A (simple) definition for philosophy

Quoting Tarskian

if it is a statement about another statement

That is called metalanguage, not philosophy.

Quoting Tarskian

A theory is incomplete if it can express statements about its own statements.

Quoting Tarskian

If a statement can talk about other statements, then it can also talk about itself.

Quoting Tarskian

Hence, philosophy is a mathematical capability of the language at hand.

Huh

Quoting Lionino

That is called metalanguage, not philosophy.

First-order arithmetic is its own metalanguage. It is capable of talking about its own statements.

A language is philosophical if it is its own metalanguage.

Reply to Lionino

Quoting Tarskian

If a statement can talk about other statements, then it can also talk about itself.

The long form:

If it is possible to express a statement about other statements in the language at hand, then it is also possible to express statements about themselves in this language.

A statement about another statement:

K(#S)

A statement about itself:

S <-> K(#S)

This language would only need support for the equivalence operator, i.e. the biconditional.

But then again, I doubt that a language that does not support this operator, or cannot implement it using a detour, is capable of expressing much logic at all. In the end, the equivalence operator is just a simple truth table.

Quoting Tarskian

First-order arithmetic is its own metalanguage. It is capable of talking about its own statements.

So is English.

Quoting Tarskian

A language is philosophical if it is its own metalanguage.

That is not what the word 'philosophical' means, which goes back to my first post.

Quoting Lionino

So is English.

Yes, English is a philosophical language because it is its own metalanguage.

Quoting Lionino

That is not what the word 'philosophical' means, which goes back to my first post.

In this post, I am trying to point out what I believe, is the correct -- or actionable -- definition for the term philosophy.

The existing definition is known not to be usable. It is not predicable. My alternative is eminently predicable and therefore a viable alternative, unless you can point out that it would lead to glaring contradictions.

Quoting Tarskian

Hence, philosophy is a mathematical capability of the language at hand.

Some feedback: I notice since you've joined that you have a strong tendency to devise your own definitions, interpretations and standards for what constitutes philosophy. All well and good, but consider the implications of the term 'idiosyncratic'. Idiosyncratic means 'pertaining to a particular individual' (It is the same word root as 'idiom' and 'idiot', which originally meant 'one who speaks a language nobody else can understand' - no pejorative intended, as there are also idiosyncratic talents.)

Just sayin'. ;-)

Reply to Wayfarer :up:

Quoting Wayfarer

I notice since you've joined that you have a strong tendency to devise your own definitions, interpretations and standards for what constitutes philosophy.

For a starters, the term philosophy does not have a single definition:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy

Academic definitions

Attempts to provide more precise definitions of philosophy are controversial[17] and are studied in metaphilosophy.[18]

Precise definitions are often only accepted by theorists belonging to a certain philosophical movement and are revisionistic according to Søren Overgaard et al. in that many presumed parts of philosophy would not deserve the title "philosophy" if they were true.[20]

Some definitions characterize philosophy in relation to its method, like pure reasoning.

Many definitions of philosophy emphasize its intimate relation to science.[24] In this sense, philosophy is sometimes understood as a proper science in its own right.

Other definitions focus on the contrast between science and philosophy.

Another definition characterizes philosophy as thinking about thinking to emphasize its self-critical, reflective nature.[31]

The definition that I propose, is actually not particularly new. It is quite close to [I]thinking about thinking[/I]:

Overgaard, Gilbert & Burwood 2013, pp. 36–37, 43, What Is Philosophy?
Nuttall 2013, p. 12, 1. The Nature of Philosophy

"Thinking about thinking" and "statements about other statements" are notions that are very close to each other.

The origin for what I write, is of course, the foundational crisis in mathematics. I believe that it sheds new light not just on metaphysics but also on metaphilosophy.

Again, Godel's seminal publication is now almost a century old.

Its implications have, however, not been absorbed outside the narrow field of mathematical logic. There are many reasons for that; one of which is the fact that the language of mathematical logic is considered to be impenetrable.

One goal of metaphilosophy is to finally discover a usable definition for philosophy. I think that Godel's theorem can help with that.

Quoting Tarskian

One goal of metaphilosophy is to finally discover a usable definition for philosophy.

No sooner would that be done than philosophy will then be about undermining that very definition. Quoting Tarskian

A statement is philosophical, if it is a statement about another statement.

Anyway, the definition you offer is trivially too broad. "John said it is raining" is about a statement, but not philosophy.

Quoting Banno

Anyway, the definition you offer is trivially too broad. "John said it is raining" is about a statement, but not philosophy.

If SaidByJohn(#S) is a legitimate predicate, then your example sentence would indeed satisfy the definition proposed.

If this is a problem, then how can we exclude it from the definition?

There are precedents for excluding predicates from Godel's language. For example, true(#S) is not definable.

In fact, it would also be interesting to elaborate why exactly your example sentence is not philosophical.

Another angle would be to find a statement that is philosophical but that does not satisfy the definition.

Reply to Wayfarer Interesting. Didn't know that

Quoting Tarskian

If this is a problem, then how can we exclude it from the definition?

You missed the point of my post. Any definition will be contradicted by some philosophy.

Quoting Tarskian

...find a statement that is philosophical but that does not satisfy the definition

"Know thyself".

"Here is a hand".

"I think, therefore I am".

"The world is all that is the case".

Quoting bert1

Didn't know that

I picked it up in a podcast about Trump's use of language.

Quoting Tarskian

The origin for what I write, is of course, the foundational crisis in mathematics.

Of course. Should be obvious to everyone.

"Know thyself" is not a logic sentence. It is not true or false.

"Here is a hand" is a statement about a physical fact.

"I think, therefore I am". S => Q does not mention any predicate about a statement. Furthermore, P and Q are arguably physical facts. Unless "I am" is written by using a predicate as: exists(me). However, "me" is not a sentence. The sentence may be considered philosophical even though it is not recognized by the definition as such. Interesting potential counterexample!

"The world is all that is the case". It is a statement about the world, which is a physical fact.

Reply to Tarskian So are you claiming that these sentences, each famously part of important philosophical discussions, are actually not philosophical?

You sure you want to do that?

Quoting Tarskian

"The world is all that is the case". It is a statement about the world, which is a physical fact.

Or is it a statement about the meaning of words? Like a definition is about the meaning of words.
Oh dear - it looks like your topic is not philosophical according to your own definition. Does that trouble you at all?

Quoting Banno

So are you claiming that these sentences, each famously part of important philosophical discussions, are actually not philosophical?

You sure you want to do that?

"I think therefore I am" is problematic. Not sure what to do with that. It would fit fine with "thinking about thinking" but not with necessarily with "statements about statements". The problem with philosophy of the mind is that it necessarily always rests on introspection, which badly damages the potential to have an objective, shared understanding on the matter.

Quoting unenlightened

Or is it a statement about the meaning of words? Like a definition is about the meaning of words.
Oh dear - it looks like your topic is not philosophical according to your own definition. Does that trouble you at all?

I think that the definition of a word is an abstraction about an abstraction, a statement about a statement. It is clearly a language expression about another language expression. So, I think that the definition of the term philosophy is a philosophical question. The literature even terms it a "metaphilosophical" question.

Reply to Tarskian So you agree it is philosophical, but it is not a statement about another statement, and so doesn't meet your definition.

Your definition of "philosophy" seems to include things unnecessary and insufficient to philosophy.

Quoting Banno

So you agree it is philosophical, but it is not a statement about another statement, and so doesn't meet your definition.

The definition for philosophy is a predicate:

isPhilosophical(#S)

which is true if S is philosophical.

So, the definition of philosophy is the source code for a particular predicate.

isPhilosophical(#S) is a statement about any other statement S.

Quoting Banno

Your definition of "philosophy" seems to include things unnecessary and insufficient to philosophy.

Possibly. That requires an investigation of possible counterexamples. I think that these counterexamples should be quite interesting. Why exactly are they legitimate counterexamples? That will probably shine some more light on the issue.

Reply to Tarskian

And you proposed

isPhilosophical(#S) IFF S is about another statement.

And I gave examples of statements that were about other statements, but not philosophical, and statements that are philosophical, but not about other statements.

So your definition is void.

Quoting Banno

And you proposed

isPhilosophical(#S) IFF S is about another statement.

And I gave examples of statements that were about other statements, but not philosophical, and statements that are philosophical, but not about other statements.

So your definition is void.

Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" is a problem. It is covered by "thinking about thinking" but not by "statements about statements". We cannot expect Godel's work to cover philosophy of the mind by using arithmetic. So, it leads to two definitions: "philosophy not of the mind" and "philosophy of the mind".

The statements about statements that are not philosophical was about predicates such as PeterSaidThat(#S). So, predicates that merely indicate the origin of a sentence may also be excluded from the definition. It just means that not all predicates are allowed. So, it may mean that there is a list of permissible predicates (or a list of excluded ones).

Quoting Tarskian

I think that the definition of the term philosophy is a philosophical question. The literature even terms it a "metaphilosophical" question.

I agree with you here, and one of my favourite philosophy books is an exhaustive and exhausting treatment of the varied definitions of the word "meaning" which is obviously crucial to an understanding of 'definition'.

But I see a further difficulty in your definition of philosophy, which is hinted at by my comment on your treatment of Wittgenstein's statement below.

Quoting Tarskian

"The world is all that is the case". It is a statement about the world, which is a physical fact.

One can take this as definitive, in which case it is philosophical, and likewise Moore's "This is a hand".

But at the same time, one can hardly deny that they are statements about the world. And this means that the separation between statements about the world and statements about statements cannot be so sharply made as to answer the question what is and is not philosophy. And We should be glad of that, because if philosophy was merely talk about talk, and had no connection with the world, it would be an entirely trivial pursuit.

But Wittgenstein also said, "Meaning is use." and one does not have to establish exact boundaries to the meaning of a a word, but rather the boundaries are established by the ways in which the word is used in the community. "Ways" plural, because a word can be used with different meaning and scope in different contexts. Thus language is part of the world, and has real causal function in the world, and philosophy 'matters'.

What is your objective here?

Often, the aim of people who try to redefine established concepts is to try and create a more consistent definition, not a new definition that immediately bakes in the known inconsistencies of some other theory so they can say "Here's my new definition of P which is purposefully inconsistent and therefore implies that the inconsistencies of theory M are ALSO inherent inconsistencies of theory P!".

Maybe I'm missing something, but unless you're something like a Used Paradigm Salesman who's trying to make up some suddenly catastrophic problems in the existing paradigm so you can sell a new one... I don't see any value in this proposition.

Quoting Jaded Scholar

What is your objective here?

Google Translate is not 100% accurate but it is quite good nonetheless. It could be interesting to have the starting point for something that can detect philosophical sentences. Most existing definitions are not suitable for that purpose just like most language textbooks would never be a good starting point for building Google Translate. I think that Gödel's theorem suggests a more interesting starting point. Some predicates must be excluded and philosophy of the mind requires a different approach. Besides that, I think that things are still nicely on target.

I personally think that this is a terrible motivation. But I have to admit that it seems like a good approach for your stated objective, and it does indeed sound like an interesting exercise either way. Carry on.

Reply to Tarskian
My understanding of a definition is that it explains the use of a word or term. As it happens, that roughly corresponds to what the dictionaries say, but obviously we can't necessarily rely on them. Nevertheless, I think that approach is helpful here. Let's call it a working definition.
We need to remember that not all definitions are linguistic. Ostensive definitions need not employ any words at all, although they do presuppose a basic understanding of language - except when we are training animals.
I suggest two basic varieties of definition which need to be taken into consideration here. One is the attempt to capture (perhaps codify) the use of an existing word or term. One might call these empirical definitions, paradoxical as it may seem. The other lays down a rule; this is commonest when a new term is being created (or a new use of an existing term, perhaps in a specific context, as in technical terms). One might call these stipulative definitions.

Cutting to the chase, I suggest that you need to clarify in your own mind whether you wish to capture the existing use of the term "philosophy" or stipulate a definition to be used in a specific context.

Quoting Tarskian

The origin for what I write, is of course, the foundational crisis in mathematics. I believe that it sheds new light not just on metaphysics but also on metaphilosophy.

This suggests that your definition is formulated in a specific context, but that you think it has consequences for philosophy more widely. I'm not clear whether you consider the possibility of that extension to be a philosophical thesis or not.

BTW, is meta-philosophy philosophy or not? - is that a philosophical question? It seems to be an extension of a concept that is used (and therefore defined) within a specific context, which may or may not be considered to be philosophical.

[quote=Wikipedia]Precise definitions are often only accepted by theorists belonging to a certain philosophical movement and are revisionistic according to Søren Overgaard et al. in that many presumed parts of philosophy would not deserve the title "philosophy" if they were true.[/quote]
Wikipedia is not wrong, especially in this observation. I would question "often" unless someone can come up with a definition of philosophy that is universally accepted by philosophers. Your definition is no exception - it has a philosophical agenda and is constructed in the pursuit of that agenda. That's fair enough, until you claim that it is a definition of philosophy.

Dogmatically, I would start by saying that philosophy is a practice (or a family of inter-related practices), the scope of which is effectively defined by what its practitioners do when they are philosophizing. One may compare music or the visual or performance arts, or even science itself.

Quoting Tarskian

a statement about another statement.

That's merely a metastatement (@Lionino)

IMO, a "philosophical statement" is a non-propositional expression (i.e. proposal) of a presupposition or an implication derived from a proposed answer to a philosophical question or from a philosophical question itself. A philosophical question, OTOH, is a counterfactual supposition (or thought-experiment) that cannot be definitively answered by either empirical or formal means (i.e. propositions).

Example:

Is the world (i e. a concept of "the world") deterministic or indeterministic?

If the world is deterministic, meaning that every event is caused by a prior event (i.e. non-random), then every person's choosing is epiphenomenal (or an illusion).

However, if the world is indeterministic, meaning that every event is uncaused (i.e. random), then, yet again, every person's choosing is epiphenomenal (or an illusion).

Suppose the world has both deterministic properties and indeterministic properties, meaning that any chain, or sequence, of events consists in alternating causal and noncausal relations, which therefore implies that every person's choosing is unconstrained-within-constraints, or compatible with the world conceived of having both deterministic and indetetministic properties.

I'm not satisfied with this simplistic example but I think it works well enough. My point is that philosophy's sine qua non is her questions (even meta-questions) – the how what when & why of them – rather than any answers, or "statements". In Socratic manner, I think, philosophizing strives to reason to more probative questions (or more clear, precise formulations of a question) and not just the academic penchant for masturbating each other with cleverer and cleverer logical puzzles.

Quoting Ludwig V

Cutting to the chase, I suggest that you need to clarify in your own mind whether you wish to capture the existing use of the term "philosophy" or stipulate a definition to be used in a specific context.

I am interested in a computable predicate, i.e. a computer program or a function, that will be able to distinguish between statements that are philosophical and statements that are not. Therefore, the most important requirement is that it can be implemented as source code.

However, the output does not need to be correct all the time.

We do not require that from Google Translate either. It just needs to be correct "most of the time" or "substantially more often than not".

Quoting Ludwig V

BTW, is meta-philosophy philosophy or not? - is that a philosophical question? It seems to be an extension of a concept that is used (and therefore defined) within a specific context, which may or may not be considered to be philosophical.

Is philosophical(#S) is a statement about statement S. So, in this definition, the metaphilosophy is a subdivision of philosophy.

Quoting Ludwig V

Dogmatically, I would start by saying that philosophy is a practice (or a family of inter-related practices), the scope of which is effectively defined by what its practitioners do when they are philosophizing.

That would be compatible with the ChatGPT approach.

Let the algorithm read a large sample of philosophy, summarize it into an appropriate numerical data structure, and then get it to discriminate inputs between philosophy and not philosophy.

This approach will undoubtedly still require an underlying notion of what exactly to extract and summarize from the sample ("machine learning"), and therefore, what exactly matters when trying to distinguish philosophy from the alternative.

For example, object recognition in computer vision ultimately rests on relatively simple underlying notions such as haar-like features, without which the discrimination algorithm would not even work properly.

Therefore, without some basic notion of at least what to look for in a sentence, the philosophy-detection algorithm's ability to discriminate can be expected to be disappointingly poor.

Quoting Ludwig V

One may compare music or the visual or performance arts, or even science itself.

It is actually possible to detect if any particular sound is music or not, with a tool such as Spleeter from Deezer research:

https://research.deezer.com/projects/spleeter.html

There are, of course, more research budgets available for music than for philosophy. So, the fact that a discrimination algorithm exists for music and not one for philosophy, should not come as a surprise.

Not all sound is music. Thus, there are algorithms available that can quite precisely discriminate between music and other sounds.

The discrimination problem is not necessarily easier for music than for philosophy. It is just that there are people who have worked on a solution for music but not on one for philosophy.

Reply to Tarskian
Some more philosophical statements that don't meet your standard.

• The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao - Lao Tzu
• God will not have his work made manifest by cowards - Emerson
• All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason - Kant

Another philosophical statement that doesn't meet the standard:

• Philosophy is a mathematical capability of the language at hand.

Quoting T Clark

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao

This goes straight to Yanofsky's characterization of the truth, i.e. most truth is ineffable:

eternal(#S) => ineffable(#S)
or
¬ ineffable(#S) => ¬ eternal(#S)

It revolves around properties of sentences. So, I think that this example is actually captured by the definition.

Quoting T Clark

God will not have his work made manifest by cowards - Emerson

toManifest(_owner, _byWhom, _work)

? _work ( ¬ toManifest(God, cowards, _work) )

It is a 3-argument predicate while none of the arguments are sentences. This is a similar problem as JohnSaid(#S) or Said(John, #S).

This definition can definitely not handle persons involved, such as "by whom" or "for whom".

If it were not about God, but about an arbitrary person John, then it would be about a physical fact. For example, "John will not have his work made manifest by cowards". In my opinion, "by whom" and "for whom" tend to point to physical facts.

Quoting T Clark

All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason - Kant

Knowledge(#S) <-> ( Stage1Senses(#S) ?Stage2Understanding(#S) ^ Stage3Reason(#S) )

S has property Knowledge if and only if S has senses in stage1 and ...

In my opinion, it seems to work.

Quoting Lionino

Another philosophical statement that doesn't meet the standard:

Philosophy is a mathematical capability of the language at hand.

hasGödelNumbering(#languageDefinition) => isPhilosophicalLanguage(#languageDefinition)

I think that it matches the definition.

Note: Even English has just standard UTF-8 as Gödel numbering. You can do arithmetic in English and express the UTF-8 algorithm in plain English. The problem will be the language definition of English. A rather poor definition from something like Google Translate could possibly be used.

Reply to Tarskian

I don't understand you responses to my statements. Seems like you're just stretching your definition to fit my examples.

Quoting Tarskian

I am interested in a computable predicate, i.e. a computer program or a function, that will be able to distinguish between statements that are philosophical and statements that are not. Therefore, the most important requirement is that it can be implemented as source code.

I wish you luck with your project. But I can't help feeling that that your project would be more relevant if the most important requirement was that the definition was correct. It would be handy if it could be implemented as source code, but that's definitely a secondary consideration.

Quoting Tarskian

We do not require that ("right all the time") from Google Translate either. It just needs to be correct "most of the time" or "substantially more often than not".

Who's we? Lawyers translating international treaties are not going to settle for "right most of the time". Nor engineers translating engineering manuals. Mind you, they can expect to be disappointed, since often no translation is correct. Translators of literature and poetry - and philosophy - frequently wrestle with this.

Quoting Tarskian

It is actually possible to detect if any particular sound is music or not, with a tool such as Spleeter from Deezer research:

[quote=Deezer Research - Sleeter;"https://research.deezer.com/projects/spleeter.html"]The models available are:
Vocals (singing voice) / accompaniment separation (2 stems)
Vocals / drums / bass / other separation (4 stems)
Vocals / drums / bass / piano / other separation (5 stems)[/quote]
What a disappointment!
Tchaikovsky uses cannon-fire in the 1812 overture. Music? Not Music? Depends on the use the sound is put to.
If you tap a glass tumbler with a hard object, it makes a ringing sound. Whether that is music or not depends on what you do next.
It is quite usual for new forms of music to be rejected by many existing practitioners but to be accepted as time goes by. Jazz, is, of course, the classic example.

Quoting Tarskian

This approach will undoubtedly still require an underlying notion of what exactly to extract and summarize from the sample ("machine learning"), and therefore, what exactly matters when trying to distinguish philosophy from the alternative.

Yes, and no doubt they will produce excellent summaries of existing practice. Your sample will be, effectively the definition of philosophy of the person or people who collect and identify the sample. So a machine trained on philosophy up to 1900 may or may not correctly identify philosophy written a hundred years later. Any definition that catches existing practice is likely to fail in the face of new practices, so this approach needs constant updating by people who have classified the new material.

Quoting Tarskian

That would be compatible with the ChatGPT approach.

I have heard - perhaps I'm wrong - that there is a nasty problem lurking in ChatGPT. It picks up on racist or sexist language in its sample - and there's plenty of that, apparently - and adopts it as normal, since no-one has told it any different. But what makes language racist or sexist is not just a matter of vocabulary, but of use - even intent.

Quoting Ludwig V

It would be handy if it could be implemented as source code, but that's definitely a secondary consideration.

As other users pointed and me initially, the concept he is describing is already perfectly called 'metalanguage'. If his redefinition is adopted, we lose the word 'philosophy' and 'metalanguage' becomes redundant.

Refining definitions is okay if done in an educated fashion, many scientific and philosophical terms out there would benefit from refinement; but changing definitions altogether is sophomoric unless you are Terence Tao or Stephen Hawking.

Not only that problem, but also the word 'philosophy' doesn't exist only in English; in fact, it is not even an English word.

Quoting Lionino

Refining definitions is okay if done in an educated fashion, many scientific and philosophical terms out there would benefit from refinement; but changing definitions altogether is sophomoric unless you are Terence Tao or Stephen Hawking.

I agree that refining definitions can be useful, though much depends on whether the refined definition is useful or helpful in some way, in the context in which is to be applied. Even changing definitions for terms that are to be used in a specific context may be acceptable. But it turns out that this definition has an agenda - as many other proferred definitions of philosophy do. But they at least have a philosophical agenda. This definition is not in pursuit of a project that I would consider philosophical.

Quoting Lionino

Not only that problem, but also the word 'philosophy' doesn't exist only in English; in fact, it is not even an English word.

You are right that philosophy doesn't exist only in English. One assumes that the term has a recognizably similar meaning at least in other European languages. But I can't understand why you think it isn't an English word. The fact that it was originally a compound word in ancient Greek seems to me to be irrelevant. The fact that it may overlap to a greater or lesser extent with parallel words in other languages is more relevant, but doesn't mean it is not an English word. Though, perhaps, it depends on you criterion for which are to count as English.

Quoting Ludwig V

But I can't understand why you think it isn't an English word.

You can.

Quoting Lionino

But I can't understand why you think it isn't an English word.
— Ludwig V
You can.

Sorry. Let me put it a different way. Why do you think that "philosophy" isn't an English word?

Reply to Ludwig V If I were to say "'Democrazia' non è una parola italiana.", every awake person in Italy who finished school would know what I am talking about. I don't think it is the case that you are half-asleep right now or that the average Italian is much smarter than you, so I think you know very well what I meant by my statement.

Quoting T Clark

I don't understand you responses to my statements. Seems like you're just stretching your definition to fit my examples.

As soon as you can write the sentence as one that contains the pattern K(#S), i.e. a property of a statement, it is philosophical.

Asserting a property of a statement is a statement about a statement.

It works out of the box for Tao and Kant's general assertion about knowledge.

Quoting Tarskian

As soon as you can write the sentence as one that contains the pattern K(#S), i.e. a property of a statement, it is philosophical.

That doesn't make any sense. No need to take this any further.

Quoting Ludwig V

But I can't help feeling that that your project would be more relevant if the most important requirement was that the definition was correct.

The notion of Haar-like feature is not even a particularly good definition for "visual object". It is good enough, however, to build systems with that recognize faces in a crowd.

Better underlying notions would lead to better object recognition. It would undoubtedly fail less often.

What does not work, however, is perfectionism. Perfect is the enemy of good.

Quoting Ludwig V

Lawyers translating international treaties are not going to settle for "right most of the time".

They would obviously not use automated translation. But then again, automated translation can still speed up the work of a human translator. In the 10% of the time that it is inadequate, he will correct the output.

Quoting Ludwig V

Tchaikovsky uses cannon-fire in the 1812 overture. Music? Not Music? Depends on the use the sound is put to.

Perfect is the enemy of good. Should Deezer research improve Spleeter for that? Not sure about that ...

Quoting Ludwig V

So a machine trained on philosophy up to 1900 may or may not correctly identify philosophy written a hundred years later.

Language also changes. English today is not exactly the same language as in the 16th century.

The need to adjust things to changing definitions is a good problem to have. It means that the system already works for the existing situation. That is not necessarily future-proof, but that is rather a problem to fix if and when it occurs.

Quoting T Clark

That doesn't make any sense. No need to take this any further.

That doesn't make any sense ... to you. If you understood it, it would.

Reply to unenlightened Yup.

Quoting Lionino

changing definitions altogether

There is no definition for the term philosophy. There is only a large collection of (partially failed) attempts.

Replacing the existing alternative definition "thinking about thinking" by "statement about statement" has the tangible advantage that it becomes an eminently computable definition. At that point, a machine can do it too.

The goal is to supply a functional underlying notion usable for the purpose of machine learning.

We have tools for object recognition, music detection, and many other discrimination and classification software systems. A computable definition for philosophy would allow us to pick philosophical statements out of their textual environment.

Quoting Tarskian

There is no definition for the term philosophy.

:roll:

But Pythagoras was the first person who invented the term
Philosophy, and who called himself a philosopher; when he was conversing
at Sicyon with Leon, who was tyrant of the Sicyonians or of the
Phliasians (as Heraclides Ponticus relates in the book which he wrote
about a dead woman); for he said that no man ought to be called wise,
but only God. For formerly what is now called philosophy (?????????) was
called wisdom (?????), and they who professed it were called wise men
(?????), as being endowed with great acuteness and accuracy of mind; but
now he who embraces wisdom is called a philosopher (?????????).

Quoting Tarskian

has the tangible advantage that it becomes an eminently computable definition

The word philosophy doesn't have to be computable any more than the word 'dog' does.

Quoting Lionino

The word philosophy doesn't have to be computable any more than the word 'dog' does.

One example for the computability of the term "dog":

https://www.cvedia.com/animal-detection

Animal and wildlife detection using CVEDIA-RT.

Deep learning powered by synthetic data

What is animal detection ?using deep learning.

Animal detection involves finding wildlife or pets in photos or videos. Traditional computer vision techniques, such as motion detection, caused false alarms and drained camera batteries, but deep learning has improved accuracy and added the ability to classify animal species. This is crucial for monitoring specific animals in the wild and alerting people to pests or predators.

Another example:

https://aimagelab.ing.unimore.it/imagelab/project.asp?idprogetto=49

A computer vision system for the evaluation of the behaviour and the well-being of the dogs housed in the shelter

The project, funded by the Ministry of Health, aims to develop a computer vision system that monitors the well-being of the dogs housed in shelters with the use of 3D images acquisition sensors. The system shall analyze automatically and continuously the behavior of dogs in the short and especially long-term, detecting anomalies that may be induced by a malaise of the animals, reporting alerts to the experts and staff.

There are massive research and development budgets for "dog" object-recognition and monitoring systems.

The budgets for the term "dog" are obviously dwarfed by the amount of money being invested in systems that revolve around the term "cattle" or "flock of hens".

If you want to get a better understanding of what the term "a lot of money" means, then look at the R & D budgets for agriculture.

The funny thing is that "statements about statements", i.e. philosophy, is absolutely pervasive in our use of abstractions. It touches everything. In my opinion, it even explains some of the metaphysics of the universe.

However, there are apparently no budgets for that.

I think that this is a wrong choice. Other systems would be so much more effective, if we came to grips with their common-most general underlying notion.

Quoting Tarskian

A computable definition for philosophy would allow us to pick philosophical statements out of their textual environment.

The only problem we have with picking philosophical statements out of their textual environment is that we don't agree what philosophy is. The machine will not help with that.
Indeed, the project itself will very likely throw up problems of its own. The difference between a sentence and a statement is precisely the environment (textual and otherwise). To extract a sentence from its textual environment would effectively prevent identifying philosophical statements.

Quoting Tarskian

They would obviously not use automated translation. But then again, automated translation can still speed up the work of a human translator. In the 10% of the time that it is inadequate, he will correct the output.

Doing a job badly, so that someone else has to check and correct the result is normally regarded as little better than not doing the job. But it the machine can do donkey-work and so help us out, that may be worth having. But it contributes nothing at all to defining philosophy.

A computer vision system for the evaluation of the behaviour and the well-being of the dogs housed in the shelter

Who decides what behaviour is problematic or when the dog's well-being is undermined? Not the machine, that's for sure. It may save donkey-work, but it isn't capable of telling us anything we don't know.

Quoting Tarskian

The need to adjust things to changing definitions is a good problem to have. It means that the system already works for the existing situation. That is not necessarily future-proof, but that is rather a problem to fix if and when it occurs.

My point is that the machine has to be adjusted to conform with human definitions. The machine does not define anything, but extrapolates something from whatever samples we offer it. The selection of the samples is, effectively, a definition.

I think you might find Wikipedia - Motte and Bailey Fallacy helpful.

Quoting Lionino

As other users pointed and me initially, the concept he is describing is already perfectly called 'metalanguage'. If his redefinition is adopted, we lose the word 'philosophy' and 'metalanguage' becomes redundant.

I agree with that.

Quoting Lionino

If I were to say "'Democrazia' non è una parola italiana.", every awake person in Italy who finished school would know what I am talking about. I don't think it is the case that you are half-asleep right now or that the average Italian is much smarter than you, so I think you know very well what I meant by my statement.

Whether I'm asleep or not is not the issue. It I did have ideas about why you are saying what you are saying, it is reasonable to confirm whether they are right before I start criticizing them. But apparently you don't want to do that. But, in general terms, my issue is whether you are wearing blinkers or not. This is a trivial issue about how "same word" is applied. it's not sufficiently interesting to bother with.

Quoting Ludwig V

Who decides what behaviour is problematic or when the dog's well-being is undermined? Not the machine, that's for sure. It may save donkey-work, but it isn't capable of telling us anything we don't know.

They have managed to convince the Ministry of Health that the project is worth doing and therefore worthwhile for them to fund it.

The thing with grant proposals is that you have to know what the other side is willing to pay for.

In fact, Google, Meta, and Microsoft are even much bigger spenders. When they get interested, they buy up the entire startup and add it to their growing collection of curiosa.

In the industry of building R&D curiosa, you have to be open minded.

I guess that 75% of the projects that I ever worked on, ultimately failed to achieve their objective, even though I preselected them for their potential for success, avoiding the potential frustration of initiatives that in my opinion could not possibly succeed.

If you are too critical, you don't do anything at all. In this industry, it means that you simply don't make any money either. I guess that my experience has made me biased towards more instead of less risk.

You may simply have to assume that the promotor of this project knows what he is doing. I don't know anything about dog behaviour, but I would just assume that the project owner does. Since someone else at the Ministry of Health is also willing to pay for the project owner's mistakes, I would give him the benefit of the doubt.

Reply to Tarskian
You may well be right. I couldn't possibly tell.

How is all this relevant for defining philosophy? How is this the relevant to philosophy in any way?

Quoting Tarskian

The origin for what I write, is of course, the foundational crisis in mathematics

Here we go again, assuming a stroll along an uneven path is the same as wandering through a minefield.

Quoting Ludwig V

How is all this relevant for defining philosophy? How is this the relevant to philosophy in any way?

:up:

Quoting Ludwig V

How is all this relevant for defining philosophy? How is this the relevant to philosophy in any way?

It was a direct answer to your question.

Your question about dog behavior may indeed not be directly relevant to the definition of philosophy.

All of this originally came up as a remark that the definition for"philosophy" does not need to be computable any more than the definition for "dog" needs to be

I pointed out that there are actually budgets for doing exactly that, i.e. computability of "dog".

Quoting jgill

Here we go again, assuming a stroll along an uneven path is the same as wandering through a minefield.

So, the idea is that the use of Godel numbering in a logic expression points to making use of the philosophical capability of the language and therefore turns the expression into a philosophical one. There may be exceptions, though.

It makes the notion of philosophy eminently computable. Computability is a requirement for machine learning.

In the meanwhile, I have discovered that this view is absolutely not new:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-philosophy/

Computational philosophy is the use of mechanized computational techniques to instantiate, extend, and amplify philosophical research. Computational philosophy is not philosophy of computers or computational techniques; it is rather philosophy using computers and computational techniques. The idea is simply to apply advances in computer technology and techniques to advance discovery, exploration and argument within any philosophical area.

Computational philosophy is deemed promising and useful:

There is one extremely promising area in need of development within computational philosophy, though that area may also call for changes in conceptions of philosophy itself. Philosophy has classically been conceived as abstract rather than concrete, as seeking understanding at the most general level rather than specific prediction or retrodiction, often normative, and as operating in terms of logical argument and analysis rather than empirical data. The last of these characteristics, and to some extent the first, will have to be qualified if computational philosophy grows to incorporate a major batch of contemporary techniques: those related to big data.

Reply to Ludwig V

Hence, concerning your question, "How is this the relevant to philosophy in any way?", there is your answer, and it is called, "Computational philosophy". It is actually a gigantic subdiscipline.

Benzmüller, Christoph and David Fuenmayor, 2018, “Can Computers Help to Sharpen Our Understanding of Ontological Arguments?” in S. Gosh, R. Uppalari, K. Rao, V. Agarwal, and S. Sharma (eds.), Mathematics and Reality: Proceedings of the 11th All Indian Students’ Conference on Science and Spiritual Quest (AISSQ), Bhudabenswar, Kolkata: The Bhaktiedanta Institute, pp. 195–226.

Dennett, Daniel, 1979, “Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology”, in Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence, Martin Ringle (ed.), Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, pp. 57–80.

Fitelson, Branden and Edward N. Zalta, 2007, “Steps Toward a Computational Metaphysics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36(2): 227–247. doi:10.1007/s10992-006-9038-7

Grim, Patrick, Gary R. Mar, and Paul St. Denis, 1998, The Philosophical Computer: Exploratory Essays in Philosophical Computer Modeling, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Horner, Jack K., 2019, “A Computationally Assisted Reconstruction of an Ontological Argument in Spinoza’s The Ethics”, Open Philosophy, (special issue on computational philosophy) 2(1): 211–229. doi:10.1515/opphil-2019-0012

Kirchner, Daniel, Christoph Benzmüller, and Edward N. Zalta, 2019, “Computer Science and Metaphysics: A Cross-Fertilization”, Open Philosophy, (special issue on computational philosophy) 2(1): 230–251. doi:10.1515/opphil-2019-0015

Oppenheimer, Paul E. and Edward N. Zalta, 2011, “A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(2): 333–349. doi:10.1080/00048401003674482

Pence, Charles H. and Grant Ramsey, 2018, “How to Do Digital Philosophy of Science”, Philosophy of Science, 85(5): 930–941. doi:10.1086/699697

Rushby, John, 2018, “A Mechanically Assisted Examination of Begging the Question in Anselm’s Ontological Argument”, Journal of Applied Logics, 5(7): 1473–1496.

Shults, F. LeRon, 2019, “Computer Modeling in Philosophy of Religion”, Open Philosophy, (special issue on computer modeling in philosophy) 2(1): 108–125. doi:10.1515/opphil-2019-0011

Thagard, Paul, 1988, Computational Philosophy of Science, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Van Den Hoven, Jeroen and Gert?Jan Lokhorst, 2002, “Deontic Logic and Computer?Supported Computer Ethics”, Metaphilosophy, 33(3): 376–386. doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00233

Wheeler, Billy, 2019, “Computer Simulations in Metaphysics: Possibilities and Limitations,” Manuscrito, 42(3): 108–148

Godel numbering could actually be to computational philosophy what the haar-like feature is to computer-based visual object recognition.

Quoting Tarskian

Here we go again, assuming a stroll along an uneven path is the same as wandering through a minefield. — jgill


So, the idea is that the use of Godel numbering in a logic expression points to making use of the philosophical capability of the language and therefore turns the expression into a philosophical one. There may be exceptions, though.

I was just commenting on your referring to "a foundational crises in mathematics". I doubt many mathematicians would agree there is a "crises". Concerns perhaps.

I suspect Quoting jgill

"a foundational crises in mathematics"

is to be understood as "I don't get it!"

Quoting jgill

I was just commenting on your referring to "a foundational crises in mathematics". I doubt many mathematicians would agree there is a "crises". Concerns perhaps.

I actually did not invent the term "foundational crisis of mathematics" by myself:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundations_of_mathematics

The foundational crisis of mathematics arose at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century with the discovery of several paradoxes or counter-intuitive results.

Several schools of philosophy of mathematics were challenged with these problems in the 20th century, and are described below.

These problems were also studied by mathematicians, and this led to establish mathematical logic as a new area of mathematics,

They even write entire books about the foundational crisis of mathematics:

Ferreiros, J. (2008), Gowers, Timothy (ed.), "The Crisis in the Foundations of Mathematics", Princeton Companion to Mathematics, Princeton University Press, retrieved 2022-08-26

Robi?, Borut (2015), Robi?, Borut (ed.), "The Foundational Crisis of Mathematics", The Foundations of Computability Theory, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 9–30, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44808-3_2, ISBN 978-3-662-44808-3, S2CID 124817202, retrieved 2022-08-26

Statements don't talk.

Quoting Banno

I suspect
"a foundational crises in mathematics"
— jgill
is to be understood as "I don't get it!"

The term can be traced back to Russell's criticism on Frege's publication on the foundations of mathematics:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Foundations_of_Arithmetic

The Foundations of Arithmetic (German: Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik) is a book by Gottlob Frege, published in 1884, which investigates the philosophical foundations of arithmetic.

Although Bertrand Russell later found a major flaw in Frege's Basic Law V (this flaw is known as Russell's paradox, which is resolved by axiomatic set theory), the book was influential in subsequent developments, such as Principia Mathematica.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_paradox

Russell wrote to Frege about the paradox just as Frege was preparing the second volume of his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.

Frege then wrote an appendix admitting to the paradox,[17] and proposed a solution that Russell would endorse in his Principles of Mathematics,[18] but was later considered by some to be unsatisfactory.[19]

It is Godel's incompleteness theorem (1931) that eventually proved that the foundational crisis cannot be solved.

Quoting creativesoul

Statements don't talk.

The idea revolves around a statement making use of the Godel numbering capability in its language to refer to another statement or even to itself.

This capability is a prerequisite for a language to be its own metalanguage and hence to be capable of philosophy.

In first-order arithmetic it is relatively easy to detect the use of Godel numbering. If the Godel numbering symbol appears anywhere in the expression, then the expression is -- according to this definition -- philosophical.

Personally speaking I think of 'Philosophy' as essentially meaning "ways of thinking about ..." rather than "love of knowledge," which is too question begging for me.

Quoting I like sushi

Personally speaking I think of 'Philosophy' as essentially meaning "ways of thinking about ..." rather than "love of knowledge," which is too question begging for me.

One major problem with any definition for philosophy is the following remark:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definitions_of_philosophy

Another characterization of philosophy sometimes found in the literature is that, at least in principle, it does not take any facts for granted and allows any presupposition to be questioned, including its own methods.[7][11] This is reflected in the fact that philosophy has no solid foundations to build on since whatever foundations one philosopher accepts may be questioned by another.

There is no definition for philosophy.

There is only a collection of partially failed attempts.

The one closest to my own definition of "statements about other statements" is "Thinking about thinking":

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy

Another definition characterizes philosophy as thinking about thinking to emphasize its self-critical, reflective nature.

Overgaard, Søren; Gilbert, Paul; Burwood, Stephen (2013). "What Is Philosophy?". An Introduction to Metaphilosophy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-19341-2.

Your own proposal of "ways of thinking" is also very close to "thinking about thinking".

I do not look at the process itself -- a black box really -- but only at its output, i.e. statements.

Furthermore, by cutting out the human element, the definition lends itself more readily to computational philosophy.

While a computer can certainly analyze a large body of text, it cannot meaningfully analyze a large number of people while they are actively thinking.

In order to achieve an objective, shared understanding, it is in my opinion preferable to use a reproducible method of analysis.

It may leave out important subsections of philosophy, such as philosophy of the mind, but in my opinion, the benefit of doing so, is greater than the cost.

Quoting Tarskian

All of this originally came up as a remark that the definition for"philosophy" does not need to be computable any more than the definition for "dog" needs to be.

Your project, as far as I understand it, is to develop a machine that can tell the difference between philosophical sentences/statements and other things. I've pointed out that a definition of philosophy may be required for the project, what you describe does not provide it, but rather depends on it.

Quoting Tarskian

You may simply have to assume that the promotor of this project knows what he is doing. I don't know anything about dog behaviour, but I would just assume that the project owner does. Since someone else at the Ministry of Health is also willing to pay for the project owner's mistakes, I would give him the benefit of the doubt.

The person in charge of the project to enable machines to identify behavioural and health problems in dogs may well know what they are doing. But they are not developing a definition of "dog".
I can't tell whether you know what you are doing. But it doesn't look good.

Quoting Tarskian

Hence, concerning your question, "How is this the relevant to philosophy in any way?", there is your answer, and it is called, "Computational philosophy". It is actually a gigantic subdiscipline.

Well, of course there's a lot of literature and a lot of enthusiasm. Computing is very fashionable. And delegating philosophy to computers might save a lot of wasted time - or be a lot of wasted time. I agree that it is entirely appropriate that the possible applications of computing should be thoroughly explored. But books that you so kindly list for us don't seem likely to provide a definition of philosophy.

Quoting Ludwig V

But they are not developing a definition of "dog".

Actually, they are.

It is not in the form of natural language sentences, but in the form of a numerical data structure.

For example, in the following article, they develop a definition for the human face. It is contained in the configuration file haarcascade_frontalface_default.xml. It allows them to do the folllowing:

https://machinelearningmastery.com/using-haar-cascade-for-object-detection/

# Load the Haar cascade for face detection

face_cascade = cv2.CascadeClassifier(cv2.data.haarcascades + 

             'haarcascade_frontalface_default.xml')

 

# Read the input image

img = cv2.imread(filename)

 

# Convert the image to grayscale

gray = cv2.cvtColor(img, cv2.COLOR_BGR2GRAY)

 

# Perform face detection

faces = face_cascade.detectMultiScale(gray, scaleFactor=1.1, 

      minNeighbors=4, minSize=(20, 20))

 

# Draw rectangles around the detected faces

for (x, y, w, h) in faces:

    cv2.rectangle(img, (x, y), (x+w, y+h), (255, 0, 0), 2)

For all intents and purposes, the configuration data in haarcascade_frontalface_default.xml contains an abstract definition for the human face.

At the basis of the classifier is a very, very poor definition of what a visual object is:

Since the technique developed by Paul Viola and Michael Jones in 2001, Haar features and Haar cascades have revolutionized object detection.

Haar features are extracted from rectangular areas in an image. The feature’s value is based on the pixel intensities. Usually, it is calculated using a sliding window, and the area within the window is partitioned into two or more rectangular areas. Haar feature is the difference in the sum of pixel intensities between these areas.

It is believed that an object’s presence will distort the variation of pixel intensity. By checking the pixel intensity between neighboring rectangular areas, you should be able to notice a difference. Hence it is indicative of the object’s presence.

The key idea behind Haar cascade is that only a small number of pixels among the entire image is related to the object in concern. Therefore, it is essential to discard the irrelevant part of the image as quickly as possible.

For machine learning, you do indeed need some notion of what you are looking for. However, it does not need to be perfect at all. Visual object detection is not based on a particularly correct definition of what a visual object is. It is based on a rule of thumb that apparently works out really well.

The presence of Gödel numbering in a sentence, is a notion that is much more directly related to the definition for philosophy than the haar feature is related to a definition for visual object. Using the notion of haar feature in visual object detection works like a charm already. Perfection is absolutely not needed. In fact, perfection is the enemy of good.

Quoting Ludwig V

before I start criticizing them

And there is the problem. Some things are not up to be criticised because they are evidently correct. It is only by misinterpreting the text, by assuming that the other person is saying something absurd rather than something obvious, fueled by the desire for polemics, that we then enable criticism in something otherwise uncontroversial. Not everything is polemical. In Italy they would just acquiesce and carry on with the conversation, but hereabouts we have "Well, how do you know that you know that you know?".

Quoting Tarskian

One example for the computability of the term "dog":

First, I said 'dog' doesn't have to be computable, not that it isn't.

Second, the deep learning used to detect dogs can be used to detect philosophical speech, without your distortion of the word.

In fact, go ahead and feed ChatGPT a bunch of texts, it will tell you which is philosophy and which is not.

Inb4: "But some texts are ambiguous and ChatGPT will not get them right!"

Give the dog detector the picture of a dog-looking but alien creature and it will have the same ambiguous and possibility of error, or give it a bad drawing of a dog, or give it a blurred picture of a dog, etc...

Quoting Lionino

In fact, go ahead and feed ChatGPT a bunch of texts, it will tell you which is philosophy and which is not.

If you ask ChatGPT about face detection, it will advise you to try OpenCV.

https://medium.com/@vdkolekar/face-detection-implementation-using-chatgpt-622ab3a61df2
(Face Detection implementation using ChatGPT)

ChatGPT cannot do face detection by itself. It will refer you to a specialized engine for visual object detection.

Same with advice on converting PDF to audio. ChatGPT advises to use a specialized engine for PDF (PyPDF2) and one for text-to-speech synthesis (gTTS):

https://medium.com/@vdkolekar/pdf-to-audio-using-chatgpt-ed6d07b98733

ChatGPT does not seem to be itself a specialized engine for anything, actually.

In order to implement philosophy detection based on the definition that I propose, a specialized engine would be required that translates natural English into first-order arithmetic. The only engine I found that could possibly be shoehorned in that direction, is old unsupported abandonware called SPF from Cornell University:

https://github.com/lil-lab/spf

It's not that you can just feed SPF a sentence in English and that SPF will give you the output in the syntax of first-order arithmetic. Instead, SPF looks rather unusable.

Again, there are no budgets for this kind of things. You can much more easily get money for detecting dogs, rabbits, or loose cattle in the field than for philosophy.

Quoting Tarskian

For example, in the following article, they develop a definition for the human face. It is contained in the configuration file haarcascade_frontalface_default.xml. It allows them to do the folllowing:

Sorry, I put my point badly. The definition is being developed by the people, and applied by the machine. So whatever your philosophical machine can do, it is not defining philosophy, but applying a definition of philosophy to the tedious task of distinguishing philosophy texts from other kinds of text.

Quoting Lionino

It is only by misinterpreting the text, by assuming that the other person is saying something absurd rather than something obvious, fueled by the desire for polemics, that we then enable criticism in something otherwise uncontroversial.

That can happen. So it seems a good idea, before embarking on any criticism, to confirm that one's speculations or assumptions are correct or not. No?

Quoting Lionino

Some things are not up to be criticised because they are evidently correct. ..... In Italy they would just acquiesce and carry on with the conversation,

Do you never find that something you thought was evidently correct, isn't?
A wild speculation.
Some UK, or at least English-speaking philosophers, especially analytic ones, express disagreement, not by saying "You are talking rubbish" or even "I disagree with you" or even "Why do you believe that", but by saying "I can't understand why you think that.." It's just a politeness - disagreeing without raising the emotional temperature. Perhaps things are not the same in Italy and when you disagree, you say so more plainly.

In this case, what is self-evident to you is not at all self-evident to me. It is a trivial disagreement, since it depends on which criterion you choose to apply count as English or Italian word. Our disagreement is incidental and I didn't intend to provoke a great discussion about it. But perhaps you'll allow me to state my view and then we can leave it at that - agreeing to disagree.

It is true that sometimes similar words and terms are found in different languages, as with "democracy", "'democrazia", "demokratie", "demokracja", "democracia". If "'democrazia" is not an Italian word and not an English word, which language does it belong to? I think you must mean that it is a Greek word. (You'll let me know if that assumption is wrong, I'm sure).
Well, it is not self-evident to me that a word can only ever belong to the language it originally belonged to. If it is meaningful in more than one language, it belongs to all the languages in which it is meaningful. In fact, so this word was originally Greek, but, in various forms (I'll spare you the argument about that) it is now a word in English, Italian, German, Polish and Spanish amongst other languages.

I think it is true of all languages and it is certainly true of English that many words are imported from other languages. Sometimes they remain identifiable as importations, but in many cases they are absorbed. That boundary is pretty uncertain, but I'm not aware that any significant philosophical issues hang on the distinction, so I'm not inclined to worry about it.

Quoting Tarskian

If you ask ChatGPT about face detection, it will advise you to try OpenCV.

Ok, and?

Quoting Ludwig V

Perhaps things are not the same in Italy and when you disagree, you say so more plainly.

I am not Italian, just have been and talk to locals frequently.

Quoting Ludwig V

Do you never find that something you thought was evidently correct, isn't?

However "'democrazia' non è una parola italiana" is correct, unless one wants to misinterpret it to mean "la parola 'democrazia' non esiste in italiano", which nobody would ever say because it is evidently incorrect.

Quoting Ludwig V

think you must mean that it is a Greek word.

And that is because it is a Greek word. Same with 'philosophy'.

Quoting Ludwig V

Well, it is not self-evident to me that a word can only ever belong to the language it originally belonged to.

So I recommend that you either look deeper or reconsider your choice of words. It undoubtably belongs to Greek, even if it is used by other languages, because among other things it only makes sense in Greek. In case of disagreement, visit the nearby (authentic) Greek restaurant and tell the restaurant owner that the word 'democracy' "belongs" to English. Even without the same education, his reply will be better than mine would have been.

Quoting Ludwig V

I think it is true of all languages and it is certainly true of English that many words are imported from other languages

As long as you arbitrarily choose what qualifies as "many", that is surely true.

Quoting Ludwig V

but I'm not aware that any significant philosophical issues hang on the distinction, so I'm not inclined to worry about it.

Though I disagree, my original remark was not philosophical, it was general. This thread itself is not even philosophical. At most, it is a very low-quality attempt at prescriptive grammar.

Quoting Lionino

Though I disagree, my original remark was not philosophical, it was general. This thread itself is not even philosophical. At most, it is a very low-quality attempt at prescriptive grammar.

Yes, indeed. :smile:

Quoting Lionino

Though I disagree

To be clear, I don't disagree that he is not aware, as obviously I can't read minds, I disagree with the idea that there aren't philosophical issues implied.

Quoting Tarskian

I actually did not invent the term "foundational crisis of mathematics" by myself

OK. Thanks for the links. It should be emphasized that the crises is in the philosophy of mathematics. Mathematicians by and large ignore the crises (unless they are into fundamentals). :cool:

Reply to Tarskian

Language doesn't think about itself.

Quoting creativesoul

Language doesn't think about itself.

Of course, it doesn't.

First-order logic -- in absence of arithmetic -- cannot express sentences about its own sentences. It requires Godel numbering for that purpose which in turn requires arithmetic.

When Godel numbering is available, a person (or a computer) can produce sentences in first-order logic that express sentences that are about other sentences in first-order logic.

A computer does not think but it can output sentences.

Quoting Lionino

This thread itself is not even philosophical.

It is about metaphilosophy and computational philosophy based on the philosophy of mathematics.

For you, however, every thread is ultimately always about criticism on people ... except criticism on yourself.

Quoting Tarskian

It is about metaphilosophy and computational philosophy based on the philosophy of mathematics.

Changing the definition of common words is not metaphilosophy.

And stop crying.

There definitely was a foundational crisis in mathematics in the 19th century, it wasn't in the philosophy of mathematics.

One could say the crisis is still going on, as we don't know whether ZFC is free of contradictions (and perhaps never will).

Quoting Lionino

Changing the definition of common words is not metaphilosophy.

There is no definition for the term philosophy. There is merely a collection of partially failed attempts. My own definition may be suitable for computational philosophy.

Quoting Lionino

And stop crying.

I am several orders better than you at insulting. I just don't do it. I'd rather explore new ideas instead of seeking conflict.

Quoting Tarskian

There is no definition for the term philosophy.

We went through this already. There are plenty of definitions for philosophy. Not only are you unable to keep up with what has already discussed, but your replies are half of the time off-topic — as you know they are, because you have no proper reply.

Quoting Lionino

The word philosophy doesn't have to be computable any more than the word 'dog' does.

The user replies with:

Quoting Tarskian

One example for the computability of the term "dog":

As was explained, the point is that it doesn't have to be computable, not that it is not computable. The user does not understand how to appropriately reply to arguments, so by then we are already off-topic.

He uses computability of 'dog' with deep learning as an example.

Quoting Lionino

Second, the deep learning used to detect dogs can be used to detect philosophical speech, without your distortion of the word.

By his own example, his proposal for a strict (and erroneous) definition of philosophy is already obsolete, as machine learning can work with the traditional definition of philosophy, and current AIs will show so.

Then,

Quoting Tarskian

If you ask ChatGPT about face detection, it will advise you to try OpenCV.

he replies that ChatGPT cannot do face detection, which is completely unrelated and irrelevant (as we weren't talking about ChatGPT and face recognition, but ChatGPT and philosophical texts) and might as well be wrong for next models.

It is really an embarassing discussion. He doesn't even know what it is that he wants to talk about.

Quoting Tarskian

I am several orders better than you at insulting. I just don't do it. I'd rather explore new ideas instead of seeking conflict.

It is not an insult. Everytime you find yourself at a dead-end, you start crying about me poking holes in your nonsensical slop. You just keep crying about it, that is the truth. Speaking of insults, you frequently accuse me of being unemployed with zero evidence, even though by your own admission you are jobless in Southeast Asia (among the cheapest civilised places in the world).

Quoting Lionino

and might as well be wrong for next models.

Not even wrong for "next models", it is already wrong today.

By ChatGPT 3.5o:


Claude nails the image, correctly pointing out China, which is where the picture is from:



All of these are the free edition, I don't pay for any of them.

If you are going to go off-topic, at least don't be wrong about that too.

Quoting Lionino

He uses computability of 'dog' with deep learning as an example.

Yes. It points to the existing practice of using specialized engines for object recognition. Music recognition, for example, is carried out with other specialized engines.

Discrimination and classification software is a collection of specialized engines that sport a scripting interface. Computational philosophy most likely needs its own specialized engine.

A suitable engine for computational philosophy does not seem to exist at this point.

Quoting Lionino

me poking holes in your nonsensical slop

Maximum precision is a requirement when writing source code. My own source code runs like a charm.

As Linus Torvalds famously quipped, "Talk is cheap. Show me the code."

I don't know about your source code but I doubt that you actually have anything to show for.

When explaining source code, you'd better leave out technical details as much as possible. Source code looks impenetrable to the non-technical person. Hence, less is more.

What I say now, is the result of years of experience of working in a technological environment. You cannot and should not annoy stakeholders with technical details.

Concerning your approach to life, you cannot successfully write functioning source code or do anything of value actually, merely by criticizing other people. As I have asked you previously already, who exactly would want you on their team?

Quoting Lionino

even though by your own admission you are jobless in Southeast Asia

If you are really good at writing source code, sooner or later, you won't have to anymore. Successful careers in technology are actually quite short. Next, you just switch to your hobbies instead.

Seriously, do you know of any other ultra high net-worth individual who is looking for a job? I don't look for jobs. Instead, I buy the company if I am interested in it.

Quoting Lionino

you frequently accuse me of being unemployed with zero evidence

Someone who never does anything else besides criticizing others, will inevitably have serious problems hanging on to a job.

It's the same situation as with a woman who sleeps around and keeps racking up a growing body count. You just know that she cannot hang on to a husband or even a boyfriend for particularly long. You just know that she is statistically always single.

I assume that you are statistically always unemployed. If you are not right now, then you will soon be.

You both sound as if it's time to cool your boots, take a couple of days away from each other and come back without the venom present here...

Quoting Lionino

Speaking of insults, you frequently accuse me of being unemployed with zero evidence,

Quoting Tarskian

Someone who never does anything else besides criticizing others, will inevitably have serious problems hanging on to a job.

Like pottery. I am really talking to a badly programmed NPC.

In the meanwhile, it is funny moderators will leave such a post with clownish vitriol and no substance up but erase my post recommending a clearly insane person to seek medication.

Quoting Lionino

In the meanwhile, it is funny moderators will leave such a post with clownish vitriol and no substance up but erase my post recommending a clearly insane person to seek medication.

This post is not about you. It is about Godel numbering being indicative of philosophical textual content.

I haven't been able to find a converter of English to first-order logic, but now I have run into something that may reach halfway: grammar parse trees.

https://github.com/opencog/link-grammar

The CMU Link Grammar natural language parser

The Link Grammar Parser exhibits the linguistic (natural language) structure of English, Thai, Russian, Arabic, Persian and limited subsets of a half-dozen other languages. This structure is a graph of typed links (edges) between the words in a sentence.

There is still some distance to cover between this output and first-order logic/arithmetic.

I'm in the gym now but I'll look into compiling the tool later on. There's an entire page on its underlying theory on Wikipedia:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link_grammar

Quoting Lionino

One could say the crisis is still going on, as we don't know whether ZFC is free of contradictions (and perhaps never will).

I suppose it is, especially among foundations mathematicians. But I would not say it remains a crisis within the broader scope of the profession. Mostly a curiosity.

Quoting jgill

I suppose it is, especially among foundations mathematicians. But I would not say it remains a crisis within the broader scope of the profession. Mostly a curiosity.

The discipline of mathematical logic grew out of the foundational crisis:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundations_of_mathematics

This led, near the end of the 19th century, to a series of paradoxical mathematical results that challenged the general confidence in reliability and truth of mathematical results. This has been called the foundational crisis of mathematics.

The resolution of this crisis involved the rise of a new mathematical discipline called mathematical logic that includes set theory, model theory, proof theory, computability and computational complexity theory, and more recently, several parts of computer science.

Not sure if mathematical logic is just a curiosity.

Quoting Tarskian

Not sure if mathematical logic is just a curiosity

To make your point would require some sort of poll of mathematicians asking "Are the Foundations of Mathematics important to you as you pursue your explorations into your specialties?"

I'm betting most of my colleagues would say no. I think you are possibly unaware of the enormous scope of mathematical inquiries these days. Look up college catalogues of math courses and find how many have set theory prominently displayed in more than an introductory course. Here are Harvard's Offerings. M145a and M145b and M385 out of how many courses? Plus, of course some overlaps.

When I was somewhat active over 25 years ago Foundations never came up at the conferences I participated in - international groups. Except a joke or two about the continuum hypothesis.

Philosophy is what the philosophers worry about. Issues that have not been made into a science, or issues in science that have not been so systematized.

And many issues that could well never be a science. So, it's quite a lot.

Simple definitions are hard and maybe impossible (aside from math and stipulations). Not for "philosophy", but virtually every word.

Reply to Tarskian
I think that philosophy is a part of the knowledge based on facts while science is a part of the knowledge based on data.

Quoting jgill

To make your point would require some sort of poll of mathematicians asking "Are the Foundations of Mathematics important to you as you pursue your explorations into your specialties?" I'm betting most of my colleagues

Mathematics does not have direct practical applications, mostly by design so. That is often a good thing, but it also means that the academic consensus has much more weight than it would have, if there were practical applications.

This reminds me of the notorious debate between Andrew Tanenbaum and Linus Torvalds:

LINUX is obsolete (Jan 29, 1992)

Torvalds: You use this [being a professor] as an excuse for the limitations of minix? ... your job is being a professor and researcher: That's one hell of a good excuse for some of the brain-damages of minix.

Tanenbaum: Writing a new OS only for the 386 in 1991 gets you your second 'F' for this term. But if you do real well on the final exam, you can still pass the course.

In this realm, i.e. operating system research, it is the billions of users of the Android mobile phones (built on top of the Linux kernel) who give an 'F' to Andrew Tanenbaum and an 'A' to Linus Torvalds.

Tanenbaum's colleagues obviously thought the same as Tanenbaum, and all of them were completely and dead wrong.

Philosophy and mathematics are certainly interesting hobbies. Unfortunately, unlike in operating system research, there does not exist an objective meritocracy.

There's just the mutually back-patting consensus, or else meaningless grades on a collection of otherwise irrelevant tests and exams, or even the eternally back-patting citation carousel. That is why I have personally never treated and will never treat philosophy or mathematics as more than just hobbies.

Quoting Tarskian

Mathematics does not have direct practical applications, mostly by design so. That is often a good thing, but it also means that the academic consensus has much more weight than it would have, if there were practical applications

Quoting Tarskian

There's just the mutually back-patting consensus, or else meaningless grades on a collection of otherwise irrelevant tests and exams, or even the eternally back-patting citation carousel. That is why I have personally never treated and will never treat philosophy or mathematics as more than just hobbies

Your opinion has been noted. Actually, I agree with the first statement above. The second sounds a little bitter.

Quoting jgill

The second sounds a little bitter.

Well, not really. I (semi-)retired in 2017 from software engineering. Until then, I never had much time for my hobbies. Now I finally do.

Quoting Tarskian

That is why I have personally never treated and will never treat philosophy or mathematics as more than just hobbies

Understandable. Many others likewise. For the last 24 years math explorations have been a hobby for me as well.

Reply to Tarskian

Quoting Tarskian

In fact, it would also be interesting to elaborate why exactly your example sentence is not philosophical.

What if you had written: (In fact, it would also be philosophically interesting to elaborate why exactly your example sentence is not philosophical.)?

Does your definition tell us philosophy is inherently iterative?

Reply to Wayfarer

Quoting Wayfarer

...consider the implications of the term 'idiosyncratic'. Idiosyncratic means 'pertaining to a particular individual'

Do you imply that Tarskian's definition is too narrow in scope to be considered philosophical?

Reply to ucarr No, I said his definition is idiosyncratic. It doesn't mean that it's incorrect, but it is very much of his own devising, to wit:

Quoting Tarskian

philosophy is a mathematical capability of the language at hand.

Compare the orthodox definition from Brittanica for example.

I don't understand many of @Tarskians posts as they rely heavily on mathematics and symbolic logic. The gist seems to be that Godel's incompleteness theorem introduces a 'foundational crisis' in philosophy and mathematics because it indicates reality is not logical all the way down, or something like that. But I've left that to others who are more conversant with the intricacies to thrash out, as much of it is beyond me.

(Which is not to say I don't believe there is a 'crisis in philosophy' - I have on my desk Edmund Husserl's The Crisis of the European Sciences, published after his death, and composed mainly in the 1920's and 30's. It too addresses themes about the limitations of positivism, the implications of what we now call 'scientism', and the the impact of the mathematization of nature in post-galilean science etc, but it's very much broader in scope than simply consideration of the impact of Godel's incompleteness theorem.)

Reply to Wayfarer

philosophy -- the study of ideas about knowledge, truth, the nature and meaning of life, etc.

--The Britannica Dictionary

Do you agree that this definition can be paraphrased thus: philosophy -- thinking about thinking

Reply to ucarr Maybe, but it's meaningless. It conveys nothing significant.

My definition begins with the word itself: philo (love) sophia (wisdom), philo-sophia, 'love~wisdom'. What that means, how to realise it.

Quoting Wayfarer

(Which is not to say I don't believe there is a 'crisis in philosophy' - I have on my desk Edmund Husserl's The Crisis of the European Sciences, published after his death, and composed mainly in the 1920's and 30's.

I suspect there has been a crisis in philosophy since day one...

Quoting Wayfarer

My definition begins with the word itself: philo (love) sophia (wisdom), philo-sophia, 'love~wisdom'. What that means, how to realise it.

It's hard to avoid this definition, isn't it? One issue, of course, is that the notion of what counts as wisdom is a bit nebulous. I sometimes think philosophy is at war with wisdom, inasmuch as it tends to deconstruct this 'sacred' knowledge we have derived through experience, reflection and judgement.

Another problem is how do we recognise what is wise if we ourselves are not? We tend to gravitate to the philosophical ideas that match our personality and inclinations. I wonder if this mostly takes us in the wrong direction and I wonder too if true wisdom for most of us might involve staying away from philosophy.

For me, the essence of philosophy seems to lie in exploring what can be considered true about the nature of reality; even examining whether the concept of 'reality' is actually a useful term.

Reply to Tom Storm The other point I would definitely include is ‘some reference to the canonical texts of the philosophical tradition’. This thread, for instance, contains none.

Quoting Tom Storm

? We tend to gravitate to the philosophical ideas that match our personality and inclinations.

So say us moderns whose whole notion of philosophy tends towards an ego-centred outlook.

Quoting Wayfarer

The other point I would definitely include is ‘some reference to the canonical texts of the philosophical tradition’. This thread, for instance, contains none.

Yes, the tradition is important. The hard part is determining which parts to privilege and study. Just getting up to speed would take more than a lifetime and be utterly beyond the capacity of most people. And there's always the nagging feeling that there may well have been one or two thinkers along the way who might have allowed us to dispense with some of what came before them.

Reply to Tom Storm I totally get that. I now have far too many books, and always the nagging realisation of how little I know. Still, I do try and relate what I’m thinking or arguing with some touch-points in philosophy generally. Something I will call out, is the inherent tendency of moderns to ‘historical presentism’ - that what we know now, what with science being so powerful, renders much or even all of pre-modern philosophy archaic and superseded. There is an element of truth insofar as factual matters are concerned, but in respect of questions of meaning and the nature of lived existence, the border isn’t at all clear-cut.

Quoting Wayfarer

The other point I would definitely include is ‘some reference to the canonical texts of the philosophical tradition’. This thread, for instance, contains none.

There are entire areas in philosophy that are dominant elsewhere but will never get mentioned in a philosophy department.

For example:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_philosophy

Unix philosophy

The Unix philosophy, originated by Ken Thompson, is a set of cultural norms and philosophical approaches to minimalist, modular software development. It is based on the experience of leading developers of the Unix operating system.

There is nothing wrong with 2500-year-old texts.

However, there is a lot more philosophy than that. Philosophy did not stop with Aristotle.

Depending on your background, you will be more influenced by different texts, simply because in your own environment, they are mentioned more often.

Furthermore, philosophy often emerges out of the confrontation with existing practice. New questions will lead to new philosophical considerations.

We simply do not live in antiquity anymore. Some of the ancient findings are still relevant. A lot of it, is not.

It is naive to believe that by merely studying the old masters, you will be able to make a relevant contribution to the world of philosophy as it exists today. Instead, you will find yourself mostly divorced from the contemporary discourse.

Quoting Tarskian

It is naive to believe that by merely studying the old masters, you will be able to make a relevant contribution to the world of philosophy as it exists today. Instead, you will find yourself mostly divorced from the contemporary discourse.

Quoting Wayfarer

Something I will call out, is the inherent tendency of moderns to ‘historical presentism’ - that what we know now, what with science being so powerful, renders much or even all of pre-modern philosophy archaic and superseded. There is an element of truth insofar as factual matters are concerned, but in respect of questions of meaning and the nature of lived existence, the border isn’t at all clear-cut.

.

And by the philosophical canon I don’t just mean ancient philosophy, there are many interesting current philosophers.

Accountancy companies and engineering firms might have philosophies concerning how they do business but that doesn’t necessarily mean they have wider application outside their spheres.

Quoting Wayfarer

Accountancy companies and engineering firms might have philosophies concerning how they do business but that doesn’t necessarily mean they have wider application outside their spheres.

Aristotle wrote interesting things which were essentially about recursive algorithms. If an algorithm f(n) has two parts:

func f(n)

{

           part1(n);

           part2(n);

}

If part2(n) is recursive, i.e. it contains a reference to f(n-1), and if the algorithm eventually halts, then part1(n) necessarily contains a termination clause:

if n=n0 then return f0;

Aristotle used this argument two times in his publications. One time in "Posterior Analytics" to argue why foundationalism is inevitable and another time in "Metaphysics" when arguing why he believes there must be an unmoved mover, i.e. a universal initial cause.

The next time after Aristotle that someone successfully used a partial function to prove anything, was when Alan Turing used it in 1936 for the formalization of his halting problem. (Turing didn't call the problem as such but it is under that name that it started circulating).

Anybody in between? Not so much, I guess.

I don't know if Aristotle has written anything about accounting or engineering, but he certainly has about recursive algorithms.

Quoting Wayfarer

And by the philosophical canon I don’t just mean ancient philosophy, there are many interesting current philosophers.

Possibly.

However, it is unfortunately not clear to me which one of them would be remarkable.

For example, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a long-winding text that rarely commits to anything actionable, but when it very occasionally does, it turns out to be wrong.

For example, according to Kant, the natural numbers and arithmetic would not be an axiomatic theory. Kant argued that numbers would originate in intuition and not be analytic a priori. Later on, Peano and Dedekind published a perfectly viable axiomatic take on arithmetic and the natural numbers. Frege also pointed out that Kant was fundamentally misguided about the natural numbers and arithmetic.

Writing a word salad is easy. Successfully arguing a point by using partial functions, is hard. Unlike what many philosophers think, I consider Aristotle and Kant to be in different leagues. Aristotle did something difficult to do. Kant did not.

Quoting Tarskian

The definition that I propose, is actually not particularly new. It is quite close to thinking about thinking:

Overgaard, Gilbert & Burwood 2013, pp. 36–37, 43, What Is Philosophy?
Nuttall 2013, p. 12, 1. The Nature of Philosophy

Me if I abused philosophical literature, searched for the first thing that somewhat agreed with my sophomoric redefinition, didn't read the rest, and decided to quote it even though the person being quoted would disagree with me.

Quoting Tarskian

"Thinking about thinking" and "statements about other statements" are notions that are very close to each other.

Yet they are not the same thing at all.

Quoting Tarskian

That is why I have personally never treated and will never treat philosophy or mathematics as more than just hobbies.

Of course, you can't do either of them at all.

Quoting Tarskian

Kant did not.

Now you pretend to know Kant, rich :lol:

Quoting Wayfarer

The other point I would definitely include is ‘some reference to the canonical texts of the philosophical tradition’. This thread, for instance, contains none.

Quoting Tom Storm

Yes, the tradition is important. The hard part is determining which parts to privilege and study.

That is indeed a big problem. In practice, you will find yourself looking at the philosophical canon. Those books will at least make it much easier to talk to other philosophers.

The concept may be unfamiliar, so here is a reasonably authoritative explanation:-
[quote=Canon and Classic | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Literature]
The literary canon, theorists contend, is a selection of reputable works that abstracts their value for specific purposes: to safeguard them from neglect or censure, reproduce social and institutional values, maintain them as exemplary in the formation of personal or communal identities, or objectify and enshrine standards of judgment. .... The discourse of canonicity thus relies on an economy of belief about the possibility and validity of agreement about literary value. Within this economy, the canon, in whichever composition, is both the evidence and the outcome of agreement, without which value would seemingly become entirely speculative. ..... A work may be treated as a reference point, a familiar and influential text whose contribution to culture is measured relative to one context. [/quote]
The link is here

Quoting Tom Storm

And there's always the nagging feeling that there may well have been one or two thinkers along the way who might have allowed us to dispense with some of what came before them.

Oh, that is a big problem, which is exacerbated by the academic idea that you have to read everything in order to understand anything. In practice, people read the stuff that the people they are talking to read. Going beyond that is pretty much a question of happenstance (or, these days, what comes up in the first page or two of a web search). But that's all right. Sometimes, you find something new and interesting.

Quoting Tarskian

It is naïve to believe that by merely studying the old masters, you will be able to make a relevant contribution to the world of philosophy as it exists today. Instead, you will find yourself mostly divorced from the contemporary discourse.

That opinion depends on which parts of contemporary discourse you happen to be reading. There is a good deal of contemporary discourse about a good many of the old masters. Collectively, they set the context of contemporary discussion. Every few years, someone comes along who thinks they have overturned everything that went before. Its part of the tradition. It never works. At best, the revolutionaries add a new strand to the complex web that we know and, sometimes, love.

Quoting Tarskian

For example, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a long-winding text that rarely commits to anything actionable, but when it very occasionally does, it turns out to be wrong.

Of course he gets things wrong. Everyone gets things wrong. But Kant gets thing wrong in interesting ways. That's what keeps philosophy going.

Quoting Tarskian

That is why I have personally never treated and will never treat philosophy or mathematics as more than just hobbies.

Simple definitions. Work is what you have to do. Hobbies are what make life worth living.

Quoting Lionino

Me if I abused philosophical literature, searched for the first thing that somewhat agreed with my sophomoric redefinition, didn't read the rest, and decided to quote it even though the person being quoted would disagree with me.

Here we go again.

Have you found a job already? Or are you going to keep living off your mother's welfare benefits?

Quoting Lionino

Of course, you can't do either of them at all.

Is there anything that you can do, that someone else is willing to pay for?

Philosophy and the philosophy of mathematics are not objective meritocracies. That is a massive drawback. It fails to expose people -- whose only contribution is to shit talk other people -- for what they truly are.

By the way, I have heard that Starbucks is hiring in your area.

Quoting Tarskian

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a long-winding text that rarely commits to anything actionable, but when it very occasionally does, it turns out to be wrong.

That text figures in many a list of great philosophical books and is also particularly relevant in our day. While I perfectly agree that Kant’s writing is voluminous and extremely difficult, I don’t believe he can be dismissed so easily. Furthermore I’m sure many who dismiss him fail to grasp the significance of that work.

Quoting Tarskian

Successfully arguing a point by using partial functions, is hard

:chin: You seem to me to be highly trained in a specific subject area but much of what you say is impenetrable to others not so trained.

Reply to Ludwig V :ok:

In 10 days this thread has produced 4 pages of back-and-forth discussion. So, there is action, reaction, interaction. If some read the thread and do not choose to participate and then those that do not read it at all provide another thing, inaction.

There are always only three ways to examine something/express something. But these three ways when combined in percentages allow an infinity of ways to examine something/express something.

The penchant here on these forums and elsewhere these days relies upon one of the three ways overmuch. That is the way of fear. The way of fear is responsible for all order in reality. All structure, all limits, all connection (speaks again to structure really), all observation and awareness, all thought, is all just and only fear. The world of the Noosphere (Vladimir Vernadsky / Ken Wilber) is all only fear.

When you use symbolism, symbolic logic, logic, any thought really, you are enacting and manifesting fear.

Of course no manifestation within reality is truly isolated in emotive content. That means besides fear and its rather pure manifestations like structure and thought, we have ... two ... other emotions.

These are desire and anger.

The core tension of all reality is only and always the interaction between these three emotions, which I refer to as primal emotions. There is nothing else in existence. But the three primal emotions, again, fear, anger, and desire, together are the system, reality, ... and the term most often and appropriately used for this union, ... love. You can call it God if you like, or fate, or nature. Blah blah blah. It's all the same thing, everything, and all only and always fear, anger, and desire and their interactions.

Fear, as mentioned is order and logic and academics and certainly especially philosophers tend to gravitate towards fear and thought as their holy tool. But this is a rank failure in philosophy. It SHOULD be obvious why this is clearly true, but alas, logic is a prison, and that includes logic itself as the thing imprisoned. Rules, rules, rules ... order .. hierarchy ... structure. Yawn.

What of desire and anger then?

YOUR types in general, apologies to those that do bridge the gaps, seem bound (intentional word) and determined (Intentional word) {both words are fear words clearly associated with hierarchy and limits} to fail in regular and predictable ways. Again, this is NOT philosophy, but a caricature of that fine effort only. The greats of the field, even if prone to such failures, will mention and partake in healthy doubt (proper fear) of this foolish order-centric Pragmatism.

All Pragmatism is the base philosophy of fear and thus, on its own an obvious failure as well.

So, again, and repeatedly, what of desire and anger?

Well the short answer is they are the EQUAL, precisely equal (order) emotions to fear. Any wise philosophy must perforce include them and indeed, my contention, as EQUALS.

Desire is the classical enemy and balancing force to fear. You will notice that although I speak in plain English using relatively easy to digest words instead of arcane academic formulas, there is still an equation, and a balance mentioned and upheld as meaningful and true. If you choose to be offended by this approach and ignore its actually rather obvious veracity, well, it can be true that the gilded cage of Pragmatism is pretty and a 'safe' bet. But, 'safe' is in quotes and appropriately so. It is and always will be a cop-out, the Pragmatic 'short-cut' to truth and being. This is just the way of fear, the way of cowards.

Cowardice is indeed the core sin or failing of fear and order. The betting man's game says cop-out things like 'We are only human! You can't expect perfection'. In underscoring the 'impossibility' of perfection, pragmatism will point to any number of logical short-cuts and in facts will often sacrifice wisdom and all that is GOOD, in the name of mere cowardly efficiency. Continue this over-anxious path at your peril and certainly amid failure to understand wisdom.

So, desire.

Desire is chaos, the opposite of order. Another synonym is freedom. If you believe freedom is only GOOD, what a trivially false belief that would be. No, desire alone is as foolish as Pragmatism and ONLY equally so. The Pragmatist would scoff at this and prefer order to chaos, a la so many such ... men (usually). One example whom I dearly love yet fails this way often enough, Jordan Peterson. Most classical philosophy by far falls into the trap of order (and is also male by the way). Cowards, at least in leaning is my accusation.

Desire is the source of idealism. Alone, like to Pragmatism, it is silly, ridiculous immoral failure. Self-indulgence is the core sin of desire.

The concept of separation from all is a fear thing, the structure of a thing apart as identity. This permeates all reality from the smallest quanta to ourselves, humanity, who, as far as we know, are the highest quality moral agents in the universe. Notice how the one immoral failure begats another. The foolishness of separation, a coward's fear of being unequal to ALL, also then causes the will to freedom, self-indulgent specific desire (immoral).

So, let's BEGIN to segue this long post towards the OP. A 'simple' definition for philosophy. And I completely realize that I have not yet discussed anger. That is intentional as is all of this post.

What is wrong with, 'A love of wisdom' ? Is that too simple somehow? Or really too complex? Clearly, it is both. We simply do not understand how complexity is defined by simplicity and vice versa. And when some ... philosopher ... comes along and starts saying things like 'there are only three emotions' or 'love is only fear, anger, and desire; combined' everyone gets mad at the simplicity stated and the complexity implied.

I rather like 'A love of wisdom'. But, then of course we are left defining what wisdom is. Oh bother. You will find this simple complexity is unavoidable in all things and no fear-only formula can withstand it. All three emotions MUST be present and in equal measure. But equality alone is not enough. There is another factor and that is amplitude. Something happens when we increase fear, anger, and desire.

That something is actually ... the GOOD. Or let's be clearer and say the potential for the GOOD. So, the GOOD to me (and I all cap it to show its difference from the colloquial nonsense term 'good' which is usually corrupted by immorality to mean 'what i want' or 'what we think is right right now'. The GOOD is actual perfection, objective moral truth. Although it is impossible to arrive at it, it is the only proper aim in all cases.

Why is wisdom so elusive?

People are easily far more fearful or angry as individuals than they are wise. They are mostly NOT in balance, NOT wise. Some of the most concerned with so-called philosophy, which SHOULD be the love of wisdom, is deeply skewed to academic Pragmatism and thus precisely unwise. Likewise, must of common culture is a pig sty wallow of self-serving blather, feckless self-indulgence at its worst and again, especially these days, hidden behind a wall of pretty propped up virtue signaling, as opposed to actual virtue.

The common polarities in life are almost all just fear vs desire. The right and left wing are the nominal example. Pragmatism/Idealism is another.

But wisdom shows us the failure of even that balance. And the reason is the much misunderstood truth of anger, of balance.

Anger is the emotion of balance. It denies fear and desire and in equal measure. This tension of anger, caused by anger, literally CAUSES everything we call reality to exist. The empty prisons of order are meaningless though without instantiation. Imagination and desire has no object, no existence and floats in all directions (chaos) without the instantiation of BEING. Mass itself is caused by anger, the action of the emotion of anger on both fear and desire.

You WILL NOT be engaged in philosophy well and properly until you grasp some aspect of these truths. I DO NOT claim to know anything, only to believe some things more than others. But that is my belief. Most academic prison builders (order bound) would do well to engage more desire and add and accept chaos in their systems of thought. This acceptance of the enemy of fear, the enemy of order, desire, chaos, is REQUIRED for the final truth of order to emerge. That is that the order DOES include that chaos and it MUST be accounted for as an equal.

Finally, there is the question, why the dichotomy? Why not a trichotomy? It is a trichotomy is the answer. But the Pragmatists and the Idealists alike team up to denigrate anger (being). They deny truth wholesale to shrink in fear and imprison themselves. They deny truth wholesale to remain open immorally to self-indulgence. And the amplitude of their anger is weak. This is the sin of moderation. Perfection IS NOT at peace with vapid empty moderation at all.

Moderation exposes at last the core failure of anger. That is: 'don't get angry! don't get violent! Be calm! Seek peace! Cum for us and take your place and its spoils in the order of things!' Men of Athens! I beseech you, peace is delusional and not a wise or valid goal. The moral truth of anger is effort, the suffering of being. As such the amplitude of anger is the amplitude of effort. The moral man DOES NOT seek ease but instead increasing suffering to earn more wisdom. Conflict is the core means of approaching effort.

The truth and perfection are ALWAYS harder and harder to increase. If you find an easy way, by definition you are failing. If it seems easily at first to be a preferred or practical path, then BY DEFINITION you are failing. The truth of anger shows us that eternal conflict and increasing effort is wise. Deal with it!

Quoting Ludwig V

Every few years, someone comes along who thinks they have overturned everything that went before. Its part of the tradition. It never works.

Quite a bit of philosophy from antiquity is still perfectly valid. I don't believe that it will ever be overturned.

But then again, the environment has changed since antiquity. People's cognitive reactions will reflect that. Philosophy will therefore reflect that. The effects of changes in the environment will inevitably make their way into philosophy. Of course, it still won't overturn everything that went before.

The better starting point is not necessarily the classics.

For example, Karl Popper's seminal text "Science as falsification", is largely a reflection on the conversations with his friends who were admirers of Marx, Freud, and Adler, and what was wrong with these theories. The result is nothing less than the dominant modern take on the epistemology of science.

I don't know if Popper overturned everything that went before. Was there even anything that went before, so to speak of?

Quoting Tarskian

The better starting point is not necessarily the classics.

Well, you seem to be accepting that the classics (or at least some of them) are a starting-point.

For me, the best starting-point is whatever turns you on, or annoys but haunts you - classic or not. It doesn't matter. Once you start philosophizing you will need to engage with other philosophers. It won't be long before talking to them will drive you to something that is canonical, because those are the reference points of the discussion - even if they are wrong - no, that's wrong - especially when they are wrong.

Quoting Tarskian

I don't know if Popper overturned everything that went before. Was there even anything that went before, so to speak of?

So when you cite Popper, you do not think that his text is a classic. But what you say about it tells me that you think it is a classic, or at least ought to be a classic.
But that argument doesn't show that history is unimportant, even if it is bunk. He was writing in the immediate context of his contemporaries - Marx, Adler and Freud. But they were writing in their historical context (though how far it was philosophical I do not know) and in his own wider context of what passed for the philosophy of science in his day, especially Hume's account of induction and ideas about logic and proof - again, I don't know exactly what his reference points were, but I'm quite sure he had some.
He undoubtedly was the originator of new ideas about science. Many people have criticized or amended them since he wrote - and I'm sure that there will be a continuing thread of writing about him - though you can never tell. Certainly, for many people he is canonical, including, I think, you.