The Nature of Causality and Modality
Please forgive if you have a quizzical look after reading the title of the OP.
This thread will mainly focus on two aspects of nature. One being the nature of modality, and the other the nature of how events happen as they do. Now, it seems extremely important to the field of science and physics, that we have an accurate grasp on the nature of causality. I say this because in the earlier days of science and physics, the community of scientists were occupied with the Newtonian view of physics of there being an order to everything astronomical. This order was postulated by even philosophers like Schopenhauer in his Principle of Sufficient Reason, stating that for every event there is a preceding cause to that event, even in a strictly deterministic manner. Fast-forward to the 20-21'st century, and we seem more concerned with probabilities and statistical likelihoods, as per the field of quantum mechanics.
Returning back to the question of how the nature of causality works, what are the leading theories of causality, nowadays? I ask because if indeterminism is at hand and how intuition grapples with indeterminism, then are we at a limit of how to interpret nature? If the preceding is true, then where do we go on from here?
Returning to the second question, about modality, which I raise due to being influenced by possible world semantics, then how does one reconcile the nature of possibility within causality within the world? Specifically, if modality exists within the world, then on what does it manifest itself in? It would seem that there are certain aspects of nature that are hard to define other than existing in part according to a unitary evolving value which has potentiality to manifest in different ways, yet one would find it hard to define. To put this in simple terms, how or why does modality exist?
Thanks for any insights or thoughts.
This thread will mainly focus on two aspects of nature. One being the nature of modality, and the other the nature of how events happen as they do. Now, it seems extremely important to the field of science and physics, that we have an accurate grasp on the nature of causality. I say this because in the earlier days of science and physics, the community of scientists were occupied with the Newtonian view of physics of there being an order to everything astronomical. This order was postulated by even philosophers like Schopenhauer in his Principle of Sufficient Reason, stating that for every event there is a preceding cause to that event, even in a strictly deterministic manner. Fast-forward to the 20-21'st century, and we seem more concerned with probabilities and statistical likelihoods, as per the field of quantum mechanics.
Returning back to the question of how the nature of causality works, what are the leading theories of causality, nowadays? I ask because if indeterminism is at hand and how intuition grapples with indeterminism, then are we at a limit of how to interpret nature? If the preceding is true, then where do we go on from here?
Returning to the second question, about modality, which I raise due to being influenced by possible world semantics, then how does one reconcile the nature of possibility within causality within the world? Specifically, if modality exists within the world, then on what does it manifest itself in? It would seem that there are certain aspects of nature that are hard to define other than existing in part according to a unitary evolving value which has potentiality to manifest in different ways, yet one would find it hard to define. To put this in simple terms, how or why does modality exist?
Thanks for any insights or thoughts.
Comments (42)
Quoting Shawn
We are still occupied with the Newtonian view of reality -- not just physics, but the Newtonian causality. We might not be using the name 'Newtonian' because it is old-timey, but we are very much committed to causality, which is, in fact, Newtonian.
The probabilities and statistical likelihood -- our propensity to predict the trends and progressions of things -- has been made stronger because of our commitment to causality. They are actually connected, not at odds with each other.
Quoting Shawn
The same theories laid down by Descartes, Aristotle, Hume, Whitehead, and others.
We get lost in the new terminologies or modern names that we forget we are still using their theories.
Quoting Shawn
We could only really talk about nondeterminism if we've already been made aware of causation. That's why, babies, of course, cannot talk about nondeterminism. Children have no business talking about nondeterminism.
With causation, we are at a limit of how we interpret nature. Our lived experience is bound by space and time.
Quoting Shawn
Very good question. Our perception shapes what we think of possibilities. It's been explored by metaphysicians that the quality of what we think of possibilities relies on the quality of our causal experience. Here we know that modalities are not in the world, but are actually the deliberative thought caused by our experience. There are futures to pursue based on what we know at the present. We perform the elimination process -- not everything is possible as we say.
Indeterminism can be true and also merely relative. The full weirdness of "the quantum realm" is never observed, as at every point since the Big Bang, it has been thermally decohered to one degree or another. The weirdness has been constrained towards its classical limit by the Universe becoming a history of past thermal events.
The future is open. But only to the degree that its possibilities haven't already been dissipated in an asymptotically expanding and cooling void. Or what is called the growing block universe model of time.
So yes, indeterminism is a thing. Nonlocality is the new realism. But it is also pretty undramatic when it comes to our practical descriptions of Nature at the level which we typically experience it the everyday scale of an ontology of "medium-sized dry goods". For all practical purposes, chairs and tables function like the fully determinate objects of classical physics and classical logic.
There is no crisis of contradicting paradigms. Reality runs its gamut from scales where the Cosmos is almost completely undetermined as in the Big Bang to scales where it is as thermally decohered and determinate for the difference not to matter a damn. In our everyday world with its everyday notions of causality.
Yes, I believe Leibnitz was actually more in correspondence with how the world works according to possibilities and his monadology than Newton. Leibnitz all the way.
Quoting L'éléphant
I think that through being within the very system that created us, that we can take a look at ourselves and the world to deduce how things fit together in the way the system works. That's why I don't believe that we are incapable to find out these relations between induction, deduction, abduction, and causality.
There are other ways of looking at reality other than the classical Newtonian thermodynamic paradigm. I'm still surprised it has lasted for so long until the modern era. The only cherry on the cake, is what Newton might have alluded to in terms of entropy.
Relativity is also classical. Theories get quantum once they have to include Plancks constant h in their mechanistic equations. That inserts the indeterminacy into the models.
For me, the (deductive) inferential theory of causation seems the most elegant. It says that the structure of our spatio-temporal world contains regularities in the distribution of matter in spacetime called laws of physics, and that the distribution of matter in space at time t logically follows (i.e. can be deduced/computed) from the distribution of matter in space at an earlier time t-1 and from the laws of physics. The distribution of matter at time t can be called "consequences" and the distribution of matter at time t-1 can be called "causes". In this spatio-temporal structure of the world it is also possible to deduce causes from the consequences and the laws of physics; the crucial difference between causes and consequences is that causes exist at an earlier time than their consequences, so there must be an asymmetry in the time dimension of spacetime, the so-called "arrow of time", which differentiates between "earlier" and "later" moments on the time dimension. The prevailing explanation of this time asymmetry seems to be that the direction of time from the past to the future is identical with the direction of the increase of spatial entropy (disorder) of matter along the time dimension, which is in agreement with the second law of thermodynamics.
Quoting Shawn
Quantum mechanics shows that the spatio-temporal structure of our world is not as deterministic as I have just described above. Which means that the spatial distribution of matter at time t does not logically follow (cannot be deduced/computed) from the spatial distribution of matter at time t-1 and from the laws of physics. The spatio-temporal regularities in the distribution of matter in spacetime are not strong enough for the logical entailment that is necessary for causality. Still, there are weaker regularities that enable at least the deduction of probabilities of spatial distribution of matter at time t from spatial distribution of matter at time t-1 and from the laws of physics. We could say that causality in the quantum-mechanical world is weakened.
Quoting Shawn
I see no difference between logical consistency and existence so I think that all logical possibilities exist in reality (modal realism). This leads to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics where all possible outcomes of a measurement are realized in different worlds that are apparently causally disconnected. In the macroscopic world where we can neglect quantum indeterminism, our imaginations that our world could have different futures stem from limitations of our knowlege. Those imaginations may be accurate with respect to other possible worlds though.
I don't think you need to consider the quantum realm to find indeterminism. Reality is equally indeterminate at classical scales. People have been arguing about it for centuries.
Or then we could dispense with the idea of causation completely except at scales where we humans live. If I punch you in the face and your nose bleeds, I caused the bleeding.
You would not be the sole cause though. For example, planet Earth would participate in the causality too. If planet Earth didn't exist you would not be able to stand here, let alone punch anything. But we take it for granted, so we don't mention it.
Agreed, and that's one of the arguments against causation. From the perspective you describe, every event has an almost infinite number of causes. If my father hadn't met my mother on a train from New York City to New Haven in 1948, I would never have been born. Did my father's decision to take the 3:17 train instead of the 5:42 cause my birth? When a billiard ball strikes another, is the cause me, the pool cue, the tree that provided the wood for the cue, the elastic nature of the ball, the intermolecular forces that transmit the force between the balls, the fact that my girlfriend had to call off our date so I decided to go to the pool hall instead, my father's decision to take the 3:17 instead of the 5:42...?
Ok, I didn't know this is used as an argument against causation. Of course in our life as humans we single out a particular cause or a small number of causes that are useful to us and help us navigate the world. Even in physics we usually don't need to consider the whole universe when predicting the future but only focus on those causes that have a significant impact on the matter at hand.
I think this issue highlights the fact that few events have a single important cause that we can isolate from the background rough and tumble of the world we live in at all scales.
It is of course everywhere scaled by h as a constant. But here on Earth, at its average 20 degrees, with its complex planetary materiality, you can say that the nanoscale is the effective semi-classical transition zone between the quantum and the classical.
Biophysicists and chip manufacturers have to take the quantum aspects of biology and electronic circuits seriously. Biologists and car manufacturers not so much.
I'm having a hard time discerning the observer effect in QM with the MWI. Specifically, I can give an example. If one were to play the lottery in a world, then what determinant makes you the winner out of all the losses that are possible. One thing that one can deduce is consistent histories. But, even in simpler terms if all possible outcomes are realized, and the determinism of the MWI is applied, then where does this leave the uncertainty principle in any reference frame?
Thanks.
You are conflating the words "possible" and "potentiality" in physics. There is no hard currency for possibilities except what we imagine them to be -- no measurements required. We are allowed to think of possibilities, but there are restrictions for potentiality. What I think you wanted to say is potentiality. This has skin in the game.
MWI interpretation is not deterministic in the sense that in a parallel world later events logically follow from earlier events and from the laws of physics. This lack of logical entailment means that we cannot predict (with 100% certainty) the future of our world. Yes, we can predict that all possible outcomes happen in various parallel worlds but we don't know which of those worlds is ours. This is our so-called self-locating uncertainty.
By "possibility" I mean logical consistency, that is an object that is logically consistently defined in relations to all other possible (logically consistently defined) objects. How would you determine which of those objects are merely possible and which are real? Yes, some of those objects may be just in your mind and others out in the street. But your mind, including its contents, is part of reality too, part of everything that exists. So I say that all possible objects exist, in the way in which they are defined.
The most popular according to philsurveys 2020 is counterfactual/difference-making, but process and primitive are quite popular too.
I am more of a fan of singularist/physicalist theories.
Theories of relation or properties do not hold that they have a being. They could only be present if objects of contemplation exist. Hence, they are not existent the way humans exist. 'Possible' is a relation or a property, not a thing or object.
Relata cannot exist without their relations and relations cannot exist without their relata. Relata and relations are inseparable, and I don't see why one would be ontologically prior to the other.
Moreover, a possible object is consistently defined not only in its relations to other objects but also in relation to itself (if identity is a relation at all). If an object is identical to itself then it is a logically consistent object and thus exists. It is then also consistently related to all other objects because relations between objects are derived from the objects' identities, just as the objects' identities are derived from relations between them. All relations are similarity relations (they constitute the similarity of their relata) because they are derived from the (same and different) properties of their relata, just as the properties of the relata are derived from similarity relations between the relata.
I would be inclined to hold this same view, the problem is, I see it as a circular response to ontology. Not to mention that it is ignoring the fact that it is our own perceptual interpretation why we see an 'apple' and not some collection of atoms.
As children, surely we didn't mean by the question, "What's this?" that we were asking about the elemental or atomic composition of the apple. What we wanted to know is what kind of fruit is it? And now we have this thing called 'fruit' with relational properties to the apple.
If I am reading a 'book' it is because we have a prior knowledge of what a book is -- how to write a book, the author, the subject matter, and its format (hard or soft-bound printed on paper in some language). I could use it as a door stop, probably effectively, but a book is not intended to be used as a door stop. So, our conception of a book is that it contains a subject matter written in depth, in a language we can understand, in a format that required printing and binding. But let's suppose some strange population of beings see it as a good building material. So, then what happens to the relational properties of the book?
Circularity doesn't bother me in ontology, it's like in mathematics where all mathematical objects are consistently interrelated and all of them exist necessarily, so they are all on the same ontological footing. I actually think that mathematics, with its concretization in set theory, is a comprehensive elaboration of logic, of the logical structure of reality.
Quoting L'éléphant
In addition to relations there are also non-relations, and particular (as opposed to universal) non-relations are collections. A collection is a non-relation that has part-whole relations to other objects that are its parts. Of course, a collection also has relations to all other objects (that are not its parts). A collection can be empty, which is an object with no parts, or non-empty, which is an object that has parts.
Quoting L'éléphant
But that doesn't mean that relations don't exist, if that's what you were getting at. It also doesn't mean that when we make sense of an object by its relations to other objects that those other objects don't exist.
You are using 'exist' loosely here and out of touch of philosophical scrutiny.
Statistics are based on causality. Without causality, there is no reason and no limitations. What you might be confusing with anti-causality is 'limits on knowledge', specifically in regards to measurment. Statistics and probabilities are all based on limited knowledge. Take a classic coin flip for example. When the coin is flipped, the outcome is determined by the sum of the forces on it. However, we can't know all of those forces due to a lack of measurement. But what we've found is that a small variability in force can greatly affect the outcome. What we know is that few people have the capability to flip a coin with the exact precision and force to have it land on the same side every time. So we assume an average of variability from what we do know, and determine that its a 50% chance for the coin to land on either side.
To the broader question of modality or 'the nature of necessity', it is still held that forces always work in the same way. So if an electron is traveling with a particular set of forces that we could measure, the outcome would always be the same. People confuse quantum mechanics math with the idea that an electron is magically indeterminate. No, our lack of measurement and knowledge mean we have to use probability and indeterminate math to have any chance of approximating the electrons outcome. But underlying it all, the assumption that the forces of the world work deterministically is still held by modern science.
According to ontic structural realism, relations are the only things that exist. I am not so extreme though, I just think that relations and non-relations cannot exist without each other and neither is ontologically prior or more fundamental.
So let's assume that object X is consistently defined by its relations to all other objects. How can you tell whether object X is real or merely possible? What is the difference between a real object X and a merely possible object X?
Since 'possible' objects are derived from our causal experience -- we wouldn't be able to imagine an object without the exposure to actual objects (if you want to challenge this claim, think of the actual findings about people who have no depth perception or their depth perception is skewed because they were limited in their mobility and touch) -- causal experience is prior to your imagining what's possible.
Without causal experience, a baby would not survive as there wouldn't be an actual sensation of food, of human touch, sound etc. The fact that you no longer remember how you'd survived up to this point with your thoughts intact is no excuse to inquire about what's real and what's possible. You had experienced the real -- you are welcome to deny it -- but you can't hide it.
Quoting litewave
Rubbish! Relations are our perceptual interpretation of the causal experience. Mutation is nature's way of saying that things do not have to follow the 'relations' at all times.
So what is the difference between a logically consistent object and a real object? Can you imagine that?
Quoting L'éléphant
What do you mean by 'following relations'? Different things have different relations.
In the words of a realist, we could all be totally ignorant and illogical all we want, but the universe would be here.
Quoting litewave
And same things viewed under ordinary observation could have different relations viewed under quantum existence.
I asked you whether you can imagine a difference between a logically consistent object and a real object. Are you saying that if you were totally ignorant and illogical you could imagine such a difference?
Quoting L'éléphant
So what? Two things viewed from a distance could seem the same but when viewed more closely we would see them as different. I am talking about things and relations in the ontological (existential) sense, not in the epistemical sense.
I can imagine a logically consistent object and a real object.
If I were totally ignorant and illogical, I could still imagine such a difference. For the order of things in my mind during my 'illogical' tenure would be uniformly applied to the objects in front of me.
If I were ignorant, I could still imagine such a difference. I imagine myself, no? I am a consistent object and a real object at once.
Quoting litewave
And here you are even more out of line for asking the ontological nature of relations. Relations are our perceptual interpretation of the tangible objects. And I say 'tangible' as a rule, for gravity is invisible and not readily available to us, except that we, the objects, do not readily float at will because something is keeping us grounded. There is no instance where you yourself have understood relations except in situations where there is at least one physical object as an element in your analysis.
And what is the difference between them? I can't imagine the difference.
Perhaps one object is only logically coherent, but not metaphysically possible in any possible world?
Such as infinitely tall unicycle. Not logically contradictory, but not metaphysically possible. Or the existence of literally only one thing. That's not a logically incoherent notion, but I don't think there can exist literally only one thing because I believe for something to exist it must causally interact with something else as either an agent or a patient.
But what is the difference between logical and metaphysical possibility?
Quoting Bodhy
If such a unicycle is logically possible why is it not metaphysically possible? I guess it is not metaphysically possible in our world but that also means that it is not logically possible in our world either, because it is not logically consistent with the laws of physics in our world. But it might be possible (logically and metaphysically) in some other world.
Quoting Bodhy
Well, it is, because the existence of only one thing is a property of the content of another thing - a thing that contains only one thing.
A real object is prior to you giving a reason for its existence. It does not have to have a reason to exist. It just is. Water is not meant to be logical -- just liquid.
A logically consistent object could not exist without the perceptual evaluation of humans. It must conform to the coherence and epistemic requirements of rational beings. Note again that animals do not need this approval.
Here is a summary: real objects are discovered. Logically consistent objects are invented.
But it must be logically consistent too, otherwise it wouldn't exist. Logically inconsistent water cannot exist, for example water that is not water, or water in a glass that is not in a glass. And that is irrespective of the evaluation of any humans.
Logical possibility just means it can be stated in a way that doesn't violate an axiom of logic, but metaphysical possibility requires there is a possible world where such a thing can really exist.
A mile high unicycle is not incoherent, but it's not metaphysically possible because of the impossibility of an actually existing infinite set of things. So it is definitely possible for something to be logically coherent but not existentially possible.
And on the only one existing thing idea, what you might be suggesting is that the existence of a thing implies the set of existing things albeit with only one member, so a thing existing presumes the set existing.
But do sets exist? That's an unresolved metaphysical debate. So I don't think it's incoherent to claim only one thing exists, despite its metaphysical impossibility.
And for me a possible world is a logically consistent one, so I see no difference between metaphysical and logical possibility.
Quoting Bodhy
A mile high unicycle would be logically inconsistent in a world whose structure, including laws of physics, is logically inconsistent with a mile high unicycle. For example, if there was a world in the shape of a cube whose side is 10 yards, it would be logically inconsistent for a mile high unicycle to exist in such a world. I see no problem in the existence of actual infinity. Maybe it doesn't exist in our world but it may exist in a different one.
Quoting Bodhy
Sets are collections. When there are some things, they are automatically the content of a collection (unless the collection is logically inconsistent, for example there is no set of all sets that are not members of themselves). In a special case, the content can be just one thing. In yet another special case, an empty collection has no content; it is a collection that has the property of having no content; in other words it is a non-composite thing. That is also the reason why there can't be absolute nothingness - nothingness is absence of content, absence of content is the property of an empty collection, and an empty collection is something, a non-composite thing.
Quoting Shawn
IMO, the most plausible account of causality is law realism:
where a and b are particulars: a causes b iff there is a law such that Type(a) necessarily causes Type(b).
Stated differently: laws are relations between universals.
Regarding quantum indeterminacy, this would be expressed as a probabilistic law:
Type(a) necessarily causes (a probability distribution).
Probabilistic causation accounts for ontological contingency in the world. Ontological contingency grounds statements about what is possible (i.e. modality).