject to the same categorical imperative(s).
When I discuss "morality" I am referring to objective, universal, indeed necessary, morality. Those truths, if indeed they exist, are the ones I am after. I think that is what people say when they say "morality." If it isn't, then so much the worse for them, and I will accept the asterisk next to the word and continue on regardless, as those are the kind of moral truths that are worth pursuing.
I don't know if you mean to suggest that moral philosophy, as a discipline, doesn't include objectivism, but this is fairly obviously not the case. So I'm going to assume you don't mean to say that.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would say instead that the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them is the best candidate we have for moral value (for all the reasons mentioned in my primer and the referenced works). So, assuming anything has moral value, we should assume it is this. Abductive reasoning, not deductive.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not really. It is a method of evalutating actions, but it is a feature a theory can have, it isn't a theory by itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that I don't think truth is subjective, but presumably you think I am wrong? Presumably you could state P1, and then state P2 (as Dan thinks etc etc), and thus end up with the conclusion that truth isn't subjective.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know where you've gotten this from or why you think this, but it's not correct. It is very much your position which allows for contradictory premises since it allows the same proposition to be both true and untrue, especially when I start having beliefs about your beliefs etc.
To justify this would require demonstrating a causal relation between the proposed cause, praising the wrong, and the effect, future right ones.
Quoting Dan
In the example, administering drug X caused the death of the patient, that's why it was judged as wrong. If you praise administering drugs which cause death to patients, how do you think that this promotes future right acts.
As I've been trying to tell you, without analyzing the act, and separating the right from the wrong, you cannot conclude that promoting the act will have the best consequences. This is because separating the actions of the acter, which you wish to praise, from the particular circumstances, which are responsible for the judgement of wrong, will have better consequences than simply praising the act which was wrong. The consequences will be better because analysis will enable the students to better "understand" the role of circumstances in relation to the consequences of their actions.
So, " you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X." But this is clearly not the best approach. We want doctors to do more than just consider "the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc,", we want doctors to also be aware of unique and peculiar circumstances. "Etc." here might indicate other situations in which the patient would die. This is a special sort of keenness which is sometimes associated with intuition, but it can be identified and cultivated by educators. It is a heightened sense of awareness of the risks and dangers in a given situation, and the capacity to rapidly assess and judge the potential impact of the circumstances.
This capacity separates someone with excellent capacities (expert), from someone who is merely good at what they do. If we want "the best consequences" we need to promote such excellence, rather than your average "goodness", and this means having the highest understanding of how the peculiarities and uniqueness of each particular situation may have an effect on the consequences. This is known as "good intuition", and excellence requires not only good education, but also good intuition. And that is why we do not judge "expertise" solely on a person's theoretical education, but also on one's practise, because how an individual applies one's theory to the vast variety of situations which a person finds oneself in, is what really determines how "good" the person is.
Quoting Dan
You are missing the point, let me try again.
If we name any specific thing, as that which a person desires, this would be as you say, a contingent truth, not a necessary truth. This is due to the nature of the human being, and free will. We have desires, and particular things are sometimes desired, but no particular thing desired, is necessarily desired, and this constitutes our freedom of choice. If certain things appeared to us as "necessary" in any absolute sense. we would have no freedom of choice, because of the necessity of those particular things.
Because of this, there is no "objective truth" to "what a person desires". If there was objective truth to "what a person desires", this would implicitly negate freedom of choice, by contradiction and incompatibility. So, moral philosophy takes this as a fundamental principle, not necessarily an "objective truth", though some may say that God supports this as an objective truth. I take it as an axiom, a self-evident principle, since it is evident that we have free will, it is a necessary conclusion that nothing desired is desired as necessary.
What I was telling you, is that this principle provides the basis for moral philosophy, because it allows for the reality of differences between us. So for example, we do not need to fight over the same thing. It is not necessary that we each have the very same thing, we can each have something similar. Furthermore, by cultivating the differences between us, we have different people suitable for different positions, different jobs, etc..
So, your idea " any moral facts that exist are objectively true" is actually counter productive to moral philosophy. "Moral facts" are statements about human subjectivity, what we value, and desire. And, it is essential to recognize and promote the "moral fact" that we may value and desire different things. This is necessary to avoid fighting over the same thing. Further, allowing for these differences allows us to cooperate toward common goals or ends, by each person playing a different role.
The difficult part to understand, and accept, is that "moral facts" themselves cannot be objectively true. This is what I've been trying to tell you concerning the nature of a predication, as a judgement. Judgements are made by subjects, and as such they are guided by one's desires and intentions, so they are inherently subjective. If we assume facts which are "objectively true" these fall outside the realm of human judgement, therefore outside the realm of "moral facts", which consists of human judgements. Then the only time they can become relevant is if we attempt to determine what these divine judgements might look like, but that is a completely different subject, not moral philosophy, but ontology or metaphysics. Plato outlined that separation in The Euthyphro.
Quoting Dan
That's consistent with your usual response. You insist that I am "dead wrong", but you offer nothing to back that up. You clearly have a misunderstanding of "moral philosophy", believing that it consists of some universal, objective statements about "the thing we all desire" when I've explained how this is dead wrong. Moral philosophy must be based in assumptions that we desire different things.
Quoting Dan
So you really do share ideas with traditional moral philosophy. That is why I still think it is worthwhile discussing these things with you. We don't throw out the baby with the bath water. Your idea to maximize freedom is consistent with traditional moral philosophy. you just do not seem to have the same understanding of "freedom", and so you have a different approach.
Quoting Dan
I think you misunderstand Kant's concept of categorical imperative. Notice, there is not one universal "imperative", but a better interpretation would reveal a different imperative for each different situation. That renders Kant's idea as useless.
Moral philosophy is intended to help guide us through the difficulties of the uniqueness of situations, where universal objective principles do not well apply. So if you seek such universal, objective principles, as a basis for moral philosophy, you are proceeding in the wrong direction. What you ought to look at is how such universal principles fail us in the uniqueness of particular circumstances. That's what moral philosophy is all about, guiding us in dealing with the unique and peculiar circumstances which we find ourselves in every day. I think that is the lesson of the doctor example. The doctor follows "the universal rule" but still ends up making what could be judged as "the wrong choice". Moral philosophy guides us to hone our intuitions enabling us to rapidly assess the peculiarities of the circumstances, and how these peculiarities may effect any attempts to apply universal rules.
Quoting Dan
That's right, there is absolutely no place for objectivism in moral philosophy, which deals with the decision making of subjects. The subject of moral philosophy is the decisions of the subject, so objectivity is irrelevant. Those who want to bring objectivity to bear on moral philosophy assume a compromised (false) sense of objectivity, often called intersubjectivity, which is nothing more than convention, agreement between subjects. Objectivism is relegated to a place outside moral philosophy, i.e. ontology or metaphysics. From there it can bear on epistemology, and even moral philosophy, but only in the way that it affects an individual subject's attitude toward these fields.
Quoting Dan
But you do not say why freedom of persons over their choices has "value". Because of this, it is just an arbitrary assertion. You assert something like "the ability to make one's own choice freely is the most valuable thing". But someone could say "the ability to eat is the most valuable thing", or "the ability to breathe", "the ability to move", or "the ability to see", or "hear", etc.. Unless you support your claim with reasons, it is just arbitrary like all these others, and many more.
To support or justify your position you need a definition of "value" which is consistent with your claim. The common definition associates "value" with what is desirable, but this does not work for you. And when we associate "value" with freedom in a more general sense, it is incompatible with general universal "objective" moral principles. So you need to give up one or the other. Either give up associating "value" with freedom. or give up associating "value" with objective moral principles, because the two produce incompatible definitions of "value". What I have proposed is to associate value with freedom, but then moral principles are taken as subjective.
Quoting Dan
No, it doesn't work that way. If I state P1 as "I think truth is subjective", and P2 as "Dan thinks truth is objective", then it is recognized as the beliefs of two different subjects. How do you get from this to "truth isn't subjective"? That would require the same sort of misunderstanding of predication which you demonstrated with "that expert is a person". See, "objective truth" is predicated to what "Dan thinks". It is not stated as "there is objective truth and Dan believes this", it is stated as Dan's belief, so it is only true if truth is subjective. Therefore we cannot conclude that truth is not subjective, because without the further premise "truth is subjective" none of the premises can be taken as truth. And with that premise, it just means that Dan's belief is inconsistent with that premise (i.e. wrong if we accept that premise).
I mean, I gave you an example of this in this hypothetical scenario. In real life, we would praise the wrong action when we had good reason to think this would lead to good consequences.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In this case, the drug caused the death of the patient due to unusual circumstances that would be irresponsible to check for in most cases where the patient is presenting with those symptoms/has that medical history/etc due to needing to act quickly or risk the patient's death. Assuming that this specific scenario has been analyzed and concluded that it is unlikely to come up again, or is likely to come up so rarely that checking for it will cost more lives than it saves, then we might well praise the wrong action in the hopes that doctors in the future will also proscribe drug X to patients presenting with the same symptoms/medical history/etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, in this case we don't want doctors to be doing that because not proscribing drug X will kill more people than it saves.
Intuition, of the reliable kind that might present in this kind of context, is more about unconsciously noticing circumstances that your experience and training have prepared you to notice. Eg, a firefighter "just knowing" that a building is about to collapse, because they have unconsciously noticed signs that correspond to things they have seen in buildings on the verge of collapse in the past. In this case, no such signs are present in the patients who will die from drug X.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, there presumably is an objective truth to what a person desires. I think you may be misusing "objective truth" there. Second, moral philosophy does not take this as a fundamental principle. It is an assumption presumed by some moral theories, but not all. Third, I'm not sure it is evident we have free will, though I think we do. Fourth, even if we did, that wouldn't mean that our desires wouldn't be hard-wired into us. Fifth, I am in no way claiming that our desires are necessary or all the same, and it wouldn't make any difference to me if they were, since I'm not making the assumption that what we desire is morally valuable.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, moral facts are facts about the way that persons ought to be or act. You are either assuming that what is desirable is valuable or indeed treating moral values as something we invent, like the rules of chess. I did ask about this, but I don't seem to have gotten an answer.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, no, morality (at least, of the sort I am interested in) is not about human judgements, but about the way all persons, actual and merely possible, ought to be or act. Of course, both are the subject of moral philosophy, as what morality is and what the goal of morality is is a question of metaethics.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To be fair, that wasn't the end of my response there. Also, moral philosophy is about a lot of things, such as whether morality is objective, or subjective, or relative, etc. I think that objectivism is the only viable metaethical option at this level, and that leaves us with either moral realism (paired with objectivism) or moral error theory as our potential plausible views of morality, of which I think moral realism is the better view to take. Also, quite a lot of normative theories in moral philosphy are very much based on the assumption that we all desire (or perhaps aim at) the same end. Utilitarianism very commonly relies on this assumption, and Aristotle seems to make it in the Nichomachean Ethics with regard to eudaimonia. That being said, I am not saying that morality is about what we all desire. I am saying it is not about what we desire at all.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is very much not an idea that is common in moral philosophy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, Kant aboslutely would say that there is one universal imperative, though he would claim there are different "formulations" of it.
Universal objective principles, assuming that any exist, do well apply to individual situations. That's rather what "universal" means. If the principle fails to provide appropriate guidance in some particular circumstance, then I suggest it wasn't the right principle in the first place.
The doctor case is a bit different, but I'd sooner not distract from my core point with that here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So on one reading of this, you're very badly wrong. Moral philosophy as a discipline doesn't start with an assumption of subjectivity and then proceed from there. If you'd like, I can point you at some moral philosophy textbooks if you like so you can get a better grasp of this.
If however you are saying that moral philosophy should start with an assumption of subjectivism, then you're still wrong, but you at least have some company in your view. Those who want to bring objectivity to bear in morality (which I think is probably most of us, and is certainly me) are not using intersubjectivity and calling objectivity, we are talking about actual objectivity. I expect the reason you are having trouble with this is that you are making the assumption that morality is about what is desired, which isn't an assumption that everyone else is making, and that we all desire different things, which also isn't a desire that everyone else is making. It may be worth considering what assumptions you are making and ensure one of them is not that everyone else is making the same ones.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not an arbitrary assertion, it is abductively reasoning towards the best candidate for moral value under the assumption that something has such value.
There is absolutely nothing incompatible between freedom and moral value being universal and objective.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How I get from one to the other is that, presumably, if truth is subjective, then each of our beliefs are true "for us". I agree it is only true if truth is subjective, but if you think truth is subjective, then presumably you must accept that if I think truth is objective, I am also right, thus the contradiction.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So you're saying that if we accept the premise "truth is subjective", then my beliefs about whether truth is subjective or not can be wrong? Which is to say, there is an objective truth to whether truth is subjective? I mentioned this earlier, but you tried to dodge it by allowing the subjectivity of truth to itself be subjective, which gives rise to exactly the problem I pointed out here.
I disagree, we always want doctors to be aware of possible negative effects of any drugs they prescribe. Telling doctors this drug usually saves lives when a person has such and such symptoms, therefore always prescribe it when a person has those symptoms, is wrong, and not he way doctors are actually trained. They are trained to be aware of, and look for possible complications
Quoting Dan
Right, that's what I am talking about. Training is not simply about teaching general rules (prescribe X drug when a patient has such and such symptoms), it's also about culturing good intuition, which is reading the peculiarities of the unique circumstances. Doctors need this just as much as firefighters do.
You are wrong to say no such sign is present in this case. If I remember the example correctly, the sign is explicit, and tattooed right on the foot of the patient. The doctor might be aware of a trend to make such a tattoo, or some other factor learned might subconsciously incline the doctor to check the foot. And in real life cases there are often indications that a doctor might look for, just like a firefighter. Intuition is a factor which gives the expert an edge over others.
Quoting Dan
You might presume this, but if it were true, it would deny the possibility of free will. As I explained if it was an objective truth that a person desires X, then the person would have to seek X and would not be free to do otherwise.
Quoting Dan
This is nonsense. No moral philosophy claims to state objective facts about the way people ought to act. We might make a general statement like "a person ought to do what is good", but since "good" is such a general term, this sort of statement says noting about any specific "way" that a person ought to be. Even Kant's presumed categorical imperative doesn't state a way that people should live.
Quoting Dan
You are wrong. As I demonstrated already, "the sort" you are interested in, is not a sort of morality at all. You pretty much accepted this already when you told me that you didn't agree with any traditional moral principles. So it's just like my example. If a person came up with a bunch of axioms which are completely inconsistent with traditional mathematics, and said "this is the sort of mathematics I'm interested in", we'd have to say that is not mathematic at all. And to take the analogy further, if someone proposed "a sort" of logic which was completely inconsistent with traditional logic, we'd designate it as illogical. Likewise, your "sort" is immoral.
Quoting Dan
I'm starting to see that your form of "objectivism" is actually inconsistent with free will. This makes it inconsistent with moral theory, therefore immoral.
Quoting Dan
You are demonstrating a very low level degree of education in moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
Different "formulations" is the key thing here. The problem for Kant is that there are two distinct universals to deal with, every situation, and every human being. Due to the incompatibility between these two universals, there cannot be one law for both, every human being in every situation. Kant thought there ought to be one overarching categorical imperative so he tried to determine it.
However, his attempt breaks down, such that we can either have distinct laws for each situation, which apply to all people, or we can have distinct laws for each person which apply in all situations. Either way ends up with a multitude of categorical imperatives, either a distinct imperative for each situation, or a distinct imperative for each person, and there cannot be one categorical imperative which determines them all because there are two distinct types.
Quoting Dan
Take Kant's for example. He starts from the personal believe, a subjective opinion, that there ought to be one categorical imperative. That is a subjective opinion. No matter how you look at it, you cannot get away from the subjectivity of moral philosophy.
You like to think that moral philosophy can start in objectivity, but that's your subjective opinion, and as Kant's effort demonstrates the quest for objectivity is doomed to failure. Therefore every successful (i.e. influential) moral philosophy in the past, begins with the subject. You can show me as many proposals for moral philosophy, as you like, which begin in objectivity, and I will show you how each fails. And, since they are all inconsistent with true, accepted, conventional, and influential moral philosophy, it's best to describe them as immoral.
Quoting Dan
Unless you can provide the reasons, there is no abductive reasoning here at all, and your claim of what provides the best candidate for moral value is arbitrary.
I've provided good reason why "desire" grounds "value" in what is desirable. This is because desire is what shapes and guides our decisions. We choose things which we desire, and that is a natural fact. So we ground "value" in how it is naturally grounded. Notice, this is not proposed as "objective fact", it is a natural inclination. Since free will allows us to create structures of value not grounded in natural inclinations, such as what you propose, we cannot say that it is an objective fact that value must be grounded this way. It is a choice to be made, ground value in the natural way or not, just like the choice to be moral or immoral. We cannot say that it is an objective fact that we must behave morally, because that would be denying our freedom of choice to act immorally.. Such proposals, being inconsistent with what is natural, ought to be rejected as immoral, but I cannot say it's an objective fact that they must be rejected..
Quoting Dan
I explained to you how this idea is very faulty. So it's definitely not an assumption I am making.
Quoting Dan
I don't see the contradiction. You simply demonstrate your lack of understanding of predication.
P1 predicates of the subject MU, the belief that truth is subjective.
P2 predicates of the subject Dan, the belief that truth is objective.
There is nothing more than this, and no incompatibility nor contradiction, different beliefs are predicated of different subjects.
It is only if you add a further premise, P3 "truth is subjective", that the appearance of contradiction arises. However, the appearance of contradiction is due to the way "truth is subjective" is interpreted by you. You interpret "truth is subjective" as an objective truth. And of course, if you interpret the proposition "truth is subjective": as an objective truth, contradiction is implicit within your interpretation, and so absurdity appears.
The issue therefore, is that since you believe truth is objective (P2), then if you judge P3 "truth is subjective" as true you create a contradiction. Therefore to judge P3 as true you need to be a different person than the Dan mentioned. Then you will not judge P3 "truth is subjective" through an interpretation of this as an objective truth, you will judge it as true in the only way that it could truly be judged as true, a subjective truth (you simply believe it), and then there is no contradiction and no absurdities.
Quoting Dan
No, I didn't imply any objective truth. I said that if two premises contradict each other, and we accept one as correct, then we must reject the other as wrong. There is no implied "objective truth" just adherence to the law of noncontradiction.
That also isn't what is happening in my hypothetical. The situation I presented was that of a patient in a time-sensitive situation where spending time investigating rare conditions may result in their death, drug X is the most effective drug for the condition and has the least general risk associated with it, and the patients does not present any signs in either their behaviour, symptoms, or available medical history that would suggest they have the rare condition that would make the proscribing of drug X the wrong choice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, they might be aware of that if such a trend existed, but it doesn't. It's just this fellow doing it in this case. There are not indications that the doctor can see or notice without checking the patient's foot.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That isn't what it means for something to be objectively true at all. It is presumably objectively true that I want some ice cream. That doesn't mean I have to seek ice cream. I might change my mind and stop desiring it, or indeed act contrary to that desire (perhaps in pursuit of some other desire, or perhaps for some other reason). Just because I want something doesn't mean I have to keep wanting it or indeed have to pursue it. The reason I suggest that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter is that presumably we can be wrong about what we desire. We can think we desire one thing, but in fact we don't (this is different from desiring something and then, once we get it, we decide we don't really like it after all).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are badly mistaken. Kant's categorical imperative absolutely does say how people should act. Specifically, that they must always act according to maxims that they can at the same time will to be universal law, that they must always treat humanity whether they find it in themselves or in others as an end unto itself and never as a mere means only, etc.
Not all adherents to normative theories have the same metaethical commitments, which is what will determine whether they think that their theory is aiming at objective moral truths or something else, but normative theories very much are aiming at figuring out how persons ought to be or act. Kant is one example, but certainly not the only one. For another, the classical utilitarian would say the way you should act is in the way that maximizes utility (usually understood as happiness - unhappiness).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You haven't demonstrated anything but a complete lack of understanding of the subject of moral philosophy. I recommend reading any introductory ethics textbook. The elements of moral philosophy by Rachels and Rachels might be a good place to start.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It isn't inconsistent with free will in the least. That being said, many moral philosophers seem to think free will is not necessary for moral theory (especially not of the strong, incompatibilist sort). I disagree with them on this point, but again, you appear to be demonstrating a lack of understanding of the landscape of moral philosophy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I'm not. You are making massive claims about the discipline that are just incorrect. What you percieve as a lack of education is actually just you being wrong about the thing we are discussing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't really know what this means. I don't know what it means that "every person" and "every situation" is a "universal". I don't really know what your criticism of Kant is here. And I don't know if you are claiming that Kant thinking there are multiple formulations of the categorical imperative is something to do with this point you are making and, if so, what you are saying the one has to do with the other.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
He doesn't start with a subjective opinion, but a believe about the objective. Also, whether or not Kant succeeds does not demonstrate that the goal he is aiming at is doomed to failure. Also, if you are calling a moral philosophy successful based on how influential is has been, then objectivity is very much the name of the game. Kant is one of the most influential moral philosophers of all times. Jeremy Bentham also begins with objective assumptions, such as it being irrational and impermissible to make an exception of oneself, such that if one values one's own happines, one ought to value others'. I mean, arguably the most influential moral tradition in the western world is the Christian tradition. It's vague, awful, and badly wrong, but it's certainly influential, and I think you'll find that the Christians are definitely aiming at objectivity.
On a different note, being accepted and convential is not the same as being true.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I wouldn't say must I would say should. I think you'll find I did provide the reasons why this was the best candidate for moral value, I'm fairly certain I did so both in the initial primer and then again in response to your posts. Also, why should we assume that what we value and what is morally valuable are the same? Also, you appear to be committing a naturalistic fallacy towards the end there, suggesting that what is natural is moral etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what you mean by this. It doesn't appear to relate to what I said though.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
When you say something is true, do you just mean that you believe it? There is nothing more to it than that? I want to be clear on what untennable position it is that you hold here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Okay, but why do we need to abide by the law of noncontradiction if it is not true? What if you don't believe in the law of noncontradiction?
There is nothing in this example to indicate that the wrong choice was made. There is only indication that the right choice was made. Therefore we ought to conclude that the right choice was made. Furthermore, if a patient does dies from that "rare condition", it is the rare condition which causes the patient's death, not the doctor's actions, and we still cannot conclude that the doctor's actions were wrong.
Quoting Dan
You are speaking nonsense again. If it is objectively true that you desire ice cream then it is objectively true that your are seeking it. How could it possibly be an objective truth that you desire ice cream unless you were seeking it? What produces the objective conclusion is the fact that you are seeking it. If you say "I feel like I want ice cream, but I am not seeking it", then you refer to subjective feelings, and it's not an objective truth, it's subjective. You, the subject are interpreting your own feelings as a desire for ice cream, and this means it's a subjective conclusion.
Quoting Dan
Right, and that's one example of why there is no such thing as objective truth about such feelings. They are what defines "subjective", feelings of the subject. You propose "that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", but as I've explained to you, this would exclude the possibility of free will. If there was objective truth in the matter, desires, and the actions which we say are caused by desires, would be one and the same. That is what is required to make the desire objectifiable. Conventionally we hold the desire as separate as separate from the action, because the causal connection is not necessary (free choice being intermediary), and the desire is of the subject, not observed, therefore subjective.
What I've been telling you, your presumption, "presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", is nothing but a fiction, a fantasy of your imagination, which is demonstrably incoherent. You presume this because it provides some support to your consequentialist morals. In reality though, if what you presume was true, it would deny the possibility of free will, and all types of moral philosophy. Therefore if you keep supporting your so-called moral philosophy on such presumptions, you render what you propose as something other than moral philosophy. I've been calling it "immoral", but I now see it's better called "amoral", because your principles put what you propose right outside the field of moral philosophy, so that it cannot be judged by the principles of moral philosophy to be immoral. What you propose is simply not relevant to moral philosophy, therefore amoral.
Quoting Dan
You don't seem to understand the meaning of what you are saying here. If the imperative states "act according to maxims", that imperative is not telling anyone "how to act". It is telling them that there is a maxim which will tell them how to act. Then there needs to be a different maxim for every different situation to tell a person how to act in that situation. This proposed categorical imperative tells everyone that they must act according to a maxim which is applicable to each particular situation one finds oneself in, but that says nothing about how one should act in any situation.
Therefore it truly says nothing about how one should act. It just states a general principle of what one should consider before acting. And if we say that deciding how to act is itself an action, and this is the action which that categorical imperative refers to, then the imperative becomes incoherent. The imperative "how to act" must be understood before it can be followed in an act. If, "act" also refers to understanding it is impossible that one could apply the imperative to the act of understanding the imperative.
Your claim demonstrates the same type of category mistake you make when you say that "the world is changing" makes a statement about the way that the world is. "Changing" signifies something mutually exclusive from what "what is" signifies. The two were demonstrated by Aristotle to be incompatible. So when you predicate "is changing" of "the world" you create the illusion that "changing" is compatible with "what is". That is a sophistic trick exposed by Socrates and Plato thousands of years ago. You employ another version of the same type of sophistic trick when you claim that "one imperative which states that you must act according to many imperatives", means that there is one imperative which tells you how to act. Really, what this means is that there is one imperative which tells you that there are many imperatives which tell you how to act.
Quoting Dan
Again, all this says is that there is a different way to act for every different situation, which is the best way according to the situation. It is not one rule which tells you how to act in all situations.
Quoting Dan
Yes, this is really the issue we have now. Since it is very clear that moral theory is inherently subjective, moral philosophers can produce all sorts of different moral theories. That is evident from the abundance and variety of moral theories which avail us. Some are quite absurd. However, some, like Platonic moral theory for example, get accepted, conventionalized, and become quite influential, through a sort of intersubjectivity.
On the other hand, there are some people who do not like the idea that moral theory is inherently subjective. They believe that the reality of a multitude of moral theories which is enabled by free will, freedom of choice in thinking, and the inherent subjectivity of moral theory, is for some reason a defect to moral theory, which ought to be corrected. So these people, like Kant, like yourself, and many others, ignore the lessons of history which teach us the reality about moral theories, and they produce further subjective theories, which propose objective principles as the foundation for their subjective theories.
Of course we can reject these as being inherently self-defeating, untrue in the sense of dishonesty, subjective theories which claim to be objective. Further, since their basic principles miss the true essence of a moral theory, a subjective theory which is agreeable, and likely to be accepted, and conventionalized in an intersubjective way, we can dismiss these proposals as outside the category of what constitutes a "moral theory".
Quoting Dan
Any "belief about the objective" very clearly is a subjective opinion. If you understood metaphysics and ontology, you'd see this very clearly. Our beliefs about "the objective" are all subjective opinions.
Quoting Dan
The problems which he encounters which I explained, but you didn't understand demonstrates that his goal is doomed to failure. Maybe you'll understand better from what I said in this post, concerning the "one imperative", which dictates that a vast multitude of imperatives tells us what to do. Making an imperative which dictates that many imperatives are required, does not constitute demonstrating that one imperative will suffice. It actually demonstrates that the opposite is probable.
Quoting Dan
I don't think so. Christianity is based in Platonist moral theory. It held sway in the western world for many hundreds of years. Kant pales in comparison. In fact Kant as a moralist, is more often than not, criticized and rejected, as insufficient. Where is the supposed "influence"?
Quoting Dan
This demonstrates the same misunderstanding of the Platonic/Christian tradition you showed earlier. If you read Plato's Republic, you will see that each individual person has one's own place within the state, with ones own desires and goals. "The good" refers to what is desired by the individual, as the motivation for activity, and this is not one common, objective goal which we all seek. The idea of one common goal, validated by the divinity, is the idea which is shown to be incoherent in The Euthyphro.
Quoting Dan
The goal of moral philosophy is not to be "true" in the "objective" way that you understand this word. That shows your attempt to conflate is and ought. The goal is to be "true to oneself", honest. And when an individual moral philosopher is honest in this way, the principles will be espoused by others. "Truth" in the way you use that word is irrelevant and outside of moral philosophy.
Quoting Dan
How would you get anyone to accept your moral philosophy if you put forth a system where what is proposed as "valuable" is not actually valued by anyone? How is that coherent?
Quoting Dan
No, I'm not suggesting any such equivalence. I am suggesting that moral philosophy must be based in something real, and what we have as "real" in relation to the acts of beings, is what is natural. That doesn't say that what is natural and what is moral are equivalent. Basing moral philosophy in some fictional fantasy of what is "objectively" true or right, provides no traction.
Quoting Dan
Yes, when I say "X is true", it means that I honestly believe X. You know, like when someone says "tell the truth", and in court when they say "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth", it means what you honestly believe. How could there be anything more to "is true" than this?
Quoting Dan
The law of noncontradiction is a rule I believe in because of its usefulness. Depending on one's attitude toward the law of identity, the applicability of the law of noncontradiction may be accepted or rejected. Hegel rejected the law of identity as a useless tautology. But then some who follow him, like dialetheists and dialectical materialists, also reject the law of noncontradiction, as inapplicable in cases where identity is inapplicable. They do not believe in the law of noncontradiction.
The rare condition in this case causes drug X to be lethal, so the doctor's actions did kill them, which from an actual-value consequentialism perspective, does make them wrong inasmuch as the doctor could have acted differently and their action caused worse consequences than had they done so.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The rest of what I said here I think explains what I mean.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have just asserted that if there was an objective truth about the matter, this would make free will impossible, but there is no reason to think this. You are asserting that it can't be the case that it is objectively true that I desire ice cream but I am not seeking it, but there is no reason to think this is the case. Desires are indeed different from the actions one takes in pursuit of them.
The reason I think that truth is objective has nothing to do with consequentialism. The truth is objective, believing so is really the only viable option, as I've explained before. It is a necessary assumption to have any discussion of anything worth discussing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, it says rather a lot more than "act according to maxims". It specifically says what kind of maxims it is rational (according to Kant) and therefor moral (according to Kant) to act in accordance with. It is very much telling you how to act.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's also not true, as presumably Kant would presumably say that the categorical imperative is consistent with itself so considering how one should act is an action that is in accordance with the formualtion of universalizability.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I would say Kant does propose multiple rules for action, rather than just one, though he would surely disagree. Either way, they definitely are rules for acting. They don't spawn many imperatives, but rather limit the maxims we can justifably (according to Kant) act in accordance with, the actions we can justifiably take.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is one rule which tells you how to act in all situations. Specifically, in the way that produces the most utility. Yes, that will certainly be different based on the situation, but it is clearly action-guiding.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It isn't inherently subjective. But people are wrong a lot, and not clarifying their starting assumptions is a big part of this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That isn't what Kant or I do. Morality isn't subjective. People all believing different things about morality is a result of some (or all) of them being wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No idea who "we" is in this context as I'm fairly sure that moral objectivism is the majority view, but even if it weren't, we have good reason to think it is the correct view. Although, if I am right that objectivism is the majority view, this also means that objective theories are more likely to be accepted.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. When we hold beliefs about objective reality, those are not the same as subjective opinions about, for example, matters of taste. One set can be correct or incorrect, the other set, not so much.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, I didn't understand it because it didn't make sense. What you said in this post showed wrongheaded thinking about what constitutes action-guidingness in moral theories.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, why do you think that Christianity is based on Plato?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Euthyphro shows nothing of the sort. Also, Plato and Christianity aren't the same thing. Also, Plato at least seemed to think there was a form of the good which all good things participated in. Given that this form is supposed to exist in the same realm of the forms as things like mathematical objects, presumably he thinks that this is an objective property things can have.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Truth is very much the goal of moral philosophy, certainly any moral philosophy worthy of discussion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because it is morally valuable. It is coherent because moral value and being valued by someone aren't the same thing. Further, how to make a theory persuasive is a different question to whether it is correct. As to why anyone might care, I think that a reasonable number of people do want to do the right thing, which is a good piece of luck for persauding them to do so.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Objective truth is not a fiction or a fantasy. It is in fact quite the opposite.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because people can be wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Usefulness in what sense? I don't know how any laws of logic or rules of theory selection in, for example, science can be useful if you think that whatever you believe is true. There's no fail-state, so there's no need for any of these rules. You can just believe any old nonsense and hold that it's true, no need to evaluate your beliefs for consistency or consider whether they match reality at all.
I don't think so. As you state, the rare condition "causes drug X to be lethal". The act of administering the drug is not a lethal act, as indicated by all the other instances. Therefore the rare condition is the cause of death, not the doctor's action, which you mistakenly judge as wrong.
Quoting Dan
I explained the reasons. It seems you didn't pay attention, maybe you didn't understand, or just ignored.
.Quoting Dan
Sure they are different, when the desire is understood as subjective, and the action is understood as objective. But the issue is how could both the action and the desire be objective without them being one and the same. "Objective" implies observable by someone other than the subject. No part of the desire is observable except the actions associated with it. Therefore the proposed "objective desire" and the action which demonstrates it, would be one and
And the reason why objectivity of desire is incompatible with free will is that if there was objective fact about what I desired, then I, the subject could not use my will power to overcome that desire. In other words, I could not choose to desire something contrary to what I objectively desired, because a person could not deliberate, i.e. having incompatible desires. Take your shirt buying example as proof that desires cannot be objective. The stated desire is to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton, yet somehow an incompatible desire caused the act. How could two incompatible desires both be objectively true at the same time? Yet two incompatible desires coexist when we deliberate.
Quoting Dan
The categorical imperative says what kind of maxims tell one how to act. It does not "tell you how to act". It tells you what kind of maxims tell you how to act. This is another good example of the same type of category mistake you make when you say "the world is changing" says something about the way that the world is. In this case, since there is one maxim which says that there are many maxims required to tell you how to act, you conclude that there is one maxim which tells you how to act. In the other case, "the world is changing" tells you that there are many ways which "the world is" and you conclude that it states that there is one way that the world is.
Quoting Dan
This is the problem. What Kant did, is not the same as what he said he did. What he said he was doing (his goal or intention) doesn't pan out in what he did. This is because what he was trying to do, base moral philosophy in one objective principle was impossible, so his endeavour was doomed to failure. So when we state what he did, he would disagree and say that's not what I was doing.
This is what happens when you seek to base moral philosophy in some fictional, fantasy "objective truth". You produce an unobtainable goal for your moral philosophy, an ideal (sort of perfection) which is unrealistic, such that the philosophy itself, which is intended to support that goal cannot do what you need it to do.
Quoting Dan
OK, and what do you base your claim that they are wrong on, other than insisting that your morality is right? These statements of yours are useless.
Quoting Dan
Ha ha, that's funny. You have good reason to think that objectivism is the correct view, because objectivism states its position to be objective, therefore impossible to be wrong. Oh, that's actually begging the question, and truly a very bad reason. "I hold the correct view, because I assert that it is impossible for me to be wrong."
And then you make a meaningless, unsupported assertion about objectivism being the majority view, when such a thing would be completely irrelevant to objectivism.
Quoting Dan
Beliefs about "objective reality" are metaphysical speculations which are subjective opinions, "matters of taste". This is one's attitude toward reality, what you prefer to believe, just like your attitude toward ice cream flavours.
Quoting Dan
To start with, I've read Plato, and I've also read St Augustine, a Church Father. Augustine claimed to base many of his ideas in Plato, and I've corroborated that claim through my own comparison. I've also read other Christian theologians, and have seen how they were influenced by reading Plato. We could discuss this, but you already demonstrated a strong aversion to theology.
Quoting Dan
With the dilemma illustrated in Euthyphro, it is shown that it is neither the case that the pious is called "pious" because it refers to what is loved by the gods or God, nor is it the case that the gods, or God loving the pious is what causes it to be called "pious". And in the context of the discussion, court trials about impiety, it is demonstrate that in our world of existence, "pious" is what human beings determine it to be. So the idea of one common, independent "good", validated by divinity, is demonstrated as false, and "good" is what human beings determine.
Quoting Dan
You have not demonstrated how something which is not valued by anyone could be valuable. If you are the one assigning "value" to it, then it is valuable to you. But that is clearly subjective.
Quoting Dan
Thanks for letting me in on your subjective opinion. Not that it does you any good.
Quoting Dan
Right, now you're catching on. When someone says "tell the truth", and you tell the truth, you do actually tell the truth, even if you are wrong. That is the nature of human fallibility. Even when we tell the truth there is a possibility that "the truth" which is told, might still be wrong. That is what constitutes "an honest mistake".
If you insist that "the truth" must exclude the possibility of being wrong, you place 'truth" right outside the world of human existence, and human activity. This is the interaction problem of Platonic realism. Your proposed "objective truth" is a fantasy, a product of your imagination which has no bearing on the existence, and actions of human beings, unless these human beings are willing to accept this ideal (imaginary perfection), and allow it into their lives. Then it becomes a divinity, like God, something we accept, believe in, and have faith in.
Quoting Dan
Believing and doing are distinct things. If a person could sit in meditation, without doing anything, they could believe "any old nonsense, and believe it's true" as you say. However, life requires action or we die. When we move to act, our beliefs are tested for usefulness. Ones which do not produce success are forgotten, and no longer is it possible that a person believes any old nonsense. Beliefs of "any old nonsense" die with those who hold them. And "rules" which prove to be useful prevail over our activities.
Consider the implications of what you are saying here. Do you meant to imply that a doctor is not responsible for the death of a patient when proscribing a medicine that is lethal to a patient who has a specific condition. It seems like you are implying that doctors need not check for potential risk factors at all. I imagine you don't mean to imply this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your reasons seem to be based on a poor understanding of free will and objective truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, are you suggesting something is objective?
As for how they can be the same thing, that's easy, not things that are objective are the same thing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That just isn't so. Even if we take objective to imply that it is observable to someone other than the subject, which I don't agree with, something being observable doesn't make it immutable. We might imagine a mind reader who can tell what you desire, but you might nevertheless be able to overcome that desire or not act in accordance with it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It does tell you how to act. It tells you what you should and shouldn't do, specifically, tells you which maxims you should and shouldn't act in accordance with.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are asserting it is impossible. You have given no reason to suggest that it is that doesn't require one to misunderstand essentially every element of the discussion in order to accept.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Among other things I base it on rational analysis of principles as well as the underlying assumptions that support those principles and the logic connecting the two.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That isn't remotely what I said. I don't know where you got this from, but it certainly isn't a claim I made.
Also, it is your position that claims one cannot be wrong. My position is there is a right answer, and I am attempting to find it. Yours appears to be that whatever one thinks, they're right.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
They really aren't. One of them can be incorrect. If I like chocolate ice cream and you prefer strawberry, one of us isn't wrong. If you think the world is flat and I think it's round(ish) one of us is wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I'm not suggesting that no Christian thinkers were influenced by Plato, but you seem to be suggesting that their entire school of thought is based on his work, or that the two are in some way interchangable. That is rather a larger claim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The Euthyphro dilemma shows that suggesting that the good/pious is determined by god/the gods leads one to either the good/pious being arbitrary or nor actually being determined by god/the gods after all. But this does not mean that there is no objective good/right. Good/right in the moral sense need not be 'determined' by anyone.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am not 'assigning' value to it, I am suggesting that it might be morally valuable. Valuable as such. Valuable whether or not anyone values it. What one should do (or how one should be, or what one should pursue etc) regardless of what one wants. A categorical imperative, rather than a hypothetical one.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not my subjective opinion. It is my belief on an objective matter.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, when someone says 'tell the truth' and you tell what you believe to be the truth but you are wrong, you have made an honest mistake but you have not 'told the truth'. You have been honest, but not truthful. And no, that doesn't imply any of what you said in the second paragraph here.
I don't know how you can consistently say that someone can say what they believe and be wrong. I don't know how your beliefs allow for honest mistakes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you think that life requires action or we die? Just believe something different and it won't anymore according to your position.
It is those of us who believe that there is a world beyond our beliefs that are entitled to suggest that one's beliefs can come into conflict with reality and prove to not be useful. If you think that anything you believe actually is true, then surely you can just stop believing that that lion is going to eat you, and it won't.
You are not getting it Dan. The subject matter here, the issue which the example exposes, is the relevance of particular circumstances. The nature of particular circumstances is that they are features unique to the individual situation and therefore are outside the applicability of general, universal principles. In Aristotelian logic, these particular circumstances, which escape the formal rules, are known as accidents.
What you have done in reply here, is instead of respecting the reality of, and the nature of, particular circumstances, as features which fall outside the applicability of the universal rules, you have produced a universal rule to include that particular set of circumstances. This just indicates that you misunderstand the nature of particular circumstances. If it was feasible to produce a universal rule for every particular set of circumstances, then the applicability of universal rules would be negated, by the requirement of a different rule for every particular set of circumstances.
Quoting Dan
That's right, I do not deny the relevance of "objectivity". What I am arguing is that "truth" and "right", as concepts produced by human subjects, are wrongly represented as "objective". To argue that "truth" and "right" are wrongly classed as "objective" does not imply that there is nothing which can be classed as "objective".
Quoting Dan
Huh?
Quoting Dan
The point though, is that to consider opposing desires, as we do in deliberation, it is required that contrary desires are predicable of the same subject, at the same time, in violation of the law of noncontradiction. The three fundamental laws of logic dictate how we understand objects. Objects have identity as an object, and what we say about "the object" must obey the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.
If we make the subject the object, as you propose in saying that the subject's desires are objective, there is an incompatibility with the law of noncontradiction when the object has contrary predicates (desires) at the same time, as is evident in deliberation.
I see a few possible solutions.
The first, most obvious possibility is to allow for a general violation of the law of noncontradiction. However, this has far reaching ramifications for our capacity to understand "the object", and further ramifications on the nature of "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects) in general.
The next possibility which I see, is to alter the law of identity, design a form of "identity", which allows that the identity of a subject, as an identifiable object, is a different kind of object (allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction) from other types of objects (not allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction). However, this is very confusing because now we have two distinct types of objects, those which obey the law of noncontradiction, and those which do not. Further, this would produce a bifurcation in "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects), according to that same division. Since the same words are used, "object", "objective", etc., equivocation and very significant, and important, misunderstanding, is inevitable.
What I propose therefore, is to maintain the separation between subject and object. This allows distinct words, "subject" and "object", so that we do not confuse things which are "subjective" (of the subject) with things which are "objective" (of the object). In this way, we are not inclined to call things which are property of the subject, like desires, "objective", because we maintain a proper separation between the categories, subject and object. That this categorical separation is required is demonstrated by the fact that understanding of "the object" is facilitated by adhering to the three fundamental laws of logic. However, understanding of "the subject" is facilitated by allowing for violation of those laws. This is because the fundamental, or essential nature of the object (describable by determinist principles), is incompatible with the fundamental, or essential nature of the subject (describable by the principles of free will).
Quoting Dan
No it really doesn't tell you this, because you still have to make the decision for yourself, rather than having the categorical imperative state it for you.
Quoting Dan
You seem to be forgetting what I am arguing. Being right is not simply a matter of truth, there is also the issue of justification.
This is exactly the problem with your approach, You state all these things about obective truth and objective right, which you seem to honestly believe, therefore they are true for you, but you haven't been able to justify any of it. Your attempts demonstrate incoherency in your beliefs.
Quoting Dan
This example is not applicable. Claims about the world being flat, or round, are not claims about objective reality, they are claims about the world. You continue to demonstrate that you just do not understand predication at all.
Quoting Dan
You're right that the arguments themselves do not produce that conclusion. However, as I said, we are meant to infer, from the context of the dialogue, in relation to the human court trials of impiety, that pious/impious is determined by human beings. That is the way that Platonic arguments work. Plato demonstrates the unsound deductive arguments of others, unsound due to faulty premises. Then he provides information which is evidence for the probable correct premise. So the conclusion (the correct premise) is more like an inductive conclusion, based in evidence and probability, rather than a deductive proof.
Look at the conclusions more critically. Pious/good is not determined by the gods or God. Pious/good might be arbitrary. But obviously it is not arbitrary, because there are human trials going on which determine pious/good. That's the evidence. The conclusion we ought to draw, is obvious, human beings determine pious/good, in a non-arbitrary way.
Quoting Dan
This makes no sense. If you say that it is morally valuable, then you are assigning value to it, moral value. What could "valuable, but not valued by anyone" possibly mean? What would justify the claim that it is valuable? And if you say "it's just a belief", then as I explained, a belief must be justifiable through application, or it's worthless. Therefore it's a belief with no value, and self-contradicting.
Quoting Dan
Unless it is justifiable, it is just a subjective opinion. I think I've adequately demonstrated that your supposed concept of "objective truth" is unjustifiable. Therefore it is a subjective opinion.
Quoting Dan
I think you are continuing to judge "subjective truth" from your premise that truth must be objective. Of course this is the instance of' begging the question' which I explained earlier. It makes "subjective truth" appear self-contradictory to you. Therefore you make all sorts of absurd conclusions about subjective truth. The problem, obviously, is that you are not letting go of your premise that truth must be objective, before considering the concept of "subjective truth".
Quoting Dan
I don't see your point. We must breathe, eat, etc.. If you believe that you can live without these go ahead and try. I will then judge whether you've justified those beliefs or not.
:roll:
Universal rules do apply to every particular circumstance. That's what makes them universal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If not the truth, what can be objective? Are you perhaps using "truth" in some non-standard way? Perhaps you agree that there is an objective world with facts about it, but don't want to refer to these facts as true?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, typo. Not all things that are objective are the same thing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A much easier way to go would be to recognize that having conflicting desires is not in violation of the law of noncontradiction since having the property of "wanting to eat cake" and the property of "wanting to be thin" or whatever conflicting desires you like, aren't mutually exclusive and one does not imply the lack of the other.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not really sure what you mean by this. Morality tells us how we should act, but you still make the decision of whether to do so yourself. It doesn't make you act in some way. But perhaps you mean instead that there are multiple maxims one might act in accordance with that may all be acceptable according to the categorical imperative? That's also not problematic, as morality telling you what to do doesn't require it to tell you that only one thing is permissible. There may be multiple actions that are morally permissible. That doesn't make the moral theory in question not action-guiding.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have given good reasons to believe in what I have presented. I have not demonstrated incoherence or inconsistency in my beliefs. These accusations have been based on either misunderstanding the core concepts under discussion or on simply claiming I am making claims that I am not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The planet that we live on is very much a part of objective reality. Claims about what shape it is absolutely are claims about objective reality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is a poor conclusion to draw from that information. First, that people would have a trial for something does not mean it exists in the first place (plenty of witchcraft trials, but no witches). Second, these things need not be "determined" by anyone, but rather discovered. Certainly we might have a trial where we attempt to discover the truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't say "it's just a belief". I give reasons why this is an appropriate belief to hold. And no, I am not assigning moral value to it, rather I am suggesting that it already has moral value as an objective fact. What "value" could mean in this context is that its presence determines the morality of actions (that's not an entire or formal definition of moral value of course, but rather an example of what it can mean for something to have moral value).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have demonstrated that it is the only justified option. There are potentially other reasons to think so, but the fact that it is the only option where we can consider whether beliefs are justified (since it is possible for them to be wrong) or have any kind of meaningful discussion about anything, provides good enough reason in this case.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I am just taking what you have said at face value and pointing out that it is inconsistent.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
My point is that your view that anything you believe is true is nonsense. I agree that we must breathe, eat, etc, but that is because there is an objective fact of the matter. Your position seems to be that if you believed that you no longer needed to eat, or breathe, then you would no longer need to.
Perhaps not my most polite of comments. Perhaps while attempting to spit someone else's words out of my mouth, I accidentally spat out some venom.
I believe you are conflating "descriptive rules" with "prescriptive rules". A universal, descriptive rule, such as "we ought to do what is good", does not apply as a prescriptive rule. It is categorically distinct, as stating what is the case (description) rather than stating something we ought to do (prescription). What causes the confusion, is that it is a descriptive statement about what is valued, or as I say, what is desired.
The descriptive rule does not tell us how to act, it tells us "what is the case". A prescriptive rule, such as "you ought to save an abandoned baby", tells a person how to act, by projecting what is valued or desired into the individual. Descriptive value-based rules, such as "abandoned babies should be saved", and even "people should save abandoned babies", do not tell anyone how to act. Notice, that once the universal "people" is used, the statement becomes a descriptive "is" statement, as compared to the prescriptive which is directed at the individual named as "you".
Kant's so-called categorical imperative is a descriptive value-based rule. It tells us what is the case, that there is a prescriptive rule for every situation. As a descriptive rule, it does not tell us how to act. Prescriptive rules tell us how to act.
Quoting Dan
I am using "truth" in a different standard way. If you check a dictionary you will notice two basic ways to use that word.
Quoting Dan
All you do here is use sophistry to hide what you truly understand as contradictory. The properties of "wanting to eat cake", and "wanting not to eat cake", which make it difficult to decide whether or not to eat cake, are truly contradictory.
This way that you have, of refusing to accept what you know to be true, because it is inconsistent with the principles you espouse, is a sort of dishonesty, self-deception which interferes with good philosophical discourse. That is what led to the impasse in our discussion of "understanding". When it comes down to looking at these conditions which are internal to us, subjective features, you make statements which are completely inconsistent with my personal experience. This is the case now with your attempt to make "desire" objective. I cannot agree with such statements, and you refuse to consider the possibility that your statements may be inconsistent with your own experience. The impasse is imposed.
Quoting Dan
The point is that a universal descriptive statement, by the fact that it is descriptive rather than prescriptive,, does not tell a person how to act. That is the point of the is/ought divide. The universal, descriptive statement, is a statement of what is the case, which may or may not have been produced from good inductive reasoning. So, "one ought to do good" is a descriptive value-based statement of what "is" the case, which may or may not be a good inductive conclusion. It does not, in any way, tell a person how to act. Notice there is no actions described. This is the same category mistake you repeat over and over. Because it is a value-based descriptive statement it uses the word "ought". By using the word "ought" in the phrase, it appears like the phrase is a prescriptive statement, telling a person what act one ought to make, but it's clearly not. In a similar way, "the world is changing" doesn't tell us anything about the way that the world "is".
So the issue (problem) is the gap between the universal, descriptive statement, and how one should act in any particular situation, consequently what one "ought" to do. In any particular situation, an individual must decide, which universal statements are applicable, and how to apply them toward what is desired or valued personally, by the individual. This will include universal value-based statements, which influence what the person desires, or values. It is this act of choice, by the individual, in the particular situation, which determines which universal statements are relevant, in relation to the individual's personal desires and values, which "tells a person how to act". Notice, it is an act of choice which tells the person how to act, not any specific universal statement, or set of universal statements. It is clearly not the universal statements which tell the person how to act, because the person must establish a relation between these statements and what is personally desired.
Quoting Dan
Your so-called "good reasons" to believe in objective truth, is that it is the only thing which makes sense to you. That is nothing other than a subjective opinion. So a true, honest understanding of your "objective truth" reveals it to be subjective.
And when you apply your premise of objective truth toward trying to understand "subjective truth", you create a contradiction which makes subjective truth appear to be absurd. These absurdities created by your begging the question constitutes your "good reasons".
Quoting Dan
That's a composition fallacy.
Quoting Dan
This merely demonstrates the incoherency of "has moral value as an objective fact". You are proposing, as a personal (subjective) opinion, your choice of "value", as a principle which "determines the morality of actions". You support this principle with reasons, an attempt at justification. Your reasons are "it is an objective fact".
Obviously, it is not an objective fact. It is your subjective opinion, an idea which you are proposing. And if you are capable of supporting this principle, it is a justified idea. But no amount of justification can turn it into an "objective fact" as you desire this to mean, independent from human values. Therefore "it is an objective fact" is incapable of justifying your opinion.
Quoting Dan
No, you really haven't. You begged the question, assuming objective truth as a primary premise, then from this premise you show how the secondary premise of "subjective truth" produces absurdities. Duh! Obviously when you assume contradictory premises, the result is absurd.
Quoting Dan
Why do you think that the premise of objective truth provides the only means for justification? I already explained to you how application of beliefs in actual pratise is what justifies them. Further, I explained how we employ principles such as the law of noncontradiction in our judgements of justification.
It is your assumption of "objective truth", which is absolutely useless for any form of justification. What are we supposed to do, compare a belief with "the objective truth" to judge that belief in justification? Where would we find that "objective truth" to make the comparison, when all that appears to us is beliefs?
Quoting Dan
Actually, if you had taken just a tiny bit of your precious ten years, to think about this, you would easily have recognized that the idea of "being true" as independent from "being believed to be true", is what is nonsense. There is absolutely nothing to the judgement "X is true" other than a belief that X is true.
Quoting Dan
You have clearly reversed the logical priority here. Because we observe the necessity in the following, "we must breathe, eat, etc,", then we infer the logical conclusion, "there is an objective fact of the matter". Do you understand the difference? Please take some time to consider this because it is very important.
We cannot proceed logically from the premise "there is an objective fact of the matter", to the conclusion "we must breathe, eat, etc.", as you do when you say "that is because there is an objective fact of the matter". This is because these things, the need to breathe, eat, etc.. do not necessarily follow from a supposed "objective world". The premise "objective world" does not necessitate logically the need to eat, breathe, etc., so we cannot say that the need for these things is because there is an objective fact of the matter. This is the issue with free will as well. Freely chosen acts are not necessitated by "objective fact", that is the gap between what is, and what we choose, (and what we ought to choose), which cannot be bridged with logic, due to that lack of necessity.
However. we can proceed in the other direction, the inverse way, logically. We can look at the evidence, "we must breathe", "we must eat", etc., and the necessity provided by "must", produces what is required to make a logical conclusion about the "objective world" within which the subject lives. Notice though, that "must" (the form of necessity specified here), is as means to the end, which is "to live". If we assign "value" to life, then we can say things like "we ought to breathe", "we ought to eat", and these "oughts" are supported by the value assigned to living, as the end.
Notice that "the obective world" is produced as a logical conclusion from our observations, induced by our observations of "necessity". The very same type of observations of what is natural to us, as living beings, produces inductive conclusions about what is valued. Then, we can make logical conclusions about what is "necessary" in this other sense, as required to achieve those ends. But starting with "there is an objective fact about the matter" gives us nothing to base any logic in, because the is/ought gap cannot be bridged in this direction.
"We ought to do good" is a normative statement, not a descriptive one. You can tell because it's about what one ought to do. Kant's categorical imperative also attempts to tell us what we ought to do (or in this what we ought not to do) so it is normative, rather than descriptive.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
By all means explain what you mean.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
They aren't contradictory properties. One doesn't imply the lack of the other. This seems very obvious to me, and I certainly don't know the opposite to be true. This isn't sophistry, nor is it inconsistent with my own experience. I have conflicting desires all the time. I don't lose one desire because I choose to act in accordance with a conflicting one. We are entirely capable of having conflicting desires, there's nothing about that which runs afoul of the lack of non-contradiction.
Further, I don't have any particular attachment to the idea that desires are objective, but it seems as though we can be wrong about what it is that we desire, which suggests that there is some objective truth to the matter.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is true, but Kant's categorical imperative is very much a normative claim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. The biggest clue that it is a claim about what one ought to do might be the word "ought".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, not a subjective opinion, but a belief regarding objective fact based on reason. And not because it is the only thing that "makes sense to me" but rather because it is the only viable option for any kind of investigation, discussion, discovery, and really anything worth doing. "Subjective truth" is absurd, it's not me making it appear that way.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No it isn't. It would be a composition fallacy if I were to suggest that anything true of the planet we live on would be true of the whole of objective reality. It is not a composition fallacy to point out that the planet we live on exists objectively and claims made about it are claims about (a part of) objective reality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I am not proposing anything as a personal subjective opinion. I propose a candidate for objective value which I support with reasons which I have mentioned both in this discussion and in the initial primer, my reasons are not "it is an objective fact".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, I allowed for things to be true subjectively and showed that this leads to absurdity. Things being true "subjectively" is what allows for contradictory premises, although exactly what you mean by being true subjectively has been difficult to pin down as you seem to make claims that you seem to be making about objective facts.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have no idea what you mean by actual practice (or practise) without the assumption that there is a world beyond what we believe. It is only with this assumption, that we can be wrong, that we can determine what beliefs can or cannot be justified.
And no, I do not suggest we have access to the objective truth of all matters (perhaps we do for some things, like the cogito, but not much) but we do our best to figure out what the world is like by considering the evidence we have available to us. If we instead assume that whatever we believe is correct, then there is no need for any of this surely.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But the truth isn't the judgement. The fact isn't the belief. Again, people can be wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, I think you are assuming I'm doing something here that I'm just not. I'm not suggesting for a second that we can tell that we need to eat and breathe because the truth is objective. What I am suggesting is that if you don't think there is an objective fact about whether we need to eat and breathe (which requires there to be such a thing as objective facts/objective truth) then you must accept that if you believed otherwise, you wouldn't need to breathe or eat.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It isn't produced by the logical conclusion. We must assume there is objective truth in order to come to any conclusions about what we must do in any sense.
And again, you are bringing in the is/ought gap where it doesn't belong. There isn't any attempts to jump from the descriptive to the normative without intervening normative premises here. It is you who are making the claim that we must eat and breathe if we want to live (which is debatably normative in a pretty limited sense). I completely agree with this claim, and am simply pointing out that unless we think that our beliefs about the world can be wrong, then presumably anyone who does not believe this would not need to eat or breathe.
This really depends on how one would interpret the statement. If you interpret it as a value judgement, then it is making a subjective normative statement, indicating that the author believes that the type of action which one ought to do, is the good type. Then it might be interpreted as a normative statement, telling you that there is a type of act, called a good act, which is what you ought. Of course you can see how useless such a statement, as a normative statement, would be, as it gives no indicatinon as to how to identify an act as a good one. That's why I say it really is not a normative statement, because it says nothing about what type of acts one should make, only naming them as good acts.
But if you interpret it as an objectively true proposition, then it is a descriptive statement indicating that acts which are referred to with "ought" are only those describable as "good". In this case, the statement is interpreted as intended to demonstration (through a sort of description), the meaning of "ought". This is analogous to "all bachelors are unmarried men". It can be interpreted as a normative (subjective value) statement, meaning you ought only use "bachelor" to refer to a married man, or you can interpret it as a demonstrative, descriptive (objectively true) proposition, meaning that if it is called "bachelor" it is an unmarried man.
As a demonstrative, descriptive statement, is a more meaningful interpretation of "we ought to do good". Then if we are told "you ought to do X", we know that X is good, or desirable, from this descriptive interpretation. "We ought to do good" demonstrates the meaning of "ought", through that description, just like "all bachelors are unmarried men" demonstrates the meaning of "bachelor" through that description.
Clearly, these two modes of interpretation are completely different from each other, and this constitutes a form of ambiguity. To mix them up, and conflate the two is a form of equivocation which was common to classical sophistry, as demonstrated by Plato.
This is the type of sophistry which you are currently engaged in Dan. You interpret the statement true by definition, and you assume that this provides "objective truth" to the normative interpretation. So, you also take the inverted, normative (subjective value) interpretation of that statement, and you conflate the two. The conflation of two distinct, and incompatible interpretations provides you with the fallacious conclusion of a normative statement with objective truth.
Quoting Dan
If you say the desire to eat cake, and the desire to not eat cake, are not contradictory properties, then this is simple denial. And to stretch for other words to describe the desire to not eat cake, (the desire to lose weight or something like that), just demonstrates your refusal to acknowledge what "deliberation" really consists of, weighing the reasons for and against accepting a proposal.
Quoting Dan
OK, now please accept the implications of this admission. If you are the subject, and you have contrary desires, then this means that if we are to predicate desires of that subject, you, in the same way that we predicate properties concerning an object with an identity, we must allow for violation of the law of noncontradiction.
Will you accept that, or are you going to go back to describing the "conflicting desires" with words that create the appearance that such desires are not really contradictory, in the way of sophistry?
Quoting Dan
As indicated above, it can be interpreted in two very distinct ways. If you interpret the categorical imperative as "normative", then it is a subjective value statement. If you interpret it as a proposition with "objective truth", then it is a descriptive principle.
Quoting Dan
As explained above, the word "ought" does not necessarily imply that the statement indicates what one ought to do. To make that assumption would cause equivocation, when the statement was demonstrative, demonstrating or describing the meaning of "ought".
Here, let me formulate the statement in a slightly different way to demonstrate. "The acts which a person ought to do, are acts which are good." See how the statement is descriptive, and demonstrating the meaning of "ought", by describing what we ought to do, as good acts. This makes the same descriptive statement as "we ought to do what is good".
Quoting Dan
How is "belief regarding objective fact based on reason" anything other than a subjective opinion to you?
I'll refer you back to your claims about understanding one's own choice, to show you that having reasons for what one believes, does not negate the subjectivity of the belief.
Quoting Dan
That's exactly what you did do. You said that a belief about the planet is a belief about objective reality.
Quoting Dan
I do not deny reality beyond what we believe. I deny that there is truth beyond what we believe, unless one assumes God or some other divinity.
Quoting Dan
Contradictory premises are common, so we have to accept that as part of reality. And, as explained above, it is necessary to allow predications of contradictory desires of the same subject at the same time. Therefore it is necessary to understand the reality of contradiction as a very important, and significant aspect of the subjective reality. Denying subjectivity because it allows for the reality of contradiction, is the mistaken approach, because deliberation, where contrary premises coexist, is very real, and we need to account for it as a significant part of reality.
So when a person deliberates on contrary beliefs, e.g. "the world is flat", and "the world is round" then we allow for violation of the law of excluded middle, the person believes neither. Or, if we represent this deliberation in the form of desires "the person wants to believe that the world is flat", and "the person wants to believe that the world is round", both at the same time, then the desires violate the law of noncontradiction, as explained above.
Quoting Dan
I've told you already there is clearly very much beyond what people believe. I've just argued that its incoherent to say there is truth there, beyond what people believe, unless we attribute that truth to God.
Quoting Dan
This indicates the problem about your perspective which I pointed out already. If, as is indicated here, "truth", and "fact" signify an exclusion of the possibility of error, then it is irrelevant to this world of human beliefs which we are talking about. If this is what you want from "truth", that the possibility of error is completely excluded, then we cannot use the word at all in talking about human affairs, because human beings are fallible, and cannot exclude the possibility of error. If this is what you desire from "truth" then we can never truthfully call a human belief "true", and the word becomes useless to us.
Therefore we need to respect the reality that "truth" actually is a judgement. We judge propositions as true, we judge beliefs as true. And if we use "truth" in this other way, which you propose, as an independent, objective form of "truth", we need to respect the difference lest we equivocate. But this other sense of "truth" which you propose is completely irrelevant, so we do not need to use it at all. So we have to accept "truth" as a type of human judgement Of course the sophists will equivocate though, and say that some human judgements of "truth" are objective truths.
Quoting Dan
Human beings are fallible. No judgement of truth or fact, made by a human being can exclude the possibility of mistake. Therefore human beings cannot have "objective truth" in any matters.
Quoting Dan
We do not need to eat and breathe, as an "objective fact", that's the point. If we do not eat and breathe we simply die. So, we only need to eat and breathe if we want to stay alive. This makes "we need to eat and breathe" a subjective value statement. We only need to eat and breathe for the sake of that specific subjective end, to stay alive.
Quoting Dan
You are sorely mistaken. All we "need", to make conclusions about what we must do, is desires, goals or intentions, as well as some experience. The desires tell us what we want, and the experience tells us the successful method of getting it. From this we can make a conclusion about "what we must do". If a person is lacking in experience, then they proceed through trial and error, but this type of choice is not of what we "must" do, it's a choice with less imperative.
Your claim "We must assume there is objective truth" makes no sense at all. How does the assumption of "objective truth" even have any bearing on our conclusions about what we must do? We cannot assume to know the objective truth. So the idea of objective truth becomes completely irrelevant, and we make our conclusions about what we must do relative to what we desire, and our experience, as I explained.
I don't do anything of the sort. I haven't been claiming that my position is correct because it is true by definition, nor have I been conflating different definitions in order to pull some dubious trick. The rest of this looks like highly dubious and you seem to be making a lot of assumptions you aren't entitled to and conflating terms and concepts inappropriately. What I will say is this:
"You ought to do good" is a normative claim. It appears to be making the claim that one (or you) ought to perform good actions or promote good, (as is distinct from simply refraining from committing bad actions). That seems the most obvious way to interpret it and what I would probably take someone to mean if they said it to me.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There are very often reasons for and against a proposal, but the desire to eat cake and the desire to lose weight are not contradictory in the sense of being contradictory properties. People can definitely have both of them. One might count against an action (such as eating a cake) and one might count for it. None of this is a problem.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have consistently been using words to describe conflicting desires that do not create the appearance of them being contradictory, because they are in fact, not contradictory (in the sense of being contradictory properties in violation of the law of noncontradiction). This is not sophistry, this is talking about things sensibly as they are.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is incorrect. It is an objective normative principle. I don't think it's correct, but it appears to very much be aiming at objective truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, it is true that dictionaries aren't making normative claims when they talk about the meaning of the word "ought", but people are very rarely talking about the meaning of the word "ought" when they say "you ought to do good". This would be a very strange way to talk about the meaning of the word.
In this case, the first statement isn't totally clear about what it means, and the second statement appears not to mean what you are suggesting it does. It is possible to interpret it that way, but it would be odd to do so, and it would not be a very clear way of making that claim.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, subjective opinions cannot be wrong, as there is no fact of the matter. Beliefs about objective matters of fact can be wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't say that a belief about the planet was a belief about all of objective reality, rather that it is a belief about objective reality, in this case, a part of objective reality. The parts that are most accessible to us to know things about tend to be on our planet.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what this means. Are you allowing for an objective reality that has features/properties that we can be right or wrong about? Because, if so, good news, you believe in objective truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, we can absolutely use the word "truth" because we can aim at truth even if we cannot know for sure we have got it. When we claim that something is true, we usually mean that we think it is true, since there are so few things we can be sure about. But the judgement that it is true is not itself the truth. The judgement can be wrong. What makes that judgement wrong is that it doesn't match up with the truth.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Putting the cogito aside, you're rather missing the point here. Truth isn't the same as certainty. Just because something exists in the world doesn't mean we can know about it, and even if we do, we aren't likely to have complete certainty of it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is very much nit-picking and avoiding the core point. If you don't think there is an objective fact to whether you not eating or breathing will lead to your death and that this is just subjective, then presumably you think that if you believe that failing to eat or breathe will not lead to your death, then it won't.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, we need a lot more. We need to assume that the future will resemble the past in order to draw from our experiences to make judgements about the future.
Again, you are confusing "there is objective truth" with "we know the objective truth". These are not the same, but the assumption that there is a reality beyond that which we believe is necessary to any investigation/discovery/analysis/etc. You can't improve your beliefs if they are all correct by definition.
You are changing the description to suit your purpose. I am talking about deliberation, the desire to eat cake versus the desire to not eat cake. There may be numerous reasons to eat cake, and numerous reasons to not eat cake (of which the desire to lose weight may be one). I am not talking about any specific reasons, I am talking about deliberation, in general, which considers various reasons for and against a proposition, or idea. So your straw man is not relevant.
Now, once you get beyond the straw man, you will see that people "can definitely have both" of contradictory desires. If, a person is weighing factors against, and for, a specific action, and this is not a case of having contradictory desires, then we need to answer which is properly called "the desire", and which is called "reasons against the desire"? Since "desire" is commonly associated with base emotions, we would say that "to eat cake" is the desire, and the other is "against the desire". In this way we might avoid the contradiction. That, I tell you is the sophistry designed to make the problem appear like an illusion.
So let's replace "desire" with "goal", "intention", or "end", to see the situation more clearly, free from that deceptive sophistry . Suppose I have two distinct goals. Goal #1 requires that I perform action A, and goal #2 requires that I do not perform action A. For example, I want to complete my Christmas shopping today, and this requires that I take the afternoon off from work, but I also want a clean absentee record at work, and this requires that I do not take the afternoon off. The subject of deliberation here is "I take the afternoon off from work". It is apprehended as a necessary means to the end which is goal #1. The exact contrary of this is recognized as the means to the end which is goal #2. Since I hold both goals at the very same time, I have an inclination (I excluded the word "desire" above) toward choosing contradictory propositions. The "inclination" which I have, as a describable property of a subject, "my attitude", violates the law of noncontradiction. I have, as a property of myself, contradictory inclinations.
This is very relevant to what I said about "understanding one's choice" in the case of buying the shirt. In the example, there was contradictory inclinations, and the example did not provide a reasonable understanding of the contradictory inclinations, therefore I conclude that the choice was not understood.
The driving inclination, the primary goal as stated in the example, goal#1 was "only buy cotton", and this is produced from an inclination toward cotton as the only desirable material. The secondary goal, goal #2, "buy a shirt" is produced from a different inclination, I need a shirt, or something like that. At the store, the attitude, or inclination, toward the particular object in question, a particular shirt, is contradictory, due to the difference between the two goals. Goal#2 produces the attitude of "buy", and goal#1 produces the attitude of "do not buy". Since the example does not provide reasons why goal#2 was prioritized over goal#1, in the decision, I concluded that the decision was not understood. When two goals collide, we need to refer to a higher goal in order to reasonably choose one over the other.
Quoting Dan
As explained above, conflicting goals, intentions, or ends, produce contradictory inclinations or attitudes. Describing the contradictory inclinations in different ways, to make them appear like they are not actually contradictory, does not resolve the issue. And yes, that is sophistry, as it does not provide adequate principles for moral philosophy. We need good principles which help us to understand the problem of contradictory inclinations, and methods for resolving them. If we simply create the illusion that they are not contradictory, and insist that they are not actually contradictory, then we will be inclined to allow them to continue to coexist, and we will always be debilitated by a condition of indecision, or else we will continually make decisions which we do not properly understand, like the shirt example.
Quoting Dan
What kind of bull shit is this? "Wrong", and "right" are judgements. And, it is subjective opinions which we judge as wrong or right. Your assumed "fact of the matter" is completely irrelevant.
Quoting Dan
No, I've already explained why this is not what I am saying. The supposed independent "reality" which I assume, is continually changing. We make "objective" judgements (judgements concerning supposed independent objects), based on certain logical principles, which are inconsistent with the reality of continual change. Therefore "objective reality" is incoherent as self-contradictory.
Quoting Dan
The problem I described though, is that we can know for sure that we will never have "truth" as you use the word, due to the fact that we know for sure that human beings are not perfect in their knowledge. This makes "truth" as a goal, out of reach to human beings, an impossible goal for human beings. Having an impossible goal is counterproductive because when we come to realize (through demonstrations like mine), that the goal is impossible, it becomes very discouraging, as there is then a hole, where there should be a realistic (potentially obtainable) goal.
Quoting Dan
This is the unnecessary, and completely useless assumption you make, that there is something beyond the judgement "it is true", which is "itself the truth". All we have, beyond an individual judgement, is further judgements, personal reflection, and judgements from others. What produces the further judgement, that the initial judgement of "true" was a "wrong" judgement, is a change of mind, generally created by a difference of information, applied in personal reflection. Also, one person can judge another's judgement of "true" as "wrong" based on a similar difference of information. This other assumed thing, which you say is "itself the truth", is completely irrelevant, having absolutely no bearing on any of these judgements.
Quoting Dan
But "truth" as you represent it, is absolute certainty. It is "the way the world is" without any possibility of error. Notice "the way the world is", is something distinct from "the world itself", as that which corresponds with "the world itself", in "truth". And as you insist, this correspondence must be without error. Therefore "truth" as you represent it, is a correspondence of absolute certainty.
Quoting Dan
What? This makes no sense. The need to eat and breathe is not an objective fact, because it is not a fact about objects, it is a fact about subjects. That makes it a subjective fact. And, as I've explained, facts about subjects are completely different from facts about objects. In the case of the former we must allow violation to the fundamental laws of logic, in the case of the latter, we do not (try Charles Peirce for information on this). We must allow violation to those laws of logic for the reasons I explained, the facts about subjects (subjective facts) exist in relation to value structures, which are often conflicting. The fact that a person needs to eat and breathe exists as a fact, in relation to life, as the valued goal. If a person is suicidal, and values death, the need to eat and breathe is no longer given priority, and is therefore no longer a fact. That is the nature of "subjective facts" (facts about subjects), they shift, and change, depending on what the subject values. And since a single subject often has conflicting values, subjective facts are often contradictory. That produces the need for deliberation, and principles to resolve the reality of contradictory facts.
There isn't a problem. You are inventing a problem where none exists.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This doesn't violate the law of noncontradiction at all. This is exactly the kind of situation I am saying is fine and not in the least contradictory (in the sense of having mutually exclusive properties). It's not a matter of words. People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations, these aren't contradictory properties since one does not imply the lack of the other.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This seems fairly clearly not to be true. We can want two things but want one more than the other.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, it's not a matter of using a different word. I'm not engaging in any sophistry here, I'm just pointing out that it isn't in violation of the law of noncontradiction to want two things which conflict with one another.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you are confusing the judgement with the thing the judgement is made about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, every part of that is nonsense. 1) whether something is changing or not doesn't make it not objective or not existent. 2) The feature of constant change would, as mentioned earlier, be an objective truth about the world. 3) Logical principles aren't inconsistent with continual change unless you are suggesting that the laws of logic are included in the things that are always changing, is that what you are suggesting? 4) None of that shows anything like objective reality being in any way contradictory.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that we can't know all of the truth, so we can't know any of it? Because that is fairly obviously a fallacy.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
When you judge that you are running along a safe path but the truth of the matter involves a pitfall trap and a hungry tiger, then the truth has pretty significant bearing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, truth is not certainty at all. Certainty relates to degrees of confidence for our beliefs. It relates to states of mind. It is epistemic. The truth of those beliefs is (or isn't) in the world itself. Just because something believes something that is true is not a reason to believe their belief is certain.
For example, if we were playing poker and I believed you had three nines in your hand, and you did, then my belief would be true. But this wouldn't make me any more certain of my belief. It would still be a guess based on the information I had, just one that happened to be true in this case.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't include any claim about need here to avoid you trying to weasel out of the core point in exactly the way you are doing here, but you seem to have ignored that and done it anyway.
Also, an objective fact isn't a fact "about objects" nor is a subjective fact a fact "about subjects". Neither in the grammatical sense nor in the everyday use of that sense. That is not an appropriate definition.
What has been revealed now, is why there is such a huge difference between you and I as to what it means to "understand" one's choice. I believe that making a decision often involves having contradictory inclinations, and decision making involves resolving those contradictions. You have asserted that there is an "objective truth" concerning what one desires. This makes the way that I understand decision making unintelligible to you. And, the way that you understand decision making is unintelligible to me.
Quoting Dan
The point is that if we treat "inclinations" as objective properties, like you proposed we do with "desires", then there is a violation of the law of noncontradiction. A person cannot have, as objective properties, both the inclination to eat cake, and the inclination to not eat cake, at the same time without violating the law of noncontradiction.
You can insist, as I do, "People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations... " but then you ought to recognize that people are not objects, they are subjects, and what we can validly say about subjects is different from what we can validly say about objects. Objects cannot have contrary properties at the same time. Subjects can have contradictory properties at the same time,, as you yourself say, "People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations". Therefore we must maintain the division between objective facts and subjective facts. So what we say about the inclinations of people cannot be said to be objective fact, because we do not allow contradiction within "objective facts".
Quoting Dan
Sure, and of course, there is a reason why one has a higher value than the other, that is what I referred to as the "higher goal". The higher goal gives the higher value. And this is why one thing is wanted more than another.
In the case of objects, it makes no sense to say that an object has a specific property more than the contradictory property. We don't say that an object has the property of being red more than the property of not being red, allowing some of each. This would just be seen as an instance of attempting violate the law of excluded middle, by saying that the object is "to some degree" both red and not red.
This is more evidence as to why we need to maintain a distinction between "subjective" (of the subject), and objective.
Quoting Dan
When we treat a subject as something with properties to be judged according to the fundamental laws of logic, then "what a person wants", would clearly violate the law of noncontradiction. This indicates that we cannot treat "what a person wants" as an objective property, because it would be a property which violates the law of noncontradiction, and this would make the supposed "objective" independent world unintelligible, if we allow for such violations in the "objective" world. . This is why I keep telling you that there is no "objective truth" to what a person desires. "What a person desires" exists relative to subjective value structures, of which a person has more than one, and which are constantly changing.
Quoting Dan
No, it's you who is conflating the judgement with the thing that the judgement is about. The judgement is "true" or "false", and the thing judged is a statement, proposition, idea, belief, or something like that. In the other case the judgement is "right" or "wrong", and the thing judged is a human action. Whether it's "true", "false", "right", or "wrong", this is the judgement, not the thing being judged.
Quoting Dan
I don't understand why this is so difficult for you. What I say is that none of our knowledge is truth as you describe "truth". You describe "truth" such that "a truth: is something in which the possibility of a mistake is excluded. Human beings are fallible, imperfect in their knowledge, so there is always a possibility of mistake within any human knowledge. All of our knowledge is imperfect. There is always the possibility of mistake. Therefore none of our knowledge obtains to the level of "truth" as you describe it, as requiring that there is no possibility of mistake.
Quoting Dan
The only relevant "truth" to this matter is a subjective truth. "Safe path" is a subjective judgement, relative to the values of a subject. The subject may misjudge, and make a mistake. The assumption of an "objective truth" to this matter is completely, and absolutely irrelevant. So why make it.
Quoting Dan
You said that truth is "the way that the world is". That is clearly not "in the world itself", but something which corresponds with the world.
To make this clear to yourself, consider where falsity is. Clearly falsity is not "in the world itself", but it must be somewhere mustn't it? But the difference between truth and falsity is that one is the way that the world is, and the other is the way that the world isn't. That does not put truth into the world itself, it just shows that the designated "way" of truth is different from the "way" of falsity. Where might these different "ways" of the world exist? I assume there must be an infinity of them, because of all the possible wrong ways. These "ways" are not in the world, where are they? And what separates the true way from the false ways?
Quoting Dan
This doesn't help, what you wrote still makes no sense. A belief about myself dying if I don't eat, is a belief relating to a subject, therefore it is subjective. What definition of "subjective" allows this belief to be anything other than subjective?
Quoting Dan
"Subjective" means "of the person", which we know as "the subject". "Objective" means not of the subject, what is other than the subject, which we know as the objects.
I have absolutely been saying that people have conflicting inclinations, but this isn't a problem. Also, since I haven't defined understanding a choice in relation to someone's desires for making that choice, it really isn't relevant.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're just wrong. This is not a violation of the law of noncontradiction at all. Wanting something does not imply not wanting something else which conflicts with the ability to get the first thing. It would be true that it couldn't be true of someone that they both have a desire to eat cake and do not have a desire to eat cake, but they might well have a desire not to eat cake, as this is not mutually exclusive with having a desire to eat cake. Conflicting desires are not logically problematic in the least.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, no need for another goal to get involved, we can simply want two things but want one more than another.
Again, conflicting desires are not contradictory in the sense of one implying the lack of another.
Again, no. It doesn't violate the law of noncontradiction because wanting something does not imply wanting something else which conflicts with the first thing. There isn't a problem here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In the statement "Your action is wrong" there are two things that judgement refers to, the action, and the property of wrongness. Neither of those things is equal to the judgement, they are what the judgement is about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, if we know something that is true, then we aren't mistaken, that's correct. But that isn't the same as being able to be sure that we aren't mistaken. Again, you are conflating what is the case with how certain we can be in our knowledge that it is the case.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Someone cannot misjudge if there is no objective truth to the matter and the truth only relies on what they believe. If you prefer, I will state it as such: If you believe you are on a path that does not contain a tiger and a pitfall trap in a place that will lead to your death if you continue along it, but the truth of the matter contradicts this belief, then it is going to have fairly significant bearing on you, and indeed on the tiger's prospects for lunch.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yea, I think I'd say that the truth of a proposition is in its correspondence with reality, at least as a fairly basic good-enough-for-government-work definition. I'm not sure asking "where falsity is" is a sensible question.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is not a good definition when it comes to subjective and objective claims. I suspect this is going to be one of those things that is hard to pin down with definition. For example, there are definitions of "subjective" I might consider reasonable in which we perhaps wouldn't say that there is an objective fact of the matter to one's desires. So, let me offer some general comments rather than defining these terms.
To say that something is "subjective" generally refers to things such as matters of taste, where there is no right answer beyond what the person in question thinks.
To say that something is "objective" generally refers to things in which the truth of the matter exists independently of what the person in question thinks.
We can absolutely make objective claims about ourselves. If I claim that I am the president of Morocco, or that I have six arms, or that I am a centaur, these are certainly claims about me (the subject) but they aren't subjective claims. The truth (or in these cases falsity) of these statements depends on the state of the world.
As I explained, I believe this is exactly what "a problem" is. And, this is what decision making is all about, resolving conflicting inclinations. If this is not what "a problem" is, then what is a problem to you?
It's becoming very clear why you and I have completely different ideas about what it means to "understand one's choice". For you, to "understand one's choice" simply requires a description, what you like to think of as an "objectively true" description. For me, to "understand one's choice" requires the choice be given a position within one's wants, needs, desires and goals, the person's subjective value structure. The former, your sense of "understanding" is a description of what the choice is. The latter, my sense of "understanding" is to know why the choice was made.
Quoting Dan
That's clearly incorrect. consider this statement, in that context, "the judgement is 'wrong'". It is a judgement of "wrong". Obviously, "is" signifies identity here, it does not signify predication, or else it would mean that the judgement is judged as wrong. We can refer to "the judgement", and we can refer to "wrong", in this context, and they both refer to the very same thing. It is not the case that "wrong" is what the judgement is about. What the judgement is about, is the action which was judged.
There is no "property of wrongness". How would we sense that property? And if we do not sense it, how would we decide whether or not a thing had that property, except by a judgement? And if the decision of "wrong" is made by judgement, without any wrongness being evident through sensation, wrongness only being present to the mind that judges, how could the wrongness be anything other than the judgement itself?
We can go further, however, and ask about the judgement. This would be to ask about the wrongness which was determined. This requires a definition of "wrong" and an explanation of how the act fulfills the criteria of that definition.
Quoting Dan
You have provided a conditional proposition. And, the "conditional proposition" provides a rule for logical procedure. In your usage, in this example, "not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true". This is a rule about judging something as "true". To judge it as true requires that it be judged as not mistaken. Accordingly, "being sure that we are not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true".
Your sophistry is to introduce another sense of "true" which is hidden within your usage as "something that is true". This would be a sense of "true" which is independent of the logical procedure, and judgement of the conditional. In other words, the conditional proposition lays rules for a judgement of "true", while you also speak of "something that is true", independent of that judgement. Your statement conflates the two distinct meanings of "true" in an invitation to equivocate.
The invitation to equivocate is the sophistry. The conditional should be properly stated as "if we know that something is true, then we are not mistaken". The way you state it " if we know something that is true", is incoherent if analyzed. This is to say that there is a thing which we name as or describe as "true". No such thing is ever apprehended as existing anywhere or is ever named as "true", and no such thing is ever described as true.
Propositions, statements, beliefs, and ideas, are judged as true. A judgement of a belief as true or false is not a description of a thing. Furthermore, if we accept the conditional proposition in its proper form (and assume that your incoherent expression is an honest mistake), then to know something to be true requires knowing that it is not mistaken, and this is beyond the limitations of human ability.
This is similar to the sophistical treatment of "the conditional" which you did with "if I do not breathe and eat, then I will not live". The conditional proposition sates a rule for logical proceeding, but you present it as an "objective truth" independent of the logic which makes it valid. This makes a subjective value statement have the appearance of an "objective truth", in a similar way to the way that the values in a number system make "1+1=2" appear to be an objective truth. See how sophistry can make the subjective appear to be objective?
Quoting Dan
You are still missing the point. That something is a misjudgment, is itself a judgement. And, there is no need for any assumption of an "objective truth", to make the judgement of "misjudgment". It is just a matter of two different subjective judgements. You can say that I am wrong (misjudge), and I say that you are wrong (misjudge), because we disagree, no assumption of objective truth is needed. Any supposed "objective truth" is irrelevant, because it is just introduced as what one of us believes.
Therefore, your example makes no sense because you assume a "truth of the matter", when it is irrelevant to our discussion. The "tiger and pitfall trap" are imaginary things, as is the whole story, fiction designed to prove the nature of truth. How is that reasonable? You make an imaginary story to exemplify the relevance of truth. There is an imaginary "truth of the matter" and in the imaginary example the imaginary truth of the matter makes a difference. How is that supposed to convince anyone that there is a real truth of the the matter which really does make a difference?
You might as well be telling me that there is an objective truth, and if I don't believe in the objective truth, it is going to kill me. What good does that do? I believe I'm going to die anyway. In Christianity, at least they promise eternal life if you believe in the objective truth (God). I'd far rather believe in God and eternal life, than that the objective truth is going to kill me.
Look at your example realistically. I want the take path Z because it is the shortest way from A to B. You tell me there are tigers and pitfalls down there. So I either decide to go another way, or I take some precautions and take path Z, carry a gun and walk carefully. Or I decide that you are lying, or I ask you for proof. of this Your proposed "truth of the matter" is completely irrelevant. But in your make-believe story, you speak as if it is relevant, and thereby fabricate its relevance. That's sophistry, pure and simple.
I'm not sure you are referring to the same thing as a problem that I am. What I am saying is the fact that people have conflicting desires is not a problem that needs solving or explaining. It is not running afoul of the law of noncontradiction.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If someone said "that judgement is wrong" I would absolutely take them to mean that they think the judgement in question has the property of wrongness (probably in the sense of incorrectness). It would be incredibly weird to say that the judgement is the same thing as wrong. I'm not even really sure what that means.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This doesn't follow. You have added in "being sure", which is exactly where the problem arises. If we judge something to be true, we judge that belief to not be mistaken, but that isn't the same thing as being sure it isn't mistaken.
Further, there is no sophistry in pointing out that the judgement we make about something is different to the thing we are judging.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what you mean by this. On it's face, it looks very obviously wrong. Perhaps it is just unclear though.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
First, yes the judgement of a belief as true or false is very much a judgement that involves the description of some thing (the belief) as being a certain way or having a certain property (being true or false or, if you prefer, having the property of truth of falsity, I'm not really that worried about whether this is described in terms of properties or not). Second, you appear to be trying to smuggle certainty into the mix where it doesn't belong. It might be fair to say that if I know 2+2=4 to be true, then I know this not to be mistaken, but that isn't the same as me being certain that I know this or being justified in that certainty. If, from the information I have, I could be wrong, then the level of certainty I am justified in holding is presumably somewhat less than 100%. But what levels of certainty we are justified in our lack of mistakenness regarding some belief is not the same as whether we are in fact mistaken or not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This states an empirical fact, rather than a deductive argument, so logical validity doesn't really come into it. However, I'm not really sure how I am presenting anything as 'independent of the logic which makes it valid', or what exactly you are accusing me of here.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Objective truth is very much relevant. It is what determines which judgement is correct and, as demonstrated in the tiger and the pitfall trap example, it can rudely disabuse us of our previous notions without the need for anyone to disagree with us.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Are you serious with this? Are you genuinely suggesting that hypotheticals shouldn't be used in discussions regarding the truth? Are you suggesting my point would be better if I actually dug a trap on a path you were walking and filled it with a tiger?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You are doing that thing again where you assert things as objective truths but refuse to call them such. You claim you are "going to die anyway" but your position (that truth is subjective) makes this only true if you believe it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You've missed the point entirely. I don't tell you anything. You go down the path believing there is no pitfall trap filled with a hungry tiger. However, the world does not live up to your belief and, despite your belief that the path you are treading contains no pitfall traps, you subsequently fall into one and are eaten. My point, which I thought was fairly clear, is that just believing something doesn't make it so and the truth or falsity of those beliefs has very real, sometimes lethal, consequences.
It appears like neither one of us is understanding anything which the other is saying at this point.
Break time.
Five percent, that must have been a minor influence.
Are you publishing the solution, so the rest of us can see where we were barking up the wrong tree?
I'm not interested in knowing the author, only in reading the material. However, if it was someone recruited through The Philosophy Forum, who has been influential, it might be appropriate to send a further commission to support the forum.
By "various freedoms", you really mean various constraints don't you? This is how "total freedom" is broken down into individual "freedoms", by imposing moral restrictions on any aspect of the total freedom which falls outside the boundaries of each individual freedom. So what you would really be weighing is the value of those restrictions, each set of restrictions designed to produce a different specific "freedom" from the base, total freedom.