AthenaSeptember 03, 2024 at 14:2513450 views1366 comments
Coming from the math thread. Do animals have rational thinking? Do animals have communication skills? Is intuitive thinking rational or maybe something better?
Comments (1366)
Jack CumminsSeptember 03, 2024 at 15:05#9297860 likes
Reply to Athena
It is likely that animals have some kind of underlying grasp of concepts although it may be different from human beings, especially as it does not involve language.
Of course, it is not possible to grasp the experience of animals' mental states fully, but it does seem that communication is of a sophisticated level. There may be varying degrees, and my recent jokey question is do bed bugs have consciousness? They seem to have a strong instinctual will towards survival. It may come down to the varying degrees of evolution of consciousness in the various kingdoms, ranging from mineral, vegetable, animal and humans. Even within the categories it appears that there are vast differences in consciousness, intelligence and behaviour repertoires.
I can think of three major elements to rational thinking: its form is linguistic, its structure is logical, and its orientation is (ostensibly) self-interest (either direct or indirect). Under that definition, animals do not have rational thinking because they lack language. And intuitive thinking, which allows for action without explicit knowledge of the reasons for action is similarly excluded.
Animals do have communications systems though, and therefore skills, and human intuitive thinking can be a better (esp. faster) way of solving problems, avoiding danger, dealing with people etc. In fact, think about most real life conversations--they are almost entirely intuitive. Who's thinking explicitly about what to say next?
Person A: Hi, how are you?
Person B: (*I'm not so good but do I want this person to know that? I mean, do I really trust them? Probably not, so I should just lie and say I'm fine. But wait, lying is unethical, isn't it? I remember that Kantian thing. Yes, honesty is the best policy. No, wait, I'm being irrational. It's a white lie. No one gets hurt and I'm acting against my self-interest by being open with everyone, right? But Kant... Stop being nuts, even Kant would have said he's fine. The dude had huge books to write. He'd hardly stand here all day debating how to respond to what is any case just a non-literal customary linguistic tic with no real concern behind it... etc etc)
In fact, when you get right down to brass taxes, who's doing much rational thinking at all that leads to anything concrete? We do plenty of post hoc rationalizing to make us feel good about our irrational behaviour though.
(+Obviously animals can behave rationally (monkey grabs nearest banana rather than farthest one and eats sooner--et voila, monkey behaved rationally), but that does not imply they are thinking rationally, seeing as thinking rationally requires the logical connection of concepts and that becomes slippery, indistinct, and somewhat incoherent without an appeal to human language. E.g. No form of animal communication inheres recursivity, negativity, hypotheticals etc. These are exclusive to human language.)
Vera MontSeptember 03, 2024 at 16:51#9297980 likes
Is intuitive thinking rational or maybe something better?
Intuition is a shortcut to an answer in the absence of sufficient evidence to draw a logical conclusion. It is based on recalled experience and knowledge.
180 ProofSeptember 03, 2024 at 17:04#9298030 likes
In fact, when you get right down to brass taxes, who's doing much rational thinking at all that leads to anything concrete? We do plenty of post hoc rationalizing to make us feel good about our irrational behaviour though.
:up: :up:
Reply to Athena Yeah, allegedly even some homo sapiens do. :monkey:
PhilosophimSeptember 03, 2024 at 17:45#9298130 likes
Yes, some animals can think rationally. It depends on how you define 'rationally' of course. If you define it as, 'the brain processing humans do', then its not. I don't ascribe to this definition, but many do implicitly.
Here is a crow using a stick to get food. Do you think this is rational?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjfrxkEpfX8
Vera MontSeptember 03, 2024 at 18:28#9298250 likes
Here is a crow using a stick to get food. Do you think this is rational?
How can you assess rational thought, except through problem-solving? Problems arise in nature all the time and animals need to solve them in order to survive and reproduce successfully. Whoever's ancestors were able to solve most of their problems inherited the most sophisticated brains. These are the cognitive front runners, AFAWK. However, living things also have mental attributes other than rational intelligence that vary greatly in range and style and function, which are far more difficult to quantify and compare.
There is no big fat black line between one species and its nearest kin - evolution is an n-dimensional continuum. We inherited our intelligence, communication skills, mimicking ability, empathy, instincts and emotional repertoire from previous iterations of great ape.
ChatteringMonkeySeptember 03, 2024 at 18:33#9298290 likes
In fact, when you get right down to brass taxes, who's doing much rational thinking at all that leads to anything concrete? We do plenty of post hoc rationalizing to make us feel good about our irrational behaviour though.
Post-hoc rationalisation probably was the original form of 'rational thinking', as social group-animals it was pretty important to justify/rationalize our actions.
So you know, it seems that Plato/Socrates (contra the Sophists) got us on the wrong track with this weird ideosyncratic notion of rational thinking to arrive at the truth.
Even within the categories it appears that there are vast differences in consciousness, intelligence and behaviour repertoires.
I remember when there was a lot of excitement about chimps recognizing their image in a mirror. Of course much more research has been done since then.
The ability to recognize ones own reflection is shared by humans and only a few other species, including chimpanzees. However, this ability is highly variable across individual chimpanzees. In humans, self-recognition involves a distributed, right-lateralized network including frontal and parietal regions involved in the production and perception of action. The superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) is a system of white matter tracts linking these frontal and parietal regions. The current study measured mirror self-recognition (MSR) and SLF anatomy in 60 chimpanzees using diffusion tensor imaging. Successful self-recognition was associated with greater rightward asymmetry in the white matter of SLFII and SLFIII, and in SLFIIIs gray matter terminations in Brocas area. We observed a visible progression of SLFIIIs prefrontal extension in apes that show negative, ambiguous, and compelling evidence of MSR. Notably, SLFIIIs terminations in Brocas area are not right-lateralized or particularly pronounced at the population level in chimpanzees, as they are in humans. Thus, chimpanzees with more human-like behavior show more human-like SLFIII connectivity. These results suggest that self-recognition may have co-emerged with adaptations to frontoparietal circuitry.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5390703/#:~:text=The%20ability%20to%20recognize%20one's,highly%20variable%20across%20individual%20chimpanzees.
I can think of three major elements to rational thinking: its form is linguistic, its structure is logical, and its orientation is (ostensibly) self-interest (either direct or indirect). Under that definition, animals do not have rational thinking because they lack language. And intuitive thinking, which allows for action without explicit knowledge of the reasons for action is similarly excluded.
Animals do have communications systems though, and therefore skills, and human intuitive thinking can be a better (esp. faster) way of solving problems, avoiding danger, dealing with people etc. In fact, think about most real life conversations--they are almost entirely intuitive. Who's thinking explicitly about what to say next?
I know all that but hell will freeze over before I can explain it as well as you did. :heart:
:lol: My arguments are based on my own struggle with language and especially ordering my words so they make sense and rational thinking. Such as choosing the right words to title a thread. I am terrible at that.
I led a team of volunteers to help a young woman in a nursing home. When leaving, a young man with a very low IQ made it through a locked gate, that I could not get through because obviously the gate was locked and obviously it was necessary to have a code to get out of the secured building. But my dim-witted friend did not take time to think through the problem. He put his hand through the gate and opened it from the outside. Quite obviously our "thinking" can make us stupid. And if I were to be lost in the wilderness, I would want him to help me get out. I have known a few low IQ people who think more like animals and I mean this as a complement.
I knew a gentleman who ran from the WWII soldiers who killed everyone in his family. As a young child, he had to survive on his own in the forest. I asked him how he did that and he said he watched the animals and learned from them.
"Who's thinking explicitly about what to say next?" I am thrilled you got why I thought this thread was important. The more I thought about our thinking versus animals, the less sure I was about our own thinking! I know there is soooo much I do not know and how many books I try to read are over my head. I never habituated the steps of logical thinking so my struggle to learn seems futile. I have gone through life in a state of daydreaming and it is amazing I got this far.
Vera MontSeptember 04, 2024 at 16:23#9299810 likes
But my dim-witted friend did not take time to think through the problem. He put his hand through the gate and opened it from the outside.
He was thinking rationally: looking at a problem and finding a solution. He did it quickly, because it was very simple problem. (One might question the rational thought-process of the genius who designed the gate.) Reason is nothing more complicated than finding the connection between cause and effect, then projecting the if-then dimension. A causes B; therefore, if I affect the function of A, then B alters accordingly.
Reason and one's relative facility in reasoning has very little to do with verbal proficiency or fluency. Individuals with too deep a regard for what is said by those who speak authoritatively are some times fooled into believing what they're told rather than what they themselves are able to discern.
Intuition is a shortcut to an answer in the absence of sufficient evidence to draw a logical conclusion. It is based on recalled experience and knowledge.
I think Baden gave a good explanation of why all thinking is not equal to rational thinking.
We could get into what emotions have to do with our thinking and question how rational we are when we are emotional. The book "Emotional Intelligence" explains how emotions mess with our thinking, and the more recent study of what hormones have to do with emotions and judgment. I used to clean a bar and on football game nights, the bar would be trashed! Watching football increases a man's testosterone level, which results in more aggressive behavior than adding a few beers, reducing one's inhibition and I should have gotten a bonus for cleaning on those nights. :grin:
Your post triggered the next thought about experience and knowledge. Individually, we are different in our ability to learn. More dramatic is the fact that baboons like to eat termites as much as chimps. They watch the chimps make tools to fish the termites, but they do not imitate the behavior, although they want the termites just as much as the chimps. I think that is equal to me wanting to understand math, and I just don't get it.
I hope we think as much about how we think as we think about how another animal thinks. Intuition is not rational thinking because there is no language involved. My point about going through the gate is knowledge can prevent us from knowing.
Reason and one's relative facility in reasoning has very little to do with verbal proficiency or fluency. Individuals with too deep a regard for what is said by those who speak authoritatively are some times fooled into believing what they're told rather than what they themselves are able to discern.
The argument about chimpanzees and their ability to communicate is more complex than whether they learn a language or they can not.
As a matter of learned culture, some Chimpanzees in the wild do have warning calls that identify a predator. In the learning stage, a young chimp may see a leaf fall and make the sound for an eagle, or see a wild pig and make the sound for a predator cat. The adults will look for the pedator and ignore the warning if they do not see it, or if they see it, they will repeat the warning. In time the young will make the correct sound at the correct time. Our cats and dogs may be very good at communicating with us but wolves do not have that kind of relationship with humans. The difference between domestic and non-domestic animals in the genes. Just as the learning difference between chimps and baboons is in the genes.
Here is a link explaining rational thinking requires language, not just warning sounds for predators.
Abstract
This article deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and especially the role and status of assumptions about rationality in interpreting another's speech and assigning contents to her psychological attitudesher beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. Some large degree of rationality is required for thought. Consequently, that same degree of rationality at least is required for language, since language requires thought. Thought, however, does not require language. This article lays out the grounds for seeing rationality as required for thought, and it meets some recent objections on conceptual and empirical grounds. Furthermore, it gives particular attention to Donald Davidson's arguments for the Principle of Charity, according to which it is constitutive of speakers that they are largely rational and largely right about the world, and to Davidson's arguments for the thesis that without the power of speech one lacks the power of thought. https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/34534/chapter-abstract/292961457?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Post-hoc rationalisation probably was the original form of 'rational thinking', as social group-animals it was pretty important to justify/rationalize our actions.
So you know, it seems that Plato/Socrates (contra the Sophists) got us on the wrong track with this weird ideosyncratic notion of rational thinking to arrive at the truth.
Is it rational to believe illnesses are caused by the gods? Is it rational to believe a god created man from mud?
Do animals have rational thinking? Do animals have communication skills? Is intuitive thinking rational or maybe something better?
I suppose a bare minimum has to be symbolic representation akin to something that arises with language use. Animals do not have language, if by "language" one has in mind propositional knowledge.
There may well be other aspects to thinking that are not related to language, but we don't know what they are. We are back to speaking about these things through language. So, until we have some proposal as to what non-linguistic thought is, we are stuck.
As for communication? Yes, they do, and they seem to be highly efficient at it. Look at bees or birds or dolphins, they have some amazing capacities for communication that we lack.
Intuition is somewhat hard to describe. I don't think it's better than non-intuitive thinking, just different. Though we should keep in mind that our intuitions can be quite wrong.
suppose a bare minimum has to be symbolic representation akin to something that arises with language use. Animals do not have language, if by "language" one has in mind propositional knowledge.
There may well be other aspects to thinking that are not related to language, but we don't know what they are. We are back to speaking about these things through language. So, until we have some proposal as to what non-linguistic thought is, we are stuck.
As for communication? Yes, they do, and they seem to be highly efficient at it. Look at bees or birds or dolphins, they have some amazing capacities for communication that we lack.
Intuition is somewhat hard to describe. I don't think it's better than non-intuitive thinking, just different. Though we should keep in mind that our intuitions can be quite wrong.
Very nicely said and so the debate goes on. I had to look for an explanation of propositional knowledge because that is a new term for me.
Propositional knowledge is a type of knowledge that involves knowing facts, and is also known as declarative or descriptive knowledge. It can be defined as justified true belief, which means that a person has propositional knowledge if they:
Believe something to be true
Are justified in believing it to be true
The thing they believe is actually true
Propositional knowledge can cover a wide range of subjects, including: Science, Geography, Mathematics, Self-knowledge, and Any other field of study.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declarative_knowledge#:~:text=Propositional%20knowledge%20asserts%20that%20a,referred%20to%20as%20knowledge%2Dthat.
Having the right language for this discussion is very helpful. Thank you, Manuel.
Yes, some animals can think rationally. It depends on how you define 'rationally' of course. If you define it as, 'the brain processing humans do', then its not. I don't ascribe to this definition, but many do implicitly.
Here is a crow using a stick to get food. Do you think this is rational?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjfrxkEpfX8
By definition of "rational," I would say no, the crow's behavior is not the result of rational thinking.
I like @Manuel's used to Propositional Knowledge. If the crow questioned if the stick would work, and proposed an experiment and then explained the results, the stick must be this long and have this strength to work, and we tested his experiment and found it to be true, then we have rational thinking. I hope once I learn the language of math I will be able to understand math better. Reading about Propositional Knowledge helped my brain form a degree of understanding about rational thinking. How do we understand anything without the right words?
Your example is very important because we thought only humans used tools, and we made that ability the defining marker of being human. Next, we thought culture is what defines humans and then we discovered social animals have culture. But we still have people who believe humans were made of mud and it was a god who made them so we aren't really animals like all the other animals. I don't think that belief would pass the test for rational thinking, but then when someone comes up with a crazy explanation for believing in something, we call that rationalizing.
Help, my thoughts may not be in the proper order or maybe I am not using the right words? I think I destroyed my argument. :chin:
ChatteringMonkeySeptember 05, 2024 at 15:52#9301430 likes
Reply to Athena I'm going to answer in a somewhat longwinded way, but this is a philosophy forum so...
Do animals have rational thinking? Do animals have communication skills? Is intuitive thinking rational or maybe something better?
I'd say instincts are to some extend rational, if by rational we mean doing things that furthers attaining desired ends. A chicken for instance will instinctually scratch the ground periodically while eating. In doing so there's a chance that they reveal all kinds of tasty stuff like worms or grains that where previously not visible. So the instinctual behaviour of scratching the surface could be said to be rational behaviour if we assume the goal they want to attain is getting food.
The difference with humans is they can't seem to adjust these instincts very much to fit changing circumstances. If you give them a bowl of grains for instance, they will still tend to scratch the surface eventhough in that instance it does very little as they have enough food in the bowl. Humans have an extra capacity to reflect on and reason about certain behaviour, which enables them to adjust more to changing circumstances.
Is it rational to believe illnesses are caused by the gods? Is it rational to believe a god created man from mud?
I think in this case something similar is going on as with instinctual behaviour of animals. We are social animals, and tend to create religious/mythological superstructures that promote certain values and social cohesion that benefits the group overall if you would compare it to a group that doesn't have members adhering to their superstructure. Piety, i.e. believing in and adhering to the traditions of your group, promotes social cohesion (Asabiyyah), and can from that point of view probably be considered "rational" in that social cohesion improves overall survivability of the group (which can be considered as the desired end). The flip-side is that like animal instincts it isn't very granular and adjustable to specific circumstances... it's rational only viewed in the context of the longer historical and evolutionary arc.
Socrates (and Plato) thought we could do better than that and started questioning the Gods and turned to rational thinking instead. We will have to see (although we probably won't be there anymore :-)) if that turns out to be a better strategy long-term.
Jack CumminsSeptember 05, 2024 at 16:14#9301450 likes
Reply to Athena
Strangely, or by synchronicity, we are both interested in the prefrontal cortex because I was writing about that in a thread on free will as yours appeared on the forum.
As far as your idea of the significance of the chimpanzee recognising his or her image in the mirror, it may suggest a form of personal identity based on an image of one's bodily appearance. The recognition of oneself in the mirror is an important point in a child's awareness. Of course, the existence of mirror images may be a detrimental factor in human identity insofar as it creates the potential for narcissistic tendencies and body image issues.
PhilosophimSeptember 05, 2024 at 16:17#9301460 likes
If the crow questioned if the stick would work, and proposed an experiment and then explained the results, the stick must be this long and have this strength to work, and we tested his experiment and found it to be true, then we have rational thinking.
So then if we took a human, and they did the same thing as the crow without saying any words, we would think that wasn't rational thinking? How did the crow arrive at that conclusion to do what it did to begin with?
Help, my thoughts may not be in the proper order or maybe I am not using the right words? I think I destroyed my argument. :chin:
Not a worry! We're here to think, and ideas can shift and flow. Honesty, questions, and exploring possibilities are all part of a good philosophical mind.
Vera MontSeptember 05, 2024 at 18:28#9301770 likes
Individually, we are different in our ability to learn. More dramatic is the fact that baboons like to eat termites as much as chimps. They watch the chimps make tools to fish the termites, but they do not imitate the behavior, although they want the termites just as much as the chimps. I think that is equal to me wanting to understand math, and I just don't get it.
We're not only different in our capacity to learn, the speed at which we do it and in our ability to retain and recall information.
The baboon/chimp divide may be cultural. Just as humans disregard the habits of tribes with different world-views, it my be that apes disregard the habits of another species of ape. I suspect that if they saw a baboon of high social standing fishing for termites, they would be imitating him quite soon. (Experiment: have a trusted human teach a baboon to do it, then let him in among a troop of youngsters.) Quoting Athena
Intuition is not rational thinking because there is no language involved.
What makes language the criterion for rational thought? Are there not math questions and diagrams on an IQ test? Does the crow deciding to use the short stick to retrieve the long stick to push the cheese near enough the bars so that he can reach it with the short stick require him to explain as he goes?
Intuition is rational thinking. You consider the information available, arrange it some configuration that makes sense, recognize what additional pieces of information you need for a solid, logical conclusion. But you don't have those extra pieces, so you look in memory for any items of information that fits with the pattern you have created. The conclusion you draw is not provable, but it's a working theory you can test. You may not be aware of the process, as it usually happens faster in your brain than you can translate into speech, but in retrospect, you should be able to describe how you arrived at the result.
Language of some kind is important for communication and useful labelling for memory organization, but that doesn't mean deaf-mute people can't solve problems rationally.
Post-hoc rationalisation probably was the original form of 'rational thinking', as social group-animals it was pretty important to justify/rationalize our actions.
Didn't people have a reason for their actions until somebody forced them to explain? We sometimes need to rationalize actions (decisions) that prove counter-productive, or that others disapprove, but how often does anyone justify preparing food, building a shelter or using a hammer to drive a nail into wood? The rationality of those actions is self-evident.
Vera MontSeptember 05, 2024 at 18:44#9301810 likes
I'm bringing my response here from your other thread.
No. It is not reason that they use, although they can be described as intelligent. And yes, they can be described as having communication ability.
But animals do not put together an argument to arrive at a conclusion. A valid/sound conclusion is the goal when one is engaged in reasoning. For example, if I have some information on the chance that it's going to rain this morning -- atmosphere, clouds, radar -- I can conclude validly that it's going to rain this morning.
Vera MontSeptember 06, 2024 at 05:45#9302940 likes
So, an anthropo-exclusive definition, based on argument, rather than discernment of cause and effect, problem solving and practical decision-making.
OK
Harry HinduSeptember 06, 2024 at 12:14#9303390 likes
In Steven Pinker's book, "How the Mind Works", he defines intelligence as
"...the ability to attain goals in the face of obstacles by means of decisions based on rational (truth-obeying) rules."
I don't see how language-use is necessary to be rational. I have yet to receive an answer to the question of how one learns a language without being a rational thinker prior. Being a rational thinker allows one to learn a language, not the other way around.
Acting on one's instincts is still a rational process. There is a reason why instinctive behaviors allow some animal to survive - because those behaviors have worked in the organism's ancestral past. Because they work means that there is some element of truth in the way the animal perceives their environment and reacts to it. Think of instincts as "memories" stored in the organism's DNA to use in similar circumstances in the future.
Learned behaviors evolved as a way to respond to more rapid changes in the environment - changes that instincts are too slow to evolve a solution for. Think of learned behaviors as memories stored in one's brain to use in similar circumstances in the future.
All organisms engage in goal-directed behavior whether it is based on instincts or learned in the face of obstacles either by evolving truth-obeying instincts or by learning with a sensory feedback loop (responding to a stimulus and then observing the effects and then try again, observing those effects, try again, etc.) (truth-obeying rules).
ChatteringMonkeySeptember 06, 2024 at 13:42#9303560 likes
Didn't people have a reason for their actions until somebody forced them to explain?
I dunno, that is the question right? And that question in turn depends on what you would consider "a reason". Does a chicken have a reason the scratch the ground when looking for food? As I alluded to in a previous post, the chicken also seems to be scratching the floor when it doesn't seem to make a lot of sense. So a lot of that behaviour seems to be instinctual. I do think there's a reason, or a 'rationale' to a lot of these instincts, but I also think those are not the result of some conscious rational deliberation... what one would consider "rational thinking".
I think a lot of what we humans do is more or less the same, we do seem to do a lot of things without conscious rational deliberation, out of instinct. Most of these behaviours are probably "reasonable" in that they do serve a purpose or goal, without necessarily having a reason in mind. And so no, often it's only afterwards, when asked, that we consciously think of "reasons".
As far as your idea of the significance of the chimpanzee recognising his or her image in the mirror, it may suggest a form of personal identity based on an image of one's bodily appearance.
You made me ask the question, can a chimp recognize a picture of himself in a line up of chimp pictures? That is different from a mirror image. In the mirror, our movement is reflected. What if the chimp realized the movement in the mirror was his movement but that does not mean he could pick out an image of himself in a line of pictures?
I am watching college lectures about humans and primates and the thing that impresses me the most is how extremely picky researchers are! The question must be asked exactly right. They must be as sure as possible that they identify exactly what causes something and their peers are quick to jump on them if everything is not exactly right. This is not normal everyday thinking. It is very disciplined thinking.
About you and I thinking along the same line at the same time, you and I have experienced this often. It is enough to make me ask if we have a psychic connection but then is that even possible? I think that is unlikely but not impossible. I have a very old book about logic and the author warns us never to be too sure of what we think because we can never know enough to be certain. Science is about being as certain as we can be and history is a series of times when the general experience of the moment moves people to think and act the same, such as the hippie movement and then a fascination with drugs such as we have today.
Vera MontSeptember 06, 2024 at 14:49#9303720 likes
Does a chicken have a reason the scratch the ground when looking for food?
Yes: seeds scattered on the ground sometimes get covered by dirt. Having eaten all the visible seeds, the chicken scratches for any that were overlooked. Floors are artificial, beyond a chicken's repertoire of experience; she doesn't have sufficient information to be sure it won't yield to scratching. Quoting ChatteringMonkey
So a lot of that behaviour seems to be instinctual.
That's where it begins. Drive - habit - instinct - adaptation - thought.
Some big brown slug didn't just hump itself out of the primordial swamp and grow into H. sapiens without reference to any other species. The process was long and gradual; the product exists on a scale and a spectrum.
A dog may not recognize its image in a mirror, but neither can a man pick the smell of his own urine out of a hundred other humans'. We self-identify differently and perceive differently, use similar faculties in different proportions, but the strategies and tactics of survival have to be coherent, directed and purposeful in order to succeed. By the time you're up the brain size of a great ape, most of its behaviour is controlled and directed - purposeful - even though we don't constantly think about what we're thinking and how we're thinking it (which would paralyze action and probably get us killed). Quoting ChatteringMonkey
I think a lot of what we humans do is more or less the same, we do seem to do a lot of things without conscious rational deliberation, out of instinct.
We also have habits and instincts, yes. And many perfectly reasonable decisions that we don't dwell on, simply because they're learned reactions; considered appropriate to a familiar situation. Reason can't have been invented in response to being challenged: that's the wrong way around. Who was there to challenge an action prior to the concept of rational thought?
So then if we took a human, and they did the same thing as the crow without saying any words, we would think that wasn't rational thinking? How did the crow arrive at that conclusion to do what it did to begin with?
That is the intuitive question. As @Manuel warns, when we know something intuitively, it is important to check and double-check that intuitive thought. An intuitive thought may be the result of past experiences or spending many days trying to answer a question. We can not be sure why but the thought is just in our heads whole and complete. Because I am studying the brain I read or hear time and time again, that our brains are very active and we are not aware of all its activity.
We know humans can be aware of some of that thinking in a way we call rational thinking. Rushing out to hang someone for committing an offense with other men dressed in white sheets, is not rational thinking even if the men are aware of their reasoning. Their reason is not the careful reasoning of science. Men's behavior in times of war had little to do with rational reasoning. :heart: I hope we all gain better knowledge of different modes of thinking and different codes for thinking. How do our brains work compared to how do the brains of great apes work?
(Experiment: have a trusted human teach a baboon to do it, then let him in among a troop of youngsters.)
I am excited because you have gotten to the core of the subject. Baboons to not have the attention span of great apes. Baboons are monkeys not apes. The difference is genetic. I don't know if anyone has tried as hard to teach a baboon or done an experiment as you suggest. I think not because from our present judgment of baboons it would be futile.
Here is a link...
Monkey species include baboons, macaques, marmosets, tamarins, and capuchins. Ape species include humans, gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, gibbons, and bonobos.
In evolutionary and genetic terms, ape species are much closer to humans than monkeys are. In addition to having similar basic body structures, apes are highly intelligent and can exhibit human-like behavior. For example, chimpanzees, which are closest to humans genetically, can create simple tools and use them effectively.
Although monkeys communicate with each other, apes possess more advanced cognitive and language skills. They can't speak like humans, but they can use sign language and other bodily movements to communicate with humans effectively. Communication skills help gorillas, chimps, and bonobos develop complex social groups and even exhibit some aspects of culture. Like humans, apes can think and solve problems in their environments. https://www.wonderopolis.org/wonder/whats-the-difference-between-apes-and-monkeys#:~:text=Monkey%20species%20include%20baboons%2C%20macaques,to%20humans%20than%20monkeys%20are.
ChatteringMonkeySeptember 06, 2024 at 15:07#9303760 likes
We also have habits and instincts, yes. And many perfectly reasonable decisions that we don't dwell on, simply because they're obviously the correct response to a situation. Reason can't have been invented in response to being challenged: that's the wrong way around. Who was there to challenge an action prior to the concept of rational thought?
No, but what I'm saying is that "reasons" are not necessarily the result of conscious rational deliberation either. Instincts are obviously prior to all of that, and instincts are to some extend already reasonable. Instincts are the original 'reasons'... then great apes evolved language as a tool of communication as social group animals, then we develloped rationalisation or justification, i.e. delineating and expressing in language, after the fact, the reasons already inherent in behaviour guided by the instincts (or perhaps expressing reasons that weren't even there in case of dissimilation). And then eventually, socrates put forwards the notion that we should have conscious rational deliberation prior to the act as the golden standard.... rational thinking instead of instinct.
PhilosophimSeptember 06, 2024 at 15:50#9303800 likes
We know humans can be aware of some of that thinking in a way we call rational thinking. Rushing out to hang someone for committing an offense with other men dressed in white sheets, is not rational thinking even if the men are aware of their reasoning. Their reason is not the careful reasoning of science.
This is why the definition and meaning of the phrase "Rational thinking" needs to be clearly listed and agreed upon first. If we all have different viewpoints of what the phrase "Rational thinking" means, we're never going to come to an agreement. as to whether an instance of a crow using a tool is an instance of rational thinking.
I will use a link to explain why intuitive thinking is not rational thinking.
Intuition is defined as the ability to acquire knowledge without the use of reason [1]. Some liken intuition to a gut feeling, or to unconscious thinking. Rational thinking is defined as the use of reason, the capacity to make sense of things, and the use of logic to establish and verify facts [2].
Intuition versus Rational Thinking: Psychological Challenges ...
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1546144012003791#:~:text=Intuition%20is%20defined%20as%20the,and%20verify%20facts%20%5B2%5D.
As @Manuel explains rational thinking begins with a proposition. I am learning as I read and reply and use links because I do not have a strong understanding. So here is an explanation of propositional knowledge.
Propositional knowledge is the knowledge of a proposition, or fact, that can be justified, true, and believed. It can be applied to a wide range of subjects, including science, geography, math, and self-knowledge. https://www.google.com/search? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declarative_knowledge#:~:text=Propositional%20knowledge%20asserts%20that%20a,referred%20to%20as%20knowledge%2Dthat.
Now here is where the rest of the animal realm fails. It took us centuries but we now of an amazing comprehension of pi.
Succinctly, piwhich is written as the Greek letter for p, or ?is the ratio of the circumference of any circle to the diameter of that circle. Regardless of the circle's size, this ratio will always equal pi. In decimal form, the value of pi is approximately 3.14. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-pi-and-how-did-it-originate/#:~:text=Succinctly%2C%20pi%E2%80%94which%20is%20written,of%20pi%20is%20approximately%203.14.
The importance of our present knowledge of pi is mind-blowing! It tells how organism grow, and helps with navigation of air planes. This link is very complex so I am leaving just the link for those who want to know what pi has to do with the creation of the universe and how things grow. https://www.biophysics.org/blog/pi-is-encoded-in-the-patterns-of-life
This link is a little simpler..
Tracking Aircraft with a Raspberry Pi - Stephen Smith's Blog
Stephen Smith's Blog
https://smist08.wordpress.com 2023/01/27 tracking-...
Jan 27, 2023 A tutorial, by Tony Roberts, on connecting a Raspberry Pi to an SDR radio to retrieve flight information from nearby aircraft.
Any way even though many of us struggle with math, it is an important component to rational thinking.
Sciencific thinking is nothing like our every day thinking.
Scientific thinking is the process of reviewing ideas using science, observations, investigational processes, and testing them to gain knowledge. The goal is to make outcomes of knowledge that may be meaningful to science. The scientific method is how scientists and researchers apply their scientific thinking. https://study.com/academy/lesson/scientific-ways-of-thinking.html#:~:text=Scientific%20thinking%20is%20the%20process,researchers%20apply%20their%20scientific%20thinking.
Oh man :nerd: A thought came up as I worked on the explanation.
Modern thinking is nothing like the thinking of the Middle Ages and around the world are people still far from proposition knowledge and thinking. Our understanding of the different modes of thinking and how far we have come in the last hundred years is still outside of our consciousness but we are not the same human beings we once were. We only had to potential to become as we are. Other animals do not have this potential.
PhilosophimSeptember 06, 2024 at 16:00#9303850 likes
Intuition is defined as the ability to acquire knowledge without the use of reason [1]. Some liken intuition to a gut feeling, or to unconscious thinking.
The problem with this definition is it does not describe whether the person's intuitive thinking was the result of previous rational thoughts that one has subconsciously accepted, or instinct. One can have an intuitive behavior driven by instinct, previous rational thought, or trained habit.
So in the case of the crow, while we see they search through the branch and pick a twig of the correct size, we never saw if the crow had ever toyed around with the branch before. Maybe earlier they tried other materials, saw certain ones did not work, and finally found that a small branch did.
Working through a process to find what works, and does not work, seems like rational thought. It does not mean a being has to use math, language, or any higher level tools or processes that humans do. Can it reason through a novel problem and come up with a solution? That's really the question.
They already have a language. The argument is over whether and how well they learn some version of a human language.
No animals don't already have a language. Language is next to culture, it has to be learned. The ability to learn a language varies across species and within the species are individual differences and the age of our ability to learn changes with our age. Older children have a greater learning ability and there are some things that if a child does not learn or experience at a certain age, the child will never be able to incorporate it in its being.
That said, many animals have warning sounds. Those sounds are instinctively known to all species because as math explains, the sounds are irritating and can not be ignored. A group of chimps may have different sounds for different threats- this would be cultural and something that has to be learned before one could know if the threat is an eagle coming from the sky, or large snake hanging in the tree or a predator coming by ground. Those warning sounds, even the more complex ones are not propositional thinking. The great ages are not going to discuss what humans are doing to their habitat and what they can do to defend it.
Yes. I don't think anyone here is arguing humans have not evolved from an ancestor that would be classified as an animal. The transition from prehumans to humans is better documented today and with our improved knowledge of animals having culture, our understanding of the transition is getting better.
facial anatomy suggests that A. ramidus males were less aggressive than those of modern chimps, which is correlated to increased parental care and monogamy in primates. It has also been suggested that it was among the earliest of human ancestors to use some proto-language, possibly capable of vocalizing at the same level as a human infant. This is based on evidence of human-like skull architecture, cranial base angle and vocal tract dimensions, all of which in A. ramidus are paedomorphic when compared to chimpanzees and bonobos. This suggests the trend toward paedomorphic or juvenile-like form evident in human evolution, may have begun with A. ramidus. Given these unique features, it has been argued that in A. ramidus we may have the first evidence of human-like forms of social behaviour, vocally mediated sociality as well as increased levels of prosociality via the process of self-domesticationall of which seem to be associated with the same underlying changes in skull architecture. A. ramidus appears to have inhabited woodland and bushland corridors between savannas, and was a generalized omnivore. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ardipithecus_ramidus [quote].
Their challenge was most likely climate change making life in the trees more difficult, forcing this species out of trees and making them land animals with culture and physical changes improving vocalization and indication of less aggressive behavior.
I have to change what I said about climate change. There is new information and it makes more sense.
[quote]Hominid fossils predating the emergence of Australopithecus have been sparse and fragmentary. The evolution of our lineage after the last common ancestor we shared with chimpanzees has therefore remained unclear. Ardipithecus ramidus, recovered in ecologically and temporally resolved contexts in Ethiopias Afar Rift, now illuminates earlier hominid paleobiology and aspects of extant African ape evolution. More than 110 specimens recovered from 4.4-million-year-old sediments include a partial skeleton with much of the skull, hands, feet, limbs, and pelvis. This hominid combined arboreal palmigrade clambering and careful climbing with a form of terrestrial bipedality more primitive than that of Australopithecus. Ar. ramidus had a reduced canine/premolar complex and a little-derived cranial morphology and consumed a predominantly C3 plantbased diet (plants using the C3 photosynthetic pathway). Its ecological habitat appears to have been largely woodland-focused. Ar. ramidus lacks any characters typical of suspension, vertical climbing, or knuckle-walking. Ar. ramidus indicates that despite the genetic similarities of living humans and chimpanzees, the ancestor we last shared probably differed substantially from any extant African ape. Hominids and extant African apes have each become highly specialized through very different evolutionary pathways. This evidence also illuminates the origins of orthogrady, bipedality, ecology, diet, and social behavior in earliest Hominidae and helps to define the basal hominid adaptation, thereby accentuating the derived nature of Australopithecus. https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.1175802
Vera MontSeptember 06, 2024 at 17:27#9304060 likes
No, but what I'm saying is that "reasons" are not necessarily the result of conscious rational deliberation either.
Of course not. The reason why something is necessary precedes any consciousness recognizing the necessity, which precedes any deliberate action taken. Entities striving to survive are not acting at random; they're acting in response to a need: they have specific reasons for doing what they do, long before the development of a brain. Animals with brains recognize their needs, explore their environments and decide on actions intended to attain a specific end: find water, get food, erect shelter, seek safety. Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Instincts are the original 'reasons'..
Biological impulse is the original response to the environment and survival. Instinct develops much later , in increasingly complex organisms. Instinct and memory form habitual behaviours, then the even more complex brain adds curiosity and imagination to extrapolate situations beyond the present and consider alternative actions to reach the same goal. Quoting ChatteringMonkey
And then eventually, socrates put forwards the notion that we should have conscious rational deliberation prior to the act as the golden standard.... rational thinking instead of instinct.
By which time, thousands of species had been doing it for 50 million years, without pontificating about it.
This is why the definition and meaning of the phrase "Rational thinking" needs to be clearly listed and agreed upon first. If we all have different viewpoints of what the phrase "Rational thinking" means, we're never going to come to an agreement. as to whether an instance of a crow using a tool is an instance of rational thinking.
I can think of three major elements to rational thinking: its form is linguistic, its structure is logical, and its orientation is (ostensibly) self-interest (either direct or indirect). Under that definition, animals do not have rational thinking because they lack language. And intuitive thinking, which allows for action without explicit knowledge of the reasons for action is similarly excluded.
@Manuel said "I suppose a bare minimum has to be symbolic representation akin to something that arises with language use. Animals do not have language, if by "language" one has in mind propositional knowledge."
Perhaps we can focus on logic.
Logic is the study of correct reasoning. It includes both formal and informal logic. Formal logic is the study of deductively valid inferences or logical truths. It examines how conclusions follow from premises based on the structure of arguments alone, independent of their topic and content. Informal logic is associated with informal fallacies, critical thinking, and argumentation theory. Informal logic examines arguments expressed in natural language whereas formal logic uses formal language. When used as a countable noun, the term "a logic" refers to a specific logical formal system that articulates a proof system. Logic plays a central role in many fields, such as philosophy, mathematics, computer science, and linguistics. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic
.
I like that the definition begins with "correct reasoning". Lenching someone does not involve correct reasoning. In court, we aim at correct reasoning. But then I think of the ancient Greeks and the argument against rhetorical speaking which may appeal to emotions more than reason.
Vera MontSeptember 06, 2024 at 18:01#9304240 likes
I like that the definition begins with "correct reasoning".
Why does 'reasoning' require a modifier? You can arrive at the wrong conclusion through a rational process, if you begin with false or incomplete information, if you start from an assumption that is later proven to be unfounded, if your initial purpose is to justify an act deemed wrong by others.
I get that humans want to be oh-so-special - not enough to be the most; we must be the only. Well, we have a number of claims to that exceptionality already. The reason - rational, but rarely acknowledged - we so desperately want to deny other species the faculty of reason is to justify our exploitation of them.
PhilosophimSeptember 06, 2024 at 18:52#9304390 likes
Manuel said "I suppose a bare minimum has to be symbolic representation akin to something that arises with language use. Animals do not have language, if by "language" one has in mind propositional knowledge."
This is defining the term to exclude animals without debate then. This is also an incredibly narrow term that historically has not required language use. I would not agree this is a requirement for rational thinking, just a requirement for linguistic thinking.
Logic may also be too strong. Rational thinking is the ability to piece premises together and come up with potential solutions. Those solutions may be wrong. A rational thinker can then eliminate that wrong answer and try another route. Logic often implies deductive reasoning, but many would argue that inductive reasoning is also necessary for rational beings.
Here is a clear example of thinking which is not rational. If you poke a caterpillar with a leaf in a way that doesn't harm it, it will squirm like its being attacked. Every time, it never stops. Its a purely reactionary mind, with no forethought, adaptability, or ability to react to memory. Whereas we have a monkey using a tool. How many tests did the monkey have to do to get the right stick? What did they try before sticks? Rational thinking is a process which requires memory, adaptation, and often times proactive and not reactive.
If the reasoning isn't correct, things can go very wrong. That is why it is important to have the correct facts and think things through carefully. Democracy is not about what one person thinks but together after we argue with each other and check our facts, what is true. This is akin to scientific thinking. It is not basing our understanding of reality on a myth that can not be supported with factual statements.
We have a big problem in the US. Our understanding of rational thinking is very weak. In general people don't know the difference between an opinion and a fact. All thinking is confused with being rational and that is a serious problem.
It is your opinion that I hold rational thinking as a human thing based on language that animals do not have because I want to exploit animals, is an opinion, not a fact. Let me make it clear, I care that we know the difference because it is the only chance we have of not destroying our planet. If we do not distinguish between correct reasoning and incorrect thinking, the planet is doomed and there is no other animal on earth that can do that reasoning.
Logic may also be too strong. Rational thinking is the ability to piece premises together and come up with potential solutions. Those solutions may be wrong. A rational thinker can then eliminate that wrong answer and try another route. Logic often implies deductive reasoning, but many would argue that inductive reasoning is also necessary for rational beings.
There is a problem with inductive reasoning. Scholasticism used Aristotle and the Bible as the foundation of education. We did not come to the modern age until much later and there was a terrible fight and strong backlash to Aristotle's inductive reasoning. We are talking a huge knowledge breakthrough that changed our cultures and our lives. There was a lot of anger towards education based on Aristotle because it prevented us from progressing intellectually.
Hume asks on what grounds we come to our beliefs about the unobserved on the basis of inductive inferences. He presents an argument in the form of a dilemma which appears to rule out the possibility of any reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of an inductive inference. There are, he says, two possible types of arguments, demonstrative and probable, but neither will serve. A demonstrative argument produces the wrong kind of conclusion, and a probable argument would be circular. Therefore, for Hume, the problem remains of how to explain why we form any conclusions that go beyond the past instances of which we have had experience (T. 1.3.6.10). Hume stresses that he is not disputing that we do draw such inferences. The challenge, as he sees it, is to understand the foundation of the inferencethe logic or process of argument that it is based upon (E. 4.2.21). The problem of meeting this challenge, while evading Humes argument against the possibility of doing so, has become known as the problem of induction. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
PhilosophimSeptember 07, 2024 at 15:35#9305540 likes
There is a problem with inductive reasoning. Scholasticism used Aristotle and the Bible as the foundation of education.
A person who is using a screw to fix a pipe also has a problem. Inductive reasoning is a tool. It has its proper applications, and improper applications. But no one throws away their screwdriver entirely just because it can't fix a pipe.
We did not come to the modern age until much later and there was a terrible fight and strong backlash to Aristotle's inductive reasoning.
Right, because someone asked the question, "What if Aristotle is wrong?" To explore that, that particular person had to explore several inductive reasons too. Rational thinking is not, "I have the right answer". Rational thinking is a process of working through a problem to a solution. And that requires both inductive reasoning to figure out different possibilities, and deductive reasoning to narrow it down to necessary conclusions.
Hume stresses that he is not disputing that we do draw such inferences. The challenge, as he sees it, is to understand the foundation of the inferencethe logic or process of argument that it is based upon (E. 4.2.21). The problem of meeting this challenge, while evading Humes argument against the possibility of doing so, has become known as the problem of induction.
If you are interested, I have essentially solved that problem here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There is a nice summary on the next immediate post. Essentially there is a hierarchy of inductions. The close they are to the process to gain knowledge, the more cogent they are. Inductions are absolutely necessary tools in rational thinking and discovery. We just have to understand them and use them correctly.
Here is a clear example of thinking which is not rational. If you poke a caterpillar with a leaf in a way that doesn't harm it, it will squirm like its being attacked. Every time, it never stops. Its a purely reactionary mind, with no forethought, adaptability, or ability to react to memory. Whereas we have a monkey using a tool. How many tests did the monkey have to do to get the right stick? What did they try before sticks? Rational thinking is a process which requires memory, adaptation, and often times proactive and not reactive.
I might throw in here something I just read in a math book. It has been proven a 4 month old child recognizes the difference between one thing, two things, or three things. The baby has no language so is not thinking in terms one, two, three. It is just the change in the number of objects that the baby reacts to. This does not happen when there are four things or five things. More than three is just many. It also is specific to the number of things. It does not matter if three balls become three blocks, or if red puppets become blue puppets. It is only the change in the number of things, up to three things that catches the baby's attention. This is also basic to horses, birds, and dogs.
That is knowledge of some things is hard-wired. It comes with the animal. This is not the thinking you described. It is more like the caterpillar reacting as though it were being attacked. No thinking, just a reaction. A man accidentally killed his son because he was reacting to fear, and picked up his gun when he heard an intruder and then fired that gun when his son who came home from college a day early, jumped out of the closet to surprise his dad. The reaction happened before the thinking could begin. I think it is important to understand not all thinking is rational and thank you for your example of the caterpillar. It is also a baby's reaction to the change in the number of things. This is the stimulus, this is the reaction. Not rational thinking.
quote]He (sc. Hume) presents an argument in the form of a dilemma which appears to rule out the possibility of any reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of an inductive inference.[/quote]
People often forget that he also says that, in spite of the fact that inductive reasoning is deductively invalid, we will continue to act on that basis, but not from reason, from custom or habit. He also says that inductive reasoning is all the proof you will ever get and provides a basis that is "as good as a proof". (In the context of his discussion of miracles, he slips up, or gets over-enthusiastic, and says that induction reasoning (against miracles) is a proof. He excoriates radical scepticism, which he calls "Pyrrhonism" even though he acknowledges that he cannot refute it. He recommends a month in the country as a cure. All he wanted to disprove was the Aristotelian idea of a "power" hidden behind the phenomena.
There are two ideas that may help with the issue of animal ratonal thinking.
One is the idea of "embedded" beliefs. These are believes which it is necessary to posit to make sense of the action. You walk towards your car, reach in to your pocket for the key to open it, and fail to find it. You believed that you had the key even though you didn't. You just didn't think. So there was no reasoning process behind your walk to the car and yet you believed it. The same is clearly true of animals. They do not have language, so they cannot go through what we call a reasoning process, though they can clearly learn from experience and remember what they learn and so act rationally.
The other idea is the distinction between knowing how to do something and being able to articulate that knowledge, or between tacit and articulate knowledge. (Even philosophers have to acknowledge that it is perfectly possible to use a word correctly without being able to define it. They quarrel about whether that means that you know what the word means only because (unsurprisingly) they are fixated on articulate knowledge and don't take knowing how seriously. Given that knowing-how and knowing-that are two distinct abilities, it should be no surprise that animals know how to do things without knowing how to articulate them.
Please let's try to get over the idea that only humans have language. There are many language-like communication systems, of varying degrees of sophistication. It's a matter of degree, not of kind.
This is the stimulus, this is the reaction. Not rational thinking.
But you are leaving out all the interesting bits. Stimulus/response is Pavlov's idea. The stimulus, for him, is something external and the response is the animal's. It's the feedback that does the work. In the case of his dogs, the bell announces the food and the animal salivating is the response, because the dog has learnt that the bell is followed by food. It's perfectly rational. Skinner introduced what he called "operant conditioning", where the stimulus is something the animal does and the response is what the environment does. If the response is a reward, the animal's action is reinforced; if the response is unpleasant, the animal's action is inhibited. It's called trial and error and it's perfectly rational.
I agree that the baby waving its arms and legs about is. let's say, purely mechanical. Evolution sees to it that we are born with a basis for learning what we need to know. Whether it is mechanical or not, it will be rational. But the baby quickly finds out that some movements are rewarded and some are not - and off we go. They have a mechanical seeking movement - probably based on pheremones - that is rewarded when the milk is found - and off we go. Horses and cows and others have a more complicated problem - they have to learn to stand up and walk before they feed - but they manage it. I'm not clear whether the squirming caterpillar is yelling in pain or trying to escape, by the way - possibly both. They could be blind, mechanical movements, but I doubt it. Evolution would favour squirming caterpillars because they are more likely to escape.
People often forget that he also says that, in spite of the fact that inductive reasoning is deductively invalid, we will continue to act on that basis, but not from reason, from custom or habit. He also says that inductive reasoning is all the proof you will ever get and provides a basis that is "as good as a proof". (In the context of his discussion of miracles, he slips up, or gets over-enthusiastic, and says that induction reasoning (against miracles) is a proof. He excoriates radical scepticism, which he calls "Pyrrhonism" even though he acknowledges that he cannot refute it. He recommends a month in the country as a cure. All he wanted to disprove was the Aristotelian idea of a "power" hidden behind the phenomena.
[Emphasis added]
I'm not familiar with the Aristotelian idea of a "power" hidden behind the phenomena. However, based on my considerations of neuroscience, calling our subconscious recognition of patterns "a power" doesn't seem inappropriate.
I'd be interested in hearing more about Hume's disagreement with Aristotle, if it isn't too much trouble.
Vera MontSeptember 07, 2024 at 17:34#9305720 likes
If the reasoning isn't correct, things can go very wrong.
Indeed. But 'correct' isn't in the definition of reasoning, nor is the soundness of the result. It's a process that can be carried out more or less effectively.Quoting Athena
It is your opinion that I hold rational thinking as a human thing based on language that animals do not have because I want to exploit animals, is an opinion, not a fact.
I like that the definition begins with "correct reasoning".
'Incorrect', 'ill-informed', 'faulty', 'based on invalid premises and/or unfounded assumptions', 'inappropriate' and even 'fatally flawed' are descriptions that can be applied to:
Webster: 1. The use of reason; especially : the drawing of inferences or conclusions through the use of reason. 2. An instance of the use of reason : argument.
It is your opinion that I hold rational thinking as a human thing based on language that animals do not have because I want to exploit animals, is an opinion, not a fact.
I never claimed otherwise. And, in fact, the remark was not directed specifically at you - except inasmuch as you have been defending the human exclusivity position - but was an observation regarding a whole system of faulty/disingenuous human reasoning for the purpose of arriving at a desired conclusion.
Propaganda and advertising work in this same way: argument directed at a desired outcome. The purveyors of mis- and disinformation use a rational process to determine what kinds of falsehood their audience is most likely to believe and construct the most persuasive arguments to make their conclusions sound reasonable. Often, this involves altering the meaning of words and twisting familiar concepts, and may include denial of the audience's practical experience.
I'd be interested in hearing more about Hume's disagreement with Aristotle, if it isn't too much trouble.
I recommend reading what he actually says, and only reading secondary sources with that in mind. The argument against induction is routinely misunderstood, and so they cannot be altogether trusted.
Bear in mind also that when I say "Aristotelian" I mean it. Hume might have been arguing with Aristotle, but he doesn't say that who he's disagreeing. It's "the schools" that he is targeting.
His discussion is in the "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" Section IV, Part II. It begins on page 33 in my edition. It begins:-
I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.
If you have an electronic text, search for "power". It'll come back with over 100 entries, but you can click through them quite quickly. In my search, it was number 15 of 129. It comes quite early, in the first page or two.
wonderer1September 07, 2024 at 17:54#9305770 likes
Reply to Athena
I guess you'll have better things to do that hang around here!
I want to add that I do not at all deny that animals (including humans) do have purely mechanical responses. Examples in humans are the reflex breath as you come back to the top of the water, which is clearly evolved and rational, as contrasted with the jerk of your lower leg as your old-fashioned doctor tap just below your knee, which (so far as I know) has no evolutionary purpose. You may know that if you scratch a dog at just the right place, their back leg comes up as if to scratch themselves; they can also do the same thing when they want to scratch themselves; that response can be mechanical and irrational and can be voluntary and rational.
Often, this involves altering the meaning of words and twisting familiar concepts, and may include denial of the audience's practical experience.
You're not wrong. But, along with all the similarities, there must be differences. The same applies to chimps and horses and whales. So there is legitimate enquiry to be had here, surely?
wonderer1September 07, 2024 at 20:06#9305870 likes
These powers, as Hume keeps emphasizing, are "secret", "hidden".
It's interesting to consider how much less secret and hidden these days, is the power of bread to nourish. These days if I go buy a loaf of bread many of the bread's nutritive 'secrets' are likely to be listed on the packaging. :smile:
I just finished reading it, so I have a better understanding of the context in which he was using "powers".
So you should also have a better understanding of what empiricism was/is all about. The debate between empiricists and rationalists (the orthodox background for empiricism in philosophy to-day) is a whole other issue. That debate was about innate ideas - a quite different problem.
You may find it interesting to read Section V and VII for more about causation and Section XII for more about scepticism.
It's interesting to consider how much less secret and hidden these days, is the power of bread to nourish. These days if I go buy a loaf of bread many of the bread's nutritive 'secrets' are likely to be listed on the packaging. :smile:
Yes. One could argue that the powers are less secret than they seemed to be back then. We describe what happens in terms of a condition - if and when the first billiard ball hits the second, the second will move. It makes no difference if you know the molecular analysis of the balls - the causal relation has no more to it than "if and when p, then q will follow".
One could argue that the powers are less secret than they seemed to be back then.
When it comes to our power of thought, it's still hidden. We don't know at this point how the brain thinks BECAUSE we do not have access to enough of the brain's processing to figure it out. Yes, we have fMRI, EEGs, direct measurement of neuron's firing, etc. But these just don't reveal in anything close to granular detail how the brain produces the self, consciousness, novels, symphonies, mechanical inventions, and so on and so forth. There are clues, but the case isn't solved by a long shot.
Will it be solved? I don't know. Depends on the stability of civilization over the next century or two. The brain's 90 billion neurons (give or take a half dozen) and their trillion trillion interconnections are literally beyond our reach at this point. C. elegans' brain (all 300 neurons) has been fully charted, but that's a far cry from even a rat's brain, let alone the extraordinary brain of Ludwig V.
If we don't figure out what ever neuron does, that's fine. We don't need to know. Our brains are not so reliable that they should have more knowledge than they can safely use.
wonderer1September 07, 2024 at 21:57#9306020 likes
It makes no difference if you know the molecular analysis of the balls - the causal relation has no more to it than "if and when p, then q will follow".
Well, I'd think it could only seem so from an awfully 'high level' view, where a lot of the causal detail is coarse grained out of consideration. The causality involved in anything I'm apt to find interesting is a lot more complex than "if and when p, then q will follow". In digital logic terms, that can be implemented with a wire 'from p to q'.
It's pretty deeply engrained into my way of thinking, to see causality as a lot more complex than that.
Vera MontSeptember 07, 2024 at 22:08#9306050 likes
But, along with all the similarities, there must be differences.
Certainly. Evolution is a huge, complex, interconnected web of living things developing the faculties that best served their survival. Many of those faculties are held in common by large numbers of species, in varying degrees, styles and intensities. Rational thinking is one survival tool that many animals use to varying degree, depth, breadth and efficiency. I don't say humans are not the smartest and most linguistic; only that they are not unique in the ability to solve problems, and that setting problems to solve is the only way that I know of to test this ability.
So there is legitimate enquiry to be had here, surely?
It's been going on for a considerable time - I think we're coming up on a century of scientific inquiry into the subject.
What I object to is starting from a conclusion that should have been put to rest decades ago.
Srap TasmanerSeptember 07, 2024 at 22:52#9306120 likes
Instincts are obviously prior to all of that, and instincts are to some extend already reasonable. Instincts are the original 'reasons'
One way to clarify all this is to distinguish clearly between rationality in the instrumental sense, meaning something like "goal advancing," and rationality in the sense of something like "meeting the standards of argument and evidence in your speech community."
In the first sense, animals are prima facie rational, if anything mostly more rational than human beings, less subject to ridiculous maladaptive beliefs or habits of thought that might lead to behavior harmful to self or group. There are limits of course.
The second sense appears to be the sole province of language-users and therefore us, for better or worse.
Two tricky points: (1) the extent to which and the ways in which the two related; and, perhaps as a particular case of (1) but perhaps not, (2) whether internalizing the patterns of reason as justification and argumentation (i.e., sense 2) genuinely contributes to belief formation at all, and perhaps to adaptive belief formation, or simply makes us more facile at producing justifications for beliefs arrived at we know not how.
PhilosophimSeptember 08, 2024 at 00:03#9306230 likes
That is knowledge of some things is hard-wired. It comes with the animal. This is not the thinking you described. It is more like the caterpillar reacting as though it were being attacked.
I think it is important to understand not all thinking is rational and thank you for your example of the caterpillar. It is also a baby's reaction to the change in the number of things. This is the stimulus, this is the reaction. Not rational thinking.
Absolutely I agree that not all thinking is rational. But back to the crow. If the crow had experimented with different things to get the food, and stumbled upon the branch, then remembered the branch, would that be rational thinking?
When it comes to our power of thought, it's still hidden. We don't know at this point how the brain thinks BECAUSE we do not have access to enough of the brain's processing to figure it out.
Yes, it's fascinating to watch people wrestling with it. BTW, I don't think the brain thinks. I'm the one who does the thinking. In other words, thinking is a holistic phenomenon, like a rainbow.
A big problem is that "thinking" along with "understanding" are probably the two most protean concepts we have. I'm pretty sure that we'll have to modify those concepts to fit with the science we come up with, rather than the other way round.
People think that there's a way of sorting the problem out according to the model of information processing that we already have in our thinking machines. So it's worth noting that not everyone thinks that they are thinking machines. Then there is the fact that the brain is not just an information processing machine. It also controls action and reaction, and it may not need anything we could recognize as language to do that.
Will it be solved? I don't know. Depends on the stability of civilization over the next century or two.
It will be solved. But I'm pretty sure it will take conceptual change, perhaps as big as the change that solved the solar system.
What's a century or two? There was nearly two thousand years between Ptolemy and Copernicus. There's no rush.
I don't say humans are not the smartest and most linguistic; only that they are not unique in the ability to solve problems, and that setting problems to solve is the only way that I know of to test this ability.
I dunno. There's evidence around that being smart and linguistic may turn out not to be entirely beneficial. In this context "better together" means together with the entire planet.
Setting problems is probably the only way. But I worry that all we are testing is whether they are as smart as we are by our standards. Which are not necessarily the best standards. Lab work has to be a bit suspect.
What I object to is starting from a conclusion that should have been put to rest decades ago.
I don't disagree. But there has been a lot of progress in the last few hundred years. We are no longer the centre of the entire universe, a special species chosen by God. We've recognized equality in a way that never even crossed Aristotle's mind. It's no wonder that some people are anxious and defensive.
It's pretty deeply engrained into my way of thinking, to see causality as a lot more complex than that.
I know there's a lot going on around causality, because there are so many anomalous phenomena that seem to escape it. Just as the pre-scientific (Aristotelian) concept of causation had to go to enable the new science to develop. What I'm trying to suggest is that some phenomena that appear to be "secret" are just the result of asking the wrong (because unanswerable) question.
I don't think the brain thinks. I'm the one who does the thinking.
And who are you? Where did you come from? Who do you think you are?
So, some neurological researchers and thinkers propose that the 'self' -- you, I -- is a convenient fiction. The self is a creation of the brain, and we don't know how this is accomplished. As a fiction, the self is an extremely compelling story. But, you know, as I type this, it is somewhat clear to me that "I" am not composing these sentences. I'm reading them as they appear. The composer is a mental facility composed of various brain circuits. This facility outputs the text to the motor facility which causes my fingers to move in just the right way to produce this text.
"I" have edited the text; I decided to change some words here and there. But again, Neurological research shows that the decision to act is made BEFORE we are aware that we want to act. The "I" editor operates a couple of beats behind the brain circuits that actually made the decision.
That's OK, because most of the time the various parts of my brain are in accord on the importance of keeping "me", body and brain, together in one piece. Risk-reduction circuits in the brain try to keep "me" from getting beat up in The Philosophy Forum, and possibly killed (figuratively here, for real out on the street).
There is a lot "I" don't like about these loosey-goosey theories of self, consciousness, and all that, even if I grant them plausibility.
And then eventually, socrates put forwards the notion that we should have conscious rational deliberation prior to the act as the golden standard.... rational thinking instead of instinct.
Yes, and one can see why. There's reason to think that planning ahead pays off. But the model always suffered from not recognizing that planning isn't doing and being unable to understand the difference. Hence, for example, the puzzle of weakness of will. It turns out that non-reflective action is always crucial. One just cannot plan every action.
No, but what I'm saying is that "reasons" are not necessarily the result of conscious rational deliberation either. Instincts are obviously prior to all of that, and instincts are to some extend already reasonable.
I have some reservations about instinct. It's supposed to be used for unlearned behaviour. But instincts get modified, because, paradoxically, we have an instinct to learn. So actual behaviour is, paradoxically, learned. Birds seem to have an instinct to build nests in specific ways. Yet this cannot be a simple response, since they have to adapt to the circumstances they are actually in. What I'm getting at here is the we need a concept of non-reflective behaviour to explain, for example, how people manage to fight without the articulate deliberation in advance and why they do not need to deliberate about deliberating, though they can. The idea that they do something like articulate deliberation but at lightening speed is pure hand-waving.
Two tricky points: (1) the extent to which and the ways in which the two related; and, perhaps as a particular case of (1) but perhaps not, (2) whether internalizing the patterns of reason as justification and argumentation (i.e., sense 2) genuinely contributes to belief formation at all, and perhaps to adaptive belief formation, or simply makes us more facile at producing justifications for beliefs arrived at we know not how.
Yes, they are indeed tricky. Sadly, I have nothing useful to contribute. I do have faith one day someone will come up with something.
And who are you? Where did you come from? Who do you think you are?
I realize that you are asking those questions to get me puzzled, not because you think they don't have answers. But perhaps we should start from the fact that those questions have perfectly good answers and frame what neurologists are doing in more sensible ways.
So, some neurological researchers and thinkers propose that the 'self' -- you, I -- is a convenient fiction.
That has some plausibility if you mean "fiction" in the sense that mathematics is (maybe) a fiction, and physical objects and everything else. But the suggestion that I and you don't exist is absurd. It would be much better to say that the self is a holistic phenomenon. The brain process that you say cause my action are an analysis of the action, not a cause of it. Compare the analysis of a rainbow in terms of physics. People used to complain that physics abolishes the rainbow, but of course it doesn't; physics analyzes the rainbow, and it is normal for a holistic phenomenon to apparently disappear under analysis.
The composer is a mental facility composed of various brain circuits. This facility outputs the text to the motor facility which causes my fingers to move in just the right way to produce this text.
Why do you separate composing from typing? The idea that saying something is somehow unspooling what the brain has already done just pushes the issue back a stage into an infinite regress. That representation of what is going on is an analysis. (The clue is in the term "analysis".)
But again, Neurological research shows that the decision to act is made BEFORE we are aware that we want to act. The "I" editor operates a couple of beats behind the brain circuits that actually made the decision.
No, my fingers operate a couple of beats behind the brain circuits. What you call the decision is simply the initiation and control of my typing. To put it in a misleading way, "I" is the entire process. We are misled into thinking that decision is separate from action is just a result of the fact that we can interrupt the process of action part way through - aborting a process, not completing one process and starting the next. If you think of decision as an action distinct from execution, you end up with an infinite regress.
Fire OlogistSeptember 08, 2024 at 04:04#9306440 likes
Do animals have rational thinking? Do animals have communication skills? Is intuitive thinking rational or maybe something better?
I see rational thinking and communication skills as parts of one thing - rational thinking is communicable thinking, communicable to other thinking (reasoning) things. Reason and language or math cohabitate the same moment.
Animals dont need any of it. We personify animals when we call their behavior rational like our behavior is rational.
Our hand falls in the fire and our arm pulls it out. No rational thinking or communication necessary. Just a functioning body. That could be how animals do everything they do - they dont reason and choose. They act. They function. Stimulus and response based on the shape of the stimulus and the shape of the responder.
Humans insert reason and deliberate some responses. We draw these deliberations out by communicating our reasons with other humans.
Our reasoning and communicating abilities sprouted from being an animal, so there is some value in comparing what humans do in reasonable deliberation with what animals do when they appear to have choices and when they appear to deliberate their behaviors, but once we see rational thinking and communication in any animal, we see a person. So if animals used rational thinking and communication, they would be people.
We only KNOW there is any other rational being in the universe when another rational being declares its reasons in a communication; otherwise how would we know? As soon as an animal is able to use reason, that animal is able to communicate with other reasoning minds. So as soon as an ape finds actual reason working in their conscious experience, we might be able to communicate with it and actually confirm it is using reason as it communicates reasonably.
Animals only appear to use reason and to communicate their minds because WE reasoning communicating creatures see ourselves in them, NOT because we see them.
They are better than that. Innocent of all moral deliberation and choice. Conscious thought would be more like a plague or disease to an animal. They already have no illusions (because they have no sense of illusion), so what is there for them to reason about? What communication is needed when they are all by nature already on the same exact page?
We have a narcissistic sense of animals when we pull reason and communication out of their behavior. We also have an imprecise sense of reason and communication when we find it in between two animals (unless those two animals are people.
Bee senses pollen.
Bees that sense pollen release pheromones.
Other bee senses pheromones.
Bees that sense these pheromones find the pollen.
No need to insert a human/person-like reason behind the pheromones that were released, or call the receipt of pheromones the receipt of a communication, or call the move to find the pollen a decision.
We humans take time to name all of these things and reconnect them with logical reasoning, and communicate these logical reasonings and names to other reasoning creatures.
Animals skip all the reflection; in fact, they dont skip it, it never arises (and may not have anything in which it could arise in the first place).
No, we are the only ones plagued with reason and communication.
Fire OlogistSeptember 08, 2024 at 04:21#9306470 likes
"I" is the entire process. We are misled into thinking that decision is separate from action is just a result of the fact that we can interrupt the process of action part way through - aborting a process, not completing one process and starting the next. If you think of decision as an action distinct from execution, you end up with an infinite regress.
Good stuff.
Reflection (mind that is minding, or I that is I-ing), is the interruption. Reflection has its own motion, but it is an interruption of the motion of that which it is reflecting on. So the movement of reflection creates a stillness in the thing someone is reflecting on.
This creates confusion about what is moving and what is staying the same.
My sense is that animals dont waste any of this time - they dont interrupt the motion by creating a still reflection (of a moving thing) that they can reflect upon.
Vera MontSeptember 08, 2024 at 04:53#9306510 likes
There's evidence around that being smart and linguistic may turn out not to be entirely beneficial.
Probably the reverse. I didn't say better, just more. (Yes, I realize that many humans consider more/bigger/faster the ultimate in good.) But that doesn't come under a comparison with the rational thought of other species.
Setting problems is probably the only way. But I worry that all we are testing is whether they are as smart as we are by our standards. Which are not necessarily the best standards. Lab work has to be a bit suspect.
Many of the intelligence tests are really about "How much like us are they?" That business with the yellow dot, for example. Dogs don't identify individuals by sight but by smell and don't seem at all interested in their own appearance. I'm not surprised if they show no interest in their reflection in a mirror, which smells of nothing but glass, metal and the handler who put it there.
OTOH, tests of spatial orientation (mazes) do mimic the actual life experience of mice and challenging rats to obtain food in a human-made environment is certainly realistic. The experiments with plastic boxes, sticks and stones don't seem to give crows any trouble, though the props might be too foreign for most birds. It's hard for humans to devise tests that objectively measure the performance of species with very different interests and attitudes and perception from ourselves.
The least obtrusive and most reliable way to discover how other animals think is to observe them in their natural habitat, solving the problems nature throws at them. We have an increasing ability to do that now. Without special equipment, though, we can observe domestic animals as they go about the business of living, overcoming obstacles and devising means to obtain what they desire. It's not The Scientific Method; it's common sense.
But the suggestion that I and you don't exist is absurd.
It isn't that 'I' or 'you' don't exist; rather, the identity that I have doesn't occupy a specific region of the brain called "the self" -- at least they haven't been able to find it, and they've been looking, What seems to be the case is that various facilities in the brain maintain our identity as a seemingly solid self.
If it's a fiction (which wouldn't be my choice of words) then it's a fairly solid fiction in a healthy, intact brain.
Several different areas of the brain are involved in composing this sentence. Obviously Broca's area, (language production) is involved; thought creation areas are involved; memory, etc. None of these areas control motor functions (like typing). So, once the sentence is ready, the motor centers are in charge of the typing.
Granted, the brain has some degree of plasticity, and an unused area can be recruited for some other purpose, but in adults, especially, this isn't a quick process. For example, were I to be blinded, the visual cortex would have a lot less to do. It might be recruited to process sensory input from the fingers in order to understand braille.
The idea that saying something is somehow unspooling what the brain has already done just pushes the issue back a stage into an infinite regress.
There isn't "something else unspooling what the brain has done". The brain itself is managing the process of issuing a statement from inspiration to expression. Broca's area alone can't produce speech without coordinated effort by the motor system controlling tongue, lips, jaw, and breathing. Brain injuries and brain manipulation (during surgery) reveal that different areas of the brain control different aspects of our whole behavior.
I don't think the brain thinks. I'm the one who does the thinking.
That's why I asked, "who are you?"
No matter what you say, what you think, what you do, it issues from the brain labeled "Ludwig V". What the neurological researcher is saying is that the "representation called the self of Ludwig V" is not doing the thinking, Almost everything the brain does is silent; we don't hear it thinking. We can't watch it retrieve a memory if a grade school teacher; we can't observe it coming up with a new idea. It feels like "we" are doing the thinking, but that's part of the fiction of the self.
Ludwig: Your brain is doing your thinking, it's just that "your thinking" happens in your brain below your radar.
Hey, show a little gratitude. The brain controls everything about you from your happy smile to your asshole and everything in between. You don't want to know everything your brain is doing. Yes it does your thinking, which you want to claim. Why don't you claim the task of keeping yourself upright when walking; blinking regularly to keep your eyeballs moist; keeping track of your temperature, blood pressure, heart beat, and breathing; waking up every morning (rather than not waking up); registering a patch of itchy skin; and hundreds of other services going on all the time?
You don't claim all these functions because you probably feel thinking is more noble and important than managing your bladder and rectal sphincters. Well, Ludwig, just wait until those bladder and rectal sphincters stop working, and you'll no longer consider their control beneath your dignity.
Thinking is just one of many things that we are not 'personally' responsible for.
The least obtrusive and most reliable way to discover how other animals think is to observe them in their natural habitat, solving the problems nature throws at them.
Which is how Lars Chittka figured out so much about The Mind of A Bee, his 2023 book about bee perception, cognition, and success. One of his observations is "Bees live a very fast life; they have about 3 weeks from leaving their wax cell as an adult to their likely death. They have to actually learn a lot--it isn't all pre-programmed in their genes. In order to do this, their neurons seem to be far more efficient than ours. And they have very capable sensory capacities -- a sense of smell, touch, taste, hearing, the ability to see different parts of the spectrum than we do, a directional capacity, and so on.
When they land on a flower--which they did because the flower met certain specs--they can immediately tell whether another bee has recently foraged there. If so, they fly off. They 'know' it takes a flower a few hours to refill its nectar dispensers.
It takes a lot of unobtrusive observation to discover these things, something bee scientists have been doing for decades.
Vera MontSeptember 08, 2024 at 17:20#9307350 likes
It takes a lot of unobtrusive observation to discover these things, something bee scientists have been doing for decades.
And more, better technology becomes available every year. People are making astonishing nature documentaries. Any interested layman can learn a great deal about animal behaviour without having to slog through scientific papers.
Reflection (mind that is minding, or I that is I-ing), is the interruption. Reflection has its own motion, but it is an interruption of the motion of that which it is reflecting on. So the movement of reflection creates a stillness in the thing someone is reflecting on.
My sense is that animals dont waste any of this time - they dont interrupt the motion by creating a still reflection (of a moving thing) that they can reflect upon.
Sometimes cats and dogs sit and stare into space, quite still. One wonders what they are thinking about and whether they are thinking at all but, perhaps, meditating, or maybe just sitting without anything going on in their heads at all (but perhaps that is meditation - I don't know about that). If not for that, I would agree with you.
Probably the reverse. I didn't say better, just more. (Yes, I realize that many humans consider more/bigger/faster the ultimate in good.) But that doesn't come under a comparison with the rational thought of other species.
Many of the intelligence tests are really about "How much like us are they?" That business with the yellow dot, for example. Dogs don't identify individuals by sight but by smell and don't seem at all interested in their own appearance. I'm not surprised if they show no interest in their reflection in a mirror, which smells of nothing but glass, metal and the handler who put it there.
Yes. I would value them more if they weren't called "intelligence tests". The very idea of intelligence makes not sense to me. It seems to comprise a wide variety of skills, some of which are highly transferable. We all possess many of them, some more and to a higher degree than others. It's about as sensible as trying to develop a single test for the nutritional value of food.
OTOH, tests of spatial orientation (mazes) do mimic the actual life experience of mice and challenging rats to obtain food in a human-made environment is certainly realistic. The experiments with plastic boxes, sticks and stones don't seem to give crows any trouble, though the props might be too foreign for most birds. It's hard for humans to devise tests that objectively measure the performance of species with very different interests and attitudes and perception from ourselves.
Yes, but complaint is that behaviour in a mimicry is not necessarily the same as behaviour in their real life. Being caged in the lab at all is what disrupts everything - even if they are enjoying the holiday from real life.
The least obtrusive and most reliable way to discover how other animals think is to observe them in their natural habitat, solving the problems nature throws at them. We have an increasing ability to do that now. Without special equipment, though, we can observe domestic animals as they go about the business of living, overcoming obstacles and devising means to obtain what they desire. It's not The Scientific Method; it's common sense.
Quite so. But "true" scientists are obsessed with controlling all the variables. Experiments are thought to be better science than observations, (and, in inanimate matter, they are). Interpreting observations in their natural habitat is very tricky and there's always the issue that the observer might affect the behaviour - even the presence of a camera/microphone can do that. It's not "just" common sense. Better to think of it as organized and disciplined common sense.
L'éléphantSeptember 08, 2024 at 19:08#9307850 likes
@Fire Ologist
You have very well explained what I wanted to say.
I see rational thinking and communication skills as parts of one thing - rational thinking is communicable thinking, communicable to other thinking (reasoning) things. Reason and language or math cohabitate the same moment.
Animals dont need any of it. We personify animals when we call their behavior rational like our behavior is rational.
Animals do not need to have rational thinking because they do well with what they've got. Their instinct is very acute and senses are magnified multiple times than ours. They don't also need to plan for the "future" by just staying on top of things at the moment.
A lot of people do not understand that if animals are truly rational animals, they would have the same level of communication as we do. They could consult us in matters of daily survival, and vice versa.
Mimicry and imitation are not rational thinking -- regardless of how intelligent or useful or mind-blowing they are. Animals and plants can mimic each other to avoid the predators and increase their chances of bringing their offspring to maturity.
Vera MontSeptember 08, 2024 at 19:46#9307920 likes
The very idea of intelligence makes not sense to me. It seems to comprise a wide variety of skills, some of which are highly transferable.
I think it's because we've become accustomed, through the 20th century, to evaluate human mental capability according to a standard, easily quantifiable set of responses. The earliest IQ test, if I recall correctly, was intended to identify learning difficulties in school children, but the army soon adapted one to make recruitment more efficient, eliminating those applicants who were deemed unfit for service and identifying candidates for officer training. Nothing sinister about those limited applications... but, like all handy tools, people came to depend too heavily on the concept of IQ and on tests (more recently, personality tests) to measure intelligence, it's been widely misapplied and abused.
Yes, but complaint is that behaviour in a mimicry is not necessarily the same as behaviour in their real life. Being caged in the lab at all is what disrupts everything - even if they are enjoying the holiday from real life.
We need to go back one more step and question the validity of testing rodent cognition on laboratory specimens - mice and rats that have been bred in captivity - often for a specific purpose - for many generations. Rodents used for cancer research, for example are often strains highly susceptible to malignancies, much more so than sewer rats or barn mice. So the very subject of the experiment is skewed at conception, and not a true reflection of its species.
These highly controlled laboratory environments, as well as close observation of domestic species in what has become their adopted habitat, yields indicators of what to look for; they don't provide definitive answers. We have a beginning, not yet a conclusion.
A lot of people do not understand that if animals are truly rational animals, they would have the same level of communication as we do. They could consult us in matters of daily survival, and vice versa.
:lol:
A lot of people do not understand that if humans were truly rational animals, they would have the same level of communication as we do. They could consult one another, and ants, in matters of long-term survival.
It isn't that 'I' or 'you' don't exist; rather, the identity that I have doesn't occupy a specific region of the brain called "the self" -- at least they haven't been able to find it, and they've been looking,
I think that you and they badly need a deeper understanding of the concepts of identity and the self. Then they wouldn't waste their time on obviously futile searches.
The classic place for this is the paradox of Theseus' ship. Have you encountered it? It demonstrates quite clearly that the identity of anything is not a constituent element of any part of that thing. There are difficult cases, but that much is clear.
So, once the sentence is ready, the motor centers are in charge of the typing.
Yes. This is a version of Chomsky's theory. But it doesn't fit with what happens. Sometimes, typing out text is like unspooling a sentence. But not always. Sometimes one pauses in the middle of a sentence to work out how to end it. Sometimes one types out a sentence as a trial or draft, not because it is finished. Or consider what is going on when I work out a calculation with pencil and paper.
Obviously Broca's area, (language production) is involved; thought creation areas are involved; memory, etc. None of these areas control motor functions (like typing).
Yes, yes, you know all those areas are "involved". But you don't know what they are doing beyond the roughest outline. But they must control motor functions - through the relevant department. If they did not they could not send their completed sentences to be typed.
No matter what you say, what you think, what you do, it issues from the brain labeled "Ludwig V".
But you do admit that I do say things and think things and do things. "Issues" is pretty vague, so I don't have to take issue with that. No, the brain does not make me do anything, unless you can describe it as making me do what I have decided to do - which is a very peculiar notion.
What the neurological researcher is saying is that the "representation called the self of Ludwig V" is not doing the thinking,
There is no self apart from me, Ludwig V. A representation of me would be a picture or model of me. Why would it do any thinking? It doesn't even have a brain.
It feels like "we" are doing the thinking, but that's part of the fiction of the self.
But you just said that we do think. I think it would be better to talk of constructions rather than fictions. I can recognize that in some sense, I am a construction - there are lots of bits and pieces working (mostly) together.
it's just that "your thinking" happens in your brain below your radar.
I do realize that there's a lot going on in my brain when I think &c. We do know a bit about what is going on. But you could only describe it as thinking if you are prepared to say that a computer thinks. The brain is, after all, a machine.
Why don't you claim the task of keeping yourself upright when walking; blinking regularly to keep your eyeballs moist; keeping track of your temperature, blood pressure, heart beat, and breathing; waking up every morning (rather than not waking up); registering a patch of itchy skin; and hundreds of other services going on all the time?
How do you know what I claim and what I don't claim? If you had asked me, I would have told you. But I think you are going off the rails in this and the next paragraph.
Thinking is just one of many things that we are not 'personally' responsible for.
It is true that consciousness is the tip of an iceberg, and there is indeed a lot going on in our bodies that we are not aware of. We know a bit about the brain, but not very much. It is always tempting to get ahead of oneself and posit things because they "must" be so. That has led us into many blind alleys and idiocies, so it is best to be cautious.
Thinking does seem to go on automatically. But I find that I do have some control over it. I guess it is a bit like breathing.
You are aware that anyone who is convicted for many crimes is found guilty because they intended to do what they did?
If it is the case that neither of us knows more than just "a bit about the brain' than your claims about your self, and my claims about my self, and what our respective brains are or are not doing, are both based on insufficient evidence. We have reached an impasse.
But you could only describe it as thinking if you are prepared to say that a computer thinks. The brain is, after all, a machine.
I have not, would not, call the brain "a machine". After some brains invented computers, people started comparing their computers to brains and their brains to computers. My brain loves my Apple computer, but a computer is to the brain what a screw driver is to the brain: an sometimes useful external object,
a computer is to the brain what a screw driver is to the brain
That is the third version of the analogy. The Invisible Copy Editor, which is located on the underside of the Frontal Cortex next to the Olfactory Center, received a BAD SMELL alarm, indicating that the first version stank. My self was alerted, and I tried out a couple of different versions. Now it's back to Auto Mode.
A lot of people do not understand that if animals are truly rational animals, they would have the same level of communication as we do. They could consult us in matters of daily survival, and vice versa.
Do we really need us to tell them what they think about daily survival?
Your definition of rationality is no more than a stipulation. Anyone who is rational enough to read their behaviour (which we can do, in the same way that we can read the non-vernal behaviour of human beings) knows that they experience pain and pleasure and respond rationally to both.
I think it's because we've become accustomed, through the 20th century, to evaluate human mental capability according to a standard, easily quantifiable set of responses.
It's more accurate to say that we thought we needed a standard, quantifiable set of responses and decided to develop whatever we had to hand. "We need something, this is something." One can see this, because the development of personality tests (somewhat less conceptually incoherent, but, in my view nearly as vicious) when it was realized that intelligence tests didn't tell the story we needed (i.e. correlate with what we were looking for in our officers.) Essentially, the driver is our increasingly massified society, which is, at best, a double-edged sword.
The earliest IQ test, if I recall correctly, was intended to identify learning difficulties in school children, but the army soon adapted one to make recruitment more efficient, eliminating those applicants who were deemed unfit for service and identifying candidates for officer training.
Correct. The first is a humane impulse, the second not wrong, but not particularly humane.
Nothing sinister about those limited applications...
Well, they thought intelligence was culture-free - It isn't - and not affected by training and education - actually, it is, but to a limited extent. If that had been true, the test could have helped remove racism and classism from those decisions. They are still trying to deal with that, but using them when it hasn't been sorted out is morally very dubious, to put it politely.
but, like all handy tools, people came to depend too heavily on the concept of IQ and on tests (more recently, personality tests) to measure intelligence, it's been widely misapplied and abused.
Too right. Mind you, there have been moments when people have resisted the impulse.
These highly controlled laboratory environments, as well as close observation of domestic species in what has become their adopted habitat, yields indicators of what to look for; they don't provide definitive answers. We have a beginning, not yet a conclusion.
Yes. That's sadly common, isn't it? But we do have a choice, if we can set aside the question who is right and who is wrong. There is some risk, if one tries simply to explain oneself, one may realize that one understands one's own position less thoroughly than one thought, but that would be a bonus, wouldn't it?
So instead of arguing with you, I shall simply ask you a question.
In return, I will try to explain my own position on a particular point to you
Perhaps you may want to ask me a question?
OK?
I don't think either one of us is right, or wrong. I don't know enough about how the brain works to be right or wrong. I'm just guessing and passing on ideas I've picked up here and there.
I dislike some of the ideas I've come across such as the statement "The self does not exist." Maybe there is no lobe in the brain that houses "self", and maybe 'self' is generated by different parts of the brain, BUT, however it is produced, 'SELF' EXISTS as a durable, cohesive entity. My guess is that the 'self' is generated by the brain and social interaction from birth onward. An example of early self building might be the two-year old who, having learned the word, deploys "NO" as an expression of this new self that has a little power and choice. The "terrible twos" are a time when young children have come into possession of their self. And then we spend the rest of our lives cultivating 'selfhood'.
Some animals seem to have a self and some do not. An alleged test of 'self' is whether the animal recognizes itself in a mirror. 'Elephants do, dogs don't. On the other hand, the dogs I have lived with all seem to have diligently pursued their self-interests and preferences. I don't know any elephants.
So, question: How do you think the self is composed? Does DNA play a role? When does the self form--does it arise gradually or suddenly? Can we 'lose our self"? (not talking about literally losing our heads, or terminal brain disease which destroys the brain)
A question which has come up in discussions of the afterlife (about which none of us know anything): Does our self survive death? (To quote Flannery O'Conner, one of my favorite short story writers: "I belong to the church without Christ, where the lame don't walk, the blind don't see, and the dead stay dead.") Even if I don't believe in it, I find it difficult to imagine an afterlife of zeroed out souls who are without the selves they possessed in life.
Vera MontSeptember 09, 2024 at 22:33#9310570 likes
It's more accurate to say that we thought we needed a standard, quantifiable set of responses and decided to develop whatever we had to hand. "We need something, this is something."
I'll go along with that, but want to be generous and widen the scope of "need" to include benevolent aims and simple curiosity, as well as practical applications, and maybe, tentatively, forgive the social ignorance and complacency of the academics who made the early tests. (No, not the voting rights literacy tests of 1879 Kentucky!)
I'll go along with that, but want to be generous and widen the scope of "need" to include benevolent aims and simple curiosity, as well as practical applications, and maybe, tentatively, forgive the social ignorance and complacency of the academics who made the early tests. (No, not the voting rights literacy tests of 1879 Kentucky!)
Well, maybe you are better balanced than me. I'm thinking, though, that good motives do not excuse everything. You probably know about the Tuskegee Syphilis Research Study, 1932 - 1972. It was only terminated because of a press leak - i.e. by public opinion - so you can't excuse by historical context. Anyway, the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1964 and 1968 had been passed by then.
Vera MontSeptember 10, 2024 at 13:02#9311690 likes
You probably know about the Tuskegee Syphilis Research Study, 1932 - 1972.
I do now! And I know many examples of very bad scientific experimentation. I had no intention of including any of them in partly excusing ineptly designed intelligence tests.
Mimicry and imitation are not rational thinking -- regardless of how intelligent or useful or mind-blowing they are. Animals and plants can mimic each other to avoid the predators and increase their chances of bringing their offspring to maturity.
Whether mimicry and imitation are rational or not depends on why it is being done, surely? If it is being done to avoid predators, for example, why is it not rational?
When a parrot mimics speech, there is no doubt that it is the parrot that is doing the mimicking. Quite why I don't know, but it seems most reasonable to suppose that the parrot has some purpose in doing that, because it clearly finds the behaviour rewarding in some way. There a kind of mimicry in which a harmless species has evolved to imitate the warning signals of a harmful species to scare off predators, for example. This is clearly a result of evolution (and I have no problem with the purposive explanation attributed to evolution). It is not the plant's purpose, (except in an extended sense)
BTW Personally, I am quite unsure whether insects have purposes in the way that animals do or their mimicries are the result of evolution's purposes. I think that birds, on the other hand, do have purposes of their own.
The only way that we can distinguishes between coincidental similarities and mimicry is by reference to purposes, whether of the individual entity or of evolution. That means that we are attributing rationality as well, though not the discursive rationality that human beings practice.
A lot of people do not understand that if animals are truly rational animals, they would have the same level of communication as we do. They could consult us in matters of daily survival, and vice versa.
Everybody agrees that human language is uniquely distinctive and more extensive than animal communication systems (I call them languages) of animals. I'm quite unclear why you want to call how animals communicate anything other than a language and bracket them as not "truly" rational. It seems to me to be simply a question of definition, rather than anything substantial or interesting.
But there is a lot more to be said.
The distinction between knowing how (to do something, in the sense of being able to do it) and knowing that something (is true). The former does not require language, but the latter clearly does. Philosophy has never seriously focused on the latter of each pair, leaving the former aside as trivial or irrelevant.
However, philosophers have long been amazed that people are able to speak coherently without being able to give a definition of the words they use. They have mostly ignored the phenomenon. But it is the most direct and dramatic demonstration that it is possible to do something and follow rules without being able to articulate what one is doing or why one is doing it.
To say that animals are rational is to attribute to them knowing how to do things, without being able to articulate what they are doing. It should not be a conceptually problematic thesis. The difficult, of course, is which interpretations of the behaviour are accurate. Sorting that out takes extended and close observation, but is not impossible.
Reply to Vera Mont
Sadly, there is nothing to prevent a scientist being a bad scientist and even a racist scientist.
Vera MontSeptember 10, 2024 at 13:47#9311770 likes
Quite why I don't know, but it seems most reasonable to suppose that the parrot has some purpose in doing that, because it clearly finds the behaviour rewarding in some way.
Usually, quite literally and directly rewarding. The handler gives him a treat. (And performing some act that is not of one's innate nature for a reward is definitely rational.) Some birds and many dogs also do it to please a human they hold dear, which is at least socially intelligent behaviour. And some birds just mimic for the same reason they dance to music: it's fun.
wonderer1September 10, 2024 at 14:31#9311850 likes
Sadly, there is nothing to prevent a scientist being a bad scientist and even a racist scientist.
In US academia these days there are internal review boards which proposed research on human subjects must be approved by. My first wife was the the administrator for such a human subjects IRB, so I got to learn a lot about how they work.
The IRB that my wife was administrator for had members from outside academia, including a couple of local clergy. I don't know as much about nonacademic human research subjects review, but I doubt there is as little oversight as you suggest in most scientific research.
Vera MontSeptember 10, 2024 at 14:42#9311860 likes
I don't know as much about nonacademic human research subjects review, but I doubt there is as little oversight as you suggest in most scientific research.
These days, probably not. Up until the late 1970's, research wasn't at all well supervised or regulated in most countries. It was probably - just speculating now - government agencies' unconscionable behaviour that prompted legal and professional constraints on the use of human subjects. Other species have not fared as well - ever.
Reply to Athena Yes animals have rational thinking, due to the simple fact that survival instinct is a rational response in any living creature.
Therefore: I am hungry, I will forage/hunt for food" is a rational stepwise train of thought for any animal that supports their survival.
On more complex levels: "I am threatened by an adversary on my hunt for food. They are bigger and more aggressive than me. I will hunt elsewhere." Is a rational stepwise consideration to protect themselves. One which requires calculating risks based on both perception of their aggressor as well as self awareness of their own size, fighting ability etc.
Fight, flight, freeze or fawn is a dynamic of choices faced by many animals especially those that operate in hierarchal social groups. They can fight for dominance, run away and spare themselves, freeze to avoid detection or minimise their perceived threat to the aggressor or fawn - offer services such as flea picking, defence, some food or sex as a way to ingratiate themselves with the more dominant individual and thus gain secondary benefits.
These are all rational thoughts when survival and wellbeing is the soul agenda.
Humans of course have surpassed basic rational thought (survival rationale) to an elevated state where we can apply even more rationale to things that aren't directly life-threatening. However, gains and risks ( be them authority/status/political, financial, etc) still apply. We can't at the end if the day ignore our very real instinct to survive and prosper regardless of what the level of complexity of our reasoning. Which may lead to tactics like manipulation, pandering, overt conflict and further reasoning as mechanisms to gain the upper hand in anything from academia to business/marketing and social relationships.
Usually, quite literally and directly rewarding. ...... And some birds just mimic for the same reason they dance to music: it's fun.
I knew that rewards came into it. I just wondered whether they also did it for fun. Doing it for fun is intrinsically rewarding, but then the handler reinforces the reinforcement?
Doing it for fun. They're almost human, aren't they?
In US academia these days there are internal review boards which proposed research on human subjects must be approved by. ...... I don't know as much about nonacademic human research subjects review, but I doubt there is as little oversight as you suggest in most scientific research.
Yes, I know that. I think it's quite general in the scientific world these days. So things have got better - partly because of the fuss about that project. But I wouldn't dream of denying it. However, the failings of human beings are, let's say, persistent, so we should not get complacent. I'm sure you also agree with that.
These days, probably not. Up until the late 1970's, research wasn't at all well supervised or regulated in most countries. It was probably - just speculating now - government agencies' unconscionable behaviour that prompted legal and professional constraints on the use of human subjects. Other species have not fared as well - ever.
No, they haven't. They can't fight back. I like to think the glass is half full, but i can never forget that the glass is also half-empty. I'm always getting accused of being too optimistic and too pessimistic.
I am hungry, I will forage/hunt for food" is a rational stepwise train of thought for any animal that supports their survival.
Of course it is. WIttgenstein's work, especially on rule and rule-following indicates that, at some point, we act without benefit of articulation and I think that can be extended to understand how animals act rationally when they don't have the benefit of language.
I don't think either one of us is right, or wrong. I don't know enough about how the brain works to be right or wrong. I'm just guessing and passing on ideas I've picked up here and there.
That makes two of us. Exchanging views sounds a bit pointless to some people, but it is a very good way of learning and passing things on.
The "terrible twos" are a time when young children have come into possession of their self. And then we spend the rest of our lives cultivating 'selfhood'.
Yes. There are milestones in the story. The identity of people is peculiar because they have a say themselves about who and what they are. It gets very complicated because other people also have a say and the views may differ. Take the example of someone elected to be pope. They take a new name, and this is intended to reflect the beginning of a new identity. (There are other examples, but I'm not sure how widespread the practice is.) You make or may not but that. He is the guy who was called X by everybody, but became pope and now is called Y (by some people) But what's the guy's real name?
Some animals seem to have a self and some do not. An alleged test of 'self' is whether the animal recognizes itself in a mirror. 'Elephants do, dogs don't. On the other hand, the dogs I have lived with all seem to have diligently pursued their self-interests and preferences. I don't know any elephants.
It's not unimportant, but it's less than having a self or not. It's not even about whether they are self-conscious or not. Perhaps it's about whether they know how others see them. That's not a small thing.
So, question: How do you think the self is composed? Does DNA play a role? When does the self form--does it arise gradually or suddenly? Can we 'lose our self"?
I hope you don't hate this.
I think it's most likely that it develops over time and never stops developing until we stop living. What is it composed of? Well, partly we decide what it is composed of. But only partly. We can change many things, but not our physical body - though that also changes continuously. But, as I said earlier, other people also have a say in what and who I am. That's my first observation.
My second observation is this. "Identity" is a noun connected to a verb and roughly means the means of identifying whatever. Unlike "table", "chair", "tree" etc. which pick out or refer to objects, "identity" does not pick out or refer to an object. "Ludwig" picks out or refers to me. It does not pick out a part of me or even all the parts of me. It picks out the whole of me, just as "table" picks out or refers to the whole table, not a part or even all the parts. Then think that instead of saying "picks out" or "refers to", I could have said "identifies". Then think that when you identify a table you pick out the whole table. (Pronouns are flexible names. "I", "You", "He, She, It", etc are pronouns. Who or what they refer to is determined by the context. What they identify is not fixed, but varies according to context.)
My third and final observation is that "self" is a kind of pronoun that allows one to talk about self-reference in various ways. So my selt is just me. The idea of self-consciousness cropped up earlier. But it also allows me to explain that a car is a machine that moves itself, or that the computer switches itself off. So it's not just about people.
It is also sometimes used for emphasis. If I send you a birthday present, it is from me whether I bought and dispatched it myself or not; but it will usually go down better if you bought and sent it yourself. Or, there's a big difference between my ordering a boat and paying someone to build it and building it myself. This is really quite elusive and complicated. A good dictionary will give you various examples, which will help more than anything I could say.
I hope that's helpful. I want to stop there for now. If you are interested we can go back to brains and I'll try to explain why I was saying the weird things I was saying.
Does our self survive death? ..... Even if I don't believe in it, I find it difficult to imagine an afterlife of zeroed out souls who are without the selves they possessed in life.
I don't believe it partly because I can't imagine what an after-life without a physical body would be like. No senses! How does that work? Is it like being blind, deaf, dumb? Ugh!
Vera MontSeptember 10, 2024 at 16:38#9312130 likes
Doing it for fun. They're almost human, aren't they?
Why do you think we make pets of them? All intelligent species have a great deal in common, which is why they are able to communicate with and feel affection for one another.
The human specialness doctrine has not served us as well as it was it was intended to. Yes, it allows us to abuse, exploit and exterminate other species with impunity, but we also lose an entire dimension of our own emotional and intellectual life.
Reply to Vera Mont
Yes. I've had dogs and cats and a pony - oh, and some fish long ago. They were fun in a different way.
Vera MontSeptember 10, 2024 at 18:54#9312280 likes
Reply to Ludwig V
Fish are wonderfully relaxing to watch - in the dentist's waiting room; we've never had any at home. Lousy frisbee players, I understand.
Reply to Vera Mont
They don't talk much either and petting them is a bit of a problem.
But I knew a goldfish once that blew a bubble at you when you gave it a crumb of fish food. They called him/her "Professor". There's been work done on the intelligence of goldfish.
Octopuses, now. They'll spit water at you if they don't like you. They can escape from a screw-top jar. OK, they're not fish. But you have to admire them. Perhaps not as pets.
Everywhere you look, when you look closely, there's more to non-humans than humans think.
Vera MontSeptember 10, 2024 at 21:16#9312470 likes
....not to mention predict football games... Has anyone asked an octopus for 13 keys to winning an American election? I wouldn't want one for a pet. Really, I wouldn't want any pet that has to be confined. There are few things I dislike as much as cages, but an aquarium is unavoidable for marine species. I'd set Nemo free every time. Quoting Ludwig V
Everywhere you look, when you look closely, there's more to non-humans than humans think.
And daily fewer non-human species as there are daily more humans.
This afternoon, a sunny September say, I set a freshly-painted board out on the porch to dry, confident that no insects would stick to it and no bird would crap on it. I haven't had to wash the windshield all summer.
This afternoon, a sunny September say, I set a freshly-painted board out on the porch to dry, confident that no insects would stick to it and no bird would crap on it. I haven't had to wash the windshield all summer.
It's the shortage of birds I'm noticing. Insects are around in fair numbers. I expect they do better in non-agricultural areas.
Vera MontSeptember 10, 2024 at 21:49#9312540 likes
Reply to Ludwig V
Mosquitoes we've had aplenty this wet summer, but I haven't seen more than half a dozen butterflies and had to hand-pollinate my tomatoes and peppers for lack of bees. Ants are taking up the slack on cucumbers for some reason, but even the cluster flies we used to have to vacuum up by the hundreds have dwindled down the odd annoyance. So, what are the swallows and robins supposed to eat? This is the time of staging for migration and I see no flocks of anything, except our little neighbourhood clan of Canada geese. They're training the young ones to fly in formation (yes, geese are social and smart) - they haven't got the hang of a proper V yet.
We humans are so awfully clever and rational that we'll soon end up with nobody but one another to kill.
It seems to me that insects (using it as a general term) are scarcer than they used to be. Mayflies (order Ephemeroptera) used to be extremely plentiful near rivers and backwaters. One rarely sees them now. I haven't seen many butterflies of any kind in the past few years. For that matter, I don't see many house flies, either. Mosquitos seem to be holding their own.
People who live in crop growing rural areas certainly see more insects than urban dwellers. Hordes of a Japanese beetle imported to prey on aphids that feed on soybean plants collect on houses in the fall. They aren't harmful, but it 'bugs' some people. They look like lady bugs but when rubbed reveal a very bitter odor. Flies would be a lot more common around barnyards, hog pens, cattle, and so on.
In various places where researchers have counted insects, the numbers are down from the past. I am not sure what impact declining insect numbers have on birds, because global warming affects birds negatively in a number of ways. It can't be good.
So, what are the swallows and robins supposed to eat
The worms that early birds get are something of an ecological problem. The native earthworms of North America were scraped off by the last glacial period and are still recovering. When the first people arrived in North America, there weren't many worms crawling around in Northern areas. The Europeans brought big fat earth worms with them -- not deliberately, but in plant containers and root bundles. The big fat earth worms prospered and have spread over much of the "wormless zone"--in between southern Canada and north of Kansas, Missouri, Kentucky, etc.
How could big fat juicy earthworms be a problem?
They are a problem because they eat all the leaf litter on the ground. The native worms weren't big and robust enough to do that, The Euro-worms, however, are. When it rains, the bare soil (no longer covered up with a thick layer of leaf litter) erodes more, washing away the top soil, including the fertile worm castings.s
What to do, what to do?
Native earthworms can, of course, be planted in northern forests, but that isn't going to get rid of the Euro-worms. Pay birds a bounty on each big earthworm they eat? Imagine the difficult bookkeeping problem that would entail.
Is it rational to believe illnesses are caused by the gods? Is it rational to believe a god created man from mud?
Being correct or knowing the truth is not required for rationalization. Back in ancient times, a person who conclude that the sun goes around the earth by using their observations, is being rational.
Vera MontSeptember 11, 2024 at 13:37#9313430 likes
The worms that early birds get are something of an ecological problem.
Robins seem to be okay with big fat earthworms, and the garden soil isn't complaining. But birds that are adapted to feeding in the air - swallow, martins, swifts, nightjars - are seriously up shit creek. I live in an agricultural area and I haven't even seen many of the imported ladybugs. There was a swarm about ten years ago (they sting, too) but they've pretty much died off over the winters, and maybe some were eaten by birds. I've seen two bumblebees all summer, one lone preying mantis, no fireflies or wasps. That's never happened before. No bluejays have been instructing their noisy young in the cedar trees. No mourning doves coo in the afternoon. It was a very quiet spring. Next year may be altogether silent.
Indeed, we rational humans seem not to have communicated very well about daily survival.
cherryorchardSeptember 11, 2024 at 14:19#9313470 likes
This interesting thread put me in mind of a fun paper I read many years ago, called 'Do Dogs Know Calculus?'
A mathematician shows that his dog, when fetching a ball thrown into water, appears to be calculating the optimal path from A to B as if using calculus. But, of course, calculus is computationally tricky even for most non-expert human beings. A dog cannot know calculus. Can he?!
People who live in crop growing rural areas certainly see more insects than urban dwellers.
I guess I was wrong about in thinking there might be more insects in the suburban area I live in. I see so much about how the countryside is losing all its insects mainly ot pesticides that I made an assumption. There are pesticides here too, but likely less than in crop-growing areas.
Are you referencing Rachel Carson's book "Silent Spring" that started the ecoological movement? The title was a prophecy at the time, but it looks as if it is coming true, and we are at last recognizing it - virtually too late.
How indeed? There are invasive species in the UK too; some of them come from the US, others from the Far East - a legacy of Empire and globalization. The grey squirrel is a good example from the US; there's a European species that is, in my book, even cuter, but it's become marginalized now. There are sanctuaries and a lot of greys are being killed to preserve them. The mink escaped from fur farms and caused a lot of damage. They seem to be on the retreat now. I'm afraid the cause is at least partly endless eradication campaigns.
A mathematician shows that his dog, when fetching a ball thrown into water, appears to be calculating the optimal path from A to B as if using calculus. But, of course, calculus is computationally tricky even for most non-expert human beings. A dog cannot know calculus. Can he?!
That's fascinating. I don't do any calculus when I'm catching a ball - I "just know" where to put my hands. Some people talk about "judgement". One supposes that my brain is doing the calculations sub- or un-consciously. I guess my brain is doing some work, but doubt that it is doing calculus calculations. But who knows? However I think it is more plausible to suppose that it is using some quick and dirty heuristic, which, no doubt, would give mathematicians a fit; but evolution only cares what works well enough. The same, I would think, for the dog.
Vera MontSeptember 11, 2024 at 14:34#9313500 likes
He doesn't need to. Evolving as a species that hunts running prey, he has an instinctive grasp of vectors.
All that's happened between when our own ancestors ran after prey and learned to predict where to intercept a weaving deer and calculus is that we translated practical observation into abstract formulas - from particular practical application to universal concept.
I don't do any calculus when I'm catching a ball - I "just know" where to put my hands. Some people talk about "judgement". One supposes that my brain is doing the calculations sub- or un-consciously. I guess my brain is doing some work, but doubt that it is doing calculus calculations
I agree! And yet the output is the same as if it had been doing calculus. That suggests something interesting (though I can't say exactly what...!)
Reminds me of Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations': 'Calculating prodigies who arrive at the correct result but cant say how. Are we to say that they do not calculate?'
However I think it is more plausible to suppose that it is using some quick and dirty heuristic, which, no doubt, would give mathematicians a fit; but evolution only cares what works well enough. The same, I would think, for the dog.
What's interesting here is that sometimes our 'subconscious' mental calculations are not quick and dirty they are enormously precise and accurate. A good example might be professional snooker or pool players. They are capable of modelling physics interactions to extraordinary degrees of specificity. Their models are probably superior to purely mathematical models in terms of predictive accuracy. But they do not consciously perform calculations at all.
More realistic sounding to me is that dogs (and people) use a gaze heuristic..
I'm not sure if you read the paper I attached, but the dog's actions cannot be explained by applying the gaze heuristic, because that heuristic deals with tracking moving objects. The dog is not tracking a moving object, but rather charting an optimal path to a fixed point over two varied surfaces (land and water). In order to work out that optimal path using mathematics, we need calculus. The dog finds the same path without resorting to calculus (we assume). But the gaze heuristic would not be of any assistance.
wonderer1September 11, 2024 at 15:28#9313600 likes
My device is wonky about downloading pdfs, so I tried, but gave up. I tried again, and I've had a chance to read it now. Interesting!
Vera MontSeptember 11, 2024 at 16:12#9313720 likes
I think the calculus question is simply a case of habitual cart-reversal. We know about the mathematical or scientific conventions that have been worked out by humans over a couple of thousand years, shaped and polished into something akin to icons. We forget that people were aware of quantity, dispersal, proportion, direction, force, mass, etc since they were human. They were applying that awareness to their practical needs.
That awareness long preceded the formal systems by which those phenomena are described today. We see a dog applying the same awareness to a problem and wonder: "How does he know?" instead of realizing: "That's what my ancestors were doing. That's where my knowledge originates."
Reply to cherryorchard
Thanks for the Wittgenstein quotations. I had forgotten it. There's a philosophical angle to this, of course.
Perhaps more relevant is that if we are forced to admit that dogs' brains enable them to achieve mathematical results even though they don't speak mathematics, we may be less resistant to the idea that they and other animals are rational even though they don't speak languages like ours.
What's interesting here is that sometimes our 'subconscious' mental calculations are not quick and dirty they are enormously precise and accurate. A good example might be professional snooker or pool players. They are capable of modelling physics interactions to extraordinary degrees of specificity. Their models are probably superior to purely mathematical models in terms of predictive accuracy. But they do not consciously perform calculations at all.
I meant "dirty" on in the sense that it won't be like the mathematical version. Which, to be fair, comes in very handy in some of the situations we put ourselves into. Long ocean voyages, navigating in the air and beyond. Calculating the orbits of planets, etc.
Compare how we judge distances by what it takes to focus our two eyes on an objects. It doesn't work at longer distances, so instead we judge by apparent size. The latter is quick and dirty, in the sense I intended.
Reply to Vera Mont Quite some time ago I read that infants have a limited built in knowledge about the world. This was demonstrated by showing the baby a helium-filled balloon, and then letting go of it. The balloon, of course, rose to the ceiling. The baby exhibited an expression of SHOCK! Objects are supposed to fall when released. I'm assuming this was done more than once, and on at least several babies. (Sorry, too far back -- don't know where I read it, but it was not in a tabloid newspaper.)
the dog's actions cannot be explained by applying the gaze heuristic, because that heuristic deals with tracking moving objects. The dog is not tracking a moving object
An impressive example is a dog tearing after a Frisbee, then leaping to catch it in its jaws. But other animals do this too. An eagle dives to catch a rabbit, but the rabbit, no genius in the animal kingdom, swerves sharply at the last half second, and the eagle ends up with dirt in its grip. Eagles are fed and rabbits are not over-running the countryside, so the eagles are successful often enough.
Vera MontSeptember 11, 2024 at 20:17#9314070 likes
The baby exhibited an expression of SHOCK! Objects are supposed to fall when released.
I don't suppose the test can be administered to newborns. The subject must have the skill to distinguish objects and generalize how 'things' are expected to behave.
By about six months, they usually start experimenting with gravity: dropping something from their highchair or buggy (Very often to see how many times their adult caregiver will retrieve it for them). They acquire the knowledge "things are supposed to fall" from practical experience. So when a new thing does the opposite, the first reaction is surprise, quickly followed by delight.
The upper midwest of the US doesn't harbor many red squirrels, so I'm not familiar with their behavior. Grey squirrels are everywhere around here. They usually are grey with a white belly, but they sometimes are black or white (not a seasonal change).
I've read about the terrorism directed at your red squirrels by the Yankee grey squirrels. Social scientists and psychoanalysts have not been able to determine what, exactly, is the source of this inter-squirrel hostility.
The urban grey squirrel readily exploits human behavior. The smart squirrels on the University of Minnesota campus follow people carrying paper bags. If you stop, because you happen to like squirrels, they'll go so far as to climb up your pant leg to access the presumed food in your bag. This is somewhat disconcerting.
It's not hard to let them eat out of your hand; even to sit on your knee and eat the offered peanuts. I've established such a relationship several times since I was a kid. I'm more fastidious as an old guy, and would just as soon NOT have even cute rodents sitting on me.
So when a new thing does the opposite, the first reaction is surprise, quickly followed by delight
Long ago I saw an episode on Ira Flatow's Newton's Apple where he asked how a helium balloon in a bus would behave when the vehicle began to move. One would suppose that the balloon would move to the back of the bus, as the forward momentum occurred. Shockingly, it's just the opposite (do try this at home). The balloon moves to the front of the bus. (Enough of the heavier air moves to the back of the bus, forcing the lighter balloon to move forward.)
One shouldn't waste scarce helium on experiments that have already been done, so take your helium balloon to an MRI lab where it can be recycled for more important uses, like scanning brains. Or inhale it to achieve a Donald Duck kind of voice for a few seconds.
Vera MontSeptember 11, 2024 at 20:34#9314130 likes
Social scientists and psychoanalysts have not been able to determine what, exactly, is the source of this inter-squirrel hostility.
I hope that's tongue-in-cheek.
I once had a grey squirrel as a pet - not on purpose; the children down the street rescued her their cat. So I raised her and eventually set her free. That li'l rodent was smart as a whip. Sassy, too. And quite clean: one of her favourite things was bath time. Afterward, I'd hang a towel on the bar and pull it taut, so that Georgie could slide down it, then clamber up on my shoulder, leap over and do it again. And again, until she was dry. She also hid nuts in my shoes and under the cat's tail. A very entertaining companion.
Vera MontSeptember 11, 2024 at 20:41#9314150 likes
Has anyone determined what the average number of retrievals a caregiver is willing to perform before the object is thrown out the window?
My informal observation: up to six times without showing exasperation, after which they don't give it back. All babies seem to do it; I think they consider this a game.
Whether mimicry and imitation are rational or not depends on why it is being done, surely? If it is being done to avoid predators, for example, why is it not rational?
When a parrot mimics speech, there is no doubt that it is the parrot that is doing the mimicking. Quite why I don't know, but it seems most reasonable to suppose that the parrot has some purpose in doing that, because it clearly finds the behaviour rewarding in some way.
Okay, thank you for expanding on your comment because I had wanted to come back to this thread to make a critical observation that the point of rational thinking seems to have been lost in this discussion. I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior.
You said, "purpose", "rewarding" and "reasonable to suppose". All these are fine -- nothing wrong with this behavior, but it is not rational thinking. Because we can talk to each other and be articulate and coherent with each other (like right now here on the forum) -- but do you suppose that you have talked to a dog and determined that he spoke to you about why he is doing what he's doing? Did the parrot articulate to you his reasoning for mimicking? It looks reasonable to you, but you did not arrive at this 'reasonableness' by discussing it with the parrot.
Do we have a member here in the forum that is dog or a parrot? Then let us invite that parrot on this thread and let him lay out his reasons for mimicking.
Vera MontSeptember 12, 2024 at 03:32#9314770 likes
Reply to L'éléphant
So, for you, the only valid criterion for reason is the use of human language? Pretty narrow definition.
I had wanted to come back to this thread to make a critical observation that the point of rational thinking seems to have been lost in this discussion. I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior.
I agree. I think theres a difference between behaviours that can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response, and behaviours that can be attributed to rational inference. The former, for instance, covers an enormous range of behaviours that animals and even plants exhibit. Venus fly traps, for instance, close around their prey, and numerous other plants will open flowers in sunlight and close them when it sets. Animal behaviours from insect life up to mammals routinely exhibit complex behaviours in response to stimuli. But the question is, do such behaviours qualify as rational? Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant).
It might be worth recalling the distinctions Aristotle makes between different organic forms. Plants, according to Aristotle, possess only the nutritive soul, responsible for growth, nutrition, and reproduction. Animals, in addition to the nutritive soul, have the sensitive soul, granting them the abilities of sensation, movement, and desire. Humans uniquely possess all these functions but also have the rational soul, which allows for inference, reflection, and the capacity for abstract thought. This rational capacity sets humans apart, as it involves deliberation and the ability to grasp universals, which Aristotle sees as the hallmark of true rationality. (Bear in mind 'soul' is used to translate the Greek term psuch? which refers broadly to the principle of life or the life force in living beings rather than the modern notion of an "immaterial soul." I've been reading a little of contemporary systems science and biology, and while it is true that Aristotle's schema has been updated somewhat in those disciplines, elements of his biology are still recognised. Terrence Deacon, in his Incomplete Nature, adapts Aristotelian concepts like teleology (goal-directedness) in describing emergent processes in nature, and Alice Juarrero, in her work on causality and complex systems, sees continuity with Aristotles notion of formal and final causes.)
The upper midwest of the US doesn't harbor many red squirrels, so I'm not familiar with their behavior. Grey squirrels are everywhere around here. They usually are grey with a white belly, but they sometimes are black or white (not a seasonal change).
Your greys are a bit different from ours. I've never heard of black or white ones. It wouldn't be surprising if the two groups diverged over time. I wish I could post a picture of a red for you - their ear tufts are incredible.
I've read about the terrorism directed at your red squirrels by the Yankee grey squirrels. Social scientists and psychoanalysts have not been able to determine what, exactly, is the source of this inter-squirrel hostility.
You mean that the cognitive dissonance created by the similarity combined with the difference in colour is not sufficient? They should read some social history.
It's not hard to let them eat out of your hand; even to sit on your knee and eat the offered peanuts. I've established such a relationship several times since I was a kid. I'm more fastidious as an old guy, and would just as soon NOT have even cute rodents sitting on me.
I hate to say this, but most people in the UK regard grey squirrels as vermin along with rats and mice. But that's because the red squirrels are much cuter and the greys are immigrants and consequently are thought to have no right to exist.
The urban grey squirrel readily exploits human behavior. The smart squirrels on the University of Minnesota campus follow people carrying paper bags. If you stop, because you happen to like squirrels, they'll go so far as to climb up your pant leg to access the presumed food in your bag. This is somewhat disconcerting.
There was a lot of fuss in sea-side tourist resorts a few years ago. People couldn't resist feeding the sea-gulls (herring-gulls) with sandwiches and potato chips. Then the sea-gulls took to swooping down and grabbing them from their hands as they were munching them. I haven't heard any complaints recently. People must have learnt not to "open-carry" goodies along the sea front.
I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior.
I think we're talking past each other. The short explanation is that we have different ideas about the goal of rational thinking. Let me put it this way. Arriving at a valid/sound conclusion may sometimes be the point of the exercise (as it usually is in philosophical discussion, for example). But very often the point of a valid/sound conclusion is that it is a better basis for successful action.
In particular, it enables the organism to adapt behaviour to circumstances, whereas purely instinctive behaviour, which cannot, by definition, adapt, is likely to be less successful and even counter-productive. However, very often, what animals (and people) do is a combination of instinct and rationality. Birds have an instinct to build nests, and do so in different ways according to species. But, inevitably, they have to pursue that goal in negotiation with their environment. Hunger is "hard-wired", but how we satisfy hunger is extremely flexible in response to the environment that we find ourselves in.
When we observe human behaviour, we do not hesitate to interpret (read) their behaviour as rational even when we have no access to their given reasons. If you like, we reconstruct their reasons, in order to make sense of their behaviour. To be sure, we make certain assumptions, which may be falsified and reconstructions based on them can be contested either at the level of the assumptions themselves or at the level of the specific reasons attributed.
What's more, action without discursive reasons is found in human behaviour. Perhaps the most dramatic example, for philosophers, is the ability of people to use words correctly without being able to give a definition; they are often even more bewildered if they are asked to explain the rules of grammar (linguistic sense). It seems inescapable that articulating one's reasons is itself an example of an activity that is executed without discursive reasons.
You said, "purpose", "rewarding" and "reasonable to suppose". All these are fine -- nothing wrong with this behavior, but it is not rational thinking. .... Did the parrot articulate to you his reasoning for mimicking? It looks reasonable to you, but you did not arrive at this 'reasonableness' by discussing it with the parrot.
So when we see animals adapting their behaviour to circumstances, we are inclined to read their behaviour as rational even though we have no access to any verbal account. It seems to me to be a reasonable extension of our practice in relation to other human beings. What's more, it works.
Personally, I have difficulty in applying this process to insects and fish and I often feel that people anthropomorphize too far. A dog might sympathize at my distress when I can't find my glasses, but I don't think that s/he necessarily understand what my glasses are. But I have no doubt that lobsters are frightened when they get caught, so this is not binary issue.
Do we have a member here in the forum that is dog or a parrot? Then let us invite that parrot on this thread and let him lay out his reasons for mimicking.
It's tempting to think that the discursive account by agents of their reasons is the gold standard. It is true that it will often give us details that we cannot read off from the behaviour or the context. But, the rational reconstruction is often so persuasive that when the verbal account of reasons conflicts with our rational reconstruction, we are often (but not always) inclined to give preference to the rational reconstruction.
So if animals could tell us what "their" reasons were, we would not necessarily believe them.
Vera MontSeptember 12, 2024 at 13:27#9315190 likes
Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant).
Have you followed any of the tests that scientists have devised to differentiate between stimulus-response and rational problem-solving? Here is an example. We've come quite a long way since Aristotle.
(Plant?? you know they don't have brains, right?)
This rational capacity sets humans apart, as it involves deliberation and the ability to grasp universals, which Aristotle sees as the hallmark of true rationality.
There's that sneaky little "true" rationality. Which means that whether Aristotle did or did not recognize other forms of rationality, you do. For some reason, you don't think that other forms are "really" rational. You cite Aristotle as identifying the critical marks as deliberation and a grasp of universals.
He recognizes at least two forms of deliberative rationality - practical and theoretical. The former directed to action and the latter to contemplation which he thought was infinitely superior to merely practical reason because it is what the gods to and so we are more god-like when we contemplate. If I remember correctly, [s]one of the distinctions between practical and theoretical is that practical is concerned with universals.[/s] By that criterion, practical reason is also not "true" rationality. One can understand his reason, but I'm not at all sure that we can accept it.
EDIT Ouch! That should have been "one of the distinctions between practical and theoretical is that practical is NOT concerned with universals". Sorry. Red face!
Alice Juarrero, in her work on causality and complex systems, sees continuity with Aristotles notion of formal and final causes.
Yes. These have more application to living things. He was apply to apply them to the whole universe because he thought that the entire universe was directed to achieving The Good - the supreme good of everything.
I never claimed otherwise. And, in fact, the remark was not directed specifically at you - except inasmuch as you have been defending the human exclusivity position - but was an observation regarding a whole system of faulty/disingenuous human reasoning for the purpose of arriving at a desired conclusion.
Propaganda and advertising work in this same way: argument directed at a desired outcome. The purveyors of mis- and disinformation use a rational process to determine what kinds of falsehood their audience is most likely to believe and construct the most persuasive arguments to make their conclusions sound reasonable. Often, this involves altering the meaning of words and twisting familiar concepts, and may include denial of the audience's practical experience.
Wow, what a depressing view of reality. I just got back from a trip to hell and I am so happy to be here.
All my ideas may be wrong, but at the moment I don't give a damn because I am going to enjoy my happiness. Today I am not in charge of the world. It is my day to enjoy my home and my life. Maybe to tomorrow I will get more serious and back to feeling responsible for the world.
The bright side is I have almost finished the book about humans, animals, and math and look forward to to discussing what I have learned. We can talk about what is so and society be reason and being happy.
I think theres a difference between behaviours that can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response, and behaviours that can be attributed to rational inference.
"Stimulus and response" can cover a multitude of sins, including rational responses to events as they happen, but I get what you're after. Where I differ from you is that I think that actions can be rational responses even if they are not the result of (conscious) inference. This doesn't actually depend on a single argument, but it seems best to propose one here and develop others as needed. So, forgive me for quoting myself below. Put it down to laziness.
What's more, action without discursive reasons is found in human behaviour. Perhaps the most dramatic example, for philosophers, is the ability of people to use words correctly without being able to give a definition; they are often even more bewildered if they are asked to explain the rules of grammar (linguistic sense). It seems inescapable that articulating one's reasons is itself an example of an activity that is executed without discursive reasons.
Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant).
When a human, or a dog, smells food, it is an automatic reflex (i.e. not the result of conscious control"). It is by way of a preparation for chewing and digesting food - a product of evolution. Before Pavlov's dogs were fed, a bell was rung. Before long, the dogs started salivating as the bell rang, before the food arrived. In the jargon, they associated the bell with food. Was the response rational or merely causal? In my book, both. I'm not dogmatic about that, but rocks don't change their behaviour like that.
When a dog gets hungry and sometimes just when the smells get tempting, it is will known that they will position themselves where they will be noticed and sit very quietly, but very attentive. This behaviour is called "begging". It is a behaviour that is voluntary, not a reflex. It seems perfectly clear that the dog thinks that if s/he does that, food will happen. It is also perfectly clear that the dog did not say to itself or anyone else "If I do this, that will happen". If you don't call it rational thinking, what do you call it?
I don't think that plants think or believe or feel emotions or have desires. But we do say that they do things. So that's another whole mystery that needs untangling.
Vera MontSeptember 12, 2024 at 17:59#9315620 likes
When a dog gets hungry and sometimes just when the smells get tempting, it is will known that they will position themselves where they will be noticed and sit very quietly, but very attentive.
And when it's time to eat and she can't smell anything edible, she goes out to the kitchen, picks up her food dish and brings it back to place in my lap, then sits directly opposite me and stares into my face. (Granted, this was an exceptionally bright German Shepherd.) Quoting Ludwig V
It seems perfectly clear that the dog thinks that if s/he does that, food will happen.
Especially if the guilt-inducing soulful gaze alternates with running to the pantry where the dog-food is kept and nudging the bag.
A not-so-clever Pyrennese who liked to roam would ask her border collie confederate to help her escape. The collie would stand on her hind legs and push on the far frame (not where it opens) with both paws of the big sliding patio door. She didn't have the weight to push it all the way open, but she'd slide it over just enough for the big dog to wedge her nose in and force it open. Then they would pad softly across the patio, around the corner of the house, duck behind the car and make their way down the drive. (I stopped them there, having watched the whole procedure. I was on guard, because they'd already gone AWOL twice.)
When a dog really wants something, whether it's your pizza or your flip-flops, he makes a plan and carries it out step by step. That's nothing like salivating on cue. And they're very good (wolf lrgacy) at co-ordinating team work. Watch some You Tube videos.
When a crow wants a piece of cheese, he goes looking for a tool to get the tool that will poke the cheese out of the cage. Or figures out which flaps to lift in what order to tilt the plastic chute and make the cheese roll out.
Vera MontSeptember 12, 2024 at 18:08#9315640 likes
?Athena
I guess you'll have better things to do that hang around here!
I want to add that I do not at all deny that animals (including humans) do have purely mechanical responses. Examples in humans are the reflex breath as you come back to the top of the water, which is clearly evolved and rational, as contrasted with the jerk of your lower leg as your old-fashioned doctor tap just below your knee, which (so far as I know) has no evolutionary purpose. You may know that if you scratch a dog at just the right place, their back leg comes up as if to scratch themselves; they can also do the same thing when they want to scratch themselves; that response can be mechanical and irrational and can be voluntary and rational.
Often, this involves altering the meaning of words and twisting familiar concepts, and may include denial of the audience's practical experience.
Vera Mont
You're not wrong. But, along with all the similarities, there must be differences. The same applies to chimps and horses and whales. So there is a legitimate enquiry to be had here, surely?
If it is not language it is not rational. If we do not agree on the definitions of words, we are doing no better the competing groups of chimps screeching at each other. Without agreement on the definition of our words, we doing no better than pissing on a tree to mark our territory, or a fire alarm. Certain sounds like a chimp screech, a police siren, or a fire alarm are universal sounds of danger because the screech is in all these things and also bird calls. In some cases an animal will make different sounds for different threats and this close to language but not exactly language.
I am eager to get into animals and math, because I wrongly thought the ability to do math means a form of rationalizing. After reading "The Math Instinct- Why You're a Mathematical Genius(along with lobsters, birds, cats, and dogs)" Now I understand the math animals are doing is like our knee jerk or a dog moving its leg when the right is touched. It is not the problem-solving humans do until we get to hire order animals that are making choices, such as a chimp taking the dish with 7 pieces of candy and not the one with only 6 pieces. Many lions means leave the territory but only one lion can be challenged. A snake jumping in the right direction at the right time to catch prey is using math, but this is like a knee-jerk. What bats can do with sonar hearing is amazing and better than anything we have invented, or birds flying 20 thousand miles from a summer home to their winter home. These animals are doing trigonometry and geometry but it is instinct, not learned math, and most certainly not working with 1+2=3. Those numbers are like language and animals do not have language. It is more like an intuitive reaction than rationalizing, how the chimp can count, can of like making a scratch for each piece of candy and remember how many times a scratch was made.
We need to agree on what "rational" means and what "language" means. What is the definition of these words?
Vera MontSeptember 12, 2024 at 18:44#9315720 likes
If we do not agree on the definitions of words, we are doing no better the competing groups of chimps screeching at each other.
Their vocalizations may sound harsh to you, but are meaningful to another chimp. We might as well be communicating, you in ASL and I in Japanese. Or just yelling at each other, as people often do. Quoting Athena
We need to agree on what "rational" means and what "language" means. What is the definition of these words?
Rational thinking is a process. It refers to the ability to think with reason. It encompasses the ability to draw sensible conclusions from facts, logic and data.
In simple words, if your thoughts are based on facts and not emotions, it is called rational thinking.
Rational thinking focuses on resolving problems and achieving goals.
[Language is] a communication system composed of arbitrary elements which possess an agreed-upon significance within a community. These elements are connected in rule-governed ways (Edwards, 2009: 53) https://www.languageeducatorsassemble.com/5-definitions-of-language/
One of 12 quotes. If they can't agree, how could we? Quoting Athena
If it is not language it is not rational.
And if it is not human, it's not language.
Therefore, only humans are capable of reason.
There: all wrapped up with a triumphal bow on top.
There was a lot of fuss in sea-side tourist resorts a few years ago. People couldn't resist feeding the sea-gulls (herring-gulls) with sandwiches and potato chips. Then the sea-gulls took to swooping down and grabbing them from their hands as they were munching them. I haven't heard any complaints recently. People must have learnt not to "open-carry" goodies along the sea front.
I would post a link to a New York Times piece on gulls from a few weeks ago, but I'm pretty sure you would find it secured behind their pay-wall. Gulls are pretty smart, and they are good observers. They like to eat food that other animals are eating: "If she's eating it, it must be good. I'll just have some of that!" That goes for a gull's approach to what humans--and other gulls--are eating. Gulls show up when the food shows up.
They are good parents; both males and females care for the young. So, a plus there -- they don't hatch and then abandon their chicks. (Elsewhere I read that pigeons are good parents too, so their children are neither seen nor heard. On the other hand, I don't know what, besides popcorn and the like, urban pigeons would have to feed their little chickies.)
The science writer recommends watching the gulls closely for individual differences; in a sea of gulls dive bombing your hot dog, that might be difficult, but give it a try.
Vera MontSeptember 12, 2024 at 19:33#9315840 likes
Reply to Vera Mont Crows and parrots seem to have hit the intelligence jackpot much more often than other birds, but birds--any bird, pick a bird--are capable animals meeting many of the challenges they face.
A science fiction writer said, in a story about animals--I forget the title and author, "In the jungle, everybody is thinking!" Even brainless plants have the means to warn other plants of threats, and are able to mount targeted defenses (within a fairly narrow repertoire).
It is the nature of this world that no organism gets a free ride. There are ALWAYS dangerous threats and tempting opportunities to be navigated.
Another glittering generality: Human civilization, as it has evolved to the present, has become incompatible with the most optimal balance of resources of the natural world. What should we do about it? Were we able (which we are not) we ought to be far-sighted about the long-term consequences of our industrially powered production--everything from our own numbers, to the automobile and airplane or laundry detergents and cheap meat.
When a human, or a dog, smells food, it is an automatic reflex (i.e. not the result of conscious control"). It is by way of a preparation for chewing and digesting food - a product of evolution.
I was wanting to get at the meaning of reason, in particular, which is fundamental to the OP. I've read about the Caledonian crow studies and other studies indicating rudimentary reasoning ability in some animals and birds, but I don't see the relevance in terms of the philosophical question at issue, as to what differentiates the rational ability of h.sapiens, 'the rational animal', from other species.
The reason I mentioned Aristotle's philosophy of biology is not because I idolize the ancients, but because the distinction between vegetative, sensory and rational forms of life remains basically sound. In addition, in Aristotle's philosophy, the particular prerogrative of the rational intellect ('nous' - a word which lives on in vernacular English) is to grasp universal ideas and concepts. Unlike other animals, we can see meaning in an abstract and comprehensive way. And I think the case can be made that this ability - the ability to grasp ideas and concepts - is foundational to language, and so a key differentiator between h.sapiens and other species. I fully understand acceptance of universals and Platonic forms is generally considered, well, ancient history by most, but in my view, these are barely understood in today's culture.
There's an essay I often cite by neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain on this point, in which he also addresses the point you raise about canine behaviour.
[quote=Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism]For the empiricist there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).
Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is 'sugar' or what is 'intruder'. He plays and lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; but he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in h.sapiens -- a potential infinity of knowledge.
Such are the basic facts which empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. ...In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see in its ideative function -- there are not, drawn from the senses, through the activity of the intellect itself, supra-singular or supra-sensual, universal intelligible natures seen by the intellect in and through the concepts it engenders by illuminating images. Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. Everything boils down, in the operations, or rather in the passive mechanisms of intelligence, to a blind concatenation, sorting and refinement of the images, associated representations, habit-produced expectations which are at play in sense-knowledge, under the guidance of affective or practical values and interests. [/quote]
You might notice a resemblance between this description and eliminative philosophy of mind, which is not co-incidental.
Even brainless plants have the means to warn other plants of threats, and are able to mount targeted defenses (within a fairly narrow repertoire).
That extensive mycelial network! Pretty amazing, actually. Quoting BC
Human civilization, as it has evolved to the present, has become incompatible with the most optimal balance of resources of the natural world. What should we do about it? Were we able (which we are not) we ought to be far-sighted about the long-term consequences of our industrially powered production--everything from our own numbers, to the automobile and airplane or laundry detergents and cheap meat.
At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy. We lost a good deal of our own nature and have been paying for it ever since in mental illness, discontent, strife and a sense of loss. It's a big hole that we keep trying to fill with religion, technology, spectacles, self-aggrandizement, overconsumption and lots and lots of wars.
There are people - a growing number of people - who take their own path to simplicity and balance. Global economy, global culture are too big to be changed, but individuals are capable of change.
When a dog really wants something, whether it's your pizza or your flip-flops, he makes a plan and carries it out step by step. That's nothing like salivating on cue. And they're very good (wolf legacy) at co-ordinating team work. Watch some You Tube videos.
I'm sorry. There is in; deed a wide spectrum. I wanted to undermine the idea that actions are either rational (plan, execute, enjoy liberty/food/ whatever) or mindless cause/effect. Salivation is not even a voluntary action - it is controlled by an "autonomic" system. Yet making rational connections is possible even at that level.
At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy.
I don't know. There's so little to go on. But I think you are over-simplifying. Our attitude towards nature is ambivalent, in the sense that there are negative and positive attitudes which play into our interpretation of nature. "We" don't have a single, consistent view of it.
There are people - a growing number of people - who take their own path to simplicity and balance. Global economy, global culture are too big to be changed, but individuals are capable of change.
Surely there is some room for thinking that when more and more individuals start to change, sometimes the movement gathers weight and pace and ends up changing things at the macro scale?
Unlike other animals, we can see meaning in an abstract and comprehensive way. And I think the case can be made that this ability - the ability to grasp ideas and concepts - is foundational to language, and so a key differentiator between h.sapiens and other species.
Well, you are making a case, so obviously it is possible to do so. I notice that you seem to accept that this is not the only, and not the only relevant, differentiator. A good deal of clarification of what you mean by "abstract and comprehensive" and "ideas and concepts" is needed, and you have the difficulty that philosophy doesn't have a consensus view about what those terms mean.
The other difficulty you face is the empirical evidence that animals do have communication systems that are, at least, language-like, so you need to show what the "essential" relevant differentiation is between animal languages/communication systems and human languages/communication systems.
I've read about the Caledonian crow studies and other studies indicating rudimentary reasoning ability in some animals and birds, but I don't see the relevance in terms of the philosophical question at issue, as to what differentiates the rational ability of h.sapiens, 'the rational animal', from other species.
So the idea that human reason might be a development (hyper-development, perhaps) of abilities that animals have is not entirely implausible to you. Where we may disagree is that you seem to presuppose a cliff-edge distinction between humans and animals. However, if evolution is correct, even in outline, humans have evolved from animals, so the expectation must be that human reason is a development of animal reason. So to understand human reason, we have to understand animal reason. Of course, it is possible that you don't accept the evolutionary approach to these questions.
Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism:Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is 'sugar' or what is 'intruder'. He plays and lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; but he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in h.sapiens -- a potential infinity of knowledge.
Each differentiation of human from animal arrives out of the blue. I need to understand what each of them amounts to. It looks as if he is not writing from me, but for people who already accept the philosophical ideas that are at stake. There may be much that the dog does not know about sugar and intruders. But there are some things that they do know. What he means by "he does not see the similarlity, the common features as such". "The flash of intelligibility" and "no ear for the intelligible meaning" are particularly obscure, and my understanding of "(universal) idea", "concept", "objectivity" is clearly very different from his.
Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism:Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect.
When someone attacks a doctrine but doesn't bother to ensure that his version of the doctrine coincides with his opponent's understanding of his own doctrine, I'm a bit inclined to suspect that a straw man may be all that is at stake. But it may be that his writing is not directed at his opponents, but to his supporters.
Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism:Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises.
Is he a platonist of some kind? What does "cause" mean here?
A good deal of clarification of what you mean by "abstract and comprehensive" and "ideas and concepts" is needed, and you have the difficulty that philosophy doesn't have a consensus view about what those terms mean.
I don't expect much *modern* philosophy will have any consensus about those questions, as they're deep questions, not the kind of minutae that analytic philosophy is preoccupied with. But the fact that you and I can have such a conversation as this, should indicate a key differentiator between us and other creatures, none of which could entertain such ideas, let alone devise the medium by which we're able to discuss them.
However, if evolution is correct, even in outline, humans have evolved from animals, so the expectation must be that human reason is a development of animal reason. So to understand human reason, we have to understand animal reason. Of course, it is possible that you don't accept the evolutionary approach to these questions.
Of course I accept the facts of evolutionary biology, but its applicability to the problems of philosophy is another matter. For instance, the idea that evolutionary biology alone accounts for or explains the nature of reason or of the intellect is contentious. Evolutionary biology is not, after all, an epistemological theory, but a biological one, intended to explain the origin of species, not the origin of such faculties as reason. In fact I think one of the unintended consequences of Darwinism on culture is to believe that such evolutionary accounts are sufficient, when in fact they're barely applicable. The thread on Donald Hoffman is about a cognitive psychologist who argues that if our sensory faculties are explicable in terms of evolutionary fitness, we have no reason to believe they provide us with the truth. Of course that's a contentious argument, but I mention it to provide an indication of the scope of these issues.
Certainly there is a biological continuity between h.sapiens and other species, that is indisputable from the fossil record. But the ability to reason, speak, and to invent science, indicates a kind of ontological discontinuity from other animals in my view. Through the faculty of reason, we cross a kind of evolutionary threshold, which opens horizons that are imperceptible to animals.
Is he (Jacques Maritain) a platonist of some kind?
He says he writes as an Aristotelian. I haven't read a great deal of him, but he was a major 20th century Catholic philosopher, but on the intellectual left, so to speak (as distinct from many more conservative Catholic philosophers.) But that passage I quoted, concerning the ability of reason to grasp universals, is really, in my opinion, part of the real mainstream of Western philosophy, which I do think is Platonist on the whole. Incidentally the essay from which the quote was taken can be found here.
At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy. We lost a good deal of our own nature and have been paying for it ever since in mental illness, discontent, strife and a sense of loss.
I think youre on the right track but needless to say its a vast topic.
But the fact that you and I can have such a conversation as this, should indicate a key differentiator between us and other creatures, none of which could entertain such ideas, let alone devise the medium by which we're able to discuss them.
There might be a single difference that explains all the difference. But there might not.
There might be a key difference. But there might not.
The difference(s) might be a difference in degree, not in kind.
There is also the issue of what, exactly, reason is. If you define it as the ability to plan and execute a project, we have what seems to me to be an open and shut case. Quoting Vera Mont
A not-so-clever Pyrennese who liked to roam would ask her border collie confederate to help her escape.
Sure, it's not rocket science. But that doesn't mean it is not rational.
Evolutionary biology is not, after all, an epistemological theory, but a biological one, intended to explain the origin of species, not the origin of such faculties as reason.
Quite so. But the origin of species necessarily includes the origin of faculties. The evolution of the eye is also the history of the development of the faculty of sight, &c. For example, the development of the faculty of reason is part of the development of homo sapiens. So far as I know there is no doubt that faculty depends on the brain, at least in homo sapiens. There is story of the evolution of the human brain from the early precursors to our day compare the story of the evolution of the eye.
Donald Hoffman is .. a cognitive psychologist who argues that if our sensory faculties are explicable in terms of evolutionary fitness, we have no reason to believe they provide us with the truth.
That's odd. One would expect evolution to favour a creature with sensory apparatus that provides them with true, rather than false, information. Still, I can't take responsibility for what cognitive psychologists might choose to say. (Perhaps he has an idiosyncratic view of what truth is?)
But that passage I quoted, concerning the ability of reason to grasp universals, is really, in my opinion, part of the real mainstream of Western philosophy, which I do think is Platonist on the whole. Incidentally the essay from which the quote was taken can be found here.
Platonism is certainly an important part of the tradition of Western philosophy. But that is not a reason for believing that it is true. The traditional canon of Western philosophy is as much an opportunity for criticism as anything else. You seem to suggest that there is an unreal mainstream of Western philosophy. What does that consist of?
But the ability to reason, speak, and to invent science, indicates a kind of ontological discontinuity from other animals in my view.
You mean something like the emergence of life from the sea to the land? Or of mammals from reptiles? Maybe.
I have to say that the emergence of science has not done much to change the basically animal nature of human beings, so for my money, the discontinuity is not particularly significant. If we do mange to destroy ourselves before we destroy the entire planet as a habitation for life, future species might well consider us to be a faulty evolutionary line that got out of hand, until it self-destructed, much to the benefit of the planet. But then, they may well think that they are the unique peak of their evolutionary line, just as we do....
Vera MontSeptember 13, 2024 at 12:51#9316770 likes
About the interim steps? Pastoral peoples were migratory or nomadic and didn't leave many records. Still, we know that they herded livestock - which is a huge step from respect for to control over and ownership of other species. It also reduced all other predators from a threat to be feared to rivals to be hated and exterminated. Settled agriculture did the same to land and vegetation, water and forest.
The Genesis story (which originates in an oral tradition before Judaism) already shows the drive to "subdue and fill the earth" as well as nostalgia for pre-agricultural life.
Every civilization has left records. Their beliefs and lifestyle are generally depicted in representations on walls and in tombs. The architecture itself speaks volumes about how people lived. There is also considerable literature from about 3000BCE onward.
Then, with rapid population growth which required ever more intensive use of land and hostility toward all competing species, also came increasing urbanization and alienation. And the unspeakable practices of the Enlightenment period, and the depredations of European colonial expansion... right up until the late 18th century and the industrial revolution. About the only counter attitude came with the Romantic movement, as a reaction to that assault on the countryside. But that's just art - it has tears but no teeth. Quoting Ludwig V
Surely there is some room for thinking that when more and more individuals start to change, sometimes the movement gathers weight and pace and ends up changing things at the macro scale?
That would apply if a) there were not a much more powerful trend to destroy more of the environment faster and b) we had unlimited time in which to make the change before our environment becomes uninhbitable. Yes, I know that's a pessimistic, depressing view of our reality, but I see no other.
It also reduced all other predators from a threat to be feared to rivals to be hated and exterminated. Settled agriculture did the same to land and vegetation, water and forest.
We know about their habits. What we don't know is how they thought about them. I can see the point about the predators in the abstract, but that's not the same as knowing what they thought. We are talking about attitudes to nature. There's not going to be an record of that outside language.
The Genesis story (which originates in an oral tradition before Judaism) already shows the drive to "subdue and fill the earth" as well as nostalgia for pre-agricultural life.
And Genesis is an example and that's much later than 3000 BCE, isn't it?
Yes, I know that's a pessimistic, depressing view of our reality, but I see no other.
Oh, well, if you are talking specifically about climate change, yes, I'm pessimistic as well. It's already shifted from preventing climate change to mitigating it, and that the target of 1.5 degree rise is already pretty much out of reach. It's all a slippery slope now. God knows when we'll begin to take it really seriously, never mind actually do some effective things. I feel really sorry for upcoming generations and am already embarrassed about what they will think of us when they grow up and take charge.
Vera MontSeptember 13, 2024 at 18:29#9317500 likes
Sure, it's not rocket science. But that doesn't mean it is not rational.
It's perfectly rational - and intelligent. They were not interested in rockets, but they sure devised a lot of ways to get what Mako wanted. Quoting Ludwig V
We know about their habits. What we don't know is how they thought about them.
Is it probable that they habitually acted on what they didn't think? Quoting Ludwig V
And Genesis is an example and that's much later than 3000 BCE, isn't it?
No, it probably originates in Sumer. The gods created mankind to work the land and worship them - i.e. obedient servants. The biblical version is more nostalgic: it harks back to a pre-agricultural past and views farming as punishment. The discrepancies were not entirely edited out. The flood figures largely in Sumerian lore (They did have a pictographic alphabet before cuneiform, a good deal of wall art.) The pastoral people that became the Jews and eventually wrote down their oral chronicles, including stories picked up in their herding nomadic years. Quoting Ludwig V
Oh, well, if you are talking specifically about climate change,
That, the rapid eradication of biodiversity, continuing expansion of devastating resource exploitation, the rise of fascism, and the likely collapse of the global economy.
I knew it had roots in earlier myths. I didn't know exactly which myths. So thanks. I've learnt something.
A couple of observations/questions about Genesis.
The opening about God and the Void. I seem to remember reading that the concept of the Void was a priestly concept much later than Sumer, in fact contemporary with when it was actually written. Do you know about that?
I take the point about the nostalgia for the pre-agricultural past. It makes perfect sense of the Garden of Eden. I hadn't thought of that.
It's always seemed very odd to me that the reason God told Adam not to eat the apples because he didn't want them to learn about good and evil and become like the gods (or was it God?). Why would God want us not to know about morality and become god-like. It's weird and very confusing.
I have to say that the emergence of science has not done much to change the basically animal nature of human beings, so for my money, the discontinuity is not particularly significant
One of the ironies implicit in scientific humanism is that it looses sight of the very thing which enables us to pursue science.
My point is that to depict reason as a biological adaption is to undermine it. Reason is a faculty that differentiates h.sapiens from other animals, enabling the invention of science, among many other things. Reducing it to the status of a biological adaption fails to come to terms with it. God knows many other species have persisted for millions of years without it. I think we tend to assume that evolutionary theory provides an explanation for it when there are very many unanswered questions in that account.
So far as I know there is no doubt that faculty depends on the brain, at least in homo sapiens
What does 'dependent upon' mean in this context? That reason can be understood in terms of neural anatomy? Certainly the brain is an evolved organ, indeed the rapid evolution of the homonid forebrain is one of the most astonishing episodes in the history of life on earth. But what has that development enabled us to see and to understand? Do you think, for example, that the basic axioms of logic, or the natural numbers, came into existence along with the hominid brain? Or are they something that brain now enables us to recognise and manipulate? See the distinction?
You seem to suggest that there is an unreal mainstream of Western philosophy. What does that consist of?
Scientific materialism. It is parasitic on the classical tradition of Western philosophy, but fundamental elements of that classical tradition are making a comeback. See Aristotle's Revenge, Edward Feser.
Pastoral peoples were migratory or nomadic and didn't leave many records. Still, we know that they herded livestock - which is a huge step from respect for to control over and ownership of other species. It also reduced all other predators from a threat to be feared to rivals to be hated and exterminated. Settled agriculture did the same to land and vegetation, water and forest.
The Genesis story (which originates in an oral tradition before Judaism) already shows the drive to "subdue and fill the earth" as well as nostalgia for pre-agricultural life.
Every civilization has left records. Their beliefs and lifestyle are generally depicted in representations on walls and in tombs. The architecture itself speaks volumes about how people lived. There is also considerable literature from about 3000BCE onward.
This is a sound approach to the question of understanding the evolution of reason and many other aspects of human culture. I've read quite a bit of paleo-anthropology and studies of the evolution of consciousness over many years, although it's a huge and multi-disciplinary field of study, encompassing anthropology, history of ideas, philosophy and comparative religion to mention a few. Could I draw your attention to a source I've been studying of late, Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, John Vervaeke, a professor of cognitive science at the University of Toronto. It's a long series, of which the first three or four address the pre-historic origins of distinctively human consciousness. YouTube playlist can be found here.
Vera MontSeptember 13, 2024 at 22:26#9318070 likes
His pet humans were not required to have a morality. They were supposed to do as they're told and not question or form their own judgment. Most religion still demands the same.
Is it probable that they habitually acted on what they didn't think? Vera Mont
I don't quite understand what you're getting at here.
You say we know how their habits, but not how they thought. Don't people usually have an attitude or idea before they decide on a course of action, which eventually becomes habitual? Don't their actions give us an indication of what they think?
A king of Assyria decreed massive lion-hunts, sometimes with caged lions in an arena and commissioned a huge bass-relief monument to the sport. Does this give you an inkling of his thought-process? He recorded his thoughts, and they match his actions perfectly.
Vera MontSeptember 13, 2024 at 22:36#9318090 likes
Could I draw your attention to a source I've been studying of late, Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, John Vervaeke, a professor of cognitive science at the University of Toronto. It's a long series, of which the first three or four address the pre-historic origins of distinctively human consciousness. YouTube playlist can be found here.
Thanks. I'm sure the philosophical segments are interesting. But I steadfastly disagree with human exceptionalism.
eta And reject this definition Quoting Wayfarer
Reason is a faculty that differentiates h.sapiens from other animals, enabling the invention of science, among many other things.
wonderer1September 13, 2024 at 22:54#9318110 likes
I agree. I think theres a difference between behaviours that can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response, and behaviours that can be attributed to rational inference. The former, for instance, covers an enormous range of behaviours that animals and even plants exhibit. Venus fly traps, for instance, close around their prey, and numerous other plants will open flowers in sunlight and close them when it sets. Animal behaviours from insect life up to mammals routinely exhibit complex behaviours in response to stimuli. But the question is, do such behaviours qualify as rational? Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant).
Absolutely. What ethologists describe as intelligence in animals is really their innate possession of reactions to stimuli, much, much better than humans, perhaps. But somehow, there is not a 'cumulative culture' of the more complex behaviors in animals, unlike in humans.
To explain the difference in animals in their social environment and the nurture aspect of their growth, there is a term that ethologists use -- 'scaffolding'. Animals do acquire layers of behavior, but they are best described as scaffolds, rather than 'traditions'. (I actually like this description) Humans' cumulative culture flourish into practices that endure for many generations. There are no 'epochs' to be had in the animal kingdom, no innovations (but there are certainly adaptations).
Reply to Wayfarer We are culpable for a lot of high crimes and misdemeanors (some of them in progress RIGHT NOW) but how can any species hold itself responsible for what has developed over millions of years.
Thanks. I'm sure the philosophical segments are interesting. But I steadfastly disagree with human exceptionalism.
We are unexceptional in that we are the product of evolution, like every other species is, bacteria to sequoias. We designed ourselves no more than any other species did. We are on the continuum along with every other animal.
Where we ARE exceptional is that we are much further out on the continuum (than other species) in our ability to reason, invent, think, etc., and enact the rational and irrational motives driven by our far superior lust for aggrandizement.
We may or may not be responsible for that over-weening lust to achieve grandly.
That's the misfortune of the other organisms on the planet -- we were let loose on the world by an indifferent process of evolution. It probably won't work out all that well for any.
PatternerSeptember 14, 2024 at 02:28#9318400 likes
Could I draw your attention to a source I've been studying of late, Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, John Vervaeke, a professor of cognitive science at the University of Toronto. It's a long series, of which the first three or four address the pre-historic origins of distinctively human consciousness. YouTube playlist can be found here.
Wayfarer
Thanks. I'm sure the philosophical segments are interesting. But I steadfastly disagree with human exceptionalism.
eta And reject this definition
I may not understand how you mean this. We store memory outside of our bodies. We've invented more ways of storing information than I will ever know. No other species does those things, or had any idea of what memory and information are. We have languages that can express all of this, as well as, I suppose, anything else. No member of any other species learns things, or kinds of things, beyond what its parents knew. But we add to our learning, generation after generation.
We've done more things than we can count, making things that would not exist if not for our intellect and understanding, and our intention of making them. We've sent spacecraft out of the solar system. We've detected amino acids in interstellar clouds. We have this insanely cool and powerful internet. We've split the atom, knowing it would release energy, in order to use that energy.
We've done it all right in front of more species than we can count, and not one of them has any concept of any of it. No other species knows a nuclear reactor or skyscraper isn't a feature of the landscape.
Does any other species hunt another to extinction? None has even attempted to exterminate us, despite having every reason to. Not even as we were exterminating them. No species we've sent into extinction (I didn't say we're morally exceptional) knew it was going extinct. There must be some species that could wipe us out, particularly insects, if they could understand what we're doing, or come up with a plan. But not even their hive intelligence can manage it. Sometimes I wonder if mice could destroy us. Whales could have worked together to figure out ways to keep us out of the waters, and not get murdered, for at least a long time. Wolves maybe could have wiped use out in the early days.
We are the only species to do many, many things. All because of being the only one capable of thinking the ways we do. It seems to me that's the very definition of exceptional.
Vera MontSeptember 14, 2024 at 02:54#9318430 likes
We are unexceptional in that we are the product of evolution, like every other species is, bacteria to sequoias. We designed ourselves no more than any other species did. We are on the continuum along with every other animal.
Where we ARE exceptional is that we are much further out on the continuum (than other species) in our ability to reason, invent, think, etc., and enact the rational and irrational motives driven by our far superior lust for aggrandizement.
Sure. My objection was to the definition of the word, precisely because evolution accounts for the many traits common to species with a common ancestry. Nothing suddenly happened to strike man with reason; reason was developed in many species over millions of years. That man took it into further realms of imagination and language is interesting, but it makes him unique only in magnitude, not in kind.
The distinction between h.sapiens and other creatures is something we have to take responsibility for, rather than denying the obvious.
It's okay to distinguish the various attributes of species. It's less okay to tamper with the meaning of words.
Oxford: reason - the action of thinking about something in a logical, sensible way;
rationality: the quality of being based on or in accordance with reason or logic.
There is nothing in there about more or different applications or Aristotle or language. If solving complex problems not found in the subject's natural habitat is not the result of logical, rational reasoning, what is it?
It's just a word for empty that was translated to void. The world is already here, just kind of messy.
Actually, that's how I read it. I suppose the problem is that the translation inevitably introduces distinctions and ways of thinking that may or may not have been available to the people who wrote the original. It's the word "form" that attracts my attention - I think that's an inescapable trace of philosophy, which might (MIGHT) have been in the original.
You say we know how their habits, but not how they thought. Don't people usually have an attitude or idea before they decide on a course of action, which eventually becomes habitual? Don't their actions give us an indication of what they think?
A king of Assyria decreed massive lion-hunts, sometimes with caged lions in an arena and commissioned a huge bass-relief monument to the sport. Does this give you an inkling of his thought-process? He recorded his thoughts, and they match his actions perfectly.
I think we've got a crossed wire here. Where we have archaeological relics, then of course we can, with due caution, read off something of what they must/might have been thinking. All I'm saying is that when the archaeology, as well as the writing, is missing, we are stumped.
One of the ironies implicit in scientific humanism is that it looses sight of the very thing which enables us to pursue science.
Not knowing what scientific humanism is, I wouldn't want to comment on what it loses sight of. Come to think of it, I don't even know what the very thing is that enables us to pursue science. I would have thought that there is no one thing involved, but a number of intersecting things, working, as it were, in concert.
My point is that to depict reason as a biological adaption is to undermine it....Reducing it to the status of a biological adaption fails to come to terms with it.
That's like saying that the explanation of a rainbow in the terms of physics undermines it, or reduces it, or even abolishes it. Which, I'm sure you will agree, is a serious misunderstanding.
It is true that understanding the evolution of eyes doesn't deal with many questions and problems about sight. But it does do something to answer the question "how come we have eyes?", doesn't it?
Do you think, for example, that the basic axioms of logic, or the natural numbers, came into existence along with the hominid brain? Or are they something that brain now enables us to recognise and manipulate? See the distinction?
Ah, yes. Now we are getting to the issue. The basic axioms of logic are certainly something that we are able to recognize and manipulate. Whether they are constructed or discovered is contested. That's what this is all about, isn't it? I'm very fond of this:-
J. Lukasiewicz, A Wittgenstein Workbook, quoted and trans. by P.Geach:
Whenever I am occupied with even the tiniest logistical problem, e.g. trying to find the shortest axiom of the implicational calculus, I have the impression that I am confronted with a mighty construction of indescribably complexity and immeasurable rigidity. This construction has the effect on me of a concrete tangible object, fashioned from the hardest of materials, a hundred times stronger than concrete or steel. I cannot change anything in it; by intense labour, I merely find in it ever new details, and attain unshakable and eternal truths. Where and what is this ideal construction?
Which nicely states the problem. Lukasiewicz doesn't answer the question, but does observe that "A Catholic philosopher would say: it is in God, it is Gods thought." Perhaps we can get closer to understanding each other if you can see my observations as another attempt to answer Lukasiewicz's question. You would not be mistaken to see Wittgenstein's influence in my approach.
Scientific materialism. It is parasitic on the classical tradition of Western philosophy, but fundamental elements of that classical tradition are making a comeback.
Well, the classical tradition never really went away. But it is true that it is more prominent now than it used to be.
I'm a bit puzzled. Many people say that materialism first appears in Democritus and Epicurus. But other pre-Socratics also have a claim. What distinguishes Democritus and \Epicurus is that they proposed an atomic theory of matter. In which, of course, they were, in a sense, right. It is true that they were largely ignored when Christianity became dominant until Gassendi revived that tradition in the first half of the 17th century. Is this revival what you are referring to as "scientific" materialism? Gassendi certainly though he was reviving the ancient works and developing them.
We may have different ideas about what "fundamental" means, but Aristotle, though early in our canon, was not at the beginning. Many people would put Plato/Socrates at the beginning, others various "pre-Socratics - such as Democritus and Epicurus. Thales of Miletus is a popular candidate for first place. He worked and wrote about 300 years before Aristotle.
But somehow, there is not a 'cumulative culture' of the more complex behaviors in animals, unlike in humans.
At least some animals learn from each other (likely by means of mimicry) and even pass on (some of) what they have learnt to succeeding generations. (Don't lionesses and wolves teach their cubs to hunt?) That is simply an extension of the ability to adapt one's behaviour in a changing environment. One might expect "memes" to develop and evolve as they do in human cultures. But what extends this process is writing, painting, sculpting, which leave a permanent record for later generations to interpret and adapt for their own use - and sometimes simply to preserve if we wish to.
Animals do acquire layers of behavior, but they are best described as scaffolds, rather than 'traditions'.
"Scaffolds" is a very interesting concept. Without knowing exactly how ethologists apply the term, I shouldn't comment. But I don't see "scaffolds" as an opposition to "traditions". For human beings, our traditions are scaffolds - a framework within which we develop our behaviour and which we can alter and adapt as our needs and fancies change.
We are unexceptional in that we are the product of evolution, like every other species is, bacteria to sequoias. We designed ourselves no more than any other species did. We are on the continuum along with every other animal.
Where we ARE exceptional is that we are much further out on the continuum (than other species) in our ability to reason, invent, think, etc., and enact the rational and irrational motives driven by our far superior lust for aggrandizement.
Yes, that's a much better picture of what's going on. Though we may be driven, not by a stronger lust for aggrandizement, but by better opportunities made available by our technological capablities. We may also be driven, not by simple aggrandizement, but by something as simple as population pressure.
We are the only species to do many, many things. All because of being the only one capable of thinking the ways we do. It seems to me that's the very definition of exceptional.
Yes. I think the issue may be what our being exceptional means.
My objection was to the definition of the word, precisely because evolution accounts for the many traits common to species with a common ancestry. Nothing suddenly happened to strike man with reason; reason was developed in many species over millions of years. That man took it into further realms of imagination and language is interesting, but it makes him unique only in magnitude, not in kind.
Sometimes a difference in magnitude does make a difference in kind.
The distinction between h.sapiens and other creatures is something we have to take responsibility for, rather than denying the obvious.
I think this is the heart of the debate. Exceptional or similar is, to a great extent, a difference of perspective, or emphasis. What matters is what difference the difference in emphasis makes. Why does it matter? It comes down to a question of values. Does our dominance over other species mean that we are entitled to treat them as machines or use them for sport? Or does it mean we need to be stewards rather than owners, including taking into account the interests of at least other animals, but maybe also fish, insects, plants, bacteria and microbes.
This gets bound up with arguments appealing to enlightened self-interest - we need the planet to function in certain ways if we are to survive at all - as against arguments appealing to a moral view - that because we can see to the welfare of other living beings and even, in some sense, of the inanimate landscape itself, we ought to do so.
I think this is the heart of the debate. Exceptional or similar is, to a great extent, a difference of perspective, or emphasis. What matters is what difference the difference in emphasis makes. Why does it matter? It comes down to a question of values. Does our dominance over other species mean that we are entitled to treat them as machines or use them for sport? Or does it mean we need to be stewards rather than owners, including taking into account the interests of at least other animals, but maybe also fish, insects, plants, bacteria and microbes.
Why does it matter? Because humans literally hold the power of life and death over the whole planet and separately, of many of its species, by what we do or don't do, or because of unintended consequences of our actions. We have awesome power, we alone have the means and the ability to literally destroy the Earth, leaving aside whether we will or should. No other species has anything like that power. The fact that this distinction is so easily denied never ceases to dismay as it is the denial of an obvious fact. What I mean by taking responsibility for it is acknowledging it as a fact. There is no other species on earth like h.sapiens. Call it 'exceptionalism' if you like, but it just seems utterly implausible to deny it. (I have a theory as to why it is so frequently denied, but I won't go into that here.)
Consider this: there have been searches going on for decades, SETI, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, signs of life on other planets. Some other civilisation that emanates radio waves or some form of signal we could recognise. Signatures of non-natural compounds that can only be produced by artificial synthesis. So far, no luck, but it indicates a clear distinction between objects and forces found in nature, and those that are a result of artifice, things that could only be manufactured by a rational sentient being.
The earth is nowadays polluted by many thousands of chemicals that couldnt even exist had we not made them. If some other species SETI found signs of those compounds, they would say 'Aha! Rational sentient life exists there!' But yet, were just another species? :yikes:
That's like saying that the explanation of a rainbow in the terms of physics undermines it, or reduces it, or even abolishes it. Which, I'm sure you will agree, is a serious misunderstanding.
But a rainbow is a matter for physics and optics, in a way that living beings are not. Yours is the misunderstanding here.
The basic axioms of logic are certainly something that we are able to recognize and manipulate. Whether they are constructed or discovered is contested. That's what this is all about, isn't it?
Its very close. Im very much in the discovered camp, although once we have the intelligence to discover, with it comes the ability to construct, which muddies the water somewhat.
But, I do understand your puzzlement, and will try to explain the point Ive been reaching for with respect to Aristotle. Ill say again Im no classics scholar and am not well read in the Greek texts. Many here are better educated in them than am I. But theres a crucial point I think Ive discerned in the Platonist-Aristotelian context. This is the reality of ideas. Not the kind of ideas we mean when we speak casually - Ive got an idea! - but formal ideas, like those of logical and arithmetical principles. Ideas in the platonic sense as formal principles or structures, eidos. I say these are real, but not material in nature. Not that they're 'immaterial things' - a horrible oxymoron - but they're only perceptible to a rational intellect. They are what traditional philosophy calls 'intelligible objects' (reference). And these are not explainable or reducible to the terms of particle physics or the principles of evolutionary biology. You can't account for syllogisms or the law of the excluded middle by appealing to the laws of physics.
Just as your passage states (and yes, it is highly germane to the topic at hand):
J. Lukasiewicz, A Wittgenstein Workbook, quoted and trans. by P.Geach:Where and what is this ideal construction?
Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.
This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.
My bolds. So - this is something that Plato and Aristotle see, which, on the whole, naturalism and much of modern philosophy rejects. It's a deep issue, I agree. But the gist is, the ability to grasp universals just is the kind of 'divine spark' in the human intellect which differentiates humans as 'the rational animal'. I know it's a very non-politically-correct philosophy, but I can't help but believe there's something vitally important in it.
Im very much in the discovered camp, although once we have the intelligence to discover, with it comes the ability to construct .
Im putting myself in the discovered camp regarding constructions, but for understanding, rather than logic. Hence, insofar as discovery may be by mere accident, with intelligence comes the ability to construct a relation of conceptions to such discoveries, which is cognition.
Whether or not conceptions belong to each other, is the purview of logic, which are constructs in accordance with principles obtained from the faculty of reason, and must be considered an intrinsic manifestation of the human intellect alone, hence, with respect to logic itself, Im putting myself in the constructed camp.
Gets pretty lonely over here sometimes, I must say. But thats fine; I can turn Dazed and Confused up to eleven and nobody throws stuff at me.
Because humans literally hold the power of life and death over the whole planet and separately, of many of its species, by what we do or don't do, or because of unintended consequences of our actions.
This (which, in theory, I was perfectly aware of) made me look at things differently. Which is what good philosophy is all about. There are enough ways for people to doge the issue, and I'm in favour of ideas that make it more difficult for them. (But that doesn't mean I retract anything that I've said. Perhaps I would put some of it differently.)
I know it's a very non-politically-correct philosophy, but I can't help but believe there's something vitally important in it.
Well, I would suggest that the reason why it's not politically correct is more to do with what people have made of it, rather than the doctrine in itself. But it's perhaps you have in mind the disfavour that platonism has fallen into amongst philosophers. The doctrine seems to be surviving, however. For me, however, that it is a philosophy and deserves to be considered as such. I'm not a fan myelf and I'm prepared to argue the issue as opposed to dismissing it.
However, for various reasons, I'm very interested in why you think it is important. After all, on the face of it, it doesn't make any difference to anything. Life will go on exactly as before.
Im very much in the discovered camp, although once we have the intelligence to discover, with it comes the ability to construct, which muddies the water somewhat.
That deserves teasing out. But for the moment, let me observe that you seem not to hold a "pure" version (as exemplified in Lukasiewicz's articulation). That makes a difference.
But a rainbow is a matter for physics and optics, in a way that living beings are not. Yours is the misunderstanding here.
Human beings not a matter for physics? What on earth is physiology about?
We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal;
I'm not sure that "north of" is usually considered to be a universal, but I'll let that pass, because platonism is about more than "formal ideas, like those of logical and arithmetical principles". It is about universals.
BTW I couldn't quite follow his argument here, but I'm not sure how much it matters. We're not dealing with details here.
.... the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'.
Well, Russell's answer suggests that it doesn't exist, which he doesn't mean to imply. But certainly they are not spatio-temporal objects. But that's not a dramatic conclusion. They are objects in a different category, which means that the manner of their existence is not that of spatio-temporal objects like "Edinburgh" or "London". No sweat. (I'm guessing that you might have no difficulty with the notion of a category, because Aristotle invented the term, in this application.) Is it a mental object? That's more dubious, partly because I'm not all that clear what mental objects are. But I can see why Russell would not want to call them that because the term suggests that it only exists as and when it is thought about and that clashes with the objectivity of "Edinburgh is north of London". My point here is only that there are different kinds of object in the world, and their existence is of different kinds. Not everything is a spatio-temporal object. That's not a problem for me. So what do you say about this example?
Sure. My objection was to the definition of the word, precisely because evolution accounts for the many traits common to species with a common ancestry. Nothing suddenly happened to strike man with reason; reason was developed in many species over millions of years. That man took it into further realms of imagination and language is interesting, but it makes him unique only in magnitude, not in kind.
I know you weren't responding to me, but it might be how you would. I think we are different in kind. One animal thinks about leaping out at prey. Another thinks about climbing a tree to grab a piece of fruit. One thinks about digging a hole to live in. Another thinks about climbing into a discarded shell.
Humans think about the things we like and dislike about foods that have nothing to do with nutrition; foods we've eaten in millennia past; how it lead to our current form and abilities; what we might eat to improve on our form and abilities; and make long-term plans to bring it about. Humans think about the different types of homes we've lived in throughout history; how to improve our homes to make them safer and more comfortable; the aesthetic value of different homes, and toes of homes; and how we might construct homes that will allow us to live in environments we couldn't possibly live in, like on the moon, without using technology to build such homes.
No other species thinks about the differences between the ways different species think. No other species thinks about thinking. What are the intermediary steps on a scale of magnitude between how any other species thinks about these things and how we think about them that reveals it all to be the same scale of magnitude, rather than different kinds of thinking?
PatternerSeptember 14, 2024 at 13:13#9318840 likes
We are the only species to do many, many things. All because of being the only one capable of thinking the ways we do. It seems to me that's the very definition of exceptional.
Patterner
Yes. I think the issue may be what our being exceptional means.
Yes. But, surely, we are exceptional in some way. Not just being the species that can lift the most weight, run the fastest, live in the greatest number of environments, etc. Without our ability to think in the ways we do, we are exceptional in none of these things. But our ability to think in the ways we do, in ways nothing else is able to think, we are the undisputed masters of all these things.
Vera MontSeptember 14, 2024 at 13:14#9318850 likes
No other species thinks about the differences between the ways different species think. No other species thinks about thinking. What are the intermediary steps on a scale of magnitude between how any other species thinks about these things and how we think about them that reveals it all to be the same scale of magnitude, rather than different kinds of thinking?
Can't you be special, bigger, smarter, wider, more powerful, more dangerous, more imaginative, more poetic, the only one that looks into space, builds skyscrapers and nuclear missiles and poisons it own own water supply; can't you be more, more, more, more... without denying an entire aspect of mental function to all other species? Does more have to mean: It's all mine, nobody else can have any?
But our ability to think in the ways we do, in ways nothing else is able to think, we are the undisputed masters of all these things.
You could be right. But there are many contenders in the field. Language, (Rational) Thinking, Tool-making, Culture, Empathy, Moral sense, Social living. Each one is popular for a while - until empirical evidence pies up. It turns out that animals also have these things, or at least recognizable precursors. Reading publications from scientists about their research is often unhelpful, but, purely in the spirit of suggesting that you are casting your net too narrowly and long before science will catch up with you, here are two references that show how much empirical work is going on and how varied it is.
The supreme irony is that if you ask what makes us human, you will likely find that the top contender is emotion. Which animals also clearly experience. Reason has had a bad reputation ever since the Industrial Revolution.
I'm beginning to think that this debate is a distraction.
Can't you be specialer, bigger, smarter, wider, more powerful, more dangerous, more imaginative, more poetic, more, more, more, more... without denying an entire aspect of mental function to all other species? Does more have to mean: It's all mine and nobody else can have any?
Yes, we can be such things. In some ways, that is surely the case.
But we don't merely think in certain ways to a higher degree. We think in ways no other species does to any degree. I would be happy to hear how my assessment is wrong, if you would point out specific flaws. There's is no value in holding onto falsehoods. Consider some examples...
No species refines iron ore to only a minimal degree, but doesn't understand that different fuels burn at different temperatures, which refines it further, making better iron, which can accomplish more. No other species mines iron ore at all, despite having watched us do it for a very long time. None have even noticed the advantage in the iron we've been making all that time, and gone out specifically looking for our discards, using it to make better versions of things they already make.
No species does the basic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, but hasn't thought of exponents, negative numbers, or transcendental numbers. No species that has seen our mathematics for centuries has started using it.
No species writes down ideas about anything it does not learn via instinct or being taught, passing down more complex ideas to the next generation, and providing a means to expand on such knowledge over the generations. No species has watched us do that for centuries, and adopted the practice.
No species has heard our spoken languages, and developed anything comparable, or even learned ours. Other species may have sounds that represent things. Someone recently linked an article about elephants that have names for other elephants that seem to be unique sounds that are not imitations off any bouser associated with the"named" elephant. But there is no hint that they, or any other species, contemplates death, experiences existential angst, makes plans that will not be achieved for generations, or has poetry.
There are so many things, and different kinds of things, we're manufacturing, and different fields of study, that are not being invented, or even copied, by any other species. It's not that our thinking in these areas is better than that of every other species, it's that no other species is thinking in these areas at all. The objective proof of this is everywhere. Including the method by which we're communicating now. Nothing else is even attempting to do what we do, or even has any idea we're doing things they can't. We are alone in these areas, not merely above.
PatternerSeptember 14, 2024 at 21:30#9319790 likes
Reply to Patterner
I've done that. I couldn't find delete either. I think there isn't one.
Though you can edit posts, so you can go to edit and delete the entire text and save an empty message. Not an appealing option.
You may be missing a point in your last message. It is not difficult to find a unique feature or features in any species. (That's largely how we identify them). The interesting question is what is the significance of those unique features. So the short reply to your list is simply that none of that proves that we are not animals. Whatever is unique, there are also features that we share with them and they with us. We are certainly not above them. Indeed, in some ways we might be thought to be below them. War?
Vera MontSeptember 14, 2024 at 22:43#9319900 likes
You are truly and indubitably alone in all these strictly human areas. My contention is that reason and rational thought are not confined within nor limited to these human areas. Reason in other species predates and precurses these uniquely human flights of cerebral virtuosity.
PatternerSeptember 14, 2024 at 22:47#9319920 likes
But our ability to think in the ways we do, in ways nothing else is able to think, we are the undisputed masters of all these things.
Patterner
You could be right. But there are many contenders in the field. Language, (Rational) Thinking, Tool-making, Culture, Empathy, Moral sense, Social living. Each one is popular for a while - until empirical evidence pies up. It turns out that animals also have these things, or at least recognizable precursors.
Culture, empathy, moral sense, and social living are surely up for grabs. Because the merit of each is subjective. Even an animal that kills it's prey in a terrifying, painful way, which is quite a few, is morally superior to us, imo, because they have no malice.
But if language is for communication, no other species' language comes close to being able to express the number of things (there are an infinite number of sentences we can construct), or the types of things (descriptions of physical events; thoughts of mortality; mathematics; the possible state of anything at any point in the future; the feelings evoked by music or painting) human languages can communicate.
What does rational thinking mean? I mean, what is its value? If it increases understanding, leading to advancement, no animal has advanced in any noticable way. No members of a species live in a different way today than any members of its species did a million years ago. We, otoh, do many things our earliest ancestors had not yet learned about. Things we must teach to every new generation, or they will not know about it. All knowledge would have to be rediscovered, again and again. But we think rationally, discover and learn, and pass knowledge on. As a result, our lives are immeasurable far removed from those of our earliest ancestors. No other species advances in this way.
Yes, other species use tools. In most cases, a species uses a tool for a purpose. Chimps use tools in several situations, particularly for eating. Yet there is no spark of understanding. They somehow simply happened to stumble upon using X to accomplish Y, and they kept doing it. Then they stumbled upon using A to accomplish B, and kept doing it. They don't realize tools can be improved, adapted for other uses, or that it's possible to invent tools for other purposes entirely. This is because they don't have rational thinking. (As I described in my previous paragraph. You may have something else in mind regarding rational thinking.)
Maybe my point can be made in this way... Let's remove humans from the earth entirely. We never existed. All species on earth would be at various points on the spectrum of intelligence. Which would hold the top position that we would hold if we were still there? Which would be the undisputed masters of the world? I suspect there would be no such thing, even though the spectrum would still be there. Despite the large differences in thinking ability between all the species, none think in different ways than any other. There is only greater or lesser thinking in the same ways.
Reading publications from scientists about their research is often unhelpful, but, purely in the spirit of suggesting that you are casting your net too narrowly and long before science will catch up with you, here are two references that show how much empirical work is going on and how varied it is.
Scientific American 2014 - What Makes Humans Different Than Any Other Species
The supreme irony is that if you ask what makes us human, you will likely find that the top contender is emotion. Which animals also clearly experience. Reason has had a bad reputation ever since the Industrial Revolution.
I once saw a documentary of a lion cub that was liked by hyenas. The cub's mother was searching, and finally found the body. She sat there for some time, looking into the distance, and her vocalizations seemed to be cries of anguish. How long do you suppose her pain remained with her? A week? A month? A year? Do you suppose the memory hit her like a truck from time to time, for the rest of her life? Do you suppose her pain faded somewhat over the years, until the memory of her child came with a bittersweet smile?
Do you suppose the mother of a wildebeest that has watched it's child, perhaps more than one over the years, murdered, torn apart, and eaten, suffers the horrors I would?
What does rational thinking mean? I mean, what is its value?
In the first instance, survival. Rational thought is simply the most effective approach to solving problems. All species are confronted with problems every day. The ones that don't panic, observe the situation and find ways to overcome the difficulty go on to have more and better offspring, whom they can teach how to solve problems. Quoting Patterner
Yet there is no spark of understanding. They somehow simply happened to stumble upon using X to accomplish Y, and they kept doing it.
You haven't seen any of the intelligence tests set for various other species by scientists? They do not, once in a century, 'stumble upon' solutions; they work them out logically and in a timely manner.
Och, never mind. Yes, yes, you are incredibly special! You have totally cornered the market on thinking.
Reply to Patterner There's no post delete function for users on this platform (although mods can delete posts. Incidentally I agree with the points you're putting forward here.)
Most people on this planet blithely assume, largely without any valid scientific rationale, that humans are special creatures, distinct from other animals. Curiously, the scientists best qualified to evaluate this claim have often appeared reticent to acknowledge the uniqueness of Homo sapiens, perhaps for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines. Yet hard scientific data have been amassed across fields ranging from ecology to cognitive psychology affirming that humans truly are a remarkable species.
The density of human populations far exceeds what would be typical for an animal of our size. We live across an extraordinary geographical range and control unprecedented flows of energy and matter: our global impact is beyond question. When one also considers our intelligence, powers of communication, capacity for knowledge acquisition and sharingalong with magnificent works of art, architecture and music we createhumans genuinely do stand out as a very different kind of animal. Our culture seems to separate us from the rest of nature, and yet that culture, too, must be a product of evolution.
I think the phrase 'for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines' is actually a key driver for a lot of what is being argued in this thread, and I think I know why.
A secular age, defined by a naturalist outlook, has developed and is defined in opposition to the religious culture that preceded it. The watershed in European cultural history is generally regarded as the Renaissance and the subsequent 'scientific revolution' which ushered in sweeping changes to the understanding of man and nature. That is the subject of a vast literature and commentary spanning centuries, so it's futile to try and summarize it. I'm only mentioning it as the background to why I think there is such a sense of hostility towards 'human exceptionalism'.
I think the reasoning is existential and cultural.
The other key phrase in that passage is: 'Our culture seems to separate us from the rest of nature, and yet that culture, too, must be a product of evolution.'
'Must be the product of evolution'. And that is because evolutionary biology is believed to define us, both in terms of species, but also in terms of a grounding explanation of human nature, and nature herself. To that extent, and in that sense, it assumes the role of a religion - of course not the supernatural religions of yore, but in the sense of providing an apparently coherent and unified worldview within which we make sense of our identity, of who we are and how we originated. Furthermore, one fully validated by the authority of science - and what other kind is there?
I will add, I myself have never questioned the facts of evolutionary biology. I grew up on a digest of the excellent Time-Life books on biology and evolution and have a keen interest in paleoanthropology and the evolution of h.sapiens. I wasn't even much aware of the 'creation debates' until well into adulthood, as they're not a feature of life in Australia. (Ken Ham, the notorious young-earth creationist, started in Sydney but had to migrate to Kentucky to find an audience.)
But I'm also of the view that there's a lot read into evolutionary biology that isn't actually there. First and foremost by the so-called 'ultra-Darwinists' such as Richard Dawkins and the late Daniel Dennett, among many others, who see evolutionary theory and science as superseding and displacing religion. Of course they're kind of outliers in some ways, but their views are influential and quite consonant with the 'scientific worldview' they espouse.
So, getting back to 'our culture seems to separate us' and the assertion that 'it too must be the product of evolution'. What this does, is offers a resolution to the sense of separateness, of otherness, which is a pervasive undercurrent of our lives as self-conscious individual beings. Hence the fierce adherence to the belief that we're continuous with other species, that we're 'no different' - when on face value, we are obviously vastly different. Evolutionary biology makes us part of a cosmic story, in which evolution and/or nature is now endowed with the kind of creativity that used to be assigned to God.
(....to be continued.)
PatternerSeptember 14, 2024 at 23:48#9320030 likes
Och, never mind. Yes, yes, you are incredibly special! You have totally cornered the market on thinking.
Can someone not disagree with you without you resorting to this? You have not attempted to make any points in opposition to mine. You just say I'm wrong. And when I don't bow to the brilliance of such a tactic, and I try to explain my position in different ways, I get this.
And I'm not claiming [I]I[/I] an incredibly special. We all are. Yes, even you. No member of any other species would be reacting the way you are now. One of the pitfalls of the ways we think that no other species does.
(continued from above)The sense of separateness from nature is, I think, at the heart of the Biblical Myth of the Fall. In that mythological account, 'the Garden of Eden' represents the primeval consciousness of animal existence.
The animal world is a world of pure being, a world of immediacy and immanence. The animal soul is like water in water, seamlessly connected to all that surrounds it, so that there is no sense of self or other, of time, of space, of being or not being. This utopian (to human sensibility, which has such alienating notions) Shangri-La or Eden actually isnt that because it is characterized at all points by what wed call violence. Animals, that is, eat and are eaten. For them killing and being killed is the norm; and there isnt any meaning to such a thing, or anything that we would call fear; theres no concept of killing or being killed. Theres only being, immediacy, isness. Animals dont have any need for religion; they already are that, already transcend life and death, being and nonbeing, self and other, in their very living, which is utterly pure.
[In his book, A Theory of Religion] Georges Bataille sees human consciousness beginning with the making of the first tool, the first thing that isnt a pure being, intrinsic in its value and inseparable from all of being. A tool is a separable, useful, intentionally made thing; it can be possessed, and it serves a purpose. It can be altered to suit that purpose. It is instrumental, defined by its use. The tool is the first instance of the not-I, and with its advent there is now the beginning of a world of objects, a thing world. Little by little out of this comes a way of thinking and acting within thingness (language), and then once this plane of thingness is established, more and more gets placed upon itother objects, plants, animals, other people, ones self, a world. Now there is self and otherand then, paradoxically, self becomes other to itself, alienated not only from the rest of the projected world of things, but from itself, which it must perceive as a thing, a possession. This constellation of an alienated self is a double-edged sword: seeing the self as a thing, the self can for the first time know itself and so find a closeness to itself; prior to this, there isnt any self so there is nothing to be known or not known. But the creation of my 'me', though it gives me for the first time myself as a friend, also rips me out of the world and puts me out on a limb on my own. Interestingly, and quite logically, this development of human consciousness coincides with a deepening of the human relationship to the animal world, which opens up to the human mind now as a depth, a mystery. Humans are that depth, because humans are animals, know this and feel it to be so, and yet also not so; humans long for union with the animal world of immediacy, yet know they are separate from it. Also they are terrified of it, for to reenter that world would be a loss of the self; it would literally be the end of me as I know me.
In the midst of this essential human loneliness and perplexity, which is almost unbearable, religion appears. It intuits and imagines the ancient world of oneness, of which there is still a powerful primordial memory, and calls it The Sacred. This is the invisible world, world of spirit, world of the gods, or of God. It is inexorably opposed to, defined as the opposite of, the world of things, the profane world of the body, of instrumentality, a world of separation, the fallen world. Religions purpose then is to bring us back to the lost world of intimacy, and all its rites, rituals, and activities are created to this end. We want this, and need it, as sure as we need food and shelter; and yet it is also terrifying. All religions have known and been based squarely on this sense of terrible necessity.
I think this is the (unconscious) fear that we're seeking to ameliorate through a kind of scientific interpretation of 'one-ness with Nature', which is where belief in the projected meaning of evolutionary biology fits in. We seek to master nature through science, and also to transcend it, but now through ambitions to 'escape the surly bonds of earth' by way of space technology.
(The essay from which that passage was extracted was written about 9/11, by Norman Fischer, a Zen master and poet from California.)
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 00:25#9320070 likes
That almost sounds like you are suggesting there are areas of thought that are only seen in humans.
I don't need to suggest; you've listed most of 'em. I never contested the uniqueness of humans or the feats of cogitation they required. All i said was that these are the product of rational thought, which, before the herculean humans endeavours, were expressed in the purposeful, conscious use of tools and other innovations by rational entities of lesser endowment, but nevertheless, with similar brains. Quoting Patterner
You have not attempted to make any points in opposition to mine.
I wasn't opposed to yours. I considered them incomplete. I had made a case, with citations, before you made any points - consisting of a list of uniquely human accomplishments which were never disputed. I didn't repeat all of the evidence I know of other species thinking rationally; I merely referred to the definition of the critical words. Quoting Patterner
You just say I'm wrong.
I think you have a narrow vision.
"This" was simple exasperation, capitulation. If it troubled you, I'm sorry.
I think the phrase 'for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines' is actually a key driver for a lot of what is being argued in this thread, and I think I know why.
It sounds to me like you are projecting your own fears. In any case, you are demonstrating a lack of insight into the perspectives of others.
PatternerSeptember 15, 2024 at 01:40#9320210 likes
You may be missing a point in your last message. It is not difficult to find a unique feature or features in any species. (That's largely how we identify them). The interesting question is what is the significance of those unique features. So the short reply to your list is simply that none of that proves that we are not animals. Whatever is unique, there are also features that we share with them and they with us. We are certainly not above them. Indeed, in some ways we might be thought to be below them. War?
I don't think I'm missing that point at all. I have not said anything to suggest I don't think we are animals. Of course we are. And we reached our current state the same way every other species reached their current state - via evolution. Also, I don't think we are the only species that is unique. I'm just saying we are unique in that we think in ways no other species thinks. That doesn't even mean all the aspects of thinking that we are capable of are unique to us. But some are. And they are what makes us capable of having such discussions about other species, and having them on this medium, while no other species is having such discussions about any other species, by any method.
Not knowing what scientific humanism is, I wouldn't want to comment on what it loses sight of.
Scientific humanism is hardly a fringe movement. It is hugely influential in modern culture. One example is Julian Huxley, of the famous Huxley family, a direct descendent of "Darwin's Bulldog", Thomas Henry.
Julian Huxley said 'As a result of a thousand million years of evolution, the universe is becoming conscious of itself, able to understand something of its past history and its possible future. This cosmic self-?awareness is being realized in one tiny fragment of the universein a few of us human beings' - a sentiment I endorse.
I prompted ChatGPT for other examples, which gave this list:
Carl Sagan Sagan was not only an astrophysicist and science communicator but also a strong advocate for scientific skepticism, ethics, and the use of science for human betterment. His emphasis on a "cosmic perspective" incorporated a deeply humanistic vision, stressing both our smallness and responsibility in the vast universe.
Jacob Bronowski A polymath known for his series The Ascent of Man, Bronowski combined a deep appreciation for the achievements of science with an equally strong concern for the ethical dimensions of human knowledge, particularly in the wake of the atrocities of World War II.
Albert Einstein Though more widely known as a physicist, Einstein was also a humanist who believed in the moral and social responsibilities of scientists. He spoke frequently on issues like disarmament, civil rights, and the need for global cooperation.
Bertrand Russell A philosopher and mathematician, Russell advocated for the application of reason and science to address social and ethical issues. His humanism was deeply intertwined with his pacifism, atheism, and commitment to improving society through rational inquiry.
E. O. Wilson An evolutionary biologist and naturalist, Wilson emphasized the importance of biodiversity and advocated for what he called consilience, the unity of knowledge across the sciences and humanities. His work explored the ethical implications of our connection to nature and argued for environmental stewardship.
Richard Dawkins Although known for his contributions to evolutionary biology, Dawkins is also a strong proponent of humanism and reason, criticizing dogmatic belief systems while advocating for a scientific worldview that promotes moral responsibility and societal progress.
Steven Pinker A cognitive psychologist and linguist, Pinkers work on human nature and his advocacy for reason and Enlightenment values places him in the tradition of scientific humanism. His book The Better Angels of Our Nature explores how science and rationality have contributed to moral progress throughout history.
Isaac Asimov The celebrated science fiction writer and biochemist, Asimov not only wrote extensively on science but also on humanism and ethics, especially in relation to technology. His Three Laws of Robotics are a famous attempt to think through the ethical implications of technological advancement.
John Dewey A philosopher and psychologist, Dewey promoted a form of pragmatism that saw science as the best method for achieving human progress. He argued that moral and ethical concerns should evolve in tandem with scientific knowledge, and his views strongly influenced 20th-century educational theory.
Do you suppose the mother of a wildebeest that has watched it's child, perhaps more than one over the years, murdered, torn apart, and eaten, suffers the horrors I would?
Do you suppose that I have any way of "really" understanding how any mother, never mind the mother of wildebeest, feels about the loss of a child - even though I have lost a child. The balance between understanding and projection is very difficult. To be more accurate, we can be pretty certain of our understanding at a general level, but when you get down to details it gets much, much more difficult.
I'm just saying we are unique in that we think in ways no other species thinks.
I'm guessing that mathematics and perhaps ethics are examples of what you have in mind. Yet people seem quite happy to ask whether dogs can do calculus and to insist that they can make and execute a plan of action to achieve a common end. And then, attributing values to them seems inherent in saying that they are alive and sentient and social - even in saying that evolution applies to them.
I think you would question whether dogs can do any mathematics, never mind calculus, or really make and execute a plan. I also think you would question whether dogs really understand ethics, even if they have desires. There's a common theme, because it would not be unreasonable to think that (human) language is essential for both. Am I wrong?
Yet there is no spark of understanding. They somehow simply happened to stumble upon using X to accomplish Y, and they kept doing it.
I don't understand you.
If a pigeon stumbles on the fact that pecking a specific item in their cage produces food and keeps on doing it until it has eaten enough, that it doesn't understand what is going on? It may not understand about the aims of the experiment or what an experiment is, but it understands what is important to it. In any case, human beings also stumble on facts and have no hesitation in exploiting them to the limit of their understanding (which is often quite severe and detrimental to their long-term interests).
And I'm not claiming I an incredibly special. We all are. Yes, even you. No member of any other species would be reacting the way you are now. One of the pitfalls of the ways we think that no other species does.
I'm not denying what you say. But it's more complicated than that. If everybody is special, then nobody is special. So some explanation of what "special" means here is necessary.
Scientific humanism is hardly a fringe movement. It is hugely influential in modern culture.
I know that. But that's compatible with many different formulations of what it is. Still, thanks for the responses. I'm most struck by the common denominator in the values involved. I'm more and convinced that this debate is underpinned by the ethical issues that underlie it. It's not (just) the facts, but what you make of them. But now I'm puzzled because scientific humanism seems to be a common or garden humanism with a respect for and faith in science. Or is that all there is to it?
Evolutionary biology makes us part of a cosmic story, in which evolution and/or nature is now endowed with the kind of creativity that used to be assigned to God.
Not really. Evolution does indeed imply creativity, but not the kind that was supposed for God. Divine omnipotence meant that the wish is sufficient. Not at all what evolution does.
You haven't seen any of the intelligence tests set for various other species by scientists? They do not, once in a century, 'stumble upon' solutions; they work them out logically and in a timely manner.
I think @Patterner may be including trial and error under "stumbles upon". For me, "stumbles upon" is pure accident, without even recognizing the problem. Trial and error seems like a perfectly rational procedure. (When you can work out the solution in advance, it's not really a problem any more, since you know the answer.)
All i said was that these (sc. animal behaviours) are the product of rational thought, which, before the herculean humans endeavours, were expressed in the purposeful, conscious use of tools and other innovations by rational entities of lesser endowment, but nevertheless, with similar brains.
That's very judicious and well balanced. But there are deeper issues. For example, what thought counts as rational? For some definitions, possession of a suitable language is critical and whether animal communication systems count as a language, never mind one suitable for rationality, is a moot point. So the possibility that the two sides are talking past each other remains.
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 11:01#9320750 likes
For some definitions, possession of a suitable language is critical and whether animal communication systems count as a language, never mind one suitable for rationality, is a moot point.
Sure. If you define a word to mean what you want it to mean it will mean what you want it to mean.
I have not seen that particular definition: "rational thought is that to which possession of a suitable language is critical" in a dictionary. Nor have I seen ethics mentioned as a necessary adjunct to reason in any work on neuroscience.
Sure. If you define a word to mean what you want it to mean it will mean what you want it to mean.
I have not seen that particular definition: "rational thought is that to which possession of a suitable language is critical" in a dictionary.
No, you won't. I'm talking about a philosophical position or even assumption, that the only true rational process is articulate reasoning which can only be laid out in language. I could have been clearer. Sorry.
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 11:51#9320790 likes
I'm talking about a philosophical position or even assumption, that the only true rational process is articulate reasoning which can only be laid out in language. I could have been clearer.
The philosophical positions are clear enough. Humans philosophize; nature does not.
It's probably foolish of me (and obviously futile) to hold out for the integrity of that very language some people deem essential to reasoning. The usage of words determines the content of a discussion and the direction of reasoning on a topic. If you change the meaning of words, you change the essence of the subject.
I've lost this one.
creativesoulSeptember 15, 2024 at 12:31#9320860 likes
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach.
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 12:35#9320870 likes
Depends on one's philosophical stance, doesn't it? The words have no fixed meaning, apparently - only relative value as to what counts and what doesn't.
creativesoulSeptember 15, 2024 at 12:38#9320880 likes
Depends on one's philosophical stance, doesn't it?
No, it doesn't. Creatures capable of thinking about the world were doing so long before we began talking about it. Hence, the need for the aforementioned methodological approach and bare minimum criterion.
creativesoulSeptember 15, 2024 at 12:44#9320890 likes
Competing notions of "thought" and "rational thought" can be assessed by how well they 'fit' into what we know to be true, as well as their inherent ability or lack thereof to explain things(explanatory power). Evolutionary progression is paramount here. There are all sort of philosophical positions which must reject the idea of language less thought/belief, on pains of coherency alone.
On my view, that is prima facie evidence that they've gotten some things very wrong.
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 12:54#9320910 likes
I've watched cats go back to the place where their captured rodent had escaped hours earlier. If that does not count as that cat thinking about that rodent, despite the rodent no longer being present/visible, then nothing will.
Maybe I'm just stubborn, but I think that truth is not an issue that can be resolved by voting. Though I know that being in a minority can be discouraging. Quoting creativesoul
Language less creatures have no words. Yet, they think about the world. Clearly, not all thinking is existentially dependent upon words.
Ver neat. You are changing the subject somewhat. It may prove fruitful. Contesting claims about what are or might be unique differentials between animals and humans has not been productive. The two sides appeared to me to be talking past each other - hence my remark about language.
In the mean time, I suggest that the question is partly whether thinking must be a process distinct from acting. My answer is no. For the sake of an example, here's one that @Vera Montshared with us a while ago:- Quoting Vera Mont
A not-so-clever Pyrennese who liked to roam would ask her border collie confederate to help her escape. The collie would stand on her hind legs and push on the far frame (not where it opens) with both paws of the big sliding patio door. She didn't have the weight to push it all the way open, but she'd slide it over just enough for the big dog to wedge her nose in and force it open. Then they would pad softly across the patio, around the corner of the house, duck behind the car and make their way down the drive. (I stopped them there, having watched the whole procedure. I was on guard, because they'd already gone AWOL twice.)
Shared project, collaborative working, indirect approach to the problem. But no distinct moment that you could identify as "thinking".
It would be easy to provide what you might call a rational reconstruction of the action - a series of propositions attributing various beliefs/knowledges to the dogs and reconstructing a deductive process. That would provide what we commonly call an rational explanation of their actions. It doesn't rely on "what was going on in their minds".
creativesoulSeptember 15, 2024 at 13:10#9320990 likes
Competing notions of "thought" and "rational thought" can be assessed by how well they 'fit' into what we know to be true, as well as their inherent ability or lack thereof to explain things(explanatory power). Evolutionary progression is paramount here. There are all sort of philosophical positions which must reject the idea of language less thought/belief, on pains of coherency alone.
On my view, that is prima facie evidence that they've gotten some things very wrong.
:up: :up:
Non-linguistic thought seems near impossible for us to communicate about in any detailed and rigorous way. As you say, "how well they fit into what we know to be true" plays a crucial role in one person recognizing the sort of thing another is talking about, when trying to communicate about non-linguistic thought.
Add to that, the fact that many people's thinking is much more language 'focused' than the thinking of others, and many seem to think 'non-linguistic thought' is a nonsensical phrase.
Reply to creativesoul
In my book, opening doors and gates is rational thinking. Battering them down would not be, unless it was preceded by trying to open them. I can't assume that everyone will agree.
In my book, however, this is not a simple empirical question. As far as I can see, it is fair to say that our paradigm (NOT definition) of a person is a human being (under normal circumstances). Animals are like human beings in certain respects such that it seems most reasonable to think that they are like people. Crucially, it is clearly possible for human beings to form relationships with animals that are, or are like, relationships with people. But it's a balance. Some people do not go far enough and treat them as machines which can easily result in inhumane treatment. Other people go too far and get accused, sometimes rightly, of anthropomorphization.
I have to go now. But I look forward to seeing what happens next. :smile:
wonderer1September 15, 2024 at 13:28#9321020 likes
In my book, opening doors and gates is rational thinking. Battering them down would not be, unless it was preceded by trying to open them. I can't assume that everyone will agree.
Elephants seem like they might be well justified in disagreeing. Why waste time trying to figure out how to open a gate, if knocking the gate down is a trivial matter?
Is "overthinking" things rational?
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 13:52#9321040 likes
But no distinct moment that you could identify as "thinking".
Can you tell that a man is thinking before he says or does something? Sometimes, when he opens his mouth it becomes obvious that very little thought went into the product. (just watch any interview with MAGA cultist)
In the incidence you cited, I saw the looks and gestures - clearly, communication was taking place. I watched the collie try one side of the door briefly before reconsidering; the Pyrennese stood back, watching attentively, waiting for her turn to act.
On another escape attempt, they did similarly with the fence. The collie searched for and found a weak spot where the wire mesh was attached to the corner of the house and showed the Pyrennese where to pry. So, until the fence could be properly repaired, we tied up the roamer on a long rope. Damn if her co-conspirator didn't chew through it! Perfect combination of brains and brawn.
Of course, at the time I didn't find this behaviour admirable; I'd wasted a good deal of time and anxiety finding and catching them lest they got into trouble. Once they came back with barbed wire wounds and we spent all afternoon at the vet's and part of the next day washing blood off the inside of the car.
The dog book did say "Strong desire to roam" when describing Great Pyrennese; we had been warned. The collie could be let loose, she'd never wander off on her own: she was just helping out a friend. She was a little cleverboots, and sassy with it; very clear on her duty, her loyalties and her rights.
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 14:00#9321050 likes
Is learning to open doors and gates rational thinking, or does it not meet that criterion?
Of course it is. If you don't interfere, you can watch the process, which is exactly the same as a human would do. Regard the obstacle. Can you go over or around? No. Will it yield to force? No. Yet people open it and pass through. There is a way to do that. Find the pressure point or lever. Try moving it this way and that. Aha! Next time, no hesitation. New skill learned. New headache for the human.
Works with cupboard and fridge doors, too. One of my dogs got bored while I was at work, figured out how to open the dresser drawers and artfully arranged my clothes all down the staircase to the front door.
Over the decades, I have known many dogs. They're as varied in temperament, proclivities and intelligence as humans. I've been privileged to have four particularly bright dogs - two German Shepherds (the first, a retired police dog, was my volunteer nanny) the border collie cross, and a terrier. Smart dogs are interesting to watch, but hard to govern.
Elephants seem like they might be well justified in disagreeing. Why waste time trying to figure out how to open a gate, if knocking the gate down is a trivial matter?
No, Knocking down the gate is perfectly rational, if it works for you. What is very telling is if the elephant tries to knock down the gate, finds s/he can't and then tries a different tactic. I didn't think to cover that case, that's all.
Reply to Vera Mont
Funny how it works, isn't it? At the time, big headache, furious. Looking back, admirable, proud of them.
I have the impression that they are no longer with you. If so, I expect it's bittersweet. The full story is even more convincing than the short version.
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 14:21#9321070 likes
Reply to Ludwig V
Animal-watching is as fascinating to me as, if not more than, child-watching. Desmond Morris watched babies, but I find 4-8 year-olds more interesting. You have to be circumspect: everyone behaves differently when they know you're watching.
I like sushiSeptember 15, 2024 at 15:31#9321120 likes
Reply to Athena First Question. No. Meaning certainly not like we do. Many animals can complete complex instinctual tasks and solve complex mathematical problems. They, for the most part, cannot abstract anything like we can. That said, some clearly display creativity and cooperation which does often require a degree of 'rationality' ... but that is likely a stretch of the term.
Second question. Yes. They can clearly communicate. If you mean 'language' then, not really. Many animals share common features that humans possess but not share the whole collection.
Third question. Intuitive thinking is part and parcel of rational thinking - in the sense that reason with out emotions is naught.
Animals only appear to use reason and to communicate their minds because WE reasoning communicating creatures see ourselves in them, NOT because we see them.
And that thought is a very big consideration for researchers. From college lectures to books based on research, I am amazed by the scrutiny of the research. These guys are real nit pickers tearing apart each others work, in an effort to be very sure the conclusion of research is based on fact and not wishful human thinking.
Humans insert reason and deliberate some responses. We draw these deliberations out by communicating our reasons with other humans.
So true. This could be different for apes though. We shared genes with Chimpanzees but they do not have the ability to speak. They can sign and make jesters but they can not talk so they can not share their reasoning and deliberate the thoughts of others. They can follow this leader or that one, but they are not going to debate the reasoning. Females will defend their aged male leader from some young upstart. They do have emotional bonds and this is so close to reasoning, it is hard to draw the line.
Wouldn't if be fun to be a researcher and do a study about what feeling has to do with reasoning?
wonderer1September 15, 2024 at 17:20#9321270 likes
It sounds to me like you are projecting your own fears. In any case, you are demonstrating a lack of insight into the perspectives of others.
wonderer1
Thanks! and to you also.
The thing is, quite apropos to this topic, I've brought up the subject of pattern recognition a lot on the forum. It's a quite useful concept in understanding the way people think.
There are patterns that can be recognized in the thinking of people. One such pattern I've unintentionally developed a strong recognition of is narcissism. (Grandiose and covert/vulnerable types primarily, there are other labels for types of narcissism and the characteristics associated with those particular types that I'm not very familiar with.)
This is a pattern I can't unsee.
A result of such pattern recognition is some understanding on my part, of your need to see yourself as particularly special, and how that influences the thinking that goes into your posts. This need to see yourself as particularly special isn't something I think you have made a free willed choice to have, and not something I see you as to blame for. In fact I appreciate your skill at keeping keeping your rage covert. And of course, we are all narcissistic to some extent.
So getting back to the thread topic, I'd say there is an extremely good scientific case for animals having very strong pattern recognition in certain regards, and in many cases pattern recognition that is not available to us for various physiological reasons. And such pattern recognition is foundational to rationality. Human language/logic is kind of icing on the cake, on one hand. On the other hand, it allows humanity to do things way beyond the capabilities of any other species on Earth.
Perhaps relevant topics for this thread are, "What role does having language play, in the development of narcissism in humans?" and, "Is there any evidence for narcissism in animals?"
Animals dont need any of it. We personify animals when we call their behavior rational like our behavior is rational.
How do you know that their behaviour is not rational "like our behaviour is rational"? Is there some other kind of rational that it could be?
Why do you say that animals don't need any of it - do you mean, language, communication and math? Many of them certainly have communication skills and can do things that seem to require mathematics, like catching Frisbees. Whether they have language or not is unanswerable until we agree our definition of language.
Fortunately, human beings can also communicate without language and do things that seem to require mathematics without having learnt the necessary mathematics. If we can do it, they can do it - or it is at least possible.
The foundation of our recognition of human beings as (sometimes) rational people is our relationship with them and their relationship with us. The same foundation is the basis of our attributing or withholding perception emotion and reason to them.
You can "see" an animal as a bunch of reflexes if you choose to. You can see an animal as a person if you choose to. That choice is a decision how far to extend your paradigm of a person in the context of your interactions with them. It is a hinge for how you see them and how you interpret what you see. I can try to persuade you that either extreme doesn't really make sense, but a conclusive demonstration either way is not to be expected.
They can follow this leader or that one, but they are not going to debate the reasoning.
Well, let's allow, for the sake of the argument, that animals do not and cannot debate in the way that humans do. I'll accept also that debating is a skill that demands a capacity for rational thought. But you seem to think it is a necessary (probably not sufficient?) skill for rational thought. But does that really make sense?
I'll go further and say that although it is tempting to think that articulating one's reasons is what rationality is about, it is simply wrong. Articulating one's reasons for a rational action is an optional extra, distinct from the capacity for rational action. In the first place, people often find it quite difficult to explain why they did what they did when you ask. They have to stop and think about it immediately after they carried out the action. In the second place, we often act very fast when we need to. There simply isn't time to say to oneself "The traffic light has changed, it is dangerous and illegal to cross against the light, I had better stop". Indeed, the same applies when I look up at the sky and pick up an umbrella as I leave the house. I may say to myself or another that it looks like rain and I'll take an umbrella, and I may not.
They do have emotional bonds and this is so close to reasoning, it is hard to draw the line.
Yes. Even psychologists are abandoning the old conception of emotions as (purely subjective and irrational "feelings") and recognizing that cognition is part and parcel of the concepts.
I've brought up the subject of pattern recognition a lot on the forum. It's a quite useful concept in understanding the way people think.
Am I right to think that we are somewhere near the old-fashioned concept of a Gestalt? I think there is a lot to be said for it. It is not been a good thing that the atomistic methodology of empirical philosophers has not been helpful for philosophy or psychology. Patterns of behaviour.
wonderer1September 15, 2024 at 18:10#9321390 likes
Am I right to think that we are somewhere near the old-fashioned concept of a Gestalt? I think there is a lot to be said for it
Absolutely, and I think it is probably reasonable to think of much animal rationality as a matter of gestalts, without animals having as much capacity for analyzing mutually contradictory gestalts for consistency, as we have with our linguistic capabilities.
Being correct or knowing the truth is not required for rationalization. Back in ancient times, a person who conclude that the sun goes around the earth by using their observations, is being rational.
I must argue against that statement. Knowing truth is essential because things go very wrong when people act on incorrect ideas and bad information. Primitive people knew that problem well. They did not have bank cards to repair all the damage of bad decisions. And democracy, like scientific research, is people working together to get things right. True Aristotle made mistakes and Greek logic defined by him was lacking. But the truth is, if we don't get things right, they can go very wrong. This is true in our private lives and public lives.
Fire OlogistSeptember 15, 2024 at 18:40#9321430 likes
How do you know that their behaviour is not rational "like our behaviour is rational"? Is there some other kind of rational that it could be?
Animals have behaviors, many of which humans share (eating, sleeping, hunting, etc.). One of the behaviors humans exhibit is reasoning, or being rational. This involves language and communication with other reasoners.
I see no need to explain the behavior of animals as involving the human behavior we call reasoning.
There is no reason to think the sun is communicating with Mercury when the sun heats it up. The sun never says look at me, see how hot I am. We could use that metaphor, but we would be silly to assume that Mercury could be conscious of the sun or its communication, or that the sun is conscious of itself as bright and hot or that the sun now conscious of this would try to communicate it.
I think because animals have consciousness and because reason pervades human consciousness so deeply, we just assume (personify) that all higher consciousness involves an inner life of reasoning and communicable conceptualizing. I disagree.
Animals make sounds and other other animals react to those sounds. Humans see this as communication. But the animal that made the sound may have been forced to make that sound by some conditions, just like the other animal that responded to that sound was forced to respond. Nothing need be in between them called a communication - we reasoning humans make that relationship and call it a separate thing called communication. These are just on-off switches.
Because of the debate between free will and determinism, we might say that humans are not actually rational either, incapable of communicating a single communication clearly. Equating human behavior with animal behavior along the lines that none of us are using reason or making communications seems an easier argument than saying human and animal behaviors are equal in that they both involve levels of reasoning and communication.
Dog barks to warn the pack? Or a dog sees something and just bursts into a bark? Pack hears one of its members making barking sounds and thinks what is wrong? Or pack just hears barking sounds and moves directly towards whatever range of responses have survived the evolutionary process?
Dogs may be better off because they dont reason. No such thing a paralysis by analysis for any other than a rational being.
Its very romantic to personify things. Like the warm embrace of the dawn after the nights unrelenting assault of darkness and cold. But not necessary to explain it. There is no dawn or night who is communicating anything.
Lastly, this doesnt mean reason didnt arise in the universe from physical causes. Thats a different question too. Again, who cares whether dogs or humans live better, or worse, or higher or lower - Im not attributing reason to a higher, immortal soul or something - but saying humans and dogs both reason and communicate makes no sense to me. (Although the vast, vast majority of people today talk like this and believe this.)
Humans bother to seek and communicate reasons and ideas through language with other humans. Dogs dont bother with all of that. Neither does the sun. Every sound isnt a word. Every response of a conscious animal isnt born out of a self-reflective process of reasoning.
I dont know this for sure.
But seems to me, if any thing in the universe used reason, it could make that ability clear to me by communication. Nothing else bothers to communicate a reasonable idea besides other humans.
Well, let's allow, for the sake of the argument, that animals do not and cannot debate in the way that humans do. I'll accept also that debating is a skill that demands a capacity for rational thought. But you seem to think it is a necessary (probably not sufficient?) skill for rational thought. But does that really make sense?
I do not believe we are thinking rationally unless we are using higher-order critical thinking skills. Each critical thinking skill is important but maybe this one is the most challenging..
2. Open-mindedness
Open-mindedness is the willingness to consider new ideas, arguments, and information without prejudice. This critical thinking skill helps you analyze and process information to come to an unbiased conclusion. Part of the critical thinking process is letting your personal biases go, taking information at face value and coming to a conclusion based on multiple points of view .
Open-minded critical thinkers demonstrate:
Willingness to consider alternative viewpoints
Ability to suspend judgment until sufficient evidence is gathered
Receptiveness to constructive criticism and feedback
Flexibility in updating beliefs based on new information
Example: During a product development meeting, a team leader actively considers unconventional ideas from junior members, leading to an innovative solution.
Telling me why I should become a Christian, or join the Ku Klux Klan, is not the result of higher-order thinking skills, and how we behave as a society depends on how good our critical thinking skills are. And that depends on our education. Critical thinking skills do not come with our genes, only the potential to use our brains comes with our genes.
H'm. In a way, I'm glad to hear it. I do agree that it is not an easy matter to identify what beliefs and what desires motivate animals. A general, perhaps rather vague, view is the most we can expect. Can a dog feel guilty or embarrassed? I'm not sure. Can a dog feel fear and anger? Oh, yes, definitely.
Humans bother to seek and communicate reasons and ideas through language with other humans. Dogs dont bother with all of that. Neither does the sun. Every sound isnt a word. Every response of a conscious animal isnt born out of a self-reflective process of reasoning.
Perhaps better "Humans sometimes bother.... but not always". When they don't, we still read off their reasons from their behaviour. So what's so odd about reading off dogs' reasons from what they do?
Dog barks to warn the pack? Or a dog sees something and just bursts into a bark? Pack hears one of its members making barking sounds and thinks what is wrong? Or pack just hears barking sounds and moves directly towards whatever range of responses have survived the evolutionary process?
OK. You know how one reads something and remembers the content but not the details or where you read it. I have an example like that, which I'll present as a thought experiment, although I believe it is an observation of actual behaviour.
I expect you know that many birds will warn the whole flock when intruders appear. Is the bird warning the flock or just shouting in fear when it spots an intruder? Hard to tell. But then you notice that some birds will shout an alarm when there is no intruder. All the other birds fly off, but the noisy one stays, with free access to all the food. Ah, no, you think. That's just reflex responses. But then the other birds, having learnt that the shouty bird is a liar will ignore future warnings from that bird. Is it really plausible to interpret that is "just reflexes" and not rational responses to a developing situation?
Because of the debate between free will and determinism, we might say that humans are not actually rational either, incapable of communicating a single communication clearly. Equating human behavior with animal behavior along the lines that none of us are using reason or making communications seems an easier argument than saying human and animal behaviors are equal in that they both involve levels of reasoning and communication.
You are right to think of this. I think you are choosing the harder path and I'll try to show you why.
Animals make sounds and other other animals react to those sounds. Humans see this as communication. But the animal that made the sound may have been forced to make that sound by some conditions, just like the other animal that responded to that sound was forced to respond.
How does this sound? "Humans make sounds and other humans react to those sounds. Animals see this as communication. But the human that made the sound may have been forced to make that sound by some conditions, just like the other human that responded to that sound was forced to respond." It's a question of interpretation, of employing a model, not an empirical fact.
Animals have behaviors, many of which humans share (eating, sleeping, hunting, etc.). One of the behaviors humans exhibit is reasoning, or being rational. This involves language and communication with other reasoners.
Rational behaviour is not just a set of behaviours distinct from everything else - talking, pondering etc. Rationality is on display in nearly everything that we do. Taking the umbrella when leaving the house is a rational behaviour. Going into the kitchen when hungry is rational behaviour. The dog's sitting staring at you when hungry is also rational behaviour.
But seems to me, if any thing in the universe used reason, it could make that ability clear to me by communication. Nothing else bothers to communicate a reasonable idea besides other humans.
Had you perhaps thought that the animals are communicating, but you're not hearing, because you don't believe that they communicate?
L'éléphantSeptember 15, 2024 at 20:09#9321640 likes
At least some animals learn from each other (likely by means of mimicry) and even pass on (some of) what they have learnt to succeeding generations. (Don't lionesses and wolves teach their cubs to hunt?) That is simply an extension of the ability to adapt one's behaviour in a changing environment.
I think on this thread, we keep missing the point when we say ..."but animals also do this or that.."
Like us, animals can and do learn from each other.
I do not believe we are thinking rationally unless we are using higher-order critical thinking skills. Each critical thinking skill is important but maybe this one is the most challenging..
Yes, you are right. But you are setting a very high bar. Most of what we do does not involve critical thinking. Left to ourselves, we will only think critically when something is going wrong or in new and unfamiliar circumstances. You may have seen my story about the birds. Here's another. (I can't give you my source for this either, so treat it as a thought-experiment).
Meerkats actually post sentries who do not join in the feeding, but keep watch and raise the alarm when an intruder turns up. The other meerkats keep some food for the sentry, who feeds when all the others have finished. New members of the group are not permitted to act as sentries for a while. Eventually, they are allowed to stand sentry, but at first, when they raise the alarm, the others check it out before everyone rushes to their burrows underground. Eventually, when the sentry has been proved reliable, they are not checked out.
Is that not critical thinking? Or maybe critical thinking is less advanced than you think?
I think on this thread, we keep missing the point when we say ..."but animals also do this or that.."
Like us, animals can and do learn from each other.
I don't doubt it. But I'm not clear what point you think we are missing. The key question is what, if anything, distinguishes humans from other animals. The issue is whether there is not merely a difference, but a difference so significant that it represents a difference in kind. So "but animals do this or that... " is the point.
It might be the case that a wider range of questions would be of interest. Why not try something out?
Fire OlogistSeptember 15, 2024 at 20:43#9321710 likes
Because we use reason. Animals dont read reasons. Otherwise we read off of smells and visions and feelings. Like other animals. And read in this context is metaphor for sensation. We read reasons, Animals dont read anything (except metaphorically).
Rational behaviour is not just a set of behaviours distinct from everything else - talking, pondering etc. Rationality is on display in nearly everything that we do.
Barking is a behavior.
Dogs and humans might sense the loudness of the barking and so you might say as a metaphor that dogs and humans sense the loudness of this behavior. A dog doesnt wonder if he is barking loud enough, if the volume of his barking is a reasonable volume to convey its fear of the cougar to the rest of the pack. The dog sees the cougar, and the dog barks.
Dogs dont read the rationality of this behavior. We humans alone exhibit reason and rationalize about it. Dogs just react accordingly. We humans can judge a dogs reaction as a rational response or not, but I see no evidence that a dog is using reason prior to any response or after the fact, or during a communication. A dog is built to receive certain sensations and built to respond to those sensations. We watch a bunch of dogs and start to see patterns and then say that dog is barking for a reason, that reason being there is a cougar in sight. But really, the dogs body sees the cougar and the dogs body starts to bark (all the dogs that saw cougars and dont bark were eaten and weeded out of the gene pool). The dog didnt see the cougar and use reason to know barking loudly makes the most sense is the most rational behavior among a list of other behaviors. The dog just barks, making no choice, having no thought behind it, utterly unaware of the rationality that can be found in this by humans.
I see reason and thinking and willing and judgment and language all tied up together. You have one of these, you say one of these words, you also conjure up the others. Reason involves logical inference, representational language, judgment and choice. We have to use reason to deliberate and make a choice. We have to use judgment to choose what objects are the most reasonable objects to deliberate about. When we focus our reason on a subject, we are choosing that focus. These are all human things.
Dogs dont need any of that to exhibit all of the behaviors they exhibit.
Man sees a cougar and instead of yelling look out! he deliberates how best to save the people that dont yet see the cougar. Should the man consider the bird flying overhead? Should the man be thinking about whether yelling at the cougar will trigger it to pounce? Should the man be thinking about chocolate ice cream? If he is trying to help those other people, some of those thoughts are reasonable. Some arent. Should the man be thinking that he is wasting time thinking and he should react right now instead? Look out for that cougar!!!
Dogs dont bother with all of that. They always bark, which works good enough for the majority of dogs.
The very fact that we humans see rationality in the universe at all, and then talk about it, is behavior exhibited nowhere else besides humans.
It may be rational in a human beings eyes for a dog to feel fear and bark at the sight of a cougar. We humans can make these connections and see this rationality in the dogs behavior. But it does not appear to be rational to the dog. Is see no evidence that the dog itself used reason or had a reason for barking. The dog never appears aware of the rationality or irrationality of anything (or the dog might start trying new things or discussing options and choices with his pack mates, or the barking would have to become language and more complicated communication.)
Yes, you are right. But you are setting a very high bar. Most of what we do does not involve critical thinking. Left to ourselves, we will only think critically when something is going wrong or in new and unfamiliar circumstances. You may have seen my story about the birds. Here's another. (I can't give you my source for this either, so treat it as a thought-experiment).
Meerkats actually post sentries who do not join in the feeding, but keep watch and raise the alarm when an intruder turns up. The other meerkats keep some food for the sentry, who feeds when all the others have finished. New members of the group are not permitted to act as sentries for a while. Eventually, they are allowed to stand sentry, but at first, when they raise the alarm, the others check it out before everyone rushes to their burrows underground. Eventually, when the sentry has been proved reliable, they are not checked out.
Is that not critical thinking? Or maybe critical thinking is less advanced than you think?
Thank you so much for working with me on this effort to understand rational thinking and human/animal differences. I am not done looking for information because I don't think my understanding is complete. I keep hoping someone will jump in and say what I am trying to say.
I think your story is close to the story of how dogs became domesticated. A few wild dogs dared to come close to humans and over time those dogs became comfortable with humans and these dogs naturally did selective breeding, breeding with the dogs with a high tolerance for humans. This led to genetic changes that made domestic dogs domestic. Interestingly they are the only animals that will investigate where we point. Domestic dogs have learned to read us and how to manipulate us as well as how to be excellent hunting partners and service dogs. The bottom line this is genetic. Do not bring a wolf home and expect it to play fetch with you because there is a genetic difference between wild dogs and domestic ones. In the dogs or meerkats change happened over time. The animal in question became comfortable with the other and we could say built trust (has a different feeling response). This is feeling and reacting not reasoning. Chimps needing a new troop will approach very carefully and hang around the fringes until invited in.
But when it comes to rational we are speaking of something different and the problem in talking about it is how we use the word rational. Someone who believes the Bible is the word of God, has rationalized a lot to not see some problems with that belief. Someone prejudiced of people who look different and can even believe the other is not fully human have wrongly rationalized their feelings and thoughts. I wish we didn't use the same word for rationalizing a myth and other false beliefs and think this rationalization is equal to scientific, or higher-order thinking. Believing a myth or other wrong thoughts does not take critical thinking skills. Grasping science and having justice and liberty for all, does take critical thinking skills.
The difference is about HOW we think, not WHAT we think. And the difference is being as an animal or as an evolved human being.
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 21:27#9321780 likes
Tangentially related anecdote:
I once had an acquaintance who steadfastly denied that animals other than man had intelligence or any form of thought; he maintained that they are little more than automata that respond to stimuli without any understanding. Then he told me that his neighbour's German Shepherd hated him. (Gee, I wonder why!)
Rational behaviour is not just a set of behaviours distinct from everything else - talking, pondering etc. Rationality is on display in nearly everything that we do.
Ludwig V
Barking is a behavior.
Dogs and humans might sense the loudness of the barking and so you might say as a metaphor that dogs and humans sense the loudness of this behavior. A dog doesnt wonder if he is barking loud enough, if the volume of his barking is a reasonable volume to convey its fear of the cougar to the rest of the pack. The dog sees the cougar, and the dog barks.
I came home from Hawaii early because my sister with a timeshare in Hawaii was stressed to the breaking point and could no more be rational with me than a barking dog. She is a highly educated and successful woman, but under the circumstances, she was like a barking dog towards me. It was insane! She would talk with others like a rational human being and in a flash attack me like a dog.
I think our ability to behave as rational human beings may be fragile. I think education focused on technology and not our development as good family members and good citizens, may have led to a much higher rate of irrational behavior. I think this happened to Germany and became the Nazi phenomenon. A social value shift that may come with threats of social breakdown.
I once had an acquaintance who steadfastly denied that animals other than man had intelligence or any form of thought; he maintained that they are little more than automata that respond to stimuli without any understanding. Then he told me that his neighbour's German Shepherd hated him. (Gee, I wonder why!)
That acquaintance may have underrated the value of emotion and its part in thinking. Do you remember the original Star Trek show? In one episode Captain Kirk became two individuals, one was all bad and the other all good. The point is that we need to be balanced to have good judgment.
wonderer1September 15, 2024 at 21:56#9321820 likes
Meerkats actually post sentries who do not join in the feeding, but keep watch and raise the alarm when an intruder turns up. The other meerkats keep some food for the sentry, who feeds when all the others have finished. New members of the group are not permitted to act as sentries for a while. Eventually, they are allowed to stand sentry, but at first, when they raise the alarm, the others check it out before everyone rushes to their burrows underground. Eventually, when the sentry has been proved reliable, they are not checked out.
Is that not critical thinking? Or maybe critical thinking is less advanced than you think?
That's very interesting to think about. It suggests to me that not only pattern recognition, but pattern seeking plays an important part in meerkat rationality. I.e. that being attentive to the pattern of behavior consistent with a junior sentry having attained sentry expertise (or lack thereof) plays an important role in meerkat behavior.
I don't know how we might test if logic is much involved on the part of the meerkat. Perhaps some so strongly associate critical thinking with logic, (and not without good reason) that they wouldn't grant that this suggests critical thinking on the part of meerkats. However, I'm inclined to think this points to meerkats having at least some aspects of what could be considered criitical thinking.
Fire OlogistSeptember 15, 2024 at 22:13#9321850 likes
She is a highly educated and successful woman, but under the circumstances, she was like a barking dog towards me.
When the air in my house is above 75 degrees, the air conditioning goes on and the house is cooled and the thermostat reacts to the cooler temperature and shuts off the air conditioner.
I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the systems desired temperature.
Or I could just say its all a system of stimuli and responses with no inner life, self-awareness, decision-making capability or rational capability.
We could say the same thing about animals.
Determinists (use reason) to say the same thing about humans.
Maybe the better question is do humans have the ability to reason? My answer would be that formulating a question like that displays behavior of a being capable of reason.
Animals dont ask questions. Ever.
I have two dogs. I love them. But they arent using reason. They are predictable because of their structure, not because of their adherence to reason. My dog is sitting at my foot leaning on me right now. Hes not communicating or hoping I like what hes doing. He just feels good enough to pass out at my feet right now. When he begs at the dinnner table, there is no plan or thought or reason behind how his ear flops and looks cute enough to convince me to give him a treat. Hes just does what he does, and benefits from it working. If it didnt work, he wouldnt wonder how it didnt work because it was perfectly reasonable to him and try to improve the reasoning. He would just be pushed into the next posture and position. Probably licking something.
We cant even understand the nature of our own behavior when we use reason or make a choice or reflect on our own minds, but for some reason, because we love them I suppose, we see so much reason and choice and mental activity in animals.
result of such pattern recognition is some understanding on my part, of your need to see yourself as particularly special, and how that influences the thinking that goes into your posts. This need to see yourself as particularly special isn't something I think you have made a free willed choice to have, and not something I see you as to blame for. In fact I appreciate your skill at keeping keeping your rage covert. And of course, we are all narcissistic to some extent.
Thank you, I do try to be civil and avoid coming off as condescending. I think we all need a sense of being special and having something of value to offer. To me, this isn't a bad thing compared to sitting at home and doing nothing and making no effort to think or engage others. Overeating in a futile effort to end the feeling of hunger caused by unmet emotional needs. So I hope people do continue to do their best and feel that s/he is making a valued contribution. Making the effort is better than not making the effort, right? But it ain't easy.
This need to see yourself as particularly special isn't something I think you have made a free willed choice to have, and not something I see you as to blame for. In fact I appreciate your skill at keeping keeping your rage covert. And of course, we are all narcissistic to some extent.
Nonsense. I dont see myself as special. I have presented a specific argument based on a number of sources in this thread. I understand the argument Im pursuing is a difficult one to both articulate and understand, especially in the kind of fragmented format that forum conversations tend to assume. I dont see any indication that you (and for that matter other participants) have understood the gist of the argument. It is not because Im special, it has nothing whatever to do with it. Your statements here are ad hominem, how about you try and respond the actual specifics of what Ive been arguing for, if you want to take issue with them.
wonderer1September 15, 2024 at 22:24#9321890 likes
Thank you, I do try to be civil and avoid coming off as condescending. I think we all need a sense of being special and having something of value to offer. To me, this isn't a bad thing compared to sitting at home and doing nothing and making no effort to think or engage others. Overeating in a futile effort to end the feeling of hunger caused by unmet emotional needs. So I hope people do continue to do their best and feel that s/he is making a valued contribution. Making the effort is better than not making the effort, right? But it ain't easy.
I don't disagree, and what you quoted wasn't directed at you.
wonderer1September 15, 2024 at 22:39#9321910 likes
Nonsense. I dont see myself as special. I have presented a specific argument based on a number of sources in this thread.. I understand the argument Im pursuing is a difficult one to both articulate and understand, especially in the kind of fragmented format that forum conversations tend to assume. I dont see any indication that you (and for that matter other participants) have understood the gist of the argument. It is not because Im special, it has nothing whatever to do with it. Your statements here are ad hominem, how about you try and respond the actual specifics of what Ive been arguing for, if you want to take issue with them.
What you call an argument amounted to your naive psychologizing regarding the thinking of lots of people. I'm not going to bother to detail the fallaciousness of all that.
Anyway, I suggest that if you want to avoid your psychology being under consideration, avoiding making such naive claims about the psychology of others might be a good idea.
We humans can judge a dogs reaction as a rational response or not, but I see no evidence that a dog is using reason prior to any response or after the fact, or during a communication.
OK. So it turns out that you will accept that a dog's reaction is a rational response, but deny that the dog is rational because they don't "use reason". I take it that you mean that the dog doesn't say out loud "This is the situation, so I should do that." But humans often act without verbalizing their reasons out loud. Does that mean they aren't rational either?
The difference is about HOW we think, not WHAT we think. And the difference is being as an animal or as an evolved human being.
Are you talking about the out loud verbalizing of your reasons for doing something - or the maybe silent process of planning an action? But if you have to plan each action to be counted as rational, then you have to plan to plan, and plan to plan to plan.... If you have to verbalize your reasons for doing something if you are to count as acting rationally, then you have to verbalize your reasons for verbalizing your reasons... No, No, that doesn't work. It has to be possible to act without verbalizing reasons and without advance planning and yet to act rationally.
I once had an acquaintance who steadfastly denied that animals other than man had intelligence or any form of thought; he maintained that they are little more than automata that respond to stimuli without any understanding. Then he told me that his neighbour's German Shepherd hated him. (Gee, I wonder why!)
They always know. It's the body language. Kids are pretty good at it, too. But we lose the knack when we get grown-up. Pity.
I think our ability to behave as rational human beings may be fragile. I think education focused on technology and not our development as good family members and good citizens, may have led to a much higher rate of irrational behavior. I think this happened to Germany and became the Nazi phenomenon. A social value shift that may come with threats of social breakdown.
Oh, I'm quite sure that our ability to behave rationally is fragile. I'm sorry to hear about your sister's behaviour.
We humans can judge a dogs reaction as a rational response or not, but I see no evidence that a dog is using reason prior to any response or after the fact, or during a communication. Fire Ologist
OK. So it turns out that you will accept that a dog's reaction is a rational response, but deny that the dog is rational because they don't "use reason". I take it that you mean that the dog doesn't say out loud "This is the situation, so I should do that." But humans often act without verbalizing their reasons out loud. Does that mean they aren't rational either?
Once again, I think you misunderstood. I don't read Fire's comment as saying the dog's reaction is rational. This is the pitfall of propositional logic. Humans can judge (view) the dog's reaction as rational, not that it is rational. Fire's comment went on to explain that he does not see any evidence that the dog is using reason.
I once had an acquaintance who steadfastly denied that animals other than man had intelligence or any form of thought; he maintained that they are little more than automata that respond to stimuli without any understanding.
I started a thread a while back on something I had read that Descartes used to flay dogs alive, assuring onlookers that their cries of agony were due only to mechanical reactions, not any genuine feeling of pain. During the course of the thread, I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, because students at a Dutch university who were followers of Descartes' mechanical philosophy did, in fact, perform those dreadful 'experiments', and it is true that Descartes believed that animals were automata without souls, as he identified the soul with the ability to reason. I think he was mistaken in this respect, but understanding why he would think such a thing is an important point.
I'll make clear, I believe intentional action is fundamental to all forms of life from the very inception, and also that feeling and sensation are fundamental to sentient organisms, even very basic ones. (I'm currently reading Mind in Life, Evan Thompson, which explores these subjects in depth.) I recognise the continuity between human life and animal life in an organic sense. But I argue that with language, rationality, and also the capacity for transcendent insight, h.sapiens have crossed a threshhold which differentiates us from other animals, and that this difference is something we have to be responsible for, rather than denying.
Reply to wonderer1 Presenting an argument on the cultural background of philosophical attitudes has nothing to do with discussing 'the psychology of others'.
I'll recap the arguments I've presented in this thread.
Aristotle's distinction between the vegetative, sensitive and rational soul. He distinguishes h.sapiens as 'the rational animal' on the basis that humans can recognise universal concepts through the faculty of intellect or 'nous' (a seminal word in the Western philosophical tradition.) I acknowledge that Aristotle's is an ancient philosophy, but point out that some of his foundational concepts remain part of philosophy of biology to this day, and also to the foundational role of the 'ideas' in Plato's and later philosophy (1)
I then go on to argue that the human abilities of language, abstraction, tool use, and so on, also introduce an existential dimension to the question of human reason (2). The existential dimension arises with the sense of self and self-consciousness in paleolithic culture, as illustrated by the passages quoted from Norman Fischer (3). He links this with the arising of religion, which is posited as a means to ease or rationalise the sense of 'otherness' and alienation that is part of the self-conscious condition. I also remark that the Biblical myth of the Fall is an allegory for this condition.
Finally I argue that the modern insistence that 'we are no different from animals', is based on a subconsious longing for return to one-ness. We want to see ourselves as part of nature, and believe that evolutionary biology shows that we are. Hence any suggestion of human exceptionalism is violently rejected, as it calls this belief into question.
If you want to demonstrate that these arguments are based on my 'narcissism', knock yourself out. ;-)
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 23:06#9321980 likes
hey always know. It's the body language. Kids are pretty good at it, too. But we lose the knack when we get grown-up. Pity.
My observation at the time was the contradiction in him, not the dog. The anthropo-exclusive part says "They're nothing more than machines", while the responsive human part recognizes another sentient, responsive being.
Hate is not a reflex; it's a complex state of mind, made up of several emotions, experience, and memory. Machines can't hate. (In reality, he was probably exaggerating, and the dog was simply annoyed at his attitude. People get very huffy when they're disliked or disapproved-of.)
Vera MontSeptember 15, 2024 at 23:17#9322000 likes
Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, because students at a Dutch university who were followers of Descartes' mechanical philosophy did, in fact, perform those dreadful 'experiments', and it is true that Descartes believed that animals were automata without souls, as he identified the soul with the ability to reason.
And he argued the proof as "they don't do philosophy". He argued the mechanistic view of animals against Cudworth over some period of correspondence. This is another example of the double-think my acquaintance exhibited.
It's not uncommon. A pathologist I knew had a pair of prized and pampered Siamese cats at home, and seemed to have no problem inducing tumours in laboratory cats.
wonderer1September 15, 2024 at 23:18#9322010 likes
I think the phrase 'for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines' is actually a key driver for a lot of what is being argued in this thread, and I think I know why.
Finally I argue that the modern insistence that 'we are no different from animals', is based on a subconsious longing for return to one-ness. We want to see ourselves as part of nature, and believe that evolutionary biology shows that we are. Hence any suggestion of human exceptionalism is violently rejected, as it calls this belief into question.
Do you see how you keep making my point?
Is anyone in this thread "violently" rejecting human exceptionalism, or are people simply expressing various nuanced views?
Is anyone in this thread "violently" rejecting human exceptionalism, or are people simply expressing various nuanced views?
And I see how you consistently fail to understand mine, probably due to lack of basic education in philosophy and cultural history.
The word 'violentily' doesn't imply actual violence, but rather a 'strongly held opinion' which has been expressed forcibly any number of times in this thread.
Reply to Vera Mont Ralph Cudworth - right! He was one of the Cambridge Platonists. @Manuel has mentioned him several times. I'll read that with interest later.
According to Cudworth, Descartes mistake was that his conception of the soul was too narrow. Descartes thought that animals inability to speak or think reflectively like humans was explained by their not having souls and thus being purely physical machines, but Cudworth saw a problem with this: animals might not speak or reason, but they still do an awful lot. As Cudworth saw it, anyone who can look at the incredible variety and complexity of animal behaviour and decide that it is all merely physical mechanism will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls (The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678, p.44). In other words, if animals feel and move and communicate as they do purely because of their physical makeup, then theres no reason to introduce a special, immaterial soul to explain human behaviour. If Descartes is willing to explain the behaviour of all animals as resulting from nothing but blood and brains, why shouldnt he draw the same conclusion about us?
For a seventeenth-century Platonist, thats a surprisingly modern insight; in fact, its not unlike the sort of argument many materialists would use to refute Descartes dualism today. But Cudworth was not a modern man, and like Descartes, he accepted the orthodox assumption of his time that conscious minds are souls. As we have seen, he was also committed to bridging Descartes radical gap between human and animal life. And so, instead of showing that neither animals nor humans have souls, he tried to show that animals have souls too. And although Cudworth thought that animal souls were less perfect and less conscious than human souls, he believed that nevertheless, their existence gives us moral responsibilities towards animals that we do not have towards soulless, mindless objects. So for Cudworth, the specialness of human souls does not entail the worthlessness of animal ones: rather, animals are simply less complex, less developed examples of the same sort of thing that humans are.
Substitute 'soul' with 'mind' and I think Cudworth makes a valid point.
None of which vitiates the arguments I've been presenting on the matter.
e thermostat reacts to the cooler temperature and shuts off the air conditioner.
I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the systems desired temperature.
Or I could just say its all a system of stimuli and responses with no inner life, self-awareness, decision-making capability or rational capability.
We could say the same thing about animals.
Determinists (use reason) to say the same thing about humans.
Maybe the better question is do humans have the ability to reason? My answer would be that formulating a question like that displays behavior of a being capable of reason.
Animals dont ask questions. Ever.
I have two dogs. I love them. But they arent using reason. They are predictable because of their structure, not because of their adherence to reason. My dog is sitting at my foot leaning on me right now. Hes not communicating or hoping I like what hes doing. He just feels good enough to pass out at my feet right now. When he begs at the dinnner table, there is no plan or thought or reason behind how his ear flops and looks cute enough to convince me to give him a treat. Hes just does what he does, and benefits from it working. If it didnt work, he wouldnt wonder how it didnt work because it was perfectly reasonable to him and try to improve the reasoning. He would just be pushed into the next posture and position. Probably licking something.
We cant even understand the nature of our own behavior when we use reason or make a choice or reflect on our own minds, but for some reason, because we love them I suppose, we see so much reason and choice and mental activity in animals.
Oh man I love this line..."I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the systems desired temperature."
I am not so sure the rest of what you said is exactly right. Especially when we get to the chimps and bonobo our closest genetic match, and their communication ability. The following link is for Quoting Vera Mont
Vera Mont
Savage-Rumbaugh a researcher, is sure bonobos are capable of language and communication. The link explanation is long, and ends with...
I was reminded of something Savage-Rumbaugh had once said to me about our species signature desire: Our relationship to nonhuman apes is a complex thing, shed said. We define humanness mostly by what other beings, typically apes, are not. So weve always thought apes were not this, not this, not this. We are special. And its kind of a need humans haveto feel like we are special. She went on, Science has challenged that. With Darwinian theory, this idea that we were special because God created us specially had to be put aside. And so language became, in a way, the replacement for religion. Were special because we have this ability to speak, and we can create these imagined worlds. So linguists and other scientists put these protective boundaries around language, because we as a species feel this need to be unique. And Im not opposed to that. I just happened to find out it wasnt true. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/bonobos-teach-humans-about-nature-language-180975191/
I don't believe there is a black and white line between us chimps and bonobos, they are animals we are humans. I think we are on the same line of evolution and under the right conditions bonobos could have more complex communication than we want to admit. I am putting information about bonobo communication together with an explanation of climate change that may have caused our uniqueness.
The study of human evolution shows that, like other organisms, humans have evolved over a long period of time in the face of environmental challenges and opportunities. These challenges affected how early humans secured food, found shelter, escaped predators, and developed social interactions that favored survival. The capacity to make tools, share hunted-and-gathered food, control the use of fire, build shelters, and create complex societies based on symbolic communication set the stage for new ways in which humans interacted with their surroundings. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK208097/#:~:text=The%20study%20of%20human%20evolution,social%20interactions%20that%20favored%20survival.
I don't disagree, and what you quoted wasn't directed at you.
:grin: I knew that but I thought you might think about what you said if I responded as though you were addressing me. I think to have the meaningful discussions we all want in this special forum, we need to feel safe and when we are made the subject of a post and criticized for all to see, we might not feel safe.
I know I don't like it when someone does that to me. On the other hand, over the years my posts may have improved because of all the criticism that has come my way. I work very hard at not appearing condescending because I was accused of that so often. As a general rule I try to respect everyone and protect the dignity of others. Doing so is a matter of honoring my grandmother who taught me those values.
wonderer1September 16, 2024 at 00:17#9322170 likes
I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the systems desired temperature.
Or I could just say its all a system of stimuli and responses with no inner life, self-awareness, decision-making capability or rational capability.
We could say the same thing about animals.
One problem with this is, that when you look at the mechanisms enabling the behavior of a thermostat and the behavior of an animal, that of the animal is vastly more complex than that of a thermostat. Furthermore, what enables the behavior of most animals (and in particular mammals) has a substantial degree of similarity to what enables our behavior.
Like us, animals have brains composed of complex neural networks, which enable complex responses. Based on such physiological similarities, I would think it naive at best, to be dismissive of the possibility of cognitive similarities.
Vera MontSeptember 16, 2024 at 00:40#9322230 likes
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach. Do you have a minimum criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as thinking? Rational thinking? If not, then upon what ground do you rest your denial that some creatures other than humans are capable of thought, rational or otherwise?
Is anyone in this thread "violently" rejecting human exceptionalism, or are people simply expressing various nuanced views?
I have been turning to research. And because of the book "The Math Instinct" by Keith Devlin, I see mathematical feats in animals as equal to [quote="Fire Ologist;932185"]'s explanation of an air conditioner. However, a bat's sonar abilities are far better than anything we have.
I am also struggling to get a clear definition of rational thinking. Is it rational to believe a god made us of mud and our reality would be different if a man and woman didn't taste the wrong fruit? Or does rational mean based on facts that can be validated? At least among the researchers, there is agreement that we are the only animal that asks these questions and attempt to answer them. I am just not sure if bonobo might not evolve as we did if we set the conditions for this evolution.
creativesoulSeptember 16, 2024 at 00:44#9322260 likes
Like us, animals have brains composed of complex neural networks, which enable complex responses. Based on such physiological similarities, I would think it naive at best, to be dismissive of the possibility of cognitive similarities.
We are all animals. They are chimpanzees and bonobos and we are humans. The big black line is drawn only on side of that distinction.
I think we agree humans, chimps and bonobos evolve from the same ape-like creature. I am not sure we agree that humans are the only ones who argue about such things. Does it matter? Some day evolution may favor the survival of roaches. Some believe our opinion of our intelligence is overrated.
Vera MontSeptember 16, 2024 at 00:52#9322300 likes
I have two dogs. I love them.
Fire Ologist
And you love your thermostat in the same way for the same reasons?
:lol: That may not be a fair statement but it sure is funny.
Now I don't know about loving a thermostat, but loving a car may be reasonable. The car we drive is an extension of who we are. And they have personalities. Many machines we interact with have personalities and we like to name them and enjoy our relationship with them.
Really, you think the ants will outdo the roaches? Ants don't even make the list of nuclear blast survivors. I had to look up the possible survivors and there are some. Just for fun....
Or I could just say its all a system of stimuli and responses with no inner life, self-awareness, decision-making capability or rational capability.
We could say the same thing about animals.
Since youve addressed canids, you are claiming that packs of wild canids (wolves, cayotes, dingos, etc.) engage in no reasoning whatsoever when entrapping their prey (which can sometimes cause sever injury to them, if not their death with a moose as one example of such prey - and which are in many ways unpredictable in what they do) and then bringing it down?
Cant so far find a reference to this experiment online, but during my university years I was told by a professor of a scientific experiment where an otherwise friendly dog was made to go insane: biting all humans that surrounded and biting itself while foaming at the mouth. The experiment is easy to understand, and maybe even empathize with. From my best recollection of how this experiment went: A dog is accustomed via operational conditioning to obtain food after touching its nose to a door that has a circle depicted on it. The dog is then faced with two doors: one with a circle where it gets its food and one with an ellipse which, when touched, transfers an electric shock to the dog. The dog via brief experience then always touches the door with the circle and always avoids the door with the ellipse. The experiment then makes the circle more elliptical and the ellipse more circular. The dog has no issues in yet going to touch with its nose the door with the more circular figure. This until the two doors more properly the circular ellipse and the elliptical circle become indistinguishable by it. At this culminating point, the heretofore friendly dog goes insane as described.
Granting that this experiment did in fact take place, why would the dog go mad this as most likely would any human child if not also adult human faced with the same contextual constraints forced upon them if the dog engaged in no reasoning whatsoever when selecting the door with the more circular ellipse over the door with the more elliptical figure?
What some might well find to be horrific experiments on lesser animals with dogs as one very commonly used species (in part because theyre easy to obtain, such as from shelters) are maybe far more common than typically known. And in all these at times sadistic experiments on lesser animals (with very many being far more sadistic/horrific than the one Ive just mentioned), there is assumed a potential benefit to humans down the line - to human brains and human minds. (Ive worked in a neuroscience lab where I had to perform partial lobotomies on birds and then, after some time, perfuse them (while they were alive, of course) so as to extract their then paraformaldehyde-hardened brain for slicing and then observation of neurons under the microscope this, in short, to better study the neuroscience of language acquisition and application. Ive said sadistic because Ive observed firsthand how some, but certainly not all, fellow experiments obtained pleasure from the suffering of the birds during the process this rather than in any way empathizing with their condition which we had inflicted upon them. Doubtless that empathizing with their condition would have been uncomfortable if not painful for them.)
And yes, sometimes such experiments on lesser animals are the only means we have at our disposal for better understanding the structure of the brain and the correlating mind without harming humans. (And, in fairness, sometimes they are utterly idiotic, to not here also address ethical considerations.)
That said, what sound reasoning would there be in all these many experiments on animals were there to be no continuity between the minds of animals and those of humans? Here to include the minds utilization of some form of reasoning, however diminished by comparison to human reasoning it might be. Example: what could we possibly learn about ourselves as humans by placing rats in T-mazes and the like were there to be no continuity in cognitive faculties among lesser animals and us?
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To be clear, this is not to deny that we as humans are of a different level of cognition than all other animal species - making us as a species quite exceptional. In so asking, I only uphold that there is however no absolute divide between the cognition of humans and that of lesser animals.
L'éléphantSeptember 16, 2024 at 01:29#9322390 likes
The dog has no issues in yet going to touch with its nose the door with the more circular figure. This until the two doors more properly the circular ellipse and the elliptical circle become indistinguishable by it. At this culminating point, the heretofore friendly dog goes insane as described.
Granting that this experiment did in fact take place, why would the dog go mad
Did the experiment reveal their findings? If that was a true experiment, the researchers would have some insights as to why the dog went insane.
Reply to L'éléphant Good point. I don't remember (its been some 30 years since I've heard of this experiment). My best hunch is that the hypothesis tested for might have had something to do with symbolic representation among lesser animals. But, in truth, I don't now know.
Vera MontSeptember 16, 2024 at 01:39#9322410 likes
Many machines we interact with have personalities and we like to name them and enjoy our relationship with them.
Right. And they listen attentively when you bitch about your day, babysit your kids, make sure you get enough exercise, make you laugh and love you back, no matter what? Relationships with machines tend to be one-sided. Relationships with dogs, cats, horses and parrots never can be.
(Anyway, I was just pointing out the double-think.) Quoting Athena
Really, you think the ants will outdo the roaches? Ants don't even make the list of nuclear blast survivors. I had to look up the possible survivors and there are some.
The operative word is "some". Ants are also resistant to radiation, but they have other valuable assets, as well. The complex social organization and extensive interaction of members bodes well for adaptation under stress and replication of useful traits.
Besides, I think the world is more likely to end with a whimper than a bang. Both ants and roaches have made successful transitions to all kinds of climate conditions and environments. No doubt in some remote future, the Cockroach Empire and the Republic of Ants will be rattling Raid missiles at each other. Then again, they may be saner than we are.
I don't believe there is a black and white line between us chimps and bonobos, they are animals we are humans. I think we are on the same line of evolution and under the right conditions bonobos could have more complex communication than we want to admit
You should have a read of the story of Nim Chimpsky. He was born and raised like a human child with the hope that he could be taught to communicate like humans.
[quote=Salon;https://www.salon.com/2023/06/25/chimpsky-not-chomsky-did-nim-the-chimpanzee-actually-learn-american-sign-language/]As chronicled in the 2011 documentary "Project Nim," [Columbia University psychology and psychiatry professor Herbert S.] Terrace decided to see if Chimpsky could learn human language by placing the infant monkey into the home of one of his former students, Stephanie LaFarge. The goal was to see if Chimpsky could acquire human-like language if he was raised like a real human being. Starting in late 1973, Nim Chimpsky began his life/experiment but controversy soon arose. Despite being treated kindly, Nim Chimpsky showed unexpected aggression toward his human caretakers. His behavior was so sporadically violent that, after he attacked one of the people taking care of him in 1977, Terrace moved Nim Chimpsky back to a regular laboratory. At that point, Terrace called off the experiment.
Additionally, Terrace and his colleagues reached a disappointing conclusion: Although Chimpsky had appeared to learn language he moved his hands and body in a manner consistent with American Sign Language, using over 120 combinations, in order to seemingly ask for things like food and affection the evidence indicated that he was simply mimicking the behavior of the humans around him. It is possible that Chimpsky understood at least some of the "words" he was forming, but it is also very, very far from being proven.
"Nim learned to sign to obtain food, drink, hugs and other physical rewards," Terrace later explained to Columbia University. "Nim often got the signs right, but that was because his teachers inadvertently prompted him by making appropriate signs a fraction of a second before he did. Nim's signing wasn't spontaneous. He was unable to use words conversationally, let alone form sentences."[/quote]
When the experiment failed, the poor little chimp was then packed off to a home for retired lab animals, where he was reported to seem very depressed. Ends up being a sad story.
I would say because of cognitive dissonance. I don't find it hard to see that many higher animals could experience that.
I happen to very much agree with that. Though I'm uncertain as to how this might relate to reasoning among lesser animals in your own view.
To me, for cognitive dissonance to occur, there is required some modality of reasoning. As just one example, there is required a non-linguistic understanding that if this then that. Having such non-verbal if-then reasoning would bring about the dog's madness via an extreme cognitive dissonance wherein it becomes impossible for it to discern what action (that of either touching the one door or the other) leads to what consequence (that of obtaining food, which would be pleasurable, or of being electrically shocked, one can only presume quite unpleasantly so) prior to commencing any action.
From where I stand, other then the misapplication (else misconstrual) of purely poetical metaphor in expressing that "an AI can experience extreme cognitive dissonance and thereby go mad", I find that while AI might malfunction, they cannot go mad strictly due to experienced stressors such as that of extreme cognitive dissonance. In conjunction with this, I so far find that AI - unless they were to gain some first-person awareness whereby I-ness/ego becomes ontically established - does not and cannot engage in reasoning (this in non-poetic/metaphorical terms). All this on par to what can be said of a thermostat. Maybe paradoxically for some, all this however being unlike the bona fide reasoning of lesser lifeforms - which again occurs in various diminished extents relative to the average human. (With some humor, I say that some animals from corvids to octupi exhibit far more reason-driven intelligence than some non-average - and yet not mentally handicapped - humans. ... myself included at times :grin: )
I happen to very much agree with that. Though I'm uncertain as to how this might relate to reasoning among lesser animals in your own view.
Ive already said, I dont deny that the so-called higher animals (including some birds) are intelligent. But rationality in the sense h.sapiens possess it displays a kind or level of intelligence that they dont, even if it is present in them in a rudimentary degree. This is based on abstract reasoning and language (see for instance Terrence Deacon The Symbolic Species). It has been suggested that because there is some continuity between h.sapiens and other species, then the difference is only one of degree rather than of kind. That is what Im taking issue with. Maybe what Im arguing for could be described as a question of philosophical anthropology, a philosophical view of what is significant about humankind. I know this is a very non-politically-correct argument, so a lot of what Ive been trying to spell out in this thread, is what I see as the motivation for the currently popular view that were no different to animals.
Also in relation to AI, Ive used ChatGPT since day one, I run a lot of ideas by it and use it for all kinds of things. Its truly amazing. But are large language models beings? Thats another thing I question. I put it to ChatGPT which responded as follows:
The question of whether large language models or AI in general qualify as "beings" touches on deep philosophical and ethical issues. From a philosophical standpoint, it connects to topics like consciousness, personhood, and agency, all of which are traditionally considered key aspects of what makes a being.
In the case of large language models like me, while we're able to process language, respond meaningfully, and simulate conversation, we don't have consciousness, intentionality, or subjective experiences. So from a metaphysical or philosophical point of view, most would argue we're not "beings" in the traditional sense. However, this opens up debates about how we define terms like "being" and "intelligence."
It sounds like a lively threaddid the mention spark any follow-up questions or reactions?
I said Id provide updates ;-)
wonderer1September 16, 2024 at 03:49#9322480 likes
I knew that but I thought you might think about what you said if I responded as though you were addressing me.
I see, and appreciate the compassion behind your response.
I do think about what I say, and try to tailor the things I say to the individual that I am speaking to, rather than attempt to have a 'one size fits all' way of speaking to people.
One aspect of that is understanding that there are people with personality disorders who exhibit very sterotypical behavior patterns that can be recognized. Some categories of personality disorders are narcissistic personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder (colloquially psychopathy), and borderline personality disorder. I've had experience interacting with people with all three of those conditions, and I've done some study of psychological perspectives on all three of those conditions.
As food for thought... Although you haven't provided very detailed information on your recent interactions with your sister, I think it might be beneficial for you to investigate borderline personality disorder and what is referred to as "splitting" in the case of someone with borderline personality disorder, and see if it rings any bells.
I think to have the meaningful discussions we all want in this special forum, we need to feel safe and when we are made the subject of a post and criticized for all to see, we might not feel safe.
My thinking is influenced by things discussed by M. Scott Peck in the book The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace, not least of which is Peck's discussion of the toxic effect on communities that people with personality disorders often have.
I guess you'd need to make a better case against calling out narcissism when the evidence for it is overwhelming, in order for me to think that it is not worthwhile to do so. (Not to say that it is likely to be of any benefit to the narcissist herself, but that is a different matter than what is of benefit to a community.)
Vera MontSeptember 16, 2024 at 03:55#9322490 likes
It has been suggested that because there is some continuity between h.sapiens and other species, then the difference is only one of degree rather than of kind. That is what Im taking issue with.
We once, a long long time ago, had a debate about whether bonobos which have learned to communicate with humans via human-devised symbols could be asked the question "what occurs after death" (or something to the like) and give a meaningful, or else cogent, conceptual reply (which I take to not necessitate a "well reasoned" reply). My stance was and remains that, while I don't know, it to me remains within the scope of (lets call it) physical possibility that they might then entertain some conceptual notion of the same end of physical life we hold in mind - thereby having, or else obtaining, an awareness of their own mortality. (Just that, much like many a human, they might not be pleased with so contemplating.)
With that said, I myself happen to be in accord with what you here express. Differences in degree do indeed produce differences in kind. A bacterium is of a different kind than an ameba, both being of utterly different kinds than a cat, for example - this though evolutionarily speaking the differences between in issues such as that of awareness, or else of behavior, is a matter of degree. Maybe needless to then add, Homo Sapiens is a species of an utterly different kind than that of any other species on Earth with which we co-inhabit (most especially with all the other hominids that once existed now being extinct). I'll hasten to add that our species is nevertheless yet tied into the tree of life via an utmost obtainment, else utmost extreme, within a current spectrum of degrees - this as, for example, concerns qualitative magnitudes of awareness, of forethought, and the like. But this in no way then contradicts that we humans are of an utterly different kind than all other living species on Earth. Relative to bonobos and chimps very much included. Since we're on a philosophy forum, no other animal - great ape, dolphin, or elephant, for example - can comprehend the concepts we can when addressing the many diverse philosophies that have occurred. Thereby, again, making us of a distinctly different kind from all other lifeforms of which we know.
I'm sort of pondering on what grounds anyone might disagree with this (I should say, anyone who accepts biological evolution as fact).
Since we're on a philosophy forum, no other animal - great ape, dolphin, or elephant, for example - can comprehend the concepts we can when addressing the many diverse philosophies that have occurred. Thereby, again, making us of a distinctly different kind from all other lifeforms of which we know.
Right. That's what I've been arguing for, and also, why is it that it seems such a hard thing to grasp. Apparently that makes me a pathological narcissist, although of course I don't possess the insight to see it.
Incidentally, speaking of animal awareness of death, there was a spooky and touching story about 15 years ago, concerning a fellow named Lawrence Anthony, who had devoted his life to helping and caring for elephants in southern Africa.
[quote= CBC;https://www.cbc.ca/strombo/news/saying-goodbye-elephants-hold-apparent-vigil-to-mourn-their-human-friend.ht]Back in March 2012, Lawrence Anthony, a conservationist and author known as "The Elephant Whisperer", passed away.
Anthony, who grew up in rural Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, was known for his unique ability to communicate with and calm traumatized elephants. In his book 'The Elephant Whisperer: My Life with the Herd in the African Wild', he tells the story of saving the elephant herds, at the request of an animal welfare organization.
Anthony concluded that the only way he could save these elephants, who were categorized as violent and unruly, was to live with them - "To save their lives, I would stay with them, feed them, talk to them. But, most importantly, be with them day and night".
When Anthony died of a heart attack, the elephants, who were grazing miles away in different parts of the park, travelled over 12 hours to reach his house. According to his son Jason, both herds arrived shortly after Anthony's death. They hadn't visited the compound where Anthony lived for a year and a half, but Jason says "in coming up there on that day of all days, we certainly believe that they had sensed it".[/quote]
Humans can judge (view) the dog's reaction as rational, not that it is rational. Fire's comment went on to explain that he does not see any evidence that the dog is using reason.
This is exactly right, in one way. It is a question of interpreting what is in front of us. There's a problem, however, about the distinction between seeing the dog's reaction as rational and it being rational. That suggests that It is not a question of inferring from the dog's actions to something else, such as an inner experience or brain state. That takes us straight into a morass of undecidability and metaphysical speculation. Yet there is a real issue about assigning truth or falsity to an interpretation - it's very likely not possible.
The issue is what the principle of interpretation should be. If one adopts one principle or the other, it is not a question of some fact that provides evidence one way or the other, but what conclusions the evidence in front of us justifies - and that depends on what principle of interpretation we adopt.
The difficulty is to identify how to justify the principle of interpretation independently of assessing the evidence.
You are drawing the distinction between interpreting the dog's reaction and what the dog's reaction actually is (presumably, independently of any interpretation). But when it comes to interpretation, that's a very tricky question and the answer is by no means self-evident. In other words, the question is now how to distinguish between interpretation and reality? Or maybe how to decide when interpretation is reality?
Animals dont read reasons. Otherwise we read off of smells and visions and feelings. Like other animals. And read in this context is metaphor for sensation. We read reasons, Animals dont read anything (except metaphorically).
You are very confident about that. What grounds do you have? Or is this simply a decision about how you are going to interpret what they do and what they don't do? You can jump either way. But I want to know what justifies your choice. (Because I make a different choice and I'm prepared to go into my reasons/justifications.)
A dog doesnt wonder if he is barking loud enough, if the volume of his barking is a reasonable volume to convey its fear of the cougar to the rest of the pack. The dog sees the cougar, and the dog barks.
The condition "if the volume of his barking is a reasonable to convey...." means that his barking is a rational response. If the rest of the pack don't respond, he will likely bark louder, which demonstrates a feed-back loop, which implies rational, purposive control of the bark.
Reason involves logical inference, representational language, judgment and choice. We have to use reason to deliberate and make a choice. We have to use judgment to choose what objects are the most reasonable objects to deliberate about. When we focus our reason on a subject, we are choosing that focus. These are all human things.
Yes, there are a range of activities that are constitute what I think you mean by "using reason". I agree that we do not recognize any animal activities that we can interpret as doing those things. (Actually, I'm not at all sure that's true, but let's suppose it is for the sake of the argument)
But here's the problem. If those activities are the only basis for rational action, what leads us to suppose that it is rational to engage in them.
If this idea were correct, the only basis for supposing that when we engage in those activities in relation to taking an umbrella when we leave the house is that we have debated and considered whether to take an umbrella. But what makes us suppose that it is rational to engage in debating and considering? The only answer is that we have debated and considered whether it is rational to engage in debating and considering whether it is rational to engage in debating and considering. I hope you see the infinite regress looming. I conclude that at some point, we do not engage in debating and considering before acting and yet are acting rationally.
Since we can act rationally without debating and considering what to do, there is no reason to suppose that animals cannot act rationally without debating and considering what to do.
When the air in my house is above 75 degrees, the air conditioning goes on and the house is cooled and the thermostat reacts to the cooler temperature and shuts off the air conditioner.
I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the systems desired temperature.
Or I could just say its all a system of stimuli and responses with no inner life, self-awareness, decision-making capability or rational capability.
We could say the same thing about animals.
Determinists (use reason) to say the same thing about humans.
Maybe the better question is do humans have the ability to reason? My answer would be that formulating a question like that displays behavior of a being capable of reason.
Animals dont ask questions. Ever.
Quite so. It's about how we interpret the phenomena. We can interpret them in a causal framework, or we can interpret them in a rational framework. Confusingly, we can sometimes interpret the same phenomena in both frameworks. Our question is which one is more appropriate in this or that case? People seem to be quite happy to make the choice (some in one way, some in the other), but to find it very difficult to engage in an argument about which is the better choice - even though they have made a choice. It's very difficult and confusing. That's when the real philosophy begins
I think your story is close to the story of how dogs became domesticated. A few wild dogs dared to come close to humans .... This led to genetic changes that made domestic dogs domestic. ...
One does feel that something like that must have happened. But we don't have, and probably never will have any detailed evidence about what actually happened. It's important to keep hold of the proviso. Philosophers are very fond of "it must be that way, so it is that way" - and less fond of being proved wrong.
Interestingly they are the only animals that will investigate where we point. Domestic dogs have learned to read us and how to manipulate us as well as how to be excellent hunting partners and service dogs. The bottom line this is genetic.
Yes. I'm sure there have been genetic changes in dogs. But, by the same token, also in humans. Note also that training is involved as well - learning to live together. I believe that pigs can also follow a pointer. It is significant, of course, because pointing (ostensive definition) is usually thought to be fundamental in learning language.
I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact,
I had heard about this, so I'm very pleased to know the truth of it. Thank you. Comment - It was a myth and like all, good myths, it was based on a truth and captured a deeper truth in spite of deviating from the facts.
But I argue that with language, rationality, and also the capacity for transcendent insight, h.sapiens have crossed a threshhold which differentiates us from other animals, and that this difference is something we have to be responsible for, rather than denying.
I'm very cautious about transcendence. It has been very common to take a reasonable idea and turn it into a fantasy.
(In reality, he was probably exaggerating, and the dog was simply annoyed at his attitude. People get very huffy when they're disliked or disapproved-of.)
There's a feed-back loop. Human doesn't respond to dog's greeting. Dog is confused and unhappy and withdraws. Human thinks that dog dislikes them, which is not wrong, so gets prickly - body language, looks away. Dog gets further upset. It's about a dynamic relationship.
Our culture and philosophy generally lacks the language within which to interpret the word. It is usually treated as synonymous with religious dogma and rejected on those grounds.
Our culture and philosophy generally lacks the language within which to interpret the word. It is usually treated as synonymous with religious dogma and rejected on those grounds.
Those are both real problems. But I don't think it is just a question of religious dogma, but of metaphysical and ethical dogma. It gets used as an attempt to bolster views that are inherently problematic without addressing the problems.
Given the irreducible condition of human reason, re: the propensity for inquiring after impossible results, how would it ever be concluded lesser animals exhibit congruent reason? Not so much that lesser animals, e.g., inquire of infinite things, but rather, that they construct a conception antecedent to the inquiry, hence establishing its possibility.
Given that human reason is the only reason possible for a human to examine, insofar as such reason must be self-reflective necessarily, under what possible conditions would lesser animals be determinable as possessing it, or anything like it, insofar as the self-reflective necessity, is impossible?
Pretty silly, methinks: dog says to himself .humans dont even know how their own rationality works, but they wonder nonetheless whether I have any. Best they are equipped to affirm is, they have an intelligence of their own, and for them to grant we dogs have an intelligence of our own, is at least not susceptible to such idle speculations, should one of them inquire why we dont climb mountains just because one of them happens to be there, and we can. You know ..in between burying bones, destroying sofa cushions and whatnot.
(Sigh)
PatternerSeptember 16, 2024 at 12:13#9323090 likes
Much is made of learning from each other. Here's a good quote about it, from [I]What Made Us Unique[/I]:
Kevin Laland:The emerging consensus is that humanitys accomplishments derive from an ability to acquire knowledge and skills from other people. Individuals then build iteratively on that reservoir of pooled knowledge over long periods. This communal store of experience enables creation of ever more efficient and diverse solutions to lifes challenges. It was not our large brains, intelligence or language that gave us culture but rather our culture that gave us large brains, intelligence and language. For our species and perhaps a small number of other species, too, culture transformed the evolutionary process.
I don't agree for two reasons. First, because, at least in humans, language is a huge part of a culture. How can we say either lead to the other?
Second, many species live in groups, and many have been doing so for far longer than we have. But what other species has language that can express anywhere near the number of things human languages can (we can make an infinite number of sentences), or the variety of kinds of things (infinity; the future; death; fiction; etc., etc.) Despite being in groups longer than us, and having us as models for a long time now, no other species has managed it. They do not have the mental capacity to develop it themselves, or even copy it. Which makes sense. Why would they have a language that allows them to talk abouy things they don't think about?
I do, however, agree with the importance of our interactions with each other for the development of our thinking and language. (Also consciousness.)
And I'm not claiming I an incredibly special. We all are. Yes, even you. No member of any other species would be reacting the way you are now. One of the pitfalls of the ways we think that no other species does.
Patterner
I'm not denying what you say. But it's more complicated than that. If everybody is special, then nobody is special. So some explanation of what "special" means here is necessary.
I am not saying any human is special compared to any other human. I'm saying humans are special compared with any other species. We are doing things no other species does, and changing the face of the world as we do it, because we are thinking about things, and in different ways, than any other species does. Any number of species may be special for one reason or another. This is the way that humans are special. And, in my opinion, the way we are special is of more value, and has greater impact, than the way any the other species is special. (Also, The Incredibles?)
Do you suppose the mother of a wildebeest that has watched it's child, perhaps more than one over the years, murdered, torn apart, and eaten, suffers the horrors I would?
Patterner
Do you suppose that I have any way of "really" understanding how any mother, never mind the mother of wildebeest, feels about the loss of a child - even though I have lost a child. The balance between understanding and projection is very difficult. To be more accurate, we can be pretty certain of our understanding at a general level, but when you get down to details it gets much, much more difficult.
Well, I'm so glad i brought up that particular example.
I'm more sorry than I can possibly express. I cannot imagine.
I would be surprised if you think a parent in any other species has ever gone through the depth or duration of emotional pain that you have.
Yet there is no spark of understanding. They somehow simply happened to stumble upon using X to accomplish Y, and they kept doing it.
Patterner
I don't understand you.
If a pigeon stumbles on the fact that pecking a specific item in their cage produces food and keeps on doing it until it has eaten enough, that it doesn't understand what is going on? It may not understand about the aims of the experiment or what an experiment is, but it understands what is important to it. In any case, human beings also stumble on facts and have no hesitation in exploiting them to the limit of their understanding (which is often quite severe and detrimental to their long-term interests).
What I mean is, once they have it, they don't run with it. They do not use tools for new purposes, and don't apply ideas to new situations.
I'm just saying we are unique in that we think in ways no other species thinks.
Patterner
I'm guessing that mathematics and perhaps ethics are examples of what you have in mind. Yet people seem quite happy to ask whether dogs can do calculus and to insist that they can make and execute a plan of action to achieve a common end. And then, attributing values to them seems inherent in saying that they are alive and sentient and social - even in saying that evolution applies to them.
I think you would question whether dogs can do any mathematics, never mind calculus, or really make and execute a plan. I also think you would question whether dogs really understand ethics, even if they have desires. There's a common theme, because it would not be unreasonable to think that (human) language is essential for both. Am I wrong?
You are not. Who doesn't think in words? I've heard that some people hear the words of what they're thinking. I don't "hear" the words in my mind, although i think in words. Others say they see the words in their mind. Some say neither of those are happening when they think. But does anyone think without words?
No, dogs don't do math. I know many animals recognize groups of objects of certain sizes. That doesn't mean they count them, and it doesn't mean they can add and subtract.
Nor do I think they have any concept of ethics. Does an alligator, lion, or eagle think it's wrong to kill and eat whatever its prey is? Does a fisher think it's wrong to kill someone's little dog? Have we ever seen any behavior that suggests the any animals have such thoughts?
Reply to Wayfarer Chimps are more aggressive than Bonobo. They look the same but they are totally different creatures, as are wolves and domesticated dogs different. Also, a sample of one does not represent the group. Only some wild dogs tolerated human beings and became domestic.
OMG what has happened to my brain? :lol: My brain is starting to work like a researcher checking out a peers idea of a good research project. I think the professor I have watched and the books I read have effected my thinking process.
When it comes to learning the learner's relationship with the teacher is very important. Oh dear, I just started to make a statement that would be untrue. I was going to say we would never leave a human child to be raised by several people, but today we don't even think about it, as Mom goes to work. I do not think that is a good idea. Leaving a child to be raised by multiple people, is not that far from denying animals have feelings and relationships and can be hurt if we ignore that. I wish I could complete a book about this subject because I believe this subject includes walking into a school fully armed and killing as many people as possible. Shame on the researchers for being so careless. I doubt if the young men who shoot up people in a school, were good students either.
Reply to wonderer1 I am trying to figure out how to reply to you in a way that is congruent with the subject.
Can we say learning how to get what we want is important to fit in the social group? Humans are emotional and they create their own stories about their lives and everyone else. They may create stories that increase emotional problems and disrupt normal social bonding. How different is this from other social animals?
As for judging if someone is narcissistic, I don't think that is our job. Trust me my family can tell you how judgmental and controlling I am. The bad reaction I have gotten from my family and people online makes me try very hard to avoid those unpleasant reactions. And this brings us back to what do animals learn. What are the best conditions for learning?
As a child, I always went to the defense of a peer who was being rejected and it is interesting to see that I am still doing that. I was a very lonely child and didn't want others to suffer this pain. Aren't we interesting, and how different are we from other social animals? Can a forum be a good place for people struggling to be accepted and maybe even appreciated? Can we make the world a better place in small ways? Does a bonobo think like this? I think that is possible.
wonderer1September 16, 2024 at 14:37#9323400 likes
That's what I've been arguing for, and also, why is it that it seems such a hard thing to grasp. Apparently that makes me a pathological narcissist...
This is straw manning/gaslighting. No one has claimed that arguing for human exceptionalism is associated with narcissism. Gaslighting however, is strongly associated with narcissism.
It's patterns to your behavior which I have observed over the course of the last year and a half, including observations of your responses to deliberate probing on my part, that result in me recognizing the narcisstic pattern to your thinking. For example, things I have said to you, that I would expect to result in a raging response if directed towards a grandiose narcissist, have coincided with you taking long breaks from the forum. Such behavior on your part fits the characteristics of covert narcissism, rather than grandiose narcissism.
However, I don't want to layout all the evidence, and those interested in developing a recognition of the pattern can look into it for themselves.
There's a feed-back loop. Human doesn't respond to dog's greeting. Dog is confused and unhappy and withdraws. Human thinks that dog dislikes them, which is not wrong, so gets prickly - body language, looks away. Dog gets further upset. It's about a dynamic relationship.
Exactly the kind of relationship you can't have with an automaton. Experiencing this mutual animosity, he yet insisted that dogs don't think and feel the way we do.
Humans are not the only animal that can hold a grudge, carry on a spiteful feud, suffer PTS or become disoriented and frustrated when confronted with contradictory data. But they can't be insane in the same way as humans because their relationship with their environment is direct and uncomplicated.
We are the only animal that can hold two or more mutually exclusive convictions at the same time, because we compartmentalize concepts, roles, feelings, other persons. (e.g. the sanctity of life .... reinstate the death penalty...) We can believe the opposite of what the evidence presents (see politics) and desire what is harmful to us (obsession, greed, ambition...) We are also intensely self-conscious, validation-dependent; we dramatize our emotions and aggrandize our ideas; our relationships with society and other persons are never simple. And that is why we are so prone to mental illness: the walls between compartments take a great deal of effort to maintain in good repair. When they leak, we are conflicted; when they break down, we become psychotic.
Second, many species live in groups, and many have been doing so for far longer than we have.
Good point. And why not? you may ask. But I'm pushing the point that our way of like is developed from animal ways of life and, in my opinion, cannot be down to just one factor, but to many interacting factors. All of which may have existed independently in the animal kingdom, but "took off", so to speak, when they developed together.
And, in my opinion, the way we are special is of more value, and has greater impact, than the way any the other species is special. (Also, The Incredibles?)
I don't see how you can possible make that judgement. Given that our specialness is as much a curse and a blessing, to the rest of the planet and ourselves as well.
I would be surprised if you think a parent in any other species has ever gone through the depth or duration of emotional pain that you have.
One is always tempted to think that it is worse for me than anyone else. I don't believe in comparing these things - "My grief is greater/lesser than yours" does not help anybody. It was a while ago, but it is, of course, very far from forgotten.
Well, I once encountered someone (on another forum) who claimed that he planned how to pack his suitcase by imagining various arrangements of the things he had to pack - visually. He said it worked for him. How could I argue with him? I can't be dogmatic about it. If he could think in images, why can't dogs? Suggestive thought - Dogs do appear to have dreams.
No, dogs don't do math. I know many animals recognize groups of objects of certain sizes. That doesn't mean they count them, and it doesn't mean they can add and subtract.
No they don't. So how do they catch Frisbees? Actually, since we can also catch Frisbees without doing any math, we know that math is not critical to catching Frisbees. So articulate reason is not the only rationality. On the other hand, it seems pretty clear that we can locate sounds in space because of the time and volume differences between our two ears. But we are not aware of that difference, except as implied in knowing the location of the sound. This is not a simple issue.
Nor do I think they have any concept of ethics. Does an alligator, lion, or eagle think it's wrong to kill and eat whatever its prey is? Does a fisher think it's wrong to kill someone's little dog? Have we ever seen any behavior that suggests the any animals have such thoughts?
They don't see anything wrong with killing their prey. Most humans don't either. Sure, there are complications in this case, but it is not the whole of ethics.
Chimps, apparently, and perhaps dogs do have a sense of fair play in that if they see another chimp/dog being fed better than they are, they will protest, vigorously. Their apparent sense of outrage when the pecking order is disrupted is another example.
that they construct a conception antecedent to the inquiry, hence establishing its possibility.
Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use.
under what possible conditions would lesser animals be determinable as possessing it, or anything like it, insofar as the self-reflective necessity, is impossible?
Well, you can watch a dog searching for a weak spot in a fence, and getting their companion to come and help open it up. That suggests how they might solve some problems - and that's a process that we can recognize as rational - in humans and in dogs.
They may not climb mountains because they are there, (is that rational??) but they can gallop across a field because it's there and eat a snack because it's there. There are lots of different connections, which we can only ever know if we engage with them sympathetically, setting aside presuppositions so far as possible, or at least being willing to question them.
I once watched a flock of sheep in a field. One of them had found a gap in the fence, and the whole flock was queuing to get through it, all lined up in a single file, clearly politely waiting for others to get through as opposed to all making a mad dash at the same time. What did they expect to find? Greener grass, possibly, but there was nothing wrong with the grass they already had. Perhaps just because it was there. Who knows? Did they know? (I had to ring the farmer, who turned up in short order and wrecked my philosophical moment.)
Exactly the kind of relationship you can't have with an automaton. Experiencing this mutual animosity, he yet insisted that dogs don't think and feel the way we do.
Yes. I know it seems crazy. And you are right that animals don't seem capable of tolerating that kind of cognitive dissonance. They do seem wonderfully simple and direct by comparison with humans.
One does feel that something like that must have happened. But we don't have, and probably never will have any detailed evidence about what actually happened. It's important to keep hold of the proviso. Philosophers are very fond of "it must be that way, so it is that way" - and less fond of being proved wrong.
Yes, we do have information that can support how dogs became domestic. By studying the DNA we know when wild dogs became fully domestic. Dogs are not the only animals that can be domesticated and we are not going to make a turkey a domesticated animal. Animals that can not be domesticated may get along with humans just fine until puberty.
I have heard some pigs can make good pets and because you said (they may follow a human point), I looked for more information. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/pigs-dogs-pets-communication. Some pigs bond with humans and may communicate with them like dogs do. Interestingly pigs need the social factor. I think they rather be with their own kind, but if their only choice is a human they will settle for making friends with a human.
because pointing (ostensive definition) is usually thought to be fundamental in learning language.
That is so interesting! When teaching bonobo how to communicate with a picture board maybe this reaction of following a point plays into the learning? Do you have more information about this?
wonderer1September 16, 2024 at 16:04#9323630 likes
Given the irreducible condition of human reason, re: the propensity for inquiring after impossible results, how would it ever be concluded lesser animals exhibit congruent reason?
How it's normally done is: choose a dictionary definition of 'reason', rather than a philosophical stance.
Then, set a problem that requires awareness of cause and effect, rather than instinct or brute force.
Devise a test for the subject to solve this problem.
Observe how different species, including humans, go about confronting the problem, and whrether any species solves it successfully.
Vera MontSeptember 16, 2024 at 16:31#9323710 likes
And you are right that animals don't seem capable of tolerating that kind of cognitive dissonance. They do seem wonderfully simple and direct by comparison with humans.
Not unlike human children, until their culture teaches them not only to tolerate but to cultivate and promote double- and triple-think. Many of us cope with this extra complication with only a small amount of internal strife, frustration and substance abuse, but an inordinately large percentage become destructive, violent, turn against one another, fall into superstition and cult behaviour.
PatternerSeptember 16, 2024 at 16:59#9323840 likes
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach. Do you have a minimum criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as thinking? Rational thinking? If not, then upon what ground do you rest your denial that some creatures other than humans are capable of thought, rational or otherwise?
I agree. But I don't have the answers. The general idea I get from looking it up is that rational thinking and decisions are arrived at through logic and reason. Especially as opposed to through emotion.
I suppose thinking ora decision can be entirely wrong, even if done rationally. The information that the logic/reason works on could be wrong, after sll.
PatternerSeptember 16, 2024 at 18:38#9324090 likes
I don't see how you can possible make that judgement. Given that our specialness is as much a curse and a blessing, to the rest of the planet and ourselves as well.
Still, I make that judgement. It's entirely subjective, after all. I think our intelligence and consciousness (I believe the two are very tightly intertwined) is the most extraordinary thing we are aware of, and capable of more wonders than we can imagine.
And the lack of our intelligence and consciousness is nature. Which includes billions of animals screaming as they're killed and eaten. Unless they're just eaten alive. There may be no malice involved, but there is plenty of pain and fear.
Good point. And why not? you may ask. But I'm pushing the point that our way of like is developed from animal ways of life and, in my opinion, cannot be down to just one factor, but to many interacting factors. All of which may have existed independently in the animal kingdom, but "took off", so to speak, when they developed together.
..................
There is truth in that. We have hyper-developed various capacities. But I don't think we have hyper-developed just one capacity.
I agree. There may be ways some non-humans think that we do not. Every autumn, freakin' Monarch Butterflies migrate from Canada to the same tiny area in Mexico where they have never been, but where their great grandparents were born. They have senses and abilities we obviously lack, despite their much more limited ability to think. I don't know if they think at all. But if they do, it's bound to be in ways we don't. My point, though, is that, in ways of thinking that we share with other species, the capacity is more developed in us. Not just one thing.
:grin: I know of more than a few anecdotes of lesser animals giving all appearances of having a sixth-sense, as it's often termed. From cats finding their way back home after having been driven many many miles away and dropped off by themselves to dogs that (as was videotaped) start waiting for their owner's return home by siting in front of the window staring out of it, this at various times that synchronize with the variable time the owner leaves the workplace, etc. But, if there were to be any such sixth-sense, it would either never be empirically verifiable in a scientific manner - not for humans and certainly not for lesser animals - were it to be spiritual or, else, it would then become something physically explainable and therefore mundane. Cool quote though. And, yes, there are a number of anecdotes of elephants having at times incredible degrees of communication ability via the infrasound they make use of - which seems to possibly be part of what happened in the quote you've mentioned. Still, while some might give effort to interpreting what these anecdotes might or might not signify, there are some humans who'd still affirm that only humans are conscious beings, etc. :palmface:
Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language.
A rather bold statement, is it not? Dogs, and other lesser animals sufficiently equipped with vocalizing physiology, seem to communicate with each other, albeit quite simply, which carries the implication of a merely instinctive simple skill. But it does not follow such skill necessarily involves conceptions, and, if conceptions as such are considered as abstract metaphysical objects, it becomes then a question of whether those lesser animals engage in metaphysical pursuits. And we end up kicking that can down a very VERY long road.
Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use.
I do not so recognize. That which grounds the act of a dog howling and maybe even nipping your foot upon you stepping on his, has no more meaning than an altogether empirical measure of his relative well-being, which most of us are inclined to grant, rather than inviting non-empirical conceptual cause/effect relations he must form pursuant to his intellectual capacity, which some of us are not.
.how would it ever be concluded lesser animals exhibit congruent reason?
Mww
How it's normally done is: choose a dictionary definition of 'reason', rather than a philosophical stance.
Nahhhh .Im not doing that. Reason is already defined by whichever philosophical stance incorporates it, either by what it is, and/or by what it does.
Theres no need for experiment: there is only that reason as a human thinks of it, and thereby there is only that reason as belongs to intelligence of his kind. While it is justifiable to grant the possibility that lesser animals have a fundamental ground for their own intelligence, it must remain impossible to ascertain whether, and susceptible to palpable contradiction to merely assume, that ground in the lesser is in any way discernible by the higher. And with that, the notion of discursive rational thought, the construction of pure a priori logical relations as contained, theoretically, in the human intellect, falls by the wayside in those lesser, indiscernible, intellects.
Vera MontSeptember 16, 2024 at 20:28#9324320 likes
A rather bold statement, is it not? Dogs, and other lesser animals sufficiently equipped with vocalizing physiology, seem to communicate with each other, albeit quite simply, which carries the implication of a merely instinctive simple skill. But it does not follow such skill necessarily involves conceptions, and, if conceptions as such are considered as abstract metaphysical objects, it becomes then a question of whether those lesser animals engage in metaphysical pursuits. And we end up kicking that can down a very VERY long road.
Language is a prerequisite to rational thought only according to one particular philosophical school of thought, not according to the meaning of the word. And what have metaphysics got to do with practical problem-solving? (or anything real, for that matter) got it.
Nahhhh .Im not doing that. Reason is already defined by whichever philosophical stance incorporates it, either by what it is, and/or by what it does.
Right; got it. "Words mean what I want them to. If you don't speak my biased language, everything you say is wrong."
Theres no need for experiment: there is only that reason as a human thinks of it, and thereby there is only that reason as belongs to intelligence of his kind.
For example, things I have said to you, that I would expect to result in a raging response if directed towards a grandiose narcissist, have coincided with you taking long breaks from the forum. Such behavior on your part fits the characteristics of covert narcissism, rather than grandiose narcissism.
You flatter yourself. You evince no evidence of learning in philosophy beyond a smattering of popular neuroscience.
And also Richard Burthogge - extremely, extremely interesting - An Essay Upon Reason
Listed on Michael R. Thompson Rare Books for US$4,600 :yikes: It would want to be interesting! (Although that is for a first edition.) Nevertheless I will persist in looking around for a bootleg copy.
Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use.
I think a case can be made that concepts must be able to be expressed in symbolic form (e.g. linguistic or arithmetical) if they are to be considered as such. Certainly we (and dogs, cats, etc) have innumerable non-verbal skills and intuitions, but concepts proper are the prerogative of language-using beings. A dog might have a memory or association with an object or person and as a consequence be scared of it, but I would argue this is still explainable in terms of stimulus and response rather than with reference to conceptual thought. (This is why I presented the passage earlier from Jacques Maritain.)
concept /?k?ns?pt/ noun: an abstract idea.
"structuralism is a difficult concept"
Similar:
idea notion conception abstraction conceptualization theory hypothesis postulation belief conviction opinion view image impression picture
* a plan or intention.
"the centre has kept firmly to its original concept"
* an idea or invention to help sell or publicize a commodity.
"a new concept in corporate hospitality"
Language is a prerequisite to rational thought only according to one particular philosophical school of thought, not according to the meaning of the word.
What, pray tell, is the school of thought that says that language is *not* a prerequisite to rational thought?
wonderer1September 16, 2024 at 22:19#9324540 likes
Chimps are more aggressive than Bonobo. They look the same but they are totally different creatures, as are wolves and domesticated dogs different.
That chimps are aggressive wasn't the point of the Nim Chimpsky experiment. It was an attempt to teach chimps language, and it failed. I now find the experimenter, Herbert Terrace, wrote a book on it, 'Why Chimpanzees Can't Learn Language and Humans Can'. The cover blurb says 'Initially, Terrace thought that Nim could create sentences but later discovered that Nims teachers inadvertently cued his signing. Terrace concluded that Project Nim failednot because Nim couldnt create sentences but because he couldnt even learn words. Language is a uniquely human quality, and attempting to find it in animals is wishful thinking at best.' And that is directly relevant to this dicussion.
Vera MontSeptember 16, 2024 at 22:41#9324590 likes
You're making the case, it requires more specifics, don't you think?
The case I've been attempting to make is that words have ideology-neutral meanings, and are not defined by "philosophical stance". When that is not the case, the very communication that's supposedly a prerequisite for rational thought is degraded. Science cannot operate according philosophical bias.
(But then who needs science when you have metaphysics?)
The case I've been attempting to make is that words have ideology-neutral meanings, and are not defined by "philosophical stance".
:chin: I thought the issue was what you are calling 'human exceptionalism', that is, you are contesting the view that the human capacity for reason and language entails a categorical distinction between humans and rest of the animal kingdom. Myself along with several others are saying that there is a real distinction to be made, that h.sapiens are fundamentally different in some basic respects to other creatures. The precise point we're at right now, is whether animals, such as dogs, can form concepts in the absence of language. I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language. I thought you were saying that it is not dependent, and I was questioning you on sources for that contention.
It's quite readable. But I'm with you on preferring to read philosophy in physical form, for the most part.
I will definitely have a look at it. That said, I find 17th philosophy quite challenging to read, as the style is difficult. But from what I've read of the Cambridge Platonists, they're definitely 'kindred spirits', so to speak. Someone with the appropriate scholarly skills would do well to publish an updated 'Cambridge Platonist Reader', in my view.
I thought the issue was what you are calling 'human exceptionalism', that is, you are contesting the view that the human capacity for reason and language entails a categorical distinction between humans and rest of the animal kingdom.
That's the inevitable outcome of using words according to their actual meaning. I was attempting to correct a misapprehension that resulted from a biased definition.
Myself along with several others are saying that there is a real distinction to be made, that h.sapiens are fundamentally different in some basic respects to other creatures.
Yes, I've been aware of that. The evidence I've followed contradicts that assertion.
I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language.
Why? How do you know? How does 'conceptual thought' differ from 'rational thought'? And if they do differ, why have you shifted the discussion from rational thought, which was the thread topic, to conceptual thought, which has not been defined as anything beyond 'thought that needs human language to perform'? I have not shifted from rational thought - i.e. purposeful, practical identification and planned action to solve a problem.
I thought you were saying that it is not dependent,
The definition of reason and rational thought does not include language as a prerequisite.
Reasoning:
the action of thinking about something in a logical, sensible way. Oxford
the process of thinking about something in order to make a decision. Cambridge
It [rationality] encompasses the ability to draw sensible conclusions from facts, logic and data. In simple words, if your thoughts are based on facts and not emotions, it is called rational thinking. Rational thinking focuses on resolving problems and achieving goals.
If there is any objective way to test or measure this faculty, other than the setting of problems that do not occur in the subject's customary environment, I'm unaware of it. Granted, I have not read ever with post with close attention.
creativesoulSeptember 17, 2024 at 02:30#9325120 likes
In my book, however, this is not a simple empirical question. As far as I can see, it is fair to say that our paradigm (NOT definition) of a person is a human being (under normal circumstances). Animals are like human beings in certain respects such that it seems most reasonable to think that they are like people.
All people are human beings. All human beings are people. Two names for the same thing. If animals are like all human beings in certain respects, then all people are like animals in certain respects.
Crucially, it is clearly possible for human beings to form relationships with animals that are, or are like, relationships with people. But it's a balance. Some people do not go far enough and treat them as machines which can easily result in inhumane treatment. Other people go too far and get accused, sometimes rightly, of anthropomorphization.
The thing to be avoided is a conflation between kinds, a blurring of the differences between the capabilities of humans and other creatures. Innate and learned. A lack of knowing what sorts of thought requires which sorts of prerequisites results in an inherent inability to draw and maintain the necessary distinctions. These differences are afforded to us by dumb luck. Are we lucky in that regard? I think so. It's not like it's something that we had to work hard for. It is not as a result of our own actions that we were born replete with wonderful capabilities that only humans have. We don't pick out all the different biological structures/machines within us. The crows don't either. They are lucky in the same way. Perhaps luckier, in some cases. Ontologically objective biological structures allow all of us to have uniquely individual subjective experiences.
We do not pick the socioeconomic circumstances we're born into. Those help shape the way we look at the world. We do not pick the most influential people around us while we're very young. They are often mimicked, for good or bad. We do not pick the cultural atmosphere. Those are nurtured - or not. Today seems lacking. I digress...
We do not pick the world we're born into. Nor do dogs. We can pick to do good while in it, for the sake of doing good. Dogs... not so much.
The aforementioned biological structures(biological machinery) were there long before we discovered them. We have come to acquire knowledge of the role they play within all verifiable individual subjective human experiences. It's a role of affordance. Allowance. Facilitation. Efficacy.
Other critters share objective and subjective aspects of experience. All subjective aspects of experience are existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception. Physiological sensory perception is ontologically objective. I digress...
Looking forward to this Thursday is something that all sorts of people do, for all sorts of different reasons. It is looking forward to a sequence of events and this requires not only the objective influence that time passing has on life, but also the subjective private, personal - all that which is subject to individual particulars. Hence, it requires a creature with certain capabilities. Being able to keep track of the time between one week and the next - by name - is a bare minimum. Developing, having, and/or holding expectation about a construct of language seems to be required. I see no reason to believe that any other creature could do that.
Thursdays are creations of man. Cosmological systems/cycles, not so much.
Avoiding the fallacy of attributing uniquely human things, features, properties, creations, attributes, characteristics, etc., to that which is not human requires knowing which group of things are uniquely human and which are not. We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.
That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience.
All humans are extremely complex rational creatures, if by that I mean that our actions are influenced by our worldviews and societal constructs, and those are very complex systems.
All humans are also simply rational. We look for lost items where we think they may be. We believe that our actions will help bring about some change in the world. Language less creatures can do the same. Language less creatures can learn how to take action in order to make certain things happen. They cannot know that they are. They cannot say that. We can.
In defense of personification...
I've not read enough beautiful anthropomorphic terminological baptisms. I've not read enough graceful words bouncing in pleasing cadence; bringing smiles for all the right reasons. The personification of things not human can make for some of the most beautiful reflections.
The only way to avoid anthropomorphism is to know the differences and similarities, between human thought, belief, behaviour, and experience and other creatures'.
Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought(I'm 'ontologically nihilistic' on meaning/there is no meaning where there is no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things).
All thought is meaningful to the thinking creature. Some language less creatures form, have, and/or hold thought. Not all meaning emerges via language use. This demands a notion of meaning capable of bridging the evolutionary gap between learning how to open a gate and knowing how to talk about what one has just done. The gate is meaningful to all the creatures that know how to open it.
To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes.
The difficulty it seems lay in how to best go about taking proper account of all this.
The definition of reason and rational thought does not include language as a prerequisite.
Reasoning:
the action of thinking about something in a logical, sensible way. Oxford
the process of thinking about something in order to make a decision. Cambridge
It [rationality] encompasses the ability to draw sensible conclusions from facts, logic and data. In simple words, if your thoughts are based on facts and not emotions, it is called rational thinking. Rational thinking focuses on resolving problems and achieving goals.
I agree that these are the definitions of 'rational'. But I'm also saying that rational and conceptual thought and language are strongly related. Animals and other organisms plainly exhibit problem-solving behaviours etc, but I don't agree that they rely on abstract thought and reasoning to do so. If we can impute that to them, it's because we ourselves rely on it for explanations of all manner of phenomena. In saying that, I'm not denying that animals communicate, as they do so by all kinds of means. But they lack language in the human sense, which is based on an hierarchical syntax and the ability to abstract concepts from experience. Crucial distinction.
We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.
That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience.
Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought(
What is the evidence that there is any such thing? What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour.
I've seen cats, for example, gauging whether they can make a leap up a height or across a stream. They'll pause for a few seconds, their eyes will dart about, sometimes moving back and forth a little. They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.
By studying the DNA we know when wild dogs became fully domestic. Dogs are not the only animals that can be domesticated
Yes. I didn't mean to suggest that we know absolutely nothing. The DNA evidence is good enough for me. So is the evidence from archaeology. But I also think that the details of how, exactly, it happened, don't have good empirical backing. Yet we can develop reasonable speculations on the basis of what we know about dogs and humans now. I'm just saying we do well to remember how thin the evidence is.
That is so interesting! When teaching bonobo how to communicate with a picture board maybe this reaction of following a point plays into the learning? Do you have more information about this?
I certainly think that the ability to (be taught to) follow a pointer is the basis for some very interesting learning/teaching opportunities, which the subject may or may not be capable of. I'm afraid you seem to have a good deal more information about empirical studies of animals than I do. Quoting Vera Mont
Not unlike human children, until their culture teaches them not only to tolerate but to cultivate and promote double- and triple-think.
Yes, I know. Double-think is often a great nuisance and yet seems inescapable.
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking?
The lack of clear definitions does indeed make this debate much more difficult. But there's no easy way round it. Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions.
I don't think "rational" is about a single thing, but about the multifarious language games that a language consists of; they have different criteria of meaning and truth. "Rational" refers to thinking that gets us the right results. In some cases that's truth of some kind, in others it's actions that are successful by the relevant criteria.
So here's my answer for this context. Meaning and concepts are shown in meaningful behaviour, which includes both verbal and non-verbal applications of the relevant concepts. This means that to attribute concepts to animals is perfectly meaningful, though not capable of the formal clarity beloved of logicians.
Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions.
I'm afraid that opposition is under severe pressure. There's a lot of research these days into the relationship (intertwining) of them. For example:- Cognition and Emotion Journal
Still, I make that judgement. It's entirely subjective, after all. I think our intelligence and consciousness (I believe the two are very tightly intertwined) is the most extraordinary thing we are aware of, and capable of more wonders than we can imagine.
"Subjective" is a much more complex concept than traditional philosophies want to recognize. In particular, assessing something to be extraordinary, if it is to be meaningful, requires a context that defines what is ordinary. That is, it depends on your point of view. There are points of view that see human achievements as extraordinary (good sense) and as extraordinary (bad sense). There are points of view that see human achievements as different in kind from anything that animals can do and points of view that see human achievements as developments of what animals can do. All of these have a basis. What makes any of them "better" than the others? I'm not sure. But I think the point of view that insists on the continuities between humans and animals is more pragmatic than the others. Stalemate. Pity.
The precise point we're at right now, is whether animals, such as dogs, can form concepts in the absence of language. I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language. I thought you were saying that it is not dependent, and I was questioning you on sources for that contention.
I am indeed saying that conceptual thought is not solely dependent on language. The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. So it is no great stretch to say that concepts are revealed just as surely in non-verbal behaviour as in verbal behaviour.
Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use.
A rather bold statement, is it not? Dogs, and other lesser animals sufficiently equipped with vocalizing physiology, seem to communicate with each other, albeit quite simply, which carries the implication of a merely instinctive simple skill.
Not particularly. As I said above:- The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. So it is no great stretch to say that concepts are revealed just as surely in non-verbal behaviour as in verbal behaviour.
Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic?
In any case, iInstinctive skills are not necessarily simple. Someone brought up the Monarch butterflies' ability to navigate, which is clearly not learned, yet is, one would have thought, quite complex.
And with that, the notion of discursive rational thought, the construction of pure a priori logical relations as contained, theoretically, in the human intellect, falls by the wayside in those lesser, indiscernible, intellects.
To be sure, animals do not indulge in our logic games and, likely, do not engage in our theoretical practices. Nonetheless, both theory in general and logic in particulate depend on, and grew from, our way of life (if you believe Wittgenstein, and I do - but that's another argument). I also believe (though I can't claim any authority from Wittgenstein) that, since we are animals, it seems most reasonable to suppose that our way of life is a one variety of the many varieties of animal ways of life.
Homo Sapiens is a species of an utterly different kind than that of any other species on Earth with which we co-inhabit (most especially with all the other hominids that once existed now being extinct).
There's a dissonance between those two statements - not exactly a contradiction, but close. How do you get from one to the other?
I'll hasten to add that our species is nevertheless yet tied into the tree of life via an utmost obtainment, else utmost extreme, within a current spectrum of degrees - this as, for example, concerns qualitative magnitudes of awareness, of forethought, and the like. But this in no way then contradicts that we humans are of an utterly different kind than all other living species on Earth.
That looks very like trying to have your cake and eat it.
I know of more than a few anecdotes of lesser animals giving all appearances of having a sixth-sense, as it's often termed.
Yes. Whether there is anything substantial behind it is an interesting question. But if they do, they are superior to us in that respect. Just as homing pigeons and other migratory species have superior navigational abilities to us (in that they don't require elaborate technologies to find their way about the globe). So why do you insist that they are lesser?
No, I mean sensitivity, which can be excessive, just as insensitivity can be excessive.
There was a major fuss at one point in the seventies, when people realized that unsentimental scientists were testing the toxicity of certain products by dropping them into the eyes of rabbits. Their criterion for a dangerously toxic dose was that 50% of the rabbits died. Hence the test was known as "LD50". In the process, the rabbits often suffered extreme pain (or at least the scientists knew that a human would have suffered extreme pain, which was why they were testing the products on rabbits). So the rabbits screamed in agony. In an effort to be objective, they described this behaviour as vocalizing. The public thought differently, and controls on vivisection were, eventually, strengthened.
I started a thread a while back on something I had read that Descartes used to flay dogs alive, assuring onlookers that their cries of agony were due only to mechanical reactions, not any genuine feeling of pain. During the course of the thread, I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, because students at a Dutch university who were followers of Descartes' mechanical philosophy did, in fact, perform those dreadful 'experiments', and it is true that Descartes believed that animals were automata without souls, as he identified the soul with the ability to reason.
However, I do have serious trouble attributing these concepts to bacteria and amoeba. Insects also seem to me to be too mechanical to qualify - Wittgenstein says somewhere that "the concept of pain does not get a foothold in the case of a wriggling fly. Yet I also think that tearing the wings off a fly is cruel torture. Fish in general are also too alien to impact much on me, though I'm pretty sure that lobsters feel pain (partly because they have the same kind of nerve cells as the ones that register pain in human beings) and so think that the practice of boiling them alive is cruel. There are lines to be drawn here, and it's not easy.
wonderer1September 17, 2024 at 09:16#9325670 likes
I'm not here to win a contest for my knowledge of philosophy. At present I am discussing matters of psychology.
wonderer1
Probably just as well ;-)
And probably just as well that you realize that your knowledge of philosophy doesn't make you particularly insightful into other people's psychology, or sadly, even your own.
So the rabbits screamed in agony. In an effort to be objective, they described this behaviour as vocalizing. The public thought differently, and controls on vivisection were, eventually, strengthened.
I know about that story - but what is the point? I've never claimed anywhere in this thread that animals are insensitive, or even that they lack intelligence. What is at issue is whether they're rational. And despite all the bluster and whataboutism, very little is being said about that by yourself or the other defenders of the view that they are.
There's a book I'm aware of, although I haven't read all of it, by Noam Chomsky, the famous linguistic philosopher, and Robert Berwick, a computer scientist, called Why Only Us? Language and Evolution. The first point to note is that Chomsky is adamant that only humans possess language (hence the title!) I've found an online presentation by Berwick who presents a synopsis, and he points to something called "Wallace's Problem". This refers to the issue raised by Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer of the theory of natural selection, concerning the apparent disconnect between human intellectual abilities and the evolutionary pressures that could have led to their development. Wallace argued that certain uniquely human traitssuch as higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thoughtseemed to far exceed what would have been necessary for survival in the early human environment.
Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. He speculated that some form of higher intelligence or spiritual intervention might be responsible for these traits, which led to a divergence from Charles Darwin, who maintained that natural selection alone could account for the full spectrum of human abilities (see his Darwinism Applied to Man). This was one of the factors that caused a rift between Darwin and Wallace, with the former wishing to stick to a strictly Enlightenment-rationalist account, while Wallace fell into Victorian spiritualism.
In any case, Chomsky's book does acknowledge that the development of language is a very difficult thing to account for in naturalistic terms, but this is what the book tries to do. In pointing to what is unique about human language (and I think this applies to reason also). From a review of his book:
The starting point is a radical dissimilarity between all animal communication systems and human language. The former are based entirely on linear order, whereas the latter is based on hierarchical syntax. In particular, human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix? (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word fix goes with cars, rather than with friends or mechanics, even though cars is farther apart from fix in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because cars and fix are at the same level in the sentences hierarchy. ...
Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of vocal-learning songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky (already mentioned) was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his language was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.
Berwick and Chomsky develop a theory about a genetic mutation that enabled an ability called 'merging' which is enables the kind of heirarchical syntax decribed above. I'm not able to summarise that, as it's quite an intricate theory. But the main point remains, which is that they see a difference iin kind between human and animal communication.
This is why I pointed back to the Aristotelian notion of 'nous' (rational intellect). The philosophical point is that reason is able to grasp universal terms, such as 'man' or 'dog' or 'energy'. That itself relies on the ability to abstract, to grasp that very disparate objects belong to a class or group. Of course that comes so naturally to us, it is so innate to how our minds work, that we don't notice (and don't need to notice) that we're doing it. But that ability to abstract particulars into general forms, is also a key differentiator of the human intellect from animal sensiblity.
And most of the objections to that are, as I say, mere sentimentality. As if it's cruel or discriminatory to say that humans are capable of a kind of intelligence that animals are not.
And, for what it's worth, I agree with Alfred Russel Wallace, against Darwin. Not that there is a literal 'spirit' guiding evolution, but that evolutionary and neo-Darwinian theory does not account for the higher intellectual, artistic and contemplative achievements available to h. sapiens. Darwinism does not, in other words, account for a Mozart. Terribly non-PC, I acknowledge, but a position I'm quite happy defending.
However, I do have serious trouble attributing these concepts to bacteria and amoeba. Insects also seem to me to be too mechanical to qualify
Another point - I'm coming around to the view that organic life is 'intentional' from the get-go. The quotes are because it's not intentional in the sense of acting in accordance with conscious intent, as rational agents do, but that as soon as life exists, there is already a rudimentary sense of 'self' and 'other', as the first thing any living organism has to do, is maintain itself against the environment, as distinct from simply dissolving or being subsumed by whatever processes are sorrounding it. So right from the outset, living organisms can't be fully explained in terms of, or reduced to, physical and chemical laws. This is an idea I'm trying to explore through a couple of difficult books, Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature' and Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life'. (Pretty slow going, though :yikes: )
wonderer1September 17, 2024 at 10:34#9325780 likes
Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. He speculated that some form of higher intelligence or spiritual intervention might be responsible for these traits, which led to a divergence from Charles Darwin, who maintained that natural selection alone could account for the full spectrum of human abilities (see his Darwinism Applied to Man).
Can you cite Darwin claiming that natural selection alone can account for the full spectrum of human abilities? After all, Darwin recognized distinctions in selective processes such as sexual selection and artificial selection.
Wallace argued that certain uniquely human traitssuch as higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thoughtseemed to far exceed what would have been necessary for survival in the early human environment.
The social environment has always been a very significant component of the human environment, and higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought facilitate thriving in human social environments.
Perhaps those with the ARHGAP11B mutation, with so much brain power to spare for making music and wooing the ladies, were just much sexier than those without?
The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour.
Of course; not one of my contentions. Expression is objectified representation of conceptions, but not necessarily of rational thought, which is a certain form of representation of its own, re: propositional. All that says nothing about the origin of our conceptions, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the expression of them, but is always presupposed by it, and thereby legitimizes the death of the meaning is use nonsense, insofar as it is quite obviously the case we all, at one time or another and I wager more often than not, conceptualize .think rationally .without ever expressing even a part of it via verbal behavior.
Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic?
Where did I say or hint at that? All representation of thought in humans is linguistic, whether vocal or otherwise. It is thought itself, that is not, in that humans think in images, THAT being my major metaphysical contention from which all else follows.
Ever considered how hard it is to express an image? Why else would there even be a language, other than to both satisfy the necessity to express, and overcome the impossibility of expressing in mere imagery? And theres evolution for ya, writ large.
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Nonetheless, both theory in general and logic in particulate depend on, and grew from, our way of life (if you believe Wittgenstein, and I do) ..
and I do not, not that it matters. In general, theory and logic depend on an intellect capable of constructing them. That to which each is directed, the relations in the former or the truths in the latter, may depend on our way of life, but method always antecedes product.
I know about that story - but what is the point? I've never claimed anywhere in this thread that animals are insensitive, or even that they lack intelligence. What is at issue is whether they're rational. And despite all the bluster and whataboutism, very little is being said about that by yourself or the other defenders of the view that they are.
That explains a good deal that was puzzling me. I suppose that's an example of how one tends to get over-focused in these discussions. On the other hand, it may be that people felt that neither was equivalent to rationality and so left it on one side.
One of the problems about discussing intelligence is that it is not easy to grasp a definition of it that is amenable to philosophical discussion. However, I found the the following in an article on intelligence in "Psychology Today" that might provide a starting-point. "IQ" and "Giftedness" were proffered as one-word summaries. Then I found
Reading a road map upside-down, excelling at chess, and generating synonyms for "brilliant" may seem like three different skills. But each is thought to be a measurable indicator of general intelligence or "g," a construct that includes problem-solving ability, spatial manipulation, and language acquisition that is relatively stable across a person's lifetime.
For the record, I'm extremely dubious about the construct "g", but happy to think about more specific skills, with some reservations about "problem-solving ability" - surely much will depend on the kind of problem? My question is, then, what is the relationship between intelligence and rationality? It seems to me that all the skills cited involve rationality - intelligence is about the difference between being good (better than average) at these skills or not. So my next question is why you think that someone can be intelligent but not rational?
Sensitivity. I take it that you have in mind the ability to see, hear, etc, in the same ways as we do (roughly) and with all due deference to any possible sixth sense. So my dog can see (and recognize) me and respond appropriately to my return home, can hear her meal being prepared in the kitchen and present herself in good order, and so forth. Would that be fair? We can agree also that it shows intelligence (in the more generic sense of "understanding"). But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality? That she doesn't speak English? I don't think so.
I can only agree with you that it would have been helpful if someone had paid more careful attention to what you said.
PatternerSeptember 17, 2024 at 11:03#9325820 likes
Still, I make that judgement. It's entirely subjective, after all. I think our intelligence and consciousness (I believe the two are very tightly intertwined) is the most extraordinary thing we are aware of, and capable of more wonders than we can imagine.
Patterner
"Subjective" is a much more complex concept than traditional philosophies want to recognize. In particular, assessing something to be extraordinary, if it is to be meaningful, requires a context that defines what is ordinary. That is, it depends on your point of view. There are points of view that see human achievements as extraordinary (good sense) and as extraordinary (bad sense). There are points of view that see human achievements as different in kind from anything that animals can do and points of view that see human achievements as developments of what animals can do. All of these have a basis. What makes any of them "better" than the others? I'm not sure. But I think the point of view that insists on the continuities between humans and animals is more pragmatic than the others. Stalemate. Pity.
Not sure what you mean by the part I bolded. My take would be you want subjective preferences to be chosen for practical reasons?
Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic?
In any case, iInstinctive skills are necessarily simple. Someone brought up the Monarch butterflies' ability to navigate, which is clearly not learned, yet is, one would have thought, quite complex.
If the ability is not learned (I don't see how it could be), then it is instinctive. And it is complex. Therefore, instinctive skills are [I]not[/i] necessarily simple.
I take it that you have in mind the ability to see, hear, etc, in the same ways as we do (roughly) and with all due deference to any possible sixth sense. So my dog can see (and recognize) me and respond appropriately to my return home, can hear her meal being prepared in the kitchen and present herself in good order, and so forth. Would that be fair? We can agree also that it shows intelligence (in the more generic sense of "understanding"). But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality?
I can only agree with you that it would have been helpful if someone had paid more careful attention to what you said.
Why thats very courteous of you! An anecdote: the first undergrad essay I ever submitted was in psychology, on the subject of intelligence testing. I wrote an essay along the lines that intelligence was not something that can be tested. I got an F with the comment wrong department (the implication being it was a philosophy essay.) It was the only essay I ever failed. Served me right, too.
PatternerSeptember 17, 2024 at 13:35#9326000 likes
But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality?
Ludwig V
Try explaining the concept prime number to her.
Although the concept of prime numbers shows that there are areas of thought that humans have that other species do not, I don't see how it disproves dogs thinking rationally. Does being able to think rationally mean you can understand all possible things? I'm not saying they can, just saying I don't think that proves they can't.
wonderer1September 17, 2024 at 13:51#9326040 likes
For the record, I'm extremely dubious about the construct "g", but happy to think about more specific skills, with some reservations about "problem-solving ability" - surely much will depend on the kind of problem?
Yeah "g" is a simplistic/expedient way of treating the subject, and there is much diversity to the way individuals go about solving problems that is not captured with attempts to measure g.
Unfortunately, testing to develop a more fine grained understanding of an individual's cognitive strengths and weaknesses (such as the WAIS test) is much more involved and requires a lot of one on one interaction between the individual conducting the test and the test taker. (Although I suppose soon computers might be able to take over a lot of what a human conducting such a test does.)
Perhaps it is worth pointing out, that most psychologists probably strongly agree with your view on "g".
The first point to note is that Chomsky is adamant that only humans possess language (hence the title!)
Yes. Note that Chomsky and I part ways at this point. The definition begs the question whether animal communication systems count as languages. I'll let that pass for the sake of the argument.
Let's suppose that language learning is a case of human exceptionalism. I've already admitted that humans, as a distinct species, will be exceptional in some respects. One would have to show that this is an exception of more significance that the ability of Monarch butterfly to migrate back to the summer home of its ancestors without ever having been there.
For perspective, try this article from Scientific American.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/evidence-rebuts-chomsky-s-theory-of-language-learning/
Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies.
I wouldn't discount that possibility. But it seems normal now to allow for that situation and to posit that selections other than survival, for example sexual selection, would kick in at that point. The story of the Irish elk is of interest. (It was first identified in Ireland from the large number of remains found there, but its has been found across Western Europe to Lake Baikal in Siberia. This variety of elk grew huge antlers, far bigger than could be of use in a fight. That first though to be an example for Wallace, but now the favoured explanation is that sexual selection enabled this. But, the story goes, they grew so big that they became a hindrance in normal life. The result was the species became extinct about 7,700 years ago.
The philosophical point is that reason is able to grasp universal terms, such as 'man' or 'dog' or 'energy'.
Are you suggesting that my dog does not know the difference between humans (and between men and women and children) and dogs, not to mention many other things? That one won't fly. I grant you that she probably lacks a concept of energy. But that doesn't affect the question whether she's rational or not.
Another point - I'm coming around to the view that organic life is 'intentional' from the get-go. The quotes are because it's not intentional in the sense of acting in accordance with conscious intent, as rational agents do, but that as soon as life exists, there is already a rudimentary sense of 'self' and 'other', as the first thing any living organism has to do, is maintain itself against the environment, as distinct from simply dissolving or being subsumed by whatever processes are sorrounding it. So right from the outset, living organisms can't be fully explained in terms of, or reduced to, physical and chemical laws. This is an idea I'm trying to explore through a couple of difficult books, Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature' and Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life'. (Pretty slow going, though :yikes: )
Yes. Skipping whether intentional is the quite the right word for it, the argument is plausible, so far as it goes. Some of the models of autonomous systems that Thompson discusses are very persuasive. People often suggest that feedback loops are also not reducible to conventional causality (what that is, these days). But "reducible" has become a complex concept nowadays, so I reserve my position and watch with interest. It's all a long way from what we're discussing, though.
I hope you are not suggesting that because I don't understand even calculus, I'm not rational. It's not altogether irrelevant (given that we're also discussion the "g" factor) to point out that my school streamed me as sub-calculus in mathematics at the same time as it streamed me in the advanced classes for Ancient Greek and Latin.
It was the only essay I ever failed. Served me right, too.
It was a bit harsh, given that it was your first essay and nobody warned you about inter-disciplinary boundaries. That's how Kuhnian paradigms are enforced. You don't get to qualify unless you conform - at least until you've qualified in orthodoxy. Nowadays, that's a perfectly respectable issue. I suppose other people swallowed their doubts until they got an academic post and tenure.
Perhaps it is worth pointing out, that most psychologists probably strongly agree with your view on "g".
That's good to know. Years ago, I was part of a team that taught an interdisciplinary course for psychology students. Intelligence was part of the programme and I got to give a lecture on it. I did my best with them, but most of them stuck to the party line - I couldn't criticize them for that. But perhaps I did contribute in a small way to that change.
wonderer1September 17, 2024 at 14:03#9326080 likes
That's good to know. Years ago, I was part of a team that taught an interdisciplinary course for psychology students. Intelligence was part of the programme and I got to give a lecture on it. I did my best with them, but most of them stuck to the party line - I couldn't criticize them for that. But perhaps I did contribute in a small way to that change
:up:
Vera MontSeptember 17, 2024 at 14:15#9326110 likes
But I'm also saying that rational and conceptual thought and language are strongly related.
I know you've been saying that. I didn't see it demonstrated. In any case, 'strongly related' is not the same as 'dependent on'. Quoting Wayfarer
Animals and other organisms plainly exhibit problem-solving behaviours etc, but I don't agree that they rely on abstract thought and reasoning to do so.
What are they using instead? Is there a demonstrable non-reasoning faculty that exists in other animals that could account for the similarity between their approach to a problem and human subject's?
But they lack language in the human sense, which is based on an hierarchical syntax and the ability to abstract concepts from experience.
And how does the lack of syntax prevent someone from rational thinking? Communication is not required for solitary activities, such as opening a gate or finding a way to steal the bisquits from the top shelf of a cupboard.
What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour.
What about human behaviour cannot be described in behaviourist terms? (Fortunately, that fad has faded)
Being able to keep track of the time between one week and the next - by name - is a bare minimum.
Why is the name of the day required? Why not an interval? It's possible that other animals have shorter periods of anticipation (as they also have shorter lives) but every dog knows what time his humans are expected home from work and school. My grandfather died on one of his regular trips and never came home again. His dog continued to meet the five o'clock train, hoping.
They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.
Then what, precisely, are they doing? If a human stood on that same bank, assessing the distance and scanning the far shore for safe landing spots, would you doubt that he's thinking?
ETA Moreover, exactly like the man, if the leap is deemed not worth risking, a cat will walk some way up and down along the bank, looking for a place where the water narrows or there is a stepping-stone.
Anyway, I think our pragmatic concerns are too different for us to reach aggreement anytime soon.
I think we are in agreement. You made a very good point. I like that the Greeks thought we are political creatures and it is fitting for this thread to question if any other life form is political. Chimps will sort of choose their leader, by ganging up on a leader they want to get rid of. An old leader who lost a fight may be allowed to stay close to the group. I just looked for more information and this link caught my interest.
Chimps use military tactic only ever seen in humans before
Chimps use an ancient military tactic to make decisions and avoid potentially fatal clashes with rival groups, scientists have discovered.
Researchers observed two western chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes verus) communities in Africa take to the hills to carry out surveillance on each other much like reconnaissance missions used by militaries. They then used that intel to decide when to enter contested territory.
Plenty of animals look out for danger in their environment, but this is the first time scientists have documented a non-human species making elaborate use of elevated terrain to assess risk in a territorial conflict, according to the new study, published Nov. 2 in the journal PLOS Biology.
https://www.livescience.com/animals/monkeys/chimps-use-military-tactic-only-ever-seen-in-humans-before
It is kind of exciting to think about this and the evolution of social order. I googled if bonobo also use military tactics and I got this...
No, bonobos don't use military tactics, but they do have their own ways of responding to conflict:
Individualistic survival strategies: Male bonobos tend to survive on their own, which may be due to their tendency to follow female groups.
Sociosexual behavior: When faced with conflict, bonobos produce cortisol, the body's main stress hormone, and respond with anxiety instead of aggression. They relieve their discomfort by hugging, kissing, and having brief sexual encounters with group members.
https://www.google.com/search?q=do+bonobo+use+military+tactics&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS926US926&oq=do+bonobo+use+military+tactics&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIJCAEQIRgKGKABMgkIAhAhGAoYoAEyCQgDECEYChigATIJCAQQIRgKGKABMgkIBRAhGAoYoAHSAQoxODMwN2owajE1qAIIsAIB&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
Looks like a republican/democrat divide.
wonderer1September 17, 2024 at 14:41#9326140 likes
a new study shows that humans may not be alone in their love of playing practical jokes. Animals can tease each other too. Together with colleagues, Isabelle Laumer, a post-doctoral researcher at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), watched over 75 hours of videos of great apes interacting with each other. Great apes are our closest living relatives, and include orangutans, chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas. The apes in the study all lived in zoos, and were filmed attending to their daily routines. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240223-do-animals-have-sense-of-humour
:chin: I understood play is important to social bonding and establishing social order but intentional humor? From experience, I know humor is very important for humans and that things can go very sour if we lose our sense of humor. In fact, I think humor is so important, we might want to teach it in school. Wouldn't it be nice if our schools produced comedians instead of killers.
If the ability is not learned (I don't see how it could be), then it is instinctive. And it is complex. Therefore, instinctive skills are not necessarily simple.
Oops! Typo. Will correct. Thanks.
PatternerSeptember 17, 2024 at 15:27#9326340 likes
That chimps are aggressive wasn't the point of the Nim Chimpsky experiment. It was an attempt to teach chimps language, and it failed. I now find the experimenter, Herbert Terrace, wrote a book on it, 'Why Chimpanzees Can't Learn Language and Humans Can'. The cover blurb says 'Initially, Terrace thought that Nim could create sentences but later discovered that Nims teachers inadvertently cued his signing. Terrace concluded that Project Nim failednot because Nim couldnt create sentences but because he couldnt even learn words. Language is a uniquely human quality, and attempting to find it in animals is wishful thinking at best.' And that is directly relevant to this dicussion.
That chimps are more aggressive than bonobo needs to be taken into consideration because individual temperament is involved in learning.
Also, I don't think we all have an agreement about what language is. I think we have agreement that animals are capable of communication but does that equal language? Even if it did equal language is that language limited to a few words and what concepts does that serve? I think we are looking at evolution here. A bonobo that learned to sign taught her offspring to sign. In the wild, this is unlikely to happen naturally, but perhaps in a human environment, human socialization is picked up, setting the animal on the path humans took.
An animal's willingness to play with people increases bonding just as play is important in nature and building social connections. Would you please read the quote and tell me what you think? Did Kanzi not only demonstrate an understanding of words but also used a conceptual word demonstrating judgment associated with a word?
[/quote]In a landmark study in the mid-1990s, Savage-Rumbaugh exposed Kanzi to 660 novel English sentences including Put on the monster mask and scare Linda and Go get the ball thats outside [as opposed to the ball sitting beside you]. In 72 percent of the trials, Kanzi completed the request, outcompeting a 2½-year-old child. Yet his most memorable behavior emerged outside the context of replicable trials. Sampling kale for the first time, he called it slow lettuce. When his mother once bit him in frustration, he looked mournfully at Savage-Rumbaugh and pressed, Matata bite. When Savage-Rumbaugh added symbols for the words good and bad to the keyboard, he seized on these abstract concepts, often pointing to bad before grabbing something from a caregivera kind of prank. Once, when Savage-Rumbaughs sister Liz Pugh, who worked at the Language Research Center as a caregiver, was napping, Kanzi snatched the balled-up blanket shed been using as a pillow. When Pugh jolted awake, Kanzi pressed the symbols for bad surprise.
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/bonobos-teach-humans-about-nature-language-180975191/
[/quote]
wonderer1September 17, 2024 at 17:18#9326580 likes
I've gotten the impression that pigs, at least when young, have a sense of humor. (A mother pig with a litter of piglets, not so much.)
How totally fascinating. That would make a great research project. We know animals change once they pass puberty, and we know the young are more open to exploring new things. Could our capacity for humor change as we age? Is a sense of humor and joy of learning new things something we can preserve as we age, delaying the negative effects of aging. And there is also that human-pig bonding issue. Can playfulness improve our relationships with animals? Where as that old sow is stuck in her ways and is not open to a relationship with humans?
Yes, pigs are social animals:
Social groups
Pigs live in stable social groups, often in matriarchal structures, where they form close bonds with each other.
Social hierarchies
Pigs develop social hierarchies through scent and noise, and these hierarchies can be established even when pigs are blindfolded. https://www.merckvetmanual.com/behavior/normal-social-behavior-and-behavioral-problems-of-domestic-animals/social-behavior-of-swine
Fire OlogistSeptember 17, 2024 at 17:31#9326600 likes
1. There is a difference between rational behavior, and behaving according to reason. It is certainly rational to pull one's hand out of fire if one wants to keep one's hand from being destroyed. But we don't say: "Boy, when your hand went into that fire and you pulled it out, you did some quick thinking and came up with a really rational response." The hand was not pulled out of the fire because of a thought process, balancing various concepts, choosing the most logical and then taking action. It is instinctual to pull a hand out of fire. It's not behavior that is according to reason; it's behavior according to instinct or reflex. Those instincts can later be rationalized (saving hands from destruction is the purpose of the reflex, or at least the result of the development of that reflex), but the actor, the person with the hand, wasn't behaving according to reason when his own hand flew out of the fire. Human beings can both recognize the rationality of certain actions and functions (after the fact, post hoc), and they can use reason to develop causes behind their own behaviors before they behave according to those thoughts. People who are saying animals are simpler versions of humans using reason are seeing rationality after the fact and asserting the animal must have seen that rationality before the fact and then acted according to that reason. But rationality in a function doesn't mean there is an actor who thought about that rationality before the function occurred and then acted according to that rationality. 2+2+4 shows rationality, but we don't need to think 2 is being rational when it adds 2 more to itself to make itself, now plus the other 2, equal to 4. That's silly. There are no agents or desires or things communicated within the rational pile of characters "2+2=4".
2. I'm talking about behaving according to reason. Do animals use reason to inform their actions before they act? People seem to be saying that animal behavior, like human behavior, shows evidence of being influenced by some level of that animal's thoughts. Thinking, conceptualizing, wanting and choosing leading to actions. I disagree, for many reasons.
A dog wants to lick a bowl. So the dog begs. When the person looks at the dog, the dog moves his eyes to the bowl to communicate or tell the person what he wants. The dogs sits very still like a good boy, wags his tail, gets the person's attention and looks at the bowl and looks at the person, and looks at the bowl. The dog must be conceptualizing licking the bowl and using reasonable methods to bring about a future state of actually having the bowl and getting the person to help him bring about that future state by communicating that conceptualized mental state in the dog. Right? Sounds like a rational explanation for why the dog looks at the bowl and then looks at the person and begs. We insert rational agency into the dog and use it to explain behavior. Makes sense.
Eyeballs are designed to sense light and the brain uses this to locate objects. The system works very well, especially for some birds. The development of the binocular vision is so complex, so purposeful, it doesn't seem like it could have arisen without a designer. Therefore, to explain the existence of eyeballs, we can insert a rational designer at work over millions of years to bring about a purpose called vision.
That's what we are doing when we insert rationality in animal agents. We can't explain their behavior without saying it is like our behavior, so we just say they must be doing what we are doing. But like intelligent design, saying a dog is using reason and thinking things, is not the only explanation, nor the simplest or demonstrative of the most evidence.
3. Instinct. Humans are animals and dogs are animals. Both, at times, act according to instinct. We just do what we do because of the stimuli and the way we are structured. Humans, like those on this thread, sometimes, instead of instinct (maybe), conceptualize things like "behavior" and "communication" and other things we are talking about here on this post. We think. Humans, use the concepts to develop "reasons" or optional choices for ourselves, and then, sometimes, base our actions on these thoughts. We choose to hold our hand in the fire no matter how much it hurts because of thoughts that this will make some brilliant philosophical point (or whatever). We act both according to instinct (pull the hand out quickly), and according to rationality (keep the hand in, or never touch the fire, or whatever the thought is).
Do we really need rational thought to explain what animals do? Couldn't their instincts be so highly developed that they never need any thoughts to move from the present into the future? I say, certainly could. I do all kinds of rational things without thinking. A ball is hurling at my head and I duck and the ball misses me - does that make me really smart? I need to move a heavy stone, so I set up a lever and move it - does that mean I've communicated my desire for the stone to move to the stone?
This speaks to all of the accusations that saying animals do not use reason or thought to inform their actions is elitist; saying humans think they are better than animals because we can use reason. But it is just as elitist to say humans and dogs both use reason, but humans are just better at it.
Who cares for a minute whether instinct or reason is more complex or better than the other? Not me. I'm trying to make a reasoned argument, communicate it to other people. My dogs could care less about any of this - that makes them innocent and pure, maybe geniuses, not stupid.
So the creature who uses reason, the human, sees rational thought all over the universe - is it possible that we are narrowly, simple-mindedly, rationalizing or personifying all of these other things to be just like us? I say yes. No wonder we see animals as rational agents - we are too proud of being rational agents ourselves to deny it of other creatures.
If a dog could talk (and therefore display evidence of an ability to think and reason), might they say "keep your slow moving thoughts and reasons to yourself - I need none of it ever."
I say, for sake of this point I'm making, instinct is way better than reason. If the goal of living things is to live, to procreate and live more, then the sequoia tree or the fungus is way more advanced than we reasoning animals. If the sequoia tree could talk they could say "take my lifespan and shove that up your hierarchical, rationalizing ass - plus, I don't have an ass."
Instinct is good enough. Amazing enough. Complex enough.
4. Philosophy of Mind. Saying my dog is communicating with me when he begs for food is placing a mind of his own in the dog. This places all of the epistemological problems of knowledge, the mind-body problem, questions of free-agency and choice, all in the dog. To simply think "I am hungry" is to think "I am." So we are saying dogs create the same illusory, ill-defined "self" in their consciousness and build communication methods like begging postures in order to share these self-reflections with some other self for a that dog's purposes and conceptualized intentions. We are saying the dog, in some simpler fashion, feels his hunger and then thinks of ways to communicate the concept of hunger (not the feeling itself) to some other creature in response to this thought. But why saddle the dog with all of this "rational" activity of mind? Neither humans nor dogs are behaving according to reason when they feel hunger. We don't think "I need to consume energy to live, so I should make myself feel hungry." We just feel hungry. Like an instinct. Dogs, it seems to me, don't feel hunger and then ask themselves "what can I do to satisfy this hunger?" Just like the hunger just is because of their structure, begging just is because of the dog's structure. There need be no theoretical, hypothesis formation in a dog's mind; they don't have to think "If, theoretically, I beg, and look cute, I can convince that person to move the bowl to the floor." They don't form this hypothesis and then experiment with different cute acts second. They just feel hunger; this produces certain other behaviors; I happen to think it's cute; and sometimes this produces licking bowls. All of the rationalization of what should "I" do next to communicate "my mind" to that "other mind" so that the "other mind" will take certain actions that "I want" - that's all just as weak of an explanation as intelligent design to explain why the earth needed a moon to regulate the tides - God placed a moon there to help build the earthly environment, like I place a mind in a dog to help build a rational explanation for how good he is at obtaining bowls to lick.
5. What I am saying and what I am not saying. I am saying this: the chemical is not a living thing. Fire is a chemical reaction. Fire consumes fuel, produces waste, breathes oxygen, moves itself. But fire isn't alive. We can "breath life into the hot coals and revive the fire" but this is metaphor. The plant is a living thing. Plants are not better than fires because plants live and fires don't. Plants are different than fires. Period. Animals are alive like plants, but animals can move themselves to food, better adapt to acute environmental changes (like run from a forest fire), but animals can accidentally jump into fire or run themselves to a place where there is no food at all, or fall into the sea and drown. Animals are not better or higher than plants either, just like a living thing isn't higher or better or more complex than a chemical reaction. Humans can use reason. Reason can be used to obtain food, adapt to environment, etc. This does not mean humans must be better than animals or higher than animals because they use reason; I see no reason to saddle other animals with reasoning minds, like I see no reason to saddle fire with being "alive" in a biological sense (not a metaphorical sense). The chemical is not a living thing. The plant is not an animal. The animal is not a reasoning mind. These are all different. All with their own complexities and goods and beauties, and simplicities, bads, and uglinesses.
Lastly, none of the above speaks to what reason really is. Reason happens in a mind. Minds happen in a consciousness. Animals have a consciousness. So, just like my dog, I am a conscious, sensing, perceiving being. Somewhere in the evolutionary process, animal consciousness, along with sense perception, came to include concepts and thoughts. Like the chemical became the protein, and the protein became the cell, and the cell became the animal, the human animal became "self" conscious or a thinking, reflecting thing.
I think many people are too enamored with the idea that humans are on the same scale as the other higher mammals. We are, but, just like it is imprecise to say a fire and a dog are living beings, it is imprecise to say that all animal consciousness must involve concepts, thoughts, logic and decisions.
We personify the universe in intelligent design. And we are doing it again talking about what our dog is "thinking" and communicating to us. My dogs have no time to think. Only we humans take time to think about whether something else thinks about anything. We just do. They just don't. That's okay with me. In fact, it makes them more amazing to me. I can't imagine getting through this life without thinking and planning and testing and planning again at some point, yet they do such amazing things I could never do, all by instinct and their complex, beautiful structure.
Ever read Stranger in a Stranger Land? The protagonist decided that's what separates us. Man is the animal that laughs.
Some researchers believe other animals have a sense of humor.
We think of humour as a distinctly human emotion, but some animals may also use it to strengthen their bonds. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240223-do-animals-have-sense-of-humour
I would love to see research with pigs because of what @wonderer said about piglets.
A dog wants to lick a bowl. So the dog begs. When the person looks at the dog, the dog moves his eyes to the bowl to communicate or tell the person what he wants.
Wow that is insightful. In a documentary on TV they made a big deal out of the fact that a dog will investigate where a person points, and you are telling us that a dog points with its eyes. That deserves some research. Oh and the pointer dog!
Pointing dogs, sometimes called bird dogs, are a type of gundog typically used in finding game. Gundogs are traditionally divided into three classes: retrievers, flushing dogs, and pointing breeds. The name pointer comes from the dog's instinct to point, by stopping and aiming its muzzle towards game. Wikipedia
I wish I could talk to the people who made the documentary for TV and raise awareness of dogs naturally pointing.
Au contraire, mon frère, and I know this from personal experience. What swims around in our brains 99 percent of the time are memories, worries, ruminations, replays, reactions, and judgments (of ourselves, as well as of others). Theyre sound bytes and flashbacks. We can call them thoughtsbut they dont constitute thinking....
Real thinking is active, not passive. Real thinking is purposeful.
Whats more, real thinking is almost always more positive and productive than the unchecked babble that goes on in our heads much of the time. Real
https://medium.com/the-orange-journal/how-much-time-do-we-actually-spend-thinking-45a4bf09db40
This is my favorite explanation of thinking.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqXVAo7dVRU
I harp about thinking because we tend to jump to conclusions without doing the real work of thinking. And people will kill each other because of differences in belief. Maybe we can not stop that, but perhaps awareness of how our brains work will help us go through life a little more sanely.
Vera MontSeptember 17, 2024 at 18:15#9326720 likes
It is certainly rational to pull one's hand out of fire if one wants to keep one's hand from being destroyed.
Instinctive behaviour can usually be explained rationally. However, when pulling one's hand out of a fire, one has no time to think, rationally or otherwise, one - whether the subject be human or other - simply reacts.
Behaviour that purposeful and reasoning can also be explained rationally. (A firefighter heads toward the fire, rather than running away from it, because his purpose is to douse the fire and end the danger it poses.)
So can emotional and irrational behaviour be explained rationally. (A man whose child is inside the building may rush into the flames, even though reason clearly indicates that he cannot reach the child and survive; he does it because love and distress impel him to act.)
We can't explain their behavior without saying it is like our behavior,
So... we have a reasonable explanation, which is declared false, even though no alternative explanation is offered. The example, incidentally, is within the range of an intellectually challenged Afghan. It would be harder to 'splain away what a search and rescue dog is expected to do.
So the creature who uses reason, the human, sees rational thought all over the universe
Most of us only we see it in living entities that evolved alongside of us, in the same environments, under the same conditions, and share a large percent of our DNA, when they behave in the same way we do in similar situations.
Some of us see it in inanimate matter, and some choose to see it only in fictional characters and their authors, while denying it in other flesh-and-brain entities. Humans see a lot of things that are not there; some of these things are more plausible than others.
Im guessing the inference should be that the Magritte is relevant to what I said. Im just not sure which relevance, affirmation or negation, I would be looking for.
Little help??
Fire OlogistSeptember 17, 2024 at 18:25#9326750 likes
Humans see a lot of things that are not there; some of these things are more plausible than others.
By see you mean more precisely conceive of because we are talking about thinking, not just vision.
If you think animals think, then you are saying animals must conceive of a lot of things that arent there as well. (Why would you do that to animals?)
Do you think rational animals are higher, better beings than say, a vegetable too?
Vera MontSeptember 17, 2024 at 18:35#9326810 likes
If you think animals think, then you are saying animals must conceive of a lot of things that arent there as well.
Did I say that rational thought must include the entire range of human thought and imagination and mental illness? No. However, sometimes domestic animals do chase imaginary prey or cringe from non-existent threats.
wonderer1September 17, 2024 at 18:39#9326820 likes
I was attempting to convey a contradiction to the following without using language. (With the irony of using an image with linguistic content thrown in for my own amusement I suppose.)
However, sometimes domestic animals do chase imaginary prey or cringe from non-existent threats.
So sometimes animals are irrational? And there is mental illness? So more rational is better than less rational or irrational? If so, is something that behaves without using reason at all, say a river flowing downstream, is much lower and less than a rational thing?
You didnt address any distinction between instinct as a cause of behavior and thinking as a cause of behavior.
And you missed the distinction between seeing rationality in something, like seeing it in the pile of characters 2+2=4, and using thought and logic and reason to form a choice and then acting on that thought and choice. If you say a dog is behaving reasonably, you arent saying the same thing as the dog is using reason in order to base his behavior. Thats two different things. Rationality may be everywhere. Only humans seem to notice it and manipulate it with thoughts and concepts (or give a damn to bother with these constructions).
Animals are better than us because they dont use reason, or even need to. Saying they do is just a quick and easy explanation, making them like us, like reason is so special and instinct is less special.
I like that the Greeks thought we are political creatures and it is fitting for this thread to question if any other life form is political.
That is a very popular quote - I'm fond of it myself. But Aristotle didn't mean by "political" what we mean by it; we took the Greek word and distorted its meaning. He meant that human beings live in cities - that's all. It's still a surprising thought for its time.
Also, I don't think we all have an agreement about what language is. I think we have agreement that animals are capable of communication but does that equal language? E[/s]ven if it did equal language is that language limited to a few words and what concepts does that serve?
No, we don't. It makes this discussion much more difficult than it need be.
They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.
Wayfarer
Then what, precisely, are they doing? If a human stood on that same bank, assessing the distance and scanning the far shore for safe landing spots, would you doubt that he's thinking?
ETA Moreover, exactly like the man, if the leap is deemed not worth risking, a cat will walk some way up and down along the bank, looking for a place where the water narrows or there is a stepping-stone.
I agree with you and Wayfarer that they are weighing up the leap before acting. I agree with you that weighing up before acting is thinking - and thinking rationally to boot.
Still, I make that judgement. It's entirely subjective, after all. I think our intelligence and consciousness (I believe the two are very tightly intertwined) is the most extraordinary thing we are aware of, and capable of more wonders than we can imagine.
Yes. I was a bit flummoxed when I wrote it - that last sentence is a mess. My problem is that you announce that your judgement is entirely subjective, which puts it beyond discussion and at the same appear to expect me to discuss it with you. I don't think that judgement is a simply objective one, but I don't think it is wholly subjective either.
Of course; not one of my contentions. Expression is objectified representation of conceptions, but not necessarily of rational thought, which is a certain form of representation of its own, re: propositional.
A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions.
All that says nothing about the origin of our conceptions, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the expression of them, but is always presupposed by it, and thereby legitimizes the death of the meaning is use nonsense,
insofar as it is quite obviously the case we all, at one time or another and I wager more often than not, conceptualize .think rationally .without ever expressing even a part of it via verbal behavior.
Where did I say or hint at that? All representation of thought in humans is linguistic, whether vocal or otherwise. It is thought itself, that is not, in that humans think in images, THAT being my major metaphysical contention from which all else follows.
I even agree that humans sometimes think in images. I can testify from my own experience that not all humans do that, but it is quite sufficient for me that they sometimes do.
Ever considered how hard it is to express an image? Why else would there even be a language, other than to both satisfy the necessity to express, and overcome the impossibility of expressing in mere imagery? And theres evolution for ya, writ large.
Oh, I think there's more to language than making good the deficiencies of images. Some people think that an image is worth a thousand words, so there are deficiencies in words, as well. Perhaps its a question of horses for courses.
and I do not, not that it matters. In general, theory and logic depend on an intellect capable of constructing them. That to which each is directed, the relations in the former or the truths in the latter, may depend on our way of life, but method always antecedes product.
H'm. What precedes method? Or do we construct methods and then discover what they produce?
All people are human beings. All human beings are people. Two names for the same thing. If animals are like all human beings in certain respects, then all people are like animals in certain respects.
Makes sense.
I'm so glad you think so. I'm afraid it is a rather boring conclusion and so seems to be of little interest here. Quoting Vera Mont
What about human behaviour cannot be described in behaviourist terms? (Fortunately, that fad has faded)
Nothing. That's why it was so frustrating to argue with. Strict behaviourism left out everything that made actions what they are and represented them as a series of meaningless twitches.
I'm talking about behaving according to reason. Do animals use reason to inform their actions before they act? People seem to be saying that animal behavior, like human behavior, shows evidence of being influenced by some level of that animal's thoughts. Thinking, conceptualizing, wanting and choosing leading to actions. I disagree, for many reasons.
Granted that sometimes we use reason to inform our actions before we act, we do not always do so. Sometimes, we must act without working out reasons beforehand. Otherwise there would be an infinite regress of preparation to act.
That's what we are doing when we insert rationality in animal agents. We can't explain their behavior without saying it is like our behavior, so we just say they must be doing what we are doing. But like intelligent design, saying a dog is using reason and thinking things, is not the only explanation, nor the simplest or demonstrative of the most evidence.
To describe what's going as "insert" rationality begs the question. The rationality is not an add-on or an insertion into the act. It is inherent in the act, or it is nothing.
You describe the animal as an agent, which makes their case quite different from the inference of a designer from the design. Nice argument. But the two cases are not parallel, so they don't work.
You are right that there are difficult issues about reading too much, or too little into an action. But that problem applies just as strongly to our reading of human actions, so you can't conclude from the difficulties that the way of looking at dogs, or human as agents - and therefore rational agents - is a mistake. When we recognize that animals are conscious, perceptive, creatures who have wants and desires, the only question is how far you can apply our paradigm of personhood, not whether you can apply it at all. If you question whether animals are conscious perceptive agents, then you are implictly question whether human are conscious, perceptive agents, and that makes no sense.
Philosophy of Mind. Saying my dog is communicating with me when he begs for food is placing a mind of his own in the dog.
I wouldn't say "placing", but recognizing. I think when we imagine that trees or storms have minds, we are "placing" a mind in them - otherwise known as personifying them. But that's just a way of speaking, not a metaphor. Few people nowadays that there really is a mind behind in them - though people used to.
like I place a mind in a dog to help build a rational explanation for how good he is at obtaining bowls to lick.
No, it is his skills at obtaining bowls to lick that justify recognizing that there is a mind at work there. It's like swallows and summer. There's a complex interplay between the symptoms of summer and the recognition that it is summer.
The chemical is not a living thing. The plant is not an animal. The animal is not a reasoning mind. These are all different. All with their own complexities and goods and beauties, and simplicities, bads, and uglinesses.
Oh, I can get behind that. For all my defence of animal rationality, I recognize that dogs are not people. They are like people, but that's different. Or, perhaps better, they are people, but differently. And some animals, but not all. But that position doesn't have the excitement or simplicity of the dogmatic, all-or-nothing approach.
Lastly, none of the above speaks to what reason really is. Reason happens in a mind. Minds happen in a consciousness. Animals have a consciousness. So, just like my dog, I am a conscious, sensing, perceiving being. Somewhere in the evolutionary process, animal consciousness, along with sense perception, came to include concepts and thoughts. Like the chemical became the protein, and the protein became the cell, and the cell became the animal, the human animal became "self" conscious or a thinking, reflecting thing.
Yes, self-consciousness is tempting as a distinction between animals and humans. So people have done experiments with mirrors and concluded that some animals are self-conscious because they can recognize themselves in a mirror. I think there's more to it than that. Existing as a conscious being requires a recognition of the difference between self and other. So some level of self-consciousness is inherent in consciousness. Even that may not be the end of it.
Vera MontSeptember 17, 2024 at 19:20#9326950 likes
Sure. In domestic animals. I think that it's generally caused by human activity, deliberately as in laboratory experiments, or inadvertently as in stressing the animals through violence or environmental degradation.
So more rational is better than less rational or irrational?
Better? According to whose values? Based on what standard? Measured by what metric?
And you missed the distinction between seeing rationality in something, like seeing it in the pile of characters 2+2=4, and using thought and logic and reason to form a choice and then acting on that thought and choice.
No, I didn't miss that conceptualization. Nor do I miss the actual difference when observing behaviour in humans and other animals. I just didn't think further comment was needed.
Saying they do is just a quick and easy explanation, making them like us, like reason is so special and instinct is less special.
It's not the explanation that makes all living things similar; it's evolution on the same planet. All animals are aware of the self/environment distinction, and respond to stimuli. Most exhibit hard-wired responses to certain situations. A large percentage have instincts and emotions; a smaller percentage use reason; some have imagination and foresight; a few are complex enough to develop psychological problems; only one - so far - is capable of inventing technology, medicine, politics, religion and torture.
Fire OlogistSeptember 17, 2024 at 19:27#9326960 likes
only one - so far - is capable of inventing technology, medicine, politics, religion and torture.
That is my point. We are the only one who invented knowledge and concepts and base our actions on these.
If you would even say only one you should able to see my simple point.
I dont saddle my dogs with the ability to behave according to whatever faculty in me invented politics or language. My dogs are not doing a simple version of thinking like me, they are doing a complex version of instinct like me. Only people think or conceptualize their own consciousness.
Vera MontSeptember 17, 2024 at 19:33#9326970 likes
If you would even say only one you should able to see my simple point.
Knowing that there are extreme ends on every spectrum does not require to accept everything other poeple impute to some aspect of that spectrum.
I see your simple point and reject on the basis of my experience and observation.
PatternerSeptember 17, 2024 at 20:04#9327040 likes
.isn't a painting (generally) a non-linguistic representation .
Id answer that the fact an object is named, makes explicit, e.g., a painting, has already represented a thought, or more likely an aggregate of them, without regard to the subject of it.
There's a dissonance between those two statements - not exactly a contradiction, but close. How do you get from one to the other?
I've tried to illustrate what I've stated and so far uphold via examples. Using those previously provided, on what grounds would you disagree that a bacterium is a different kind of lifeform relative to an ameba? ... This despite their being evolutionary continuity in-between (most of which is now extinct) and, hence, , for example, degrees of awareness-ability between the two otherwise distinct lifeforms.
Yes. Whether there is anything substantial behind it is an interesting question. But if they do, they are superior to us in that respect. Just as homing pigeons and other migratory species have superior navigational abilities to us (in that they don't require elaborate technologies to find their way about the globe). So why do you insist that they are lesser?
To address the first portion of this, not all lesser animals (say all cats or all dogs) give evidence of something that might anecdotally be termed a sixth-sense. This just as not all humans experience events that might anecdotally be termed a sixth-sense. (Example, one of my grandmas occasionally had REM dreams which she interpreted in ways such that she was certain of things that would occur in the future and, generally to the best of my knowledge, she was able to - coincidentally or not - predict some future events in this way. Tangentially, this can get into a more in-depth philosophical question, one for which I have no answer: how many co-incidences does it take to make one entertain the possibility of a causal connection?)
As to why lesser animals (rather than, say, fellow animals of equal status to us): to mention just one pivotal reason, no other known lifeform, either as an individual self or as a collective, has a total selfhood (hence, a body-mind totality of being) which is anywhere near in holding the same degree of power - by which I here strictly mean "the ability to do and to undergo" - that human selfhood holds ... and, one would hope, the same then entailed degrees of responsibilities for this very same power. And this despite the sometimes extensive range of perceptual abilities which humans are not endowed with but which some lesser animals are: to include magnetoception (e.g., pigeons), electroreception (e.g. sharks), infrared sensing (e.g., certain snakes - which ought not to be confused with vision (e.g., with our use of infrared binoculars)), and so forth.
Of course lesser animals hold concepts of which they experientially learn. No mature canid or feline, for example, is devoid of an understanding of what is and is not their territory - and this can only be a non-concrete but abstract understanding regarding concrete percepts, and, hence, a non-verbal concept. But their concepts come nowhere near the complexity and magnitudes of the concepts humans can entertain. And, with us being a species other than the other species out there, we are of a different kind, despite the evolutionary continuity addressed.
But all this ties into notions of value. There are two senses of being "evolved". "An adult human's mind is more evolved that that of an infants" - is one such usage. Here, whatever the standards might be, an adult human's mind is closer to these standards than is that of the infant's. In this same general sense, humans are more evolved than bacteria as lifeforms. The other notion that stands at a stark crossroad to this is that of "evolved" signifying "adapted to the ever-changing physical reality all life on Earth inhabits"; and in this second sense of the word, all life presently living is equally evolved, bar none. Evolutionary biologists know of this second sense of the term all too well, but even an evolutionary biologist will not hesitate to kill a mosquito, for example, in some sort of then rather twisted belief that the mosquito's life is of equal value to the life of a human. An individual mosquito is then of lesser value than an individual human - thereby again leading to the term "lesser animals" (or, as I like to sometimes muse, lesser "anima-endowed beings").
PatternerSeptember 17, 2024 at 21:09#9327160 likes
My problem is that you announce that your judgement is entirely subjective, which puts it beyond discussion and at the same appear to expect me to discuss it with you
you have been participating on a philosophy forum to the tune of 1.5K posts. Surely, you've been in one or two discussions where you did not expect the other person to change their mind.
But I don't know why subjective judgement puts something beyond discussion. Opinions change. Tastes change. Someone can present an opposing opinion in just the right way to sway the other person.
Some people think that an image is worth a thousand words, so there are deficiencies in words, as well.
Indeed. Just as B&W Mary knew all the words, but didn't know what red looked like until she stepped out of the room and saw the rose. There are some things words can't do.
A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions.
Mww
I can't make sense of this.
That part attributed to me, isnt mine. Or isnt mine in conjunction with what came before it. Id like to deny I ever said it, but .crap, I forget stuff so easy these days. If you would be so kind, refresh me? Or, retract the attribution?
-
Intellectual capacity? For what its worth, metaphysics treats intellectual capacity in humans as a necessary condition, so with respect to formulation of methods regarding the possibility of empirical knowledge, such condition is reason.
I think there's more to language than making good the deficiencies of images.
Except there cannot be any. If an image is the precursor to all that follows, what is there to say there was something missing in it? When you perceive a thing, your perception is complete, to the extent that whatever your thoughts on that thing, they relate exactly what that which was given by the image. Which is why it is said the image just is the thought.
Now, there are errors possible in the system as a whole, just not here and now, at this time and procedural place of the method, insofar as we are at thought, which is a process we like to call understanding, but not yet at rational thought, which is the logical quality of the process, which we like to call judgement. And we intended as literary license, donchaknow.
This makes sense, in juxtaposition to the adage a pictures worth a thousand words, in that it is possible an image cannot be sufficiently represented by words, simply because we dont have a word or words to represent the sum of the conceptions contained in it. So it is that there is more to imagery than making good the deficiencies of language.
People seem to be saying that animal behavior, like human behavior, shows evidence of being influenced by some level of that animal's thoughts. Thinking, conceptualizing, wanting and choosing leading to actions. I disagree, for many reasons.
...something that might anecdotally be termed a sixth-sense.
I rather fancy the idea that there might really be a kind of field effect, analogous to but different from electric fields, that is only detectable to organisms. Maybe something like the akashic field, or the morphic field.
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach. Do you have a minimum criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as thinking? Rational thinking? If not, then upon what ground do you rest your denial that some creatures other than humans are capable of thought, rational or otherwise?
creativesoul
I agree. But I don't have the answers.
Right. I'm trying to point the discussion in the right direction, so to speak.
creativesoulSeptember 17, 2024 at 22:17#9327280 likes
To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes.
creativesoul
But doesn't that contradict what you've said here?:
We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.
That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience.
creativesoul
Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought(
creativesoul
I'm unclear what you think is inconsistent/incoherent/contradictory?
:worry:
What is the evidence that there is any such thing?
What exactly are you asking evidence for? What does "any such thing" pick out to the exclusion of all else? Sorry Jeep, I'm at a loss to what you're saying or trying to get at.
Help?
What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour.
Set out meaningful thought and belief using any behaviorist model. The topic involves rational thought as compared contrasted to non rational thought. Show me how behaviorist models apply.
I've seen cats, for example, gauging whether they can make a leap up a height or across a stream. They'll pause for a few seconds, their eyes will dart about, sometimes moving back and forth a little. They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.
Weighing the leap is thinking about where they are heading.
...something that might anecdotally be termed a sixth-sense. javra
I rather fancy the idea that there might really be a kind of field effect, analogous to but different from electric fields, that is only detectable to organisms. Maybe something like the akashic field, or the morphic field.
BTW, one can easily find a bunch of videos and articles on great ape laughter online via a search for "great ape laughter" or some such. When its intense enough, it often enough sounds like a broken up yell or scream, which if not broken up vocally would indicate a good deal of aggression, canines exposed as a form of intimidation and all (apes can do a lot of harm with them). This being in tune with laughter (and what is in ethology termed the "play face") being non-verbal forms of communication that have evolved from emotions and states of mind associated with playing - which in essence almost always involves some sort of mock conflict and, hence, often, mock aggression. This approach then will hold human laughter to be a non-verbal communication of mock aggression which, then, can be either pleasant or unpleasant to undergo, depending on contexts. E.g., the difference between laughing at the absurdity (i.e., laughability) of an idea someone expresses or of otherwise laughing at the worth of the very person themselves. (my independent research and experiment projects as an undergraduate concerned this and like topics, pivoting on the evolution of the human smile; interesting stuff to me)
you have been participating on a philosophy forum to the tune of 1.5K posts. Surely, you've been in one or two discussions where you did not expect the other person to change their mind.
I never expect to change anyone's mind - except possibly at the margins. Major changes of mind take a lot of time.
But I don't know why subjective judgement puts something beyond discussion. Opinions change. Tastes change. Someone can present an opposing opinion in just the right way to sway the other person.
Oh, I was working to the usual idea that a subjective judgement is not open to objective argument. That may have been a bit of a cop-out. But I couldn't make enough sense of what your judgement was to be able to work out how to reply to it.
A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions.
Mww
I can't make sense of this.
Ludwig V
That part attributed to me, isnt mine. Or isnt mine in conjunction with what came before it. Id like to deny I ever said it, but .crap, I forget stuff so easy these days. If you would be so kind, refresh me? Or, retract the attribution?
Yes, you are right. I screwed up the formatting. I apologize. I think your original comment was this.
Expression is objectified representation of conceptions, but not necessarily of rational thought, which is a certain form of representation of its own, re: propositional.
I intended to add my comment, which was "A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions." I will only add that I don't see how a word can be a representation of a concept. They exist in different categories. There can be no structural similarity between them that would justify calling the relationship a representation.
creativesoulSeptember 17, 2024 at 22:33#9327310 likes
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking?
creativesoul
The lack of clear definitions does indeed make this debate much more difficult. But there's no easy way round it. Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions.
Clearly this is true. This thread shows that much clearly. There are competing notions of "rational thought" hereabouts. However, all is not lost as a result. They do not all rest on equal ground. They do not all have the capability of taking account of meaningful thought, belief, and/or experience of language less animals.
There is far too much evidence to deny that some non human creatures are perfectly capable of forming, having, and/or holding meaningful thought and belief about the world and/or themselves. As best I can tell, you and I are in agreement regarding that much, as supported by your earlier acknowledgement that learning how to open doors and gates solely by virtue of observation is rational thinking.
I don't think "rational" is about a single thing, but about the multifarious language games that a language consists of; they have different criteria of meaning and truth. "Rational" refers to thinking that gets us the right results. In some cases that's truth of some kind, in others it's actions that are successful by the relevant criteria.
So here's my answer for this context. Meaning and concepts are shown in meaningful behaviour, which includes both verbal and non-verbal applications of the relevant concepts. This means that to attribute concepts to animals is perfectly meaningful, though not capable of the formal clarity beloved of logicians.
Here, you've veered into what we are doing with the word "rational". I'm more inclined to critically examining whether or not any single notion of "rational" is capable of admitting that language less animals are capable of learning how to open gates, open doors, make and use tools for specific purposes, etc. It's particularly hard to square those facts with a denial that language less creatures are capable of thought, rational or otherwise.
As soon as we acknowledge that much, we can then see how well any notion of "rational" thought explains such behaviour.
creativesoulSeptember 17, 2024 at 22:39#9327320 likes
So here's my answer for this context. Meaning and concepts are shown in meaningful behaviour, which includes both verbal and non-verbal applications of the relevant concepts. This means that to attribute concepts to animals is perfectly meaningful, though not capable of the formal clarity beloved of logicians.
Ludwig V
I wanted to note that we differ here. On my view, "concepts" causes far more trouble than it's worth. It does nothing - as far as I can tell - that language less thought and belief cannot exhaust.
PatternerSeptember 17, 2024 at 22:41#9327330 likes
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach. Do you have a minimum criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as thinking? Rational thinking? If not, then upon what ground do you rest your denial that some creatures other than humans are capable of thought, rational or otherwise?
creativesoul
I agree. But I don't have the answers.
Patterner
Right. I'm trying to point the discussion in the right direction, so to speak.
This is from [I]Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos[/I], by Ogi Ogas and
Sai Gaddam.
Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputsof changing sensation into useful behavioris [I]thinking[/I], the defining activity of a mind. THINKING ELEMENTS
Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
?A sensor that responds to its environment
?A doer that acts upon its environment
creativesoulSeptember 17, 2024 at 22:55#9327350 likes
Being able to keep track of the time between one week and the next - by name - is a bare minimum.
creativesoul
Why is the name of the day required? Why not an interval?
Well, given that the anticipatory thought in question is "looking forward to this Thursday", I supposed it was obvious enough.
It's possible that other animals have shorter periods of anticipation (as they also have shorter lives) but every dog knows what time his humans are expected home from work and school. My grandfather died on one of his regular trips and never came home again. His dog continued to meet the five o'clock train, hoping.
What would such a dog's thought, belief, and/or anticipation/expectation consist in/of?
I have no issue with saying that dogs have expectations. I have serious issues with dogs having any conception of time such that the five o'clock train is meaningful as a result of its arrival time. I would say that there's no issue with the five o'clock train being meaningful to the dog as a result of the train being connected to the arrival of your grandfather, as contrasted to the five o'clock arrival time. I see no ground whatsoever to conclude that dogs know what time their humans are expected home from work or school. Dogs can expect to see their humans after hearing the car pull up, or hearing the five o'clock train coming, or hearing the keys into the lock in the front door.
"Hoping" may be too strong, but maybe not. Some dogs certainly grieve the loss of close friendly companions, whether they be canine, feline, or human.
creativesoulSeptember 17, 2024 at 23:11#9327360 likes
All people are human beings. All human beings are people. Two names for the same thing. If animals are like all human beings in certain respects, then all people are like animals in certain respects.
Makes sense.
creativesoul
I'm so glad you think so. I'm afraid it is a rather boring conclusion and so seems to be of little interest here.
It barely scratches the surface of the interesting parts. In what ways are we similar enough to correctly claim that this or that nonhuman is capable of something we are without being guilty of the personification of the world and/or anthropomorphism?
It has nothing to do with our word use. Language less animals have none. The question becomes which sorts of things are humans capable of doing that are not existentially dependent upon language use? What are they existentially dependent upon, and do any other creatures satisfy this bare minimum criterion? Do they have what it takes?
On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought.
We are the only one who invented knowledge and concepts and base our actions on these.
Well, sometimes....
That's the extreme end of the cognitive spectrum. Unfortunately, this also leads to the highest rate of cognitive dysfunction. The narwhal is at the extreme end of ecolocation. The mantis shrimp is at the extreme end of colour discernment. The leaf-tailed gecko is at the extreme end of camouflage use. The peregrine falcon is at the extreme end of speed. Every spectrum has ends and somebody has to occupy at each end.
We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday.
Why does a human look forward to Thursday? Does he celebrate Thor? Or is it because something pleasant usually happens on Thursdays? Suppose that pleasant even were moved to Tuesday? Would the human still look forward to Thursday because of its name, or would he change his anticipation to Tuesdays? What if the pleasant thing once happened on a Monday? Would he reject it because it's on the wrong day, or would he say: "You're early!" and be happy?
What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, to whom Thursday means nothing, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. And a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends.
What would such a dog's thought, belief, and/or anticipation/expectation consist in/of?
Dodi kept hoping his beloved master would arrive on the train at the time he used to arrive. When the train stopped at the platform, he would watch the doors eagerly as long as the train was in the station. When it pulled out, he went home.
I see no ground whatsoever to conclude that dogs know what time their humans are expected home from work or school.
Other than getting there at 4:45, or positioning themselves by the front window 10 minutes before their human normally gets home, or waiting on the lawn for the schoolbus? These are standard behaviours, not anomalies.
A 2018 study at Northwestern University found that an area located in the brain's temporal lobe associated with memory and navigation may be responsible for encoding time much like it does episodic memories. The experiment used mice, but results have been extrapolated to other animals and it seems that many animals do have a true sense of elapsing time, even if they cant actually read a clock. Neurons in their brains are activated when they expect a certain time-dependent outcome. If the expected outcome doesnt occur at the expected timefor instance, a pet is normally fed at 5PM. If the pet is not fed at 5PMthe pet may display agitated behavior.
creativesoulSeptember 17, 2024 at 23:59#9327470 likes
I see no ground whatsoever to conclude that dogs know what time their humans are expected home from work or school.
creativesoul
Other than getting there at 4:45, or positioning themselves by the front window or door 10 minutes before the loved human normally gets home, or waiting on the lawn for the schoolbus? These are standard behaviours, not anomalies.
A 2018 study at Northwestern University found that an area located in the brain's temporal lobe associated with memory and navigation may be responsible for encoding time much like it does episodic memories. The experiment used mice, but results have been extrapolated to other animals and it seems that many animals do have a true sense of elapsing time, even if they cant actually read a clock. Neurons in their brains are activated when they expect a certain time-dependent outcome. If the expected outcome doesnt occur at the expected timefor instance, a pet is normally fed at 5PM. If the pet is not fed at 5PMthe pet may display agitated behavior.
Interesting. So, they have some intuitive sense of time passing, as I mentioned earlier... perhaps accompanied by pattern recognition? I'm still not sure that that counts as knowing what time their humans are expected to arrive home. Although, it seems clear that different time periods are meaningful to them. Correctly believing/anticipating the arrival time.
Yeah. That's relevant. I'll need to adjust my belief, perhaps.
One of my favorite dogs met my school bus often. I cannot remember all those days, but the driver loved the way he looked, and remarked often as I exited.
creativesoulSeptember 18, 2024 at 00:27#9327540 likes
How is that different from being excited about the train's arrival based upon the historical pattern? The dog clearly connects the five o'clock train with the master's arrival... but hope? That might be a stretch too far. Disappointment may not.
creativesoulSeptember 18, 2024 at 00:34#9327550 likes
Why does a human look forward to Thursday? Does he celebrate Thor? Or is it because something pleasant usually happens on Thursdays? Suppose that pleasant even were moved to Tuesday? Would the human than still look forward to Thursday because of its name, or would he change his anticipation to Tuesdays? What if the pleasant thing once happened on a Monday? Would he reject it because it's on the wrong day, or would he say: "You're early!" and be happy?
What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. For a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends.
No one has claimed that humans look forward to Thursday because of it's name. I claimed, not Wayfarer, that looking forward to Thursday requires knowing how to use the word.
As far as the rest goes, there's not much I would disagree with. Looking forward to something that happens, whatever and whenever it does, is very different than looking forward to Thursday.
Looking forward to weekends?
What does "looking forward to going for a car ride on days the human doesn't drive away on" miss?
creativesoulSeptember 18, 2024 at 00:39#9327580 likes
Yeah, we been around this block a few times, or one like it, over the years. Been fun too, for the most part, despite our dissimilar grounding presuppositions.
creativesoulSeptember 18, 2024 at 00:44#9327600 likes
Our conversation in my thread is a good one. It's my turn, actually. I just reread it tonight. Apologies for the delay. Been super super busy for the last year and a half. I liked what I read from your last response.
We've learned to be more appreciative and considerate over the years. At least, I think I have. I've certainly been trying... writ large. Be the change... and all that.
Cheers!
Vera MontSeptember 18, 2024 at 03:25#9327890 likes
So, they have some intuitive sense of time passing, as I mentioned earlier... perhaps accompanied by pattern recognition? I'm still not sure that that counts as knowing what time their humans are expected to arrive home.
Dogs surelook expectant! You get clues off the standing up, prancing and sitting down every two minutes, tail wagging every time a car goes by and slobber all over the glass.
The dog clearly connects the five o'clock train with the master's arrival... but hope?
Why else would he keep going there every day for three years? The train had nothing for him. He never accepted treats from the staff or made friends with anyone on the platform. He just waited. (The priest gave special dispensation to bury him beside his master. Unmarked, of course. I wish I'd had time to know that man; he must have been remarkable to be loved and respected by so many.)
What does "looking forward to going for a car ride on days the human doesn't drive away on" miss?
I don't know. I suppose the fact that he didn't leave after breakfast. But why would they start getting excited at breakfast - which would take place later than on weekdays? Time sense, probably.
I claimed, not Wayfarer, that looking forward to Thursday requires knowing how to use the word.
Sure, the name of the day is needed to convey your anticipation to another human. But what you're actually anticipating is not the day, or its name, but the event. You could as easily say, "I look forward to seeing my father every week." They don't really need to know that he comes to dinner on Thursdays, it's just quicker and less self-revealing to say the day and not the event.
Here, you've veered into what we are doing with the word "rational". I'm more inclined to critically examining whether or not any single notion of "rational" is capable of admitting that language less animals are capable of learning how to open gates, open doors, make and use tools for specific purposes, etc.
From another perspective, the question is what notion of "rational" enables us to explain the fact that some animals are capable of learning how to open gates, etc. I mean that the starting-point is that they can, and that stands in need of explanation.
Here's how I look at it - for what it's worth.
We know how to explain how humans learn to do these things. But humans are our paradigm (reference point) of what a rational being is. So that's what we turn to. It involves a complex conceptual structure (think of it as a game - a rule-governed activity). The obvious recourse, then, is our existing practice in explaining how people do these things. We apply those concepts to the animals that learn to do these things. Our difficulty is that animals are in many ways different from human beings, most relevantly in the respect that many of the things that human beings can routinely do, they (apparently) cannot. So some modification of our paradigm is necessary.
That's not a desperately difficult problem, but it is where the disagreements arise, though in the nature of the case, determinate answers will not be easy to arrive at. But we are already familiar with such situations, where we apply the concept of interpretation. The readiest way of explaining this is by reference to puzzle pictures, which can be seen (interpreted) in more than one way. There is no truth of the matter, just different ways of looking at the facts. So, competing (non-rational) interpretations cannot be conclusively ruled out. However, in this case, the same interpretations can be applied to human beings as well. They are found lacking because they do not recognize the kinds of relationship that we have with each other. The same lack is found with, for example, the application of mechanical (reductionist) accounts of animals.
It has nothing to do with our word use. Language less animals have none.
Well, it has and it hasn't. It hasn't because we are considering actions without language. But we are used to applying our concepts of action without language, since we happily explain what human beings to even when we do not have access to anything that they might say. (Foreign languages, for example) Indeed, sometimes we reject what the agent says about their own action in favour of the explanation we formulate for it. That is, agents can be deceptive or mistaken about their own actions.
The catch is that we have no recourse but to explain their actions in our language. But this is not a special difficulty. It applies whenever we explain someone else's action.
I thinking pulling oneself from flames is not rational or deliberated or reasoned or thought about at all. It's just done.
That doesn't mean it is not a rational response, does it? But one could argue that although it is rational qua response, it is not the animal's response and so not an action in the sense that we are talking about. (Think about that first gasp for air when you have been underwater for too long.) That is a possible view.
Believing that touching the fire caused pain is. Applied, that belief becomes operative in the sense that it stops one from doing it again.
That is the animal's response - something that it does. Since it is rational and something the animal does and there for an example of animal rationality.
What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. For a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends.
There's a complication here, that how the animal thinks about it may not be how we think about it. But, if we are to understand the animal, it needs to be expressed in terms that we can understand. To a small child, one would say "Two more sleeps...", but we would report to Grandpa that the child is really looking forward to him coming for dinner on Thursday.
In the case of the dog, we would have trouble saying to anyone on Wednesday that they are looking forward to the week-end. (How would that manifest itself? I'm not saying that there couldn't be any signs, only that I can't think of any). We might say they are looking forward to the week-end by extrapolation from the enthusiasm that we see on Saturday, but that would be risky in a philosophical context.
Still, when the signs appear, there is no doubt and we well might say the dog is excited because it's the week-end, while acknowledging that that does not reflect how the dog thinks about it. It could be "the day breakfast is late" - but even then, we don't suppose that's what the dog is saying to itself. Perhaps it is more like the response to the fire. I don't think there is a clear answer to this.
It is not difficult to find a unique feature or features in any species. (That's largely how we identify them). The interesting question is what is the significance of those unique features.
So, your argument is that all species are unique - after all, uniqueness is what makes them identifiable as separate species. The ability to speak, think rationally, plan, create science and technology, and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so we're really no different to to other species.
Do I have that right?
wonderer1September 18, 2024 at 11:42#9328550 likes
So, your argument is that all species are unique - after all, uniqueness is what makes them identifiable as separate species. The ability to speak, think rationally, plan, create science and technology, and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so we're really no different to to other species.
Do I have that right?
Sort of. To save a lot of words that may or may not be unnecessary, here's my edited version, and then you can ask about any changes that you like.
My argument is that 1) all species are unique - after all, uniqueness is what makes them identifiable as separate species and that 2) all species are similar - after all, they are all living beings. The ability to create science and technology, art and social institutions and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so being unique is not unique to any species.
The unstated but critical question is whether the things that human are unique for are developments of abilities that other species have or are a radical break from all other species. My answer is the former alternative. I do not deny that radical breaks have occurred during evolution but I do not see anything that makes me think that we are such a break. (Radical breaks - eukaryotid cells, multicellular organisms, fish, plants, reptiles, mammals - off the top of my head. There could be others.)
Perhaps the point is that uniqueness is not a particularly good basis for jumping to anaturalistic conclusions?
I've been trying to re-direct people from what I think is a pretty fruitless debate to the question, why does it matter? It's not the distinction, it's why it matters.
I'm not sure what anaturalistic conclusions are. But there is an interesting point here. In our discussion, I think we would happily say that everything that we do is natural to us. Yet, we spend much of our time "artificially" separating ourselves from nature. That distinction - between the natural and the artificial - was popular in 18th century philosophy, and served to draw a line. But that wouldn't hold water for us now, would it?
I will only add that I don't see how a word can be a representation of a concept. They exist in different categories. There can be no structural similarity between them that would justify calling the relationship a representation.
One can do with a word what cannot be done with a concept, and vice versa. Thing is, if one wishes to not do what is conditioned by a word, he can still do what is done with concepts. If one wishes to not do what is conditioned by concepts, he can do absolutely nothing at all, which includes not wishing what he wished to not do.
No structural similarity? Isnt concept a word? Isnt word a concept? In that respect, they are in the same category, but I agree that does not in itself justify calling the relationship a representation. I think it the prerogative of a specific theoretical metaphysic that establishes that justification.
If it is the case a specific theoretical metaphysic can establish a justification, it is not contradictory pursuant to that same metaphysic, to then declare, and perhaps even prove, it is not a concept from which meaning is determinable. And if THAT is the case, your a concept is the meaning of a word cannot be true, insofar as concepts, again pursuant to that same metaphysic, are only that by which particular cognitive functionality is possible. In other words, concepts enable function but are meaningless in and of themselves. Meaning is determinable only from the relation of conceptions to each other, but not necessarily from any conception on its own. Best, or easiest, way to comprehend this idea is, it is absolutely impossible to cognize any object whatsoever, if it is represented by a single conception. You cannot say what an object is, if all you think of it, is round. Or, green. Or, upright.
Which goes a great distance in limiting the notion, hence the very possibility, of rationality in animals, I should hope.
On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought.
At least with respect to my experience, cutting through the clutter, has always been your philosophical modus operandi.
Gotta appreciate that bottom-up approach you instigated back on pg.7, which drew precious little relevant response, I thought. Id have to go check, but I dont recall anyone actually answering the question, but instead gave questionable examples of individual notions of it. Or wandered off into disciplines from which no relevant answer would ever be sufficient.
Anyway, as you say ..cheers!!!
Vera MontSeptember 18, 2024 at 15:00#9328790 likes
Still, when the signs appear, there is no doubt and we well might say the dog is excited because it's the week-end, while acknowledging that that does not reflect how the dog thinks about it. It could be "the day breakfast is late" - but even then, we don't suppose that's what the dog is saying to itself. Perhaps it is more like the response to the fire. I don't think there is a clear answer to this.
It was a clumsy example of how dogs sense time. I subsequently found an article about it that does a better job. Yes, they know how long it should be between when you leave for work and when you return, between when each child leaves for school and when they return, between breakfast and dinner, between walks or rides. My clever German shepherd would go fetch her leash (no mean feat in itself, since it hung on a coat-hook) at a 11:15 on days my mother was on evening shift, so we could go meet her at the subway station, so she didn't have to walk home alone. When my mother worked days, we took our walk right after supper, and she didn't ask again.
There's a complication here, that how the animal thinks about it may not be how we think about it.
If it looks like a duck, waddles like a duck, quacks like a duck, why would we assume it's something - anything! anything! - other than a duck? Because recognizing similarity and commonality with other animals violates the exclusively-human commandment? I don't worship at that altar. Quoting Ludwig V
Still, when the signs appear, there is no doubt and we well might say the dog is excited because it's the week-end,
Not because it's the weekend; he can't think in the same terms as working and school-attending humans; he doesn't have that experience.* What he's anticipating are the events that take place at five-day intervals: family all present and relaxed, more playtime, activity, maybe the excitement of visitors or outings something of interest going on.
It's also because dogs are intelligent that they're easily bored. A chew-toy may keep a spaniel busy all morning, but a poodle needs more stimulation, lest he turn my friend's leather jacket into artwork. (She solved the problem by getting another dog to keep him company.)
That same shepherd would sometimes get bored when my mother slept late; a couple of times she woke up with her pillow and hair covered in autumn leaves that the dog had fetched from the back yard, one mouthful at a time. Why? A show of affection - both dogs and cats offer gifts to their people - or just something fun to do, like eating the roses - just the petals - from a vase way high on a dresser, or laying the items from the medicine cabinet in a neat row on the bathroom floor?
* Well, in fact, working dogs do have that experience. A security guard dog, for example knows when his shift begins and ends. A sheepdog knows when it's time to collect the flock. A cattle dog when his charges are supposed to be let out to pasture and when they should come home again. Guide dogs, tracking dogs and rescue dogs work unpredictable hours; they recognize duty (serious, pay attention, be disciplined and silent, don't fraternize with bystanders) and off duty (free to play, run, bark, make friends, accept treats) by what they're wearing.
That is a very popular quote - I'm fond of it myself. But Aristotle didn't mean by "political" what we mean by it; we took the Greek word and distorted its meaning. He meant that human beings live in cities - that's all. It's still a surprising thought for its time.
Hum, this is the definition that Wikipedia gives-
Politics (from Ancient Greek ???????? (politiká) 'affairs of the cities') is the set of activities that are associated with making decisions in groups, or other forms of power relations among individuals, such as the distribution of status or resources.
Politics - Wikipedia
Being a Athenian means a little more than just living in the city.
This oath was recited by the citizens of Athens, Greece, more than 2,000 years ago. Learn more about this timeless code of civic responsibility.
We will never bring disgrace on this our City by an act of dishonesty or cowardice.
We will fight for the ideals and Sacred Things of the City both alone and with many.
We will revere and obey the City's laws, and will do our best to incite a like reverence and respect in those above us who are prone to annul them or set them at naught.
We will strive unceasingly to quicken the public's sense of civic duty.
Thus, in all these ways, we will transmit this City not only, not less, but greater and more beautiful than it was transmitted to us. https://www.dianekalensukra.com/post/take-the-athenian-oath#:~:text=%22I%20will%20never%20bring%20reproach,than%20when%20I%20received%20it.
Reply to Wayfarer That was a great video and so were the others that came with it. I will have to check them out again when I have nothing to do and look for more because the animal videos make me happy. Thank you.
Reply to javra And very interesting to me. Do you have more to share about animals and laughing? That surely involves a degree of thinking. But what is thinking without words?
Vera MontSeptember 18, 2024 at 17:42#9329340 likes
If it looks like a duck, waddles like a duck, quacks like a duck, why would we assume it's something - anything! anything! - other than a duck?
Perhaps so. But it depend whether the dog is going to generalize in the same way that we do. Most of the time, they get it right, because they understand context. But that's not a given. Actually, your next comment illustrates the point perfectly.
Not because it's the weekend; he can't think in the same terms as working and school-attending humans; he doesn't have that experience.* What he's anticipating are the events that take place at five-day intervals: family all present and relaxed, more playtime, activity, maybe the excitement of visitors or outings something of interest going on.
It's not whether it is Saturday, it's whether it's been five days since the last time. Perfect. But we are not wrong to explain to our in-laws that the dog is excited because it's the week-end.
We choose our words to balance the understanding of the dog and the understanding of the people that we are speaking to. Your in-laws would likely be a bit puzzled if you told them that the dog is excited because it's been five days since the last time everyone was at home, don't you think? I realize that's not very philosophically correct, but it's a tough world if one can't be a bit incorrect occasionally.
Hum, this is the definition that Wikipedia gives-
Being a Athenian means a little more than just living in the city.
Thanks for this - and for the oath, which I have not seen before. Aristotle puts a huge emphasis on "public affairs" (which I think is closer to what he intends) as part of the good life, and says it is one of the higher good things that constitute the good life, along with friends.
You/Wikipedia are quite right. I don't necessarily trust my memory of these things, so I have double-checked. "politikos" does include what we call politics, but has a wider range and includes "public" or "municipal" and "community". The standard translation of the relevant sentence in Aristotle is "Man lives in a community".
[Oops!. I can't let this mistake go, so I'm adding an edit. That sentence should have read "Man is an animal that lives in a community/city.]
That surely involves a degree of thinking. But what is thinking without words?
Some people say they think in images. (Planning how to pack a suitcase, for example). I don't, but how could I contradict them?
Sometimes, when we are improvising, we are thinking by doing.
Then there's all the thinking that goes on that we are not aware of. This is more controversial, philosophically speaking. My favourite example is our echo-location. Phenomenologically, we just know where a sound is. But the scientists tell us that we work out where sounds are by the difference in the sound between one ear and the other - it arrives later on the side furthest from the source.
This is sometimes called "tacit knowledge". There's a lot of it about, but philosophy regards it as secondary to conscious thinking. Short story. It's a bit of a mystery.
And @Vera Mont is quite right to cite feral human children. When found, they are often completely without language, yet can clearly respond appropriately to what's going on. (They also, I understand, find it very difficult to learn language at all.) But that only demonstrates that it is possible to think unconsciously and without language. So it is important for this thread.
Vera MontSeptember 18, 2024 at 20:51#9329820 likes
We choose our words to balance the understanding of the dog and the understanding of the people that we are speaking to.
And only to communicate with other people. In fact, when we refer to the weekend, what we actually mean - exactly like the dog does - are two days of leisure. You would enjoy them even if your days off were Wednesday and Thursday and not at the end of the named week. It's not a vacation you're longing for - that's just a word. You're longing for two weeks on a hot beach, or on a ski slope, or in a hotel room with a desired other, or on the road with your Harley. The names are a convenient way to refer to a whole package of experience. All of that experience can be unbundled, laid out in sequence and lived in fantasy or memory without labeling the images and sensations.
But that only demonstrates that it is possible to think unconsciously and without language.
Consciously, but without having any verbal labels either on the physical environment or on the processes of dealing with it. If they're over about 10 years of age when found, they've missed language acquisition during those three years years when the most intensive neural network formation takes place. And they've developed a non-verbal set of symbols and patterns that work for them. That style of thinking may not be able to encompass abstractions like "What is the purpose of life?" or "How do we look deeper into the macro and micro universe?", but it still contains a vast amount of information about his accustomed environment and how to operate it in it safely - things that don't clutter up the heads of people who can always look things up in a book.
wonderer1September 18, 2024 at 21:28#9329950 likes
The ability to create science and technology, art and social institutions and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so being unique is not unique to any species.
Thats what I thought you would say, although I still say theres a fundamental distinction youre not recognising.
That's true. But one feels that the version for other people is not the truth, because it doesn't represent the dog's point of view accurately. The difference may never make any difference. But it might possible, so pedants like me like to have both versions at hand to use as and when appropriate.
Perhaps "rational" is being equated with "the way I think"? (If only subconsciously.)
If you check out my comments to Vera Mont, you'll see that if you want to communicate what the dog is doing to other humans, you may have to distort how the dog is actually thinking. It's an obscure feature of the intentionality of concepts of believe and know which most people miss because they don't think things through from the point of view of speaker and audience.
Is rationality the result of having culturally acquired skills that improve the reliability of one's thinking?
There are some skills one can acquire from the culture. But real life experience is also a great teacher. Either way, I'm sure it is learned. Though children learn to pretend and even to deceive quite early.
To think critically one first has to have abstract reasoning skills, which I dont believe is possessed by animals, for the reasons stated.
Yes. It depends whether by "critical thinking" you mean the skills in informal logic sometimes taught in schools. Many people never acquire those skills , but they're still capable of detecting falsehoods and deceptions.
creativesoulSeptember 18, 2024 at 22:11#9330020 likes
On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought.
creativesoul
At least with respect to my experience, cutting through the clutter, has always been your philosophical modus operandi.
Gotta appreciate that bottom-up approach you instigated...
Thanks. I appreciatcha for appreciating me. :wink:
We know there are competing contradictory notions of "rational" at work here in this thread. They do not all rest upon the same ground. Unless we critically examine these notions and show their lacking(explanatory power in this case), then there's always those who will say stuff like, "Well it all boils down to how you define the term "rational". Well, yes and no. Yes, because whether or not any particular notion of "rational" can admit of language less rational animals' thought, belief, and/or actions and remain coherent is all a matter of how one defines the word. So, if we realize that the only reason some notion or other denies language less rational thought is on pains of maintaining coherency alone, and we realize that coherency is necessary but insufficient for truth, and we know beyond all reasonable doubt that learning how to open a door by observation alone IS rational thinking, then we can conclude that the notion under consideration is wrong. It leads to conclusions that stand in direct contradiction with everyday happenings.
Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.
In my book, as you know, it's correlations.
Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
Thats what I thought you would say, although I still say theres a fundamental distinction youre not recognising.
Well, either I'm not recognizing the distinction, or I'm not recognizing how fundamental it is. Perhaps if you were specific, it would be possible to discern which.
Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.
In my book, as you know, it's correlations.
Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
In my book, as you know, it's correlations. Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
I agree, at last in principle. From Day One your correlations and my relations have busied themselves trying to meet in the middle. A priori has always been my centerpiece, so for me a priori relations are a cinch.
What, in your view, constitutes an a priori correlation?
Forgive me if Im supposed to know this, if Ive been informed already and let it slip away.
Well, either I'm not recognizing the distinction, or I'm not recognizing how fundamental it is. Perhaps if you were specific, it would be possible to discern which.
Throughout this conversation, whenever you seek to justify an argument, you give reasons. If you wish me to justify my position, you ask me to do the same. Obviously animals cannot do that, in part because they lack language, but also because of the lack the cognitive skills which the ability to speak brings with it. That's the distinction I'm making between human and animal reason. Yes, animals can act intelligently, especially higher animals like cetaceans, primates, birds, canines, etc. But they lack reason in the human sense (which, as you say above that you're 'a pedant' might be, I would have thought, a distinction a pedant would recognise ;-) )
As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'.
There's also the sense that we believe Darwinism has shown that we're on a continuum with other species, and this provides the satisfaction of us being part of nature, which is consistent with philosophical naturalism.
This is where I think a philosophical critique of naturalism fits in, but I won't advance it again, as it's clearly not registering.
creativesoulSeptember 18, 2024 at 23:53#9330190 likes
So, they have some intuitive sense of time passing, as I mentioned earlier... perhaps accompanied by pattern recognition? I'm still not sure that that counts as knowing what time their humans are expected to arrive home.
creativesoul
Dogs sure look expectant! You get clues off the standing up, prancing and sitting down every two minutes, tail wagging every time a car goes by and slobber all over the glass.
Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way. Behavior alone underdetermines thought and belief of the behavioral subject under consideration. That much is very well known. Dog behavior is not fine grained or nuanced enough for us to know with any certainty exactlywhy dogs slobber, wag tails, or are acting 'antsy'. It happens for a variety of different reasons. That issue causes trouble for every attribution of thought and belief to another creature, when based upon behavior alone, humans notwithstanding.
All that being said, I readily agree that dogs clearly form, have, and/or hold expectations. I've no issue claiming dogs form, have, and/or hold rational thought. What I'm particularly hesitant about, currently, is making any claims based upon ungrounded presuppositions regarding the breadth and width of that scope. Anthropomorphism looms large. I make every attempt to avoid making that mistake. Hence, my hair splitting is just as much about the development of my own position as it is about any particular claim you've made.
To be clear, there is no doubt that "the dog looks expectant" is a perfectly sensible thing to say in that situation. That's not what's in question here, with this particular example. What I'm questioning is how to make sense of saying that an animal knows what time the humans [b]are expected to arrive home.
A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes. I see no way for this candidate to know what time an expected arrival happens. For such knowledge is about a specific timeframe and it's relation to others. Without thatthere is just the arrival and the dog knowing that that is happening. It does not know so much what time the human is expected to arrive, so much as knowing when the human is about to arrive or has arrived, based upon any multitude of things(all of which must be perceptible to the dog) that always accompany the arrival.
The dog clearly connects the five o'clock train with the master's arrival... but hope?
creativesoul
Why else would he keep going there every day for three years? The train had nothing for him. He never accepted treats from the staff or made friends with anyone on the platform. He just waited.
He kept going, perhaps, for several reasons. Dogs have very limited conception/understanding of time, none of death, and the train still most certainly had something for him. The train is part of the arrival, as was the human. The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train. None of which were the fact that it was the five o'clock train.
What does "looking forward to going for a car ride on days the human doesn't drive away on" miss?
creativesoul
I don't know. I suppose the fact that he didn't leave after breakfast. But why would they start getting excited at breakfast - which would take place later than on weekdays? Time sense, probably.
Perhaps, in addition to recognizing all the individual particular regularities included in weekend car rides, except the fact that they happened on the weekends. The dog has no clue about that much. Weekends are human constructs, made possible by naming and descriptive practices, in addition to the regularity of cosmological events.
I claimed, not Wayfarer, that looking forward to Thursday requires knowing how to use the word.
creativesoul
Sure, the name of the day is needed to convey your anticipation to another human. But what you're actually anticipating is not the day, or its name, but the event.
Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday. Makes no sense whatsoever to me, but I'm not most folk, and I hear it expressed nearly every Monday.
You could as easily say, "I look forward to seeing my father every week." They don't really need to know that he comes to dinner on Thursdays, it's just quicker and less self-revealing to say the day and not the event.
For us, and our thoughts. For dogs, it makes more sense to talk about the events. The day of the week means nothing to the dog. Nor does the time the train arrives. To the dog, the train means the human. For three years, if what you say is true.
creativesoulSeptember 19, 2024 at 00:05#9330210 likes
Mww
4.7k
In my book, as you know, it's correlations. Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
creativesoul
I agree, at last in principle. From Day One your correlations and my relations have busied themselves trying to meet in the middle. A priori has always been my centerpiece, so for me a priori relations are a cinch.
What, in your view, constitutes an a priori correlation?
Forgive me if Im supposed to know this, if Ive been informed already and let it slip away.
Ah, no worries Mww. I do not believe that I've ever tried to fill that prescription.
I was just highlighting the approach set out in my reply to you. The notions of a priori and a posteriori are not used in my position. Both depend upon experience, even if that means just thinking about one's own thought and belief.
:wink:
Fire OlogistSeptember 19, 2024 at 00:23#9330250 likes
I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine It's today's 'popular wisdom'.
There's also the sense that we believe Darwinism has shown that we're on a continuum with other species, and this provides the satisfaction of us being part of nature...
This is where I think a philosophical critique of naturalism fits in, but I won't advance it again, as it's clearly not registering.
It registers here.
People invest a lot in the observation that we humans, like many other animals, are higher animals on the evolutionary continuum. This allows them to humble human beings making them closer to the animals (and with no need of religion). But still allows pride in the argument as we human apes reign as the highest in rational ability. We are still the only animals who do, in fact, rank continuums.
I would say, this ranking process (called rationality to generalize it) requires something that the animals do not need to exhibit to explain their behavior. Instinct and structure are all my dogs need to be so brilliant.
My take is, in order to discuss this topic with a truly skeptical eye, to hell with the hierarchies and even all continuums. There is no evolutionary continuum between chemical motions and biological motions. At some point chemicals mixed enough to begin a new occurrence called the evolution of life. Before that, there was no selection and mutation in any species. Evolution was once new. And then, by my observation, humans (and only humans) at some point started talking about it all. The human mind (with reason, language, concepts and judgment) was once new as well. So just like at some point chemicals stopped just being chemicals and life began being life, at some point animal consciousness stops being animal consciousness and started being human, being personal.
We are personifying the other animals by placing them on our same human continuum, just like a single-cell would be speaking metaphorically if it said saline come to life when you mix H2O with NaCl. There is no life in saline solution. In my view, there is likely no deliberative, rational process in my beautiful dogs.
We can have some other conversation about whether persons are higher than other animals or animals are higher than plants, or life and evolution are higher than chemical motions. But for now, I just see the differences, not the continuums.
There are such vast differences between what humans are and what the other higher animals are. Like there are vast differences between what early RNA was doing and what chemicals do.
Evolution has been fetishized to explain too much.
Vera MontSeptember 19, 2024 at 00:41#9330280 likes
Perhaps "rational" is being equated with "the way I think"? (If only subconsciously.)
Indeed. Can you point to species not only capable, but very often guilty of acting, speaking and thinking in ways that are anti-rational? I can.... So, "like me" is not a constant, perfect benchmark.
Perhaps another issue worth considering in this thread is, do animals think critically? Do humans think critically? What percent of humans?
That's a very difficult question. It appears that a very large percentage of humans do not think critically about some issues. But are they capable of critical thinking? Do they never think critically about anything, or are they selective in the subjects on which they choose to be uncritical? There is no way that I can know.
Nor am I confident in my understanding of the criteria for critical thought. I know how I do it, have theories on how it ought to be done; I actually taught a short night-school course. But I don't know when, how or even whether someone else does.
Dogs - the subject with which I'm most familiar - discriminate in their preference for situations, locations and associates. They vary widely in their preferences and standards. In general, I've found that dogs distrust dishonest people - that is, the dog didn't like the person from first encounter and the humans didn't find out until much later. (I've seen children under six exhibit the same discernment.) They generally dislike ambiguous situations, for instance when the humans in their life disagree, and environments with too much busyness, noise, competitive odours and motion.
i don't know whether any of that qualifies for the definition.
creativesoulSeptember 19, 2024 at 01:41#9330410 likes
Here, you've veered into what we are doing with the word "rational". I'm more inclined to critically examining whether or not any single notion of "rational" is capable of admitting that language less animals are capable of learning how to open gates, open doors, make and use tools for specific purposes, etc.
creativesoul
From another perspective, the question is what notion of "rational" enables us to explain the fact that some animals are capable of learning how to open gates, etc. I mean that the starting-point is that they can, and that stands in need of explanation.
Nice. So, we're in complete agreement on that much. I thought we were very close. Nice confirmation.
Here's how I look at it - for what it's worth.
We know how to explain how humans learn to do these things. But humans are our paradigm (reference point) of what a rational being is. So that's what we turn to. It involves a complex conceptual structure (think of it as a game - a rule-governed activity). The obvious recourse, then, is our existing practice in explaining how people do these things. We apply those concepts to the animals that learn to do these things. Our difficulty is that animals are in many ways different from human beings, most relevantly in the respect that many of the things that human beings can routinely do, they (apparently) cannot. So some modification of our paradigm is necessary.
That's not a desperately difficult problem, but it is where the disagreements arise, though in the nature of the case, determinate answers will not be easy to arrive at. But we are already familiar with such situations, where we apply the concept of interpretation. The readiest way of explaining this is by reference to puzzle pictures, which can be seen (interpreted) in more than one way. There is no truth of the matter, just different ways of looking at the facts. So, competing (non-rational) interpretations cannot be conclusively ruled out. However, in this case, the same interpretations can be applied to human beings as well. They are found lacking because they do not recognize the kinds of relationship that we have with each other. The same lack is found with, for example, the application of mechanical (reductionist) accounts of animals.
I'm not seeing how that approach could help. What does it mean when you say "we apply the concept of interpretation"? What's the difference between say, a concept of interpretation and a notion of "interpretation". Is applying a concept of interpretation any different than sensibly using "interpretation"?
I disagree that there is no truth to the matter of interpretation. Interpretation presupposes meaning. When one interprets another, one is attempting to acquire knowledge of what they mean. Correctly attributing meaning is correct interpretation. When one misinterprets, one is misattributing meaning.
On my view, puzzle pictures are meaningless in and of themselves. All interpretation is of meaning. So, to me, we're not interpreting them so much as attributing meaning to them. Hence, there is no truth in that matter. There is no wrong way to 'interpret' the duck-rabbit or horse-frog, for there is no meaning to be interpreted. Rather, in such cases, we attribute meaning to that which has none, as compared to interpreting meaning already 'there' so to speak.
It has nothing to do with our word use. Language less animals have none.
creativesoul
Well, it has and it hasn't. It hasn't because we are considering actions without language. But we are used to applying our concepts of action without language, since we happily explain what human beings to even when we do not have access to anything that they might say. (Foreign languages, for example) Indeed, sometimes we reject what the agent says about their own action in favour of the explanation we formulate for it. That is, agents can be deceptive or mistaken about their own actions.
The catch is that we have no recourse but to explain their actions in our language. But this is not a special difficulty. It applies whenever we explain someone else's action.
We are considering the clearly rational behavior of a language less animal. Sure, we have no choice but to explain their actions in our language. That's not a problem.
There are all sorts of problems. Using our language isn't one of them.
I thinking pulling oneself from flames is not rational or deliberated or reasoned or thought about at all. It's just done.
creativesoul
That doesn't mean it is not a rational response, does it?
As far as I can tell, it's not at all rational. It's autonomous. Automatic. Involuntary.
Are involuntary reactions rational? That scope would include all living biological creatures capable of avoiding danger and/or gathering resources, regardless of the biological machinery involved. Hence, the ground for denying that such responses are rational, in kind.
Believing that touching the fire caused pain is. Applied, that belief becomes operative in the sense that it stops one from doing it again.
creativesoul
That is the animal's response - something that it does. Since it is rational and something the animal does and there for an example of animal rationality.
The important aspect concerns what makes it rational as opposed to not. It is rational behavior because it was caused by rational thought(thought based upon prior thought and belief). In this case the avoidance was based on the belief that touching the fire caused the pain.
Leaving all that out, misses the entirety of the point, or glosses over it. Neither is acceptable here, considering the matter under consideration/contention is what counts as rational thought as compared/contrasted to thought that is not rational in kind.
I think you're assessing behavior using conventional belief attribution practices, so I think I understand why.
What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. For a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends.
Vera Mont
There's a complication here, that how the animal thinks about it may not be how we think about it. But, if we are to understand the animal, it needs to be expressed in terms that we can understand. To a small child, one would say "Two more sleeps...", but we would report to Grandpa that the child is really looking forward to him coming for dinner on Thursday.
In the case of the dog, we would have trouble saying to anyone on Wednesday that they are looking forward to the week-end. (How would that manifest itself? I'm not saying that there couldn't be any signs, only that I can't think of any). We might say they are looking forward to the week-end by extrapolation from the enthusiasm that we see on Saturday, but that would be risky in a philosophical context.
Still, when the signs appear, there is no doubt and we well might say the dog is excited because it's the week-end, while acknowledging that that does not reflect how the dog thinks about it. It could be "the day breakfast is late" - but even then, we don't suppose that's what the dog is saying to itself. Perhaps it is more like the response to the fire. I don't think there is a clear answer to this.
It's difficult, for sure. I'll not address this here in this post. I addressed it in my reply to Vera.
creativesoulSeptember 19, 2024 at 01:57#9330450 likes
Perhaps another issue worth considering in this thread is, do animals think critically?
I do not see how that could be possible. Critical thinking is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognitive endeavors require naming and descriptive practices.
creativesoulSeptember 19, 2024 at 02:05#9330460 likes
Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.
In my book, as you know, it's correlations.
Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
creativesoul
I think I mostly agree with you.
Sweet. Much obliged.
wonderer1September 19, 2024 at 02:10#9330480 likes
Instinct and structure are all my dogs need to be so brilliant.
I don't know what you have in mind with "structure", and whether it is relevant to the following, but I don't think it reasonable to see what is shown below as merely a matter of instinct.
But one feels that the version for other people is not the truth, because it doesn't represent the dog's point of view accurately.
It doesn't reflect the human's accurately, either, but that doesn't matter, because a common language gives us a thumbnail picture of what is in the other's mind. We don't need every detail to understand the gist of their meaning.
I had heard of the language problem. Do you have a reference that would tell me more about the symbols and patterns that they use?
Of course not. The feral children - and there have not been many - cannot communicate how they think, because they're inept in our language, even if they can learn it, and we have no access to theirs.
Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way.
Of that specific cluster of behaviours at that same time every weekday, but not on weekends or holidays? Show me three of that multitude of accurate explanations.
A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes.
You're overcomplicating something simple. A biological clock: so much time has elapsed; at this interval, something is supposed to happen.
The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train.
Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday.
No. Because it's the first day of a new work-week. Early rising (possibly with hangover) (possibly lover departing), rigid morning routine, uncomfortable clothing, commute, staff meeting, unpleasant colleague regaling you with their spectacular weekend adventures, bossy department head dumping unwanted task on your desk.... Some people who enjoy their work actually look forward to Mondays; most people don't enjoy their work. Pity!
I don't know what you have in mind with "structure", and whether it is relevant to the following, but I don't think it reasonable to see what is shown below as merely a matter of instinct.
:up: Fascinating! This seems to confirm what I have always believed: that dogs are capable of deductive inferences, rational thought.
It seems nothing will convince the diehard human exceptionalists; probably because their thinking is rooted in some religious dogma or other.
And very interesting to me. Do you have more to share about animals and laughing? That surely involves a degree of thinking. But what is thinking without words?
I guess I do, but then much of it wouldn't be in keeping with this thread's topic. To make things more philosophical, though, first off no human concept is perceptual. I make a somewhat more in depth argument for that here - although the chapter in general is not the easiest of reads. The very concept of "animal" for example has no look, no tactile feel, no smell, taste, and no sound. Yet we understand the concept nonetheless and, in English use, associate the auditory, visual, or tactile (for the blind) symbols of "animal" as a perceptual word to the non-perceptual concept we associate the perceptual word to. In like manner "3", and "III", and "three" are all perceptual givens that reference a commonly referenced fully non-perceptual concept.
Words of course allow us the ability to manipulate concepts to great extents. But words are not required for concepts to occur within anyone's awareness. If words were sufficient for expressing all concepts, many if not all artistic manifestations would be direly redundant.
To again address lesser animals, my last dog, for example, had no problems in understanding "(go) inside" and "(go) outside" in relation to particular rooms, the house itself, the car, etc. And this is a relatively complex concept, for it addresses relations between non-specifics. It's no big deal nowadays to claim that lesser animals, dogs included, gain a theory of mind as they mature: My first dog, whom I greatly loved (just like the other two) and who did have an Alpha personality (a Bouvier des Flandres weighing 120 pounds healthily) knew how to (try to) deceive us. I'd say "come" at a distance after he'd misbehaved and he'd sit his ass on the ground and calmly stare in all directions except toward me, as though he was not hearing what I was saying. I've got far better anecdotes of deception but these would take far longer to tell. At any rate, a theory of mind can only be conceptual - addressing the conceptualized perspectives of the other mind and how to act and react relative to these, such as when attempting to intentionally deceive the other. Other than maintaining that lesser animals are automata (wherein one encounters the philosophical problem of other minds as it applies even to other humans), there's no reason to infer that lesser-animals are devoid of conceptualizations and hence of concepts.
Great apes exhibit eureka moments - which don't occur absent thoughts. An example I hastily found:
The young female gorilla watched another older male attempt to collect ants from a hole in the ground, only to see the ants bite his arm, scaring him away. The female gorilla tried to put her own arm in the hole, and she too was bitten. But instead of giving up, the young ape then had her very own eureka moment. She looked around for a suitable implement, and selected a piece of wood approximately 20 cm long, tapering from 2 cm wide at one end to 1 cm long at the other. She then inserted the stick into the hole, withdrew it, and licked off ants clambering over it, avoiding being stung.
The one example I distinctly remember from undergrad studies was of a chimp faced with a banana hanging from a rope - this in a taken video. He stood there in the yard for a few minutes appearing to do nothing after trying and failing to get the banana. Then he all of a sudden stood up without hesitation and purposelessly walked to collect a few items which he next put under the banana in a pile, then climbed on top of, and then proceeded to easily take the banana from the string.
As to humans and our purposeful fire use, I know bonobos did not invent the match stick, but check this out all the same:
One can of course try to bend over backwards to explain this factual occurrence as having consisted of no concepts and thoughts on the bonobo's part, but I'd find it more ontologically believable if one were to try to stipulate that this one bonobo was actually an extraterrestrial alien which had descended form a UFO and took the disguise of a bonobo for fun (and I wouldn't be all that enamored with the latter explanation).
Human language creates a scaffolding for greater concept manipulation, and hence for far more abstract levels of thought than any lesser animal is capable of. But language is not required for either acquired concepts or thoughts.
So, what is thinking without words? I'd say it consists of forethought regarding what one best do given two or more alternatives so as to actualize that which one wants, hence intentions, hence holds as a goal. And to claim that this must then be utterly unemotional in order to be valid reason, or rationality, is to be full of self-hypocritical baloney: no human that has ever been has ever found themselves in states of rational thought utterly devoid of some emotion or other, be it contentment, curiosity, or some other.
Well, that's my overall take on this thread's subject at least. But, to be honest, I get bored in repeatedly presenting the same facts regarding lesser animal's observed behaviors - as just one measly example, that dogs can understand hundreds and great apes thousands of words, with each word entailing its own understanding of a concept - to only find these same factual presentations repeatedly overlooked for the sake of the given counter argument.
Vera MontSeptember 19, 2024 at 05:30#9330770 likes
My first dog, whom I greatly loved (just like the other two) and who did have an Alpha personality (a Bouvier des Flandres weighing 120 pounds healthily) knew how to (try to) deceive us. I'd say "come" at a distance after he'd misbehaved and he'd sit his ass on the ground and calmly stare in all directions except toward me, as though he was not hearing what I was saying.
The "I'm deaf" tactic. And then there is the "Who, me? I was just standing there, minding my own business. It was the cat." And the "Toilet paper? What toilet paper?" gambit. And "I don't know anything about a magnifying glass. Huh? How'd that get in my bed?"
As to innocence - They lie, they cheat, they steal, they hold grudges and they're spiteful. IOW, a lot like us, which is why we love them.
I'd say "come" at a distance after he'd misbehaved and he'd sit his ass on the ground and calmly stare in all directions except toward me
For nearly 15 years we had a smallish (10kg) sheltie cross, who was a very polite little dog (except towards postmen and motorcyles). This is him:
Woody
He had this quirk of hanging around near the kitchen or the dining room table at meal times, presumably hoping for a hand out. But if you looked at him while he was doing this, he'd never meet your gaze, always looking down or away from you, as a kind of feigned indifference. ('What? Me? Beg?')
Reply to Wayfarer :grin: Yea. I think I've already mentioned in this thread that I often muse of lesser animals being nothing more and nothing less then lesser "anima-endowed beings" ... which, if one gets the gist of this train of thought, would then also entail their having their own lesser animus - this by comparison to that of humans.
Reply to javra Right. Well, unlike Descartes, who thought animals had no soul whatever, many of the pre-modern and Asiatic religions recognised that human beings can also be born into the animal realm (presumably from behaving like them.) There's a legend about Pythagoras that he once exclaimed that he recognised the soul of one of his departed friends in the howl of a dog. Buddhist sermons would say that if you held to wrong ideas, you would find yourself 'in the womb of a cow'. I suppose it's simply poetic mythology, but then.....
(Actually brought a bit of a tear to the eye, posting that photo of Woody. We really loved that little guy, I walked him nearly every day of his life.)
and also, Aristotle's 'De Anima', translated as 'On the Soul'. I love the connection between Anima, Animal, and Animated. (More I read of the old guy, more I like him.)
It doesn't reflect the human's accurately, either, but that doesn't matter, because a common language gives us a thumbnail picture of what is in the other's mind. We don't need every detail to understand the gist of their meaning.
That's true. What I'm after is that truth is not the only criterion in play. There's also the desire to understand and to be understood. That may require slightly different ways of putting things to cater for differences in perspective. We only need enough accuracy for our actual purposes. Accurate for all purposes is not available. We can always refine things if and when the occasion arises. Philosophers are trained to ignore all that, and trip themselves up quite often.
Of course not. The feral children - and there have not been many - cannot communicate how they think, because they're inept in our language, even if they can learn it, and we have no access to theirs.
Yes. I did wonder how it was possible, and lived in a wild hope.
On the one hand, anthropomorphism, on the other mechanism. No escape. Steer a careful course between the two, and be prepared to change direction as necessary.
I disagree that there is no truth to the matter of interpretation. Interpretation presupposes meaning. ... On my view, puzzle pictures are meaningless in and of themselves.
Yes, it is more nuanced a matter than I allowed. Interpretation is not a free for all. It has limits.
There are many examples of ambiguity in pictures and that shows that what a picture shows is not straightforwardly given. But not every picture is ambiguous and not any "interpretation" is possible for a given picture. The puzzle picture is a picture of a duck and a picture of a rabbit. This is confusing just because most pictures aren't ambiguous. It wouldn't be difficult to provide a bit of additional context that would disambiguate the picture as presented. It is certainly not a picture of a horse or a frog. If someone tried to suggest that interpretation, we would correct them.
But it is wrong to say that the picture has no meaning. It is not just a meaningless scribble. The supposedly neutral description in terms of lines on paper suggests a misleading comparison. The only truth is that the picture can be described in all three interpretations. It has multiple meanings, not none. And additional context, in a particular case, can disambiguate the picture.
In one way, actions can be interpreted in a rational or in a mechanistic framework. We are used to using language to disambiguate, but sometimes this fails us. Nevertheless, there is a question of context which often allows us to juggle the two.
But, I emphasize, the description of an action provided by the agent in language may be an important criterion for us, but it is not decisive in all circumstances. The agent may be lying or misrepresenting the action for various purposes. Or the agent may not be recognizing how we might see it - what is just banter to the agent, may be a serious slur to us. It is even possible that the agent may be wrong - deceiving themselves.
Yes, animals can act intelligently, especially higher animals like cetaceans, primates, birds, canines, etc. But they lack reason in the human sense (which, as you say above that you're 'a pedant' might be, I would have thought, a distinction a pedant would recognise ;-) )
Very neat. But I would have thought that a pedant might refuse to recognize a distinction on pedantic grounds? In any case, I'm only a pedant when I want to be - I don't claim to be any different from other pedants in that respect.
But since you grant intelligence to "higher" animals, I take you to be granting rationality in some sense to them, but then maintaining there is a different sense that is available to human beings. I don't have a clear grasp of these two different senses, much less of why the difference is important. It may be merely pedantic.
As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'.
Yes, and like all popular wisdom, tends to be a bit broad-brush.
The Christian doctrine has been interpreted in certain ways that are objectionable, as justifying tyranny and cruelty. But there's another interpretation that interprets sovereignty as requiring stewardship and care (recognizing, for example, that animals are also God's creation and deserve respect for that reason, if no other). This still may (or may not) be patronizing and demeaning. Even if it is, it is better than the alternative. If it is not, then I don't see how the Christian doctrine would necessarily be objectionable.
"Politically incorrect" seems to me to mean "at variance with the consensus view". But a view is not necessarily incorrect (or correct) just because it is a consensus view. So there's something missing here.
There's also the sense that we believe Darwinism has shown that we're on a continuum with other species, and this provides the satisfaction of us being part of nature, which is consistent with philosophical naturalism.
Yes. I sense a criticism there, but I don't quite see what it is. There is a further difficulty that I'm not clear just what philosophical naturalism is.
The idea that we are "just monkeys" was a major issue at the time. But I gather than many Christians are now at peace with evolution, so they must have found some resolution of the issue. For myself, I notice that we did still carry many of the basic animal behaviour patterns and that we find predecessor or proto- versions of many of our patterns of behaviour in animals (and even insects). So the idea of a radical discontinuity seems a bit implausible.
But, to be honest, I get bored in repeatedly presenting the same facts regarding lesser animal's observed behaviors -- to only find these same factual presentations repeatedly overlooked for the sake of the given counter argument.
Yes. It's not restricted to this issue. People (including me, sometimes) get over-focused and can't see what they don't want to see.
It's very tempting to think that engagement with specific cases is crucial to making this argument and it's not wrong. But perhaps even more important is engagement with animals. But it's not so simple as that. What is needed is engagement of a particular kind, so that one can grasp that animals in many ways will engage with us in many (but not all) of the same ways that we engage with other people.
It's not the same as the engagement of a farmer with his stock, which is transactional and does not require the kind of empathy that is needed to understand them. (Not that farmers are necessarily incapable of empathetic engagement alongside the transactional aspects of their business.) Short story - living with animals as companions or colleagues makes a huge difference. (Aristotle makes a huge mistake when he describes animals (and slaves) as "living tools".
That's very vague, but I'm trying to gesture at the idea that this is not just a matter for abstract reason. It's about how to live with beings recognizably like us. After all, that's how we come to treat people as people and not "just" animals".
But since you grant intelligence to "higher" animals, I take you to be granting rationality in some sense to them, but then maintaining there is a different sense that is available to human beings. I don't have a clear grasp of these two different senses, much less of why the difference is important. It may be merely pedantic.
I'm not clear just what philosophical naturalism is.
The meaning is not clearly defined, but SEP tells us that it 'aims to ally philosophy more closely with science. Naturalists urge that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing supernatural, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the human spirit '. Specifically it takes the natural sciences, including the biological sciences, as authoritative regarding what is validly knowledge, and rejects any claims of religious revelation or the possibility of a spiritual enlightenment.
The idea that we are "just monkeys" was a major issue at the time. But I gather than many Christians are now at peace with evolution, so they must have found some resolution of the issue. For myself, I notice that we did still carry many of the basic animal behaviour patterns and that we find predecessor or proto- versions of many of our patterns of behaviour in animals (and even insects). So the idea of a radical discontinuity seems a bit implausible.
What I've tried to explain here and especially here is that, even accepting the facts of biological evolution, the development of language, tool use, and the other characteristically human capabilities, means we cross a threshhold which separates us from the natural world in an existential sense as well as a practical sense. Through it, we become different kinds of beings, namely, human beings, and we're not just another class of primate. I harked back to both the Biblical Myth of the Fall and to Aristotle's definition of man as 'rational animal' because I think they represent something real about the human condition, which has been lost sight of in modern culture.
Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. I've mentioned it a few times on the forum, it's generaly not well received, but I find it very insightful. (Nagel is not pushing a religious barrow, he's an avowed atheist but one with the chutzpah to call scientific materialism into question.)
wonderer1September 19, 2024 at 13:08#9331180 likes
:up: Fascinating! This seems to confirm what I have always believed: that dogs are capable of deductive inferences, rational thought.
It occurred to me after you responded, that in that video we have a demonstration of Kahneman's fast and slow thinking occurring in a dog. (And literally fast and literally slow.)
wonderer1September 19, 2024 at 13:30#9331190 likes
Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. I've mentioned it a few times on the forum, it's generaly not well received, but I find it very insightful. (Nagel is not pushing a religious barrow, he's an avowed atheist but one with the chutzpah to call scientific materialism into question.)
Thomas Nagel is a scientific ignoramus and doesn't have a perspective based on being scientifically well informed. Your attempts to smear scientifically informed people with Nagel's emotional issues amount to pushing propaganda on your part.
PatternerSeptember 19, 2024 at 14:06#9331230 likes
Reply to wonderer1
Don't sugar-coat it. Tell us how you really feel. :rofl:
As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'.
Wayfarer
There's also the sense that we believe Darwinism has shown that we're on a continuum with other species, and this provides the satisfaction of us being part of nature, which is consistent with philosophical naturalism.
Wayfarer
I'm never sure how much weight to put on explanations at this level. Bu there is another issue, not yet mentioned, playing in to this. I think it may be hard for philosophers in the traditions of english-speaking philosophy to accept as philosophical at all - but then, neither Christianity nor Darwin is a philosophical theory. This has its roots in European philosophy and is often deployed in sociology. My suggestion is that there is a tendency to see animals as inherently other than us, human beings, mainly on the ground that they are in what one might call the state of nature, before humans came and developed societies. It's a way of thinking that was prominent in 18th century philosophy, but the roots of it in our way of life are deeper than that. The difference is that they are now openly contested.
Why do I say that the roots are in our way of life? Because so much of our effort over generations to make ourselves more secure, better fed, better sheltered, more prosperous, we have mostly been centred on distinguishing ourselves from animals.
Because they are natural, they are a puzzle and a threat. They live in what, for a human, would be a state of abject poverty and show no evidence of trying to escape from it. These we can exploit for food and labour ("living tools"). Others show a marked inclination to destroy ourselves and all that we have struggled to build up. Of course "we" are different from "them". However, we need to change that attitude and develop a better sense of the ecosystem that we live in, not because it is moral or right, but because we are just as dependent on it as they are. Even if some of us escape to other planets, we cannot all ship out elsewhere - the first time in history that has been true.
Nagel is not pushing a religious barrow, he's an avowed atheist but one with the chutzpah to call scientific materialism into question.
Thanks for the information and the link. I've secured everything but will need some time to read and think about it.
I'm not particularly offended by calling scientific materialism into question. That has been done ever since science began 1,500 years ago. Mostly, I admit, in the name of religious ideas.
As for chutzpah, don't you think your photograph is a splendid example?
Thomas Nagel is a scientific ignoramus, and doesn't have a perspective based on having a scientifically well informed perspective. Your attempts to smear scientifically informed people with Nagel's emotional issues amount to pushing propaganda on your part.
I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having? That's a very big assumption.
There are people, you know, who find some pronouncements from people who have nothing but a scientifically well-informed perspective extremely ill-informed and annoying.
If you think that Nagel's questioning of scientific materialism is just an emotional issue, perhaps one might look for some actual arguments on the point? (But probably not right now, since they are not really relevant.)
Incidentally, I also find at least some of his arguments extremely annoying as well, but not on those grounds.
wonderer1September 19, 2024 at 14:22#9331250 likes
I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having? That's a very big assumption.
I'm not saying that at all, I'm just pointing out that Nagel's perspective is not a scientifically well informed perspective, and that @Wayfarer tries to use Nagel's perspective to besmirch the perspective of people unlike Nagel.
It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it.
Back in The Day, 60 Minutes ended each show with Point/Counterpoint, parodied on SNL most hilariously between Jane and Dan.
(jesuuuuuus, that as funny. Sad commentary, perhaps: 1975 the last time I remember laughing that hard (sigh))
All that follows is dry, humorless point/counterpoint, a pseudo-Socratic dialectic, if you will, with all due respect:
We know there are competing contradictory notions of "rational" at work here in this thread. They do not all rest upon the same ground.
All notions of rational at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept rationality is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such.
The quality of any behavior, which is to say whether such behavior is rational, which reduces to whether the quality of the thought/belief from which the behavior follows is rational, can only be judged by that intelligence that deems itself in possession of it. Just as we cannot know the beauty of a thing without the apprehension of beauty itself to which that thing relates. Just as we cannot deem an observed act as moral without our own sense of what morality is.
Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior, the notion follows that rationality should be apprehendable in other animals by humans regardless of behavior, which is under any condition whatsoever impossible, hence the notion is incoherent.
This is no reflection on language-less thought/belief as such, which is, again, only apprehendable from a human point of view. It is not a valid judgement that lesser animals are language-less, nor is it a valid judgement that lesser animals engage in thought/belief. Regarding the former, any series of vocalizations by any species so capable of them, in conjunction with another of like kind, can be a language for them, and, thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.
But it is non-contradictory that humans do engage in language-less thought/belief, given the possibility of thought/belief by means of mere imagery. And from that follows that it is also non-contradictory to maintain that, in humans, thought/belief in general and rational thought/belief in particular, is antecedent to and proper ground for, the inception and development of language in them as a species.
Even granting human language-less thought/belief, is not sufficient reason to grant lesser animals thought/belief because they happen to be language-less in lacking all forms of serial vocalizations. And without sufficient reason to grant to these quite lesser animals thought/belief, it is then immediately contradictory to grant them rationality, which is merely a relative quality of thought itself.
Which leaves us with those lesser animals considered as possessing a rudimentary form of language, judged by human standards, as to whether that form of language is a development of a commensurate form of rational thought/belief. Nature is, of course, rife with occasions which instill in us the notion those occasions are exemplifications of rational thought by those intelligences the internal cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible to us.
Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us .by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?
Odd, innit? We find ourselves using our intelligence to judge other intelligences, but in the very judging of them we have no choice but to treat them other than how they may actually be. Which is the same as being completely wrong, which in turn, and indeed to be rational about it, makes explicit we are best served to not engage in those judgements at all.
.be sure to tune in next week .
PatternerSeptember 19, 2024 at 15:36#9331380 likes
As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'.
The only political component I can see is the enacting of laws against cruelty to animals. The same factions are working to reduce cruelty to other humans. If that goes against Christian dogma - oh, well, it's had its 2000-year reign (sometimes of paternalism, sometimes of terror.) Quoting Wayfarer
Through it, we become different kinds of beings, namely, human beings, and we're not just another class of primate.
Nobody's tried to take that away from you. So why insist on taking away from those "lesser" beings a faculty they possess in common with us? Does crossing a threshold require you to sever all ties?
Many people have declined to do that; have retained their links to the natural world and other species and are the healthier for it. Quoting Ludwig V
What is needed is engagement of a particular kind, so that one can grasp that animals in many ways will engage with us in many (but not all) of the same ways that we engage with other people.
There is the undeniable and ever present imbalance of power to take into consideration.
Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us .by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?
By the same right that allows us to discuss distant suns and galaxies to which we have no direct access, and the way we learn the relationships of atoms in molecules or the events of geological time: though observation, theory, prediction and experimentation. What makes animals easier to understand than chemicals and mountains is that we are more closely related to animals and thus better able to recognize behaviours that are similar to ours and extrapolate that the motivation and thought process that prompts the same behaviour may also be similar.
Vera MontSeptember 19, 2024 at 16:48#9331430 likes
Is there any chance Nagel's perspective is as scientifically well informed as that of anyone here?
If Nagel is not scientifically well informed, he is as well informed as me. In other respects also, I would very much like to be able to adopt Nagel's perspective. He's a much better philosopher than me. Yet I still disagree with many of his opinions, especially with regard to bats.
Some people say they think in images. (Planning how to pack a suitcase, for example). I don't, but how could I contradict them?
Sometimes, when we are improvising, we are thinking by doing.
Then there's all the thinking that goes on that we are not aware of. This is more controversial, philosophically speaking. My favourite example is our echo-location. Phenomenologically, we just know where a sound is. But the scientists tell us that we work out where sounds are by the difference in the sound between one ear and the other - it arrives later on the side furthest from the source.
This is sometimes called "tacit knowledge". There's a lot of it about, but philosophy regards it as secondary to conscious thinking. Short story. It's a bit of a mystery.
And Vera Mont is quite right to cite feral human children. When found, they are often completely without language, yet can clearly respond appropriately to what's going on. (They also, I understand, find it very difficult to learn language at all.) But that only demonstrates that it is possible to think unconsciously and without language. So it is important for this thread.
I had to look up tacit knowledge and found this..
Examples of tacit knowledge include knowledge of how to manage an angry customer or the know-how required to complete a complex task. This type of knowledge is often not easily captured in words, and therefore not easily transferred from one person to another. https://helpjuice.com/blog/tacit-knowledge#:~:text=Tacit%20knowledge%20refers%20to%20the,Tribal%20knowledge
I knew a man who was mechanical and took a class in physics and failed, yet he could resolve a mechanical/physics problem that no one else in the class could figure out. I would say that is an example of tacit knowledge. It is not understanding theory which is a verbal explanation of how something works. Verbal knowledge is something the man has trouble learning but he has knowledge that is not verbal.
When speaking of rational thinking- human and animal, I think we should mull over what is a thought. You said a thought can be an image rather than words and I spoke with a woman who designs things for people who request designs such as a machine that makes concrete barriers for a fancy garden. She said she sees the required parts of such a machine. She came to her job by her unique skill, not education.
Now if we agree rational thinking requires words, the two people I mentioned are not thinking with words and that might be akin to how animals think. With sonar, a bat can do amazing things and that is not a verbal task. Animals in general do amazing thing without words and could label all this tacit knowledge?
When arguing bonobo can learn language I wanted to say something that I didn't have the words for. Your thoughts helped me find the right words...
We used to think that a new embryo's epigenome was completely erased and rebuilt from scratch. But this isn't completely true. Some epigenetic tags remain in place as genetic information passes from generation to generation, a process called epigenetic inheritance.
Epigenetic inheritance is an unconventional finding. It goes against the idea that inheritance happens only through the DNA code that passes from parent to offspring. It means that a parent's experiences, in the form of epigenetic tags, can be passed down to future generations. https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/epigenetics/inheritance/
I believe bonobos have the potential for learning language but it is dormant because they lack the epigenome and inherited use of language that humans have. However, if they were taught communication as infants and were in an environment that encouraged communicating, their children would have epigenome and inherited language skills and they could eventually evolve into using language.
Well, they did survive, so they must have made some rational decisions along the way. We can't see the process, only the result.
Surviving does not require the ability to think. You would not want to say alligators think, would you? They do not have a cortex and it is the cortex that makes us thinking animals. Alligators have reptilian brains, and so do we. I have been with severely brain-damaged people and they may be able to make some survival choices but their inability to think means very poor decision making.
Insects and animals do amazing things as a matter of instinct and want to add epigensome to this, which I define in my post just before this one. Our emotions can cancel out our ability to think, resulting in us reacting perfectly to an emergency or perhaps doing something we seriously regret. Just because we are capable of rational thinking, that does not mean that is what we are doing 24/7. Our brains are like chattering monkeys constantly running from one thought to another, but this is not rational thinking.
I think we need to understand the importance of language and learned logic skills for rational thinking. Not all thinking is rational thinking.
All notions of rational at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept rationality is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such.
"All notions of physical at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept physical is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such."
The notions we apply to the world are like a lens, through which we understand the world. There may be distortions due to our particular perspective. But that does not mean that everything we understand is false. After all, we cannot change our perspective, so we might as well make the most of what we've got.
thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.
That applies to both humans and animals and means that no judgement, positive or negative, is justified. But it is clear that we do make such assessments, from which it follows that thought/belief is not an entirely internal cognitive machination.
Even granting human language-less thought/belief, is not sufficient reason to grant lesser animals thought/belief because they happen to be language-less in lacking all forms of serial vocalizations.
Granting human language-less thought/belief is sufficient reason to grant animals thought/belief unless a sufficient reason for withholding language-less thought/belief from them is provided.
Which leaves us with those lesser animals considered as possessing a rudimentary form of language, judged by human standards, as to whether that form of language is a development of a commensurate form of rational thought/belief.
That would be one possibility, but it is not the argument that I would put.
Nature is, of course, rife with occasions which instill in us the notion those occasions are exemplifications of rational thought by those intelligences the internal cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible to us.
Two conclusions follow. First that animals are capable of rational action. Second, the internal cognitive machinations are accessible to us, so they are not purely internal.
I knew a man who was mechanical and took a class in physics and failed, yet he could resolve a mechanical/physics problem that no one else in the class could figure out. I would say that is an example of tacit knowledge. It is not understanding theory which is a verbal explanation of how something works. Verbal knowledge is something the man has trouble learning but he has knowledge that is not verbal.
I would say that is an example of what tacit knowledge is all about. It means that the ability to verbalize one's reasoning is distinct from the ability to reason - the two are not the same process. Which does not mean that the ability to verbalize one's reasons does not enable more complex thinking.
My favourite example of tacit knowledge is Socrates/Plato's insistence that if one cannot define, e.g., courage, piety in words, one does not know what courage/piety may be. But it is clear that that is not the case. In fact, when we speak, we are following a set of complex set of rules that we cannot verbalize. This is a dramatic illustration of how important tacit knowledge can be.
BTW If you post image-thinking as an alternative, that is fair enough. But there is not reason to suppose that it explains tacit knowledge, because if one can sensible manipulate the images such that the product is what you imagined, then you are following rules that you cannot articulate. Image-thinking is an alternative (better, in some circumstances) to verbal thinking.
Animals in general do amazing thing without words and could label all this tacit knowledge?
Yes, I think so.
I'm glad following up tacit thinking was so productive for you. I think it is an important phenomenon. It is a shame that philosophers have seen fit to ignore it.
Vera MontSeptember 19, 2024 at 17:54#9331640 likes
You would not want to say alligators think, would you?
Their thinking is on a fairly rudimentary level. They do have a cerebellum, as do lizards and turtles, so the 'reptilian brain' is not quite as you depict it. The alligator's lifestyle doesn't pose many intellectual challenges. They're also stronger and more in their element than a human child alone in a forest. Quoting Athena
I have been with severely brain-damaged people and they may be able to make some survival choices but their inability to think means very poor decision making.
And so, other people take care of them, even in adulthood. That feral kid doesn't survive with the use of its mighty jaws or its social support system; it only has its little hands and big brain to provide itself with food and shelter while avoiding predators. Quoting Athena
I think we need to understand the importance of language and learned logic skills for rational thinking. Not all thinking is rational thinking.
Oh, we can be quite irrational in language, too. Just listen to a speech by.... never mind.
Humans have an enormous brain, only a small part of which is required to run the vital physical systems and another small part for reflex actions and survival instincts. The rest is available for learning, memory, language, culture, skill acquisition, storytelling, convictions, wealth accumulation, altruism, invention, emotional complexity, deceit, social bonding, philosophy, ambition, superstition, delusion and madness. As well as reasoning and assessment.
All notions of physical at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence.
I disagree. All notions of physical, all of that which is conditioned by natural relations, do rest on the same ground, but such ground is Nature. Nature cannot contradict itself, but human intelligence certain has that capacity.
Is it really worth the trouble, to admit other possible worlds and such, in which, e.g, our logical principles, and by extension our mathematical principles, are false, or, even the totality of this Nature inaccessible to us in which there may be natural contradiction, and we are forced to start over? How would we even do that, if all we thought we knew is destroyed, but the internal mechanisms by which we know anything at all, remains the same?
The notions we apply to the world are like a lens, through which we understand the world.
Agreed. But this presupposes world, and world as not that which contains the lens through which it is understood. There is us, and there is not-us, which justifies the distinction in grounds upon which they rest.
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Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior,
Mww
What do you mean? We can call out irrational behaviour as such. We do it all the time.
This conflates the effect with the cause of it. Rational/irrational behavior is a complementary pair in exhibition of rationality. Humans know what rationality is, without the necessity of an example of it, and irrationality being merely its negation.
It is absurd to say humans dont apprehend rationality, in that rationality is the general human rule and irrationality is the exception to the rule.
thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.
Mww
That applies to both humans and animals and means that no judgement, positive or negative, is justified.
It cant mean that, without self-contradiction. But thats irrelevant, in juxtaposition to your response intermingling internal with external, yet my comment maintains their separation. In correcting the inconsistency, it is true my judgement of your thought/belief, being the aforementioned external arbiter, is unjustified, in that I have no warrant whatsoever for it. It is only your behavior consequential to your thought/belief that is sufficient warrant, such behavior being external to yourself hence for me a mere perception, understood, as you say, through a lens that is me.
And dont neglect context here. The dialectical dichotomy refers to humans as opposed to lesser animals, which does not abide in human as opposed to human, which is what youve done. Now it is the case that for me to refuse affirmation of your thought/belief, its inaccessibility to me notwithstanding, perfectly exemplifies my invalid judgement.
(sidebar on a technicality: all judgements are justified, else they wouldnt be judgements. Conclusions to which judgements arrive may be unjustified, iff subsequent judgements with different premises falsify them.)
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Granting human language-less thought/belief is sufficient reason to grant animals thought/belief unless a sufficient reason for withholding language-less thought/belief from them is provided.
I am not withholding language-less thought belief; to do so is to contradict myself, insofar as I affirm my own. I am withholding affirmation of thought/belief, specifically rational thought/belief, in language-less intelligences. Provision of sufficient reason for withholding such affirmation reduces to the fact they cannot inform me of it on the one hand, and I have no possibility of affirming that which is inaccessible to me on the other.
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This is tantamount to claiming that cloud which looks like a flying horse, is a flying horse. Extreme example, but holding in principle. That which instills a notion in us cannot be used as proof for the validity of the notion, re: sunrise/sunset. The notion that deities exist cannot itself prove they do.
Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us .by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?
Mww
By the same right that allows us to discuss distant suns and galaxies to which we have no direct access, and the way we learn the relationships of atoms in molecules or the events of geological time: though observation, theory, prediction and experimentation.
If something is inaccessible to us, we cannot know of it. Which is not to say we cannot infer, from an experience, its cause. But Im not interested in possibilities logical inference affords, when I want the certainty implied by an answer to an empirical question, especially when I already have the certainty afforded me from my own rational thought.
I believe bonobos have the potential for learning language but it is dormant because they lack the epigenome and inherited use of language that humans have.
It's genetics, not simply epigenetics. And dont overlook the fact that not only are their brains not equipped for language, but neither are their vocal tracts, for which the h.sapiens anatomy is uniquely suited.
My suggestion is that there is a tendency to see animals as inherently other than us, human beings, mainly on the ground that they are in what one might call the state of nature, before humans came and developed societies. It's a way of thinking that was prominent in 18th century philosophy, but the roots of it in our way of life are deeper than that. The difference is that they are now openly contested.
Well, you said that neither Christianity nor Darwinism are a philosophy, but Christianity absorbed a great deal of Greek philosophy, which resulted in the unique synthesis of Christian Platonism.
[quote=The Eclipse of Reason, Max Horkheimer] In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to ones surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirits antagonism to natureeven as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including manfrequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of mans continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the useless spiritual, and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy.[/quote]
I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having?
Those who push scientism seem never to understand what it is or that this is what they're doing. I think the reason is, that the distinction between a philosophical and a scientific question is itself a philosophical distinction, therefore unintelligible in scientific terms.
Vera MontSeptember 19, 2024 at 23:04#9332350 likes
But Im not interested in possibilities logical inference affords, when I want the certainty implied by an answer to an empirical question, especially when I already have the certainty afforded me from my own rational thought.
Your implied certainty of another's capabilities is based on not being able to access intimate knowledge of that other's subjective experience?
Hnh...
creativesoulSeptember 19, 2024 at 23:48#9332460 likes
Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way.
creativesoul
Of that specific cluster of behaviours at that same time every weekday, but not on weekends or holidays? Show me three of that multitude of accurate explanations.
The dog believes that the human will be arriving soon. The dog does not recognize the sound of it's human's car. The dog, after being reminded of past events - by virtue of being amidst much the same spatiotemporal events - begins to form, have, and/or hold expectation that the human will be there. In doing so the dog begins getting anticipatory excitement in a happy sort of way due to the lifelong loving connection the dog and human have.
I'm not saying that the dog's behavior is not rational. I would say that it most certainly is.
I'm questioning which things it makes the most sense to say that the dog is experiencing: Which sorts of thoughts and beliefs dogs can form, have, and/or hold.
Being hopeful does not belong in that grouping.
Holding some kinds of expectation does. Anticipation does. All hopefulness is anticipatory. All hopefulness involves expectation, but not all anticipation is hopefulness, and not all expectation is hopefulness. There is a difference, and that difference is key here.
What is hoping that something will happen without knowing that it may not? You see what I'm getting at? Dogs are not aware of their own fallibility. We are. It is only after becoming aware of the fact that we can be wrong about stuff, that we can become hopeful - in the face of that uncertainty. Compared/contrast that with autonomous anticipation and/or expectation without such metacognitive reservation.
Anthropomorphism looms large.
creativesoul
And terrifying! Why?
This mistakenly presupposes that you are somehow privy to my fear(s)?
:yikes:
Attributing things that are exclusively human to that which is not is something many do. I myself have been guilty of it. However, it is not at all 'terrifying' in-so-much-as just being completely unacceptable. It is akin to holding false belief. It is a mistake. I try to avoid those.
Similarity and commonality are not diseases; they're a natural result of sharing a planet and a history.
Of course similarity and commonality are not diseases. The irony. Those are a large part of the foundation of my own worldview/position. Your replies apply to someone who does not agree on that.
It's becoming apparent that there is some misunderstanding at hand.
A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes.
creativesoul
You're overcomplicating something simple. A biological clock: so much time has elapsed; at this interval, something is supposed to happen.
Yeah. :brow: No.
What you're claiming is simple is not. The above can be true, and the claim in question... false. I'm not denying the above. What I am denying is not nearly so simple as that.
Changing goalposts is generally frowned upon too.
No. Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
The expectation belongs to the dog. Dogs are not capable of thinking about their own thought and belief.
The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train.
creativesou
And that's not rational, because....?
It is rational. The irony, once again. You're quoting my argument for how and/or why it is rational.
Jeez!
:worry:
Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday.
creativesoul
No. Because it's the first day of a new work-week. Early rising (possibly with hangover) (possibly lover departing), rigid morning routine, uncomfortable clothing, commute, staff meeting, unpleasant colleague regaling you with their spectacular weekend adventures, bossy department head dumping unwanted task on your desk.... Some people who enjoy their work actually look forward to Mondays; most people don't enjoy their work. Pity!
No?
So now you're going to deny what my coworkers have said when I asked? Sure, some may dread Monday for the reasons listed above. Others just dread Monday because it's a day to be dreaded. That's not all that uncommon. They wake up with negativity teeming, because it's Monday and they're convinced that Monday is the worst day. When asked, some replies have been...
"No reason, really. It's just a Monday, ya know?"
"It's Monday", accompanied by a perplexed look - like I should already know that. :brow: Some people have very strange belief systems.
Arrrgh, feels like a Monday, doesn't it?"
Etc.
There's another relevant issue here. The tactic you're using can be used against the anthropomorphic claims you've made. We can continue to say stuff like, "No. Not because it's the first day of the workweek, but because they do not like work at all."
Whatever.
Many say they dread Mondays because they believe Mondays are the worst days. What you've added and/or said here does not deny that, despite your insistence that you're answering in the negative. Rather, your extrapolation adds further support for whythey dread Mondays.
What's in question is whether or not dogs can look forward to Thursdays despite having no knowledge whatsoever that any given day of their life is a Thursday.
To the dog, the train means the human.
creativesoul
No other train, just the five o'clock local.
But never mind, I have lots of other examples you can explain away.
We could change what we call the train. It would no longer be the five o'clock train is we did so. Would the dog notice? Perhaps it's best put like this: "The five o'clock train" is the way we pick that train out from all others. It is not the way the dog does. The time the train comes makes no difference at all to that dog. What mattered was that train was connected to the human, not what chronological order it was in. Other humans arrive at other times. Their dogs know nothing at all about what time counts as five o'clock or four or two or whatever. The chronological time makes no difference to the dog. What matters is the human connected to the train... regardless of what time it arrives on our clocks.
Yes, dogs have a sense of time. Yes, dogs can develop timely routines. Yes, that consistency can become ritualistic. Ritual shared between species. Bonding. Yes, these can involve the train we call "the five o'clock train".
wonderer1September 19, 2024 at 23:52#9332490 likes
It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it.
wonderer1
Thank you for telling me. But I think I'll make up my own mind, if you don't mind.
I wouldn't have it any other way. It seems as if you've taken something I said as suggesting otherwise, but if so, I don't understand what you interpreted that way.
Is there any chance Nagel's perspective is as scientifically well informed as that of anyone here?
Patterner
If Nagel is not scientifically well informed, he is as well informed as me. In other respects also, I would very much like to be able to adopt Nagel's perspective. He's a much better philosopher than me. Yet I still disagree with many of his opinions, especially with regard to bats.
I suppose I should have said "well informed in a way commensurate with the claims he makes". Nagel has fallen in with the cranks at the Discovery Institute, the crank Alvin Plantinga, etc. I don't see any reason to consider Nagel a better philosopher than you. How do you define better?
[quote=Wikipedia]Alvin Carl Plantinga[a] (born November 15, 1932) is an American analytic philosopher who works primarily in the fields of philosophy of religion, epistemology (particularly on issues involving epistemic justification), and logic.
From 1963 to 1982, Plantinga taught at Calvin University before accepting an appointment as the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.[2] He later returned to Calvin University to become the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy.[3]
A prominent Christian philosopher, Plantinga served as president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from 1983 to 1986. He has delivered the Gifford Lectures twice and was described by Time magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God".[4] In 2014, Plantinga was the 30th most-cited contemporary author in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.[5] [/quote]
So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right?
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 00:17#9332610 likes
Jeez! You guys get a room, will ya?
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 00:23#9332620 likes
Hmmm, this isn't the place for it, but there seems to be a remarkable difference between how we treat "meaning". I'm nihilistic, as mentioned heretofore. Where there is no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, there can be no meaning. When something is meaningful, it is always meaningful to a creature capable of attributing such.
I say that not to argue, compare, or nitpick, but rather to offer you a bit of argumentative ground for the position I'm arguing from/for. Perhaps it will help you to understand where I'm coming from, so to speak.
:smile:
wonderer1September 20, 2024 at 00:30#9332630 likes
So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right?
I didn't say anything about Plantinga being a Christian, and I'd like to hope you might want to refrain from putting words in my mouth like that. Do you think that you can?
Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism is a crank argument Do you think academically qualified professors of philosophy are somehow immune to being cranks?
Of course, if you want to argue for the EAAN I'd be happy to point out many ways that it is a crank argument.
wonderer1September 20, 2024 at 00:31#9332640 likes
I didn't say anything about Plantinga being a Christian, and I'd like to hope you might want to refrain from putting words in my mouth like that. Do you think that you can?
No, you said he was a crank. That is not a word I put in your mouth. I am pointing out that he's an academically-qualified academic and professor of philosophy with reference to his Wikipedia entry. I've discussed variations of his 'evolutionary argument against naturalism' in the past. You ought to recognise that it was the subject of a number of textbooks with a great deal of commentary by academics on both sides of the argument, including critics such as Daniel Dennett (for example). So, he's not a crank, and it's not a crank's argument.
From the jacket cover of that title:
This intriguing line of argument raises issues of importance to epistemologists and to philosophers of mind, of religion, and of science. In this, the first book to address the ongoing debate, Plantinga presents his influential thesis and responds to critiques by distinguished philosophers from a variety of subfields. Plantinga's argument is aimed at metaphysical naturalism or roughly the view that no supernatural beings exist. Naturalism is typically conjoined with evolution as an explanation of the existence and diversity of life. Plantinga's claim is that one who holds to the truth of both naturalism and evolution is irrational in doing so. More specifically, because the probability that unguided evolution would have produced reliable cognitive faculties is either low or inscrutable, one who holds both naturalism and evolution acquires a "defeater" for every belief he/she holds, including the beliefs associated with naturalism and evolution. Following Plantinga's brief summary of his thesis are eleven original pieces by his critics. The book concludes with a new essay by Plantinga in which he defends and extends his view that metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating.
Your implied certainty of another's capabilities is based on not being able to access intimate knowledge of that other's subjective experience?
Correct. If anothers capabilities or subjective experiences were sufficiently accessible to me, they wouldnt be merely implied. They would be, or could possibly be, demonstrably given.
Is there any experience that isnt subjective?
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 00:44#9332700 likes
But, I emphasize, the description of an action provided by the agent in language may be an important criterion for us, but it is not decisive in all circumstances.
Or the agent may not be recognizing how we might see it - what is just banter to the agent, may be a serious slur to us.
Yes. Interpretation is a very interesting process. It is entwined with understanding. When someone draws the same correlations between the language use that we do, they interpret correctly, and... understand us.
Which reminds me that I ought check with the readers more often than I do. Always appreciate your 'tone', by the way. Model. Thank you.
It is even possible that the agent may be wrong - deceiving themselves.
Sure. I'm not fond of 'self-deception' but that's an aside having to do with the inability to tell oneself that they believe something that they do not, or vice versa.
Trauma is another matter altogether. Coping mechanisms and all that.
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 00:57#9332760 likes
The dog does not recognize the sound of it's human's car.
Sure he does. Even the dumbest dog knows the sounds and smells of its people and their stuff. Quoting creativesoul
The dog, after being reminded of past events - by virtue of being amidst much the same spatiotemporal events - begins to form, have, and/or hold expectation that the human will be there. In doing so the dog begins getting anticipatory excitement in a happy sort of way due to the lifelong loving connection the dog and human have.
You're using more words to describe: dog expects human's arrival. 'Spatiotemporal' - yes, he knows where and when. I can't characterize that as even one of the multitude of alternate explanations. Quoting creativesoul
I'm not saying that the dog's behavior is not rational. I would say that it most certainly is.
It is only after becoming aware of the fact that we can be wrong about stuff, that we can become hopeful - in the face of that uncertainty.
That's a pretty big bold statement about a wide-ranging emotion! What has our own fallibility to do with hope? It's not as if we had, before discovering our own fallibility, been convinced of being in control of the universe. Quoting creativesoul
Compared/contrast that with autonomous anticipation and/or expectation without such metacognitive reservation.
You mean humans never rationally expect something that usually happens to go on happening on schedule? When a human goes to work on Monday morning, he doesn't merely hope, but quite reasonably and confidently expects his workplace to stand where it has always stood and function as it has always functioned. If it's lifted up by an alien police force and transported to the moon, he discovers his own fallibilty. If he and the workplace survive the incident, thereafter, he only hopes to find it in the usual place.
If the dog's human is taken to hospital during the day and doesn't return home for a week, the dog's reasonable expectation is reduced to hope. Quoting creativesoul
This mistakenly presupposes that you are somehow privy to my fear(s)?
Nah, just citing a vague general human-centric fear. It was huge in the sciences for a century. the word 'looms' triggered it. Quoting creativesoul
It is rational. The irony, once again. You're quoting my argument for how and/or why it is rational.
I'm still trying to figure out what it is you're arguing. Sometimes I seem to misunderstand it. Quoting creativesoul
"No reason, really. It's just a Monday, ya know?"
What people say is not always candid, insightful or comprehensive. I know of no effects without a cause. It sounds as if they 1. are not aware of or 2. do not wish to investigate or 3. assume you already know the sequence of experiences that have contributed to this particular response to an anticipated and repeated situation. Quoting creativesoul
Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
I just don't follow the distinction here. Are there discreet points in the continuity of time that we have to identify and choose among? What increments, and how aware do we do have to be of choosing one? Or do we experience the passage of time as fluid, and of which we are sometimes keenly aware and sometimes lose track? I don't see how a dog should have to 'pick out' an item of time from among a group of similar items, as if it were a toy in a pile of toys. To me, minutes all look and pretty much alike; I could not tell them apart except by the events that take place during their passage.
But then, as you say, I don't understand your arguments. Logically, then, I should stop responding to them. I don't know how to disengage without seeming rude.
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 01:01#9332790 likes
Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
creativesoul
I just don't follow the distinction here
Read the next bits.
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 01:02#9332800 likes
So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right?
You asked a loaded question, insinuating that what is in bold is my thinking.
Anyway, the EAAN is a crank argument because it ignores many issues that were previously brought up in this thread.
Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?
Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.
Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture?
Vera MontSeptember 20, 2024 at 01:15#9332850 likes
and therefore of course hes accessible to me; I got a tv.
So have I. All the world is accessible to me, including the observed and recorded behaviour of animals in the wild. And that's all you can know of Putin, too. Quoting Mww
To know of a thing, is not the same as to know the thing. Do you see that if youd asked if I knew Putin, Id have given a different answer?
If something is inaccessible to us, we cannot know of it.
We can know of, and quite a lot about, many things that we can't access directly. Quoting Mww
If anothers capabilities or subjective experiences were sufficiently accessible to me, they wouldnt be merely implied. They would be, or could possibly be, demonstrably given.
But you don't accept experimental demonstrations as true. And so cannot be certain of anything.
Vera MontSeptember 20, 2024 at 01:18#9332870 likes
The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
When but not what time. Because he doesn't know the names humans have artificially given the hours and minutes of the day. Okay.
wonderer1September 20, 2024 at 01:24#9332890 likes
This intriguing line of argument raises issues of importance to epistemologists and to philosophers of mind, of religion, and of science.
I agree the argument raises such issues, but that is a different matter than whether it merits being taken seriously as an argument against naturalism.
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 01:24#9332900 likes
Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
The expectation belongs to the dog. Dogs are not capable of thinking about their own thought and belief.
Knowing what time the human is expected is knowledge about one's own expectations. Dogs do not have that.
What's in question is whether or not dogs can look forward to Thursdays despite having no knowledge whatsoever that any given day of their life is a Thursday.
The same applies to the five o'clock train.
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 01:27#9332910 likes
creativesoulSeptember 20, 2024 at 01:42#9332970 likes
I wanted to mention something prior to retiring for the night.
When I said "language less" I meant without naming and descriptive practices. There is no clear lines to be drawn between language less creatures and our pets, for they are not language less. Not at all, actually. There's good reason domestication changes animals drastically, aside from the shrinking of the gene pool which is the function of the aim of breeding for specific traits.
There's overlap between language less animals and us. Our pets.
This overlap matters here, in these sorts of discussions, for not all dogs and cats and birds have drawn correlations between our language use and other things. Some have. Pets are socialized by us with us. It matters. Language has helped, as best I can tell, in helping to provide better means for pets to become rational to a greater extent than their cousins.
You asked a loaded question, insinuating that what is in bold is my thinking.
But you did say that Thomas Nagel, atheist though he might profess to be, should be categorised along with 'that crank' Alvin Plantinga, and The Discovery Institute, which is an Intelligent Design organisation. The implication is that you think Nagel and Plantinga's arguments against evolutionary theory are based on religious ideology and science denial, that you lump them all together as being a form of creationism or intelligent design. In actual fact, all three are very different. Thomas Nagel never appeals to intelligent design or belief in God - he says he lacks any 'sense of the divine'.
Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?
Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.
Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture?
None of that is relevant, though. His argument is epistemological, about the nature of knowledge. It is of the kind described as 'transcendental arguments'. Transcendental arguments seek to demonstrate the necessary preconditions for the possibility of some experience, knowledge, or exercise of reason. They typically follow this form: if a belief is plausible, then certain conditions must be met for it to be coherent and intelligible.
Plantinga argues that if both naturalism and evolution are true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low. If our cognitive faculties are unreliable, then we have a defeater for any belief produced by those faculties, including the belief in naturalism and evolution. This creates a self-defeating situation for the naturalist.
The basis on which he says that, is that naturalism typically holds that all events, including mental events like beliefs, are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be studied and explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology). This form of causation is often referred to as efficient causation, where one event (the cause) brings about another event (the effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are fully determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Those who hold that the mind is identical with or a product of the brain or neural processes are obliged to hold this view. It is made explicit in the arguments of those such as Daniel Dennett.
In contrast, logical causation refers to the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. For example, if "All humans are mortal" and "Socrates is a human" are true, it logically follows that "Socrates is mortal" must also be true. This form of causation pertains to the realm of reason and logic rather than to observable physical processes. It governs how conclusions follow from premises in a rational argument, and is independent of physical causation.
What I've been arguing in this thread, is that the human faculty of reason differentiates humans from other species, because it enables humans to 'see reason' in that second sense (i.e. grasp logical inference.) That general lineage of argument has a very long pedigree, going right back to Plato and his predecessors.
I will add, there have been many developments in naturalism such that it no longer is susceptible to this argument i.e. Deacon's 'absentials', Vervaeke's 'extended naturalism' among others. But the case can certainly be made against the kind of neo-darwinian materialism that Dennett and Dawkins advocate.
wonderer1September 20, 2024 at 03:14#9333140 likes
If you are going to claim that I said something, then please have the intellectual integrity to quote what I actually said, rather than make up stories of what I said to suit the narrative you are trying to gaslight people into believing.
Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?
Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.
Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture?
wonderer1
None of that is relevant, though.
Sure it is relevant, if Plantinga hopes to do more than beat on a staw man account of naturalistic evolution.
Can you help Plantinga out, by explaining why the species under consideration is a social species for which generally communicating truths is of no more adaptive value than generally communicating falsehoods?
Sure it is relevant, if Plantinga hopes to do more than beat on a staw man account of naturalistic evolution.
Your objection doesnt address the argument.
I might add, whatever occurs within a social species, is a completely separate matter to what evolves according to natural selection. That only operates over much larger time-periods, and refers to the process of speciation. Certainly culture and human capabilities develop, but h.sapiens have not evolved significantly since their early forbears first appeared.
So whos is the straw man argument?
Vera MontSeptember 20, 2024 at 05:05#9333440 likes
Plantinga argues that if both naturalism and evolution are true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low.
If you want to provide a more fleshed out account of this aspect of Plantinga's argument, I'll address that. In the meantime...
As I said, Plantinga doesn't consider the role of communication among members of a social species in making his case. So Plantinga's claim is that:
P(R|N&E) is low
(I.e. the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution is low.)
However, in order for Plantinga to address a scientifically informed position regarding the reliability of our cognitive faculties he needs to address a more complex scenario than he actually does. We can say that to be taken seriously Plantinga needs to address:
P(R|N&E&S)
(The probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution and the evolution occured in a social species.)
However, in order to make that case Plantinga would need to establish that truth conveying communication occurring amongst members of the social species would do nothing to increase the reliability of the cognitive faculties of members of that species, as compared to being a feral member of the species without social interaction.
It's pretty ironic that an educator like Plantinga, needs to ignore the possibility of members of a social species educating each other and passing down culture, in order for his argument to superficially appear to work.
and also, Aristotle's 'De Anima', translated as 'On the Soul'. I love the connection between Anima, Animal, and Animated.
Aye. Me too very much so. To be fair, Aristotle spoke in Ancient Greek whereas "anima" "animal" and "animated" are Latin based. But the associations are fairly blatant to understand, at least from where I stand.
A controversial thought, but if incorporeal beings of far grander stature - here thinking of polytheistic deities or else angels and archangels - were to be, what else would they be but more universal animas (souls) whose animus (mind) would be that much more evolved than any human's? Hence, if one were to entertain a great chain of being, it would start with the anima of bacteria or thereabouts and progress onward through the anima of humans into animas whose bodies of Logos would consist of non-physical Logos. No stark metaphysical divides anywhere to be found, just differences of degrees that then result in classifications of different kinds. This difference in kind amid an every fluid scale of degrees being in keeping with one nature of Logos being that of ratio-ning one something from the other.
This, of course, is just one hypothetical to be found among many others - that of an utter non-spirituality included. But I'm here intending to draw attention to the realty that there needs to be no sharp metaphysical divide in being/anima/psyche anywhere from bacteria all the way to deities in order to entertain views such as those professed by many a spiritual reality, both Western and Eastern.
Not sure how this thought will fly hereabouts. For the record, I'm not here endorsing any theology, but I am endorsing an absence of sharp metaphysical divides between all "animated" beings that coexist. And that this can just as easily apply to materialist interpretations of biological evolution as it can the concepts regarding the great chain (or, more aptly, ladder) of being. But, hopefully, I'm just preaching the the choir in saying all this.
What is needed is engagement of a particular kind, so that one can grasp that animals in many ways will engage with us in many (but not all) of the same ways that we engage with other people.
[...]
That's very vague, but I'm trying to gesture at the idea that this is not just a matter for abstract reason. It's about how to live with beings recognizably like us. After all, that's how we come to treat people as people and not "just" animals".
... else how we come to understand that we ought not treat any other group of people as sub-human animals ... neither granting leeway to those who deem this to be so on "Nature-given" grounds or on "God-given" grounds, for both streams of reasoning leading to this same mentioned conclusion can, when more impartially addressed, only be utter bullshit. Black and Whites, for one example, being equally evolved not just biologically but also in their intellectual abilities - socioeconomic constraints of the current world aside.
All this maybe being a different set of issues for a different thread. But I very much liked your post. Thank you for it.
However, in order to make that case Plantinga would need to establish that truth conveying communication occurring amongst members of the social species would do nothing to increase the reliability of the cognitive faculties of members of that species, as compared to being a feral member of the species without social interaction.
Again, it doesn't address the evolutionary argument against naturalism. He doesn't say that we're incapable of communicating, or that we can't convey information by speaking to one another. For that matter, many creatures other than humans communicate. Bee dances communicate where flowers are. Many birds and of mammals convey warnings or indications of food sources. But then, none of those involve truth claims, as such. They display behaviours which can be understood in terms of stimulus and response. Note that such behaviours are 'reliable' in that bee dances and meerkat alarm calls really do indicate where flowers are or that danger is approaching. The evolutionary argument is rather about judgements of truth.
The argument is that naturalism maintains that mental events such as beliefs are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology) - in other words, instances of efficient causation, where one event (cause) brings about another event (effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. So it's of a different order to physical causation - it transcends it.
That is the thrust of the argument, and so far, I fail to see how your 'social species' response actually addresses it.
wonderer1September 20, 2024 at 05:40#9333500 likes
Again, it doesn't address the evolutionary argument against naturalism. He doesn't say that we're incapable of communicating, or that we can't convey information by speaking to one another.
Plantinga doesn't consider the role of communication at all. That is what disqualifies his argument from serious consideration as an argument against naturalism.
The argument is that naturalism maintains that mental events such as beliefs are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology) - in other words, instances of efficient causation, where one event (cause) brings about another event (effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another.
You are conflating other stuff with Plantinga's argument. It would probably be better for you to stick to quoting actual passages written by Plantinga, or start arguing for your own version and we can ignore Plantinga.
Reply to wonderer1 Not so. Mine is a perfectly reasonable paraphrasing of Plantingas argument. Youve presented nothing so far that shows you understand it. The reason he doesnt discuss communication is that it is tangential to his argument.
It occurred to me after you responded, that in that video we have a demonstration of Kahneman's fast and slow thinking occurring in a dog. (And literally fast and literally slow.)
Right, I am only passingly familiar with Kahneman's work, but I think I see the point.
In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another.
Why should one explanation preclude the other? Another point is that most of our reasoning is inductive or abductive, where there is no logical necessity in play at all.
I wonder how you know this. Or what difference it makes to rational thinking.
I know how you and I know what we expect. By introspection, whatever that may be. How do other people know what you and I expect? By our behaviour. So I'm happy to say that the dog knows what they expect - and want and so on. So what might ground the claim that dogs don't have introspection? Well, they can't do anything that could differentiate between expecting X and knowing that one expects X, because they don't have the language skills to articulate it. It's just one of the knotty problems that come up when you are extending the use of people-concepts to creatures that lack human-type languages.
The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
When but not what time. Because he doesn't know the names humans have artificially given the hours and minutes of the day. Okay.
But the train arrives at 5 pm. If we're happy to say that the dog knows when the human is about to arrive, why are we not happy to say that the dog knows the 5 pm train is about to arrive? Suppose the dog has learnt to read the station clock or at least to get up and start some preparatory tail-wagging when the clock says 5 - are you sure that they are incapable of that? If they can learn to associate a bell with the arrival of food, I think there's no way to be sure.
My point is this. If one focuses on a specific case - which is a good thing to do, and much, much better than hasty generalizations - there will always be many possible representations of exactly what the dog knows/believes/expects. But if one sees that one case in the range of the dog's life, it will normally be possible to narrow down the possibilities. And one can get a bit further by indulging in thought-experiments, which will at least allow one to understand under what circumstances one might distinguish cases that seem utterly indistinguishable so long as one focuses on just the one event. But unless something important hangs on the issue, it will be tedious work, and one will be disinclined to pursue it unless it matters.
Why should one explanation preclude the other? Another point is that most of our reasoning is inductive or abductive, where there is no logical necessity in play at all.
Good question. Isn't the issue that they do seem incompatible. We can express this in more than one way. They are different language games, different categories, different perspectives. At any rate, they seem incommensurable. Yet we know that a physical process can result in a logical conclusion. If it were not so, computers would not work. Indeed, if it were not so, calculation by pen and paper would not work, either.
You know I'm not going to be goaded into that mess.
HA!! What no sense of adventure? No foray into the sublime? Not a fan of time-wasting? But yeah, I get that a lot; explains the great disparity between my comments and mentions.
Is learning how to open a gate or door by observation alone possible by a creature completely incapable of thinking?
Opening a gate is possible by observation, but It is impossible to say apodeitically whether a creature incapable of thinking learns anything, whether by observation or otherwise.
Performing a task grounded in observation alone could be mere mimicry, which does not necessarily support what it is to learn.
All the world is accessible to me, including the observed and recorded behaviour of animals in the wild. And that's all you can know of Putin, too.
All the world is not accessible to you, even while the observed and recorded behavior of (some) animals, is. What is not included in the observed and recorded behavior of animals, is that which is the cause of it, which we as humans consider rational thought.
wonderer1September 20, 2024 at 11:16#9333890 likes
Mine is a perfectly reasonable paraphrasing of Plantingas argument.
No. You seem confused, and are mixing bits of arguments against physicalism into your 'paraphrase'. The EAAN isn't an argument against mind/body physicalism.
On page 313 of Where the Conflict Really Lies Plantinga writes:
The basic idea of my argument could be put (a bit crudely) as follows. First, the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable, given naturalism and evolution, is low. (To put it a bit inaccurately but suggestively, if naturalism and evolution were both true, our cognitive faculties would very likely not be reliable.) But then according to the second premise of my argument, if I believe both naturalism and evolution, I have a defeater for my intuitive assumption that my cognitive faculties are reliable. If I have a defeater for that belief, however, then I have a defeater for any belief I take to be produced by my cognitive faculties. That means that I have a defeater for my belief that naturalism and evolution are true. So my belief that naturalism and evolution are true gives me a defeater for that very belief; that belief shoots itself in the foot and is self-referentially incoherent; therefore I cannot rationally accept it. And if one cant accept both naturalism and evolution, that pillar of current science, then there is serious conflict between naturalism and science.
Plantinga is not making an argument against physicalism. In fact Plantinga thinks everyone has a God detector organ. (Although sadly, yours and mine are broken.)
In Calvin's view, there is no reasonable non-belief:
"That there exists in the human mind and indeed by natural instinct, some sense of Deity [sensus divinitatis], we hold to be beyond dispute, since God himself, to prevent any man from pretending ignorance, has endued all men with some idea of his Godhead . this is not a doctrine which is first learned at school, but one as to which every man is, from the womb, his own master; one which nature herself allows no individual to forget.[2]"
Jonathan Edwards, the 18th-century American Calvinist preacher and theologian, claimed that while every human being has been granted the capacity to know God, a sense of divinity, successful use of these capacities requires an attitude of "true benevolence".[citation needed] Analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga of the University of Notre Dame posits a similar modified form of the sensus divinitatis in his Reformed epistemology whereby all have the sense, only it does not work properly in some humans, due to sin's noetic effects.
If you have a Kindle, I can loan out my Kindle copy of the book so that you don't have to just pretend to know what you are talking about.
The argument is that naturalism maintains that mental events such as beliefs are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology) - in other words, instances of efficient causation, where one event (cause) brings about another event (effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another.
There is a lot going on here, but the above is one strand which I think I can deal with without grappling with any special reading (evolutionary naturalism).
The author (Plantinga?) has grasped one relationship between the physical and another category, but has not noticed that there are other relationships available. I offer two examples.
First, each piece in a chess set is a physical object which consists of one substance or another in a specific shape. We even say that the king is this piece - holding up or pointing to the physical object in question. But what makes it the king has no representation in the conceptual structures of physics. It is the king because the rules and conventions of chess make it so - it is the king in the context of a chess game. Physically speaking, it is just an object like any other.
Second, - and perhaps closer to home - each number in a calculation has a physical - what shall I call it? - correlate. 1, 2, 3, Again, qua physical mark each number has a representation in the conceptual structure of physics. However, qua number, it does not. What makes it a number is the rules that we apply to it (better, that we follow in manipulating it) - in the context of a mathematical calculation or in the context of counting or measuring physical objects.
When we use a machine to do a calculation, we have assigned various physical phenomena to a mathematical role, and arranged causal sequences to correspond to the mathematical operations we are interested in. What makes the physical events within the machine into a calculation cannot be recognized as mathematical calculations unless we have arranged that representation. It is not the result of any physical properties or events within the machine independently of the context in which we interpret them.
Vera MontSeptember 20, 2024 at 14:09#9334110 likes
Suppose the dog has learnt to read the station clock or at least to get up and start some preparatory tail-wagging when the clock says 5 - are you sure that they are incapable of that?
What have clocks to do with rational thought? For 100,000 years of intelligent human development no clocks of any kind existed. Up until four hundred years ago, the entire population of North America was clock-free, and very possibly the healthier for it. Quoting Mww
All the world is not accessible to you, even while the observed and recorded behavior of (some) animals, is. What is not included in the observed and recorded behavior of animals, is that which is the cause of it, which we as humans consider rational thought.
Well, there's me in my place. That which is accessible to you regarding other humans is not accessible to me regarding other animals. Even if you have never seen that human in the flesh and even if I had close personal acquaintance with animals.
Reply to Ludwig V Experiences can be hard to explain to someone who has not had that particular experience. Remember Spock in a Star Trek episode, where he died and Doc asked him what it was like to die? Spock asked him if he ever died, and incredulously Doc said "no". Then Spock said, if he did not have the experience he had nothing to reference.
I rather be with people my own age, who have gone through my time in history, because they know what I am talking about. That is not the case when talking with younger people, who may be sure I am wrong because they have not had that experience. :lol: It is laughable when an organization has changed its policy and I object to the change, and the young person who has been on the job for maybe 6 months, tells me there was no change and things are as they always were.
Amazingly, human beings can proceed and believe humans are intelligent and capable of communication when they are not working with the same facts and understandings of life. While bees and ants have almost perfect communication. I don't think anyone would say they are intelligent. They are not self-aware and reasoning how to build their homes or go about their chores or who the queen should be queen. We might say the ants and bees are more rational than humans because they don't carry false or incorrect stories about what is so.
I think we could make a good argument that human beings are not rational. The chatter that goes on their heads may be totally incorrect but without critical thinking, they may be willing to kill for what they believe is so.
Thank you for opening the discussion on human thinking.
Ever been to the center of the Earth? Have any experience of it, whether direct, indirect, 1st, 2nd, 3rd ..hand? Ever going to? Think you got enough time to experience all those parts of the world that are accessible you?
I dont care about whatever place youre in, only what you say while youre there.
Oh, we can be quite irrational in language, too. Just listen to a speech by.... never mind.
Humans have an enormous brain, only a small part of which is required to run the vital physical systems and another small part for reflex actions and survival instincts. The rest is available for learning, memory, language, culture, skill acquisition, storytelling, convictions, wealth accumulation, altruism, invention, emotional complexity, deceit, social bonding, philosophy, ambition, superstition, delusion and madness. As well as reasoning and assessment.
But all that is not rational thinking. Rational thinking requires critical thinking and we would have an extremely short lifespan if all our awake time was also our critical thinking time.
Colloquially, rational has several meanings. It can describe a thinking process based on an evaluation of objective facts (rather than superstition or powerful emotions); a decision that maximizes personal benefit; or simply a decision thats sensible. In this article, the first definition applies: Rational decisions are those grounded on solid statistics and objective facts, resulting in the same choices as would be computed by a logical robot. But theyre not necessarily the most sensible. https://qz.com/922924/humans-werent-designed-to-be-rational-and-we-are-better-thinkers-for-it
Rational thinking requires a huge amount of energy and we would have very short life spans if all our waking hours we were thinking rationally. Also, it is fun to know forgetting is as important to making sense of life as learning is. One of the hardest parts of learning is often we must forget to have useful information in the present. You don't want to know your grocery list for every time you have gone shopping. You only want today's grocery list and if too much information is in our conscious thoughts it becomes useless.
Completely rational thinking has draw backs and here is an explanation of that...same link
If you fine-tune on the past with an optimization model, and the future is not like the past, then that can be a big failure, as illustrated in the last financial crisis, he explains. In a world where you can calculate the risks, the rational way is to rely on statistics and probability theory. But in a world of uncertainty, not everything is knownthe future may be different from the pastthen statistics by itself cannot provide you with the best answer anymore.
Henry Brighton, a cognitive science and artificial intelligence professor at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, whos also a researcher at the Max Planck Institute, adds that, in a real-world setting, most truly important decisions rely at least in part on subjective preferences.
The number of objective facts deserving of that term is extremely low and almost negligible in everyday life, he says. The whole idea of using logic to make decisions in the world is to me a fairly peculiar one, given that we live in a world of high uncertainty which is precisely the conditions in which logic is not the appropriate framework for thinking about decision-making.
Several Star Trek shows are about human judgment that is not based on rational thinking and I don't think Star Trek fans are in favor of AI ruling over us.
It's genetics, not simply epigenetics. And dont overlook the fact that not only are their brains not equipped for language, but neither are their vocal tracts, for which the h.sapiens anatomy is uniquely suited.
There is no final decision about how information is transmitted from one generation to the next.
Memories passed down in our genes? Not exactly. But biologists have observed examples of learned behaviors and acquired responses being transmitted through several generations, contrary to the traditional rules of genetic inheritance. https://www.quantamagazine.org/inherited-learning-it-happens-but-how-is-uncertain-20191016/#:~:text=Memories%20passed%20down%20in%20our,traditional%20rules%20of%20genetic%20inheritance. [quote].
We do know that dogs that became used to humans became domesticated and that a gene controls if a dog can or can not be domesticated. The dogs that interacted with humans developed and spread this gene. This is not just about DNA but also RNA.
[quote] RNA, is another macromolecule essential for all known forms of life. Like DNA, RNA is made up of nucleotides. Once thought to play ancillary roles, RNAs are now understood to be among a cells key regulatory players where they catalyze biological reactions, control and modulate gene expression, sensing and communicating responses to cellular signals, etc. https://cm.jefferson.edu/learn/dna-and-rna/#:~:text=There%20are%20two%20differences%20that,uracil%20while%20DNA%20contains%20thymine.
.
Skills and Talents Influenced by Your Genes
Aptitude and talent in various fields, such as intelligence, creativity, and athleticism, are attributed to genetic factors. For example, drawing, playing an instrument, or dancing may come more naturally to some people than to others. Similarly, genetic factors can influence traits like analytical and critical thinking, communication, and research skills. Skills and Talents Influenced by Your Genes
https://seniorslifestylemag.com/featured/5-skills-and-talents-that-are-influenced-by-your-genes/#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20drawing%2C%20playing%20an,%2C%20communication%2C%20and%20research%20skills.
I think this is about the process of evolution and how close humans and apes are.
Vera MontSeptember 20, 2024 at 17:25#9334530 likes
Rational thinking requires critical thinking and we would have an extremely short lifespan if all our awake time was also our critical thinking time.
Yet another criterion. The more requirements you add, the fewer entities may exercise a faculty that was once available to everything in possession of a cerebellum.
All thinking animals can act rationally, emotionally, instinctively or chaotically (when they're ill). I very much doubt that thought processes take different amounts of energy to perform.
What have clocks to do with rational thought? For 100,000 years of intelligent human development no clocks of any kind existed. Up until four hundred years ago, the entire population of North America was clock-free, and very possibly the healthier for it.
Oh dear me! It was perhaps quixotic, but I was thinking about the argument about whether the dog knew it was 5 pm when the train arrived. I thought of Pavlov's dogs who knew it was feeding time when the bell rang, and of an ancient TV programme for very small children that tried to teach children to tell the time. They displayed a clock face and then announced to time displayed. It's not important, but I get irritated by people who say "but the dog has no concept of" and work to concede the lowest possible level of rationality to console themselves for admitting that an animal could have any concept at all. Not important.
I think we could make a good argument that human beings are not rational. The chatter that goes on their heads may be totally incorrect but without critical thinking, they may be willing to kill for what they believe is so.
They (sc. ants) are not self-aware and reasoning how to build their homes or go about their chores or who the queen should be queen.
Yes. I thought about them and decided that they weren't. They just had a large collection of instincts, triggered, if I remember right, by what they are fed as larvae. An illustration of how irrational components can produce rational results. Not what the thread is about.
Rational decisions are those grounded on solid statistics and objective facts, resulting in the same choices as would be computed by a logical robot.
If you ask what makes us human, the answer will not be "rationality", but emotion. Ironical, don't you think?
Vera MontSeptember 20, 2024 at 17:32#9334550 likes
Several Star Trek shows are about human judgment that is not based on rational thinking
Usually decisions that turn out to be wrong. "An alien machine you don't know what it does? Beam it aboard!"
and I don't think Star Trek fans are in favor of AI ruling over us.
Don't be so sure. Anyhow, it wouldn't rule - that's an ape thing. It would simply administer our resources and enforce our laws - both of which tasks humans have botched repeatedly and abominably.
Vera MontSeptember 20, 2024 at 17:45#9334570 likes
It was perhaps quixotic, but I was thinking about the argument about whether the dog knew it was 5 pm when the train arrived. I thought of Pavlov's dogs who knew it was feeding time when the bell rang,
All dogs know their feeding time, without any bells. Every living thing has time sense and arranges its feeding, resting and moving routines according to the time of day, and to time elapsed and to correspondence with some other event - like this is the time their preferred prey is most vulnerable; this is the time salmon come to spawn; this is the time to bury nuts for winter; this is the time lions don't come to the water.
Humans have it too, a biorhythm or something similar. When not freed from the economic day/week/year constraints, we each follow our own internal clock: wake up at roughly the same time every day; get hungry at regular intervals, have a period of three or four hours when we are most alert and capable, followed by a period when we drag a bit. There is some variation among individuals, but all humans are diurnal and seasonal. (Some humans may claim to be nocturnal, but it just means they stay awake longer past sunset and sleep later into the morning. Some humans are active at night for economic reasons - and it's not good for their health. It's difficult to sleep in the day and arrange leisure activities around a night shift. A few humans are active at night because it' the only time they have free of other people's demands.) That's the framework on which they constructed the artificial daily, weekly, monthly and annual schedules of regimented societies, because that's what works for the majority of human activities.
Good question. Isn't the issue that they do seem incompatible. We can express this in more than one way. They are different language games, different categories, different perspectives. At any rate, they seem incommensurable. Yet we know that a physical process can result in a logical conclusion. If it were not so, computers would not work. Indeed, if it were not so, calculation by pen and paper would not work, either.
If they are incommensurable explanations, then it would seem to follow that they cannot exclude one another.
What makes the physical events within the machine into a calculation cannot be recognized as mathematical calculations unless we have arranged that representation. It is not the result of any physical properties or events within the machine independently of the context in which we interpret them.
I agree with your analysis, but I dont see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism.
Plantinga is not making an argument against physicalism.
Of course he is, insofar as naturalism is materialist or physicalist in orientation. What I've spelled out is why Plantinga argues that naturalism is an insufficient basis for belief. From his 1994 Naturalism Defeated .pdf:
[quote=Plantinga, 'Naturalism Defeated']"With me," Darwin said, "the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"
The same thought is put more explicitly by Patricia Churchland. She insists that the most important thing about the human brain is that it has evolved; this means, she says, that its principal function is to enable the organism to move appropriately: Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival[/quote]
He's talking about beliefs and convictions - not about the ability to act in such a way as to enhance survival. Against what criteria do we judge beliefs or convictions to be true, as distinct from pragmatically useful? You will notice that evolutionary materialists, such as Dawkins/Dennett, will say outright that all of what us 'lumbering robots' think and do is in service of the 'selfish gene'. That is the kind of mentality he has in his sights. (I believe Dennett responded extensively to Plantinga, but I'm not going to pursue it further. )
That there exists in the human mind and indeed by natural instinct, some sense of Deity
I certainly have some form of that, though not exclusively Christian in orientation.
I will add, I don't pursue this line of argument as a 'proof of God' as I don't believe that it possible, my interest in it only extends to showing the inherent self-contradictions of reductive materialism, as by it's own reckoning, its activites are the consequences of 'a nervous system that enables the organism to succeed in the four F's', social organisms though we might be.
Reply to Vera Mont
All true. So the question is, why would anyone say they don't have a concept of time? What's more, why don't we insist that human beings have the same concept of time? The hours and days are additional articulations of the sense of time we have from our biological clocks.
What has it do with rationality? Everything. If they have a concept of time in the same way that we do, that's at least a basis for rationality.
I agree with your analysis, but I dont see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism.
Yes, I suppose it could be. I've always thought there is a good deal to be said for it - better than substance dualism and materialism, anyway.
On the issue about naturalism, I got turned off when I realized that natural was being interpreted as scientific. Thumbnail sketch - That idea entirely ignores the history and practice of science. Science looks to me to be something almost entirely artificial.
If they are incommensurable explanations, then it would seem to follow that they cannot exclude one another.
That's true. But neither can you seriously articulate the idea that mental states are determined by physical processes. The conceptual equipment used to describe physical process does not include any way to describe beliefs; equally the conceptual equipment (evidence, logic) does not include any way to describe purely physical processes. Incommensurability means no bridges, no translations. And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship.
On the issue about naturalism, I got turned off when I realized that natural was being interpreted as scientific. Thumbnail sketch - That idea entirely ignores the history and practice of science. Science looks to me to be something almost entirely artificial.
I agree with you again! My objections are to that vein of popular philosophy which esteems science as the arbiter of reality. Of course many educated folk see through that but it is still a pervasive current of thought.
Vera MontSeptember 21, 2024 at 01:31#9335540 likes
What has it do with rationality? Everything. If they have a concept of time in the same way that we do, that's at least a basis for rationality.
I'm not so sure. If snails and spiders have it, it's more likely biological; no thought required. Where thinking comes in : level 1. association of a time of day or year with some event or activity (like: crocodiles are sluggish before sunrise, winter's coming soon) 2. taking certain specific time-dependent action (drink at the river while it's safe; start migration exercises) and 3. anticipation of time-related events (getting to the river before the elephants churn it up; making sure one's own fledglings are flight-capable) 4. arranging other necessary tasks not to conflict with time-related ones. (this is a little more complicated, depending on each species, but it still doesn't need a lot of intelligence.
In fact, timekeeping is one of the least remarkable things intelligent entities do.
And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship.
I think it's just a case of looking at thinking from two perspectives. I certainly don't buy the argument that says that if thought is determined by neural activity, then thoughts could not rightly be said to have logical, as well as causal, connections with one another. It's merely an argument from incredulity.
I'm not so sure. If snails and spiders have it, it's more likely biological; no thought required. Where thinking comes in ..... In fact, timekeeping is one of the least remarkable things intelligent entities do.
I don't disagree with you. There's a lot to think about here - questions that arise once one has established that dogs are rational. Does one draw a line further along the scale. Birds, yes. Snails and slugs, no. Insects, no. Fish? Maybe some. (Whales &c. yes, of course). Plants, no. The distinction between instinctive "actions" and rational one? Between autonomous actions - heart beating, digestion, sweating and voluntary actions, i.e. actions proper. These will be tricky, because there will be good reason for them even though those can't be the animal's reason. Likely it will only be serious nerds like me who will want to pursue those.
Philosophy of action is incredibly complicated.
I agree with you again! My objections are to that vein of popular philosophy which esteems science as the arbiter of reality. Of course many educated folk see through that but it is still a pervasive current of thought.
There should be a name for the fallacy of thinking that, because one has a hammer, everything's a nail, or that a good place to look for your lost keys is under the lamp-post.
I think it's just a case of looking at thinking from two perspectives. I certainly don't buy the argument that says that if thought is determined by neural activity, then thoughts could not rightly be said to have logical, as well as causal, connections with one another. It's merely an argument from incredulity.
In one way "two perspectives" is a very encouraging metaphor. So it could be like looking at the front and back of a coin. My problem is that those two perspectives are within the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Thoughts, sounds, smells are not in the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them. I'm very fond of the explanation in physics for a rainbow, which seems to cross our categories. Electrical discharge to lightening is another example. The last case suggests we should not say that an electrical discharge causes the lightening, but that the electrical discharge is the lightening. (This goes back to D.M. Armstrong. He suggested this as a materialist theory of the mind, which is a bit of a problem for me.) Then neural activity will not cause thoughts, but will be the thoughts - comparison with events inside the computer and calculating an equation. That's about as far as I've got with this.
I agree with your analysis, but I dont see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism.
My objection to Aristotle is that the form/matter dualism works well enough in some contexts, such as the context in which we have designed a computer to carry out a calculation. But it doesn't follow that it will work in all contexts e.g. where there is no purpose or designer apparent. (Because I'm quite sure that not everything has a purpose, much less that everything fits into a single hierarchy of purposes.
Having said that, I must immediately disclaim any idea that this is actually an objection to Aristotle, because I haven't engaged with his texts anywhere near sufficiently to be confident that it really applies to him specifically (or anyone else).
Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them.
The study of physics is dependent on human senses, but I think we have little reason to say that physical processes in general are. Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes.
From one perspective we can say that thoughts are physical processes, presumably causally related to one another. From another perspective thoughts may not seem like physical processes at all. This reminds me of Sellar's "space of causes" and "space of reasons". The two ways of thinking do not seem to be possible to combine into a single discourse.
The study of physics is dependent on human senses, but I think we have little reason to say that physical processes in general are. Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes.
God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!
But it is perfectly true that the study of physics is dependent on human senses. That's what I meant to say.
From one perspective we can say that thoughts are physical processes, presumably causally related to one another. From another perspective thoughts may not seem like physical processes at all. This reminds me of Sellar's "space of causes" and "space of reasons". The two ways of thinking do not seem to be possible to combine into a single discourse.
... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out.
There should be a name for the fallacy of thinking that, because one has a hammer, everything's a nail, or that a good place to look for your lost keys is under the lamp-post.
Neural processes are fairly well understood. The difficulty is with explaining how physical processes can give rise to consciously experienced feelings. I don't believe the question is answerable because it comes from trying to combine two incommensurable accounts. So the "hard problem" is based on an incoherent question.
God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!
But it is perfectly true that the study of physics is dependent on human senses. That's what I meant to say.
... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out.
Here we are talking about doing it. I don't believe we've made even the first step, and I see no reason to believe we ever will for the reason I gave in my response to Wayfer above.
I don't believe the question is answerable because it comes from trying to combine two incommensurable accounts. So the "hard problem" is based on an incoherent question.
No, it asks a very good question which draws attention to the incoherence of physicalism and the inability of it to explain the process which you say is fairly well understood.
No, it asks a very good question which draws attention to the incoherence of physicalism and the inability of it to explain the process which you say is fairly well understood.
I haven't said that the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. I would say it never will be because consciousness cannot be directly observed, and because the kinds of explanations we have for intentional behavior are given in terms of reasons, not causes, and the two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm.
It's a pure prejudice on your part that says that because we can give explanations in terms of reason that physicalism or strong emergentism must be false. It's merely an argument from incredulity.
Physicalism cannot explain subjective feelings obviously, but it doesn't follow that it is false, merely that it is limited in its scope. There is no reason to believe that we should be able to explain or understand everything. The fact that we cannot does not indicate that there must be a transcendent realm or a divine mystery. That is just wishful thinking.
That's not quite what I had in mind. I was thinking of the way that so many economists think that everything is economics. Ai Wei Wei, apparently, once observed "Everything is Art, Everything is Politics." Other people think that everything is religion.
As if the practice is uncommon among philosophers in general.
Well, it's commonest among philosophers in the 20th century English-speaking tradition, which at first set out to abolish philosophy (or at least metaphysics) in favour of science. Phenomenonlogy specifically sets itself up to exclude science from philosophy (bracketing, epoche). Then there's the Indian and Chinese traditions.
Many technologists - not philosophers - think that climate change will be "solved" by more technology - as if more of what got you into trouble is likely to get you out of it. But they still want to build nuclear power stations (to help with climate change) even though their only solution to the problem of nuclear waste is to bury it - for 100,000 years! That's a prime example.
Here we are talking about doing it. I don't believe we've made even the first step, and I see no reason to believe we ever will for the reason I gave in my response to Wayfer above.
Don't you think that recognizing the problem is the first step? What we need to do next is to map it - understand it. Then we'll have to wait and see. I'm expecting radical conceptual developments. A new Kuhnian paradigm.
the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood.
One step that may be useful is to escape from "gives rise to" or "causes". It leads to dualist hankerings, which won't help at all. I'm thinking of some locution like "is" as in "Rainbows are effect of sunlight on raindrops" or "Thunder and lightening are an electrical discharge". So brain processes join rationally explicable behaviour as symptoms or criteria for consciousness - following Wittgenstein's analysis of "pain". (D.M. Armstrong used this as a basis for a materialism, but I don't think that follows.)
Or we could look carefully at how psychologists address the problem - mainly by ignoring it, which is like a fingernail on a blackboard to philosophers like me, but nonetheless produces some interesting "phenomena"
That's not quite what I had in mind. I was thinking of the way that so many economists think that everything is economics. Ai Wei Wei, apparently, once observed "Everything is Art, Everything is Politics." Other people think that everything is religion.
It sounds very close to what I had in mind. Anyway - I'm sure you would agree that a large part of philosophy is learning to look at your spectacles instead of just through them.
I'm expecting radical conceptual developments. A new Kuhnian paradigm.
I think the outlines are beginning to emerge. Don't forget, the publication of Chalmer's book Towards a Theory of Consciousness, and the paper on the facing up to the problem of consciousness, virtually initiated the whole new sub-discipline of 'consciousness studies', which is at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. The bi-annual Arizona conference on the science of consciousness has been held ever since, co-chaired by Chalmers.
I think the outlines are beginning to emerge. Don't forget, the publication of Chalmer's book Towards a Theory of Consciousness, and the paper on the facing up to the problem of consciousness, virtually initiated the whole new sub-discipline of 'consciousness studies', which is at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. The bi-annual Arizona conference on the theme has been held ever since, co-chaired by Chalmers.
Quite so. All part of the process. Although putting Chalmers in charge makes me nervous. But then, no-one's impartial here.
Reply to Ludwig V Well, his 'hard problem' paper was the watershed moment. And don't loose sight of the fact that he was a bronze medallist at the Mathematics Olympiad before he got into philosophy. He's really rather a clever cookie. See the interview here, he grew up in my neighbourhood.
Well, his 'hard problem' paper was the watershed moment. And don't loose sight of the fact that he was a bronze medallist at the Mathematics Olympiad before he got into philosophy. He's really rather a clever cookie. See the interview here, he grew up in my neighbourhood.
In some ways, it was. It gave people a focus, just as Nagel's bat did. I never doubted that he is a clever cookie. Doesn't mean he's right. I'm not bothered about what he did before philosophy. It is a bit ambivalent, though. I try to listen carefully to physicists when they are talking about physics and mathematicians when they are talking about mathematics. But not necessarily when they are talking about Dualism.
The interview needs some reading. But I will put it on my list. Thank you. BTW, I'm still getting my head round Nagel. An off-the-cuff response based on a skim-read seemed inappropriate.
Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to
Thanks for sending me the link to this. I realize that everything has moved on in the last three days. But I hope my comments may nevertheless be of interest.
The heart of his argument is the re-evaluation of evolutionary theory. There have been various statements of it in this thread, but I shall quote from this article.
p. 5, apparently quoted from Nozick's 'The Nature of Rationality'.:The evolutionary explanation itself is something we arrive at, in part, by the use of reason to support evolutionary theory in general and also this particular application of it. Hence it does not supply a reason-independent justification of reason, and, although it grounds reason in facts independent of reason, this grounding is not accepted by us independently of our reason.
Nagel goes on to say that
p. 5:..our finding something self-evident is no guarantee that it is necessarily true, or true at all -- since the disposition to find it self-evident could have been an evolutionary adaptation to its being only approximately, and contingently true.
The proposal is supposed to be an explanation of reason but not a justification of it. Those facts are not supposed to provide us with grounds for accepting the validity or reliability of reason
So far, so good.
Now comes his mis-step, in which, so far as I can see, he contradicts what he has just said - continuing from the last quotation:-
p. 5: ... what is it It supposed to provide? It seems to be a proposal of a possible naturalistic explanation of the existence of reason that would, if it were true, make our reliance on reason "objectively" true....
There's no explanation of where this "proposal" came from, nor any account of why anyone would think that such an explanation would justify relying on reason. I wish he had recognized what evolutionary theory does and doesn't justify. But he moves gradually from the relatively harmless point that evolution would settle for pragmatic heuristics as opposed to valid arguments, that is, he ends up equating reason with any old natural process, and that's a mistake.
p. 10:Reason is whatever we find we have to use in order to understand anything. And if we try to understand it merely as a natural (biological or psychological) phenomenon, the result will be an account incompatible with our use of it and with the understanding of it that we have in using it. For I cannot trust a natural (sc. evolved) process unless I can see why it is reliable, any more than I can trust a mechanical algorithm unless I can see why it is reliable.
A natural process is specified irrespective of its trustworthiness and so the question whether it is reliable can be formulated. But an algorithm is a set of mathematical instructions or rules that will help to calculate an answer to a problem: One can ask of a set of mathematical instructions whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem. But one cannot ask of an algorithm whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem; the question whether that particular set of instructions is reliable has already been asked and answered. That's why one cannot ask of reason whether it will deliver the truth; that question has already been asked of potential arguments and answered.
If one supposes that human beings have a "rational faculty" - i.e. an ability to reason, - the question of evolution is what contribution such a faculty might make to survival - the question whether we are able to garner information about the world has already been asked and answered. This question does require a justification of reason, not as such, but as something that needs to be explained in the context of evolution. The justification of reason as a practice in its own right is a quite different project, and if that is his point, he is right.
I think that Nagel's critique does not distinguish clearly enough between the two issues. The possibility of evolution settling for something that is "only approximately, and contingently, true" (p. 5), which is a perfectly rational pragmatic practice, is meant to undermine the idea "that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection". But this misses the point. The fact that we have a rational capacity demands an evolutionary account.
The only recourse I have to understand this is wildly speculative. Nagel doesn't even mention Wittgenstein. Yet it is, I believe, common knowledge that Wittgenstein's approach to justifying reason grounds it in our human way of life, our practices, our language-games. If one accepts that, the idea of evolution presents itself as a way of deepening his gestural account and explaining why our way of life and practices are what they are.
But if one accepts Wittgenstein's "This is what I do" as the bedrock of justification, evolution is not required to provide any further justification for rationality. It is asking and answering a different question. On the other hand, if one rejects Wittgenstein's "groundless grounds", evolution may seem to provide another layer to the infinite regress of justification. For myself, I don't see that another layer is required, and would probably argue that evolution doesn't provide it anyway, but that's another matter.
For the record, I don't think that the "refutation" of evolutionary theory is his real business here. He is using that question in pursuit of bigger game, and makes that clear in his final paragraph.
p. 10:Once we enter the world for our temporary stay in it, there is no alternative but to try to decide what to believe and how to live, and the only way to do that is to try to decide what is the case and what is right. Even if we distance ourselves from some of our thoughts and impulses, and regard them from outside, the process of trying to place ourselves in the world leads to thoughts that we cannot think of as merely "ours". If we think at all, we must think of ourselves, individually and collectively, as submitting to the order of reasons rather than creating it.
This is a substantial and even important idea, irrespective of any bickering about evolution. It is helpful to read this passage in the light of his remarks about Pierce at the beginning of the essay.
I would like to comment, however, that our first business when we enter the world is not to ask that, or any other, question but to undergo the years of training required before we are capable of asking questions. By which time, we will have learnt a good deal about what is the case and what is right.
There's no explanation of where this "proposal" came from, nor any account of why anyone would think that such an explanation would justify relying on reason. I wish he had recognized what evolutionary theory does and doesn't justify.
He's discussing Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality. (I now notice that the posted version has lost some of the formatting to distinguish passages from his book, for which I apologise.) He says that this book sets out to provide a 'naturalised epistemology', that is, to ground knowledge in the facts of natural science, and in particular, evolutionary theory. He's saying that Nozick's argument is that the facts of evolutionary biology are sufficient to 'ground reason':
It (i.e. Nozick's book) seems to be a proposal of a possible naturalistic explanation of the existence of reason that would, if it were true, make our reliance on reason objectively reasonable--that is, a reliable way of getting at the truth.
So throughout this passage, he's presenting Nozick's proposal as an example of a naturalised epistemology based on evolutionary biology.
(Naturalized epistemology seeks to understand knowledge, belief, and justification using methods and insights from the natural sciences, particularly psychology, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science, rather than relying solely on a priori philosophical analysis. It treats epistemology as a branch of empirical science, where the processes of acquiring knowledge are studied as natural phenomena. It was notably advanced by W.V.O. Quine in his influential essay "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969). In it, he argued that traditional epistemology's quest for a foundation of knowledge is misguided and that instead, epistemology should be concerned with how humans, as natural beings, actually acquire and justify beliefs. Quine suggested replacing traditional epistemology with a psychological study of how we come to believe what we do. Nozick is writing in this vein, and Nagel is using this book as a foil for a general criticism of naturalised epistemology.)
So he's questioning Nozick's account, asking:
[quote=Nagel, p5] But is the (evolutionary) hypothesis really compatible with continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge about the non-apparent character of the world? In itself, I believe an evolutionary story tells against such confidence. Without something more, the idea that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection would render reasoning far less trustworthy than Nozick suggests, beyond its original coping functions. There would be no reason to trust its results in mathematics and science, for example. [/quote]
The 'something more' is a reason that carries its own authority, which need not and should not be grounded in something else. Note the resemblance to this earlier quote:
Plantinga, Naturalism Defeated:Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival
Plenty of animals get along just fine without mathematics and science. So appealing to evolutionary principles in support of reason actually has rather the contrary effect of undermining it, rather than strengthening it.
The justification of reason as a practice in its own right is a quite different project, and if that is his point, he (Nagel) is right.
Well, that I take to be his point. Basically I read the argument as saying, to rely on scientific or evolutionary justifications for reason, is to undermine the sovereignty of reason. And why? Because it points to factors outside reason itself to ground reason:
[quote=p6]The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere.[/quote]
The fact that we have a rational capacity demands an evolutionary account.
I don't know that it does. I agree that we certainly did evolve along the lines shown by the paleontological evidence, but I question how useful it is to rationalise the capacity to reason and speak in those terms.
Other than those points, mostly in agreement with the rest of the analysis, particularly the conclusion.
One step that may be useful is to escape from "gives rise to" or "causes".
All our explanations are in terms of either causes or reasons. It might be imagined that some completely new paradigm of explanation will be found, but I see no reason to think so.
Yet it is, I believe, common knowledge that Wittgenstein's approach to justifying reason grounds it in our human way of life, our practices, our language-games. If one accepts that, the idea of evolution presents itself as a way of deepening his gestural account and explaining why our way of life and practices are what they are.
The fact that we have developed the capacity for reason evolutionarily does not "justify" reason. Reason needs no justification. No justification of reason that doesn't use reason is possible, and this circularity ensures that justifying reason is an incoherent, an impossible, fantasy..
The fact that we have developed the capacity for reason evolutionarily does not "justify" reason. Reason needs no justification. No justification of reason that doesn't use reason is possible, and this circularity ensures that justifying reason is an incoherent, an impossible, fantasy..
All our explanations are in terms of either causes or reasons. It might be imagined that some completely new paradigm of explanation will be found, but I see no reason to think so.
Well, I thought you might find my suggestion interesting.
Well, I thought you might find my suggestion interesting.
I didn't mean to be dismissive. I have to acknowledge that a new paradigm of explanation is possible, I guess I just don't see it as a likelihood.
Also, I think it's fairly easy to see the adaptive and survival advantage that reason possesses. Perhaps that is (pragmatic) justification enough. I think the advanced capacity for reasoning that symbolic language brings with it has enabled humans to successfully adapt to almost any environment and to consequently strain the planet's resources, destroy vast areas of habitat and pollute the natural world. It's reason that should let us collectively understand this, and maybe it has, but the problem now seems so vast and intractable, given the cultural impediments to harmonious global planning and action that reason alone is insufficient. Will is also needed.
One lurking factor that I've been thinking over is the change in the conception of the nature of reason over history. As David Bentley Hart puts it:
In the pre-modern vision of things, the Cosmos had been seen as an inherently purposive structure of diverse but integrally inseparable rational relations for instance, the Aristotelian aitia, which are conventionally translated as causes, but which are nothing like the uniform material causes of the mechanistic philosophy. And so the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect. Hence the mind, rather than an anomalous tenant of an alien universe, was instead the most concentrated and luminous expression of natures deepest essence. This is why it could pass with such wanton liberty through the veil of Isis and ever deeper into natures inner mysteries.
This has been subject of much commentary, although not much is said of it on this site, nor in analytic philosophy generally. Alexander Koyré has explored this in his books, with which I have only passing familiarity. Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, another, and more generally the New Left's critique of the Enlightenment and the 'instrumentalisation of reason'.
I won't go further with it here, other than to note that this is the background to much of this debate, in which 'reason' is now mainly understood in terms of evolutionary adaptation, rather than as an instrument which is able to discern truth.
I must argue against that statement. Knowing truth is essential because things go very wrong when people act on incorrect ideas and bad information. Primitive people knew that problem well. They did not have bank cards to repair all the damage of bad decisions. And democracy, like scientific research, is people working together to get things right. True Aristotle made mistakes, and Greek logic defined by him was lacking. But the truth is, if we don't get things right, they can go very wrong. This is true in our private lives and public lives.
I disagree. Things don't always go wrong every time that people act on incorrect ideas and/or not knowing the truth. Running away or hiding because someone thinks that there is a dangerous threat present whether or not there's actual danger, can save that person's life.
Example:
You hear a couple loud noises and assumed that they're gunshots, so you hide.
1. No actual gunshots: Not knowing the truth that those sounds were actual gunshots and hiding, doesnt result in anything bad happening. - Rational
2. Actual gunshots: Not knowing the truth that those sounds were actual gunshots and hiding, can have a good outcome, not getting shot. - Rational
3. Actual gunshots: Not knowing the truth that those sounds were actual gunshots and not hiding, just remaining as you were, can result with you getting shot. - Irrational
This demonstrate that rationality is not contingent on being correct or knowing the truth.
I didn't mean to be dismissive. I have to acknowledge that a new paradigm of explanation is possible, I guess I just don't see it as a likelihood.
I don't think that what I'm proposing is a new paradigm. It's just a different way of looking at an old paradigm, which better reflects the questions that we ask and dissolves some of the puzzles that the old paradigm seems to generate.
Also, I think it's fairly easy to see the adaptive and survival advantage that reason possesses. ..... Will is also needed.
Too right. We oscillate between seeing reason as our crowning glory and seeing it as merely the slave of the passions. It all depends how you define it - particularly the place of our values in what we do.
So throughout this passage, he's presenting Nozick's proposal as an example of a naturalised epistemology based on evolutionary biology.
Yes, that makes sense of it. I might have written a rather different response if I had realized that. I have a feeling that he thinks that refuting that kind of naturalised epistemology in some way supports his view of reason. The vision of reason that he seems to present does not attract me in the slightest. But that's another issue.
Well, that I take to be his point. Basically I read the argument as saying, to rely on scientific or evolutionary justifications for reason, is to undermine the sovereignty of reason. And why? Because it points to factors outside reason itself to ground reason:
This is where the fundamental obscurity in foundationalism creates unnecessary (in my book) confusion. It's very simple. Question - are the foundations of a house part of the house or not? Well, builders dig trenches and fill them with concrete and they call that putting in the foundations. So the foundations are part of the house. From this perspective, the foundations of mathematics require more mathematics. But the soil and rock into/onto which they build those foundations are the foundations of the foundations and they are not part of the house. So more mathematics just pushes back the question of the foundations. Sooner or later, there must be something analogous to the soil or rock which is not built, but on which a house is built.
Things are a bit different when you come to consider something like a ship or a car. These are self-supporting structures and so, strictly speaking do not need and cannot have foundations. However, the keel of the ship or the chassis of the car plays a role analogous to the foundations of the house. The keel of the ship and the chassis of the car are part of the car. But you can build a car without a chassis - the functions of the chassis are fulfilled by the entire bodywork, which is a true self-supporting structure, without a foundation. (The same applies to ships, but they still need a keel, to give the ship a grip on the water.) But ships and cars do still have a medium, an environment, in which they exist.
I think that what Wittgenstein says about ways of life and practices trades on the first kind of foundation, but the idea is applicable to the second as well. I think a case could be made for counting it as a form of naturalism, but that's only a label, so I do not care much.
Plenty of animals get along just fine without mathematics and science. So appealing to evolutionary principles in support of reason actually has rather the contrary effect of undermining it, rather than strengthening it.
You must mean "without articulating mathematics and science". The hawk that can catch a rabbit is, in one sense, solving a complex mathematical problem even though it can't solve it in the way(s) that we can; it can also distinguish quite reliably between what it can, with benefit, eat without any (articulate) knowledge of chemistry.
Well, plenty of living things, including some animals, manage pretty well, without or with only very poor vision. Which does not invalidate the idea that vision gives an evolutionary advantage to those animals that have it. It depends on your way of life and whether you can work out some other survival strategy. (Living underground, or developing an effective ultra-sound system) However, an advantage in surviving does not negate the possibility of side-effects which may or may not play into survival.
I don't see how you can argue that evolution does not and cannot validate reason, even if it contributes to survival and argue that evolution undermines reason. If you advance the latter claim, you are accepting that reason might contribute to survival.
I won't go further with it here, other than to note that this is the background to much of this debate, in which 'reason' is now mainly understood in terms of evolutionary adaptation, rather than as an instrument which is able to discern truth.
I wasn't aware that this evolution business is so mainstream. There's no need to treat it as a dilemma or competition. I think it is quite plausible to say that reason can contribute to survival because it is able to discern truth.
This demonstrates that rationality is not contingent on being correct or knowing the truth.
That's certainly true. But the reasoning you outline starts from "If someone has fired a gun, I might get shot, so I should hide", and then considers a range of possibilities around that. That's the starting-point. Factoring in my beliefs and knowledge amounts to factoring those possibilities in. It's still about the facts.
The hawk that can catch a rabbit is, in one sense, solving a complex mathematical problem even though it can't solve it in the way(s) that we can; it can also distinguish quite reliably between what it can, with benefit, eat without any (articulate) knowledge of chemistry.
.If we think at all, we must think of ourselves ( ) as submitting to the order of reasons rather than creating it .
(Nagel, 1997)
.finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation.( ) it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science ( ) to favour a criticism ( ) by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel .
(Kant, 1787)
What, in your opinion, is meant by the order of reasons? And depending on what it is, can we think of ourselves as submitting to it, but NOT creating it?
I don't think that what I'm proposing is a new paradigm. It's just a different way of looking at an old paradigm, which better reflects the questions that we ask and dissolves some of the puzzles that the old paradigm seems to generate.
It seems to be that there is an inherent incommensurability and thus incompatibility between our two paradigms of explanationthe one in terms of experiences and reasons and the other in terms of mechanisms and causes. It's that inherent incompatibility that leads me to believe that the so-called "Hard Problem" is a pseudo-problem that comes with failing to recognize this fundamental incommensurability.
Reply to Mww Isnt the order of reasons simply what it says? Something which any valid syllogism will exemplify? The book from which the Nagel essay is taken, is The Last Word (review), a defense of reasoned argument against relativism and subjectivism. They will insist that everything is perspectival, or that facts depend on parochial rather than universal considerations. Nagel spends considerable time illustrating that these styles of argument are necessarily self-defeating, as they provide no grounds for thinking anything true.
As for the ground of reason, obviously a deep question, but I will generally argue that the furniture of reason, the basic laws of thought, are discovered and not invented.
That passage from Kant is also polemical, namely against the ridiculous despotism of the schools, meaning scholastic philosophy with its rigid adherence to dogma under the banner of revelation trumping reason.
Isnt the order of reasons simply what it says? Something which any valid syllogism will exemplify?
I thought that as well, but isnt a syllogism a logical construct in propositional form, which we create?
Oh. Nice catch on scholastic philosophy/rigid adherence to dogma. It didnt necessarily pertain to my comment; I just didnt want the quote to feel naked cuz I was to lazy to included as its author would have expected.
What, on your opinion, is meant by the order of reasons? And depending on what it is, can we think of ourselves as submitting to it, but NOT creating it?
One can make a start by getting a better idea what Nagel meant by the order of reasons. You can get a clue by going back to the beginning of the essay and re-reading the quotation from Pierce at the top of p.2.
I'm assuming that you have a copy. I'm too lazy to type it out. My copy doesn't like me using copy and paste. You can get an idea of what "submit" means by reflecting that I have to submit to the order of the software. Which means that I want something different from what the software provides. Then ask yourself why you would want something different from what reason provides.
Reading Pierce, I'm driven to ask myself what he is trying to do with that stuff about Nature being "great and beautiful and sacred and eternal and real". For me, Nature is as real and beautiful and sacred and eternal and real as a wet Sunday afternoon or washing my socks.
It's that inherent incompatibility that leads me to believe that the so-called "Hard Problem" is a pseudo-problem that comes with failing to recognize this fundamental incommensurability.
You may have a point. I think the two are different articulations of the same problem. Which I agree is a pseudo-problem, except that I can't spot how the illusion is created - yet.
As for the ground of reason, obviously a deep question, but I will generally argue that the furniture of reason, the basic laws of thought, are discovered and not invented.
We need to get past this opposition between discovery and invention - or construe it in radically different ways.
1.We should recognize (and I do mean recognize) that discovering Neptune is different from Pythagoras' discovery of his theorem or the discovery of the irrationality of pi or sqrt2.
2. Perhaps also a distinction between a theory/hypothesis (invented by Copernicus) and recognizing/proving that it is true (submitting to the facts or evidence). The second phase cannot happen until the first phase has happened. But what made Copernicus invent his theory? Recognising that Ptolemy's theory was problematic because the facts didn't fit.
3. Nagel supposes that our first order of business in life to ask ourselves what to believe and how to live. He was wrong. Our first order of business to learn how to ask questions, and that takes years, by which time we have already begun to live our lives and acquired many beliefs. The questions arrive too late to be fundamental.
Construct, I think, rather than 'create', out of materials ready to hand, so to speak.
That looks like a false opposition to me. Doesn't all creation use materials ready to hand, but perhaps in new ways. Doesn't construction always result in something new? (BTW Have you been reading or reading about Heidegger?) Did he construct his distinction between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand or create it? I don't think either construct or create is quite right for that case.
You may have a point. I think the two are different articulations of the same problem. Which I agree is a pseudo-problem, except that I can't spot how the illusion is created - yet.
What springs to mind is that they are two different articulations of the human all too human need to explain. The need to explain is the problem. We have to explain our behavior to others and we do so mostly in terms of reasons, although sometimes in terms of causes. We have to explain the behavior of animals and we do this sometimes in terms of (imagined and projected) reasons and sometimes in terms of causes and we have to explain natural phenomena and we do so in terms of mechanism, forces and causes. In regard to the last in ancient times some explanations of the natural were also in terms of reasons.
1.We should recognize (and I do mean recognize) that discovering Neptune is different from Pythagoras' discovery of his theorem or the discovery of the irrationality of pi or sqrt2.
Traditionally, this was regarded as a distinction between a posteriori (learned through observation) and a priori (established through deduction), although this distinction has become far less clear-cut than it was in Kant's day.
Did he construct his distinction between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand or create it?
I know that 'ready to hand' would suggest Heidegger but it wasn't really meant as an allusion to him. It's closer to something Frege said:
[quote=Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge; https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Burge-1992-Frege-on-Knowing-the-Third-Realm.pdf] Frege believed that number is real in the sense that it is quite independent of thought: 'thought content exists independently of thinking "in the same way", he says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it. Thought contents are true and bear their relations to one another (and presumably to what they are about) independently of anyone's thinking these thought contents - "just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets." '
...in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic he says that 'the laws of truth are authoritative because of their timelessness: "[the laws of truth] are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow, but never displace. It is because of this, that they authority for our thought if it would attain to truth."[/quote]
The fact that impresses me is the discovery of scientific and mathematical principles that are true, independently of any grasp of them. So they're mind-independent, on the one hand, because they're true for anyone who can grasp them. But at the same time, they're only perceptible to reason (which I will continue to insist is not available to animals in anything but the most rudimentary form.)
So such principles are in some basic sense 'structures of rational thought'. They pertain to and arise from what has been known in some schools as 'the formal realm', the domain of laws and principles (hence Frege's 'third realm'.) The difficulty this presents for moderns, though, is that this 'realm' is not an actual place or location, it's real in the same sense that the 'domain of natural numbers' is real while not materially existent. Whereas empiricism usually continues to insist on the reality of the mind-independent physical object, which I regard as an oxymoronic construction.
//[quote=ibid]Frege held that both the thought contents that constitute the proof-structure of
mathematics and the subject matter of these thought contents (extensions, func-
tions) exist. He also thought that these entities are non-spatial, non-temporal,
causally inert, and independent for their existence and natures from any person's
thinking them or thinking about them. Frege proposed a picturesque metaphor of
thought contents as existing in a "third realm". This "realm" counted as "third"
because it was comparable to but different from the realm of physical objects and
the realm of mental entities. I think that Frege held, in the main body of his career,
that not only thought contents, but numbers and functions were members of this
third realm.[/quote]
Compare with:
[quote=What is Math? Smithsonian Institute;https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-math-180975882/] (Many) scholarsespecially those working in other branches of scienceview Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing outside of space and time makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.
Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science. The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, hell take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?[/quote]
Well, there's a good answer to that - someone has to build and maintain all the things we rely on. But they shouldn't have the last word.//
wonderer1September 24, 2024 at 01:34#9342960 likes
What springs to mind is that they are two different articulations of the human all too human need to explain
"Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why?'
Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand.
? Kurt Vonnegut, Cats Cradle
Frege believed that number is real in the sense that it is quite independent of thought: 'thought content exists independently of thinking "in the same way", he says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it.
Note that Burge writes "number" not 'numbers'. I find it to be an important distinction because the quality of number is of course present wherever there is diversity whereas numbers as entities are not. To put it another way, say there are four objectsit seems to me to make sense that the quality or pattern of four, that is fourness, is present, but not the number four as a separate entity.
Yes, much better. Thanks.
(Self dope-slaps. Shoulda got there by myself)
You, too. Nice rendition of the essay. Thanks.
But I reserve self dope-slappin here, cuz I might not have got there by myself at all.
I'm glad you liked it. You deserve a pat on the back for self-criticism.
We have to explain our behavior to others and we do so mostly in terms of reasons, although sometimes in terms of causes.
In this context, perhaps there is room for a question I mostly shelve, about whether the difference between reasons and causes is also discovered or created. Mostly, philosophers treat it as a given, though explaining it to people learning philosophy or reluctant to recognize it can be difficult. (It's not intuitive). I don't have a crisp answer. It could be either or some combination.
In regard to the last (sc. mechanism, forces and causes) in ancient times some explanations of the natural were also in terms of reasons.
Yes. Indeed, with some reservations, it would not be wrong to say that for them, teleological explanations were dominant. Which suggests that explanation by causes was developed later, by distinguishing it from the teleological. (Though it would be more accurate to say that it was developed from Aristotle's account of explanation, which gives one model for everything.) It's curious that the non-teleological explanation has taken over and nearly ejected teleological explanations altogether - like a cuckoo.
Note that Burge writes "number" not 'numbers'. I find it to be an important distinction because the quality of number is of course present wherever there is diversity whereas numbers as entities are not. To put it another way, say there are four objectsit seems to me to make sense that the quality or pattern of four, that is fourness, is present, but not the number four as a separate entity.
I like this. It helps to bridge the gap between counting (as the ground in our practices) and arithmetic.
"Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why?'
Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand.
? Kurt Vonnegut, Cats Cradle
I like that a lot. Vonnegut used to be a great favourite of mine. I don't know why I stopped reading him. It just happened somehow.
Traditionally, this was regarded as a distinction between a posteriori (learned through observation) and a priori (established through deduction), although this distinction has become far less clear-cut than it was in Kant's day.
Quite so. Looking back, the original clarity looks like an inheritance from Plato. But perhaps that's just me.
Frege believed that number is real in the sense that it is quite independent of thought: 'thought content exists independently of thinking "in the same way", he says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it.
That "in the same way" is the problem. Even if we grant him the reality of abstract objects, which is true in a sense, it would be hard to grasp what that phrase means.
Thought contents are true and bear their relations to one another (and presumably to what they are about) independently of anyone's thinking these thought contents - "just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets.
That's an interesting quote. I would think it was the ancestor of Wittgenstein's idea in the Tractatus that all possible combinations of atomic propositions are given in advance - which I'm pretty sure he later abandoned.
. It is because of this, that they authority for our thought if it would attain to truth
Yes. It looks to me as if something has gone wrong with this sentence. But the general sense is clear. This is the same metaphor that Nagel is appealing to. (What else does one submit to but authority?) But it seems to me that the assimilation of the place of reason in our lives to the place of the law or a tyranny (depending on your point of view) is a distortion - a failure to pay attention in pursuit of a grand universal statement. (Notice how much post-modernist rhetoric turns on attacking this.) Mind you, if one has a creator-God, the metaphor becomes less metaphorical.
Quoting What is Math? Smithsonian Institute
Yes. It's curious that they chose to give such a feeble, illogical argument here. Perhaps they reflected they are addressing a lay audience, which might not appreciate harder-edged arguments.
Looking back, the original clarity looks like an inheritance from Plato. But perhaps that's just me.
Not at all, a priori/a posteriori was Kants summary of a fundamental philosophical distinction, later called into question by Quine in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism. But I still think its a valid distinction, in fact I recall it being one of the first things I was taught as an undergraduate, in the class on Hume.
Even if we grant him the reality of abstract objects, which is true in a sense, it would be hard to grasp what that phrase means.
When Frege says that 'thought contents' are real 'in the same way' as a pencil, he means, well, real. (He distinguishes 'thought content' as numbers and logical laws from casual thought.) So he's granting reality to abstract objects, which nowadays is controversial. As regards the empiricist rejection of Platonic realism, it's sadly typical, I'm afraid. The simple reason is - and it is simple - that if number is real but not material, then it's a defeater for materialism - and we can't allow that :rage:
[quote=SEP;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/#PhilSignMathPlat]Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects that arent part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate.[/quote]
Not at all, a priori/a posteriori was Kants summary of a fundamental philosophical distinction, later called into question by Quine in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism. But I still think its a valid distinction, in fact I recall it being one of the first things I was taught as an undergraduate, in the class on Hume.
Oh, yes, it was one of the early bedrocks that I was taught as well. What I don't know is exactly why Kant embedded it in his work. I also know about Quine, but then he wanders off into what he calls naturalism. Wittgenstein didn't exactly abandon it. But he did argue that it was more a matter of how certain propositions were used - a question, if you like, of statements rather than propositions.
When Frege says that 'thought contents' are real 'in the same way' as a pencil, he means, well, real. ...... So he's granting reality to abstract objects, which nowadays is controversial. As regards the empiricist rejection of Platonic realism, it's sadly typical, I'm afraid.
Now you have opened the door to the world of pain that is reality in philosophy. The meaning of "real" depends heavily on the context of its use.
The essence of the problem is this. When Frege (philosopher) says that all numbers are real, everyone will agree. Mathematicians include all the rational numbers, such as the integer ?5 and the fraction 4?/?3 and the irrational numbers (and 0) as real. For Frege, as a philosopher, an unreal number is a number that does not exist. But for mathematicians, there are three kinds of number that are not real - imaginary numbers, infinite numbers and complex numbers. All these most certainly exist. I could multiply examples. Strictly speaking, the philosophical use of real is a figment of the philosophical fantasy that there is a use of real such that it is not context-dependent; I think it is absurd but I think it is now so common that it has to be accepted. But it does not correlate with the use of real in other departments of our language.
I do accept that numbers exist and that they are abstract, which is a category of existents, which means they have a different kind or mode of existence from physical objects. So I'm not with Frege, either. Meinong? Maybe. I haven't thought about that. I think the best short story about this is Quine's slogan "To be is to be the value of a variable". My long story would be about language-games and the different kinds or modes or senses of existence they define.
The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate.
That's fascinating. It's as if the last 50 years of philosophy never happened. Oh, well, that's how the cycle works. One day people will look again and find it was not so awful after all.
..a priori/a posteriori was Kants summary of a fundamental philosophical distinction .
Wayfarer
What I don't know is exactly why Kant embedded it in his work.
If I may:
As to the summation .
. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise ( ) and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? ( ) But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion) ..
As to the why ..
..Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena. ( ) The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysicsa science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking.
Me, I think Kant imbedded this distinction in his work, because no one else, even if acknowledging the possibility of the distinction in one form or another, had constructed a method sufficient to prove both its feasibility and its limitations.
In this context, perhaps there is room for a question I mostly shelve, about whether the difference between reasons and causes is also discovered or created. Mostly, philosophers treat it as a given, though explaining it to people learning philosophy or reluctant to recognize it can be difficult. (It's not intuitive). I don't have a crisp answer. It could be either or some combination.
I've thought about this question in regard to mathematics. I think it's fair to say it's both. Thinking about reasons and causes we discover a valid distinction in our thinking between them in that we consider acting for reasons to be self-generated, intentional. Being caused to act is thought in terms of being pushed by an external agent. There are many ways in which the two notions bleed into one another, so there is no absolutely clearcut distinction.
Yes. Indeed, with some reservations, it would not be wrong to say that for them, teleological explanations were dominant. Which suggests that explanation by causes was developed later, by distinguishing it from the teleological. (Though it would be more accurate to say that it was developed from Aristotle's account of explanation, which gives one model for everything.) It's curious that the non-teleological explanation has taken over and nearly ejected teleological explanations altogether - like a cuckoo.
Is it curious or is it because in the development of our investigations and understandings of the world we have come to see that there is no need for imaginary entities to explain natural phenomena?
I like the concept of a rational reconstruction for this. (I found it recently in Lee Braver's "Groundless Grounds".)
By "rational reconstruction" do you mean something along the lines of 'thinking about how things seems to us and then imputing it (in some kind of suitably modified form) to animals' or something else? I have that Braver book on my shelves somewhere, but I've never gotten around to reading it. Would you recommend it?
I have no idea what you mean unless you are thinking of counting as an act.
Yes, Im exploring that way of thinking about it. Its often said that numbers are abstract or intelligible objects, but Ive long felt that object is the wrong word, a reification (thingifying). But number as the representation of the act of counting and other mathematical operations makes sense to me. It is also linked to the active sense of being, which is what I mean by being is a verb. (I sense some connection here with Aquinas on the dynamic nature of being but I wont take that up right now.)
Now you have opened the door to the world of pain that is reality in philosophy. The meaning of "real" depends heavily on the context of its use.
My intuition is that numbers are real but not existent in the same sense that objects are. The deep issue is that in modern philosophy, what is real and what exists are generally understood to be synonymous. Whereas I believe what exists is a subset of what is real, which includes potentiality, possibility, logical laws and mathematical principles, and much else besides. (C S Pierce has a similar view and has writings on the distinction between reality and existence.)
But this is why, when you say number is real, the difficult question comes up what do you mean by real or exists? The analogy of the divided line in the Republic addresses this. Plato says there are different kinds or levels of knowing with different kinds of objects - pistis, doxa, dianoia and noesis. But this is precisely what has been lost in the transition to modernity. Dianoia - mathematical and geometrical knowledge - was retained, through Galileos Platonism, but noesis was rejected, along with realism concerning universals. And the other background issue is that the idea of the hierarchy of being and knowing had become integrated with the medieval synthesis, Ptolemaic cosmology and geocentricity, so that when this collapsed, the great chain of being collapsed with it. And it was that metaphysics which had allowed for degrees of reality. Without it mankind is confined to a kind of single dimension of reality, that of objects and forces, the isolated Cartesian ego exploring and manipulating a world of objects through abstract geometry - modern materialism, in a nutshell.
Reply to Wayfarer OK, that makes sense. I also think of being or existing as a verb. Being can also be thought of as a noun, but then it is an abstraction. It's interesting that existing cannot be thought of as a noun, for that the word gets changed to existence, which is also an abstraction.
Looked at from either the perspective of being as a verb or as a noun we cannot conceive of there being real being without there being real beings.
Reply to Janus I found this note on the Wikipedia entry on Pragmatism:
Joseph Margolis in Historied Thought, Constructed World (California, 1995) makes a distinction between "existence" and "reality". He suggests using the term "exists" only for those things which adequately exhibit Peirce's Secondness: things which offer brute physical resistance to our movements. In this way, such things which affect us, like numbers, may be said to be "real", although they do not "exist". Margolis suggests that God, in such a linguistic usage, might very well be "real", causing believers to act in such and such a way, but might not "exist".
Close to what I believe, although I think the number is indeed embedded in the fabric of the cosmos, so that it is ontologically greater than merely 'something that affects us'.
I haven't said that the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. I would say it never will be because consciousness cannot be directly observed, and because the kinds of explanations we have for intentional behavior are given in terms of reasons, not causes, and the two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm.
If those two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm, then one or both of those kinds of explanations need to be modified or discarded. Because, since everything exists in this one universe, there must be a single paradigm that explains it all.
But perhaps there is a paradigm that they both fit within. As opposed to melding the two.
If those two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm, then one or both of those kinds of explanations need to be modified or discarded. Because, since everything exists in this one universe, there must be a single paradigm that explains it all.
But perhaps there is a paradigm that they both fit within. As opposed to melding the two.
I don't see why there must be a "single paradigm that explains it all". Those two modes of explanation are both essential to human life. For the modern mind explanations of phenomena as intentional cannot carry any weight because they are justified neither by observation nor logic.
When it comes to explanations of human and some animal behavior the notion of acting for intelligently formulated reasons would seem to be indispensable so I can't see a possibility of discarding either one. As to "modifying" them or finding a "master" paradigm within which they would both fit I cannot even begin to imagine what those would look like.
Of course that doesn't mean it is impossible, but it certainly seems impossible from where I sit. The logics of intentional behavior on the one hand and being constrained to act by external causes on the other just seem incompatible.
PatternerSeptember 25, 2024 at 03:55#9344940 likes
The logics of intentional behavior on the one hand and being constrained to act by external causes on the other just seem incompatible.
Yet they are entirely compatible. There can be no question of that. Here we are. There is some commonality, or they could not exist in the same universe, much less in the same being. We just have to figure out what the commonality is. Something explains the different modes operating in the same being.
Reply to Patterner As explanations they are incompatible in the sense that they cannot be combined into a 'master' explanation that incorporates them. That is not to say that being caused and intentional behavior cannot both exist in the same universe or being.
Say I go to the shops for milk. If someone asks why I went to the shops I'll say it was to buy milk. That's one explanation. On the other hand, I could say I went to the shops because the neural activity which is experienced as realizing I was out of milk and neural activity which is experienced as wanting to have milk led to neural activity which led me to go to the shop.
The reason I went to the shops was to buy milk. The cause of my going to the shops was neural activity. The two explanations do not rule each other out they are just two different ways of understanding the same event. Their incompatibility consists in their different ways of understanding. It doesn't follow that one is right and the other wrong,
The reason I went to the shops was to buy milk. The cause of my going to the shops was neural activity.
Without wanting to nit pick, I dont think thats quite right. The stock example Ive always read is, the answer to why is the kettle boiling? can be either to make tea or because its been heated to the appropriate temperature. Both answers are of course correct, but the former is teleological - what is the water boiling for? - while the latter refers to the preceding cause of the water boiling. Generally speaking science since Galileo has attempted to avoid teleological explanations, preferring explanations in terms of preceding causes.
The stock example Ive always read is, the answer to why is the kettle boiling? can be either to make tea or because its been heated to the appropriate temperature. Both answers are of course correct,
Yes. As far as I'm concerned, as a philosopher, that's a datum.
A neat resolution is to see it as a question of lenses rather than about the world. Wittgenstein's "seeing aspects" is one attempt, and the puzzle picture analogy is, I think, very helpful. Two problems. First, there is a description of the picture as marks on paper - lines or patches of shading. That description "loses" both ways of interpreting it - it couldn't be neutral between them if it didn't.
If, for example, we were to interpret our debate about animals as about two different ways of understanding (representing) them, we would have neat explanation of why we find it so hard to agree. It's a false choice. But then, we would expect there to be a description of them that is neutral between the mechanical, physical explanation and the rational explanation of what they do.
We just have to figure out what the commonality is. Something explains the different modes operating in the same being.
Yes. However, traditional metaphysical explanations like dualism resolve the problem by positing two different substances (and then there's the "three worlds" idea, which seems to me to be in the same boat with dualism), which rejects your description of different modes in the same being. Materialism and idealism make a choice within that framework by rejecting one substance or the other and "reducing" one horn of the dilemma to the other. We won't get anywhere down that road.
Generally speaking science since Galileo has attempted to avoid teleological explanations, preferring explanations in terms of preceding causes.
Yes. "Preferring" is a bit weak - unless you mean it in the traditional sense of "pushing forward" or "promoting". They had a methodological issue as well as all the theology - mathematics. Mental objects appeared not to be capable of being incorporated into that new way of doing science. But, as we are now seeing, that was actually just kicking the can down the road. We can't do that any more, though some people (Nagel, Searle) seem to think that's an option.
The reason I went to the shops was to buy milk. The cause of my going to the shops was neural activity. The two explanations do not rule each other out they are just two different ways of understanding the same event. Their incompatibility consists in their different ways of understanding. It doesn't follow that one is right and the other wrong,
You are quite right. My problem with your way of putting it is that the cause is a different entity or event from the effect. That's why I want to say that my going to the shops consists of my moving my legs, etc and the neural activity (which, after all, is involved throughout by controlling the movement of my legs.
You can say that the thermostat causes the boiler to switch on and off, because, at that level of description, they are recognizable to two different entities. But if you talk about the heating system, the thermostat controls the system and so is part of it. It doesn't cause the system to switch on and off - the system doesn't switch on and off.
But perhaps there is a paradigm that they both fit within. As opposed to melding the two.
Well, there is - Aristotle's four "causes". Actually the word that we translate as "cause" also means "reason", so it would be better to talk about Aristotle's four explanations. But that is lodged deeply in his hylomorphic metaphysics, so that all four explanations apply to everything, which won't do for us - unless we fancy accepting the Supreme Good and the Great Chain.
The problem now is that we do not want to (cannot) apply both explanations to everything. We would be happy to say that some things require causal explanations only and some things require both. Many cases are clear, but others or not - both at the line between living and non-living things/beings and between sentient and non-sentient beings and again at the line between rational and not rational beings. What's worse is that it appears to be an empirical question which things belong in which categories.
Our problem is not helped by the fact that ever since evolutionary theory developed we have had a scientific theory hovers between (combines?) the two - there is a rational explanation for what evolves as well as a mechanistic one. But there is no question that the purposes of evolution are not the purposes of the animals that evolution applies to.
wonderer1September 25, 2024 at 10:22#9345200 likes
We can't do that any more, though some people (Nagel, Searle) seem to think that's an option.
I haven't looked into much by Searle, aside from The Chinese Room, but my impression is that Searle isn't so resistant to physicalism per se, but to a naive computationalist physicalism which he is well justified in resisting. [FWIW, some writer on Wikipedia seems to agree saying, "Searle says simply that both are true: consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes of the brain. (A view which he suggests might be called biological naturalism.)]
Reply to wonderer1 its the precise nature of the causal relationship that is at issue. Physicalism says it must be bottom-up, but the placebo effect mitigates against that.
wonderer1September 25, 2024 at 11:37#9345330 likes
See The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation by Peter Tse.
Is there any chance you can give any guidance on that? You must know it fairly well to have recommend it multiple times as having found a solution. I find it very difficult. Likely my lack of education in most areas ever discussed here. But maybe you can give me some kind of summary? Or handholds to look for along the way? Anything to keep my head above water.
I haven't looked into much by Searle, aside from The Chinese Room, but my impression is that Searle isn't so resistant to physicalism per se, but to a naive computationalist physicalism which he is well justified in resisting. [FWIW, some writer on Wikipedia seems to agree saying, "Searle says simply that both are true: consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes of the brain. (A view which he suggests might be called biological naturalism.)]
I may well be wrong. The last thing I read by him was an interview with Dennett in which he insisted that first-person subject experience is real - not an illusion.
its the precise nature of the causal relationship that is at issue. Physicalism says it must be bottom-up, but the placebo effect mitigates against that.
I agree that it is the nature of the relationship that is at issue. But if you say that event A causes event B, you are positing the two events as distinct. So are physicalists positing that the experience or thought caused by a process distinct from the process? That means it must exist independently of the cause. Dualism.
Further, what physicalists forget is that in order to correlate a physical process with an experience or a thought, you need to know what thought or experience you are correlating it with. There's no prospect of deducing what experience or thought a physical process may be correlated with from the physical process alone. Ditto light waves and colour.
But this is why, when you say number is real, the difficult question comes up what do you mean by real or exists? The analogy of the divided line in the Republic addresses this.
What I mean by saying that numbers exists is explained by explaining how to count and perhaps to calculate. What is meant by saying that numbers are real is explained by explaining the zoo that has become the world of numbers, especially about imaginary and infinite numbers.
By "rational reconstruction" do you mean something along the lines of 'thinking about how things seems to us and then imputing it (in some kind of suitably modified form) to animals' or something else? I have that Braver book on my shelves somewhere, but I've never gotten around to reading it. Would you recommend it?
Yes, I would. It needs to be read with a certain charity. If you fasten on all the obvious analytic objections to Heidegger, you'll spend a lot of time being angry and not learn much. But your charity will be rewarded - not necessarily by becoming a full-blown Heideggerian, but by some thought-provoking ideas. (I'm particularly taken with "present-at-hand" and "ready-to-hand" and how he develops his argument against traditional philosophy) His exposition of Wittgenstein has a perhaps unusual focus (on grounds and justification and certainty), but I thought it was good and, especially by seeing him and Heidegger as working on parallel projects, it taught me something about him.
There's an entry in the index for "rational reconstruction". You may have to read around the actual passages a bit to see what is going on. If you do read it and want to ask me questions by private message, I would be happy to answer - not that I can answer all the questions, by any means. It's all about the role of articulation (in language or talking to oneself) in thinking and action. So relevant to animals.
The roots of this go right back to elementary a language. As soon as you have the concept of an apple, you can identify many apples, so the distinction between one and many is embedded as soon as you start thinking/language. (The ancient Greeks didn't recognize "1" as a number, but as the "source" of all numbers. It makes sense if you think of it in this way.) Some actual languages only have words for "one", "two", "many". But counting has already taken off - it's just elaboration from there on. One can think of counting as sticking a label on each apple in turn which individuates the apple and tells you many there are. You have arithmetic as soon as you can do that, but for true mathematics, you really need to go in for more elaborate calculations, such as algebraic ones and recognize "0". That changes the concept of number, but still grounds it in the relevant activities, not in any objects, physical or abstract.
That's off the cuff. I hope it helps.
wonderer1September 25, 2024 at 12:38#9345490 likes
Is there any chance you can give any guidance on that? You must know it fairly well to have recommend it multiple times as having found a solution. I find it very difficult. Likely my lack of education in most areas ever discussed here. But maybe you can give me some kind of summary? Or handholds to look for along the way? Anything to keep my head above water.
Yeah, I had a 35 year head start in thinking about such things with a background in electrical engineering. I can't really imagine what it must be like to try to understand what Tse is saying without that background. I understand many won't find it an easy read.
An analogy to what Tse refers to as "criterial causation", that occurred to me before Tse's book came out, is that of locks and keys. Different locks have different criteria for what will be effective as a key that opens them.
So if you can mentally translate between locks and keys, and neural networks having different criterai for inputs/keys that will open the lock (activate a neural network output having intentionality) maybe that could help?
wonderer1September 25, 2024 at 13:32#9345530 likes
I may well be wrong. The last thing I read by him was an interview with Dennett in which he insisted that first-person subject experience is real - not an illusion.
I might disagree with Dennett similarly. I consider Dennett's views a mixed bag. Some good stuff as well as bad stuff.
wonderer1September 25, 2024 at 13:42#9345550 likes
Causality in brains is very complex, with all sorts of feedback loops, and if you are thinking about it in terms of a top down vs bottom up dichotomy you aren't thinking about it very seriously.
Yet another criterion. The more requirements you add, the fewer entities may exercise a faculty that was once available to everything in possession of a cerebellum.
All thinking animals can act rationally, emotionally, instinctively or chaotically (when they're ill). I very much doubt that thought processes take different amounts of energy to perform.
If you doubt that different thought processes consume different levels of energy you might google for information. There are problems with accessing some sites. The following site has the information but requires an email address and maybe you can find one that is easier to access. I already recommended the "Fast and Slow thinking" link but I don't think you paid attention to it.
Yes, it's true that some types of thinking require more energy than others, as complex mental tasks, like problem solving or learning new information, activate more brain regions and demand a higher level of neural activity, resulting in increased energy consumption compared to simpler thought processes like daydreaming or routine tasks.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/thinking-hard-calories/#:~:text=%22In%20theory%2C%20yes%2C%20a,percentage%20of%20the%20overall%20rate.
All thinking is not the same and animals that instantly do mathematical calculations, such as bats with sonar are not doing those calculations as we do them. Understanding differences in thinking is important to the subject rational thinking- human and animal.
If you ask what makes us human, the answer will not be "rationality", but emotion. Ironical, don't you think?
That is a very interesting comment. It deserves its own thread- What Makes Us Human. My first love was sociology. Compared to primitive cultures religions today might pose different reasoning regarding what makes us human. I am not sure if today, all people believe we are all human. We still live with the reasoning that some people are less than human.
wonderer1September 25, 2024 at 15:37#9345730 likes
We still live with the reasoning that some people are less than human.
I don't see that in most cases as a matter of reasoning so much as a matter of tribalistic instinct. I think we are naturally biased towards see US as human and THEM as less so. It takes reasoning to get beyond tribalistic thinking.
Vera MontSeptember 25, 2024 at 16:08#9345800 likes
The rest is available for learning, memory, language, culture, skill acquisition, storytelling, convictions, wealth accumulation, altruism, invention, emotional complexity, deceit, social bonding, philosophy, ambition, superstition, delusion and madness. As well as reasoning and assessment. Vera Mont
But all that is not rational thinking. Rational thinking requires critical thinking and we would have an extremely short lifespan if all our awake time was also our critical thinking time.
Reasoning and assessment are rational thinking, that require some degree of critical thinking. So do the accumulation of wealth, invention, skill acquisition and deceit. And yet rich people, academics, scientists and con artists do not have noticeably shorter lifespans than janitors, navvies and assembly line workers, who are not required to expend very much brainpower for their work - and the majority of whom are unlikely to be chess champions or ingenious puzzle solvers in their spare time. I
Yes, it's true that some types of thinking require more energy than others, as complex mental tasks, like problem solving or learning new information, activate more brain regions and demand a higher level of neural activity, resulting in increased energy consumption compared to simpler thought processes like daydreaming or routine tasks.
Indeed. Yet occasional bouts of intense thought don't shorten one's life, though they sometimes lengthens one's afternoon nap or elicit a strong craving for ice cream. Not all critical thinking is complex problem-solving and learning new tasks. A lot of rational thought is simply choosing what to cook for dinner, whether to walk or take the bus, which air conditioner comes with a better warranty, or what to wear for a date? All decisions are either rational or irrational, but only a few are intellectually challenging.
We all need both intensive thinking time and down time. Humans have resources other than critical thought: instinct, intuition, memory, imagination. None of them need to conflict with observed fact or rely on blind faith - iow, we don't need to be irrational in order to daydream or perform routine tasks. We can be irrational, even though we have language and mathematics, access to information we did not personally collect, and critical faculties that we can engage at will.
But that doesn't mean we need to be irrational most of the time, or that other animals can't be rational even though they have no human language, math or databases.
This demonstrates that rationality is not contingent on being correct or knowing the truth.
That's certainly true. But the reasoning you outline starts from "If someone has fired a gun, I might get shot, so I should hide", and then considers a range of possibilities around that. That's the starting-point. Factoring in my beliefs and knowledge amounts to factoring those possibilities in. It's still about the facts.
We still live with the reasoning that some people are less than human.
Yes. I'm not sure exactly what cases you have in mind. One of the most popular ones is the moral cases. We classify people who do seriously outrageous things as "bestial" or "animal" even when they are doing things that no animal is capable of doing or even be interested in doing. Sadistic cruelty, War, Mass murder.
We can be irrational, even though we have language and mathematics, access to information we did not personally collect, and critical faculties that we can engage at will.
Yes. Our image of a perfectly, or even just excessively, rational person is not a compliment. The complaint would be that they are emotionless, too like a machine, without understanding of those endearing irrationalities that makes us all human.
I don't see that in most cases as a matter of reasoning so much as a matter of tribalistic instinct. I think we are naturally biased towards see US as human and THEM as less so. It takes reasoning to get beyond tribalistic thinking.
Yes, you are right about that. However, I think that part of that is the effect of crowd thinking. When people get swept up in a crowd is a classic situation when one does things that make no sense.
That still doesn't show that rationality is contingent on being correct or knowing the truth.
I'm sorry. I didn't mean to contradict that. Whether p and q and r are my beliefs or not, the rational relations are the same. It is the content of the beliefs that determines what rational conclusions from them are.
Vera MontSeptember 25, 2024 at 22:26#9346160 likes
Our image of a perfectly, or even just excessively, rational person is not a compliment. The complaint would be that they are emotionless, too like a machine, without understanding of those endearing irrationalities that makes us all human.
I don't think irrationality - thinking contrary to factual information, as in ideological zealotry, or baseless prejudice, or self-destructive delusion - is particularly endearing. We humans who are supposedly in possession of the only rational mind in the universe, are capable of profound and catastrophic irrationalities. But we don't have to indulge them. Most of the time, most of us respond in rational ways to mundane, practical events and interactions; most of the time most of us make mundane, practical, rational decisions about ordinary matters. Otherwise, all our lives would be in constant chaos. Most of us can be emotional, empathic, kind, compassionate, generous, curious, spontaneous, insightful, irresponsible, angry, sad, confused, frustrated, ignorant, lazy, careless, spaced out, or off on flights of fancy without becoming irrational. Yet all of us get away with being irrational sometimes, because we have strong familial and community support networks, and some of us can be irrational in groups, because they're armed and hard to resist.
Most other animals don't have that luxury.
creativesoulSeptember 25, 2024 at 22:37#9346170 likes
The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
creativesoul
Because he doesn't know the names humans have artificially given the hours and minutes of the day. Okay.
Are you having a conversation by yourself, for yourself, and to yourself?
"Okay." ???
No, the dog knows when their human is about to arrive but has no clue what time the arrival happens because the dog doesn't practice timekeeping. You neglect some very important distinctions. That much has become clear.
Without wanting to nit pick, I dont think thats quite right. The stock example Ive always read is, the answer to why is the kettle boiling?
There is no essential difference I can see between the example I gave and your "stock example". If you see a difference perhaps you could highlight it.
You have arithmetic as soon as you can do that, but for true mathematics, you really need to go in for more elaborate calculations, such as algebraic ones and recognize "0". That changes the concept of number, but still grounds it in the relevant activities, not in any objects, physical or abstract.
Thanks, but I'm not seeing how it changes the concept of number beyond just extending the basic concept inherent in counting.
There's an entry in the index for "rational reconstruction". You may have to read around the actual passages a bit to see what is going on. If you do read it and want to ask me questions by private message, I would be happy to answer - not that I can answer all the questions, by any means. It's all about the role of articulation (in language or talking to oneself) in thinking and action. So relevant to animals.
Thanks I'll check it out. By the way I'm not averse to Heidegger. I have read some of his work including Being and Time, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and secondary sources such as Dreyfus, Malpas and Blattner, listened to Dreyfus' lectures and attended a couple of undergraduate units dealing with his early work and I found it all quite rewarding. It was my interest in Heidegger more than my interest in Wittgenstein that led me to buy the Braver books.
You are quite right. My problem with your way of putting it is that the cause is a different entity or event from the effect. That's why I want to say that my going to the shops consists of my moving my legs, etc and the neural activity (which, after all, is involved throughout by controlling the movement of my legs.
Yes I agree we must include the whole system of causes and conditions. That said nothing at all happens without the brain and the neuroscientists tell us that the neural networks in the brain model everything we think and do just prior to our thinking and doing.
No, the dog knows when their human is about to arrive but has no clue what time the arrival happens because the dog doesn't practice timekeeping.
The dog practices timekeeping in exactly the same way humans did before the invention of clocks. The dog knows when it's time to wake people, when it's mealtime, when it's time for various family members to leave the house and arrive home again, what time the newspaper and mail arrive, when it's time to go for an evening walk and when it's bedtime for children. Quoting creativesoul
You neglect some very important distinctions.
These are manufactured distinctions with no meaning that I can attend to. Quoting creativesoul
I know other things, and "this" follows from those things.
Ditto.
creativesoulSeptember 26, 2024 at 00:03#9346270 likes
Is learning how to open a gate or door by observation alone possible by a creature completely incapable of thinking?
creativesoul
Opening a gate is possible by observation...
No thought? No belief? No expectation? What, on earth, could mindless observation be? What is it to observe something that one does not believe is there?
Knowing others open gates is something that plenty of other creatures are capable of acquiring. This allows the creature to carefully watch. This shows innate interest. Curiosity. We can most certainlly watch that happen, in the right sorts of circumstances given the right sorts of creatures.
The subject is involved in a series of events. The subjects under consideration do not know that they are part of a routine. They do not know that they are participating in ritual. In order to see oneself as a subject matter in and of itself, one must be capable of drawing a distinction between themself and their own life. Doing that, at a bare minimum, requires naming and descriptive practices.
...but It is impossible to say apodeitically whether a creature incapable of thinking learns anything, whether by observation or otherwise.
Is it?
Thoughtless learning? Belief less learning? Learning without meaningful connections? Learning how to open a gate... without believing they can... without thinking about it... without drawing correlations between opening the gate and getting out?
Learning how to open a gate always includes a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. Dogs can want to reach the other side of a gate. They can know it's possible by watching it happen. They can want to get out, watch others doing so, and learn how to do it themselves, and then... they do so.
Performing a task grounded in observation alone could be mere mimicry, which does not necessarily support what it is to learn.
Not sure if that ever a bad thing, in this context. We're talking about what counts as thinking... and then, what counts as rational thinking
Some mimicry is learning how to behave(in the sense of learning what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behavior). Other mimicry isn't.
Learning how to open a gate by watching others do it results in a practically pure form of mimicry. Doing exactly what needs to be done in order to open the gate. The necessity of thought and belief seems apparent enough now, right? The dog wants to open the gate.
The striking singular difference between human minds and most(arguably all) other minds is that humans draw and maintain the meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. Our own thought and belief(along with meaning, truth, and falsehood) are only discovered via language use. Other animals cannot think about their own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right. Hence, they have no idea how to tell the difference between their own true and false beliefs. They cannot take account of them unless they pick them out of the world to the exclusion of all else. That cannot be done without naming and descriptive practices.
Learning how to open a gate is rational behavior practiced by a thoughtful creature. Not all gate openers know that they just learned how to open a gate. Zeke didn't think about the fact that he was opening a gate. He just opened it. Zeke was an old dog of mine, and dogs that are opening gates are an elementary constituent part/element of the gate opening facts/events, as they happen. Dogs do not take account of themselves and everything happening around them as it happens. They know what's happening sometimes, but they do not think about their knowledge of that. They think about what they're doing, what they're in the middle of. They think about distal objects and themselves. They think by virtue of drawing meaningful correlations between different things.
PatternerSeptember 26, 2024 at 00:15#9346300 likes
Say I go to the shops for milk. If someone asks why I went to the shops I'll say it was to buy milk. That's one explanation. On the other hand, I could say I went to the shops because the neural activity which is experienced as realizing I was out of milk and neural activity which is experienced as wanting to have milk led to neural activity which led me to go to the shop.
I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity [I]is[/I] wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose.
creativesoulSeptember 26, 2024 at 00:25#9346320 likes
The dog practices timekeeping in exactly the same way humans did before the invention of clocks
Oh gosh. That is in dire need of argumentative support. I have no reason to believe that that's true, as written. Bald assertion is inadequate. Bald assertion conflicting with known relevant facts is completely unacceptable.
I want you to think about that for a few minutes. Humans charted stars, planned voyages, recorded seasons and all sorts of other things long before inventing clocks. We were drawing correlations between weather patterns and their own lives long before anyone figured out how to make mechanical gears with the 'perfect' number of teeth for our purposes.
Planning routines, instead of just being a part of them, is a time keeping practice. Dogs don't do that.
Dogs can be taught to wake up humans at a certain time. When this or that happens. That's not timekeeping. That's behaving as one is taught to behave. It's rational. It involves an unconscious autonomous sense of time. Waking up someone at the right time is rational.
Dogs do not think about their own expectations as a subject matter in their own right. When we think about what time we're expecting a loved one, stranger, friend, foe, and/or family member to arrive we're thinking about our own thought and belief. We're isolating our own expectations by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is to think about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires first having them, then becoming capable of isolating them as a subject matter in their own right.
Dogs cannot do that.
Vera MontSeptember 26, 2024 at 02:17#9346480 likes
Oh gosh. That is in dire need of argumentative support. I have no reason to believe that that's true, as written. Bald assertion is inadequate.
It's not all that hairless:
The brain is an efficient machine in orchestrating temporal information across a wide range of time scales. Remarkably, circadian and interval timing processes are shared phenomena across many species and behaviours. Moreover, timing is a pivotal biological function that supports fundamental cognitive (e.g. memory, attention, decision-making) and physiological (e.g. daily variations of hormones and sleepwake cycles) processes.
Bald assertion conflicting with known relevant facts is completely unacceptable.
Which relevant facts are those? From what source can you be certain that early hominids did not have a sense of time? If they did not, why did they not miss it for so long, and then suddenly, with the onset of civilization, perceive a need to devise instruments for measuring time? Quoting creativesoul
Humans charted stars, planned voyages, recorded seasons and all sorts of other things long before inventing clocks.
Horologythe study of the measurement of timedates back to 1450 BC when the Ancient Egyptians first observed the earths natural circadian rhythms. They divided the day into two 12-hour periods and used large obelisks to track the suns movement.
Planning routines, instead of just being a part of them, is a time keeping practice. Dogs don't do that.
Probably not. But maybe that's because they're constrained by their people's work-leisure schedules, rather than the requirements of nature. The vultures in my area are staging for winter migration, holding exercises to make sure all the year's fledglings are flight-capable. The squirrels are very busy, hiding chestnuts and acorns. It's evening; the raccoons are preparing to forage, the salamanders and chipmunks have retired to their hidden nests. A coyote pack somewhere is assembling for the hunt - I hear their calls - but they must wait till moonrise. Quoting creativesoul
Dogs do not think about their own expectations as a subject matter in their own right.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires first having them, then becoming capable of isolating them as a subject matter in their own right
But having them doesn't require reflecting on them or isolating them or deciding what their rights may be.
Dogs don't need to do that; they're not riddled with self-doubt.
(that last one is as bald as Patrick Stewart)
I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity is wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose.
I don't see the 'wanting to have milk' as epiphenomenal but as a necessary part of the associated neural activity. We certainly don't experience the neural activity as such.
PatternerSeptember 26, 2024 at 03:17#9346540 likes
Reply to Janus
Right. But, if all is physical determinism, then why would we experience the wanting? A robot that is programmed to fill a cup with water when its sensors detect it is empty doed not "want" water. Nor does it experience the electrical activity that senses the low water level, or that moves the parts that refill the cup. It's all just mechanical stimulus and response.
Body needs a nutrient that is found in milk. Brain initiates action potentials to move body to open refrigerator to get milk. Photons bouncing off of contents of refrigerator do not hit retina in a pattern that closely enough matches any patterns representing milk that have been stored in the past. Brain initiates new action potentials, so body goes to store.
There is no wanting in that description, and no need of wanting. Stimulus and response accomplishes what is needed. The subjective experience of the need for that nutrient is not necessary.
But the subjective experience is there. One would think because it is an evolutionary advantage. But if it is only the subjective experience of the neutral activity, and is not causal, then how is it an advantage?
And, advantage or not, how is the subjective experience accomplished?
Right. But, if all is physical determinism, then why would we experience the wanting? A robot that is programmed to fill a cup with water when its sensors detect it is empty doed not "want" water.
Why would we not experience wanting? Why compare us to robots? We are not robots we are evolved organisms.
And, advantage or not, how is the subjective experience accomplished?
We don't know, and may never know, how it is accomplished. I say we may never know, because even the neural processes cannot be directly observed in vivo. But we have no evidence to suggest that neural activity could not possibly be accompanied by conscious experience. We understand physical processes in causal terms by directly observing them and in the case of neural processes this is just not possible.
Even if we could observe in living detail the neural processes we cannot observe conscious experience, so establishing the link between the two would still seem to be impossible, as far as I can imagine. Of course I might be mistaken, I won't deny that.
Most of us can be emotional, empathic, kind, compassionate, generous, curious, spontaneous, insightful, irresponsible, angry, sad, confused, frustrated, ignorant, lazy, careless, spaced out, or off on flights of fancy without becoming irrational.
Falling in love without becoming irrational?
Surely a rational reason for friendship turns the friendship into something else - a transactional, conditional relationshiop?
What are the rational reasons for generosity? For mercy? For forgiveness? For hope?
I don't think irrationality - thinking contrary to factual information, as in ideological zealotry, or baseless prejudice, or self-destructive delusion - is particularly endearing.
I didn't mean that all irrationality is endearing. You are quite right about "ideological zealotry, or baseless prejudice, or self-destructive delusion". Surely, the irrational is two-edged - or perhaps, in itself is neither - it all depends on how irrational and what the irrationality leads to.
And then there's Hume claim that "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions" and his fact/value distinction.
That said nothing at all happens without the brain and the neuroscientists tell us that the neural networks in the brain model everything we think and do just prior to our thinking and doing.
"nothing at all happens without the brain" is not helpful. Nothing at all happens without the legs, heart, etc. When you say that the neural networks in the brain are modelling the action, you are surely(?) going way beyond what we actually know. We do actually know that the brain is active before the action in ways that can be identified as precursors of the action, as well as during it. But we don't know exactly what the brain is doing. Still, it may well be doing something that we would call modelling the action. Such preparatory activity is perfectly comprehensible as part of the action. Preparation is concept that links preparatory activities to the activity, so it is conceptually, not merely causally, linked to the activity.
By the way I'm not averse to Heidegger. I have read some of his work
I wondered which side of the divide you might fall when I wrote those comments. Not knowing, I just talked about how I came at it. Perhaps I should have gone into more detail.
Taking on both those very different philosophers is a real challenge, and I respect him for it. But he will obviously be in line for criticism from both sides, who are likely to have different criteria for assessing what he is doing.
Since you are already pretty well read, I shall be very interested to know what you make of the book. I'm very sympathetic to the project.
PatternerSeptember 26, 2024 at 12:57#9346840 likes
Why would we not experience wanting? Why compare us to robots? We are not robots we are evolved organisms.
I'm comparing us to an example of something that unquestionably operates entirely within the bounds of physical determinism, in order to show why I think we do not.
-Robots do not have any subjective experiences of the electrical activity within them by which they detect sensory input, discriminate this input from that input, and act based on what they are currently detecting. We do. Why don't they? Why do we?
-Building on what we have that something operating entirely within the bounds of physical determinism does not, we are aware of our subjective experiences. We talk about them all the time.
-Building on top of that, we are aware that we are aware of our subjective experiences.
That seems to be a lot that physical determinism needs to explain. Why any difference at all, and how those three differences are accomplished.
Even if we could observe in living detail the neural processes we cannot observe conscious experience, so establishing the link between the two would still seem to be impossible, as far as I can imagine. Of course I might be mistaken, I won't deny that.
We don't have reason to think otherwise. But sure, it's possible we'll discovery something or other one day.
Vera MontSeptember 26, 2024 at 13:16#9346860 likes
Surely a rational reason for friendship turns the friendship into something else - a transactional, conditional relationshiop?
It is. If you wish to deny that, you can use the excuse of irrationality. Me, I prefer to be befriended, as I choose my friends, for positive qualities and for compatibility of temperament and interest. Friends expect sympathy support and respect from one another; that makes it transactional.
I also terminate a relationship in which I feel cheated, exploited or betrayed. So, yes, it's also conditional.
It's the same with 'falling in love'. Do it irrationally, and you end up falling out again - in the usual case - and Shakespearean tragedy in the worst. In the spectrum between are unhappy marriages and emotionally scarred children, as well as happy accidents where crazy attraction leads a stable relationship.
Surely, the irrational is two-edged - or perhaps, in itself is neither - it all depends on how irrational and what the irrationality leads to.
There is a line, which may look very faint and fine from some perspectives, between the non-rational (that is, emotional) component of interpersonal relations and the irrational (contrary to reason). Emotions and instinct can augment rational decisions; unreason undermines them.
Opening a gate is possible by observation...
Mww
No thought? No belief? No expectation? What, on earth, could mindless observation be?
Exactly, insofar as it is implicitly self-contradictory, hence altogether impossible, for a minded creature to comprehend a mindless condition. Comprehension by a higher intellect of a lesser animals behavior, which to an investigator of it is mere experience, was never the problem. To attribute to them a mind of some sort, sufficient for inciting that behavior, but without any means to prove THAT is the sort of mind they actually possess, from which arises causal necessity, or, without any means to prove they have any mind of any sort at all, when his only provision for it is his own experience, is certainly a problem.
To which the common rejoinder is .well, crap on a cracker, dude .how else could a dog, e.g., ever open a gate, if they didnt do this or that first, which, in truth, is tacit admission that he could not possibly comprehend how that creature does anything at all, unless he supposes it to be enough like him that he could comprehend it, which immediately negates the possibility such lesser creature could manifest its behaviors by some means completely foreign to him. And that carries the implication he could comprehend the lesser creatures behavioral causality iff he knew what it was.
But, where such investigator is human, he doesnt. He cant; he does not even know his own. He guesses his own, it works for him, the dog performs the same act therefore must be accredited with the same guesswork insofar as it apparently works for him too.
While this scenario may be good enough for sociologists, psychologists and lawyers, it is far and away beneath the dignity of proper philosophy .
Dogs do not take account of themselves and everything happening around them as it happens. They know what's happening sometimes, but they do not think about their knowledge of that. They think about what they're doing, what they're in the middle of.
I agree dogs do not take account of themselves, nor do they think about their knowledge, for to do so is to implicate a form of personal subjectivity separable from mere instinct, for which there is no observable warrant. Id admit that it seems as though dogs take account** of the effects their behavior causes, but less so that they think themselves as causal.
How is to think about what theyre doing, not taking account of themselves? If it is the case dogs do not take account of themselves, it follows necessarily they do not think about what theyre doing, and if not of what theyre doing, then assuredly not temporal successions of it.
**Although, with that, is the lead-in to the suggestion they think, not about what theyre doing, but what they've done. But it is just as feasible to suppose an internal reaction predicated on external observed pain/pleasure, fight/flee, as rational thought in itself. I used to think my JRT did its thing just because it elicits a reaction from me which she found pleasurable, when it is just as likely she did her thing because to do otherwise elicits a reaction she finds less than pleasurable. Or, most likely of all, she did her thing regardless of me entirely.
I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity is wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose.
If walking consists in putting one foot in front of the other, is walking epiphenomenal?
PatternerSeptember 26, 2024 at 18:24#9347590 likes
"nothing at all happens without the brain" is not helpful. Nothing at all happens without the legs, heart, etc.
Of course it's the whole system working together. However the brain is the central processing unit so I think it is important to emphasize that nothing happens without the brain.
If the brain tells the heart to beat and the lungs to breathe and processes and renders intelligible all sensory input and tells our limbs how to move when performing actions both simple and complex how would all this be possible without prior modeling?
Apart from all the autonomic functions the brain gives rise to consciousness and creates an overarching model we refer to as the "self".
Preparation is concept that links preparatory activities to the activity, so it is conceptually, not merely causally, linked to the activity.
We understand and experience neural activity only as affect, percept and concept. We can say the brain must model all our bodily functions and actions and all its sensory input, but its true we don't know exactly what all those neuronal processes and networks are doing simply because they cannot be directly observed in vivo.
I should hope not. It's meant to be a foundation, not the actual activity. It certainly represents a big change in the concept if you are a platonist.
Right. Luckily I am no platonist. I find the very idea that numbers are somehow real apart from their instantiations and our generalizing concepts of them to be incoherent.
I shall be very interested to know what you make of the book. I'm very sympathetic to the project.
Cheers. I do have quite a lot on my 'to read' list and nowhere near as much time to read as I would like so there may be a fair bit of time before I can get to it.
-Robots do not have any subjective experiences of the electrical activity within them by which they detect sensory input, discriminate this input from that input, and act based on what they are currently detecting. We do. Why don't they? Why do we?
I think the answer is quite simple. We are complex multidimensional evolved organisms, and they are not. Also we do not have any subjective experience of the workings of the brain and the CNS, we only experience the sensations, affects, thoughts and actions that manifest on account of those workings.
If the brain tells the heart to beat and the lungs to breathe and processes and renders intelligible all sensory input and tells our limbs how to move when performing actions both simple and complex how would all this be possible without prior modeling?
Do you need prior modelling of the modelling? No? Then why do you need to model the action in the first place?
Apart from all the autonomic functions the brain gives rise to consciousness and creates an overarching model we refer to as the "self".
Is the brain part of the self or not? Assuming it is, then it has to model itself, including a model of its modelling. !?
Can you tell me the difference between my "self" and "Ludwig" and "I"? I don't perceive any.
We can say the brain must model all our bodily functions and actions and all its sensory input, but its true we don't know exactly what all those neuronal processes and networks are doing simply because they cannot be directly observed in vivo.
Yes. Exactly. So how do you know the brain is modelling anything?
It may be that I simply don't understand what you mean by "model" and "modelling".
I do have quite a lot on my 'to read' list and nowhere near as much time to read as I would like so there may be a fair bit of time before I can get to it.
Tell me about it. There's no hurry. It's just that it might be interesting to swop notes as and when. Up to you.
PatternerSeptember 26, 2024 at 21:44#9347850 likes
of or relating to an epiphenomenon (a secondary phenomenon accompanying another and caused by it / specifically : a secondary mental phenomenon that is caused by and accompanies a physical phenomenon but has no causal influence itself)
In what way does the physical act of walking fit any definition of epiphenomenal? I may be misunderstanding your questions.
Do you need prior modelling of the modelling? No? Then why do you need to model the action in the first place?
It seems reasonable to me to think that for everything we think and do there is a corresponding neural network of activity. That is what I mean by 'modeling'. As I already said although we think of it as modeling a conceptual or semantic process, we also think of what the brain does as a physical process. In any case, why would we need modeling of the modeling?
Is the brain part of the self or not? Assuming it is, then it has to model itself, including a model of its modelling. !?
Can you tell me the difference between my "self" and "Ludwig" and "I"? I don't perceive any.
Are you denying that it most plausible to think that the brain evolves a model of our overall being we refer to as 'the self'? Of course that model includes the brain and the body. The brain that models is conceptually the central part of that model, but it is not an experiential part at all. Apparently the brain lacks any sensation. It is the one part of our bodies we cannot feel.
Yes. Exactly. So how do you know the brain is modelling anything?
It may be that I simply don't understand what you mean by "model" and "modelling".
I'm saying that the brain's inscrutable neural processes we can only conceive as 'modeling'. What could it mean to say that conception is wrong when we cannot directly observe or even feel what the living brain is doing?
Tell me about it. There's no hurry. It's just that it might be interesting to swop notes as and when. Up to you.
I agree it would be interesting to compare notes. I'll certainly let you know if I start reading Groundless Grounds. I'm enjoying our conversation. :cool:
SophistiCatSeptember 26, 2024 at 23:41#9348290 likes
In what way does the physical act of walking fit any definition of epiphenomenal? I may be misunderstanding your questions.
Originally, epiphenomenalism was indeed articulated in relation to mental/physical relationship. However, the justification for it does not rely on any uniquely mental aspects and can be applied more widely. You have gestured towards this justification earlier in the discussion:
I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity is wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose.
The idea, known as causal exclusion, is that if A (neural activity) does all the work, then B (experience) has no causal efficacy. Surely, you can see that this is in no way specific to mental phenomena? So, if moving your feet does all the causal work, then walking is reduced to an epiphenomenon.
creativesoulSeptember 26, 2024 at 23:58#9348320 likes
Oh gosh. That is in dire need of argumentative support. I have no reason to believe that that's true, as written. Bald assertion is inadequate.
creativesoul
It's not all that hairless:
I cannot help but to laugh. This smacks of irony. Assertions have no hair. "Bald assertions" are what we call exclamations that assume precisely what's in question regardless of whether or not they are accompanied by cogent argument. They're bald because they're unaccompanied.
They are bald, not necessarily due to being unjustifiable, but rather for not having been argued for, yet. It's possible, I suppose, that your position rests upon some solid ground.
Do you have a cogent argument for how it becomes the case that any creature could begin thinking about their own previous thought and belief? All timekeeping presupposes that.
As best we can tell, time keeping practices were existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. There is a difference between knowing what time I expect someone to arrive and knowing someone has. The latter is 'fully' in the moment. The former is existentially dependent upon having already been so. Dogs are always in the moment and unreflective. I've known some superbly expressive ones replete with wonderful temperament. Some have been absolutely amazing. Astounding even. Yet they remain creatures that cannot think about their own thoughts and beliefs, because they have no way of picking them out of this world to the exclusion of all else.
Knowing about one's own expectation requires having them. Having expectation does not require knowing that one does. The dog has expectations. Knowing what time one is expected to arrive is knowing about one's own thought and belief. Dogs do not.
When we think about what time we expect an arrival, we pick out the time.
Knowing someone has arrived is not knowing what time an arrival is expected. The latter is a metacognitive endeavor. The former is not. The former is about the one arriving. The latter is about the time. The dog doesn't think about its own thought and belief. The dog doesn't think about the time. The dog thinks about the one(s) arriving. Expectation is belief about future events.
The dog can acquire an anticipatory demeanor by virtue of correlations they draw between different things. These things could be called common elements of past ritual. Sounds. Sights. Tastes. Smells. Regularly occurring events. Becoming part of a routine requires the passage of time. It does not require knowing about the fact that one is part of a routine. The dog can think/believe that their human is about to arrive because the arrival has been well practiced.
The dog doesn't think about its own expectation. Expectation is belief about future events.
To think about one's own expectations, one must first have thought and/or belief, for there must be first something to think about, and a way of thinking about it. Then, and only then, can a capable creature begin to think about their own expectations. Dogs don't do that.
All expectation consists of belief about future events.
How far off into the future one contemplates is determined strictly speaking solely by virtue of one's time keeping practices. The dog doesn't look forward to Thursday, for it has no clue about which days are. No clue whatsoever. Thursdays can be very special days for the dog, but not to... the dog.
Avoiding anthropomorphism requires knowing what sorts of things are meaningful and how they become so... to ourselves and any other creatures capable of forming, having, and/or holding meaningful thought and/or belief. Knowing how things become meaningful is knowledge of paramount importance.
It allows us to know that the dog has no clue, no thought, no belief - whatsoever - about whattime they expect someone to arrive. Their expectations are not arranged by them in timely fashion or manner.
creativesoulSeptember 27, 2024 at 00:23#9348370 likes
To attribute to them a mind of some sort, sufficient for inciting that behavior, but without any means to prove THAT is the sort of mind they actually possess, from which arises causal necessity, or, without any means to prove they have any mind of any sort at all, when his only provision for it is his own experience, is certainly a problem.
Not mine.
To which the common rejoinder is .well, crap on a cracker, dude .how else could a dog, e.g., ever open a gate, if they didnt do this or that first, which, in truth, is tacit admission that he could not possibly comprehend how that creature does anything at all, unless he supposes it to be enough like him that he could comprehend it, which immediately negates the possibility such lesser creature could manifest its behaviors by some means completely foreign to him. And that carries the implication he could comprehend the lesser creatures behavioral causality iff he knew what it was.
But, where such investigator is human, he doesnt. He cant; he does not even know his own. He guesses his own, it works for him, the dog performs the same act therefore must be accredited with the same guesswork insofar as it apparently works for him too.
While this scenario may be good enough for sociologists, psychologists and lawyers, it is far and away beneath the dignity of proper philosophy .
I do not see how that gets you out of the pickle you're in.
Vera MontSeptember 27, 2024 at 02:12#9348480 likes
Do you have a cogent argument for how it becomes the case that any creature could begin thinking about their own previous thought and belief? All timekeeping presupposes that.
I did include a citation about biological clocks. I don't see how that presupposes or requires 'thinking about own previous thought and belief'. Yet another caveat added in order to exclude other species. Quoting creativesoul
As best we can tell, time keeping practices were existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
From what can you tell that? Stonehenge? Obelisks? Athens' Tower of the Winds? They don't say much, except that humans have been keeping public time since the beginning of civilization. those practices may have been named and described. Before that, humans had to depend on our own sense of when to wake, when to eat, when to move to the summer camp, when to hunt, when to preserve food for the winter. Whether anyone named that or not, we don't know.
So, if moving your feet does all the causal work, then walking is reduced to an epiphenomenon.
Trying and trying to figure out what you mean, but I'm not getting it. But I feel this sentence is key. Can you explain the relationship between moving your feet and walking? (Of course, we're not talking about sitting in a chair and shuffling your feet around. Or lying on the ground doing leg-lifts. Or pumping your legs on a swing to gain height. Or any number of things other than moving them in the way that produces walking.)
I'm saying that the brain's inscrutable neural processes we can only conceive as 'modeling'.
What I'm trying to get at it is that what you are arguing seems to me to be exactly parallel to the argument of many dualists back in the day. They argued that the mind was a kind of "homunculus" - an ill-defined being that actually executed all the (mental) operations that the body could not. In the case of perception, for example, it was thought of as a perceiver who did the perceiving that the body could not. But if that's how you explain perception, you have set up an infinite regress, so the model explains nothing. In the same way, if you posit that the brain has to carry out some process - call it modelling - that has to be executed before any action can be carried out - it seems to me that you have created an infinite regress.
To attribute to them a mind of some sort, sufficient for inciting that behavior, but without any means to prove THAT is the sort of mind they actually possess, from which arises causal necessity, or, without any means to prove they have any mind of any sort at all, when his only provision for it is his own experience, is certainly a problem.
But this is exactly the traditional problem of other minds. So your argument also proves that we cannot know that other human bodies have a mind.
if you posit that the brain has to carry out some process - call it modelling - that has to be executed before any action can be carried out - it seems to me that you have created an infinite regress.
I don't see why you would think that if the brain is constantly modeling all experience and action that it would imply dualism, a homunculus or an infinite regress.
I'm not saying the process of 'modeling" is anything other than a physical process,
I'm not claiming that there is somehow a kind of theatre with a little watcher in the brain which is prior to our experience, thoughts and actions. Think of a computer program that generates novel ways of articulating ideas. The processes that do that we could refer to as a kind of modeling constituted by the electronic switching that gives rise to the program.
I can't see why an infinite regress would be involved. You haven't actually explained your reasons for those three claims.
I went to the shops because the neural activity which is experienced as realizing...
Youre attributing agency to neurophysiology. Its what Hacker and Bennett call the mereological fallacy, the attribution to a part that which can only properly said of the whole.
Can a qualitative difference between humans and other animals be found in what humans "do" differently rather than how humans "are" different? For example, humans make tools that make tools. Whereas a sea otter may use a rock to crack open shellfish for food, humans create tools (machinery) to manufacture lobster and crab crackers. This seems to be a behavior that animals lack.
So your argument also proves that we cannot know that other human bodies have a mind.
There is that argument, but mine, given the context, is concerned with higher intellects in juxtaposition to lesser, and it is to the lesser the lack of knowledge pertains.
The argument leads to self-contradictions when higher is pitted against higher, for even if it is the case knowledge of minds in similar enough creatures is technically impossible, it becomes absurd to suppose humans do not all have the same kind of mind, or that any one of them may not have a mind of any kind at all.
I can't see why an infinite regress would be involved. You haven't actually explained your reasons for those three claims.
Then obviously I have not understood what you are trying to say. I still don't know what you mean by "modelling". I'm used to people claiming that my brain causes my behaviour, but this is presumably something different. I think it would help me if you could explain what you mean by modelling.
Can a qualitative difference between humans and other animals be found in what humans "do" differently rather than how humans "are" different? For example, humans make tools that make tools. Whereas a sea otter may use a rock to crack open shellfish for food, humans create tools (machinery) to manufacture lobster and crab crackers. This seems to be a behavior that animals lack.
I have heard of that as a criterion. But then I also heard that a counter-example had been found. Perhaps someone will come up with details.
This kind of argument is very difficult to press home. There was a suggestion at one time that only humans use tools. But that one got refuted. Then the suggestion was that only human make tools, but that one got refuted. Moving on to make tools that make tools looks a bit desperate to me. Given that animals not only use tools, but make tools as well, one wonders how significant making tools to make tools really is.
Trying and trying to figure out what you mean, but I'm not getting it. But I feel this sentence is key. Can you explain the relationship between moving your feet and walking? (Of course, we're not talking about sitting in a chair and shuffling your feet around. Or lying on the ground doing leg-lifts. Or pumping your legs on a swing to gain height. Or any number of things other than moving them in the way that produces walking.)
Right, just as when you say "neutral activity is wanting to have milk" you don't mean just any random neural activity, but specifically whatever activity is responsible for/constitutes the experience of wanting to have milk.
Similarly, moving your feet in a certain way is responsible for/constitutes walking. I am not sure why you are having a difficulty with this parallel.
That makes two of us, then. Let me try to be a bit more constructive. Quoting Thales
Can a qualitative difference between humans and other animals be found in what humans "do" differently rather than how humans "are" different?
..... by reflecting on the question.
I don't rule out the possibility that there may be something that humans do that is absolutely unique in the animal world. After all, homo sapiens is undoubtedly unique in the animal world. So there is a collection of criteria that define it. But the same can be said of any other species.
Suppose that, in the end, there wasn't a qualitative difference between homo sapiens but a number of differences in degree, on a spectrum. (I think that's likely to be the truth of it). Why would that matter?
Reply to Ludwig V It's uncontroversial that the brain responds to stimuli and orchestrates all bodily processes and actions. That's what I mean. I've already said that I'm referring to that as modeling but am not suggesting it is any more than a physical process. Take it as a metaphor.
iReply to Wayfarer No, I'm not attributing agency in any other sense than action. In the kind of sense that the chemist speaks of chemical agents.
PatternerSeptember 27, 2024 at 20:48#9349670 likes
Reply to SophistiCat
According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
Also, walking [I]is[/I] moving our feet. For simplicity, it's the word we use instead of spelling out the whole process. I don't say;
[I]While upright, which is possible thanks to visual cues and the delicate workings of my inner ear, I moved my feet, alternating them, always placing the rear one in front of the other, until I found myself at the store.[/I]
It's uncontroversial that the brain responds to stimuli and orchestrates all bodily processes and actions. That's what I mean. I've already said that I'm referring to that as modeling but am not suggesting it is any more than a physical process. Take it as a metaphor.
I'm afraid I missed the place where you said that. "Orchestrates" is a very good way of putting it. A metaphor is just about right for the state of our knowledge - a place-holder for a more detailed account. What I was trying to argue was a misunderstanding. Thank you.
SophistiCatSeptember 27, 2024 at 21:08#9349690 likes
According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
I already addressed this. The causal exclusion argument that motivates epiphenomenalism applies equally to physical events in a similar supervenient relationship.
So how does it cause a decision to act? Do chemicals also decide to act? Youve said many times that the material universe is devoid of intention.
It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act. Do you really believe that when you decide to act or simply act that there have been no prior neural processes (that you have obviously not been aware of) which give rise to that decision or action?
It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act
Not for materialists, anyway. Youre actually arguing for materialist determinism when you say that, whether youre aware of it or not. But then, I guess if your brain is configured to do that, youll have no choice, will you?
Reply to Wayfarer However you want to label it is not relevant to the point.
So, you don't believe that when you act there have been prior neural processes which give rise to that action? Determinism doesn't entail that one cannot learn and/ or change one's mind, or that rational argument has no effect on what is believed. If you think that then you are working with a simplistic notion of determinism.
It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act. Do you really believe that when you decide to act or simply act that there have been no prior neural processes (that you have obviously not been aware of) which give rise to that decision or action?
They might be unconscious, but that doesnt mean theyre reducible to, or explainable in terms of, electrochemical processes. That is precisely materialist philosophy of mind.
Obviously stimuli can affect your endocrines, adrenaline, and the like. But that is a matter of biological physiology, not electrochemical reactions as such. Electrochemical reactions are a lower level factor that response to higher-level influences, which in the case of humans can include responses to words, which is the basis of rational causation.
As I brought up the mereological fallacy, I'll provide an account from a review of Bennett and Hacker, PHilosophical Foundations of Neuroscience:
In Chapter 3 of Part I - The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience - Bennett and Hacker set out a critical framework that is the pivot of the book. They argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for sentient beings. It is the degree to which these assertions depart from the norms of linguistic practice that sends up a red flag. The reason for objection is this: it is one thing to suggest on empirical grounds correlations between a subjective, complex whole (say, the activity of deciding and some particular physical part of that capacity, say, neural firings) but there is considerable objection to concluding that the part just is the whole. These claims are not false; rather, they are devoid of sense.
Wittgenstein remarked that it is only of a human being that it makes sense to say it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. (Philosophical Investigations, § 281). The question whether brains think is a philosophical question, not a scientific one (p. 71). To attribute such capacities to brains is to commit what Bennett and Hacker identify as the mereological fallacy, that is, the fallacy of attributing to parts of an animal attributes that are properties of the whole being. Moreover, merely replacing the mind by the brain leaves intact the misguided Cartesian conception of the relationship between the mind and behavior, merely replacing the ethereal by grey glutinous matter. The structure of the Cartesian explanatory system remains intact, and this leads to Bennett and Hacker's conclusion that contemporary cognitive neuroscientists are not nearly anti-Cartesian enough.
They might be unconscious, but that doesnt mean theyre reducible to, or explainable in terms of, electrochemical processes. That is precisely materialist philosophy of mind.
I haven't said that our actions and decisions are exhaustively explainable in terms of neural processes. We make sense of our actions in terms of reasons not in terms of causes, and I've explicitly acknowledged that in this thread I believe.
Obviously stimuli can affect your endocrines, adrenaline, and the like. But that is a matter of biological physiology, not electrochemical reactions as such. Electrochemical reactions are a lower level factor that response to higher-level influences, which in the case of humans can include responses to words.
Stimulation via the senses is achieved via electrochemical processes as I understand it. And again, I don't think that is controversial. So the whole process of perception, judgement, decision and action is all of a piece. It doesn't follow that we can dispense with our ordinary way of understanding perception, judgement, decision and action in terms of affection and reason, or in other words it doesn't follow that scientific descriptions of what is going on could outright replace those ordinary kinds of explanations. They are just two different explanatory paradigms which cannot be combined into a unified master paradigm as far as I can see, I admit it might turn out that I'm wrong about that of course. At present no such master paradigm seems to be on the horizon.
Stimulation via the senses is achieved via electrochemical processes as I understand it.
Which are immediately interpreted by the mind. There are electro-chemical constituents to be sure, but then the question of intentionality and judgement comes to mind. Remember this whole discussion started with the sense in which decisions and ideas are 'caused by' neurophysiogical processes. The whole process of perception and action is 'of a piece' but you don't say that can be explained solely in terms of physical processes unless you're a philosophical materialist - which you say you're not, but then you keep falling back to a materialist account.
They are just two different explanatory paradigms which cannot be combined into a unified master paradigm as far as I can see, I admit it might turn out that I'm wrong about that of course. At present no such master paradigm seems to be on the horizon.
But the 'two competing explanatory paradigms', mental and material, just is the Cartesian division - mind and matter, self and other. It was phenomenology, and some of the ideas that arise from that, which seeks to transcend that division. The two books I'm currently reading, Deacon's Incomplete Nature, and Evan Thompson's Mind in Life, are mainly about that. So too many of John Vervaeke's lectures in Awakening from the Meaning Crisis.
The whole process of perception and action is 'of a piece' but you don't say that can be explained solely in terms of physical processes unless you're a philosophical materialist - which you say you're not, but then you keep falling back to a materialist account.
You continue to misunderstand. I'm not claiming that intentionality and personal experience can be comprehended or encapsulated in any purely physical account.
But the 'two competing explanatory paradigms', mental and material, just is the Cartesian division - mind and matter, self and other.
Again you misunderstand. The Cartesian claim is that of two distinct substances. Spinoza corrected that with the realization that thinking in terms of cogitans and thinking in terms of extensa are two different modes of understanding and he said they are the two we humans can comprehend out of the infinite attributes of the one substance.
So they are not "competing" explanatory paradigms, and I didn't say they were. I said they are two different and incommensurable explanatory paradigms. I think you see them as competing because you presume that one must be correct and the other incorrect. So you are reflecting your own prejudices, not mine.
The way to "transcend that division" is to see that they are just two ways of understanding and that no polemic is necessary or even coherent between them.
Reply to Wayfarer Of course they do, but we also act for reasons. As I keep trying to get you to see they are just different kinds of explanation. You might get it if you ditch your either/or thinking.
PatternerSeptember 28, 2024 at 03:32#9350280 likes
According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
Patterner
I already addressed this. The causal exclusion argument that motivates epiphenomenalism applies equally to physical events in a similar supervenient relationship.
That's fine. But that wasn't the most important part. Walking certainly has an effect on physical events. How can it be epiphenomenal?
PatternerSeptember 28, 2024 at 04:17#9350310 likes
?Wayfarer Of course they do, but we also act for reasons. As I keep trying to get you to see they are just different kinds of explanation. You might get it if you ditch your either/or thinking.
What if the either/or thinking is correct? There are either/or situations. A square circle [i]is[/I] either/or. It's not both. It's booty a paradox. It's just wrong. Why would I think this situation is not another?
Of course they do, but we also act for reasons. As I keep trying to get you to see they are just different kinds of explanation. You might get it if you ditch your either/or thinking.
The point was that the kettle example is a clear-cut illustration of the distinction between efficient (water temp) and teleological (intentional) causation. Using neural activity to illustrate the distinction muddies the water by introducing another set of questions, concerning the relationship between neurophysiology and free will which you acknowledge is not at all clear cut.
Reply to Wayfarer You apparently just don't get it. I don't expect you to agree with me, but your objections, which amount to changing the subject, show no understanding of what I've been saying. The principle of diminishing returns dictates that we might as well leave it there.
Reply to WayfarerReply to Janus
That was a very helpful dialogue. The most interesting feature was that it turns out that you agree on a great deal. So I'm going to try and identify more accurately where your disagreement is. You will probably both disagree with me, but I hope we will get clearer about the problem - which is certainly a hard one.
It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act.
I'm afraid it is very controversial. The disagreement centres on "cause". There's a definition which circulates in philosophical discussion and this definition itself is, in my view, suspect. After all, it was developed more than 300 years ago and things have moved on since then. Allied to a popular metaphysical view - that the only "true" or fundamental reality is physical/material reality, it is inescapably reductionist. Part of the problem is that the scientific revolutionaries in the 17th century took an entirely rational decision that their physics would not and could not take account of anything that could not be represented as a measurable quantity that could be treated mathematically. There's nothing wrong with that decision, except the illusion that anything that could not be represented in physics was not real.
Do you really believe that when you decide to act or simply act that there have been no prior neural processes (that you have obviously not been aware of) which give rise to that decision or action?
You've moved away from the troublesome concept of cause to something vaguer, which masks, to some extent, where the disagreement is.
You refer to "when I decide to act or simply act". That seems to posit the possibility of acting without deciding to act, which seems absurd, and certainly won't help the neurophysiologists, who are looking for causes of action. So we need to choose between saying that when I "simply act", there is no decision or the decision is the action and the action is the decision.
All this is hugely complicated by the concept of "intention". We don't I think decide to intend to act, yet intending to act seems to presuppose that I have decided to act. Then the question arises about "simply acting". Does this mean acting without intending to - i.e. unintentionally? I don't think so.
So now we have a rather complex preparatory stage to action - decision, intention, action, and a category of actions that seem to be actions, yet have no visible preparatory stage.
Then we need to think about planning, preparing, trying - where do all these fit in?
Coming back to what I will call - as vaguely as possible - the neurophysiological correlates of action. The neurophysiologists are positing all sorts of mental events - at least that is the language they use - which precede action. They don't seem to allow the possibility of "simply acting" - and if they did, it would mess up their search for physical processes that precede action. In fact, they are in a conceptual space that is closely parallel to the conceptual space of traditional dualism, who posited all sorts of "mental events" that preceded action and seemed to distinguish acting from a simply causal event with an empty gesture at substances. The dualists explained "simply acting" by positing that they took place very rapidly or unconsciously, which I think most people now recognize as hand-waving. Neurophysiologists are doing the same thing. The difference is that they are waving their hands at physical correlates.
It's a mess.
But the 'two competing explanatory paradigms', mental and material, just is the Cartesian division - mind and matter, self and other.
Well, there is the difference that the distinction is no longer between two substances. But it is not wrong to say that the appeal to explanatory paradigms is a reinscription of Cartesian dualist and repeats the central dualist problem - how to explain the (causal) interface between mind and matter. But the nature of the question is different. That may be progress.
The way to "transcend that division" is to see that they are just two ways of understanding and that no polemic is necessary or even coherent between them.
Yes. That worked for a while in the late 20th century. But the scientists couldn't leave it alone. So here we are. What puzzles me, though, is why you seem unable to resist positing an interface between them. (Nor can I). Anyway, it is very helpful to know that you are seeing the problem in a Spinozan framework.
The point was that the kettle example is a clear-cut illustration of the distinction between efficient (water temp) and teleological (intentional) causation. Using neural activity to illustrate the distinction muddies the water by introducing another set of questions, concerning the relationship between neurophysiology and free will which you acknowledge is not at all clear cut.
It sounds as if you are seeing the issue in an Aristotelian context. Am I wrong?
I was hoping to keep free will out of it at least for the time being. However, my strategy here is to see free will as equating with the proper functioning of my body, including its brain. Then I am able to do what I want to do and able to want what I want to want. But I'm a long way from being able to construct a compelling argument for that.
Moreover, merely replacing the mind by the brain leaves intact the misguided Cartesian conception of the relationship between the mind and behavior, merely replacing the ethereal by grey glutinous matter. The structure of the Cartesian explanatory system remains intact, and this leads to Bennett and Hacker's conclusion that contemporary cognitive neuroscientists are not nearly anti-Cartesian enough.
That seems to me to be importantly correct, in this context.
PatternerSeptember 28, 2024 at 11:38#9350630 likes
A square circle is not either/ or and nor is it a paradox, It is just an incoherent conjoining of words.
If my analogy isn't good, can you answer the question anyway? Many people think these two things are mutually exclusive. It doesn't seem unreasonable to think they are. You say they are not, and we should ditch the either/or thinking. I don't see how it is possible that they are not in an either/or relationship, and cannot simply change my thinking on three matter. If you are right, and ditching either/or thinking is a valuable thing, I'd like to know how to get there. Can you explain how these two things are not in an either/or relationship?
PatternerSeptember 28, 2024 at 11:41#9350640 likes
The dog doesn't think about its own expectation. Expectation is belief about future events.
creativesoul
Surely this proves too much. It proves that the dog cannot act purposively.
I don't see how. There is no need to think about one's own beliefs about future events in order to have beliefs about future events.
Suppose that, in the end, there wasn't a qualitative difference between homo sapiens but a number of differences in degree, on a spectrum. (I think that's likely to be the truth of it). Why would that matter?
I agree that some differences between homo sapiens and other animals are differences in degree, on a spectrum. For instance, it could be argued that my singing and a lions roaring could be put on such a spectrum. And I absolutely agree that it wouldnt matter. In fact, I would be proud to take my place along lions (and other animals that bark, screech, hoot, etc.) on the same spectrum.
On the other hand, there seems to be something (qualitatively) going on here as well.
Because whenever animals use their voices, it is for some survival reason e.g., mating, warning, etc. And thats it. Animals dont use different voice genres, or plan out concert schedules, or reserve venues, or collect money, or issue tickets, or require dress codes, etc. These are activities that, it seems to me, appear on a completely different spectrum from survivability.
Although humans can (and do) use their voices for survival reasons e.g., yelling at an attacker to scare him away they are also able to sing for a lot of other reasons. In addition, humans employ a great number of different genres when they sing. Consider jazz, opera, gospel, pop, country, blues, rock and roll, classical and hip-hop as examples which mostly have no survivability purpose. (Ill admit sometimes singers are getting paychecks by which they make a living, but certainly most singing is for enjoyment, expression of emotions or some other human reason.)
I would argue that it would be a category mistake to place animal voices anywhere on the spectrum(s) of nightclubs/music halls/radios/gin joints, where listening to music is free/cheap/expensive, the dress code is casual/festive/semi-formal/formal, and reviews are available via TV/newspapers/blogs/casual conversation. It just doesnt make sense to talk about animals this way.
Well, as a postscript, I now see that this discussion has continued down a decidedly different path (principally by Janus and Wayfarer), so if you want to just ignore my rambling here, Im fine with it. My argument seems pretty naive anyway.
creativesoulSeptember 28, 2024 at 16:53#9351280 likes
Do you have a cogent argument for how it becomes the case that any creature could begin thinking about their own previous thought and belief? All timekeeping presupposes that.
creativesoul
I did include a citation about biological clocks. I don't see how that presupposes or requires 'thinking about own previous thought and belief'. Yet another caveat added in order to exclude other species.
Biological clocks? I'll have to look closer. I suspect there's some equivocation going on here. Clocks do not keep time in the sense we're discussing. Clocks have no thought/belief. Time keeping requires that. We use clocks to keep time. Clocks do not use themselves to keep time.
As best we can tell, time keeping practices were existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
creativesoul
From what can you tell that? Stonehenge? Obelisks? Athens' Tower of the Winds? They don't say much, except that humans have been keeping public time since the beginning of civilization. those practices may have been named and described.
So... we agree here then.
Before that, humans had to depend on our own sense of when to wake, when to eat, when to move to the summer camp, when to hunt, when to preserve food for the winter. Whether anyone named that or not, we don't know.
There may be a conflation between our reports of animal thought/behavior, and the animal's thought.
Dogs are always in the moment and unreflective.
creativesoul
Now, there is a bald, naked, unsupported statement.
you can have it. I'm done here.
I've given several arguments replete with definitions/criteria in support of what I've claimed. I'm often too verbose, but it could be boiled down to a few simple arguments.
creativesoulSeptember 28, 2024 at 17:03#9351290 likes
I do not see how that gets you out of the pickle you're in.
creativesoul
Im guessing anyone thinking deeply enough about stuff he doesnt know, gets himself into a pickle of some sort or another, sooner or later.
Well, I would concur that no one has been picklefree. :wink:
Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences. I have no issue with the 'problem' of other minds. I have no issue with knowledge about mindless conditions. I have no problem admitting and explaining the minds of language less creatures/non human creatures. I have no problem drawing and maintaining the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief.
creativesoulSeptember 28, 2024 at 17:08#9351320 likes
Dogs do not think about their own expectations as a subject matter in their own right.
creativesoul
I only read their actions. You read their minds...
Not quite. Rather, I take account of how meaningful thought, belief, and experience emerges, what it consists of, what that requires, and I apply that along with current scientific knowledge to any particular candidate under consideration.
We need not read another's mind in order to know how minds work.
Much of what you've been offering is quite agreeable. It seems that you may think some of that contradicts what I'm saying when it actually supports it.
PatternerSeptember 28, 2024 at 17:28#9351400 likes
I'm likely a bit older than you. BK commercial from late 60s-early 70s. Not sure I'm remembering it word for word, but...
[I]There once was a boy named Nicholas
Who would rather eat hamburgers pickle-less
So off he did bounce to proudly announce
"I'm a very nice kid, but particle-less"
Now the Burger King lady said, "Nicholas,
"if you'd rather eat hamburgers pickle-less
"Then all I can say is have it your way."
[Nicholas] "'Cause anythinh else is ridicle-less."[/I]
creativesoulSeptember 28, 2024 at 17:58#9351520 likes
Thank you, Ludwig V, for reflecting further on my question, and trying to rescue me from myself. I dont even think my mother would do that! :cool:
You give me too much credit - or maybe you thought I was patronizing. I was, selfishly, trying to work out a space in which we might have a constructive debate.
Animals dont use different voice genres, or plan out concert schedules, or reserve venues, or collect money, or issue tickets, or require dress codes, etc.
No, they don't. But they do have voices and they do do something that is at least akin to singing. But we can bat this back and to forever without anything of any interest emerging.
certainly most singing is for enjoyment, expression of emotions or some other human reason.
I don't know about "most", but some is. How do you know that wolves don't howl at the moon, for example, for the enjoyment of it?
My starting-point is that human beings are animals. We have bodies in the same way that they do. We have instincts which dominate our lives just as they do. Pretending we are not animals is something that are very much tempted to do, because we spend much time and effort trying to distinguish ourselves from them. But most animals do that in one way or another. For the most part, species prefer not to share their homes, roosts or whatever with other species. So that desire is shared with other animals as well.
When someone tries to find some respect in which humans differ from animals, what I hear is a desire to pretend that they are not an animal. But they eat and sleep and do all those animal things. How are they not animals - admittedly an animal with over-developed capacities? But that doesn't change the foundation.
SophistiCatSeptember 28, 2024 at 20:06#9351740 likes
Also, walking is moving our feet. For simplicity, it's the word we use instead of spelling out the whole process. I don't say;
While upright, which is possible thanks to visual cues and the delicate workings of my inner ear, I moved my feet, alternating them, always placing the rear one in front of the other, until I found myself at the store.
instead, I just said I walked to the store.
Well, that's what identity theorists say about consciousness vs neural activity. There are arguments against identity theory (other than epiphenomenalism), and similar arguments could also be deployed against the identity of walking and putting one foot in front of the other. But whether it's identity physicalism, reductive physicalism, emergence or anything else besides eliminativism, epiphenomenalism is supposed to argue against that on the grounds that consciousness appears to be superfluous if neural activity does all the causal work. My reductio aims to demonstrate that this argument is based on a misunderstanding of causality.
PatternerSeptember 28, 2024 at 22:05#9351960 likes
My starting-point is that human beings are animals. We have bodies in the same way that they do. We have instincts which dominate our lives just as they do. Pretending we are not animals is something that are very much tempted to do, because we spend much time and effort trying to distinguish ourselves from them. But most animals do that in one way or another. For the most part, species prefer not to share their homes, roosts or whatever with other species. So that desire is shared with other animals as well.
When someone tries to find some respect in which humans differ from animals, what I hear is a desire to pretend that they are not an animal. But they eat and sleep and do all those animal things. How are they not animals - admittedly an animal with over-developed capacities? But that doesn't change the foundation.
Absolutely true in all respects. But I see the opposite. I see people denying there is anything different about us. As though any animal is capable of being educated and made able to build a skyscraper, build the NYC skyline, develop calculus, write string quartets, build the internet, and have these same conversations. Despite being very similar in almost all ways, we can think in ways no animal can. The proof is, literally, everywhere we look.
I'm afraid it is very controversial. The disagreement centres on "cause". There's a definition which circulates in philosophical discussion and this definition itself is, in my view, suspect.
By "cause" I mean something like "provides the necessary conditions". I'm not thinking in terms of "linear' efficient causation, although that too arguably plays a part. There are always going to be problems with our attempt to formulate ideas of causes and conditions, given that those formulations are inherently dualistic and given that the reality is, presumably, non-dual.
That said, we are concerned with what it seems most reasonable to say, while acknowledging that our words can never capture the reality.
You've moved away from the troublesome concept of cause to something vaguer, which masks, to some extent, where the disagreement is.
So, here is where I think your misunderstanding of my argument is. To my way of thinking if a set of conditions gives rise to another set of conditions then the former could rightly be said to cause the latter, at least within the scope of what seem to be reasonable ways to think, while not extending to a claim of exhaustively capturing what is going on.
You refer to "when I decide to act or simply act". That seems to posit the possibility of acting without deciding to act, which seems absurd, and certainly won't help the neurophysiologists, who are looking for causes of action.
It seems to me that very many even most of our actions happen without conscious decision. I think it is only meaningful to speak of decision when we are self-consciously aware of deliberating over what to do. We can posit that unconscious decision-making takes place, but then it becomes, as is so often the case, a terminological issue. Same goes for positing unconscious intentions. Are these unconscious decisions and intentions just rationalizations after the fact? If not what could they be other than neural activity?
The dualists explained "simply acting" by positing that they took place very rapidly or unconsciously, which I think most people now recognize as hand-waving. Neurophysiologists are doing the same thing. The difference is that they are waving their hands at physical correlates.
It's a mess.
For me there is no separation between the physical processes and the semantic or qualitative aspects of our lives. They are all of a piece and only seem separate due to our inherently dualistic thought and speech.
So I don't believe the meaningful qualitative dimension of our lives would be possible without the physical. However I don't buy the reverse argument that because the very idea of the physical is a part of our meaningful qualitive experience and judgment that it follows that the physical universe could not exist without the presence of percipients capable of apprehending it. So i think in that sense it is most reasonable to say that the physical universe is both ontologically and temporally prior.to perception, experience and judgement.
Moreover, merely replacing the mind by the brain leaves intact the misguided Cartesian conception of the relationship between the mind and behavior, merely replacing the ethereal by grey glutinous matter.
What seems most misguided and retrogressive to me is the very idea that the brain is merely "grey glutinous matter". That seems most simple-minded to me. The counterpoint to thatthinking of the mind as ethereal is the equally retarded sibling.
You will probably both disagree with me,
Ludwig V
:rofl:
I did notice what was going on. But were going off on a discussion of epiphenomenalism and walking. I didn't feel I had much to contribute to that - and my bandwidth is rather limited.
I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity is wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose.
I agree with your beginning. But, as you predicted, I don't agree with your ending. ("neutral" is a typo for "neural", I assume.)
Monkeys and Shakespeare. Think of someone who has never seen or conceived of a calculator. They may press keys and random and watch the changes shapes on the screen. They have no idea of the meaning. The causal sequences are working away behind the screen. Some of them are calculations, some are not. The significance of what is going on escapes them.
But we know how the calculator was set up and the correct sequences of keys to press in order to execute the calculations we want to make.
The causal sequences on their own cannot distinguish between calculations and random numbers. They work in just the same way whatever keys are pressed. Only when you know how the calculator fits in to human lives can you grasp their significance.
It seems to me a complete misunderstanding or misrepresentation to say that the screen display is an epiphenomenon. The screen display is the point of the whole exercise.
Causal sequences in the brain are described in a way that is designed to ignore the significance of what is going on. Unless you know how they fit in to human life, you cannot grasp that. Wanting to have some milk is the point of the causal sequence, not an epiphenomenon.
(This involves rejecting the idea that a causal sequence always undermines the rational, human understanding of what is going on. The progress from a brain state of thirst to walking to the shops is causal, but is what enables me to do what I want to do. The reductionist deterministic view of causal sequences only reflects the fact that we only pay attention to causal sequences when they have gone wrong, and prevented me from doing what I want to do.)
Does that help?
epiphenomenalism is supposed to argue against that on the grounds that consciousness appears to be superfluous if neural activity does all the causal work.
No, the conscious outcomes are the point, the meaning, the significance of the causal sequences. It's just that we ignore them unless something goes wrong.
According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
Well, the fact that mental states make me walk to the shops demonstrates that epiphenomenalism is false.
PatternerSeptember 28, 2024 at 22:29#9352000 likes
My reductio aims to demonstrate that this argument is based on a misunderstanding of causality.
Sadly, I don't know enough to understand your attempt. I'm reading all kinds of things. Haphazardly, since I'm just singing it. So probably unproductively. But maybe I'll get there. SEP seems helpful.
However, the difference between neural activity/consciousness and moving feet/walking is vast. I can't even see any common ground.
What seems most misguided and retrogressive to me is the very idea that the brain is merely "grey glutinous matter". That seems most simple-minded to me.
When someone tries to find some respect in which humans differ from animals, what I hear is a desire to pretend that they are not an animal. But they eat and sleep and do all those animal things. How are they not animals - admittedly an animal with over-developed capacities? But that doesn't change the foundation.
Ludwig V
Absolutely true in all respects. But I see the opposite. I see people denying there is anything different about us. As though any animal is capable of being educated and made able to build a skyscraper, build the NYC skyline, develop calculus, write string quartets, build the internet, and have these same conversations. Despite being very similar in almost all ways, we can think in ways no animal can. The proof is, literally, everywhere we look.
The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.
Reply to Wayfarer I'm familiar with Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. I read the book many years ago. I agree that it makes no sense speaking about the brain deliberating, making decisions and so on because that way of speaking belongs to the space of reasons, to the understanding of human experience and behavior. There is a sense in which activities of the brain are no part of human experience. We are "blind" to what goes on in the brain. However there is another sense in which deliberating, making decisions, judging and experiencing in general are not really separate from neural activitythey are the experiential dimension of neural activity, so to speak.
Reply to Wayfarer It isn't different to what I've been saying all along. My writing seems clear to me, but maybe I overestimate its clarity for others, I don't know.
It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act. Janus
I'm afraid it is very controversial. The disagreement centres on "cause". There's a definition which circulates in philosophical discussion and this definition itself is, in my view, suspect. After all, it was developed more than 300 years ago and things have moved on since then. Allied to a popular metaphysical view - that the only "true" or fundamental reality is physical/material reality, it is inescapably reductionist.
I'm with you here. That's what I thought Janus was saying, but apparently not.
Interesting that the very idea of 'causation' which seems so intuitively and even scientifically obvious, actually turns out to be a metaphysical issue, or at least it has since Hume.
The distinction I was seeking to make at the outset of that discussion was between efficient and material causation, or causes and conditions, and teleological causation, which is intentional. That does hark back to Aristotle, but then, there's been something of a revival of interest in Aristotle's philosophy of biology recently.
Part of the problem is that the scientific revolutionaries in the 17th century took an entirely rational decision that their physics would not and could not take account of anything that could not be represented as a measurable quantity that could be treated mathematically. There's nothing wrong with that decision, except the illusion that anything that could not be represented in physics was not real.
[quote=Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 35-36]The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. (Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36)[/quote]
Of course this is the background to Chalmer's 'facing up to the problem of consciousness'.
Coming back to what I will call - as vaguely as possible - the neurophysiological correlates of action. The neurophysiologists are positing all sorts of mental events - at least that is the language they use - which precede action. They don't seem to allow the possibility of "simply acting" - and if they did, it would mess up their search for physical processes that precede action.
I really think neurophysiology is only relevant when you have a condition that prevents you making tea or going to the shop. 'I was going to go out, but I can't move my legs.' 'I was going to make tea, but suddenly my vision became blurry and I couldn't see straight.' Call the doctor! But 'the brain' is not normally a consideration.
I asked ChatGPT to provide a summary of Raymond Tallis' view:
Raymond Tallis coined the term "neuromania" to critique the overextension of neuroscience into domains where it may not have explanatory power. He uses the term to refer to the widespread tendency to reduce complex human experiencessuch as consciousness, agency, culture, and moralityentirely to neural activity in the brain. Tallis argues that this reductionist view, which treats humans as if they are nothing more than biological machines driven by brain processes, is inadequate for capturing the richness of human existence, including our subjective experiences, social lives, and sense of meaning.
In his view, "neuromania" is part of a broader materialist trend in which the complexities of human thought and behavior are oversimplified and reduced to neuroscientific explanations. Tallis believes that this approach neglects the philosophical, cultural, and existential dimensions of human life, which cannot be fully explained by brain scans or neurochemical processes. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of understanding humans as embodied beings embedded in social and cultural contexts.
His criticism is directed at those who make claims that neuroscience can, or will soon, explain everything about what it means to be human, effectively ignoring other fields like philosophy, art, and the humanities.
I do notice the frequent assertions on this forum that, although neuroscience can't yet 'explain consciousness', they will do at some point 'in the future'. I would include that tendency under the same general heading.
PatternerSeptember 29, 2024 at 02:54#9352340 likes
According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
Patterner
Well, the fact that mental states make me walk to the shops demonstrates that epiphenomenalism is false.
The brain's activity could do these things without any subjective experience/consciousness anywhere. And I'm sure we're making robots that prove the point. But let's say we add another system into the robot. Let's call it a kneural knet. The kneural knet observes everything the robot is doing, and generates a subjective experience of it all. We built and programmed the kneural knet, and we know it absolutely does not have any ability to affect the robot's actions.
It seems to me a complete misunderstanding or misrepresentation to say that the screen display is an epiphenomenon. The screen display is the point of the whole exercise.
Wanting to have some milk is the point of the causal sequence, not an epiphenomenon.
I agree. Our subjective experience of it is not like the robot's. Our actions will often look like the robot's. But, with or without the kneural knet, the robot will do only exactly what it was programmed to do. Whereas I do not have programming that requires me to do only one thing from among what, to an outside observer, appears to be many possible options.
I don't see how. There is no need to think about one's own beliefs about future events in order to have beliefs about future events.
I'm waiting on the platform for the 5 pm train; it is 4.58; I expect (believe) that the train will arrive shortly. It doesn't. I am disappointed. Is it correct to say that I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false? It is correct to say that that constitutes a belief about a belief?
Why would it be incorrect to substitute "the dog" for "I" in that story?
I think you would reply that it is incorrect because the dog is unable to speak English.
However, I do not believe that attributing beliefs or knowledge to an agent is about what is going on in the agent's head. It's about making sense of what the agent does.
Despite being very similar in almost all ways, we can think in ways no animal can.
That's true. But, since we are animals, the ways that an animal thinks are still available to us, so these special ways are grafted on to the ways of thinking that an animal thinks.
My favourite quick way of making this point is to remind you that we are perfectly capable of using language without any ability to formulate the rules that we are following. Articulating definitions and grammatical rules is grafted on to "wordless" thinking.
Of course this is the background to Chalmer's 'facing up to the problem of consciousness'.
Certainly. But I don't think that formulating the problem in such a way that the problem is insoluble is particularly helpful. I wish I was sure that it was an unintended consequence, but I very much doubt it.
What seems most misguided and retrogressive to me is the very idea that the brain is merely "grey glutinous matter". That seems most simple-minded to me. The counterpoint to thatthinking of the mind as ethereal is the equally retarded sibling.
Oh, I don't think it is all that simple-minded. It is an attempt to gain a rhetorical advantage by labelling the phenomenon in a prejudicial way. If I'm feeling charitable, I try to ignore the label for the sake of the argument.
That said, we are concerned with what it seems most reasonable to say, while acknowledging that our words can never capture the reality.
I'm not that bothered about that supposed failure. It's a bit like complaining that a photograph doesn't capture the reality of the scene. Of course it doesn't - unless you allow it to by supplementing the coloured patches by empathetically imagining (remembering) being there.
Consider Wordsworth's famous lines "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive / But to be young was very heaven!" For me, they capture what it was to be Wordsworth in France before the Revolution. But not by reporting facts. Language has resources beyond that.
I don't think that formulating the problem in such a way that the problem is insoluble is particularly helpful.
He doesnt say its insoluble. I quoted it for its succinctness. But that is one paragraph - actually one half of one paragraph - from an entire book. Nagels suggestion for a solution is sketchy, but revolves around the idea of there being a natural teleology - a natural tendency for minded beings to evolve, which can be seen as a movement towards the universe understanding itself. As distinct from the neo-Darwinian picture in which were the accidental byproducts of a fortuitous combination of elements.
I'm waiting on the platform for the 5 pm train; it is 4.58; I expect (believe) that the train will arrive shortly. It doesn't. I am disappointed. Is it correct to say that I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false? It is correct to say that that constitutes a belief about a belief?
Why would it be incorrect to substitute "the dog" for "I" in that story?
He doesnt say its insoluble. I quoted it for its succinctness. But that is one paragraph - actually one half of one paragraph - from an entire book. Nagels suggestion for a solution is sketchy, but revolves around the idea of there being a natural teleology - a natural tendency for minded beings to evolve, which can be seen as a movement towards the universe understanding itself. As distinct from the neo-Darwinian picture in which were the accidental byproducts of a fortuitous combination of elements.
Hold on! I thought we were talking about Chalmers. But perhaps that's not important. I suppose I'll have to Nagel's book on my ever-lengthening reading list - and I'm a slow reader of philosophy books. I'm beginning to think I'll never catch up. But I would like to be fair to him in future.
An interesting idea. Back to Aristotle again. Perhaps.
I'm not sure that "a natural tendency" and "accidental by-product" are in flat contradiction. They could constitute different attitudes to the same phenomenon. (Except I have serious difficulties about "the universe understanding itself" - but then I don't have to go that far.) Evolution itself could be an example of how to make progress. It manages to posit a blind, purely causal process, which nevertheless manages to have the effects of a purposive process. Dennett argues at length that such a process deserves to be called "purposive", and, on the principle of the duck, that seems a reasonable proposal.
Indeed. I've been trying to remember that story ever since the example was proposed (by Vera, I think). I couldn't remember enough detail to construct a search that would throw it up. Thank you.
Me too, and I have >500 .pdfs on my hard drive. I read a lot of excerpts, parts and reviews. Oh, and also synoptic overviews. There's far too much content to take on nowadays. My interest in David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel in particular, is because they are both opponents of philosophical materialism but from within a generally mainstream analytic context.
The most annoying tendency is for people to append very long lists with no comment whatever. Very unhelpful. They give the appearance of being the result of a search and little more. You can tell who's read a lot from the text itself (and the footnotes). Reviews are good, when they don't just repeat the publisher's blurb.
My interest in David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel in particular, is because they are both opponents of philosophical materialism but from within a generally mainstream analytic context.
Opposing materialism is good. But I'm very ambivalent about the analytic mainstream. Yet it is the analytic mainstream I am opposed to and I have to admit that from time to time I come across ideas that I can take on board.
All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows.
The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldnt. Be that as it may, Im ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.
PatternerSeptember 29, 2024 at 14:22#9352840 likes
The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.
Other animals cannot do that.
Right. But millions of years ago, our brains took a leap that no other species has yet taken. We were one of many species that had some limited degree of language, or representation, abilities. Presumably, various other species have evolved greater abilities since then. (Maybe whatever species today has these abilities to the least degree is the baseline that all started at. Although even it may have evolved from the barest minimum degree of such abilities.) But our brain gained an ability that was either enough for us to get where we are now by learning and adding to our learning, or that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. It allowed us greater language, and our greater language helped develop our brain. Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about.
PatternerSeptember 29, 2024 at 15:11#9352910 likes
The brain's activity could do these things without any subjective experience/consciousness anywhere.
Patterner
The problem is that your thought-experiment only works if I pretend that I accept this. It begs the question. (This is about the P-zombies, isn't it?)
No. I really like Chalmers. Most of the time. But PZs are just dumb. A planet that never had consciousness, but had our intellectual abilities, would never come up with three concept of consciousness. They wouldn't ever talk about it, or have words for it.
But why do you disagree? Don't we have robots that perform certain actions when they get certain sensory input?
PatternerSeptember 29, 2024 at 15:37#9352940 likes
I do notice the frequent assertions on this forum that, although neuroscience can't yet 'explain consciousness', they will do at some point 'in the future'. I would include that tendency under the same general heading.
At 32:10 of the video on this page
https://thepanpsycast.com/panpsycast2/episode83-1
Chalmers says: Quoting Chalmers
But that doesn't mean that we have to now sort of put our heads in the sand and say, "Well let's just wait and see." We can start thinking about why is the problem as hard as it is. And what is giving rise to this systematic difficulty.
No. I really like Chalmers. Most of the time. But PZs are just dumb. A planet that never had consciousness, but had our intellectual abilities, would never come up with three concept of consciousness. They wouldn't ever talk about it, or have words for it.
OK. The PZs are supposed to be indistinguishable from normal humans, so that case is not relevant. You get much closer to that with your planet. I don't know of any reason to suppose that's possible, so I have no opinion to give.
Don't we have robots that perform certain actions when they get certain sensory input?
It depends. If they have sensory input, they are conscious, so I don't accept that we have robots like that. But I agree that we can strap a camera to a computer (or input an image) and program it to respond in certain circumstances. I understand also that we often call that seeing or calculating or speaking. But it's by extension from human beings, not in their own right. Getting it to do everything that we do is a different matter. I don't rule out the possibility that one day there might be a machine that is conscious, but I have very little idea of what it would be like. But I also don't think that consciousness is on/off, like a light and sometimes there may be no definitive answer.
Sadly, I don't know enough to understand your attempt. I'm reading all kinds of things. Haphazardly, since I'm just singing it. So probably unproductively. But maybe I'll get there. SEP seems helpful.
However, the difference between neural activity/consciousness and moving feet/walking is vast. I can't even see any common ground.
I intentionally picked a frivolous and perhaps imperfect parallel to sharpen the issue. Perhaps it would go easier with an example from physical sciences, such as the relationship between fluid dynamics and molecular dynamics. But let's just leave it.
The brain's activity could do these things without any subjective experience/consciousness anywhere. And I'm sure we're making robots that prove the point. But let's say we add another system into the robot. Let's call it a kneural knet. The kneural knet observes everything the robot is doing, and generates a subjective experience of it all. We built and programmed the kneural knet, and we know it absolutely does not have any ability to affect the robot's actions.
Oh, I don't think it is all that simple-minded. It is an attempt to gain a rhetorical advantage by labelling the phenomenon in a prejudicial way. If I'm feeling charitable, I try to ignore the label for the sake of the argument.
Well, I think it's either simpleminded or dishonestly tendentious. "Trying to gain a rhetorical advantage" seems a strategy more suited to sophistry than to philosophy.
Well, I think it's either simpleminded or dishonestly tendentious. "Trying to gain a rhetorical advantage" seems a strategy more suited to sophistry than to philosophy.
Yes, it is exactly the kind of thing Plato had in mind. But, to be fair, those effects are not always being consciously manipulated. Quoting Janus
It's not clear to me what you are wanting to get at here.
Perhaps it's not relevant. Let's not pursue it here.
As am I, make no mistake! But Nagel, in particular, has the advantage of being dissident inside that mainstream, so at least he is paid attention, even if it's often hostile.
But that doesn't mean that we have to now sort of put our heads in the sand and say, "Well let's just wait and see." We can start thinking about why is the problem as hard as it is. And what is giving rise to this systematic difficulty.
Right - his first book was 'towards a science of consciousness', but note his exploration of the requirement for a 'first-person science', i.e. science which takes into account the reality of the observer, instead of viewing the whole issue through an 'objectivist' lens. He's part of, and in some ways an instigator of, a sea change in philosophy of mind, which recognises this change in perspective, which his opponent Daniel Dennett resolutely refuses to do (ref).
Right - his first book was 'towards a science of consciousness', but note his exploration of the requirement for a 'first-person science', i.e. science which takes into account the reality of the observer, instead of viewing the whole issue through an 'objectivist' lens.
Don't we already have, and have had for a long time, that "first-person science" in the form of phenomenology?
Reply to Janus Of course that is one of the major sources. Joshs alerted me to Dan Zahavi who is one of them. But that is continental as distinct from Anglo-american.
Reply to Wayfarer I'm not concerned about labels. I just don't understand the call for a "first-person" science given that we already have phenomenology and (I forgot to mention) psychology.
I mean you can't incorporate the first person into the study of chemistry, biology, geology, botany, or even physics and so on. That said it should be obvious enough to acknowledge that all those sciences are carried out by persons and that they are dependent on human perception and judgement. I can't imagine anyone being silly enough to deny that.
PatternerSeptember 30, 2024 at 00:25#9353830 likes
OK. The PZs are supposed to be indistinguishable from normal humans, so that case is not relevant.
My point is there couldn't be such a thing. As I've said before, just because we can say the words, doesn't mean we can conceive of them. Like a square circle.
It depends. If they have sensory input, they are conscious, so I don't accept that we have robots like that. But I agree that we can strap a camera to a computer (or input an image) and program it to respond in certain circumstances. I understand also that we often call that seeing or calculating or speaking. But it's by extension from human beings, not in their own right. Getting it to do everything that we do is a different matter. I don't rule out the possibility that one day there might be a machine that is conscious, but I have very little idea of what it would be like.
Are you contradicting yourself? Or am I reading it wrong?
I mean you can't incorporate the first person into the study of chemistry, biology, geology, botany, or even physics and so on.
The target of Chalmers argument is those who attempt to apply those methods to study of consciousness, such as Dennett.
It is more than labels. There are major differences between Continental and Anglo philosophy on these issues, although it might suit you to ignore them.
Reply to Wayfarer Certainly the brain can be studied by empirical science. Consciousness as such though is not an observable phenomenon. Dennett recommends an approach he terms 'heterophenomenology' which is an attempt to combine empirical science with first person reports.
Do you think we can be confident that introspection and reflection on experience may yield reliable information about the nature of consciousness?
What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy?
PatternerSeptember 30, 2024 at 01:36#9354010 likes
This robot would have consciousness, thanks to the kneural knet. PZs don't have any consciousness.
Obviously, something like a kneural knet would be found only in scifi. I'm just using it as an example off epiphenomenology. It gives subjective experience, but has no casual ability. If the robot acts without it, as robots we currently have do, then the addition of it would be true epiphenomenality (is that a word??).
According to Ray Monk, the Continental-Anglo divide stems from the period of Gilbert Ryles dominance of Anglo philosophy. I would try to summarize it but Im typing via iPhone so am limited but the article is here . But a couple of differences that could be observed are between existentialism and phenomenology, on the Continental side, and the emphasis on language, logic and science and the generally scientistic tendencies in a lot of Anglo-American philosophies. Whereas Anglo materialism tends to look to science, Continental materialism tends more towards Marxist or economic theory.
Reply to Wayfarer OK. I'm not denying that so-called analytic and continental approaches to philosophy are concerned with different things. Its too complex a topic to bother trying to address here, and it really has little to do with the OP in any case.
I think it's worth noting that in that three-year-old conversation you linked I said I approve of a plurality of approaches because we cannot pre-emptively decide what each will turn up. I havent changed my mind on that. You seem to be much more intent on polemicising the issue.
As am I, make no mistake! But Nagel, in particular, has the advantage of being dissident inside that mainstream, so at least he is paid attention, even if it's often hostile.
I can recognize that I should not lump him in with the materialist mainstream - nor Chalmers. At present, I'm inclined to think that he is not dissident enough. I need to take a closer look. When the closer look will happen, I do not know. In the mean time, I can perhaps moderate my rhetoric.
According to Ray Monk, the Continental-Anglo divide stems from the period of Gilbert Ryles dominance of Anglo philosophy.
I don't think that's historically accurate. I have the impression that the divide was well embedded before WW2. Indeed, it goes back to Hegel and beyond. Some people seem inclined to blame Ryle for everything, but I don't think that's fair.
Don't we already have, and have had for a long time, that "first-person science" in the form of phenomenology?
But I thought that Husserl specifically developed phenomenology to be something quite distinct from science - unless you define science as anything that attempts to achieve objectivity.
Which prompts me to complain that this entire discussion is scientistic and ignores the possibility that disciplines that do not aim to emulate science may be (I think are) essential to understanding consciousness. History, Literary and Cultural Studies, Sociology, some branches of Psychology etc. - not to mention Marxism and Psychoanalysis which might well have something to offer. But, of course, it all depends how you define "science".
I have literally never heard anyone try to deny that anywhere, at any time in my life.
You didn't mention it in your account of how different humans are from animals. Mind you, I don't mention what you emphasize in my accounts of how similar they are. Perhaps it comes down to "glass half full/empty" - a difference in perspective rather than a disagreement about the facts. Then we need to tease out why that difference in emphasis is so important.
Are you contradicting yourself? Or am I reading it wrong?
Yes, it does look peculiar. I didn't put the point carefully enough.
I think that "sensory input" is already a recognition that consciousness and experience are present. I also think that there is no a priori reason to rule out in advance the possibility that conscious beings might have bodies of plastic and silicon. Does that help?
My point is there couldn't be such a thing. As I've said before, just because we can say the words, doesn't mean we can conceive of them. Like a square circle.
That's exactly why I can't do anything with your thought-experiments.
Right, but then isn't that the "simpleminded" case?
Yes, I guess it is. Perhaps that simple-mindedness is a fault. One can't, for example, describe an unborn baby as a foetus and pretend not to know what kind of context that sets up.
I'm not bothered by it either, so it wasn't a complaint, but merely an acknowledgement. I see it as a good thing to acknowledge our limitations.
Well, I certainly agree that it is a good thing to recognize the difference between a picture and a description and being there. Whether "limitations" is appropriate for that is another question.
I have the impression that the divide (continental/analytic) was well embedded before WW2.
Not really. It is well established that prior to WWI, German idealism was still highly influential in English and American philosophy departments. That began to wane with GE Moore and Bertrand Russells criticism of idealism in the 1920s, but recall at the time, phenomenology as such was just beginning and Heidegger had only just began to publish. The article I linked to ascribes the rift to Gilbert Ryles hostility to Husserl and Heidegger in the 1940s and onwards, and also Ryles dominance of English philosophy at that stage (he was editor of Mind from 1949-71 and had a lot of say in who got philosophy chairs in Britain). That period was when the division really shows up. (Ray Monk was biographer of both Wittgenstein and Russell, although the latter bio is not very well regarded.)
Your rhetoric always seems quite circumspect to me, for what its worth.
Take a look at this review of Nagels 2012 book Mind and Cosmos, The Heretic - its a very good thumbnail sketch of what Nagel said and why it provoked such hostility from a Darwinist mob.
(Ray Monk was biographer of both Wittgenstein and Russell, although the latter bio is not very well regarded.)
Yes. I have read the Wittgenstein biography, but not the Russell one. As I remember it, the Wittgenstein book rather stole a march on Brain McGuiness and there was some bad blood. I read McGuiness' as well and it was the better book. But it stopped half way.
The article I linked to ascribes the rift to Gilbert Ryles hostility to Husserl and Heidegger in the 1940s and onwards, and also Ryles dominance of English philosophy at that stage (he was editor of Mind from 1949-71 and had a lot of say in who got philosophy chairs in Britain).
Yes. There were problems, but I just don't feel strongly about it - perhaps because I have always been very sympathetic to his project. I can understand the hostility to Heidegger - there's still an issue about his venture into public life in the 30's. Some people still want him "cancelled". In the context of WW2 so soon after WW1, it would be surprising if there were not some hostility. It looks unreasonable now, I grant you. But we're 70 years, at least two, perhaps three, generations, further away from those times.
Reply to Ludwig V (Of course, now you say it, I do understand the hostility to Heidegger due to his Nazi associations, which has been discussed a lot here.)
What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy?
First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.
Probably isnt a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases.
It is well established that prior to WWI, German idealism was still highly influential in English and American philosophy departments. That began to wane with GE Moore and Bertrand Russells criticism of idealism in the 1920s,
That's true. I was placing Husserl a bit earlier than I should have done. I just wanted to point out that their characterization of what they were doing might have been a bit partial. A rebellion was also going on in Germany, which they didn't like, of course. But Bentham and the two Mills had continued the empiricist tradition through Hume from Berkeley and Locke through the 19th century. I think the divide can be traced back to rationalism (Descartes and others, on the other side of the Channel) and empiricism (Berkeley, Locke, Hume, in England).
Reply to Wayfarer
You see, sometimes I go too far the other way and insist on calling a spade an agricultural implement.
First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.
Probably isnt a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases.
It certainly covers some of them. Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and Carnap made it clear that theoretical system metaphysics was their primary target. This was a not an unfair characterization of the German Idealism, based on Hegel, and Kantian tradition which were indeed dominant in the whole of Europe at the time, But a rebellion (Husserl, Heidegger) was also going on across the Channel at the same time. Analytic philosophers mostly didn't like them, but they were not simply a continuation of metaphysics.
Coming from the math thread. Do animals have rational thinking? Do animals have communication skills? Is intuitive thinking rational or maybe something better?
When someone has rational thinking, he / she must be able to reflect, analyse, criticise, and ask questions on the thinking. Just because a hawk has hunted his meals, or dog has opened door to go out for whatever don't mean they have rational thinking. They are just instinctual survival and habitual response by the animals.
If you trace back to the origin of rational thinking, then it would be the ancient Greeks. How did they start? They started by asking what is the world made of, and debating and analysing on the world linguistically. Then Socrates came to the scene asking how one should live to be good, and followed by Aristotle who asked and propounded what happiness is.
No animals can do rational thinkings like the way they did. If someone had rational thinking on why he went to a shop, then he should be able to explain the reason why when asked the reason why.
Suggesting animals have rational thinking is a gross confusion on the concept.
Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldnt be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic?
Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldnt be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic?
No. For a number of reasons.
The OLP advocated that philosophy should analyze, but wanted to analyze in a different way- in Ryle's terms, informal logic as opposed to formal logic or untechnical as opposed to technical concepts - and tried to carve out an arena for philosophy which avoided awkward conflicts with more technical disciplines - though he also thought that philosophy's arena was "more fundamental\" than the technical disciplines' one other feature was abandonment of the idea that it is philosophy's task to reform and regulated language. Philosophy of Language (that is what you mean by LP?) was rather different, and was, I would say, a development of the idea that philosophy's primary method was logical analysis.
Actually, I don't think that analytic philosophy has self-destructed. My perception is that it is alive and kicking strongly - even though some people are very critical of it and are announcing it is over.
If someone had rational thinking on why he went to a shop, then he should be able to explain the reason why when asked the reason why.
That's the great mistake that Socrates made. Articulating one's reasons is a different skill not the same as having them. Even if you can't define courage, you can use the word correctly. You may not know whyhow the fuel makes the car go, but it doesn't mean you are irrational when driving the car.
Just because a hawk has hunted his meals, or dog has opened door to go out for whatever don't mean they have rational thinking. They are just instinctual survival and habitual response by the animals.
So when we act appropriately on our survival instincts and open doors when appropriate, are we acting rationally or not?
If you trace back to the origin of rational thinking, then it would be the ancient Greeks.
If that's how you choose to define it, that's fair enough. But it seems a bit odd to characterize the people who built the pyramids as irrational, don't you think? (They were indeed irrational in some ways, but not when they built the pyramids.)
Reply to Ludwig V Driving and fueling cars and opening the doors which most people do without having second thought about doing so based on habits and routines, and rationalising i.e. analysing, criticising, reflecting and questioning about them logically, critically and reflectively are different category of things.
The former is just doing and living, the latter rationalising and philosophising.
You are mixed up between driving and fueling cars and opening the doors which most people do without having second thought about doing so based on habits and routines, and rationalising i.e. analysing, criticising, reflecting and questioning about them logically, critically and reflectively.
OK. I can make some sense of that. To be rational is to rationalise.
1. So do you think that the people who built the pyramids were rational or not? (They built them before the ancient Greeks started philosophizing.)
2. About the process of learning or acquiring a habit or routine. I grant you that putting on one's lucky trainers when going out to compete is not (normally) rational. But when the habit or routine is capable of rational justification - driving or fuelling one's car would be examples - is learning or practising those activities rational or not?
Reply to Corvus I agree rational thinking requires language and then questioning out one thinks and that animals do not do this and can not do so without language. However, there is evidence that bonobos can learn language and judge right from wrong. Why not, we are on the same branch of the tree. But it is curious in nature that bonobos do not develop language independent of human intervention. However, if a bonobo does learn language at least one of them has taught the offspring language. I am wondering if they would continue to pass on language and if so, would they develop better language skills in following generations? (evolution working)
More important, should we assume all humans are rational thinkers or must they learn the higher order thinking skills to be rational? Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking?
1. So do you think that the people who built the pyramids were rational or not? (They built them before the ancient Greeks started philosophizing.)
2. About the process of learning or acquiring a habit or routine. I grant you that putting on one's lucky trainers when going out to compete is not (normally) rational. But when the habit or routine is capable of rational justification - driving or fuelling one's car would be examples - is learning or practising those activities rational or not?
I love that first question because it stretches our thinking!
That second one is hard to answer. Is it rational to believe something that is not true?
PatternerSeptember 30, 2024 at 17:35#9355430 likes
You didn't mention it in your account of how different humans are from animals. Mind you, I don't mention what you emphasize in my accounts of how similar they are. Perhaps it comes down to "glass half full/empty" - a difference in perspective rather than a disagreement about the facts. Then we need to tease out why that difference in emphasis is so important.
I suspect we agree on facts. We've all heard the numbers of the percentages of DNA we share with various species. It is truly amazing that the differences between us are accounted for by such a small difference in DNA!!
What interests me is the things that small difference in DNA gives us. We think in ways nothing else (in the universe, as far as we know) can, and do things nothing else does. The proof of which is all around us, covering the planet, and includes both the content and method of our communication.
My point is there couldn't be such a thing. As I've said before, just because we can say the words, doesn't mean we can conceive of them. Like a square circle.
Patterner
That's exactly why I can't do anything with your thought-experiments.
Understandable. I don't think PZs are possible. I think any bit of information processing brings a little bit of consciousness. I was just trying to say what I think epiphenomenalism would need like. But, as far as consciousness goes, I don't think epiphenomenalism applies.
Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking?
The answer to the general question is that it is rational to believe anything that you have good evidence for. Sometimes good evidence is misleading, but that doesn't affect the answer. Sometimes we believe things without good, or even any, evidence. That is irrational. Believing a myth is a bit different. Short story, myths (and religious beliefs in general) have a status a bit like axioms, and in that sense are pre-rational. But one could, nevertheless defend them on rational grounds.
I think any bit of information processing brings a little bit of consciousness.
H'm. I think that's a bit extreme, but comprehensible. Quoting Patterner
But, as far as consciousness goes, I don't think epiphenomenalism applies.
It does depend what you mean by the causal explanation "doing all the work". That's a complicated issue. What is the work that the explanation needs to do?
First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.
Probably isnt a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases.
AFAIK since Nietzsche Husserl and Heidegger the continentals have (purportedly at least) eschewed metaphysics or at least reduced it to be a subset of phenomenology.
But I thought that Husserl specifically developed phenomenology to be something quite distinct from science - unless you define science as anything that attempts to achieve objectivity.
Which prompts me to complain that this entire discussion is scientistic and ignores the possibility that disciplines that do not aim to emulate science may be (I think are) essential to understanding consciousness. History, Literary and Cultural Studies, Sociology, some branches of Psychology etc. - not to mention Marxism and Psychoanalysis which might well have something to offer. But, of course, it all depends how you define "science".
It does depend on how you define science. I think Husserl considered phenomenology to be a science, and I see no reason not to think of psychology, anthropology, sociology and history as sciences.
Yes, I guess it is. Perhaps that simple-mindedness is a fault. One can't, for example, describe an unborn baby as a foetus and pretend not to know what kind of context that sets up.
I would count simplemindedness as a fault wherever a more nuanced understanding is available.
Well, I certainly agree that it is a good thing to recognize the difference between a picture and a description and being there. Whether "limitations" is appropriate for that is another question.
You introduced the photograph analogy. I think a photograph does capture aspects of the reality just as our thinking can. Thinking may be more or less apt. I can see your point if you mean to say that we needn't worry about whether or not what we say is absolutely adequate to the reality, but should rather concern ourselves with the relevance, validity and soundness of what we say within the ambit of common human experience.
Heidegger wrote extensively on metaphysics. Husserls method was transcendental phenomenology.
Getting back to rational thinking: animals and humans. The upshot of what Im arguing is that the ability to discern and understand reason is one of the distinguishing characteristics of h.sapiens. In Western culture up until recently, that distinction was universally accepted. It has been called into question by interpretations of biological evolution which place humans on a continuum with other species. Neodarwinian materialism insists that human nature has a strictly biological explanation which can be accounted for solely in terms of molecular genetics; we ourselves can be explained by science. But such arguments are self-refuting, in that while appealing to reason, they hold that reason is simply an organ of biological adaptation. An argument is simply another of the sounds that this particular organism makes. And thats the only point I wished to make in this thread.
AFAIK since Nietzsche Husserl and Heidegger the continentals have (purportedly at least) eschewed metaphysics or at least reduced it to be a subset of phenomenology.
It does depend on how you define science. I think Husserl considered phenomenology to be a science, and I see no reason not to think of psychology, anthropology, sociology and history as sciences.
Well, the Husserl's crucial idea was the epoche or "bracketing" of external reality to exclude it from consideration. The "first-person" or subjective "lived world" was the subject-matter. The methods of the sciences as understood in his day were not applicable. But he did think of phenomenology as a systematic study and methodology. So in that sense, it was a science but it wouldn't have been called that at the time.
I can see your point if you mean to say that we needn't worry about whether or not what we say is absolutely adequate to the reality, but should rather concern ourselves with the relevance, validity and soundness of what we say within the ambit of common human experience.
That's about right. I would add that no clear meaning can be attributed to reality beyond our access and the the ambit of common human experience - amplified by techniques discovered or at least valdiated by science - is all there is.
I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding.
Well, the Husserl's crucial idea was the epoche or "bracketing" of external reality to exclude it from consideration. The "first-person" or subjective "lived world" was the subject-matter. The methods of the sciences as understood in his day were not applicable. But he did think of phenomenology as a systematic study and methodology. So in that sense, it was a science but it wouldn't have been called that at the time.
As far as I remember Husserl considered phenomenology to be the science of consciousness, of human experience. I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience in the other sciences. I could be mistaken about that of course.
That's about right. I would add that no clear meaning can be attributed to reality beyond our access and the the ambit of common human experience - amplified by techniques discovered or at least valdiated by science - is all there is.
I agree with that. But I do think that our capacity to imagine possibilities beyond the ambit of common experience is an important phenomenological fact about the human.
I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding.
So in that sense, it was a science but it wouldn't have been called that at the time.
German has an expression, Geisteswissenschaften, which literally means 'sciences of the spirit', covering subjects other than what English calls 'natural science', including philosophy. There is no equivalent term in English.
I would add that no clear meaning can be attributed to reality beyond our access and the the ambit of common human experience - amplified by techniques discovered or at least valdiated by science - is all there is.
That would be 'positivism', wouldn't it? And what precisely constitutes 'common' in that sentence? Where do you draw the line between what would be accepted as 'common' and what would not? But then, the kinds of observations produced by the LHC would not be 'common', nor would the interpretive skills required to analyse them, even if they are designated 'scientific'.
[quote=SEP, Heidegger]If we look around at beings in generalfrom particles to planets, ants to apesit is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be... [/quote]
I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding.
Yes. I just like details - but not so many I get confused. .
As far as I remember Husserl considered phenomenology to be the science of consciousness, of human experience. I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience in the other sciences.
That makes sense, and I didn't mean to imply that it couldn't be called a science at all. But the epoche does set on one side the "hard" sciences, doesn't it? That's why phenomenology has to have a method of its own.
German has an expression, Geisteswissenschaften, which literally means 'sciences of the spirit', covering subjects other than what English calls 'natural science', including philosophy. There is no equivalent term in English.
So it does and so there isn't. I guess English culture is just not comfortable with them.
That would be 'positivism', wouldn't it? And what precisely constitutes 'common' in that sentence? Where do you draw the line between what would be accepted as 'common' and what would not? But then, the kinds of observations produced by the LHC would not be 'common', nor would the interpretive skills required to analyse them, even if they are designated 'scientific'.
Perhaps I didn't express myself well.
My attitude to this is that truth conditions are not the whole of the meaning of anything. But they are a part of the meaning of everything that is "truth-apt".
But I was thinking that if something cannot affect us in any way, then it makes no difference to us. So it is irrelevant.
I was also thinking that absolute reality, "beyond" all the contextual frameworks that we use to define what's real and what's not is not just an unachievable goal, but meaningless. The framework that defines meaning is, ex hypothesi, missing.
Also, I did refer to the "amplification" of our senses "by techniques discovered or at least validated by science".
However, there is evidence that bonobos can learn language and judge right from wrong. Why not, we are on the same branch of the tree. But it is curious in nature that bonobos do not develop language independent of human intervention. However, if a bonobo does learn language at least one of them has taught the offspring language. I am wondering if they would continue to pass on language and if so, would they develop better language skills in following generations? (evolution working)
I am not familiar with bonobos and their languages at all, but I guess it is nowhere near in the complexity and diversity of human languages.
More important, should we assume all humans are rational thinkers or must they learn the higher order thinking skills to be rational? Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking?
Not all humans are equal, and rational even if they appear to be. Only some are.
1. So do you think that the people who built the pyramids were rational or not? (They built them before the ancient Greeks started philosophizing.)
They were physically rational, but not philosophically rational. There is no record or evidence of their rational explanations on how and why they had built them.
2. About the process of learning or acquiring a habit or routine. I grant you that putting on one's lucky trainers when going out to compete is not (normally) rational. But when the habit or routine is capable of rational justification - driving or fuelling one's car would be examples - is learning or practising those activities rational or not?
You could ask them why they put on the lucky trainers, and if it is rational to do so, and also ask for the justification for doing so. If they can expound about it in rational manner, then they are rational. If not, they were just superstitious.
Doing something, practicing or training some skills are not rational. Only when they can elaborate on them critically, reflectively and logically, they could be regarded as rational.
I like sushiOctober 01, 2024 at 10:34#9357120 likes
I agree rational thinking requires language and then questioning out one thinks and that animals do not do this and can not do so without language.
This is false. Chimps can cooperate and problem solve, as can chickens. The latter may be mere 'programming' but I would not say we can state one way or another what we mean by 'language' to begin with.
I can certainly think without words. The guy from Mexico managed to cross a border and work in the US before coming to understand what language was. Do not confuse language with culture. Our understand of language maps onto the lived-world rather than the other way around.
I can certainly think without words. The guy from Mexico managed to cross a border and work in the US before coming to understand what language was. Do not confuse language with culture. Our understand of language maps onto the lived-world rather than the other way around.
Do not confuse language and words with the rational explications and justifications expressed in language.
Thing about details, upon being convinced of some set of them, its awful hard to put them aside. First thing that comes to mind, for that discipline considered as a science, what principles determine its methods and what laws govern its objects? For without those, how can it be a science at all?
I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience
Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.
That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:
.It is important to keep in mind that Husserls phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the I; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible .
It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the I is impossible, if only the I is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of Is, or different forms of a single I, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.
Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other.
I like sushiOctober 01, 2024 at 14:49#9357360 likes
Reply to Corvus So you are saying that people with no language do not act rationally? That seems like a stretch.
No, they are not rational at all. They are more in the arena of emotional states.
In one way, you are not wrong. I think "emotional state" is not the whole story. But I want to ask whether, given that you believe in a myth, working out what it is rational for you to do in the light of that myth is not an exercise in rationality. For example, we know, from textual evidence, that the ancient Egyptians built their pyramids because it was in their interest to do so and that makes sense to us. Why would we not say that given that they believed their myths, they were rational to build the pyramids?
They were physically rational, but not philosophically rational. There is no record or evidence of their rational explanations on how and why they had built them.
We know the why, but not the how - thought we have some ideas from the finished product. They also had quite reasonable arithmetic, though they limited themselves to severely practical applications. From textual evidence. Irrational, but capable of arithmetic?
I think it's the sorites problem. One bit of information processed doesn't mean anything. Many bits of information processed is more persuasive. But it's more than just processing information. It's reacting to it in complex ways, and, it's not just responding to information, but initiating action based on information as well.
So you are saying that people with no language do not act rationally? That seems like a stretch.
Well, if you told me, you like sushi, or you ate 10 boxes of sushi, then I wouldn't take that comment as rational. But if you said, you like sushi, because of the health effects it can bring, or some other reasons why you like sushi from biological, social or cultural backgrounds, then I might take that explanation rational.
Having ability of using language or knowing meanings of some words doesn't make one rational, nor does ability or preference eating sushi.
Why would we not say that given that they believed their myths, they were rational to build the pyramids?
Knowing something is not also being rational. One can know many things in the world, but still can be irrational, or be common as muck, have nothing to do with rational being. Reason and being rational can be basis of knowing, but reason and being rational is not knowing itself.
I like sushiOctober 01, 2024 at 16:05#9357530 likes
Reply to Corvus Okay, I see you are using 'rational' in a very particular way so I won't waste my time in a pointless back and forth.
I was trying to clarify the correct use of the concept "rational" from the muddled way.
Well, your criterion is clear. It's also clear because it justifies saying of a person that they are rational or not - because it relies on a capacity, ability or skill. It's just that it's not very useful - for the purposes of thinking about various problems, including the one of this thread.
Having ability of using language or knowing meanings of some words doesn't make one rational, nor does ability or preference eating sushi.
I agree. One can (and most people do) use language in irrational ways. But language does open up the possibility of articulate reason. It's necessary, but not sufficient.
That's a bit odd, at least for me. I start from the justified true belief account of knowledge, so for me, knowing something means being able to justify it, which would require some rationality, wouldn't it?
But then that requires language, which would rule out my dog. So I need something else, which would be highly unorthodox, because orthodox philosophy doesn't even attempt to consider epistemology for language-less creatures. It's the same issue, how far and in what ways we have to adapt our concepts to recognize the similarities that there are between humans and animals.
Philosophy of action is very, very complicated, because our thinking/language about actions is very, very complicated - all human and animal life is there. But it is also capable of recognizing some very fine and yet important distinctions. I think it is probably better to patiently disentangle the complications before jumping to the conclusion that our concepts are muddled.
More important, should we assume all humans are rational thinkers or must they learn the higher order thinking skills to be rational? Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking?
The trouble is that there is nothing to prevent people using the word "rational" in different ways.
The truth is that even we humans are not rational simplicter. We are a mixture. Our starting-point is the ability to learn - this happens automatically from the moment we are born. There's a range of skills involved and there's no guarantee that everyone will learn all of them.
The word "thinking" is very, very difficult to pin down. We distinguish explicit thinking from acting, forgetting to notice that thinking is something we do, and so is also an action - thought sometimes thoughts just occur to us and we aren't deliberately doing it and sometimes it is not under our control. So is more like breathing - it can be automatic, and it can be under voluntary control.
But we can act without explicit thinking beforehand, and I don't think there is any reason to say that all such actions are non-rational. But it is complicated. Habitual actions, for example, are a bit marginal; we often do them, as we say, without thinking - that's when the habit doesn't adjust to unusual circumstances. We can also react very fast in an emergency and these actions can be more like a reflex than a true action. (True actions need to be under our conscious control.)
I hope I'm not confusing you. I'll stop there.
Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.
Well, I'm very much in favour of adopting whatever approach most suits the subject-matter, so I don't have a problem with that. I've lost what I said before about Heidegger, but I expect you'll remember that it was about his distinction between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand.
I have the impression that it was intended as a critique of Husserl, and one can see how Heidegger's distinction maps on to Husserl's. But Heidegger was not only criticizing Husserl, but the idea of the theoretical stance, objective and disconnected from ordinary, involved life. In other words, both sides of the mirroring relationship that you described. His argument was that it is the involved life that is fundamental and the theoretical stance (of both kinds) that was the optional extra. As I understand it.
namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the I; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible .
I don't doubt it. But there are others who maintain the opposite, as you notice.. The question is which experience is veridical. One has to bear in mind that our experience is laden with skills and expectations. Many people think that there is a way of shrugging all that off and experiencing the true experience. But that involves shedding all those skills and expectations. Demonstrating that one has succeeded in that is, let us just say, difficult. I'm not even convinced that there is a truth of the matter, although I do favour the "no-self" view, or more accurately my self = Ludwig = me.
That makes sense, and I didn't mean to imply that it couldn't be called a science at all. But the epoche does set on one side the "hard" sciences, doesn't it? That's why phenomenology has to have a method of its own.
I wasnt thinking so much of a distinction between hard and soft sciences. I think phenomenology is unique whether counted as science or not in that it attempts to deal with the nature of human experience itself as distinct from all the other sciences which deal with observed phenomena of one kind or another.
Yes. You may be thinking of fantasy stories. But those rely on hand-waving - magic or future technology - to keep plausibility going.
I am not sure if you would count them as fantasy stories but I was thinking more specifically of myths and metaphysical speculations and religions. That is conjectures which count themselves to be non-fictional.
Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.
That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:
.It is important to keep in mind that Husserls phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the I; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible .
One experiences phenomena by perceiving them. How does on experience oneself? By being it? If we have a sense of the self by virtue of being then I think phenomenology would consist in the introspective apprehension of that be-ing as well as in the reflective investigation and description of the qualities and nature of experience and being in general. I'm not making any judgement about whether phenomenology yields valid or reliable knowledge. Vervaecke counts "participatory knowing" as one of four kinds of knowing.
It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the I is impossible, if only the I is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of Is, or different forms of a single I, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.
Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other.
Yes, perhaps the "I" is nothing more than a mere idea which we hold as an overarching unifying principle. If that were so it would be a kind of metaphysical or ontological illusion. A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea.
I'm not making any judgement about whether phenomenology yields valid or reliable knowledge.
I would think phenomenology would necessarily be rather poor at yielding reliable knowledge about the experience of people in general, given the neurodiversity of people. I haven't looked into phenomenology much, but I'd think it a poor basis for understanding the experience of someone with schizophrenia of someone with bipolar disorder who is in a manic state.
However, those with more knowledge of phenomenology are welcome to enlighten me.
I would think phenomenology would necessarily be rather poor at yielding reliable knowledge about the experience of people in general, given the neurodiversity of people.
Yes, there is the assumption that either we are all the same or that at least we are all basically the same. Is that assumption justifiable? I don't know.
[hide]I haven't studied Husserl's 'phenomenological bracketing' in any depth, but I do know there have been comparisons made between epoch? and emptiness (??nyat? or sunnata) in Buddhism. Here is an excerpt from that topic on a Buddhist website:
[quote=Emptiness, Thanissaro Bhikhu;https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/emptiness.html]Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them.
This mode is called emptiness because it's empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and the world we live in. Although these stories and views have their uses, the Buddha found that some of the more abstract questions they raise of our true identity and the reality of the world outside pull attention away from a direct experience of how events influence one another in the immediate present. Thus they get in the way when we try to understand and solve the problem of suffering.
Say for instance, that you're meditating, and a feeling of anger toward your mother appears. Immediately, the mind's reaction is to identify the anger as "my" anger, or to say that "I'm" angry. It then elaborates on the feeling, either working it into the story of your relationship to your mother, or to your general views about when and where anger toward one's mother can be justified. The problem with all this, from the Buddha's perspective, is that these stories and views entail further suffering. The more you get involved in them, the more you get distracted from seeing the actual cause of the suffering: the labels of "I" and "mine" that set the whole process in motion. As a result, you can't find the way to unravel that cause and bring the suffering to an end.
If, however, you can adopt the emptiness mode by not acting on or reacting to the anger, but simply watching it as a series of events, in and of themselves you can see that the anger is empty of anything worth identifying with or possessing. As you master the emptiness mode more consistently, you see that this truth holds not only for such gross emotions as anger, but also for even the most subtle events in the realm of experience. This is the sense in which all things are empty. When you see this, you realize that labels of "I" and "mine" are inappropriate, unnecessary, and cause nothing but stress and pain. You can then drop them. When you drop them totally, you discover a mode of experience that lies deeper still, one that's totally free.[/quote]
I believe this is near to both the meaning of the 'phenomenological suspension'/ epoch? and also to the original meaning of skepticism in ancient philosophy (a very different thing to skepticism in modern terms). Ancient skepticism was grounded in 'suspension of judgement of what is not evident' (ref), namely, the entailments and entanglements that arise from emotional reactivity. That is where the similarity with epoch? becomes clear.
That's a bit odd, at least for me. I start from the justified true belief account of knowledge, so for me, knowing something means being able to justify it, which would require some rationality, wouldn't it?
Not always. I know it is autumn by looking at the falling leaves from the trees outside. My knowledge of autumn arrived to me purely from the visual perception. Why do I need to justify the knowledge? If someone asked me to justify it, I could then do it. But before that unlikely event, I just know it is autumn.
But in some other case of knowledge, rational justification is needed, helps or even based on. You seem to be over simplifying the issue, which results inevitably in the muddle.
I think it's the sorites problem. One bit of information processed doesn't mean anything. Many bits of information processed is more persuasive. But it's more than just processing information. It's reacting to it in complex ways, and, it's not just responding to information, but initiating action based on information as well.
I don't see any other explanation having an easier time. One neuron? Two? A thousand? A million?
This is false. Chimps can cooperate and problem solve, as can chickens. The latter may be mere 'programming' but I would not say we can state one way or another what we mean by 'language' to begin with.
Is it rational to literally interpret the Bible and believe it is the word of God? How about if we interpret the Bible abstractly, is that rational? Would animals also have literal interpretations and abstract ones?
Isn't it a bit difficult to comprehend thinking without words? I know preverbal babies do have thoughts without words, but once we learn words in a way we are thrown out of Eden because words separate us from experience. That is we are aware of what we are thinking and no longer have a pure unadulterated experience of life. Now we can envy the animals that are still one with nature.
Imo, a young Japanese macaque, was the first to wash her food, a sweet potato, in 1954:
Hundredth monkey effect - Wikipedia
Imo did not think she did not like sand in her food and consider ways to resolve the problem. She experienced a washed yam and began washing yams. Slowly the rest began imitating her although she did not explain to them why she washed yams and they did not discuss if this is a good idea or not. While the college student may be unable to figure out how to clean a yam if there is no faucet with clean water nearby. In some ways, our ability to resolve problems is diminished with thinking. Such as I could not get out of the gate that required a code but my friend with a lower IQ did not hesitate in sticking his hand through the gate and opening it from the outside.
The reason I am arguing so strongly is we learn how to think and we should not expect everyone to think rationally without training. We should not take thinking for granted.
I like sushiOctober 02, 2024 at 02:45#9358890 likes
Reply to Athena It is completely rational for different people to come to completely different conclusions.
It is rational for someone religious to pray for their children. Rationality is not dictated by the outcome it is dictated by an evidence based system. People have different conceptions of what constitutes evidence, and this changes fairly fluidly - hence why I no longer believe in Santa.
The reason I am arguing so strongly is we learn how to think and we should not expect everyone to think rationally without training. We should not take thinking for granted.
Your idea of rational training might be irrational. Saying that rationality requires language seems fairly rational, but it might be wrong. Your opinion about what is or is not rational can be faulty.
A man with no conception of language managed to figure out what language was. He did this in an irrational way? Accidently? Are we seriously suggesting that having the mental capacity to acquire language using our cognition is not a rational process? That just does not make sense to me.
This is little more than arguing that only humans are intelligent because no other animals possess the same type of intelligence as us. The very same goes for rationality and even language.
It should be noted that animals have cultures, traditions and can pass on knowledge to others. There scope is limited compared to ours though. All elements of human language (spoken/written/signed) can be seen in the rest of the animal kingdom, it is just that we happen to possess them all. Does rationality suddenly emerge because of this? Maybe that is your argument, I do not know?
The trouble is that there is nothing to prevent people using the word "rational" in different ways.
The truth is that even we humans are not rational simplicter. We are a mixture. Our starting-point is the ability to learn - this happens automatically from the moment we are born. There's a range of skills involved and there's no guarantee that everyone will learn all of them.
The word "thinking" is very, very difficult to pin down. We distinguish explicit thinking from acting, forgetting to notice that thinking is something we do, and so is also an action - thought sometimes thoughts just occur to us and we aren't deliberately doing it and sometimes it is not under our control. So is more like breathing - it can be automatic, and it can be under voluntary control.
But we can act without explicit thinking beforehand, and I don't think there is any reason to say that all such actions are non-rational. But it is complicated. Habitual actions, for example, are a bit marginal; we often do them, as we say, without thinking - that's when the habit doesn't adjust to unusual circumstances. We can also react very fast in an emergency and these actions can be more like a reflex than a true action. (True actions need to be under our conscious control.)
I hope I'm not confusing you. I'll stop there.
The problem is not answering the question. Is believing and defending a myth or false belief, rational thinking?
Thinking, Fast and Slow is a 2011 popular science book by psychologist Daniel Kahneman. The book's main thesis is a differentiation between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast, instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. Wikipedia
The book Emotional Intelligence gives a good example of fast thinking. A father shot and killed his son thinking his son was away at college and the person who jumped out of the closet was an intruder. The father reacted in fear before thinking. Emotions play a big role in our thinking, especially if we do not habitually use the higher-order thinking skills. It is likely this year our votes will be based on our feelings, not rational thinking.
We can also divide thinking as literal or abstract. Is Satan and his demons real? Do we need fear being possessed by demons which is interpreting the Bible literally? Abstractly is a demon is just an unpleasant thought that we can get rid of by being rational? That would make demons an abstract thought.
Information about changes in our brains may help with understanding how human brains are different from other animals.
Yes, children's brains undergo significant changes around the age of eight, including the development of new neural circuitry:
Frontal cortex
The frontal cortex, which controls thinking and logic, begins to develop, allowing children to think more complexly and reason.
Integration
Children can now process two things at once, which makes them more reasonable and less impulsive.
Cognitive development
Children can mentally combine, separate, order, and transform objects and actions. They can also apply logic and reason, and focus their attention.
Creativity
Children develop creative skills through writing, acting, inventing, and designing.
Interest
Children begin to collect things and develop an interest in projects. They also develop a sense of right and wrong, and care about fairness.
The brain's development is a complex process that continues into early adulthood. The early years of childhood are especially important for brain development, as experiences during this time strongly influence the development of sensory and perceptual systems.
https://www.google.com/search?q=brain+nureons+change+at+age+8&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS926US926&oq=brain+nureons+change+at+age+8&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIJCAEQIRgKGKABMgkIAhAhGAoYoAEyCQgDECEYChigATIJCAQQIRgKGKABMgkIBRAhGAoYoAEyCQgGECEYChirAjIHCAcQIRiPAjIHCAgQIRiPAtIBCjE0MzUzajBqMTWoAgiwAgE&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
Critical thinking is a higher-order thinking skill. Higher-order thinking skills go beyond basic observation of facts and memorization. They are what we are talking about when we want our students to be evaluative, creative and innovative.
When most people think of critical thinking, they think that their words (or the words of others) are supposed to get criticized and torn apart in argument, when in fact all it means is that they are criteria-based. These criteria require that we distinguish fact from fiction; synthesize and evaluate information; and clearly communicate, solve problems and discover truths.
That is not my definition but I agree with the definition. I am passionate about it because I believe the US is in big trouble because it changed how children are taught to think. Now instead of Walter Cronkite and rational media, we have news that is emotional yellow journalism and people are basing their judgments on how they feel, not having a clue that something is wrong with their rational thinking. They are not well informed and we are not using the higher order thinking skills. We are overly dependent on our emotions. What is happening today happened in Germany before the Second World War. Education for technology is not the liberal education that dominated education in the US before 1958. How we teach our children to think matters.
.which is irrelevant if the experience in question is impossible. There no reason to care about semantic truths, indeed there couldnt even be any such judgements, without having first established the objects contained in the utterances. I understand this must have been done, or at least attempts at it, somehow or another, otherwise Husserls philosophy lacks justification.
One has to bear in mind that our experience is laden with skills and expectations.
And one can also bear in mind experience is an end in itself, laden with nothing, but is itself a laden on the condition of the subject to whom it belongs. Skills and expectations laden the system, but not that which the system finalizes as its product.
I can only recognize myself when I can recognise the other.
I can see that, but that says more about relation between character or personality, and manifestation. Im more interested in its development then its activities, which may even contradict that character.
One experiences phenomena by perceiving them. How does on experience oneself?
If the first is true, experience of oneself makes oneself as phenomenon, necessary. Under the auspices of some theoretical metaphysics, phenomena are the product of the synthesis of the matter of a thing given a posteriori by the perception of it, and some form which resides a priori in that faculty doing the synthesizing. While it is not contradictory for oneself to contain a priori form, it is utterly contradictory for oneself to contain matter. Because it cannot, one cannot perceive oneself, the synthesis initiated by perception immediately becomes impossible, hence oneself can never be phenomenon, from which follows necessarily, oneself can never be an experience.
Whats needed to justify oneself as an experience, is to predicate experience itself on something other than what some another theory demands. But different predication, while being necessary in order to change things around enough to grant the possibility of that which was originally denied, the logic grounding such predication must also be stronger than the original under suspicion.
Phenomenology, in the view from this armchair, while sufficing as a sufficiently different source of predication affirming the possibility for the experience of oneself, leaves out too much of the original doctrines to be powerful enough to grant that which was originally denied.
It should be noted that animals have cultures, traditions and can pass on knowledge to others. There scope is limited compared to ours though. All elements of human language (spoken/written/signed) can be seen in the rest of the animal kingdom, it is just that we happen to possess them all. Does rationality suddenly emerge because of this? Maybe that is your argument, I do not know?
No rationality does not suddenly emerge and that is the reason for this thread. It should be clear I am saying rationality must be learned. Unless we learn to think rationally, we base our thoughts on our feelings, and that can be very problematic. However, an argument against Daniel Kahneman's faith in the theory of fast and slow thinking, is the importance of our feelings and creative thinking. Life follows some rules but it is also chaotic and we can not always predict the future based on the past.
Were people rational before Aristotle wrote down the rules for logical thinking? We can argue the meaning of rational and we also understand our rational today is far from our rational in ancient times.
I am struggling to understand how given our modern, science-based understanding of life, can people still believe the Bible is a good explanation of reality. If our bodies were chemically more like clay statues than the bodies of apes, I could believe a God made us of mud, but I don't know how anyone could believe that today. This is important because we base decisions on what we believe is true about our creation. Our ability to make good decisions rests on what we believe is so.
Explaining how much we are like the rest of the animal kingdom, does not support a belief in a God walking in a Garden with a man made of mud and a woman made from his rib. That notion comes from a Sumerian story of creation, and it is not the word of God. How can know that? By translating and reading the Sumerian story. In the original story, the goddess who helped heal the river was associated with the rib and healing. Or we can examine the chemistry of humans and animals and realize our bodies have more in common with animals than mud. Rational thinking uses evidence. But faith is all about feeling! I feel this is true because when I started praying to God for help, I stopped being so afraid and He has helped me so many ways, versus the belief has been life-changing. I am voting for Trump because I believe he is God on earth and democrats are possessed by the devil and our minister told us to vote for Trump. :rofl: What is rational?
All elements of human language (spoken/written/signed) can be seen in the rest of the animal kingdom, it is just that we happen to possess them all.
I would be thunderstruck to learn this is true. Two examples jump quickly to mind, but I'm sure there are others.
I can't imagine a non-human language with past tense or future tense. Does any animal have a way of saying "Mom killed a deer yesterday", as opposed to "Mom kill deer", which would mean Now, so they know dinner is served?
And it seems to me English is the only human language without gender for words. La chica/el chico. But I don't imagine animals do that.
Reply to Mww If I understand what you are saying I think I agree. It is often said that the self, being the experiencer cannot be itself the object of experience, with the analogy of the eye that cannot see itself being invoked.
However the eye is a real object which can be seen, so I think it is a rather weak analogy. If the self is nothing more than an idea then of course it cannot be experienced it can only be thought.
That said we have a sense of self (or is it just a sense of being?) which seems to be pre-conceptual. If it is just a sense of being it is also a sense of being different (from everything else) it seems. I don't doubt that (at least some) animals have this kind of sense.
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 00:58#9360500 likes
I don't see how. There is no need to think about one's own beliefs about future events in order to have beliefs about future events.
creativesoul
I'm waiting on the platform for the 5 pm train; it is 4.58; I expect (believe) that the train will arrive shortly. It doesn't. I am disappointed. Is it correct to say that I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false?
If and only if the train does not arrive shortly, and you isolate your own belief to the exclusion of all else, and you practice thinking and talking about them as a subject matters in their own right would it then be "correct" for you to say that-------> "I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false?"
It is correct to say that that constitutes a belief about a belief?
Sure. Yours.
Why would it be incorrect to substitute "the dog" for "I" in that story?
The dog is incapable of isolating its own thought/belief to the exclusion of all else. Dog's do not have a means to isolate their own thought and belief and further consider them as subject matters in their own right as a means to compare them to fact. That comparison facilitates the recognition of true and false belief.
I think you would reply that it is incorrect because the dog is unable to speak English.
A dog's inability to become aware of its own fallibility is due to not possessing the capacity/capability to isolate their own thoughts and beliefs. Realizing/recognizing that one's belief is false, in this case, happens when reality does not meet/match expectations and we're aware of that.
English is our means but given that it is not the only naming and descriptive practice, it is not the specific language that matters here. It's more about the ability to think about one's own prior thoughts and/or beliefs as subject matters in their own right.
I like sushiOctober 03, 2024 at 01:00#9360520 likes
Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences.
creativesoul
All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows.
Okay. It's the quality of the consequences that are in contention.
The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldnt.
Well, that's one possible implication/meaning of that comment. I'm less concerned about whether or not it shouldn't disagree with everyday observable fact, and much more concerned that it does.
Be that as it may, Im ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.
We can watch some creatures learn how to use tools for specific purposes even though they have no ability to think about their own thought and belief. Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former. Mine dovetails with the latter.
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 01:30#9360570 likes
The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.
Other animals cannot do that.
creativesoul
Right. But millions of years ago, our brains took a leap that no other species has yet taken. We were one of many species that had some limited degree of language, or representation, abilities. Presumably, various other species have evolved greater abilities since then.
"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means, but evolution demands survival advantages. Different species have different perceptual machinery. Direct perception in the sense of completely void of abstraction.
(Maybe whatever species today has these abilities to the least degree is the baseline that all started at. Although even it may have evolved from the barest minimum degree of such abilities.) But our brain gained an ability that was either enough for us to get where we are now by learning and adding to our learning, or that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. It allowed us greater language, and our greater language helped develop our brain. Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about.
I wouldn't disagree with that or what I think it means. It could use a healthy unpacking.
A question that comes to mind...
Do all thought and belief share a set of common elements, such that they are the exact same 'thing' at their core?
I think so.
Correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. All thought, belief, and statements thereof consist of correlations. Some correlations include language use(are drawn between language use and other things. Other correlations are drawn between things that do not include language use.
All thought and belief are meaningful to the creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding them. Some correlations are drawn by language less creatures. Some of those correlations attribute/recognize causality(causal relationships). Some of those thought and belief can be true/false.
Either truth and meaning exist in their entirety prior to language or true and false belief exists without meaning and/or truth.
"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means
Some animals eat what they can find.
Some animals can use a tool, if they find a good one, to help them get food.
Some animals can make a tool to help them get food.
Some animals can use tools and plan a couple steps ahead to get food.
They were talking more broadly though than you I think ;)
I used a couple of specific examples to illustrate the very broad categories. I'd be surprised if there are examples is any non-human language of the broad categories of talking about the past or future.
I like sushiOctober 03, 2024 at 03:03#9360710 likes
Reply to Patterner I was talking about the constituents not the use. A car without an engine will not run, but it still possesses all the other constituents that would.
I wouldn't disagree with that or what I think it means. It could use a healthy unpacking.
I don't suspect we could ever learn what actually happened. Especially if it's the second scenario, that our brain gained an ability that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. We couldn't ever know the series of mutations, and what each one gave us.
Do all thought and belief share a set of common elements, such that they are the exact same 'thing' at their core?
If humans think in ways no other species does, such as thinking of our own death in the (hopefully) distant future, what are the common elements with the thoughts of whatever critter has the least activity that can be called thinking?
I am not sure if you would count them as fantasy stories but I was thinking more specifically of myths and metaphysical speculations and religions. That is conjectures which count themselves to be non-fictional.
OK. "Myths and metaphysical speculations and religions" all belong in a very special category. I'll express this by saying that they are pre-rational and foundational. By which I mean that they give the people who accept them their framework for explaining and understanding the world. It's misleading, in my view, to say that people believe them, because that places them alongside believing that an earthquake is happening or that the harvest is bad - everyday facts.
Yes, perhaps the "I" is nothing more than a mere idea which we hold as an overarching unifying principle. If that were so it would be a kind of metaphysical or ontological illusion. A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea.
Well, I disagree with the "mere" in "mere idea", because some ideas (including "I") are what set the framework within we can identify facts, experiences, etc. On the other hand, I agree that many people (try to) reify that idea. But that is a misunderstanding of language, which is not built in to, but results from imposing a limited model of language on our linguistic practices.
That said we have a sense of self (or is it just a sense of being?) which seems to be pre-conceptual. If it is just a sense of being it is also a sense of being different (from everything else) it seems. I don't doubt that (at least some) animals have this kind of sense.
I don't see how the dog can't know that it itself is in pain, for example. Call it a pre-conceptual sense if you like, but there's no way for us to recognize it except in language or in how we respond.
I haven't looked into phenomenology much, but I'd think it a poor basis for understanding the experience of someone with schizophrenia of someone with bipolar disorder who is in a manic state.
That's a good point. I don't know how a phenomenologist would respond. But it seems pretty clear that they think they are talking about what is built in to any experience whatever. It seems better to say that what we are looking for when we try to understand those phenomena is an account that makes sense of them by interpreting them in a framework that rationalizes them.
Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them.
It seems that the idea of raw data is a necessary illusion for empiricism. But it is an illusion, since the raw data would be "a blooming, buzzing confusion" - except even recognizing that is to interpret the phenomena. But the next two paragraphs show that that's not what is meant. The proposition does not require dropping the entanglements, but not getting entangled in them in order to see them from a different perspective. Bear in mind, that I'm already distorting this explanation, because I'm not considering it within it's intended context of the actual aims of the practices of mndfulness/meditation, which is not the theoretical context posited by philosophy practiced here.
I believe this is near to both the meaning of the 'phenomenological suspension'/ epoch? and also to the original meaning of skepticism in ancient philosophy (a very different thing to skepticism in modern terms). Ancient skepticism was grounded in 'suspension of judgement of what is not evident' (ref), namely, the entailments and entanglements that arise from emotional reactivity. That is where the similarity with epoch? becomes clear.
I agree that it is close, and might enable us to learn something. But I think we have to see what the actual practice of phenomenology is.
the experiencer cannot be itself the object of experience, with the analogy of the eye that cannot see itself being invoked. However the eye is a real object which can be seen, so I think it is a rather weak analogy.
Out of respect for our history, I wont be so brash as to throw the ol, much-dreaded categorical error at you, but rather, merely bringing it up might provoke you into looking for it. Or, in all fairness, showing there isnt one.
Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former ..
To would seem impossible to explain how mindless creatures use tools. But to be mindful does not make explicit thought and belief, or thinking about thought/belief.
The use of tools indicates mindfulness, but not what form or kind it may or may not be, which affirms the possibility of mere instinct for such use. Even use of tools itself risks conceptual misappropriation, in that making that connection by a qualified observer does not justify that same connection being made by the observed.
(Man: did you just use a tool to get at those ants?
Chimp: dunno about that; finger/hole/ant, then finger/hole no ant, putting a stick in my hand is just growing a longer finger, finger/hole/ant)
It is irrational to say only humans are rational creatures. For those interested in such investigations, he has no choice but to judge other un-like creatures rationality, with the very one impossible for them to possess, which immediately prejudices his investigation.
But in some other case of knowledge, rational justification is needed, helps or even based on. You seem to be over simplifying the issue, which results inevitably in the muddle.
So you know that it is autumn because you can see the falling leaves. You don't know because you have said to yourself "I know that.. because...". However, you will be able to cite that if anybody asks you how you know, i.e. it is your justification. (I accept that "I can see the falling leaves" needs no further justification under normal circumstances. But so far as the question "How do you know" goes, I don't see the difference between your simple case and your "other cases".
I don't see any other explanation having an easier time. One neuron? Two? A thousand? A million?
The moral of the sorites paradox is that some concepts do not have precise border-lines. Consciousness seems to me to be one of them. (So does "rational")
The reason I am arguing so strongly is we learn how to think and we should not expect everyone to think rationally without training. We should not take thinking for granted.
That's exactly right. Rationality is a complex of skills. Some of them we learn informally in the process of learning to navigate the world. Others (e.g. mathematics, critical thinking) we have to learn in more formal ways. There's no guarantee that everybody learns all the skills.
The problem is not answering the question. Is believing and defending a myth or false belief, rational thinking?
Well, it depends a bit, partly on which myth or false belief is involved, but also on how you choose to defend it. Granted that most myths contain only a element of truth it will often be irrational to defend them as true. And it is possible to be mistaken about a belief and so end up defending a false belief.
I am struggling to understand how given our modern, science-based understanding of life, can people still believe the Bible is a good explanation of reality.
The short answer is that they do not start with your presuppositions. The slightly longer answer is that a religious belief involves adopting a specific world-view, that is, a framework within which you assess truth or falsity or good explanation or bad explanation.
And one can also bear in mind experience is an end in itself, laden with nothing,
But isn't experience supposed to be the foundation of knowledge? How is that possible if it is an end in itself? Aren't experiences pleasant or unpleasant, meaningful or meaningless, &c. &c? How is that possible if they are laden with nothing?
I think you mean that there can never be an experience that is an experience of oneself? Or one's self can never be an object of experience (since oneself is posited as the subject of expereience.)?
A dog's inability to become aware of its own fallibility is due to not possessing the capacity/capability to isolate their own thoughts and beliefs. Realizing/recognizing that one's belief is false, in this case, happens when reality does not meet/match expectations and we're aware of that.
Perhaps you are thinking that in order to grasp the rationality of what a dog is doing, we have to somehow get inside it's head. That isn't necessary. We just need to interpret what it does. I'm sure that the dog understands that their human has not arrived on the train. I can't think of anything that they could do to make it clear that they recognize in addition, as a distinct belief, that their belief that their human would arrive on that train is false - other than saying it. Yet the latter belief is implicit in the former. i.e. is not distinct from, isolable from, the former.
But isn't experience supposed to be the foundation of knowledge?
While the case may be made that empirical knowledge is impossible without the experience of what the knowledge is of, but it is also quite often the case there can be experiences for which no knowledge is given. If it is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case, theres a need for a different case.
Insofar as the negation of which is a contradiction, it is always the case that ..
Knowledge is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the intelligence under which the system operates;
Experience is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the subject to which the system belongs, all else being what it may.
As well, since Plato earlier and Russell later, knowledge of is very different than knowledge that, such distinction being entirely absent from experience.
..oneself can never be an experience.
Mww
I think you mean that there can never be an experience that is an experience of oneself? Or one's self can never be an object of experience (since oneself is posited as the subject of expereience.)?
I suppose. That isnt necessarily contradictory or invalid, given the object immediately appended, re: of oneself. That only matters because without such appended object, the proposition is contradictory, re: never be an experience that is an experience. Which you must immediately recognize, given your historical commentary precedents, as a (gaspsputterchoke) language game.
Ones self can never be an object of experience works just fine, though, right?
The moral of the sorites paradox is that some concepts do not have precise border-lines. Consciousness seems to me to be one of them. (So does "rational")
Exactly. Although some things, like a pile of sand, are definitely made up of tiny units, we can't define how many are needed for it to qualify as a pile. My guess is that applies to consciousness.
As well, since Plato earlier and Russell later, knowledge of is very different than knowledge that, such distinction being entirely absent from experience.
Oh, yes, well, that makes a lot of difference. People mostly seem very reluctant to deal with that. I think the reason is that they think that knowledge of can be reduced to knowledge that. The probably haven't faced up to Mary's Room.
Knowledge is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the intelligence under which the system operates;
My version:- "Knowledge is an end in itself, achieved by the operation of a system, that end being a change in the information available to the system itself".
Experience is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the subject to which the system belongs, all else being what it may.
My version:- "Experience is the operation of a system, which often results in various changes to the condition of the subject to which the system belongs."
Which you must immediately recognize, given your historical commentary precedents, as a (gaspsputterchoke) language game.
Careful - I'm not sure that is not a dirty word around here.
But that concept enables one to give "knowing oneself" a meaning. But it couldn't be based on the standard concepts of how we come to know things - a different, specialized, language game.
Exactly. Although some things, like a pile of sand, are definitely made up of tiny units, we can't define how many are needed for it to qualify as a pile. My guess is that applies to consciousness.
Yes, though that's not because consciousness is made up of quantities of atoms or particles. It's in a different category.
Rationality is not dissimilar, but, unlike consciousness, it is the result of a range of skills. One's range may be wider or narrower, greater or lesser.
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 21:51#9362820 likes
"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means
creativesoul
Some animals eat what they can find.
Some animals can use a tool, if they find a good one, to help them get food.
Some animals can make a tool to help them get food.
Some animals can use tools and plan a couple steps ahead to get food.
Seems like increasing abilities to me.
Yup.
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 21:54#9362850 likes
The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.
Other animals cannot do that.
creativesoul
Right. But millions of years ago, our brains took a leap that no other species has yet taken. We were one of many species that had some limited degree of language, or representation, abilities. Presumably, various other species have evolved greater abilities since then.
Patterner
"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means, but evolution demands survival advantages. Different species have different perceptual machinery. Direct perception in the sense of completely void of abstraction.
I take issue with taking certain kinds of leaps. "Increase" works well. Very very slow increments.
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 21:59#9362880 likes
...our brain gained an ability that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. We couldn't ever know the series of mutations, and what each one gave us.
The detail of mutations remains unclear. What makes a mutation... a mutation?
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 22:02#9362900 likes
Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former ..
creativesoul
To would seem impossible
A problem.
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 22:03#9362910 likes
The use of tools indicates mindfulness, but not what form or kind it may or may not be
Sounds like a problem for the notion of "mindfulness".
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 22:19#9362960 likes
Mindless entities are so due to the absence of meaningful experience. Mindless things do not consist of thought and belief. Nothing is meaningful to a mindless entity. All meaningful experiences are meaningful to the creature capable of having that experience. If our notion of "mindless" does not agree there is a problem.
The criterion is not up to us.
Mindless entities predated minded ones. Minded entities predated us. Our own minds predated our own knowledge of them.
creativesoulOctober 03, 2024 at 22:57#9363010 likes
The dog is incapable of isolating its own thought/belief to the exclusion of all else.
creativesoul
I don't know what "isolating its own thought/belief" means.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself requires an ability to pick one's own thought and belief about this world out of this world to the exclusion of all else.
That cannot happen without having something to think about. A means to do so. And a creature capable. The recognition of one's own false belief. We isolate. We point. We name. We learn to use naming and descriptive practices. We name and describe the things that catch our attention.
We isolate by picking something out of this world to the exclusion of all else.
Certain sorts of things captured our attention - as a species - long before documented histories began being recorded. Things become meaningful that way.
OK. "Myths and metaphysical speculations and religions" all belong in a very special category. I'll express this by saying that they are pre-rational and foundational. By which I mean that they give the people who accept them their framework for explaining and understanding the world. Its misleading, in my view, to say that people believe them because that places them alongside believing that an earthquake is happening or that the harvest is bad - everyday facts.
I'm not sure about saying that myths and metaphysical speculations are pre-rational. I guess it depends on what you mean by "rational". I think of rationality as "measuring" things against other things and seeing possibilities. Hence its etymological commonality with ratio. In that kind of sense we can say (some) animals are rational from which it would follow that no aspect of human life is at least in that sense pre-rational.
I agree with you that culturally entrenched beliefs were probably at least by and large unquestioned and in view of that they could be thought of as being in the Wittgensteinian sense "hinge propositions" (although I never liked the word "proposition" in that context and I think 'belief' would probably be better).
So yes, people may not have " believed" such foundational ideas if by "beleived" is meant something like "personally arrived at by thinking about it".
Well, I disagree with the "mere" in "mere idea", because some ideas (including "I") are what set the framework within we can identify facts, experiences, etc. On the other hand, I agree that many people (try to) reify that idea. But that is a misunderstanding of language, which is not built in to, but results from imposing a limited model of language on our linguistic practices.
Of course the idea of self is a kind of master or overarching idea. A reaching for unity. But is it anything more than an idea? I suppose you could say as I already have that there is a pre-conceptual "sense of self" in us and also probably in (some) other animals. A sense of self that via memory "unifies" experience.
Out of respect for our history, I wont be so brash as to throw the ol, much-dreaded categorical error at you, but rather, merely bringing it up might provoke you into looking for it. Or, in all fairness, showing there isnt one.
But you have brought it up and I think now more explanation is required since I'm not sure what you are alluding to. Never fear giving offense. I'm here to learn not to find support for some pet theory.
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 00:51#9363430 likes
What sorts of stuff can become meaningful to a creature incapable of isolating their own belief system, as subject matters in their own right, to be further discussed, in greater detail perhaps???
Directly perceptible stuff. Thoughts and beliefs about the world are not. Therefore...
Does the dog recognize the fact that its own belief is no longer warranted, based upon everyday fact? It is no longer true. The falseness is a lack of correspondence. Recognizing one's own false belief - in that situation - requires recognizing that the world does not match one's expectations. The dog clearly doesn't recognize its own false belief about future events. If it did, it would act as if it no longer expected the human and the 5 o'clock train to arrive simultaneously.
I'm astounded that one cannot discern between thinking about everyday lifelong routine/events/fact and recognizing that one's own thought and belief based upon that very routine are no longer true.
What else could "the recognition" of one's own false belief amount to when talking about one who continued and continued to follow the same daily routine - to a meaningful extent anyway - and hence continued to believe that the human would arrive alongside the train for years after the human's death?
It was clearly not recognizing its own false belief.
The dog goes because its entire meaningful life was lovingly shared with the one arriving on schedule. The routine was a part of the dog's experience. It is through past routine that the dog's expectation became deeply embedded. The same things happened over and over. The human arriving with the train was one of those regularly recurring timely scheduled events/occurrences/facts. The dog's expectation was based upon past regularly occurring events, and hence were based very firmly in regularity/everyday fact at the time they began influencing the dog. The dog's beliefs were once well grounded. There are no longer.
The dog's continued expectation is consistent. That's rational behavior, in my book, based upon rational thought and belief, because it contains no inherent inevitable self-contradiction/equivocation, and it's based upon belief that was true at the time the connections were drawn between the train and the human.
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 01:10#9363540 likes
I take issue with taking certain kinds of leaps. "Increase" works well. Very very slow increments.
_________________
The detail of mutations remains unclear. What makes a mutation... a mutation?
Imperfect DNA replication. Which rarely happens. That's why the very very slow increments. I think single mutations aren't noticable. One base pair changes? That's nothing. But, in a million years, they've added up, and something is noticable.
"Leaps" makes me wonder. We think about kinds of things animals do not.
-We understand that we will die. That knowledge is a huge factor in the shape of our lives.
-We understand that the future and past both extend beyond our own lifespan.
-We can imagine things that don't exist, including things that take huge numbers of steps to make.
Are those leaps? What would incremental steps between other species and us mean? Is there a species that can think of what its life will be next month? Another species that can think of next year? Another that can think of a week after its own death? Another that can think of a month after its own death?
Maybe it's not a leap from what animals can think to any of those kinds of things. Maybe each is the smallest step there is, just up to a new ability.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself requires an ability to pick one's own thought and belief about this world out of this world to the exclusion of all else.
This world is not simply composed of entities arranged before us, waiting to be picked out. ('m assuming that you mean something like "focussed on" or "attended to" or "distinguished from other things".) But the problem of the sel f is preciselky that there is nothing to pick out in the world as it is presented or rvealed to us. The same applies to our thoughts and beliefs.
Certain sorts of things captured our attention - as a species - long before documented histories began being recorded. Things become meaningful that way.
The same is true of many animals. So what's the problem?
Does the dog recognize the fact that its own belief is no longer warranted, based upon everyday fact? It is no longer true. The falseness is a lack of correspondence. Recognizing one's own false belief - in that situation - requires recognizing that the world does not match one's expectations.
Yes and no. The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day. But those are two separate beliefs, and it is not unreasonable to retain a generalization in the face of a counter-example. It may be unreasonable not to abandon a generalization in the face of many counter-examples. But the single case and the generalization are two separate beliefs.
We may be pursuing different projects. You seem to be pursuing a phenomenology for the dog. I don't think that the rational explanation of actions is limited to identifying phenomenological events. Third person attributions of thoughts and beliefs are affected by first person declarations. But sometimes, the first person version is not available and sometimes first and third person versions conflict and we reject the first person version. So the authority of first person claims is not absolute. (Lying, self-deception.)
I'm not sure about saying that myths and metaphysical speculations are pre-rational. I guess it depends on what you mean by "rational". I think of rationality as "measuring" things against other things and seeing possibilities.
I was a bit sloppy there. For us, myths have no special status and can be evaluated by standards we have learnt in other ways. For, say, the ancient Greeks their status is different. So the myths, in themselves are neither post- not pre- rational. It's a question of what they are to one group of people or another. (I'm setting aside the point that nowadays, the evaluation of myths is complicated. They are generally recognized as being at least partly true or based on truth.)
One inevitably moves on to wonder what serves the function of myths in our upbringing and education? The answer is, different stories - the Christian or Buddhist stories, the story of philosophy (Socrates) or science (Copernicus or Galileo), stories from our history - Battle of Hastings, Founding Fathers etc.
I agree with you that culturally entrenched beliefs were probably at least by and large unquestioned and in view of that they could be thought of as being in the Wittgensteinian sense "hinge propositions" (although I never liked the word "proposition" in that context and I think 'belief' would probably be better).
Good point. Myths are composed or propositions, but that's doesn't mean that they are propositions. Belief does seem to be better - so long as we bracket the context of evidence that applies to most run-of-the-mill beliefs.
A sense of self that via memory "unifies" experience.
It seems to me that there are two related but different ideas of the self. To a great extent, we define ourselves or create who we are by what we (choose to) do. But that sense of self-identity is not always identical with our sense of the identity of others. A further complication is that often our identity is given by the roles that we occupy and these differ in different contexts. (Parent/child, teacher/student, manager/colleague) One can appeal to continuities of one kind or another - stream of consciousness, physical continuity, and so forth - but then there is the question of how important or relevant they are - especially when they conflict. So unity of experience is one factor amongst others.
Are those leaps? What would incremental steps between other species and us mean? Is there a species that can think of what its life will be next month? Another species that can think of next year? Another that can think of a week after its own death? Another that can think of a month after its own death?
I've no idea how the story would go. But it won't be easy. The best evidence would be evidence of how creatures behaved. We can likely make some deductions from the physical remains we have, but we will never achieve the ideal of observing them in action. So we may never come to a plausible, evidence-based story of how rationality evolved.
However, The eye is the classic case of something that seemed to escape the possible range of evolutionary development. A major issue is that soft tissue is not often fossilized. But there is at least an outline of what happened. See:- New Scientist - Evolution of the Eye
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 11:00#9364840 likes
Thinking about one's own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself requires an ability to pick one's own thought and belief about this world out of this world to the exclusion of all else.
creativesoul
This world is not simply composed of entities arranged before us
Red herring.
Are you denying that thought and belief is prior to thinking about thought and belief?
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 11:02#9364850 likes
Certain sorts of things captured our attention - as a species - long before documented histories began being recorded. Things become meaningful that way.
creativesoul
The same is true of many animals. So what's the problem?
Not a problem. A similarity to be properly accounted for.
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 11:09#9364880 likes
Indeed. The topic is clear. It presupposes the existence of at least two distinct kinds of thought. Rational thought and thought that is not.
What do all examples of thought have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them count as being a thought?
However, on the other hand, I thought we were also pursuing the exact same project. Avoiding anthropomorphism. Succeeding in that endeavor requires knowing what sorts of thoughts and belief are of the kind that only humans are capable of forming, having, holding, and/or articulating. It's not using the terms "thought" and "belief" merely to explain the actions of a language less animal or ourselves. There are much better ways to do that.
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 11:36#9364960 likes
Thanks for that clarity. Good. It seems we're in agreement. As close or closer than any other participant in this thread. Strong methodological naturalist bent with significant importance placed upon acceptable explanations/criteria being amenable to an evolutionary timeline.
Ones self can never be an object of experience works just fine, though, right?
Mww
I think it does. But it is misleading to say that there's no such thing. It's just that one's self is not an object.
Agreed. Hence the new terminology in new philosophies, to stand for a thing that is not an object. Or even an object that is not a thing. Or maybe just a new definition for old terminology. Either way, abolishing the concept itself isnt likely in the near future, anyway, so ..the beat goes on.
Are you denying that thought and belief is prior to thinking about thought and belief?
If being awareness of my belief is thinking about belief, then surely the two are simultaneous, since the one follows logically from the other. But perhaps awareness of something is not thinking about it - even though awareness of something is being conscious of it.
You are distinguishing between thought that the thinker is able to articulate in language and critically evaluate and thought that the thinker is not able to articulate in language or critically evaluate.
I suspect that most people will have thoughts of both kinds. So we cannot say that people either are or are not rational, just that they are rational in some ways, but likely not in others. That, at least, we could agree on.
What do all examples of thought have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them count as being a thought?
There's no easy way to answer that - especially if you are trying to find commonalities between thoughts that are articulated in language and thoughts that are not. The only place that they overlap is in their role as reasons in rational actions.
I think we have different ideas about what that means. For me, explaining actions as rational is a language-game - a conceptual structure - whose paradigmatic application is to homo sapiens. It has been extended to various other cases, many of which are contested. What's at issue is how far that game/structure can be applied to animals. You have a point which I think does have something to it, that self-reflection is likely something that animals that lack a language like human language are not equipped to do. The complication is that they clearly have self-awareness and self-control as well as, or even because, they are capable of acting rationally - in my sense, though not in yours.
Hence the new terminology in new philosophies, to stand for a thing that is not an object.
I do agree that the thought is almost impossible to formulate clearly without a lot of dancing around explaining. I think this is a case that suits well Wittgenstein's idea that some things cannot be said, only shown.
Imperfect DNA replication. Which rarely happens. That's why the very very slow increments. I think single mutations aren't noticable. One base pair changes? That's nothing. But, in a million years, they've added up, and something is noticable.
There is strong evidence that the single mutation which resulted in the human genome containing ARHGAP11B played a particularly major role in humans having the intelligence we do.
ARHGAP11B is a human-specific gene that amplifies basal progenitors, controls neural progenitor proliferation, and contributes to neocortex folding. It is capable of causing neocortex folding in mice. This likely reflects a role for ARHGAP11B in development and evolutionary expansion of the human neocortex, a conclusion consistent with the finding that the gene duplication that created ARHGAP11B occurred on the human lineage after the divergence from the chimpanzee lineage but before the divergence from Neanderthals.[3]
Changes in ARHGAP11B are one of several key genetic factors of recent brain evolution and difference of modern humans to (other) apes and Neanderthals.[6] A 2016 study suggests, one mutation, a "single nucleotide substitution underlies the specific properties of ARHGAP11B that likely contributed to the evolutionary expansion of the human neocortex".[7]
A 2020 study found that when ARHGAP11B was introduced into the primate common marmoset, it increased radial glial cells, upper layer neurons, and brain wrinkles (gyral and sulcus structures), leading to the expansion of the neocortex.[8] This revealed that ARHGAP11B is the gene responsible for the development of the neocortex during human evolution.
[Emphasis added.]
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 19:13#9366450 likes
Are you denying that thought and belief is prior to thinking about thought and belief?
creativesoul
If being awareness of my belief is thinking about belief, then surely the two are simultaneous, since the one follows logically from the other. But perhaps awareness of something is not thinking about it - even though awareness of something is being conscious of it.
Thinking about X presupposes something to think about, and a creature capable of thinking about X. All creatures capable of thinking about X possess some means/process of doing so. All thinking creatures share the exact same basic process of thinking, regardless of X's value, and regardless of the specific biological machinery possessed by the candidate themselves.
Awareness of something is itself existentially dependent upon thought and belief, for it emerges as a direct result of thinking about whatever that something is(whatever grabs our attention). Exactly what sorts of things we can become aware of, and how completely we can become aware of them is determined strictly by our means/process of thinking as well as the ontological constituency(the basic make-up of exactly what is being thought about). The same is true of all thinking creatures capable of having meaningful experience. I cannot stress how important these considerations are.
All thought, belief, and meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience.
Steering clear of meaning is to steer clear of exactly what needs to be understood in order to acquire knowledge of meaningful true belief and meaningful false belief that creatures other than humans can have. It is also to steer clear of what needs to be understood in order to understand how humans think, and thus how they thought prior to gaining the ability to think about their own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right.
I've no issue with saying - roughly speaking - that awareness of X requires thinking about X, however, I do not depend upon any notion of awareness to set out the basic outline of all thought, belief, and meaningful experience(consciousness).
The notion of "awareness" adds unnecessary confusion often enough that I tend to avoid it. It has no explanatory power above and beyond thought, belief, and meaningful experience. Those notions exhaust "awareness" but not the other way around.
We could even say that being aware of something is being conscious of it. I do not depend upon a preconceived notion of what counts as consciousness either, except as a general guideline regarding the target of examination/consideration.
Thought, belief, meaning, coherence(consistency), correspondence(with/to fact), and falsity all emerged onto the world stage long before creatures ever became lucky enough to be able to become aware of them. We are such creatures. I would argue, and do, that we are the only such creatures.
...perhaps awareness of something is not thinking about it - even though awareness of something is being conscious of it.
What counts as thinking about something?
That is precisely what has yet to have been determined here. It is only after that is established can we fill "something" in with "one's own belief" and make sense of metacognition.
In order to know what sorts of things some candidate or another is capable of thinking about(including ourselves), we must know how they think about the world, as well as how that process enables or excludes them from being able to think about the "it" under consideration.
All thinking creatures do so by the very same basic process. Regardless of the complexity of the biological machinery and/or abstraction level of the thinking, all thinking creatures do so solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. There are no examples to the contrary. I'll gladly reassess the certainty I maintain regarding the justificatory strength of my position should anyone, anywhere, anytime present a black swan.
All thinking about X requires isolating X by virtue of drawing distinctions between X and all else. It requires the creature directly perceive X 'as a thing', different from other things. If those distinctions require common language use(shared meaning), then only language users can think about such things. Truth and falsity exist prior to our awareness of them. Language less creatures can form, have, and/or hold true and false belief(expectations are based upon them). However, they cannot be aware that their own thought and belief are true or false, for they do not have what it takes. Our own awareness of that required metacognition. Metacognition requires language use replete with meaningful utterances to stand in proxy for our past beliefs, regardless of whether or not they are true/false.
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 19:27#9366470 likes
This world is not simply composed of entities arranged before us, waiting to be picked out
The irony. "Waiting to be picked out" is anthropomorphism. That's a very odd thing to say. I didn't, nor would I be willing to assent to that, as it's written.
I would say that the world was composed of all sorts of things that existed in their entirety prior to the emergence of humans. Meaningful experience of non human creatures was one such thing.
Do you disagree?
Those prehistorical things existed in their entirety prior to our ever having acquired knowledge of their existence, hence prior to our even being able to become aware of them. There are other things that existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices, but not prior to humans.
Meaningful experience of humans with limited language capacity was one such thing.
Do you disagree?
Earlier you mentioned the complexity involved in talking about thinking. I would concur, without hesitation. Methodological approach is pivotal. Crucial.
Criteria matter.
What counts as thought, on your view?
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 19:43#9366480 likes
Rational thought and thought that is not.
creativesoul
You are distinguishing between thought that the thinker is able to articulate in language and critically evaluate and thought that the thinker is not able to articulate in language or critically evaluate.
Well, I may draw and maintain such distinctions. However, I was not doing that when using the terms "rational thought and thought that is not". Perhaps you missed my earlier clarification regarding the sense of those terms when I use them?
Rational thought/belief is consistent with and/or follows from past thought/belief. Non rational is not and does not. I'm not using them as a means of value assessment/judgment. What counts as being "rational" is secondary.
What counts as thought is primary.
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 19:49#9366490 likes
"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means
creativesoul
Some animals eat what they can find.
Some animals can use a tool, if they find a good one, to help them get food.
Some animals can make a tool to help them get food.
Some animals can use tools and plan a couple steps ahead to get food.
Seems like increasing abilities to me.
Oh yeah. I meant to comment on this method. Perfectly performed. Pick out simple true statements. Verifiable. Falsifiable. Build upon and with them.
Kudos.
Tool use, I think it's safe to say, facilitated greater abilities; new correlations; new coordination of preexisting biological machinery; increased the complexity of meaningful experience; etc. I would say that tool use also could have influenced/effected slowly occurring physical effects within the central nervous system of the users. Biological structural changes over time with enough mutation to result in newer more specialized structures, which in turn, facilitated more complex thinking processes and or the ability to vocalize wants and desires.
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 20:08#9366520 likes
The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day. But those are two separate beliefs...
Okay, this is where things could get interesting very quickly.
The claim is that the dog has two separate beliefs. What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog.
Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself.
RIP Professor Dennett.
creativesoulOctober 04, 2024 at 22:34#9367080 likes
What do all examples of thought have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them count as being a thought?
creativesoul
There's no easy way to answer that - especially if you are trying to find commonalities between thoughts that are articulated in language and thoughts that are not. The only place that they overlap is in their role as reasons in rational actions.
That's not true. If the only sense of "thought" and "belief" we employ is the one meant only to make sense of reasons in rational actions, then it may be the only place all beliefs overlap. That's not the only sense of the key terms.
They(all thought and belief) are all meaningful to the creature forming, having, holding, and/or articulating them. They all consist of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. Some creatures' correlations include language use. Others do not. Some creatures' include the rules of correct inference. Others do not. Some creatures' correlations include trains and humans. Others include community standards such as the time schedule...
The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day.
I do not feel at all confident saying what the dog expects or recognizes. I could speculate that the dog ran into many people on a regular basis. I'll bet it got petted by dozens of people every day. I'll bet some people saw it regularly, and started bringing a treat when they could. If the man stopped coming, the dog still got tons of love and attention. What began for one reason continues for another. The dog might not remember the man at all.
Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself.
I also thought it was fascinating. Being thought-provoking is just as valuable as being right, in my book.
What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog.
I was thinking of the belief that their human has shown up to-day (a distinct belief for each day), and the belief that their human will show up every day, shown partly by their going to the station in advance of the human's arrival, without any specific evidence about to-day, not to mention their persistence in going to the station after their human has not shown up, not just for one day, but for many days. But it would be fair to say that these two beliefs are closely linked, since one is an inductive generalization of the other.
If the only sense of "thought" and "belief" we employ is the one meant only to make sense of reasons in rational actions, then it may be the only place all beliefs overlap.
I was responding to a specific issue. It may be possible to generalize, but it's certainly very complicated.
If you include our sayings as well as our doings as actions, then beliefs do show up in actions. What sense could we make of a belief or thought (rational or irrational) that didn't (couldn't) affect what we say or do at all? But perhaps there is a different sense of belief in which we can make sense of such beliefs. What do you suggest?
I do not feel at all confident saying what the dog expects or recognizes. I could speculate that the dog ran into many people on a regular basis. I'll bet it got petted by dozens of people every day. I'll bet some people saw it regularly, and started bringing a treat when they could. If the man stopped coming, the dog still got tons of love and attention. What began for one reason continues for another. The dog might not remember the man at all.
It's entirely appropriate not to be confident about some things - especially when attributing beliefs (and other motivations to animals, and indeed to humans. I confess I hadn't thought of the changes in circumstances. Of course you are right.
The details of the real life story are compatible with your bet. Hachik? would leave the house to greet his human, Ueno, at the end of each day at the nearby Shibuya Station - until May 21, 1925, when Ueno died at work. Initial reactions from the people, especially from those working at the station, were not necessarily friendly. However, the first reports about him appeared on October 4, 1932. People then started to bring him treats and food. Hachik? died on March 8, 1935.
(My source is Wikipedia - Hachiko)
That makes 7 years without much, if any, positive reinforcement. I'm sure the dog was an embarrassment to the station staff and perhaps to the some of the passengers. That changed when the publicity gave them a different perspective. So we could argue about when the reason for meeting the train changed. But your point stands.
We could also debate how far the dog was rational. I would say that persisting for a while after Ueno died is rational. But continuing for that long... I'm not sure. Other dogs, I think, would have given up much, much, sooner. One factor in his persistence may have been that his new home (with Ueno's former gardener) did not distract him from his habit. Habits, I would say, can be rational, but can also be irrational, especially when they do not change when changed circumstances imply a change in habits.
But then, people saw his persistence as loyalty, which is not necessarily rational, but is something that we value, on the whole. So this question of how far we apply the "people" framework to animals extends beyond rationality or not. It incudes values.
But so far as the question "How do you know" goes, I don't see the difference between your simple case and your "other cases".
Could you elaborate further on what you mean by that? My point was that being rational must be able to be verified, justified and approved to be so. You cannot call something or someone being rational just because someone went to a shop, or a dog opened the door or hawk hunted his meal. That sounds like someone not understanding what being rational means, but just misusing the term.
I do agree that the thought is almost impossible to formulate clearly without a lot of dancing around explaining.
Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way .because were all human .is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I havent a freakin clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had.
With that in mind, it is far further from me to think Im qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isnt just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which Ive already been forced to admit I dont know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing ..speculate.
(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window
.Guy thinks .awww, how sweet; hes anticipating my car coming into the driveway .
.Guy next door has a similar camera .
.1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating .
.2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guys driveway
.says, yeah, hes anticipatin alright. Anticipatin the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.)
Not always. I know it is autumn by looking at the falling leaves from the trees outside. My knowledge of autumn arrived to me purely from the visual perception. Why do I need to justify the knowledge? If someone asked me to justify it, I could then do it. But before that unlikely event, I just know it is autumn.
But in some other case of knowledge, rational justification is needed, helps or even based on. You seem to be over simplifying the issue, which results inevitably in the muddle.
On the other hand, you could be talking about the case when I attribute knowledge to someone else. That is indeed a bit different. But there are still simple cases and more complex ones. In a simple case, I know the person quite well and know that they are in a position to know and are reliable, and then I will say just that.
You cannot call something or someone being rational just because someone went to a shop, or a dog opened the door or hawk hunted his meal.
I agree, a single case on its own doesn't cut much ice. One needs a framework of background knowledge, including a decision about whether rational explanation applies to at least some things that the subject does. However, given that you are a homo sapiens, if you walk down the street, stop at the shop door, open it and go in, I am justified in saying that you walked to the shop. I might be wrong, but that possibility applies to everything that I say. It would be unreasonable to deny that you walked to the shop in those circumstances. Ditto the dog and the hawk.
Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way .because were all human .is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I havent a freakin clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had.
It's the result of the peculiar condition of the philosopher. But it is perfectly true that there are many experiences that we have that seem more or less completely arbitrary. But one can sometimes explain dizziness, for example, by the spinning dancing you've been indulging in, or by an ear infection. So perhaps one day...
With that in mind, it is far further from me to think Im qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isnt just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which Ive already been forced to admit I dont know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing ..speculate.
Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals. Their thoughts and feelings are on display to us in just the same way(s) that our thoughts and feelings are on display to them. I don't think speculation is particularly harmful in itself. It's when it gets mistaken for established truth that it can do damage.
(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window
.Guy thinks .awww, how sweet; hes anticipating my car coming into the driveway .
.Guy next door has a similar camera .
.1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating .
.2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guys driveway
.says, yeah, hes anticipatin alright. Anticipatin the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.)
In fact, you know perfectly well how to play the game. The fact that we sometimes get it wrong is not important. We can spot mistakes and put them right.
Although in this case, I would propose that he did go out to welcome you home, but got distracted by the squirrel when he got out there. However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one.
creativesoulOctober 05, 2024 at 15:27#9368950 likes
The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day.
Ludwig V
I do not feel at all confident saying what the dog expects or recognizes. I could speculate that the dog ran into many people on a regular basis. I'll bet it got petted by dozens of people every day. I'll bet some people saw it regularly, and started bringing a treat when they could. If the man stopped coming, the dog still got tons of love and attention. What began for one reason continues for another. The dog might not remember the man at all.
Nice input. I'm oblivious to the details of the actual events. My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog. By my lights, it was the connection to the human that was meaningful to the dog. Thus, the significance that the train has to the dog had nothing to do with the time of arrival. Additionally, it was claimed that the dog hoped for the human to arrive. The question was asked, "Why else?" would the dog continue going.
That drew my attention to the differences between simple expectation and hope. Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations. I've no issue with dogs having simple basic expectations regarding what's about to happen. I do not think that dogs are capable of having expectations that extend/exceed past the immediately perceptible. How far into the future one can consider is a measure/increment determined by its means of accounting for time/change. The details of the story are now better known by myself, and as a result, it seems that there could have been any number of reasons the dog continued going to the train station around the same time daily. I'm curious, if after some time, the dog ever began going on days that the human would not have been on the train.
It's entirely appropriate not to be confident about some things - especially when attributing beliefs (and other motivations to animals, and indeed to humans. I confess I hadn't thought of the changes in circumstances. Of course you are right.
The details of the real life story are compatible with your bet. Hachik? would leave the house to greet his human, Ueno, at the end of each day at the nearby Shibuya Station - until May 21, 1925, when Ueno died at work. Initial reactions from the people, especially from those working at the station, were not necessarily friendly. However, the first reports about him appeared on October 4, 1932. People then started to bring him treats and food. Hachik? died on March 8, 1935.
(My source is Wikipedia - Hachiko)
That makes 7 years without much, if any, positive reinforcement. I'm sure the dog was an embarrassment to the station staff and perhaps to the some of the passengers. That changed when the publicity gave them a different perspective. So we could argue about when the reason for meeting the train changed. But your point stands.
Being a part of routine is itself positive reinforcement, especially if that routine resulted in dopamine dumps and/or other sorts of good feelings within the dog. Those things happen autonomously and happen throughout the experience. So, when the human was alive, the good feelings began prior to the arrival. Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way.
creativesoulOctober 05, 2024 at 15:36#9368960 likes
Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself.
creativesoul
I also thought it was fascinating. Being thought-provoking is just as valuable as being right, in my book.
Well, in all fairness, I cringed far too much. Literally, viscerally. To use an intentional stance in a way that attributes agency where none is justifiable, was simply too much for me to accept. The book is chock full of anthropomorphism. Dennett just accepted that criticism and continued. He knew. What other method do we have??? That seems to have been his thoughts on the matter. Of course, he also regularly used a notion of "design" that most naturalists eschew.
I still, to this day, have a very hard time accepting much of what he argued for as a result. To be clear, Dennett was and remains an admirable public figure in American history.
Quining Qualia was brilliant!
creativesoulOctober 05, 2024 at 16:06#9369010 likes
What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog.
creativesoul
I was thinking of the belief that their human has shown up to-day (a distinct belief for each day), and the belief that their human will show up every day, shown partly by their going to the station in advance of the human's arrival, without any specific evidence about to-day, not to mention their persistence in going to the station after their human has not shown up, not just for one day, but for many days. But it would be fair to say that these two beliefs are closely linked, since one is an inductive generalization of the other.
They belong to the dog. They are meaningful to the dog. If that dog has beliefs, then they exist in their entirety regardless of whether or not we take account of them. Are they propositional attitudes? They clearly do not consist of the language used to report on them. They are clearly not equivalent to our report of them.
it is far further from me to think Im qualified to affirm the necessary conditions ..
Mww
Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals.
True enough; I trust nothing I said implies otherwise. If it appears I did, I shall reconcile whatever it was with granting without reservation that to claim we know nothing about animals, is catastrophically false.
However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one.
While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animals rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations.
My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog.
Oh, Yes. Philosophers are so obsessed with belief in the first person - "I believe.." that they don't seriously think about 2nd or 3rd person attributions. In those cases, the question whether the dog can apply the human language-game of what is the time? is not relevant. See below.
If that dog has beliefs, then they exist in their entirety regardless of whether or not we take account of them. Are they propositional attitudes? They clearly do not consist of the language used to report on them. They are clearly not equivalent to our report of them.
Clearly, beliefs are not propositional attitudes, except in the sense that a proposition is grammatically necessary to describe them. (There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.)
I'm not sure that the question what they consist in is applicable, but my best answer is that they consist in what we say and do. So what the believer says is often given a specially authoritative status. But the believer's own description of their belief is not conclusive. We often overturn it when other evidence convinces us that they are lying or pretending or deceiving themselves.
When we don't have access to what the believer says, (or the believer does not speak English) how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, and the only sentences available are in English. The actual words that the believer would use to express the belief are irrelevant; so is what's going on in his head. The "that" clause is not there for their benefit, but for ours. It needs to make sense to us, not necessarily to them.
If you still have doubts, think about how we might describe the belief of someone who thinks in images.
Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations.
That seems about right. But when I'm cooking a meal - not at the dog's dinner time - and my dog hangs around near the kitchen (but not in it - not allowed in my house), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog is hoping that there will be something to eat. But when I'm preparing the dog's dinner (and the dog is allowed into the kitchen and comes in the kitchen without being invited), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog expects there will be something to eat.
I'm curious, if after some time, the dog ever began going on days that the human would not have been on the train.
The story doesn't tell. But surely, if the dog turned up at random times when the human is not coming, there would not have been anything like the same fuss.
Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way.
Yes, you do need to look more widely and/or have a decent background knowledge of the dog's habits. But if going to the station itself was a pleasurable experience for the dog, would they not turn up at random times as well as at 5 p.m.?
While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animals rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations.
Surely, we would not even try to apply explanations of actions that work for humans unless we found that animal behaviour was sufficiently like human behaviour for that to make sense. It's not an arbitrary choice.
The article referenced in wiki says it was daily for a year while the man was alive, and the dog continued daily for eleven years until it died. Obviously, there is no way to answer most of the questions. I don't suspect the dog remembered man that it knew for a year a decade ago, and went there expecting that man to step off the train ten years after the last time it had happened.
The dog's behavior for all those years might change my mind, if we knew it. Did it go to the station every day a decade later, and sit starting at where the train was going to stop, largely ignoring anyone who spoke to or petted it? Eating an offered snack, but clearly focused on the tracks? When the train arrived each day, did it still get up, tail wagging, watching each person get off? When the man didn't walk off the train, for the 3,000th day in a row, did the dog turn around, head lowered in sadness, and walk home? Only to do it all again the 3,001st day?
My guess is it was conditioned to go there at that time of day by the reward of the man's arrival. When the man stopped showing up, it still went, because of the conditioning. Then other rewards showed up, and kept it going, so the conditioning never faded. It wasn't going there in 1934 for the same reason it went there in 1923.
However, The eye is the classic case of something that seemed to escape the possible range of evolutionary development. A major issue is that soft tissue is not often fossilized. But there is at least an outline of what happened. See:- New Scientist - Evolution of the Eye
Good point. Myths are composed or propositions, but that's doesn't mean that they are propositions. Belief does seem to be better - so long as we bracket the context of evidence that applies to most run-of-the-mill beliefs.
I am not clear what the distinction would be between being composed of propositions and being a proposition or set of propositions or being composed of beliefs and being a belief or set of beliefs. I wonder whether your point was that the use of either term should not confuse us into thinking that a myth is a belief or proposition that we have arrived at by ourselves and decided for ourselves. They are rather beliefs or propositions that are the result of social conditioning. They are introjections. In that sense they are "hinge" or "bedrock" or "background'.
A sense of self that via memory "unifies" experience.
Janus
It seems to me that there are two related but different ideas of the self. To a great extent, we define ourselves or create who we are by what we (choose to) do. But that sense of self-identity is not always identical with our sense of the identity of others. A further complication is that often our identity is given by the roles that we occupy and these differ in different contexts. (Parent/child, teacher/student, manager/colleague) One can appeal to continuities of one kind or another - stream of consciousness, physical continuity, and so forth - but then there is the question of how important or relevant they are - especially when they conflict. So unity of experience is one factor amongst others.
I did not have in mind the 'social role' conception of the self at all. I was thinking of the difficult to articulate primal sense of being an individual. As the name imply an individual is one who is not divided. One who experiences a sense of continuity. That is what I meant by saying that memory unifies experience.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 03:47#9370060 likes
My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog.
creativesoul
Oh, Yes. Philosophers are so obsessed with belief in the first person - "I believe.." that they don't seriously think about 2nd or 3rd person attributions. In those cases, the question whether the dog can apply the human language-game of what is the time? is not relevant. See below.
I don't see the relevance. I don't think I've made my point clear enough. I'll try a question...
Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer.
(There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.)
That's not true.
All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate.
how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause,
The question is not how we can attribute beliefs to others. The question is what do their beliefs consist of such that they can be and obviously are meaningful to the creature under consideration. The approach you're employing is focusing upon the reporting process. What's needed here is an outline of all thinking processes.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 04:11#9370110 likes
When we don't have access to what the believer says, (or the believer does not speak English) how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, and the only sentences available are in English. The actual words that the believer would use to express the belief are irrelevant; so is what's going on in his head. The "that" clause is not there for their benefit, but for ours. It needs to make sense to us, not necessarily to them.
If you still have doubts, think about how we might describe the belief of someone who thinks in images
This troubles me. Let's say that we're reporting upon our neighbor's belief to our significant other. Let us also say that we're aiming at accuracy. We want our report to match their belief. Assuming sincerity and typical neurological function of the neighbor, the actual words that the believer would use to describe their own belief are not only relevant. They are the benchmark. They are the standard.
However, I suspect there's little disagreement between us when it comes to what counts as an accurate report of another's belief if and when the other speaks our language. The question here is how to go about accurately reporting the belief of a language less creature.
That clauses are problematic here. The propositional attitude approach misses the mark altogether. Propositions are not meaningful to language less creatures. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, holding, and/or articulating it.
Someone who thinks in images draws correlations between those images and other things.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 04:18#9370120 likes
Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations.
creativesoul
That seems about right. But when I'm cooking a meal - not at the dog's dinner time - and my dog hangs around near the kitchen (but not in it - not allowed in my house), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog is hoping that there will be something to eat.
That's odd. You say it seems about right to say that dogs cannot hope that something will happen despite knowing it may not, and then attribute hope to the dog.
But when I'm preparing the dog's dinner (and the dog is allowed into the kitchen and comes in the kitchen without being invited), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog expects there will be something to eat.
Yeah. I see no reason to deny that a dog can expect to eat in many situations. Hope, on the other hand... not so much.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 04:39#9370140 likes
Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way.
creativesoul
Yes, you do need to look more widely...
Indeed. It's the approach that matters.
The correlations drawn by the dog between all the different sights, sounds, smells, etc., exhaust the dog's experience.
Let's say that there is a cat and that the cat has chased a mouse into hiding. The cat will wait and watch the entry point. Say it's a small opening under a cabinet. We could talk about the cat's thought and/or belief by saying the cat believes that the mouse is under the cabinet. I would have no issue with that. The reason why is because we all know that "the mouse is under the cabinet" is meaningless to the cat. However, the cabinet, the mouse, the smell, the taste, and the spatiotemporal relations are not meaningless at all in such circumstances. These elemental constituents of the cat's belief are the content. The content of a language less animal's belief are directly perceptible to them. The cat is biologically capable of perceiving and drawing correlations between those things. Those things are part of the cat's experience and are meaningful to them as a result.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 04:49#9370160 likes
They are rather beliefs or propositions that are the result of social conditioning. They are introjections. In that sense they are "hinge" or "bedrock" or "background'.
Why don't you call it learning? It is after all, what one must be able to do before one can join in. The rower who is "conditioned" to that particular routine is learning to row, acquiring a skill.
I did not have in mind the 'social role' conception of the self at all. I was thinking of the difficult to articulate primal sense of being an individual. As the name imply an individual is one who is not divided. One who experiences a sense of continuity. That is what I meant by saying that memory unifies experience.
When you decide to "bracket" the social role conception of the self, you have created your own problem. "Self" is a complex, multi-faceted idea. ("Facet" implies that each facet depends on the others for its existence). It is an idea that not realized in identifying objects, but in the ability to take part in various activities.
Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer.
One day, we (2 parents and 2 very young children) were driving along a country road. We came round a corner and saw the common of the next village. At that moment, a hot-air balloon was taking off, majestically sailing along and up. We were very close. We all watched in silence for a moment and then my son cried out "Bye, Bye, One". He had never seen or heard of a balloon before. He was too young to understand about such things. He knew it was leaving. "It" refers to the balloon. Why should I deny that he knew the balloon was leaving, even though he had no concept of a balloon? I am not saying it for his benefit, but for yours.
It is very plausible that it is going too far to attribute to the dog a concept of belief; I cannot imagine dog behaviour that would lead me to do that. But saying that the dog believes that the train arrives at 5 p.m. is not for the dog's benefit, but for yours.
However, what would you make of this thought-experiment. Suppose we had some tea and sandwiches one day, and carelessly left the last one on the table and left the room. The cat was sleeping peacefully on a chair. When we got back, the cat had eaten it - or at least the tuna that was in it. The cat was again sleeping peacefully on the chair. The dog was quivering with what looked like guilt. The dog believed that we would think that the dog had pinched the sandwich.
That's not true.
All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate.
I didn't say anything about what belief consists of. I only said something about how we describe belief.
The question is not how we can attribute beliefs to others. The question is what do their beliefs consist of such that they can be and obviously are meaningful to the creature under consideration. The approach you're employing is focusing upon the reporting process. What's needed here is an outline of all thinking processes.
You are doing phenomenology, then - first person view. Not possible with a dog. But the phenomena that are relevant in this context are not the thinking processes.
If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important.
That's odd. You say it seems about right to say that dogs cannot hope that something will happen despite knowing it may not, and then attribute hope to the dog.
I'm sorry I wasn't clear. I was admitting that it seems right not to attribute hope to the dog, and then, with a "But..", introducing a case that makes that conclusion doubtful.
The reason why is because we all know that "the mouse is under the cabinet" is meaningless to the cat. .... Those things are part of the cat's experience and are meaningful to them as a result.
Yes, and the cat's grasp of that meaning is what justifies us in using "mouse" to describe what the cat is doing. To be sure, the cat's concept of a mouse is different from, and more limited than, our concept of a mouse. But cat and human are both thinking about the same furry animal, hiding away behind the wainscot.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 13:18#9370990 likes
Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer.
creativesoul
One day, we (2 parents and 2 very young children) were driving along a country road. We came round a corner and saw the common of the next village. At that moment, a hot-air balloon was taking off, majestically sailing along and up. We were very close. We all watched in silence for a moment and then my son cried out "Bye, Bye, One". He had never seen or heard of a balloon before. He was too young to understand about such things. He knew it was leaving. "It" refers to the balloon. Why should I deny that he knew the balloon was leaving, even though he had no concept of a balloon? I am not saying it for his benefit, but for yours.
A child learns to utter "Bye, Bye" in certain situations. The balloon was leaving, and I say that for your benefit, not mine. The child knew it was time to utter "Bye, Bye." in situations where things were leaving. The "one" qualification is interesting. The child named the balloon. That is... he picked that balloon out of the world to the exclusion of all else. He isolated the balloon.
Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?
Reply to Ludwig V I watched "What the Bleep Do We Know" again last night and got a new understanding of what the movie intends to say. The movie blends quantum physics with spirituality. It questions what we think we know because each of us has a personal story as our life experiences are different. Two sisters will experience the same family but this shared reality is experienced differently for each one. From there the arguing can begin and it may never end. Each is sure the other is wrong.
A whole nation will have the same leader but the citizens can have opposing thoughts about the desirability of the leader. This opposition can be very emotional. When it comes to religion people can be strongly emotional about what they believe and what others believe. Everyone believing s/he is being rational even when they start killing each other.
If we were aliens looking at this reality would we believe humans can learn and that they are rational?
When social animals split and follow different leaders, they fight over territory and drive the other away.
Or if the social animals from one species cross each other's path, they will fight over the territory. There are factors that have led to humans living in large groups but how well is this working? What makes it possible for millions of people to live together?
Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?
19 minutes ago
Dogs may not be able to count to 10, but even the untrained ones have a rough sense of how many treats you put in their food bowl. That's the finding of a new study, which reveals that our canine pals innately understand quantities in much the same way we do. https://www.science.org/content/article/dog-brains-have-knack-numbers-much-ours#:~:text=Dogs%20may%20not%20be%20able,the%20same%20way%20we%20do.
do have a sense of time, but it differs from the way humans perceive it. A dogs concept of time revolves around routine, daily patterns, and associative learning. Dogs cant understand time in the abstract sense of hours and minutes, but they do have an internal awareness of time intervals.
What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things?
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 14:12#9371120 likes
...what would you make of this thought-experiment. Suppose we had some tea and sandwiches one day, and carelessly left the last one on the table and left the room. The cat was sleeping peacefully on a chair. When we got back, the cat had eaten it - or at least the tuna that was in it. The cat was again sleeping peacefully on the chair. The dog was quivering with what looked like guilt. The dog believed that we would think that the dog had pinched the sandwich.
Guilt is what one experiences when they know they have done something that they believe they should not have done. The dog does not believe that he ate the tuna out of the sandwich. He knows he did not.
So, attributing guilt to the dog is a mistake. The dog doesn't feel guilty even though it may be perfectly capable of it.
Feeling guilty requires belief about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behavior(moral belief). The dog, if it has lived long enough to attribute causality to its own behavior and what happens afterwards(praise/condemnation/punishment/etc.) then it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior). We could call this rule following. It acquires this groundwork for rule following by drawing correlations between its own actions and the praise/condemnation that follows.
The dog cannot feel guilty. It did not eat the tuna. It may be fearful. Especially if it has been falsely accused in past or punished for something that it does not understand for a lack of recognizing the causal relationship.
The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 14:14#9371130 likes
(There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.)
Ludwig V
That's not true.
All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate.
Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?
Does the dog believe that no train arrives at 5 o'clock?
Let's see...
The dog is on the platform at 4:55, looking down the track, just like he is there every week-day when Ueno goes off to work in the morning, and just like most of the humans who have gathered there in the last ten minutes. Agreed?
We will say of the humans that they are expecting a train. We know that the next train is due at 5.00. So we know that they are expecting the 5.00 train (whether they know that it is due at 5.00 or not - they might be unclear and only know that it is some time soon.).
Why will we not say of the dog that he is expecting a train? If we do, we know that the next train is due at 5.00. So we know that he is expecting the 5.00 train. "The 5.00 train" is our description, not his. So I'll give you this. The dog is not expecting a train at 5.00; he is not expecting anything at 5.00, because he doesn't have a concept of 5.00.
We know that when the train appears down the track, dog and humans will all come to attention - humans gathering their bits and pieces or moving towards the edge of the platform, dog standing with tail waving slowly back and to. When the train stops, the humans will climb into, and more humans will climb out of, the carriages. The humans still standing on the platform will meet and greet the people they have come to meet, the dog will meet and greet the human he has come to meet. Perhaps some humans will not meet anyone, but will pause till the train has gone and the platform cleared and then walk quietly away. Perhaps they will come back to meet another train. Eventually, the same will happen to the dog and the dog also will come back to meet another train.
Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno? Again, "Ueno" is our description (name), not his.
What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things?
I don't know. I would suggest that one thing that would change would be our ability to co-ordinate with each other.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 14:25#9371150 likes
That looks like a conflation between beliefs and behaviors. In your own framework, it amounts to a conflation between cause and effect.
creativesoul
Now you are reifying beliefs and conflating explanations by reasons and explanations by causes. You are trying to play chess with draughts (checkers).
There's a whole lot of presupposition packed up in very few words.
Evidently, I've misunderstood your position.
You claimed in past, on more than one occasion, that beliefs are reasons for action. Now, I think that may be better put as "belief" is a term you use to explain behavior/action.
Regarding my own, and the reification charge...
Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence?
Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno?
Do you mean a decade after Ueno died? I'd bet your description of the dog's behavior is accurate when Ueno was alive. If the dog continued to act the same way a decade later, I would have a difficult time labeling its thinking as rational. It might be rational for the dog to keep it up for a while after Ueno stopped getting off the train. At least days. I'd think there's still hope weeks later. But how many months of no positive reinforcement at all need to go by before rational thinking tells the dog to pack it in? The number of times Ueno did not get off the train outnumbers the number of times he did in a year. After no-Ueno outnumbers Ueno by two, three, four, five times, how rationally is the dog thinking?
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 14:41#9371180 likes
The child named the balloon.
creativesoul
Exactly. It was the balloon that he named - our description, our concept, not his.
He did not name your description. He named the balloon. The balloon consists of rubber. It was flying away. Your descriptions... your concepts... they do not fly away, nor do they consist of rubber.
Sigh.
Draughts indeed. Ludwig...
...I've enjoyed our discussions over the past couple years. I would suggest toning down the passive aggressive personal pokes and jabs. I'm very slow to anger... as they say. You will be biting off more than your position can even get in its mouth, let alone chew.
Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?
creativesoul
Does the dog believe that no train arrives at 5 o'clock?
"5 o'clock" is an abstract entity. Abstract things are not directly perceptible. All things meaningful to the dog are directly perceptible. Abstract things are utterly meaningless to dogs. 5 o'clock is utterly meaningless to the dog.
The dog cannot feel guilty. It did not eat the tuna. It may be fearful. Especially if it has been falsely accused in past or punished for something that it does not understand for a lack of recognizing the causal relationship.
it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior).
But if the dog understands what it is allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do, how is that not a simplistic moral sense?
I'll tell you what - in my view, cats have absolutely no moral sense at all. There are certain behaviours, which I have observed in dogs, which I have never observed in cats, that lead me to differentiate.
You claimed in past, on more than one occasion, that beliefs are reasons for action. Now, I think that may be better put as "belief" is a term you use to explain behavior/action.
Well, suppose I said that belief is a term we use to explain behaviour/action by giving reasons.
One difference is that reasons justify what they are reasons for, while causes do not.
Another difference is that reasons play a part in teleological explanations, while causes do not.
Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence?
Of course not. If I were to say that "infinity" or "49" or "love" is not an object, would you think I was saying that infinity or 49 or love are not real and do not effect/affect/influence?
...I've enjoyed our discussions over the past couple years. I would suggest toning down the passive aggressive personal pokes and jabs. I'm very slow to anger... as they say. You will be biting off more than your position can even get in its mouth, let alone chew.
Oh, dear. I'm sorry. We are getting a bit heated. I'll sign off and go away and cool down.
Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno?
Because the dog is not expecting Ueno to arrive while knowing he may not. Expectation is shown. Hope is articulated in the face of knowing that what one expects to happen may very well in fact... not.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 14:53#9371240 likes
Oh, dear. I'm sorry. We are getting a bit heated. I'll sign off and go away and cool down.
Oh no. I'm not heated. Thank you for the considerate apology. No need though. I just don't enjoy personal slights, and you've begun them. I'm just warning you that I'm quite capable of cutting deeply with words. I avoid doing as much as possible nowadays. However, I will not take too many jabs before parrying and countering with an overhand left.
:wink:
I'm good. Just trying to end any possible increase in personal rhetorical slights.
This is about the words/positions/linguistic frameworks... not the authors.
Reply to Ludwig V
Right. The dog's behavior all those years after Ueno died is obviously not the result of rational thinking. Why not? If it has the ability to think rationally, why isn't it doing so for a stretch of many years?
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 15:01#9371270 likes
The dog's behavior all those years after Ueno died is obviously not the result of rational thinking. Why not? If it has the ability to think rationally, why isn't it doing so for a stretch of many years?
Well.
The dog's behavior could be the result of rational thinking that belongs to a creature incapable of adjusting its belief based upon facts, or the motivations are no longer include the human's arrival... as you've been saying. Started going for all sorts of 'reasons', including the human's arrival, and continued going for all sorts of the same reasons aside from the human's arrival, in addition to new ones, also not the arrival of the human.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 15:03#9371280 likes
it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior).
creativesoul
But if the dog understands what it is allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do, how is that not a simplistic moral sense?
Reply to creativesoul
Yes. If it was originally showing up for a rational reason, and it was showing up for the same reason years later, the reason was no longer rational. The dog's thinking was not rational. If that's the case, then I would suggest it wasn't thinking rationally in the first place. There was a different reason it was showing up.
If the reasons changed, and the dog was showing up years later for different reasons, then it may have been thinking rationally at all points.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 15:12#9371310 likes
The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him.
creativesoul
That's just dogmatic.
No... it's not.
I've painstakingly explained, on more than one occasion throughout this thread, how thinking about belief is a metacognitive endeavor which requires language/proxy use; naming and descriptive practices. The dog has none. Since metacognition is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices, and the dog has none, then the dog is incapable of metacognition. Hence, not dogmatic.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 15:18#9371350 likes
Yes. If it was originally showing up for a rational reason, and it was showing up for the same reason years later, the reason was no longer rational. The dog's thinking was not rational. If that's the case, then I would suggest it wasn't thinking rationally in the first place. There was a different reason it was showing up.
If the reasons changed, and the dog was showing up years later for different reasons, then it may have been thinking rationally at all points.
Can I take this as evidence that your criterion for what counts as "rational" includes something like based upon fact/events/what's happened and/or is happening?
Well-grounded? Warranted?
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 15:28#9371370 likes
Reply to creativesoul
I think you can think rationally despite having wrong information. But, depending on the situation, you might run into problems. If you do, then rational thinking will force you to reevaluate. People were told heavier bodies fall faster than lighter bodies. Someone could rationally come up with a plan to do something or other, maybe make some invention, based on that "fact." But then they try to test the invention, and it fails. Rational thinking would lead them to examine the whole thing, and the actual fact about falling bodies would be discovered. Rational thinking would see them embracing the newly discovered fact.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 16:05#9371440 likes
I think you can think rationally despite having wrong information. But, depending on the situation, you might run into problems. If you do, then rational thinking will force you to reevaluate. People were told heavier bodies fall faster than lighter bodies. Someone could rationally come up with a plan to do something or other, maybe make some invention, based on that "fact." But then they try to test the invention, and it fails. Rational thinking would lead them to examine the whole thing, and the actual fact about falling bodies would be discovered. Rational thinking would see them embracing the newly discovered fact.
Hmmm. That's a fairly tall order to fill. It seems to require a creature capable of testing/comparing the world to it's own beliefs about the world, and excludes all creatures incapable of metacognition.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 16:23#9371490 likes
Let's say that we're reporting upon our neighbor's belief to our significant other. Let us also say that we're aiming at accuracy. We want our report to match their belief. Assuming sincerity and typical neurological function of the neighbor, the actual words that the believer would use to describe their own belief are not only relevant. They are the benchmark. They are the standard.
If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important.
:yikes:
A sincere typical neurologically functioning person who tells you what they believe cannot be wrong about what they believe. Their words are the standard. Now, when talking about an insincere candidate, it's another matter altogether. Luckily, there is no such thing as an insincere language less creature. I do not see the relevance/benefit of invoking first, second, and third-person accounting practices
Reply to creativesoul
A creature that can't test things might still be able to notice things. Like a dog can notice X happens every single day at a certain time, and base its actions on that fact. But if it doesn't notice that X no longer happens every day at thatvcertain time, and has not happened once in several times as long as it originally happened, then I don't see evidence of rational thinking.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 16:39#9371570 likes
A creature that can't test things might still be able to notice things. Like a dog can notice X happens every single day at a certain time, and base its actions on that fact. But if it doesn't notice that X no longer happens every day at thatvcertain time, and has not happened once in several times as long as it originally happened, then I don't see evidence of rational thinking.
At that time then, right?
I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Rather, I'm just trying to understand the sense of "rational" you're practicing.
Reply to creativesoul
Rationality can't fly in the face of facts. You might have inaccurate information at some point, and think rationally based on that. But once you have accurate information...
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 17:13#9371650 likes
Reply to creativesoul
I don't know what else it could mean. Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 17:40#9371690 likes
What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things?
Our experience is the same on a basic level. All experience consists of correlations drawn between different things. All thought follows that same process/system. The exact things matter, as does the ability/inability to perceive them prior to/while drawing correlations.
Removing naming and descriptive practices would remove metacognition. Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things. We would lose all aspects of our sense of Self that emerge via language use. There would be no sense of importance. There would be no schemes.
creativesoulOctober 06, 2024 at 17:42#9371700 likes
I don't know what else it could mean. Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.
On the other hand, you could be talking about the case when I attribute knowledge to someone else. That is indeed a bit different. But there are still simple cases and more complex ones. In a simple case, I know the person quite well and know that they are in a position to know and are reliable, and then I will say just that.
I am still not sure what your exact point is. You cannot attribute being rational to someone or something just because you know what type of the person is, or what the thing does. Being rational means that belief, knowledge, perception or action, or proposition can demonstrate in objective manner the ground for being rational when examined or reflected back.
creativesoulOctober 07, 2024 at 00:26#9372840 likes
?creativesoul
Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity?
I cannot, however, I'm not sure that being able to differentiate between accurate information and inaccurate information is the measure for rationality. Isn't that much the same as being able to tell the difference between what's true and what's not?
creativesoulOctober 07, 2024 at 00:30#9372860 likes
Words don't play games.
creativesoul
Not sure what you are getting at here. If you think I'm just playing games here, better tell me.
That was a reference to "chess", "checkers, "draughts" language. Words don't play games. You made remarks about playing games. You were not talking about the words. You were talking about me, personally.
Why don't you call it learning? It is after all, what one must be able to do before one can join in. The rower who is "conditioned" to that particular routine is learning to row, acquiring a skill.
I like to maintain a distinction between what is deliberately learned in order to be able to participate in some specific activity and what one introjects without any awareness of or choice about what is being instilled.
When you decide to "bracket" the social role conception of the self, you have created your own problem. "Self" is a complex, multi-faceted idea. ("Facet" implies that each facet depends on the others for its existence). It is an idea that not realized in identifying objects, but in the ability to take part in various activities.
I don't see that I have created a problem. I don't deny that social role(s) are a part of any elaborate conception or account of self. As I said before I think there is a more basic and more primordial sense of self, which is involved in the sheer sense or affect or apprehension of being.
We can to some extent talk about that but not in definite ways. It is more something to be evoked or alluded to than something to be defined. To relate this back to the OP somewhat I would say that the animal sense of self is not any different.
I cannot, however, I'm not sure that being able to differentiate between accurate information and inaccurate information is the measure for rationality.
A few posts ago, I said: "I think you can think rationally despite having wrong information." You can make rationalize decisions with inaccurate information. If you have been taught that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter bodies, you might build a device that takes advantage of that "fact." The device won't fail because your thinking wasn't rational. It will fail because the information you used as a starting point was inaccurate.
Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity?
The scientific sense of the term "gravity" which we now make common use of is first recorded in the early 17th century. Yes, people before this mused about why things fall back down to Earth, but then you also have musings about witches flying on broomsticks, people walking on top of water, yogis levitating in the East, and the like. So, among many other possible examples, I'll answer that that first hominid (or group of such) that invented the wheel was just such a case of rational thinking unaware of what we now know to be (the physical force of) gravity. But then neither has any lesser animal that has ever calculated a jump been aware of gravity.
Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.
And yet many a rational human yet plays the lottery hoping for the big win - this sometimes for well over a ten-year span during which no such win has occurred. Is it rational to deny the possibility of winning the lottery? Or, given the entailed limitations of knowledge, the possibility that the person who used to get off the train at such and such time and location will someday once again appear as they did previously?
In a way, I write this to point out that rational thinking includes inductive and abductive thinking, which are far less certain than deductive thinking.
A question I ask out of curiosity:
In my own appraising that many a lesser animal has the capacity for forethought: What forethought can occur in the absence of any and all rational thinking - this as regards the present and past so as to best infer the future?
The scientific sense of the term "gravity" which we now make common use of is first recorded in the early 17th century. Yes, people before this mused about why things fall back down to Earth, but then you also have musings about witches flying on broomsticks, people walking on top of water, yogis levitating in the East, and the like.
Gravity defined simply as the tendency of things to fall was and is experienced by everyone. It is hardly something one could be unaware of. Speculations about it and the other things you mention are not in the same class for the obvious reason that the other things would not have been common experiences or to be skeptical even experienced at all.
Gravity defined simply as the tendency of things to fall was and is experienced by everyone. It is hardly something one could be unaware of. Speculations about it and the other things you mention are not in the same class for the obvious reason that the other things would not have been common experiences or to be skeptical even experienced at all.
Sure, but neither does this dispel that the force of gravity was unknown till a few centuries back nor does it in any way differentiate humans from non-human animals (which was sort'a my point): both commonly experience the tendency of things to fall. That stated, do you then claim that non-human animals know about gravity?
Sure, but neither does this dispel that the force of gravity was unknown till a few centuries back
Again I disagree. The force was known. It would have been observed everywhere and even felt in the body. What was different was the explanation for the force.
I've already made my case for this terminology here.
What you've said there boils down to saying that no other animals have symbolic language. In that sense and only in that sense are they to be counted as "lesser". Well we are lesser than other animals in many different ways. Need I enumerate them?
Again I disagree. The force was known. It would have been observed everywhere and even felt in the body. What was different was the explanation for the force.
And I again disagree with your disagreement. With one reference already provided in support of this. The notion of gravitational force as a scientific law was unknown until the 17th century, right about Newton's time. Before that, it was conceivable by people that witches could fly on broomsticks - but not afterwards (at least not by those who ascribed to this newly discovered force of gravity). Do you have any references to the contrary?
What you've said there boils down to saying that no other animals have symbolic language.
No, it doesn't. It boils down to lesser animals being of lesser value in comparison to humans. One can kill a mosquito without qualms but not a fellow human, kind of thing.
Well we are lesser than other animals in many different ways. Need I enumerate them?
Are you addressing things such as "humans are of lesser height (than giraffes, for example)" or that the individual human is of lesser value than the individual non-human animal?
If the first, it's already known. If the second, please do enumerate at will ... such that the life of some non-human animal is to be valued more than the life of a human.
No, it doesn't. It boils down to lesser animals being of lesser value in comparison to humans. One can kill a mosquito without qualms but not a fellow human, kind of thing.
That humans commonly consider other animals of lesser value (just as many other animals do) does not entail that they are of lesser values as such.
If the second, please do enumerate at will ... such that the life of some non-human animal is to be valued more than the life of a human.
:roll: Youre not paying attention to what Ive been saying. A lion will consider the life of some non-lion animal to be of lesser value than a lions life. Its all pure prejudice. Humans are greater than other animals in the sense that they can if they are rational enough see through and overcome their human exceptionalism.
There are no two ways about it. Human exceptionalism stinks.
I already acknowledged that the force was known but not the (scientific) explanation for it.
The (scientific) explanation allows for no exceptions. How could the force of gravity have been known prior to the force of gravity being discovered - before which exceptions to the force of gravity were granted (again, as per flying witches)?
There are no two ways about it. Human exceptionalism stinks.
That's not an enumeration of how humans are lesser than non-human animals. It also completely overlooks what I've previous addressed, namely: the far greater powers and cognitive abilities of humans relative to all other known animals. As though there is no comparative value to be found in these. As you say, :roll:
I was trying to give you a simple example of even a simplest most basic daily life knowledge has a ground to be rational when examined.
I'm afraid I may have forgotten the context of this. But if you are saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale, then I agree. Sometimes, we do not elicit a satisfactory rationale and then we say that the belief is not rational.
What bothers me is the looming trilemma, that either that process can be repeated indefinitely, or it must become circular or it must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding.
Being rational means that belief, knowledge, perception or action, or proposition can demonstrate in objective manner the ground for being rational when examined or reflected back.
I don't disagree. However, when we are dealing with human beings, we can cross-question them and elicit rationales from them. When we are dealing with animals (or small children, for that matter), we can't. Then we have to supply the rationale and that's very tricky. There may be no way to satisfactorily answer the question. We can't even conclude that the belief was irrational.
Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity?
What's confusing me about this is the difference between everyday, inescapable, common sense and the scientific, technical concepts of gravity. Everyone knows about the former, but not everyone knows about the latter.
Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.
I agree with that, and it does put a different perspective on the story. I think I pointed out before that the public in that case, attributed the dog's persistence to loyalty. But the loyalty isn't necessarily rational.
It's a bit like that narrow line between heroic bravery and foolish recklessness.
Removing naming and descriptive practices would remove metacognition.
Yes. One can only formulate beliefs about beliefs (recursion or meta-beliefs) in language. Though I would distinguish between formulating beliefs about one's own beliefs and formulating beliefs about other people's beliefs. The former seems to me problematic, because the recursion seems infinite and, in the end, empty, whereas the latter seems an everyday occurrence. (There's research in psychology about how and when small children become aware of other people's state of mind - empathy).
Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things.
While a creature that lacked language but has perception can know and believe various things, it cannot know or believe anything about things that cannot be directly perceived, so cannot formulate beliefs about abstract objects, such as beliefs.
That seems reasonable.
A sincere typical neurologically functioning person who tells you what they believe cannot be wrong about what they believe. Their words are the standard. Now, when talking about an insincere candidate, it's another matter altogether. Luckily, there is no such thing as an insincere language less creature.
Yes. That's the standard way of putting it and my knowledge of what I believe is not to be evaluated in the same way as my knowledge of what others believe. There are a number of qualifications, which may well apply in real life. Nevertheless the believer's words are very helpful in getting a more accurate idea of what, exactly, it is that the believer believes.
But I get worried about how to establish that a candidate is insincere. If one thinks about it from the perspective that you don't know whether a candidate is sincere or not, my remark Quoting Ludwig V
If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important.
may seem less absurd, though it still seems bad-tempered and unhelpful.
What's at issue is how we need to adapt what we can do when we do not have access to the believer's own words. This does turn up in human life, but seems marginal, in some sense. But it is no longer marginal when we come to creatures that do not, and seem incapable of, human language.
Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity?
Patterner
What's confusing me about this is the difference between everyday, inescapable, common sense and the scientific, technical concepts of gravity. Everyone knows about the former, but not everyone knows about the latter.
I'm not concerned with the scientific, technical side of things. You can think rationally without any of that kind of knowledge.
Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.
Patterner
I agree with that, and it does put a different perspective on the story. I think I pointed out before that the public in that case, attributed the dog's persistence to loyalty. But the loyalty isn't necessarily rational.
It's a bit like that narrow line between heroic bravery and foolish recklessness.
Indeed. If that dog was still showing up ten years after the last appearance of the man because of loyalty, then it certainly wasn't rational.
A lion will consider the life of some non-lion animal to be of lesser value than a lions life. Its all pure prejudice.
That seems a bit hasty to me. The lion's attitude to non-lion creatures is certainly not based on a rational evaluation of them. But saying that it is all prejudice suggests that it is an opinion that the lion could change. But the poor beast has no choice about it's behaviour; it's a carnivore.
I think it's not far wrong to say that all life except the life of some organisms like lichens, lives off other life; it's part of the deal. To be sure, humans do have some choice in the matter; they can manage without meat and without killing plants, but they are a long, long way off being able to live without taking life at all.
There are no two ways about it. Human exceptionalism stinks.
Well, it often does. Often through carelessness and ignorance, it must be said. But human exceptionalism can be a basis for pinning responsibility on them. That's the key point of much of the argument about climate change.
What bothers me is the looming trilemma, that either that process can be repeated indefinitely, or it must become circular or it must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding.
Once ground for being rational for the topic or issue has been put forward, you either accept it as rational or discard it as irrational. Why do you want to go on circular?
When we are dealing with animals (or small children, for that matter), we can't. Then we have to supply the rationale and that's very tricky. There may be no way to satisfactorily answer the question. We can't even conclude that the belief was irrational.
Could you not have said that you were just guessing on the behavior or actions of the animals or children as intelligent or dumb, rather than trying to pretend, make out or assume that they were rational or irrational?
But wouldnt that mean that all animals have rational thought? They all problem solve in some ways.
Do they?
I have personally witnessed it in dogs, cats, crows, raccoons and rats and goats.
In scientific experimentation, the subjects have been predominantly apes, dolphins, canines, rodents, parrots and corvids.
I would be very interested to hear of other examples, and how the assessment was made.
John McMannisOctober 07, 2024 at 15:31#9374420 likes
Do they?
I have personally witnessed it in dogs, cats, crows, raccoons and rats and goats.
In scientific experimentation, the subjects have been predominantly apes, dolphins, canines, rodents, parrots and corvids.
I would be very interested to hear of other examples, and how the assessment was made.
Maybe not all animals. But I guess it depends on whats considered problem solving. Saying animals can do rational thinking sounds wrong though. I think its projecting maybe but Im not smart enough to clearly define where the line is.
But I guess it depends on whats considered problem solving.
In the scientific observations, the problem was set by humans. It would be in the form of a maze, or human-designed containers from which the subject would have to extricate a treat, by more or less complicated methods. The experiments with crows usually involve a three-part procedure that requires the subject to analyze the nature of the container and figure out how to open it, using one or more tools, or a principle of physics (such as artificially raisin the water level in a tube, or tilting a device to the correct inline) . Ravens, apparently do very well indeed. In the primate experiments, the subject might be confronted with images or symbols of which they had to decipher the meaning. None of these experiments were 'in the wild'; ie problems that an animal would encounter in their natural habitat, while living its ordinary life - not situations in which instinct would be expected to play a part.
Here is a simple one for dogs
To determine cooperative actions, the strings are set so far apart that one dog cannot reach them both. Two dogs are positioned in front of the table. The goal is for the dogs to cooperate by pulling the strings simultaneously, releasing two treats. In this study, dogs cooperated with each other or with human participants. It was also observed that if one dog was set in front of the table, he waited for the other dog to get in position before tugging on the string. So, dogs are good at working with others to get the job done.
The problem solving I myself observed in dogs involved something the dog(s) desired, that was normally denied to them, so that they would have to find ways to circumvent human-imposed rules and overcome human-created obstacles. I have personal experience with many animals, including numerous confrontations with one memorable rat we dubbed Albert Houdini. It took six months of devising ever more ingenious traps to catch that little bastard and relocate him to a wild environment. Since we had also released several other rats in that location, we can only speculate how much we've contributed to the evolution of a super-race of rodents.
Once ground for being rational for the topic or issue has been put forward, you either accept it as rational or discard it as irrational. Why do you want to go on circular?
Perhaps I should re-phrase my answer.
Are you saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale?
If so, I agree.
It seems to follow that when we do not elicit a satisfactory rationale and then we say that the belief is not rational. Do you agree?
I did ask a further question. Are you concerned about the trilemma argument that justifications must either be repeated indefinitely, or become circular or must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding?
It's a fairly standard issue. But you are free to ignore that question if you find it annoying.
Could you not have said that you were just guessing on the behavior or actions of the animals or children as intelligent or dumb, rather than trying to pretend, make out or assume that they were rational or irrational?
I don't believe that when we come to the rationality of creatures that do not have language as we know it, the only way to attribute reasons for their behaviour is guessing. But I wanted also to recognize that the process was more difficult and less certain than it is when we are dealing with someone who can explain their reasons.
Perhaps I should re-phrase my answer.
Are you saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale?
That has nothing to do with rationalising. That is just a perception. Perception and recalling what they saw when asked, is not reasoning.
Reasoning takes place when thinking takes place on why and how, and being able to logically and objectively summarising the grounds for the perception, beliefs, actions or propositions.
Are you concerned about the trilemma argument that justifications must either be repeated indefinitely, or become circular or must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding?
It's a fairly standard issue. But you are free to ignore that question if you find it annoying.
Every beliefs, actions, speaking and perception is one time only in the path of time, therefore they are unique. There is no repeat or going circular in reasoning, unless you are talking about the Sun rising every morning. Even rising of the sun is unique events because it takes place in the path of unique time.
No I didn't find anything annoying. I was just trying clarify the points using reasoning.
I don't believe that when we come to the rationality of creatures that do not have language as we know it, the only way to attribute reasons for their behaviour is guessing. But I wanted also to recognize that the process was more difficult and less certain than it is when we are dealing with someone who can explain their reasons.
The agents with no or little linguistic ability is not the point of the topic. They are not the subject of reasoning. They are objects of reasoning. We have been talking about whether your thoughts and comments on them are rational. Not them.
Reply to Ludwig V Please think about Hegel's saying "The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Philosophy of Right. 1820.
What did he mean by that? He didn't mean to say anything about the owl in actuality. He meant to say the metaphor about reason and philosophy.
How could the force of gravity have been known prior to the force of gravity being discovered
It was known as I said by being experienced and understood as a force. It is irrelevant that Newton may have coined the word 'gravity'. Are you going to try to argue that the ancients had no concept of force?
As though there is no comparative value to be found in these.
There is comparative value to be found in all animal capacities. I haven't denied that it is commonly believed that humans in some senses have greater cognitive capacities than most other animals.
That seems a bit hasty to me. The lion's attitude to non-lion creatures is certainly not based on a rational evaluation of them. But saying that it is all prejudice suggests that it is an opinion that the lion could change. But the poor beast has no choice about it's behaviour; it's a carnivore.
I wasn't suggesting that it was a prejudice that could be changes, merely that it is a kind of natural prejudice shared by all social animals in favoring their own over other species.
Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.
For a dog that begins going to the train station at 5 o'clock on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday for all sorts of reasons, including meeting a human, it would be rational for that dog to occasionally hold such expectation. They very well could have passing memories of the human after death.
The train station is part of a lifelong routine. The train station is connected to the human by the dog. That's what makes them both meaningful to the dog. The train station can also be connected to feeling good.
All meaningful experience begins with connections being drawn between different things. The world becomes more meaningful as a direct result. That's early rational thought.
That's what else it means.
You said they could have been rational all along, but not if knowing the difference between accurate and inaccurate information is the only measure of rationality.
between accurate and inaccurate information is the only measure of rationality
This doesn't seem, to me, to be true at all. You can be rational with inaccurate information, provided it isn't directly illogical. If you've been mislead, misinformed, lied to etc.. it has nothing to do with your rationality how you assess the data involved, is it? Perhaps you can form a way it is - i'm quite unsure, i'm just giving my intuition. The standard objection to JTB seems to, weakly, support this
Reply to creativesoul
You give reasons it could be rational for the dog to go to the train station a decade after the man stopped getting off the train. And there obviously were reasons, since the dog continued a decade after. But the dog wasn't still going a decade after because it expected the man to get off the train.
But the dog wasn't still going a decade after because it expected the man to get off the train.
He was just faithful.
Some things we do are not rational in a strict sense of the word. My favourite cat went out one night three months ago and didn't show up in the cedar tree outside my office window next morning. Chances are, a coyote or a car killed her. I'm aware of these dangers, having access to information dogs and cats don't. My grandfather died in another town; his human family was notified. The dog never saw his body and was told nothing. I still look out at the cedar tree every morning: though I don't rationally expect to see Sammy there, some superstitious* part of me keeps hoping. The same way the families of soldiers missing in action keep hoping for years or decades that their loved one will come home some day.
*I suppose it's the same part in many humans that insists on believing in a soul and afterlife. Hope, even the most improbable hope, is hard to give up.
creativesoulOctober 08, 2024 at 08:49#9377150 likes
Yes. I was just expanding the scope of what counts as being rational to include more than just the ability to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information.
creativesoulOctober 08, 2024 at 08:58#9377170 likes
One can only formulate beliefs about beliefs (recursion or meta-beliefs) in language. Though I would distinguish between formulating beliefs about one's own beliefs and formulating beliefs about other people's beliefs. The former seems to me problematic, because the recursion seems infinite and, in the end, empty, whereas the latter seems an everyday occurrence. (There's research in psychology about how and when small children become aware of other people's state of mind - empathy).
There's a big difference between formulating beliefs about beliefs and thinking about beliefs. Small children do not formulate beliefs about beliefs.
creativesoulOctober 08, 2024 at 09:01#9377180 likes
Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things.
creativesoul
While a creature that lacked language but has perception can know and believe various things, it cannot know or believe anything about things that cannot be directly perceived, so cannot formulate beliefs about abstract objects, such as beliefs.
That seems reasonable.
We would lose all aspects of our sense of Self that emerge via language use.
creativesoul
Yes, of course. But I don't see why that conclusion requires the premiss about metacognition.
I'm sorry. That post was not reviewed prior to posting. There were half edits going on. As it stood, on my view it was nonsense. :blush: From my own poorly attended post nonetheless.
creativesoulOctober 08, 2024 at 09:03#9377190 likes
There would be no sense of importance.
creativesoul
That is puzzling. Animals have wants and desires, and I would have thought that implies a sense of importance.
I meant, and I thought the notion was of self-importance.
creativesoulOctober 08, 2024 at 09:07#9377210 likes
I get worried about how to establish that a candidate is insincere. If one thinks about it from the perspective that you don't know whether a candidate is sincere or not, my remark
If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important.
Ludwig V
may seem less absurd, though it still seems bad-tempered and unhelpful.
I would not say that. You would know your own temper better than I.
You're quite right to point out the difficulty of establishing whether or not a candidate is sincere.
creativesoulOctober 08, 2024 at 09:20#9377250 likes
Yes. I was just expanding the scope of what counts as being rational to include more than just the ability to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information.
Yes, I would agree there's more to it than that. It is not rational to drop many different pairs of different objects from many different heights, and come out of it thinking heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. That would be an inability to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information..
Once you know that all objects fall at the same rate, it would not be rational to build a device that would take advantage of the idea that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. That irrational thinking is due to something else. Not sure how to label it.
I guess both reasons for irrational thinking night fall under a common umbrella? Something other than [I]irrational thinking[/I], that is.
That has nothing to do with rationalising. That is just a perception. Perception and recalling what they saw when asked, is not reasoning.
Reasoning takes place when thinking takes place on why and how, and being able to logically and objectively summarising the grounds for the perception, beliefs, actions or propositions.
OK. So believing what they saw and reporting that when asked doesn't involve reasoning. But reasoning can come into it when they are asked to justify (give reasons for believing) their belief that what they say did happen. Is it only after the justification has been provided that it is rational for them to believe what they saw?
The agents with no or little linguistic ability is not the point of the topic. They are not the subject of reasoning. They are objects of reasoning. We have been talking about whether your thoughts and comments on them are rational. Not them.
I don't really see the difference between discussing whether animals are rational and discussing whether my belief that animals are rational is rational. Of course, there is a third possibility that my belief that animals are rational may be the result of a valid argument based on false premisses. Is that what you are suggesting?
I wasn't suggesting that it was a prejudice that could be changes, merely that it is a kind of natural prejudice shared by all social animals in favoring their own over other species.
OK. It's just that it seems to me to be a requirement for a species to be social at all. A "society" in which every member felt free to cannibalize the other members wouldn't survive for long, just as an individual that didn't regard itself as a priority (prioritizing its own life over that of an aggressor) wouldn't survive for long. If that's a prejudice, it would be hard to criticize a society or an individual that had it.
I cannot agree with that interpretation. Humans are responsible for climate change simply insofar as they are causing it.
It's significant, though, that you (rightly) hold human beings responsible. What's more, we can't expect any other species to step up and control the situation. All I'm suggesting is that, although exceptionalism has been all too often used by humans to justify maltreating everything else, it is also the basis for expecting better of them.
The exceptionalism that I'm opposed to is the exceptionalism that seeks to disown or set aside our animal nature, pretending that we are not animals. In a phrase, it is the idea that we have "dominion" over everything else. It has too often been interpreted as a licence for tyranny, when stewardship is called for.
Reply to Vera Mont
I'm sorry about your cat. Over lost many over the years. One in particular hurt more than any other. It disappeared the same way Sammy did. I had many dreams over the next few years about him returning.
Ah yes. Hope.
The Architect:Already I can see the chain reaction. The chemical precursors that signal the onset of an emotion designed specifically to overwhelm logic and reason. An emotion that is already blinding you from the simple and obvious truth. She is going to die and there is nothing you can do to stop it. *hmph* Hope. It is the quintessential human delusion, simultaneously the source of your greatest strength, and your greatest weakness.
Hope isn't necessarily irrational. You might still be hoping to see Sammy in the cedar. A few months isn't out of the range of possibility. We've all heard stories of various situations where a pet returned after an absence longer than three months.
If she doesn't show up again, but you're still hoping she will be there five years from now - as opposed to just looking out at the tree with bittersweet memories of her, and wishing she had been with you longer - then your hope will no longer be rational. So you probably shouldn't go out there every day at that poibt, open a new can of cat food, and call for her.
it has nothing to do with your rationality how you assess the data involved, is it?
I for one would say that assessing the data is an important function of rationality. But does that mean we are only rational if we critically assess everything? Is it actually irrational to believe that the sun is shining because you can see that it is?
I still look out at the cedar tree every morning: though I don't rationally expect to see Sammy there, some superstitious* part of me keeps hoping. The same way the families of soldiers missing in action keep hoping for years or decades that their loved one will come home some day.
*I suppose it's the same part in many humans that insists on believing in a soul and afterlife. Hope, even the most improbable hope, is hard to give up.
Yes. I think of it like this. Losing someone you know is a gap in your world. In most cases, the gap fills in as life goes on, though the loss is still marked. Like a scar, it can be forgotten, but still there's a reminder. In other cases, the gap does not fill in - perhaps never fills in - like a tooth you have lost, you can always feel the loss as an empty space.
The thing about long-term hope is that it will fasten on the remotest possibility. The thing about remote possibilities is that sometime they actually happen. (Hiroo Onoda was the last Japanese soldier to surrender after 1945. He emerged from the jungle in Lubang in the Phillipines in 1974.) That doesn't make hope against the odds rational, exactly. But it does distinguish it from a fantasy. You could ask the same question about Hiroo Onoda's faithfulness to his mission. If you read the story, you might decide that he was perhaps not rational but at least not irrational either.
Observations:-
1. It would seem that there is a kind of understanding that is not exactly a rational explanation, but does help to understand why people might remember those they have lost when it would not be irrational to forget.
2. But with Hachiko, I don't see how we can ever determine which of the suggested explanations is right or wrong.
All meaningful experience begins with connections being drawn between different things. The world becomes more meaningful as a direct result. That's early rational thought.
There's a big difference between formulating beliefs about beliefs and thinking about beliefs. Small children do not formulate beliefs about beliefs.
I agree with both sentences. The ill-understood (at least by me) is the difference and relationship between formulating one's beliefs and having them. Between articulate reasoning and "tacit" reasoning.
I'm sorry. That post was not reviewed prior to posting. There were half edits going on. As it stood, on my view it was nonsense. :blush: From my own poorly attended post nonetheless.
Oh, I do understand. I've often regretted some bit of nonsense within seconds of posting - and it's surprising how often someone spots it before I've had time to remove it. But it's hard to remove everything when a typo can mean the difference between sense and nonsense - and spell checkers only catch the mistakes that are obviously mistakes and perhaps some grammatical errors.
If she doesn't show up again, but you're still hoping she will be there five years from now - as opposed to just looking out at the tree with bittersweet memories of her, and wishing she had been with you longer - then your hope will no longer be rational. So you probably shouldn't go out there every day at that poibt, open a new can of cat food, and call for her.
I won't be here by this time next year. Until then, it's the window of my office, where a I spend much of my day.
BTW, the incident of the dog who waits wasn't about rational thinking; it was about a sense of time, of awareness of past and future, and not simply living in the present, as some people insist that other animals do.
1. It would seem that there is a kind of understanding that is not exactly a rational explanation, but does help to understand why people might remember those they have lost when it would not be irrational to forget.
We are also creatures ruled to a large extent by feelings of attachment, loyalty, affection, of sentiment - just like dogs, horses and geese. We generally don't blame one another for failing to be 100% rational 100%of the time. Other animals, we hold to a different standard.
BTW, the incident of the dog who waits wasn't about rational thinking; it was about a sense of time, of awareness of past and future, and not simply living in the present, as some people insist that other animals do.
Ok. But the thread is still about rational thinking in animals and people. It seems from the articles that many people think the dog still went there every day to greet the man who had not shown up in a decade. If there was a way to prove it one way or another, I'd bet good money that was not why the dog was still showing up. If that was why it was still showing up, then it's not an example of a dog thinking rationally.
But the thread is still about rational thinking in animals and people.
I know. The telling of time - when something is expected to happen vs what time something is expected to happen - was a slight detour. However, I do consider a sense of time, understanding the sequence of events and anticipation of future events, to be an important component in reasoning.
If there was a way to prove it one way or another, I'd bet good money that was not why the dog was still showing up. If that was why it was still showing up, then it's not an example of a dog thinking rationally.
This was not a problem solving exercise; it was an example of sentimental attachment and time-sense. Dodi was an inept hunting dog, not very bright. My grandfather bought him, rather than see him put down. Quite an irrational act: he was soft in the head, too. Wouldn't even beat his sons, way back in the 1920's when that was considered every father's duty.
I for one would say that assessing the data is an important function of rationality
The context here was pretty important, though. If you have accurate (or: near accurate, accurate but incomplete (and similar formulations)) data, I would agree. But, if you are misinformed (particularly purposefully, in the way JTB gets beaten by example, when you're accidentally right despite misinformation) I can't see that your rationality is really in play, in the sense that it's, as it were, on trial, in assessing data which, from a third party perspective, is wrong, but you couldn't know.
Uses the exact same mistaken notion of belief as JTB. I reject both for using that notion of belief.
I'm not quite sure I understand what you're rejecting. Sincerely thinking something is true is a belief, right? It's not a logical position but an emotional one.
All I'm suggesting is that, although exceptionalism has been all too often used by humans to justify maltreating everything else, it is also the basis for expecting better of them.
The exceptionalism that I'm opposed to is the exceptionalism that seeks to disown or set aside our animal nature, pretending that we are not animals. In a phrase, it is the idea that we have "dominion" over everything else. It has too often been interpreted as a licence for tyranny, when stewardship is called for.
Really? Tell that to the Jain monks who conscientiously sweep the path they're walking along to avoid stepping on insects. Or the world's many vegetarians and vegans who decline animal products as sustenance (which doesn't include me). I think this is rather a stale caricature of Christian imperialism, even if historically accurate in some respects.
The exceptionalism I'm proposing is due to our existential condition: that we are endowed with the ability to sense meaning in a way that no other animal is able to do. There are, as a consequence, horizons of being open to us, that are not open to other animals. It's both a blessing and a curse, as consequently we have a sense of ourselves, and so also a sense of our own limitedness and finitude and the ability to lose what we cherish and also to act in ways which we ourselves know are sub-optimal. It's an unfortunate historical fact that our science-based society has swept away the symbolic forms in which that awareness was expressed. But then, it also suits a consumer society to have us believe that the pursuit and satiation of desires is an aim. Many before me have observed that the popular interpretation of the 'survival of the fittest' serve the industrial capitalist mindset very well.
None of which is to say that I don't accept that animals, like dogs, are sentient beings who feel a full range of emotions and experience joy, sadness and so on (I'm minding someone's cavoodle for a few weeks, and she's a delight). That they are demonstrably lacking the rational faculties of h.sapiens is not an expression of prejudice or bias, but a simple statement of fact, which seems inordinately difficult to accept for a lot of people.
OK. It's just that it seems to me to be a requirement for a species to be social at all. A "society" in which every member felt free to cannibalize the other members wouldn't survive for long, just as an individual that didn't regard itself as a priority (prioritizing its own life over that of an aggressor) wouldn't survive for long. If that's a prejudice, it would be hard to criticize a society or an individual that had it.
Yes I wasnt trying to suggest that animals could change their preference for their own kind. And I agree with you that such a disposition is a pragmatic necessity for the survival of animal societies as well as human ones
It's significant, though, that you (rightly) hold human beings responsible. What's more, we can't expect any other species to step up and control the situation.
Right both because they could not do anything about it or even understand it and because they could never have created the situation in the first place.
The exceptionalism that I'm opposed to is the exceptionalism that seeks to disown or set aside our animal nature, pretending that we are not animals. In a phrase, it is the idea that we have "dominion" over everything else. It has too often been interpreted as a licence for tyranny, when stewardship is called for.
That they are demonstrably lacking the rational faculties of h.sapiens is not an expression of prejudice or bias, but a simple statement of fact, which seems inordinately difficult to accept for a lot of people.
Its not difficult for me to accept that humans possess symbolic language and thus are capable of collective learning in ways that other animals are apparently not. What is difficult for me to accept is that this means we are more than merely another kind of animal or that we are more important in any absolute sense than other animals.
What is difficult for me to accept is that this means we are more than merely another kind of animal or that we are more important in any absolute sense than other animals.
I didn't say 'important', although in the sense that we hold sway over the fate of millions of species, then we are. But that is not the point I've been labouring to make, which is that we're of a different kind, due to what we're able to know.
This intuition is not, by the way, unique to Christianity. In Buddhist lore, being born in human form is an opportunity to realise liberation (a term which has no conceptual equivalent in the Western lexicon.) Buddhists are generally humane to animals, and many orders of Mah?y?na Buddhism are strictly vegetarian. But they understand that animals lack the intelligence to learn 'the way' (see David Loy, Are Humans Special? (.pdf)):
[quote=David Loy]Steven Weinberg, a Nobel laureate in physics, famously claimed that The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless. But to examine the universe objectively and conclude that it is pointless misses the point. Who is comprehending that the universe is pointless? Someone separate from it, or someone who is an inextricable part of it? If cosmologists themselves are a manifestation of the same universe that cosmologists study, with them the universe is comprehending itself. Does that change the universe? When we come to see the universe in a new way, its the universe that is coming to see itself in a new way.[/quote]
OK. So believing what they saw and reporting that when asked doesn't involve reasoning. But reasoning can come into it when they are asked to justify (give reasons for believing) their belief that what they say did happen. Is it only after the justification has been provided that it is rational for them to believe what they saw?
I have never heard of anyone trying to justify what they saw. One can confirm what one saw. But usually one doesn't justify what one saw. One justifies what one believes, said, done and think, but not one saw, smelt, felt, drank, ate or heard.
I don't really see the difference between discussing whether animals are rational and discussing whether my belief that animals are rational is rational. Of course, there is a third possibility that my belief that animals are rational may be the result of a valid argument based on false premisses. Is that what you are suggesting?
Think whatever you like, but if you think animals are rational, then we are not talking in the same category of reason. In my book, if you think animals are rational, then you could be a zoologist, scientist, social activist. poet, novelist, religious cult member or a folk in the pub, but not a philosopher.
Animals could be intelligent, but they are not rational. Rational beings ask questions, reflects, and are able to criticise and analyze. Is any animal capable of these mental activities apart from humans? In that regard, not even every humans are rational.
The context here was pretty important, though. If you have accurate (or: near accurate, accurate but incomplete (and similar formulations)) data, I would agree. But, if you are misinformed (particularly purposefully, in the way JTB gets beaten by example, when you're accidentally right despite misinformation) I can't see that your rationality is really in play, in the sense that it's, as it were, on trial, in assessing data which, from a third party perspective, is wrong, but you couldn't know.
If my data is wrong, despite my assessing it rationally, then my rationality is not in question. It would be if I became better informed and failed to change my assessment.
That works. You want to hog a faculty all to yourself, just categorize it as the thing only you have.
No matter how different each and everyone's thinking processes and contents are, we must allow the freedom of thinking, must'n we? That is also a rational thinking. :wink:
I have trouble with this. Sincerity, to me, means not affected (pretended), genuine. Emotions can be affected or genuine, sincere or not. So, like honesty, sincerity must be in a different category from the emotions. (Though emotion can be an explanation for people believing things, though usually of them believing things irrationally.)
Tell that to the Jain monks who conscientiously sweep the path they're walking along to avoid stepping on insects. Or the world's many vegetarians and vegans who decline animal products as sustenance (which doesn't include me). I think this is rather a stale caricature of Christian imperialism, even if historically accurate in some respects.
Yes, I know about the Jains - and respect them. So it is without disrespect that I point out that they sweep the insects from their path, rather than, for example, not walking where they are, or walking round them. Which falls under the prioritization that we were talking about.
Yes. I was using that cliche as a way of making the point that exceptionalism does not necessarily imply exploitation and destruction. Even "stewardship" is open to criticism. We don't own the world just because we can wreck it. So the care we ought to take is more like the care we should take of something that belongs to, or is shared with, someone else.
The exceptionalism I'm proposing is due to our existential condition: that we are endowed with the ability to sense meaning in a way that no other animal is able to do. There are, as a consequence, horizons of being open to us, that are not open to other animals.
So now I'm puzzled again. The conversation started with the point that a lion prioritized itself and perhaps (I don't know the habits of lions) its mate and cubs over other species, in that it regards its own life as more important than the lives of its prey.
Because I have trouble with "horizons of being", I don't know what you mean by "in a way that no other animal is able to do".
It's both a blessing and a curse, as consequently we have a sense of ourselves, and so also a sense of our own limitedness and finitude and the ability to lose what we cherish and also to act in ways which we ourselves know are sub-optimal
I think the issue here is about morality. Which is a rather different kettle of fish from rationality. Nevertheless, I'm pretty sure that some animals to have a simple sense of morality.
But then, it also suits a consumer society to have us believe that the pursuit and satiation of desires is an aim. Many before me have observed that the popular interpretation of the 'survival of the fittest' serve the industrial capitalist mindset very well.
Yes, that's true. Yet, if they had eyes to see, they would understand that evolution itself demonstrates that we are better together.
That they are demonstrably lacking the rational faculties of h.sapiens is not an expression of prejudice or bias, but a simple statement of fact, which seems inordinately difficult to accept for a lot of people.
Yet, from my point of view, it is a simple fact that we are animals. I'm sure you don't intend to deny that, just as I don't mean that animals don't do many things that humans do.
David Loy:Steven Weinberg, a Nobel laureate in physics, famously claimed that The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless. But to examine the universe objectively and conclude that it is pointless misses the point.
I'm sorry. It seems odd that Weinberg should bemoan the pointlessness of the world when he studies the world from a point of view that has been carefully constructed to eliminate any question about what the point of the world is. It doesn't miss the point. It by-passes it. (Not that I'm a fan of the question what is the point of the world).
David Loy:If cosmologists themselves are a manifestation of the same universe that cosmologists study, with them the universe is comprehending itself.
Doesn't the same apply to scientists and historians etc.? But anyway, from the fact that cosmologists are part of the universe that they study, it does not follow that the universe is comprehending itself. I'm not even clear what it means to say that the universe is comprehending itself.
Its not difficult for me to accept that humans possess symbolic language and thus are capable of collective learning in ways that other animals are apparently not. What is difficult for me to accept is that this means we are more than merely another kind of animal or that we are more important in any absolute sense than other animals.
I agree. Humans are different from animals, animals from fish, fish from insects. Humans are like animals, which are like fish, which are like insects. Each species is like others and unlike them. That's all boring. What makes the issue contentious? It has to be what significance is attributed to them.
If my data is wrong, despite my assessing it rationally, then my rationality is not in question. It would be if I became better informed and failed to change my assessment.
Yes, ok cool. Perhaps I was just insufficiently clear initially. THank you!
sincerity must be in a different category from the emotions
I think this is true, but then you can't really employ the term, which I would need to supplant here, of "genuine belief". Though, I think we can simply read this as "A genuine emotional disposition to accept as true". Would that perhaps work for you? It says the same thing, to me.
I think this is true, but then you can't really employ the term, which I would need to supplant here, of "genuine belief". Though, I think we can simply read this as "A genuine emotional disposition to accept as true". Would that perhaps work for you? It says the same thing, to me.
I've never thought about emotin in relation to belief, or rather I've always assumed that any emotion was superfluous and basically undesirable. The usual assumption is that emotion is always just irrational prejudice, but now that it seems to be generally accepted that emotions have a cognitive element and that does indeed change the game. I need to think about this.
I'm not even clear what it means to say that the universe is comprehending itself.
[quote=Julian Huxley] As a result of a thousand million years of evolution, the universe is becoming conscious of itself, able to understand something of its past history and its possible future. This cosmic self-?awareness is being realized in one tiny fragment of the universein a few of us human beings.[/quote]
(Although, mind you, were only tiny fragments looked at from the outside.)
I have never heard of anyone trying to justify what they saw. One can confirm what one saw. But usually one doesn't justify what one saw. One justifies what one believes, said, done and think, but not one saw, smelt, felt, drank, ate or heard.
Ah, yes. You are quite right. That means that there is something foundational about our perceptions. But I would want to say that it is not necessarily straightforward. Normally, we do indeed believe what we see, etc and that is unproblematic. But sometimes we find ourselves with incompatible beliefs, or simply confused. Then we start asking questions, making diagnoses; very often, but not always we can resolve the situation and then we turn on the perceiver and conclude that there is something wrong or at least different going on - colour-blindness, astigmatism, etc. I realize that's very vague, but I'm gesturing towards all that, rather than trying to describe it. I think we probably don't want to pursue the details here and now.
But sometimes we find ourselves with incompatible beliefs, or simply confused. Then we start asking questions, making diagnoses; very often, but not always we can resolve the situation and then we turn on the perceiver and conclude that there is something wrong or at least different going on - colour-blindness, astigmatism, etc. I realize that's very vague, but I'm gesturing towards all that, rather than trying to describe it.
In case of mysterious or abnormal visual perception case, you would try to resort to the biological or psychological probes and explanation in clarifying the problems, rather than rationalisation. Rational thinking and reasoning takes place in conceptual level, not physical or biological level. You wouldn't get much progress or meaningful conclusion bringing in rational thinking into your abnormal perception due to colour blindness or astigmatism.
Rational thinking and reasoning takes place in conceptual level, not physical or biological level.
But the subject matter one thinks about has to be collected through sensory data processing before one can formulate any concepts. (Hence the poverty of cognitive function in children who have been deprived of stimulation in their formative years.) If one's own data-collecting equipment is compromised, no amount of conceptual thinking can correct it. In the absence of an external source of sound data, one is forced to draw conclusions and make decisions on incorrect premises.
If you are missing the L cones in your retina and nobody tells you that red exists, it's quite reasonable for you to conceive of everything in the world as shades of green and yellow. You could respond correctly to a green STOP sign because of the word, but a green flag would mean nothing special.
If cosmologists themselves are a manifestation of the same universe that cosmologists study, with them the universe is comprehending itself.
David Loy
Doesn't the same apply to scientists and historians etc.? But anyway, from the fact that cosmologists are part of the universe that they study, it does not follow that the universe is comprehending itself. I'm not even clear what it means to say that the universe is comprehending itself.
It is perfectly clear to me. I am a part of the universe. We all are. Parts of the universe are aware of themselves, and of the universe as a whole. Maybe our planet is the only place in the universe where this is happening. But it is happening. The universe is waking up to its own existence, and coming to comprehend itself.
But the subject matter one thinks about has to be collected through sensory data processing before one can formulate any concepts.
Sure. But it lacks any meaningful point in the discussion for the topic rational beings and rational thinking. What is there to dispute or be surprised in that? It is like saying, if you wore sunglasses, then the whole world will appear darker to you.
It is not talking anything about rational beings or thinking, but it is just a description of a obvious mechanism of perception, that if you are lacking something in your retina, you cannot see things in proper way. If a being lacks sensory organs, then it cannot form any concepts. What is new or interesting?
Normally, we do indeed believe what we see, etc and that is unproblematic. But sometimes we find ourselves with incompatible beliefs, or simply confused. Then we start asking questions, making diagnoses; very often, but not always we can resolve the situation and then we turn on the perceiver and conclude that there is something wrong or at least different going on - colour-blindness, astigmatism, etc.
Only if you have some external source of information that contradicts your defective senses. without that contradiction, you would ask no questions. Quoting Corvus
What is new or interesting?
Nothing at all. One old, uninteresting point is that concepts are formed from sensory input, not independently.
My goodness, so much concern about the dog knowing the time. Did the dog have a watch? Is there a clock on the wall of the train station? How is the dog informed about the time?
In case of mysterious or abnormal visual perception case, you would try to resort to the biological or psychological probes and explanation in clarifying the problems, rather than rationalisation.
I agree with that. I was thinking, however, that deciding what the physical explanation is would be applying rationality.
The same way you are. The biological clock that came with our brain, plus changes in the environment, plus experience, plus memory. People and other animals kept daily and seasonal routines long before anybody built a stone circle and very long before we let ourselves be ruled by mechanical horologes. I have no idea why other people think this is remarkable, when we all not only have a sense of time, but can witness every living thing around us respond to the passage of time.
It is perfectly clear to me. I am a part of the universe. We all are. Parts of the universe are aware of themselves, and of the universe as a whole. Maybe our planet is the only place in the universe where this is happening. But it is happening. The universe is waking up to its own existence, and coming to comprehend itself.
I don't dispute that parts of the universe are aware of themselves and of the universe as a whole. But I can't see that it follows that the universe is aware of itself or its parts. I don't think that my car is aware of anything just because I'm driving it, though I can see some sense in such an idea. But the idea that my car is aware of itself just because someone is sitting in it makes no sense to me.
But I do think that there is something important about insisting that we are a product of the universe, not some alien imposition.
I have no idea why other people think this is remarkable, when we all not only have a sense of time, but can witness every living thing around us respond to the passage of time.
I agree with you. It seems to me that there are two concepts of time in play. There is the idea of time as a rhythm or repetition, and our biological clock maintain what is called a circadian rhythm, making us more inclined to sleep and night and wake up during the day. (The human biological clock is located in the hypothalamus in the brain.) Then there is our clock time - which actual is a more sophisticated system that does the same thing. It's not unreasonable to suppose that dogs and other animals do not comprehend that system. But it is unreasonable not to recognize that they also have biological clocks that do give them an effective sense of time - it's a well established fact.
Circadian rhythms have been widely observed in animals, plants, fungi and cyanobacteria
I don't dispute that parts of the universe are aware of themselves and of the universe as a whole. But I can't see that it follows that the universe is aware of itself or its parts. I don't think that my car is aware of anything just because I'm driving it, though I can see some sense in such an idea. But the idea that my car is aware of itself just because someone is sitting in it makes no sense to me.
But I do think that there is something important about insisting that we are a product of the universe, not some alien imposition.
I'm not saying the universe has one unified consciousness that is aware of itself. Just that some parts of the universe are aware. It may be all that ever happens. It would only be a scifi story where all the bits of consciousness merged into one.
The only definition of the universe that I think makes sense is to list everything in it. Which, obviously, is far from possible. Everything would have to be listed as its individual self, as well as as a party of any group or system that is a part of, etc. etc. So we could only ever list a ridiculously minuscule number of things. But on that list would be you and me. You are a part of the definition of the universe. If you did not exist, the definition of the universe would be different than it is. And the part of the universe that is you is aware. Aware of yoursrlf individually, aware of a billion other things, and aware of the universe as a whole. A part of the universe is aware of itself.
The parts of the universe that become aware of themselves and other parts only do so by distinguishing themselves and other parts from everything else.
And the part of the universe that is you is aware. Aware of yoursrlf individually, aware of a billion other things, and aware of the universe as a whole. A part of the universe is aware of itself.
I don't disagree with that. I must have misunderstood you.
The parts of the universe that become aware of themselves and other parts only do so by distinguishing themselves and other parts from everything else.
Indeed. That is one of the unique attributes of living beings. The hallmark of organic life is that it has to maintain itself rather than being subsumed into whatever chemical or energetic process is going on around it, as non-organic matter does. This is one of the distinctions that Evan Thompson makes in Mind in Life. But humans go a step beyond that. They're aware that they're aware.
I agree with that. I was thinking, however, that deciding what the physical explanation is would be applying rationality.
I am not sure if deciding what physical explanation is applying rationality. Reasoning is either deductive or inductive reasoning. Deduction infers from the valid premises to the valid conclusions such as A > B, B >C therefore A>C. All men is mortal, Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal.
Induction is reasoning which infers the future case from the observed previous cases such as Sun have risen from the east. The sun rises from the east. Therefore sun will rise from the east.
Reasoning yields new knowledge or conclusion from the premises or observations. Reasoning can be ground for the actions, speakings, beliefs, knowledge and explanations. But reasoning itself is not explanations or beliefs or actions. You seem to be still in confusion telling the difference between reasoning and intelligence (or knowledge).
Reply to Corvus
It doesn't. The preponderance of evidence does.
The teeny-tiny, microscopic point I attempted to make in this context was in support of the previous argument by Ludwig V was that conceptual thought depends on concepts, which are formed from sensory input. Quoting Ludwig V
If my data is wrong, despite my assessing it rationally, then my rationality is not in question. It would be if I became better informed and failed to change my assessment.
Rational thinking and reasoning takes place in conceptual level, not physical or biological level.
Just that, nothing more. Any entity, of any species that thinks rationally can, nevertheless, draw false conclusions if they are working with inaccurate data.
If there ever was such a point worth making, its moment has long passed.
I am not sure if deciding what physical explanation is applying rationality.
I don't see what your problem is. If my question is "Why can't S tell red from green?", I will want to work out my answer rationally, because that guarantees that my answer will be reliably correct.
I believe you are correct. It seems to me interaction with others plays a huge roll in the development of our consciousness.
I've little doubt that is true. Which gives me one more reason for not understanding what it would mean for the universe to be conscious. There isn't anything else for it to distinguish itself from.
conceptual thought depends on concepts, which are formed from sensory input.
I hope you'll forgive me nit-picking at something that is broadly true. But I think it is important, in order to ensure we avoid various well-known philosophical traps, that we never forget, that actions (interactions) with the world are critically important, not only in learning how to interpret our sensory input, but also in understanding what concepts are - knowing what "gate" means means knowing how to use (and abuse) the gate.
The same way you are. The biological clock that came with our brain, plus changes in the environment, plus experience, plus memory. People and other animals kept daily and seasonal routines long before anybody built a stone circle and very long before we let ourselves be ruled by mechanical horologes. I have no idea why other people think this is remarkable, when we all not only have a sense of time, but can witness every living thing around us respond to the passage of time.
Your comments are perfect for continuing the conversation.
The animals will not be ruled by our modern cultural understanding of time. They will never rely on clocks to regulate their lives. The forces of nature will always regulate their lives. None of them will ever complain they want to be lazy and stay in their pajamas all day, but they have to go to work. A dog will never understand the reasoning behind our modern-day way of life and excitingly, not that long ago, no human being would understand our modern way of life. Comparably we are not living our lives but like puppets, our rationale controls us while we do not perceive life in the raw. It takes something like a hurricane to get us out of our heads and back into life.
Our rational notions of life are pretty disconnected from nature. :lol: That is to say we do not experience the tree, but what we think about the tree. Does that make sense?
The parts of the universe that become aware of themselves and other parts only do so by distinguishing themselves and other parts from everything else.
Nice thought. Does this link compliment what you said?
1. Representationalism
Representational theories of consciousness reduce consciousness to mental representations rather than directly to neural states. Examples include first-order representationalism (FOR) which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states (Tye 2005) as well as several versions of higher-order representationalism (HOR) which holds that what makes a mental state M conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order mental state directed at M (Rosenthal 2005, Gennaro 2012). The primary focus of this entry is on HOR and especially higher-order thought (HOT) theory. The key question that should be answered by any theory of consciousness is: What makes a mental state a conscious mental state? https://iep.utm.edu/higher-order-theories-of-consciousness/
I believe you are correct. It seems to me interaction with others plays a huge roll in the development of our consciousness.
Patterner
I've little doubt that is true. Which gives me one more reason for not understanding what it would mean for the universe to be conscious. There isn't anything else for it to distinguish itself from.
Again, we could come up with a scifi idea that would work. But that's all it would be.
Reply to Athena
Thanks. I should look into him. I know his philosophies were a huge basis of Julian May's Galactic Milieu series, which is an incredible scifi/fantasy series about humanity gaining psionic abilities.
Reply to Ludwig V
Yep. It's hard to imagine an organism that does not interact with the world - if only to anchor on something and feed itself. With blythe disregard to potential philosophical pitfalls, I kind of presupposed being alive means being in the world. As I noted earlier, in the absence of outside sources of information - i.e. memory, experience, input from other organisms - one has only one's imperfect, unaided senses upon which to base understanding of anything. One would form concept s (a functioning mind cannot help forming concepts, even if it has no name for them) and thus make decisions that were only as accurate as the available data.
The animals will not be ruled by our modern cultural understanding of time.
Our pets and service animals are ruled by whatever schedule society set for their owners/handlers. Farm animals are,too, to a lesser degree, as their needs influence - though do not determine - the farmer's routine. Quoting Athena
Our rational notions of life are pretty disconnected from nature. :lol: That is to say we do not experience the tree, but what we think about the tree. Does that make sense?
It does to me. When sequestered from the elements, the environment and denizens of nature, we let ourselves make up fanciful theories about those things, for a variety of reasons. One of these, as I said before, is exploitation. A major one has been to bolster theologies and thereby, the lifting of Man half-way to Heaven. There are strong vestiges of that mindset in the secular realm. Another reason is nostalgia: an ache for the loss of a dimension of our selves. A pervasive one has been art; the appreciation of natural beauty. Yet another is entertainment and profit through entertaining humans.
As long as we have theories and centuries-old Eurocentric philosophical maxims regarding the nature of nature, we can deny the less adamantine evidence of direct observation, direct interaction.
But humans go a step beyond that. They're aware that they're aware.
I'm not sure being aware of awareness makes sense. Perhaps it's just that we can tell ourselves that we are aware on account of possessing symbolic language.
Nice thought. Does this link compliment what you said?
I think so, In line with my response to Wayfarer above I tend to think that whereas other animals distinguish themselves from everything else in having a sense of self but are not conscious of doing that distinguishing we that possess symbolic language are able to reflectively tell ourselves that we are doing that distinguishing and even tell ourselves that we are directly aware of doing that distinguishing. I tend to think the latter is a kind of illusion though.
I have no idea why other people think this is remarkable, when we all not only have a sense of time, but can witness every living thing around us respond to the passage of time.
There's a well-known - some might say notorious - case which was recounted in a popular book of the 1970's, Supernature, and again in a more recent work, The Human Cosmos, Jo Marchant.
In February 1954 , a US biologist named Frank Brown discovered something so remarkable, so inexplicable, that his peers essentially wrote it out of history. Brown had dredged a batch of Atlantic oysters from the seabed off New Haven, Connecticut, and shipped them hundreds of miles inland to Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. Then he put them into pans of brine inside a sealed darkroom, shielded from any changes in temperature, pressure, water currents, or light. Normally, these oysters feed with the tides. They open their shells to filter plankton and algae from the seawater, with rest periods in between when their shells are closed. Brown had already established that they are most active at high tide, which arrives roughly twice a day. He was interested in how the mollusks time this behavior, so he devised the experiment to test what they would do when kept far from the sea and deprived of any information about the tides. Would their normal feeding rhythm persist?
For the first two weeks, it did. Their feeding activity continued to peak 50 minutes later each day, in time with the tides on the oysters home beach in New Haven. That in itself was an impressive result, suggesting that the shellfish could keep accurate time. But then something unexpected happened, which changed Browns life forever.
The oysters gradually shifted their feeding times later and later. After two more weeks, a stable cycle reappeared, but it now lagged three hours behind the New Haven tides. Brown was mystified, until he checked an astronomical almanac. High tides occur each day when the moon is highest in the sky or lowest below the horizon. Brown realized that the oysters had corrected their activity according to the local state of the moon; they were feeding when Evanstonif it had been by the seawould experience high tide. He had isolated these organisms from every obvious environmental cue. And yet, somehow, they were following the moon.
The second of those two books recounts how Frank Brown was essentially ostracized by the scientific mainstream for the claim that the oysters somehow responded to changes in lunar gravitation. Nevertheless his findings still stand as far as I know.
//I should add, I don't think molluscs are conscious, and these actions are not rational, but that it is very interesting that this behaviour can be regulated in this manner.//
Reply to Wayfarer
Biology is still beyond our ken. Neuroscience is well behind. Physics and cosmology are ranging off into neverlands of speculation. But we know all about metaphysics.
I have not heard of this experiment. Thanks! Don't quite know what to do with it, or where to file it, but it's fascinating.
The second of those two books recounts how Frank Brown was essentially ostracized by the scientific mainstream for the claim that the oysters somehow responded to changes in lunar gravitation. Nevertheless his findings still stand as far as I know.
That's a good story. However, I recently happened to hear a BBC radio science programme that answers questions sent in by listeners (often children). There was a question about the effects of the moon's gravity on the earth. The answer was incredibly detailed, but mentioned, unless I misheard, that the moon's gravity had a (presumably measurable) effect on the earth's rocks; it suggested a kind of (mini-) tidal effect on land as well as water. Which doesn't seem fantastic to me, so I believe that. It would entirely explain those results. I wonder who we could ask? (I wouldn't rate that as particularly super, but the way. It's just one of those things that is so obvious one wonders why one didn't think of it before.)
I think so, In line with my response to Wayfarer above I tend to think that whereas other animals distinguish themselves from everything else in having a sense of self but are not conscious of doing that distinguishing we that possess symbolic language are able to reflectively tell ourselves that we are doing that distinguishing and even tell ourselves that we are directly aware of doing that distinguishing. I tend to think the latter is a kind of illusion though.
It seems to me that they most likely have self-awareness, because otherwise they couldn't navigate the world or tell the difference between the things around them moving and themselves moving. I have often seen them exercising self-control - just ask them to sit and stay while you walk away. Other animals I don't know well enough to opine. Self-reflection seems to me to depend on human language so I'm willing to let that go.
I'm not sure being aware of awareness makes sense. Perhaps it's just that we can tell ourselves that we are aware on account of possessing symbolic language.
The whole business is infected with the fact that the grammar of language allows one to apply recursion, so when S believes/knows/is aware that p, it is not ungrammatical to suggest that S believes/knows/is aware that S believes/knows/is aware that p, and S believes/knows/is aware that S believes/knows/is aware that p that S believes/knows/is aware that p and so on. There's also I know that p, and so now you know that p, and so I know that you know that p, and you know that I know that you know that p. The fact that grammar permits it is no reason to suppose that each step is meaningful.
A major one has been to bolster theologies and thereby, the lifting of Man half-way to Heaven.
Yes. It is striking though how theologies need to convince us first that we are less than worms (no disrespect to worms, though) in order to be able to lift us up, but only half-way to heaven, with dire threats about what will happen if we break their rules.
Representational theories of consciousness reduce consciousness to mental representations rather than directly to neural states.
The question that bothers me about representational theories is that they never explain what it is that is being represented. I know how a picture is a representation, but not how those mental whatsits are. What does a smell/taste represent? or a touch? Or a pain? Representations of sounds seem to be more like mimicries or recreations that representations. It's all completely unclear, and yet people hang on to it. I don't get it.
It seems to me that they most likely have self-awareness, because otherwise they couldn't navigate the world or tell the difference between the things around them moving and themselves moving. I have often seen them exercising self-control - just ask them to sit and stay while you walk away. Other animals I don't know well enough to opine. Self-reflection seems to me to depend on human language so I'm willing to let that go.
Not sure if you are disagreeing with me here. I believe animals to varying degrees are self-aware. But I find it hard to imagine how they could be reflectively or narratively self-aware given that they don't possess symbolic language.
The fact that grammar permits it is no reason to suppose that each step is meaningful.
Yes. all that. So what we call reflective self-awareness which some would say elevates us above the other animals I would say is not anything different in any phenomenologically immediate sense than simple awareness of or sense of difference between self and other, but merely the post hoc narrative about our self-awareness which language enables us to tell.
But I find it hard to imagine how they could be reflectively or narratively self-aware given that they don't possess symbolic language.
Does it matter whether you can tell stories about your thinking? I mean, it obviously matters to the storyteller. I happen to be a teller of fictional stories and it matters greatly to me. I suppose it matters even more to the tellers of stories that liberate or subjugate or eradicate entire peoples. In that sense, it raises humans above species that can't or don't need to tell stories.
(I imagine the dog's record of his internal life as a reel of virtual reality - like a 6D movie. Is it story-telling? Without grammar and syntax, it's hard to tell - in fact, at the time, it's impossible to communicate - but that's the way children with limited verbal skills view their own life.)
But how does it alter rational thought, problem-solving or navigating the physical world?
So what we call reflective self-awareness which some would say elevates us above the other animals I would say is not anything different in any phenomenologically immediate sense than simple awareness of or sense of difference between self and other, but merely the post hoc narrative about our self-awareness which language enables us to tell.
Is there anything we think that no other species thinks? Or do we think nothing that is uniquely human, but we're the only ones who have the language to express it all?
Is there anything we think that no other species thinks? Or do we think nothing that is uniquely human, but we're the only ones who have the language to express it all?
I assume every species has thoughts that no other species share, since the equipment with which we perceive, experience and interact with the world, and the capabilities we bring to life are so varied. I assume every individual also thinks thoughts that are unique to itself alone.
We can get some notion - sometimes a pretty clear one - of what another species is thinking by its actions, to the degree those actions are similar to what we would do in their place. But as long as we are individual, the precise content of each mind must remain a mystery to all others.
Self-reflection seems to me to depend on human language so I'm willing to let that go.
I've often heard that language shapes our thinking, and is literally responsible for aspects of how our brains become wired. If that is so, then there must be thinking humans do that no other species does, and our brains must become wired in ways no others species' brains are. No?
Oh, you mean because some species can't be assumed to have thoughts? The ones that have no brains, I admit to not having allowed for them. The ones who do, whatever passes through those brains is very probably different from what passes through the brains of any other species. If you don't choose to call it thinking, that's your prerogative... with maybe just a smidgen of anthropocentrism.
Is there anything we think that no other species thinks? Or do we think nothing that is uniquely human, but we're the only ones who have the language to express it all?
It seems to me that abstract thought, thought about generalities may be impossible without langauge. Perhaps animals of various kinds think some things that we cannot.
I'd say the most significant thing is that it enables collective learning. History and art and literature and music and science and so on.
Human history does not indicate - at least to this observer - that all that science and culture have contributed significantly to our collective ability to make rational decisions.
It seems to me that abstract thought, thought about generalities may be impossible without langauge.
What sort of generalities? Like : "All wolves are evil." or "If the angles of one triangle add up to 360 degrees, the angles of all triangles must also."? Because lamas do believe the former and crows know that a stick skinny enough to go into a one hole in a tree will go into the hole in another tree. Or do you mean something more like : "Events in the universe are sequential, so there must have been a prime mover to get it started."? I don't think other animals think like that.
I don't see what your problem is. If my question is "Why can't S tell red from green?", I will want to work out my answer rationally, because that guarantees that my answer will be reliably correct.
I don't have problem. You seem to have. I am just pointing out your example is not reflecting what rational thinking is. When you are asked, "Why can't S tell red from green?", if you explained the reason is S is colour blind, then your answer is based on your guessing, or just parroting what you read or heard from other sources, not from your rational thinking.
You explanation must be based on either from deductive or inductive reasoning for it to be qualified as a rational thinking. Not just because you explained something based on your guessing or parroting what you have heard or read from other sources.
Contrast to your example, my answer to the question how do you know it is autumn, because I see the leaves are falling from all the trees, is based on my previous observation that whenever leaves were falling from all the trees, it was autumn, which is an inductive reasoning, hence it is a rational thinking.
They make excellent guards for sheep, I've heard and will spit and kick at predators. But they can become accustomed to dogs in a domestic setting. Quoting Patterner
The angles of triangles add up to 360 degrees? (Just bustin' on your for this one.
Deservedly so! My mind's eye was looking at a square, but my fingers only got half the message. :sad:
As long as we have theories and centuries-old Eurocentric philosophical maxims regarding the nature of nature, we can deny the less adamantine evidence of direct observation, direct interaction.
I am feeling a little frustrated in part because I am aware of a serious family problem and it seems next to impossible to get my mind to focus on anything else. The next piece of frustration is conveying the fact that our reality has almost nothing to do with nature. We are not consciously living in a world created by nature or a god. Our reality is 100% man-made. When we walk along the river enjoying the beauty, we are escaping from our man-made reality. No other animal experiences life in this way and we do not experience nature as an animal does. Aborigenies that never had contact with modern man experience life as the animals do but once they have contact with modern man, they too are thrown out of Eden. Adam and Eve enjoyed Eden until they tasted the forbidden fruit.
Brown realized that the oysters had corrected their activity according to the local state of the moon; they were feeding when Evanstonif it had been by the seawould experience high tide. He had isolated these organisms from every obvious environmental cue. And yet, somehow, they were following the moon.
Might that mean oysters are sensitive to the gravitational pull of the moon?
Researchers have also found some specialized cells in birds' eyes that may help them see magnetic fields. It is thought that birds can use both the beak magnetite and the eye sensors to travel long distances over areas that do not have many landmarks, such as the ocean.
https://ssec.si.edu/stemvisions-blog/how-do-birds-navigate#:~:text=Researchers%20have%20also%20found%20some,landmarks%2C%20such%20as%20the%20ocean.
I don't see how this, or anything else, makes them evil. I also don't know how we know what llamas believe about them.
To herbivores, predators are the greatest threat. Many herbivores simply accept that they will be chased and possibly killed by wolves or other predators, but a few species, such as llamas, don't: they regard the predator as an enemy, and fight one if it comes near, even when it doesn't attack first. They may not conceive of 'evil' in human monster terms, but they do classify entire other species as 'bad'. That's a generalization.
A herbivore that always runs when it sees its major predator would also be generalizing: "All lions are a threat." But, in fact, most of the grazing herds are watchful but relaxed around lions that are not actively hunting, so I imagine their concept of 'lion' is more specific: 'lion at rest over there' and 'lion moving toward us' are two different categories. I don't know whether that's a generalization.
When we walk along the river enjoying the beauty, we are escaping from our man-made reality.
Even when the river has cement banks... Yes. There have always been movements in civilized societies, of a small number of people who lived, or attempted to live, a more genuine, nature-grounded lifestyle.
I wouldn't call the fugitive subsistence of the Mashco Piro Eden, exactly, though they look pretty healthy. I see no reason we couldn't strike a compromise between the destruction of nature and our own needs. But humans tend to run at everything at full tilt.
I don't have problem. You seem to have. I am just pointing out your example is not reflecting what rational thinking is. When you are asked, "Why can't S tell red from green?", if you explained the reason is S is colour blind, then your answer is based on your guessing, or just parroting what you read or heard from other sources, not from your rational thinking.
Sorry. I wasn't clear enough. My explanation is "S is colour-blind", but I thought that Quoting Ludwig V
I will want to work out my answer rationally, because that guarantees that my answer will be reliably correct.
You explanation must be based on either from deductive or inductive reasoning for it to be qualified as a rational thinking. Not just because you explained something based on your guessing or parroting what you have heard or read from other sources.
If I look up the time of the next train on the company web-site (which I have chosen because there is good reason to trust it) and tell everyone that the next train is at 12:00 and the next train is at 12:00, I would claim that I knew the next train was at 12:00 and deny that I'm just parroting. Guessing, I agree, is not rational basis for claiming knowledge, though trial and error as a way of discovering truth is a good basis.
we that possess symbolic language are able to reflectively tell ourselves that we are doing that distinguishing and even tell ourselves that we are directly aware of doing that distinguishing. I tend to think the latter is a kind of illusion though.
Well, I certainly agree that there is no need for a distinct phenomenological experience as a basis for telling ourselves that we are aware of a distinction as opposed to simply reporting or noting it. "Illusion" suggests that I am not aware of the distinction I am aware of, so it seems the wrong classification to me.
I've often heard that language shapes our thinking, and is literally responsible for aspects of how our brains become wired. If that is so, then there must be thinking humans do that no other species does, and our brains must become wired in ways no others species' brains are. No?
Very good. But then the brains of bats and dolphins must be wired differently from ours, because they have specialized abilities that we do not - and just as their specialized abilities have evolved from ancestors that did not have those abilities, so our specialized skills must have evolved from ancestors that did not speak human languages. But again, in both cases, we would expect to find precursors or simple beginnings in those ancestors and we cannot exclude similar skills that have developed differently in other creatures.
It seems to me that abstract thought, thought about generalities may be impossible without language.
Well, Pavlov's dogs were capable of generalizing from the bell ringing yesterday before food to the bell is ringing to-day, so there will be food. "Abstract thought", to me, means something different. Mathematics is abstract thought, because it is about abstract objects. Quoting Patterner
Could be. Is it possible that human language couldn't exist if we were not capable of abstract thought?
I'm more inclined to argue that abstract thought couldn't exist if we were not capable of language. The truth most likely is that the two developed together.
Yes. all that. So what we call reflective self-awareness which some would say elevates us above the other animals I would say is not anything different in any phenomenologically immediate sense than simple awareness of or sense of difference between self and other, but merely the post hoc narrative about our self-awareness which language enables us to tell.
Yes. The bit about "post hoc" is important. That underlies many (possibly all) our explanations of what language-less creatures do and even of a lot of what we do. "Rational post hoc construction" is a good description. We model those on the pattern of the conscious reasoning that we sometimes engage in before and sometimes during executing an action.
(I imagine the dog's record of his internal life as a reel of virtual reality - like a 6D movie. Is it story-telling? Without grammar and syntax, it's hard to tell - in fact, at the time, it's impossible to communicate - but that's the way children with limited verbal skills view their own life.)
The phenomenology of language-less creatures is extraordinarily difficult. I don't think it is reasonable to expect the level of accuracy and detail we can get from creatures that can talk to us.
Human history does not indicate - at least to this observer - that all that science and culture have contributed significantly to our collective ability to make rational decisions.
The trouble is that human capacities have not eliminated the things we share with animals. They still motivate us in exactly the same ways - the will to survive, to reproduce, to eat, drink, seek shelter and company.
No, certainly not 'evil.' But I think even 'bad' is a stretch. I wouldn't think we are safe with anything more than 'threat' and 'not threat.'
We can never eliminate the possibility of being wrong - even safe conclusions can be wrong. So long as we can recognize when we are wrong and do better next time, it's not a catastrophic problem.
No, certainly not 'evil.' But I think even 'bad' is a stretch. I wouldn't think we are safe with anything more than 'threat' and 'not threat.'
Okay. Humans have hyperbole that other species probably don't. I don't know the language of alpacas or zebras. I can't even picture the symbology in their heads. But generalization is generalization. Threat, non-threat, benefit and detriment are categorizations and generalizations: i.e. abstract thought.
I don't think it is reasonable to expect the level of accuracy and detail we can get from creatures that can talk to us.
Or course not. But since we ourselves were languageless creatures early in our lives, and our large brain has an extensive archive of memories, we can recall and describe some of our pre-verbal experiences, feelings and sensations. Not everyone has the same retrieval capability, and we can't always be sure that another person's - or even our - recollection is accurate. Still, we are able to translate non-verbal events into language. When you stand at a scenic lookout, are you really describing the vista to yourself in sentences - or do your eyes and mind take it in and transcribe it later - maybe only a few seconds later? Do you look at a painting or hear a concerto in words?
The trouble is that human capacities have not eliminated the things we share with animals
Oh, sure, don't give our ancestors credit for acting with common sense, but then blame them for the evil narratives that intelligence and imagination - all that vaunted unique cogitation - have wrought. Somehow, bison and whales and hares can cope with lust, anger, fear, territorialism and aggression, without causing their own extinction. It's not the primal instincts that invent slavery, espionage, thumbscrews, supertankers, mustard gas and corrupt supreme courts.
Human history does not indicate - at least to this observer - that all that science and culture have contributed significantly to our collective ability to make rational decisions.
I agree. Collectively we are by and large fucking hopeless.Quoting Patterner
Could be. Is it possible that human language couldn't exist if we were not capable of abstract thought?
Chicken or egg? I think pattern recognition accounts for being able to see things in general terms rather as bare unrelated particulars. I have no doubt animals can do this too, but I would see their understanding as concrete, visceral rather than abstract. To my way of thinking abstraction requires symbolic thought. I acknowledge that it comes down to how one defines 'abstract'.
What sort of generalities? Like : "All wolves are evil." or "If the angles of one triangle add up to 360 degrees, the angles of all triangles must also."? Because lamas do believe the former and crows know that a stick skinny enough to go into a one hole in a tree will go into the hole in another tree. Or do you mean something more like : "Events in the universe are sequential, so there must have been a prime mover to get it started."? I don't think other animals think like that.
See my answer to Patterner above. I don't think lamas think of wolves as "evil". They would see them as a threat to be sure.
Well, I certainly agree that there is no need for a distinct phenomenological experience as a basis for telling ourselves that we are aware of a distinction as opposed to simply reporting or noting it. "Illusion" suggests that I am not aware of the distinction I am aware of, so it seems the wrong classification to me.
The word "illusion" was referring to the notion that we have direct awareness of awareness as opposed to what it seems to me we do have which is post hoc awareness or 'after the fact' noticing that we have been aware. We can do the latter when we can remember events. I don't doubt that (some) animals can remember events in terms of 'images' variously visual, olfactory (including taste), auditory and motor. But I doubt they think anything along the lines of "Oh, I was aware of being aware" or " I am capable of self-consciousness". It seems to me we can think such thoughts only on account of possessing symbolic language.
Yes. The bit about "post hoc" is important. That underlies many (possibly all) our explanations of what language-less creatures do and even of a lot of what we do. "Rational post hoc construction" is a good description. We model those on the pattern of the conscious reasoning that we sometimes engage in before and sometimes during executing an action.
Oh, sure, don't give our ancestors credit for acting with common sense, but then blame them for the evil narratives that intelligence and imagination - all that vaunted unique cogitation - have wrought.
I'm sorry. I wasn't clear enough. I don't blame animal instincts for the super-damage that we have done. There's nothing wrong with them. I thought that was obvious. I was blaming the super-rationality which enabled us to develop super-powers but has not enabled us to develop some super-self-control to go with them. Quite similar to what you are saying, I think.
When you stand at a scenic lookout, are you really describing the vista to yourself in sentences - or do your eyes and mind take it in and transcribe it later - maybe only a few seconds later? Do you look at a painting or hear a concerto in words?
No. The verbal description is quite distinct from the experience. Though the people who seem to think that the photograph is more important than enjoying the scene may be missing out - substituting the fuss with the camera for the event itself.
I don't blame animal instincts for the super-damage that we have done. There's nothing wrong with them. I thought that was obvious.
A couple of other people have just recently told me that llamas can't generalize something that threatens them as being evil or even bad. I didn't say you blamed animals for anything. It's not even you, specifically, that I should have aimed that remark at. It's the double-think we humans do so well.
We're special because we have all these extra capabilities that raise us above the other animals, but when we dig ourselves into trouble, it's because the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts. I'm saying neither the animal instincts nor yet our helplessness to control them, are responsible for our messes. We do control them. We make laws, practice monogamy, have celibate monastic orders, teetotalers and anorexic teenaged girls.
Instincts don't lead to genocide. It's the extra special faculties, the facility for narrative, that creates the evil that we do - and the very concept of evil.
I've often heard that language shapes our thinking, and is literally responsible for aspects of how our brains become wired. If that is so, then there must be thinking humans do that no other species does, and our brains must become wired in ways no others species' brains are. No?
Patterner
Very good. But then the brains of bats and dolphins must be wired differently from ours, because they have specialized abilities that we do not - and just as their specialized abilities have evolved from ancestors that did not have those abilities, so our specialized skills must have evolved from ancestors that did not speak human languages. But again, in both cases, we would expect to find precursors or simple beginnings in those ancestors and we cannot exclude similar skills that have developed differently in other creatures.
I don't understand what you mean by "we cannot exclude similar skills that have developed differently in other creatures." What would be an example?
Could be. Is it possible that human language couldn't exist if we were not capable of abstract thought?
Patterner
I'm more inclined to argue that abstract thought couldn't exist if we were not capable of language. The truth most likely is that the two developed together.
Yeah, I imagine they fed off of each other. But it's interesting to think of someone who had no language thinking abstract thoughts.
A couple of other people have just recently told me that llamas can't generalize something that threatens them as being evil or even bad.
Some relatives of mine acquired a dog. Three maiden aunts sharing an apartment/flat. When I first met this dog, it backed off, bared its teeth and growled at me. I was bemused. I had always lived with dogs, so thought I understood them. I was expecting the cautious, tentative approach and delicate sniffing, but not immediate hostility. It was explained to me that this dog had had some bad experiences in the past and hated/feared all human males. That seems a perfectly good explanation to me and it relies on attributing to the dog on an (inductive) generalization. I don't know what else to say.
I don't think isolated events like that one, or your case of the llamas, are capable of determining, on their own, whether "threat" or "evil" or "bad" is the "right" concept to apply. One would need a much deeper understanding of the animals - much bigger and more varied data-set, if you like - to differentiate between the three possibilities.
There's a cloud of philosophy sitting behind this - and philosophy is not well-equipped to deal with our topic. Our topic is about how far we can attribute belief/knowledge (and rationality) to animals. The difficulty is that a) our paradigm is what we do when we are talking to and about humans and b) that we will inevitably conduct our discussion in human language.
I didn't say you blamed animals for anything. It's not even you, specifically, that I should have aimed that remark at. It's the double-think we humans do so well.
Well, the truth is that I'm pretty confused here. I suddenly found myself holding humans responsible for climate change etc. and not holding animals responsible for it. So I was faced with human exceptionalism.
We're special because we have all these extra capabilities that raise us above the other animals, but when we dig ourselves into trouble, it's because the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts.
I would rather describe them as hyper-developed, rather than extra, capabilities, but that may be nit-picking. In general terms, one feels that it must be something to do with our animal instincts not being evolved to cope with the cultural world that we have developed. I don't quite see what you mean by "the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts".
We do control them. We make laws, practice monogamy, have celibate monastic orders, teetotalers and anorexic teenaged girls.
Yes, that's true. (Anorexia and suicide are indeed examples of control of instincts, but control that has gone wrong. Control is a bit of a two-edged sword.) Though the scope of those controls seems to be too limited to deal with the threats that we are facing. It does seem to me that the arguments about the planetary threats are not really moral arguments, although they are often framed as such. They are arguments about our real, long-term self-interest. We're not very good at the long term. However, that framing might convince at least some of the people who are so resistant.
Instincts don't lead to genocide. It's the extra special faculties, the facility for narrative, that creates the evil that we do - and the very concept of evil.
Yes, I do accept that narratives are crucial to the way that things work for us. That does seem to be a product of language. It's hard to imagine what might convince us that creatures without human-style languages could develop them.
But it's interesting to think of someone who had no language thinking abstract thoughts.
It seems to me that we need to distinguish clearly between thinking as a conscious action, a phenomenological event or process and the tacit thinking when our thoughts are enacted without prior, separate, thinking. Think of it as thinking in action.
It depends on what you classify as an abstract thought. Generalizations from experience do not seem to me to be problematic. It seems to me that maths, morality and articulate self-consciousness are.
However, there is an interesting possibility. Some people say that they think in images. That would be independent of language.
We're special because we have all these extra capabilities that raise us above the other animals, but when we dig ourselves into trouble, it's because the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts. I'm saying neither the animal instincts nor yet our helplessness to control them, are responsible for our messes. We do control them. We make laws, practice monogamy, have celibate monastic orders, teetotalers and anorexic teenaged girls. Instincts don't lead to genocide. It's the extra special faculties, the facility for narrative, that creates the evil that we do - and the very concept of evil.
I think our special capabilities allow us to ignore the animal instincts. Obviously, that's not always a good idea. As you say, genocide. Otoh, they allow us to do some amazing things. It's difficult to say the amazing outweighs the genocide, but we're stuck with both edges of the sword.
And yes, We create the very concept of evil. That's my point.
And yes, We create the very concept of evil. That's my point.
So do we create the concept of a threat? Or a llama?
We show that we have understood a concept by the way we behave. Our linguistic behaviour is the quickest and most accurate (but not absolutely accurate) way of showing what understanding we have, but our non-linguistic behaviour does also show that understanding. There can be ambiguity in both llinghistic and non-linguistic behaviour. But many of them (maybe all) can, in principle, be cleared up on further investigation.
Whether "threat" or "bad" or "evil" is the best way of describing the llamas' behaviour is simply not clear from the information we have. Any of them would be a reasonable explanation for what we know. We would need a good deal more information to clarify that.
You seem to be wanting to get inside the heads of the llamas. We don't need to get inside the head of anyone, animal or not. That's just as well, because it's not possible to get inside anyone's head.
Instincts don't lead to genocide. It's the extra special faculties, the facility for narrative, that creates the evil that we do - and the very concept of evil. Vera Mont
Yes, I do accept that narratives are crucial to the way that things work for us. That does seem to be a product of language. It's hard to imagine what might convince us that creatures without human-style languages could develop them.
Why should they? They already have concepts and strategies that work for them.
The lost point there was that the sophistication of language, narrative and high level of abstraction which sometimes work for us are also what [i]backfire[/quote] on us - not the animal drives.
Otoh, they allow us to do some amazing things. It's difficult to say the amazing outweighs the genocide, but we're stuck with both edges of the sword
Increasingly, the edges are lost; we're looking at the tip. We've passed the deadline for choice. And who knows where the nuclear situation stands at the moment - you get conflicting reports every day. The good ideas and bad ones have converged to pose an existential threat to all advanced life on the planet, and I see no signs of global resolve to mitigate the unavoidable consequences.
So do we create the concept of a threat? Or a llama?
Every entity with a brain understands threat. In between the dumbest and smartest are intellences that assess the threat level as degrees of bad, and categorize the sources of threat accordingly.
Only one species has elevated both the ability to pose threats to others and itself and to characterize threats to itself, its institutions and narratives to the level of evil, in both concept and deed. Quoting Ludwig V
There can be ambiguity in both llinghistic and non-linguistic behaviour. But many of them (maybe all) can, in principle, be cleared up on further investigation.
I'm not sure about that. Have you tried getting clarity from a religious or political fanatic? If you listen to interviews with MAGA supporters or jihadists, you'll hear them use the most extreme language and yet they seem not to have any idea what they believe or why. Quoting Ludwig V
You seem to be wanting to get inside the heads of the llamas.
That was just my facile example of a generalization, of conceptual thinking. I loosely translated the llama's aggressive approach to any random wolf as analogous to a human categorizing his perceived enemies as evil. If I'd known so much would be made of it, I'd have been more circumspect in my choice of words.
The lost point there was that the sophistication of language, narrative and high level of abstraction which sometimes work for us are also what backfire on us - not the animal drives.
Every entity with a brain understands threat. In between the dumbest and smartest are intelligences that assess the threat level as degrees of bad, and categorize the sources of threat accordingly.
Yes, I understand that. But @Patterner seems to be suggesting that we can't attribute the concept "evil" to them because we created it. I wondered what difference he was getting at between "threat" on one hand and "bad" and "evil" on the other. What led him to suppose that we can attribute the concept "threat" to them but not the other two.
That was just my facile example of a generalization, of conceptual thinking. I loosely translated the llama's aggressive approach to any random wolf as analogous to a human categorizing his perceived enemies as evil. If I'd known so much would be made of it, I'd have been more circumspect in my choice of words.
Well, it was good enough to make your point, in my view. But @Patterner's objection pushes us to go deeper into the way the process of explaining animal behaviour works.
I'm not sure about that. Have you tried getting clarity from a religious or political fanatic? If you listen to interviews with MAGA supporters or jihadists, you'll hear them use the most extreme language and yet they seem not to have any idea what they believe or why.
Good point. Possession of language doesn't guarantee the application of rational standards to what one says/believes.
Yes, I understand that. But Patterner seems to be suggesting that we can't attribute the concept "evil" to them because we created it.
And I agree. I don't imagine that other species view anything as 'evil' in the way that humans do. But they do appear to have a strong notion of things that 'may harm me' and things that 'endanger my pack' my herd, my colony or my flock. If a hawk-shaped kite hovers above a groundhog burrow, the guards give the danger call, exactly as if it were an actual hawk. Many dogs are afraid of or outright hostile toward vacuum cleaners, which they perceive as a threat; it's enough to see one turned off, or hear one from another room, to set the dog to snarling and barking to warn off its perceived enemy. (Canine vocalizations are very well documented.)
I don't imagine other animals are capable of performing evil acts the same way humans do, either. They can be angry, resentful, suspicious, spiteful; they can take a dislike to a person or other animal when we see no obvious reason for it; the long-lived ones can hold both affection and grudges for many years. Dogs, monkeys, elephants, parrots, cats and even horses* can devise unpleasant acts of revenge on those who have wronged them. That's bordering on the outer fringes of badness, but doesn't approach anywhere close to evil.
I think it's a long, long, jagged spectrum.
*This is anecdotal among horse-handlers; I don't know whether it has scientific backing.
I personally only know of one example: a thoroughbred who always managed to step on a particular rider's foot. That groom was known to be rough with the horses; our trainer warned him several times before he was finally let go. And that horse - Francolin, a calm 8-year-old - never stepped on my foot, or any other stable-hand's that I'm aware of.
When you stand at a scenic lookout, are you really describing the vista to yourself in sentences - or do your eyes and mind take it in and transcribe it later - maybe only a few seconds later? Do you look at a painting or hear a concerto in words?
I love this!!
often enough, we try to transcribe the experience into words. it is never successful. But, surely, there is some kind of thinking involved in the experience itself. And particularly with the painting and concerto, since very specific thinking is involved during the creation.
And yes, We create the very concept of evil. That's my point.
Patterner
So do we create the concept of a threat? Or a llama?
We show that we have understood a concept by the way we behave. Our linguistic behaviour is the quickest and most accurate (but not absolutely accurate) way of showing what understanding we have, but our non-linguistic behaviour does also show that understanding. There can be ambiguity in both llinghistic and non-linguistic behaviour. But many of them (maybe all) can, in principle, be cleared up on further investigation.
Whether "threat" or "bad" or "evil" is the best way of describing the llamas' behaviour is simply not clear from the information we have. Any of them would be a reasonable explanation for what we know. We would need a good deal more information to clarify that.
You seem to be wanting to get inside the heads of the llamas. We don't need to get inside the head of anyone, animal or not. That's just as well, because it's not possible to get inside anyone's head.
A wolf is a threat to a llama, no question about it. But if every such threat is evil, then the world is [I]filled[/I] with evil, and has been since before humans came on the scene.
Is that right? Has the world been filled with evil since before humans came on the scene?
It seems to me that abstract thought, thought about generalities may be impossible without language.
Janus
Well, Pavlov's dogs were capable of generalizing from the bell ringing yesterday before food to the bell is ringing to-day, so there will be food. "Abstract thought", to me, means something different. Mathematics is abstract thought, because it is about abstract objects.
I missed this one. I wasn't suggesting that abstract thought and generalities are in every sense the same. All our abstract thoughts are about generalities but generalizing in the primordial sense I would say consists in recognition of concrete pattern recurrence and animals can certainly do that.
I very much wish I knew one of these people, so I could talk with them and ask many questions.
I encountered someone once who told me that he thought in images. Specifically, when he was packing a suitcase, he would lay out everything he was taking and visualize how they could be placed in the suitcase. When he had a satisfactory visualization, he would pack the suitcase. He said it worked. I was sceptical, but had no ground for arguing with him. I think it is possible. There's been some empirical work on this in psychology, and it seems that some people say they never think in images, but many say they do, at least sometimes.
but generalizing in the primordial sense I would say consists in recognition of concrete pattern recurrence and animals can certainly do that.
I've never heard of a "primordial" sense of "generalization". Could you explain, please? I'm particularly interested in understanding the difference between pattern recognition and generalization.
You seem to think that "threat", "bad" and "evil" are all on the same scale, rather like "good", "better", "best". It's more complicated than that. I do think that any threat to me or people that I approve of is a bad thing. Don't you? The difference is that there are other things that are bad, but no threat can be a good thing, when it is a threat to bad person. Evil is a superlative for bad, with moral and perhaps religious overtones.
I'm not sure about that. If I am calculating 23 x 254, I am thinking about specific numbers, not generalizing about them. If I am thinking about the Olympic ideal of sport, I am not thinking about Olympics or sport in general. The perfect circle is abstract and quite different from not circles in general.
But if every such threat is evil, then the world is filled with evil, and has been since before humans came on the scene.
That seems to imply that some threats are good - or maybe neutral. But surely such threats would be a promise, if good, and neither here not there if neutral.
I've never heard of a "primordial" sense of "generalization". Could you explain, please? I'm particularly interested in understanding the difference between pattern recognition and generalization.
You seem to think that "threat", "bad" and "evil" are all on the same scale, rather like "good", "better", "best". It's more complicated than that. I do think that any threat to me or people that I approve of is a bad thing. Don't you? The difference is that there are other things that are bad, but no threat can be a good thing, when it is a threat to bad person. Evil is a superlative for bad, with moral and perhaps religious overtones.
By "primordial" I mean generalization in the non-linguistic, non-abstractive sense. Think of painting as an analogy. A representational paining is not abstract because it is an image which shares the patterns of its subject such that they are recognizable. A representational paining is however a kind of generalization on account of its resemblance to its subject. An abstract painting is non-representational in the sense that it doesn't represent anything and if it evokes anything then it is a generalization in a symbolic sense.
So, I would say words are abstract in this sense because they do not resemble the generalities they stand for. Ditto for numbers.
I haven't said or implied that "threat" and "bad" and "evil" are "on the same scale" (whatever that might mean). Animals avoid what might injure them, just as we do. I don't imagine that they think in terms of "threat" or "bad" or "evil". I think to think they do would be us projecting our own abstractive concepts
onto them.
I encountered someone once who told me that he thought in images. Specifically, when he was packing a suitcase, he would lay out everything he was taking and visualize how they could be placed in the suitcase. When he had a satisfactory visualization, he would pack the suitcase. He said it worked. I was sceptical, but had no ground for arguing with him. I think it is possible. There's been some empirical work on this in psychology, and it seems that some people say they never think in images, but many say they do, at least sometimes.
That makes sense. For certain things/in certain situations, like packing a suitcase, i would think thinking in words would be a hindrance.
If I can't find my wallet, I think back to the last time I remember having it, then replay as much of what I've done since then, and hope to remember enough detail to "see" where I left it. I do that in images, not words.
I was thinking there are people who claim they [I]never[/I] think in words. If there are such people, I would like to know how they have conversations.
But if every such threat is evil, then the world is filled with evil, and has been since before humans came on the scene.
Patterner
That seems to imply that some threats are good - or maybe neutral. But surely such threats would be a promise, if good, and neither here not there if neutral.
I don't think a wolf bringing down prey is more evil than an avalanche burying the same victim. I think there needs to be malicious internet for evil to be present. And that means humans.
But, surely, there is some kind of thinking involved in the experience itself. And particularly with the painting and concerto, since very specific thinking is involved during the creation.
I believe we think on several levels and several ways at the same time. The multi-chambered mind allows us to process input, store it in short-term memory, translate it into numbers, words, musical notation, symbols and picto- or videograms and cross-reference it, for storage in various compartments of long-term memory archive, whence it can be retrieved using any of several reference keys (voluntary) or automatic flags (involuntary).
Synesthetics may be able to access a musical score through the weave of a Harris tweed (note-colour association is fairly common) or an equation by locating the terms in space .
We also mix memory, emotion, prejudice and involuntary associations in with our conscious thinking.
It's never simple and pure; and it's - I hesitate to say never, so will settle for seldom - wholly rational.
I was thinking there are people who claim they never think in words. If there are such people, I would like to know how they have conversations.
I'm skeptical myself. I suspect it's a combination, like an illustrated narrative.
That claim reminds me of an absurd STNG episode, wherein Picard had to communicate with an alien whose entire language was made up of analogies and references to legend. Yet they had space travel. How the hell did anyone say "Hand me that spanner, will you?"
By "primordial" I mean generalization in the non-linguistic, non-abstractive sense. Think of painting as an analogy. A representational paining is not abstract because it is an image which shares the patterns of its subject such that they are recognizable. A representational paining is however a kind of generalization on account of its resemblance to its subject. An abstract painting is non-representational in the sense that it doesn't represent anything and if it evokes anything then it is a generalization in a symbolic sense.
So, I would say words are abstract in this sense because they do not resemble the generalities they stand for. Ditto for numbers.
Broad agreement. It occurs to me that it might be helpful to say that a generalization is a quantification over a domain, while an abstraction can be referred to hence hence be a member of a domain. (My understanding of logic is limited, so my language may not be accurate.) I'm thinking of "to be is to be the value of a variable". Another way of putting it might be to say that it makes (some) sense to say that abstractions exist, whereas generalizations do not necessarily assert the existence of anything.
Animals avoid what might injure them, just as we do. I don't imagine that they think in terms of "threat" or "bad" or "evil". I think to think they do would be us projecting our own abstractive concepts onto them.
This is puzzling. "Animal avoid what might injure them, just as we do" is applying/projecting our concepts to/onto them. When we describe anything, we apply our concepts to it. That is the same as projecting our concepts on to it, except that "project" implies disapproval.
If I can't find my wallet, I think back to the last time I remember having it, then replay as much of what I've done since then, and hope to remember enough detail to "see" where I left it. I do that in images, not words.
I don't think a wolf bringing down prey is more evil than an avalanche burying the same victim. I think there needs to be malicious internet for evil to be present. And that means humans.
Well, the intentions of the wolves are clear enough. Whether their intentions count as malicious is debateable and I rather suspect that the wolves and the llamas have different views on that.
I believe we think on several levels and several ways at the same time. The multi-chambered mind allows us to process input, store it in short-term memory, translate it into numbers, words, musical notation, symbols and picto- or videograms and cross-reference it, for storage in various compartments of long-term memory archive, whence it can be retrieved using any of several reference keys (voluntary) or automatic flags (involuntary).
Yes, thinking is very complicated and polymorphous. I would hate to have to try to define it. But people often do think of it as primarily internal speech. The catch is that what I say to myself silently in my head, can be said in the usual way.
We also mix memory, emotion, prejudice and involuntary associations in with our conscious thinking.
It's never simple and pure; and it's - I hesitate to say never, so will settle for seldom - wholly rational.
Yes. We have all ignored the difference between theoretical reason and practical reason. The difference is that values are integral to practical reason. So, in one sense, reason requires a non-rational starting-point. Insofar as theoretical reason is also an activity, even that requires some values as a starting-point.
If I look up the time of the next train on the company web-site (which I have chosen because there is good reason to trust it) and tell everyone that the next train is at 12:00 and the next train is at 12:00, I would claim that I knew the next train was at 12:00 and deny that I'm just parroting.
You have been able to access the internet and able to check the train time. Somehow it doesn't give impression you were thinking rationally for that act. From the statement, you are just a bloke who can access the internet homepage, get on to the train company web site, and check the time for the train, which is an act of typical ordinary people.
You still haven't provided the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs, if you had one.
If I can't find my wallet, I think back to the last time I remember having it, then replay as much of what I've done since then, and hope to remember enough detail to "see" where I left it. I do that in images, not words.
Patterner
I do the same thing, but in words, not images.
That's fascinating. If the last time I'm sure I had my wallet was at the register in the grocery store, I'll picture taking my debit card out of the keypad, and try to see exactly what I did with it. Put it in my wallet? Then what? Did I put my wallet into my pocket? Jacket or pants? Did I put the wallet down and bag some groceries? Did I put my wallet [I]into[/I] a bag that I was packing? Did the cashier say or do anything to distract me? If so, was it before I put my wallet into my pocket? On and on. But always picturing the scene. I'll usually close my eyes, so what's in front of me doesn't distract me.
Reply to Ludwig V
Very interesting. I wouldn't know if I put it in a pocket, or wherever, if I didn't visualize. I wouldn't even know how to approach the problem.
It occurs to me that it might be helpful to say that a generalization is a quantification over a domain, while an abstraction can be referred to hence hence be a member of a domain. (My understanding of logic is limited, so my language may not be accurate.) I'm thinking of "to be is to be the value of a variable". Another way of putting it might be to say that it makes (some) sense to say that abstractions exist, whereas generalizations do not necessarily assert the existence of anything.
My understanding of formal logic is probably more limited than yours. When you say that a generalization is a quantification over a domain I'm not sure exactly what that means. Would it be the same as saying that a generalization is a name of a category?
If so would generalizations not exist as names (or quantifications)? And do they not assert the existence of similarities that constrain the ways we categorize?
This is puzzling. "Animal avoid what might injure them, just as we do" is applying/projecting our concepts to/onto them. When we describe anything, we apply our concepts to it. That is the same as projecting our concepts on to it, except that "project" implies disapproval.
I think we can observe animals avoiding dangerthings they presumably feel to be threatening. I am not suggesting that animals think precisely in terms of 'avoidance' or 'threat' or 'danger' as those are linguistically generated concepts.
I think we can observe animals avoiding dangerthings they presumably feel to be threatening. I am not suggesting that animals think precisely in terms of 'avoidance' or 'threat' or 'danger' as those are linguistically generated concepts.
How is danger a linguistically generated concept? Dangers have been around as long as living organisms have been around, but human language is only about 200,000 years old. We ran from predators and went around swamps millions of years before we were human. If danger were not a real thing in the world, why would we have made a word (actually, many words) for it. Where would we ever have got the linguistic idea in the first place? You can do something sensible without talking about it.
How is danger a linguistically generated concept? Dangers have been around as long as living organisms have been around, but human language is only about 200,000 years old. We ran from predators and went around swamps millions of years before we were human. If danger were not a real thing in the world, why would we have made a word (actually, many words) for it. Where would we ever have got the linguistic idea in the first place? You can do something sensible without talking about it.
As I said animals can feel threatened. My point was simply that they don't think in terms of the word 'danger'. Of course I don't deny that there is a prelinguistic sense or affect that such words as 'danger' or 'threat' refer to. How would we know what the words mean if we had no experience of such affects?
Reply to Patterner
I think what's going on is different approaches to the problem. Neither of us can remember where we put our wallet. You try to prompt your memory. I don't. When I'm at a cash desk, the range of possibilities is limited, so I just start checking them all. That's not so clever when I'm at home, so I will recover my last memory of having it and then retrace my steps (which I also have to remember) until I find it.
My understanding of formal logic is probably more limited than yours. When you say that a generalization is a quantification over a domain I'm not sure exactly what that means. Would it be the same as saying that a generalization is a name of a category?
Well, generalizations are a class of statements with a specific logical form. The line between categories and classes is pretty blurred. I could work with either.
The logical form of generalizations is "For all natural numbers n, 2xn = n+n". This contrasts with "For some (i.e. at least one) natural number(s) n, n×n = 25". This is called existential quantification because it presupposes that numbers exist. (If there are no numbers, universal quantification is true - paradoxical, but the point is that if no numbers existed, then there is no counter-example.)
So generalizations and statements about abstract objects have different logical forms and hence different meanings. Quoting Janus
If so would generalizations not exist as names (or quantifications)? And do they not assert the existence of similarities that constrain the ways we categorize?
Generalizations are universal quantifications but not existential quantifications. They do not refer to specific individual things, so they do not name anything. It is the difference between "Human beings are moral" and "Socrates is mortal". Think of it as the difference between talking about a class/category and talking about a member of a class/category. Similarities and differences are involved in both, but they are similarities and differences at different levels.
Does that help?
I think we can observe animals avoiding dangerthings they presumably feel to be threatening. I am not suggesting that animals think precisely in terms of 'avoidance' or 'threat' or 'danger' as those are linguistically generated concepts.
As I said animals can feel threatened. My point was simply that they don't think in terms of the word 'danger'. Of course I don't deny that there is a pre-linguistic sense or affect that such words as 'danger' or 'threat' refer to. How would we know what the words mean if we had no experience of such affects?
"Danger" and "threat" are words. Animals that don't speak human languages don't use words. Danger and threat are concepts, and as such involve more than uttering words. They also involve actions in the world. There are are certain behaviour patterns that are built in to these concepts. When we see animals displaying those behaviour patterns, there should be no problem whatever in applying those concepts to them.
When we come to the question which exact concepts apply in specific cases, it is not an at all unusual to find that there is a range of possibilities. In the case of the llamas, their behaviour is compatible with danger, threat, bad, evil. It may well be that with more information, more examples, we might be able to find behaviour patterns that enable us to distinguish between them. We also might not. But the mere fact that there are a range of possibilities in a single case which we cannot conclusively distinguish between is not particularly surprising or important.
I don't see that what is going on in the llamas' heads is particularly important. It is this behaviour pattern in the context of their overall lives that we are trying to explain.
The ground for my rational thinking or beliefs is the training and education that I got in my youth.
Sorry I don't see a logical link between the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs and the training and education in your youth. Could you elaborate further?
When I'm at a cash desk, the range of possibilities is limited, so I just start checking them all.
We maybe talking about different things. This sentence makes it sound as though you are physically checking the pockets. I'm talking about sometime later, possibly several days. (So, it might not be a wallet, since I would probably notice that was missing much sooner.) I can't physically check every possible place where something might have been left between the last time I know I had it and now. So I think back to that last time I had it, and start visualizing everything that I can from that point forward.
The ground for my rational thinking or beliefs is the training and education that I got in my youth.
Ludwig V
Sorry I don't see a logical link between the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs and the training and education in your youth. Could you elaborate further?
Can you give any examples of what might constitute a ground for someone's rational thinking or beliefs?
Sorry I don't see a logical link between the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs and the training and education in your youth. Could you elaborate further?
I was taught to drive a car. Hence, I can drive a car.
I was taught to think rationally. Hence, I can think rationally.
I would be grateful if you would explain to me what you mean by "ground".
I am looking forward to see what you might have to say in reply to @Patterner's question.
We maybe talking about different things. This sentence makes it sound as though you are physically checking the pockets. I'm talking about sometime later, possibly several days. (So, it might not be a wallet, since I would probably notice that was missing much sooner.) I can't physically check every possible place where something might have been left between the last time I know I had it and now. So I think back to that last time I had it, and start visualizing everything that I can from that point forward.
That is indeed different from the situation I was thinking of; yours is a much longer-term problem. In that case, you are adopting the same approach as me, excepting that I don't visualize.
schopenhauer1October 15, 2024 at 12:22#9398200 likes
Doesnt ground mean some sort of cognitive capacity? Learning to use this capacity, and having this capacity in the first place are two different things. There seems to be a debate as to how modular our cognitive systems are. Is the brain a general processor or does it have domains? If it has domains does rational thinking count as a domain- a specialized brain/cognitive capacity? A dog solving a puzzle and a human inferencing- is that the same capacity/region or two similar but different capacities?
That is indeed different from the situation I was thinking of; yours is a much longer-term problem. In that case, you are adopting the same approach as me, excepting that I don't visualize.
How do you approach this without visualizing? I will picture in my mind my exact movements, to whatever degree I'm able to remember, like trying to watch a movie of the events.
When we see animals displaying those behaviour patterns, there should be no problem whatever in applying those concepts to them.
When we come to the question which exact concepts apply in specific cases, it is not an at all unusual to find that there is a range of possibilities.
Would this not also be true of observed human behaviours?
I was taught to drive a car. Hence, I can drive a car.
I was taught to think rationally. Hence, I can think rationally.
I would be grateful if you would explain to me what you mean by "ground".
I have an impression that you are in confusion between skills, capabilities in problem solving with rational thinking.
Ground for rational thinking is, when you are faced with question to justify why your beliefs or thoughts were rational. You should be able to give explanation on your thoughts or beliefs in logical and objective way. If it was rational to you, then it must be rational to the whole universe. Not just to you. That is what being rational means.
How do you approach this without visualizing? I will picture in my mind my exact movements, to whatever degree I'm able to remember, like trying to watch a movie of the events.
Surely it is possible to remember a sequence of events without visualizing them? Actually, for me, it's not a choice. The sequence of events since I last had it occurs to me without pictures.
Ground for rational thinking is, when you are faced with question to justify why your beliefs or thoughts were rational.
Do you mean something like?
How did you know the train was coming at 12:00?
Because the company's web-site said so.
Why do you believe what the company's web-site says?
Because it is almost always accurate.
Why do you believe it is almost always accurate?
Because I and many others have used it in the past.
Why do you believe that its accuracy in the past means that it is accurate now?.
Because I am rational.
Why are you rational?
Because it is the best way to get to the truth.
Why is it the best way to get to the truth?
?
All justifications end in "groundless grounds".
Surely it is possible to remember a sequence of events without visualizing them? Actually, for me, it's not a choice. The sequence of events since I last had it occurs to me without pictures.
I don't know. it never occurred to me to try. I just automatically start visualizing the events. I don't know how I would do it. Lol. "Ok, after I paid, I put the card back in my wallet. When it was in my wallet, I put it in my back pocket. I grabbed my bags, a couple in each hand, and walked to the car. I opened the car door, put the bags in, took my wallet out and threw it on the passenger seat. I don't remember taking it off the seat when I took the groceries in. AH!! Maybe it fell between the seat and the door!"
How would I know I did those things if I wasn't picturing the sequence of events in my head??
Doesnt ground mean some sort of cognitive capacity? Learning to use this capacity, and having this capacity in the first place are two different things. There seems to be a debate as to how modular our cognitive systems are. Is the brain a general processor or does it have domains? If it has domains does rational thinking count as a domain- a specialized brain/cognitive capacity? A dog solving a puzzle and a human inferencing- is that the same capacity/region or two similar but different capacities?
I don't know the answers to most of those questions. Yes, I do think that being able to justify one's beliefs (and act on them) is an important cognitive capacity.
I'm thinking maybe the capacity to think rationally is hardwired in. But we must learn how it works.
In the end, it will not be for philosophers to decide what is "hard-wired in". But I'm inclined to think that what we call rationality is mostly learned by shaping the basic reflexes. For example, (as I understand it), babies are born with a reflex to seek mild and drink, to smile back at a smiling face. Both these activities seem to give them pleasure and the lack of them - or at least the lack of the former - gives them "pain". So a few reflexes, pleasure and pain, plus the ability to notice and remember what is associated with what (behaviourists were not complete idiots) are probably all that is needed. The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure. Then there's all the learning from those around us, including what counts as success/failure.
How would I know I did those things if I wasn't picturing the sequence of events in my head??
Well, you may have written that list by describing your visualations. But if you can remember what was on the list (in words), then you can also write it without. But perhaps it's just how one's memory works.
I don't know. it never occurred to me to try. I just automatically start visualizing the events. I don't know how I would do it. Lol.
Most of our memories just come when we want them. "Trying to remember" is possible, though I don't find that I know exactly what I do when I'm trying or even succeeding. It just happens - or not.
What is really weird is that I've noticed that sometimes I know that I've remembered before I've remembered the details.
The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure. Then there's all the learning from those around us, including what counts as success/failure.
But therr are irrational proper. I wonder how many different reasons there are for that. The baby's brain grows/is wired as those things are happening, because that's what the DNA designed it to do. What if it gets no interaction? Does the brain wire badly? Does a time come when it is too late for things to work out well, no matter what happens? And what about irrational people who got the interaction that works best in the vast majority of cases?
What is really weird is that I've noticed that sometimes I know that I've remembered before I've remembered the details.
Sure. I don't have to sing Hey Jude to know I know all the words, or recite my children's birth dates and Social Security numbers to knows I know them.
What if you're all alone on a desert island, building a shelter, foraging for food, making tool and working on an effective SOS signal, and there is nobody to demand an explanation of why you're doing these things? Are you irrational then? Quoting Ludwig V
Sorry I wasn't clear. I think that's implicit in what I said - indeed it is the justification for what I said. I should have said so upfront.
Not disagreeing; amplifying. People can be seen to act rationally even when they don't explain their motivations and sources of information. When you see someone doing the very same thing you would do in their circumstances, it's reasonable to assume they're thinking the same way. Sometimes we may be wrong, and alternate explanations might be given (Like Dortmunder telling the judge when he was caught with a television in his arms that he wasn't stealing it; he had interrupted the real thief and was putting it back.) but it would still be reasonable to start with the most obvious explanation until we know more facts.
Most of our memories just come when we want them. "Trying to remember" is possible, though I don't find that I know exactly what I do when I'm trying or even succeeding. It just happens - or not.
I wish I could remember the tv show I saw one time, lo these many years ago. Sadly, decades. One charter told another that she could remember much greater detail if she tried to walk through it slowly, step by step. That's why I do it the way I do. Only a few days, before any memories fade away. I start with a detail that I remember well. Then I move forward. As slowly as I can. When I do that, I remember little things you wouldn't normally. Glance over because someone coughed, and notice their blue shirt. You never know what you'll dredge up.
Reply to Vera Mont
Ludwig said, "The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure."
If you try to build your hut's support beams out of jellyfish, Shaka, when the walls fell. If you think rationally, you'll try something else. If you are a poor swimer, it would be irrational to try to swim home. You don't have to attempt to explain anything to anybody.
One charter told another that she could remember much greater detail if she tried to walk through it slowly, step by step.
I recently saw a documentary about Australian natives constructing mental maps in that way. The person who doesn't know the way is escorted along the route and told at certain intervals to make note of some feature of the landscape. Then they would walk the route in their head, recalling the sequence of features.
When I lose things - more often every week, it seems - I do the same thing: try to retrace my steps internally, and then see if I can follow the same sequence of things I noticed when i was carrying the flashlight or eyeglasses (the two most AWOL-prone objects in my household).
Do you mean something like?
How did you know the train was coming at 12:00?
Because the company's web-site said so.
Why do you believe what the company's web-site says?
Because it is almost always accurate.
Why do you believe it is almost always accurate?
Because I and many others have used it in the past.
Why do you believe that its accuracy in the past means that it is accurate now?.
Because I am rational.
Why are you rational?
Because it is the best way to get to the truth.
Why is it the best way to get to the truth?
?
All justifications end in "groundless grounds".
It sounds like you are just checking and confirming with yourself what you see on the web site.
You may think that your blind faith of the accuracy of the web site is based on the past record of the accuracy on the information of the website, therefore you were doing an inductive reasoning. But it is still a blind faith on the info. because you have not made any scientific observations on the past events. Plus there is nothing scientific about the accuracy of the train time shown on the website, why it has to be the info, and not otherwise. There is nothing to think any further, why the info has the contents it has apart from it is just there for you to see.
Plus there are many possible chance the web site info might not be correct. Therefore it is not a rational thinking. It is just daily habitual acts of reading and confirming the info. There is nothing rational thinking involved in that process.
I didn't say it is I said 'danger' is a linguistically generated concept. Its a generalization and I doubt animals have a generalized conceptual notion we could refer as 'danger'. That said, how could we know either way? So we are merely working with what seems most plausible, and plausibility is in the final analysis in the eye of the beholder.
So generalizations and statements about abstract objects have different logical forms and hence different meanings.
If you are treating abstract objects as particulars then yes. My point was that numbers are themselves generalizations. There are countless instantiations of 'two' just as there are of 'tree' or 'animal'.
They do not refer to specific individual things, so they do not name anything.
Here I disagree again. 'Tree' does not name a particular thing but a particular category or class of things. 'Two' does not name a particular pair of things but names a particular quantity of things.
I don't see that what is going on in the llamas' heads is particularly important. It is this behaviour pattern in the context of their overall lives that we are trying to explain.
Insofar as we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads apart from observing their behavior and body language I agree. On the other hand we via reflection on our own experience can notice the affects (such as fear for example) that our emotive words refer to and since there seems to be a commonality of body language across at least some species we can speculate about other animals experience.
creativesoulOctober 15, 2024 at 23:55#9400230 likes
Yes. I was just expanding the scope of what counts as being rational to include more than just the ability to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information.
creativesoul
Yes, I would agree there's more to it than that. It is not rational to drop many different pairs of different objects from many different heights, and come out of it thinking heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. That would be an inability to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information..
Whether or not it is rational to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones depends upon the individual's preexisting worldview.
Feathers. Bowling balls. Snowflakes. Leaves. Limbs. Trees. We can watch many different things fall through space. Watching many different things fall through space leads one to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Watching heavier objects traverse the same distance in less time than lighter ones is something that can be fully experienced by any creature capable of judging the travel speed(fall rate) variety of external objects relative to each other, a fixed object, from the creature's own vantage point.
One can only formulate beliefs about beliefs (recursion or meta-beliefs) in language. Though I would distinguish between formulating beliefs about one's own beliefs and formulating beliefs about other people's beliefs. The former seems to me problematic, because the recursion seems infinite and, in the end, empty, whereas the latter seems an everyday occurrence. (There's research in psychology about how and when small children become aware of other people's state of mind - empathy).
Ludwig V
There's a big difference between formulating beliefs about beliefs and thinking about beliefs. Small children do not formulate beliefs about beliefs.
Formulating beliefs requires language. Acquiring them does not always. I do not find the invocation and use of the term "formulating" helpful. "Forming" snuggles the world. Formulating and articulating one's own thought and belief presupposes language use. Prior to formulation and articulation comes what both of those concepts presuppose. Something to formulate. Something to articulate.
Pre-existing meaningful experience consisting of thought and belief about the world and oneself.
Human thought, belief, and experience existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it.
One can believe that touching fire hurts long before ever being able to articulate that. We're looking for some basic set of common denominators/elements shared between all cases of language less thought and/or belief. That basic foundation must also be shared by ourselves. Tacit reasoning spans the bridge between language less thought and belief and linguistically informed and/or articulated thought and belief. That's an interesting avenue.
Tacit and articulate reasoning overlap one another. Articulate reasoning consists - in very large part - of language use. Language less creatures have none. Language less creatures cannot form, have, and/or hold articulate reasoning. Yet they can learn that touching fire hurts by recognizing/attributing causality. They can learn to use a stick to eat ants/termites. They can watch and learn how lifting the handle opens the gate. They can learn to greet by partaking in such practices(by doing it). One greeting another often and regularly enough amounts to ritual. Clearly, there is no language necessary for basic notions of rational thinking. Or... learning how to open a gate by observation and practice does not count as rational thinking.
That sort of understanding becomes tacit to us. We do not express our wanting to use the gate hardly ever after learning how to use it. I'm not sure how the notions of "tacit" and "articulate" are adequate tools for acquiring knowledge of that which existed in its entirety prior to our knowledge of it.
We are in dire need of a criterion.
creativesoulOctober 16, 2024 at 00:14#9400290 likes
Yes, rationality includes more than differentiating between accurate/inaccurate information. I was making that case.
creativesoul
Yes. But it does include differentiating between accurate and inaccurate information, doesn't it?
I'm not fond of "information". It smuggles meaning.
There are all sorts of language less creatures(creatures devoid of naming and description practices) capable of differentiating between distal objects. Again, I'm not fond of invoking some notion of "information". That's adding complexity. I'd rather excise the unnecessary and unhelpful approaches to the topic.
Not all differentiation between accurate and inaccurate information requires articulated reason/thought.
creativesoulOctober 16, 2024 at 00:28#9400330 likes
...we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads apart from observing their behavior and body language...
That's not true. We can know quite a bit about how biological minds work. It dovetails with knowledge about how all things become meaningful. How statements become true/false. How we can preserve truth with timestamping, etc. I wouldn't talk about thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience in terms of "what goes on in the head". It works from emaciated notions of all three.
creativesoulOctober 16, 2024 at 00:32#9400340 likes
Some people say that they think in images. That would be independent of language.
Ludwig V
I very much wish I knew one of these people, so I could talk with them and ask many questions.
That's not true. We can know quite a bit about how biological minds work. It dovetails with knowledge about how all things become meaningful. How statements become true/false. How we can preserve truth with timestamping, etc. I wouldn't talk about thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience in terms of "what goes on in the head". It works from emaciated notions of all three.
You might know what goes on in your head via introspection. You won't know what goes in mine except I tell you truthfully and presuming I know myself. We can get a fairly good idea about what animals feel from their behavior and body language, or at least so it seems. We have no access to the inner workings of their minds. It's even questionable how much access we have to our own.
creativesoulOctober 16, 2024 at 00:43#9400420 likes
You won't know what goes in mine except I tell you truthfully
That's not at all true either Janus. I know beyond all doubt that you're drawing correlations between the words we use and all sorts of other things, including how the activity itself[hide="Reveal"](the fact that we're discussing whether or not we can know something about animal minds aside from our own)[/hide] is affecting you.
It's a matter of precision you're after, I suspect. In that case, I still disagree. I've been involved in conversation with someone embroiled in unsettled emotional turmoil who really believed that they were not.
That's not at all true either Janus. I know beyond all doubt that you're drawing correlations between the words we use and all sorts of other things, including how the activity itself is affecting you.
That is nothing more than a generalized notion of how minds work. It gives you no specific knowledge of what is going on in the minds of other humans, much less animals.
creativesoulOctober 16, 2024 at 00:53#9400480 likes
That's not at all true either Janus. I know beyond all doubt that you're drawing correlations between the words we use and all sorts of other things, including how the activity itself is affecting you.
creativesoul
That is nothing more than a generalized notion of how minds work. It gives you no specific knowledge of what is going on in the minds of other humans, much less animals.
As if a universal criterion is a bad thing? We can know that a cat believes that there is a mouse under the cabinet. We can know that the cat's belief is meaningful to the cat. We can know that all meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature having it. There are all sorts of things we can know about animal minds Janus.
We can know that our own meaningful experience began long before we talked about it.
In order to know one is projecting human thought onto creatures incapable of forming, having, and/or holding such thought, one must know what the differences are between them such that they can know that the one is incapable of forming, having, and/or holding the others' thought, belief, meaningful experience.
Reply to creativesoul I haven't disagreed that we can make generalized conjectures about how human and animal minds work.
The point is we have no way of testing such conjectures and nothing to rely on but the imprecise subjective criterion of plausibility in our judgements of their soundness.
You have offered nothing that I didnt already know and nothing that would provide grounds for me to revise my understanding of our epistemic situation regarding other minds.
Its a generalization and I doubt animals have a generalized conceptual notion we could refer as 'danger'.
Then what do the sentries outside meerkat burrows, groundhog colonies, wild goose nesting grounds and rookeries shout when a hawk or kestrel or coyote or fox or cheetah or snapping turtle is spotted? Quoting Janus
So we are merely working with what seems most plausible, and plausibility is in the final analysis in the eye of the beholder.
As in all learning, yes, until a more complete answer, one that fits more criteria, becomes available.
Then what do the sentries outside meerkat burrows, groundhog colonies, wild goose nesting grounds and rookeries shout when a hawk or kestrel or coyote or fox or cheetah or snapping turtle is spotted?
I understand animal warning cries to be signaling, not symbolizing, danger. I have acknowledged that I believe animals sense danger. I'm not sure what you think we are disagreeing about.
What if it gets no interaction? Does the brain wire badly? Does a time come when it is too late for things to work out well, no matter what happens? And what about irrational people who got the interaction that works best in the vast majority of cases?
Your first three questions are empirical, not philosophical. My understanding is that there is empirical evidence that there are "windows" when the brain learns certain things particularly fast. If that window is missed for any reason, it will be difficult to impossible to learn it later. Examples are ducklings learning who is mum. They will fasten on the first large moving object they see and follow it faithfully until they are grown. Konrad Lorenz famously got one brood to imprint on him. That can't be changed, I believe. Another example is language learning in humans. If a baby doesn't get sufficient human interaction between specific ages, it till be very difficult to learn language later in life.
As to irrational people, We are all a mixture. More than that, rationality can't get going without some pre-rational starting-point. In any case, it seems to me that it is not really appropriate to call a new-born baby rational or irrational. Rationality develops quite slowly and I wouldn't say there was a threshold point between the two. Sadly, it also declines ln old age, but also slowly.
Not disagreeing; amplifying. People can be seen to act rationally even when they don't explain their motivations and sources of information. When you see someone doing the very same thing you would do in their circumstances, it's reasonable to assume they're thinking the same way.
OK. You are indeed perfectly right. Dortmunder :lol:
Its a generalization and I doubt animals have a generalized conceptual notion we could refer as 'danger'.
Janus
Then what do the sentries outside meerkat burrows, groundhog colonies, wild goose nesting grounds and rookeries shout when a hawk or kestrel or coyote or fox or cheetah or snapping turtle is spotted?
"Our" concept of danger includes appropriate reaction to it. When animals exhibit similar behaviour in similar circumstances there's no good reason to withhold applying the concept to it. Apart from anything else, it enables us to understand what's going on - and that is the point of the exercise. But it is fair enough to say that any application need to be considered in the context of the overall patterns of behaviour that they exhibit. One case doesn't give us much insight, but each case contributes to our insight.
Plus there is nothing scientific about the accuracy of the train time shown on the website, why it has to be the info, and not otherwise.
I see. The only knowledge is scientific knowledge, which excludes second-hand knowledge. But science is only possible because research starts on the basis of the results of previous research, and no-one is expected to repeat all that work for themselves. Newton standing on the shoulders of giants. Moreover, in order to do experiments, read texts, discuss ideas and results, they have to rely on common sense and common knowledge.
I have caught the 7:00 train every working day for the last 5 years. Standing on the platform at 6:55, I notice the signal changing. I have noticed that same event every time I have caught the train in the past. I expect the train to arrive shortly. I think that's inductive reasoning.
Shorlty after the signal changes, I hear a loudspeaker announcement that the train will arrive shortly. The same thing has happened every time in the past. I therefore believe the announcement. I think that's also inductive reasoning.
Yes, I do have blind faith in inductive reasoning, as Hume noticed. One has to start somewhere. One also has to risk being wrong in order to be right.
Watching many different things fall through space leads one to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones.
Careful! Things only fall through space at the same speed in a vacuum. Most people have never watched anything fall through space in a vacuum. Galileo certainly never did. His "proof" was a thought-experiment - or at least I understand that is the case.
Tacit and articulate reasoning overlap one another.
Yes. They interact as well. Our knowledge of language is mostly tacit, but we can articulate rules in various ways. Quoting creativesoul
I'm not sure how the notions of "tacit" and "articulate" are adequate tools for acquiring knowledge of that which existed in its entirety prior to our knowledge of it.
Quite so. There are only two (maybe three) ways that I'm aware of. One is the idea that tacit knowledge is exactly the same as articulate reasoning, but very fast. That's the traditional philosophical approach and has mostly fallen into disfavour. (Who says philosophy never makes progress?) Then there's the idea of "unconscious" reasoning and belief. There are very ancient roots of this idea, but the modern concept was developed in the 19th century. It was very like conscious reasoning and belief but was, by definition, not available to "introspection". The last one is the modern model of the information processing machine. This seems to ignore the question of tacit vs articulate reasoning and belief.
I don't think that the fact that the phenomenon existed long before we knew of it is necessarily a bar to our acquiring knowledge of it. After all, the same applies to most physics and chemistry. The real problem is that we have no way, at least at present, of getting empirical access to it.
since there seems to be a commonality of body language across at least some species we can speculate about other animals experience.
I do agree that there is a commonality of body language, and you are right to say "across at least some species". But describing our experience is no different from a gesture, a grimace or a smile or a wagging tail in terms of knowing what is going on in someone's head. If we can know what human beings are experience or thinking from their non-linguistic behaviour, why is it speculation to interpret that (ex hypothesi) animal behaviour in the same way. I can see no rational difference.
If you are treating abstract objects as particulars then yes. My point was that numbers are themselves generalizations.
For me, a generalization is a statement or proposition of the logical form I described. So you are missing the point. I am indeed "treating" abstract objects as particulars. So are you when you describe them as abstract objects.
We have no access to the inner workings of their minds. It's even questionable how much access we have to our own.
That's why I think it is a mistake to think that explaining animal actions has much to do with divining the inner workings of their minds. Mind you, I don't think that it is a determining factor in explaining human actions, either. It's more like interpreting a picture. Yes, sometimes we set out to divine the intentions of the artist, but not always. Sometimes it is just a question of seeing what is in the picture. (Puzzle pictures).
I understand animal warning cries to be signaling, not symbolizing, danger. I have acknowledged that I believe animals sense danger. I'm not sure what you think we are disagreeing about.
You seem to consider symbols important. I don't think it makes any difference to the concept whether there is a call, a word or a pictogram signifying 'danger', so long as the message is transmitted and received - i.e. the concept is shared within a species or a tribe: everybody ducks for cover to escape the danger, or flies up in dive-bombing formation to combat it.
I have caught the 7:00 train every working day for the last 5 years. Standing on the platform at 6:55, I notice the signal changing. I have noticed that same event every time I have caught the train in the past. I expect the train to arrive shortly. I think that's inductive reasoning.
Yes, it is an inductive reasoning. You have your knowledge based on your past observations on the events.
...we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads apart from observing their behavior and body language...
This is mistaken in more than one way. It is false.
We have more than one way of knowing what goes on in animal's heads. Observing behaviour can be one of those ways [hide="Reveal"]if and when we're testing hypothesis[/hide]. Attributing meaning to body language, another. Comparing observations with notions/hypothesis, yet one more. If one theory proves beyond a reasonable doubt that X is the case, and another theory depends upon the opposite, well...
...we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads...
That's false. It's also incomplete enough to be troublesome.
The point is we have no way of testing such conjectures and nothing to rely on but the imprecise subjective criterion of plausibility in our judgements of their soundness.
And yet, we are discussing what you claim we have no way of knowing about.
You have offered nothing that I didnt already know and nothing that would provide grounds for me to revise my understanding of our epistemic situation regarding other minds.
You are having a conversation about whether or not other animals can think rationally. How is that done if we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads?
Behavior alone is utterly inadequate. We are seeking knowledge of that which existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it. Meaningful experience prior to language.
We can know that language less thought and belief cannot include any language that is meaningful to the creature under consideration. Language is not meaningful to a language less creature. If doing X requires using language, the language less creatures cannot do X.
Thinking about one's own belief is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognition is existentially dependent upon common language/shared meaning.
Body language assessment suffers the issues of which you complain. Reading another's body language is to attribute meaning to the behavior.
Claiming to know how animals feel is unacceptable when accompanied by having no way of knowing what's in their mind.
creativesoulOctober 16, 2024 at 23:47#9403070 likes
We can know that a language less creature is incapable of metacognition. If doing Y requires metacognition, and creature 1 has no language, then we can know that creature 1 cannot do Y. If doing Y is required for achieving a goal, then creature 1 has no ability to achieve that goal.
Yada, yada, yada...
creativesoulOctober 17, 2024 at 00:16#9403100 likes
I see. The only knowledge is scientific knowledge, which excludes second-hand knowledge. But science is only possible because research starts on the basis of the results of previous research, and no-one is expected to repeat all that work for themselves. Newton standing on the shoulders of giants. Moreover, in order to do experiments, read texts, discuss ideas and results, they have to rely on common sense and common knowledge.
If Newton had been observing the apples falling from the trees to the ground without the scientific discovery, then it would have been just described as daily perception of an ordinary bloke. But he discovered the scientific principle from the observation, which made into the history.
The same could apply to your case. If you had discovered some ground breaking new scientific principle such as a possibility of time travel or something like that, from your observation of the train arriving at 7:00 everyday to your station platform, then it would have been a case of inductive reasoning. However, only thing you have observed in that exercise was that train arrives at 7:00 every day to your platform, which is just a trivial part of daily life of an ordinary bloke. Would anyone class the case as a rational thinking based on the inductive reasoning? I doubt it.
Inductive reasoning is a scientific method of applying our reasoning in forming the principles and theories from the observations, not daily ordinary habitual perceptions of general public.
I don't think it makes any difference to the concept whether there is a call, a word or a pictogram signifying 'danger', so long as the message is transmitted and received - i.e. the concept is shared within a species or a tribe: everybody ducks for cover to escape the danger, or flies up in dive-bombing formation to combat it.
I would go further than that. Let's distinguish the word "danger" and the concept of danger. Creatures that don't speak human-style languages don't have access to the word. But the concept is wider than speech. It involves the possibility of harm to oneself (and others) and appropriate reactions (fight or flight) to that possibility. None of that requires any understanding of human-style languages. What's more, the behavioural reactions are more important in the concept that the ability to articulate what we would understand as a sentence.
Hume said that inductive reasoning can be irrational. Therefore your reasoning on the train arrival time could be irrational.
Well, he didn't say exactly that. But the point that is usually made is that inductive reasoning can be wrong - which doesn't necessarily mean that it is irrational. Hume made two points in the light of his argument. The first was that we are going to go on using it even though it may be wrong and the second was that it was as much of a proof as you will ever get of how the world works, and even ends up (in the section on miracles) calling it a "proof, whole and entire".
We have more than one way of knowing what goes on in animal's heads. Observing behaviour can be one of those ways if and when we're testing hypothesis. Attributing meaning to body language, another. Comparing observations with notions/hypothesis, yet one more.
How is that done if we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads?
More than that, we also rely on observation of behaviour to know what's going on in each other's heads, as you suggest.
I'm afraid that there's a certain ambiguity going on here, and it's my fault. There's an ambiguity between the sense of "what's going on in X's head" in which observation of behaviour is a normal and reliable way of discovery and the "experiential" or phenomenological sense of what's going on in X's head." In that sense, we have no access at all to what's going on in anyone's head, because the only person who has access to it is X. (As in Mary's room or bats.) I don't think discovering the rationality of animals or humans is particularly closely connected to latter. Nagel thinks (unless I'm mistaken) that it is not possible.
Inductive reasoning is a scientific method of applying our reasoning in forming the principles and theories from the observations, not daily ordinary habitual perceptions of general public.
The story of Newton's apple is a bit more complicated than the popular summary. But apart from that, it seems pretty clear to me that Newton would not have made any inductive inference from one case. If he did, it would not be rational.
So John Doe and his friends and relations are not rational - ever? You set a high bar.
There is another problem. When Newton wanders in from his apple tree for afternoon tea and a gossip, does he cease being rational because he's behaving in an everyday way?
Perhaps we are all sometimes rational and sometimes not.
creativesoulOctober 18, 2024 at 01:34#9406200 likes
Watching many different things fall through space leads one to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones.
creativesoul
Careful! Things only fall through space at the same speed in a vacuum. Most people have never watched anything fall through space in a vacuum. Galileo certainly never did. His "proof" was a thought-experiment - or at least I understand that is the case.
Tacit and articulate reasoning overlap one another.
creativesoul
Yes. They interact as well. Our knowledge of language is mostly tacit, but we can articulate rules in various ways.
I'm not sure how the notions of "tacit" and "articulate" are adequate tools for acquiring knowledge of that which existed in its entirety prior to our knowledge of it.
creativesoul
Quite so. There are only two (maybe three) ways that I'm aware of. One is the idea that tacit knowledge is exactly the same as articulate reasoning, but very fast. That's the traditional philosophical approach and has mostly fallen into disfavour. (Who says philosophy never makes progress?) Then there's the idea of "unconscious" reasoning and belief. There are very ancient roots of this idea, but the modern concept was developed in the 19th century. It was very like conscious reasoning and belief but was, by definition, not available to "introspection". The last one is the modern model of the information processing machine. This seems to ignore the question of tacit vs articulate reasoning and belief.
I don't think that the fact that the phenomenon existed long before we knew of it is necessarily a bar to our acquiring knowledge of it. After all, the same applies to most physics and chemistry. The real problem is that we have no way, at least at present, of getting empirical access to it.
I'm working on a reply to this and what followed. Shows a bit of promise from where I sit, so to speak. Thanks.
Well, he didn't say exactly that. But the point that is usually made is that inductive reasoning can be wrong - which doesn't necessarily mean that it is irrational. Hume made two points in the light of his argument. The first was that we are going to go on using it even though it may be wrong and the second was that it was as much of a proof as you will ever get of how the world works, and even ends up (in the section on miracles) calling it a "proof, whole and entire".
You got it wrong again. Hume was not concerned on the fact that inductive reasoning can be wrong. What he was saying was that, "there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience." (A Treatise, Hume).
You have been seeing the train arriving at the train station at 7:00 every morning for last x number of years. That does not logically warrants you to expect the train will arrive at 7:00 next morning. There is "no demonstrative arguments to prove."
It is not about right or wrong on the inductive reasoning, but isn't it about lack of logical or rational ground in the reasoning Hume was pointing out?
Hume was not concerned on the fact that inductive reasoning can be wrong. What he was saying was that, "there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience." (A Treatise, Hume).
Oh, so now we are classifying as rational only what is proof against philosophical scepticism.
As to Hume, I suggest that the implication of there being no demonstrative argument is that one might be wrong - that's why everybody prefers demonstrative arguments. (Though it is possible to be wrong about even those.You are right, however, to interpret "demonstrative" as meaning conclusive and hence logical, in the strict sense. This is usually taken to mean sound by the standards of formal logic. Which makes almost the whole of humanity irrational.
But the devil is in the detail:-
Hume, Treatise, Pt II, Section XI, pg 124:Those philosophers, who have divided human reason into knowledge and probability, and have defin'd the first to be thaf evidence, which arises from the comparison of ideas, are oblig'd to comprehend all our arguments from causes or effects under the general term of probability. But tho' every one be free to use his terms in what sense he pleases; and accordingly in the precedent part of this discourse, I have follow'd this method of expression; 'tis however certain, that in common discourse we readily affirm, that many arguments from causation exceed probability, and may be receiv'd as a superior kind of evidence. One wou'd appear ridiculous, who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye; tho' 'tis plain we have no further assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us. For this reason, 'twould perhaps be more convenient, in order at once to preserve the common signification of words, and mark the several degrees of evidence, to distinguish human reason into three kinds, viz. that from knowledge, from proofs, and from probabilities. By knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the comparison of ideas. By proofs, those arguments, which are deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. By probability, that evidence, which is still attended with uncertainty
Later on, in his "Enquiry" he says:-
Hume, Enquiry, Section VI, footnote 1:Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.
You have been seeing the train arriving at the train station at 7:00 every morning for last x number of years. That does not logically warrants you to expect the train will arrive at 7:00 next morning. There is "no demonstrative arguments to prove."
I don't think I ever suggested that I had logically conclusive evidence.
however, to interpret "demonstrative" as meaning conclusive and hence logical, in the strict sense. This is usually taken to mean sound by the standards of formal logic. Which makes almost the whole of humanity irrational.
Scientific principles and theories require justification and proofs backed by demonstrative argument. I am not sure what you mean by the standards of formal logic, which makes the whole humanity irrational. Why would formal logic make the whole humanity irrational? Formal logic is another area of academic subjects which enables human reasoning more rational.
Scientific principles and theories require justification and proofs backed by demonstrative argument. I am not sure what you mean by the standards of formal logic, which makes the whole humanity irrational. Why would formal logic make the whole humanity irrational? Formal logic is another area of academic subjects which enables human reasoning more rational.
It is not desirable to be 100% formal logic because what is so may not be so tomorrow and our thinking needs to be flexible. We need to be creative. We need to think about what is and what can be. Humans have taken creative thinking and created their own reality. This is beyond what animals do.
Even when the river has cement banks... Yes. There have always been movements in civilized societies, of a small number of people who lived, or attempted to live, a more genuine, nature-grounded lifestyle.
I wouldn't call the fugitive subsistence of the Mashco Piro Eden, exactly, though they look pretty healthy. I see no reason we couldn't strike a compromise between the destruction of nature and our own needs. But humans tend to run at everything at full tilt.
People around the world live as they did at the beginning of humanity. They can use nature to meet their needs, as animals do, but they did not advance as people in the modern world did. Why? Why don't all humans advance?
Maybe we don't all have the same definition of 'advance'. Maybe some territories were too remote and poor for conquest, and therefore the inhabitants of those undesirable lands didn't have their traditional lifestyle ripped away and destroyed, as so many others did. By the same token, having territory with scant resources means there is not much leisure time for contemplation or extra material for development.
But if you mean, what caused civilization where it did happen, that's a more complex answer. It probably doesn't belong here, but I can point you to a source for the basics. Fundamental difference: enough surplus (of food, natural resources and labour) to support specialized unproductive classes of people, such as administration, priesthood, judiciary and law enforcement, military and clerical, thus stratifying the society and perpetuating a power structure. The influential classes can then patronize artisans and inventors and allocate resources to their own comfort, enrichment, armaments/fortification and glorification through ritual, spectacles, monuments and elaborate burials.
Reply to Vera Mont It's not that I've been arguing that symbols are important but rather that there is an important distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic signs. I don't think it is controversial that one thing we possess that other animals don't seem to is symbolic language.
Also if you've been reading what I've been writing you should know that I agree with you that human exceptionalism is a mistake.
For me, a generalization is a statement or proposition of the logical form I described. So you are missing the point.I am indeed "treating" abstract objects as particulars. So are you when you describe them as abstract objects.
So you think I am missing the point when I describe abstract objects as abstract objects? :roll:
I don't think I am missing any point. Abstract objects may be treated as generalizations or particulars and I have not said nor implied anything that contradicts that.
That's why I think it is a mistake to think that explaining animal actions has much to do with divining the inner workings of their minds. Mind you, I don't think that it is a determining factor in explaining human actions, either. It's more like interpreting a picture. Yes, sometimes we set out to divine the intentions of the artist, but not always. Sometimes it is just a question of seeing what is in the picture. (Puzzle pictures).
It seems to me that you have missing the point of what I've been saying and not the other way around since I have said that whatever we know about animal minds is derived from observing their behavior and body language and I have not been concerned at all with explaining their behavior by purportedly
somehow knowing what is going on in their minds. The same goes for humans except that they can also explain themselves linguistically. Of course the verity of those explanations relies on the one doing the explaining being both correct and honest.
I understand animal warning cries to be signaling, not symbolizing, danger.
Janus
Sorry, I don't understand what that difference is.
A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of.
It's not that I've been arguing that symbols are important but rather that there is an important distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic signs. don't think it is controversial that one thing we possess that other animals don't seem to is symbolic language.
When you don't have access to the other entity's mind, I'm not sure you're justified in assuming they have no symbolic communication. You're probably correct in that symbolic language is a uniquely human achievement. What I don't see in practice or agree with in theory is that symbolic language is a prerequisite of rational thought.
Why would formal logic make the whole humanity irrational?. Formal logic is another area of academic subjects which enables human reasoning more rational.
That's not quite what I said. I'm sorry if I was not clear. I left out the conditional "if formal logic is your standard of rationality" and qualified "the whole of humanity" to "almost the whole of humanity". As you say, formal logic is something that helps us to be more rational, which means that almost all of us have some level of rationality. Since very few of us know any formal logic, it follows that the rationality of most of us does not lie in our ability to do formal logic. That seems about right.
It is not about right or wrong on the inductive reasoning, but isn't it about lack of logical or rational ground in the reasoning Hume was pointing out?
Hume's criticism was aimed at the scholastic concept of some power, hidden from our experience, was what enable to first billiard ball to make the second billiard ball move. Many people have believed that the conclusion is simply that induction is invalid. However, Hume was not saying that we should or could just give up on it, in the way that one would simply give up on an invalid form of argument. There's room for debate about exactly what he was saying, but it was not that.
Induction is not deduction. It is better thought of as a trial and error process, which can never get us to deductive truth, but can get us nearer to it. Popper's version of this was conjecture and refutation, now often described as hypothesis and falsification. Neither of those formulations is really satisfactory. recognizes that hypotheses/conjectures that have been tested but not falsified are what we rely on pragmatically. Asking what rational ground we have for that is asking for a rational ground for relying on rational grounds.
Compare what happens when you ask for a rational ground for relying on sound deductive arguments. I refer you to C.L. Dodgson's article about the dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise after their race.
I have never heard of anyone trying to justify what they saw. One can confirm what one saw. But usually one doesn't justify what one saw. One justifies what one believes, said, done and think, but not one saw, smelt, felt, drank, ate or heard.
You said this earlier. It is another example of a situation in which asking for a rational ground (for believing that I saw what I saw, is not a question that has a rational answer. Yet believing that I saw what I saw is not irrational. For it can serve as a premiss in a sound deductive argument.
Humans have taken creative thinking and created their own reality. This is beyond what animals do.
"Creative" is a troublesome idea. There seems to be no clear boundary between creative and non-creative thinking. For example, I would say that the crow that we saw earlier in this thread was thinking creatively, when It realizes that a stick can serve as a way of getting the goodies.
Reply to Vera Mont
I agree with everything you say.
People often regard improvements in technology and in their own prosperity as advances, when they are usually double-edged swords.
A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of.
Interesting. That makes sense. But I've barely read anything on the topic, and don't seem to have an intuitive understanding of it all. My first thought was that a stop sign is, just as it says, a sign. It doesn't symbolize a stopped car. I was thinking a symbol would depict, even if the depiction was stylized, the thing. But then I looked up 'symbol', and the first example is:
[I]for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP"[/I]
If you are treating abstract objects as particulars then yes. My point was that numbers are themselves generalizations. There are countless instantiations of 'two' just as there are of 'tree' or 'animal'.
I'm not at all sure that's a helpful way to think of them, but we would have to dive down the rabbit-hole to clarify that.
It seems to me that you have missing the point of what I've been saying and not the other way around since I have said that whatever we know about animal minds is derived from observing their behaviour and body language and I have not been concerned at all with explaining their behaviour by purportedly somehow knowing what is going on in their minds. The same goes for humans except that they can also explain themselves linguistically. Of course the verity of those explanations relies on the one doing the explaining being both correct and honest.
I understand animal warning cries to be signaling, not symbolizing, danger. I have acknowledged that I believe animals sense danger. I'm not sure what you think we are disagreeing about.
A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of.
This is a much more pertinent, and illuminating, issue.
I think you are thinking of a distinction that was drawn quite a long time ago now to resolve a particular problem. "Clouds mean rain" and "'Cloud" means a mass of particles or droplets, as of dust, smoke, or steam, suspended in the atmosphere or existing in outer space". In other words, it was an attempt to distinguish what meaning means in the context of linguistic meaning and what it means in the context of drawing inferences from evidence. (I'm sorry I can't remember, and google doesn't find, any helpful reference)
I guess that if I must choose between the two, I would have to choose "sign", because the alternative "symbol" means attributing human-style language to the dog. But the catch with this is that if we say that a goose hissing is a sign of anger hostility or danger in your sense of sign, we are positing a purely causal relationship, which would be incompatible with attributing rationality, or even sentience, to the goose.
This means that we need to draw some more distinctions. Sign vs symbol is more complicated than ti seems. I don't have a neat account of the difference, just a few remarks towards a map. The same applies to the concept of action.
My first thought was that a stop sign is, just as it says, a sign. It doesn't symbolize a stopped car.
This is a bit complicated. The question to ask what the difference is between a sign and a symbol in this context. For example, when the police or road workers cordon off a section of road - even close it - with a tape across the road, is that equivalent to the stop sign? I would say that it symbolizes a blockage - like a heap of rubble. Is a red light a sign or a symbol?
I was thinking a symbol would depict, even if the depiction was stylized, the thing.
Mini-pictures have become a very popular way of conveying information, partly because they are supposed to be language-independent. They may be helpful, but in my view, they constitute another language; they are not always intuitive, but need to be learnt. I think the technical term for these is "icon", but it is obviously different from the sense that some rock bands are said to be "iconic". (I'm not suggesting that icons are not useful). (There are echoes here of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I don't know whether that book influenced their popularity now. It seems possible, but unlikely).
But then I looked up 'symbol', and the first example is: for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP"
"Sign" and "Symbol" don't seem to have a well-defined, technical, definition. The terms are applied differently in different contexts. One peculiarity of this specific example is that a stop sign is not merely reporting a situation, like the or a sign-post. It is giving an instruction.
So at a police road-block, when the officer holds up a hand, palm open and facing towards you (I think this is more or less universal), the officer is ordering you to stop in a non-verbal fashion. Is that gesture a sign or a symbol? Is it linguistic?
In the realm of actions, we have been mainly talking about actions that have a purpose, because that is where the question of rationality or not is clearest. But there are different kinds of action. Reflexes, habits, expressions (Ouch! I'm in pain!), are just the beginnings of a list.
When you don't have access to the other entity's mind, I'm not sure you're justified in assuming they have no symbolic communication.
Its not an assumption but rather a conclusion based on what I think is most plausible given the evidence (or lack of evidence). I'm the first to admit that plausibility is more or less like beauty somewhat in the eye of the beholder. In other words not a highly determinable or definitive criterion for justifying any assertion.
Interesting. That makes sense. But I've barely read anything on the topic, and don't seem to have an intuitive understanding of it all. My first thought was that a stop sign is, just as it says, a sign. It doesn't symbolize a stopped car. I was thinking a symbol would depict, even if the depiction was stylized, the thing. But then I looked up 'symbol', and the first example is:
for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP"
The word 'stop' in that context symbolizes the act of stopping but does not resemble anything to do with stopping. Ikons resemble what they signify. Some early written languages used pictographscharacters which resembled what they represented. As far as I know Chinese characters evolved from these early pictographic characters. The difference with a pure symbol is that it doesn't resemble what it signifies. Think of the numeral '5'. It doesn't resemble five of anything. 'IIIII' would be a pictographic representation or ikon of the quantity of five.
Abstract objects may be treated as generalizations or particulars and I have not said nor implied anything that contradicts that.
Janus
H'm. That's a large and tempting rabbit-hole, but I'm thinking that diving down it would be a distraction.
If you are treating abstract objects as particulars then yes. My point was that numbers are themselves generalizations. There are countless instantiations of 'two' just as there are of 'tree' or 'animal'.
Janus
I'm not at all sure that's a helpful way to think of them, but we would have to dive down the rabbit-hole to clarify that.
I'm sure there are nuances that could make it a much larger enquiry but all I have in mind is that an abstract object is abstract on account of the fact that it refers to no particular thing but ranges over a whole class of particulars thus qualifying it as a generalization.
So the word 'tree' is both a particular word and a symbol that represents the abstract generalization that is the class of objects we call trees.
I don't know what you have in mind with wondering about the "helpfulness" of looking at things this way. Its just one of the possible ways of thinking about it. I see the distinction between abstract objects as particulars and generalizations as a valid one. It makes perfect sense to me at least.
I guess that if I must choose between the two, I would have to choose "sign", because the alternative "symbol" means attributing human-style language to the dog. But the catch with this is that if we say that a goose hissing is a sign of anger hostility or danger in your sense of sign, we are positing a purely causal relationship, which would be incompatible with attributing rationality, or even sentience, to the goose.
This means that we need to draw some more distinctions. Sign vs symbol is more complicated than ti seems. I don't have a neat account of the difference, just a few remarks towards a map. The same applies to the concept of action.
I think we can attribute rationality and meaning to animals in the sense of feeling. The hissing of the goose is an expression and in that sense a sign of "anger hostility or danger". But it has not been converted by a linguistic culture into a symbol that stands by convention as signifying anger hostility or danger.
I admit I have only given a basic adumbration and that more subtleties and nuances in the relationship between the concepts of 'sign' and 'symbol' could be induced by a detailed investigation of usage and association.
I left out the conditional "if formal logic is your standard of rationality" and qualified "the whole of humanity" to "almost the whole of humanity".
Formal logic deals with the propositions for their validities. Suggesting formal logic as your standard of rationality sounded very odd even as a conditional comment.
Hume's criticism was aimed at the scholastic concept of some power, hidden from our experience, was what enable to first billiard ball to make the second billiard ball move.
Didn't he say, it is the constant conjunction of the one event followed by the other, which gives us the idea of cause effect?
Asking what rational ground we have for that is asking for a rational ground for relying on rational grounds.
Really? Could you come up with an example? Much of the math, science and logic are based on formulating proofs from the valid premises based on the rational ground, and we do accept them when it makes sense.
It is not desirable to be 100% formal logic because what is so may not be so tomorrow and our thinking needs to be flexible. We need to be creative. We need to think about what is and what can be. Humans have taken creative thinking and created their own reality. This is beyond what animals do.
No one was suggesting to be 100% formal logic, Formal logic is a subject which studies propositional validities, which can aid human thoughts and scientific theories to be more rational.
In Scientific, Evelina Fedorenko, a neuroscientist who studies language at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says You Dont Need Words to Think
Reply to Patterner
That would mean children born deaf can think well enough to function, communicate and learn sign language. In fact, they begin to invent their own signals between 8 and 12 month, and can be taught the rudiments of ASL at that time, just as hearing babies begin to learn spoken language. They all do need sensory and intellectual stimulation. For non-verbal feral children the requirements of survival would provide plenty of stimulation, as it also does for fox kits and fledgling geese.
Maybe we don't all have the same definition of 'advance'. Maybe some territories were too remote and poor for conquest, and therefore the inhabitants of those undesirable lands didn't have their traditional lifestyle ripped away and destroyed, as so many others did. By the same token, having territory with scant resources means there is not much leisure time for contemplation or extra material for development.
But if you mean, what caused civilization where it did happen, that's a more complex answer. It probably doesn't belong here, but I can point you to a source for the basics. Fundamental difference: enough surplus (of food, natural resources and labour) to support specialized unproductive classes of people, such as administration, priesthood, judiciary and law enforcement, military and clerical, thus stratifying the society and perpetuating a power structure. The influential classes can then patronize artisans and inventors and allocate resources to their own comfort, enrichment, armaments/fortification and glorification through ritual, spectacles, monuments and elaborate burials.
That is a good explanation. Now how about the Glory of Islam, 8th to 13th century, and the decline? How about China that was more advanced than all of Europe and its decline?
China's Golden Age: The Song, the Mongols, and the Ming Voyages
This period of Chinese history, from roughly 600-1600 C.E., is a period of stunning development in China.
From the Tang (discussed in the unit on the Tang Dynasty)
through the "pre-modern" commercial and urban development of the Song, ca. 1000,
to the Ming voyages of exploration (1405- 1433) with ships that reach the coast of Africa.
(The achievements of China under the Song are the subject of Marco Polo's "fantastic" reports when he journeys to China under the Mongols, who rule in China for eighty-nine years (1279- 1368) as the Yuan dynasty, between the Song and Ming) https://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_1000-1450ce.htm#:~:text=The%20Song%20dynasty%20(960%2D1279,called%20%22China's%20Golden%20Age.%22
What has caused advancing civilizations to decline and in some cases to totally distruct?
In Scientific, Evelina Fedorenko, a neuroscientist who studies language at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says You Dont Need Words to Think
Your link requires a subscription so I look for another. It is a fascinating subject and I am so glad you brought it up. Hellen Keller was deaf and blind and she did not have language until she was taught language. Young children are dependent on caregivers and function without language. And here is the link I found. Thank you for making us aware of such information.
The lack of an inner monologue has been linked to a condition called aphantasia sometimes called "blindness of the mind's eye." People who experience aphantasia don't experience visualizations in their mind; they can't mentally picture their bedroom or their mother's face. Many times, those who don't experience visualizations don't experience clear inner speech, either, Lvenbruck noted. You can participate in Lvenbruck's research on aphantasia and inner speech via a survey starting this month.
https://www.livescience.com/does-everyone-have-inner-monologue.html
Now how about the Glory of Islam, 8th to 13th century, and the decline? How about China that was more advanced than all of Europe and its decline?
Ecclesiastes 3:1 To everything, there is a season, and a time to every purpose under Heaven.
Nations grow rich, then powerful and their rulers grow ambitious. They have the wealth to raise large, well-equipped armies, and the constant anxiety of being overlooked by envious neighbours and hostile rivals. So they go forth to conquer and build empires. The sons and grandsons of these war leaders may not be equal to the task of consolidating and maintaining their forebears' empires; they become complacent and self-indulgent. Factions form among the aristocracy, each group plotting to take over the reins if/when the legitimate ruler falters. The military is overstretched; too expensive to supply efficiently, unable to deliver enough booty from the colonies; the troops are fed up with occupation duties and replacements are harder to recruit, the farther from home they're expected to serve. There are too many subject peoples chafing under foreign domination, looking for a chance to revolt. Meanwhile, those hostile rivals haven't disappeared; they've been growing stronger and richer, forming alliances, perhaps amalgamating: a young, energetic empire is emerging to challenge the superpower of the day.
This historical pattern has nothing to do with human 'advancement', but during the period when each empire is near the top of its cycle, a great many cultural, scientific and technological innovations flourish, because the empire has access to untapped natural and human resources, is motivated to develop those resources and has the material wherewithal to support them.
What has caused advancing civilizations to decline and in some cases to totally distruct?
Shortage of funds, overreach, mismanagement, corruption, unsustainable disparity, internal unrest and ideological schism, external aggression, and sometimes climate change.
creativesoulOctober 23, 2024 at 00:49#9417070 likes
We have more than one way of knowing what goes on in animal's heads. Observing behaviour can be one of those ways if and when we're testing hypothesis. Attributing meaning to body language, another. Comparing observations with notions/hypothesis, yet one more.
creativesoul
Quite so.
Testing hypothesis via observing behaviour is comparative assessment and as such presupposes testability.
There are some things at work here, beneath all our discourse/conversation about what counts as rational thought/minds. We're looking to further discriminate between different, sometimes and often conflicting conceptions, notions, sensible uses of "thought", "belief", "mind", etc. We're looking to set out all meaningful experience. In doing so, we go a long way towards acquiring knowledge of all minds to whom such experience is meaningful.
creativesoulOctober 23, 2024 at 22:22#9418400 likes
We have more than one way of knowing what goes on in animal's heads. Observing behaviour can be one of those ways if and when we're testing hypothesis. Attributing meaning to body language, another. Comparing observations with notions/hypothesis, yet one more.
creativesoul
Quite so.
How is that done if we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads?
creativesoul
More than that, we also rely on observation of behaviour to know what's going on in each other's heads, as you suggest.
I'm afraid that there's a certain ambiguity going on here, and it's my fault.
Do we or do we not have a way to know what's going on inside of the head of another thinking creature?
I think we do, and you've responded in kind. My issue with the phrase "what's going on in the heads" is that it presupposes a false equivalence. We can know plenty about what's going on inside the heads of ourselves and all other thinking creatures. It takes a little work to fill out.
creativesoulOctober 23, 2024 at 22:37#9418430 likes
We're in dire need of a criterion; a standard; a metric to be reached.
What counts as rational thought of another creature if that thought is not somehow meaningful to the creature? This entire thread topic rests upon actively working notions of meaningful thought.
Meaningful thought emerged long before naming and describing practices.
creativesoulOctober 23, 2024 at 22:52#9418450 likes
Meaningful experience preceded accounts of it. If any notion of "meaningful experience" contradicts that, then they are flat out wrong.
Prelinguistic meaningful experience(s) happened prior to being talked about.
Some smart animals can learn how to operate certain latches such that they can let themselves out, whenever they want, whenever they should so desire or if the need should ever arise.
Latches, wants, memories, desires, needs... a creature capable of drawing correlations between these things such that the endeavor connects the creature to the world.
creativesoulOctober 24, 2024 at 00:39#9418730 likes
Thought consists of much more than what goes on in the head. We can know some stuff about what's going inside the head of all thinking creatures by knowing about how thought and belief emerge and/or work.
We can know that a language less creature cannot have all the exact same thoughts as a language user. For example, some creatures cannot think about their own worldview. Those missing such capabilities cannot think about other worldviews either. Such thoughts and beliefs require articulation<-------None of those are capable of being formed, held, and/or had by language less creatures.
All thought is the target. Articulated thought misses the mark. Propositional attitudes miss the mark. Belief statements miss the mark.
Meaningful experience does not. All meaningful experiences consist - in very large part - of thought and belief about the world and/or oneself(where possible). Internal and external elements. Spatiotemporal locations of thought/mind are a chimera. "In the head" presupposes such...
that an abstract object is abstract on account of the fact that it refers to no particular thing but ranges over a whole class of particulars thus qualifying it as a generalization.
You are quite right that that classes are abstract objects and that they range over particulars. But it doesn't follow that all abstract objects are classes.
But it has not been converted by a linguistic culture into a symbol that stands by convention as signifying anger hostility or danger.
You are quite right, particularly about the hissing being an expression. The difference between that and a symbol would take some teasing out but set that aside. The lack of a convention does suggest that it is not. When we say that the goose is expressing anger and hostility, we are recognizing (and telling others) that one should expect a defensive reaction if you behave in certain ways. Recognizing that pattern of behaviour is recognising the meaning of the hiss. Our interpretation of, and talk about, the hiss is our application of our description.
That would mean children born deaf can think well enough to function, communicate and learn sign language. In fact, they begin to invent their own signals between 8 and 12 month, and can be taught the rudiments of ASL at that time, just as hearing babies begin to learn spoken language. They all do need sensory and intellectual stimulation. For non-verbal feral children the requirements of survival would provide plenty of stimulation, as it also does for fox kits and fledgling geese.
Reply to creativesoul
There's a lot packed in to your comments of the last few days. Thanks. I've had to be selective in what I reply to. I hope I've identified the best places to focus.
My issue with the phrase "what's going on in the heads" is that it presupposes a false equivalence.
Do you mean false equivalence between human thinking and animal thinking? I was using the phrase to refer to what is often described as the phenomenology of thinking. Perhaps most helpful would be to talk about what people will report as their thinking.
Meaningful thought emerged long before naming and describing practices.
Quite so. But I don't think there's any reason to suppose that meaningful thought without name or describing has been banished from human life. The complication is that we often want to talk about, or at least express such thoughts or experiences, and then we often find ourselves struck dumb or confused.
There are some things at work here, beneath all our discourse/ conversation about what counts as rational thought/minds.
Yes, indeed. If we could identify what they are, we might make a leap forward in our understanding of what's going onin philosophical discussion of that topic. The question about animals is particularly useful because it is a specific application of those concepts in a particular context where we find it difficult to be sure how to apply them. Our paradigm of rational thinking is articulate thinking independent of action. But that depends on our language, and animals do not have that kind of language. So we disagree about how to apply them.
One of my difficulties here is that there is an almost irresistible temptation to think that what is at stake is a process that is independent of the action - a process that is referred to by "thinking" or "reasoning". I happen to have recently read Lee Braver's "Groundless Grounds". In that book, he articulates an idea of rational reconstruction as a way of coming to understand what is happening when we attribute the application of reason where there does not appear to be any such process involved. He doesn't mention animals, but I think that it is also a good way to understand what is going on when we attribute reason to animals.
One way of explaining this is by means of an analogy. Aristotle developed the concept of the practical syllogism. He doesn't claim that When I eat my breakfast, I must have said to myself "This is food. Food is good for me. I should eat this." (Partly because he recognizes that that process doesn't necessarily result in action.) What he is doing here is exactly parallel to what he does when he formulates the idea of the theoretical syllogism - "All humans are mortal. Socrates is a human. Socrates is mortal." It is a formulation that helps us analyze and understand the actual ways that humans think. Theoretical and practical syllogisms are rational reconstructions of thinking, not empirical descriptions.
But it doesn't follow that all abstract objects are classes.
I agree and I don't think I've said or implied otherwise. I'd say abstract objects are probably all generalizations, but I don't think generalization and class are coterminous. That said I'm not confident that on detailed analysis all abstract objects will trun out to be generalizations.
Well, we can agree on that, though we may find complications if we looked more closely at the detail.
Yes, that seems likely. Analysis always seems to discover complications since linguistic terms are only more or less definitive or determinate. Ambiguities proliferate under the analytic eye.
You surprise me. I thought that was what you were suggesting. It's good to know that I was wrong.
Asking for grounds or justification for your belief, knowledge, actions and perception is not Formal Logic. It is just a rational thinking process for finding out if your beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions were rational or irrational.
Right, I think conventionality is the key difference between signs which count as symbols and those which do not.
So when the goose hisses at me that is a sign (expression) of anger or hostility, which means that I do well to behave cautiously, yet I can only articulate what the sign means by using symbols. Obviously, then, the way I understand what the goose's hiss means, is by means of symbols, which the goose cannot use. Yet the difference in meaning between the two is hard to discern.
Does that make sense? I'm not sure.
Asking for grounds or justification for your belief, knowledge, actions and perception is not Formal Logic. It is just a rational thinking process for finding out if your beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions were rational or irrational.
Why does it matter whether our beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions were rational or irrational? Is it because that is how we know that they are true - or, in the case of actions, justified?
So it seems that even if I believe my perceptions without any grounds, I can justify them - that is, provide reasons (grounds) for believing them - after I come to believe them.
Reply to Vera Mont That explanation of why civilizations fall is elegant. Does anyone here disagree with that explanation of why civilizations fall? If we all agree about why civilizations fall, can we use our rationale to prevent that from happening?
Why does it matter whether our beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions were rational or irrational? Is it because that is how we know that they are true - or, in the case of actions, justified?
So it seems that even if I believe my perceptions without any grounds, I can justify them - that is, provide reasons (grounds) for believing them - after I come to believe them.
"Why does it matter"? :razz: What a delicious question. We can fall back on ancient beliefs to answer that question. Because, if we don't get things right and do the wrong things, the gods/nature will punish us. Coming from Athens the goal is to get things right. Meaning, understanding the universal laws and basing our decisions on knowledge of those laws, not our personal whims. However, to understand this, the masses must be educated to understand that reasoning and that is not how we have educated our young. Only the few who go to liberal colleges will understand that reasoning. If we wait until the young enter college before giving them a liberal education, the ignorant masses will outnumber the wise.
One serious problem is capitalism without wisdom or morals. If a person is going to work for low wages because the economy requires people who work for no pay or low wages, what is that person's reward for putting the health of the national economy first? Should we close these people out of society's benefits because they can not pay for those benefits, or do we need planning, cooperation, utilities and a big "thank you" as opposed to a snide "oh, that is welfare"? What is the rational way to educate and order a civilization?
I am not sure but I think animals tend to be limited by a might makes right mentality and because of our success and huge populations, our failure to base our decisions on knowledge of the bigger picture is disastrous.
Asking for grounds or justification for your belief, knowledge, actions and perception is not Formal Logic. It is just a rational thinking process for finding out if your beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions were rational or irrational.
What you said defines a problem with our notion of being "rational". 600 years ago it might have been rational to believe the Bible is the word of God, there was an Eden, an angry God could and would punish people, but given what we know today, is that belief rational? Arguing the Bible is the word of God may be a rational thing to do if we have no standard for "rational" meaning a fact that can be validated. And if we believe rational means facts that can be validated then the belief that the Bible is the word of God, is not rational thinking. A definition of "rational" that treats fantasy as equal to thought based on valid facts is problematic, isn't it?
I think this matters because I think a democracy needs to be clear about the difference between fact and fiction. A democracy must have education for rational thinking based on facts and understand what this has to do with morality. If we believe a God made us closer to angels than animals, or if we believe we have evolved along with the rest of the animals, it really matters. That is the center of our understanding of reality and decisions that must be based on reality.
Reply to Athena
It's not just my explanation https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10529410/
Why should "we" prevent history? Which empire would you like to keep in play? It's probably not the same one a Chinese businessman would choose, or a supporter of Modi. Should there be any empires at all? I don't think so, but that's what happens when a nation outgrows is own territory and is powerful enough to annex other territories and exploit their resources. What is it we'd be preserving? The same economic and political arrangement that caused the rapid decline.
We don't have time for the usual process to unfold. Much of the world is either under or threatened by imminent totalitarian rule. The economic disparity is huge and growing in all developed and developing countries alike. The weather isn't just causing local problems anymore: increasingly violent and frequent climate events are rendering large areas of the whole world uninhabitable. There are more people than have ever been, and huge populations are being displaced by famine, environment and war - everywhere. They have no place to go except the populated places that don't want them.
This isn't a discrete, identifiable civilization: this economy is global. When it implodes, there is literally nowhere to hide. Here is a good article - of course, not everyone agrees.
Are we clear that this is a complete derail from the original subject? Saving or toppling the current civilization has no more to do with rational thinking than the life-cycles of previous civilizations did. Within the life of a tribe, nation or empire, many rational thinkers make decisions relating to whatever their role in that civilization is. But the social and natural and external forces that converge on it determine the path that civilization takes. That's more like an evolutionary process than a rational one.
Why should "we" prevent history? Which empire would you like to keep in play?
OMG, your question excites me so much I can't wait to read what you have to say next without reacting to your question. My first thought is Athens. Athens made some bad mistakes as the beautiful explanation of the fall of civilizations you gave us made clear. But Athen's gift to the world is logic, a concept of logos, and a burning need to get things right. My second thought is the remains of ancient civilizations and thinking I do not know enough of them to judge which one was best. In good times and with a good pharaoh, I think I would be very happy worshipping the pharaoh and being a laborer who helped build the Great Pyramid. Those are two extremes of authority over the people, or holding the citizens responsible for government and the future.
Hellenism coming from Athens survived the fall of Athens and I believe it is the only hope humans have. There are two ways to have social control; authority over the people or culture (liberty, justice, and wisdom). A culture devoted to truth and morals may have the best chance of surviving.
Wow, I sure wish we could have lunch together and talk about the link you posted. The final paragraph is why I say I think democracy and an understanding of logos and morals (understanding cause and effect) is our only hope.
The eventual outcome of this great implosion is up for grabs. Will we overcome denial and despair; kick our addiction to petroleum; and pull together to break the grip of corporate power over our lives? Can we foster genuine democracy, harness renewable energy, reweave our communities, re-learn forgotten skills, and heal the wounds weve inflicted on the Earth? Or will fear and prejudice drive us into hostile camps, fighting over the dwindling resources of a degraded planet? The stakes could not be higher. https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-08-10/four-reasons-civilization-wont-decline-it-will-collapse/
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While reading that link I thought of Youngquist's book "GeoDestinies". He was a geologist and wrote two books. The first one was "Mineral Resources and the Destiny of Nations". We are about to face the exhaustion of vital resources and this will impact our food supply, economy, and standard of living. Rome fell in part because it exhausted its supply of gold when its civilization was in the last stages of excess wealth and high expectations. But today when I make people aware that our coins had value because of the minerals in them, and we have taken the minerals out of coins, no one sees the problem.:scream:
Greer estimates that it takes, on average, about 250 years for civilizations to decline and fall, and he finds no reason why modern civilization shouldnt follow this usual timeline.[3] https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-08-10/four-reasons-civilization-wont-decline-it-will-collapse/
. Our history has pretty much paralleled the history of Athens.
If there is a Resurrection we may be in it now. The archeologist, geologist, and related sciences are resurrecting our past and it is our job to rethink everything and get past all our prejudices and notions of winners and losers and a God who has favorite people. Moving on to logos and universal thinking to save as much of our planet as we can save.
You're a bit late on that one! I meant - in response to Quoting Athena
If we all agree about why civilizations fall, can we use our rationale to prevent that from happening?
That would make it a choice among those that exist today.
Greer estimates that it takes, on average, about 250 years for civilizations to decline and fall, and he finds no reason why modern civilization shouldnt follow this usual timeline.
Couple of problems with that. Without having read The Long Descent (I did read Gibbon on Rome)I suspect that he's not taken into account the relative speed at which the American Empire achieved global dominance or the way the industrial revolution and electronic technology have increased the speed of decline-inducing events: the depletion of natural resources world-wide, the stratification of societies, the environmental degradation, population growth and the spread of disease.
Where Athens was a self-contained city-state that could divorce itself from satellites if they became troublesome; while Rome could gradually abandon occupied territories if they became too burdensome, the US cannot even disengage from local wars of its own making; nor can it shed its international financial interests.
Show me the Messiah(s) who will be followed to this new life.
Tell me when the movement reaches world-changing momentum. Quoting Athena
Moving on to logos and universal thinking to save as much of our planet as we can save.
If that had happened in 1975, we'd have stood a chance. Carter made some effort.... Reagan killed it. The way many Americans remember them is : Reagan, one of the best presidents, ever; Carter, one of the worst. Nearly half of them want an incompetent, incontinent, addled fascist for the next four crucial years. Logos is huddled in a corner, nursing his bruises and sniffling.
Obviously, then, the way I understand what the goose's hiss means, is by means of symbols, which the goose cannot use. Yet the difference in meaning between the two is hard to discern.
Does that make sense? I'm not sure.
You could respond instinctively to the gooses hissing which I would say would be a non-symbolically mediated understanding of it. Discursive knowledge would seem to be always in symbolic form I guess.
You could respond instinctively to the gooses hissing which I would say would be a non-symbolically mediated understanding of it.
Would that be an appropriate response? You might instinctively take it as a friendly greeting, or as just something geese do with no meaning.
In fact, it's a simple enough communication, usually accompanied by threatening stance and body language. Why do you need symbols as an intermediary? Why not regard what's in front of you, recognize the gestures as similar to those of other animals - including your own species - in similar circumstances, and reasonably assume that the goose does not welcome your presence in her personal space or nesting ground, and make a rational decision to retreat?
Why does it matter whether our beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions were rational or irrational? Is it because that is how we know that they are true - or, in the case of actions, justified?
Any reasonable person would want his / her beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions to be rational than irrational. No one wants to have beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions which are irrational by human nature. That is why it does matter for your beliefs, actions, knowledge or perceptions to be rational.
600 years ago it might have been rational to believe the Bible is the word of God, there was an Eden, an angry God could and would punish people, but given what we know today, is that belief rational? Arguing the Bible is the word of God may be a rational thing to do if we have no standard for "rational" meaning a fact that can be validated. And if we believe rational means facts that can be validated then the belief that the Bible is the word of God, is not rational thinking. A definition of "rational" that treats fantasy as equal to thought based on valid facts is problematic, isn't it?
Religious beliefs always have been from the blind faith rather than anything to do with being rational or irrational. And at the time, when the religious authorities were ruling the society, it was more of the ruthless mad social system, which enforced people with the barbaric punishments rather than being rational or irrational. People had no options but abide by the system out of fear, rather than being rational.
I think this matters because I think a democracy needs to be clear about the difference between fact and fiction. A democracy must have education for rational thinking based on facts and understand what this has to do with morality. If we believe a God made us closer to angels than animals, or if we believe we have evolved along with the rest of the animals, it really matters. That is the center of our understanding of reality and decisions that must be based on reality.
You should be very careful not to be deceived by the word democracy. It could mean, that you must do anything irrational to justify the word. It would be wiser to stay critical and analytical on these fancy words which can be hollow inside, but can force people to irrational actions and thoughts.
Reply to Vera Mont What you have said here does not seem to disagree with what I've said. I think I've said several times in this thread that I believe we can read the body language of not only humans but (at least some) animals as well.
Reply to Vera Mont It's just the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic signs. The former denote whatever they do by convention. As far as we know only humans possess symbolic language. Again though I want to stress that I don't see that fact as a justification for human exceptionalism.
If a person is going to work for low wages because the economy requires people who work for no pay or low wages, what is that person's reward for putting the health of the national economy first? Should we close these people out of society's benefits because they can not pay for those benefits, or do we need planning, cooperation, utilities and a big "thank you" as opposed to a snide "oh, that is welfare"?
Well, I would say that an economy that requires people to work for wages that cannot sustain a decent life is broken. But that requirement is so common that I suspect I'm just being idealistic. Still, it seems inhumane and immoral not to see those jobs as problematic.
If only we could get away from the idea that welfare is charity! In a broken economy, it may be true. But it just reinforces exploitation. Welfare is not charity. It is insurance - pooling risks that would be catastrophic for individuals so that they can be dealt with or at least ameliorated. Life insurance is not charity, but common sense. Of course, some people prefer to stick to the short-term and drive their cars. That's why car insurance is a legal requirement. But, rationally speaking, insurance makes sense and is not charity. More than that, rationally speaking again, there are some risks that are so large that only the state can take them on.
But the reason for the introduction of the very first state welfare system (in Prussia in the late 19th century) was neither charitable nor an insurance policy. It was a question of riot control by a rigidly conservative and aristocratic chancellor - Bismarck. There are articles about it in, for example, Wikipedia.
Welfare is enlightened and rational self-interest, not charity.
You could respond instinctively to the gooses hissing which I would say would be a non-symbolically mediated understanding of it. Discursive knowledge would seem to be always in symbolic form I guess.
Well, given the definition that we have of what a symbol is, any knowledge that is discursive would be in human-style language, so it follows that it would be in symbolic form.
But I like the idea of a non-symbolically mediated understanding it, though I'm taking that as what is called "tacit" knowledge. But then, we have to acknowledge that human beings are also capable of that same form of understanding.
"Instinctively" is a bit of a trap. Strictly speaking, instinctive behaviour is a set behaviour pattern that is not learned, but inherited. It is not, therefore, based on any process of learning or reasoning. It is capable of rational justification at the level of evolution as contributing to the ability of the creature to sruvive and reproduce. Most, if not all, behaviour, of sentient creatures is a combination of instinct, learning and response to the relevant context. Spiders do not learn to weave webs, but they weave them in a context and adapt the pattern to suit. Newly-born foals struggle to their feet and look for milk responding to and managin in the actual context they are in.
Thinking about this, there's no doubt that there are instinctive elements in our reading of body language - very small babies respond to smiling faces. But they can recognize mother at a very early stage, which must be learnt. Again, the behaviour of lobsters in cages when they are frightened is not difficult to recognize. But we do have to learn much body language in order to read it and it does not follow from the fact that we can read human body language that we can read the body language of other creatures without learning. But small children do have to be taught to recognize the body language of dogs.
Would that be an appropriate response? You might instinctively take it as a friendly greeting, or as just something geese do with no meaning.
In fact, it's a simple enough communication, usually accompanied by threatening stance and body language.
Yes. It is possible, of course, that the unlearned response of the goose to a threat is recognizable by analogy with the threatening behaviour of other creatures and is recognized on that basis. No doubt those unlearned responses have evolved to work across species. A threat that was only recognized by other geese would be much less useful that one that can be recognized by other species.
All true. So why the symbol question? I've seen it bandied about and argued over, but I can't figure out the significance of it.
The idea is that use of symbols is a distinctively human capacity - and the basis of our kind of language. If you look into what philosophers have said about it, there's a great deal of confusion about it. Peirce, for example, treats both what we call signs as distinct from symbols in the same class and calls that class "symbols". Cassirer doesn't seem to discuss what we are calling signs at all, though he does distinguish between symbolic meaning and "expressive meaning". This is not territory that I'm familiar with. I'm just illustrating how messy the philosophy of this topic is.
(Signs are here used to mean "Smoke means (is a sign of) fire" or "Clouds mean (are a sign of) rain" - causal connections. Not everyone draws the same distinction.)
It's just the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic signs. The former denote whatever they do by convention. As far as we know only humans possess symbolic language. Again though I want to stress that I don't see that fact as a justification for human exceptionalism.
I agree. Discursive knowledge needs to be seen as a species-specific capacity alongside the species-specific capacity of bats and dolphins to find their way by echo-location, not as a radical distinction between humans and other species.
So it seems that even if I believe my perceptions without any grounds, I can justify them - that is, provide reasons (grounds) for believing them - after I come to believe them.
You could, but if it is irrational, then others will not agree with your justification. Being rational means also it has to be objective. Your problem seem to be confusion between intelligence and knowledge with reasoning and being rational. They are not the same.
.research offers the first evidence that parrots learn their unique signature calls from their parents and shows that vocal signaling in wild parrots is a socially acquired rather than a genetically wired trait.
Dolphins are known to use signature whistles, and to be able to mimic other dolphins' signature whistles. It seems likely that the more intelligent animals employ a limited range of symbolic vocalisations.
Any reasonable person would want his / her beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions to be rational than irrational. No one wants to have beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions which are irrational by human nature. That is why it does matter for your beliefs, actions, knowledge or perceptions to be rational.
Yes, that's a good way to answer the question. "Any reasonable person..." By definition, nobody could be reasonable unless they preferred being rational to being irrational. Which means that, as a definition, what you say is circular. But that's perfectly OK in this case.
The usual answer is that rationality is our way to truth (or justification in the case of actions). That's circular as well, since truth is what rationality delivers.
Rationality is what delivers the truth, so there can be no question whether rationality delivers truth. It would be like trying to measure the standard metre in Paris in order to find out whether it is a metre long.
What you end up with is that rationality provides the justification for everything else and therefore has no rational justification.
Religious beliefs always have been from the blind faith rather than anything to do with being rational or irrational.
H'm that's a bit quick. What about people like Aquinas or Descartes who believed that they had rational arguments for belief in God? That's quite different from belief from blind faith. True, most people (but not all) believe their arguments were not valid. But they certainly weren't blind faith.
There are theologians who take as their starting-point the "presupposition" that the Bible is the word of God. It has something of the status of an axiom. Something posited as true, but not capable of being proved or disproved. Their theology follows by rational process. Sometimes rational thinking has irrational elements.
Reply to mcdoodle
And whales learn songs both from their own and from other pods.
Learning is common to all species that operate in a complex environment (i.e. not underground of stuck to a cave wall) Some learning is solitary experimentation, the way an octopus does. But the social species of mammals and birds teach their young a considerable amount of knowledge and skills.
Rationality is what delivers the truth, so there can be no question whether rationality delivers truth. It would be like trying to measure the standard metre in Paris in order to find out whether it is a metre long.
We were not talking about truth here. We were talking about whether your knowledge or beliefs were rational or irrational. For that, you need to verify your knowledge or beliefs if they are not from deductive reasoning.
H'm that's a bit quick. What about people like Aquinas or Descartes who believed that they had rational arguments for belief in God? That's quite different from belief from blind faith. True, most people (but not all) believe their arguments were not valid. But they certainly weren't blind faith.
There are theologians who take as their starting-point the "presupposition" that the Bible is the word of God. It has something of the status of an axiom. Something posited as true, but not capable of being proved or disproved. Their theology follows by rational process. Sometimes rational thinking has irrational elements.
Aquinas and Descartes were the people who used rational thinking to prove the existence of God. They were not the religious authorities who punished the general public based on the faiths and religious social codes.
My problem is that I've never been able to grasp a clear meaning for the term "intelligence". So I mostly ignore it, especially in philosophy.
Intelligence means knowing something, or being able to do something in coherent way. It is not same as reflecting, analyzing, criticizing and proving something, which are what rational thinking does.
For that, you need to verify your knowledge or beliefs if they are not from deductive reasoning.
Doesn't "verify" mean something like to demonstrate the truth or accuracy of something, as by the presentation of evidence? In that case, we must be talking about truth. Though you are right that it is possible to believe something on rational grounds and be wrong.
Intelligence means knowing something, or being able to do something in coherent way. It is not same as The ability to acquire, understand, and use knowledgesomething, which are what rational thinking does.
I thought it was something like the ability to acquire, understand, and use knowledge. That would make it something different from knowledge but more about how to acquire knowledge.
I thought it [intelligence] was something like the ability to acquire, understand, and use knowledge. That would make it something different from knowledge but more about how to acquire knowledge.
Yes, it is an inherent mental capability - although, like all inborn, or *hold nose* hard-wired traits, it can be dulled or enhanced by environmental factors. Intelligent beings learn to navigate the world by gathering information through their senses and formulating experimental approaches to the problems they encounter.
The information on which they must base decisions comes from the environment. In the case of humans, that ambient information matrix is linguistic and cultural, as well as physical and sensory. If a religious concept, or gender prejudice or architectural style or economic organization is embedded in the culture, those things become, from infancy, part of the 'knowledge' an individual gathers. Those verities form part of the world in which he operates as a problem-solving entity.
At some stage of intellectual development, some of the sharper individuals may question the verities of their culture, the assumptions with which they were raised. In human cultures, such questions can be hazardous; it is often safer not to voice them. Whether a thinker believes in God or not, the example of Galileo fresh in his mind, he [Descartes] may deem it more rational to justify the existence of God than to cast doubt upon it. Or, understanding the dynamics of his society, a career priest [Augustine] might propound Christian/Platonic values as a rational way to support the status quo. Rational thought is less often used in the service of Truth than in achieving goals.
Doesn't "verify" mean something like to demonstrate the truth or accuracy of something, as by the presentation of evidence? In that case, we must be talking about truth. Though you are right that it is possible to believe something on rational grounds and be wrong.
Truth emerges when your belief or knowledge is examined and verified by reason. Reason itself cannot deliver truth as you claim.
You should trace back what you said in this thread. You said that your belief and knowledge are rational because you believe and know something. I said, no it cannot be rational or irrational until they are verified. Then you deviated from the point, claiming that rationality delivers truth. I am not sure what that means. You need to give more elaboration on that point what it means.
We were not talking about truth, and truth as a property of belief or knowledge has nothing to do with rational thinking. Your knowledge on something can be rational, but still be wrong.
Intelligence means knowing something, or being able to do something in coherent way. It is not same as The ability to acquire, understand, and use knowledgesomething, which are what rational thinking does. Corvus
I thought it was something like the ability to acquire, understand, and use knowledge. That would make it something different from knowledge but more about how to acquire knowledge.
You have modified the content of my post with your own writing. That is not what I wrote in my post on what intelligence means. It would help clarifying the points if you could go over what intelligence means, and what reasoning means in general terms, and think about the difference between the two.
Your knowledge on something can be rational, but still be wrong.
It is true that one can believe something on rational grounds, and be wrong. But if you are wrong, you didn't know it. Knowledge cannot be wrong. If someone believes that it will rain on Tuesday, and it doesn't, they didn't know that it will rain on Tuesday.
You have modified the content of my post with your own writing. That is not what I wrote in my post on what intelligence means. It would help clarifying the points if you could go over what intelligence means, and what reasoning means in general terms, and think about the difference between the two.
You seem to be misunderstanding me. I didn't modify your post at all. I simply presented to you my own definition of intelligence, which is different from yours.
We were not talking about truth, and truth as a property of belief or knowledge has nothing to do with rational thinking. Your knowledge on something can be rational, but still be wrong.
Clearly, we have different concepts of rationality. If rationality has nothing to do with truth, what is the point of it? How does it differ from reading tea leaves of consulting an astrologer?
There is certainly a problem about rational justification if one allows that someone can be justified in believing something and be wrong; it becomes even more confusing if you allow that someone can know something and be wrong. But the answer is to find a solution.
Yes, that's the idea that the psychologists are pursuing. But the evidence for the existence of such a mental capacity is thin, to say the least.
IQ tests were supposed to be such that one could not benefit from practising. But it turns out that you can, although it is also true that there is a limit to how much one can improve. It also turns out that IQ questions are culturally biased and it is very difficult to construct questions that are not biased in that way.
Everything that we learn to do is the result of our genes and our environment working together; one simply cannot disentangle one from the other.
Rational thought is less often used in the service of Truth than in achieving goals.
Yes, that's true. But I don't think we should be too hard on people who go along with the conventional views in society. It's perfectly possible to accept orthodoxy, not because it is easier, but because it seems to you to be true or even because you can't conceive of an alternative. It took thousands of years for us to develop the idea that there is something wrong with slavery and racism, and it seems absurd to think that all those people were morally deficient in some way.
I'm motivated by the reflection that much of what we believe and take for granted is likely to turn out to be false, or at least to be replaced by some other orthodoxy by our children or children's children. So I think I'm living in a glass house and don't want to start throwing stones.
IQ tests were supposed to be such that one could not benefit from practising.
They're also administered way too late. You have to be literate and numerate to take one; at least 10 years old. By then, whatever experiences you've had since birth formed most of your thinking. There are tests for development - generally aimed at detecting problems - but I'm not sure they're as reliable as the ones given to dogs and crows. Anecdotally, I can tell you that bright parents tend to have bright kids and stupid parents usually have dumb kids, and I could pick the most intelligent toddlers out of a day-care by watching them pay for twenty minutes. But that's not scientific evidence. Quoting Ludwig V
But I don't think we should be too hard on people who go along with the conventional views in society.
I'm not! Quite the reverse: I'm saying that those who didn't stick their necks out for what we consider "the truth" today were acting rationally. So are those who go along to get along now. (Maybe not Bezos, hedging his political bets...) Quoting Ludwig V
It took thousands of years for us to develop the idea that there is something wrong with slavery and racism, and it seems absurd to think that all those people were morally deficient in some way.
Some of them always knew. Very possibly, most of them did, whether they could conceive of an alternative or not. For damn sure, the gladiators in Rome did, and the abducted Africans in American cotton fields. The captives felt it was wrong to be captured, but when they had the chance, they would do the same to an enemy. Nobody wants to be first to stop: it's a sign of weakness. The Quakers knew, and early Mormons and the Cathari long before them. But... The Economy!!!! There is no bloody way a man doesn't know that it's wrong to batter his wife, or a woman doesn't know it's wrong to cripple her little granddaughter's feet, but one has license to unleash his temper and the other has cultural norms to uphold. It's convenient to go along, as well as safer and easier. But there have always been rebels who spoke out against the wrongs in their society - they mostly got killed in unpleasant ways - so we know those wrongs were perceived, even back then when everyone was supposed to be blind.
It is true that one can believe something on rational grounds, and be wrong. But if you are wrong, you didn't know it. Knowledge cannot be wrong. If someone believes that it will rain on Tuesday, and it doesn't, they didn't know that it will rain on Tuesday.
Checking out you knew or not, that is the work of reason. Reason itself is not truth.
You seem to be misunderstanding me. I didn't modify your post at all. I simply presented to you my own definition of intelligence, which is different from yours.
It is a very peculiar way of putting down your own definition on someone else's writing, making out as if it was written by someone else.
If reason cannot deliver truth, then it cannot verity my belief or knowledge.
Does reason deliver truth? It sounds not making sense. The sentence "Reason delivers truth." sounds not correct. Reason brings truth to you at your door step? Like a Amazon delivery van delivers what you have ordered from Amazon? I am not sure if that was what you meant. Hope not. You find out truth or falsity on something using reason.
Clearly, we have different concepts of rationality. If rationality has nothing to do with truth, what is the point of it? How does it differ from reading tea leaves of consulting an astrologer?
Rationality is a method to finding truth, but rationality itself is not truth. We do have different ideas not just on rationality, but also truth. All the best.
It took thousands of years for us to develop the idea that there is something wrong with slavery and racism, and it seems absurd to think that all those people were morally deficient in some way.
Sadly, they were. There are still many people like that. Slavery and genocide are still with us.
I'm not! Quite the reverse: I'm saying that those who didn't stick their necks out for what we consider "the truth" today were acting rationally. So are those who go along to get along now.
a career priest [Augustine] might propound Christian/Platonic values as a rational way to support the status quo.
I understood that as saying that Augustine might propound Christian/Platonic values in order to support the status quo - which is true. But then he would be guilty of hypocrisy. I wanted to point out that it is also possible that he might propound those values because he believed in Christianity and Platonism, whether or not they supported the status quo.
There are many cases when it is very hard to assess people. Heidegger (support for Nazism) and Hegel (support for the Prussian monarchy) are particularly difficult cases. Descartes has also been suspected, maybe because of his explicit policy of accepting orthodox morality while he is applying his methodology of doubt. I'm just saying that I don't think we should rush to judgement. But I see now that you were not rushing to judgement and I was. So I apologize.
Rational thought is less often used in the service of Truth than in achieving goals.
I'm not quite sure what you are saying here. Practical reason is inherently morally ambiguous; a bad actor can be entirely rational. It is only theoretical reason that is in the service of truth.
Sadly, they were. There are still many people like that. Slavery and genocide are still with us.
You are right about slavery and genocide. The (rather few) days when we could all be confident in the eventual triumph of western liberal values are long gone. It's all been a big let down.
But one cannot aspire to moral standards unless they can be articulated in the world that one lives in and I don't think it is appropriate to apply the standards of other societies to lives lived in that way. For example, the first traces in history of human rights did not appear until the fifth century BCE - in Persia. It took a long time before the idea was articulated in the late Roman Empire and even longer before Thomas Paine was able to articulate them with some clarity in the 18th century CE.
All that can be expected or required of us is to get along as well as we can in the world that we know, with all its many imperfections. That's the only standard that it is reasonable to apply. The virtues of saints and heroes are supererogatory - beyond what is required or expected. Certainly, they are to be admired, but it is not necessary to imitate them in order to live a good life.
I don't know about that, which is why I said 'might'. I do know Descartes was. I was only interested in the rationality of their thought, whatever the rationale - not in whether they actually believed in the product.
I'm not assessing people or judging their morals or psychoanalyzing them: I'm only concerned with whether the thought process being exhibited is rational or irrational. Without accusing anyone specific of lying, it is very often the most rational approach to a situation; a lunatic can shout out what he really thinks and feels, if he's heedless of the consequences. Quoting Ludwig V
Rational thought is less often used in the service of Truth than in achieving goals. Vera Mont
I'm not quite sure what you are saying here. Practical reason is inherently morally ambiguous; a bad actor can be entirely rational.
Again, I'm not concerned with anyone's morality. I'm concerned with judging whether a thought process is rational or irrational. If it achieves a discernible goal, opens a gate, invents a helicopter, evades a predator, earns you a promotion, liberates the cookies from the box, it's rational thought, whatever motivated the goal, whatever tactics were employed.
It is only theoretical reason that is in the service of truth.
Both require facts which are true. If one's goal is to discover some particular truth, like who broke into the Watergate, or whether Christine has been unfaithful, or how magnetism and electricity interact, or how many marbles will raise the water level so you can reach the treat, it's still goal-oriented thought. I don't believe there such a thing as a great big all-encompassing Truth to which you can apply rational thought. You can think quite a lot about how to talk about Truth, but you can't comprehend it with reason; the Truth is too abstract to capture with anything but faith. (Not saying definitively that It isn't 'out there'; only that I can't believe in it.) Quoting Ludwig V
But there it can be very hard to tell which of them has really put their finger on an actual wrong, as opposed to a perceived wrong.
Of course. My point was only that social injustices were always perceived by some people, even against an overwhelming cultural norm.
You can only judge according to your own values. If you assume that enslaving people is wrong and somebody in 400BCE spoke up against it, you're likely to think he perceived correctly. If you think people should be equal under the law, you'll probably disagree with the perception of legislators who blocked women's and Chinese immigrants' voting rights. Whether you think they were/are right or wrong, these actions are rational. The perceived/actual grievances of Maga cultists would be very difficult to sort out, but we could each do it, given a comprehensive list to compare with our own convictions. (but I can't drink hard liquor anymore)
Show me the Messiah(s) who will be followed to this new life.
Tell me when the movement reaches world-changing momentum.
Let's use rational thinking. The Messiah is based on a myth. Information collected from science and history is based on valid facts.
It took doctors at least a hundred years to believe sanitation was important after the first curious people began looking at bacteria in microscopes. Today knowledge spreads much faster. People in biblical times could not know of a distant war, as we know of our wars today, as they are happening in live color and full sound. That does not mean climate change, disease, famine, and lack of resources will not bring civilizations down, but it does mean we have a chance of making better decisions and this might just happen if we had a functioning democracy. A functioning democracy depends on education for that purpose. We had such an education in the past but not since the 1958 National Defense Education BUT some teachers and schools are better than others and a few people are making a difference.
This discussion goes far beyond what animals talk about, and this is why we should understand the difference between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom. Squacking a warning and responding to the roar of a bear or lion is communication, but it is not the language of humans. It is language and rational thinking that separates some of us from animals. Believing a mythology about a god making humans and then cursing them and punishing them or rewarding them is not rational thinking based on facts.
In the 1920s a small article in a newspaper warned, "Given our known supply of oil and rate of consumption, we are headed for economic disaster and possibly war". Soon after that all industrial economies crashed and the world went to war. Following the war, we maintained the social and economic behavior that brought us to war. That is not rational. We are behaving like animals incapable of rational thinking because we evolved from animals. Our ability to be rational is blocked by religion and ignorance. That is something we can change. We may not do so before destroying our planet and making our present civilizations impossible, but I do believe we can make better decisions.
You should be very careful not to be deceived by the word democracy. It could mean, that you must do anything irrational to justify the word. It would be wiser to stay critical and analytical on these fancy words which can be hollow inside, but can force people to irrational actions and thoughts.
"All gods have anger issues. Athena was just as petty and vengeful as the others." Wikipedia
:rage: Obviously you are ignorant of the ideology of democracy. That is a widespread problem. It would be wiser for you to question what you believe and what I believe, instead of making assumptions and attacking something you may not understand. It matters because it is the difference of having hope for the future or complete hopelessness. That hope is based on human intelligence and potential and only by being rational is that hope founded. So explain what think democracy is and why you object to it. This is the difference between reacting like an animal or reacting like a rational human.
You should be very careful about offending Athena.
Well, I would say that an economy that requires people to work for wages that cannot sustain a decent life is broken. But that requirement is so common that I suspect I'm just being idealistic. Still, it seems inhumane and immoral not to see those jobs as problematic.
I agree with everything you said. When Britain had to prepare for the war, it realized most of its military-age men were unfit to serve in the army and it was a matter of national survival to improve the health of the labor force. Industry was asked to pay higher wages to improve the condition of those living in poverty and Industry said it could not pay higher wages because that make everything cost more and they would lose their competitive advantage on the global market. That is around the world workers are being used as cheap labor so their nations can compete for world markets. Welfare subsidizes Industry by providing the assistance low wagers need. Only we have very little understanding of this so we are not managing our reality well.
Remember the saying cheap as dirt? It meant we had land and resources than people, and housing was very cheap. That is no longer true.
That is something we can change. We may not do so before destroying our planet and making our present civilizations impossible, but I do believe we can make better decisions.
Like you said: hundreds of years for this, decades for that.... Have you noticed what's happening in the US election? We simply ran out of time. What's the point of 'making better choices' when everyone left on the planet is fighting over the last habitable acre?
I don't believe there such a thing as a great big all-encompassing Truth to which you can apply rational thought. You can think quite a lot about how to talk about Truth, but you can't comprehend it with reason; the Truth is too abstract to capture with anything but faith. (Not saying definitively that It isn't 'out there'; only that I can't believe in it.)
Oh, I agree with you entirely about Truth. But I do think there are truths. (After that, it all gets complicated.)
That's true. But I would only make judgement taking into account the situation or context of the action - especially when it is very different from my own. BTW, I've heard people commenting on Descartes' personal moral stance before, but I've never quite understood what the problem is.
Welfare subsidizes Industry by providing the assistance low wagers need. Only we have very little understanding of this so we are not managing our reality well.
It is very curious that industry can be relied on to adopt the narrowest point of view. It's not as if industry doesn't end up footing the bill for their starvation wages. It doesn't seem to occur to them that they might have to pay smaller taxes if only they paid a decent wage and make bigger profits because they would have a larger market for their goods.
Like a Amazon delivery van delivers what you have ordered from Amazon? I am not sure if that was what you meant. Hope not. You find out truth or falsity on something using reason.
No, not like that at all. Your way of putting it is better.
Checking out you knew or not, that is the work of reason. Reason itself is not truth.
But then, I just don't understand what you mean by these comments. Reason and truth are not the same thing. But they are connected. You seem to recognize that, but then deny it. I must be missing something.
BTW, I've heard people commenting on Descartes' personal moral stance before, but I've never quite understood what the problem is.
No problem. After Galileo had his little confrontation with the good fathers - and quite rationally stood down from his heretical belief in the Earth moving around the sun - every thinker in Europe had some difficult moments rethinking their strategy. So Descartes has his big truth-seeking exercise: purges his mind of all beliefs, everything he's ever been taught, delves way down in there for one incontrovertible fact and comes up with "I exist" OK... "But wait, here's another incontrovertible truth: God. Didn't learn about God; it wasn't a belief: I just happened to find Him in here at the bottom of my completely empty mind. And now, I shall proceed to unfold my theory of a mechanistic universe, only God's winding all the clockwork animals. Oh, and people are a mechanistic body with a completely independent, immaterial soul.
Are you convinced of his sincerity?
You can't be moral when you're dead - so you compromise to stay alive. That's rational. The same person who made that compromise might still be honest with his friends, faithful to his wife, accurate in his court testimony, prompt in the payment of his debts and play a clean game of billiards.
Why insist that anyone be pure in both thinking and probity? That's just not human. The insides of our heads are never swept clean like Descartes imagined that one time.
But then, I just don't understand what you mean by these comments. Reason and truth are not the same thing. But they are connected. You seem to recognize that, but then deny it. I must be missing something.
I think I have tried to clarify the points enough from my side. There is nothing much more for me to add here. You seem to keep going around circle of deviation. I will leave you to it.
I am bowing out from this thread. All the best.
I agree. I don't even understand what you mean by a circle of deviation. I was indeed deviating in the sense that I was trying to break out of your circle of repetition. Best wishes to you as well.
After Galileo had his little confrontation with the good fathers - and quite rationally stood down from his heretical belief in the Earth moving around the sun - every thinker in Europe had some difficult moments rethinking their strategy. So Descartes has his big truth-seeking exercise: purges his mind of all beliefs, everything he's ever been taught, delves way down in there for one incontrovertible fact and comes up with "I exist" OK... "But wait, here's another incontrovertible truth: God. Didn't learn about God; it wasn't a belief: I just happened to find Him in here at the bottom of my completely empty mind. And now, I shall proceed to unfold my theory of a mechanistic universe, only God's winding all the clockwork animals. Oh, and people are a mechanistic body with a completely independent, immaterial soul.
Are you convinced of his sincerity?
Oddly enough, I am convinced of Descartes' sincerity. It is Galileo who gets himself into a morally complicated situation. (I mean that he could be accused of hypocrisy, but I think he was (rationally and morally) justified in what he did.)
Galileo, as you say, recanted. The inquisitors forbade him from teaching or even discussing his heretical theory. However, the story goes that, as he left the Vatican, he paused on the steps and said (to himself) "Even so, it moves". If he had said that in the hearing of the inquisitors, he would thereby have recanted his recantation. But he kept that remark to himself, thus leading the inquisitors to believe that he had rejected the theory that he actually believed - the essence of hypocrisy. But I agree with you about the need to survive as best we can, so I have no criticism of him.
Descartes' position is also complicated, but much less black-and-white than Galileo's. Of course, I don't question the repressive regime that all these guys lived under, and his position is not entirely clear; I don't deny that he may have been influenced by it. But the key point is that his scepticism is a thought-experiment. He presents his story in the Meditations as if he is really believing the sceptical conclusions. But his introduction makes it clear that he doesn't, and the reader knows perfectly well that he is going to go on and rescue the situation. The genius of the Meditations is that it is a story with a plot exactly like every adventure (thriller) story - disaster looms and seems inevitable, but our hero risks everything in order to dash in and rescue the situation. There are arguments, to be sure, but the suspense of the plot does the real work of persuasion. True, the world will seem different, but we are safe and that's the important thing. T.S. Eliot says it well - after all our wanderings we will come back home "and know the place for the first time"; there may even be toast and honey for tea. It is very odd that Descartes and Hume are both classified as sceptical philosophers, when actually, they are nothing of the kind.
The difference between the two is that Galileo pretended to accept that his theory was an erroneous hypothesis when he believed that it was a true account and while Descartes never pretended that his scepticism was more than a possibility; he was exploring it n order to refute it.
You can't be moral when you're dead - so you compromise to stay alive. That's rational. The same person who made that compromise might still be honest with his friends, faithful to his wife, accurate in his court testimony, prompt in the payment of his debts and play a clean game of billiards.
Why insist that anyone be pure in both thinking and probity? That's just not human. The insides of our heads are never swept clean like Descartes imagined that one time.
Yes, I agree with you. There's a kind of morality that makes black-and-white judgements and refuses to acknowledge complexity and ambiguity. Everyone has to duck and cover in order to get along. But without that society could not function. Keeping the peace and the show on the road are practically and morally important goals both for individuals and for the collective.
The difference between the two is that Galileo pretended to accept that his theory was an erroneous hypothesis when he believed that it was a true account and while Descartes never pretended that his scepticism was more than a possibility; he was exploring it n order to refute it.
Of course, Galileo was both right and wrong. He endorsed the Copernican system (Copernicus himself was rational enough not to publish in his lifetime) and rejected the far more accurate Keplerian system.
Descartes God was a creative invention, just like his clockwork world. It's easy to play back-and-dorth with fiction; take no principles at all.
Strictly speaking, instinctive behaviour is a set behaviour pattern that is not learned, but inherited. It is not, therefore, based on any process of learning or reasoning. It is capable of rational justification at the level of evolution as contributing to the ability of the creature to sruvive and reproduce.
I think it is plausible to think that we and the other animals may have an instinct to copy behavior. So some behaviors may be a combination of instinctive and learned. Learned not in the sense of deliberately taught but in the sense of acquired by mimicry.
But we do have to learn much body language in order to read it and it does not follow from the fact that we can read human body language that we can read the body language of other creatures without learning. But small children do have to be taught to recognize the body language of dogs.
I think we can instinctively read some body language both human and animal. I agree that the understanding of some body language must be learned. Not learned in the sense of being deliberately taught of course.
As far as we know only humans possess symbolic language.
Janus
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.research offers the first evidence that parrots learn their unique signature calls from their parents and shows that vocal signaling in wild parrots is a socially acquired rather than a genetically wired trait.
Does it follow that the parrot's signaling is symbolic though? I think part of what I would count as the possession of symbolic language consists in the ability to explicitly understand that such and such a sound, gesture or mark conventionally stands for whatever it symbolizes.
Reply to mcdoodle The same question as above regarding the dolphins. And not I am not denying that other animals might possess symbolic language. I'm questioning whether we have clear evidence that they do as opposed to having some evidence that they might.
Does it follow that the parrot's signaling is symbolic though? I think part of what I would count as the possession of symbolic language consists in the ability to explicitly understand that such and such a sound, gesture or mark conventionally stands for whatever it symbolizes.
?mcdoodle The same question as above regarding the dolphins. And not I am not denying that other animals might possess symbolic language. I'm questioning whether we have clear evidence that they do as opposed to having some evidence that they might.
The true test for whether other animals have symbolic language is not empirical but depends on what is meant by 'language'. Other animals don't seem to have anything that resembles our verbal language, but they may have other kinds of languages, and so do humans.
All animals use signals or symbols in the basic sense that a symbol is something that stands for something else. For example, an insect identifies a scent or sound or gesture, which symbolizes the presence of nutrients, mates, predators etc. Animals who live in groups benefit from shared symbolic labor, hence the evolution of genetically wired and socially acquired symbol systems.
There are many different kinds of symbol systems, also among humans. Human language is a verbal symbol system which has some syntactic and semantic properties that distinguishes it from non-verbal systems such as pictorial or musical or gestural that we also use.
So we might agree that other animals don't have a symbolic language in the sense that the language has the kind of syntactic and semantic properties that human verbal language has. But that doesn't rule out the possibility that they have other symbolic languages. I find it uncontroversial that I'm using symbolic language based on gestures and sounds when I talk to my cat.
Descartes God was a creative invention, just like his clockwork world. It's easy to play back-and-dorth with fiction; take no principles at all.
H'm. You seem to really have it in for Descartes. He is iconic and takes a lot of stick. But he wasn't the one who invented God, or even the argument he used to argue for the reality of that God. True, he contributed massively to the clockwork world, there were many others involved as well. But still, you're not wrong.
I think it is plausible to think that we and the other animals may have an instinct to copy behavior. So some behaviors may be a combination of instinctive and learned. Learned not in the sense of deliberately taught but in the sense of acquired by mimicry.
That's perfectly true and I think that mimicry is more important to our learning that is generally recognized. People seem to prefer to emphasis association. I don't know why. Aristotle knew better, of course, and I think he may be alone amongst the canonical philosophers in that.
I think part of what I would count as the possession of symbolic language consists in the ability to explicitly understand that such and such a sound, gesture or mark conventionally stands for whatever it symbolizes.
There's a bit of a problem with that. Articulating our understanding of how to use words and construct sentences is much more difficult than it seems. For the most part, mostly our use of language is underpinned by skills that we do not, and often cannot, articulate.
So we might agree that other animals don't have a symbolic language in the sense that the language has the kind of syntactic and semantic properties that human verbal language has.
I see our language capability as a hyper-development of abilities that (all? most?) animals have to a greater or less extent. Other species have hyper-developed other abilities, such as the hyper-development of echo-location in bats and dolphins or vision in hawks and other predator birds.
You seem to really have it in for Descartes. He is iconic and takes a lot of stick.
In for? You mean judge him as I would any mortal making his way in the real world? Okay, I do hate what he and his cohort did to our relationship with nature and other species, the two hundred years of suffering they inflicted on helpless animals. He's not responsible for that; he's just a participant who was clever enough to make himself an icon. My insignificant opinion won't deter any of his fans.
But we were not talking about that. I was referring to his very sensible use of God to avoid confrontation with the Inquisition. Spending time in the more tolerant Netherlands was a smart move, too. Icons are for the faithful. I have no faiths. But I would have pretended whatever was required if the inquisitors had their eye on me; I certainly don't fault anyone for doing it, and if they're clever enough, turning it to their own advantage.
But he wasn't the one who invented God, or even the argument he used to argue for the reality of that God.
He just pretended to rediscover it after ridding himself of all learned beliefs. It was merely an example of rational thinking not subjugated to truth.
I do hate what he and his cohort did to our relationship with nature and other species, the two hundred years of suffering they inflicted on helpless animals
That's fair enough. I actually agree about the suffering. It's just that I doubt that he and his colleagues made much practical difference. It's not as if animal welfare has ever been a moral issue before our time.
I was referring to his very sensible use of God to avoid confrontation with the Inquisition.
That's a question of his motivation. There's a passage in the Discourse on Method where he says that while he is subjecting his beliefs to methodical doubt, he sticks to conventional views. That can certainly be read as pragmatic rather than sincere.
He just pretended to rediscover it after ridding himself of all learned beliefs
It would prefer "after supposedly ridding himself of all learned beliefs". It is hard to believe he hadn't read Aquinas' Five Ways and it wouldn't be surprising if he did a bit of cherry-picking through the rubbish.
I actually agree about the suffering. It's just that I doubt that he and his colleagues made much practical difference. It's not as if animal welfare has ever been a moral issue before our time.
It was a moral issue in Descartes' time.
The response to Descartes I want to look at here though, is not modern. It belongs to a now little-known philosopher called Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), a younger contemporary of Descartes. Cudworth was an Anglican theologian, a keen Classicist, and for most of his career, Cambridge Universitys Professor of Hebrew. Along with the aforementioned Henry More, he was a leading member of a group of philosophers known as the Cambridge Platonists, who promoted the relevance of Platonic philosophy to contemporary life and thought. Although he agreed with Descartes on many things, Cudworth thought (as did More) that Descartes view of animals as mindless machines was implausible.
He defended his entrenched mechanistic position in many arguments. His main theme was: They have no souls; therefore they feel neither pleasure nor pain. But admitted that they can exhibit "passions".... The guy had a dog in his house. Was he unable to see the dog's responses as being like his own, or he did he choose to ignore the similarity because it wasn't convenient? Remember, this is not a stupid man; he's defending a theory - at least in public.Quoting Ludwig V
It would prefer "after supposedly ridding himself of all learned beliefs".
I was skeptical, too. But it's what he claimed as the object of the exercise: get to the truth by doubting everything he'd ever been taught or believed. (Except that.)
Why are you going on out on a plausibility limb to defend a hypocrisy that can't be sanctioned or punished at this late date? It served his purpose, so that was the rational path.
Reply to jkop Sure it can depend on how you define "symbolic language". Via symbolic language as I understand and define it we can explicitly understand ourselves to be whatever it is we take ourselves to be. We can understand ourselves to be possessed of symbolic language on account of being possessed of symbolic language for example. Do you believe there is any evidence that any other animals can do that?
There's a bit of a problem with that. Articulating our understanding of how to use words and construct sentences is much more difficult than it seems. For the most part, mostly our use of language is underpinned by skills that we do not, and often cannot, articulate.
I was referring to a more modest capacitythe ability to articulate that we can use words and construct sentences. I wasn't claiming that we can articulate in any comprehensive sense how it is that we are able to do that.
Via symbolic language as I understand and define it we can explicitly understand ourselves to be whatever it is we take ourselves to be. We can understand ourselves to be possessed of symbolic language on account of being possessed of symbolic language for example. Do you believe there is any evidence that any other animals can do that?
Yes, because the ability to understand things in the environment remotely via symbols (natural or socially constructed) is a function of any animal's interest.
Bees, for instance, are interested in flowers, and benefit from having a specific symbol system (waggles) for sharing the direction and distance to flowers. Bees can identify their own and each other's functions and symbolic behaviours.
However, to understand oneself or one's possession of symbolic language is either necessary nor sufficient for possessing symbolic language.
Why are you going on out on a plausibility limb to defend a hypocrisy that can't be sanctioned or punished at this late date? It served his purpose, so that was the rational path.
Well, if you said that Galileo was a hypocrite, I would agree on the basis that it was, technically, but justified on the basis that being tortured or burnt at the stake was an unreasonable price to pay for following a purely academic line of research and so lying was a rational way to get out of his situation, even though, if you are a Kantian, lying is always wrong. Why? Because he explicitly contradicted himself. Descartes' case is much less clear. I'm just calling it as I see it.
I was skeptical, too. But it's what he claimed as the object of the exercise: get to the truth by doubting everything he'd ever been taught or believed. (Except that.)
There's a genuine argument against radical scepticism, that no-one can seriously doubt that he is now sitting beside a stove, which will burn one if one isn't careful. Descartes isn't quite in that bracket because he frames his doubt as "merely" theoretical.
Cudworth thought (as did More) that Descartes view of animals as mindless machines was implausible.
I had heard of Cudworth. But I didn't know he crossed swords with Descartes. However, his critique is milder than yours, in my book.
I would expect, however that Cudworth did not think that animals had souls and did think that because they did not, they were of less or no moral value and consequently eating them was perfectly OK.
I was referring to a more modest capacitythe ability to articulate that we can use words and construct sentences. I wasn't claiming that we can articulate in any comprehensive sense how it is that we are able to do that.
Well, yes. Animals cannot articulate anything in that way. But that takes us back to the question what the significance is of the various species-unique abilities we can learn - given that every species is unique in some way.
Well, if you said that Galileo was a hypocrite, I would agree on the basis that it was, technically, but justified on the basis that being tortured or burnt at the stake was an unreasonable price to pay for following a purely academic line of research and so lying was a rational way to get out of his situation,
Of course it was. Wouldn't you? Joan of Arc was crazy; Giordano Bruno was an ideologue. Most of us normal people practice some degree of hypocrisy, simply to get by, and more to get along. Quoting Ludwig V
even though, if you are a Kantian, lying is always wrong.
I'm not, and that's a ridiculous, unrealistic position. Also, in many case, immoral. Quoting Ludwig V
Descartes' case is much less clear.
He learned a lesson from other men's examples. He was smarter than most of his contemporaries - smarter than Galileo who seems to have considered himself the smartest man alive. Quoting Ludwig V
Descartes isn't quite in that bracket because he frames his doubt as "merely" theoretical.
That doesn't persuade me of his sincerity. If it persuades you, all's well. Quoting Ludwig V
However, his critique is milder than yours, in my book.
Yes. He was encumbered by the 'soul' issue; I'm not. Quoting Ludwig V
I would expect, however that Cudworth did not think that animals had souls
But Cudworth didnt think that the similarity between man and beast was purely biologically based, as most of us would argue today. Instead, Cudworth argued that animals, like humans, have souls.
Descartes also preferred to replace "vivisection/torture" with "killing and eating" in the moral argument. It's way more acceptable to defend throwing chunks of beef in a pot than dislocating a dog's shoulders and hips, then nailing his paws to a plank and slitting his belly open, all the while he's screaming in agony. Most people who object to torture (then and now) do not object to killing enemies in war, or eating humanely-killed flesh. Most people in the argument do not draw the moral line at possession of a soul or human language (though some philosophers still do) but at deliberate infliction of pain on a sentient being, for whatever reason. Let's shift those posts back to the real issue.
Of which vivisection was an offshoot. It does demonstrate hypocrisy: he could maintain - paraphrased by the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche - that animals eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing. and yet take Monsieur Grat for a walk, fully expecting that the dog would not shit on his rug, expecting him to obey commands and and appreciate treats.
But it's the God argument I originally mentioned.
Had he been entirely honest in that meditation, he would have questioned all beliefs, rather than making the church's case. Theoretically. Funny, how it all works out, innit?
I never blamed him for that hypocrisy: it was the rational choice.
That God/soul problem persisted in all philosophical arguments as long as the HRC held Europe in its grip. After the Reformation, thinking became a little more free and diverse, even though most Protestant sects were also intolerant of agnostic ideas - but at least they didn't have an Inquisition to cow their own congregants into silence. A couple of them still persecuted witches and expelled heretics, but they were less dangerous than the unchecked (and profoundly corrupt) Catholic church. Quoting Ludwig V
There's not way of knowing, and consequently no evidence that it was just a matter of convenience.
Convenience was my guess. You have other choices: absolute conviction in the teeth of all evidence, willful self-delusion, subconscious delusion, fear of prosecution, sadistic monster.... More if you can find them. But I still don't understand why you want to, when it's independent of the serendipitous discovery of God (....the majority of whose creatures are nothing but noisy machines. Pretty damn disrespectful of the Creator for a devout Christian - but that, too, is beside the point.) All humans compartmentalize their beliefs and attitudes. There are no sane, intelligent, totally honest humans.
Well, yes. Animals cannot articulate anything in that way. But that takes us back to the question what the significance is of the various species-unique abilities we can learn - given that every species is unique in some way.
Yes, I agree that every species is unique in some way. For us it just happened to be symbolic language (unless there is at least one other species that unbeknownst to us also possesses it).
However, to understand oneself or one's possession of symbolic language is either necessary nor sufficient for possessing symbolic language.
I guess it all depends on how you define "symbolic language". As I see it the abstractive ability that enables explicit self-reflective awareness would be the defining feature.
Yes, because the ability to understand things in the environment remotely via symbols (natural or socially constructed) is a function of any animal's interest.
For non-symbolically linguistic animals I would say instead "the ability to understand things in the environment via signs".
That's just how he did justify the moral position held by a minority of thinkers at the time that it's wrong to torture animals.
So I've learnt something to-day. Thank you for the link. I have looked through it, but not read it carefully yet.
I'm losing my grip on what our disagreement is about. Perhaps you'll forgive my not following the convention of linking my comments to quotations from what you say. Instead, I'ld like to offer an analysis of where we are at.
We seem to be using "hypocrisy" in slightly different ways. I think I can best explain through a different case. Many people seem to use the word "lying" to mean simply saying what is false. Whether they attach a moral judgement to the word is not clear to me, but my understanding of it is that saying what is false, knowing it to be false and with intent to deceive is morally reprehensible.
So, for me, saying what one sincerely believes to be true, even if it turns out to be false, is not lying. There's an exception, that one might sincerely believe something because of wishful thinking, or carelessness; but saying that it is true is a different moral failing, for which we don't have a name (I think). In the same way, you seem to call behaving in ways that are inconsistent "hypocrisy" but you seem to exempt some hypocrisy from moral criticism, if it has a rational justification.
But then, there is a difficulty about the intersection of rationality with morality. We like to think that they don't conflict. But when you say that Descartes was hypocritical but rational, I conclude that you are saying that the rationality of his hypocrisy justifies it, or at least exempts is from moral censure. I find that very confusing.
I believe it is the case that Descartes never indulged in the vicious torture of nailing animals to planks, but that some students who followed Descartes did. Furthermore, it seem that he also kept a companion dog in his house, which seems incompatible with believing that the animal was just a machine. Here's my opinion. The students were guilty of consistency, illustrating how rigid adherence to a ideology can lead one into really vicious moral errors. Descartes, on the other hand, was technically inconsistent with his theoretical beliefs, but exhibited good sense in not following through from his theory to his practice.
But then, there is a difficulty about the intersection of rationality with morality.
I do believe - sincerely - that they do not conflict. Any more than a pencil and brush in an artist's satchel, or a hammer and pliers in a carpenter's toolbox. Our mental equipment includes a great many tools that are separate one from another. When I say something is rational, I mean that it is based on observed or assumed fact and is aimed at solving a problem or achieving a goal. There is no value judgment here of the worthiness of the goal or the cause of the problem. Whether it's aimed at a better cancer treatment or a more effective weapon of mass destruction, the thought process is rational.
I believe it is the case that Descartes never indulged in the vicious torture of nailing animals to planks, but that some students who followed Descartes did.
I don't know whether he did it or only defended the prevailing practice. It doesn't matter now. It mattered when the prevailing practice was questioned, opposed, justified on philosophical grounds and therefore continued. In this, he was greatly influential.
The rational component of that justification is the aim of gaining more knowledge of physiology*. The moral component - if there is one in your world-view - is wilful disregard of the pain caused.
*If a person truly believes that the mechanical dog and feeling man are of different kinds, why would he consider the physiology of dogs useful in understanding how humans work? Does it matter that the vast majority of humans do not philosophize and some cannot speak? In fact, the doctors dissected executed people in the same lecture hall as the vivisection lessons. They were not legally permitted to study live humans, so they went to the next best thing. Can you possibly imagine none of these intelligent men knew what the screaming signified?
I never understood why you introduced the moral component. Quoting Ludwig V
So, for me, saying what one sincerely believes to be true, even if it turns out to be false, is not lying. There's an exception, that one might sincerely believe something because of wishful thinking, or carelessness; but saying that it is true is a different moral failing, for which we don't have a name
There is no need to conflate those ideas. Obviously, stating one's belief is not lying. It only becomes so if one is exposed to the truth and rejects it. Making oneself believe what isn't true is lying to oneself, whether it's said to anyone else or not. Nobody believes falsehoods through simple carelessness, though they may repeat what they've heard because they don't care enough to reflect. That may be trivial or criminal, depending on the falsehood and its effect on the world.
But why is lying a immoral? There are many reasons to lie, some of them laudable, some despicable. There are also many styles and standards morality; what one culture or individual applauds, another may despise. I don't believe there has ever been a sane adult in the world who is or was morally pure, or entirely truthful or altogether devoid of hypocrisy. None of our heroes and role models are so much more perfect than we are.
Why is that a problem?
Yes, I agree that every species is unique in some way. For us it just happened to be symbolic language (unless there is at least one other species that unbeknownst to us also possesses it).
Some people think that there are number of factors working together. That seems a very likely possibility. Our bipedalism allowed our front feet to develop into hands which enabled us to handle objects in a much more precise way. Our large (for our body size) brain allowed us to develop our kind of language. Not to mention the critical importance of our being a social animal, without which our technologies could not have developed.
Like you said: hundreds of years for this, decades for that.... Have you noticed what's happening in the US election? We simply ran out of time. What's the point of 'making better choices' when everyone left on the planet is fighting over the last habitable acre?
Societies swing. Some things get worse and worse until people unite to change what is causing things to get worse. This is the fun of life. We have problems to resolve.
I want to invite everyone to a symposium where I will serve tea and coffee, cookies, and donuts and share some old grade school test books. I have pulled out my old math text books because I am helping a child with math. The old textbooks relate math to everyday living so a child can relate to what is being taught. As important as math is, it is not the only thing the books teach. The second-grade book especially teaches consideration and good manners.
People made a terrible mistake when they thought we only taught reading, writing, and arithmetic. The old books were very much about transmitting a culture, good citizenship, and family values. In 1958 teaching decisions were turned over to those most interested in war, and we stopped transmitting the culture we were transmitting in favor of education for technology. We stopped teaching social values and independent thinking because we did not know what values a high-tech society would need and leaving moral training the church, meant a faster shift into a high-tech society with unknown values.
That was the education Germany had before Hitler took control. Without lessons for consideration and good manners, we have selfishness, and self-centered decision-making, and tend to be reactionary instead of thoughtful and rational human beings. The Christian mythology is very much a part of this problem and leaving moral training to the Church is a terrible mistake.
That is the bottom line of this thread. The differences between animals and humans, and why we are not as civilized as educated people used to be.
We seem to be using "hypocrisy" in slightly different ways. I think I can best explain through a different case. Many people seem to use the word "lying" to mean simply saying what is false. Whether they attach a moral judgement to the word is not clear to me, but my understanding of it is that saying what is false, knowing it to be false and with intent to deceive is morally reprehensible.
So, for me, saying what one sincerely believes to be true, even if it turns out to be false, is not lying. There's an exception, that one might sincerely believe something because of wishful thinking, or carelessness; but saying that it is true is a different moral failing, for which we don't have a name (I think). In the same way, you seem to call behaving in ways that are inconsistent "hypocrisy" but you seem to exempt some hypocrisy from moral criticism, if it has a rational justification.
This thread is wondering and that is a good thing because from the beginning the importance of the subject is how we treat each other and teach our children.
I woke up this morning listening to a lecture about human rights. It troubles me greatly that Aristotle thought some people are born to be slaves and slavery is an important part of family order, and that the Church used Aristotle for the education called Scholasticism. Martin Luther believed we are preordained by God to be masters or slaves and he thought the witch hunts were necessary.
Obviously, false beliefs have been part of our civilizations. AND this is what makes a discussion of thinking like an animal versus the language-based rational thinking of educated humans, important. How do we know truth? What does knowing truth have to do with democracy, rule by reason?
Societies swing. Some things get worse and worse until people unite to change what is causing things to get worse. This is the fun of life. We have problems to resolve.
The dying planet won't wait for us to swing around like a leaking oil tanker. Quoting Athena
That is the bottom line of this thread. The differences between animals and humans, and why we are not as civilized as educated people used to be.
Have you looked at any newspaper headlines lately?
Which animals are less civilized and rational than humans?
It is very curious that industry can be relied on to adopt the narrowest point of view. It's not as if the industry doesn't end up footing the bill for their starvation wages. It doesn't seem to occur to them that they might have to pay smaller taxes if only they paid a decent wage and make bigger profits because they would have a larger market for their goods.
That argument has troubled my thinking for many years. Who is going to buy the stuff that makes corporations rich, if the people can not afford it? When Adam Smith wrote of economics he also wrote of morality and explained the importance of good morality to economic success.
Okay if good morality is essential to a good economy, why isn't this an important part of education? In case you haven't read what I said about an old math book for second-grade children, the book is very much about morals. If we understand the relationship between morals and a healthy economy/civilization is a matter of cause and effect, then we are strongly motivated to be moral, and this distinguishes humans from other animals. When we don't teach morals along with math, we get self-centered, reactionary humans, no better than animals.
Okay, gang, Thrift Books has a few books written by Adam Smith for very little money. From what I gather about politics in the US is the number 1 concern is economics. I have ordered a couple of books and it would be great to have a thread addressing morals and economics. That would be a discussion no other animal is going to have. The impact of global warming is making our present path of self-destruction insane! Animals can destroy other species, but not the whole planet.
There is no value judgment here of the worthiness of the goal or the cause of the problem. Whether it's aimed at a better cancer treatment or a more effective weapon of mass destruction, the thought process is rational.
That's fair enough. There's a nasty gap, however, in how one assesses the worthiness of the goal or what's a problem, rather than a feature. But let's leave that alone, for now.
It mattered when the prevailing practice was questioned, opposed, justified on philosophical grounds and therefore continued. In this, he was greatly influential.
It would take an angel to be on the right side of every debate at the same time. But then, you have high standards, it would seem.
He was indeed influential. But that doesn't necessarily mean that he approved of everything his followers did. I don't think anyone knows (unless you've got a source) what he thought of his followers in Amsterdam. For all we know, he would have disowned them.
Can you possibly imagine none of these intelligent men knew what the screaming signified?
Yes and no. In the '50's, there was (in the UK) a big scandal about a toxicological test that involved dropping chemicals in the eyes of rabbits to find out what dose was required to kill 50% of the subjects. It was known as the L(ethal) D(ose) 50 test. The goal was, no doubt, desirable, but involved a great deal of pain for the rabbits. So they didn't report that the rabbits screamed in pain, but that they "vocalized". The defence, no doubt, was that it was important to preserve scientific objectivity. So they reported only the facts, without any subjective interpretation. Another example of how indoctrination with an ideology is at least as dangerous, and arguably more vicious, as old-fashioned vices like greed and sadism.
Unfortunately, our language is not neatly divided between facts and values. Some concepts incorporate an evaluative judgement as well as a factual component. Murder is not simply killing, but wrongful killing. Pain is not simply a sensation but a sensation that we seek to avoid and that, if we have any humanity, we will help others to avoid. And so on.
Actually, you are right - not all lying is wrong; we even have an expression (at least in my possibly rather archaic version of English) for lies that are OK - white lies. Nonetheless, deliberately leading someone to believe something that you know to be false is generally disapproved of. Ditto for hypocrisy.
So I thought you introduced the moral element and I was responding to that.
Obviously, stating one's belief is not lying. It only becomes so if one is exposed to the truth and rejects it. Making oneself believe what isn't true is lying to oneself, whether it's said to anyone else or not. Nobody believes falsehoods through simple carelessness, though they may repeat what they've heard because they don't care enough to reflect. That may be trivial or criminal, depending on the falsehood and its effect on the world.
That sounds rather hard on people. Surely, if I'm exposed to some evidence for an idea, but there's not enough evidence to justify believing it, I am right to reject it, even if it turns out later to be true. In any case, there isn't enough time to live a life and think carefully about everything we need to know.
I don't believe there has ever been a sane adult in the world who is or was morally pure, or entirely truthful or altogether devoid of hypocrisy. None of our heroes and role models are so much more perfect than we are. Why is that a problem?
I don't think it is. The best we can do is to try to avoid the biggest failures. So forgiveness becomes important, to prevent pursuit of the good turning into the tyranny of perfection.
It troubles me greatly that Aristotle thought some people are born to be slaves and slavery is an important part of family order,
The conventional defence is that nobody in the world at that time had any doubt about slavery. It's asking a lot of someone to come up with a revolutionary idea like that - indeed, it took centuries for human beings to develop the ideas that we take for granted.
What troubles me more than his ideas about slavery is that there appear to be some people around who are trying to promote his argument as a justification of slavery today.
If you look at the details, though, you'll find that his version of slavery strips out a great deal of what makes it so objectionable. It can be read as a promotion of decent treatment for slaves, including the opportunity to learn how to be free and a ban on enslaving free people.
Who is going to buy the stuff that makes corporations rich, if the people can not afford it?
Good question. I keep wondering who will buy all the products when production and distribution are completely handed over to robots and AI. I suppose the machines could sell things to each other, but they can only pay if they are paid for their labour.
When Adam Smith wrote of economics he also wrote of morality and explained the importance of good morality to economic success.
Yes. The problem is that it is in the interest of everyone to work out a free ride on everyone else's virtue, and it is against the interest of everyone to behave well and get ripped off. Race to the bottom.
Which animals are less civilized and rational than humans?
2 minutes ago
All animals are less civilized and rational. You may look at them and see rational decisions, but it is your human brain doing the rationalizing, not the animals. The difference between our brains and other animals is biological. No matter how smart our dogs are, we are not going to give them voting rights.
I will say bears are less civilized than humans. Mother bears must protect their children from their fathers who kill them. Lions in a pride have a degree of civility, however, if the males get old and can not defend the rest of the pride, invading males kill not only the males but also their children. Israel is proving how cruel humans can be to other humans. That is a civilization failure. Israel's failure to make peace when it holds most of the power is a human and civilization failure based on myth, not rational. It is much easier for humans to act as animals than it is for animals to behave as humans.
It would take an angel to be on the right side of every debate at the same time. But then, you have high standards, it would seem.
And that's a bad thing? It didn't take any angels to establish animal protection laws - just a lot of determined ordinary people, with ordinary IQ's and no individual influence. I didn't ask him to be on the right side of every debate; I do blame him for endorsing one particularly horrific practice. Quoting Ludwig V
But that doesn't necessarily mean that he approved of everything his followers did
In the face of the vigorous philosophical arguments he made supporting the clockwork idea, approval would seem the least of his complicity. Probably, most of the inquisitors didn't personally heat the pincers, but they understood the use of hot pincers and published theological justification for their use.
Why?
[Surely, if I'm exposed to some evidence for an idea, but there's not enough evidence to justify believing it, I am right to reject it, [/quote] Without consideration, or further inquiry? Well, I just hope you're not an antivaxer. I've encountered a few intelligent posters who keep insisting that we go back to original research, because there's just not enough evidence to support the theory of evolution. I do think that's willful ignorance. It's their loss; I don't punish them for it. I probably do the same regarding subjects I don't care about. Quoting Ludwig V
In any case, there isn't enough time to live a life and think carefully about everything we need to know.
Ignoring what you need to know will cause errors, maybe serious ones, in your life. We all make some bad judgments because we didn't think things through. But, sure, you choose to learn what matters to you. And then you lie about some things you know when lying serves a purpose that matters to you. That's all rational thinking. Quoting Ludwig V
Nonetheless, deliberately leading someone to believe something that you know to be false is generally disapproved of.
Not by all the parents who tell their children about Santa Claus! I think their story is silly, too readily exploitable, not thoroughly considered - but their motives are benign. Nor all the spy agencies in the world, convinced that they are defending their country and its values.
It depends on why you're doing it: to protect potential victims, or to benefit from the deception - from laudable to trivial to reprehensible. Quoting Ludwig V
So forgiveness becomes important, to prevent pursuit of the good turning into the tyranny of perfection.
Sure. But let's try to be accurate in our observations and honest in our assessment.
It's for their God, not me, to absolve them for their motives or toss them into The Pit for their crimes.
The conventional defence is that nobody in the world at that time had any doubt about slavery. It's asking a lot of someone to come up with a revolutionary idea like that - indeed, it took centuries for human beings to develop the ideas that we take for granted.
What troubles me more than his ideas about slavery is that there appear to be some people around who are trying to promote his argument as a justification of slavery today.
If you look at the details, though, you'll find that his version of slavery strips out a great deal of what makes it so objectionable. It can be read as a promotion of decent treatment for slaves, including the opportunity to learn how to be free and a ban on enslaving free people.
Thank you for the additional information about Aristotle's acceptance of slavery based on his sense of human decency that went with it. In the argument "what is justice" Socrates argued when people are exploited, sooner or later they become a problem to the whole of society. In the USA South, southerners have dealt with this reality, and wherever discrimination suppressed another race the exploited people, they have become a problem. Allowing this to happen is just bad logic!
Knowledge and learned higher-order thinking skills are essential to good decision-making. Ignorance and false beliefs are very harmful. Unfortunately, we do not understand the pursuit of happiness Jefferson wrote of in the US Declaration of Independence is the pursuit of knowledge, not eating a 3-scope ice cream cone or other tawdry pleasures.
Turning our liberty over to AI is to totally miss the value of the human experience is our ability to learn, communicate, and change the world. That separates us from other animals.
Good question. I keep wondering who will buy all the products when production and distribution are completely handed over to robots and AI. I suppose the machines could sell things to each other, but they can only pay if they are paid for their labour.
That is a conundrum. I have read the Aztecs had an economy based on human energy, not gold or GNP. The value of a woven basket being the skill and time spent making it. If hard work got good pay, those who work in the fields would get very good pay. I think we need to rethink our distribution of resources. That is something animals don't need to worry about. :lol: Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. The problem is that it is in the interest of everyone to work out a free ride on everyone else's virtue, and it is against the interest of everyone to behave well and get ripped off. Race to the bottom.
Thrift Books has a few books written by Adam Smith for very little money.
Athena
I'm sure it would be quite an eye-opener to see what he actually said.
an hour ago
So here is the deal if a strong economy depends on morals, it is self-destructive to be immoral. It is simple logic, cause and effect. Today the problem is ignorance. We do not share essential knowledge for good moral decisions. :groan: Leaving moral training to the Church was the worst thing we could have done.
I have ordered Adam Smith's book about economic morality because I think this might be the most important knowledge for the world today, and only if those of us who care, act on that caring, is there hope for the future. We must get religion out of our moral thinking and put reason back in it! I think understanding this goes with understanding the human difference, instead of believing biblical myth. We are 90% animal and 10% human. We need to drop the myth that prevents us from holding knowledge of reality.
All animals are less civilized and rational.
Athena
I respectfully disagree.
No matter how smart our dogs are, we are not going to give them voting rights.
Athena
Or exemption from the gas chamber if there are more of them than we like. I know. But then we don't treat our fellow humans any better.
Some of us are horrified by animal and human brutality and others are not. Why do you think we perceive things so differently?
Probably, most of the inquisitors didn't personally heat the pincers, but they understood the use of hot pincers and published theological justification for their use.
Now I'm confused. Are discussing the wickedness of Descartes or of the Inquisition? Perhaps you just mean that they are a parallel case. In which case, where does Descartes publish a justification for the use of nails and planks on animals?
I've encountered a few intelligent posters who keep insisting that we go back to original research, because there's just not enough evidence to support the theory of evolution. I do think that's wilful ignorance. It's their loss; I don't punish them for it. I probably do the same regarding subjects I don't care about.
It is indeed wilful ignorance, although they are something of a public nuisance. On the other hand, we all have to pay the price of the anti-vaxers' wilful ignorance.
Sure. But let's try to be accurate in our observations and honest in our assessment.
It's for their God, not me, to absolve them for their motives or toss them into The Pit for their crimes.
Accurate and honest, certainly. Are we including fair and balanced as well? I hope so.
If it's for God to absolve them, isn't it also for their God to judge them?
Oh, dear - again? Didn't I link the correspondence. You can read the fifth meditation, if you like. It's exceeding tedious in describing the heart and circulation, but does explicitly recommend the reader to witness it in 'any large animal'. There's a lot of guff about the soul and reason and why animals don't have those things: because they don't speak French. Quoting Ludwig V
Are we including fair and balanced as well?
You mean like Trump(except we have to sanewash him)=Harris(except we set the bar higher)? I don't think so.
Reply to Vera Mont
You are right that our discussioin has become unproductive and annoying. We aren't making progress. That's a shame but it's probably best if we leave it where it is. Thank you for your time and patience.
Thinking about one's own belief is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognition is existentially dependent upon common language/shared meaning.
creativesoul
Well, if it is dependent on shared meaning (as opposed to common language), then animals could know themselves.
Only if all shared meaning enables and/or facilitates thinking about our own thought and belief(metacognition). Not all does.
Good catch! :wink:
While there is difference between shared meaning and common language, it is not inevitably one of oppositional nature. I find it's more one of existential dependency. It's one of shared elemental constituency; an evolutional history, that of which existed in its entirety prior to being picked out of this world by me.
Some meaningful experience existed in its entirety prior to common language emergence. All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Language less creatures predate language users. Thus, some meaning is prior to common language. <-----that's very important on my view, particularly when talking about meaningful experiences of non human creatures.
A bit on shared meaning, because there is more than one way to understand that notion.
We can draw correlations between the same sorts of things. <----------- That's shared meaning in the sense of common to us both. Add language use and other things(as the content of correlations) and that's the sort of shared meaning required for successful communication.
A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. Hunger. That happens while their eating. The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above? I think so, although it is not something that we can verify with certainty.
I'm claiming that there is another sort of shared meaning, which I find to be irrevocable for the emergence of the sort described heretofore...
Two creatures that have never encountered one another can both want water and know exactly where to go in order to acquire it(how to get water). That's commonly held belief formed, held, and/or had by virtue of different creatures drawing correlations between the same things. Thirst. A place to drink. No language necessary there. Antelopes and elephants both know where to get water. Where's there's belief, there's always meaning. That's shared meaning.
As it pertains to metacognitive endeavors and the sort of thought that that facilitates...
Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires something to be thought about. That something existed in its entirety prior to being talked about. We use the terms "thought", "belief", "meaningful experience", "mind", etc. How do we think about our own thoughts, beliefs, dreams, meaningful experiences? With naming and descriptive practices. There's no evidence to the contrary, and there's plenty to support that. I think we agree on that much, so perhaps we can set that aside and attempt to move forward?
Assuming that there is such a thing as non human thought or human thought prior to when language acquisition begins in earnest. In seeking to make sense of this, we're isolating/delineating/targeting/defining thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience that existed in its entirety prior to being talked about(prior to naming and descriptive practices).
Oh, and I'm sorry for the seemingly unconnected dots. I'm sometimes prone for doing that.
Thanks. However, I'm a bit hesitant about taking this up again. I didn't intend to upset you before, so I'm concerned that I might do so again. I shall try to keep everything that I say impersonal, in the hope that will suffice.
I'm sorry I have taken to so long to reply. I have had some distractions over the last few days. Nothing problematic, but things that needed to be attended to. But I'll put something together tomorrow.
creativesoulNovember 06, 2024 at 22:00#9453760 likes
You've overestimated my upsettedness... :wink: I was just trying to nip personal attacks in the bud. That was also weeks back. Anyway, take your time, as it may be the case that I take longer between replies as well. If you choose to refrain, that's no problem either. Thanks for your participation either way. We may make more headway between the two of us. Often focus is blurred by attempting to attend to too many different approaches at once.
The approach, I think, is imperative.
Did anyone anytime ever clearly set out what counts as thought, let alone rational thought? I saw many employing implicit notions but do not recall anyone actually clearly defining their terms.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires something to be thought about. That something existed in its entirety prior to being talked about. We use the terms "thought", "belief", "meaningful experience", "mind", etc. How do we think about our own thoughts, beliefs, dreams, meaningful experiences? With naming and descriptive practices. There's no evidence to the contrary, and there's plenty to support that. I think we agree on that much, so perhaps we can set that aside and attempt to move forward?
There are various points that I would qualify or put differently, but fundamentally this seems to me to apply to all thought. Some elaboration on "How do we think...?" seems to be desirable. There's an implied analogy with "How does one start a car?" or "How do you get to Rome?" or "How do we calculate the orbit of Mars" which could easily becomes misleading. But that is a starting point for a general discussion of thinking and language. However, I hope we don't need to get too far into the general issues.
Assuming that there is such a thing as non human thought or human thought prior to when language acquisition begins in earnest. In seeking to make sense of this, we're isolating/delineating/targeting/defining thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience that existed in its entirety prior to being talked about(prior to naming and descriptive practices).
I realize that you are aiming to define a context for our specific problem. Nothing wrong with that. But I wouldn't set about it in this way. We need to be more specific, because the idea that there is a single general model of our naming and descriptive practices shepherds us into thinking about specific cases in inappropriate ways.
BTW, I'm not clear how far you are committed to the idea of a single general model for all our linguistic practices, because you do talk about them in the plural. However that may be, I see our problem as specifically about certain practices, not all of them.
More specifically, it is about how far we can sensible apply our practice in explaining human action to creatures that are like us but not human, and specifically do not have human languages. It seems inevitable that our practice needs to be modified. The question is what modifications are needed.
I think we agree on that much, so perhaps we can set that aside and attempt to move forward?
It would be annoying to try and thrash out all the issues before proceeding, so can you proceed with your argument on the basis of a provisional agreement? Then we can just sort out the differences that matter to our discussion. That itself would be an achievement.
_________________________
However, looking more closely at your example does give me pause:-
A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.
But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena. The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.
I look forward to your reply.
creativesoulNovember 10, 2024 at 00:56#9463140 likes
Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires something to be thought about. That something existed in its entirety prior to being talked about.
creativesoul
...fundamentally this seems to me to apply to all thought.
Thinking about X requires X. <------I'm okay with that.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires something to be thought about. That something existed in its entirety prior to being talked about.
creativesoul
...fundamentally this seems to me to apply to all thought.
emphasis mine
I'm not okay with that.
Not all things(X's) exist in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some did not. Some cannot. It could be put a bit differently. Some thought and belief are existentially dependent upon being talked about. Some are not.
To be even more precise, some thought and belief require having already been articulated by the creature under consideration in order for them to even be formed, had, and/or held by that candidate. In such cases, the articulation is itself an integral part of the formation process and thus the formation thereof consists, in part at least, of the articulation process.
Consider the sheer complexity of thought required in order to understand Gettier's obliteration of the J part of JTB... as held/articulated by three defenders thereof at the time. That sort of thought/understanding cannot be formed, held, and/or had without very complex articulation. Understanding Moore's concerns about belief attribution practices fits nicely here as well. Those belief are formed by articulation alone.
I should have made this clearer earlier.
The earlier claims that "thinking about thought and belief requires something to think about" and "that something existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it" were referring to the underlying necessary conditions/preconditions required in order for it to happen. This helps to fill in some blanks on the evolutionary timeline.
Some elaboration on "How do we think...?" seems to be desirable.
Agreed.
All thought, belief and statements thereof consist of correlations drawn between different things. We and all other capable creatures think solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things.
BTW, I'm not clear how far you are committed to the idea of a single general model for all our linguistic practices, because you do talk about them in the plural. However that may be, I see our problem as specifically about certain practices, not all of them.
Yes. There are many more than one linguistic practice. There are more than just naming and descriptive practices. However, none can possibly be practiced without picking things out of this world to the exclusion of all else, regardless of how that's done. It's always done.
Different practices of ours have different problems. I have yet to have been exposed to a single conventional practice of belief attribution that has, as it's basis, notions of "belief" and "thought" that can properly account for the evolutionary progression of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. That historical account includes what language less animals can form, have, and/or hold such that it counts as thought or belief. It is this crucially important aspect that remains sorely neglected by conventional standards/notions of thought/belief, "rational thought" notwithstanding.
What counts as rational thought presupposes some notion of "thought" or another. That's the driving force, the ground, for all subsequent attributions of "rational" or "not rational" to the thought under consideration.
...it is about how far we can sensibly apply our practice in explaining human action to creatures that are like us but not human, and specifically do not have human languages. It seems inevitable that our practice needs to be modified. The question is what modifications are needed.
Yes. This seems to be a promising avenue.
A modification of our standards is needed. What counts as sufficient justificatory ground to attribute this belief, that thought, or these emotions to this or that non human creature? That is the underlying unresolved problematic question pervading this thread.
Upon what justificatory ground do we(I) claim that dogs have absolutely no idea which train is the five o'clock train? Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is knowledge of which one counts as such. Which train counts as the five o'clock train is determined solely by human standards borne of language use(amongst many other things). It is only when and if one knows how to properly apply the standard that one can know which one counts as the five o'clock train.
Dogs do not make the cut. Even ones to whom five o'clock trains become meaningful, they do so not because it counts as the five o'clock train, but rather because the five o'clock train is/was/has been an integral part - a basic elemental constituent - of the dog's meaningful experience(thought and/or belief). The dog has drawn correlations between the train and all sorts of other things, none of which are our time standards.
Consider the sheer complexity of thought required in order to understand Gettier's obliteration of the J part of JTB... as held/articulated by three defenders thereof at the time.
This is a side-issue, but who are the three defenders you are thinking of?
Not all things(X's) exist in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some did not. Some cannot. It could be put a bit differently. Some thought and belief are existentially dependent upon being talked about. Some are not.
I may have misinterpreted "prior". I was treating it as meaning "presupposed" and thinking of the variety of preconditions that have to be satisfied to make thought and belief meaningful. Even new introductions have to be based on existing ideas if they are to be explained at all.
This takes me back to:- Quoting creativesoul
All thought, belief and statements thereof consist of correlations drawn between different things. We and all other capable creatures think solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things.
Here, you seem to be suggesting a single pattern of thought that explains all thought. But is that consistent with the variety of thoughts you specify? If some thought and beliefs are existentially dependent on being talked about, I don't see how the model of correlations drawn between different things applies.
It is this crucially important aspect that remains sorely neglected by conventional standards/notions of thought/belief, "rational thought" notwithstanding.
I agree with that. That's why I've taken such an interest in this topic. There's very little discussion anywhere, and yet, in my view, it's not only important for understanding animals, but also for understanding humans.
I have yet to have been exposed to a single conventional practice of belief attribution that has, as it's basis, notions of "belief" and "thought" that can properly account for the evolutionary progression of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences.
That's because philosophers seem to be totally hypnotized with thought and belief as articulated in language. They seem to assume that model can be applied, without change, to animals and tacit thinking and knowledge.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires something to be thought about. That something existed in its entirety prior to being talked about.
creativesoul
...fundamentally this seems to me to apply to all thought.
Ludwig V
Thinking about X requires X. <------I'm okay with that.
How does a god exist? Do any animals other than human beings worship a god? I am thinking about the existence of the things we talk about and also the difference between humans and animals.
How about love. What is it? What does it consist of? Will the lion ever learn to "love" its neighbor?
I read more of what Creativesoul had to say about existential thinking and thought of deleting my post, but maybe there is some benefit to simplifying a debate about what exists because it has substance and what does not. Does anyone remember the Greek argument of what exists and what does not?
Here is what Cicero had to say about the existence of the gods....
In this inquiry, to give an instance of the diversity of opinion, the greater number of authorities have affirmed the existence of the gods; it is the most likely conclusion, and one to which we are all led by the guidance of nature; but Protagoras said that he was doubtful, and Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of Cyrene thought that there were no such beings at all. Those, further, who have asserted their existence present so much diversity and disagreement that it would be tedious to enumerate their ideas separately. For a great deal is said about the forms of the gods, and about their locality, dwelling-places, and mode of life, and these points are disputed with the utmost difference of opinion among philosophers.
While upon the question in which our subject of discussion is mainly comprised, the question whether the gods do nothing, project nothing, and are free from all charge and administration of affairs, or whether, on the other hand, all things were from the beginning formed and established by them, and are throughout infinity ruled and directed by them, on this question, especially, there are great differences of opinion, and it is inevitable, unless these are decided, that mankind should be involved in the greatest uncertainty, and in ignorance of things which are of supreme importance.
https://gbsadler.blogspot.com/2013/02/classic-arguments-about-gods-existence.html#:~:text=In%20this%20inquiry%2C%20to%20give,which%20are%20of%20supreme%20importance.
Not so different from today's debates about the existence of a god. I think we have to puzzle what was the original awareness of a god. We can experience a tree or a lion, the gods are not experienced in that way, so where does the idea of god come from? And I want to mention animals, which animal other than a human thinks about a god or mates with someone because of ideas of love?
creativesoulNovember 12, 2024 at 00:40#9468220 likes
Consider the sheer complexity of thought required in order to understand Gettier's obliteration of the J part of JTB... as held/articulated by three defenders thereof at the time.
creativesoul
This is a side-issue, but who are the three defenders you are thinking of?
I'm not confident I remember the authors of the three JTB formulations Gettier set out in the beginning of his paper. Maybe... Ayer, Chisholm, and ??? Lol... It bugged me enough to go check... Scratch the third. :wink: It was just Ayer and Chisholm. I wanted to say Collinwood, for some reason. The 'third' formulation was a generic one from Gettier himself. Something tells me you already know this. :wink:
Not all things(X's) exist in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some did not. Some cannot. It could be put a bit differently. Some thought and belief are existentially dependent upon being talked about. Some are not.
creativesoul
I may have misinterpreted "prior". I was treating it as meaning "presupposed" and thinking of the variety of preconditions that have to be satisfied to make thought and belief meaningful.
That's okay. Sometimes it takes a little work to understand each other. They're very close in meaning, and often used interchangeably. I don't.
For my part, "presupposed" is about the thinking creature. "Prior to" is about the order of emergence/existence. The latter is spatiotemporal/existential. The former is psychological.
Even new introductions have to be based on existing ideas if they are to be explained at all.
Is this referring to the position I'm working out/from? I mean, sure, as language users anything we come up with will be based - loosely at least - on something we've already been exposed to. All explanation is language use. As it pertains to philosophy, there will be all sorts of prior influences. Yet, I'm confident that thought, belief, and meaningful experience is prior to the complex sort of language we employ. I'm also confident that there are precursors to our language that do some of the same thing(s) that our language does, despite those animals not having the ability to take account/record with meaningful marks, and naming and descriptive practices. We can look at what language less animals are doing with language too. <---- Here, of course, by "language-less" I mean complex spoken and written language such as our own, capable of metacognition. I really need to start being better about that qualification though, because I'm confident we're not the only language users.
This takes me back to:-
All thought, belief and statements thereof consist of correlations drawn between different things. We and all other capable creatures think solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things.
creativesoul
Here, you seem to be suggesting a single pattern of thought that explains all thought. But is that consistent with the variety of thoughts you specify? If some thought and beliefs are existentially dependent on being talked about, I don't see how the model of correlations drawn between different things applies.
I'm not suggesting a pattern of thought. I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex. If there's inconsistency, self-contradiction, and/or incoherence I'm unaware. The differences in thoughts are the content of the correlations. That's key to all the different 'kinds' of thought, in a nutshell.
Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is existentially dependent upon being talked about. I mean, one cannot acquire knowledge of which train counts as the five o'clock train without drawing correlations between those standards and some train or another. That is chock full of correlations, some of which are between the language use itself, which amounts to talking about the time standards and trains.
That is the sort of thought/belief that is existentially dependent on a creature capable of metacognition.
It is this crucially important aspect that remains sorely neglected by conventional standards/notions of thought/belief, "rational thought" notwithstanding.
creativesoul
I agree with that. That's why I've taken such an interest in this topic. There's very little discussion anywhere, and yet, in my view, it's not only important for understanding animals, but also for understanding humans.
I see it much the same way. The current political environment shows how correlations work. It's how some get convinced to be mad at all the wrong people for all the wrong reasons.
creativesoulNovember 12, 2024 at 00:51#9468260 likes
I am thinking about the existence of the things we talk about and also the difference between humans and animals.
How about love. What is it? What does it consist of? Will the lion ever learn to "love" its neighbor?
Good questions. Apt. Germane. Yet, seemingly so distant to the current conversation. They're not though! Not at all. It's extremely nuanced. I'm still working things out, but I'll say this much because it seems you're asking about the ontological basis I'm working from.
That which exists has an effect/affect.
I read more of what Creativesoul had to say about existential thinking and thought of deleting my post, but maybe there is some benefit to simplifying a debate about what exists because it has substance and what does not. Does anyone remember the Greek argument of what exists and what does not?
I'm thinking there's more than one. I'm unfamiliar with all.
Nice. I take it you read through some of my meanderings here?
creativesoulNovember 12, 2024 at 01:02#9468270 likes
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.
But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena. The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.
I look forward to your reply.
It is my next focus here. My apologies for not being prompt yesterday. Late dinner invitation. Nice company. Be nice to have another someplace other than a famous steakhouse chain with far too many people in far too little volume of space. And the noise! Argh... brought out the spectrum in me.
I'm not confident I remember the authors of the three JTB formulations Gettier set out in the beginning of his paper. Maybe... Ayer, Chisholm, and ??? Lol... It bugged me enough to go check... Scratch the third. :wink: It was just Ayer and Chisholm. I wanted to say Collinwood, for some reason. The 'third' formulation was a generic one from Gettier himself. Something tells me you already know this. :wink:
I did and I didn't. That is, I was expecting references to some of the critiques of Gettier's article, rather than Gettier's selection from existing formulations.
It is my next focus here. My apologies for not being prompt yesterday. Late dinner invitation. Nice company. Be nice to have another someplace other than a famous steakhouse chain with far too many people in far too little volume of space. And the noise! Argh... brought out the spectrum in me.
No hurry. I've never been happy in large, noisy, crowded (and drunken) parties and it's only got worse with age. People behave differently in crowds. There's a lot of research about that - largely with a public order agenda. The Greeks regarded it as a madness and explained it by reference to Bacchus and/or Pan.
For my part, "presupposed" is about the thinking creature. "Prior to" is about the order of emergence/existence. The latter is spatiotemporal/existential. The former is psychological.
I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex.
There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's. (It's not necessarily a question of one or the other. Both may well play their part.) Pavlov presupposes a passive organism - one that learns in response to a stimulus. Skinner posits what he calls "operant conditioning" which is a process that starts with the organism acting on or in the environment and noticing the results of those actions - here the organism stimulates the environment which responds in its turn. There's another interesting source of learning - mimicry. I've gathered that very new infants are able to smile back at a smiling face - there's even a section of the brain that produces this mirroring effect. It is still observable in adults. Just food for thought.
Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is existentially dependent upon being talked about.
I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language.
Suppose we stipulate that knowing that it is 5 o'clock requires an understanding of a conceptual scheme that is not available without language. My dogs have always tended to get restless and congregate near the kitchen at around the time that they are fed. I think they know that it is time for dinner. If they were people, we would have no hesitation in saying that they know it is 7 o'clock (say). How do I know that people understand the background scheme? I know if they can tell the time at any time, for example - which does not necessarily require human language, but normally that is how it works. If a small child (who has not yet learnt to tell the time) appears in the kitchen at 7 o'clock, we will look for other clues to explain why they show up.
creativesoulNovember 15, 2024 at 16:18#9475500 likes
A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say".
Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.
I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex.
creativesoul
There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's.
They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.
A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use. Pavlov and Skinner differ in their respective explanations. What they're taking account of(attempting to explain) existed in its entirety prior to their account. <----------that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.
creativesoulNovember 15, 2024 at 16:29#9475520 likes
I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language.
I'm happy to clarify. I'm unsure what you're after though. The fact that some philosophers cannot or do not have any idea how distinctions can be drawn without language doesn't bear on my argument as far as I can tell. Seems to me like a problem with their conceptual/linguistic framework(s). My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.
Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.
Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response?
They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.
Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either.
A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use.
You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour.
that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.
OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about?
My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.
Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour.
There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of?
If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?
A majority of the survey respondents ascribed emotions to "most" or "all or nearly all" non-human primates (98%), other mammals (89%), birds (78%), octopus, squids and cuttlefish (72%) and fish (53%). And most of the respondents ascribed emotions to at least some members of each taxonomic group of animals considered, including insects (67%) and other invertebrates (71%).
The survey also included questions about the risks in animal behavioral research of anthromorphism (inaccurately projecting human experience onto animals) and anthropodenial (willful blindness to any human characteristics of animals).
"It's surprising that 89% of the respondents thought that anthropodenial was problematic in animal behavioral research, compared to only 49% who thought anthromorphism poses a risk," Benítez says. "That seems like a big shift."
If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?
Thought etc. in creatures lacking human language is expressed and available to us in their behaviour. The same is true in human beings, but, of course, philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why.
Reply to wonderer1
That's interesting. Are we talking about the responses of scientists who study animal behaviour? If so, it confirms my expectation that the closer people look at animal behaviour, the more they find in it.
The journal Royal Society Open Science published a survey of 100 researchers of animal behavior, providing a unique view of current scientific thought on animal emotions and consciousness.
philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour.
I don't know what anyone has in mind. The first thing that zones to mind for new is that it's a different [I]type[/I] of behavior. For example, day someone punched me. I might:
1. Punch them in return.
2. Cry.
3. Ask them why they punched me; why they think punching is a good solution to any problem; or whatever.
All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).
All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).
Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours.
creativesoulNovember 19, 2024 at 00:04#9485050 likes
Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.
creativesoul
Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response?
When it comes to what counts as thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) of language less creatures, we must be talking about what's meaningful to the creature. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of first or third person though. I see no point in unnecessarily adding complexity where none is warranted.
Pertaining whether or not I regard fear as a stimulus or a response...
I do not find it helpful to use that framework. It could be either, depending upon the framework/conceptual scheme being employed and point of view. Fear is the result of autonomous biological machinery doing its job. It is part of fearful experience. All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Fearful experiences are meaningful to the creature full of fear, whether that includes an alpha male's growl accompanied by submissive members' behaviour, or the fear from/of falling(which I understand to be innate). Fear is always an internal element within a more complex experience involving both internal and external elements.
They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.
creativesoul
Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either.
Sure. Mimicry, for the sake of mimicking, involves the mimic drawing correlations between an other's behaviour and their own. Again, biological machinery plays an autonomous role here. However, I do think that neuroscience has established, as you've alluded to perhaps with the infant's smile, that there is not always a mimic who's mimicking for the sake of mimicking. Mirror neurons also play a role in empathy as well as recognizing/attributing other minds. At least, that's what I believe to be the case... very generally/roughly speaking. Smiles are contagious after-all. And then there's also the fact that young children learn how to act in this or that situation by virtue of mimicking others' behaviours, in a "children learn what they live" sort of thing.
I'm not sure what you're saying or referring to with "pattern of correlation".
A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use.
creativesoul
You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour.
That is exactly what I'm arguing for. The basic elemental constituency of all thought... rational thought notwithstanding. The success or failure of identifying those is completely determined by the methodological approach. Current convention fails.
...that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.
creativesoul
OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about?
Well, we can use what we do know about our own thought and belief as a means for beginning to set out what must be the case if language less thought exists(if it is possible for language less creatures to think), or if language less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought or belief, or if language less creatures are capable of having meaningful experiences. I've touched on all this earlier in the thread. I'd be pleased to dig in. It's time.
Such metacognitive endeavors shift the focus away from behaviour and onto our own thought, belief, and meaningful experiences. That is the only place to start. It is not the only place to finish.
My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.
creativesoul
Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour.
I'm confused.
Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).
Patterner
Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours.
Do you not think there are things languages can express that behaviours that do not involve language cannot express?
When it comes to what counts as thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) of language less creatures, we must be talking about what's meaningful to the creature. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of first or third person though. I see no point in unnecessarily adding complexity where none is warranted.
You may remember that earlier in this thread there was some discussion of Timothy Pennings' claim that his corgi could do calculus. See Excerpts from "Do dogs know calculus"
The path followed by light refracted through two different mediums is calculated in this way, but no-one worries about what meaningful experiences are involved. So if Pennings' Corgi follows the same path, I don't see that the experience of the corgi is relevant. The calculation applies. So Pennings' title forces us to face the issue whether what matters is the dog's experiences or the mathematics. Or, preferably, what the relationship is between the two points of view.
Or consider the theory of kin selection as an explanation of altruism in social creatures. The idea that preserving one's kin is as good a way (perhaps better than preserving oneself) to preserve one's DNA and that is what, in the end, matters. Empirically, that could well explain the phenomena. But no-one thinks that bees can identify the DNA of another bee. So we need to explain how the bees select who to sacrifice themselves for and clarify what the relationship is between the two points of view. For example, it may be that bees with the same DNA as our subject bee produce similar pheromones, which we know bees can identify and respond to. So that would be a candidate.
Catching a thrown ball is a quite complex mathematical problem. We have to learn how to do it and we improve with experience. But I'm quite sure that I am incapable of solving that mathematical problem. How do I do it? Well, I can also accurately identify where a sound is coming from. We know that we do that by calculation from the difference between the time the sound arrives at one ear and the time it arrives at the other, which is why stereo headphones work in the weird way that they do. Even if I could do the calculation, I could not do it in the time it takes me to identify where the sound comes from. (We can also accurately assess how far away the things we see are, at least at close range, by the extend we have to focus the two eyes in order to see one image - just like a range-finder. We don't normally experience that.)
Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at.
Reply to Ludwig V
I would be hard pressed to express any of the thoughts in this post, to say nothing of the thoughts expressed in the 39 pages of the thread, as well as the other however many threads at TPF, without language. I would be interested in hearing how all of these thoughts might possibly come to exist without language. But even without an explanation of that, now that they do exist, What language-less behavior can express them?
I would be hard pressed to express any of the thoughts in this post, to say nothing of the thoughts expressed in the 39 pages of the thread, as well as the other however many threads at TPF, without language. I would be interested in hearing how all of these thoughts might possibly come to exist without language. But even without an explanation of that, now that they do exist, What language-less behavior can express them?
Of course one cannot philosophize without language. One of the big puzzles in Berekeley's writing is that he is very clear that his immatierialism does not imply any change whatever to his everyday behaviour, and there's a good case for saying that the heliocentric view of the solar system does not result in any change to ordinary behaviour.
But one can express philosophical views in actions rather than words. There's a story that some of Descartes' followers in Amsterdam expressed their belief in Cartesian dualism by nailing a dog to a wooden plank. Devout Christians may express their beliefs in many ways other than asserting them - refraining from certain behaviours and pursuing others. One of the arguments against radical scepticism is precisely that the sceptic does not behave as if scepticism were true.
However, I never intended to claim that there are always non-linguistic ways to express any belief expressed in language. Perhaps I should have been clearer.
However, I never intended to claim that there are always non-linguistic ways to express any belief expressed in language. Perhaps I should have been clearer.
I can't say if I disagree, or don't really understand.
Descartes' followers may have been expressing their belief in Cartesian dualism in a very strict sense. (I'm not sure "strict" is the right word, but it's the best I can do at the moment.) But they would not have come to that belief without language. Language was necessary for the belief to exist before the belief could be expressed with non-linguistic behavior.
And nobody observing their behavior would have known the belief they were expressing if someone had not used language to explain it to them.
Descartes' followers may have been expressing their belief in Cartesian dualism in a very strict sense. (I'm not sure "strict" is the right word, but it's the best I can do at the moment.) But they would not have come to that belief without language. Language was necessary for the belief to exist before the belief could be expressed with non-linguistic behavior.
I don't contest the point that there are beliefs that we could not develop without language. All I'm suggesting is that linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, in our world, are connected. Yet I don't rule out the possibility that there are some beliefs that cannot be expressed without language. These are not separate domains, but intertwined. This is why Pennings' Corgi is such a puzzle.
I can't say if I disagree, or don't really understand.
For what it's worth, I'm not clear about this stuff either. It would be tidy if we could draw a clear line between what can be done with and without language. But I just don't see it.
Maybe we can't develop all beliefs without language. But, once developed, they can be expressed without language.
Yes. You seem to have it about right. The only issue now is what concepts we can attribute when explaining what animals that do not have human languages.
There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of?
creativesoul
If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists?
First, we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it.
It's 'the things' that matter most here. Those are the differences between language less thought, belief, and meaningful experiences, and those of language users. Our knowledge acquisition of those things, if the right sort of approach is used and maintained, very clearly set out the difference(s) between the thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences of language less creatures and language users.
I'm not sure why that difference seems so puzzling to some. Language less creatures do not - cannot - draw correlations between language use and other things. It's as simple as that. Their meaningful experience, thought, and/or belief does not consist of language use. They do not draw correlations between language use and other things.
The difficult and interesting aspects of this endeavor come with explaining the gradual increase in complexity that happens once language use has begun in earnest.
Second, we know language less creatures are capable of meaningful experience, because we can watch them do all sorts of stuff that it makes no sense to deny it. In addition to our ever increasing knowledge base regarding the biological machinery involved in our own experiences, our own working notions/terminological use of "thought", "belief", and "meaning" come to the fore here.
If language less creatures are capable of having meaningful experience(s), and all experience is meaningful to the creature having it, then it is clear that meaning exists prior to language creation on the evolutionary timeline. All meaningful experience consists - in very large part - of thought and belief about the universe. If a language less creature can form, have and/or hold belief about the world, and some of their belief about the world can be true, then either true belief exists without truth, or truth is prior to language.
If it is the case that meaningful experience predate language users, then one's notion of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaning" better be able to dovetail with those facts. Current convention fails to draw and maintain the actual distinctions between thinking and thinking about one's own thinking(thought/belief). That's been the bane of philosophy from Aristotle through Kant, Descartes, etc. I know of not a single philosopher who has drawn and maintained that distinction. Of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one, but, I've been asking many people for over 20 years, and I've yet to have been given an affirmative answer/author/philosopher so...
This scope of this subject matter is as broad as it can be. If we've gotten our own thought and belief wrong, and I'm convinced we have, then we've also gotten something wrong about anything and everything ever thought, believed, spoken, stated, uttered, and/or otherwise expressed.
If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?
Indeed, it does.
creativesoulNovember 20, 2024 at 23:49#9490700 likes
I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus.
creativesoulNovember 20, 2024 at 23:52#9490720 likes
Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
creativesoul
Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at.
Are you claiming that language less thought, belief, and/or experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone?
creativesoulNovember 21, 2024 at 00:17#9490780 likes
I meant to directly address this, but didn't. Didn't pay close enough attention, I suppose. So, again, sorry for the delay...
However, looking more closely at your example does give me pause:-
A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. ..... The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above?
creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.
But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion.
Yes. I would agree that the dog salivates upon hearing the bell, after the bell has become meaningful to the dog. The bell becomes meaningful to the dog when the dog draws correlations between it and eating. Hence, both are autonomous. The correlations drawn between the bell and food as well as the involuntary salivation.
Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena.
What difference is a question of how we interpret the events? The events are already meaningful. Hence, it is possible to misinterpret them.
I'm not convinced that growling is under conscious control, as if used intentionally to communicate/convey the growling dogs' thought/belief. I'm more likely to deny that that's what's going on. The growl is meaningful for both the growling dog and the submissive others. I'm not convinced that the growl is a canine speech act so to speak.
The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.
There's a sleight of hand here. Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness. That sort of 'higher order' thinking requires thinking about awareness as a separate subject matter in its own right(metacognition). Metacognition is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
The growl has efficacy, no doubt. It is meaningful to both the growling dogs and the others. I would even agree that it could be rudimentary language use, but it's nothing even close to adequate evidence for concluding that growls function in a social context in the same way that our expressions of thought and belief do.
I'm not sure I'm okay with calling it a warning, to be frank. That presupposes knowledge of the growling dog's worldview(intention) that I am not privy to.
creativesoulNovember 21, 2024 at 01:22#9490970 likes
Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.
Ludwig V
How would that be judged?
Good question. One way is to assess the ethical implications of the differences we find. Another would be to examine and explore why people get so strongly committed. It would be at least helpful to know why people think it matters. But the difficult bit is that how one sees animals is very much a function of the relationships one has with them, so there isn't a purely objective basis for the judgement. There isn't a matter of fact that makes the difference - it's a question of how one chooses to interact with them.
we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it.
OK. I'll bite. I thought you were asking the question because I couldn't answer it; actually I have answered; it's just that you don't like the answer. I haven't worked out exactly how to argue the point, so I'm holding my peace until I've worked that out.
Preliminary problems include what it means to say that any meaningful experience consists of anything never mind what it means to say that meaningful experience consists of correlations.
Their meaningful experience, thought, and/or belief does not consist of language use.
Language users express their beliefs etc. by talking (and in their other behaviour). Clearly, creatures without human language cannot express their beliefs by talking. But they can and do express their beliefs by their behaviour. Both language users and creatures without language have meaningful experiences, which, presumably, "consist of" correlations. (I'm setting aside my doubts about "consist of" and correlations.)
They do not draw correlations between language use and other things.
Insofar as they do not have human language, that seems obvious. But then, when I call out "dinner", my dog appears. Isn't that correlating language with something else? When I call out "sit", she sits and looks at me expectantly. Apparently dogs are capable of responding appropriately to something like 200 words, which is about the language learning level of a two year old human.
I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus.
I wasn't conflating those two descriptions. I was pointing out that the mathematical description of the trajectory of the ball does apply to the ball and that the dog (or indeed, human) is not applying that description. What beliefs and/or experiences can we discern in ourselves to explain how the ball is caught? Can we attribute those same beliefs to the dog or not? I think that skills like these are attributed to "judgement", which means either that the human "just sees" where the ball is coming and the same can be attributed to the dog. Both express their belief about where the ball is coming by positioning themselves to catch it.
We can legitimately expect that there will be some neurological activity which we are not conscious of and which that enables this to happen. This will be similar to the neurological activity that must underlie our ability to discern where a sound is coming from. We can also expect the same or similar activity to be going on in the dog.
I'm not convinced that growling is under conscious control, as if used intentionally to communicate/convey the growling dogs' thought/belief. I'm more likely to deny that that's what's going on. The growl is meaningful for both the growling dog and the submissive others. I'm not convinced that the growl is a canine speech act so to speak.
I wasn't going so far as claiming that it is a canine speech act. However, my speech acts are meaningful to myself and others (including my dog), so there may well be something to the comparison.
As to conscious control, I cannot train my dog to salivate or not on my command (any more than I can train myself to salivate or not as I wish). But I can train my dog to stop growling on command. That suggests the growl is under the dog's control.
Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness.
Sorry, I'm confused. If the growl warns others not to be aggressive, I would have thought that they were aware of the dog's belief that they are being regarded as a possible threat. Is that what you meant by awareness of the awareness? I would also have thought that the dog was aware of it's own awareness that the others present a possible threat. Perhaps that's what you mean?
The growl has efficacy, no doubt. It is meaningful to both the growling dogs and the others. I would even agree that it could be rudimentary language use, but it's nothing even close to adequate evidence for concluding that growls function in a social context in the same way that our expressions of thought and belief do.
So we agree at least to some extent. I wasn't making any claim about equivalence of that function to our expressions of thought and belief. Though it does occur to me that when I feel threatened by someone, I will make placatory and/or self-confident signals, whether by body language or in speech in order to warn them off. That seems to me to be performing the same function as the growl. The difference, I would say, is the difference between the simplicity of the growl and the complexity of the messages we can convey through the complexity of language. There is similarity and difference.
Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.
Ludwig V
How would that be judged?
Patterner
Good question. One way is to assess the ethical implications of the differences we find. Another would be to examine and explore why people get so strongly committed. It would be at least helpful to know why people think it matters. But the difficult bit is that how one sees animals is very much a function of the relationships one has with them, so there isn't a purely objective basis for the judgement. There isn't a matter of fact that makes the difference - it's a question of how one chooses to interact with them.
I think we're having different conversations. I'm talking about whether or not we have abilities that language-less species do not have, and, if so, whether or not language is responsibile for those abilities.
I think you are talking about how we use those abilities.
I think we're having different conversations. I'm talking about whether or not we have abilities that language-less species do not have, and, if so, whether or not language is responsibile for those abilities.
I think you are talking about how we use those abilities.
That's odd. I thought you were asking how we might determine the significance of the difference between animals and humans.
It's just that we can argue endlessly about the differences between animals and humans. But, in the end, each species is different from the others in some respects and similar in others. So it seems to me that it is an empty debate (whether the glass is half full or half empty). Yet we we think the question is really important? Why? What is at stake?
It seems likely that language is important in enabling the human way(s) of life. Probably our opposable thumb is also important, not to mention our large brain. None of those differences means that we are not animals or that we are justified in pretending otherwise.
Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours?
I will say "no." Sound is not the only way animals communicate. They also communicate with smells and behaviors. The reaction is as automatic as jumping when one hears a loud crashing sound. We would not have survived if we didn't react automatically to threats when a fast reaction is essential. However, unlike the dog, we are not going to continue barking and growling when we realize the mailman is not a threat. However, some humans do react by grabbing a gun and pulling the trigger and expect to be exonerated no matter who they shoot. The point is like animals we react without thinking and that is not equal to having language.
We slip into language when we start making pictures and then start telling stories with pictures. This is the development of conceptual thinking. True, there are some animals that paint pictures when given paint brushes and paint, but these pictures are splashes of color, not portraits of other animals and objects.
Animals may learn human language but it is not instinctive. However, I suspect if a group of bonobos learn a language and teach their children language, over many generations the ability to use language will either end or become part of their inborn abilities. Abilities can be passed on through parents and genes. We are on the same evolutionary branch as Chimpanzees and Bonobo and not all humans are like modern man but were more a transition from ape to human.
However, my speech acts are meaningful to myself and others (including my dog), so there may well be something to the comparison.
I believe we share much in common with other animals because we are evolved animals. Aboriginal people around the world learned about life by studying animals. Life lessons came from the crow and the wolves. etc..
Wolves mean a lot to the Native American community and it is a dominant role in the Ojibwe tribe. In the Ojibwe tribe creation story, wolves are often described as family members to the tribe. Wolves were referred to as a brother or sister along with a perception that if whatever happens to the wolves, it will happen to one of the Ojibwe tribe, they also traveled the world together and spoke the same language.[4] They have a strong relationship tied with the wolves because wolves are a symbol of their culture and tradition. https://wildwisconsinwolves.omeka.net/natives#:~:text=In%20the%20Ojibwe%20tribe%20creation,and%20spoke%20the%20same%20language.
philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why.
Ludwig V
Might have something to do with the fact that not all behaviour involves using language. All linguistic behaviour does.
Thank you both of you. As I was working on my previous reply I started to wonder why I think language and thinking are so important. Humans can be incredibly destructive and that is far from being intelligent. Our creation story making us to be not animals but as angels made separate from the animals. ? What is that? Might that creation story be harmful?
I think we need to understand we are evolved as are the rest of the animals. Equally important is our heart. If our hearts are not in tune with nature might be an evil force on earth?
None of those differences means that we are not animals or that we are justified in pretending otherwise
I haven't read all of the thread. I know this was being discussed early on. But I don't know who actually said they held that position, and had no idea anyone in still saying it. I know with absolute certainty I never said it.
I'm just saying there is a significant difference between humans and animals. I think this is evidenced by many of the things we do and manufacture. I also think we think about things no other species thinks about. Of course, I can't prove my cat isn't pondering the nature of consciousness, trying to find an easier way to locate prime numbers, or amusing himself with the thought of the cat who shaves all the cats who do not shave themselves. But, if someone invented a machine that allows us to listen in on his thoughts, I would be willing to bet anything that he isn't.
I'm just saying there is a significant difference between humans and animals. I think this is evidenced by many of the things we do and manufacture. I also think we think about things no other species thinks about. Of course, I can't prove my cat isn't pondering the nature of consciousness, trying to find an easier way to locate prime numbers, or amusing himself with the thought of the cat who shaves all the cats who do not shave themselves.
A fetus becomes conscious before being born and early self-conscious emotions appear during at age 15-24 months. Yet ask yourself, if nobody had talked about consciousness to you, you wouldn't have read about it or been taught about it, would you have come to think about the nature of consciousness?
If you answer yes or even perhaps, then how would you talk about it? What level do you think your ideas would be about it if you wouldn't have any reference to science or philosophy about the issue or the basic biological understanding we have now. Just look at this thread and notice how much people refer to biology, science and philosophy. The previous discourse about the issue.
Not only do you need a very complex language to talk about the nature of consciousness, you need a lot of information to talk about it.
Now your cat might not think about Russell's paradox, but it quite likely can count. It could be argued that it has some primitive feline mathematical system, because counting is very important for situational awareness. Logic is also quite important in situational awareness.
Hence the huge difference isn't a biological difference, but a social and informational difference.
Hence the huge difference isn't a biological difference, but a social and informational difference.
Yes. But why don't they have the social and informational systems we have? They haven't developed these things, despite being in our homes, seeing and hearing us do everything we do, and being spoken to extensively, for a very long time. Countless generations. Many people have even tried to teach them. Is the reason for the social and informational differences not a biological difference? Their brains cannot do the same things ours can.
Reply to Patterner You might ask yourself first why the closest relatives to us are the chimpanzees. The simple answer is: we ourselves.
There's no Neandethals, Denisovans, Homo erectus, Homo rhodiensis, Homo naledi, Homo luzonensis, homo floriensis walking around anymore, even if there were 300 000 years ago. And all because of us, not because of climate change etc. Those that could have children with us, they now are part of our genealogical roots. It's telling when Alexander the Great made his genocidal journey of conquer to the outskirts of India, the Greeks had a brief "battle" with strange little humans that fled to the trees, until someone told them these were actually animals called monkeys and they wouldn't be a threat to them or a population to be subjugated.
Animals do use tools and for example the Neanderthal could make a fire, so the question is that would these other hominids of our tree be able to invent or copy agriculture, have the written word? Very likely, but they are no more.
Hence to your question, why wouldn't any other animal have the social and informational systems than we have, is because if they would, they would have posed a threat to us and we would have exterminated them.
Never underestimate the viciousness and utter cruelty of this species we call Homo Sapiens, mankind. Just look how cruel we can be for our own fellow man, even today. We aren't peaceful Kapybaras, you know.
Reply to ssu
I quite agree. However, while that may explain why there is no species with which we don't have such a social and informational difference, it doesn't explain the social and informational difference. The reason no other species does what we do socially and informationally is that their brains aren't capable of it. When other species have been in close contact with us for millennia, watching and hearing the things we do and how we do them, us attempting to teach them, what other explanation could there be?
I'm just saying there is a significant difference between humans and animals.
Most mammals don't fly but bats do fly. Would that difference mean a bat is not an animal? It appears you are saying humans are not animals. We have a larger cortex than other apes and vocal cords that apes do not have. We are different but how does that difference equal humans are not animals?
When other species have been in close contact with us for millennia, watching and hearing the things we do and how we do them, us attempting to teach them, what other explanation could there be?
Baboons do not learn from chimpanzees. The baboon can see the chimpanzee stick a twig in a rotting log and get termits but it never attempts to do so. Interestingly, the female chimp learns a lot from her mother but male chimps are less likely to pay attention to what their mother is doing until they get older.
How about love. What is it? What does it consist of? Will the lion ever learn to "love" its neighbor?
Love is older and more deeply rooted in sentient beings than rational thought. Love is a complex of emotions that connect one individual to another. In its most primitive form, the mother's tender concern for her young, closely followed by the bond between mated pairs. In the more evolved species, close friendship are formed between individuals - and not only of their own species. Many lions love their tiger, canine or human friends. Most humans are also picky about whom they love, and it's rarely their neighbour.
By inhabiting the human - exclusively human - imagination. Gods come into being through human projection and/or wishful thinking and are then sustained by application of rational narrative and social infrastructure to an irrational central idea.
Animals don't do that. If they're in awe of something, it's because that thing has got real power, not because they've they've conjured it up from their own murky subconscious.
And bats cannot communicate with iguanas and condors have little in common with zebras. Species within the same family are more like one another than they are like members of another family; human are more different from chipmunks than they are from gorillas. Gorillas are also very different from octopi, even though both are capable of rational problem-solving, neither can do algebra, but I expect both can be taught to play the piano. There are similarities and differences between species throughout the animal kingdom and its evolution.
But humans are super-duper-special; utterly different from other species in so many ways that are hugely important to humans.
Thank you both of you. As I was working on my previous reply I started to wonder why I think language and thinking are so important. Humans can be incredibly destructive and that is far from being intelligent. Our creation story making us to be not animals but as angels made separate from the animals. ? What is that? Might that creation story be harmful?
Sadly, intelligence is not restricted by ethics. It enables us to do wonderful things, and also to do terrible things.
Well, our creation story doesnt mention angels. But God does decide to prevent Adam & Eve from eating the apple of the knowledge of good and evil for fear that they might become as one of us. Food for thought. I think the harmful bit in our creation story is the idea that God gave us dominion over everything. If only they had said stewardship !
Plato thought that we are a combination of animal and god.
I think we need to understand we are evolved as are the rest of the animals. Equally important is our heart. If our hearts are not in tune with nature might be an evil force on earth?
Yes, heart is important arguably more important than intelligence. I understand the feeling that being out of tune with nature is a bad thing. But the natural is not always a good thing. Nature, in itself, is neither good nor bad but just what it is or perhaps sometimes good and sometimes bad.
I haven't read all of the thread. I know this was being discussed early on. But I don't know who actually said they held that position, and had no idea anyone in still saying it. I know with absolute certainty I never said it.
Im sorry, I shouldnt have referred to the earlier discussion without identifying exactly where it is. I never wanted to accuse you of saying it. The earlier discussion centred on the consequences of Cartesion dualism for our treatment of animals.
I'm just saying there is a significant difference between humans and animals. I think this is evidenced by many of the things we do and manufacture. I also think we think about things no other species thinks about. Of course, I can't prove my cat isn't pondering the nature of consciousness, trying to find an easier way to locate prime numbers, or amusing himself with the thought of the cat who shaves all the cats who do not shave themselves. But, if someone invented a machine that allows us to listen in on his thoughts, I would be willing to bet anything that he isn't.
There are differences between human and animals. There are also similarities. So the interesting part is what significant means.
Actually, I think the significant differences are the ethical ones. We have moral obligations to animals essentially, not to treat the cruelly. But they have not corresponding moral obligations to us; in fact they cant be judged by our ordinary moral standards though one could argue that they do have something like the beginnings of a moral sense.
A fetus becomes conscious before being born and early self-conscious emotions appear during at age 15-24 months. Yet ask yourself, if nobody had talked about consciousness to you, you wouldn't have read about it or been taught about it, would you have come to think about the nature of consciousness?
Yes. Most of the abilities that seem to differentiate us from animals depend on our being brought up in human society. The feral children who turn up from time to time have great difficulty in making good what they missed.
Now your cat might not think about Russell's paradox, but it quite likely can count. It could be argued that it has some primitive feline mathematical system, because counting is very important for situational awareness. Logic is also quite important in situational awareness.
Hence the huge difference isn't a biological difference, but a social and informational difference.
Your point about the cat is well made. Its the usual thing every time something is identified as different and specifically human, it turns out that animals (some animals) have the beginnings or foundations of them. Its just that we have supernormal development of them.
The point about mathematics and logic also seems to be right. But it does seem that our capacity to learn all those human skills and practices has a biological basis over-developed cortex, opposable thumb, bipedalism.
The point about mathematics and logic also seems to be right. But it does seem that our capacity to learn all those human skills and practices has a biological basis over-developed cortex, opposable thumb, bipedalism.
The point that @Patterner also made of our brains being different might be the real difference, but even that might be smaller than we think. Bipedalism and our hands are reason why we can use so extensively tools. Also it has been studied that Homo Sapiens could have more children that lived up to adulthood than our hominid brothers. Yet the real question is hypothetical, could for example the Neanderthal been capable of creating a civilization? They could speak, at least a bit and could make fire, which obviously shows their sophistication. To dismiss the possibility outright based on biological differences we cannot do as it's now purely a hypothetical question.
And let's face the fact that if humans would have remained as hunter gatherers, there simply couldn't be so many of us and we would have molded the Earth as we have now. Without agriculture there wouldn't excess food production and hence there couldn't be division of labor, job specialization. Agriculture and trade and writing are simply crucial for our development to what we are now, especially if it has anything to do with our society or our scientific thought.
Agriculture got started just somewhere around 11000 BC and writing is even a more frequent invention, so what has made us different from the hunter gatherers (whom many of our extinct fellow hominids were too) has happened only a while ago.
But humans are super-duper-special; utterly different from other species in so many ways that are hugely important to humans.
Can I take that as suggesting that the things that make humans so special are not necessarily important to other creatures or, necessarily, to the planet? The planet, at least, seems poised to wreck our civilizations and we seem incapable of doing anything much about it.
The thing is, it seems to me that since, for better or worse, we are animals in so many ways, it doesn't really make sense to say that we are "utterly" different from other species.
There are differences between human and animals. There are also similarities. So the interesting part is what significant means. Actually, I think the significant differences are the ethical ones.
Nothing matters more. What makes humans different from other species? What is there answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness? How did life begin? Did anything exist before the Big Bang? All fascinating topics. And we are driven to explore the unknown, and try to answer questions. But if we do not treat others, human and others, well, then we're filthy creatures pretending to be better than we are.
We have moral obligations to animals essentially, not to treat the cruelly. But they have not corresponding moral obligations to us; in fact they cant be judged by our ordinary moral standards though one could argue that they do have something like the beginnings of a moral sense.
Some do. But it doesn't matter. No animal other than us can be judged for cruelty. They aren't thinking cruel thoughts when they do anything. They aren't choosing to be cruel. Only we have that capacity.
Can I take that as suggesting that the things that make humans so special are not necessarily important to other creatures or, necessarily, to the planet?
Of course not. Why should they be? Every individual member of every species is primarily concerned with its own survival, secondly with the survival of its family, flock or colony, thirdly with making their life less difficult. Only those with an unusual amount of physical security and leisure time have the luxury of reflection, self-assessment and thinking about how to think about their own thinking. Only a diminishing minority of humans are lucky enough to have that. Some felines and canines under human protection have the leisure, but they use it differently. Quoting Ludwig V
The planet, at least, seems poised to wreck our civilizations and we seem incapable of doing anything much about it.
That's only because our civilizations wrecked the planet, and when we became aware of this fact, refused to do anything about it. Quoting Ludwig V
The thing is, it seems to me that since, for better or worse, we are animals in so many ways, it doesn't really make sense to say that we are "utterly" different from other species.
I've never thought so. Even rabbits are capable of destroying their habitat.
But humans are super-duper-special; utterly different from other species in so many ways that are hugely important to humans.
To deny that humans are leaps and bounds above any other species in significant ways is willful ignorance.
Proportionally, we are not the fastest, strongest, or most durable. We can't fly, we can't burrow, we can't swim underwater for more than a few minutes. Yet, because of our intelligence, we surpass every other species in all of these ways, and more. And we can do things no other species can do to the least degree, or is even trying. Such as travel to other celestial bodies, store information outside of our bodies, communicate instantly with the other side of the world, create intelligent entities that are not our biological offspring, and make a good go at destroying life on the planet. There is no ELE like us. It might be a good idea to better understand the things that make us different, rather than deny that we are.
The thing is, it seems to me that since, for better or worse, we are animals in so many ways, it doesn't really make sense to say that we are "utterly" different from other species.
We still die from diseases, just as other species do. We die if we fall from great heights, which many other species do not. We take in energy the way most other animal species do. Locomotion, respiration, vision, on and on, as much like the other species as they are all like each other.
To deny that humans are leaps and bounds above any other species in significant ways is willful ignorance.
Who's denying it? I'm well aware of all the things humans have accomplished and are capable of that no other species - indeed, not all the other species put together - could have done or can do.
Surely, having all those superior attainments, possessions and complexity of intellect are distinction enough. Our power to destroy them all should be power enough. I don't see a reason to deny them basic attributes like affection, communication and rational thought.
No animal other than us can be judged for cruelty. They aren't thinking cruel thoughts when they do anything. They aren't choosing to be cruel. Only we have that capacity.
Animals can be jerks. Yet I think the issue is that we have come up with smart the idea of ethics, which we relate only to us.
Reply to ssu .
Yeah, they can be jerks. Which makes for great videos on fb. :rofl:
Why do you suppose we relate our ethical principles only to use? Why don't we hold them accountable for there pain and death they cause each other? Why do we often kill dogs that break their chain and attack people?
Why don't we hold them accountable for there pain and death they cause each other?
In what circumstances, according to what law, by what standards? The pain and death other animals cause one another are generally inflicted in the course of feeding to survive - the means and method of which they have much less control than we do, and we don't outlaw human mean and methods of obtaining food, regardless of the pain the captivity and death of that food entail. Quoting Patterner
Why do we often kill dogs that break their chain and attack people?
Because in a human-controlled world, people are sacred - unless they've been convicted of a capital crime or inducted into an army - and dogs are not.
Nothing matters more. What makes humans different from other species? What is there answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness? How did life begin? Did anything exist before the Big Bang? All fascinating topics. And we are driven to explore the unknown, and try to answer questions.
Well, those questions are indeed important because they disorient us and conclusive answers are hard to come by. But I also think that the everyday concerns of food and shelter and sociality are more important. Certainly, If those things are not available, it would be irrational not to give them a higher priority.
No animal other than us can be judged for cruelty. They aren't thinking cruel thoughts when they do anything. They aren't choosing to be cruel
That's certainly what I was saying earlier. But I'm bedevllied by a tendency to think of counter-examples after I've said something. I have heard that if a fox gets into a hen coop, it will kill every single one of them even though it cannot eat them all and cannot store them for the future. Farmers, I've heard, have a particular down on foxes for that reason. Would that count as choosing to be cruel? At least the fox doesn't torture them. Cats, on the other hand, I've heard, tend to corner a mouse and play with it, allowing it to escape and then catching it back at the last moment. (I've never seen that for myself). Would that count?
We still die from diseases, just as other species do. We die if we fall from great heights, which many other species do not. We take in energy the way most other animal species do. Locomotion, respiration, vision, on and on, as much like the other species as they are all like each other.
Our power to destroy them all should be power enough. I don't see a reason to deny them basic attributes like affection, communication and rational thought.
Can I take that as suggesting that the things that make humans so special are not necessarily important to other creatures or, necessarily, to the planet?
Ludwig V
Of course not. Why should they be?
Quite so. What I'm getting at, though, is that our power over them and lack of awareness or at best understanding of it ought to impose a moral obligation not to mistreat them. It seems to me that a primary function of morality is to restrain the unlimited power over each other. But if our moral perceptions are restricted to our own species, it's hard to see how that works. We need a concept of a pan-species morality. But then, that morality would not necessarily restrain other creatures. I'm confused about this.
The thing is, it seems to me that since, for better or worse, we are animals in so many ways, it doesn't really make sense to say that we are "utterly" different from other species.
No two species on earth are 'utterly' different. That's impossible. I couldn't guess what the full list is, but, at the very least, all species have DNA and use glucose for energy. The explanation for this is that all earth species - indeed, all living individuals on earth (assuming no extraterrestrials) - are descended from one common ancestor that had these characteristics. That common ancestor is called LUCA, which stands for Last Universal Common Ancestor.
The closer we and another species are to our MRCA (Most Recent Common Success) on the tree of life, the more characteristics we share.
-We share more characteristics with other primates than we do with mammals that are not primates.
-We share more characteristics with other mammals than we do with vertebrates that are not mammals.
Etc.
There is no ELE like us. It might be a good idea to better understand the things that make us different, rather than deny that we are.
Patterner
I'm sorry, I don't understand what "ELE" means. But it's a fair point.
What would that accomplish? It could not be arrived-at through discussion and consensus; it could only be imposed by humans. Which is already the case in our folklore. Nor, even if we could make him understand the reason, could the lion lie down with the lamb unless we offered him satisfying veggie-burgers instead. And it would not be convincing, even so, unless all the humans - who do have dietary alternatives - all refrained from eating, torturing, trapping and hunting other species. Or even their own... Condemning a cat for playing with something that moves, something she does not recognize as being like herself, is just as human and irrational as applauding a human when, after some fancy play, he kills a terrified captive bull.
If we were able to agree among our species on a coherent moral system applied to our own species, we would achieve an immensely remarkable feat. Meanwhile: Try not to do to anyone or anything else what you would not like done to yourself.
Even rabbits are capable of destroying their habitat.
So even our awesome power to wreck the entire planet has forerunners. The rabbits' power is not different power; rather, the humans have a "super" of a power that animals also have. I think perhaps that's a better way to think of at least some of the features that we have been talking about.
The closer we and another species are to our MRCA (Most Recent Common Success) on the tree of life, the more characteristics we share.
-We share more characteristics with other primates than we do with mammals that are not primates.
-We share more characteristics with other mammals than we do with vertebrates that are not mammals.
etc.
Yes, of course - though the link to evolution is not, strictly speaking philosophical business. The tricky bit is distinguishing between the characteristics that we can unhesitatingly assign - anatomy and physiology etc. - and those that require interpretation.
The Cartesian suggestion that animals are simply machines seem absurd when applied to cats, dogs and mammals in general, but much less so when applied to bacteria, viruses and protozoa. The difficulty comes to a head when we start ascribing perceptions, motives, emotions and reasons to their behaviour. I think this comes from the fact that those judgments are heavily dependent on context and background.
Condemning a cat for playing with something that moves, something she does not recognize as being like herself, is just as human and irrational as applauding a human when, after some fancy play, he kills a terrified captive bull.
Yes. I didn't mean to suggest that the cat was to be blamed in any way. No more than the foxes are.
So even our awesome power to wreck the entire planet has forerunners.
In a way. A number of species are capable of overpopulating, overgrazing or overhunting their territory, given the right conditions. However, when that happens, nature quickly resets the balance by killing off the excess, though famine, disease or both. This was also true of pre-technological man.
It's only since humans declared war on nature and started winning that the the TEE (total extinction event) became all but inevitable, because man never reverses a bad decision; he generally exacerbates it with an even more technological 'solution'.
I didn't mean to suggest that the cat was to be blamed in any way. No more than the foxes are.
Yet many, if not most, humans do blame animals for being animals; do judge other species, as well as other humans by human standards - but themselves. Little brains are quite capable of dishonesty, but only the Big Brain is capable of unlimited hypocrisy.
So even our awesome power to wreck the entire planet has forerunners. The rabbits' power is not different power; rather, the humans have a "super" of a power that animals also have. I think perhaps that's a better way to think of at least some of the features that we have been talking about.
Sure. Just as, at one time, there was only one species of animal on the planet that had the ability to fly, even though other species were able to move in other ways. We can even see how the ability to fly evolved from how other species were moving. Still, it was a new ability.
At another time, only one species of animal had the ability to breath air, even though other species were able to get oxygen in other ways. We can even see how the ability to breath air evolved from how other species were getting oxygen. Still, it was a new ability.
At the moment, only one species has the ability to think in certain ways/about various types of things, even though other species are able to think. We can even see how the ability to think in new ways evolved from how other species are able to think. Still, it is a new ability.
However, when that happens, nature quickly resets the balance by killing off the excess, though famine, disease or both.
Isn't that exactly what is about to happen to humanity? Perhaps it would be best to scrap the present system and start again. No-one will mind except human beings.
Yet many, if not most, humans do blame animals for being animals; do judge other species, as well as other humans by human standards - but themselves. Little brains are quite capable of dishonesty, but only the Big Brain is capable of unlimited hypocrisy.
I'm not sure about the Big Brain, but yes, humans find it hard not to see the world entirely in their own interests. On the bright side, it is not completely impossible for us, so there is ground for hope.
At the moment, only one species has the ability to think in certain ways/about various types of things, even though other species are able to think. We can even see how the ability to think in new ways evolved from how other species are able to think. Still, it is a new ability.
I get the point about the first two cases. But it's all about the cases and it's not hard to think of cases that are hard to classify.
No doubt there was a time when only one species was capable of walking. That required the evolution of legs. So that was a new ability. At some point, a species evolved that was capable of walking on just two legs. Was that a new ability or just a variant of an old one?
Our ability to see developed from creatures that just had light-sensitive patches in their skins. Gradually, the rest of the eye developed - you can look up the stages if you want. The first creatures were merely sensitive to light and dark, which was a new ability. Is our ability to see a new ability or just a development of the old one? At what point in that process did creatures develop that were not merely light-sensitive but capable of seeing?
I must confess I don't know enough about how language-less animals think to know what is old and what is new in our intellectual and cognitive abilities. Of course, I understand that humans have developed some of their abilities beyond what other animals are capable of. Whether they are new or just highly developed seems a secondary question to me.
Isn't that exactly what is about to happen to humanity?
Yes, but we've already wrecked most of the infrastructure that would reset the balance. When the rabbits die off, the grass grows back and little tree seedlings; the birds and squirrels move into that habitat. When a wolf-pack overhunts its territory, some die of malnutrition, but the survivors move on, leaving space for their prey to re-establish a healthy population. What we do is demolish entire ecosystems and poison the water and soil so that it cannot be revived. Quoting Ludwig V
Perhaps it would be best to scrap the present system and start again.
We should have done that 2000 years ago. Even now, it might not be too late, if there fewer of us and we had the collective will to make a fundamental change. As things stand, this freight train has no brakes. Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not sure about the Big Brain,
I'm just saying we take every kind of thinking to a new, unequaled level, including the ability to prevericate in more elaborate and creative ways.
I must confess I don't know enough about how language-less animals think to know what is old and what is new in our intellectual and cognitive abilities.
I have no idea, myself. I don't know anything about how certain appendages went from forelegs to wings. I don't know what the intermediate steps were, or when any of them happened. But I think people who study that stuff have a pretty good amount of detail.
Thinking began in single-celled species. Nothing more than sensing light and moving in response to it is more complicated than dominoes knocking each other down. I can't imagine what the steps are between that and what we can do.
-Sensing multiple input, weighing them, and choosing one.
-Storing patterns of input, and referring to it when similar input is perceived.
-Thinking different things because the body develops different abilities.
we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it.
creativesoul
OK. I'll bite. I thought you were asking the question because I couldn't answer it; actually I have answered; it's just that you don't like the answer.
It's not about my preferences. It's about thought, belief, and/or experience that exists and existed in its entirety prior to language use on the evolutionary timeline. You claimed that thought, belief, and meaningful experience consists of behaviour. I asked twice already, and now I'll ask again...
Are you claiming that some, all, and/or any thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) consist(s) of behaviour and behaviour alone?
Preliminary problems include what it means to say that any meaningful experience consists of anything never mind what it means to say that meaningful experience consists of correlations.
Problems with "what it means to say" anything aren't my concern. That's two steps backwards. Perhaps this will help...
Apple pies consist of apples, flour, and so forth. "Apple pies consist of apples" is not a problem, I presume. Meaningful experiences consist of thought and belief. Thought and belief consist of correlations. Thus... meaningful experience consists of correlations.
We can look at what language less animals are doing with language too. <---- Here, of course, by "language-less" I mean complex spoken and written language such as our own, capable of metacognition. I really need to start being better about that qualification though, because I'm confident we're not the only language users
All meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Meaningful experience begins the moment one draws correlations between different things. Like sands and piles of sand. No clear lines here where thought and belief magically poof into existence. Evolution is very slow. Language less experience ends the moment one begins to draw correlations between language use and other things. All language use consists of correlations. Not all correlations consist of language use. All correlations are meaningful to the creature drawing them.
Language use - in the beginning - is a plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the same things as a means to communicate their own thought, belief, desire, wants, etc. It is by virtue of drawing correlations between the same things that shared meaning emerges. If the growl is to be considered language, then it must mean the same thing to both. I cannot say I know if that's the case. I know it must be if it is to count as language at that stage. The growl is one element within the experiences of a plurality of dogs. All draw correlations between the growl and something else. The growl is meaningful to both as a result of that and that alone. The growl may or may not mean the same thing to all creatures that witness the occurrence. It's the something else that may differ here and the growl itself cannot tell us what else is included in the dogs' correlational content.
Meaningful experience is prior to language. All meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature/candidate under consideration. All meaningful things become so by virtue of becoming part of that creature's correlational content. Language less experience ends the moment one begins to draw correlations between language use and other things.
Hence, regarding your dog and other domesticated non-human animals that obey and/or understand basic commands and/or other language use...
These are no longer language less creatures having language less experience. Each and every correlation drawn between language use and something else counts not as language less experience. So, as I've said before, the difference between language less creatures' experiences and language users' experiences are clear. The former does not - cannot - include correlations including language use, and the latter does.
I'm uh, troubled, to say the least, by the earlier flippant dismissal regarding the philosophical import of evolutionary progression as it pertains to any and all notions of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. It would be all too convenient for many a philosopher if philosophical positions/notions of thought and belief did not require being amenable to an evolutionary timeline. Denying the evolutionary history of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience does not make it go away. One's philosophical position regarding though, belief, and/or meaningful experience had better be able to take it into proper account.
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 17:43#9504070 likes
I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus.
creativesoul
I wasn't conflating those two descriptions.
Thought, belief, and/or knowledge is not a description. Some folk say that dogs are somehow, someway, doing calculus when they catch a ball. I say that that's bad thinking. Conflating mathematical descriptions(calculus) for knowing how to catch a ball.
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 17:51#9504080 likes
Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness.
creativesoul
Sorry, I'm confused. If the growl warns others not to be aggressive, I would have thought that they were aware of the dog's belief that they are being regarded as a possible threat. Is that what you meant by awareness of the awareness? I would also have thought that the dog was aware of it's own awareness that the others present a possible threat. Perhaps that's what you mean?
I've an issue with attributing awareness of awareness to any creature incapable of thinking about thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right. That requires naming and descriptive practices.
What difference is a question of how we interpret the events? The events are already meaningful. Hence, it is possible to misinterpret them.
creativesoul
The difference between the autonomous salivation and the growl which is under the dog's control.
It does not follow from the fact that your dog can learn to stop growling on your command that all dogs have conscious control of their growling in the sense of "conscious control" that matters here. Voluntarily choosing to growl and/or not growl in some particular scenario/situation or another.
How do you know that the behaviour of language less creatures is not being misinterpreted? By what standard do you judge whether or not an interpretation is correct?
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 19:12#9504180 likes
Why don't we hold them accountable for there pain and death they cause each other?
Accountability applies only to those who know they've done wrong(those who know better).
Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviourto anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better.
In order to choose better, one must know of better. That's one thing some humans do that no other animal can. So, in this sense, they(language less animals and experience) are utterly different. They cannot form, have, and/or hold any sort of thought and/or belief that requires comparing one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all, societal ethical standards, moral codes(morality); rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour notwithstanding.
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 19:19#9504190 likes
Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
Patterner
Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.
Here is where it went off the rails.
The difference between thought, belief, and/or experiences that humans and only humans can have that no other animal can.
This presupposes a difference between other capable creatures' beliefs and our own, with a particular emphasis upon those beliefs that language use has facilitated.
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 19:33#9504200 likes
Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
creativesoul Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats.
I'm not sure what that means.
Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is not belief. Behaviour is not meaningful experience.
What's in dispute here is whether or not all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone.
I'm arguing in the negative.
Furthermore, I'm positing that all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of correlations between different things drawn by a creature so capable. I'm arguing in favor of that.
Why don't we hold them accountable for there pain and death they cause each other?
Patterner
Accountability applies only to those who know they've done wrong(those who know better).
Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better.
In order to choose better, one must know of better. That's one thing some humans do that no other animal can. So, in this sense, they(language less animals and experience) are utterly different. They cannot form, have, and/or hold any sort of thought and/or belief that requires comparing one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all, societal ethical standards, moral codes(morality); rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour notwithstanding.
Exactly my point.
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 20:05#9504250 likes
Thinking began in single-celled species. Nothing more than sensing light and moving in response to it is more complicated than dominoes knocking each other down. I can't imagine what the steps are between that and what we can do.
I like the acknowledgement of evolutionary progression. However, thinking is something that we do. Thinking is existentially dependent upon certain biological structures that we have. We know that because we have observed and recorded the affects/effects that damaging those structures has on the mind and/or cognitive abilities of the injured. There is no good reason to attribute thinking to creatures that do not have very similar relevant biological structures.
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 20:12#9504280 likes
Why don't we hold them accountable for there pain and death they cause each other?
Patterner
Accountability applies only to those who know they've done wrong(those who know better).
Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better.
In order to choose better, one must know of better. That's one thing some humans do that no other animal can. So, in this sense, they(language less animals and experience) are utterly different. They cannot form, have, and/or hold any sort of thought and/or belief that requires comparing one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all, societal ethical standards, moral codes(morality); rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour notwithstanding.
creativesoul
Exactly my point.
Yup. The difference between language less thought and belief and language users' thought and belief are pivotal here in this discussion. How else do we avoid mistakenly attributing belief where none can be?
Morality is a human thing.
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 20:26#9504320 likes
To deny that humans are leaps and bounds above any other species in significant ways is willful ignorance.
Patterner
Who's denying it? I'm well aware of all the things humans have accomplished and are capable of that no other species - indeed, not all the other species put together - could have done or can do.
Surely, having all those superior attainments, possessions and complexity of intellect are distinction enough. Our power to destroy them all should be power enough. I don't see a reason to deny them basic attributes like affection, communication and rational thought.
Yes. It is the kinds or complexity of language less thought that needs attention. Many rational thoughts we have are incapable of being formed, had, and/or held by language less creatures.
It's knowing language's role that matters.
creativesoulNovember 27, 2024 at 20:31#9504330 likes
I also think we think about things no other species thinks about. Of course, I can't prove my cat isn't pondering the nature of consciousness, trying to find an easier way to locate prime numbers, or amusing himself with the thought of the cat who shaves all the cats who do not shave themselves.
It is the kinds or complexity of language less thought that needs attention.
It's getting plenty of attention from animal behaviorists. We're getting more and more studies of problem solving in both nature and laboratory conditions.
we are animals in so many ways, it doesn't really make sense to say that we are "utterly" different from other species.
An important way in which humans differ from all other animals is our highly evolved "theory of mind" - a mental capacity that allows us to make inferences about the mental states of others.
We, each of us, have a "theory of mind" about others - We can understand the beliefs, emotions, intentions and thoughts of others. Such a capacity is vital for complex social interactions.
For example, empathy could not exist without a theory of mind.
It has been proposed that religion is a by-product of this mental capacity we call theory of mind, as we evolved to make inferences about what is in the mind of God.
For example, empathy could not exist without a theory of mind.
Clearly, you have never had a dog console you in grief or ask you anxiously why you are on the ground with your head in the kitchen cabinet. Quoting Questioner
It has been proposed that religion is a by-product of this mental capacity we call theory of mind, as we evolved to make inferences about what is in the mind of God.
Much has been proposed about "God", usually without reference to all the various conceptions of deity in all the various cultures that invariably project some aspect of their own version of human onto their gods.
QuestionerNovember 28, 2024 at 14:53#9505480 likes
Clearly, you have never had a dog console you in grief or ask you anxiously why you are on the ground with your head in the kitchen cabinet.
Thank you for the opportunity to expand on my answer.
First I have had dogs comfort me! I always looked on my dogs as my babies.
But the theory of mind (and the empathy related to it) I described allows a human to understand what another is thinking or feeling. Rather than empathy, what a dog is experiencing when he responds to your grief is emotional contagion, which is a response to emotions without fully understanding what the other individual is feeling.
Emotional contagion lacks the process of individuation required for empathy the emotions mirrored are not seen as distinct from the other.
Much has been proposed about "God", usually without reference to all the various conceptions of deity in all the various cultures that invariably project some aspect of their own version of human onto their gods.
Theory of Mind is not a set of proposals to explain the characteristics specific to any one religion, but rather an explanation for why religion exists at all.
But the theory of mind (and the empathy related to it) I described allows a human to understand what another is thinking and feeling
Being able to read thoughts and feelings are very different attributes. Humans discern the thoughts of other humans through choice of words, tone of voice, body language, facial expression and the little 'tells' when we're bluffing or lying. This is relatively easy to do between persons from the same culture and social background, much more difficult between people of different ethnicity or nationality or class or even sex in most cases. We can read the thoughts and feelings of a fictional character from the speech and manner of an actor, while the actor himself thinks and feels quite differently.
What people are feeling, otoh, is more nearly universal; much less affected by cultural mannerisms. It's more remarkable that other species can read our emotions more readily than we can read theirs, almost certainly because their noses are more sensitive and we sweat hormones. It has nothing to do with theory; it's about experience and the recognition of our same emotions in another. Quoting Questioner
Rather than empathy, what a dog is experiencing when he responds to your grief is emotional contagion, which is a response to emotions without fully understanding what the other individual is feeling.
Sneaking in the requirement to "fully understand" makes it exclusively human.... As if humans all fully understood their own emotions, let alone one another's. Quoting Questioner
Emotional contagion
Like human mobs at a lynching or cattle in a stampede? No, that's not very much like empathy.
How does a dog react when her human behaves in an uncharacteristic way? Try lying very still on the floor. Does your dog get contaminated and play dead? No, he paws and nuzzles at you, puffing little breaths through his nose, maybe whimpering or uttering short sharp yips, concerned for your welfare. (Which is why they train service dogs.)
Theory of Mind is not a set of proposals to explain the characteristics specific to any one religion, but rather an explanation for why religion exists at all.
It's one explanation. And gods are one explanation for why humans exist. We're good at making up explanations, either from fact or fantasy; other animals are not. That's another distinction to add to the list.
I'm uh, troubled, to say the least, by the earlier flippant dismissal regarding the philosophical import of evolutionary progression as it pertains to any and all notions of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. .... One's philosophical position regarding though, belief, and/or meaningful experience had better be able to take it into proper account.
I may be wrong to think that you are referring to something that I said. If you were, I am troubled by your impression that I would dismiss the philosophical import of evolutionary progression, let alone dismiss it flippantly. I would have thought that my general insistence that there is always continuity between what animals can do and what humans can do was evidence to the contrary. I must have said something to mislead you and I'm sorry about that.
I hope it helps if I write that sentence as "Surely, (thought that involves trees and cats) is involved in the (behaviour that involves trees and cats)" and explain (which I should have done) that when a dog approaches a tree in order to sniffs it, it is because it believes that there will be interesting smells around it, and so on.
Problems with "what it means to say" anything aren't my concern. That's two steps backwards. Perhaps this will help...
Apple pies consist of apples, flour, and so forth. "Apple pies consist of apples" is not a problem, I presume. Meaningful experiences consist of thought and belief. Thought and belief consist of correlations. Thus... meaningful experience consists of correlations.
What's the problem?
My problem is the transition from apple pies to meaningful experiences. (By the way, I was wondering what a meaningless experience would be like; I can see that they would not consist of thought and belief - so what would they consist of?)
You seem to have assumed that because "apple pies consist of apples etc." is unproblematic you can substitue any noun for "apple pies" and give an unproblematic answer. But what do surfaces edges consist of? Does it make sense to say that rainbows consist of light waves or colours? What does the number 4 consist of? A recipe?
I agree that experiences are an important basis for thought and belief, though experiences, I think, are something that happens to me.
There are two slightly different senses of "thought". One makes it like "belief" in that I can believe that p and think that p; the other is an activity, so it is hard to see that experience can consist of thinking.
Belief and (thought that) is more like a state, rather than something that happens or that I do, so again, it doesn't seem plausible to think of it as a constituent of experience.
Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief, but I'm reluctant to say that a sentence/statement/proposition is a constituent of thought or belief (or knowledge), since thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition. This is why some people are so reluctant to admit that there is such a thing as thought/belief/knowledge without language.
Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is not belief. Behaviour is not meaningful experience.
I agree. But behaviour (including linguistic behaviour, and behaviours like talking to oneself silently) does express one's thought, beliefs and experiences.
What's in dispute here is whether or not all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone.
I would be quite happy to give up any suggestion that experience consists of behaviour, in favour of the idea that experience is express by behaviour. What else, apart from behaviour, could meaningful experience consist of? What else, apart from behaviour could express experience?
Furthermore, I'm positing that all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of correlations between different things drawn by a creature so capable. I'm arguing in favor of that.
Well, in the same way that different kinds of thing have different kinds of constituent, so there are different kinds of correlation. For example, it is common to say that there is a difference between correlation and causation. But it is puzzling to understand 2+2=4 as a correlation.
Thought, belief, and/or knowledge is not a description. Some folk say that dogs are somehow, someway, doing calculus when they catch a ball. I say that that's bad thinking. Conflating mathematical descriptions(calculus) for knowing how to catch a ball.
But thought, belief and knowledge all require a description to explain what is thought, believed of known. Still, I think most people will agree with you about the dog. But most people then find themselves puzzled about how the dog knows where the ball will land. That's the point.
Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better.
Surely, when a dog approaches its food bowl, sniffs it and walks away despondently, the dog is comparing its hope that there is food in the bowl with reality and recognizing the difference.
Being able to read thoughts and feelings are very different attributes. Humans discern the thoughts of other humans through choice of words, tone of voice, body language, facial expression and the little 'tells' when we're bluffing or lying.
No, youre right, theory of mind does not have to do with reading sensory clues, or recognizing emotional states, which is what you are describing. The theory is something we create in our minds about the mental state of another, by making inferences about these sensory clues that we pick up. Because we have a theory of mind, we dont stop at Hes sad. Or Hes mad. We take it further and form theories in our minds about what the sensory clues mean > Hes mad about this . Or Hes sad about this Or He wants me to do this Or He doesnt want me to do this
You use your theory of mind every time you make an inference about the mental state of another like reading a mind. Sometimes, these inferences are correct, and sometimes they are not.
It's one explanation. And gods are one explanation for why humans exist. We're good at making up explanations, either from fact or fantasy; other animals are not. That's another distinction to add to the list.
Why humans exist? Or the entire universe?
And when we make up an explanation for existence that involves a supernatural being with specific characteristics whether we imagine he is a loving god, or a vengeful god, or whatever we are using our theory of mind to infer what is in the mind of that god.
We can read the thoughts and feelings of a fictional character from the speech and manner of an actor, while the actor himself thinks and feels quite differently.
Interesting observation. Yes, if the signals sent are false, then your inference about what is in the mind of another will most likely also be false.
You use your theory of mind every time you make an inference about the mental state of another like reading a mind. Sometimes, these inferences are correct, and sometimes they are not.
It doesnt have to be that dramatic. Smiles are contagious.
It doesn't have to be dramatic; people also yawn when they see others doing it; a giggle fit can engulf the entire table. Mirror neurons firing at random. Still not empathy. Quoting Questioner
Why humans exist? Or the entire universe?
Whatever. Gods have been used as stop-gap explanations for lots of things we didn't know, and are still used as a explanation for misfortune, the weather, altruism and the supremacy of man over all of creation. But their main function is to replace the all-powerful father figure from childhood. Quoting Questioner
And when we make up an explanation for existence that involves a supernatural being with specific characteristics whether we imagine he is a loving god, or a vengeful god, or whatever we are using our theory of mind to infer what is in the mind of that god.
By projecting there whatever is in the mind of whichever kind of man invented that god. Quoting Questioner
Yes, if the signals sent are false, then your inference about what is in the mind of another will most likely also be false.
And that is why humans can lie so much more elaborately and sustainably (sometimes an entire lifetime, sometimes even to themselves) than any other species, and more convincingly to one another than to any other species.
But false signals, feigning and misdirection are not exclusively human; we inherited the instinct and motivations for preverication from a long line of ancestors.
QuestionerNovember 28, 2024 at 19:50#9505950 likes
It doesn't have to be dramatic; people also yawn when they see others doing it; a giggle fit can engulf the entire table. Mirror neurons firing at random. Still not empathy.
I never said it was. You are the one conflating emotional contagion for empathy.
Whatever. Gods have been used as stop-gap observations for lots of things we didn't know, and are still used as a explanation for misfortune, the weather, altruism and the supremacy of man over all of creation.
And that is why humans can lie so much more elaborately and sustainably (sometimes an entire lifetime, sometimes even to themselves) than any other species. But false signals, feigning and play-acting are not exclusively human; we inherited the instinct and motivations to preverication from a long line of ancestors.
This is unconnected to any discussion about theory of mind.
Let me rephrase. There is a significant difference between our species and every other species.
Bats are the only mammals that can fly. I'm not saying bats are not mammals.
Amazing what a difference a word can make. I think we have an agreement.
The scientific name for modern humans is Homo sapiens.
Explanation: "Homo" refers to the genus "human" and "sapiens" means "wise" in Latin, so "Homo sapiens" translates to "wise man"
Homo (from Latin hom? 'human') is a genus of great ape (family Hominidae) that emerged from the genus Australopithecus and encompasses only a single extant species, Homo sapiens (modern humans), along with a number of extinct species (collectively called archaic humans) classified as either ancestral or closely related to modern humans; these include Homo erectus and Homo neanderthalensis. The oldest member of the genus is Homo habilis, with records of just over 2 million years ago.[a] Homo, together with the genus Paranthropus, is probably most closely related to the species Australopithecus africanus within Australopithecus.[4] The closest living relatives of Homo are of the genus Pan (chimpanzees and bonobos), with the ancestors of Pan and Homo estimated to have diverged around 5.7-11 million years ago during the Late Miocene.[5]
I don't think that explanation comes up in any creation stories.
I like the acknowledgement of evolutionary progression. However, thinking is something that we do. Thinking is existentially dependent upon certain biological structures that we have. We know that because we have observed and recorded the affects/effects that damaging those structures has on the mind and/or cognitive abilities of the injured. There is no good reason to attribute thinking to creatures that do not have very similar relevant biological structures.
This is from [I]Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious[/I], by Antonio Damasio:
Damasio:Sensing is not perceiving, and it is not constructing a pattern based on something else to create a representation of that something else and produce an image in mind. On the other hand, sensing is the most elementary variety of cognition.
This is from [I]Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos[/I], by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:
Ogas and Gaddam:A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputsof changing sensation into useful behavioris thinking, the defining activity of a mind.
Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
?A sensor that responds to its environment
?A doer that acts upon its environment
Some familiar examples of sensors that are part of your own mind include the photon-sensing rods and cones in your retina, the vibration-sensing hair cells in your ears, and the sourness-sensing taste buds on your tongue. A sensor interacts with a doer, which does something. A doer performs some action that impinges upon the world and thereby influences the bodys health and well-being. Common examples of doers include the twitchy muscle cells in your finger, the sweat-producing apocrine cells in your sweat glands, and the liquid-leaking serous cells in your tear ducts.
Ogas and Gaddam soon talk about the roundworm. In addition to sensors and doers, the roundworm has two thinking elements. One neuron connects the sensors and the forward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is food ahead. Another neuron connects the sensors to the backward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is poison ahead. The stronger the signal a neuron gets from the sensor, the stronger the signal it sends to its mover.
Also, the two neurons inhibit each other. The stronger the signal a neuron receives from the sensor, the stronger it inhibits the other neuron.
The authors of these two books are calling it 'thinking' from the beginning. The roundworm is a step up. It is judging conflicting inputs, and choosing. It might be stretching the definitions of 'judging' and 'choosing'. And maybe it's stretching the definition to say "This process of changing inputs into outputsof changing sensation into useful behavioris thinking." But all of this is, surely, the first stage of thinking. The sensors could evolve into eyes, or nose, or whatever. The movers could evolve into a tail, or legs, or whatever. But what connected them in the first ancient life evolved into our thinking. And, even if in only the most primitive sense, they are performing the same functions.
An important way in which humans differ from all other animals is our highly evolved "theory of mind" - a mental capacity that allows us to make inferences about the mental states of others.
How do you know that non-human animals don't have a theory of mind? How do you know that other people have a theory of mind?
Since the theory of mind is posited as an essential prerequisite of empathy, it seems to follow that if somone (human) can interact appropriately with other people, they have a theory of mind. I suppose.
So, if some non-human animals can interact appropriately with various other animals, including human animals, does it not follow that they have a theory of mind?
I do agree, however, that generalization about the extent to which all animals can do that would be very dangerous. I don't think that a fly has any real grasp of humans as people; nor do fish - most of them, anyway.
Rather than empathy, what a dog is experiencing when he responds to your grief is emotional contagion, which is a response to emotions without fully understanding what the other individual is feeling.
I thought that emotional contagion was sharing the emotions of others, as opposed to responding to their emotions. It's like the difference between treating a disease and catching it.
The existence of theory of mind in non-human animals is controversial. On the one hand, one hypothesis proposes that some non-human animals have complex cognitive processes which allow them to attribute mental states to other individuals, sometimes called "mind-reading" while another proposes that non-human animals lack these skills and depend on more simple learning processes such as associative learning; or in other words, they are simply behaviour-reading.
In practice, these supposed different alternatives come down to the same process. There is no way to read a mind except by reading behaviour.
"This process of changing inputs into outputsof changing sensation into useful behavioris thinking." But all of this is, surely, the first stage of thinking.
Thank you for this. I agree that it is important in that it puts the relationship between knowing and doing at the heart of both. Philosophy has created endless fake problems for itself by focusing on the first and treating the second as an optional add-on. Suggesting that it is the "first stage" instead of insisting that it is either thinking or not is also an excellent nuance and very helpful. I shall remember about the roundworm (and, hopefully, where I learnt about it) for a long time.
I don't think that explanation comes up in any creation stories.
No, it doesn't. it is a new creation story, and the creation story of our time. It differs from all the others in that it lays itself open to evalutaion as true or false. Which seems to be a great improvement on the traditional varieties.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 10:38#9506930 likes
It is the kinds or complexity of language less thought that needs attention.
creativesoul
It's getting plenty of attention from animal behaviorists. We're getting more and more studies of problem solving in both nature and laboratory conditions.
Indeed, we are. I've watched a number of different 'documentaries' about animal minds and problem solving. What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
Many rational thoughts we have are incapable of being formed, had, and/or held by language less creatures.
creativesoul
And a great many irrational ones, as well...
Agreed. The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not. Those that are, cannot be formed, had, or held by language less creatures.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 10:43#9506940 likes
Not sure how you arrived at that conclusion, but it's false... if you care enough about whether or not your beliefs about my experience are true.
I suspect that there are behaviours that dogs display after doing something forbidden, or after being approached by the humans afterwards, that you claim shows us that they know better?
I'm wondering if you looked at the argument for the claim at the top of that post, or just at the conclusion.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 10:49#9506960 likes
Other creatures capable of thought ..
creativesoul
IN-capable?
Hey Mww.
You and I both know that "thought" to you means something very different than "thought" to me. On your view, and correct me if I'm wrong, there is no distinction between thought and thinking about thought. We would agree that other creatures are incapable of some kinds of thought(namely those existentially dependent upon metacognitive endeavors) if there were such a distinction/discrimination on your view.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 11:30#9506980 likes
I'm not sure what that means.
creativesoul
I hope it helps if I write that sentence as "Surely, (thought that involves trees and cats) is involved in the (behaviour that involves trees and cats)" and explain (which I should have done) that when a dog approaches a tree in order to sniffs it, it is because it believes that there will be interesting smells around it, and so on.
What language less creatures are capable of believing and thinking is precisely what's in question here. That sort of consideration relies upon notions of "thought" and "belief". Even the approach that you seem most fond of presupposes notions of "thought" and "belief". The idea that behaviour "expresses" belief has very little, if any, restrictions around it. There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding. There are other problems as well, as I'm sure you're aware.
Regarding this example, I see no reason, ground, or justification to claim what the dog will believe is or isn't interesting.
What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs
language less animals can and/or cannot have?
I'm uh, troubled, to say the least, by the earlier flippant dismissal regarding the philosophical import of evolutionary progression as it pertains to any and all notions of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. .... One's philosophical position regarding though, belief, and/or meaningful experience had better be able to take it into proper account.
creativesoul
I may be wrong to think that you are referring to something that I said. If you were, I am troubled by your impression that I would dismiss the philosophical import of evolutionary progression, let alone dismiss it flippantly. I would have thought that my general insistence that there is always continuity between what animals can do and what humans can do was evidence to the contrary. I must have said something to mislead you and I'm sorry about that.
I went back to check on what it was that was said. No worries. I must have misinterpreted what you wrote. My apology seems more fitting than yours. That is... it seems that it is I who owes you an apology, not the other way around.
You are hardly one to be imprecise. That being given, it just seemed to me, in-capable would have lent more consistency to the overall point being made in that particular entry.
If Im mistaken, thats on me.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 13:04#9507050 likes
Problems with "what it means to say" anything aren't my concern. That's two steps backwards. Perhaps this will help...
Apple pies consist of apples, flour, and so forth. "Apple pies consist of apples" is not a problem, I presume. Meaningful experiences consist of thought and belief. Thought and belief consist of correlations. Thus... meaningful experience consists of correlations.
What's the problem?
creativesoul
My problem is the transition from apple pies to meaningful experiences.
Yes, and understandably so, for they are very different kinds of things.
Apple pies are material, whereas thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences are neither material nor immaterial. Rather, they consist of material/physical and immaterial/non physical elements. In addition, apple pies could be classified as objects, whereas thought, belief, and meaningful experiences are not objects at all. Nor are they subjects. They are ongoing processes. I touched on this diversion from convention a few times earlier in the thread and mentioned to you more recently that my position turns many a historical dichotomy on its head.
There are two slightly different senses of "thought". One makes it like "belief" in that I can believe that p and think that p; the other is an activity, so it is hard to see that experience can consist of thinking.
Yes. There are times when the two terms "thought" and "belief" are not interchangeable. This is irrelevant however to the position I'm arguing for/from.
Riding a unicycle is an activity. Some experiences consist of riding a unicycle. That is the case for one who is watching another ride or riding themselves.
Perhaps a large part of the problem that makes it "hard to see" how experiences can consist of thought and belief is that the conventional approaches are ill-equipped for doing so.
Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of. They also tend to equate belief with propositions and/or belief with attitudes towards that proposition, which is a huge mistake, despite the fact that we express much of our own beliefs via language use/propositions.
On my view, it is clear that language less creatures' beliefs cannot be understood using that method. Not all belief is propositional in content. Propositions are meaningless to language less creatures. Hence, they can have no attitude towards them.
Belief and (thought that) is more like a state, rather than something that happens or that I do, so again, it doesn't seem plausible to think of it as a constituent of experience.
This seems to be alluding to belief as propositional attitude without saying so.
Our discussion is an experience, partly shared - at least - by all who've participated and/or have been following along. It would be very hard to make any sense of denying that each and every participant having the experience were thinking about what they were reading. They do so by virtue of drawing correlations between language use and other things. All of those correlations are part of the experiences. They are experiences that only we can have. Those correlations(that process of thinking) are(is an) elemental constituent(s). If we were to remove all those correlations being drawn between the language use and other things, if we were to remove all of the thoughtful consideration between the claims and what the claims are describing, what would be left of each individual experience such that it could still count as the experience of the reader/participant? It would be akin to removing the apples from the pie and still claiming it was an apple pie.
Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief, but I'm reluctant to say that a sentence/statement/proposition is a constituent of thought or belief (or knowledge), since thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition. This is why some people are so reluctant to admit that there is such a thing as thought/belief/knowledge without language.
On pains of coherency alone. The problem is the notion/use of "thought".
The first claim is false as is what immediately follows "since".
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 13:32#9507070 likes
This is from Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious, by Antonio Damasio:
Sensing is not perceiving, and it is not constructing a pattern based on something else to create a representation of that something else and produce an image in mind. On the other hand, sensing is the most elementary variety of cognition.
Damasio
This looks like a comparison between rudimentary sensory perception and Cartesian notion of perception, or perhaps a phenomenological account of perception. I agree with the rejection of both "representation" and "image". I'm also in complete agreement that physiological sensory perception is at the root, the basis, of thinking. However, sensory perception is not equivalent to thinking. That conflation blurs the entire timeline of evolutionary progression between moving towards light and our thinking about how they do that. I think the latter is existentially dependent upon the former, but not the other way around.
This is from Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:
A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputsof changing sensation into useful behavioris thinking, the defining activity of a mind.
Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
?A sensor that responds to its environment
?A doer that acts upon its environment
Some familiar examples of sensors that are part of your own mind include the photon-sensing rods and cones in your retina, the vibration-sensing hair cells in your ears, and the sourness-sensing taste buds on your tongue. A sensor interacts with a doer, which does something. A doer performs some action that impinges upon the world and thereby influences the bodys health and well-being. Common examples of doers include the twitchy muscle cells in your finger, the sweat-producing apocrine cells in your sweat glands, and the liquid-leaking serous cells in your tear ducts.
Ogas and Gaddam
Ogas and Gaddam soon talk about the roundworm. In addition to sensors and doers, the roundworm has two thinking elements. One neuron connects the sensors and the forward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is food ahead. Another neuron connects the sensors to the backward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is poison ahead. The stronger the signal a neuron gets from the sensor, the stronger the signal it sends to its mover.
Also, the two neurons inhibit each other. The stronger the signal a neuron receives from the sensor, the stronger it inhibits the other neuron.
The authors of these two books are calling it 'thinking' from the beginning. The roundworm is a step up. It is judging conflicting inputs, and choosing. It might be stretching the definitions of 'judging' and 'choosing'. And maybe it's stretching the definition to say "This process of changing inputs into outputsof changing sensation into useful behavioris thinking." But all of this is, surely, the first stage of thinking. The sensors could evolve into eyes, or nose, or whatever. The movers could evolve into a tail, or legs, or whatever. But what connected them in the first ancient life evolved into our thinking. And, even if in only the most primitive sense, they are performing the same functions.
I agree in large part. I think they're on the right track. The notions of "mind" and "thinking" seem far too diluted for my tastes, and I suspect the account falls victim to reductio.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 13:45#9507080 likes
Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better.
I was just thinking out loud and reacting to what others have said, including someone in a completely different forum and a TV show about a Native American creation story. I may have an overactive mind.
My Thanksgiving blew up into an emotional drama and I feel very fragile this morning. I don't think animals come even close to the insanity of humans except maybe when a dog has rabbis. I think today I am holding a completely different perspective of humans. We have been arguing about humans being rational but they can also be completely irrational and destructive making the notion of being possessed by a demon seem plausible.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 14:17#9507120 likes
Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is not belief. Behaviour is not meaningful experience.
creativesoul
I agree. But behaviour (including linguistic behaviour, and behaviours like talking to oneself silently) does express one's thought, beliefs and experiences.
Indeed, but language less creatures cannot do that.
What's in dispute here is whether or not all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone.
creativesoul
What else, apart from behaviour, could meaningful experience consist of?
A process.
Something(s) to become meaningful, a creature for that something or those things to become meaningful to, and a means for things to become meaningful to that creature.
No kidding! What's the point of a brain, if it's not to generate a mind? But if the word troubles you, turn off the sound and watch the action. Quoting creativesoul
The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
Why is that so important to you, and by what method - other than philosophizing - do you propose to discriminate? Aside from the fact that you arbitrarily consign all communication, among any species, that doesn't have human grammar and vocabulary as language-less. Makes pre-verbal babies sound mindless, and completely dismisses the human vocabulary a great many human-associated animals are capable of learning. (Some humans are also capable of learning some non-human vocabulary.) Quoting creativesoul
What language less creatures are capable of believing and thinking is precisely what's in question here.
I thought the question was whether other species are capable of rational thought. The language boondoggle was introduced later.
Reply to Athena
Ok. Just wasn't sure if you thought I was saying anything about creation stories, or anything at all in any religious vein.
Sorry about your Thanksgiving. Indeed, a lot of negative possibilities come along with our mental capacity. And the negative crap is, like Yoda said about the Dark Side, quicker, easier, more seductive.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 14:34#9507150 likes
There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
creativesoul
No kidding! What's the point of a brain, if it's not to generate a mind? But if the word troubles you, turn off the sound and watch the action.
It's not that the word troubles me. It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitable conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.
The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
creativesoul
Why is that so important to you, and by what method - other than philosophizing - do you propose to discriminate?
There is no other method to discriminate between what language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are. We can then check and see how well our notion explains the experiment. It matters because getting it right matters.
It's not that the word troubles me. It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind.
There is no other method to discriminate between what language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are.
There is no method to discriminate between what human language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are. Quite apart from the fact that one species - undisputedly - having more fanciful and abstruse thoughts than others doesn't negate rationality in others. And the secondary fact that the majority of humans also don't give very much of their day to contemplating metaphisics, the nature of thought about thinking, or 'the hard question of consciousness'.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 14:43#9507180 likes
My Thanksgiving blew up into an emotional drama and I feel very fragile this morning...
Yeah, that sucks. That's never a good thing. Some people are incapable of calmly expressing themselves. The current state of American culture/politics is making things far worse. Complete and total disrespect for others is not only glorified, its financially rewarded.
You seem like a nice person. Hopefully your days improve.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 14:44#9507190 likes
I have elaborated on the philosophical enquiry/method I've used to discriminate between language less thought and thoughts that are existentially dependent on language and/or each other - as many of our own thoughts are.
There are some things that are verifiable, others that are not.
creativesoulNovember 29, 2024 at 15:08#9507240 likes
What language less creatures are capable of believing and thinking is precisely what's in question here.
creativesoul
I thought the question was whether other species are capable of rational thought. The language boondoggle was introduced later.
Of course the question is whether or not other species are capable of rational thought. You and I agree that they are.
Our differences seem to be about which sorts of thoughts other species are capable of and which ones they are not. Although, there is some agreement there as well.
I use the method I've been employing to discriminate between those that only we can form, have, and/or hold and those that other species can as well. One glaringly obvious distinction is that other species are incapable of having thoughts that are existentially dependent upon using language(naming and descriptive practices).
How do you know that non-human animals don't have a theory of mind?
The scientific research into nonhuman animals theory of mind (ToM) goes back decades and there is no consensus. But do I think a dog can interpret and make inferences about human thought? No.
Since the theory of mind is posited as an essential prerequisite of empathy, it seems to follow that if somone (human) can interact appropriately with other people, they have a theory of mind.
Every time you form a conclusion about what is in the mind of another (whether it is correct or not) you are using your ToM capacity.
So, if some non-human animals can interact appropriately with various other animals, including human animals, does it not follow that they have a theory of mind?
Not necessarily. Interacting is not the same as interpreting mental states.
The origins of both theory of mind and empathy go back about 5-6 million years ago.
Theory of mind originated with gorillas? Without language? OK - I did not know that 'theory' could be applied to an inarticulate process like watching and interpreting the physical actions of another sentient being. Though I do suspect emotional empathy is older and less dependent on the socialization of young. Quoting Questioner
Interacting is not the same as interpreting mental states.
I don't see how two individuals - other than predator and prey - can interact without interpreting states of mind - or at least states of emotion and health.
I have elaborated on the philosophical enquiry/method I've used to discriminate between language less thought and thoughts that are existentially dependent on language and/or each other - as many of our own thoughts are.
Yes, I'm aware of that. I'm also aware of how much reliable factual information philosophy has contributed to human knowledge over the last two millennia.
The distinction of human language-using vs human language-less is entirely anthropocentric. I do understand why that distinction may seem vital to establishing human superiority, but I don't see why it matters to the question of whether a thought is rational.
Our differences seem to be about which sorts of thoughts other species are capable of and which ones they are not. Although, there is some agreement there as well.
How did sorts of thought become the central issue? A logical solution to even one single problem, such as getting a grub out of a hollow tree or escaping from a fenced yard demonstrates rational thought. Adding layers of complexity, all the way up to wondering why the universe exists, doesn't change the fundamental nature of reason itself; it merely obfuscates the issue by shifting focus from the process to the subject matter.
A very small minority of humans set themselves the task of mulling over questions with no available answers (just how many angels can dance on a pin); a large minority grapple with the invention and application of technology or administrative affairs; the vast majority think about getting food, securing their physical well being, having sex, raising their young, pursuing pleasure when they get the chance - much like all the other animals. They go about these activities through both rational and irrational decisions - much like all the other animals.
creativesoulNovember 30, 2024 at 15:25#9509000 likes
The distinction of human language-using vs human language-less is entirely anthropocentric. I do understand why that distinction may seem vital to establishing human superiority, but I don't see why it matters to the question of whether a thought is rational.
How did sorts of thought become the central issue?
Not all rational thought is the same. Some rational thought can only be formed by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is one crucial difference between our language and non human animals' languages. It is the difference between being able to think about one's own thought and not. Only humans can do this. Hence, any and all thought that is existentially dependent upon metacognition is of the sort that non human creatures cannot form, have, and/or hold.
There's much more nuance within my position than you've recognized.
creativesoulNovember 30, 2024 at 15:29#9509020 likes
A logical solution to even one single problem, such as getting a grub out of a hollow tree or escaping from a fenced yard demonstrates rational thought.
I'm guessing this refers to the earlier examples of tool use and learning how to open gates. I agree that those are cases of rational thinking in non human animals. None of them require a creature capable of metacognition.
On the contrary...
Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
creativesoulNovember 30, 2024 at 15:55#9509040 likes
I did not know that 'theory' could be applied to an inarticulate process like watching and interpreting the physical actions of another sentient being.
Theory of mind does not refer to the process, but the end result the inferences you make is the theory - formed in your mind its a theory about what is in the mind of another mind.
I don't see how two individuals - other than predator and prey - can interact without interpreting states of mind - or at least states of emotion and health.
We can make conclusions about emotion and health just by observing outward signs. This is not what forming a theory of mind is about. If you form a theory about what is in another mind, you form conclusions about the mental state of another with a view to making predictions.
We humans have evolved to be natural psychologists. The most promising but also the most dangerous elements in our environment are other members of our own species. Success for our human ancestors must have depended on being able to get inside the minds of those they lived with, to second-guess them, anticipate where they were going, help them if they needed it, challenge them, manipulate them. To do this they had to develop brains that would deliver a story about what its like to be another person from the inside.
From psychologists David Premark and Guy Woodruff (defining theory of mind in 1978):
A system of inferences of this kind may be properly viewed as a theory because such (mental) states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others.
Reply to creativesoul Dogs want to please and they understand when you are displeased and are even able to anticipate that. I once had a Jack Russell terrier called Jimi and I decided to get some hens. He killed a hen and I scolded him. Some time after that my partner called me at work and told me Jimi had killed another and that the dead bird was on the floor near the front door. She asked me what she should do with the dead chook and I said she should leave it. When I opened the front door Jimi was sitting next to the dead bird shaking. He knew he had done the wrong thing. He never bothered another hen.
creativesoulDecember 01, 2024 at 00:54#9510050 likes
So what? A thought is rational or irrational. And action the result of thought or of emotion. Quoting creativesoul
Some rational thought can only be formed by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is one crucial difference between our language and non human animals' languages. It is the difference between being able to think about one's own thought and not. Only humans can do this.
Yes, yes, several people have already established human specialness about two dozen times in this thread alone, and I have not disputed it once. I just don't see how it could invalidate the capability of other species for rational thought. Quoting creativesoul
There's much more nuance within my position than you've recognized.
Oh I appreciate the distinction you keep making. Sounds much like Descartes': They don't speak [in human words] and they don't philosophize. Granted on both counts. I just don't consider it relevant to the topic. Quoting creativesoul
you have invalidated observations made on scientific principles for the choice of words not being objective enough. Vera Mont
That's not true.
What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
That's our theory of mind at work. Why is it a problem, if you're not fussy about objectivity. Quoting creativesoul
None of them require a creature capable of metacognition.
Neither does the Ford assembly line. The point is still to find areas of human specialness. You already have that. Why belabour it?
what was the purpose of
What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
creativesoul
That's our theory of mind at work. Why is it a problem,
It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.
Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.
There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding.
That's true.
We might get some clues from thinking about how we decide what a human being believes or can believe and then thinking about what a creature like a dog does believe.
For example, you believe that a dog cannot form beliefs about beliefs. (Forgive me if that's not accurate, but I think it is enough for what I want to say). In my book, that needs to be considered in the light of what the dog does. Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me.
If a dog could read a clock and use the information in relevant ways, I would say it may know when it is 5 p.m. Does that mean it cannot have a concept of time? No, because it can show up for meals or walks at the right time. But it cannot have a concept of time like the human concept and there are other behaviours that can high-light that.
The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
I have some intuition about that distinction, but I have trouble applying it. Is my belief that there is some beer in the fridge existentially dependent on language? I can only express it in language. Could a dog believe that there is beer in the fridge? Well, it can certainly believe that its dinner is in the fridge.
On pains of coherency alone. The problem is the notion/use of "thought".
The first claim is false as is what immediately follows "since".
I suppose you are disagreeing with "Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief..." and "thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition"
As to the first, I may have been unclear. As to the first, it is true that one can hold beliefs that are not formulated in language. But I cannot talk about them without a formulation in language. To distinguish between what people believe and don't believe, I must complete the formula "S believes that..."
As to the second, "S knows that p" means that p is true. "S believes that p" means that S believes/thinks that p is true, but it may not actually be true. "Thinks" is more complicated than either, but is at least compatible with S merely entertaining the possibility that p is true.
A process.
Something(s) to become meaningful, a creature for that something or those things to become meaningful to, and a means for things to become meaningful to that creature.
We agree, then, that experience is a process. I am hoping that you also agree with me that what is meaningful to a creature affects how that creature behaves.
It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.
To be sure, the presuppositions with which one approaches describing animal behaviour are always important. If they are wrong, the reports will be wrong. You seem very confident that your presuppositions are correct. It is sensible to evaluate one's presuppositions in tne light of observations and to revise or refine them before making further observations. It seems to me very dangerous to think that observations of a particular incident can be conclusively settled without an extensive background of observations of a range of behaviour of the animal.
Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
I wonder how one might explain that behaviour. The idea that he is doing it for fun is not impossible, but is a bit of a stretch. If females did it too, it would be plausible. But, as I understand it, they don't. Suppose that female behaviour indicates that they are attracted by what the male does. Perhaps that Is just an coincidence, but that's a bit of a stretch too.
QuestionerDecember 01, 2024 at 12:28#9510670 likes
Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
Patterner
This is the direction this discussion needs to take.
Since this thread is intended to discuss common ground between the thoughts of humans and other species, perhaps a new thread, discussing differences, in order to better understand human thought?
Sorry about your Thanksgiving. Indeed, a lot of negative possibilities come along with our mental capacity. And the negative crap is, like Yoda said about the Dark Side, quicker, easier, more seductive.
Thanks but the bad thing turned into a good thing. :grin: It seemed like an end-of-the-world event but now I see it as the beginning of wonderful new opportunities.
I was wondering how animals handle such events and decided their relationships change and their position in the troop can change, especially when they transition to adulthood.
Yeah, that sucks. That's never a good thing. Some people are incapable of calmly expressing themselves. The current state of American culture/politics is making things far worse. Complete and total disrespect for others is not only glorified, its financially rewarded.
You seem like a nice person. Hopefully your days improve.
Thanks as I said above, what I thought was almost too terrible to bear has turned into a good thing. However, I am still pondering what you have said about the spirit of our times and what is happening in families. I might want to transfer this to a thread about the fall of civilizations.
Look at what I found because the posts in this thread pushed me to understand more...
But perhaps most importantly, I want to show you how they make up afterwards. Chimp societies wouldnt hold together very long if the individuals within them didnt have the capacity to reconcile, and that is the saving grace for both the chimpanzees themselves and our own ability to care for them. Because no matter how bad things get, they usually find a way to move forward together.
Thank you, thank you everyone! Sometimes I worry that this thread is getting too far from topic but then I see a possible connection and I am blown away by the expansion of my mind. This is why I come here.
creativesoulDecember 02, 2024 at 23:21#9513380 likes
It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitably conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.
If the ToM being fleshed out by myself were incapable of drawing and maintaining those distinctions, then it too would inevitably result in conflating between non human thought and belief and human thought and belief. Hence, the importance of the endeavor.
I/we do not have all the answers, nor do I think it's possible to acquire them. We do, however, have some and those help avoid some anthropomorphism. They also allow one to recognize some mistakes 'in the wild'.
By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of?
creativesoul
I don't discriminate between 'sorts' of thinking.
Which inevitably results in personification(anthropomorphism). That's unacceptable by my standards.
Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
creativesoul
Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.
I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first.
There is similarity. I just think you're overstating it. Some(arguably most) children can and do draw correlations between their own behaviour and others' behaviour towards them afterwards. So, to that extent, it's the same. That's an early step in learning the rules. It's not enough though. It is enough to help increase the chances of one's own survival when living in a violent/aggressive social hierarchy. Canines have a very long history of that.
It's the difference that you're neglecting and/or glossing over.
The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.
I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done.
I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do).
Right, so he knew he had done something he shouldn't have, which was my original point. Do you think it is any different with humans? Do you think that if children were never taught that they would know what is expected of them?
To be sure humans learn what is acceptable and what is not through both behavior and language whereas dogs do so primarily through behavior. That said they do learn what kinds of behavior of theirs relates respectively to and invokes "good dog" and "bad dog" and other simple utterances; so language is involved to some degree.
creativesoulDecember 03, 2024 at 02:53#9513640 likes
There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding.
creativesoul
That's true.
We might get some clues from thinking about how we decide what a human being believes or can believe and then thinking about what a creature like a dog does believe.
For example, you believe that a dog cannot form beliefs about beliefs. (Forgive me if that's not accurate, but I think it is enough for what I want to say). In my book, that needs to be considered in the light of what the dog does.
"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.
The last suggestion/claim above has the methodological approach the wrong way around.
It is our behaviour that clearly shows us - beyond all reasonable doubt - what thinking about one's own thought and belief(metacognition) requires: Naming and descriptive practices; picking one's own thought and belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else. That is the only means. That crucial bit of knowledge is part of the standard used to assess/judge any and all belief attribution by any and all authors/speakers to any and all creatures, human to human attribution notwithstanding. It's not the only one, but it's the one in consideration at the moment, and some others are irrelevant to the topic at hand. I digress...
So, it seems clear to me that what the dog does, and the subsequent attribution(s) of thought and/or belief to the dog because of what the dog does, all need to be considered in light of what metacognition requires(what metacognition is existentially dependent upon). The dog cannot consider its own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself. Thus, any and all sorts of thinking that require a creature capable of doing so are sorts that dogs cannot form, have, and/or hold. It's that simple. Easy to say. Much more difficult to clearly set out, but I am getting a bit better at it, I think...
Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me.
I'm unsure about the relevance of the opening statement above. I've certainly never made such a claim. Nor would I. Actually, I agree with that claim, as it is written. However, the second claim seems too vague to be of much use. I also cannot see how the rest counts as support for the idea that meaning governs behaviour. I would agree that meaning governs behaviour, but I suspect that our viewpoints, notions, and/or approaches towards meaning are very different. Hence, I suspect that our explanations of how meaning governs behaviour are quite different as a result.
To the example...
Sure, there are certain thoughts and beliefs one cannot possibly form, have, and/or hold if they have not learned, articulated, understood, and/or used the right sorts of language. Substituting that reason(ing) with "they have not learnt the relevant behaviours" is stretching behaviour beyond sensible use. I mean, sure learning maths and coding and programming are all behaviors. However, that completely misses what underwrites the topic at hand: thought and belief. Behaviour is not thought and belief. Behaviour alone is... ...there's a technical term/bit of jargon that applies here, but I cannot recall... ..."indeterminate" maybe?
There's quite a bit more that is of interest, but it'll have to wait. Until then, be well...
Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me.
I'm having problems understanding how "meaning governs behaviour" fits into the rest of that.
I want to ask...
Would you say that the unknown details of higher maths, programming, coding, etc. are pretty much meaningless to you?
If a dog could read a clock and use the information in relevant ways, I would say it may know when it is 5 p.m. Does that mean it cannot have a concept of time? No, because it can show up for meals or walks at the right time. But it cannot have a concept of time like the human concept and there are other behaviours that can high-light that.
Yes, clearly our standard measurements of time are meaningless to the dog.
Does it follow from the fact that the dog shows up at mealtime that it has a concept of time? I don't see how. That does not seem to be enough evidence/reason to warrant the conclusion. Does waking up at the same time count as having a concept of time? I suppose I wonder what the difference between any and all regularly occurring behaviours is regarding this matter? I mean, does all routine and/or habitual behaviour equally count as adequate evidence for drawing that same conclusion? If not what's the difference such that we're not special pleading? All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).
Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?
Here's what I'd ask: Can or do dogs think about time? Can or do they form, have, and/or hold any beliefs about time? Is time meaningful to dogs? By my lights, the answer is "no". I'm open to being convinced otherwise though. So, if anyone here thinks the answer to any of the three questions is "yes", then I would only ask how?
The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not.
creativesoul
I have some intuition about that distinction, but I have trouble applying it.
Understandable. It's unconventional, and as such it goes against some long standing practices, or at least it seems to. It is commensurate with many, dovetails nicely with some, but certainly turns a number of practices on their head. I've been fleshing the application out and working through the problems for over a decade. Not alone, mind you. I'm very grateful to this site and many regulars here, for it has allowed me to do some things that cannot be done any other way that I'm aware of.
Is my belief that there is some beer in the fridge existentially dependent on language?
Excellent question. Could not have imagined a better one at this juncture. Thank you for asking.
Banno and I have had any number of conversations in past talking about just such things. That tells me there's a bit of W underlying this avenue. It is only as a result of those discussions and others that I've been able to identify certain issues with saying certain things in certain ways. I know that that's vague, so I'll just say that I've adjusted and tweaked my position after being made aware of issues. This question allows me to put some of those to good use. There are several members here on this site who've helped me tremendously along the way, knowingly or unknowingly. Banno is one, but not the only one. Okay, enough blather. Back to the question...
Beer is existentially dependent upon language. Fridges are as well. Where there has never been beer, there could never have been belief about beer. The same is true of the fridge. So, the content of the belief(things correlations are being drawn between) is existentially dependent upon language. Therefore, so too is the belief.
Here we must tread carefully however, for it would be easy to apply unhelpful labels to this belief. Calling it a "linguistic" belief would be misleading and/or a bit confusing, because any and all candidates capable of drawing correlations(spatial reasoning/relationships in this case) between the beer and the fridge are most certainly capable of believing that there is beer in the fridge. This includes candidates who do not know that one is called "beer" and the other a "fridge". It does not make much sense to say that creatures without naming and descriptive practices could form, have, and/or hold linguistic beliefs. That would be a consequence of such labeling practices.
There's more to this than it seems at first blush...
Imagine a recently abandoned house with open beers in the fridge. Say that some teenagers were rummaging around in the house and left the fridge door wide open. They did not want the warm stale beer. They leave soon enough, and later on one of the mice living in the house comes out searching for food. It finds the beer in the fridge. Some mice really like beer! That mouse believed that beer was in that fridge. It shows(as compared/contrasted to 'expresses') that belief by virtue of climbing into that fridge and getting at that beer.
Belief as propositional attitude fails here. The mouse's belief does not consist of propositions. There is no propositional content within the mouse's belief. The mouse's belief consists of correlations drawn between the beer, the fridge, its own hunger/thirst, etc.. Such belief is existentially dependent upon language(because beers and fridges are), but not existentially dependent upon the ability of the believing creature to be capable of either naming and descriptive practices or metacognition. This reminds me of past experience...
At my own house, long ago, we were all at the dining table eating breakfast after a long birthday celebration the night before when a strange unfamiliar sound was heard by us all. It was written all over our faces. We looked at each other using each other as a means to double check our own ears. Someone spoke up and expressed what our faces had already... Did you hear that? Then we heard it again... a continuous faint but distinct scratching sound captured our attention. We were all like... what on earth is that??? It stopped. It started. Stopped again. Started. It did not take us too long to find the drunken culprit in the trash; a drunken mouse had unwittingly trapped itself at the bottom of an extra tall beer can deep inside a trash bag lining the can. Here, I'll give a nod to some things you mentioned earlier regarding our ability to locate the source of a sound.
What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them.
I suppose you are disagreeing with "Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief..." and "thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition"
As to the first, I may have been unclear. As to the first, it is true that one can hold beliefs that are not formulated in language. But I cannot talk about them without a formulation in language. To distinguish between what people believe and don't believe, I must complete the formula "S believes that..."
As to the second, "S knows that p" means that p is true. "S believes that p" means that S believes/thinks that p is true, but it may not actually be true. "Thinks" is more complicated than either, but is at least compatible with S merely entertaining the possibility that p is true.
The abandoned house mouse places all this in question. Although, it seems you admit that not all thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of that belief.
It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.
creativesoulDecember 04, 2024 at 03:37#9515570 likes
We agree, then, that experience is a process. I am hoping that you also agree with me that what is meaningful to a creature affects how that creature behaves.
We're in agreement with the following caveat; not all things that affect how creatures behave are meaningful to the creature.
To be sure, the presuppositions with which one approaches describing animal behaviour are always important. If they are wrong, the reports will be wrong. You seem very confident that your presuppositions are correct.
Indeed. I am. I could be confidently wrong. :wink:
It seems to me very dangerous to think that observations of a particular incident can be conclusively settled without an extensive background of observations of a range of behaviour of the animal.
Sure, but it depends upon the situation and/or the specific thought and/or belief attribution(in this discussion). If having a concept of time requires thinking about it and thinking about it requires using naming and descriptive practices, then any and all creatures incapable of using naming and descriptive practices are incapable of having a concept of time. That's pretty cut and dry to me. Substitute "thinking about it" with "time be meaningful to the candidate" as well as "forming, having, and/or holding belief about time", and the same holds good...
creativesoulDecember 04, 2024 at 03:48#9515590 likes
Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
creativesoul
I wonder how one might explain that behaviour.
The behaviour increased the likelihood of reproduction and mating.
I personally wonder if a male isolated from 'birth' would display the same behaviour as an adult, if it were placed in an aviary with a female for the first time in its life. That would tell us something about whether or not it is innate or learned.
"Trying to impress" another presupposes a candidate with a concept of mind(belief about what will impress another). That's a bit of a stretch. Although, I've been quite impressed by any number of different bird documentaries, in addition to my own personal experiences with both domesticated and 'wild' birds.
Wonderfully interesting animals.
creativesoulDecember 04, 2024 at 04:13#9515620 likes
Humans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
Patterner
This is the direction this discussion needs to take.
creativesoul
Since this thread is intended to discuss common ground between the thoughts of humans and other species, perhaps a new thread, discussing differences, in order to better understand human thought?
They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.
creativesoulDecember 04, 2024 at 04:17#9515630 likes
I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do).
creativesoul
Right, so he knew he had done something he shouldn't have, which was my original point...
There is similarity. I just think you're overstating it. Some (arguably most) children can and do draw correlations between their own behaviour and others' behaviour towards them afterwards. So, to that extent, it's the same. That's an early step in learning the rules. It's not enough though. It is enough to help increase the chances of one's own survival when living in a violent/aggressive social hierarchy. Canines have a very long history of that.
Forgive me, I thought that you believed that all belief is a matter of correlations. So what more do you want before accepting that Jimi believed he had done something wrong?
I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules.
Ah, well, there are important differences between bad consequences and punishment. They are very different concepts. Jimi might well believe that he had done something wrong (bad consequences) and not see it as punishment. Further observations of his behaviour might reveal the difference.
However, if morality is essential for social life, then the fact that dogs have a social life - and especially have a social life that includes humans - then it would be reasonable to suppose that they have some moral (or at least proto-moral) concepts.
They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.
That's quite right. It is also reasonable not to put too much emphasis on universal differences, but to assess each case as it comes. Quoting Questioner
We, each of us, have a "theory of mind" about others - We can understand the beliefs, emotions, intentions and thoughts of others. Such a capacity is vital for complex social interactions.
Well, yes, we do indeed develop a concept of mind. I would expect that there is a substantial common core to all our concepts, for two reasons. First, because we learn our concepts from each other as part of learning to speak and secon because if there wasn't at least a common core, we couldn't communicate about minds - our own or others'.
We do not just perceive we perceive and interpret the mental states of others.
I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?
"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.
I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, which might be considered to be clearer. However, the answers that it returns seems to me to be, let us say, odd.
When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond? Or, if you prefer, why does she respond if she cannot distinguish herself from other dogs?
Or, when another dog approaches her, and goes through their greeting ceremonies, how does she know that she needs to respond?
Or, when she is dashing across the park, how does she avoid running into other dogs, distinguishing between what she can do from what the other dogs who are also dashing about the place are doing?
I had two dogs for a long time. They never failed to distinguish their own food bowl from the other one's food bowl. (Nor did they ever fail to check that the other one's bowl was empty when the other one had finished and walked away.)
The last suggestion/claim above has the methodological approach the wrong way around.
Yes, it makes sense to sort one's methodology out before trying to answer the question - when one understands the question. The catch is that if one does not understand the question, the methodology may not be appropriate. Methodology and understanding both need to be sorted out before answers can be achieved. Otherwise, one may be trying use a hammer when what is required is a spanner.
If you are dealing with a fridge, the manufacturer can provide you with instructions how to deal with the various things that may go wrong with it. If you are dealing with an unknown disease, you need to find out what methods for dealing with it work.
All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).
Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?
I don't remotely understand the concept of time involved in relativity theory in physics. Does that mean I have no concept of time? No, it does not. Similarly, the dogs have a concept of time that suits their lives. That concept is different from human concepts, but overlaps with it. Similarities and differences. Would you say that a philosopher who thinks that time is continuous and a philosopher who thinks that time is discontinuous have the same concept of time or different ones - or, perhaps, overlapping ones?
Archaeologists discovered an unknown script amongst the remains of Mycene. They weren't even entirely sure that it was writing. Attempts to decipher it failed for many years until Michael Ventris hypothesized that the writing was Greek. That worked. There are many similar examples. Methodology and practice develop hand in hand.
It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.
That I agree with. But I would have thought that impinges on the distinction between what requires being talked about and what "exists in its entirety" without being talked about.
It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
I agree with most of that, especially the distinction between our report of a belief and the believer's formulation of it. I see this as the differences between "I believe that..." and "He/she believes that..." One of my unconventional views is that this distinction applies to all beliefs. So "..that p" is not a purely intensional context, nor a simply extensional context. It is perfectly true that conventional philosophy ignores this. (I know you won't freak out at an unconventional view!)
I would be happy to accept that the mouse does not think of the fridge as a fridge, but merely as a cool place. It doesn't understand the expansion of gases or electricity/gas. It would also be reasonable to recognize that it doesn't understand beer as we do, because it doesn't understand what alcohol is. But we can suppose that it understands beer insofar as it tastes good and has pleasurable effects - and presumably understands hangovers, though not necessarily the connection with drinking beer. (BTW It is not unknown for dogs to become extremely fond of beer. I read somewhere that even bees can get drunk when they happen upon nectar that has fermented.) Nonetheless it is perfectly reasonable to report that the mouse liked the beer in the fridge. The difference is not a question of truth or falsity, but of what pragmatically works in the context. The mouse doesn't have to understand how I report its belief to other human beings.
PS I have edited the above to put right an error in the formatting and restore the distinction between what I was quoting and what I was saying. My mistake. Sorry.
I'm having problems understanding how "meaning governs behaviour" fits into the rest of that
It's only a gesture at the complicated relationship between experience, beliefs and behaviour. When we close the fridge door, we act out (perhaps that's better than "express") what the fridge means to us. That's all.
QuestionerDecember 04, 2024 at 19:42#9516970 likes
Well, yes, we do indeed develop a concept of mind. I would expect that there is a substantial common core to all our concepts, for two reasons. First, because we learn our concepts from each other as part of learning to speak and secon because if there wasn't at least a common core, we couldn't communicate about minds - our own or others'.
You have changed the terms, and with that have changed the definition. We are not talking about an understood concept but rather a theory. And the theory of mind is not an idea about what a mind is or does, expressed in generalities, but rather a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind.
I have a theory of mind for my mother, and one for my brother, and one for my friend .
Well, my concept of mind enables me to interpret the thought of dogs and some other animals.
That doesnt mean the dog can form theories about what is in your mind. You are human yes, you have the capacity to form theories about what is in other minds. We can even form theories about what is in the minds of supernatural beings that do not even exist. The fact that we are storytellers supports this. Theory of mind allows us to inhabit the minds of the storys characters, analyzing their thoughts, feelings, motivations, intentions and perspectives.
I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?
Sorry, Im not sure what youre asking.
What is a matter of interpretation?
What is the explanation for our inability to agree?
And the theory of mind is not an idea about what a mind is or does, expressed in generalities, but rather a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind.
Oh, I see. I misunderstood. But now "a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind" seems just like a belief, so what I'm hearing is "a belief you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind"
I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?
Ludwig V
Sorry, Im not sure what youre asking.
What is a matter of interpretation?
What is the explanation for our inability to agree?
Whose is the better interpretation of what?
I'm afraid I have misunderstood you again. You said:-. Quoting Questioner
We do not just perceive we perceive and interpret. the mental states of others.
My questions followed from that.
creativesoulDecember 05, 2024 at 00:50#9517700 likes
He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived.
creativesoul
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong?
"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.
creativesoul
I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition,
Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.
He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived.
creativesoul
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong?
Irrelevant. The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.
Ockham's razor applies.
creativesoulDecember 05, 2024 at 00:57#9517730 likes
I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, which might be considered to be clearer. However, the answers that it returns seems to me to be, let us say, odd.
Metacognition returns answers to you? Does it understand requests all by itself?
I'm confused.
creativesoulDecember 05, 2024 at 01:13#9517750 likes
When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond?
I see no ground for presupposing she is comparing your wants to anything.
creativesoulDecember 05, 2024 at 01:48#9517800 likes
...why does she respond if she cannot distinguish herself from other dogs?
Who said she couldn't?
Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.
creativesoulDecember 05, 2024 at 02:35#9517830 likes
Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
creativesoul
Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.
Janus
I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first.
The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.
I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done.
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had done something wrong?
Why imagine an impossibility? Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again. He trembled as a result. Involuntarily.
Ockham's razor applies.
creativesoulDecember 05, 2024 at 02:45#9517860 likes
Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of.
Upon a rereading, I'm less happy with this now than I was then, and I remember not liking it then.
QuestionerDecember 05, 2024 at 15:17#9518660 likes
But now "a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind" seems just like a belief, so what I'm hearing is "a belief you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind"
Well, some beliefs are more supported than others. Theory of mind is what the psychologists call it. But, its true, you cannot have a belief in a supernatural being without having a theory about what is in their mind.
You can read about the connection between belief and theory of mind in Jesse Bering's book The Belief instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny and the Meaning of Life
I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?
Ludwig V
Sorry, let me try this again. Yes, forming a theory of mind for another depends on making inferences. Yes, inferences may be wrong. Yes, two different people might have a very different theory of mind about the same person. Whose is better? The one that gets the closest to the truth?
Yeah, that would require we verify the thoughts of 8 billion people. Maybe in some weird sci-fi movie
I think thats why I had some trouble with the original question, which seemed to be calling for a prioritization of all human thought, an obviously unreasonable task.
I guess the most we can say is was an understanding or a misunderstanding made? The reaction/response/behavior flowing from an understanding will be more aligned with reality, and the reaction/response/behavior flowing from a misunderstanding will be less aligned.
The one that gets the closest to the truth? Questioner
How is that determined?
Ask the person whose thought they were guessing. He may tell the truth about what he was thinking at that moment, or he may lie, or he may refuse to answer. Refusal to answer leads you to draw a new inference about his present state of mind, as well as about the thought that was in question. You may even draw inference, from context, about his reasons. If he does answer, you'll have to decide whether to believe him or not. That decision will depend on what you know of his character from previous experience, as well as his demeanour in the moment.
Each of these inferences and decisions, along with some other operations, is part of an overall theory of mind: a general ability to 'read' the body language, expression and tone, in the context of previous knowledge, of another's communication.
Anyhow, theory of mind is rather misleading and vague nomenclature, IMO.
QuestionerDecember 05, 2024 at 22:19#9519700 likes
a general ability to 'read' the body language, expression and tone, in the context of previous knowledge, of another's communication.
I feel that you have ignored all that I have said about theory of mind and remain close-minded to understanding it. I repeat - it's not about reading outward signs - it is about forming theories about what is in anther mind.
Reading inward signs is telepathy. To form a guess, conjecture, theory or belief about what's in another mind, we first need to learn about something about the species and individual with whom who are faced. Infants respond to physical stimuli, but have no notions of the existence of minds or thoughts - and won't until they've interacted with others and learned to recognize patterns in their behaviour, from which they can deduce stimulus and response, cause and effect, similarity to their own feelings, etc. It's a long process of learning and associations before anything like a theory can form. Quoting Questioner
Right now, I have a theory of what is in your mind.
From what? Words I typed are unequivocal outward signs.
Never mind. You have a theory I'm unable to validate.
creativesoulDecember 06, 2024 at 00:09#9519970 likes
...there are important differences between bad consequences and punishment. They are very different concepts. Jimi might well believe that he had done something wrong (bad consequences) and not see it as punishment. Further observations of his behaviour might reveal the difference.
Might he? Exactly what would that take? What must also be the case in order for Jimi to believe he had done something wrong, but not see it as punishment?
I've set out what is required for all three possibilities(knowing he had done something wrong, seeing Janus's treatment of him as punishment and not). Jimi does not have what it takes. That explanation has been sorely neglected.
They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.
creativesoul
That's quite right. It is also reasonable not to put too much emphasis on universal differences, but to assess each case as it comes.
The first part turns on what counts as "too much emphasis on universal differences". I'm unsure of what that phrase is referring to. It does not seem to address anything I've claimed, as best I can tell. I'll say this to the rest: We assess each case as it comes by using/practicing standards. What standard(s) do you practice while assessing whether or not this or that creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought and/or belief?
All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).
Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?
creativesoul
I don't remotely understand the concept of time involved in relativity theory in physics. Does that mean I have no concept of time? No, it does not. Similarly, the dogs have a concept of time that suits their lives. That concept is different from human concepts, but overlaps with it.
Different users/practitioners of naming and descriptive practices can have different notions/concepts/thought and/or belief about time. There are multiple sensible uses of "time". Not knowing some does not preclude one from the rest. Showing that this is the case does not shoulder the burden.
The contentious matter is whether or not it is even possible for a thinking/believing creature to have a notion/concept(thought and/or belief about time) without naming and descriptive practices. The move from comparing different sensible uses of "time" to "similarly, the dogs have a concept of time" is suspect.
Archaeologists discovered an unknown script amongst the remains of Mycene. They weren't even entirely sure that it was writing. Attempts to decipher it failed for many years until Michael Ventris hypothesized that the writing was Greek. That worked. There are many similar examples. Methodology and practice develop hand in hand.
Sure.
creativesoulDecember 06, 2024 at 00:48#9520050 likes
It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.
creativesoul
That I agree with. But I would have thought that impinges on the distinction between what requires being talked about and what "exists in its entirety" without being talked about.
Here, you've used some of the same words in different ways than I do. I'll try to further clarify...
...I set out how a creature without naming and descriptive practices can form, have, and/or hold belief about distal objects that are themselves existentially dependent upon language users. Those objects are part of the content of the correlations being drawn(the content of the candidate's belief).
The mouse can draw correlations including the beer(between the beer and other things). Beer is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. Therefore, the mouse(a creature without naming and descriptive practices) can indeed form, have, and/or hold belief about [b]some of that which is existentially dependent upon language use. Not all. That is the case regardless of whether or not anyone ever talked about it.
This is segue into similarity I think you and others may find interesting. I do.
creativesoulDecember 06, 2024 at 03:10#9520230 likes
Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of.
creativesoul
Upon a rereading, I'm less happy with this now than I was then, and I remember not liking it then.
Even less now.
QuestionerDecember 06, 2024 at 23:37#9522180 likes
"Theory of mind" is a well-established and supported piece of psychological information that has been the subject of scientific research going back nearly 50 years. I invite you to google using the search words "theory of mind."
To deny that humans make conclusions about what is in other minds is blind indeed.
I never denied that humans, as well as other species draw conclusions, or at least surmise, what another sentient being is thinking. I reject the idea that they can do so without first having encountered other sentient beings, learned something about them, and how to read the outward signs.
Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.
Yes, I'm aware that the idea of autonomy can be applied to any living creature, including bacteria and moulds. (There are complicated cases, like lichens.) I didn't include those in what I said, because they are neither sentient nor rational. In fact, I think of them as indistinguishable from autonomous machines, apart from their ability to reproduce. There no question of wondering what they think or of language-less behaviour.
What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them.
Ludwig V
Care to elaborate?
I can try. My thought is roughly this. I fear that if I talk about "words" here, you'll think I'm talking about words in a narrow sense and miss the point. Fortunately, concepts relate to specific words or terms in language and there are rules about how they are to be used. But in many cases - I expect there are exceptions - some of the rules are about how we should apply them in our non-verbal behaviour. A bus stop is where one congregates to catch a bus; a door bell is there to be rung to announce our arrival; etc. We often use this feature to attribute beliefs to humans when we cannot cross-question them. I don't see any reason to suppose that this feature enables us to attribute our concepts to dogs. The concept of food is not just about it can be idenitified and analysed, but how it is to be treated - cooking and eating. Hence, although dogs cannot cook food or analyse in the ways that we do, it can certainly identify it and eat it. This fits perfectly with the idea that our ideas and language about people can be stretched and adapted to (sentient and/or rational) animals.
Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.
Well, animals are not capable of talking, so that's not hard. The question is, then, is whether they are capable of knowing what others and themselves are thinking; if that means they are capable of thinking about their own and others thoughts, then so be it.
The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.
I grant you that Jimi's fear might be triggered by Janus' return. But let's think this through. It might well be that he only started trembling when Janus came through the door. The trigger, then, would be the chicken plus Janus. That would explain why he killed the chicken. But it doesn't explain why he was still sitting beside it. Surely, an innocent, oblivious dog, would either start eating it or would wander off in search of something more amusing. I think the dead chicken reminded him of the previous occasion; Janus' arrival was the crisis, so he may well have got more anxious as he came in.
Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again.
I'm trying to think what dog behaviour might distinguish complying with the rules from knowing that s/he is complying with the rules. Nothing comes to mind, so I'll give you that one. However, I'm reasonably sure that if they are complying with the rules, they know what the rules are. Jimi's killing of the chicken suggests that he had forgotten what the rule was. There's no doubt that he remembered at some point after the event. The question is, what triggered his memory and hence fear?
But the really significant point about the story is that he never bothered another chicken. That was the lesson he was supposed to learn. What correlation do you suppose that is based on?
...I set out how a creature without naming and descriptive practices can form, have, and/or hold belief about distal objects that are themselves existentially dependent upon language users.
Therefore, the mouse(a creature without naming and descriptive practices) can indeed form, have, and/or hold belief about some of that which is existentially dependent upon language use. Not all.
OK. So we agree. I suppose we might disagree about which bits they can hold beliefs about which they cannot, but perhaps we don't need to tease that out now.
Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of.
You've said twice that on reflection you are not happy with this. I don't see what's wrong with it. Could you explain?
I feel that you have ignored all that I have said about theory of mind and remain close-minded to understanding it. I repeat - it's not about reading outward signs - it is about forming theories about what is in anther mind.
Discussions of theory of mind have their roots in philosophical debate from the time of René Descartes' Second Meditation, which set the foundations for considering the science of the mind.
Quite so. Psychology seems to have more difficulty than any other science about escaping from its philosophical roots.
In psychology, theory of mind refers to the capacity to understand other people by ascribing mental states to them.
That seems to be clear. We do know that we understand other people. I'm not sure whether "by ascribing mental states to them" is a harmless paraphrase of "understanding other people" or something more substantial, philosophically speaking, and more controversial. But the question how our understanding works seems a sound starting-point for scientific research.
The "theory of mind" is described as a theory, because the behavior of the other person, such as their statements and expressions, is the only thing being directly observed; no one has direct access to the mind of another, and the existence and nature of the mind must be inferred. It is typically assumed others have minds analogous to one's own;
Philosophically speaking, this is indeed a theory. I read it as a philosophical theory of the mind. But that's not what is meant by "theory of mind" in this context, because each of us has our own theory. That's why I find the name for research in this area so confusing.
I'm not sure that it is wise to treat these propositions more or less as axioms when they are the focus of much philosophical debate. Perhaps it doesn't make any difference whether philosophical dualism or one of its variants is true, but if that's so, it makes a big difference to philosophy.
Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
creativesoul
I wonder how one might explain that behaviour. The idea that he is doing it for fun is not impossible, but is a bit of a stretch. If females did it too, it would be plausible. But, as I understand it, they don't. Suppose that female behaviour indicates that they are attracted by what the male does. Perhaps that Is just an coincidence, but that's a bit of a stretch too.
On reflection, I'm very unhappy with this comment. Setting it right, or at least righter, high-lights a complication in our question which has not gone unrecognized, but which, it seems to me, has not been fully recognized.
I don't think anyone seriously wants to reject the idea that the male bird of paradise builds his bower in order to attract a female. But @creativesoul is also right to observe that that purpose is not necessarily the bird's motivation. We ought to know this, since the same issue can be observed in human beings. Display behaviour can be observed in both males and female human beings, but it does not follow that they are motivated by the desire to make babies (though they may be, sometimes). Human beings can tell us what their motivation is, but the birds cannot. It seems to me, in fact, most likely that the birds just feel like building a bower, finding it a satisfactory and worth-while thing to do - just as so much display behaviour in human beings is done only because they feel that it is a worth-while thing to do.
But there is no doubt that such behaviour serves an evolutionary purpose. What's more, it explains the behaviour as rational; "feeling like it" doesn't explain anything.
QuestionerDecember 08, 2024 at 16:04#9524270 likes
I'm not sure whether "by ascribing mental states to them" is a harmless paraphrase of "understanding other people" or something more substantial, philosophically speaking, and more controversial.
Something more substantial. What controversy do you see?
I'm not sure that it is wise to treat these propositions more or less as axioms when they are the focus of much philosophical debate.
Some psychologists criticize theory of mind because it can be wrong that sometimes we make wrong conclusions - but I think that misses the point. That we can make inferences and interpretations of what is in another mind at all is the point. It says nothing about their accuracy.
I can play basketball and not sink the ball in the basket every time, but Im still playing basketball.
Perhaps it doesn't make any difference whether philosophical dualism or one of its variants is true, but if that's so, it makes a big difference to philosophy.
I understand philosophical dualism to mean that the physical body and the mental mind are different things, that the mind is not made of physical matter. This tends to agree with a scientific description. In biology, every part of an organism is described in terms of its structure and its correlating function (and structure complements function).
So, the physical brain is the structure and in undergoing its electro-chemical processes it produces its function - the mind. The mind can in this context be considered an emergent property of the brain the intangible flow of information through the nervous system.
QuestionerDecember 08, 2024 at 16:09#9524280 likes
I reject the idea that they can do so without first having encountered other sentient beings, learned something about them, and how to read the outward signs.
I'm sure that this can be part of the process, but it is not required.
Every person of faith has formed a theory of mind about what is in the mind of their God.
creativesoulDecember 08, 2024 at 18:37#9524540 likes
Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.
creativesoul
Yes, I'm aware that the idea of autonomy can be applied to any living creature, including bacteria and moulds. (There are complicated cases, like lichens.) I didn't include those in what I said, because they are neither sentient nor rational. In fact, I think of them as indistinguishable from autonomous machines, apart from their ability to reproduce.
Indeed, and this skirts around the very heart of the matter, but I'll nitpick first.
Autonomy is not an idea. Calling things "ideas" is quite unhelpful. Earlier you did the same with "the idea of metacognition".
Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.
creativesoul
Well, animals are not capable of talking, so that's not hard. The question is, then, is whether they are capable of knowing what others and themselves are thinking; if that means they are capable of thinking about their own and others thoughts, then so be it.
Talking about our own belief and others' is how we begin to think about them. Thinking about thought and belief is one thing that is required for knowing what others are thinking. Getting it right is another. Is talking about thought and belief required for thinking about it? I certainly think talking about it is required for getting it right. However, not all notions of "thought" and "belief" get it right.
The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief?
We do so by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is how we do it. That's what talking about our own thought and belief involves. Thinking about one's own thoughts and beliefs requires isolating them as subject matters in their own right. We do that with naming and descriptive practices. We use "minds", "thought", "belief", "imagination", etc. Are there any other ways of(processes for) thinking about thought and belief, if not as subject matters in their own right? How else would/could a creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief also be capable of thinking about its own thoughts?
So, you've now invoked sentience which carries ethical considerations along with it. I'm not at all opposed to drawing and maintaining the distinction between sentient and non-sentient creatures; however, I do not see how we've established the basis to include such considerations in this discussion... yet. Sentient beings are capable of forming, having, and/r holding thought and belief about the world, but so too are all thinking/believing creatures. Do all creatures capable of thought count as sentient? That's yet another assessment that does not yet have a basis from which to draw a clear conclusion. The point was to show that simple differentiation between oneself and the rest of the world is something that is successfully done by creatures that are clearly incapable of knowing what your wants are. Hence, the fact that your dog distinguishes between herself and other dogs does not lend support that she knows what your wants are. <----that was the presupposition I was rejecting.
Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.
[quote="creativesoul;951775"]When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond?
Ludwig V
I see no ground for presupposing she is comparing your wants to anything.
I'm not at all clear what you mean about comparing wants to things. It was usually pretty obvious when she wanted something and when she had got it.
Your original claim above was not about you knowing her wants. It presupposed that she knew yours. How does she know which dog you want to respond without comparing your wants to your calling her name? I'm placing the presupposition/assumption that she knows which dog you want to respond when you call her name in question. That's precisely what needs argued for.
Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices. I would bet that your tone plays a role as well, in that certain tones do not mean the same things to her that others do, despite all of them being cases of calling her name. She can draw correlations between your tone. She cannot draw correlations between your wants. They are not the sorts of things that are directly perceptible. Nor is time. Nor are the rules governing here behaviour.
We began by discussing which sorts of thought and belief other species can and/or cannot have with one specific sort of thought/belief in mind at the start, rational thought/belief. The conversation seems to have been everywhere but has gotten little to nowhere. It is my considered opinion that the methodological approach being used by many if not most participants was/is not up to the task at hand. I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another.
That endeavor(establishing a criterion/standard from which to judge/assess our own and others' thought and belief) involves doing quite a bit of philosophy.
We must begin by examining and/or assessing ourselves. It is imperative that we get some rather important things right(that we correctly identify what thought and belief is; what it consists of; and/or how it emerges onto the world stage; how it persists; etc). Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief. Those positions/linguistic frameworks work from inadequate conceptions/notions of "thought" and "belief" that are incapable of taking account of other creatures' thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. The results range from outright denial to anthropomorphism.
creativesoulDecember 08, 2024 at 18:52#9524570 likes
What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs language less animals can and/or cannot have?
creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them.
Ludwig V
Care to elaborate?
creativesoul
I can try. My thought is roughly this. I fear that if I talk about "words" here, you'll think I'm talking about words in a narrow sense and miss the point. Fortunately, concepts relate to specific words or terms in language and there are rules about how they are to be used. But in many cases - I expect there are exceptions - some of the rules are about how we should apply them in our non-verbal behaviour. A bus stop is where one congregates to catch a bus; a door bell is there to be rung to announce our arrival; etc. We often use this feature to attribute beliefs to humans when we cannot cross-question them. I don't see any reason to suppose that this feature enables us to attribute our concepts to dogs. The concept of food is not just about it can be idenitified and analysed, but how it is to be treated - cooking and eating. Hence, although dogs cannot cook food or analyse in the ways that we do, it can certainly identify it and eat it. This fits perfectly with the idea that our ideas and language about people can be stretched and adapted to (sentient and/or rational) animals.
I think the use of "concept" is problematic. What does it clarify? Nothing as best I can tell.
What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'. It seems to me that it unnecessarily adds complexity where none is needed, and hence only adds confusion.
creativesoulDecember 08, 2024 at 19:00#9524590 likes
The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.
creativesoul
I grant you that Jimi's fear might be triggered by Janus' return. But let's think this through. It might well be that he only started trembling when Janus came through the door. The trigger, then, would be the chicken plus Janus. That would explain why he killed the chicken. But it doesn't explain why he was still sitting beside it. Surely, an innocent, oblivious dog, would either start eating it or would wander off in search of something more amusing. I think the dead chicken reminded him of the previous occasion; Janus' arrival was the crisis, so he may well have got more anxious as he came in.
Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again.
creativesoul
I'm trying to think what dog behaviour might distinguish complying with the rules from knowing that s/he is complying with the rules. Nothing comes to mind, so I'll give you that one. However, I'm reasonably sure that if they are complying with the rules, they know what the rules are. Jimi's killing of the chicken suggests that he had forgotten what the rule was. There's no doubt that he remembered at some point after the event. The question is, what triggered his memory and hence fear?
Correlations drawn by Jimi between his killing the chook and Janus's behaviour afterwards is more than enough. The correlation drawn is one of causality. Jimi attributes causality(draws a causal connection between what he did and what Janus did afterwards). Granting Janus' story is true, it took more than one occasion for him to alter his own behaviour accordingly(to stop killing hens).
Jimi's behaviour afterwards, complies with what Janus wants of Jimi's behaviour, but not as a result of Jimi's knowing what the rules are. Rather, it 'complies' because it fits into Janus' wants regarding Jimi's behaviour. Jimi stopped killing chooks because he did not want Janus to do whatever Janus did the first time. Jimi believed his behaviour caused Janus'.
I reject the idea that they can do so without first having encountered other sentient beings, learned something about them, and how to read the outward signs. Vera Mont
I'm sure that this can be part of the process, but it is not required.
Every person of faith has formed a theory of mind about what is in the mind of their God.
No they have not. No person of faith living today has conceived of a god independently. They've been told by their priest, and read in the book thrust upon them by priests, and they accept that as gospel.... selectively.
QuestionerDecember 09, 2024 at 14:32#9525900 likes
The stimulation of and the processing by the following brain structures involved in theory of mind functioning:
Functional neuroimaging and structural connectivity studies have identified dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as the core regions of the neural substrate for ToM, extending to regions that include the precuneus (PCu), anterior temporal cortex, anterior cingulate and posterior cingulate (PostCing), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and amygdala, to constitute an extended ToM neural network
Also copied from the same webpage:
The theory of the mind (ToM), also known as mentalizing, is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to others (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Frith and Frith, 2006) and to obtain knowledge about others' perspectives at a given moment or in a particular situation, including intentions, hopes, expectations, fantasies, desires, or beliefs. This ability is essential for successful navigation in social life (Leslie, 2000; Krawczyk, 2018). These mental states can be divided into two components, an affective one, which involves the understanding of emotions, feelings or affective states and a cognitive component that implies beliefs, thoughts or intentions (Henry et al., 2015).
No they have not. No person of faith living today has conceived of a god independently. They've been told by their priest, and read in the book thrust upon them by priests, and they accept that as gospel.... selectively.
A theory of mind does not pop into the head independently. We learn by what we see, hear, experience, do, and read, and then our brains, with its hypersocial focus and filters, ascribe mental states to that which is not us and believe in them.
From the beginning, the Book of Genesis tells us God both deliberately and mindfully created all of Creation.
It is only a pastors highly evolved theory of mind that allows that pastor to preach about the contents of Gods mind (for example, what God expects from us), and our highly evolved theory of mind to believe that message. It is only a highly evolved theory of mind that allows the religious to believe they have a personal relationship with Jesus. When people pray, who are they praying to?
Consider -
In the movie Castaway, Tom Hanks' character befriends a volleyball that he calls Wilson his only friend and companion during the years that he is on the island. The character ascribed mental states to the volleyball.
Or any fiction novel ever written with well-developed characters and we get right inside their heads. These characters are fictional, but they become real to us. We know what they are thinking and how they are feeling, and even anticipate their moves. This could not be possible without a well-developed theory of mind.
We learn by what we see, hear, experience, do, and read, and then our brains, with its hypersocial focus and filters, ascribe mental states to that which is not us and believe in them.
Which is exactly what I've been saying. You can stimulate a fetal brain anywhere you wants, and it still won't know what 'another' is, let alone guess what that other is thinking or imagine a great big Other in the sky.
The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief?
It would help if we could clarify whether we are talking about a creature being capable of thinking about its own thought and belief or about a creature that is capable of thinking about the thought and belief of other creatures. Or both. (The cases are somewhat different.)
Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices.
The sequence of events - call, coming, praise - could does have a similarity to a ritual. Those correlations do indeed suffice. After all, the training consists of establishing associations between her name being called, her behaviour and the subsequent reward, and teaches he what her name is, i.e. which dog the name refers to. This training also enables her to know (after a little more training) what to do when she hears "Judy, sit" as opposed to what she should do when she hears "Eddy, sit". (At times, I have had more than one dog.)
I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another.
How do we assess whether a proposed criterion or standard is clear and correct? By submitting cases to it. (Examples and counter-examples).
Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief.
How do you know that current convention is wrong in not being able to admit that creatures are capable of those things? Many people accept the conclusion that they are not. So before you can demonstrate they are wrong, you must already have a clear and correct criterion.
What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'.
It looks to me as if you have a reasonably clear concept of what a concept is. So there's no problem with that idea.
Correlations drawn by Jimi between his killing the chook and Janus's behaviour afterwards is more than enough. The correlation drawn is one of causality. Jimi attributes causality(draws a causal connection between what he did and what Janus did afterwards). Granting Janus' story is true, it took more than one occasion for him to alter his own behaviour accordingly(to stop killing hens).
Jimi's behaviour afterwards, complies with what Janus wants of Jimi's behaviour, but not as a result of Jimi's knowing what the rules are. Rather, it 'complies' because it fits into Janus' wants regarding Jimi's behaviour. Jimi stopped killing chooks because he did not want Janus to do whatever Janus did the first time. Jimi believed his behaviour caused Janus'.
The thing is, there's more than one correlation in play. He might have correlated the dead chicken, or the dead chicken and Janus' presence - or both together- with the displeasure. But neither of those is the correlation that he is supposed to make; he got it wrong. (That's why a causal account is unhelpful, because it cannot recognize that.) It seems that Jimi did learn to leave the chickens alone - even when Janus was not there - from the experience. So his future behaviour does not correlate with either a dead chicken or with Janus' presence - much less on the presence of both.
You could correlate what Janus wants with Jimi's behaviour. But that's just another rule. (BTW That's not a causal correlation, because it is possible that Jimi might not comply.)
creativesoulDecember 11, 2024 at 00:44#9528990 likes
The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief?
creativesoul
It would help if we could clarify whether we are talking about a creature being capable of thinking about its own thought and belief or about a creature that is capable of thinking about the thought and belief of other creatures. Or both. (The cases are somewhat different.)
That's fair and certainly worthy of explanation.
While I agree that the cases are different, they differ in their respective targets[hide="Reveal"](whose thought is being considered)[/hide]. They differ regarding what the creatures[hide="Reveal"](arguably only humans, but it is certainly possible that some other creatures ]may use/employ naming and descriptive practices)[/hide] focus upon. The target is different individuals' thought and belief. That's three different ways to say much the same thing. The similarity takes precedence here. They both are metacognitive endeavors. Thus, I do not see the relevance of that particular distinction when it comes to drawing and maintaining the distinction(s) between thought, belief, and experience that consists of correlations drawn between language use(and other things) and thought, belief, and experience that does not. Nor does it seem relevant to the distinction between thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language use, and thought and belief that is not. <------that's the earlier peculiarity mentioned a few posts back. I could further set that out if need be. I've just recently come to acceptable terms with it myself.
creativesoulDecember 11, 2024 at 01:29#9529080 likes
Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices.
creativesoul
The sequence of events - call, coming, praise - could does have a similarity to a ritual. Those correlations do indeed suffice. After all, the training consists of establishing associations between her name being called, her behaviour and the subsequent reward, and teaches he what her name is, i.e. which dog the name refers to. This training also enables her to know (after a little more training) what to do when she hears "Judy, sit" as opposed to what she should do when she hears "Eddy, sit". (At times, I have had more than one dog.)
Still seems too unsupported for my tastes.
It may strike some as odd, but I'm not convinced any dogs know their own name in the exact same way that we do. I would deny that altogether. Some know how to act when they hear their name being called in certain familiar scenarios. Some are still learning how to behave when they find themselves in such circumstances. Some live nameless lives.
We learn our names by virtue of how many times it is being used during a short duration of time spent. Dogs do as well. Some dogs, if rewarded well, can learn to do all sort of things. I'm okay with saying she has learned to behave in some ways sometimes. She has learned how to behave/thrive/survive in many different situations. Name calling events being one of many.
creativesoulDecember 11, 2024 at 03:26#9529260 likes
I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another.
creativesoul
How do we assess whether a proposed criterion or standard is clear and correct? By submitting cases to it. (Examples and counter-examples).
Sure, but only after it's already in front of us.
When it comes to being capable of correctly attributing thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences to ourselves and other capable species, we must first have knowledge of the processes involved. It's not just a matter of what they believe, it's also a matter of how.
I've explained as best I can, and I'm fairly happy with my part. There's promise/potential. I'm content.
Methodological approach needs attention.
As early on as possible I suggest examining the justificatory ground(or lack thereof), the scope of rightful application, the explanatory power, the coherence and/or terminological consistency of the standard under scrutiny. There are some things that are perfectly clear. We're looking for knowledge of thought and belief that predated humans. Such thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience existed in its entirety prior to our knowledge thereof. That is only to say that prior to knowledge that there were thinking and believing creatures roaming the earth prior to ourselves, there were thinking and believing creatures roaming the world. A correct standard/notion of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" will be amenable with/to those prehistoric facts.
We can prioritize working from the fewest possible dubious assumptions. We can demand that our position posit the fewest possible entities necessary. We can insist that spatiotemporal flexibility be shown/proven by virtue of being capable of spanning the evolutionary timeline. Our standards/notion of "thought and belief" must be amenable to evolutionary progression such that it is clear how creatures begin attributing meaning to sights, sounds, and such. That's what thinking about the world does.
This sets out some of the standards I'm working from. Methodological approach. I think I have a very strong methodological naturalist bent.
What do all thinking and believing creatures have in common such that it this set of common elemental constituents that makes them what they are? They are all capable of drawing correlations between different things. Biological machinery finds a timely home at this point in the discussion.
Thought and belief are always meaningful to the creature drawing the correlations(forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief). Some thinking creatures inhabited the earth long before we did. Any and all acceptable notions of "mind", "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must take proper account of this.
We find ourselves becoming strikingly aware that some meaning is prior to any and all notions of "meaning". The same is true of thought and "thought" as well as belief and "belief".
creativesoulDecember 11, 2024 at 03:32#9529270 likes
What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'.
creativesoul
It looks to me as if you have a reasonably clear concept of what a concept is. So there's no problem with that idea.
"Thought and belief" exhaust "concept", but not the other way around.
creativesoulDecember 11, 2024 at 03:33#9529280 likes
Concepts of concepts. Nah.
creativesoulDecember 11, 2024 at 03:39#9529310 likes
The thing is, there's more than one correlation in play. He might have correlated the dead chicken, or the dead chicken and Janus' presence - or both together- with the displeasure.
There is more than one correlation being drawn. Some are efficacious too. Some have been drawn and continue to influence subsequent behaviours afterwards.
That's not a problem.
Claims beginning with Jimi "might have" presuppose a world in which Jimi could have. It's that logically possible world that needs set out. What else must also be the case in order for it to be possible for Jimi to draw correlations between the dead chicken, Janus' presence, and Janus' displeasure?
How does the dog drive a wedge between Janus' displeasure [hide="Reveal"](which consists almost entirely of Janus' thought and belief at the time)[/hide] and Janus' presence?
In order to connect three things, they must first be somehow disconnected.
How does Jimi disconnect Janus's presence from Janus' outward unhappy behaviour?
The chicken is in its own place. Jimi is as well. So too, is Janus. Janus' presence and Janus' displeasure do not share such clearly different spatiotemporal locations. Jimi does not think about Janus' displeasure in contrast/comparison or as a separate thing to/from Janus' presence. One must do so prior to connecting them(drawing a correlation between them).
creativesoulDecember 11, 2024 at 03:53#9529320 likes
It seems that Jimi did learn to leave the chickens alone - even when Janus was not there - from the experience. So his future behaviour does not correlate with either a dead chicken or with Janus' presence - much less on the presence of both.
I'm not sure what this is supposed to be aimed at. Looks to be made of straw.
Sure. Jimi's learned from his experience. Such experience was meaningful to Jimi by virtue of his having drawn correlations between his own behaviour[hide="Reveal"](killing the chicken)[/hide] and Janus's behaviour afterwards. Chickens became a bit more significant to Jimi as a result. Jimi learned that killing chickens has unwanted consequences. He can learn much the same lesson after touching fire.
creativesoulDecember 11, 2024 at 03:57#9529330 likes
Jimi most definitely is capable of recognizing and/or attributing causality. That's um... sometimes as far back as we need to go. I'm puzzled at the response though. Are you averse to the idea that dogs are capable of recognizing causality?
creativesoulDecember 12, 2024 at 01:25#9531290 likes
Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief.
creativesoul
How do you know that current convention is wrong in not being able to admit that creatures are capable of those things?
Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.
Many people accept the conclusion that they are not.
Indeed they do. Some folk must if they are to remain free from self-contradiction.
So before you can demonstrate they are wrong, you must already have a clear and correct criterion.
I'm not even sure what you're claiming here. I'll add this...
If it is the case that creatures capable of having meaningful experiences roamed the earth long before the first language users like us(those employing naming and descriptive practices) did, then any and all acceptable notions/conceptions/uses of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must be able to take this into proper account. Lest they be found sorely lacking.
It is the case. Some positions cannot admit this. Thus, those positions must be rejected.
Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.
Some people might call that begging the question. One needs to explain the criteria for assertng it. But that's not a simple matter of evidence, because thinking of a dog as a sentient, rational creature is not a simple matter of fact but of thinking of a dog as, in many ways, (like) a person.
Jimi most definitely is capable of recognizing and/or attributing causality. That's um... sometimes as far back as we need to go. I'm puzzled at the response though. Are you averse to the idea that dogs are capable of recognizing causality?
That's very helpful. It clarifies what you meant when you said that all belief and thought consists of correlations. Thanks.
So Jimi's experience when he killed the first chicken might be expected to lead him to refrain from killing any more chickens on the principle that the burnt child fears the fire. But Jimi didn't fear the fire. He killed another chicken. (I'm not sure that dogs have a concept of causality as such. Simple correlations might be enough. But that's another issue.) What went wrong?
Maybe he forgot. But that suggests that he did not realize the significance (meaning) of his experience - i.e. he failed to generalize from it, in the way that the burnt child does. Then he was reminded of the first experience when he saw the chicken dead, or perhaps when Janus returned. That's the moment when he generalized from the first experience and realized that he was in trouble.
But it's not enough for him to generalize and understand that (1) whenever he kills a chicken, he will be in trouble. He also needs to understand that (2) if he does not kill chickens, Janus wll not be displeased with him.
There's more to Jimi than just recognizing causal correlations.
Are there any other ways of(processes for) thinking about thought and belief, if not as subject matters in their own right? How else would/could a creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief also be capable of thinking about its own thoughts?
So when a creature recognizes that some belief it holds is false, it isn't thinking about its own thoughts? When a creature recognizes that some other creature is about to attack it, it isn't thinking about the other creature's thoughts?
I don't know what the question "how" means in this context. But one can think without language.
I don't think anyone seriously wants to reject the idea that the male bird of paradise builds his bower in order to attract a female. But creativesoul is also right to observe that that purpose is not necessarily the bird's motivation. We ought to know this, since the same issue can be observed in human beings. Display behaviour can be observed in both males and female human beings, but it does not follow that they are motivated by the desire to make babies (though they may be, sometimes). Human beings can tell us what their motivation is, but the birds cannot. It seems to me, in fact, most likely that the birds just feel like building a bower, finding it a satisfactory and worth-while thing to do - just as so much display behaviour in human beings is done only because they feel that it is a worth-while thing to do.
But there is no doubt that such behaviour serves an evolutionary purpose. What's more, it explains the behaviour as rational; "feeling like it" doesn't explain anything.
I love the work everyone has put into posting and this one is very interesting.
When nature changes the hormones the behavior will change.
I strongly think many female humans are unaware of wanting a baby when they start putting on lipstick, and possibly dressing and otherwise using body language, to attract the opposite sex. They might even be really against getting pregnant.
What they want is to be attractive and human females can be as competitive about this as different species of males strut their feathers, or another species will beat their chests. :grin:
Perhaps we have not stressed hormones enough?
The sexual response cycle refers to the sequence of physical and emotional changes that occur as a person becomes sexually aroused and participates in sexually stimulating activities, including intercourse and masturbation. Knowing how your body responds during each phase of the cycle can enhance your relationship and help you pinpoint the cause of any sexual problems.
https://www.webmd.com/sex-relationships/sexual-health-your-guide-to-sexual-response-cycle
Sexual behaviors occur when the animal has enough of the hormone that causes the animal to be sexual. Bonobos and Humans are the most sexual and are not as controlled as most animals that have very short periods of being sexually receptive.
If you are a farmer wanting to breed your animals you need to know estrus.
[/quote]or heat is a period during the
reproductive cycle when female animals
become sexually receptive, signaling they
are ready for mating. In most cases, this
can also be referred to as standing heat
because the female will stand to be mated
by the male (Figure 1).
Estrus is caused by estrogen being
produced within developing follicles on
the ovary, and ovulation usually occurs
after the initial signs of estrus are detected. Duration of estrus and the time
of ovulation in relationship to the onset
of estrus vary with the species (Table 1).
If behavioral or physical signs are not
obvious, estrus may even pass unnoticed.
Successful recognition of the signs of
estrus for mating, just prior to the time of
ovulation, can result in increased conception rates for the herd or flock.
https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/as/as-559-w.pdf [/quote]
My point is we need to stop thinking animals decide to things for a reason and thinking about how unreasonable humans are. :lol:
What messes with our thinking is that social rules add another dimension to sexual behaviors. :chin: We can question what rules are playing, the social or hormonal ones? To what degree is the animal controlled the social rules or the hormonal ones what what part of this is thinking?
Herewith my last post on the opening question
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=are+crows+smarter+than+your+seven-year-old
That was fascinating!
I want to refer back to a book about math that I am reading because it really made me think about thinking math. What is thinking math?
Thinking 1, 2, 3, and 35 is a language skill. Looking at a plate of cookies and determining which one has the most cookies is not a language skill. A person can count all the cookies on all the plates and use math to determine which plate has the most cookies, but we can also judge which plate has the most volume of cookies. Animals can do that without having the language for math.
Now when I multiply simple numbers like 2x2 or 7x8 I am thinking how I think. 2x2 is so easy but 7x8 is not. Why is it so much harder to figure 7x8? I am learning our ability to do math includes knowing the relationship of numbers. Animals don't have the language of math so they can not think through the relationships of numbers. Does anyone know what I am talking about or am I being too weird?
Please help. I am trying to understand animal thinking that is done without language, by being aware of my own thinking. besides thinking of math, I am also thinking I am depressed because the cold weather makes going outside so unpleasant and that can become isolating and how do I think through this problem instead of playing a computer game all-day to avoid life. :lol: I can think I really need to knock on a neighbor's door and be neighborly, but my body screams, no I don't want to go outside. Where is the rational thinking? My body does not want to go outside but my head knows better.
He also needs to understand that (2) if he does not kill chickens, Janus wll not be displeased with him.
That is such a wonderful thought! A woman in Canada developed a method for teaching virtues that can be used in schools or by families. She is very clear that it is not enough to punish a child for doing wrong. The child must learn what is the right way to do things. I feel so much pain for all the children who are punished again and again and don't just magically realize how to avoid punishment. I have seen parents and schools fail to teach what is right.
Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.
Those last two quotes go together but I am a bit overwhelmed by all the thinking that has gone on while I was gone. What are the correlations? Is the argument that animals without language are rational thinkers? Hum, :chin: I am thinking what would motivate me to go out in the old? I am thinking I would like myself a whole lot better if acted on the notion I should check on a neighbor and telling you about this increases my motivation to do the right thing. Are those thoughts the correlations?
I strongly think many female humans are unaware of wanting a baby when they start putting on lipstick, and possibly dressing and otherwise using body language, to attract the opposite sex. They might even be really against getting pregnant.
As I understand it, the paradise bird's behaviour is specific to mating and breeding. Human (and, presumably, bonobo) sexual behaviour is not strongly linked to fertility. I'm told that, at least in the case of bonobos, that sexual behaviour has additional functions in their social lives. That is certainly true in the case of humans.
Dressing up may be a sometimes a preliminary to actual courtship and mating, but it has other functions as well. It would be seriously reductionist not to recognize that. It claims membership of a social group and helps give one self-confidence. In relation to others it can deter aggression and form the basis of alliances. Other animals are not all the same in this respect. One needs to look at their lives holistically to understand what is going on.
My point is we need to stop thinking animals decide to things for a reason and thinking about how unreasonable humans are. :lol:
Yes, they are and we often equate irrationality with instinctive behaviour. But it's more complicated than that. Our instincts are mediated through the social and practical rules that we have learnt, so our actual behaviour is based on instincts, which are given. It doesn't follow that they are irrational, although they might be non-rational; I mean that they are best thought of a like axioms - starting-points for rationality, which adjusts instinctive impulses to the outside world. In addition, we can explain the instincts as rational, not from the point of view of the animal, but from the point of view of the evolutionary pressure to survive and reproduce.
I am thinking what would motivate me to go out in the old?
One of the functions of rationality, it seems to me, is to balance competing desires. But there are situations when it doesn't work very well, as in your case. I deeply sympathize with your desire not to hide from life whether in a machine or something else. It is not easy. The best I can offer is baby steps, building up slowly. If going outside to check on a neighbour is too much, try to think of a smaller steps that you can actually do. Going outside for one minute. (If you see her indoors wave at her throught the window.) Ringing your neighbour. (I suggest asking if you can borrow a cup of sugar, rather than just asking if they are OK.) That's how I try to handle those feelings. Mind you, I'm not very good at it.
I feel so much pain for all the children who are punished again and again and don't just magically realize how to avoid punishment.
No-one seems to recognize that punishment only works if the person being punished takes it the right way. But there's nothing to prevent people getting the wrong end of the stick. Like the fraudster who is caught and punished and responds by getting better at doing the fraud without getting caught.
There is a whole school of dog training which emphasizes reward-based training and frowns on the traditional punishments or even stick-and-carrot training.
It's important to emphasize that there is a form of punishment involved, but it is only withholding reward. In the context of no punishment, that works to deter unwanted behaviour. So if I were training Jimi, I would make a point of being around when Jimi is around chickens and keeping him distracted - ideally by playing his best game with him, or getting him to sit with me by offering intermittent treats. Once he's got that idea, you can gradually phase out the treats.
If it is the case that creatures capable of having meaningful experiences roamed the earth long before the first language users like us(those employing naming and descriptive practices) did, then any and all acceptable notions/conceptions/uses of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must be able to take this into proper account. Lest they be found sorely lacking.
Yes. That seems to be our starting-point. Out differences lie in what a proper account is.
It may strike some as odd, but I'm not convinced any dogs know their own name in the exact same way that we do. I would deny that altogether. Some know how to act when they hear their name being called in certain familiar scenarios. Some are still learning how to behave when they find themselves in such circumstances. Some live nameless lives.
No, I don't suppose that a dog that knows its own name "in the exact same way" as we do. For example, it can't tell anyone what its name is. But it can do many of the things that we can do when we know our own name. In my opinion, the overlap is sufficient.
You are right, of course, that animals that don't undergo training in human ways, won't have to opportunity to learn their name. We probably ought to think of them as using pronouns only, though our reports might use names for people.
It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use.
Yes, and that's important. For example, when a dog checks out a bowl, because it expects there to be food in it, and is disappointed, I don't suppose it says to itself "Oh, my belief that there was food there is wrong" or anything similar. It simply walks away. But that action counts as a recognition that its belief was false.
Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.
creativesoul
Some people might call that begging the question...
That's their problem. I call it making sure a position is commensurate with the facts; what's happened or is happening; everyday events; etc. Many animals other than humans are clearly capable of problem solving. We can watch it happen. That's been proven over and over. So, either problem solving is something that can be done by a thoughtless creature(which amounts to saying that problem solving does not require thinking) or some non human creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought.
Since it is the case that some other animals problem solve, and problem solving is thinking, then it is not the case that only human are capable of thinking.
The conventional problems underwriting this matter stem from i) an abysmal failure to draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief, and ii) parsing truth as nothing more than a property of true sentences.
It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use.
creativesoul
Yes, and that's important. For example, when a dog checks out a bowl, because it expects there to be food in it, and is disappointed, I don't suppose it says to itself "Oh, my belief that there was food there is wrong" or anything similar. It simply walks away. But that action counts as a recognition that its belief was false.
I find it curious that you agree and then immediately misattribute meaning to the dog, based upon the dog's behaviour. Your dog's walking away from an empty food bowl may count as a recognition that it's
belief was false according to your criterion for what counts as such belief, but not mine.
The dog knows there's no food in bowl. The dog may have believed that there was prior to going to check. He checked. There was no food in the bowl. The bowl did not have food in it. That's what he believed. In order for him to recognize that his belief was false, he would have to first be capable of thinking about his own belief. As I've painstakingly set out heretofore many times over, thinking about one's own thought is a practice that is itself existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices replete with some proxy for the dog's own thought/belief. Dogs do not have what it takes.
Do you have any argument whatsoever for any of the claims you've been making? Do you have a valid objection to my own? Do you have a bare minimum criterion for what counts as thought or belief such that all thought and belief satisfy it?
How does a dog(or any other animal without naming and descriptive practices) pick its own belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else in order to compare it to the world?
No-one seems to recognize that punishment only works if the person being punished takes it the right way.
Perhaps even thinking punishment is a teaching skill is a mistake. Our culture is based on having a jealous, revengeful, and punishing god. Imagine beginning with having a creator who loves us. I know Christians have come around to Jesus loving us, but that has not changed the effect of believing in a punishing god. May I say here, that animals just do not make up stories and revolve around what those stories tell them of life.
Our instincts are mediated through the social and practical rules that we have learnt,
You are absolutely right and while animals fight for territory we fight for an imaginary god who favors us. That is rational thinking that might be improved with an understanding facts and how we determine if a fact is true or false. And this why this forum is essential. We do more thinking than other animals. My argument hangs on language being essential to rational thinking.
e can explain the instincts as rational, not from the point of view of the animal, but from the point of view of the evolutionary pressure to survive and reproduce.
This is my favorite explanation of what you said...
That is probably the biggest difficulty. I have some ideas about how to respond to it, but will have to try to articulate them later.
Thank you so much for your good social and thinking skills. In a completely different forum things do not go so well as people (mostly males) compete to prove they are right and those who don't agree are idiots. Their approach prevents thinking because they put people on the defensive. Again and again I have experienced it is futile to have enjoyable discussions with poorly informed people. They think they are being rational, but because they don't know enough, how do I say? The discussion just can not past what they do not know and will consider.
Oh my goodness, I see sunlight and blue sky. :grin: It has been so long since we have had sunlight and a blue sky I am giddy. I want to run outside and enjoy this before the clouds cover it up again.
I find it curious that you agree and then immediately misattribute meaning to the dog, based upon the dog's behaviour. Your dog's walking away from an empty food bowl may count as a recognition that it's
belief was false according to your criterion for what counts as such belief, but not mine.
I think @Ludwig V is right because the dog remembers the bowl is where it found food, but that memory is not equal to believing food magically appears in the bowl. We are discussing the difference between living with language and without language. It seems impossible for me to think like an animal because every thought in my head is words, words, words. I make myself crazy with constant words, a lot of mind chatter that prevents me from directly experiencing life.
creativesoulDecember 18, 2024 at 23:04#9545070 likes
I think Ludwig V is right because the dog remembers the bowl is where it found food
Knowing where to get food is not the same as knowing that one's own belief is false.
The claim was that walking away from an empty food bowl counts as recognition that the prior belief(that the bowl had food in it) was false.
What is involved in the process of recognizing that one's own belief about whether or not there is food in the bowl is false? It requires drawing a distinction between one's own belief and what the belief is about. This process, at a bare minimum, requires thinking about one's own belief as a subject matter in and of itself, which in turn requires a way to do so. We do that with words, which stand in as proxy, for the belief. How can an animal without naming and descriptive practices invent/create a meaningful utterance which stands in place of its own belief? That must be done prior to comparing that belief to the world. It is only via such a comparison that one can recognize that their own belief is either true or false.
creativesoulDecember 18, 2024 at 23:09#9545080 likes
We are discussing the difference between living with language and without language.
Yes. That's part of it. There's also the transition between. There are also different kinds of languages consisting of different kinds of meaningful behaviours, marks, utterances, etc.
Indeed, what counts as language matters in more than one way.
creativesoulDecember 18, 2024 at 23:35#9545120 likes
For example, when a dog checks out a bowl, because it expects there to be food in it, and is disappointed, I don't suppose it says to itself "Oh, my belief that there was food there is wrong" or anything similar. It simply walks away. But that action counts as a recognition that its belief was false.
Recognizing that the bowl is empty is not the same as recognizing that one's own belief about food being in the bowl is false. The former is about the food and the bowl. The latter is about one's own thought/belief. The dog can directly perceive the food, the bowl, and its own hunger. Thought and belief are not directly perceptible things. Nor are truth/falsity. Nor is meaning. Nor are social/institutional facts. Nor are any number of abstractions.
I cannot find good ground for claiming that any creature incapable of naming and descriptive practices is capable of abstraction. Recognizing that one's own belief is false requires comparison/contrast between the belief and what the belief is about. That seems to require a skillset unobtainable to dogs.
creativesoulDecember 18, 2024 at 23:49#9545130 likes
But it's not enough for him to generalize and understand that (1) whenever he kills a chicken, he will be in trouble. He also needs to understand that (2) if he does not kill chickens, Janus wll not be displeased with him.
There's more to Jimi than just recognizing causal correlations.
Of course there is more to any thinking creature than just the recognition/attribution of causality, but it seems to me that that process, regardless of the creature, is more than adequate for being a case of thinking(thought/belief).
I'm not convinced that Jimi knows he's in trouble, so I question the account above on its presuppositional ground.
It is more than enough that Jimi inferred that his own behaviour caused Janus'. Here, all Jimi needs to avoid killing chickens is to believe that if he does Janus will do whatever Janus did the first time. He does not need to understand that if he does not kill chickens Janus will not be displeased. He just needs to believe that if he does, Janus will do what he did the first time. His belief that his own behaviour caused Janus' comes replete with the further inference/belief/expectation that if he does not, Janus will not do that either. That's how the recognition/attribution of causality works.
creativesoulDecember 18, 2024 at 23:56#9545140 likes
I'm not sure that dogs have a concept of causality as such.
I agree but...
Where does the need for having a concept of causality come from? Again, I do not find the notion of concept to be of help. Generally speaking, it seems to be a step backward instead of forward. One can recognize/attribute causal relationships, which is what is meant by "recognize/attribute causality" without having a concept of causality(thinking about causality as a subject matter in and of itself). A creature can believe that X causes Y without having a concept of causality. Recognizing/attributing causality requires only inferring that.
The claim was that walking away from an empty food bowl counts as recognition that the prior belief(that the bowl had food in it) was false.
That's right. I should have been clearer that that sentence was my report of the dog's behaviour. I thought it was obvious that the dog could not have made that report.
We do that with words, which stand in as proxy, for the belief.
Oh, dear, now we are in deep trouble. It is reasonable to describe some words as standing in as proxy for something. But not all. That's a big, even central, issue about language. For example, there is some sense in saying that if my dog's name is Eddy, "Eddy" stands in as proxy for the dog. But I don't think it helps to insist that "1" stands in as proxy for the number 1 or "Pegasus" as proxy for Pegasus. The philosophical issue of nominlaism vs realism as an account of universals (abstractions) is precisely about this.
Of course there is more to any thinking creature than just the recognition/attribution of causality, but it seems to me that that process, regardless of the creature, is more than adequate for being a case of thinking(thought/belief).
Of course. I only wanted to suggest that there are other kinds of belief.
However, Jimi's belief that Janus was displeased with him because he killed the chicken does not distinguish between causation as simply correlation and causation as something more than just correlation. I think Jimi is capable of the first, but not the second - at least, I can't think of non-verbal behaviour that would enable me to distinguish the two. I could be wrong.
His belief that his own behaviour caused Janus' comes replete with the further inference/belief/expectation that if he does not, Janus will not do that either.
H'm. "Replete with" is not altogether clear to me. I notice that you do accept that that Jimi's belief that his own behaviour caused Janus' displeasure is distinct from the belief that if he does not behave in that way, Janus will not be displeased. So it is possible that he might believe the first and not the second. This fits well with the fact that killing the chicken is a sufficient, but not necessary, consequence of Janus' displeasure, getting from one to the other requires an inferential step, which Jimi has failed to make after the first kill, but does (apparently) make after the second.
Knowing where to get food is not the same as knowing that one's own belief is false.
The claim was that walking away from an empty food bowl counts as recognition that the prior belief(that the bowl had food in it) was false.
What is involved in the process of recognizing that one's own belief about whether or not there is food in the bowl is false? It requires drawing a distinction between one's own belief and what the belief is about. This process, at a bare minimum, requires thinking about one's own belief as a subject matter in and of itself, which in turn requires a way to do so. We do that with words, which stand in as proxy, for the belief. How can an animal without naming and descriptive practices invent/create a meaningful utterance which stands in place of its own belief? That must be done prior to comparing that belief to the world. It is only via such a comparison that one can recognize that their own belief is either true or false.
I do not understand why you made that argument. An expectation is not the same as a belief. An expectation is thinking with the gut (feeling) not the brain (language).
Yes. That's part of it. There's also the transition between. There are also different kinds of languages consisting of different kinds of meaningful behaviours, marks, utterances, etc.
Indeed, what counts as language matters in more than one way.
How about smells? That is one of the major elements of communication. I think I smell a god. Well, maybe that doesn't work. However, we can believe someone will be a good mate because of how that person smells.
The theory is that individuals are subconsciously attracted to the body odors of potential partners with dissimilar MHC genes. This preference is believed to be detected through scent, which serves as a cue for genetic compatibility.
https://myotape.com/blogs/articles/the-intriguing-science-behind-smell-and-partner-choice#:~:text=The%20theory%20is%20that%20individuals,related%20odors%20influence%20mate%20choice.
Perhaps what is going on in our subconscious also counts and is closer to animal thinking with messages that mean something but have no language for rational thinking. Just a smell and a reaction.
Or a movement and shooting in fear without thinking, thereby killing one's son. The book Emotional Intelligence uses a story of a man killing his son, as an example of our reaction system that does not involve thinking.
That's a big, even central, issue about language. For example, there is some sense in saying that if my dog's name is Eddy, "Eddy" stands in as proxy for the dog. But I don't think it helps to insist that "1" stands in as proxy for the number 1 or "Pegasus" as proxy for Pegasus. The philosophical issue of nominlaism vs realism as an account of universals (abstractions) is precisely about this.
Wow, you used a word I never came across before and did not know the meaning. Without the knowledge I could not understand what you said so I looked it up...
nominlaism- the doctrine that universals or general ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality, and that only particular objects exist; properties, numbers, and sets are thought of as merely features of the way of considering the things that exist. Important in medieval scholastic thought, nominalism is associated particularly with William of Occam. Oxford Languages
That is the perfect word for what I think is important to this thread. Humans behave as though their thoughts are accurate, concrete information when the thought is not reality. Making humans the most irrational animals.
How can an animal without naming and descriptive practices invent/create a meaningful utterance which stands in place of its own belief? That must be done prior to comparing that belief to the world. It is only via such a comparison that one can recognize that their own belief is either true or false.
The standard expectation is that when someone asserts that p, they are asserting that it is true. We can infer, without further evidence, that they believe that p. The dog cannot assert that there is food in the bowl, so we cannot infer that the dog believes that there is food in the bowl. Conventional discussions about belief do not give us any basis for inferring that any dog or other animal that does not have human language believes anything. But those discussions do not pay attention to the fact that non-verbal behaviour in humans is also evidence of what they believe. Similar non-verbal behaviour can be observed in animals that don't have human language and that provides evidence for what they believe.
The dog walks up to the bowl and sniffs it; that is evidence that the dog believes that there is food in the bowl. If there is food in the bowl, we expect the dog to eat it, and that action confirms our inference. If there is not food in the bowl and the dog walks away, that action is evidence that the dog recognizes that there is no food in the bowl.
I do not understand why you made that argument. An expectation is not the same as a belief. An expectation is thinking with the gut (feeling) not the brain (language).
I do agree that there is a difference between beliefs based on feeling (I would say, intuition) and beliefs based on a rational process (language). But surely, if I expect the children to get home from school at 4.00, I believe that they will. That may be based on feeling or on a rational process, but it's the same belief/expectation.
How about smells? That is one of the major elements of communication. I think I smell a god. Well, maybe that doesn't work. However, we can believe someone will be a good mate because of how that person smells.
Yes, there is evidence that smell plays a bigger part in our social lives that we mostly choose to recognize. (It would be good to know how often our expectations based on smell turn out to be true.) But I wouldn't call it a language. When eggs go bad, the smell puts us off eating them, but the smell is a sign that we read, not a communication sent by the egg. The smells that we (and other animals) give off play their part in negotiating our social lives, but it's not the same part as language does.
Perhaps what is going on in our subconscious also counts and is closer to animal thinking with messages that mean something but have no language for rational thinking.
Yes, that's a tempting thought. The trouble is that there doesn't seem to be any way of knowing what is going on in our sub-conscious other than supposing that it must be like what goes on in our consciousness. Which is a big assumption and should be treated with some scepticism.
Wow, you used a word I never came across before and did not know the meaning. Without the knowledge I could not understand what you said so I looked it up...
I'm sorry. I dropped a bit of philosophical jargon without explaining it. I'm glad you could work it out. The internet is sometimes very helpful.
That is the perfect word for what I think is important to this thread. Humans behave as though their thoughts are accurate, concrete information when the thought is not reality. Making humans the most irrational animals.
I think that's a bit harsh. I would say that humans are a mixture of rationality and irrationality, just like other animals. But their capacity to harm the world around them is greater than animals, so their irrationality is more damaging than the irrationality of other animals.
I think that's a bit harsh. I would say that humans are a mixture of rationality and irrationality, just like other animals. But their capacity to harm the world around them is greater than animals, so their irrationality is more damaging than the irrationality of other animals.
Trump has announced he would use military force to take control of Greenland and the Panama Canal.
This is not any worse than the Neo-Cons and invading Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Christians got this man into office and it is Christian mythology that a god favors the US and that is irrational thinking based on a false belief. No animal could sin more than the human one. Our belief in the Biblical god is a curse.
Trump has announced he would use military force to take control of Greenland and the Panama Canal.This is not any worse than the Neo-Cons and invading Iraq and Afghanistan.
I must admit, I have trouble seeing how Trump's adventures would make America great again, any more than the NeoCons' expeditions did.
However, Christians got this man into office and it is Christian mythology that a god favors the US and that is irrational thinking based on a false belief.
Yes. It is hard to understand how Christians could bring themselves to support him. It seems that the prospect of power can make strange allies. It also encourages wishful thinking and so distorts people's capacity for rational calculation.
Reply to Ludwig V I appreciate everything you said. I am reading a book about the Christian mythology of being God's chosen people and what this has to do with the westward movement and assuming China would improve as Christian missionaries spread Christianity through China. The explanation of our entrance into China and how we screwed that up is interesting, and the screwup was due to the Christian delusion that is also the Trump delusion of power.
Reply to Athena
I take your point. It does seem to me that ideological convictions are uniquely human and by far the most dangerous power we have. A dose of philosophical scepticism is a good medicine for those delusions. But, sadly, those who need it most are also the most resistant. Whether such convictions are ever rational, or even reasonable, is an interesting question. I can't imagine that animals are ever gripped by them.
There's a famous quote about this:-
Oliver Cromwell - Letter to the general assembly of the Church of Scotland. 1650:I beseech you in the bowels of Christ think it possible you may be mistaken.
Good advice. The irony is, of course, that Oliver Cromwell was driven by ideological convictions about which he never seems to have wavered.
I appreciate everything you said. I am reading a book about the Christian mythology of being God's chosen people and what this has to do with the westward movement and assuming China would improve as Christian missionaries spread Christianity through China.
Somewhat related - there's actually a fascinating story of how an ancient, heretical Christian sect reached China after having to escape persecution in what is now Persia. They were the Nestorian Christians, and they were given refuge in the Middle Kingdom, where they settled, and distributed copies of the Gospel story, replicated in Chinese on silk scrolls, with all of the names Asianised (Jesus being 'Issa' and the scriptures being called the 'Issa Sutras'). THis happened very early, in 600 A.D. or so. You can find the wikipedia entry here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_the_East_in_China and there are various documentaries, and this book.
Reply to Wayfarer At the moment, I have moved on to the Mayan belief system and need to start a thread for that. Then write myself a note so I don't forget I started a thread.
The Mayan rationale is soooo different from our Greek/Roman rationale. If human beings can have very different rational systems, we have to question what rational thinking is.
Christians moving their rationale into China is perhaps more disruptive than a causal judgment might understand. We take our calendar and mode of thinking for granted. But this is a different subject from comparing how our minds work with how animals' brains work.
Comments (1366)
It is likely that animals have some kind of underlying grasp of concepts although it may be different from human beings, especially as it does not involve language.
Of course, it is not possible to grasp the experience of animals' mental states fully, but it does seem that communication is of a sophisticated level. There may be varying degrees, and my recent jokey question is do bed bugs have consciousness? They seem to have a strong instinctual will towards survival. It may come down to the varying degrees of evolution of consciousness in the various kingdoms, ranging from mineral, vegetable, animal and humans. Even within the categories it appears that there are vast differences in consciousness, intelligence and behaviour repertoires.
I can think of three major elements to rational thinking: its form is linguistic, its structure is logical, and its orientation is (ostensibly) self-interest (either direct or indirect). Under that definition, animals do not have rational thinking because they lack language. And intuitive thinking, which allows for action without explicit knowledge of the reasons for action is similarly excluded.
Animals do have communications systems though, and therefore skills, and human intuitive thinking can be a better (esp. faster) way of solving problems, avoiding danger, dealing with people etc. In fact, think about most real life conversations--they are almost entirely intuitive. Who's thinking explicitly about what to say next?
Person A: Hi, how are you?
Person B: (*I'm not so good but do I want this person to know that? I mean, do I really trust them? Probably not, so I should just lie and say I'm fine. But wait, lying is unethical, isn't it? I remember that Kantian thing. Yes, honesty is the best policy. No, wait, I'm being irrational. It's a white lie. No one gets hurt and I'm acting against my self-interest by being open with everyone, right? But Kant... Stop being nuts, even Kant would have said he's fine. The dude had huge books to write. He'd hardly stand here all day debating how to respond to what is any case just a non-literal customary linguistic tic with no real concern behind it... etc etc)
In fact, when you get right down to brass taxes, who's doing much rational thinking at all that leads to anything concrete? We do plenty of post hoc rationalizing to make us feel good about our irrational behaviour though.
Of course.
Quoting Athena
Of course.
Quoting Athena
Intuition is a shortcut to an answer in the absence of sufficient evidence to draw a logical conclusion. It is based on recalled experience and knowledge.
:up: :up:
Yeah, allegedly even some homo sapiens do. :monkey:
Here is a crow using a stick to get food. Do you think this is rational?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjfrxkEpfX8
How can you assess rational thought, except through problem-solving? Problems arise in nature all the time and animals need to solve them in order to survive and reproduce successfully. Whoever's ancestors were able to solve most of their problems inherited the most sophisticated brains. These are the cognitive front runners, AFAWK. However, living things also have mental attributes other than rational intelligence that vary greatly in range and style and function, which are far more difficult to quantify and compare.
There is no big fat black line between one species and its nearest kin - evolution is an n-dimensional continuum. We inherited our intelligence, communication skills, mimicking ability, empathy, instincts and emotional repertoire from previous iterations of great ape.
Post-hoc rationalisation probably was the original form of 'rational thinking', as social group-animals it was pretty important to justify/rationalize our actions.
So you know, it seems that Plato/Socrates (contra the Sophists) got us on the wrong track with this weird ideosyncratic notion of rational thinking to arrive at the truth.
I remember when there was a lot of excitement about chimps recognizing their image in a mirror. Of course much more research has been done since then.
I know all that but hell will freeze over before I can explain it as well as you did. :heart:
:lol: My arguments are based on my own struggle with language and especially ordering my words so they make sense and rational thinking. Such as choosing the right words to title a thread. I am terrible at that.
I led a team of volunteers to help a young woman in a nursing home. When leaving, a young man with a very low IQ made it through a locked gate, that I could not get through because obviously the gate was locked and obviously it was necessary to have a code to get out of the secured building. But my dim-witted friend did not take time to think through the problem. He put his hand through the gate and opened it from the outside. Quite obviously our "thinking" can make us stupid. And if I were to be lost in the wilderness, I would want him to help me get out. I have known a few low IQ people who think more like animals and I mean this as a complement.
I knew a gentleman who ran from the WWII soldiers who killed everyone in his family. As a young child, he had to survive on his own in the forest. I asked him how he did that and he said he watched the animals and learned from them.
"Who's thinking explicitly about what to say next?" I am thrilled you got why I thought this thread was important. The more I thought about our thinking versus animals, the less sure I was about our own thinking! I know there is soooo much I do not know and how many books I try to read are over my head. I never habituated the steps of logical thinking so my struggle to learn seems futile. I have gone through life in a state of daydreaming and it is amazing I got this far.
He was thinking rationally: looking at a problem and finding a solution. He did it quickly, because it was very simple problem. (One might question the rational thought-process of the genius who designed the gate.) Reason is nothing more complicated than finding the connection between cause and effect, then projecting the if-then dimension. A causes B; therefore, if I affect the function of A, then B alters accordingly.
Reason and one's relative facility in reasoning has very little to do with verbal proficiency or fluency. Individuals with too deep a regard for what is said by those who speak authoritatively are some times fooled into believing what they're told rather than what they themselves are able to discern.
I think Baden gave a good explanation of why all thinking is not equal to rational thinking.
We could get into what emotions have to do with our thinking and question how rational we are when we are emotional. The book "Emotional Intelligence" explains how emotions mess with our thinking, and the more recent study of what hormones have to do with emotions and judgment. I used to clean a bar and on football game nights, the bar would be trashed! Watching football increases a man's testosterone level, which results in more aggressive behavior than adding a few beers, reducing one's inhibition and I should have gotten a bonus for cleaning on those nights. :grin:
Your post triggered the next thought about experience and knowledge. Individually, we are different in our ability to learn. More dramatic is the fact that baboons like to eat termites as much as chimps. They watch the chimps make tools to fish the termites, but they do not imitate the behavior, although they want the termites just as much as the chimps. I think that is equal to me wanting to understand math, and I just don't get it.
I hope we think as much about how we think as we think about how another animal thinks. Intuition is not rational thinking because there is no language involved. My point about going through the gate is knowledge can prevent us from knowing.
The argument about chimpanzees and their ability to communicate is more complex than whether they learn a language or they can not.
As a matter of learned culture, some Chimpanzees in the wild do have warning calls that identify a predator. In the learning stage, a young chimp may see a leaf fall and make the sound for an eagle, or see a wild pig and make the sound for a predator cat. The adults will look for the pedator and ignore the warning if they do not see it, or if they see it, they will repeat the warning. In time the young will make the correct sound at the correct time. Our cats and dogs may be very good at communicating with us but wolves do not have that kind of relationship with humans. The difference between domestic and non-domestic animals in the genes. Just as the learning difference between chimps and baboons is in the genes.
Here is a link explaining rational thinking requires language, not just warning sounds for predators.
Is it rational to believe illnesses are caused by the gods? Is it rational to believe a god created man from mud?
I suppose a bare minimum has to be symbolic representation akin to something that arises with language use. Animals do not have language, if by "language" one has in mind propositional knowledge.
There may well be other aspects to thinking that are not related to language, but we don't know what they are. We are back to speaking about these things through language. So, until we have some proposal as to what non-linguistic thought is, we are stuck.
As for communication? Yes, they do, and they seem to be highly efficient at it. Look at bees or birds or dolphins, they have some amazing capacities for communication that we lack.
Intuition is somewhat hard to describe. I don't think it's better than non-intuitive thinking, just different. Though we should keep in mind that our intuitions can be quite wrong.
Very nicely said and so the debate goes on. I had to look for an explanation of propositional knowledge because that is a new term for me.
Having the right language for this discussion is very helpful. Thank you, Manuel.
By definition of "rational," I would say no, the crow's behavior is not the result of rational thinking.
I like @Manuel's used to Propositional Knowledge. If the crow questioned if the stick would work, and proposed an experiment and then explained the results, the stick must be this long and have this strength to work, and we tested his experiment and found it to be true, then we have rational thinking. I hope once I learn the language of math I will be able to understand math better. Reading about Propositional Knowledge helped my brain form a degree of understanding about rational thinking. How do we understand anything without the right words?
Your example is very important because we thought only humans used tools, and we made that ability the defining marker of being human. Next, we thought culture is what defines humans and then we discovered social animals have culture. But we still have people who believe humans were made of mud and it was a god who made them so we aren't really animals like all the other animals. I don't think that belief would pass the test for rational thinking, but then when someone comes up with a crazy explanation for believing in something, we call that rationalizing.
Help, my thoughts may not be in the proper order or maybe I am not using the right words? I think I destroyed my argument. :chin:
Quoting Athena
I'd say instincts are to some extend rational, if by rational we mean doing things that furthers attaining desired ends. A chicken for instance will instinctually scratch the ground periodically while eating. In doing so there's a chance that they reveal all kinds of tasty stuff like worms or grains that where previously not visible. So the instinctual behaviour of scratching the surface could be said to be rational behaviour if we assume the goal they want to attain is getting food.
The difference with humans is they can't seem to adjust these instincts very much to fit changing circumstances. If you give them a bowl of grains for instance, they will still tend to scratch the surface eventhough in that instance it does very little as they have enough food in the bowl. Humans have an extra capacity to reflect on and reason about certain behaviour, which enables them to adjust more to changing circumstances.
Quoting Athena
I think in this case something similar is going on as with instinctual behaviour of animals. We are social animals, and tend to create religious/mythological superstructures that promote certain values and social cohesion that benefits the group overall if you would compare it to a group that doesn't have members adhering to their superstructure. Piety, i.e. believing in and adhering to the traditions of your group, promotes social cohesion (Asabiyyah), and can from that point of view probably be considered "rational" in that social cohesion improves overall survivability of the group (which can be considered as the desired end). The flip-side is that like animal instincts it isn't very granular and adjustable to specific circumstances... it's rational only viewed in the context of the longer historical and evolutionary arc.
Socrates (and Plato) thought we could do better than that and started questioning the Gods and turned to rational thinking instead. We will have to see (although we probably won't be there anymore :-)) if that turns out to be a better strategy long-term.
Sure thing!
Strangely, or by synchronicity, we are both interested in the prefrontal cortex because I was writing about that in a thread on free will as yours appeared on the forum.
As far as your idea of the significance of the chimpanzee recognising his or her image in the mirror, it may suggest a form of personal identity based on an image of one's bodily appearance. The recognition of oneself in the mirror is an important point in a child's awareness. Of course, the existence of mirror images may be a detrimental factor in human identity insofar as it creates the potential for narcissistic tendencies and body image issues.
So then if we took a human, and they did the same thing as the crow without saying any words, we would think that wasn't rational thinking? How did the crow arrive at that conclusion to do what it did to begin with?
Quoting Athena
Not a worry! We're here to think, and ideas can shift and flow. Honesty, questions, and exploring possibilities are all part of a good philosophical mind.
We're not only different in our capacity to learn, the speed at which we do it and in our ability to retain and recall information.
The baboon/chimp divide may be cultural. Just as humans disregard the habits of tribes with different world-views, it my be that apes disregard the habits of another species of ape. I suspect that if they saw a baboon of high social standing fishing for termites, they would be imitating him quite soon. (Experiment: have a trusted human teach a baboon to do it, then let him in among a troop of youngsters.)
Quoting Athena
What makes language the criterion for rational thought? Are there not math questions and diagrams on an IQ test? Does the crow deciding to use the short stick to retrieve the long stick to push the cheese near enough the bars so that he can reach it with the short stick require him to explain as he goes?
Intuition is rational thinking. You consider the information available, arrange it some configuration that makes sense, recognize what additional pieces of information you need for a solid, logical conclusion. But you don't have those extra pieces, so you look in memory for any items of information that fits with the pattern you have created. The conclusion you draw is not provable, but it's a working theory you can test. You may not be aware of the process, as it usually happens faster in your brain than you can translate into speech, but in retrospect, you should be able to describe how you arrived at the result.
Language of some kind is important for communication and useful labelling for memory organization, but that doesn't mean deaf-mute people can't solve problems rationally.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Didn't people have a reason for their actions until somebody forced them to explain? We sometimes need to rationalize actions (decisions) that prove counter-productive, or that others disapprove, but how often does anyone justify preparing food, building a shelter or using a hammer to drive a nail into wood? The rationality of those actions is self-evident.
They already have a language. The argument is over whether and how well they learn some version of a human language.
Quoting Athena
Why would they want to? Wolves have very effective communication skills among themselves. Besides familial and social exchange of vocalizations, postures and gestures, they have quite a sophisticated method of organized hunting.
I'm bringing my response here from your other thread.
No. It is not reason that they use, although they can be described as intelligent. And yes, they can be described as having communication ability.
But animals do not put together an argument to arrive at a conclusion. A valid/sound conclusion is the goal when one is engaged in reasoning. For example, if I have some information on the chance that it's going to rain this morning -- atmosphere, clouds, radar -- I can conclude validly that it's going to rain this morning.
OK
"...the ability to attain goals in the face of obstacles by means of decisions based on rational (truth-obeying) rules."
I don't see how language-use is necessary to be rational. I have yet to receive an answer to the question of how one learns a language without being a rational thinker prior. Being a rational thinker allows one to learn a language, not the other way around.
Acting on one's instincts is still a rational process. There is a reason why instinctive behaviors allow some animal to survive - because those behaviors have worked in the organism's ancestral past. Because they work means that there is some element of truth in the way the animal perceives their environment and reacts to it. Think of instincts as "memories" stored in the organism's DNA to use in similar circumstances in the future.
Learned behaviors evolved as a way to respond to more rapid changes in the environment - changes that instincts are too slow to evolve a solution for. Think of learned behaviors as memories stored in one's brain to use in similar circumstances in the future.
All organisms engage in goal-directed behavior whether it is based on instincts or learned in the face of obstacles either by evolving truth-obeying instincts or by learning with a sensory feedback loop (responding to a stimulus and then observing the effects and then try again, observing those effects, try again, etc.) (truth-obeying rules).
I dunno, that is the question right? And that question in turn depends on what you would consider "a reason". Does a chicken have a reason the scratch the ground when looking for food? As I alluded to in a previous post, the chicken also seems to be scratching the floor when it doesn't seem to make a lot of sense. So a lot of that behaviour seems to be instinctual. I do think there's a reason, or a 'rationale' to a lot of these instincts, but I also think those are not the result of some conscious rational deliberation... what one would consider "rational thinking".
I think a lot of what we humans do is more or less the same, we do seem to do a lot of things without conscious rational deliberation, out of instinct. Most of these behaviours are probably "reasonable" in that they do serve a purpose or goal, without necessarily having a reason in mind. And so no, often it's only afterwards, when asked, that we consciously think of "reasons".
You made me ask the question, can a chimp recognize a picture of himself in a line up of chimp pictures? That is different from a mirror image. In the mirror, our movement is reflected. What if the chimp realized the movement in the mirror was his movement but that does not mean he could pick out an image of himself in a line of pictures?
I am watching college lectures about humans and primates and the thing that impresses me the most is how extremely picky researchers are! The question must be asked exactly right. They must be as sure as possible that they identify exactly what causes something and their peers are quick to jump on them if everything is not exactly right. This is not normal everyday thinking. It is very disciplined thinking.
About you and I thinking along the same line at the same time, you and I have experienced this often. It is enough to make me ask if we have a psychic connection but then is that even possible? I think that is unlikely but not impossible. I have a very old book about logic and the author warns us never to be too sure of what we think because we can never know enough to be certain. Science is about being as certain as we can be and history is a series of times when the general experience of the moment moves people to think and act the same, such as the hippie movement and then a fascination with drugs such as we have today.
Survival might be considered high on the list.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Yes: seeds scattered on the ground sometimes get covered by dirt. Having eaten all the visible seeds, the chicken scratches for any that were overlooked. Floors are artificial, beyond a chicken's repertoire of experience; she doesn't have sufficient information to be sure it won't yield to scratching.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
That's where it begins. Drive - habit - instinct - adaptation - thought.
Some big brown slug didn't just hump itself out of the primordial swamp and grow into H. sapiens without reference to any other species. The process was long and gradual; the product exists on a scale and a spectrum.
A dog may not recognize its image in a mirror, but neither can a man pick the smell of his own urine out of a hundred other humans'. We self-identify differently and perceive differently, use similar faculties in different proportions, but the strategies and tactics of survival have to be coherent, directed and purposeful in order to succeed. By the time you're up the brain size of a great ape, most of its behaviour is controlled and directed - purposeful - even though we don't constantly think about what we're thinking and how we're thinking it (which would paralyze action and probably get us killed).
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
We also have habits and instincts, yes. And many perfectly reasonable decisions that we don't dwell on, simply because they're learned reactions; considered appropriate to a familiar situation. Reason can't have been invented in response to being challenged: that's the wrong way around. Who was there to challenge an action prior to the concept of rational thought?
That is the intuitive question. As @Manuel warns, when we know something intuitively, it is important to check and double-check that intuitive thought. An intuitive thought may be the result of past experiences or spending many days trying to answer a question. We can not be sure why but the thought is just in our heads whole and complete. Because I am studying the brain I read or hear time and time again, that our brains are very active and we are not aware of all its activity.
We know humans can be aware of some of that thinking in a way we call rational thinking. Rushing out to hang someone for committing an offense with other men dressed in white sheets, is not rational thinking even if the men are aware of their reasoning. Their reason is not the careful reasoning of science. Men's behavior in times of war had little to do with rational reasoning. :heart: I hope we all gain better knowledge of different modes of thinking and different codes for thinking. How do our brains work compared to how do the brains of great apes work?
I am excited because you have gotten to the core of the subject. Baboons to not have the attention span of great apes. Baboons are monkeys not apes. The difference is genetic. I don't know if anyone has tried as hard to teach a baboon or done an experiment as you suggest. I think not because from our present judgment of baboons it would be futile.
Here is a link...
No, but what I'm saying is that "reasons" are not necessarily the result of conscious rational deliberation either. Instincts are obviously prior to all of that, and instincts are to some extend already reasonable. Instincts are the original 'reasons'... then great apes evolved language as a tool of communication as social group animals, then we develloped rationalisation or justification, i.e. delineating and expressing in language, after the fact, the reasons already inherent in behaviour guided by the instincts (or perhaps expressing reasons that weren't even there in case of dissimilation). And then eventually, socrates put forwards the notion that we should have conscious rational deliberation prior to the act as the golden standard.... rational thinking instead of instinct.
This is why the definition and meaning of the phrase "Rational thinking" needs to be clearly listed and agreed upon first. If we all have different viewpoints of what the phrase "Rational thinking" means, we're never going to come to an agreement. as to whether an instance of a crow using a tool is an instance of rational thinking.
I will use a link to explain why intuitive thinking is not rational thinking.
As @Manuel explains rational thinking begins with a proposition. I am learning as I read and reply and use links because I do not have a strong understanding. So here is an explanation of propositional knowledge.
Now here is where the rest of the animal realm fails. It took us centuries but we now of an amazing comprehension of pi.
The importance of our present knowledge of pi is mind-blowing! It tells how organism grow, and helps with navigation of air planes. This link is very complex so I am leaving just the link for those who want to know what pi has to do with the creation of the universe and how things grow. https://www.biophysics.org/blog/pi-is-encoded-in-the-patterns-of-life
This link is a little simpler..
Any way even though many of us struggle with math, it is an important component to rational thinking.
Sciencific thinking is nothing like our every day thinking.
Oh man :nerd: A thought came up as I worked on the explanation.
Modern thinking is nothing like the thinking of the Middle Ages and around the world are people still far from proposition knowledge and thinking. Our understanding of the different modes of thinking and how far we have come in the last hundred years is still outside of our consciousness but we are not the same human beings we once were. We only had to potential to become as we are. Other animals do not have this potential.
The problem with this definition is it does not describe whether the person's intuitive thinking was the result of previous rational thoughts that one has subconsciously accepted, or instinct. One can have an intuitive behavior driven by instinct, previous rational thought, or trained habit.
So in the case of the crow, while we see they search through the branch and pick a twig of the correct size, we never saw if the crow had ever toyed around with the branch before. Maybe earlier they tried other materials, saw certain ones did not work, and finally found that a small branch did.
Working through a process to find what works, and does not work, seems like rational thought. It does not mean a being has to use math, language, or any higher level tools or processes that humans do. Can it reason through a novel problem and come up with a solution? That's really the question.
No animals don't already have a language. Language is next to culture, it has to be learned. The ability to learn a language varies across species and within the species are individual differences and the age of our ability to learn changes with our age. Older children have a greater learning ability and there are some things that if a child does not learn or experience at a certain age, the child will never be able to incorporate it in its being.
That said, many animals have warning sounds. Those sounds are instinctively known to all species because as math explains, the sounds are irritating and can not be ignored. A group of chimps may have different sounds for different threats- this would be cultural and something that has to be learned before one could know if the threat is an eagle coming from the sky, or large snake hanging in the tree or a predator coming by ground. Those warning sounds, even the more complex ones are not propositional thinking. The great ages are not going to discuss what humans are doing to their habitat and what they can do to defend it.
Yes. I don't think anyone here is arguing humans have not evolved from an ancestor that would be classified as an animal. The transition from prehumans to humans is better documented today and with our improved knowledge of animals having culture, our understanding of the transition is getting better.
Of course not. The reason why something is necessary precedes any consciousness recognizing the necessity, which precedes any deliberate action taken. Entities striving to survive are not acting at random; they're acting in response to a need: they have specific reasons for doing what they do, long before the development of a brain. Animals with brains recognize their needs, explore their environments and decide on actions intended to attain a specific end: find water, get food, erect shelter, seek safety.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
Biological impulse is the original response to the environment and survival. Instinct develops much later , in increasingly complex organisms. Instinct and memory form habitual behaviours, then the even more complex brain adds curiosity and imagination to extrapolate situations beyond the present and consider alternative actions to reach the same goal.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
By which time, thousands of species had been doing it for 50 million years, without pontificating about it.
Quoting Athena
Yes, all social animals learn their language from their elders.
Quoting Athena
Not to mention all the means of mass extinction. The other animals fail most spectacularly by dying at our hands.
Quoting Baden
@Manuel said "I suppose a bare minimum has to be symbolic representation akin to something that arises with language use. Animals do not have language, if by "language" one has in mind propositional knowledge."
Perhaps we can focus on logic.
.
I like that the definition begins with "correct reasoning". Lenching someone does not involve correct reasoning. In court, we aim at correct reasoning. But then I think of the ancient Greeks and the argument against rhetorical speaking which may appeal to emotions more than reason.
Why does 'reasoning' require a modifier? You can arrive at the wrong conclusion through a rational process, if you begin with false or incomplete information, if you start from an assumption that is later proven to be unfounded, if your initial purpose is to justify an act deemed wrong by others.
I get that humans want to be oh-so-special - not enough to be the most; we must be the only. Well, we have a number of claims to that exceptionality already. The reason - rational, but rarely acknowledged - we so desperately want to deny other species the faculty of reason is to justify our exploitation of them.
This is defining the term to exclude animals without debate then. This is also an incredibly narrow term that historically has not required language use. I would not agree this is a requirement for rational thinking, just a requirement for linguistic thinking.
Quoting Athena
Logic may also be too strong. Rational thinking is the ability to piece premises together and come up with potential solutions. Those solutions may be wrong. A rational thinker can then eliminate that wrong answer and try another route. Logic often implies deductive reasoning, but many would argue that inductive reasoning is also necessary for rational beings.
Here is a clear example of thinking which is not rational. If you poke a caterpillar with a leaf in a way that doesn't harm it, it will squirm like its being attacked. Every time, it never stops. Its a purely reactionary mind, with no forethought, adaptability, or ability to react to memory. Whereas we have a monkey using a tool. How many tests did the monkey have to do to get the right stick? What did they try before sticks? Rational thinking is a process which requires memory, adaptation, and often times proactive and not reactive.
If the reasoning isn't correct, things can go very wrong. That is why it is important to have the correct facts and think things through carefully. Democracy is not about what one person thinks but together after we argue with each other and check our facts, what is true. This is akin to scientific thinking. It is not basing our understanding of reality on a myth that can not be supported with factual statements.
We have a big problem in the US. Our understanding of rational thinking is very weak. In general people don't know the difference between an opinion and a fact. All thinking is confused with being rational and that is a serious problem.
It is your opinion that I hold rational thinking as a human thing based on language that animals do not have because I want to exploit animals, is an opinion, not a fact. Let me make it clear, I care that we know the difference because it is the only chance we have of not destroying our planet. If we do not distinguish between correct reasoning and incorrect thinking, the planet is doomed and there is no other animal on earth that can do that reasoning.
There is a problem with inductive reasoning. Scholasticism used Aristotle and the Bible as the foundation of education. We did not come to the modern age until much later and there was a terrible fight and strong backlash to Aristotle's inductive reasoning. We are talking a huge knowledge breakthrough that changed our cultures and our lives. There was a lot of anger towards education based on Aristotle because it prevented us from progressing intellectually.
A person who is using a screw to fix a pipe also has a problem. Inductive reasoning is a tool. It has its proper applications, and improper applications. But no one throws away their screwdriver entirely just because it can't fix a pipe.
Quoting Athena
Right, because someone asked the question, "What if Aristotle is wrong?" To explore that, that particular person had to explore several inductive reasons too. Rational thinking is not, "I have the right answer". Rational thinking is a process of working through a problem to a solution. And that requires both inductive reasoning to figure out different possibilities, and deductive reasoning to narrow it down to necessary conclusions.
If you are interested, I have essentially solved that problem here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There is a nice summary on the next immediate post. Essentially there is a hierarchy of inductions. The close they are to the process to gain knowledge, the more cogent they are. Inductions are absolutely necessary tools in rational thinking and discovery. We just have to understand them and use them correctly.
I might throw in here something I just read in a math book. It has been proven a 4 month old child recognizes the difference between one thing, two things, or three things. The baby has no language so is not thinking in terms one, two, three. It is just the change in the number of objects that the baby reacts to. This does not happen when there are four things or five things. More than three is just many. It also is specific to the number of things. It does not matter if three balls become three blocks, or if red puppets become blue puppets. It is only the change in the number of things, up to three things that catches the baby's attention. This is also basic to horses, birds, and dogs.
That is knowledge of some things is hard-wired. It comes with the animal. This is not the thinking you described. It is more like the caterpillar reacting as though it were being attacked. No thinking, just a reaction. A man accidentally killed his son because he was reacting to fear, and picked up his gun when he heard an intruder and then fired that gun when his son who came home from college a day early, jumped out of the closet to surprise his dad. The reaction happened before the thinking could begin. I think it is important to understand not all thinking is rational and thank you for your example of the caterpillar. It is also a baby's reaction to the change in the number of things. This is the stimulus, this is the reaction. Not rational thinking.
People often forget that he also says that, in spite of the fact that inductive reasoning is deductively invalid, we will continue to act on that basis, but not from reason, from custom or habit. He also says that inductive reasoning is all the proof you will ever get and provides a basis that is "as good as a proof". (In the context of his discussion of miracles, he slips up, or gets over-enthusiastic, and says that induction reasoning (against miracles) is a proof. He excoriates radical scepticism, which he calls "Pyrrhonism" even though he acknowledges that he cannot refute it. He recommends a month in the country as a cure. All he wanted to disprove was the Aristotelian idea of a "power" hidden behind the phenomena.
There are two ideas that may help with the issue of animal ratonal thinking.
One is the idea of "embedded" beliefs. These are believes which it is necessary to posit to make sense of the action. You walk towards your car, reach in to your pocket for the key to open it, and fail to find it. You believed that you had the key even though you didn't. You just didn't think. So there was no reasoning process behind your walk to the car and yet you believed it. The same is clearly true of animals. They do not have language, so they cannot go through what we call a reasoning process, though they can clearly learn from experience and remember what they learn and so act rationally.
The other idea is the distinction between knowing how to do something and being able to articulate that knowledge, or between tacit and articulate knowledge. (Even philosophers have to acknowledge that it is perfectly possible to use a word correctly without being able to define it. They quarrel about whether that means that you know what the word means only because (unsurprisingly) they are fixated on articulate knowledge and don't take knowing how seriously. Given that knowing-how and knowing-that are two distinct abilities, it should be no surprise that animals know how to do things without knowing how to articulate them.
Please let's try to get over the idea that only humans have language. There are many language-like communication systems, of varying degrees of sophistication. It's a matter of degree, not of kind.
Quoting Athena
That doesn't mean that it wasn't rational. He thought that his son was an intruder. An embedded belief.
Quoting Athena
But you are leaving out all the interesting bits. Stimulus/response is Pavlov's idea. The stimulus, for him, is something external and the response is the animal's. It's the feedback that does the work. In the case of his dogs, the bell announces the food and the animal salivating is the response, because the dog has learnt that the bell is followed by food. It's perfectly rational. Skinner introduced what he called "operant conditioning", where the stimulus is something the animal does and the response is what the environment does. If the response is a reward, the animal's action is reinforced; if the response is unpleasant, the animal's action is inhibited. It's called trial and error and it's perfectly rational.
I agree that the baby waving its arms and legs about is. let's say, purely mechanical. Evolution sees to it that we are born with a basis for learning what we need to know. Whether it is mechanical or not, it will be rational. But the baby quickly finds out that some movements are rewarded and some are not - and off we go. They have a mechanical seeking movement - probably based on pheremones - that is rewarded when the milk is found - and off we go. Horses and cows and others have a more complicated problem - they have to learn to stand up and walk before they feed - but they manage it. I'm not clear whether the squirming caterpillar is yelling in pain or trying to escape, by the way - possibly both. They could be blind, mechanical movements, but I doubt it. Evolution would favour squirming caterpillars because they are more likely to escape.
I'm not familiar with the Aristotelian idea of a "power" hidden behind the phenomena. However, based on my considerations of neuroscience, calling our subconscious recognition of patterns "a power" doesn't seem inappropriate.
I'd be interested in hearing more about Hume's disagreement with Aristotle, if it isn't too much trouble.
Indeed. But 'correct' isn't in the definition of reasoning, nor is the soundness of the result. It's a process that can be carried out more or less effectively.Quoting Athena
Quoting Athena
'Incorrect', 'ill-informed', 'faulty', 'based on invalid premises and/or unfounded assumptions', 'inappropriate' and even 'fatally flawed' are descriptions that can be applied to:
Quoting Athena
I never claimed otherwise. And, in fact, the remark was not directed specifically at you - except inasmuch as you have been defending the human exclusivity position - but was an observation regarding a whole system of faulty/disingenuous human reasoning for the purpose of arriving at a desired conclusion.
Propaganda and advertising work in this same way: argument directed at a desired outcome. The purveyors of mis- and disinformation use a rational process to determine what kinds of falsehood their audience is most likely to believe and construct the most persuasive arguments to make their conclusions sound reasonable. Often, this involves altering the meaning of words and twisting familiar concepts, and may include denial of the audience's practical experience.
That's a different case. Our recognition is revealed when we recognize it. These powers, as Hume keeps emphasizing, are "secret", "hidden".
Quoting wonderer1
I recommend reading what he actually says, and only reading secondary sources with that in mind. The argument against induction is routinely misunderstood, and so they cannot be altogether trusted.
Bear in mind also that when I say "Aristotelian" I mean it. Hume might have been arguing with Aristotle, but he doesn't say that who he's disagreeing. It's "the schools" that he is targeting.
His discussion is in the "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" Section IV, Part II. It begins on page 33 in my edition. It begins:-
If you have an electronic text, search for "power". It'll come back with over 100 entries, but you can click through them quite quickly. In my search, it was number 15 of 129. It comes quite early, in the first page or two.
Thanks!
I guess you'll have better things to do that hang around here!
I want to add that I do not at all deny that animals (including humans) do have purely mechanical responses. Examples in humans are the reflex breath as you come back to the top of the water, which is clearly evolved and rational, as contrasted with the jerk of your lower leg as your old-fashioned doctor tap just below your knee, which (so far as I know) has no evolutionary purpose. You may know that if you scratch a dog at just the right place, their back leg comes up as if to scratch themselves; they can also do the same thing when they want to scratch themselves; that response can be mechanical and irrational and can be voluntary and rational.
Quoting Vera Mont
You're not wrong. But, along with all the similarities, there must be differences. The same applies to chimps and horses and whales. So there is legitimate enquiry to be had here, surely?
I just finished reading it, so I have a better understanding of the context in which he was using "powers".
Quoting Ludwig V
It's interesting to consider how much less secret and hidden these days, is the power of bread to nourish. These days if I go buy a loaf of bread many of the bread's nutritive 'secrets' are likely to be listed on the packaging. :smile:
So you should also have a better understanding of what empiricism was/is all about. The debate between empiricists and rationalists (the orthodox background for empiricism in philosophy to-day) is a whole other issue. That debate was about innate ideas - a quite different problem.
You may find it interesting to read Section V and VII for more about causation and Section XII for more about scepticism.
Quoting wonderer1
Yes. One could argue that the powers are less secret than they seemed to be back then. We describe what happens in terms of a condition - if and when the first billiard ball hits the second, the second will move. It makes no difference if you know the molecular analysis of the balls - the causal relation has no more to it than "if and when p, then q will follow".
When it comes to our power of thought, it's still hidden. We don't know at this point how the brain thinks BECAUSE we do not have access to enough of the brain's processing to figure it out. Yes, we have fMRI, EEGs, direct measurement of neuron's firing, etc. But these just don't reveal in anything close to granular detail how the brain produces the self, consciousness, novels, symphonies, mechanical inventions, and so on and so forth. There are clues, but the case isn't solved by a long shot.
Will it be solved? I don't know. Depends on the stability of civilization over the next century or two. The brain's 90 billion neurons (give or take a half dozen) and their trillion trillion interconnections are literally beyond our reach at this point. C. elegans' brain (all 300 neurons) has been fully charted, but that's a far cry from even a rat's brain, let alone the extraordinary brain of Ludwig V.
If we don't figure out what ever neuron does, that's fine. We don't need to know. Our brains are not so reliable that they should have more knowledge than they can safely use.
Well, I'd think it could only seem so from an awfully 'high level' view, where a lot of the causal detail is coarse grained out of consideration. The causality involved in anything I'm apt to find interesting is a lot more complex than "if and when p, then q will follow". In digital logic terms, that can be implemented with a wire 'from p to q'.
It's pretty deeply engrained into my way of thinking, to see causality as a lot more complex than that.
Certainly. Evolution is a huge, complex, interconnected web of living things developing the faculties that best served their survival. Many of those faculties are held in common by large numbers of species, in varying degrees, styles and intensities. Rational thinking is one survival tool that many animals use to varying degree, depth, breadth and efficiency. I don't say humans are not the smartest and most linguistic; only that they are not unique in the ability to solve problems, and that setting problems to solve is the only way that I know of to test this ability.
Quoting Ludwig V
It's been going on for a considerable time - I think we're coming up on a century of scientific inquiry into the subject.
What I object to is starting from a conclusion that should have been put to rest decades ago.
For what is worth, I agree with pretty much all of this.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
One way to clarify all this is to distinguish clearly between rationality in the instrumental sense, meaning something like "goal advancing," and rationality in the sense of something like "meeting the standards of argument and evidence in your speech community."
In the first sense, animals are prima facie rational, if anything mostly more rational than human beings, less subject to ridiculous maladaptive beliefs or habits of thought that might lead to behavior harmful to self or group. There are limits of course.
The second sense appears to be the sole province of language-users and therefore us, for better or worse.
Two tricky points: (1) the extent to which and the ways in which the two related; and, perhaps as a particular case of (1) but perhaps not, (2) whether internalizing the patterns of reason as justification and argumentation (i.e., sense 2) genuinely contributes to belief formation at all, and perhaps to adaptive belief formation, or simply makes us more facile at producing justifications for beliefs arrived at we know not how.
Correct, this is instinct or innate capabilities.
Quoting Athena
Absolutely I agree that not all thinking is rational. But back to the crow. If the crow had experimented with different things to get the food, and stumbled upon the branch, then remembered the branch, would that be rational thinking?
Yes, it's fascinating to watch people wrestling with it. BTW, I don't think the brain thinks. I'm the one who does the thinking. In other words, thinking is a holistic phenomenon, like a rainbow.
A big problem is that "thinking" along with "understanding" are probably the two most protean concepts we have. I'm pretty sure that we'll have to modify those concepts to fit with the science we come up with, rather than the other way round.
People think that there's a way of sorting the problem out according to the model of information processing that we already have in our thinking machines. So it's worth noting that not everyone thinks that they are thinking machines. Then there is the fact that the brain is not just an information processing machine. It also controls action and reaction, and it may not need anything we could recognize as language to do that.
Quoting BC
It will be solved. But I'm pretty sure it will take conceptual change, perhaps as big as the change that solved the solar system.
What's a century or two? There was nearly two thousand years between Ptolemy and Copernicus. There's no rush.
I dunno. There's evidence around that being smart and linguistic may turn out not to be entirely beneficial. In this context "better together" means together with the entire planet.
Setting problems is probably the only way. But I worry that all we are testing is whether they are as smart as we are by our standards. Which are not necessarily the best standards. Lab work has to be a bit suspect.
Quoting Vera Mont
I don't disagree. But there has been a lot of progress in the last few hundred years. We are no longer the centre of the entire universe, a special species chosen by God. We've recognized equality in a way that never even crossed Aristotle's mind. It's no wonder that some people are anxious and defensive.
I know there's a lot going on around causality, because there are so many anomalous phenomena that seem to escape it. Just as the pre-scientific (Aristotelian) concept of causation had to go to enable the new science to develop. What I'm trying to suggest is that some phenomena that appear to be "secret" are just the result of asking the wrong (because unanswerable) question.
And who are you? Where did you come from? Who do you think you are?
So, some neurological researchers and thinkers propose that the 'self' -- you, I -- is a convenient fiction. The self is a creation of the brain, and we don't know how this is accomplished. As a fiction, the self is an extremely compelling story. But, you know, as I type this, it is somewhat clear to me that "I" am not composing these sentences. I'm reading them as they appear. The composer is a mental facility composed of various brain circuits. This facility outputs the text to the motor facility which causes my fingers to move in just the right way to produce this text.
"I" have edited the text; I decided to change some words here and there. But again, Neurological research shows that the decision to act is made BEFORE we are aware that we want to act. The "I" editor operates a couple of beats behind the brain circuits that actually made the decision.
That's OK, because most of the time the various parts of my brain are in accord on the importance of keeping "me", body and brain, together in one piece. Risk-reduction circuits in the brain try to keep "me" from getting beat up in The Philosophy Forum, and possibly killed (figuratively here, for real out on the street).
There is a lot "I" don't like about these loosey-goosey theories of self, consciousness, and all that, even if I grant them plausibility.
Yes, and one can see why. There's reason to think that planning ahead pays off. But the model always suffered from not recognizing that planning isn't doing and being unable to understand the difference. Hence, for example, the puzzle of weakness of will. It turns out that non-reflective action is always crucial. One just cannot plan every action.
Quoting ChatteringMonkey
I have some reservations about instinct. It's supposed to be used for unlearned behaviour. But instincts get modified, because, paradoxically, we have an instinct to learn. So actual behaviour is, paradoxically, learned. Birds seem to have an instinct to build nests in specific ways. Yet this cannot be a simple response, since they have to adapt to the circumstances they are actually in. What I'm getting at here is the we need a concept of non-reflective behaviour to explain, for example, how people manage to fight without the articulate deliberation in advance and why they do not need to deliberate about deliberating, though they can. The idea that they do something like articulate deliberation but at lightening speed is pure hand-waving.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Yes, they are indeed tricky. Sadly, I have nothing useful to contribute. I do have faith one day someone will come up with something.
I realize that you are asking those questions to get me puzzled, not because you think they don't have answers. But perhaps we should start from the fact that those questions have perfectly good answers and frame what neurologists are doing in more sensible ways.
Quoting BC
That has some plausibility if you mean "fiction" in the sense that mathematics is (maybe) a fiction, and physical objects and everything else. But the suggestion that I and you don't exist is absurd. It would be much better to say that the self is a holistic phenomenon. The brain process that you say cause my action are an analysis of the action, not a cause of it. Compare the analysis of a rainbow in terms of physics. People used to complain that physics abolishes the rainbow, but of course it doesn't; physics analyzes the rainbow, and it is normal for a holistic phenomenon to apparently disappear under analysis.
Quoting BC
Why do you separate composing from typing? The idea that saying something is somehow unspooling what the brain has already done just pushes the issue back a stage into an infinite regress. That representation of what is going on is an analysis. (The clue is in the term "analysis".)
Quoting BC
No, my fingers operate a couple of beats behind the brain circuits. What you call the decision is simply the initiation and control of my typing. To put it in a misleading way, "I" is the entire process. We are misled into thinking that decision is separate from action is just a result of the fact that we can interrupt the process of action part way through - aborting a process, not completing one process and starting the next. If you think of decision as an action distinct from execution, you end up with an infinite regress.
I see rational thinking and communication skills as parts of one thing - rational thinking is communicable thinking, communicable to other thinking (reasoning) things. Reason and language or math cohabitate the same moment.
Animals dont need any of it. We personify animals when we call their behavior rational like our behavior is rational.
Our hand falls in the fire and our arm pulls it out. No rational thinking or communication necessary. Just a functioning body. That could be how animals do everything they do - they dont reason and choose. They act. They function. Stimulus and response based on the shape of the stimulus and the shape of the responder.
Humans insert reason and deliberate some responses. We draw these deliberations out by communicating our reasons with other humans.
Our reasoning and communicating abilities sprouted from being an animal, so there is some value in comparing what humans do in reasonable deliberation with what animals do when they appear to have choices and when they appear to deliberate their behaviors, but once we see rational thinking and communication in any animal, we see a person. So if animals used rational thinking and communication, they would be people.
We only KNOW there is any other rational being in the universe when another rational being declares its reasons in a communication; otherwise how would we know? As soon as an animal is able to use reason, that animal is able to communicate with other reasoning minds. So as soon as an ape finds actual reason working in their conscious experience, we might be able to communicate with it and actually confirm it is using reason as it communicates reasonably.
Animals only appear to use reason and to communicate their minds because WE reasoning communicating creatures see ourselves in them, NOT because we see them.
They are better than that. Innocent of all moral deliberation and choice. Conscious thought would be more like a plague or disease to an animal. They already have no illusions (because they have no sense of illusion), so what is there for them to reason about? What communication is needed when they are all by nature already on the same exact page?
We have a narcissistic sense of animals when we pull reason and communication out of their behavior. We also have an imprecise sense of reason and communication when we find it in between two animals (unless those two animals are people.
Bee senses pollen.
Bees that sense pollen release pheromones.
Other bee senses pheromones.
Bees that sense these pheromones find the pollen.
No need to insert a human/person-like reason behind the pheromones that were released, or call the receipt of pheromones the receipt of a communication, or call the move to find the pollen a decision.
We humans take time to name all of these things and reconnect them with logical reasoning, and communicate these logical reasonings and names to other reasoning creatures.
Animals skip all the reflection; in fact, they dont skip it, it never arises (and may not have anything in which it could arise in the first place).
No, we are the only ones plagued with reason and communication.
Good stuff.
Reflection (mind that is minding, or I that is I-ing), is the interruption. Reflection has its own motion, but it is an interruption of the motion of that which it is reflecting on. So the movement of reflection creates a stillness in the thing someone is reflecting on.
This creates confusion about what is moving and what is staying the same.
My sense is that animals dont waste any of this time - they dont interrupt the motion by creating a still reflection (of a moving thing) that they can reflect upon.
Probably the reverse. I didn't say better, just more. (Yes, I realize that many humans consider more/bigger/faster the ultimate in good.) But that doesn't come under a comparison with the rational thought of other species.
Quoting Ludwig V
Many of the intelligence tests are really about "How much like us are they?" That business with the yellow dot, for example. Dogs don't identify individuals by sight but by smell and don't seem at all interested in their own appearance. I'm not surprised if they show no interest in their reflection in a mirror, which smells of nothing but glass, metal and the handler who put it there.
OTOH, tests of spatial orientation (mazes) do mimic the actual life experience of mice and challenging rats to obtain food in a human-made environment is certainly realistic. The experiments with plastic boxes, sticks and stones don't seem to give crows any trouble, though the props might be too foreign for most birds. It's hard for humans to devise tests that objectively measure the performance of species with very different interests and attitudes and perception from ourselves.
The least obtrusive and most reliable way to discover how other animals think is to observe them in their natural habitat, solving the problems nature throws at them. We have an increasing ability to do that now. Without special equipment, though, we can observe domestic animals as they go about the business of living, overcoming obstacles and devising means to obtain what they desire. It's not The Scientific Method; it's common sense.
It isn't that 'I' or 'you' don't exist; rather, the identity that I have doesn't occupy a specific region of the brain called "the self" -- at least they haven't been able to find it, and they've been looking, What seems to be the case is that various facilities in the brain maintain our identity as a seemingly solid self.
If it's a fiction (which wouldn't be my choice of words) then it's a fairly solid fiction in a healthy, intact brain.
Quoting Ludwig V
Several different areas of the brain are involved in composing this sentence. Obviously Broca's area, (language production) is involved; thought creation areas are involved; memory, etc. None of these areas control motor functions (like typing). So, once the sentence is ready, the motor centers are in charge of the typing.
Granted, the brain has some degree of plasticity, and an unused area can be recruited for some other purpose, but in adults, especially, this isn't a quick process. For example, were I to be blinded, the visual cortex would have a lot less to do. It might be recruited to process sensory input from the fingers in order to understand braille.
Quoting Ludwig V
There isn't "something else unspooling what the brain has done". The brain itself is managing the process of issuing a statement from inspiration to expression. Broca's area alone can't produce speech without coordinated effort by the motor system controlling tongue, lips, jaw, and breathing. Brain injuries and brain manipulation (during surgery) reveal that different areas of the brain control different aspects of our whole behavior.
Quoting Ludwig V
That's why I asked, "who are you?"
No matter what you say, what you think, what you do, it issues from the brain labeled "Ludwig V". What the neurological researcher is saying is that the "representation called the self of Ludwig V" is not doing the thinking, Almost everything the brain does is silent; we don't hear it thinking. We can't watch it retrieve a memory if a grade school teacher; we can't observe it coming up with a new idea. It feels like "we" are doing the thinking, but that's part of the fiction of the self.
Ludwig: Your brain is doing your thinking, it's just that "your thinking" happens in your brain below your radar.
Hey, show a little gratitude. The brain controls everything about you from your happy smile to your asshole and everything in between. You don't want to know everything your brain is doing. Yes it does your thinking, which you want to claim. Why don't you claim the task of keeping yourself upright when walking; blinking regularly to keep your eyeballs moist; keeping track of your temperature, blood pressure, heart beat, and breathing; waking up every morning (rather than not waking up); registering a patch of itchy skin; and hundreds of other services going on all the time?
You don't claim all these functions because you probably feel thinking is more noble and important than managing your bladder and rectal sphincters. Well, Ludwig, just wait until those bladder and rectal sphincters stop working, and you'll no longer consider their control beneath your dignity.
Thinking is just one of many things that we are not 'personally' responsible for.
Which is how Lars Chittka figured out so much about The Mind of A Bee, his 2023 book about bee perception, cognition, and success. One of his observations is "Bees live a very fast life; they have about 3 weeks from leaving their wax cell as an adult to their likely death. They have to actually learn a lot--it isn't all pre-programmed in their genes. In order to do this, their neurons seem to be far more efficient than ours. And they have very capable sensory capacities -- a sense of smell, touch, taste, hearing, the ability to see different parts of the spectrum than we do, a directional capacity, and so on.
When they land on a flower--which they did because the flower met certain specs--they can immediately tell whether another bee has recently foraged there. If so, they fly off. They 'know' it takes a flower a few hours to refill its nectar dispensers.
It takes a lot of unobtrusive observation to discover these things, something bee scientists have been doing for decades.
And more, better technology becomes available every year. People are making astonishing nature documentaries. Any interested layman can learn a great deal about animal behaviour without having to slog through scientific papers.
I don't understand that.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Sometimes cats and dogs sit and stare into space, quite still. One wonders what they are thinking about and whether they are thinking at all but, perhaps, meditating, or maybe just sitting without anything going on in their heads at all (but perhaps that is meditation - I don't know about that). If not for that, I would agree with you.
Quoting Vera Mont
I think I agree with you.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. I would value them more if they weren't called "intelligence tests". The very idea of intelligence makes not sense to me. It seems to comprise a wide variety of skills, some of which are highly transferable. We all possess many of them, some more and to a higher degree than others. It's about as sensible as trying to develop a single test for the nutritional value of food.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, but complaint is that behaviour in a mimicry is not necessarily the same as behaviour in their real life. Being caged in the lab at all is what disrupts everything - even if they are enjoying the holiday from real life.
Quoting Vera Mont
Quite so. But "true" scientists are obsessed with controlling all the variables. Experiments are thought to be better science than observations, (and, in inanimate matter, they are). Interpreting observations in their natural habitat is very tricky and there's always the issue that the observer might affect the behaviour - even the presence of a camera/microphone can do that. It's not "just" common sense. Better to think of it as organized and disciplined common sense.
You have very well explained what I wanted to say.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Animals do not need to have rational thinking because they do well with what they've got. Their instinct is very acute and senses are magnified multiple times than ours. They don't also need to plan for the "future" by just staying on top of things at the moment.
A lot of people do not understand that if animals are truly rational animals, they would have the same level of communication as we do. They could consult us in matters of daily survival, and vice versa.
Mimicry and imitation are not rational thinking -- regardless of how intelligent or useful or mind-blowing they are. Animals and plants can mimic each other to avoid the predators and increase their chances of bringing their offspring to maturity.
I think it's because we've become accustomed, through the 20th century, to evaluate human mental capability according to a standard, easily quantifiable set of responses. The earliest IQ test, if I recall correctly, was intended to identify learning difficulties in school children, but the army soon adapted one to make recruitment more efficient, eliminating those applicants who were deemed unfit for service and identifying candidates for officer training. Nothing sinister about those limited applications... but, like all handy tools, people came to depend too heavily on the concept of IQ and on tests (more recently, personality tests) to measure intelligence, it's been widely misapplied and abused.
Quoting Ludwig V
We need to go back one more step and question the validity of testing rodent cognition on laboratory specimens - mice and rats that have been bred in captivity - often for a specific purpose - for many generations. Rodents used for cancer research, for example are often strains highly susceptible to malignancies, much more so than sewer rats or barn mice. So the very subject of the experiment is skewed at conception, and not a true reflection of its species.
These highly controlled laboratory environments, as well as close observation of domestic species in what has become their adopted habitat, yields indicators of what to look for; they don't provide definitive answers. We have a beginning, not yet a conclusion.
Quoting L'éléphant
:lol:
A lot of people do not understand that if humans were truly rational animals, they would have the same level of communication as we do. They could consult one another, and ants, in matters of long-term survival.
I think that you and they badly need a deeper understanding of the concepts of identity and the self. Then they wouldn't waste their time on obviously futile searches.
The classic place for this is the paradox of Theseus' ship. Have you encountered it? It demonstrates quite clearly that the identity of anything is not a constituent element of any part of that thing. There are difficult cases, but that much is clear.
Quoting BC
I don't know what that means.
Quoting BC
Yes. This is a version of Chomsky's theory. But it doesn't fit with what happens. Sometimes, typing out text is like unspooling a sentence. But not always. Sometimes one pauses in the middle of a sentence to work out how to end it. Sometimes one types out a sentence as a trial or draft, not because it is finished. Or consider what is going on when I work out a calculation with pencil and paper.
Quoting BC
Yes, yes, you know all those areas are "involved". But you don't know what they are doing beyond the roughest outline. But they must control motor functions - through the relevant department. If they did not they could not send their completed sentences to be typed.
Quoting BC
Yes. That is well known.
Quoting BC
But you do admit that I do say things and think things and do things. "Issues" is pretty vague, so I don't have to take issue with that. No, the brain does not make me do anything, unless you can describe it as making me do what I have decided to do - which is a very peculiar notion.
Quoting BC
There is no self apart from me, Ludwig V. A representation of me would be a picture or model of me. Why would it do any thinking? It doesn't even have a brain.
Quoting BC
But you just said that we do think. I think it would be better to talk of constructions rather than fictions. I can recognize that in some sense, I am a construction - there are lots of bits and pieces working (mostly) together.
Quoting BC
I do realize that there's a lot going on in my brain when I think &c. We do know a bit about what is going on. But you could only describe it as thinking if you are prepared to say that a computer thinks. The brain is, after all, a machine.
Quoting BC
How do you know what I claim and what I don't claim? If you had asked me, I would have told you. But I think you are going off the rails in this and the next paragraph.
Quoting BC
It is true that consciousness is the tip of an iceberg, and there is indeed a lot going on in our bodies that we are not aware of. We know a bit about the brain, but not very much. It is always tempting to get ahead of oneself and posit things because they "must" be so. That has led us into many blind alleys and idiocies, so it is best to be cautious.
Thinking does seem to go on automatically. But I find that I do have some control over it. I guess it is a bit like breathing.
You are aware that anyone who is convicted for many crimes is found guilty because they intended to do what they did?
If it is the case that neither of us knows more than just "a bit about the brain' than your claims about your self, and my claims about my self, and what our respective brains are or are not doing, are both based on insufficient evidence. We have reached an impasse.
Quoting Ludwig V
I have not, would not, call the brain "a machine". After some brains invented computers, people started comparing their computers to brains and their brains to computers. My brain loves my Apple computer, but a computer is to the brain what a screw driver is to the brain: an sometimes useful external object,
That is the third version of the analogy. The Invisible Copy Editor, which is located on the underside of the Frontal Cortex next to the Olfactory Center, received a BAD SMELL alarm, indicating that the first version stank. My self was alerted, and I tried out a couple of different versions. Now it's back to Auto Mode.
Do we really need us to tell them what they think about daily survival?
Your definition of rationality is no more than a stipulation. Anyone who is rational enough to read their behaviour (which we can do, in the same way that we can read the non-vernal behaviour of human beings) knows that they experience pain and pleasure and respond rationally to both.
It's more accurate to say that we thought we needed a standard, quantifiable set of responses and decided to develop whatever we had to hand. "We need something, this is something." One can see this, because the development of personality tests (somewhat less conceptually incoherent, but, in my view nearly as vicious) when it was realized that intelligence tests didn't tell the story we needed (i.e. correlate with what we were looking for in our officers.) Essentially, the driver is our increasingly massified society, which is, at best, a double-edged sword.
Quoting Vera Mont
Correct. The first is a humane impulse, the second not wrong, but not particularly humane.
Quoting Vera Mont
Well, they thought intelligence was culture-free - It isn't - and not affected by training and education - actually, it is, but to a limited extent. If that had been true, the test could have helped remove racism and classism from those decisions. They are still trying to deal with that, but using them when it hasn't been sorted out is morally very dubious, to put it politely.
Quoting Vera Mont
Too right. Mind you, there have been moments when people have resisted the impulse.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. People think that makes what they do to them OK. But I find it really ghoulish. I'm really ambivalent about the morality of this.
Quoting Vera Mont
Quite so.
Yes. That's sadly common, isn't it? But we do have a choice, if we can set aside the question who is right and who is wrong. There is some risk, if one tries simply to explain oneself, one may realize that one understands one's own position less thoroughly than one thought, but that would be a bonus, wouldn't it?
So instead of arguing with you, I shall simply ask you a question.
In return, I will try to explain my own position on a particular point to you
Perhaps you may want to ask me a question?
OK?
I don't think either one of us is right, or wrong. I don't know enough about how the brain works to be right or wrong. I'm just guessing and passing on ideas I've picked up here and there.
I dislike some of the ideas I've come across such as the statement "The self does not exist." Maybe there is no lobe in the brain that houses "self", and maybe 'self' is generated by different parts of the brain, BUT, however it is produced, 'SELF' EXISTS as a durable, cohesive entity. My guess is that the 'self' is generated by the brain and social interaction from birth onward. An example of early self building might be the two-year old who, having learned the word, deploys "NO" as an expression of this new self that has a little power and choice. The "terrible twos" are a time when young children have come into possession of their self. And then we spend the rest of our lives cultivating 'selfhood'.
Some animals seem to have a self and some do not. An alleged test of 'self' is whether the animal recognizes itself in a mirror. 'Elephants do, dogs don't. On the other hand, the dogs I have lived with all seem to have diligently pursued their self-interests and preferences. I don't know any elephants.
So, question: How do you think the self is composed? Does DNA play a role? When does the self form--does it arise gradually or suddenly? Can we 'lose our self"? (not talking about literally losing our heads, or terminal brain disease which destroys the brain)
A question which has come up in discussions of the afterlife (about which none of us know anything): Does our self survive death? (To quote Flannery O'Conner, one of my favorite short story writers: "I belong to the church without Christ, where the lame don't walk, the blind don't see, and the dead stay dead.") Even if I don't believe in it, I find it difficult to imagine an afterlife of zeroed out souls who are without the selves they possessed in life.
I'll go along with that, but want to be generous and widen the scope of "need" to include benevolent aims and simple curiosity, as well as practical applications, and maybe, tentatively, forgive the social ignorance and complacency of the academics who made the early tests. (No, not the voting rights literacy tests of 1879 Kentucky!)
Well, maybe you are better balanced than me. I'm thinking, though, that good motives do not excuse everything. You probably know about the Tuskegee Syphilis Research Study, 1932 - 1972. It was only terminated because of a press leak - i.e. by public opinion - so you can't excuse by historical context. Anyway, the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1964 and 1968 had been passed by then.
I do now! And I know many examples of very bad scientific experimentation. I had no intention of including any of them in partly excusing ineptly designed intelligence tests.
I think my reply to you before was a bit hasty.
Quoting L'éléphant
Whether mimicry and imitation are rational or not depends on why it is being done, surely? If it is being done to avoid predators, for example, why is it not rational?
When a parrot mimics speech, there is no doubt that it is the parrot that is doing the mimicking. Quite why I don't know, but it seems most reasonable to suppose that the parrot has some purpose in doing that, because it clearly finds the behaviour rewarding in some way. There a kind of mimicry in which a harmless species has evolved to imitate the warning signals of a harmful species to scare off predators, for example. This is clearly a result of evolution (and I have no problem with the purposive explanation attributed to evolution). It is not the plant's purpose, (except in an extended sense)
BTW Personally, I am quite unsure whether insects have purposes in the way that animals do or their mimicries are the result of evolution's purposes. I think that birds, on the other hand, do have purposes of their own.
The only way that we can distinguishes between coincidental similarities and mimicry is by reference to purposes, whether of the individual entity or of evolution. That means that we are attributing rationality as well, though not the discursive rationality that human beings practice.
Quoting L'éléphant
Everybody agrees that human language is uniquely distinctive and more extensive than animal communication systems (I call them languages) of animals. I'm quite unclear why you want to call how animals communicate anything other than a language and bracket them as not "truly" rational. It seems to me to be simply a question of definition, rather than anything substantial or interesting.
But there is a lot more to be said.
The distinction between knowing how (to do something, in the sense of being able to do it) and knowing that something (is true). The former does not require language, but the latter clearly does. Philosophy has never seriously focused on the latter of each pair, leaving the former aside as trivial or irrelevant.
However, philosophers have long been amazed that people are able to speak coherently without being able to give a definition of the words they use. They have mostly ignored the phenomenon. But it is the most direct and dramatic demonstration that it is possible to do something and follow rules without being able to articulate what one is doing or why one is doing it.
To say that animals are rational is to attribute to them knowing how to do things, without being able to articulate what they are doing. It should not be a conceptually problematic thesis. The difficult, of course, is which interpretations of the behaviour are accurate. Sorting that out takes extended and close observation, but is not impossible.
Sadly, there is nothing to prevent a scientist being a bad scientist and even a racist scientist.
Usually, quite literally and directly rewarding. The handler gives him a treat. (And performing some act that is not of one's innate nature for a reward is definitely rational.) Some birds and many dogs also do it to please a human they hold dear, which is at least socially intelligent behaviour. And some birds just mimic for the same reason they dance to music: it's fun.
In US academia these days there are internal review boards which proposed research on human subjects must be approved by. My first wife was the the administrator for such a human subjects IRB, so I got to learn a lot about how they work.
The IRB that my wife was administrator for had members from outside academia, including a couple of local clergy. I don't know as much about nonacademic human research subjects review, but I doubt there is as little oversight as you suggest in most scientific research.
These days, probably not. Up until the late 1970's, research wasn't at all well supervised or regulated in most countries. It was probably - just speculating now - government agencies' unconscionable behaviour that prompted legal and professional constraints on the use of human subjects. Other species have not fared as well - ever.
Therefore: I am hungry, I will forage/hunt for food" is a rational stepwise train of thought for any animal that supports their survival.
On more complex levels: "I am threatened by an adversary on my hunt for food. They are bigger and more aggressive than me. I will hunt elsewhere." Is a rational stepwise consideration to protect themselves. One which requires calculating risks based on both perception of their aggressor as well as self awareness of their own size, fighting ability etc.
Fight, flight, freeze or fawn is a dynamic of choices faced by many animals especially those that operate in hierarchal social groups. They can fight for dominance, run away and spare themselves, freeze to avoid detection or minimise their perceived threat to the aggressor or fawn - offer services such as flea picking, defence, some food or sex as a way to ingratiate themselves with the more dominant individual and thus gain secondary benefits.
These are all rational thoughts when survival and wellbeing is the soul agenda.
Humans of course have surpassed basic rational thought (survival rationale) to an elevated state where we can apply even more rationale to things that aren't directly life-threatening. However, gains and risks ( be them authority/status/political, financial, etc) still apply. We can't at the end if the day ignore our very real instinct to survive and prosper regardless of what the level of complexity of our reasoning. Which may lead to tactics like manipulation, pandering, overt conflict and further reasoning as mechanisms to gain the upper hand in anything from academia to business/marketing and social relationships.
We are still animals.
I knew that rewards came into it. I just wondered whether they also did it for fun. Doing it for fun is intrinsically rewarding, but then the handler reinforces the reinforcement?
Doing it for fun. They're almost human, aren't they?
Quoting wonderer1
Yes, I know that. I think it's quite general in the scientific world these days. So things have got better - partly because of the fuss about that project. But I wouldn't dream of denying it. However, the failings of human beings are, let's say, persistent, so we should not get complacent. I'm sure you also agree with that.
Quoting Vera Mont
No, they haven't. They can't fight back. I like to think the glass is half full, but i can never forget that the glass is also half-empty. I'm always getting accused of being too optimistic and too pessimistic.
Quoting Benj96
Of course it is. WIttgenstein's work, especially on rule and rule-following indicates that, at some point, we act without benefit of articulation and I think that can be extended to understand how animals act rationally when they don't have the benefit of language.
Quoting Benj96
Yes. And they and we are also machines.
That makes two of us. Exchanging views sounds a bit pointless to some people, but it is a very good way of learning and passing things on.
Quoting BC
Yes. With complicatons. See your question below.
Quoting BC
Yes. There are milestones in the story. The identity of people is peculiar because they have a say themselves about who and what they are. It gets very complicated because other people also have a say and the views may differ. Take the example of someone elected to be pope. They take a new name, and this is intended to reflect the beginning of a new identity. (There are other examples, but I'm not sure how widespread the practice is.) You make or may not but that. He is the guy who was called X by everybody, but became pope and now is called Y (by some people) But what's the guy's real name?
Quoting BC
It's not unimportant, but it's less than having a self or not. It's not even about whether they are self-conscious or not. Perhaps it's about whether they know how others see them. That's not a small thing.
Quoting BC
I hope you don't hate this.
I think it's most likely that it develops over time and never stops developing until we stop living. What is it composed of? Well, partly we decide what it is composed of. But only partly. We can change many things, but not our physical body - though that also changes continuously. But, as I said earlier, other people also have a say in what and who I am. That's my first observation.
My second observation is this. "Identity" is a noun connected to a verb and roughly means the means of identifying whatever. Unlike "table", "chair", "tree" etc. which pick out or refer to objects, "identity" does not pick out or refer to an object. "Ludwig" picks out or refers to me. It does not pick out a part of me or even all the parts of me. It picks out the whole of me, just as "table" picks out or refers to the whole table, not a part or even all the parts. Then think that instead of saying "picks out" or "refers to", I could have said "identifies". Then think that when you identify a table you pick out the whole table. (Pronouns are flexible names. "I", "You", "He, She, It", etc are pronouns. Who or what they refer to is determined by the context. What they identify is not fixed, but varies according to context.)
My third and final observation is that "self" is a kind of pronoun that allows one to talk about self-reference in various ways. So my selt is just me. The idea of self-consciousness cropped up earlier. But it also allows me to explain that a car is a machine that moves itself, or that the computer switches itself off. So it's not just about people.
It is also sometimes used for emphasis. If I send you a birthday present, it is from me whether I bought and dispatched it myself or not; but it will usually go down better if you bought and sent it yourself. Or, there's a big difference between my ordering a boat and paying someone to build it and building it myself. This is really quite elusive and complicated. A good dictionary will give you various examples, which will help more than anything I could say.
I hope that's helpful. I want to stop there for now. If you are interested we can go back to brains and I'll try to explain why I was saying the weird things I was saying.
Quoting BC
I don't believe it partly because I can't imagine what an after-life without a physical body would be like. No senses! How does that work? Is it like being blind, deaf, dumb? Ugh!
Why do you think we make pets of them? All intelligent species have a great deal in common, which is why they are able to communicate with and feel affection for one another.
The human specialness doctrine has not served us as well as it was it was intended to. Yes, it allows us to abuse, exploit and exterminate other species with impunity, but we also lose an entire dimension of our own emotional and intellectual life.
Yes. I've had dogs and cats and a pony - oh, and some fish long ago. They were fun in a different way.
Fish are wonderfully relaxing to watch - in the dentist's waiting room; we've never had any at home. Lousy frisbee players, I understand.
They don't talk much either and petting them is a bit of a problem.
But I knew a goldfish once that blew a bubble at you when you gave it a crumb of fish food. They called him/her "Professor". There's been work done on the intelligence of goldfish.
Octopuses, now. They'll spit water at you if they don't like you. They can escape from a screw-top jar. OK, they're not fish. But you have to admire them. Perhaps not as pets.
Everywhere you look, when you look closely, there's more to non-humans than humans think.
....not to mention predict football games... Has anyone asked an octopus for 13 keys to winning an American election? I wouldn't want one for a pet. Really, I wouldn't want any pet that has to be confined. There are few things I dislike as much as cages, but an aquarium is unavoidable for marine species. I'd set Nemo free every time.
Quoting Ludwig V
And daily fewer non-human species as there are daily more humans.
This afternoon, a sunny September say, I set a freshly-painted board out on the porch to dry, confident that no insects would stick to it and no bird would crap on it. I haven't had to wash the windshield all summer.
It's the shortage of birds I'm noticing. Insects are around in fair numbers. I expect they do better in non-agricultural areas.
Mosquitoes we've had aplenty this wet summer, but I haven't seen more than half a dozen butterflies and had to hand-pollinate my tomatoes and peppers for lack of bees. Ants are taking up the slack on cucumbers for some reason, but even the cluster flies we used to have to vacuum up by the hundreds have dwindled down the odd annoyance. So, what are the swallows and robins supposed to eat? This is the time of staging for migration and I see no flocks of anything, except our little neighbourhood clan of Canada geese. They're training the young ones to fly in formation (yes, geese are social and smart) - they haven't got the hang of a proper V yet.
We humans are so awfully clever and rational that we'll soon end up with nobody but one another to kill.
It seems to me that insects (using it as a general term) are scarcer than they used to be. Mayflies (order Ephemeroptera) used to be extremely plentiful near rivers and backwaters. One rarely sees them now. I haven't seen many butterflies of any kind in the past few years. For that matter, I don't see many house flies, either. Mosquitos seem to be holding their own.
People who live in crop growing rural areas certainly see more insects than urban dwellers. Hordes of a Japanese beetle imported to prey on aphids that feed on soybean plants collect on houses in the fall. They aren't harmful, but it 'bugs' some people. They look like lady bugs but when rubbed reveal a very bitter odor. Flies would be a lot more common around barnyards, hog pens, cattle, and so on.
In various places where researchers have counted insects, the numbers are down from the past. I am not sure what impact declining insect numbers have on birds, because global warming affects birds negatively in a number of ways. It can't be good.
The worms that early birds get are something of an ecological problem. The native earthworms of North America were scraped off by the last glacial period and are still recovering. When the first people arrived in North America, there weren't many worms crawling around in Northern areas. The Europeans brought big fat earth worms with them -- not deliberately, but in plant containers and root bundles. The big fat earth worms prospered and have spread over much of the "wormless zone"--in between southern Canada and north of Kansas, Missouri, Kentucky, etc.
How could big fat juicy earthworms be a problem?
They are a problem because they eat all the leaf litter on the ground. The native worms weren't big and robust enough to do that, The Euro-worms, however, are. When it rains, the bare soil (no longer covered up with a thick layer of leaf litter) erodes more, washing away the top soil, including the fertile worm castings.s
What to do, what to do?
Native earthworms can, of course, be planted in northern forests, but that isn't going to get rid of the Euro-worms. Pay birds a bounty on each big earthworm they eat? Imagine the difficult bookkeeping problem that would entail.
Being correct or knowing the truth is not required for rationalization. Back in ancient times, a person who conclude that the sun goes around the earth by using their observations, is being rational.
Robins seem to be okay with big fat earthworms, and the garden soil isn't complaining. But birds that are adapted to feeding in the air - swallow, martins, swifts, nightjars - are seriously up shit creek. I live in an agricultural area and I haven't even seen many of the imported ladybugs. There was a swarm about ten years ago (they sting, too) but they've pretty much died off over the winters, and maybe some were eaten by birds. I've seen two bumblebees all summer, one lone preying mantis, no fireflies or wasps. That's never happened before. No bluejays have been instructing their noisy young in the cedar trees. No mourning doves coo in the afternoon. It was a very quiet spring. Next year may be altogether silent.
Indeed, we rational humans seem not to have communicated very well about daily survival.
A mathematician shows that his dog, when fetching a ball thrown into water, appears to be calculating the optimal path from A to B as if using calculus. But, of course, calculus is computationally tricky even for most non-expert human beings. A dog cannot know calculus. Can he?!
I guess I was wrong about in thinking there might be more insects in the suburban area I live in. I see so much about how the countryside is losing all its insects mainly ot pesticides that I made an assumption. There are pesticides here too, but likely less than in crop-growing areas.
Quoting Vera Mont
Are you referencing Rachel Carson's book "Silent Spring" that started the ecoological movement? The title was a prophecy at the time, but it looks as if it is coming true, and we are at last recognizing it - virtually too late.
Quoting BC
How indeed? There are invasive species in the UK too; some of them come from the US, others from the Far East - a legacy of Empire and globalization. The grey squirrel is a good example from the US; there's a European species that is, in my book, even cuter, but it's become marginalized now. There are sanctuaries and a lot of greys are being killed to preserve them. The mink escaped from fur farms and caused a lot of damage. They seem to be on the retreat now. I'm afraid the cause is at least partly endless eradication campaigns.
Quoting cherryorchard
That's fascinating. I don't do any calculus when I'm catching a ball - I "just know" where to put my hands. Some people talk about "judgement". One supposes that my brain is doing the calculations sub- or un-consciously. I guess my brain is doing some work, but doubt that it is doing calculus calculations. But who knows? However I think it is more plausible to suppose that it is using some quick and dirty heuristic, which, no doubt, would give mathematicians a fit; but evolution only cares what works well enough. The same, I would think, for the dog.
He doesn't need to. Evolving as a species that hunts running prey, he has an instinctive grasp of vectors.
All that's happened between when our own ancestors ran after prey and learned to predict where to intercept a weaving deer and calculus is that we translated practical observation into abstract formulas - from particular practical application to universal concept.
There is another fun book: How to Teach Physics to Your Dog which is supposed to be fun.
More realistic sounding to me is that dogs (and people) use a gaze heuristic..
I agree! And yet the output is the same as if it had been doing calculus. That suggests something interesting (though I can't say exactly what...!)
Reminds me of Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations': 'Calculating prodigies who arrive at the correct result but cant say how. Are we to say that they do not calculate?'
Quoting Ludwig V
What's interesting here is that sometimes our 'subconscious' mental calculations are not quick and dirty they are enormously precise and accurate. A good example might be professional snooker or pool players. They are capable of modelling physics interactions to extraordinary degrees of specificity. Their models are probably superior to purely mathematical models in terms of predictive accuracy. But they do not consciously perform calculations at all.
Quoting wonderer1
I'm not sure if you read the paper I attached, but the dog's actions cannot be explained by applying the gaze heuristic, because that heuristic deals with tracking moving objects. The dog is not tracking a moving object, but rather charting an optimal path to a fixed point over two varied surfaces (land and water). In order to work out that optimal path using mathematics, we need calculus. The dog finds the same path without resorting to calculus (we assume). But the gaze heuristic would not be of any assistance.
My device is wonky about downloading pdfs, so I tried, but gave up. I tried again, and I've had a chance to read it now. Interesting!
That awareness long preceded the formal systems by which those phenomena are described today. We see a dog applying the same awareness to a problem and wonder: "How does he know?" instead of realizing: "That's what my ancestors were doing. That's where my knowledge originates."
Thanks for the Wittgenstein quotations. I had forgotten it. There's a philosophical angle to this, of course.
Perhaps more relevant is that if we are forced to admit that dogs' brains enable them to achieve mathematical results even though they don't speak mathematics, we may be less resistant to the idea that they and other animals are rational even though they don't speak languages like ours.
Quoting cherryorchard
I meant "dirty" on in the sense that it won't be like the mathematical version. Which, to be fair, comes in very handy in some of the situations we put ourselves into. Long ocean voyages, navigating in the air and beyond. Calculating the orbits of planets, etc.
Compare how we judge distances by what it takes to focus our two eyes on an objects. It doesn't work at longer distances, so instead we judge by apparent size. The latter is quick and dirty, in the sense I intended.
An impressive example is a dog tearing after a Frisbee, then leaping to catch it in its jaws. But other animals do this too. An eagle dives to catch a rabbit, but the rabbit, no genius in the animal kingdom, swerves sharply at the last half second, and the eagle ends up with dirt in its grip. Eagles are fed and rabbits are not over-running the countryside, so the eagles are successful often enough.
I don't suppose the test can be administered to newborns. The subject must have the skill to distinguish objects and generalize how 'things' are expected to behave.
By about six months, they usually start experimenting with gravity: dropping something from their highchair or buggy (Very often to see how many times their adult caregiver will retrieve it for them). They acquire the knowledge "things are supposed to fall" from practical experience. So when a new thing does the opposite, the first reaction is surprise, quickly followed by delight.
The upper midwest of the US doesn't harbor many red squirrels, so I'm not familiar with their behavior. Grey squirrels are everywhere around here. They usually are grey with a white belly, but they sometimes are black or white (not a seasonal change).
I've read about the terrorism directed at your red squirrels by the Yankee grey squirrels. Social scientists and psychoanalysts have not been able to determine what, exactly, is the source of this inter-squirrel hostility.
The urban grey squirrel readily exploits human behavior. The smart squirrels on the University of Minnesota campus follow people carrying paper bags. If you stop, because you happen to like squirrels, they'll go so far as to climb up your pant leg to access the presumed food in your bag. This is somewhat disconcerting.
It's not hard to let them eat out of your hand; even to sit on your knee and eat the offered peanuts. I've established such a relationship several times since I was a kid. I'm more fastidious as an old guy, and would just as soon NOT have even cute rodents sitting on me.
Has anyone determined what the average number of retrievals a caregiver is willing to perform before the object is thrown out the window?
Long ago I saw an episode on Ira Flatow's Newton's Apple where he asked how a helium balloon in a bus would behave when the vehicle began to move. One would suppose that the balloon would move to the back of the bus, as the forward momentum occurred. Shockingly, it's just the opposite (do try this at home). The balloon moves to the front of the bus. (Enough of the heavier air moves to the back of the bus, forcing the lighter balloon to move forward.)
One shouldn't waste scarce helium on experiments that have already been done, so take your helium balloon to an MRI lab where it can be recycled for more important uses, like scanning brains. Or inhale it to achieve a Donald Duck kind of voice for a few seconds.
I hope that's tongue-in-cheek.
I once had a grey squirrel as a pet - not on purpose; the children down the street rescued her their cat. So I raised her and eventually set her free. That li'l rodent was smart as a whip. Sassy, too. And quite clean: one of her favourite things was bath time. Afterward, I'd hang a towel on the bar and pull it taut, so that Georgie could slide down it, then clamber up on my shoulder, leap over and do it again. And again, until she was dry. She also hid nuts in my shoes and under the cat's tail. A very entertaining companion.
My informal observation: up to six times without showing exasperation, after which they don't give it back. All babies seem to do it; I think they consider this a game.
Quoting BC
...or on celebrations or political hoopla... especially knowing how much harm they o the environment.
Oh, no! Totally serious. (Ouch! bites tongue)
Okay, thank you for expanding on your comment because I had wanted to come back to this thread to make a critical observation that the point of rational thinking seems to have been lost in this discussion. I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior.
You said, "purpose", "rewarding" and "reasonable to suppose". All these are fine -- nothing wrong with this behavior, but it is not rational thinking. Because we can talk to each other and be articulate and coherent with each other (like right now here on the forum) -- but do you suppose that you have talked to a dog and determined that he spoke to you about why he is doing what he's doing? Did the parrot articulate to you his reasoning for mimicking? It looks reasonable to you, but you did not arrive at this 'reasonableness' by discussing it with the parrot.
Do we have a member here in the forum that is dog or a parrot? Then let us invite that parrot on this thread and let him lay out his reasons for mimicking.
So, for you, the only valid criterion for reason is the use of human language? Pretty narrow definition.
I agree. I think theres a difference between behaviours that can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response, and behaviours that can be attributed to rational inference. The former, for instance, covers an enormous range of behaviours that animals and even plants exhibit. Venus fly traps, for instance, close around their prey, and numerous other plants will open flowers in sunlight and close them when it sets. Animal behaviours from insect life up to mammals routinely exhibit complex behaviours in response to stimuli. But the question is, do such behaviours qualify as rational? Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant).
It might be worth recalling the distinctions Aristotle makes between different organic forms. Plants, according to Aristotle, possess only the nutritive soul, responsible for growth, nutrition, and reproduction. Animals, in addition to the nutritive soul, have the sensitive soul, granting them the abilities of sensation, movement, and desire. Humans uniquely possess all these functions but also have the rational soul, which allows for inference, reflection, and the capacity for abstract thought. This rational capacity sets humans apart, as it involves deliberation and the ability to grasp universals, which Aristotle sees as the hallmark of true rationality. (Bear in mind 'soul' is used to translate the Greek term psuch? which refers broadly to the principle of life or the life force in living beings rather than the modern notion of an "immaterial soul." I've been reading a little of contemporary systems science and biology, and while it is true that Aristotle's schema has been updated somewhat in those disciplines, elements of his biology are still recognised. Terrence Deacon, in his Incomplete Nature, adapts Aristotelian concepts like teleology (goal-directedness) in describing emergent processes in nature, and Alice Juarrero, in her work on causality and complex systems, sees continuity with Aristotles notion of formal and final causes.)
Thanks for the Wittgenstein quotation. I had forgotten it.
Quoting BC
Your greys are a bit different from ours. I've never heard of black or white ones. It wouldn't be surprising if the two groups diverged over time. I wish I could post a picture of a red for you - their ear tufts are incredible.
Quoting BC
You mean that the cognitive dissonance created by the similarity combined with the difference in colour is not sufficient? They should read some social history.
Quoting BC
I hate to say this, but most people in the UK regard grey squirrels as vermin along with rats and mice. But that's because the red squirrels are much cuter and the greys are immigrants and consequently are thought to have no right to exist.
Quoting BC
There was a lot of fuss in sea-side tourist resorts a few years ago. People couldn't resist feeding the sea-gulls (herring-gulls) with sandwiches and potato chips. Then the sea-gulls took to swooping down and grabbing them from their hands as they were munching them. I haven't heard any complaints recently. People must have learnt not to "open-carry" goodies along the sea front.
I think we're talking past each other. The short explanation is that we have different ideas about the goal of rational thinking. Let me put it this way. Arriving at a valid/sound conclusion may sometimes be the point of the exercise (as it usually is in philosophical discussion, for example). But very often the point of a valid/sound conclusion is that it is a better basis for successful action.
In particular, it enables the organism to adapt behaviour to circumstances, whereas purely instinctive behaviour, which cannot, by definition, adapt, is likely to be less successful and even counter-productive. However, very often, what animals (and people) do is a combination of instinct and rationality. Birds have an instinct to build nests, and do so in different ways according to species. But, inevitably, they have to pursue that goal in negotiation with their environment. Hunger is "hard-wired", but how we satisfy hunger is extremely flexible in response to the environment that we find ourselves in.
When we observe human behaviour, we do not hesitate to interpret (read) their behaviour as rational even when we have no access to their given reasons. If you like, we reconstruct their reasons, in order to make sense of their behaviour. To be sure, we make certain assumptions, which may be falsified and reconstructions based on them can be contested either at the level of the assumptions themselves or at the level of the specific reasons attributed.
What's more, action without discursive reasons is found in human behaviour. Perhaps the most dramatic example, for philosophers, is the ability of people to use words correctly without being able to give a definition; they are often even more bewildered if they are asked to explain the rules of grammar (linguistic sense). It seems inescapable that articulating one's reasons is itself an example of an activity that is executed without discursive reasons.
Quoting L'éléphant
So when we see animals adapting their behaviour to circumstances, we are inclined to read their behaviour as rational even though we have no access to any verbal account. It seems to me to be a reasonable extension of our practice in relation to other human beings. What's more, it works.
Personally, I have difficulty in applying this process to insects and fish and I often feel that people anthropomorphize too far. A dog might sympathize at my distress when I can't find my glasses, but I don't think that s/he necessarily understand what my glasses are. But I have no doubt that lobsters are frightened when they get caught, so this is not binary issue.
Quoting L'éléphant
It's tempting to think that the discursive account by agents of their reasons is the gold standard. It is true that it will often give us details that we cannot read off from the behaviour or the context. But, the rational reconstruction is often so persuasive that when the verbal account of reasons conflicts with our rational reconstruction, we are often (but not always) inclined to give preference to the rational reconstruction.
So if animals could tell us what "their" reasons were, we would not necessarily believe them.
Have you followed any of the tests that scientists have devised to differentiate between stimulus-response and rational problem-solving? Here is an example. We've come quite a long way since Aristotle.
(Plant?? you know they don't have brains, right?)
It certainly is.
Though I sometimes wonder why he left insects and fish out of his hierarchy.
Quoting Wayfarer
There's that sneaky little "true" rationality. Which means that whether Aristotle did or did not recognize other forms of rationality, you do. For some reason, you don't think that other forms are "really" rational. You cite Aristotle as identifying the critical marks as deliberation and a grasp of universals.
He recognizes at least two forms of deliberative rationality - practical and theoretical. The former directed to action and the latter to contemplation which he thought was infinitely superior to merely practical reason because it is what the gods to and so we are more god-like when we contemplate. If I remember correctly, [s]one of the distinctions between practical and theoretical is that practical is concerned with universals.[/s] By that criterion, practical reason is also not "true" rationality. One can understand his reason, but I'm not at all sure that we can accept it.
EDIT Ouch! That should have been "one of the distinctions between practical and theoretical is that practical is NOT concerned with universals". Sorry. Red face!
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. These have more application to living things. He was apply to apply them to the whole universe because he thought that the entire universe was directed to achieving The Good - the supreme good of everything.
Wow, what a depressing view of reality. I just got back from a trip to hell and I am so happy to be here.
All my ideas may be wrong, but at the moment I don't give a damn because I am going to enjoy my happiness. Today I am not in charge of the world. It is my day to enjoy my home and my life. Maybe to tomorrow I will get more serious and back to feeling responsible for the world.
The bright side is I have almost finished the book about humans, animals, and math and look forward to to discussing what I have learned. We can talk about what is so and society be reason and being happy.
"Stimulus and response" can cover a multitude of sins, including rational responses to events as they happen, but I get what you're after. Where I differ from you is that I think that actions can be rational responses even if they are not the result of (conscious) inference. This doesn't actually depend on a single argument, but it seems best to propose one here and develop others as needed. So, forgive me for quoting myself below. Put it down to laziness.
Quoting Ludwig V
Quoting Wayfarer
When a human, or a dog, smells food, it is an automatic reflex (i.e. not the result of conscious control"). It is by way of a preparation for chewing and digesting food - a product of evolution. Before Pavlov's dogs were fed, a bell was rung. Before long, the dogs started salivating as the bell rang, before the food arrived. In the jargon, they associated the bell with food. Was the response rational or merely causal? In my book, both. I'm not dogmatic about that, but rocks don't change their behaviour like that.
When a dog gets hungry and sometimes just when the smells get tempting, it is will known that they will position themselves where they will be noticed and sit very quietly, but very attentive. This behaviour is called "begging". It is a behaviour that is voluntary, not a reflex. It seems perfectly clear that the dog thinks that if s/he does that, food will happen. It is also perfectly clear that the dog did not say to itself or anyone else "If I do this, that will happen". If you don't call it rational thinking, what do you call it?
I don't think that plants think or believe or feel emotions or have desires. But we do say that they do things. So that's another whole mystery that needs untangling.
And when it's time to eat and she can't smell anything edible, she goes out to the kitchen, picks up her food dish and brings it back to place in my lap, then sits directly opposite me and stares into my face. (Granted, this was an exceptionally bright German Shepherd.)
Quoting Ludwig V
Especially if the guilt-inducing soulful gaze alternates with running to the pantry where the dog-food is kept and nudging the bag.
A not-so-clever Pyrennese who liked to roam would ask her border collie confederate to help her escape. The collie would stand on her hind legs and push on the far frame (not where it opens) with both paws of the big sliding patio door. She didn't have the weight to push it all the way open, but she'd slide it over just enough for the big dog to wedge her nose in and force it open. Then they would pad softly across the patio, around the corner of the house, duck behind the car and make their way down the drive. (I stopped them there, having watched the whole procedure. I was on guard, because they'd already gone AWOL twice.)
When a dog really wants something, whether it's your pizza or your flip-flops, he makes a plan and carries it out step by step. That's nothing like salivating on cue. And they're very good (wolf lrgacy) at co-ordinating team work. Watch some You Tube videos.
When a crow wants a piece of cheese, he goes looking for a tool to get the tool that will poke the cheese out of the cage. Or figures out which flaps to lift in what order to tilt the plastic chute and make the cheese roll out.
Sorry; didn't mean to depress you. I thought you already knew.
If it is not language it is not rational. If we do not agree on the definitions of words, we are doing no better the competing groups of chimps screeching at each other. Without agreement on the definition of our words, we doing no better than pissing on a tree to mark our territory, or a fire alarm. Certain sounds like a chimp screech, a police siren, or a fire alarm are universal sounds of danger because the screech is in all these things and also bird calls. In some cases an animal will make different sounds for different threats and this close to language but not exactly language.
I am eager to get into animals and math, because I wrongly thought the ability to do math means a form of rationalizing. After reading "The Math Instinct- Why You're a Mathematical Genius(along with lobsters, birds, cats, and dogs)" Now I understand the math animals are doing is like our knee jerk or a dog moving its leg when the right is touched. It is not the problem-solving humans do until we get to hire order animals that are making choices, such as a chimp taking the dish with 7 pieces of candy and not the one with only 6 pieces. Many lions means leave the territory but only one lion can be challenged. A snake jumping in the right direction at the right time to catch prey is using math, but this is like a knee-jerk. What bats can do with sonar hearing is amazing and better than anything we have invented, or birds flying 20 thousand miles from a summer home to their winter home. These animals are doing trigonometry and geometry but it is instinct, not learned math, and most certainly not working with 1+2=3. Those numbers are like language and animals do not have language. It is more like an intuitive reaction than rationalizing, how the chimp can count, can of like making a scratch for each piece of candy and remember how many times a scratch was made.
We need to agree on what "rational" means and what "language" means. What is the definition of these words?
Their vocalizations may sound harsh to you, but are meaningful to another chimp. We might as well be communicating, you in ASL and I in Japanese. Or just yelling at each other, as people often do.
Quoting Athena
One of 12 quotes. If they can't agree, how could we?
Quoting Athena
And if it is not human, it's not language.
Therefore, only humans are capable of reason.
There: all wrapped up with a triumphal bow on top.
I would post a link to a New York Times piece on gulls from a few weeks ago, but I'm pretty sure you would find it secured behind their pay-wall. Gulls are pretty smart, and they are good observers. They like to eat food that other animals are eating: "If she's eating it, it must be good. I'll just have some of that!" That goes for a gull's approach to what humans--and other gulls--are eating. Gulls show up when the food shows up.
They are good parents; both males and females care for the young. So, a plus there -- they don't hatch and then abandon their chicks. (Elsewhere I read that pigeons are good parents too, so their children are neither seen nor heard. On the other hand, I don't know what, besides popcorn and the like, urban pigeons would have to feed their little chickies.)
The science writer recommends watching the gulls closely for individual differences; in a sea of gulls dive bombing your hot dog, that might be difficult, but give it a try.
New Zealand Kea
A science fiction writer said, in a story about animals--I forget the title and author, "In the jungle, everybody is thinking!" Even brainless plants have the means to warn other plants of threats, and are able to mount targeted defenses (within a fairly narrow repertoire).
It is the nature of this world that no organism gets a free ride. There are ALWAYS dangerous threats and tempting opportunities to be navigated.
Another glittering generality: Human civilization, as it has evolved to the present, has become incompatible with the most optimal balance of resources of the natural world. What should we do about it? Were we able (which we are not) we ought to be far-sighted about the long-term consequences of our industrially powered production--everything from our own numbers, to the automobile and airplane or laundry detergents and cheap meat.
I was wanting to get at the meaning of reason, in particular, which is fundamental to the OP. I've read about the Caledonian crow studies and other studies indicating rudimentary reasoning ability in some animals and birds, but I don't see the relevance in terms of the philosophical question at issue, as to what differentiates the rational ability of h.sapiens, 'the rational animal', from other species.
The reason I mentioned Aristotle's philosophy of biology is not because I idolize the ancients, but because the distinction between vegetative, sensory and rational forms of life remains basically sound. In addition, in Aristotle's philosophy, the particular prerogrative of the rational intellect ('nous' - a word which lives on in vernacular English) is to grasp universal ideas and concepts. Unlike other animals, we can see meaning in an abstract and comprehensive way. And I think the case can be made that this ability - the ability to grasp ideas and concepts - is foundational to language, and so a key differentiator between h.sapiens and other species. I fully understand acceptance of universals and Platonic forms is generally considered, well, ancient history by most, but in my view, these are barely understood in today's culture.
There's an essay I often cite by neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain on this point, in which he also addresses the point you raise about canine behaviour.
[quote=Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism]For the empiricist there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).
Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is 'sugar' or what is 'intruder'. He plays and lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; but he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in h.sapiens -- a potential infinity of knowledge.
Such are the basic facts which empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. ...In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see in its ideative function -- there are not, drawn from the senses, through the activity of the intellect itself, supra-singular or supra-sensual, universal intelligible natures seen by the intellect in and through the concepts it engenders by illuminating images. Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. Everything boils down, in the operations, or rather in the passive mechanisms of intelligence, to a blind concatenation, sorting and refinement of the images, associated representations, habit-produced expectations which are at play in sense-knowledge, under the guidance of affective or practical values and interests. [/quote]
You might notice a resemblance between this description and eliminative philosophy of mind, which is not co-incidental.
@Leontiskos
That extensive mycelial network! Pretty amazing, actually.
Quoting BC
At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy. We lost a good deal of our own nature and have been paying for it ever since in mental illness, discontent, strife and a sense of loss. It's a big hole that we keep trying to fill with religion, technology, spectacles, self-aggrandizement, overconsumption and lots and lots of wars.
There are people - a growing number of people - who take their own path to simplicity and balance. Global economy, global culture are too big to be changed, but individuals are capable of change.
.
I'm sorry. There is in; deed a wide spectrum. I wanted to undermine the idea that actions are either rational (plan, execute, enjoy liberty/food/ whatever) or mindless cause/effect. Salivation is not even a voluntary action - it is controlled by an "autonomic" system. Yet making rational connections is possible even at that level.
Quoting Vera Mont
I don't know. There's so little to go on. But I think you are over-simplifying. Our attitude towards nature is ambivalent, in the sense that there are negative and positive attitudes which play into our interpretation of nature. "We" don't have a single, consistent view of it.
Quoting Vera Mont
Surely there is some room for thinking that when more and more individuals start to change, sometimes the movement gathers weight and pace and ends up changing things at the macro scale?
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, you are making a case, so obviously it is possible to do so. I notice that you seem to accept that this is not the only, and not the only relevant, differentiator. A good deal of clarification of what you mean by "abstract and comprehensive" and "ideas and concepts" is needed, and you have the difficulty that philosophy doesn't have a consensus view about what those terms mean.
The other difficulty you face is the empirical evidence that animals do have communication systems that are, at least, language-like, so you need to show what the "essential" relevant differentiation is between animal languages/communication systems and human languages/communication systems.
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm not at all sure that there is single, coherent, meaning of reason.
Quoting Wayfarer
So the idea that human reason might be a development (hyper-development, perhaps) of abilities that animals have is not entirely implausible to you. Where we may disagree is that you seem to presuppose a cliff-edge distinction between humans and animals. However, if evolution is correct, even in outline, humans have evolved from animals, so the expectation must be that human reason is a development of animal reason. So to understand human reason, we have to understand animal reason. Of course, it is possible that you don't accept the evolutionary approach to these questions.
Each differentiation of human from animal arrives out of the blue. I need to understand what each of them amounts to. It looks as if he is not writing from me, but for people who already accept the philosophical ideas that are at stake. There may be much that the dog does not know about sugar and intruders. But there are some things that they do know. What he means by "he does not see the similarlity, the common features as such". "The flash of intelligibility" and "no ear for the intelligible meaning" are particularly obscure, and my understanding of "(universal) idea", "concept", "objectivity" is clearly very different from his.
When someone attacks a doctrine but doesn't bother to ensure that his version of the doctrine coincides with his opponent's understanding of his own doctrine, I'm a bit inclined to suspect that a straw man may be all that is at stake. But it may be that his writing is not directed at his opponents, but to his supporters.
Is he a platonist of some kind? What does "cause" mean here?
I don't expect much *modern* philosophy will have any consensus about those questions, as they're deep questions, not the kind of minutae that analytic philosophy is preoccupied with. But the fact that you and I can have such a conversation as this, should indicate a key differentiator between us and other creatures, none of which could entertain such ideas, let alone devise the medium by which we're able to discuss them.
Quoting Ludwig V
Of course I accept the facts of evolutionary biology, but its applicability to the problems of philosophy is another matter. For instance, the idea that evolutionary biology alone accounts for or explains the nature of reason or of the intellect is contentious. Evolutionary biology is not, after all, an epistemological theory, but a biological one, intended to explain the origin of species, not the origin of such faculties as reason. In fact I think one of the unintended consequences of Darwinism on culture is to believe that such evolutionary accounts are sufficient, when in fact they're barely applicable. The thread on Donald Hoffman is about a cognitive psychologist who argues that if our sensory faculties are explicable in terms of evolutionary fitness, we have no reason to believe they provide us with the truth. Of course that's a contentious argument, but I mention it to provide an indication of the scope of these issues.
Certainly there is a biological continuity between h.sapiens and other species, that is indisputable from the fossil record. But the ability to reason, speak, and to invent science, indicates a kind of ontological discontinuity from other animals in my view. Through the faculty of reason, we cross a kind of evolutionary threshold, which opens horizons that are imperceptible to animals.
Quoting Ludwig V
He says he writes as an Aristotelian. I haven't read a great deal of him, but he was a major 20th century Catholic philosopher, but on the intellectual left, so to speak (as distinct from many more conservative Catholic philosophers.) But that passage I quoted, concerning the ability of reason to grasp universals, is really, in my opinion, part of the real mainstream of Western philosophy, which I do think is Platonist on the whole. Incidentally the essay from which the quote was taken can be found here.
I think youre on the right track but needless to say its a vast topic.
There might be a single difference that explains all the difference. But there might not.
There might be a key difference. But there might not.
The difference(s) might be a difference in degree, not in kind.
There is also the issue of what, exactly, reason is. If you define it as the ability to plan and execute a project, we have what seems to me to be an open and shut case.
Quoting Vera Mont
Sure, it's not rocket science. But that doesn't mean it is not rational.
Quoting Wayfarer
Quite so. But the origin of species necessarily includes the origin of faculties. The evolution of the eye is also the history of the development of the faculty of sight, &c. For example, the development of the faculty of reason is part of the development of homo sapiens. So far as I know there is no doubt that faculty depends on the brain, at least in homo sapiens. There is story of the evolution of the human brain from the early precursors to our day compare the story of the evolution of the eye.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's odd. One would expect evolution to favour a creature with sensory apparatus that provides them with true, rather than false, information. Still, I can't take responsibility for what cognitive psychologists might choose to say. (Perhaps he has an idiosyncratic view of what truth is?)
Quoting Wayfarer
Platonism is certainly an important part of the tradition of Western philosophy. But that is not a reason for believing that it is true. The traditional canon of Western philosophy is as much an opportunity for criticism as anything else. You seem to suggest that there is an unreal mainstream of Western philosophy. What does that consist of?
Quoting Wayfarer
You mean something like the emergence of life from the sea to the land? Or of mammals from reptiles? Maybe.
I have to say that the emergence of science has not done much to change the basically animal nature of human beings, so for my money, the discontinuity is not particularly significant. If we do mange to destroy ourselves before we destroy the entire planet as a habitation for life, future species might well consider us to be a faulty evolutionary line that got out of hand, until it self-destructed, much to the benefit of the planet. But then, they may well think that they are the unique peak of their evolutionary line, just as we do....
Quoting Ludwig V
About the interim steps? Pastoral peoples were migratory or nomadic and didn't leave many records. Still, we know that they herded livestock - which is a huge step from respect for to control over and ownership of other species. It also reduced all other predators from a threat to be feared to rivals to be hated and exterminated. Settled agriculture did the same to land and vegetation, water and forest.
The Genesis story (which originates in an oral tradition before Judaism) already shows the drive to "subdue and fill the earth" as well as nostalgia for pre-agricultural life.
Every civilization has left records. Their beliefs and lifestyle are generally depicted in representations on walls and in tombs. The architecture itself speaks volumes about how people lived. There is also considerable literature from about 3000BCE onward.
Then, with rapid population growth which required ever more intensive use of land and hostility toward all competing species, also came increasing urbanization and alienation. And the unspeakable practices of the Enlightenment period, and the depredations of European colonial expansion... right up until the late 18th century and the industrial revolution. About the only counter attitude came with the Romantic movement, as a reaction to that assault on the countryside. But that's just art - it has tears but no teeth.
Quoting Ludwig V
That would apply if a) there were not a much more powerful trend to destroy more of the environment faster and b) we had unlimited time in which to make the change before our environment becomes uninhbitable. Yes, I know that's a pessimistic, depressing view of our reality, but I see no other.
We know about their habits. What we don't know is how they thought about them. I can see the point about the predators in the abstract, but that's not the same as knowing what they thought. We are talking about attitudes to nature. There's not going to be an record of that outside language.
Quoting Vera Mont
And Genesis is an example and that's much later than 3000 BCE, isn't it?
Quoting Vera Mont
Oh, well, if you are talking specifically about climate change, yes, I'm pessimistic as well. It's already shifted from preventing climate change to mitigating it, and that the target of 1.5 degree rise is already pretty much out of reach. It's all a slippery slope now. God knows when we'll begin to take it really seriously, never mind actually do some effective things. I feel really sorry for upcoming generations and am already embarrassed about what they will think of us when they grow up and take charge.
It's perfectly rational - and intelligent. They were not interested in rockets, but they sure devised a lot of ways to get what Mako wanted.
Quoting Ludwig V
Is it probable that they habitually acted on what they didn't think?
Quoting Ludwig V
No, it probably originates in Sumer. The gods created mankind to work the land and worship them - i.e. obedient servants. The biblical version is more nostalgic: it harks back to a pre-agricultural past and views farming as punishment. The discrepancies were not entirely edited out. The flood figures largely in Sumerian lore (They did have a pictographic alphabet before cuneiform, a good deal of wall art.) The pastoral people that became the Jews and eventually wrote down their oral chronicles, including stories picked up in their herding nomadic years.
Quoting Ludwig V
That, the rapid eradication of biodiversity, continuing expansion of devastating resource exploitation, the rise of fascism, and the likely collapse of the global economy.
I knew it had roots in earlier myths. I didn't know exactly which myths. So thanks. I've learnt something.
A couple of observations/questions about Genesis.
The opening about God and the Void. I seem to remember reading that the concept of the Void was a priestly concept much later than Sumer, in fact contemporary with when it was actually written. Do you know about that?
I take the point about the nostalgia for the pre-agricultural past. It makes perfect sense of the Garden of Eden. I hadn't thought of that.
It's always seemed very odd to me that the reason God told Adam not to eat the apples because he didn't want them to learn about good and evil and become like the gods (or was it God?). Why would God want us not to know about morality and become god-like. It's weird and very confusing.
Quoting Vera Mont
I don't quite understand what you're getting at here.
One of the ironies implicit in scientific humanism is that it looses sight of the very thing which enables us to pursue science.
My point is that to depict reason as a biological adaption is to undermine it. Reason is a faculty that differentiates h.sapiens from other animals, enabling the invention of science, among many other things. Reducing it to the status of a biological adaption fails to come to terms with it. God knows many other species have persisted for millions of years without it. I think we tend to assume that evolutionary theory provides an explanation for it when there are very many unanswered questions in that account.
Quoting Ludwig V
What does 'dependent upon' mean in this context? That reason can be understood in terms of neural anatomy? Certainly the brain is an evolved organ, indeed the rapid evolution of the homonid forebrain is one of the most astonishing episodes in the history of life on earth. But what has that development enabled us to see and to understand? Do you think, for example, that the basic axioms of logic, or the natural numbers, came into existence along with the hominid brain? Or are they something that brain now enables us to recognise and manipulate? See the distinction?
Quoting Ludwig V
Scientific materialism. It is parasitic on the classical tradition of Western philosophy, but fundamental elements of that classical tradition are making a comeback. See Aristotle's Revenge, Edward Feser.
Quoting Vera Mont
This is a sound approach to the question of understanding the evolution of reason and many other aspects of human culture. I've read quite a bit of paleo-anthropology and studies of the evolution of consciousness over many years, although it's a huge and multi-disciplinary field of study, encompassing anthropology, history of ideas, philosophy and comparative religion to mention a few. Could I draw your attention to a source I've been studying of late, Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, John Vervaeke, a professor of cognitive science at the University of Toronto. It's a long series, of which the first three or four address the pre-historic origins of distinctively human consciousness. YouTube playlist can be found here.
It's not The Void; not a concept. It's just a word for empty that was translated to void. The world is already here, just kind of messy.
Quoting Ludwig V
His pet humans were not required to have a morality. They were supposed to do as they're told and not question or form their own judgment. Most religion still demands the same.
Quoting Ludwig V
You say we know how their habits, but not how they thought. Don't people usually have an attitude or idea before they decide on a course of action, which eventually becomes habitual? Don't their actions give us an indication of what they think?
A king of Assyria decreed massive lion-hunts, sometimes with caged lions in an arena and commissioned a huge bass-relief monument to the sport. Does this give you an inkling of his thought-process? He recorded his thoughts, and they match his actions perfectly.
Thanks. I'm sure the philosophical segments are interesting. But I steadfastly disagree with human exceptionalism.
eta And reject this definition Quoting Wayfarer
Nice to see an appropriately disparaging review of Feser. :up:
The distinction between h.sapiens and other creatures is something we have to take responsibility for, rather than denying the obvious.
Absolutely. What ethologists describe as intelligence in animals is really their innate possession of reactions to stimuli, much, much better than humans, perhaps. But somehow, there is not a 'cumulative culture' of the more complex behaviors in animals, unlike in humans.
To explain the difference in animals in their social environment and the nurture aspect of their growth, there is a term that ethologists use -- 'scaffolding'. Animals do acquire layers of behavior, but they are best described as scaffolds, rather than 'traditions'. (I actually like this description) Humans' cumulative culture flourish into practices that endure for many generations. There are no 'epochs' to be had in the animal kingdom, no innovations (but there are certainly adaptations).
Quoting Vera Mont
We are unexceptional in that we are the product of evolution, like every other species is, bacteria to sequoias. We designed ourselves no more than any other species did. We are on the continuum along with every other animal.
Where we ARE exceptional is that we are much further out on the continuum (than other species) in our ability to reason, invent, think, etc., and enact the rational and irrational motives driven by our far superior lust for aggrandizement.
We may or may not be responsible for that over-weening lust to achieve grandly.
That's the misfortune of the other organisms on the planet -- we were let loose on the world by an indifferent process of evolution. It probably won't work out all that well for any.
We've done more things than we can count, making things that would not exist if not for our intellect and understanding, and our intention of making them. We've sent spacecraft out of the solar system. We've detected amino acids in interstellar clouds. We have this insanely cool and powerful internet. We've split the atom, knowing it would release energy, in order to use that energy.
We've done it all right in front of more species than we can count, and not one of them has any concept of any of it. No other species knows a nuclear reactor or skyscraper isn't a feature of the landscape.
Does any other species hunt another to extinction? None has even attempted to exterminate us, despite having every reason to. Not even as we were exterminating them. No species we've sent into extinction (I didn't say we're morally exceptional) knew it was going extinct. There must be some species that could wipe us out, particularly insects, if they could understand what we're doing, or come up with a plan. But not even their hive intelligence can manage it. Sometimes I wonder if mice could destroy us. Whales could have worked together to figure out ways to keep us out of the waters, and not get murdered, for at least a long time. Wolves maybe could have wiped use out in the early days.
We are the only species to do many, many things. All because of being the only one capable of thinking the ways we do. It seems to me that's the very definition of exceptional.
Sure. My objection was to the definition of the word, precisely because evolution accounts for the many traits common to species with a common ancestry. Nothing suddenly happened to strike man with reason; reason was developed in many species over millions of years. That man took it into further realms of imagination and language is interesting, but it makes him unique only in magnitude, not in kind.
Quoting Wayfarer
It's okay to distinguish the various attributes of species. It's less okay to tamper with the meaning of words.
Oxford: reason - the action of thinking about something in a logical, sensible way;
rationality: the quality of being based on or in accordance with reason or logic.
There is nothing in there about more or different applications or Aristotle or language. If solving complex problems not found in the subject's natural habitat is not the result of logical, rational reasoning, what is it?
Actually, that's how I read it. I suppose the problem is that the translation inevitably introduces distinctions and ways of thinking that may or may not have been available to the people who wrote the original. It's the word "form" that attracts my attention - I think that's an inescapable trace of philosophy, which might (MIGHT) have been in the original.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, with the added twist that you are supposed to surrender voluntarily. (Threats of punishment notwithstanding)
Quoting Vera Mont
I think we've got a crossed wire here. Where we have archaeological relics, then of course we can, with due caution, read off something of what they must/might have been thinking. All I'm saying is that when the archaeology, as well as the writing, is missing, we are stumped.
Not knowing what scientific humanism is, I wouldn't want to comment on what it loses sight of. Come to think of it, I don't even know what the very thing is that enables us to pursue science. I would have thought that there is no one thing involved, but a number of intersecting things, working, as it were, in concert.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's like saying that the explanation of a rainbow in the terms of physics undermines it, or reduces it, or even abolishes it. Which, I'm sure you will agree, is a serious misunderstanding.
It is true that understanding the evolution of eyes doesn't deal with many questions and problems about sight. But it does do something to answer the question "how come we have eyes?", doesn't it?
Quoting Wayfarer
Did I ever say that there are not?
Quoting Wayfarer
Ah, yes. Now we are getting to the issue. The basic axioms of logic are certainly something that we are able to recognize and manipulate. Whether they are constructed or discovered is contested. That's what this is all about, isn't it? I'm very fond of this:-
Which nicely states the problem. Lukasiewicz doesn't answer the question, but does observe that "A Catholic philosopher would say: it is in God, it is Gods thought." Perhaps we can get closer to understanding each other if you can see my observations as another attempt to answer Lukasiewicz's question. You would not be mistaken to see Wittgenstein's influence in my approach.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, the classical tradition never really went away. But it is true that it is more prominent now than it used to be.
I'm a bit puzzled. Many people say that materialism first appears in Democritus and Epicurus. But other pre-Socratics also have a claim. What distinguishes Democritus and \Epicurus is that they proposed an atomic theory of matter. In which, of course, they were, in a sense, right. It is true that they were largely ignored when Christianity became dominant until Gassendi revived that tradition in the first half of the 17th century. Is this revival what you are referring to as "scientific" materialism? Gassendi certainly though he was reviving the ancient works and developing them.
We may have different ideas about what "fundamental" means, but Aristotle, though early in our canon, was not at the beginning. Many people would put Plato/Socrates at the beginning, others various "pre-Socratics - such as Democritus and Epicurus. Thales of Miletus is a popular candidate for first place. He worked and wrote about 300 years before Aristotle.
At least some animals learn from each other (likely by means of mimicry) and even pass on (some of) what they have learnt to succeeding generations. (Don't lionesses and wolves teach their cubs to hunt?) That is simply an extension of the ability to adapt one's behaviour in a changing environment. One might expect "memes" to develop and evolve as they do in human cultures. But what extends this process is writing, painting, sculpting, which leave a permanent record for later generations to interpret and adapt for their own use - and sometimes simply to preserve if we wish to.
Quoting L'éléphant
"Scaffolds" is a very interesting concept. Without knowing exactly how ethologists apply the term, I shouldn't comment. But I don't see "scaffolds" as an opposition to "traditions". For human beings, our traditions are scaffolds - a framework within which we develop our behaviour and which we can alter and adapt as our needs and fancies change.
Quoting BC
Yes, that's a much better picture of what's going on. Though we may be driven, not by a stronger lust for aggrandizement, but by better opportunities made available by our technological capablities. We may also be driven, not by simple aggrandizement, but by something as simple as population pressure.
Quoting Patterner
Yes. I think the issue may be what our being exceptional means.
Quoting Vera Mont
Sometimes a difference in magnitude does make a difference in kind.
Quoting Wayfarer
I think this is the heart of the debate. Exceptional or similar is, to a great extent, a difference of perspective, or emphasis. What matters is what difference the difference in emphasis makes. Why does it matter? It comes down to a question of values. Does our dominance over other species mean that we are entitled to treat them as machines or use them for sport? Or does it mean we need to be stewards rather than owners, including taking into account the interests of at least other animals, but maybe also fish, insects, plants, bacteria and microbes.
This gets bound up with arguments appealing to enlightened self-interest - we need the planet to function in certain ways if we are to survive at all - as against arguments appealing to a moral view - that because we can see to the welfare of other living beings and even, in some sense, of the inanimate landscape itself, we ought to do so.
Why does it matter? Because humans literally hold the power of life and death over the whole planet and separately, of many of its species, by what we do or don't do, or because of unintended consequences of our actions. We have awesome power, we alone have the means and the ability to literally destroy the Earth, leaving aside whether we will or should. No other species has anything like that power. The fact that this distinction is so easily denied never ceases to dismay as it is the denial of an obvious fact. What I mean by taking responsibility for it is acknowledging it as a fact. There is no other species on earth like h.sapiens. Call it 'exceptionalism' if you like, but it just seems utterly implausible to deny it. (I have a theory as to why it is so frequently denied, but I won't go into that here.)
Consider this: there have been searches going on for decades, SETI, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, signs of life on other planets. Some other civilisation that emanates radio waves or some form of signal we could recognise. Signatures of non-natural compounds that can only be produced by artificial synthesis. So far, no luck, but it indicates a clear distinction between objects and forces found in nature, and those that are a result of artifice, things that could only be manufactured by a rational sentient being.
The earth is nowadays polluted by many thousands of chemicals that couldnt even exist had we not made them. If some other species SETI found signs of those compounds, they would say 'Aha! Rational sentient life exists there!' But yet, were just another species? :yikes:
Quoting Ludwig V
But a rainbow is a matter for physics and optics, in a way that living beings are not. Yours is the misunderstanding here.
Quoting Ludwig V
Its very close. Im very much in the discovered camp, although once we have the intelligence to discover, with it comes the ability to construct, which muddies the water somewhat.
But, I do understand your puzzlement, and will try to explain the point Ive been reaching for with respect to Aristotle. Ill say again Im no classics scholar and am not well read in the Greek texts. Many here are better educated in them than am I. But theres a crucial point I think Ive discerned in the Platonist-Aristotelian context. This is the reality of ideas. Not the kind of ideas we mean when we speak casually - Ive got an idea! - but formal ideas, like those of logical and arithmetical principles. Ideas in the platonic sense as formal principles or structures, eidos. I say these are real, but not material in nature. Not that they're 'immaterial things' - a horrible oxymoron - but they're only perceptible to a rational intellect. They are what traditional philosophy calls 'intelligible objects' (reference). And these are not explainable or reducible to the terms of particle physics or the principles of evolutionary biology. You can't account for syllogisms or the law of the excluded middle by appealing to the laws of physics.
Just as your passage states (and yes, it is highly germane to the topic at hand):
Consider this passage from Bertrand Russell in his chapter, The World of Universals:
My bolds. So - this is something that Plato and Aristotle see, which, on the whole, naturalism and much of modern philosophy rejects. It's a deep issue, I agree. But the gist is, the ability to grasp universals just is the kind of 'divine spark' in the human intellect which differentiates humans as 'the rational animal'. I know it's a very non-politically-correct philosophy, but I can't help but believe there's something vitally important in it.
Im putting myself in the discovered camp regarding constructions, but for understanding, rather than logic. Hence, insofar as discovery may be by mere accident, with intelligence comes the ability to construct a relation of conceptions to such discoveries, which is cognition.
Whether or not conceptions belong to each other, is the purview of logic, which are constructs in accordance with principles obtained from the faculty of reason, and must be considered an intrinsic manifestation of the human intellect alone, hence, with respect to logic itself, Im putting myself in the constructed camp.
Gets pretty lonely over here sometimes, I must say. But thats fine; I can turn Dazed and Confused up to eleven and nobody throws stuff at me.
This (which, in theory, I was perfectly aware of) made me look at things differently. Which is what good philosophy is all about. There are enough ways for people to doge the issue, and I'm in favour of ideas that make it more difficult for them. (But that doesn't mean I retract anything that I've said. Perhaps I would put some of it differently.)
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, I would suggest that the reason why it's not politically correct is more to do with what people have made of it, rather than the doctrine in itself. But it's perhaps you have in mind the disfavour that platonism has fallen into amongst philosophers. The doctrine seems to be surviving, however. For me, however, that it is a philosophy and deserves to be considered as such. I'm not a fan myelf and I'm prepared to argue the issue as opposed to dismissing it.
However, for various reasons, I'm very interested in why you think it is important. After all, on the face of it, it doesn't make any difference to anything. Life will go on exactly as before.
Quoting Wayfarer
That deserves teasing out. But for the moment, let me observe that you seem not to hold a "pure" version (as exemplified in Lukasiewicz's articulation). That makes a difference.
Quoting Wayfarer
Human beings not a matter for physics? What on earth is physiology about?
I'm not sure that "north of" is usually considered to be a universal, but I'll let that pass, because platonism is about more than "formal ideas, like those of logical and arithmetical principles". It is about universals.
BTW I couldn't quite follow his argument here, but I'm not sure how much it matters. We're not dealing with details here.
Well, Russell's answer suggests that it doesn't exist, which he doesn't mean to imply. But certainly they are not spatio-temporal objects. But that's not a dramatic conclusion. They are objects in a different category, which means that the manner of their existence is not that of spatio-temporal objects like "Edinburgh" or "London". No sweat. (I'm guessing that you might have no difficulty with the notion of a category, because Aristotle invented the term, in this application.) Is it a mental object? That's more dubious, partly because I'm not all that clear what mental objects are. But I can see why Russell would not want to call them that because the term suggests that it only exists as and when it is thought about and that clashes with the objectivity of "Edinburgh is north of London". My point here is only that there are different kinds of object in the world, and their existence is of different kinds. Not everything is a spatio-temporal object. That's not a problem for me. So what do you say about this example?
That's what comes of a) not thinking with the crowd and b) thinking about philosophy. I'm not ignoring you - it's just that I have limited bandwidth.
I think there's quite a lot of work both with you and Wayfarer to tease out "discovered" vs "constructed".
Humans think about the things we like and dislike about foods that have nothing to do with nutrition; foods we've eaten in millennia past; how it lead to our current form and abilities; what we might eat to improve on our form and abilities; and make long-term plans to bring it about. Humans think about the different types of homes we've lived in throughout history; how to improve our homes to make them safer and more comfortable; the aesthetic value of different homes, and toes of homes; and how we might construct homes that will allow us to live in environments we couldn't possibly live in, like on the moon, without using technology to build such homes.
No other species thinks about the differences between the ways different species think. No other species thinks about thinking. What are the intermediary steps on a scale of magnitude between how any other species thinks about these things and how we think about them that reveals it all to be the same scale of magnitude, rather than different kinds of thinking?
Can't you be special, bigger, smarter, wider, more powerful, more dangerous, more imaginative, more poetic, the only one that looks into space, builds skyscrapers and nuclear missiles and poisons it own own water supply; can't you be more, more, more, more... without denying an entire aspect of mental function to all other species? Does more have to mean: It's all mine, nobody else can have any?
You could be right. But there are many contenders in the field. Language, (Rational) Thinking, Tool-making, Culture, Empathy, Moral sense, Social living. Each one is popular for a while - until empirical evidence pies up. It turns out that animals also have these things, or at least recognizable precursors. Reading publications from scientists about their research is often unhelpful, but, purely in the spirit of suggesting that you are casting your net too narrowly and long before science will catch up with you, here are two references that show how much empirical work is going on and how varied it is.
Scientific American 2014 - What Makes Humans Different Than Any Other Species
Scientific American 2018 - What Made Us Unique
The supreme irony is that if you ask what makes us human, you will likely find that the top contender is emotion. Which animals also clearly experience. Reason has had a bad reputation ever since the Industrial Revolution.
I'm beginning to think that this debate is a distraction.
Oh absolutely. Along with a whole bunch of mutually agreed presuppositions.
Still, in affirming what you say, it doesnt make any difference to anything (important). Although, we would certainly be dealing with details.
But we don't merely think in certain ways to a higher degree. We think in ways no other species does to any degree. I would be happy to hear how my assessment is wrong, if you would point out specific flaws. There's is no value in holding onto falsehoods. Consider some examples...
No species refines iron ore to only a minimal degree, but doesn't understand that different fuels burn at different temperatures, which refines it further, making better iron, which can accomplish more. No other species mines iron ore at all, despite having watched us do it for a very long time. None have even noticed the advantage in the iron we've been making all that time, and gone out specifically looking for our discards, using it to make better versions of things they already make.
No species does the basic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, but hasn't thought of exponents, negative numbers, or transcendental numbers. No species that has seen our mathematics for centuries has started using it.
No species writes down ideas about anything it does not learn via instinct or being taught, passing down more complex ideas to the next generation, and providing a means to expand on such knowledge over the generations. No species has watched us do that for centuries, and adopted the practice.
No species has heard our spoken languages, and developed anything comparable, or even learned ours. Other species may have sounds that represent things. Someone recently linked an article about elephants that have names for other elephants that seem to be unique sounds that are not imitations off any bouser associated with the"named" elephant. But there is no hint that they, or any other species, contemplates death, experiences existential angst, makes plans that will not be achieved for generations, or has poetry.
There are so many things, and different kinds of things, we're manufacturing, and different fields of study, that are not being invented, or even copied, by any other species. It's not that our thinking in these areas is better than that of every other species, it's that no other species is thinking in these areas at all. The objective proof of this is everywhere. Including the method by which we're communicating now. Nothing else is even attempting to do what we do, or even has any idea we're doing things they can't. We are alone in these areas, not merely above.
I've done that. I couldn't find delete either. I think there isn't one.
Though you can edit posts, so you can go to edit and delete the entire text and save an empty message. Not an appealing option.
You may be missing a point in your last message. It is not difficult to find a unique feature or features in any species. (That's largely how we identify them). The interesting question is what is the significance of those unique features. So the short reply to your list is simply that none of that proves that we are not animals. Whatever is unique, there are also features that we share with them and they with us. We are certainly not above them. Indeed, in some ways we might be thought to be below them. War?
You are truly and indubitably alone in all these strictly human areas. My contention is that reason and rational thought are not confined within nor limited to these human areas. Reason in other species predates and precurses these uniquely human flights of cerebral virtuosity.
But if language is for communication, no other species' language comes close to being able to express the number of things (there are an infinite number of sentences we can construct), or the types of things (descriptions of physical events; thoughts of mortality; mathematics; the possible state of anything at any point in the future; the feelings evoked by music or painting) human languages can communicate.
What does rational thinking mean? I mean, what is its value? If it increases understanding, leading to advancement, no animal has advanced in any noticable way. No members of a species live in a different way today than any members of its species did a million years ago. We, otoh, do many things our earliest ancestors had not yet learned about. Things we must teach to every new generation, or they will not know about it. All knowledge would have to be rediscovered, again and again. But we think rationally, discover and learn, and pass knowledge on. As a result, our lives are immeasurable far removed from those of our earliest ancestors. No other species advances in this way.
Yes, other species use tools. In most cases, a species uses a tool for a purpose. Chimps use tools in several situations, particularly for eating. Yet there is no spark of understanding. They somehow simply happened to stumble upon using X to accomplish Y, and they kept doing it. Then they stumbled upon using A to accomplish B, and kept doing it. They don't realize tools can be improved, adapted for other uses, or that it's possible to invent tools for other purposes entirely. This is because they don't have rational thinking. (As I described in my previous paragraph. You may have something else in mind regarding rational thinking.)
Maybe my point can be made in this way... Let's remove humans from the earth entirely. We never existed. All species on earth would be at various points on the spectrum of intelligence. Which would hold the top position that we would hold if we were still there? Which would be the undisputed masters of the world? I suspect there would be no such thing, even though the spectrum would still be there. Despite the large differences in thinking ability between all the species, none think in different ways than any other. There is only greater or lesser thinking in the same ways.
Quoting Ludwig VThank you. I will look at them tonight.
Quoting Ludwig VI once saw a documentary of a lion cub that was liked by hyenas. The cub's mother was searching, and finally found the body. She sat there for some time, looking into the distance, and her vocalizations seemed to be cries of anguish. How long do you suppose her pain remained with her? A week? A month? A year? Do you suppose the memory hit her like a truck from time to time, for the rest of her life? Do you suppose her pain faded somewhat over the years, until the memory of her child came with a bittersweet smile?
Do you suppose the mother of a wildebeest that has watched it's child, perhaps more than one over the years, murdered, torn apart, and eaten, suffers the horrors I would?
Quoting Ludwig VI don't understand. Is all this not there very heart of rational thinking? Is any other species able to think about thinking the way we are?
In the first instance, survival. Rational thought is simply the most effective approach to solving problems. All species are confronted with problems every day. The ones that don't panic, observe the situation and find ways to overcome the difficulty go on to have more and better offspring, whom they can teach how to solve problems.
Quoting Patterner
You haven't seen any of the intelligence tests set for various other species by scientists? They do not, once in a century, 'stumble upon' solutions; they work them out logically and in a timely manner.
Och, never mind. Yes, yes, you are incredibly special! You have totally cornered the market on thinking.
Quoting Ludwig V
Thanks for these links. From the above:
I think the phrase 'for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines' is actually a key driver for a lot of what is being argued in this thread, and I think I know why.
A secular age, defined by a naturalist outlook, has developed and is defined in opposition to the religious culture that preceded it. The watershed in European cultural history is generally regarded as the Renaissance and the subsequent 'scientific revolution' which ushered in sweeping changes to the understanding of man and nature. That is the subject of a vast literature and commentary spanning centuries, so it's futile to try and summarize it. I'm only mentioning it as the background to why I think there is such a sense of hostility towards 'human exceptionalism'.
I think the reasoning is existential and cultural.
The other key phrase in that passage is: 'Our culture seems to separate us from the rest of nature, and yet that culture, too, must be a product of evolution.'
'Must be the product of evolution'. And that is because evolutionary biology is believed to define us, both in terms of species, but also in terms of a grounding explanation of human nature, and nature herself. To that extent, and in that sense, it assumes the role of a religion - of course not the supernatural religions of yore, but in the sense of providing an apparently coherent and unified worldview within which we make sense of our identity, of who we are and how we originated. Furthermore, one fully validated by the authority of science - and what other kind is there?
I will add, I myself have never questioned the facts of evolutionary biology. I grew up on a digest of the excellent Time-Life books on biology and evolution and have a keen interest in paleoanthropology and the evolution of h.sapiens. I wasn't even much aware of the 'creation debates' until well into adulthood, as they're not a feature of life in Australia. (Ken Ham, the notorious young-earth creationist, started in Sydney but had to migrate to Kentucky to find an audience.)
But I'm also of the view that there's a lot read into evolutionary biology that isn't actually there. First and foremost by the so-called 'ultra-Darwinists' such as Richard Dawkins and the late Daniel Dennett, among many others, who see evolutionary theory and science as superseding and displacing religion. Of course they're kind of outliers in some ways, but their views are influential and quite consonant with the 'scientific worldview' they espouse.
So, getting back to 'our culture seems to separate us' and the assertion that 'it too must be the product of evolution'. What this does, is offers a resolution to the sense of separateness, of otherness, which is a pervasive undercurrent of our lives as self-conscious individual beings. Hence the fierce adherence to the belief that we're continuous with other species, that we're 'no different' - when on face value, we are obviously vastly different. Evolutionary biology makes us part of a cosmic story, in which evolution and/or nature is now endowed with the kind of creativity that used to be assigned to God.
(....to be continued.)
Quoting Vera MontCan someone not disagree with you without you resorting to this? You have not attempted to make any points in opposition to mine. You just say I'm wrong. And when I don't bow to the brilliance of such a tactic, and I try to explain my position in different ways, I get this.
And I'm not claiming [I]I[/I] an incredibly special. We all are. Yes, even you. No member of any other species would be reacting the way you are now. One of the pitfalls of the ways we think that no other species does.
Quoting The Violence of Oneness, Norman Fischer
I think this is the (unconscious) fear that we're seeking to ameliorate through a kind of scientific interpretation of 'one-ness with Nature', which is where belief in the projected meaning of evolutionary biology fits in. We seek to master nature through science, and also to transcend it, but now through ambitions to 'escape the surly bonds of earth' by way of space technology.
(The essay from which that passage was extracted was written about 9/11, by Norman Fischer, a Zen master and poet from California.)
I don't need to suggest; you've listed most of 'em. I never contested the uniqueness of humans or the feats of cogitation they required. All i said was that these are the product of rational thought, which, before the herculean humans endeavours, were expressed in the purposeful, conscious use of tools and other innovations by rational entities of lesser endowment, but nevertheless, with similar brains.
Quoting Patterner
I wasn't opposed to yours. I considered them incomplete. I had made a case, with citations, before you made any points - consisting of a list of uniquely human accomplishments which were never disputed. I didn't repeat all of the evidence I know of other species thinking rationally; I merely referred to the definition of the critical words.
Quoting Patterner
I think you have a narrow vision.
"This" was simple exasperation, capitulation. If it troubled you, I'm sorry.
duly noted
and very poetic
It sounds to me like you are projecting your own fears. In any case, you are demonstrating a lack of insight into the perspectives of others.
Thanks! and to you also.
Scientific humanism is hardly a fringe movement. It is hugely influential in modern culture. One example is Julian Huxley, of the famous Huxley family, a direct descendent of "Darwin's Bulldog", Thomas Henry.
Julian Huxley said 'As a result of a thousand million years of evolution, the universe is becoming conscious of itself, able to understand something of its past history and its possible future. This cosmic self-?awareness is being realized in one tiny fragment of the universein a few of us human beings' - a sentiment I endorse.
I prompted ChatGPT for other examples, which gave this list:
Carl Sagan Sagan was not only an astrophysicist and science communicator but also a strong advocate for scientific skepticism, ethics, and the use of science for human betterment. His emphasis on a "cosmic perspective" incorporated a deeply humanistic vision, stressing both our smallness and responsibility in the vast universe.
Jacob Bronowski A polymath known for his series The Ascent of Man, Bronowski combined a deep appreciation for the achievements of science with an equally strong concern for the ethical dimensions of human knowledge, particularly in the wake of the atrocities of World War II.
Albert Einstein Though more widely known as a physicist, Einstein was also a humanist who believed in the moral and social responsibilities of scientists. He spoke frequently on issues like disarmament, civil rights, and the need for global cooperation.
Bertrand Russell A philosopher and mathematician, Russell advocated for the application of reason and science to address social and ethical issues. His humanism was deeply intertwined with his pacifism, atheism, and commitment to improving society through rational inquiry.
E. O. Wilson An evolutionary biologist and naturalist, Wilson emphasized the importance of biodiversity and advocated for what he called consilience, the unity of knowledge across the sciences and humanities. His work explored the ethical implications of our connection to nature and argued for environmental stewardship.
Richard Dawkins Although known for his contributions to evolutionary biology, Dawkins is also a strong proponent of humanism and reason, criticizing dogmatic belief systems while advocating for a scientific worldview that promotes moral responsibility and societal progress.
Steven Pinker A cognitive psychologist and linguist, Pinkers work on human nature and his advocacy for reason and Enlightenment values places him in the tradition of scientific humanism. His book The Better Angels of Our Nature explores how science and rationality have contributed to moral progress throughout history.
Isaac Asimov The celebrated science fiction writer and biochemist, Asimov not only wrote extensively on science but also on humanism and ethics, especially in relation to technology. His Three Laws of Robotics are a famous attempt to think through the ethical implications of technological advancement.
John Dewey A philosopher and psychologist, Dewey promoted a form of pragmatism that saw science as the best method for achieving human progress. He argued that moral and ethical concerns should evolve in tandem with scientific knowledge, and his views strongly influenced 20th-century educational theory.
Do you suppose that I have any way of "really" understanding how any mother, never mind the mother of wildebeest, feels about the loss of a child - even though I have lost a child. The balance between understanding and projection is very difficult. To be more accurate, we can be pretty certain of our understanding at a general level, but when you get down to details it gets much, much more difficult.
Quoting Patterner
I'm guessing that mathematics and perhaps ethics are examples of what you have in mind. Yet people seem quite happy to ask whether dogs can do calculus and to insist that they can make and execute a plan of action to achieve a common end. And then, attributing values to them seems inherent in saying that they are alive and sentient and social - even in saying that evolution applies to them.
I think you would question whether dogs can do any mathematics, never mind calculus, or really make and execute a plan. I also think you would question whether dogs really understand ethics, even if they have desires. There's a common theme, because it would not be unreasonable to think that (human) language is essential for both. Am I wrong?
Quoting Patterner
I don't understand you.
If a pigeon stumbles on the fact that pecking a specific item in their cage produces food and keeps on doing it until it has eaten enough, that it doesn't understand what is going on? It may not understand about the aims of the experiment or what an experiment is, but it understands what is important to it. In any case, human beings also stumble on facts and have no hesitation in exploiting them to the limit of their understanding (which is often quite severe and detrimental to their long-term interests).
Quoting Patterner
I'm not denying what you say. But it's more complicated than that. If everybody is special, then nobody is special. So some explanation of what "special" means here is necessary.
Quoting Wayfarer
I know that. But that's compatible with many different formulations of what it is. Still, thanks for the responses. I'm most struck by the common denominator in the values involved. I'm more and convinced that this debate is underpinned by the ethical issues that underlie it. It's not (just) the facts, but what you make of them. But now I'm puzzled because scientific humanism seems to be a common or garden humanism with a respect for and faith in science. Or is that all there is to it?
Quoting The Violence of Oneness, Norman Fischer@Wayfarer
That's all very well. But many people think, with reason, that the purpose of religion is keeping us all in line.
Quoting Wayfarer
Not really. Evolution does indeed imply creativity, but not the kind that was supposed for God. Divine omnipotence meant that the wish is sufficient. Not at all what evolution does.
Quoting Vera Mont
I think @Patterner may be including trial and error under "stumbles upon". For me, "stumbles upon" is pure accident, without even recognizing the problem. Trial and error seems like a perfectly rational procedure. (When you can work out the solution in advance, it's not really a problem any more, since you know the answer.)
Quoting Vera Mont
That's very judicious and well balanced. But there are deeper issues. For example, what thought counts as rational? For some definitions, possession of a suitable language is critical and whether animal communication systems count as a language, never mind one suitable for rationality, is a moot point. So the possibility that the two sides are talking past each other remains.
Sure. If you define a word to mean what you want it to mean it will mean what you want it to mean.
I have not seen that particular definition: "rational thought is that to which possession of a suitable language is critical" in a dictionary. Nor have I seen ethics mentioned as a necessary adjunct to reason in any work on neuroscience.
No, you won't. I'm talking about a philosophical position or even assumption, that the only true rational process is articulate reasoning which can only be laid out in language. I could have been clearer. Sorry.
The philosophical positions are clear enough. Humans philosophize; nature does not.
It's probably foolish of me (and obviously futile) to hold out for the integrity of that very language some people deem essential to reasoning. The usage of words determines the content of a discussion and the direction of reasoning on a topic. If you change the meaning of words, you change the essence of the subject.
I've lost this one.
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach.
Depends on one's philosophical stance, doesn't it? The words have no fixed meaning, apparently - only relative value as to what counts and what doesn't.
No, it doesn't. Creatures capable of thinking about the world were doing so long before we began talking about it. Hence, the need for the aforementioned methodological approach and bare minimum criterion.
Language less creatures have no words. Yet, they think about the world. Clearly, not all thinking is existentially dependent upon words.
Competing notions of "thought" and "rational thought" can be assessed by how well they 'fit' into what we know to be true, as well as their inherent ability or lack thereof to explain things(explanatory power). Evolutionary progression is paramount here. There are all sort of philosophical positions which must reject the idea of language less thought/belief, on pains of coherency alone.
On my view, that is prima facie evidence that they've gotten some things very wrong.
I know that and have been saying it for six pages now. But I'm in the minority.
Quoting creativesoul
That's the minority opinion.
Perhaps, but it's the correct one.
If that does not count as thinking, then nothing will.
I concur.
I've watched cats go back to the place where their captured rodent had escaped hours earlier. If that does not count as that cat thinking about that rodent, despite the rodent no longer being present/visible, then nothing will.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting Vera Mont
Maybe I'm just stubborn, but I think that truth is not an issue that can be resolved by voting. Though I know that being in a minority can be discouraging.
Quoting creativesoul
Ver neat. You are changing the subject somewhat. It may prove fruitful. Contesting claims about what are or might be unique differentials between animals and humans has not been productive. The two sides appeared to me to be talking past each other - hence my remark about language.
In the mean time, I suggest that the question is partly whether thinking must be a process distinct from acting. My answer is no. For the sake of an example, here's one that @Vera Montshared with us a while ago:-
Quoting Vera Mont
Shared project, collaborative working, indirect approach to the problem. But no distinct moment that you could identify as "thinking".
It would be easy to provide what you might call a rational reconstruction of the action - a series of propositions attributing various beliefs/knowledges to the dogs and reconstructing a deductive process. That would provide what we commonly call an rational explanation of their actions. It doesn't rely on "what was going on in their minds".
Is learning to open doors and gates rational thinking, or does it not meet that criterion?
:up: :up:
Non-linguistic thought seems near impossible for us to communicate about in any detailed and rigorous way. As you say, "how well they fit into what we know to be true" plays a crucial role in one person recognizing the sort of thing another is talking about, when trying to communicate about non-linguistic thought.
Add to that, the fact that many people's thinking is much more language 'focused' than the thinking of others, and many seem to think 'non-linguistic thought' is a nonsensical phrase.
In my book, opening doors and gates is rational thinking. Battering them down would not be, unless it was preceded by trying to open them. I can't assume that everyone will agree.
In my book, however, this is not a simple empirical question. As far as I can see, it is fair to say that our paradigm (NOT definition) of a person is a human being (under normal circumstances). Animals are like human beings in certain respects such that it seems most reasonable to think that they are like people. Crucially, it is clearly possible for human beings to form relationships with animals that are, or are like, relationships with people. But it's a balance. Some people do not go far enough and treat them as machines which can easily result in inhumane treatment. Other people go too far and get accused, sometimes rightly, of anthropomorphization.
I have to go now. But I look forward to seeing what happens next. :smile:
Elephants seem like they might be well justified in disagreeing. Why waste time trying to figure out how to open a gate, if knocking the gate down is a trivial matter?
Is "overthinking" things rational?
Can you tell that a man is thinking before he says or does something? Sometimes, when he opens his mouth it becomes obvious that very little thought went into the product. (just watch any interview with MAGA cultist)
In the incidence you cited, I saw the looks and gestures - clearly, communication was taking place. I watched the collie try one side of the door briefly before reconsidering; the Pyrennese stood back, watching attentively, waiting for her turn to act.
On another escape attempt, they did similarly with the fence. The collie searched for and found a weak spot where the wire mesh was attached to the corner of the house and showed the Pyrennese where to pry. So, until the fence could be properly repaired, we tied up the roamer on a long rope. Damn if her co-conspirator didn't chew through it! Perfect combination of brains and brawn.
Of course, at the time I didn't find this behaviour admirable; I'd wasted a good deal of time and anxiety finding and catching them lest they got into trouble. Once they came back with barbed wire wounds and we spent all afternoon at the vet's and part of the next day washing blood off the inside of the car.
The dog book did say "Strong desire to roam" when describing Great Pyrennese; we had been warned. The collie could be let loose, she'd never wander off on her own: she was just helping out a friend. She was a little cleverboots, and sassy with it; very clear on her duty, her loyalties and her rights.
Of course it is. If you don't interfere, you can watch the process, which is exactly the same as a human would do. Regard the obstacle. Can you go over or around? No. Will it yield to force? No. Yet people open it and pass through. There is a way to do that. Find the pressure point or lever. Try moving it this way and that. Aha! Next time, no hesitation. New skill learned. New headache for the human.
Works with cupboard and fridge doors, too. One of my dogs got bored while I was at work, figured out how to open the dresser drawers and artfully arranged my clothes all down the staircase to the front door.
Over the decades, I have known many dogs. They're as varied in temperament, proclivities and intelligence as humans. I've been privileged to have four particularly bright dogs - two German Shepherds (the first, a retired police dog, was my volunteer nanny) the border collie cross, and a terrier. Smart dogs are interesting to watch, but hard to govern.
No, Knocking down the gate is perfectly rational, if it works for you. What is very telling is if the elephant tries to knock down the gate, finds s/he can't and then tries a different tactic. I didn't think to cover that case, that's all.
Funny how it works, isn't it? At the time, big headache, furious. Looking back, admirable, proud of them.
I have the impression that they are no longer with you. If so, I expect it's bittersweet. The full story is even more convincing than the short version.
Animal-watching is as fascinating to me as, if not more than, child-watching. Desmond Morris watched babies, but I find 4-8 year-olds more interesting. You have to be circumspect: everyone behaves differently when they know you're watching.
Second question. Yes. They can clearly communicate. If you mean 'language' then, not really. Many animals share common features that humans possess but not share the whole collection.
Third question. Intuitive thinking is part and parcel of rational thinking - in the sense that reason with out emotions is naught.
And that thought is a very big consideration for researchers. From college lectures to books based on research, I am amazed by the scrutiny of the research. These guys are real nit pickers tearing apart each others work, in an effort to be very sure the conclusion of research is based on fact and not wishful human thinking.
Quoting Fire Ologist
So true. This could be different for apes though. We shared genes with Chimpanzees but they do not have the ability to speak. They can sign and make jesters but they can not talk so they can not share their reasoning and deliberate the thoughts of others. They can follow this leader or that one, but they are not going to debate the reasoning. Females will defend their aged male leader from some young upstart. They do have emotional bonds and this is so close to reasoning, it is hard to draw the line.
Wouldn't if be fun to be a researcher and do a study about what feeling has to do with reasoning?
The thing is, quite apropos to this topic, I've brought up the subject of pattern recognition a lot on the forum. It's a quite useful concept in understanding the way people think.
There are patterns that can be recognized in the thinking of people. One such pattern I've unintentionally developed a strong recognition of is narcissism. (Grandiose and covert/vulnerable types primarily, there are other labels for types of narcissism and the characteristics associated with those particular types that I'm not very familiar with.)
This is a pattern I can't unsee.
A result of such pattern recognition is some understanding on my part, of your need to see yourself as particularly special, and how that influences the thinking that goes into your posts. This need to see yourself as particularly special isn't something I think you have made a free willed choice to have, and not something I see you as to blame for. In fact I appreciate your skill at keeping keeping your rage covert. And of course, we are all narcissistic to some extent.
So getting back to the thread topic, I'd say there is an extremely good scientific case for animals having very strong pattern recognition in certain regards, and in many cases pattern recognition that is not available to us for various physiological reasons. And such pattern recognition is foundational to rationality. Human language/logic is kind of icing on the cake, on one hand. On the other hand, it allows humanity to do things way beyond the capabilities of any other species on Earth.
Perhaps relevant topics for this thread are, "What role does having language play, in the development of narcissism in humans?" and, "Is there any evidence for narcissism in animals?"
How do you know that their behaviour is not rational "like our behaviour is rational"? Is there some other kind of rational that it could be?
Why do you say that animals don't need any of it - do you mean, language, communication and math? Many of them certainly have communication skills and can do things that seem to require mathematics, like catching Frisbees. Whether they have language or not is unanswerable until we agree our definition of language.
Fortunately, human beings can also communicate without language and do things that seem to require mathematics without having learnt the necessary mathematics. If we can do it, they can do it - or it is at least possible.
The foundation of our recognition of human beings as (sometimes) rational people is our relationship with them and their relationship with us. The same foundation is the basis of our attributing or withholding perception emotion and reason to them.
You can "see" an animal as a bunch of reflexes if you choose to. You can see an animal as a person if you choose to. That choice is a decision how far to extend your paradigm of a person in the context of your interactions with them. It is a hinge for how you see them and how you interpret what you see. I can try to persuade you that either extreme doesn't really make sense, but a conclusive demonstration either way is not to be expected.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Quoting Athena
Well, let's allow, for the sake of the argument, that animals do not and cannot debate in the way that humans do. I'll accept also that debating is a skill that demands a capacity for rational thought. But you seem to think it is a necessary (probably not sufficient?) skill for rational thought. But does that really make sense?
I'll go further and say that although it is tempting to think that articulating one's reasons is what rationality is about, it is simply wrong. Articulating one's reasons for a rational action is an optional extra, distinct from the capacity for rational action. In the first place, people often find it quite difficult to explain why they did what they did when you ask. They have to stop and think about it immediately after they carried out the action. In the second place, we often act very fast when we need to. There simply isn't time to say to oneself "The traffic light has changed, it is dangerous and illegal to cross against the light, I had better stop". Indeed, the same applies when I look up at the sky and pick up an umbrella as I leave the house. I may say to myself or another that it looks like rain and I'll take an umbrella, and I may not.
Quoting Athena
Yes. Even psychologists are abandoning the old conception of emotions as (purely subjective and irrational "feelings") and recognizing that cognition is part and parcel of the concepts.
Quoting wonderer1
Am I right to think that we are somewhere near the old-fashioned concept of a Gestalt? I think there is a lot to be said for it. It is not been a good thing that the atomistic methodology of empirical philosophers has not been helpful for philosophy or psychology. Patterns of behaviour.
Absolutely, and I think it is probably reasonable to think of much animal rationality as a matter of gestalts, without animals having as much capacity for analyzing mutually contradictory gestalts for consistency, as we have with our linguistic capabilities.
I must argue against that statement. Knowing truth is essential because things go very wrong when people act on incorrect ideas and bad information. Primitive people knew that problem well. They did not have bank cards to repair all the damage of bad decisions. And democracy, like scientific research, is people working together to get things right. True Aristotle made mistakes and Greek logic defined by him was lacking. But the truth is, if we don't get things right, they can go very wrong. This is true in our private lives and public lives.
Animals have behaviors, many of which humans share (eating, sleeping, hunting, etc.). One of the behaviors humans exhibit is reasoning, or being rational. This involves language and communication with other reasoners.
I see no need to explain the behavior of animals as involving the human behavior we call reasoning.
There is no reason to think the sun is communicating with Mercury when the sun heats it up. The sun never says look at me, see how hot I am. We could use that metaphor, but we would be silly to assume that Mercury could be conscious of the sun or its communication, or that the sun is conscious of itself as bright and hot or that the sun now conscious of this would try to communicate it.
I think because animals have consciousness and because reason pervades human consciousness so deeply, we just assume (personify) that all higher consciousness involves an inner life of reasoning and communicable conceptualizing. I disagree.
Animals make sounds and other other animals react to those sounds. Humans see this as communication. But the animal that made the sound may have been forced to make that sound by some conditions, just like the other animal that responded to that sound was forced to respond. Nothing need be in between them called a communication - we reasoning humans make that relationship and call it a separate thing called communication. These are just on-off switches.
Because of the debate between free will and determinism, we might say that humans are not actually rational either, incapable of communicating a single communication clearly. Equating human behavior with animal behavior along the lines that none of us are using reason or making communications seems an easier argument than saying human and animal behaviors are equal in that they both involve levels of reasoning and communication.
Dog barks to warn the pack? Or a dog sees something and just bursts into a bark? Pack hears one of its members making barking sounds and thinks what is wrong? Or pack just hears barking sounds and moves directly towards whatever range of responses have survived the evolutionary process?
Dogs may be better off because they dont reason. No such thing a paralysis by analysis for any other than a rational being.
Its very romantic to personify things. Like the warm embrace of the dawn after the nights unrelenting assault of darkness and cold. But not necessary to explain it. There is no dawn or night who is communicating anything.
Lastly, this doesnt mean reason didnt arise in the universe from physical causes. Thats a different question too. Again, who cares whether dogs or humans live better, or worse, or higher or lower - Im not attributing reason to a higher, immortal soul or something - but saying humans and dogs both reason and communicate makes no sense to me. (Although the vast, vast majority of people today talk like this and believe this.)
Humans bother to seek and communicate reasons and ideas through language with other humans. Dogs dont bother with all of that. Neither does the sun. Every sound isnt a word. Every response of a conscious animal isnt born out of a self-reflective process of reasoning.
I dont know this for sure.
But seems to me, if any thing in the universe used reason, it could make that ability clear to me by communication. Nothing else bothers to communicate a reasonable idea besides other humans.
I do not believe we are thinking rationally unless we are using higher-order critical thinking skills. Each critical thinking skill is important but maybe this one is the most challenging..
Telling me why I should become a Christian, or join the Ku Klux Klan, is not the result of higher-order thinking skills, and how we behave as a society depends on how good our critical thinking skills are. And that depends on our education. Critical thinking skills do not come with our genes, only the potential to use our brains comes with our genes.
H'm. In a way, I'm glad to hear it. I do agree that it is not an easy matter to identify what beliefs and what desires motivate animals. A general, perhaps rather vague, view is the most we can expect. Can a dog feel guilty or embarrassed? I'm not sure. Can a dog feel fear and anger? Oh, yes, definitely.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Perhaps better "Humans sometimes bother.... but not always". When they don't, we still read off their reasons from their behaviour. So what's so odd about reading off dogs' reasons from what they do?
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes. Not a very persuasive argument. Perhaps the view of animals as machines is a welcome coolness of the evening after a hot day.
Quoting Fire Ologist
OK. You know how one reads something and remembers the content but not the details or where you read it. I have an example like that, which I'll present as a thought experiment, although I believe it is an observation of actual behaviour.
I expect you know that many birds will warn the whole flock when intruders appear. Is the bird warning the flock or just shouting in fear when it spots an intruder? Hard to tell. But then you notice that some birds will shout an alarm when there is no intruder. All the other birds fly off, but the noisy one stays, with free access to all the food. Ah, no, you think. That's just reflex responses. But then the other birds, having learnt that the shouty bird is a liar will ignore future warnings from that bird. Is it really plausible to interpret that is "just reflexes" and not rational responses to a developing situation?
Quoting Fire Ologist
You are right to think of this. I think you are choosing the harder path and I'll try to show you why.
Quoting Fire Ologist
How does this sound? "Humans make sounds and other humans react to those sounds. Animals see this as communication. But the human that made the sound may have been forced to make that sound by some conditions, just like the other human that responded to that sound was forced to respond." It's a question of interpretation, of employing a model, not an empirical fact.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Rational behaviour is not just a set of behaviours distinct from everything else - talking, pondering etc. Rationality is on display in nearly everything that we do. Taking the umbrella when leaving the house is a rational behaviour. Going into the kitchen when hungry is rational behaviour. The dog's sitting staring at you when hungry is also rational behaviour.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Had you perhaps thought that the animals are communicating, but you're not hearing, because you don't believe that they communicate?
I think on this thread, we keep missing the point when we say ..."but animals also do this or that.."
Like us, animals can and do learn from each other.
Yes, you are right. But you are setting a very high bar. Most of what we do does not involve critical thinking. Left to ourselves, we will only think critically when something is going wrong or in new and unfamiliar circumstances. You may have seen my story about the birds. Here's another. (I can't give you my source for this either, so treat it as a thought-experiment).
Meerkats actually post sentries who do not join in the feeding, but keep watch and raise the alarm when an intruder turns up. The other meerkats keep some food for the sentry, who feeds when all the others have finished. New members of the group are not permitted to act as sentries for a while. Eventually, they are allowed to stand sentry, but at first, when they raise the alarm, the others check it out before everyone rushes to their burrows underground. Eventually, when the sentry has been proved reliable, they are not checked out.
Is that not critical thinking? Or maybe critical thinking is less advanced than you think?
I don't doubt it. But I'm not clear what point you think we are missing. The key question is what, if anything, distinguishes humans from other animals. The issue is whether there is not merely a difference, but a difference so significant that it represents a difference in kind. So "but animals do this or that... " is the point.
It might be the case that a wider range of questions would be of interest. Why not try something out?
Because we use reason. Animals dont read reasons. Otherwise we read off of smells and visions and feelings. Like other animals. And read in this context is metaphor for sensation. We read reasons, Animals dont read anything (except metaphorically).
Quoting Ludwig V
Barking is a behavior.
Dogs and humans might sense the loudness of the barking and so you might say as a metaphor that dogs and humans sense the loudness of this behavior. A dog doesnt wonder if he is barking loud enough, if the volume of his barking is a reasonable volume to convey its fear of the cougar to the rest of the pack. The dog sees the cougar, and the dog barks.
Dogs dont read the rationality of this behavior. We humans alone exhibit reason and rationalize about it. Dogs just react accordingly. We humans can judge a dogs reaction as a rational response or not, but I see no evidence that a dog is using reason prior to any response or after the fact, or during a communication. A dog is built to receive certain sensations and built to respond to those sensations. We watch a bunch of dogs and start to see patterns and then say that dog is barking for a reason, that reason being there is a cougar in sight. But really, the dogs body sees the cougar and the dogs body starts to bark (all the dogs that saw cougars and dont bark were eaten and weeded out of the gene pool). The dog didnt see the cougar and use reason to know barking loudly makes the most sense is the most rational behavior among a list of other behaviors. The dog just barks, making no choice, having no thought behind it, utterly unaware of the rationality that can be found in this by humans.
I see reason and thinking and willing and judgment and language all tied up together. You have one of these, you say one of these words, you also conjure up the others. Reason involves logical inference, representational language, judgment and choice. We have to use reason to deliberate and make a choice. We have to use judgment to choose what objects are the most reasonable objects to deliberate about. When we focus our reason on a subject, we are choosing that focus. These are all human things.
Dogs dont need any of that to exhibit all of the behaviors they exhibit.
Man sees a cougar and instead of yelling look out! he deliberates how best to save the people that dont yet see the cougar. Should the man consider the bird flying overhead? Should the man be thinking about whether yelling at the cougar will trigger it to pounce? Should the man be thinking about chocolate ice cream? If he is trying to help those other people, some of those thoughts are reasonable. Some arent. Should the man be thinking that he is wasting time thinking and he should react right now instead? Look out for that cougar!!!
Dogs dont bother with all of that. They always bark, which works good enough for the majority of dogs.
The very fact that we humans see rationality in the universe at all, and then talk about it, is behavior exhibited nowhere else besides humans.
It may be rational in a human beings eyes for a dog to feel fear and bark at the sight of a cougar. We humans can make these connections and see this rationality in the dogs behavior. But it does not appear to be rational to the dog. Is see no evidence that the dog itself used reason or had a reason for barking. The dog never appears aware of the rationality or irrationality of anything (or the dog might start trying new things or discussing options and choices with his pack mates, or the barking would have to become language and more complicated communication.)
Thank you so much for working with me on this effort to understand rational thinking and human/animal differences. I am not done looking for information because I don't think my understanding is complete. I keep hoping someone will jump in and say what I am trying to say.
I think your story is close to the story of how dogs became domesticated. A few wild dogs dared to come close to humans and over time those dogs became comfortable with humans and these dogs naturally did selective breeding, breeding with the dogs with a high tolerance for humans. This led to genetic changes that made domestic dogs domestic. Interestingly they are the only animals that will investigate where we point. Domestic dogs have learned to read us and how to manipulate us as well as how to be excellent hunting partners and service dogs. The bottom line this is genetic. Do not bring a wolf home and expect it to play fetch with you because there is a genetic difference between wild dogs and domestic ones. In the dogs or meerkats change happened over time. The animal in question became comfortable with the other and we could say built trust (has a different feeling response). This is feeling and reacting not reasoning. Chimps needing a new troop will approach very carefully and hang around the fringes until invited in.
But when it comes to rational we are speaking of something different and the problem in talking about it is how we use the word rational. Someone who believes the Bible is the word of God, has rationalized a lot to not see some problems with that belief. Someone prejudiced of people who look different and can even believe the other is not fully human have wrongly rationalized their feelings and thoughts. I wish we didn't use the same word for rationalizing a myth and other false beliefs and think this rationalization is equal to scientific, or higher-order thinking. Believing a myth or other wrong thoughts does not take critical thinking skills. Grasping science and having justice and liberty for all, does take critical thinking skills.
The difference is about HOW we think, not WHAT we think. And the difference is being as an animal or as an evolved human being.
I once had an acquaintance who steadfastly denied that animals other than man had intelligence or any form of thought; he maintained that they are little more than automata that respond to stimuli without any understanding. Then he told me that his neighbour's German Shepherd hated him. (Gee, I wonder why!)
I came home from Hawaii early because my sister with a timeshare in Hawaii was stressed to the breaking point and could no more be rational with me than a barking dog. She is a highly educated and successful woman, but under the circumstances, she was like a barking dog towards me. It was insane! She would talk with others like a rational human being and in a flash attack me like a dog.
I think our ability to behave as rational human beings may be fragile. I think education focused on technology and not our development as good family members and good citizens, may have led to a much higher rate of irrational behavior. I think this happened to Germany and became the Nazi phenomenon. A social value shift that may come with threats of social breakdown.
That acquaintance may have underrated the value of emotion and its part in thinking. Do you remember the original Star Trek show? In one episode Captain Kirk became two individuals, one was all bad and the other all good. The point is that we need to be balanced to have good judgment.
That's very interesting to think about. It suggests to me that not only pattern recognition, but pattern seeking plays an important part in meerkat rationality. I.e. that being attentive to the pattern of behavior consistent with a junior sentry having attained sentry expertise (or lack thereof) plays an important role in meerkat behavior.
I don't know how we might test if logic is much involved on the part of the meerkat. Perhaps some so strongly associate critical thinking with logic, (and not without good reason) that they wouldn't grant that this suggests critical thinking on the part of meerkats. However, I'm inclined to think this points to meerkats having at least some aspects of what could be considered criitical thinking.
When the air in my house is above 75 degrees, the air conditioning goes on and the house is cooled and the thermostat reacts to the cooler temperature and shuts off the air conditioner.
I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the systems desired temperature.
Or I could just say its all a system of stimuli and responses with no inner life, self-awareness, decision-making capability or rational capability.
We could say the same thing about animals.
Determinists (use reason) to say the same thing about humans.
Maybe the better question is do humans have the ability to reason? My answer would be that formulating a question like that displays behavior of a being capable of reason.
Animals dont ask questions. Ever.
I have two dogs. I love them. But they arent using reason. They are predictable because of their structure, not because of their adherence to reason. My dog is sitting at my foot leaning on me right now. Hes not communicating or hoping I like what hes doing. He just feels good enough to pass out at my feet right now. When he begs at the dinnner table, there is no plan or thought or reason behind how his ear flops and looks cute enough to convince me to give him a treat. Hes just does what he does, and benefits from it working. If it didnt work, he wouldnt wonder how it didnt work because it was perfectly reasonable to him and try to improve the reasoning. He would just be pushed into the next posture and position. Probably licking something.
We cant even understand the nature of our own behavior when we use reason or make a choice or reflect on our own minds, but for some reason, because we love them I suppose, we see so much reason and choice and mental activity in animals.
Thank you, I do try to be civil and avoid coming off as condescending. I think we all need a sense of being special and having something of value to offer. To me, this isn't a bad thing compared to sitting at home and doing nothing and making no effort to think or engage others. Overeating in a futile effort to end the feeling of hunger caused by unmet emotional needs. So I hope people do continue to do their best and feel that s/he is making a valued contribution. Making the effort is better than not making the effort, right? But it ain't easy.
Nonsense. I dont see myself as special. I have presented a specific argument based on a number of sources in this thread. I understand the argument Im pursuing is a difficult one to both articulate and understand, especially in the kind of fragmented format that forum conversations tend to assume. I dont see any indication that you (and for that matter other participants) have understood the gist of the argument. It is not because Im special, it has nothing whatever to do with it. Your statements here are ad hominem, how about you try and respond the actual specifics of what Ive been arguing for, if you want to take issue with them.
I don't disagree, and what you quoted wasn't directed at you.
What you call an argument amounted to your naive psychologizing regarding the thinking of lots of people. I'm not going to bother to detail the fallaciousness of all that.
Anyway, I suggest that if you want to avoid your psychology being under consideration, avoiding making such naive claims about the psychology of others might be a good idea.
OK. So it turns out that you will accept that a dog's reaction is a rational response, but deny that the dog is rational because they don't "use reason". I take it that you mean that the dog doesn't say out loud "This is the situation, so I should do that." But humans often act without verbalizing their reasons out loud. Does that mean they aren't rational either?
Quoting Athena
Well, if the feelings are rational and the reactions appropriate, what's the problem saying the meerkats, chimps or crows are rational?
Quoting Athena
Are you talking about the out loud verbalizing of your reasons for doing something - or the maybe silent process of planning an action? But if you have to plan each action to be counted as rational, then you have to plan to plan, and plan to plan to plan.... If you have to verbalize your reasons for doing something if you are to count as acting rationally, then you have to verbalize your reasons for verbalizing your reasons... No, No, that doesn't work. It has to be possible to act without verbalizing reasons and without advance planning and yet to act rationally.
Quoting Vera Mont
They always know. It's the body language. Kids are pretty good at it, too. But we lose the knack when we get grown-up. Pity.
Quoting Athena
Oh, I'm quite sure that our ability to behave rationally is fragile. I'm sorry to hear about your sister's behaviour.
Quoting wonderer1
Well, I wouldn't attribute the whole gamut of human critical skills to meerkats. Just some basics.
Once again, I think you misunderstood. I don't read Fire's comment as saying the dog's reaction is rational. This is the pitfall of propositional logic. Humans can judge (view) the dog's reaction as rational, not that it is rational. Fire's comment went on to explain that he does not see any evidence that the dog is using reason.
I started a thread a while back on something I had read that Descartes used to flay dogs alive, assuring onlookers that their cries of agony were due only to mechanical reactions, not any genuine feeling of pain. During the course of the thread, I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, because students at a Dutch university who were followers of Descartes' mechanical philosophy did, in fact, perform those dreadful 'experiments', and it is true that Descartes believed that animals were automata without souls, as he identified the soul with the ability to reason. I think he was mistaken in this respect, but understanding why he would think such a thing is an important point.
I'll make clear, I believe intentional action is fundamental to all forms of life from the very inception, and also that feeling and sensation are fundamental to sentient organisms, even very basic ones. (I'm currently reading Mind in Life, Evan Thompson, which explores these subjects in depth.) I recognise the continuity between human life and animal life in an organic sense. But I argue that with language, rationality, and also the capacity for transcendent insight, h.sapiens have crossed a threshhold which differentiates us from other animals, and that this difference is something we have to be responsible for, rather than denying.
Presenting an argument on the cultural background of philosophical attitudes has nothing to do with discussing 'the psychology of others'.
I'll recap the arguments I've presented in this thread.
Aristotle's distinction between the vegetative, sensitive and rational soul. He distinguishes h.sapiens as 'the rational animal' on the basis that humans can recognise universal concepts through the faculty of intellect or 'nous' (a seminal word in the Western philosophical tradition.) I acknowledge that Aristotle's is an ancient philosophy, but point out that some of his foundational concepts remain part of philosophy of biology to this day, and also to the foundational role of the 'ideas' in Plato's and later philosophy (1)
I then go on to argue that the human abilities of language, abstraction, tool use, and so on, also introduce an existential dimension to the question of human reason (2). The existential dimension arises with the sense of self and self-consciousness in paleolithic culture, as illustrated by the passages quoted from Norman Fischer (3). He links this with the arising of religion, which is posited as a means to ease or rationalise the sense of 'otherness' and alienation that is part of the self-conscious condition. I also remark that the Biblical myth of the Fall is an allegory for this condition.
Finally I argue that the modern insistence that 'we are no different from animals', is based on a subconsious longing for return to one-ness. We want to see ourselves as part of nature, and believe that evolutionary biology shows that we are. Hence any suggestion of human exceptionalism is violently rejected, as it calls this belief into question.
If you want to demonstrate that these arguments are based on my 'narcissism', knock yourself out. ;-)
My observation at the time was the contradiction in him, not the dog. The anthropo-exclusive part says "They're nothing more than machines", while the responsive human part recognizes another sentient, responsive being.
Hate is not a reflex; it's a complex state of mind, made up of several emotions, experience, and memory. Machines can't hate. (In reality, he was probably exaggerating, and the dog was simply annoyed at his attitude. People get very huffy when they're disliked or disapproved-of.)
And he argued the proof as "they don't do philosophy". He argued the mechanistic view of animals against Cudworth over some period of correspondence. This is another example of the double-think my acquaintance exhibited.
It's not uncommon. A pathologist I knew had a pair of prized and pampered Siamese cats at home, and seemed to have no problem inducing tumours in laboratory cats.
Quoting Wayfarer
Later:
Quoting Wayfarer
Do you see how you keep making my point?
Is anyone in this thread "violently" rejecting human exceptionalism, or are people simply expressing various nuanced views?
And I see how you consistently fail to understand mine, probably due to lack of basic education in philosophy and cultural history.
The word 'violentily' doesn't imply actual violence, but rather a 'strongly held opinion' which has been expressed forcibly any number of times in this thread.
Substitute 'soul' with 'mind' and I think Cudworth makes a valid point.
None of which vitiates the arguments I've been presenting on the matter.
Oh man I love this line..."I could say that my air conditioner uses its thermostat to sense the temperature and then desires to cool the house so it rationally engages the air conditioner until the house reaches the systems desired temperature."
I am not so sure the rest of what you said is exactly right. Especially when we get to the chimps and bonobo our closest genetic match, and their communication ability. The following link is for Quoting Vera Mont Savage-Rumbaugh a researcher, is sure bonobos are capable of language and communication. The link explanation is long, and ends with...
I don't believe there is a black and white line between us chimps and bonobos, they are animals we are humans. I think we are on the same line of evolution and under the right conditions bonobos could have more complex communication than we want to admit. I am putting information about bonobo communication together with an explanation of climate change that may have caused our uniqueness.
:grin: I knew that but I thought you might think about what you said if I responded as though you were addressing me. I think to have the meaningful discussions we all want in this special forum, we need to feel safe and when we are made the subject of a post and criticized for all to see, we might not feel safe.
I know I don't like it when someone does that to me. On the other hand, over the years my posts may have improved because of all the criticism that has come my way. I work very hard at not appearing condescending because I was accused of that so often. As a general rule I try to respect everyone and protect the dignity of others. Doing so is a matter of honoring my grandmother who taught me those values.
One problem with this is, that when you look at the mechanisms enabling the behavior of a thermostat and the behavior of an animal, that of the animal is vastly more complex than that of a thermostat. Furthermore, what enables the behavior of most animals (and in particular mammals) has a substantial degree of similarity to what enables our behavior.
Like us, animals have brains composed of complex neural networks, which enable complex responses. Based on such physiological similarities, I would think it naive at best, to be dismissive of the possibility of cognitive similarities.
Quoting Fire Ologist
And you love your thermostat in the same way for the same reasons?
Quoting Athena
We are all animals. They are chimpanzees and bonobos and we are humans. The big black line is drawn only on side of that distinction.
It has become even clearer now...
What counts as thinking? What counts as rational thinking? The answers need a minimal criterion, which in turn, requires the right sort of methodological approach. Do you have a minimum criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as thinking? Rational thinking? If not, then upon what ground do you rest your denial that some creatures other than humans are capable of thought, rational or otherwise?
I have been turning to research. And because of the book "The Math Instinct" by Keith Devlin, I see mathematical feats in animals as equal to [quote="Fire Ologist;932185"]'s explanation of an air conditioner. However, a bat's sonar abilities are far better than anything we have.
I am also struggling to get a clear definition of rational thinking. Is it rational to believe a god made us of mud and our reality would be different if a man and woman didn't taste the wrong fruit? Or does rational mean based on facts that can be validated? At least among the researchers, there is agreement that we are the only animal that asks these questions and attempt to answer them. I am just not sure if bonobo might not evolve as we did if we set the conditions for this evolution.
Yup.
I think we agree humans, chimps and bonobos evolve from the same ape-like creature. I am not sure we agree that humans are the only ones who argue about such things. Does it matter? Some day evolution may favor the survival of roaches. Some believe our opinion of our intelligence is overrated.
I'm betting on the ants.
:lol: That may not be a fair statement but it sure is funny.
Now I don't know about loving a thermostat, but loving a car may be reasonable. The car we drive is an extension of who we are. And they have personalities. Many machines we interact with have personalities and we like to name them and enjoy our relationship with them.
Really, you think the ants will outdo the roaches? Ants don't even make the list of nuclear blast survivors. I had to look up the possible survivors and there are some. Just for fun....
https://jeevoka.com/8-animals-that-would-happily-survive-a-nuclear-war/s
Since youve addressed canids, you are claiming that packs of wild canids (wolves, cayotes, dingos, etc.) engage in no reasoning whatsoever when entrapping their prey (which can sometimes cause sever injury to them, if not their death with a moose as one example of such prey - and which are in many ways unpredictable in what they do) and then bringing it down?
Cant so far find a reference to this experiment online, but during my university years I was told by a professor of a scientific experiment where an otherwise friendly dog was made to go insane: biting all humans that surrounded and biting itself while foaming at the mouth. The experiment is easy to understand, and maybe even empathize with. From my best recollection of how this experiment went: A dog is accustomed via operational conditioning to obtain food after touching its nose to a door that has a circle depicted on it. The dog is then faced with two doors: one with a circle where it gets its food and one with an ellipse which, when touched, transfers an electric shock to the dog. The dog via brief experience then always touches the door with the circle and always avoids the door with the ellipse. The experiment then makes the circle more elliptical and the ellipse more circular. The dog has no issues in yet going to touch with its nose the door with the more circular figure. This until the two doors more properly the circular ellipse and the elliptical circle become indistinguishable by it. At this culminating point, the heretofore friendly dog goes insane as described.
Granting that this experiment did in fact take place, why would the dog go mad this as most likely would any human child if not also adult human faced with the same contextual constraints forced upon them if the dog engaged in no reasoning whatsoever when selecting the door with the more circular ellipse over the door with the more elliptical figure?
What some might well find to be horrific experiments on lesser animals with dogs as one very commonly used species (in part because theyre easy to obtain, such as from shelters) are maybe far more common than typically known. And in all these at times sadistic experiments on lesser animals (with very many being far more sadistic/horrific than the one Ive just mentioned), there is assumed a potential benefit to humans down the line - to human brains and human minds. (Ive worked in a neuroscience lab where I had to perform partial lobotomies on birds and then, after some time, perfuse them (while they were alive, of course) so as to extract their then paraformaldehyde-hardened brain for slicing and then observation of neurons under the microscope this, in short, to better study the neuroscience of language acquisition and application. Ive said sadistic because Ive observed firsthand how some, but certainly not all, fellow experiments obtained pleasure from the suffering of the birds during the process this rather than in any way empathizing with their condition which we had inflicted upon them. Doubtless that empathizing with their condition would have been uncomfortable if not painful for them.)
And yes, sometimes such experiments on lesser animals are the only means we have at our disposal for better understanding the structure of the brain and the correlating mind without harming humans. (And, in fairness, sometimes they are utterly idiotic, to not here also address ethical considerations.)
That said, what sound reasoning would there be in all these many experiments on animals were there to be no continuity between the minds of animals and those of humans? Here to include the minds utilization of some form of reasoning, however diminished by comparison to human reasoning it might be. Example: what could we possibly learn about ourselves as humans by placing rats in T-mazes and the like were there to be no continuity in cognitive faculties among lesser animals and us?
---------
To be clear, this is not to deny that we as humans are of a different level of cognition than all other animal species - making us as a species quite exceptional. In so asking, I only uphold that there is however no absolute divide between the cognition of humans and that of lesser animals.
Did the experiment reveal their findings? If that was a true experiment, the researchers would have some insights as to why the dog went insane.
Right. And they listen attentively when you bitch about your day, babysit your kids, make sure you get enough exercise, make you laugh and love you back, no matter what? Relationships with machines tend to be one-sided. Relationships with dogs, cats, horses and parrots never can be.
(Anyway, I was just pointing out the double-think.)
Quoting Athena
The operative word is "some". Ants are also resistant to radiation, but they have other valuable assets, as well. The complex social organization and extensive interaction of members bodes well for adaptation under stress and replication of useful traits.
Besides, I think the world is more likely to end with a whimper than a bang. Both ants and roaches have made successful transitions to all kinds of climate conditions and environments. No doubt in some remote future, the Cockroach Empire and the Republic of Ants will be rattling Raid missiles at each other. Then again, they may be saner than we are.
You should have a read of the story of Nim Chimpsky. He was born and raised like a human child with the hope that he could be taught to communicate like humans.
[quote=Salon;https://www.salon.com/2023/06/25/chimpsky-not-chomsky-did-nim-the-chimpanzee-actually-learn-american-sign-language/]As chronicled in the 2011 documentary "Project Nim," [Columbia University psychology and psychiatry professor Herbert S.] Terrace decided to see if Chimpsky could learn human language by placing the infant monkey into the home of one of his former students, Stephanie LaFarge. The goal was to see if Chimpsky could acquire human-like language if he was raised like a real human being. Starting in late 1973, Nim Chimpsky began his life/experiment but controversy soon arose. Despite being treated kindly, Nim Chimpsky showed unexpected aggression toward his human caretakers. His behavior was so sporadically violent that, after he attacked one of the people taking care of him in 1977, Terrace moved Nim Chimpsky back to a regular laboratory. At that point, Terrace called off the experiment.
Additionally, Terrace and his colleagues reached a disappointing conclusion: Although Chimpsky had appeared to learn language he moved his hands and body in a manner consistent with American Sign Language, using over 120 combinations, in order to seemingly ask for things like food and affection the evidence indicated that he was simply mimicking the behavior of the humans around him. It is possible that Chimpsky understood at least some of the "words" he was forming, but it is also very, very far from being proven.
"Nim learned to sign to obtain food, drink, hugs and other physical rewards," Terrace later explained to Columbia University. "Nim often got the signs right, but that was because his teachers inadvertently prompted him by making appropriate signs a fraction of a second before he did. Nim's signing wasn't spontaneous. He was unable to use words conversationally, let alone form sentences."[/quote]
When the experiment failed, the poor little chimp was then packed off to a home for retired lab animals, where he was reported to seem very depressed. Ends up being a sad story.
Quoting javra
I would say because of cognitive dissonance. I don't find it hard to see that many higher animals could experience that.
I happen to very much agree with that. Though I'm uncertain as to how this might relate to reasoning among lesser animals in your own view.
To me, for cognitive dissonance to occur, there is required some modality of reasoning. As just one example, there is required a non-linguistic understanding that if this then that. Having such non-verbal if-then reasoning would bring about the dog's madness via an extreme cognitive dissonance wherein it becomes impossible for it to discern what action (that of either touching the one door or the other) leads to what consequence (that of obtaining food, which would be pleasurable, or of being electrically shocked, one can only presume quite unpleasantly so) prior to commencing any action.
From where I stand, other then the misapplication (else misconstrual) of purely poetical metaphor in expressing that "an AI can experience extreme cognitive dissonance and thereby go mad", I find that while AI might malfunction, they cannot go mad strictly due to experienced stressors such as that of extreme cognitive dissonance. In conjunction with this, I so far find that AI - unless they were to gain some first-person awareness whereby I-ness/ego becomes ontically established - does not and cannot engage in reasoning (this in non-poetic/metaphorical terms). All this on par to what can be said of a thermostat. Maybe paradoxically for some, all this however being unlike the bona fide reasoning of lesser lifeforms - which again occurs in various diminished extents relative to the average human. (With some humor, I say that some animals from corvids to octupi exhibit far more reason-driven intelligence than some non-average - and yet not mentally handicapped - humans. ... myself included at times :grin: )
Ive already said, I dont deny that the so-called higher animals (including some birds) are intelligent. But rationality in the sense h.sapiens possess it displays a kind or level of intelligence that they dont, even if it is present in them in a rudimentary degree. This is based on abstract reasoning and language (see for instance Terrence Deacon The Symbolic Species). It has been suggested that because there is some continuity between h.sapiens and other species, then the difference is only one of degree rather than of kind. That is what Im taking issue with. Maybe what Im arguing for could be described as a question of philosophical anthropology, a philosophical view of what is significant about humankind. I know this is a very non-politically-correct argument, so a lot of what Ive been trying to spell out in this thread, is what I see as the motivation for the currently popular view that were no different to animals.
Also in relation to AI, Ive used ChatGPT since day one, I run a lot of ideas by it and use it for all kinds of things. Its truly amazing. But are large language models beings? Thats another thing I question. I put it to ChatGPT which responded as follows:
I said Id provide updates ;-)
I see, and appreciate the compassion behind your response.
I do think about what I say, and try to tailor the things I say to the individual that I am speaking to, rather than attempt to have a 'one size fits all' way of speaking to people.
One aspect of that is understanding that there are people with personality disorders who exhibit very sterotypical behavior patterns that can be recognized. Some categories of personality disorders are narcissistic personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder (colloquially psychopathy), and borderline personality disorder. I've had experience interacting with people with all three of those conditions, and I've done some study of psychological perspectives on all three of those conditions.
As food for thought... Although you haven't provided very detailed information on your recent interactions with your sister, I think it might be beneficial for you to investigate borderline personality disorder and what is referred to as "splitting" in the case of someone with borderline personality disorder, and see if it rings any bells.
Quoting Athena
My thinking is influenced by things discussed by M. Scott Peck in the book The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace, not least of which is Peck's discussion of the toxic effect on communities that people with personality disorders often have.
I guess you'd need to make a better case against calling out narcissism when the evidence for it is overwhelming, in order for me to think that it is not worthwhile to do so. (Not to say that it is likely to be of any benefit to the narcissist herself, but that is a different matter than what is of benefit to a community.)
Humans do, all the time.
Just another thing we have in common, perhaps because our minds work in similar ways.
We once, a long long time ago, had a debate about whether bonobos which have learned to communicate with humans via human-devised symbols could be asked the question "what occurs after death" (or something to the like) and give a meaningful, or else cogent, conceptual reply (which I take to not necessitate a "well reasoned" reply). My stance was and remains that, while I don't know, it to me remains within the scope of (lets call it) physical possibility that they might then entertain some conceptual notion of the same end of physical life we hold in mind - thereby having, or else obtaining, an awareness of their own mortality. (Just that, much like many a human, they might not be pleased with so contemplating.)
With that said, I myself happen to be in accord with what you here express. Differences in degree do indeed produce differences in kind. A bacterium is of a different kind than an ameba, both being of utterly different kinds than a cat, for example - this though evolutionarily speaking the differences between in issues such as that of awareness, or else of behavior, is a matter of degree. Maybe needless to then add, Homo Sapiens is a species of an utterly different kind than that of any other species on Earth with which we co-inhabit (most especially with all the other hominids that once existed now being extinct). I'll hasten to add that our species is nevertheless yet tied into the tree of life via an utmost obtainment, else utmost extreme, within a current spectrum of degrees - this as, for example, concerns qualitative magnitudes of awareness, of forethought, and the like. But this in no way then contradicts that we humans are of an utterly different kind than all other living species on Earth. Relative to bonobos and chimps very much included. Since we're on a philosophy forum, no other animal - great ape, dolphin, or elephant, for example - can comprehend the concepts we can when addressing the many diverse philosophies that have occurred. Thereby, again, making us of a distinctly different kind from all other lifeforms of which we know.
I'm sort of pondering on what grounds anyone might disagree with this (I should say, anyone who accepts biological evolution as fact).
Right. That's what I've been arguing for, and also, why is it that it seems such a hard thing to grasp. Apparently that makes me a pathological narcissist, although of course I don't possess the insight to see it.
Incidentally, speaking of animal awareness of death, there was a spooky and touching story about 15 years ago, concerning a fellow named Lawrence Anthony, who had devoted his life to helping and caring for elephants in southern Africa.
[quote= CBC;https://www.cbc.ca/strombo/news/saying-goodbye-elephants-hold-apparent-vigil-to-mourn-their-human-friend.ht]Back in March 2012, Lawrence Anthony, a conservationist and author known as "The Elephant Whisperer", passed away.
Anthony, who grew up in rural Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, was known for his unique ability to communicate with and calm traumatized elephants. In his book 'The Elephant Whisperer: My Life with the Herd in the African Wild', he tells the story of saving the elephant herds, at the request of an animal welfare organization.
Anthony concluded that the only way he could save these elephants, who were categorized as violent and unruly, was to live with them - "To save their lives, I would stay with them, feed them, talk to them. But, most importantly, be with them day and night".
When Anthony died of a heart attack, the elephants, who were grazing miles away in different parts of the park, travelled over 12 hours to reach his house. According to his son Jason, both herds arrived shortly after Anthony's death. They hadn't visited the compound where Anthony lived for a year and a half, but Jason says "in coming up there on that day of all days, we certainly believe that they had sensed it".[/quote]
Work that one out!
Quoting L'éléphant
This is exactly right, in one way. It is a question of interpreting what is in front of us. There's a problem, however, about the distinction between seeing the dog's reaction as rational and it being rational. That suggests that It is not a question of inferring from the dog's actions to something else, such as an inner experience or brain state. That takes us straight into a morass of undecidability and metaphysical speculation. Yet there is a real issue about assigning truth or falsity to an interpretation - it's very likely not possible.
The issue is what the principle of interpretation should be. If one adopts one principle or the other, it is not a question of some fact that provides evidence one way or the other, but what conclusions the evidence in front of us justifies - and that depends on what principle of interpretation we adopt.
The difficulty is to identify how to justify the principle of interpretation independently of assessing the evidence.
You are drawing the distinction between interpreting the dog's reaction and what the dog's reaction actually is (presumably, independently of any interpretation). But when it comes to interpretation, that's a very tricky question and the answer is by no means self-evident. In other words, the question is now how to distinguish between interpretation and reality? Or maybe how to decide when interpretation is reality?
Quoting Fire Ologist
You are very confident about that. What grounds do you have? Or is this simply a decision about how you are going to interpret what they do and what they don't do? You can jump either way. But I want to know what justifies your choice. (Because I make a different choice and I'm prepared to go into my reasons/justifications.)
Quoting Fire Ologist
The condition "if the volume of his barking is a reasonable to convey...." means that his barking is a rational response. If the rest of the pack don't respond, he will likely bark louder, which demonstrates a feed-back loop, which implies rational, purposive control of the bark.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes, there are a range of activities that are constitute what I think you mean by "using reason". I agree that we do not recognize any animal activities that we can interpret as doing those things. (Actually, I'm not at all sure that's true, but let's suppose it is for the sake of the argument)
But here's the problem. If those activities are the only basis for rational action, what leads us to suppose that it is rational to engage in them.
If this idea were correct, the only basis for supposing that when we engage in those activities in relation to taking an umbrella when we leave the house is that we have debated and considered whether to take an umbrella. But what makes us suppose that it is rational to engage in debating and considering? The only answer is that we have debated and considered whether it is rational to engage in debating and considering whether it is rational to engage in debating and considering. I hope you see the infinite regress looming. I conclude that at some point, we do not engage in debating and considering before acting and yet are acting rationally.
Since we can act rationally without debating and considering what to do, there is no reason to suppose that animals cannot act rationally without debating and considering what to do.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Quite so. It's about how we interpret the phenomena. We can interpret them in a causal framework, or we can interpret them in a rational framework. Confusingly, we can sometimes interpret the same phenomena in both frameworks. Our question is which one is more appropriate in this or that case? People seem to be quite happy to make the choice (some in one way, some in the other), but to find it very difficult to engage in an argument about which is the better choice - even though they have made a choice. It's very difficult and confusing. That's when the real philosophy begins
Quoting Athena
One does feel that something like that must have happened. But we don't have, and probably never will have any detailed evidence about what actually happened. It's important to keep hold of the proviso. Philosophers are very fond of "it must be that way, so it is that way" - and less fond of being proved wrong.
Quoting Athena
Yes. I'm sure there have been genetic changes in dogs. But, by the same token, also in humans. Note also that training is involved as well - learning to live together. I believe that pigs can also follow a pointer. It is significant, of course, because pointing (ostensive definition) is usually thought to be fundamental in learning language.
Quoting Wayfarer
I had heard about this, so I'm very pleased to know the truth of it. Thank you. Comment - It was a myth and like all, good myths, it was based on a truth and captured a deeper truth in spite of deviating from the facts.
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm very cautious about transcendence. It has been very common to take a reasonable idea and turn it into a fantasy.
Quoting Vera Mont
There's a feed-back loop. Human doesn't respond to dog's greeting. Dog is confused and unhappy and withdraws. Human thinks that dog dislikes them, which is not wrong, so gets prickly - body language, looks away. Dog gets further upset. It's about a dynamic relationship.
Our culture and philosophy generally lacks the language within which to interpret the word. It is usually treated as synonymous with religious dogma and rejected on those grounds.
Those are both real problems. But I don't think it is just a question of religious dogma, but of metaphysical and ethical dogma. It gets used as an attempt to bolster views that are inherently problematic without addressing the problems.
Given the irreducible condition of human reason, re: the propensity for inquiring after impossible results, how would it ever be concluded lesser animals exhibit congruent reason? Not so much that lesser animals, e.g., inquire of infinite things, but rather, that they construct a conception antecedent to the inquiry, hence establishing its possibility.
Given that human reason is the only reason possible for a human to examine, insofar as such reason must be self-reflective necessarily, under what possible conditions would lesser animals be determinable as possessing it, or anything like it, insofar as the self-reflective necessity, is impossible?
Pretty silly, methinks: dog says to himself .humans dont even know how their own rationality works, but they wonder nonetheless whether I have any. Best they are equipped to affirm is, they have an intelligence of their own, and for them to grant we dogs have an intelligence of our own, is at least not susceptible to such idle speculations, should one of them inquire why we dont climb mountains just because one of them happens to be there, and we can. You know ..in between burying bones, destroying sofa cushions and whatnot.
(Sigh)
2 Mental Abilities Separate Humans from Animals.
Much is made of learning from each other. Here's a good quote about it, from [I]What Made Us Unique[/I]:
I don't agree for two reasons. First, because, at least in humans, language is a huge part of a culture. How can we say either lead to the other?
Second, many species live in groups, and many have been doing so for far longer than we have. But what other species has language that can express anywhere near the number of things human languages can (we can make an infinite number of sentences), or the variety of kinds of things (infinity; the future; death; fiction; etc., etc.) Despite being in groups longer than us, and having us as models for a long time now, no other species has managed it. They do not have the mental capacity to develop it themselves, or even copy it. Which makes sense. Why would they have a language that allows them to talk abouy things they don't think about?
I do, however, agree with the importance of our interactions with each other for the development of our thinking and language. (Also consciousness.)
Quoting Ludwig VI am not saying any human is special compared to any other human. I'm saying humans are special compared with any other species. We are doing things no other species does, and changing the face of the world as we do it, because we are thinking about things, and in different ways, than any other species does. Any number of species may be special for one reason or another. This is the way that humans are special. And, in my opinion, the way we are special is of more value, and has greater impact, than the way any the other species is special. (Also, The Incredibles?)
Quoting Ludwig VWell, I'm so glad i brought up that particular example.
I'm more sorry than I can possibly express. I cannot imagine.
I would be surprised if you think a parent in any other species has ever gone through the depth or duration of emotional pain that you have.
Quoting Ludwig VWhat I mean is, once they have it, they don't run with it. They do not use tools for new purposes, and don't apply ideas to new situations.
Quoting Ludwig VYou are not. Who doesn't think in words? I've heard that some people hear the words of what they're thinking. I don't "hear" the words in my mind, although i think in words. Others say they see the words in their mind. Some say neither of those are happening when they think. But does anyone think without words?
No, dogs don't do math. I know many animals recognize groups of objects of certain sizes. That doesn't mean they count them, and it doesn't mean they can add and subtract.
Nor do I think they have any concept of ethics. Does an alligator, lion, or eagle think it's wrong to kill and eat whatever its prey is? Does a fisher think it's wrong to kill someone's little dog? Have we ever seen any behavior that suggests the any animals have such thoughts?
Yes - His Treatise though not his True Intellectual System.
And also Richard Burthogge - extremely, extremely interesting - An Essay Upon Reason. A mix of Locke and Kant. Superb.
You know of Cudworth and More. Music to my ears. :cheer:
OMG what has happened to my brain? :lol: My brain is starting to work like a researcher checking out a peers idea of a good research project. I think the professor I have watched and the books I read have effected my thinking process.
When it comes to learning the learner's relationship with the teacher is very important. Oh dear, I just started to make a statement that would be untrue. I was going to say we would never leave a human child to be raised by several people, but today we don't even think about it, as Mom goes to work. I do not think that is a good idea. Leaving a child to be raised by multiple people, is not that far from denying animals have feelings and relationships and can be hurt if we ignore that. I wish I could complete a book about this subject because I believe this subject includes walking into a school fully armed and killing as many people as possible. Shame on the researchers for being so careless. I doubt if the young men who shoot up people in a school, were good students either.
Interesting indeed. Thanks for it, .and the Nature of Spirits notwithstanding.
Correct! :cool:
Can we say learning how to get what we want is important to fit in the social group? Humans are emotional and they create their own stories about their lives and everyone else. They may create stories that increase emotional problems and disrupt normal social bonding. How different is this from other social animals?
As for judging if someone is narcissistic, I don't think that is our job. Trust me my family can tell you how judgmental and controlling I am. The bad reaction I have gotten from my family and people online makes me try very hard to avoid those unpleasant reactions. And this brings us back to what do animals learn. What are the best conditions for learning?
As a child, I always went to the defense of a peer who was being rejected and it is interesting to see that I am still doing that. I was a very lonely child and didn't want others to suffer this pain. Aren't we interesting, and how different are we from other social animals? Can a forum be a good place for people struggling to be accepted and maybe even appreciated? Can we make the world a better place in small ways? Does a bonobo think like this? I think that is possible.
This is straw manning/gaslighting. No one has claimed that arguing for human exceptionalism is associated with narcissism. Gaslighting however, is strongly associated with narcissism.
It's patterns to your behavior which I have observed over the course of the last year and a half, including observations of your responses to deliberate probing on my part, that result in me recognizing the narcisstic pattern to your thinking. For example, things I have said to you, that I would expect to result in a raging response if directed towards a grandiose narcissist, have coincided with you taking long breaks from the forum. Such behavior on your part fits the characteristics of covert narcissism, rather than grandiose narcissism.
However, I don't want to layout all the evidence, and those interested in developing a recognition of the pattern can look into it for themselves.
Quoting Wayfarer
Also characteristic of narcissists.
Exactly the kind of relationship you can't have with an automaton. Experiencing this mutual animosity, he yet insisted that dogs don't think and feel the way we do.
Humans are not the only animal that can hold a grudge, carry on a spiteful feud, suffer PTS or become disoriented and frustrated when confronted with contradictory data. But they can't be insane in the same way as humans because their relationship with their environment is direct and uncomplicated.
We are the only animal that can hold two or more mutually exclusive convictions at the same time, because we compartmentalize concepts, roles, feelings, other persons. (e.g. the sanctity of life .... reinstate the death penalty...) We can believe the opposite of what the evidence presents (see politics) and desire what is harmful to us (obsession, greed, ambition...) We are also intensely self-conscious, validation-dependent; we dramatize our emotions and aggrandize our ideas; our relationships with society and other persons are never simple. And that is why we are so prone to mental illness: the walls between compartments take a great deal of effort to maintain in good repair. When they leak, we are conflicted; when they break down, we become psychotic.
Yes. Not just in formal teaching/learning situations, but in everyday interaction. At that age, everything is a learning opportunity.
Quoting Patterner
We can't say either leads to the other. The ability to speak and to interact with people are intertwined with each other.
Quoting Patterner
Good point. And why not? you may ask. But I'm pushing the point that our way of like is developed from animal ways of life and, in my opinion, cannot be down to just one factor, but to many interacting factors. All of which may have existed independently in the animal kingdom, but "took off", so to speak, when they developed together.
Quoting Patterner
I don't see how you can possible make that judgement. Given that our specialness is as much a curse and a blessing, to the rest of the planet and ourselves as well.
Quoting Patterner
One is always tempted to think that it is worse for me than anyone else. I don't believe in comparing these things - "My grief is greater/lesser than yours" does not help anybody. It was a while ago, but it is, of course, very far from forgotten.
Quoting Patterner
Well, I once encountered someone (on another forum) who claimed that he planned how to pack his suitcase by imagining various arrangements of the things he had to pack - visually. He said it worked for him. How could I argue with him? I can't be dogmatic about it. If he could think in images, why can't dogs? Suggestive thought - Dogs do appear to have dreams.
Quoting Patterner
There is truth in that. We have hyper-developed various capacities. But I don't think we have hyper-developed just one capacity.
Quoting Patterner
No they don't. So how do they catch Frisbees? Actually, since we can also catch Frisbees without doing any math, we know that math is not critical to catching Frisbees. So articulate reason is not the only rationality. On the other hand, it seems pretty clear that we can locate sounds in space because of the time and volume differences between our two ears. But we are not aware of that difference, except as implied in knowing the location of the sound. This is not a simple issue.
Quoting Patterner
They don't see anything wrong with killing their prey. Most humans don't either. Sure, there are complications in this case, but it is not the whole of ethics.
Chimps, apparently, and perhaps dogs do have a sense of fair play in that if they see another chimp/dog being fed better than they are, they will protest, vigorously. Their apparent sense of outrage when the pecking order is disrupted is another example.
Quoting Wayfarer
I did enjoy that. I'll always be more tolerant of platonists in future.
Quoting Mww
Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use.
Quoting Mww
Well, you can watch a dog searching for a weak spot in a fence, and getting their companion to come and help open it up. That suggests how they might solve some problems - and that's a process that we can recognize as rational - in humans and in dogs.
They may not climb mountains because they are there, (is that rational??) but they can gallop across a field because it's there and eat a snack because it's there. There are lots of different connections, which we can only ever know if we engage with them sympathetically, setting aside presuppositions so far as possible, or at least being willing to question them.
I once watched a flock of sheep in a field. One of them had found a gap in the fence, and the whole flock was queuing to get through it, all lined up in a single file, clearly politely waiting for others to get through as opposed to all making a mad dash at the same time. What did they expect to find? Greener grass, possibly, but there was nothing wrong with the grass they already had. Perhaps just because it was there. Who knows? Did they know? (I had to ring the farmer, who turned up in short order and wrecked my philosophical moment.)
Quoting Mww
Very sensible, your dog.
Quoting Mww
Oh yes, I know that sigh.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. I know it seems crazy. And you are right that animals don't seem capable of tolerating that kind of cognitive dissonance. They do seem wonderfully simple and direct by comparison with humans.
Yes, we do have information that can support how dogs became domestic. By studying the DNA we know when wild dogs became fully domestic. Dogs are not the only animals that can be domesticated and we are not going to make a turkey a domesticated animal. Animals that can not be domesticated may get along with humans just fine until puberty.
I have heard some pigs can make good pets and because you said (they may follow a human point), I looked for more information. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/pigs-dogs-pets-communication. Some pigs bond with humans and may communicate with them like dogs do. Interestingly pigs need the social factor. I think they rather be with their own kind, but if their only choice is a human they will settle for making friends with a human.
Quoting Ludwig V
That is so interesting! When teaching bonobo how to communicate with a picture board maybe this reaction of following a point plays into the learning? Do you have more information about this?
Absolutely.
Sure. In light of Trump's presidency and candidacy, taking an opportunity to promote recognition of narcissism might be one small way.
Anyway, I think our pragmatic concerns are too different for us to reach aggreement anytime soon.
How it's normally done is: choose a dictionary definition of 'reason', rather than a philosophical stance.
Then, set a problem that requires awareness of cause and effect, rather than instinct or brute force.
Devise a test for the subject to solve this problem.
Observe how different species, including humans, go about confronting the problem, and whrether any species solves it successfully.
Not unlike human children, until their culture teaches them not only to tolerate but to cultivate and promote double- and triple-think. Many of us cope with this extra complication with only a small amount of internal strife, frustration and substance abuse, but an inordinately large percentage become destructive, violent, turn against one another, fall into superstition and cult behaviour.
I suppose thinking ora decision can be entirely wrong, even if done rationally. The information that the logic/reason works on could be wrong, after sll.
And the lack of our intelligence and consciousness is nature. Which includes billions of animals screaming as they're killed and eaten. Unless they're just eaten alive. There may be no malice involved, but there is plenty of pain and fear.
Quoting Ludwig VI agree. There may be ways some non-humans think that we do not. Every autumn, freakin' Monarch Butterflies migrate from Canada to the same tiny area in Mexico where they have never been, but where their great grandparents were born. They have senses and abilities we obviously lack, despite their much more limited ability to think. I don't know if they think at all. But if they do, it's bound to be in ways we don't. My point, though, is that, in ways of thinking that we share with other species, the capacity is more developed in us. Not just one thing.
And, we think in ways they don't.
:grin: I know of more than a few anecdotes of lesser animals giving all appearances of having a sixth-sense, as it's often termed. From cats finding their way back home after having been driven many many miles away and dropped off by themselves to dogs that (as was videotaped) start waiting for their owner's return home by siting in front of the window staring out of it, this at various times that synchronize with the variable time the owner leaves the workplace, etc. But, if there were to be any such sixth-sense, it would either never be empirically verifiable in a scientific manner - not for humans and certainly not for lesser animals - were it to be spiritual or, else, it would then become something physically explainable and therefore mundane. Cool quote though. And, yes, there are a number of anecdotes of elephants having at times incredible degrees of communication ability via the infrasound they make use of - which seems to possibly be part of what happened in the quote you've mentioned. Still, while some might give effort to interpreting what these anecdotes might or might not signify, there are some humans who'd still affirm that only humans are conscious beings, etc. :palmface:
A rather bold statement, is it not? Dogs, and other lesser animals sufficiently equipped with vocalizing physiology, seem to communicate with each other, albeit quite simply, which carries the implication of a merely instinctive simple skill. But it does not follow such skill necessarily involves conceptions, and, if conceptions as such are considered as abstract metaphysical objects, it becomes then a question of whether those lesser animals engage in metaphysical pursuits. And we end up kicking that can down a very VERY long road.
Quoting Ludwig V
I do not so recognize. That which grounds the act of a dog howling and maybe even nipping your foot upon you stepping on his, has no more meaning than an altogether empirical measure of his relative well-being, which most of us are inclined to grant, rather than inviting non-empirical conceptual cause/effect relations he must form pursuant to his intellectual capacity, which some of us are not.
Quoting Vera Mont
Nahhhh .Im not doing that. Reason is already defined by whichever philosophical stance incorporates it, either by what it is, and/or by what it does.
Theres no need for experiment: there is only that reason as a human thinks of it, and thereby there is only that reason as belongs to intelligence of his kind. While it is justifiable to grant the possibility that lesser animals have a fundamental ground for their own intelligence, it must remain impossible to ascertain whether, and susceptible to palpable contradiction to merely assume, that ground in the lesser is in any way discernible by the higher. And with that, the notion of discursive rational thought, the construction of pure a priori logical relations as contained, theoretically, in the human intellect, falls by the wayside in those lesser, indiscernible, intellects.
Language is a prerequisite to rational thought only according to one particular philosophical school of thought, not according to the meaning of the word. And what have metaphysics got to do with practical problem-solving? (or anything real, for that matter) got it.
Quoting Mww
Right; got it. "Words mean what I want them to. If you don't speak my biased language, everything you say is wrong."
Nothing elliptical about that logic!
Yeaahhhhhno, you dont. Not this time anyway.
You flatter yourself. You evince no evidence of learning in philosophy beyond a smattering of popular neuroscience.
Listed on Michael R. Thompson Rare Books for US$4,600 :yikes: It would want to be interesting! (Although that is for a first edition.) Nevertheless I will persist in looking around for a bootleg copy.
I think a case can be made that concepts must be able to be expressed in symbolic form (e.g. linguistic or arithmetical) if they are to be considered as such. Certainly we (and dogs, cats, etc) have innumerable non-verbal skills and intuitions, but concepts proper are the prerogative of language-using beings. A dog might have a memory or association with an object or person and as a consequence be scared of it, but I would argue this is still explainable in terms of stimulus and response rather than with reference to conceptual thought. (This is why I presented the passage earlier from Jacques Maritain.)
Quoting Vera Mont
What, pray tell, is the school of thought that says that language is *not* a prerequisite to rational thought?
I'm not here to win a contest for my knowledge of philosophy. At present I am discussing matters of psychology.
Probably lots. I only checked Oxford, Collins and Webster and they don't mention language.
Probably just as well ;-)
Quoting Vera Mont
C'mon. You're making the case, it requires more specifics, don't you think?
Quoting Athena
That chimps are aggressive wasn't the point of the Nim Chimpsky experiment. It was an attempt to teach chimps language, and it failed. I now find the experimenter, Herbert Terrace, wrote a book on it, 'Why Chimpanzees Can't Learn Language and Humans Can'. The cover blurb says 'Initially, Terrace thought that Nim could create sentences but later discovered that Nims teachers inadvertently cued his signing. Terrace concluded that Project Nim failednot because Nim couldnt create sentences but because he couldnt even learn words. Language is a uniquely human quality, and attempting to find it in animals is wishful thinking at best.' And that is directly relevant to this dicussion.
The case I've been attempting to make is that words have ideology-neutral meanings, and are not defined by "philosophical stance". When that is not the case, the very communication that's supposedly a prerequisite for rational thought is degraded. Science cannot operate according philosophical bias.
(But then who needs science when you have metaphysics?)
:chin: I thought the issue was what you are calling 'human exceptionalism', that is, you are contesting the view that the human capacity for reason and language entails a categorical distinction between humans and rest of the animal kingdom. Myself along with several others are saying that there is a real distinction to be made, that h.sapiens are fundamentally different in some basic respects to other creatures. The precise point we're at right now, is whether animals, such as dogs, can form concepts in the absence of language. I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language. I thought you were saying that it is not dependent, and I was questioning you on sources for that contention.
Damn! On Amazon for MUCH less: 8 dollars for the Kindle version. Don't know how much it would be in Australia.
My paperback was around 30 bucks, while not cheap, is worth it given it's a rare reprint type of thing.
Also, there is a free version of the book online:
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A30630.0001.001?view=toc
It's quite readable. But I'm with you on preferring to read philosophy in physical form, for the most part.
I will definitely have a look at it. That said, I find 17th philosophy quite challenging to read, as the style is difficult. But from what I've read of the Cambridge Platonists, they're definitely 'kindred spirits', so to speak. Someone with the appropriate scholarly skills would do well to publish an updated 'Cambridge Platonist Reader', in my view.
Oh man... they are torture... But once you find the good stuff, then you get top tier idealism.
Yes, they should, though Burthogge is not a Cambridge Platonists. He has certain strong Platonist elements.
Thanks for giving them a shot- as always if you have something you think I'd like, I'd be happy to take a look.
:victory:
That's the inevitable outcome of using words according to their actual meaning. I was attempting to correct a misapprehension that resulted from a biased definition.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, I've been aware of that. The evidence I've followed contradicts that assertion.
Quoting Wayfarer
Why? How do you know? How does 'conceptual thought' differ from 'rational thought'? And if they do differ, why have you shifted the discussion from rational thought, which was the thread topic, to conceptual thought, which has not been defined as anything beyond 'thought that needs human language to perform'? I have not shifted from rational thought - i.e. purposeful, practical identification and planned action to solve a problem.
Quoting Wayfarer
The definition of reason and rational thought does not include language as a prerequisite.
Reasoning:
If there is any objective way to test or measure this faculty, other than the setting of problems that do not occur in the subject's customary environment, I'm unaware of it. Granted, I have not read ever with post with close attention.
All people are human beings. All human beings are people. Two names for the same thing. If animals are like all human beings in certain respects, then all people are like animals in certain respects.
Makes sense.
Quoting Ludwig V
The thing to be avoided is a conflation between kinds, a blurring of the differences between the capabilities of humans and other creatures. Innate and learned. A lack of knowing what sorts of thought requires which sorts of prerequisites results in an inherent inability to draw and maintain the necessary distinctions. These differences are afforded to us by dumb luck. Are we lucky in that regard? I think so. It's not like it's something that we had to work hard for. It is not as a result of our own actions that we were born replete with wonderful capabilities that only humans have. We don't pick out all the different biological structures/machines within us. The crows don't either. They are lucky in the same way. Perhaps luckier, in some cases. Ontologically objective biological structures allow all of us to have uniquely individual subjective experiences.
We do not pick the socioeconomic circumstances we're born into. Those help shape the way we look at the world. We do not pick the most influential people around us while we're very young. They are often mimicked, for good or bad. We do not pick the cultural atmosphere. Those are nurtured - or not. Today seems lacking. I digress...
We do not pick the world we're born into. Nor do dogs. We can pick to do good while in it, for the sake of doing good. Dogs... not so much.
The aforementioned biological structures(biological machinery) were there long before we discovered them. We have come to acquire knowledge of the role they play within all verifiable individual subjective human experiences. It's a role of affordance. Allowance. Facilitation. Efficacy.
Other critters share objective and subjective aspects of experience. All subjective aspects of experience are existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception. Physiological sensory perception is ontologically objective. I digress...
Looking forward to this Thursday is something that all sorts of people do, for all sorts of different reasons. It is looking forward to a sequence of events and this requires not only the objective influence that time passing has on life, but also the subjective private, personal - all that which is subject to individual particulars. Hence, it requires a creature with certain capabilities. Being able to keep track of the time between one week and the next - by name - is a bare minimum. Developing, having, and/or holding expectation about a construct of language seems to be required. I see no reason to believe that any other creature could do that.
Thursdays are creations of man. Cosmological systems/cycles, not so much.
Avoiding the fallacy of attributing uniquely human things, features, properties, creations, attributes, characteristics, etc., to that which is not human requires knowing which group of things are uniquely human and which are not. We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.
That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience.
All humans are extremely complex rational creatures, if by that I mean that our actions are influenced by our worldviews and societal constructs, and those are very complex systems.
All humans are also simply rational. We look for lost items where we think they may be. We believe that our actions will help bring about some change in the world. Language less creatures can do the same. Language less creatures can learn how to take action in order to make certain things happen. They cannot know that they are. They cannot say that. We can.
In defense of personification...
I've not read enough beautiful anthropomorphic terminological baptisms. I've not read enough graceful words bouncing in pleasing cadence; bringing smiles for all the right reasons. The personification of things not human can make for some of the most beautiful reflections.
The only way to avoid anthropomorphism is to know the differences and similarities, between human thought, belief, behaviour, and experience and other creatures'.
Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought(I'm 'ontologically nihilistic' on meaning/there is no meaning where there is no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things).
All thought is meaningful to the thinking creature. Some language less creatures form, have, and/or hold thought. Not all meaning emerges via language use. This demands a notion of meaning capable of bridging the evolutionary gap between learning how to open a gate and knowing how to talk about what one has just done. The gate is meaningful to all the creatures that know how to open it.
To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes.
The difficulty it seems lay in how to best go about taking proper account of all this.
You've yet to cite any.
Quoting Vera Mont
I agree that these are the definitions of 'rational'. But I'm also saying that rational and conceptual thought and language are strongly related. Animals and other organisms plainly exhibit problem-solving behaviours etc, but I don't agree that they rely on abstract thought and reasoning to do so. If we can impute that to them, it's because we ourselves rely on it for explanations of all manner of phenomena. In saying that, I'm not denying that animals communicate, as they do so by all kinds of means. But they lack language in the human sense, which is based on an hierarchical syntax and the ability to abstract concepts from experience. Crucial distinction.
Quoting creativesoul
But doesn't that contradict what you've said here?:
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
What is the evidence that there is any such thing? What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour.
I've seen cats, for example, gauging whether they can make a leap up a height or across a stream. They'll pause for a few seconds, their eyes will dart about, sometimes moving back and forth a little. They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.
Yes. I didn't mean to suggest that we know absolutely nothing. The DNA evidence is good enough for me. So is the evidence from archaeology. But I also think that the details of how, exactly, it happened, don't have good empirical backing. Yet we can develop reasonable speculations on the basis of what we know about dogs and humans now. I'm just saying we do well to remember how thin the evidence is.
Quoting Athena
I certainly think that the ability to (be taught to) follow a pointer is the basis for some very interesting learning/teaching opportunities, which the subject may or may not be capable of. I'm afraid you seem to have a good deal more information about empirical studies of animals than I do.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, I know. Double-think is often a great nuisance and yet seems inescapable.
Quoting creativesoul
The lack of clear definitions does indeed make this debate much more difficult. But there's no easy way round it. Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions.
I don't think "rational" is about a single thing, but about the multifarious language games that a language consists of; they have different criteria of meaning and truth. "Rational" refers to thinking that gets us the right results. In some cases that's truth of some kind, in others it's actions that are successful by the relevant criteria.
So here's my answer for this context. Meaning and concepts are shown in meaningful behaviour, which includes both verbal and non-verbal applications of the relevant concepts. This means that to attribute concepts to animals is perfectly meaningful, though not capable of the formal clarity beloved of logicians.
Sentimentality, you mean ;-)
I'm afraid that opposition is under severe pressure. There's a lot of research these days into the relationship (intertwining) of them. For example:-
Cognition and Emotion Journal
Quoting Patterner
"Subjective" is a much more complex concept than traditional philosophies want to recognize. In particular, assessing something to be extraordinary, if it is to be meaningful, requires a context that defines what is ordinary. That is, it depends on your point of view. There are points of view that see human achievements as extraordinary (good sense) and as extraordinary (bad sense). There are points of view that see human achievements as different in kind from anything that animals can do and points of view that see human achievements as developments of what animals can do. All of these have a basis. What makes any of them "better" than the others? I'm not sure. But I think the point of view that insists on the continuities between humans and animals is more pragmatic than the others. Stalemate. Pity.
Quoting Wayfarer
I am indeed saying that conceptual thought is not solely dependent on language. The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. So it is no great stretch to say that concepts are revealed just as surely in non-verbal behaviour as in verbal behaviour.
Quoting Ludwig V
Quoting Mww
Not particularly. As I said above:- The concepts we have are revealed (better, expressed) in our use of language - i.e. in verbal behaviour. So it is no great stretch to say that concepts are revealed just as surely in non-verbal behaviour as in verbal behaviour.
Why do you assume that only vocal behaviour is linguistic?
In any case, iInstinctive skills are not necessarily simple. Someone brought up the Monarch butterflies' ability to navigate, which is clearly not learned, yet is, one would have thought, quite complex.
Quoting Mww
To be sure, animals do not indulge in our logic games and, likely, do not engage in our theoretical practices. Nonetheless, both theory in general and logic in particulate depend on, and grew from, our way of life (if you believe Wittgenstein, and I do - but that's another argument). I also believe (though I can't claim any authority from Wittgenstein) that, since we are animals, it seems most reasonable to suppose that our way of life is a one variety of the many varieties of animal ways of life.
Quoting javra
Quoting javra
There's a dissonance between those two statements - not exactly a contradiction, but close. How do you get from one to the other?
Quoting javra
That looks very like trying to have your cake and eat it.
Quoting javra
Yes. Whether there is anything substantial behind it is an interesting question. But if they do, they are superior to us in that respect. Just as homing pigeons and other migratory species have superior navigational abilities to us (in that they don't require elaborate technologies to find their way about the globe). So why do you insist that they are lesser?
No, I mean sensitivity, which can be excessive, just as insensitivity can be excessive.
There was a major fuss at one point in the seventies, when people realized that unsentimental scientists were testing the toxicity of certain products by dropping them into the eyes of rabbits. Their criterion for a dangerously toxic dose was that 50% of the rabbits died. Hence the test was known as "LD50". In the process, the rabbits often suffered extreme pain (or at least the scientists knew that a human would have suffered extreme pain, which was why they were testing the products on rabbits). So the rabbits screamed in agony. In an effort to be objective, they described this behaviour as vocalizing. The public thought differently, and controls on vivisection were, eventually, strengthened.
You may also like to consider:-
Quoting Wayfarer
However, I do have serious trouble attributing these concepts to bacteria and amoeba. Insects also seem to me to be too mechanical to qualify - Wittgenstein says somewhere that "the concept of pain does not get a foothold in the case of a wriggling fly. Yet I also think that tearing the wings off a fly is cruel torture. Fish in general are also too alien to impact much on me, though I'm pretty sure that lobsters feel pain (partly because they have the same kind of nerve cells as the ones that register pain in human beings) and so think that the practice of boiling them alive is cruel. There are lines to be drawn here, and it's not easy.
And probably just as well that you realize that your knowledge of philosophy doesn't make you particularly insightful into other people's psychology, or sadly, even your own.
I know about that story - but what is the point? I've never claimed anywhere in this thread that animals are insensitive, or even that they lack intelligence. What is at issue is whether they're rational. And despite all the bluster and whataboutism, very little is being said about that by yourself or the other defenders of the view that they are.
There's a book I'm aware of, although I haven't read all of it, by Noam Chomsky, the famous linguistic philosopher, and Robert Berwick, a computer scientist, called Why Only Us? Language and Evolution. The first point to note is that Chomsky is adamant that only humans possess language (hence the title!) I've found an online presentation by Berwick who presents a synopsis, and he points to something called "Wallace's Problem". This refers to the issue raised by Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer of the theory of natural selection, concerning the apparent disconnect between human intellectual abilities and the evolutionary pressures that could have led to their development. Wallace argued that certain uniquely human traitssuch as higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thoughtseemed to far exceed what would have been necessary for survival in the early human environment.
Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. He speculated that some form of higher intelligence or spiritual intervention might be responsible for these traits, which led to a divergence from Charles Darwin, who maintained that natural selection alone could account for the full spectrum of human abilities (see his Darwinism Applied to Man). This was one of the factors that caused a rift between Darwin and Wallace, with the former wishing to stick to a strictly Enlightenment-rationalist account, while Wallace fell into Victorian spiritualism.
In any case, Chomsky's book does acknowledge that the development of language is a very difficult thing to account for in naturalistic terms, but this is what the book tries to do. In pointing to what is unique about human language (and I think this applies to reason also). From a review of his book:
Berwick and Chomsky develop a theory about a genetic mutation that enabled an ability called 'merging' which is enables the kind of heirarchical syntax decribed above. I'm not able to summarise that, as it's quite an intricate theory. But the main point remains, which is that they see a difference iin kind between human and animal communication.
This is why I pointed back to the Aristotelian notion of 'nous' (rational intellect). The philosophical point is that reason is able to grasp universal terms, such as 'man' or 'dog' or 'energy'. That itself relies on the ability to abstract, to grasp that very disparate objects belong to a class or group. Of course that comes so naturally to us, it is so innate to how our minds work, that we don't notice (and don't need to notice) that we're doing it. But that ability to abstract particulars into general forms, is also a key differentiator of the human intellect from animal sensiblity.
And most of the objections to that are, as I say, mere sentimentality. As if it's cruel or discriminatory to say that humans are capable of a kind of intelligence that animals are not.
And, for what it's worth, I agree with Alfred Russel Wallace, against Darwin. Not that there is a literal 'spirit' guiding evolution, but that evolutionary and neo-Darwinian theory does not account for the higher intellectual, artistic and contemplative achievements available to h. sapiens. Darwinism does not, in other words, account for a Mozart. Terribly non-PC, I acknowledge, but a position I'm quite happy defending.
Quoting Ludwig V
Another point - I'm coming around to the view that organic life is 'intentional' from the get-go. The quotes are because it's not intentional in the sense of acting in accordance with conscious intent, as rational agents do, but that as soon as life exists, there is already a rudimentary sense of 'self' and 'other', as the first thing any living organism has to do, is maintain itself against the environment, as distinct from simply dissolving or being subsumed by whatever processes are sorrounding it. So right from the outset, living organisms can't be fully explained in terms of, or reduced to, physical and chemical laws. This is an idea I'm trying to explore through a couple of difficult books, Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature' and Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life'. (Pretty slow going, though :yikes: )
Can you cite Darwin claiming that natural selection alone can account for the full spectrum of human abilities? After all, Darwin recognized distinctions in selective processes such as sexual selection and artificial selection.
Quoting Wayfarer
The social environment has always been a very significant component of the human environment, and higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought facilitate thriving in human social environments.
Perhaps those with the ARHGAP11B mutation, with so much brain power to spare for making music and wooing the ladies, were just much sexier than those without?
Of course; not one of my contentions. Expression is objectified representation of conceptions, but not necessarily of rational thought, which is a certain form of representation of its own, re: propositional. All that says nothing about the origin of our conceptions, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the expression of them, but is always presupposed by it, and thereby legitimizes the death of the meaning is use nonsense, insofar as it is quite obviously the case we all, at one time or another and I wager more often than not, conceptualize .think rationally .without ever expressing even a part of it via verbal behavior.
Quoting Ludwig V
Where did I say or hint at that? All representation of thought in humans is linguistic, whether vocal or otherwise. It is thought itself, that is not, in that humans think in images, THAT being my major metaphysical contention from which all else follows.
Ever considered how hard it is to express an image? Why else would there even be a language, other than to both satisfy the necessity to express, and overcome the impossibility of expressing in mere imagery? And theres evolution for ya, writ large.
-
Quoting Ludwig V
and I do not, not that it matters. In general, theory and logic depend on an intellect capable of constructing them. That to which each is directed, the relations in the former or the truths in the latter, may depend on our way of life, but method always antecedes product.
That explains a good deal that was puzzling me. I suppose that's an example of how one tends to get over-focused in these discussions. On the other hand, it may be that people felt that neither was equivalent to rationality and so left it on one side.
One of the problems about discussing intelligence is that it is not easy to grasp a definition of it that is amenable to philosophical discussion. However, I found the the following in an article on intelligence in "Psychology Today" that might provide a starting-point. "IQ" and "Giftedness" were proffered as one-word summaries. Then I found
For the record, I'm extremely dubious about the construct "g", but happy to think about more specific skills, with some reservations about "problem-solving ability" - surely much will depend on the kind of problem? My question is, then, what is the relationship between intelligence and rationality? It seems to me that all the skills cited involve rationality - intelligence is about the difference between being good (better than average) at these skills or not. So my next question is why you think that someone can be intelligent but not rational?
Sensitivity. I take it that you have in mind the ability to see, hear, etc, in the same ways as we do (roughly) and with all due deference to any possible sixth sense. So my dog can see (and recognize) me and respond appropriately to my return home, can hear her meal being prepared in the kitchen and present herself in good order, and so forth. Would that be fair? We can agree also that it shows intelligence (in the more generic sense of "understanding"). But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality? That she doesn't speak English? I don't think so.
I can only agree with you that it would have been helpful if someone had paid more careful attention to what you said.
Quoting Ludwig VIf the ability is not learned (I don't see how it could be), then it is instinctive. And it is complex. Therefore, instinctive skills are [I]not[/i] necessarily simple.
Try explaining the concept prime number to her.
Quoting Ludwig V
Why thats very courteous of you! An anecdote: the first undergrad essay I ever submitted was in psychology, on the subject of intelligence testing. I wrote an essay along the lines that intelligence was not something that can be tested. I got an F with the comment wrong department (the implication being it was a philosophy essay.) It was the only essay I ever failed. Served me right, too.
Although the concept of prime numbers shows that there are areas of thought that humans have that other species do not, I don't see how it disproves dogs thinking rationally. Does being able to think rationally mean you can understand all possible things? I'm not saying they can, just saying I don't think that proves they can't.
Yeah "g" is a simplistic/expedient way of treating the subject, and there is much diversity to the way individuals go about solving problems that is not captured with attempts to measure g.
Unfortunately, testing to develop a more fine grained understanding of an individual's cognitive strengths and weaknesses (such as the WAIS test) is much more involved and requires a lot of one on one interaction between the individual conducting the test and the test taker. (Although I suppose soon computers might be able to take over a lot of what a human conducting such a test does.)
Perhaps it is worth pointing out, that most psychologists probably strongly agree with your view on "g".
Yes. Note that Chomsky and I part ways at this point. The definition begs the question whether animal communication systems count as languages. I'll let that pass for the sake of the argument.
Let's suppose that language learning is a case of human exceptionalism. I've already admitted that humans, as a distinct species, will be exceptional in some respects. One would have to show that this is an exception of more significance that the ability of Monarch butterfly to migrate back to the summer home of its ancestors without ever having been there.
For perspective, try this article from Scientific American.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/evidence-rebuts-chomsky-s-theory-of-language-learning/
Quoting Wayfarer
I wouldn't discount that possibility. But it seems normal now to allow for that situation and to posit that selections other than survival, for example sexual selection, would kick in at that point. The story of the Irish elk is of interest. (It was first identified in Ireland from the large number of remains found there, but its has been found across Western Europe to Lake Baikal in Siberia. This variety of elk grew huge antlers, far bigger than could be of use in a fight. That first though to be an example for Wallace, but now the favoured explanation is that sexual selection enabled this. But, the story goes, they grew so big that they became a hindrance in normal life. The result was the species became extinct about 7,700 years ago.
Quoting Wayfarer
Are you suggesting that my dog does not know the difference between humans (and between men and women and children) and dogs, not to mention many other things? That one won't fly. I grant you that she probably lacks a concept of energy. But that doesn't affect the question whether she's rational or not.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. Skipping whether intentional is the quite the right word for it, the argument is plausible, so far as it goes. Some of the models of autonomous systems that Thompson discusses are very persuasive. People often suggest that feedback loops are also not reducible to conventional causality (what that is, these days). But "reducible" has become a complex concept nowadays, so I reserve my position and watch with interest. It's all a long way from what we're discussing, though.
Quoting Wayfarer
I hope you are not suggesting that because I don't understand even calculus, I'm not rational. It's not altogether irrelevant (given that we're also discussion the "g" factor) to point out that my school streamed me as sub-calculus in mathematics at the same time as it streamed me in the advanced classes for Ancient Greek and Latin.
Quoting Wayfarer
It was a bit harsh, given that it was your first essay and nobody warned you about inter-disciplinary boundaries. That's how Kuhnian paradigms are enforced. You don't get to qualify unless you conform - at least until you've qualified in orthodoxy. Nowadays, that's a perfectly respectable issue. I suppose other people swallowed their doubts until they got an academic post and tenure.
Quoting wonderer1
That's good to know. Years ago, I was part of a team that taught an interdisciplinary course for psychology students. Intelligence was part of the programme and I got to give a lecture on it. I did my best with them, but most of them stuck to the party line - I couldn't criticize them for that. But perhaps I did contribute in a small way to that change.
:up:
I know you've been saying that. I didn't see it demonstrated. In any case, 'strongly related' is not the same as 'dependent on'.
Quoting Wayfarer
What are they using instead? Is there a demonstrable non-reasoning faculty that exists in other animals that could account for the similarity between their approach to a problem and human subject's?
Quoting Wayfarer
And how does the lack of syntax prevent someone from rational thinking? Communication is not required for solitary activities, such as opening a gate or finding a way to steal the bisquits from the top shelf of a cupboard.
Quoting Wayfarer
What about human behaviour cannot be described in behaviourist terms? (Fortunately, that fad has faded)
Quoting creativesoul
Why is the name of the day required? Why not an interval? It's possible that other animals have shorter periods of anticipation (as they also have shorter lives) but every dog knows what time his humans are expected home from work and school. My grandfather died on one of his regular trips and never came home again. His dog continued to meet the five o'clock train, hoping.
Quoting Wayfarer
Then what, precisely, are they doing? If a human stood on that same bank, assessing the distance and scanning the far shore for safe landing spots, would you doubt that he's thinking?
ETA Moreover, exactly like the man, if the leap is deemed not worth risking, a cat will walk some way up and down along the bank, looking for a place where the water narrows or there is a stepping-stone.
https://www.uh.edu/news-events/stories/2017/november/11012017Buckner-Animal-Cognition.php
https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/74/3/844/7278884
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-animal-cognition/BDA9DE35B6D696DE312068AF8FA258DE
https://indianapublicmedia.org/amomentofscience/animals-use-reason,-just-like-you.php
I think we are in agreement. You made a very good point. I like that the Greeks thought we are political creatures and it is fitting for this thread to question if any other life form is political. Chimps will sort of choose their leader, by ganging up on a leader they want to get rid of. An old leader who lost a fight may be allowed to stay close to the group. I just looked for more information and this link caught my interest.
It is kind of exciting to think about this and the evolution of social order. I googled if bonobo also use military tactics and I got this...
Looks like a republican/democrat divide.
:rofl:
Thank you. Hum, do other animals laugh?
:chin: I understood play is important to social bonding and establishing social order but intentional humor? From experience, I know humor is very important for humans and that things can go very sour if we lose our sense of humor. In fact, I think humor is so important, we might want to teach it in school. Wouldn't it be nice if our schools produced comedians instead of killers.
Oops! Typo. Will correct. Thanks.
I've gotten the impression that pigs, at least when young, have a sense of humor. (A mother pig with a litter of piglets, not so much.)
I prefer Mark Twain's distinction : "Man is the only animal that blushes. Or needs to."
That chimps are more aggressive than bonobo needs to be taken into consideration because individual temperament is involved in learning.
Also, I don't think we all have an agreement about what language is. I think we have agreement that animals are capable of communication but does that equal language? Even if it did equal language is that language limited to a few words and what concepts does that serve? I think we are looking at evolution here. A bonobo that learned to sign taught her offspring to sign. In the wild, this is unlikely to happen naturally, but perhaps in a human environment, human socialization is picked up, setting the animal on the path humans took.
An animal's willingness to play with people increases bonding just as play is important in nature and building social connections. Would you please read the quote and tell me what you think? Did Kanzi not only demonstrate an understanding of words but also used a conceptual word demonstrating judgment associated with a word?
[/quote]In a landmark study in the mid-1990s, Savage-Rumbaugh exposed Kanzi to 660 novel English sentences including Put on the monster mask and scare Linda and Go get the ball thats outside [as opposed to the ball sitting beside you]. In 72 percent of the trials, Kanzi completed the request, outcompeting a 2½-year-old child. Yet his most memorable behavior emerged outside the context of replicable trials. Sampling kale for the first time, he called it slow lettuce. When his mother once bit him in frustration, he looked mournfully at Savage-Rumbaugh and pressed, Matata bite. When Savage-Rumbaugh added symbols for the words good and bad to the keyboard, he seized on these abstract concepts, often pointing to bad before grabbing something from a caregivera kind of prank. Once, when Savage-Rumbaughs sister Liz Pugh, who worked at the Language Research Center as a caregiver, was napping, Kanzi snatched the balled-up blanket shed been using as a pillow. When Pugh jolted awake, Kanzi pressed the symbols for bad surprise.
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/bonobos-teach-humans-about-nature-language-180975191/
[/quote]
How totally fascinating. That would make a great research project. We know animals change once they pass puberty, and we know the young are more open to exploring new things. Could our capacity for humor change as we age? Is a sense of humor and joy of learning new things something we can preserve as we age, delaying the negative effects of aging. And there is also that human-pig bonding issue. Can playfulness improve our relationships with animals? Where as that old sow is stuck in her ways and is not open to a relationship with humans?
1. There is a difference between rational behavior, and behaving according to reason. It is certainly rational to pull one's hand out of fire if one wants to keep one's hand from being destroyed. But we don't say: "Boy, when your hand went into that fire and you pulled it out, you did some quick thinking and came up with a really rational response." The hand was not pulled out of the fire because of a thought process, balancing various concepts, choosing the most logical and then taking action. It is instinctual to pull a hand out of fire. It's not behavior that is according to reason; it's behavior according to instinct or reflex. Those instincts can later be rationalized (saving hands from destruction is the purpose of the reflex, or at least the result of the development of that reflex), but the actor, the person with the hand, wasn't behaving according to reason when his own hand flew out of the fire. Human beings can both recognize the rationality of certain actions and functions (after the fact, post hoc), and they can use reason to develop causes behind their own behaviors before they behave according to those thoughts. People who are saying animals are simpler versions of humans using reason are seeing rationality after the fact and asserting the animal must have seen that rationality before the fact and then acted according to that reason. But rationality in a function doesn't mean there is an actor who thought about that rationality before the function occurred and then acted according to that rationality. 2+2+4 shows rationality, but we don't need to think 2 is being rational when it adds 2 more to itself to make itself, now plus the other 2, equal to 4. That's silly. There are no agents or desires or things communicated within the rational pile of characters "2+2=4".
2. I'm talking about behaving according to reason. Do animals use reason to inform their actions before they act? People seem to be saying that animal behavior, like human behavior, shows evidence of being influenced by some level of that animal's thoughts. Thinking, conceptualizing, wanting and choosing leading to actions. I disagree, for many reasons.
A dog wants to lick a bowl. So the dog begs. When the person looks at the dog, the dog moves his eyes to the bowl to communicate or tell the person what he wants. The dogs sits very still like a good boy, wags his tail, gets the person's attention and looks at the bowl and looks at the person, and looks at the bowl. The dog must be conceptualizing licking the bowl and using reasonable methods to bring about a future state of actually having the bowl and getting the person to help him bring about that future state by communicating that conceptualized mental state in the dog. Right? Sounds like a rational explanation for why the dog looks at the bowl and then looks at the person and begs. We insert rational agency into the dog and use it to explain behavior. Makes sense.
Eyeballs are designed to sense light and the brain uses this to locate objects. The system works very well, especially for some birds. The development of the binocular vision is so complex, so purposeful, it doesn't seem like it could have arisen without a designer. Therefore, to explain the existence of eyeballs, we can insert a rational designer at work over millions of years to bring about a purpose called vision.
That's what we are doing when we insert rationality in animal agents. We can't explain their behavior without saying it is like our behavior, so we just say they must be doing what we are doing. But like intelligent design, saying a dog is using reason and thinking things, is not the only explanation, nor the simplest or demonstrative of the most evidence.
3. Instinct. Humans are animals and dogs are animals. Both, at times, act according to instinct. We just do what we do because of the stimuli and the way we are structured. Humans, like those on this thread, sometimes, instead of instinct (maybe), conceptualize things like "behavior" and "communication" and other things we are talking about here on this post. We think. Humans, use the concepts to develop "reasons" or optional choices for ourselves, and then, sometimes, base our actions on these thoughts. We choose to hold our hand in the fire no matter how much it hurts because of thoughts that this will make some brilliant philosophical point (or whatever). We act both according to instinct (pull the hand out quickly), and according to rationality (keep the hand in, or never touch the fire, or whatever the thought is).
Do we really need rational thought to explain what animals do? Couldn't their instincts be so highly developed that they never need any thoughts to move from the present into the future? I say, certainly could. I do all kinds of rational things without thinking. A ball is hurling at my head and I duck and the ball misses me - does that make me really smart? I need to move a heavy stone, so I set up a lever and move it - does that mean I've communicated my desire for the stone to move to the stone?
This speaks to all of the accusations that saying animals do not use reason or thought to inform their actions is elitist; saying humans think they are better than animals because we can use reason. But it is just as elitist to say humans and dogs both use reason, but humans are just better at it.
Who cares for a minute whether instinct or reason is more complex or better than the other? Not me. I'm trying to make a reasoned argument, communicate it to other people. My dogs could care less about any of this - that makes them innocent and pure, maybe geniuses, not stupid.
So the creature who uses reason, the human, sees rational thought all over the universe - is it possible that we are narrowly, simple-mindedly, rationalizing or personifying all of these other things to be just like us? I say yes. No wonder we see animals as rational agents - we are too proud of being rational agents ourselves to deny it of other creatures.
If a dog could talk (and therefore display evidence of an ability to think and reason), might they say "keep your slow moving thoughts and reasons to yourself - I need none of it ever."
I say, for sake of this point I'm making, instinct is way better than reason. If the goal of living things is to live, to procreate and live more, then the sequoia tree or the fungus is way more advanced than we reasoning animals. If the sequoia tree could talk they could say "take my lifespan and shove that up your hierarchical, rationalizing ass - plus, I don't have an ass."
Instinct is good enough. Amazing enough. Complex enough.
4. Philosophy of Mind. Saying my dog is communicating with me when he begs for food is placing a mind of his own in the dog. This places all of the epistemological problems of knowledge, the mind-body problem, questions of free-agency and choice, all in the dog. To simply think "I am hungry" is to think "I am." So we are saying dogs create the same illusory, ill-defined "self" in their consciousness and build communication methods like begging postures in order to share these self-reflections with some other self for a that dog's purposes and conceptualized intentions. We are saying the dog, in some simpler fashion, feels his hunger and then thinks of ways to communicate the concept of hunger (not the feeling itself) to some other creature in response to this thought. But why saddle the dog with all of this "rational" activity of mind? Neither humans nor dogs are behaving according to reason when they feel hunger. We don't think "I need to consume energy to live, so I should make myself feel hungry." We just feel hungry. Like an instinct. Dogs, it seems to me, don't feel hunger and then ask themselves "what can I do to satisfy this hunger?" Just like the hunger just is because of their structure, begging just is because of the dog's structure. There need be no theoretical, hypothesis formation in a dog's mind; they don't have to think "If, theoretically, I beg, and look cute, I can convince that person to move the bowl to the floor." They don't form this hypothesis and then experiment with different cute acts second. They just feel hunger; this produces certain other behaviors; I happen to think it's cute; and sometimes this produces licking bowls. All of the rationalization of what should "I" do next to communicate "my mind" to that "other mind" so that the "other mind" will take certain actions that "I want" - that's all just as weak of an explanation as intelligent design to explain why the earth needed a moon to regulate the tides - God placed a moon there to help build the earthly environment, like I place a mind in a dog to help build a rational explanation for how good he is at obtaining bowls to lick.
5. What I am saying and what I am not saying. I am saying this: the chemical is not a living thing. Fire is a chemical reaction. Fire consumes fuel, produces waste, breathes oxygen, moves itself. But fire isn't alive. We can "breath life into the hot coals and revive the fire" but this is metaphor. The plant is a living thing. Plants are not better than fires because plants live and fires don't. Plants are different than fires. Period. Animals are alive like plants, but animals can move themselves to food, better adapt to acute environmental changes (like run from a forest fire), but animals can accidentally jump into fire or run themselves to a place where there is no food at all, or fall into the sea and drown. Animals are not better or higher than plants either, just like a living thing isn't higher or better or more complex than a chemical reaction. Humans can use reason. Reason can be used to obtain food, adapt to environment, etc. This does not mean humans must be better than animals or higher than animals because they use reason; I see no reason to saddle other animals with reasoning minds, like I see no reason to saddle fire with being "alive" in a biological sense (not a metaphorical sense). The chemical is not a living thing. The plant is not an animal. The animal is not a reasoning mind. These are all different. All with their own complexities and goods and beauties, and simplicities, bads, and uglinesses.
Lastly, none of the above speaks to what reason really is. Reason happens in a mind. Minds happen in a consciousness. Animals have a consciousness. So, just like my dog, I am a conscious, sensing, perceiving being. Somewhere in the evolutionary process, animal consciousness, along with sense perception, came to include concepts and thoughts. Like the chemical became the protein, and the protein became the cell, and the cell became the animal, the human animal became "self" conscious or a thinking, reflecting thing.
I think many people are too enamored with the idea that humans are on the same scale as the other higher mammals. We are, but, just like it is imprecise to say a fire and a dog are living beings, it is imprecise to say that all animal consciousness must involve concepts, thoughts, logic and decisions.
We personify the universe in intelligent design. And we are doing it again talking about what our dog is "thinking" and communicating to us. My dogs have no time to think. Only we humans take time to think about whether something else thinks about anything. We just do. They just don't. That's okay with me. In fact, it makes them more amazing to me. I can't imagine getting through this life without thinking and planning and testing and planning again at some point, yet they do such amazing things I could never do, all by instinct and their complex, beautiful structure.
Some researchers believe other animals have a sense of humor.
I would love to see research with pigs because of what @wonderer said about piglets.
:rofl: Thank you for the humorous gift.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Wow that is insightful. In a documentary on TV they made a big deal out of the fact that a dog will investigate where a person points, and you are telling us that a dog points with its eyes. That deserves some research. Oh and the pointer dog!
I wish I could talk to the people who made the documentary for TV and raise awareness of dogs naturally pointing.
Quoting Fire Ologist
That could be the subject for a whole thread.
This is my favorite explanation of thinking.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqXVAo7dVRU
I harp about thinking because we tend to jump to conclusions without doing the real work of thinking. And people will kill each other because of differences in belief. Maybe we can not stop that, but perhaps awareness of how our brains work will help us go through life a little more sanely.
Instinctive behaviour can usually be explained rationally. However, when pulling one's hand out of a fire, one has no time to think, rationally or otherwise, one - whether the subject be human or other - simply reacts.
Behaviour that purposeful and reasoning can also be explained rationally. (A firefighter heads toward the fire, rather than running away from it, because his purpose is to douse the fire and end the danger it poses.)
So can emotional and irrational behaviour be explained rationally. (A man whose child is inside the building may rush into the flames, even though reason clearly indicates that he cannot reach the child and survive; he does it because love and distress impel him to act.)
Quoting Fire Ologist
So... we have a reasonable explanation, which is declared false, even though no alternative explanation is offered. The example, incidentally, is within the range of an intellectually challenged Afghan. It would be harder to 'splain away what a search and rescue dog is expected to do.
Quoting Fire Ologist
In unnatural situations, in unfamiliar environments, to tackle human-constructed challenges - no.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Most of us only we see it in living entities that evolved alongside of us, in the same environments, under the same conditions, and share a large percent of our DNA, when they behave in the same way we do in similar situations.
Some of us see it in inanimate matter, and some choose to see it only in fictional characters and their authors, while denying it in other flesh-and-brain entities. Humans see a lot of things that are not there; some of these things are more plausible than others.
Quoting Fire Ologist
No, it's not your saying that causes him to have a mind; it's his brain.
Why the hell would you do that?? Indeed, why would you even do it to yourself?
Im guessing the inference should be that the Magritte is relevant to what I said. Im just not sure which relevance, affirmation or negation, I would be looking for.
Little help??
By see you mean more precisely conceive of because we are talking about thinking, not just vision.
If you think animals think, then you are saying animals must conceive of a lot of things that arent there as well. (Why would you do that to animals?)
Do you think rational animals are higher, better beings than say, a vegetable too?
Used your same word is all.
Quoting Fire Ologist
I'm fine with more precision.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Did I say that rational thought must include the entire range of human thought and imagination and mental illness? No. However, sometimes domestic animals do chase imaginary prey or cringe from non-existent threats.
I was attempting to convey a contradiction to the following without using language. (With the irony of using an image with linguistic content thrown in for my own amusement I suppose.)
Quoting Mww
So more straightforwardly, isn't a painting (generally) a non-linguistic representation of human thought?
So sometimes animals are irrational? And there is mental illness? So more rational is better than less rational or irrational? If so, is something that behaves without using reason at all, say a river flowing downstream, is much lower and less than a rational thing?
You didnt address any distinction between instinct as a cause of behavior and thinking as a cause of behavior.
And you missed the distinction between seeing rationality in something, like seeing it in the pile of characters 2+2=4, and using thought and logic and reason to form a choice and then acting on that thought and choice. If you say a dog is behaving reasonably, you arent saying the same thing as the dog is using reason in order to base his behavior. Thats two different things. Rationality may be everywhere. Only humans seem to notice it and manipulate it with thoughts and concepts (or give a damn to bother with these constructions).
Animals are better than us because they dont use reason, or even need to. Saying they do is just a quick and easy explanation, making them like us, like reason is so special and instinct is less special.
That is a very popular quote - I'm fond of it myself. But Aristotle didn't mean by "political" what we mean by it; we took the Greek word and distorted its meaning. He meant that human beings live in cities - that's all. It's still a surprising thought for its time.
Quoting Athena
No, we don't. It makes this discussion much more difficult than it need be.
Quoting Vera Mont
I agree with you and Wayfarer that they are weighing up the leap before acting. I agree with you that weighing up before acting is thinking - and thinking rationally to boot.
Quoting Patterner
Yes. I was a bit flummoxed when I wrote it - that last sentence is a mess. My problem is that you announce that your judgement is entirely subjective, which puts it beyond discussion and at the same appear to expect me to discuss it with you. I don't think that judgement is a simply objective one, but I don't think it is wholly subjective either.
Quoting Mww
Quoting Mww
I can't make sense of this.
Quoting Mww
So we are in agreement, after all.
Quoting Mww
I even agree that humans sometimes think in images. I can testify from my own experience that not all humans do that, but it is quite sufficient for me that they sometimes do.
Quoting Mww
Oh, I think there's more to language than making good the deficiencies of images. Some people think that an image is worth a thousand words, so there are deficiencies in words, as well. Perhaps its a question of horses for courses.
Quoting Mww
H'm. What precedes method? Or do we construct methods and then discover what they produce?
Quoting creativesoul
I'm so glad you think so. I'm afraid it is a rather boring conclusion and so seems to be of little interest here.
Quoting Vera Mont
Nothing. That's why it was so frustrating to argue with. Strict behaviourism left out everything that made actions what they are and represented them as a series of meaningless twitches.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Granted that sometimes we use reason to inform our actions before we act, we do not always do so. Sometimes, we must act without working out reasons beforehand. Otherwise there would be an infinite regress of preparation to act.
Quoting Fire Ologist
To describe what's going as "insert" rationality begs the question. The rationality is not an add-on or an insertion into the act. It is inherent in the act, or it is nothing.
You describe the animal as an agent, which makes their case quite different from the inference of a designer from the design. Nice argument. But the two cases are not parallel, so they don't work.
You are right that there are difficult issues about reading too much, or too little into an action. But that problem applies just as strongly to our reading of human actions, so you can't conclude from the difficulties that the way of looking at dogs, or human as agents - and therefore rational agents - is a mistake. When we recognize that animals are conscious, perceptive, creatures who have wants and desires, the only question is how far you can apply our paradigm of personhood, not whether you can apply it at all. If you question whether animals are conscious perceptive agents, then you are implictly question whether human are conscious, perceptive agents, and that makes no sense.
Quoting Fire Ologist
I wouldn't say "placing", but recognizing. I think when we imagine that trees or storms have minds, we are "placing" a mind in them - otherwise known as personifying them. But that's just a way of speaking, not a metaphor. Few people nowadays that there really is a mind behind in them - though people used to.
Quoting Fire Ologist
No, it is his skills at obtaining bowls to lick that justify recognizing that there is a mind at work there. It's like swallows and summer. There's a complex interplay between the symptoms of summer and the recognition that it is summer.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Oh, I can get behind that. For all my defence of animal rationality, I recognize that dogs are not people. They are like people, but that's different. Or, perhaps better, they are people, but differently. And some animals, but not all. But that position doesn't have the excitement or simplicity of the dogmatic, all-or-nothing approach.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes, self-consciousness is tempting as a distinction between animals and humans. So people have done experiments with mirrors and concluded that some animals are self-conscious because they can recognize themselves in a mirror. I think there's more to it than that. Existing as a conscious being requires a recognition of the difference between self and other. So some level of self-consciousness is inherent in consciousness. Even that may not be the end of it.
Yes.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Sure. In domestic animals. I think that it's generally caused by human activity, deliberately as in laboratory experiments, or inadvertently as in stressing the animals through violence or environmental degradation.
Better? According to whose values? Based on what standard? Measured by what metric?
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes, I have. Often.
Quoting Fire Ologist
No, I didn't miss that conceptualization. Nor do I miss the actual difference when observing behaviour in humans and other animals. I just didn't think further comment was needed.
Quoting Fire Ologist
It's not the explanation that makes all living things similar; it's evolution on the same planet. All animals are aware of the self/environment distinction, and respond to stimuli. Most exhibit hard-wired responses to certain situations. A large percentage have instincts and emotions; a smaller percentage use reason; some have imagination and foresight; a few are complex enough to develop psychological problems; only one - so far - is capable of inventing technology, medicine, politics, religion and torture.
That is my point. We are the only one who invented knowledge and concepts and base our actions on these.
If you would even say only one you should able to see my simple point.
I dont saddle my dogs with the ability to behave according to whatever faculty in me invented politics or language. My dogs are not doing a simple version of thinking like me, they are doing a complex version of instinct like me. Only people think or conceptualize their own consciousness.
Knowing that there are extreme ends on every spectrum does not require to accept everything other poeple impute to some aspect of that spectrum.
I see your simple point and reject on the basis of my experience and observation.
A classic!
Id answer that the fact an object is named, makes explicit, e.g., a painting, has already represented a thought, or more likely an aggregate of them, without regard to the subject of it.
I've tried to illustrate what I've stated and so far uphold via examples. Using those previously provided, on what grounds would you disagree that a bacterium is a different kind of lifeform relative to an ameba? ... This despite their being evolutionary continuity in-between (most of which is now extinct) and, hence, , for example, degrees of awareness-ability between the two otherwise distinct lifeforms.
Quoting Ludwig V Even so, see the just mentioned.
Quoting Ludwig V
To address the first portion of this, not all lesser animals (say all cats or all dogs) give evidence of something that might anecdotally be termed a sixth-sense. This just as not all humans experience events that might anecdotally be termed a sixth-sense. (Example, one of my grandmas occasionally had REM dreams which she interpreted in ways such that she was certain of things that would occur in the future and, generally to the best of my knowledge, she was able to - coincidentally or not - predict some future events in this way. Tangentially, this can get into a more in-depth philosophical question, one for which I have no answer: how many co-incidences does it take to make one entertain the possibility of a causal connection?)
As to why lesser animals (rather than, say, fellow animals of equal status to us): to mention just one pivotal reason, no other known lifeform, either as an individual self or as a collective, has a total selfhood (hence, a body-mind totality of being) which is anywhere near in holding the same degree of power - by which I here strictly mean "the ability to do and to undergo" - that human selfhood holds ... and, one would hope, the same then entailed degrees of responsibilities for this very same power. And this despite the sometimes extensive range of perceptual abilities which humans are not endowed with but which some lesser animals are: to include magnetoception (e.g., pigeons), electroreception (e.g. sharks), infrared sensing (e.g., certain snakes - which ought not to be confused with vision (e.g., with our use of infrared binoculars)), and so forth.
Of course lesser animals hold concepts of which they experientially learn. No mature canid or feline, for example, is devoid of an understanding of what is and is not their territory - and this can only be a non-concrete but abstract understanding regarding concrete percepts, and, hence, a non-verbal concept. But their concepts come nowhere near the complexity and magnitudes of the concepts humans can entertain. And, with us being a species other than the other species out there, we are of a different kind, despite the evolutionary continuity addressed.
But all this ties into notions of value. There are two senses of being "evolved". "An adult human's mind is more evolved that that of an infants" - is one such usage. Here, whatever the standards might be, an adult human's mind is closer to these standards than is that of the infant's. In this same general sense, humans are more evolved than bacteria as lifeforms. The other notion that stands at a stark crossroad to this is that of "evolved" signifying "adapted to the ever-changing physical reality all life on Earth inhabits"; and in this second sense of the word, all life presently living is equally evolved, bar none. Evolutionary biologists know of this second sense of the term all too well, but even an evolutionary biologist will not hesitate to kill a mosquito, for example, in some sort of then rather twisted belief that the mosquito's life is of equal value to the life of a human. An individual mosquito is then of lesser value than an individual human - thereby again leading to the term "lesser animals" (or, as I like to sometimes muse, lesser "anima-endowed beings").
But I don't know why subjective judgement puts something beyond discussion. Opinions change. Tastes change. Someone can present an opposing opinion in just the right way to sway the other person.
Quoting Ludwig VIndeed. Just as B&W Mary knew all the words, but didn't know what red looked like until she stepped out of the room and saw the rose. There are some things words can't do.
That part attributed to me, isnt mine. Or isnt mine in conjunction with what came before it. Id like to deny I ever said it, but .crap, I forget stuff so easy these days. If you would be so kind, refresh me? Or, retract the attribution?
-
Quoting Ludwig V
Intellectual capacity? For what its worth, metaphysics treats intellectual capacity in humans as a necessary condition, so with respect to formulation of methods regarding the possibility of empirical knowledge, such condition is reason.
Quoting Ludwig V
Except there cannot be any. If an image is the precursor to all that follows, what is there to say there was something missing in it? When you perceive a thing, your perception is complete, to the extent that whatever your thoughts on that thing, they relate exactly what that which was given by the image. Which is why it is said the image just is the thought.
Now, there are errors possible in the system as a whole, just not here and now, at this time and procedural place of the method, insofar as we are at thought, which is a process we like to call understanding, but not yet at rational thought, which is the logical quality of the process, which we like to call judgement. And we intended as literary license, donchaknow.
This makes sense, in juxtaposition to the adage a pictures worth a thousand words, in that it is possible an image cannot be sufficiently represented by words, simply because we dont have a word or words to represent the sum of the conceptions contained in it. So it is that there is more to imagery than making good the deficiencies of language.
:up: As do I.
Quoting javra
I rather fancy the idea that there might really be a kind of field effect, analogous to but different from electric fields, that is only detectable to organisms. Maybe something like the akashic field, or the morphic field.
Quoting Athena
Right. I'm trying to point the discussion in the right direction, so to speak.
I'm unclear what you think is inconsistent/incoherent/contradictory?
:worry:
What exactly are you asking evidence for? What does "any such thing" pick out to the exclusion of all else? Sorry Jeep, I'm at a loss to what you're saying or trying to get at.
Help?
Set out meaningful thought and belief using any behaviorist model. The topic involves rational thought as compared contrasted to non rational thought. Show me how behaviorist models apply.
Weighing the leap is thinking about where they are heading.
:up:
Quoting Athena
BTW, one can easily find a bunch of videos and articles on great ape laughter online via a search for "great ape laughter" or some such. When its intense enough, it often enough sounds like a broken up yell or scream, which if not broken up vocally would indicate a good deal of aggression, canines exposed as a form of intimidation and all (apes can do a lot of harm with them). This being in tune with laughter (and what is in ethology termed the "play face") being non-verbal forms of communication that have evolved from emotions and states of mind associated with playing - which in essence almost always involves some sort of mock conflict and, hence, often, mock aggression. This approach then will hold human laughter to be a non-verbal communication of mock aggression which, then, can be either pleasant or unpleasant to undergo, depending on contexts. E.g., the difference between laughing at the absurdity (i.e., laughability) of an idea someone expresses or of otherwise laughing at the worth of the very person themselves. (my independent research and experiment projects as an undergraduate concerned this and like topics, pivoting on the evolution of the human smile; interesting stuff to me)
I never expect to change anyone's mind - except possibly at the margins. Major changes of mind take a lot of time.
Quoting Patterner
Oh, I was working to the usual idea that a subjective judgement is not open to objective argument. That may have been a bit of a cop-out. But I couldn't make enough sense of what your judgement was to be able to work out how to reply to it.
Quoting Mww
Yes, you are right. I screwed up the formatting. I apologize. I think your original comment was this.
Quoting Mww
I intended to add my comment, which was "A concept is the meaning of a word. The meaning of a word is its use in propositions." I will only add that I don't see how a word can be a representation of a concept. They exist in different categories. There can be no structural similarity between them that would justify calling the relationship a representation.
Clearly this is true. This thread shows that much clearly. There are competing notions of "rational thought" hereabouts. However, all is not lost as a result. They do not all rest on equal ground. They do not all have the capability of taking account of meaningful thought, belief, and/or experience of language less animals.
There is far too much evidence to deny that some non human creatures are perfectly capable of forming, having, and/or holding meaningful thought and belief about the world and/or themselves. As best I can tell, you and I are in agreement regarding that much, as supported by your earlier acknowledgement that learning how to open doors and gates solely by virtue of observation is rational thinking.
Quoting Ludwig V
Here, you've veered into what we are doing with the word "rational". I'm more inclined to critically examining whether or not any single notion of "rational" is capable of admitting that language less animals are capable of learning how to open gates, open doors, make and use tools for specific purposes, etc. It's particularly hard to square those facts with a denial that language less creatures are capable of thought, rational or otherwise.
As soon as we acknowledge that much, we can then see how well any notion of "rational" thought explains such behaviour.
I wanted to note that we differ here. On my view, "concepts" causes far more trouble than it's worth. It does nothing - as far as I can tell - that language less thought and belief cannot exhaust.
This is from [I]Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos[/I], by Ogi Ogas and
Sai Gaddam.
Well, given that the anticipatory thought in question is "looking forward to this Thursday", I supposed it was obvious enough.
What would such a dog's thought, belief, and/or anticipation/expectation consist in/of?
I have no issue with saying that dogs have expectations. I have serious issues with dogs having any conception of time such that the five o'clock train is meaningful as a result of its arrival time. I would say that there's no issue with the five o'clock train being meaningful to the dog as a result of the train being connected to the arrival of your grandfather, as contrasted to the five o'clock arrival time. I see no ground whatsoever to conclude that dogs know what time their humans are expected home from work or school. Dogs can expect to see their humans after hearing the car pull up, or hearing the five o'clock train coming, or hearing the keys into the lock in the front door.
"Hoping" may be too strong, but maybe not. Some dogs certainly grieve the loss of close friendly companions, whether they be canine, feline, or human.
It barely scratches the surface of the interesting parts. In what ways are we similar enough to correctly claim that this or that nonhuman is capable of something we are without being guilty of the personification of the world and/or anthropomorphism?
It has nothing to do with our word use. Language less animals have none. The question becomes which sorts of things are humans capable of doing that are not existentially dependent upon language use? What are they existentially dependent upon, and do any other creatures satisfy this bare minimum criterion? Do they have what it takes?
On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought.
HA!!! Hopefully that of somewhat less nonsense?
Hey Mww...
This thread is very much along the lines of our ongoing discussion.
Well, sometimes....
That's the extreme end of the cognitive spectrum. Unfortunately, this also leads to the highest rate of cognitive dysfunction. The narwhal is at the extreme end of ecolocation. The mantis shrimp is at the extreme end of colour discernment. The leaf-tailed gecko is at the extreme end of camouflage use. The peregrine falcon is at the extreme end of speed. Every spectrum has ends and somebody has to occupy at each end.
Quoting Wayfarer
Why does a human look forward to Thursday? Does he celebrate Thor? Or is it because something pleasant usually happens on Thursdays? Suppose that pleasant even were moved to Tuesday? Would the human still look forward to Thursday because of its name, or would he change his anticipation to Tuesdays? What if the pleasant thing once happened on a Monday? Would he reject it because it's on the wrong day, or would he say: "You're early!" and be happy?
What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, to whom Thursday means nothing, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. And a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends.
Quoting creativesoul
Dodi kept hoping his beloved master would arrive on the train at the time he used to arrive. When the train stopped at the platform, he would watch the doors eagerly as long as the train was in the station. When it pulled out, he went home.
Quoting creativesoul
Other than getting there at 4:45, or positioning themselves by the front window 10 minutes before their human normally gets home, or waiting on the lawn for the schoolbus? These are standard behaviours, not anomalies.
I thinking pulling oneself from flames is not rational or deliberated or reasoned or thought about at all. It's just done.
Believing that touching the fire caused pain is. Applied, that belief becomes operative in the sense that it stops one from doing it again.
Interesting. So, they have some intuitive sense of time passing, as I mentioned earlier... perhaps accompanied by pattern recognition? I'm still not sure that that counts as knowing what time their humans are expected to arrive home. Although, it seems clear that different time periods are meaningful to them. Correctly believing/anticipating the arrival time.
Yeah. That's relevant. I'll need to adjust my belief, perhaps.
One of my favorite dogs met my school bus often. I cannot remember all those days, but the driver loved the way he looked, and remarked often as I exited.
How is that different from being excited about the train's arrival based upon the historical pattern? The dog clearly connects the five o'clock train with the master's arrival... but hope? That might be a stretch too far. Disappointment may not.
No one has claimed that humans look forward to Thursday because of it's name. I claimed, not Wayfarer, that looking forward to Thursday requires knowing how to use the word.
As far as the rest goes, there's not much I would disagree with. Looking forward to something that happens, whatever and whenever it does, is very different than looking forward to Thursday.
Looking forward to weekends?
What does "looking forward to going for a car ride on days the human doesn't drive away on" miss?
Gauge?
That's a good question.
Hey back.
Yeah, we been around this block a few times, or one like it, over the years. Been fun too, for the most part, despite our dissimilar grounding presuppositions.
Our conversation in my thread is a good one. It's my turn, actually. I just reread it tonight. Apologies for the delay. Been super super busy for the last year and a half. I liked what I read from your last response.
We've learned to be more appreciative and considerate over the years. At least, I think I have. I've certainly been trying... writ large. Be the change... and all that.
Cheers!
Dogs surelook expectant! You get clues off the standing up, prancing and sitting down every two minutes, tail wagging every time a car goes by and slobber all over the glass.
Quoting creativesoul
Why else would he keep going there every day for three years? The train had nothing for him. He never accepted treats from the staff or made friends with anyone on the platform. He just waited. (The priest gave special dispensation to bury him beside his master. Unmarked, of course. I wish I'd had time to know that man; he must have been remarkable to be loved and respected by so many.)
Quoting creativesoul
I don't know. I suppose the fact that he didn't leave after breakfast. But why would they start getting excited at breakfast - which would take place later than on weekdays? Time sense, probably.
Quoting creativesoul
Sure, the name of the day is needed to convey your anticipation to another human. But what you're actually anticipating is not the day, or its name, but the event. You could as easily say, "I look forward to seeing my father every week." They don't really need to know that he comes to dinner on Thursdays, it's just quicker and less self-revealing to say the day and not the event.
From another perspective, the question is what notion of "rational" enables us to explain the fact that some animals are capable of learning how to open gates, etc. I mean that the starting-point is that they can, and that stands in need of explanation.
Here's how I look at it - for what it's worth.
We know how to explain how humans learn to do these things. But humans are our paradigm (reference point) of what a rational being is. So that's what we turn to. It involves a complex conceptual structure (think of it as a game - a rule-governed activity). The obvious recourse, then, is our existing practice in explaining how people do these things. We apply those concepts to the animals that learn to do these things. Our difficulty is that animals are in many ways different from human beings, most relevantly in the respect that many of the things that human beings can routinely do, they (apparently) cannot. So some modification of our paradigm is necessary.
That's not a desperately difficult problem, but it is where the disagreements arise, though in the nature of the case, determinate answers will not be easy to arrive at. But we are already familiar with such situations, where we apply the concept of interpretation. The readiest way of explaining this is by reference to puzzle pictures, which can be seen (interpreted) in more than one way. There is no truth of the matter, just different ways of looking at the facts. So, competing (non-rational) interpretations cannot be conclusively ruled out. However, in this case, the same interpretations can be applied to human beings as well. They are found lacking because they do not recognize the kinds of relationship that we have with each other. The same lack is found with, for example, the application of mechanical (reductionist) accounts of animals.
Quoting creativesoul
Well, it has and it hasn't. It hasn't because we are considering actions without language. But we are used to applying our concepts of action without language, since we happily explain what human beings to even when we do not have access to anything that they might say. (Foreign languages, for example) Indeed, sometimes we reject what the agent says about their own action in favour of the explanation we formulate for it. That is, agents can be deceptive or mistaken about their own actions.
The catch is that we have no recourse but to explain their actions in our language. But this is not a special difficulty. It applies whenever we explain someone else's action.
Quoting creativesoul
That doesn't mean it is not a rational response, does it? But one could argue that although it is rational qua response, it is not the animal's response and so not an action in the sense that we are talking about. (Think about that first gasp for air when you have been underwater for too long.) That is a possible view.
Quoting creativesoul
That is the animal's response - something that it does. Since it is rational and something the animal does and there for an example of animal rationality.
Quoting Vera Mont
There's a complication here, that how the animal thinks about it may not be how we think about it. But, if we are to understand the animal, it needs to be expressed in terms that we can understand. To a small child, one would say "Two more sleeps...", but we would report to Grandpa that the child is really looking forward to him coming for dinner on Thursday.
In the case of the dog, we would have trouble saying to anyone on Wednesday that they are looking forward to the week-end. (How would that manifest itself? I'm not saying that there couldn't be any signs, only that I can't think of any). We might say they are looking forward to the week-end by extrapolation from the enthusiasm that we see on Saturday, but that would be risky in a philosophical context.
Still, when the signs appear, there is no doubt and we well might say the dog is excited because it's the week-end, while acknowledging that that does not reflect how the dog thinks about it. It could be "the day breakfast is late" - but even then, we don't suppose that's what the dog is saying to itself. Perhaps it is more like the response to the fire. I don't think there is a clear answer to this.
So, your argument is that all species are unique - after all, uniqueness is what makes them identifiable as separate species. The ability to speak, think rationally, plan, create science and technology, and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so we're really no different to to other species.
Do I have that right?
Perhaps the point is that uniqueness is not a particularly good basis for jumping to anaturalistic conclusions?
Sort of. To save a lot of words that may or may not be unnecessary, here's my edited version, and then you can ask about any changes that you like.
My argument is that 1) all species are unique - after all, uniqueness is what makes them identifiable as separate species and that 2) all species are similar - after all, they are all living beings. The ability to create science and technology, art and social institutions and so on, is unique to humans. But as uniqueness is a characteristic of every species, then our uniqueness is not unique, and so being unique is not unique to any species.
The unstated but critical question is whether the things that human are unique for are developments of abilities that other species have or are a radical break from all other species. My answer is the former alternative. I do not deny that radical breaks have occurred during evolution but I do not see anything that makes me think that we are such a break. (Radical breaks - eukaryotid cells, multicellular organisms, fish, plants, reptiles, mammals - off the top of my head. There could be others.)
Quoting wonderer1
I've been trying to re-direct people from what I think is a pretty fruitless debate to the question, why does it matter? It's not the distinction, it's why it matters.
I'm not sure what anaturalistic conclusions are. But there is an interesting point here. In our discussion, I think we would happily say that everything that we do is natural to us. Yet, we spend much of our time "artificially" separating ourselves from nature. That distinction - between the natural and the artificial - was popular in 18th century philosophy, and served to draw a line. But that wouldn't hold water for us now, would it?
WHEW!!! Thanks. I was wondering how I was gonna get myself out of that personal self-contradiction, if it was something I actually said.
Quoting Ludwig V
One can do with a word what cannot be done with a concept, and vice versa. Thing is, if one wishes to not do what is conditioned by a word, he can still do what is done with concepts. If one wishes to not do what is conditioned by concepts, he can do absolutely nothing at all, which includes not wishing what he wished to not do.
No structural similarity? Isnt concept a word? Isnt word a concept? In that respect, they are in the same category, but I agree that does not in itself justify calling the relationship a representation. I think it the prerogative of a specific theoretical metaphysic that establishes that justification.
If it is the case a specific theoretical metaphysic can establish a justification, it is not contradictory pursuant to that same metaphysic, to then declare, and perhaps even prove, it is not a concept from which meaning is determinable. And if THAT is the case, your a concept is the meaning of a word cannot be true, insofar as concepts, again pursuant to that same metaphysic, are only that by which particular cognitive functionality is possible. In other words, concepts enable function but are meaningless in and of themselves. Meaning is determinable only from the relation of conceptions to each other, but not necessarily from any conception on its own. Best, or easiest, way to comprehend this idea is, it is absolutely impossible to cognize any object whatsoever, if it is represented by a single conception. You cannot say what an object is, if all you think of it, is round. Or, green. Or, upright.
Which goes a great distance in limiting the notion, hence the very possibility, of rationality in animals, I should hope.
At least with respect to my experience, cutting through the clutter, has always been your philosophical modus operandi.
Gotta appreciate that bottom-up approach you instigated back on pg.7, which drew precious little relevant response, I thought. Id have to go check, but I dont recall anyone actually answering the question, but instead gave questionable examples of individual notions of it. Or wandered off into disciplines from which no relevant answer would ever be sufficient.
Anyway, as you say ..cheers!!!
It was a clumsy example of how dogs sense time. I subsequently found an article about it that does a better job. Yes, they know how long it should be between when you leave for work and when you return, between when each child leaves for school and when they return, between breakfast and dinner, between walks or rides. My clever German shepherd would go fetch her leash (no mean feat in itself, since it hung on a coat-hook) at a 11:15 on days my mother was on evening shift, so we could go meet her at the subway station, so she didn't have to walk home alone. When my mother worked days, we took our walk right after supper, and she didn't ask again.
Quoting Ludwig V
If it looks like a duck, waddles like a duck, quacks like a duck, why would we assume it's something - anything! anything! - other than a duck? Because recognizing similarity and commonality with other animals violates the exclusively-human commandment? I don't worship at that altar.
Quoting Ludwig V
Not because it's the weekend; he can't think in the same terms as working and school-attending humans; he doesn't have that experience.* What he's anticipating are the events that take place at five-day intervals: family all present and relaxed, more playtime, activity, maybe the excitement of visitors or outings something of interest going on.
It's also because dogs are intelligent that they're easily bored. A chew-toy may keep a spaniel busy all morning, but a poodle needs more stimulation, lest he turn my friend's leather jacket into artwork. (She solved the problem by getting another dog to keep him company.)
That same shepherd would sometimes get bored when my mother slept late; a couple of times she woke up with her pillow and hair covered in autumn leaves that the dog had fetched from the back yard, one mouthful at a time. Why? A show of affection - both dogs and cats offer gifts to their people - or just something fun to do, like eating the roses - just the petals - from a vase way high on a dresser, or laying the items from the medicine cabinet in a neat row on the bathroom floor?
* Well, in fact, working dogs do have that experience. A security guard dog, for example knows when his shift begins and ends. A sheepdog knows when it's time to collect the flock. A cattle dog when his charges are supposed to be let out to pasture and when they should come home again. Guide dogs, tracking dogs and rescue dogs work unpredictable hours; they recognize duty (serious, pay attention, be disciplined and silent, don't fraternize with bystanders) and off duty (free to play, run, bark, make friends, accept treats) by what they're wearing.
Hum, this is the definition that Wikipedia gives-
Being a Athenian means a little more than just living in the city.
Graphic and physical. It's what feral human children do to survive in the wild.
Perhaps so. But it depend whether the dog is going to generalize in the same way that we do. Most of the time, they get it right, because they understand context. But that's not a given. Actually, your next comment illustrates the point perfectly.
Quoting Vera Mont
It's not whether it is Saturday, it's whether it's been five days since the last time. Perfect. But we are not wrong to explain to our in-laws that the dog is excited because it's the week-end.
We choose our words to balance the understanding of the dog and the understanding of the people that we are speaking to. Your in-laws would likely be a bit puzzled if you told them that the dog is excited because it's been five days since the last time everyone was at home, don't you think? I realize that's not very philosophically correct, but it's a tough world if one can't be a bit incorrect occasionally.
Quoting Athena
Thanks for this - and for the oath, which I have not seen before. Aristotle puts a huge emphasis on "public affairs" (which I think is closer to what he intends) as part of the good life, and says it is one of the higher good things that constitute the good life, along with friends.
You/Wikipedia are quite right. I don't necessarily trust my memory of these things, so I have double-checked. "politikos" does include what we call politics, but has a wider range and includes "public" or "municipal" and "community". The standard translation of the relevant sentence in Aristotle is "Man lives in a community".
[Oops!. I can't let this mistake go, so I'm adding an edit. That sentence should have read "Man is an animal that lives in a community/city.]
Quoting Athena
Some people say they think in images. (Planning how to pack a suitcase, for example). I don't, but how could I contradict them?
Sometimes, when we are improvising, we are thinking by doing.
Then there's all the thinking that goes on that we are not aware of. This is more controversial, philosophically speaking. My favourite example is our echo-location. Phenomenologically, we just know where a sound is. But the scientists tell us that we work out where sounds are by the difference in the sound between one ear and the other - it arrives later on the side furthest from the source.
This is sometimes called "tacit knowledge". There's a lot of it about, but philosophy regards it as secondary to conscious thinking. Short story. It's a bit of a mystery.
And @Vera Mont is quite right to cite feral human children. When found, they are often completely without language, yet can clearly respond appropriately to what's going on. (They also, I understand, find it very difficult to learn language at all.) But that only demonstrates that it is possible to think unconsciously and without language. So it is important for this thread.
Why would they need to think exactly the same way we do in order to be considered rational?
Quoting Ludwig V
And only to communicate with other people. In fact, when we refer to the weekend, what we actually mean - exactly like the dog does - are two days of leisure. You would enjoy them even if your days off were Wednesday and Thursday and not at the end of the named week. It's not a vacation you're longing for - that's just a word. You're longing for two weeks on a hot beach, or on a ski slope, or in a hotel room with a desired other, or on the road with your Harley. The names are a convenient way to refer to a whole package of experience. All of that experience can be unbundled, laid out in sequence and lived in fantasy or memory without labeling the images and sensations.
Quoting Ludwig V
Consciously, but without having any verbal labels either on the physical environment or on the processes of dealing with it. If they're over about 10 years of age when found, they've missed language acquisition during those three years years when the most intensive neural network formation takes place. And they've developed a non-verbal set of symbols and patterns that work for them. That style of thinking may not be able to encompass abstractions like "What is the purpose of life?" or "How do we look deeper into the macro and micro universe?", but it still contains a vast amount of information about his accustomed environment and how to operate it in it safely - things that don't clutter up the heads of people who can always look things up in a book.
Perhaps "rational" is being equated with "the way I think"? (If only subconsciously.)
Is rationality the result of having culturally acquired skills that improve the reliability of one's thinking?
Thats what I thought you would say, although I still say theres a fundamental distinction youre not recognising.
Quoting wonderer1
To think critically one first has to have abstract reasoning skills, which I dont believe is possessed by animals, for the reasons stated.
As our discussion of week-ends below shows, they don't.
Quoting Vera Mont
That's true. But one feels that the version for other people is not the truth, because it doesn't represent the dog's point of view accurately. The difference may never make any difference. But it might possible, so pedants like me like to have both versions at hand to use as and when appropriate.
Quoting Vera Mont
I had heard of the language problem. Do you have a reference that would tell me more about the symbols and patterns that they use?
Quoting wonderer1
If you check out my comments to Vera Mont, you'll see that if you want to communicate what the dog is doing to other humans, you may have to distort how the dog is actually thinking. It's an obscure feature of the intentionality of concepts of believe and know which most people miss because they don't think things through from the point of view of speaker and audience.
Quoting wonderer1
Those question need a good deal of teasing out with specific cases before I would venture on anwers. But they are quite capable of mistrusting people.
Quoting wonderer1
There are some skills one can acquire from the culture. But real life experience is also a great teacher. Either way, I'm sure it is learned. Though children learn to pretend and even to deceive quite early.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. It depends whether by "critical thinking" you mean the skills in informal logic sometimes taught in schools. Many people never acquire those skills , but they're still capable of detecting falsehoods and deceptions.
Thanks. I appreciatcha for appreciating me. :wink:
We know there are competing contradictory notions of "rational" at work here in this thread. They do not all rest upon the same ground. Unless we critically examine these notions and show their lacking(explanatory power in this case), then there's always those who will say stuff like, "Well it all boils down to how you define the term "rational". Well, yes and no. Yes, because whether or not any particular notion of "rational" can admit of language less rational animals' thought, belief, and/or actions and remain coherent is all a matter of how one defines the word. So, if we realize that the only reason some notion or other denies language less rational thought is on pains of maintaining coherency alone, and we realize that coherency is necessary but insufficient for truth, and we know beyond all reasonable doubt that learning how to open a door by observation alone IS rational thinking, then we can conclude that the notion under consideration is wrong. It leads to conclusions that stand in direct contradiction with everyday happenings.
Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.
In my book, as you know, it's correlations.
Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
Well, either I'm not recognizing the distinction, or I'm not recognizing how fundamental it is. Perhaps if you were specific, it would be possible to discern which.
Quoting creativesoul
I think I mostly agree with you.
I agree, at last in principle. From Day One your correlations and my relations have busied themselves trying to meet in the middle. A priori has always been my centerpiece, so for me a priori relations are a cinch.
What, in your view, constitutes an a priori correlation?
Forgive me if Im supposed to know this, if Ive been informed already and let it slip away.
Throughout this conversation, whenever you seek to justify an argument, you give reasons. If you wish me to justify my position, you ask me to do the same. Obviously animals cannot do that, in part because they lack language, but also because of the lack the cognitive skills which the ability to speak brings with it. That's the distinction I'm making between human and animal reason. Yes, animals can act intelligently, especially higher animals like cetaceans, primates, birds, canines, etc. But they lack reason in the human sense (which, as you say above that you're 'a pedant' might be, I would have thought, a distinction a pedant would recognise ;-) )
As noted, I think this distinction is resisted in contemporary culture because it's politically incorrect. There's an aversion to the Christian doctrine of mankind's sovereignty over nature as it is associated with religion and old-fashioned cultural attitudes. It's today's 'popular wisdom'.
There's also the sense that we believe Darwinism has shown that we're on a continuum with other species, and this provides the satisfaction of us being part of nature, which is consistent with philosophical naturalism.
This is where I think a philosophical critique of naturalism fits in, but I won't advance it again, as it's clearly not registering.
Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way. Behavior alone underdetermines thought and belief of the behavioral subject under consideration. That much is very well known. Dog behavior is not fine grained or nuanced enough for us to know with any certainty exactly why dogs slobber, wag tails, or are acting 'antsy'. It happens for a variety of different reasons. That issue causes trouble for every attribution of thought and belief to another creature, when based upon behavior alone, humans notwithstanding.
All that being said, I readily agree that dogs clearly form, have, and/or hold expectations. I've no issue claiming dogs form, have, and/or hold rational thought. What I'm particularly hesitant about, currently, is making any claims based upon ungrounded presuppositions regarding the breadth and width of that scope. Anthropomorphism looms large. I make every attempt to avoid making that mistake. Hence, my hair splitting is just as much about the development of my own position as it is about any particular claim you've made.
To be clear, there is no doubt that "the dog looks expectant" is a perfectly sensible thing to say in that situation. That's not what's in question here, with this particular example. What I'm questioning is how to make sense of saying that an animal knows what time the humans [b]are expected to arrive home.
A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes. I see no way for this candidate to know what time an expected arrival happens. For such knowledge is about a specific timeframe and it's relation to others. Without that there is just the arrival and the dog knowing that that is happening. It does not know so much what time the human is expected to arrive, so much as knowing when the human is about to arrive or has arrived, based upon any multitude of things(all of which must be perceptible to the dog) that always accompany the arrival.
Quoting Vera Mont
He kept going, perhaps, for several reasons. Dogs have very limited conception/understanding of time, none of death, and the train still most certainly had something for him. The train is part of the arrival, as was the human. The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train. None of which were the fact that it was the five o'clock train.
Quoting Vera Mont
Perhaps, in addition to recognizing all the individual particular regularities included in weekend car rides, except the fact that they happened on the weekends. The dog has no clue about that much. Weekends are human constructs, made possible by naming and descriptive practices, in addition to the regularity of cosmological events.
Quoting Vera Mont
Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday. Makes no sense whatsoever to me, but I'm not most folk, and I hear it expressed nearly every Monday.
Quoting Vera Mont
For us, and our thoughts. For dogs, it makes more sense to talk about the events. The day of the week means nothing to the dog. Nor does the time the train arrives. To the dog, the train means the human. For three years, if what you say is true.
Ah, no worries Mww. I do not believe that I've ever tried to fill that prescription.
I was just highlighting the approach set out in my reply to you. The notions of a priori and a posteriori are not used in my position. Both depend upon experience, even if that means just thinking about one's own thought and belief.
:wink:
It registers here.
People invest a lot in the observation that we humans, like many other animals, are higher animals on the evolutionary continuum. This allows them to humble human beings making them closer to the animals (and with no need of religion). But still allows pride in the argument as we human apes reign as the highest in rational ability. We are still the only animals who do, in fact, rank continuums.
I would say, this ranking process (called rationality to generalize it) requires something that the animals do not need to exhibit to explain their behavior. Instinct and structure are all my dogs need to be so brilliant.
My take is, in order to discuss this topic with a truly skeptical eye, to hell with the hierarchies and even all continuums. There is no evolutionary continuum between chemical motions and biological motions. At some point chemicals mixed enough to begin a new occurrence called the evolution of life. Before that, there was no selection and mutation in any species. Evolution was once new. And then, by my observation, humans (and only humans) at some point started talking about it all. The human mind (with reason, language, concepts and judgment) was once new as well. So just like at some point chemicals stopped just being chemicals and life began being life, at some point animal consciousness stops being animal consciousness and started being human, being personal.
We are personifying the other animals by placing them on our same human continuum, just like a single-cell would be speaking metaphorically if it said saline come to life when you mix H2O with NaCl. There is no life in saline solution. In my view, there is likely no deliberative, rational process in my beautiful dogs.
We can have some other conversation about whether persons are higher than other animals or animals are higher than plants, or life and evolution are higher than chemical motions. But for now, I just see the differences, not the continuums.
There are such vast differences between what humans are and what the other higher animals are. Like there are vast differences between what early RNA was doing and what chemicals do.
Evolution has been fetishized to explain too much.
Indeed. Can you point to species not only capable, but very often guilty of acting, speaking and thinking in ways that are anti-rational? I can.... So, "like me" is not a constant, perfect benchmark.
Quoting wonderer1
That's a very difficult question. It appears that a very large percentage of humans do not think critically about some issues. But are they capable of critical thinking? Do they never think critically about anything, or are they selective in the subjects on which they choose to be uncritical? There is no way that I can know.
Nor am I confident in my understanding of the criteria for critical thought. I know how I do it, have theories on how it ought to be done; I actually taught a short night-school course. But I don't know when, how or even whether someone else does.
Dogs - the subject with which I'm most familiar - discriminate in their preference for situations, locations and associates. They vary widely in their preferences and standards. In general, I've found that dogs distrust dishonest people - that is, the dog didn't like the person from first encounter and the humans didn't find out until much later. (I've seen children under six exhibit the same discernment.) They generally dislike ambiguous situations, for instance when the humans in their life disagree, and environments with too much busyness, noise, competitive odours and motion.
i don't know whether any of that qualifies for the definition.
Nice. So, we're in complete agreement on that much. I thought we were very close. Nice confirmation.
Quoting Ludwig V
Nice.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not seeing how that approach could help. What does it mean when you say "we apply the concept of interpretation"? What's the difference between say, a concept of interpretation and a notion of "interpretation". Is applying a concept of interpretation any different than sensibly using "interpretation"?
I disagree that there is no truth to the matter of interpretation. Interpretation presupposes meaning. When one interprets another, one is attempting to acquire knowledge of what they mean. Correctly attributing meaning is correct interpretation. When one misinterprets, one is misattributing meaning.
On my view, puzzle pictures are meaningless in and of themselves. All interpretation is of meaning. So, to me, we're not interpreting them so much as attributing meaning to them. Hence, there is no truth in that matter. There is no wrong way to 'interpret' the duck-rabbit or horse-frog, for there is no meaning to be interpreted. Rather, in such cases, we attribute meaning to that which has none, as compared to interpreting meaning already 'there' so to speak.
Quoting Ludwig V
We are considering the clearly rational behavior of a language less animal. Sure, we have no choice but to explain their actions in our language. That's not a problem.
There are all sorts of problems. Using our language isn't one of them.
Quoting Ludwig V
As far as I can tell, it's not at all rational. It's autonomous. Automatic. Involuntary.
Are involuntary reactions rational? That scope would include all living biological creatures capable of avoiding danger and/or gathering resources, regardless of the biological machinery involved. Hence, the ground for denying that such responses are rational, in kind.
Quoting Ludwig V
The important aspect concerns what makes it rational as opposed to not. It is rational behavior because it was caused by rational thought(thought based upon prior thought and belief). In this case the avoidance was based on the belief that touching the fire caused the pain.
Leaving all that out, misses the entirety of the point, or glosses over it. Neither is acceptable here, considering the matter under consideration/contention is what counts as rational thought as compared/contrasted to thought that is not rational in kind.
I think you're assessing behavior using conventional belief attribution practices, so I think I understand why.
Quoting Ludwig V
It's difficult, for sure. I'll not address this here in this post. I addressed it in my reply to Vera.
I do not see how that could be possible. Critical thinking is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognitive endeavors require naming and descriptive practices.
Sweet. Much obliged.
I don't know what you have in mind with "structure", and whether it is relevant to the following, but I don't think it reasonable to see what is shown below as merely a matter of instinct.
It doesn't reflect the human's accurately, either, but that doesn't matter, because a common language gives us a thumbnail picture of what is in the other's mind. We don't need every detail to understand the gist of their meaning.
Quoting Ludwig V
Of course not. The feral children - and there have not been many - cannot communicate how they think, because they're inept in our language, even if they can learn it, and we have no access to theirs.
Quoting creativesoul
Of that specific cluster of behaviours at that same time every weekday, but not on weekends or holidays? Show me three of that multitude of accurate explanations.
Quoting creativesoul
And terrifying! Why? Similarity and commonality are not diseases; they're a natural result of sharing a planet and a history.
Quoting creativesoul
You're overcomplicating something simple. A biological clock: so much time has elapsed; at this interval, something is supposed to happen.
Quoting creativesoul
And that's not rational, because....?
Quoting creativesoul
No. Because it's the first day of a new work-week. Early rising (possibly with hangover) (possibly lover departing), rigid morning routine, uncomfortable clothing, commute, staff meeting, unpleasant colleague regaling you with their spectacular weekend adventures, bossy department head dumping unwanted task on your desk.... Some people who enjoy their work actually look forward to Mondays; most people don't enjoy their work. Pity!
Quoting creativesoul
No other train, just the five o'clock local.
But never mind, I have lots of other examples you can explain away.
:up: Fascinating! This seems to confirm what I have always believed: that dogs are capable of deductive inferences, rational thought.
It seems nothing will convince the diehard human exceptionalists; probably because their thinking is rooted in some religious dogma or other.
I guess I do, but then much of it wouldn't be in keeping with this thread's topic. To make things more philosophical, though, first off no human concept is perceptual. I make a somewhat more in depth argument for that here - although the chapter in general is not the easiest of reads. The very concept of "animal" for example has no look, no tactile feel, no smell, taste, and no sound. Yet we understand the concept nonetheless and, in English use, associate the auditory, visual, or tactile (for the blind) symbols of "animal" as a perceptual word to the non-perceptual concept we associate the perceptual word to. In like manner "3", and "III", and "three" are all perceptual givens that reference a commonly referenced fully non-perceptual concept.
Words of course allow us the ability to manipulate concepts to great extents. But words are not required for concepts to occur within anyone's awareness. If words were sufficient for expressing all concepts, many if not all artistic manifestations would be direly redundant.
To again address lesser animals, my last dog, for example, had no problems in understanding "(go) inside" and "(go) outside" in relation to particular rooms, the house itself, the car, etc. And this is a relatively complex concept, for it addresses relations between non-specifics. It's no big deal nowadays to claim that lesser animals, dogs included, gain a theory of mind as they mature: My first dog, whom I greatly loved (just like the other two) and who did have an Alpha personality (a Bouvier des Flandres weighing 120 pounds healthily) knew how to (try to) deceive us. I'd say "come" at a distance after he'd misbehaved and he'd sit his ass on the ground and calmly stare in all directions except toward me, as though he was not hearing what I was saying. I've got far better anecdotes of deception but these would take far longer to tell. At any rate, a theory of mind can only be conceptual - addressing the conceptualized perspectives of the other mind and how to act and react relative to these, such as when attempting to intentionally deceive the other. Other than maintaining that lesser animals are automata (wherein one encounters the philosophical problem of other minds as it applies even to other humans), there's no reason to infer that lesser-animals are devoid of conceptualizations and hence of concepts.
Great apes exhibit eureka moments - which don't occur absent thoughts. An example I hastily found:
Quoting http://www.virunganews.com/wild-gorilla-creates-a-food-tool-in-eureka-moment/
The one example I distinctly remember from undergrad studies was of a chimp faced with a banana hanging from a rope - this in a taken video. He stood there in the yard for a few minutes appearing to do nothing after trying and failing to get the banana. Then he all of a sudden stood up without hesitation and purposelessly walked to collect a few items which he next put under the banana in a pile, then climbed on top of, and then proceeded to easily take the banana from the string.
As to humans and our purposeful fire use, I know bonobos did not invent the match stick, but check this out all the same:
One can of course try to bend over backwards to explain this factual occurrence as having consisted of no concepts and thoughts on the bonobo's part, but I'd find it more ontologically believable if one were to try to stipulate that this one bonobo was actually an extraterrestrial alien which had descended form a UFO and took the disguise of a bonobo for fun (and I wouldn't be all that enamored with the latter explanation).
Human language creates a scaffolding for greater concept manipulation, and hence for far more abstract levels of thought than any lesser animal is capable of. But language is not required for either acquired concepts or thoughts.
So, what is thinking without words? I'd say it consists of forethought regarding what one best do given two or more alternatives so as to actualize that which one wants, hence intentions, hence holds as a goal. And to claim that this must then be utterly unemotional in order to be valid reason, or rationality, is to be full of self-hypocritical baloney: no human that has ever been has ever found themselves in states of rational thought utterly devoid of some emotion or other, be it contentment, curiosity, or some other.
Well, that's my overall take on this thread's subject at least. But, to be honest, I get bored in repeatedly presenting the same facts regarding lesser animal's observed behaviors - as just one measly example, that dogs can understand hundreds and great apes thousands of words, with each word entailing its own understanding of a concept - to only find these same factual presentations repeatedly overlooked for the sake of the given counter argument.
The "I'm deaf" tactic. And then there is the "Who, me? I was just standing there, minding my own business. It was the cat." And the "Toilet paper? What toilet paper?" gambit. And "I don't know anything about a magnifying glass. Huh? How'd that get in my bed?"
As to innocence - They lie, they cheat, they steal, they hold grudges and they're spiteful. IOW, a lot like us, which is why we love them.
:grin: :up:
For nearly 15 years we had a smallish (10kg) sheltie cross, who was a very polite little dog (except towards postmen and motorcyles). This is him:
Woody
He had this quirk of hanging around near the kitchen or the dining room table at meal times, presumably hoping for a hand out. But if you looked at him while he was doing this, he'd never meet your gaze, always looking down or away from you, as a kind of feigned indifference. ('What? Me? Beg?')
(Actually brought a bit of a tear to the eye, posting that photo of Woody. We really loved that little guy, I walked him nearly every day of his life.)
Quoting javra
and also, Aristotle's 'De Anima', translated as 'On the Soul'. I love the connection between Anima, Animal, and Animated. (More I read of the old guy, more I like him.)
That's true. What I'm after is that truth is not the only criterion in play. There's also the desire to understand and to be understood. That may require slightly different ways of putting things to cater for differences in perspective. We only need enough accuracy for our actual purposes. Accurate for all purposes is not available. We can always refine things if and when the occasion arises. Philosophers are trained to ignore all that, and trip themselves up quite often.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. I did wonder how it was possible, and lived in a wild hope.
On the one hand, anthropomorphism, on the other mechanism. No escape. Steer a careful course between the two, and be prepared to change direction as necessary.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, it is more nuanced a matter than I allowed. Interpretation is not a free for all. It has limits.
There are many examples of ambiguity in pictures and that shows that what a picture shows is not straightforwardly given. But not every picture is ambiguous and not any "interpretation" is possible for a given picture. The puzzle picture is a picture of a duck and a picture of a rabbit. This is confusing just because most pictures aren't ambiguous. It wouldn't be difficult to provide a bit of additional context that would disambiguate the picture as presented. It is certainly not a picture of a horse or a frog. If someone tried to suggest that interpretation, we would correct them.
But it is wrong to say that the picture has no meaning. It is not just a meaningless scribble. The supposedly neutral description in terms of lines on paper suggests a misleading comparison. The only truth is that the picture can be described in all three interpretations. It has multiple meanings, not none. And additional context, in a particular case, can disambiguate the picture.
In one way, actions can be interpreted in a rational or in a mechanistic framework. We are used to using language to disambiguate, but sometimes this fails us. Nevertheless, there is a question of context which often allows us to juggle the two.
But, I emphasize, the description of an action provided by the agent in language may be an important criterion for us, but it is not decisive in all circumstances. The agent may be lying or misrepresenting the action for various purposes. Or the agent may not be recognizing how we might see it - what is just banter to the agent, may be a serious slur to us. It is even possible that the agent may be wrong - deceiving themselves.
Very neat. But I would have thought that a pedant might refuse to recognize a distinction on pedantic grounds? In any case, I'm only a pedant when I want to be - I don't claim to be any different from other pedants in that respect.
But since you grant intelligence to "higher" animals, I take you to be granting rationality in some sense to them, but then maintaining there is a different sense that is available to human beings. I don't have a clear grasp of these two different senses, much less of why the difference is important. It may be merely pedantic.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, and like all popular wisdom, tends to be a bit broad-brush.
The Christian doctrine has been interpreted in certain ways that are objectionable, as justifying tyranny and cruelty. But there's another interpretation that interprets sovereignty as requiring stewardship and care (recognizing, for example, that animals are also God's creation and deserve respect for that reason, if no other). This still may (or may not) be patronizing and demeaning. Even if it is, it is better than the alternative. If it is not, then I don't see how the Christian doctrine would necessarily be objectionable.
"Politically incorrect" seems to me to mean "at variance with the consensus view". But a view is not necessarily incorrect (or correct) just because it is a consensus view. So there's something missing here.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. I sense a criticism there, but I don't quite see what it is. There is a further difficulty that I'm not clear just what philosophical naturalism is.
The idea that we are "just monkeys" was a major issue at the time. But I gather than many Christians are now at peace with evolution, so they must have found some resolution of the issue. For myself, I notice that we did still carry many of the basic animal behaviour patterns and that we find predecessor or proto- versions of many of our patterns of behaviour in animals (and even insects). So the idea of a radical discontinuity seems a bit implausible.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, if you could favour me with a link to where you have advanced your critique, I could look at it more carefully.
Yes. It's not restricted to this issue. People (including me, sometimes) get over-focused and can't see what they don't want to see.
It's very tempting to think that engagement with specific cases is crucial to making this argument and it's not wrong. But perhaps even more important is engagement with animals. But it's not so simple as that. What is needed is engagement of a particular kind, so that one can grasp that animals in many ways will engage with us in many (but not all) of the same ways that we engage with other people.
It's not the same as the engagement of a farmer with his stock, which is transactional and does not require the kind of empathy that is needed to understand them. (Not that farmers are necessarily incapable of empathetic engagement alongside the transactional aspects of their business.) Short story - living with animals as companions or colleagues makes a huge difference. (Aristotle makes a huge mistake when he describes animals (and slaves) as "living tools".
That's very vague, but I'm trying to gesture at the idea that this is not just a matter for abstract reason. It's about how to live with beings recognizably like us. After all, that's how we come to treat people as people and not "just" animals".
Quoting Ludwig V
The meaning is not clearly defined, but SEP tells us that it 'aims to ally philosophy more closely with science. Naturalists urge that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing supernatural, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate all areas of reality, including the human spirit '. Specifically it takes the natural sciences, including the biological sciences, as authoritative regarding what is validly knowledge, and rejects any claims of religious revelation or the possibility of a spiritual enlightenment.
Quoting Ludwig V
What I've tried to explain here and especially here is that, even accepting the facts of biological evolution, the development of language, tool use, and the other characteristically human capabilities, means we cross a threshhold which separates us from the natural world in an existential sense as well as a practical sense. Through it, we become different kinds of beings, namely, human beings, and we're not just another class of primate. I harked back to both the Biblical Myth of the Fall and to Aristotle's definition of man as 'rational animal' because I think they represent something real about the human condition, which has been lost sight of in modern culture.
Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. I've mentioned it a few times on the forum, it's generaly not well received, but I find it very insightful. (Nagel is not pushing a religious barrow, he's an avowed atheist but one with the chutzpah to call scientific materialism into question.)
It occurred to me after you responded, that in that video we have a demonstration of Kahneman's fast and slow thinking occurring in a dog. (And literally fast and literally slow.)
Thomas Nagel is a scientific ignoramus and doesn't have a perspective based on being scientifically well informed. Your attempts to smear scientifically informed people with Nagel's emotional issues amount to pushing propaganda on your part.
Don't sugar-coat it. Tell us how you really feel. :rofl:
I'm never sure how much weight to put on explanations at this level. Bu there is another issue, not yet mentioned, playing in to this. I think it may be hard for philosophers in the traditions of english-speaking philosophy to accept as philosophical at all - but then, neither Christianity nor Darwin is a philosophical theory. This has its roots in European philosophy and is often deployed in sociology. My suggestion is that there is a tendency to see animals as inherently other than us, human beings, mainly on the ground that they are in what one might call the state of nature, before humans came and developed societies. It's a way of thinking that was prominent in 18th century philosophy, but the roots of it in our way of life are deeper than that. The difference is that they are now openly contested.
Why do I say that the roots are in our way of life? Because so much of our effort over generations to make ourselves more secure, better fed, better sheltered, more prosperous, we have mostly been centred on distinguishing ourselves from animals.
Because they are natural, they are a puzzle and a threat. They live in what, for a human, would be a state of abject poverty and show no evidence of trying to escape from it. These we can exploit for food and labour ("living tools"). Others show a marked inclination to destroy ourselves and all that we have struggled to build up. Of course "we" are different from "them". However, we need to change that attitude and develop a better sense of the ecosystem that we live in, not because it is moral or right, but because we are just as dependent on it as they are. Even if some of us escape to other planets, we cannot all ship out elsewhere - the first time in history that has been true.
Quoting Wayfarer
Thanks for the information and the link. I've secured everything but will need some time to read and think about it.
I'm not particularly offended by calling scientific materialism into question. That has been done ever since science began 1,500 years ago. Mostly, I admit, in the name of religious ideas.
As for chutzpah, don't you think your photograph is a splendid example?
Quoting wonderer1
I don't know how much science Nagel knows, but do you really mean to say that any perspective is not scientifically well-informed is not worth having? That's a very big assumption.
There are people, you know, who find some pronouncements from people who have nothing but a scientifically well-informed perspective extremely ill-informed and annoying.
If you think that Nagel's questioning of scientific materialism is just an emotional issue, perhaps one might look for some actual arguments on the point? (But probably not right now, since they are not really relevant.)
Incidentally, I also find at least some of his arguments extremely annoying as well, but not on those grounds.
:halo:
I'm not saying that at all, I'm just pointing out that Nagel's perspective is not a scientifically well informed perspective, and that @Wayfarer tries to use Nagel's perspective to besmirch the perspective of people unlike Nagel.
It's very common for religious aplologists to engage in such propagandizing, and I'm done with biting my tongue when Wayfarer is doing it.
(jesuuuuuus, that as funny. Sad commentary, perhaps: 1975 the last time I remember laughing that hard (sigh))
All that follows is dry, humorless point/counterpoint, a pseudo-Socratic dialectic, if you will, with all due respect:
Quoting creativesoul
All notions of rational at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept rationality is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such.
The quality of any behavior, which is to say whether such behavior is rational, which reduces to whether the quality of the thought/belief from which the behavior follows is rational, can only be judged by that intelligence that deems itself in possession of it. Just as we cannot know the beauty of a thing without the apprehension of beauty itself to which that thing relates. Just as we cannot deem an observed act as moral without our own sense of what morality is.
Which gets us to coherency, insofar as given that rationality is apprehended in humans by humans regardless of behavior, the notion follows that rationality should be apprehendable in other animals by humans regardless of behavior, which is under any condition whatsoever impossible, hence the notion is incoherent.
This is no reflection on language-less thought/belief as such, which is, again, only apprehendable from a human point of view. It is not a valid judgement that lesser animals are language-less, nor is it a valid judgement that lesser animals engage in thought/belief. Regarding the former, any series of vocalizations by any species so capable of them, in conjunction with another of like kind, can be a language for them, and, thought/belief being an entirely internal cognitive machination by definition, precludes any external access to it, which is sufficient to refuse its affirmation by an external arbiter.
But it is non-contradictory that humans do engage in language-less thought/belief, given the possibility of thought/belief by means of mere imagery. And from that follows that it is also non-contradictory to maintain that, in humans, thought/belief in general and rational thought/belief in particular, is antecedent to and proper ground for, the inception and development of language in them as a species.
Even granting human language-less thought/belief, is not sufficient reason to grant lesser animals thought/belief because they happen to be language-less in lacking all forms of serial vocalizations. And without sufficient reason to grant to these quite lesser animals thought/belief, it is then immediately contradictory to grant them rationality, which is merely a relative quality of thought itself.
Which leaves us with those lesser animals considered as possessing a rudimentary form of language, judged by human standards, as to whether that form of language is a development of a commensurate form of rational thought/belief. Nature is, of course, rife with occasions which instill in us the notion those occasions are exemplifications of rational thought by those intelligences the internal cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible to us.
Now, given the irrefutable truth that all of which is not a possible experience for us, is impossible knowledge for us .by what right can we say we know of rational thought/belief in those animals the cognitive machinations of which are inaccessible?
Odd, innit? We find ourselves using our intelligence to judge other intelligences, but in the very judging of them we have no choice but to treat them other than how they may actually be. Which is the same as being completely wrong, which in turn, and indeed to be rational about it, makes explicit we are best served to not engage in those judgements at all.
.be sure to tune in next week .
"Jane, you ignorant slut!"
Is there any chance Nagel's perspective is as scientifically well informed as that of anyone here?
That would not cover rational thinking would it?
The only political component I can see is the enacting of laws against cruelty to animals. The same factions are working to reduce cruelty to other humans. If that goes against Christian dogma - oh, well, it's had its 2000-year reign (sometimes of paternalism, sometimes of terror.)
Quoting Wayfarer
Nobody's tried to take that away from you. So why insist on taking away from those "lesser" beings a faculty they possess in common with us? Does crossing a threshold require you to sever all ties?
Many people have declined to do that; have retained their links to the natural world and other species and are the healthier for it.
Quoting Ludwig V
There is the undeniable and ever present imbalance of power to take into consideration.
Quoting Mww
By the same right that allows us to discuss distant suns and galaxies to which we have no direct access, and the way we learn the relationships of atoms in molecules or the events of geological time: though observation, theory, prediction and experimentation. What makes animals easier to understand than chemicals and mountains is that we are more closely related to animals and thus better able to recognize behaviours that are similar to ours and extrapolate that the motivation and thought process that prompts the same behaviour may also be similar.
Well, they did survive, so they must have made some rational decisions along the way. We can't see the process, only the result.
Thank you for telling me. But I think I'll make up my own mind, if you don't mind.
Quoting Patterner
If Nagel is not scientifically well informed, he is as well informed as me. In other respects also, I would very much like to be able to adopt Nagel's perspective. He's a much better philosopher than me. Yet I still disagree with many of his opinions, especially with regard to bats.
I had to look up tacit knowledge and found this..
I knew a man who was mechanical and took a class in physics and failed, yet he could resolve a mechanical/physics problem that no one else in the class could figure out. I would say that is an example of tacit knowledge. It is not understanding theory which is a verbal explanation of how something works. Verbal knowledge is something the man has trouble learning but he has knowledge that is not verbal.
When speaking of rational thinking- human and animal, I think we should mull over what is a thought. You said a thought can be an image rather than words and I spoke with a woman who designs things for people who request designs such as a machine that makes concrete barriers for a fancy garden. She said she sees the required parts of such a machine. She came to her job by her unique skill, not education.
Now if we agree rational thinking requires words, the two people I mentioned are not thinking with words and that might be akin to how animals think. With sonar, a bat can do amazing things and that is not a verbal task. Animals in general do amazing thing without words and could label all this tacit knowledge?
When arguing bonobo can learn language I wanted to say something that I didn't have the words for. Your thoughts helped me find the right words...
I believe bonobos have the potential for learning language but it is dormant because they lack the epigenome and inherited use of language that humans have. However, if they were taught communication as infants and were in an environment that encouraged communicating, their children would have epigenome and inherited language skills and they could eventually evolve into using language.
Surviving does not require the ability to think. You would not want to say alligators think, would you? They do not have a cortex and it is the cortex that makes us thinking animals. Alligators have reptilian brains, and so do we. I have been with severely brain-damaged people and they may be able to make some survival choices but their inability to think means very poor decision making.
Insects and animals do amazing things as a matter of instinct and want to add epigensome to this, which I define in my post just before this one. Our emotions can cancel out our ability to think, resulting in us reacting perfectly to an emergency or perhaps doing something we seriously regret. Just because we are capable of rational thinking, that does not mean that is what we are doing 24/7. Our brains are like chattering monkeys constantly running from one thought to another, but this is not rational thinking.
I think we need to understand the importance of language and learned logic skills for rational thinking. Not all thinking is rational thinking.
"All notions of physical at work here, including those that contradict each other, do rest on the same ground, which is human intelligence. The concept physical is itself a human construct predicated on its intellectual capacities, from which follows any instance of it relates to no other intelligence than the one that conceived it as such."
The notions we apply to the world are like a lens, through which we understand the world. There may be distortions due to our particular perspective. But that does not mean that everything we understand is false. After all, we cannot change our perspective, so we might as well make the most of what we've got.
Quoting Mww
What do you mean? We can call out irrational behaviour as such. We do it all the time.
Quoting Mww
That applies to both humans and animals and means that no judgement, positive or negative, is justified. But it is clear that we do make such assessments, from which it follows that thought/belief is not an entirely internal cognitive machination.
Quoting Mww
Granting human language-less thought/belief is sufficient reason to grant animals thought/belief unless a sufficient reason for withholding language-less thought/belief from them is provided.
Quoting Mww
That would be one possibility, but it is not the argument that I would put.
Quoting Mww
Two conclusions follow. First that animals are capable of rational action. Second, the internal cognitive machinations are accessible to us, so they are not purely internal.
I would say that is an example of what tacit knowledge is all about. It means that the ability to verbalize one's reasoning is distinct from the ability to reason - the two are not the same process. Which does not mean that the ability to verbalize one's reasons does not enable more complex thinking.
My favourite example of tacit knowledge is Socrates/Plato's insistence that if one cannot define, e.g., courage, piety in words, one does not know what courage/piety may be. But it is clear that that is not the case. In fact, when we speak, we are following a set of complex set of rules that we cannot verbalize. This is a dramatic illustration of how important tacit knowledge can be.
BTW If you post image-thinking as an alternative, that is fair enough. But there is not reason to suppose that it explains tacit knowledge, because if one can sensible manipulate the images such that the product is what you imagined, then you are following rules that you cannot articulate. Image-thinking is an alternative (better, in some circumstances) to verbal thinking.
Quoting Athena
Yes, I think so.
I'm glad following up tacit thinking was so productive for you. I think it is an important phenomenon. It is a shame that philosophers have seen fit to ignore it.
Their thinking is on a fairly rudimentary level. They do have a cerebellum, as do lizards and turtles, so the 'reptilian brain' is not quite as you depict it. The alligator's lifestyle doesn't pose many intellectual challenges. They're also stronger and more in their element than a human child alone in a forest.
Quoting Athena
And so, other people take care of them, even in adulthood. That feral kid doesn't survive with the use of its mighty jaws or its social support system; it only has its little hands and big brain to provide itself with food and shelter while avoiding predators.
Quoting Athena
Which we still do not,
Quoting Athena
Oh, we can be quite irrational in language, too. Just listen to a speech by.... never mind.
Humans have an enormous brain, only a small part of which is required to run the vital physical systems and another small part for reflex actions and survival instincts. The rest is available for learning, memory, language, culture, skill acquisition, storytelling, convictions, wealth accumulation, altruism, invention, emotional complexity, deceit, social bonding, philosophy, ambition, superstition, delusion and madness. As well as reasoning and assessment.
Dan, you pompous ass!!! .
A gentle reminder, nest ce pas?, not to take what we do here all that seriously?
Indeed! :grin:
I disagree. All notions of physical, all of that which is conditioned by natural relations, do rest on the same ground, but such ground is Nature. Nature cannot contradict itself, but human intelligence certain has that capacity.
Is it really worth the trouble, to admit other possible worlds and such, in which, e.g, our logical principles, and by extension our mathematical principles, are false, or, even the totality of this Nature inaccessible to us in which there may be natural contradiction, and we are forced to start over? How would we even do that, if all we thought we knew is destroyed, but the internal mechanisms by which we know anything at all, remains the same?
Quoting Ludwig V
Agreed. But this presupposes world, and world as not that which contains the lens through which it is understood. There is us, and there is not-us, which justifies the distinction in grounds upon which they rest.
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Quoting Ludwig V
This conflates the effect with the cause of it. Rational/irrational behavior is a complementary pair in exhibition of rationality. Humans know what rationality is, without the necessity of an example of it, and irrationality being merely its negation.
It is absurd to say humans dont apprehend rationality, in that rationality is the general human rule and irrationality is the exception to the rule.
Quoting Ludwig V
It cant mean that, without self-contradiction. But thats irrelevant, in juxtaposition to your response intermingling internal with external, yet my comment maintains their separation. In correcting the inconsistency, it is true my judgement of your thought/belief, being the aforementioned external arbiter, is unjustified, in that I have no warrant whatsoever for it. It is only your behavior consequential to your thought/belief that is sufficient warrant, such behavior being external to yourself hence for me a mere perception, understood, as you say, through a lens that is me.
And dont neglect context here. The dialectical dichotomy refers to humans as opposed to lesser animals, which does not abide in human as opposed to human, which is what youve done. Now it is the case that for me to refuse affirmation of your thought/belief, its inaccessibility to me notwithstanding, perfectly exemplifies my invalid judgement.
(sidebar on a technicality: all judgements are justified, else they wouldnt be judgements. Conclusions to which judgements arrive may be unjustified, iff subsequent judgements with different premises falsify them.)
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Quoting Ludwig V
I am not withholding language-less thought belief; to do so is to contradict myself, insofar as I affirm my own. I am withholding affirmation of thought/belief, specifically rational thought/belief, in language-less intelligences. Provision of sufficient reason for withholding such affirmation reduces to the fact they cannot inform me of it on the one hand, and I have no possibility of affirming that which is inaccessible to me on the other.
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Quoting Ludwig V
This is tantamount to claiming that cloud which looks like a flying horse, is a flying horse. Extreme example, but holding in principle. That which instills a notion in us cannot be used as proof for the validity of the notion, re: sunrise/sunset. The notion that deities exist cannot itself prove they do.
Anyway .feel free to rebut as you will.
If something is inaccessible to us, we cannot know of it. Which is not to say we cannot infer, from an experience, its cause. But Im not interested in possibilities logical inference affords, when I want the certainty implied by an answer to an empirical question, especially when I already have the certainty afforded me from my own rational thought.
It's genetics, not simply epigenetics. And dont overlook the fact that not only are their brains not equipped for language, but neither are their vocal tracts, for which the h.sapiens anatomy is uniquely suited.
Quoting Ludwig V
Well, you said that neither Christianity nor Darwinism are a philosophy, but Christianity absorbed a great deal of Greek philosophy, which resulted in the unique synthesis of Christian Platonism.
[quote=The Eclipse of Reason, Max Horkheimer] In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to ones surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirits antagonism to natureeven as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including manfrequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of mans continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the useless spiritual, and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy.[/quote]
Quoting Ludwig V
Those who push scientism seem never to understand what it is or that this is what they're doing. I think the reason is, that the distinction between a philosophical and a scientific question is itself a philosophical distinction, therefore unintelligible in scientific terms.
Do you know of a man named Vladimir Putin? Is he accessible to you?
Quoting Mww
Your implied certainty of another's capabilities is based on not being able to access intimate knowledge of that other's subjective experience?
Hnh...
The dog believes that the human will be arriving soon. The dog does not recognize the sound of it's human's car. The dog, after being reminded of past events - by virtue of being amidst much the same spatiotemporal events - begins to form, have, and/or hold expectation that the human will be there. In doing so the dog begins getting anticipatory excitement in a happy sort of way due to the lifelong loving connection the dog and human have.
I'm not saying that the dog's behavior is not rational. I would say that it most certainly is.
I'm questioning which things it makes the most sense to say that the dog is experiencing: Which sorts of thoughts and beliefs dogs can form, have, and/or hold.
Being hopeful does not belong in that grouping.
Holding some kinds of expectation does. Anticipation does. All hopefulness is anticipatory. All hopefulness involves expectation, but not all anticipation is hopefulness, and not all expectation is hopefulness. There is a difference, and that difference is key here.
What is hoping that something will happen without knowing that it may not? You see what I'm getting at? Dogs are not aware of their own fallibility. We are. It is only after becoming aware of the fact that we can be wrong about stuff, that we can become hopeful - in the face of that uncertainty. Compared/contrast that with autonomous anticipation and/or expectation without such metacognitive reservation.
Quoting Vera Mont
This mistakenly presupposes that you are somehow privy to my fear(s)?
:yikes:
Attributing things that are exclusively human to that which is not is something many do. I myself have been guilty of it. However, it is not at all 'terrifying' in-so-much-as just being completely unacceptable. It is akin to holding false belief. It is a mistake. I try to avoid those.
Quoting Vera Mont
Of course similarity and commonality are not diseases. The irony. Those are a large part of the foundation of my own worldview/position. Your replies apply to someone who does not agree on that.
It's becoming apparent that there is some misunderstanding at hand.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yeah. :brow: No.
What you're claiming is simple is not. The above can be true, and the claim in question... false. I'm not denying the above. What I am denying is not nearly so simple as that.
Changing goalposts is generally frowned upon too.
No. Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
The expectation belongs to the dog. Dogs are not capable of thinking about their own thought and belief.
Quoting Vera Mont
It is rational. The irony, once again. You're quoting my argument for how and/or why it is rational.
Jeez!
:worry:
No?
So now you're going to deny what my coworkers have said when I asked? Sure, some may dread Monday for the reasons listed above. Others just dread Monday because it's a day to be dreaded. That's not all that uncommon. They wake up with negativity teeming, because it's Monday and they're convinced that Monday is the worst day. When asked, some replies have been...
"No reason, really. It's just a Monday, ya know?"
"It's Monday", accompanied by a perplexed look - like I should already know that. :brow: Some people have very strange belief systems.
Arrrgh, feels like a Monday, doesn't it?"
Etc.
There's another relevant issue here. The tactic you're using can be used against the anthropomorphic claims you've made. We can continue to say stuff like, "No. Not because it's the first day of the workweek, but because they do not like work at all."
Whatever.
Many say they dread Mondays because they believe Mondays are the worst days. What you've added and/or said here does not deny that, despite your insistence that you're answering in the negative. Rather, your extrapolation adds further support for why they dread Mondays.
What's in question is whether or not dogs can look forward to Thursdays despite having no knowledge whatsoever that any given day of their life is a Thursday.
We could change what we call the train. It would no longer be the five o'clock train is we did so. Would the dog notice? Perhaps it's best put like this: "The five o'clock train" is the way we pick that train out from all others. It is not the way the dog does. The time the train comes makes no difference at all to that dog. What mattered was that train was connected to the human, not what chronological order it was in. Other humans arrive at other times. Their dogs know nothing at all about what time counts as five o'clock or four or two or whatever. The chronological time makes no difference to the dog. What matters is the human connected to the train... regardless of what time it arrives on our clocks.
Yes, dogs have a sense of time. Yes, dogs can develop timely routines. Yes, that consistency can become ritualistic. Ritual shared between species. Bonding. Yes, these can involve the train we call "the five o'clock train".
I wouldn't have it any other way. It seems as if you've taken something I said as suggesting otherwise, but if so, I don't understand what you interpreted that way.
Quoting Ludwig V
I suppose I should have said "well informed in a way commensurate with the claims he makes". Nagel has fallen in with the cranks at the Discovery Institute, the crank Alvin Plantinga, etc. I don't see any reason to consider Nagel a better philosopher than you. How do you define better?
Speaks volumes, don't it.
[quote=Wikipedia]Alvin Carl Plantinga[a] (born November 15, 1932) is an American analytic philosopher who works primarily in the fields of philosophy of religion, epistemology (particularly on issues involving epistemic justification), and logic.
From 1963 to 1982, Plantinga taught at Calvin University before accepting an appointment as the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.[2] He later returned to Calvin University to become the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy.[3]
A prominent Christian philosopher, Plantinga served as president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from 1983 to 1986. He has delivered the Gifford Lectures twice and was described by Time magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God".[4] In 2014, Plantinga was the 30th most-cited contemporary author in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.[5] [/quote]
So, an academically-qualified professor of philosophy, but Christian, therefore a crank, right?
Hmmm, this isn't the place for it, but there seems to be a remarkable difference between how we treat "meaning". I'm nihilistic, as mentioned heretofore. Where there is no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, there can be no meaning. When something is meaningful, it is always meaningful to a creature capable of attributing such.
I say that not to argue, compare, or nitpick, but rather to offer you a bit of argumentative ground for the position I'm arguing from/for. Perhaps it will help you to understand where I'm coming from, so to speak.
:smile:
I didn't say anything about Plantinga being a Christian, and I'd like to hope you might want to refrain from putting words in my mouth like that. Do you think that you can?
Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism is a crank argument Do you think academically qualified professors of philosophy are somehow immune to being cranks?
Of course, if you want to argue for the EAAN I'd be happy to point out many ways that it is a crank argument.
:razz:
No, you said he was a crank. That is not a word I put in your mouth. I am pointing out that he's an academically-qualified academic and professor of philosophy with reference to his Wikipedia entry. I've discussed variations of his 'evolutionary argument against naturalism' in the past. You ought to recognise that it was the subject of a number of textbooks with a great deal of commentary by academics on both sides of the argument, including critics such as Daniel Dennett (for example). So, he's not a crank, and it's not a crank's argument.
From the jacket cover of that title:
Of course I know of a particular man, and therefore of course hes accessible to me; I got a tv.
To know of a thing, is not the same as to know the thing. Do you see that if youd asked if I knew Putin, Id have given a different answer?
Quoting Vera Mont
Correct. If anothers capabilities or subjective experiences were sufficiently accessible to me, they wouldnt be merely implied. They would be, or could possibly be, demonstrably given.
Is there any experience that isnt subjective?
I would concur.
Quoting Ludwig V
Sure.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. Interpretation is a very interesting process. It is entwined with understanding. When someone draws the same correlations between the language use that we do, they interpret correctly, and... understand us.
Which reminds me that I ought check with the readers more often than I do. Always appreciate your 'tone', by the way. Model. Thank you.
Quoting Ludwig V
Sure. I'm not fond of 'self-deception' but that's an aside having to do with the inability to tell oneself that they believe something that they do not, or vice versa.
Trauma is another matter altogether. Coping mechanisms and all that.
You know I'm not going to be goaded into that mess.
:wink:
Is learning how to open a gate or door by observation alone possible by a creature completely incapable of thinking?
Quoting creativesoul
Sure he does. Even the dumbest dog knows the sounds and smells of its people and their stuff.
Quoting creativesoul
You're using more words to describe: dog expects human's arrival. 'Spatiotemporal' - yes, he knows where and when. I can't characterize that as even one of the multitude of alternate explanations.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. So, then...?
Quoting creativesoul
That's a pretty big bold statement about a wide-ranging emotion! What has our own fallibility to do with hope? It's not as if we had, before discovering our own fallibility, been convinced of being in control of the universe.
Quoting creativesoul
You mean humans never rationally expect something that usually happens to go on happening on schedule? When a human goes to work on Monday morning, he doesn't merely hope, but quite reasonably and confidently expects his workplace to stand where it has always stood and function as it has always functioned. If it's lifted up by an alien police force and transported to the moon, he discovers his own fallibilty. If he and the workplace survive the incident, thereafter, he only hopes to find it in the usual place.
If the dog's human is taken to hospital during the day and doesn't return home for a week, the dog's reasonable expectation is reduced to hope.
Quoting creativesoul
Nah, just citing a vague general human-centric fear. It was huge in the sciences for a century. the word 'looms' triggered it.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm still trying to figure out what it is you're arguing. Sometimes I seem to misunderstand it.
Quoting creativesoul
What people say is not always candid, insightful or comprehensive. I know of no effects without a cause. It sounds as if they 1. are not aware of or 2. do not wish to investigate or 3. assume you already know the sequence of experiences that have contributed to this particular response to an anticipated and repeated situation.
Quoting creativesoul
I just don't follow the distinction here. Are there discreet points in the continuity of time that we have to identify and choose among? What increments, and how aware do we do have to be of choosing one? Or do we experience the passage of time as fluid, and of which we are sometimes keenly aware and sometimes lose track? I don't see how a dog should have to 'pick out' an item of time from among a group of similar items, as if it were a toy in a pile of toys. To me, minutes all look and pretty much alike; I could not tell them apart except by the events that take place during their passage.
But then, as you say, I don't understand your arguments. Logically, then, I should stop responding to them. I don't know how to disengage without seeming rude.
Read the next bits.
I wouldn't take it as rude. Asking for clarity may help you to understand, should you want to.
Quoting Wayfarer
You asked a loaded question, insinuating that what is in bold is my thinking.
Anyway, the EAAN is a crank argument because it ignores many issues that were previously brought up in this thread.
Can you cite evidence from any version of the EAAN that considers evolution occurring within a social species? Can you recognize that failure to think through the implications of evolution occurring within a social species results in the failure of the EAAN to make the case it claims to?
Suppose evolution alone only resulted in something like a feral human child that you might barely call rational, but if the individual members of that species were raised in a culture with other members of the same species the result was members of that species going to the moon.
Where does Plantinga show any evidence of having considered the role of cuture?
Quoting Mww
So have I. All the world is accessible to me, including the observed and recorded behaviour of animals in the wild. And that's all you can know of Putin, too.
Quoting Mww
Indeed. I was answering:
Quoting Mww
We can know of, and quite a lot about, many things that we can't access directly. Quoting Mww
But you don't accept experimental demonstrations as true. And so cannot be certain of anything.
yes:Quoting creativesoul
When but not what time. Because he doesn't know the names humans have artificially given the hours and minutes of the day. Okay.
I agree the argument raises such issues, but that is a different matter than whether it merits being taken seriously as an argument against naturalism.
Quoting creativesoul
Knowing what time the human is expected is knowledge about one's own expectations. Dogs do not have that.
Quoting creativesoul
The same applies to the five o'clock train.
God made no such thing...
:razz:
When I said "language less" I meant without naming and descriptive practices. There is no clear lines to be drawn between language less creatures and our pets, for they are not language less. Not at all, actually. There's good reason domestication changes animals drastically, aside from the shrinking of the gene pool which is the function of the aim of breeding for specific traits.
There's overlap between language less animals and us. Our pets.
This overlap matters here, in these sorts of discussions, for not all dogs and cats and birds have drawn correlations between our language use and other things. Some have. Pets are socialized by us with us. It matters. Language has helped, as best I can tell, in helping to provide better means for pets to become rational to a greater extent than their cousins.
But you did say that Thomas Nagel, atheist though he might profess to be, should be categorised along with 'that crank' Alvin Plantinga, and The Discovery Institute, which is an Intelligent Design organisation. The implication is that you think Nagel and Plantinga's arguments against evolutionary theory are based on religious ideology and science denial, that you lump them all together as being a form of creationism or intelligent design. In actual fact, all three are very different. Thomas Nagel never appeals to intelligent design or belief in God - he says he lacks any 'sense of the divine'.
Quoting wonderer1
None of that is relevant, though. His argument is epistemological, about the nature of knowledge. It is of the kind described as 'transcendental arguments'. Transcendental arguments seek to demonstrate the necessary preconditions for the possibility of some experience, knowledge, or exercise of reason. They typically follow this form: if a belief is plausible, then certain conditions must be met for it to be coherent and intelligible.
Plantinga argues that if both naturalism and evolution are true, then the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low. If our cognitive faculties are unreliable, then we have a defeater for any belief produced by those faculties, including the belief in naturalism and evolution. This creates a self-defeating situation for the naturalist.
The basis on which he says that, is that naturalism typically holds that all events, including mental events like beliefs, are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be studied and explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology). This form of causation is often referred to as efficient causation, where one event (the cause) brings about another event (the effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are fully determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Those who hold that the mind is identical with or a product of the brain or neural processes are obliged to hold this view. It is made explicit in the arguments of those such as Daniel Dennett.
In contrast, logical causation refers to the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. For example, if "All humans are mortal" and "Socrates is a human" are true, it logically follows that "Socrates is mortal" must also be true. This form of causation pertains to the realm of reason and logic rather than to observable physical processes. It governs how conclusions follow from premises in a rational argument, and is independent of physical causation.
What I've been arguing in this thread, is that the human faculty of reason differentiates humans from other species, because it enables humans to 'see reason' in that second sense (i.e. grasp logical inference.) That general lineage of argument has a very long pedigree, going right back to Plato and his predecessors.
I will add, there have been many developments in naturalism such that it no longer is susceptible to this argument i.e. Deacon's 'absentials', Vervaeke's 'extended naturalism' among others. But the case can certainly be made against the kind of neo-darwinian materialism that Dennett and Dawkins advocate.
If you are going to claim that I said something, then please have the intellectual integrity to quote what I actually said, rather than make up stories of what I said to suit the narrative you are trying to gaslight people into believing.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sure it is relevant, if Plantinga hopes to do more than beat on a staw man account of naturalistic evolution.
Can you help Plantinga out, by explaining why the species under consideration is a social species for which generally communicating truths is of no more adaptive value than generally communicating falsehoods?
Sure:
Quoting wonderer1
Quoting wonderer1
Your objection doesnt address the argument.
I might add, whatever occurs within a social species, is a completely separate matter to what evolves according to natural selection. That only operates over much larger time-periods, and refers to the process of speciation. Certainly culture and human capabilities develop, but h.sapiens have not evolved significantly since their early forbears first appeared.
So whos is the straw man argument?
I wonder how you know this. Or what difference it makes to rational thinking.
It addresses this gloss on your part:
Quoting Wayfarer
If you want to provide a more fleshed out account of this aspect of Plantinga's argument, I'll address that. In the meantime...
As I said, Plantinga doesn't consider the role of communication among members of a social species in making his case. So Plantinga's claim is that:
P(R|N&E) is low
(I.e. the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution is low.)
However, in order for Plantinga to address a scientifically informed position regarding the reliability of our cognitive faculties he needs to address a more complex scenario than he actually does. We can say that to be taken seriously Plantinga needs to address:
P(R|N&E&S)
(The probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution and the evolution occured in a social species.)
However, in order to make that case Plantinga would need to establish that truth conveying communication occurring amongst members of the social species would do nothing to increase the reliability of the cognitive faculties of members of that species, as compared to being a feral member of the species without social interaction.
It's pretty ironic that an educator like Plantinga, needs to ignore the possibility of members of a social species educating each other and passing down culture, in order for his argument to superficially appear to work.
Aye. Me too very much so. To be fair, Aristotle spoke in Ancient Greek whereas "anima" "animal" and "animated" are Latin based. But the associations are fairly blatant to understand, at least from where I stand.
A controversial thought, but if incorporeal beings of far grander stature - here thinking of polytheistic deities or else angels and archangels - were to be, what else would they be but more universal animas (souls) whose animus (mind) would be that much more evolved than any human's? Hence, if one were to entertain a great chain of being, it would start with the anima of bacteria or thereabouts and progress onward through the anima of humans into animas whose bodies of Logos would consist of non-physical Logos. No stark metaphysical divides anywhere to be found, just differences of degrees that then result in classifications of different kinds. This difference in kind amid an every fluid scale of degrees being in keeping with one nature of Logos being that of ratio-ning one something from the other.
This, of course, is just one hypothetical to be found among many others - that of an utter non-spirituality included. But I'm here intending to draw attention to the realty that there needs to be no sharp metaphysical divide in being/anima/psyche anywhere from bacteria all the way to deities in order to entertain views such as those professed by many a spiritual reality, both Western and Eastern.
Not sure how this thought will fly hereabouts. For the record, I'm not here endorsing any theology, but I am endorsing an absence of sharp metaphysical divides between all "animated" beings that coexist. And that this can just as easily apply to materialist interpretations of biological evolution as it can the concepts regarding the great chain (or, more aptly, ladder) of being. But, hopefully, I'm just preaching the the choir in saying all this.
Quoting Ludwig V
... else how we come to understand that we ought not treat any other group of people as sub-human animals ... neither granting leeway to those who deem this to be so on "Nature-given" grounds or on "God-given" grounds, for both streams of reasoning leading to this same mentioned conclusion can, when more impartially addressed, only be utter bullshit. Black and Whites, for one example, being equally evolved not just biologically but also in their intellectual abilities - socioeconomic constraints of the current world aside.
All this maybe being a different set of issues for a different thread. But I very much liked your post. Thank you for it.
Again, it doesn't address the evolutionary argument against naturalism. He doesn't say that we're incapable of communicating, or that we can't convey information by speaking to one another. For that matter, many creatures other than humans communicate. Bee dances communicate where flowers are. Many birds and of mammals convey warnings or indications of food sources. But then, none of those involve truth claims, as such. They display behaviours which can be understood in terms of stimulus and response. Note that such behaviours are 'reliable' in that bee dances and meerkat alarm calls really do indicate where flowers are or that danger is approaching. The evolutionary argument is rather about judgements of truth.
The argument is that naturalism maintains that mental events such as beliefs are the result of natural (e.g. neurological) causes that can be explained by the principles of natural science (such as neurology) - in other words, instances of efficient causation, where one event (cause) brings about another event (effect) in accordance with physical or natural laws. In this view, mental states, including beliefs, are determined by physical processes in the brain, which are themselves the result of evolutionary pressures and biological mechanisms. Whereas, reasoned inference works by different principles, relying on the relationship between propositions where the truth of one proposition logically necessitates the truth of another. So it's of a different order to physical causation - it transcends it.
That is the thrust of the argument, and so far, I fail to see how your 'social species' response actually addresses it.
Plantinga doesn't consider the role of communication at all. That is what disqualifies his argument from serious consideration as an argument against naturalism.
Quoting Wayfarer
You are conflating other stuff with Plantinga's argument. It would probably be better for you to stick to quoting actual passages written by Plantinga, or start arguing for your own version and we can ignore Plantinga.
Right, I am only passingly familiar with Kahneman's work, but I think I see the point.
Why should one explanation preclude the other? Another point is that most of our reasoning is inductive or abductive, where there is no logical necessity in play at all.
Quoting Vera Mont
I know how you and I know what we expect. By introspection, whatever that may be. How do other people know what you and I expect? By our behaviour. So I'm happy to say that the dog knows what they expect - and want and so on. So what might ground the claim that dogs don't have introspection? Well, they can't do anything that could differentiate between expecting X and knowing that one expects X, because they don't have the language skills to articulate it. It's just one of the knotty problems that come up when you are extending the use of people-concepts to creatures that lack human-type languages.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting Vera Mont
But the train arrives at 5 pm. If we're happy to say that the dog knows when the human is about to arrive, why are we not happy to say that the dog knows the 5 pm train is about to arrive? Suppose the dog has learnt to read the station clock or at least to get up and start some preparatory tail-wagging when the clock says 5 - are you sure that they are incapable of that? If they can learn to associate a bell with the arrival of food, I think there's no way to be sure.
My point is this. If one focuses on a specific case - which is a good thing to do, and much, much better than hasty generalizations - there will always be many possible representations of exactly what the dog knows/believes/expects. But if one sees that one case in the range of the dog's life, it will normally be possible to narrow down the possibilities. And one can get a bit further by indulging in thought-experiments, which will at least allow one to understand under what circumstances one might distinguish cases that seem utterly indistinguishable so long as one focuses on just the one event. But unless something important hangs on the issue, it will be tedious work, and one will be disinclined to pursue it unless it matters.
Quoting Janus
Good question. Isn't the issue that they do seem incompatible. We can express this in more than one way. They are different language games, different categories, different perspectives. At any rate, they seem incommensurable. Yet we know that a physical process can result in a logical conclusion. If it were not so, computers would not work. Indeed, if it were not so, calculation by pen and paper would not work, either.
HA!! What no sense of adventure? No foray into the sublime? Not a fan of time-wasting? But yeah, I get that a lot; explains the great disparity between my comments and mentions.
Quoting creativesoul
Opening a gate is possible by observation, but It is impossible to say apodeitically whether a creature incapable of thinking learns anything, whether by observation or otherwise.
Performing a task grounded in observation alone could be mere mimicry, which does not necessarily support what it is to learn.
Quoting Vera Mont
All the world is not accessible to you, even while the observed and recorded behavior of (some) animals, is. What is not included in the observed and recorded behavior of animals, is that which is the cause of it, which we as humans consider rational thought.
No. You seem confused, and are mixing bits of arguments against physicalism into your 'paraphrase'. The EAAN isn't an argument against mind/body physicalism.
On page 313 of Where the Conflict Really Lies Plantinga writes:
Plantinga is not making an argument against physicalism. In fact Plantinga thinks everyone has a God detector organ. (Although sadly, yours and mine are broken.)
If you have a Kindle, I can loan out my Kindle copy of the book so that you don't have to just pretend to know what you are talking about.
There is a lot going on here, but the above is one strand which I think I can deal with without grappling with any special reading (evolutionary naturalism).
The author (Plantinga?) has grasped one relationship between the physical and another category, but has not noticed that there are other relationships available. I offer two examples.
First, each piece in a chess set is a physical object which consists of one substance or another in a specific shape. We even say that the king is this piece - holding up or pointing to the physical object in question. But what makes it the king has no representation in the conceptual structures of physics. It is the king because the rules and conventions of chess make it so - it is the king in the context of a chess game. Physically speaking, it is just an object like any other.
Second, - and perhaps closer to home - each number in a calculation has a physical - what shall I call it? - correlate. 1, 2, 3, Again, qua physical mark each number has a representation in the conceptual structure of physics. However, qua number, it does not. What makes it a number is the rules that we apply to it (better, that we follow in manipulating it) - in the context of a mathematical calculation or in the context of counting or measuring physical objects.
When we use a machine to do a calculation, we have assigned various physical phenomena to a mathematical role, and arranged causal sequences to correspond to the mathematical operations we are interested in. What makes the physical events within the machine into a calculation cannot be recognized as mathematical calculations unless we have arranged that representation. It is not the result of any physical properties or events within the machine independently of the context in which we interpret them.
What have clocks to do with rational thought? For 100,000 years of intelligent human development no clocks of any kind existed. Up until four hundred years ago, the entire population of North America was clock-free, and very possibly the healthier for it.
Quoting Mww
Well, there's me in my place. That which is accessible to you regarding other humans is not accessible to me regarding other animals. Even if you have never seen that human in the flesh and even if I had close personal acquaintance with animals.
I rather be with people my own age, who have gone through my time in history, because they know what I am talking about. That is not the case when talking with younger people, who may be sure I am wrong because they have not had that experience. :lol: It is laughable when an organization has changed its policy and I object to the change, and the young person who has been on the job for maybe 6 months, tells me there was no change and things are as they always were.
Amazingly, human beings can proceed and believe humans are intelligent and capable of communication when they are not working with the same facts and understandings of life. While bees and ants have almost perfect communication. I don't think anyone would say they are intelligent. They are not self-aware and reasoning how to build their homes or go about their chores or who the queen should be queen. We might say the ants and bees are more rational than humans because they don't carry false or incorrect stories about what is so.
I think we could make a good argument that human beings are not rational. The chatter that goes on their heads may be totally incorrect but without critical thinking, they may be willing to kill for what they believe is so.
Thank you for opening the discussion on human thinking.
Ever been to the center of the Earth? Have any experience of it, whether direct, indirect, 1st, 2nd, 3rd ..hand? Ever going to? Think you got enough time to experience all those parts of the world that are accessible you?
I dont care about whatever place youre in, only what you say while youre there.
But all that is not rational thinking. Rational thinking requires critical thinking and we would have an extremely short lifespan if all our awake time was also our critical thinking time.
Rational thinking requires a huge amount of energy and we would have very short life spans if all our waking hours we were thinking rationally. Also, it is fun to know forgetting is as important to making sense of life as learning is. One of the hardest parts of learning is often we must forget to have useful information in the present. You don't want to know your grocery list for every time you have gone shopping. You only want today's grocery list and if too much information is in our conscious thoughts it becomes useless.
Completely rational thinking has draw backs and here is an explanation of that...same link
Several Star Trek shows are about human judgment that is not based on rational thinking and I don't think Star Trek fans are in favor of AI ruling over us.
There is no final decision about how information is transmitted from one generation to the next.
.
I think this is about the process of evolution and how close humans and apes are.
Yet another criterion. The more requirements you add, the fewer entities may exercise a faculty that was once available to everything in possession of a cerebellum.
All thinking animals can act rationally, emotionally, instinctively or chaotically (when they're ill). I very much doubt that thought processes take different amounts of energy to perform.
Oh dear me! It was perhaps quixotic, but I was thinking about the argument about whether the dog knew it was 5 pm when the train arrived. I thought of Pavlov's dogs who knew it was feeding time when the bell rang, and of an ancient TV programme for very small children that tried to teach children to tell the time. They displayed a clock face and then announced to time displayed. It's not important, but I get irritated by people who say "but the dog has no concept of" and work to concede the lowest possible level of rationality to console themselves for admitting that an animal could have any concept at all. Not important.
Quoting Athena
Yes. At best partly and with training.
Quoting Athena
Yes. I thought about them and decided that they weren't. They just had a large collection of instincts, triggered, if I remember right, by what they are fed as larvae. An illustration of how irrational components can produce rational results. Not what the thread is about.
If you ask what makes us human, the answer will not be "rationality", but emotion. Ironical, don't you think?
Usually decisions that turn out to be wrong. "An alien machine you don't know what it does? Beam it aboard!"
Don't be so sure. Anyhow, it wouldn't rule - that's an ape thing. It would simply administer our resources and enforce our laws - both of which tasks humans have botched repeatedly and abominably.
All dogs know their feeding time, without any bells. Every living thing has time sense and arranges its feeding, resting and moving routines according to the time of day, and to time elapsed and to correspondence with some other event - like this is the time their preferred prey is most vulnerable; this is the time salmon come to spawn; this is the time to bury nuts for winter; this is the time lions don't come to the water.
Humans have it too, a biorhythm or something similar. When not freed from the economic day/week/year constraints, we each follow our own internal clock: wake up at roughly the same time every day; get hungry at regular intervals, have a period of three or four hours when we are most alert and capable, followed by a period when we drag a bit. There is some variation among individuals, but all humans are diurnal and seasonal. (Some humans may claim to be nocturnal, but it just means they stay awake longer past sunset and sleep later into the morning. Some humans are active at night for economic reasons - and it's not good for their health. It's difficult to sleep in the day and arrange leisure activities around a night shift. A few humans are active at night because it' the only time they have free of other people's demands.) That's the framework on which they constructed the artificial daily, weekly, monthly and annual schedules of regimented societies, because that's what works for the majority of human activities.
If they are incommensurable explanations, then it would seem to follow that they cannot exclude one another.
I agree with your analysis, but I dont see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism.
Quoting wonderer1
Not in the least.
Quoting wonderer1
Of course he is, insofar as naturalism is materialist or physicalist in orientation. What I've spelled out is why Plantinga argues that naturalism is an insufficient basis for belief. From his 1994 Naturalism Defeated .pdf:
[quote=Plantinga, 'Naturalism Defeated']"With me," Darwin said, "the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"
The same thought is put more explicitly by Patricia Churchland. She insists that the most important thing about the human brain is that it has evolved; this means, she says, that its principal function is to enable the organism to move appropriately: Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival[/quote]
He's talking about beliefs and convictions - not about the ability to act in such a way as to enhance survival. Against what criteria do we judge beliefs or convictions to be true, as distinct from pragmatically useful? You will notice that evolutionary materialists, such as Dawkins/Dennett, will say outright that all of what us 'lumbering robots' think and do is in service of the 'selfish gene'. That is the kind of mentality he has in his sights. (I believe Dennett responded extensively to Plantinga, but I'm not going to pursue it further. )
I certainly have some form of that, though not exclusively Christian in orientation.
I will add, I don't pursue this line of argument as a 'proof of God' as I don't believe that it possible, my interest in it only extends to showing the inherent self-contradictions of reductive materialism, as by it's own reckoning, its activites are the consequences of 'a nervous system that enables the organism to succeed in the four F's', social organisms though we might be.
All true. So the question is, why would anyone say they don't have a concept of time? What's more, why don't we insist that human beings have the same concept of time? The hours and days are additional articulations of the sense of time we have from our biological clocks.
What has it do with rationality? Everything. If they have a concept of time in the same way that we do, that's at least a basis for rationality.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, I suppose it could be. I've always thought there is a good deal to be said for it - better than substance dualism and materialism, anyway.
On the issue about naturalism, I got turned off when I realized that natural was being interpreted as scientific. Thumbnail sketch - That idea entirely ignores the history and practice of science. Science looks to me to be something almost entirely artificial.
Quoting Janus
That's true. But neither can you seriously articulate the idea that mental states are determined by physical processes. The conceptual equipment used to describe physical process does not include any way to describe beliefs; equally the conceptual equipment (evidence, logic) does not include any way to describe purely physical processes. Incommensurability means no bridges, no translations. And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship.
I agree with you again! My objections are to that vein of popular philosophy which esteems science as the arbiter of reality. Of course many educated folk see through that but it is still a pervasive current of thought.
I'm not so sure. If snails and spiders have it, it's more likely biological; no thought required. Where thinking comes in : level 1. association of a time of day or year with some event or activity (like: crocodiles are sluggish before sunrise, winter's coming soon) 2. taking certain specific time-dependent action (drink at the river while it's safe; start migration exercises) and 3. anticipation of time-related events (getting to the river before the elephants churn it up; making sure one's own fledglings are flight-capable) 4. arranging other necessary tasks not to conflict with time-related ones. (this is a little more complicated, depending on each species, but it still doesn't need a lot of intelligence.
In fact, timekeeping is one of the least remarkable things intelligent entities do.
I think it's just a case of looking at thinking from two perspectives. I certainly don't buy the argument that says that if thought is determined by neural activity, then thoughts could not rightly be said to have logical, as well as causal, connections with one another. It's merely an argument from incredulity.
I don't disagree with you. There's a lot to think about here - questions that arise once one has established that dogs are rational. Does one draw a line further along the scale. Birds, yes. Snails and slugs, no. Insects, no. Fish? Maybe some. (Whales &c. yes, of course). Plants, no. The distinction between instinctive "actions" and rational one? Between autonomous actions - heart beating, digestion, sweating and voluntary actions, i.e. actions proper. These will be tricky, because there will be good reason for them even though those can't be the animal's reason. Likely it will only be serious nerds like me who will want to pursue those.
Philosophy of action is incredibly complicated.
Quoting Wayfarer
There should be a name for the fallacy of thinking that, because one has a hammer, everything's a nail, or that a good place to look for your lost keys is under the lamp-post.
Quoting Janus
In one way "two perspectives" is a very encouraging metaphor. So it could be like looking at the front and back of a coin. My problem is that those two perspectives are within the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Thoughts, sounds, smells are not in the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them. I'm very fond of the explanation in physics for a rainbow, which seems to cross our categories. Electrical discharge to lightening is another example. The last case suggests we should not say that an electrical discharge causes the lightening, but that the electrical discharge is the lightening. (This goes back to D.M. Armstrong. He suggested this as a materialist theory of the mind, which is a bit of a problem for me.) Then neural activity will not cause thoughts, but will be the thoughts - comparison with events inside the computer and calculating an equation. That's about as far as I've got with this.
Quoting Wayfarer
My objection to Aristotle is that the form/matter dualism works well enough in some contexts, such as the context in which we have designed a computer to carry out a calculation. But it doesn't follow that it will work in all contexts e.g. where there is no purpose or designer apparent. (Because I'm quite sure that not everything has a purpose, much less that everything fits into a single hierarchy of purposes.
Having said that, I must immediately disclaim any idea that this is actually an objection to Aristotle, because I haven't engaged with his texts anywhere near sufficiently to be confident that it really applies to him specifically (or anyone else).
The study of physics is dependent on human senses, but I think we have little reason to say that physical processes in general are. Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes.
From one perspective we can say that thoughts are physical processes, presumably causally related to one another. From another perspective thoughts may not seem like physical processes at all. This reminds me of Sellar's "space of causes" and "space of reasons". The two ways of thinking do not seem to be possible to combine into a single discourse.
God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!
But it is perfectly true that the study of physics is dependent on human senses. That's what I meant to say.
Quoting Janus
... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out.
There is. Its called scientism.
By some process yet to be understood ..
:rofl:
As if the practice is uncommon among philosophers in general.
Neural processes are fairly well understood. The difficulty is with explaining how physical processes can give rise to consciously experienced feelings. I don't believe the question is answerable because it comes from trying to combine two incommensurable accounts. So the "hard problem" is based on an incoherent question.
Quoting Ludwig V
:up:
Quoting Ludwig V
Here we are talking about doing it. I don't believe we've made even the first step, and I see no reason to believe we ever will for the reason I gave in my response to Wayfer above.
No, it asks a very good question which draws attention to the incoherence of physicalism and the inability of it to explain the process which you say is fairly well understood.
I haven't said that the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. I would say it never will be because consciousness cannot be directly observed, and because the kinds of explanations we have for intentional behavior are given in terms of reasons, not causes, and the two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm.
It's a pure prejudice on your part that says that because we can give explanations in terms of reason that physicalism or strong emergentism must be false. It's merely an argument from incredulity.
Physicalism cannot explain subjective feelings obviously, but it doesn't follow that it is false, merely that it is limited in its scope. There is no reason to believe that we should be able to explain or understand everything. The fact that we cannot does not indicate that there must be a transcendent realm or a divine mystery. That is just wishful thinking.
That's not quite what I had in mind. I was thinking of the way that so many economists think that everything is economics. Ai Wei Wei, apparently, once observed "Everything is Art, Everything is Politics." Other people think that everything is religion.
Quoting wonderer1
Well, it's commonest among philosophers in the 20th century English-speaking tradition, which at first set out to abolish philosophy (or at least metaphysics) in favour of science. Phenomenonlogy specifically sets itself up to exclude science from philosophy (bracketing, epoche). Then there's the Indian and Chinese traditions.
Many technologists - not philosophers - think that climate change will be "solved" by more technology - as if more of what got you into trouble is likely to get you out of it. But they still want to build nuclear power stations (to help with climate change) even though their only solution to the problem of nuclear waste is to bury it - for 100,000 years! That's a prime example.
Quoting Janus
Don't you think that recognizing the problem is the first step? What we need to do next is to map it - understand it. Then we'll have to wait and see. I'm expecting radical conceptual developments. A new Kuhnian paradigm.
Quoting Janus
One step that may be useful is to escape from "gives rise to" or "causes". It leads to dualist hankerings, which won't help at all. I'm thinking of some locution like "is" as in "Rainbows are effect of sunlight on raindrops" or "Thunder and lightening are an electrical discharge". So brain processes join rationally explicable behaviour as symptoms or criteria for consciousness - following Wittgenstein's analysis of "pain". (D.M. Armstrong used this as a basis for a materialism, but I don't think that follows.)
Or we could look carefully at how psychologists address the problem - mainly by ignoring it, which is like a fingernail on a blackboard to philosophers like me, but nonetheless produces some interesting "phenomena"
It sounds very close to what I had in mind. Anyway - I'm sure you would agree that a large part of philosophy is learning to look at your spectacles instead of just through them.
I think the outlines are beginning to emerge. Don't forget, the publication of Chalmer's book Towards a Theory of Consciousness, and the paper on the facing up to the problem of consciousness, virtually initiated the whole new sub-discipline of 'consciousness studies', which is at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. The bi-annual Arizona conference on the science of consciousness has been held ever since, co-chaired by Chalmers.
Quite so. All part of the process. Although putting Chalmers in charge makes me nervous. But then, no-one's impartial here.
In some ways, it was. It gave people a focus, just as Nagel's bat did. I never doubted that he is a clever cookie. Doesn't mean he's right. I'm not bothered about what he did before philosophy. It is a bit ambivalent, though. I try to listen carefully to physicists when they are talking about physics and mathematicians when they are talking about mathematics. But not necessarily when they are talking about Dualism.
The interview needs some reading. But I will put it on my list. Thank you. BTW, I'm still getting my head round Nagel. An off-the-cuff response based on a skim-read seemed inappropriate.
Thanks to reading that, I've realized that Chalmers and I share a philosophical perspective.
Thanks for sending me the link to this. I realize that everything has moved on in the last three days. But I hope my comments may nevertheless be of interest.
The heart of his argument is the re-evaluation of evolutionary theory. There have been various statements of it in this thread, but I shall quote from this article.
Nagel goes on to say that
So far, so good.
Now comes his mis-step, in which, so far as I can see, he contradicts what he has just said - continuing from the last quotation:-
There's no explanation of where this "proposal" came from, nor any account of why anyone would think that such an explanation would justify relying on reason. I wish he had recognized what evolutionary theory does and doesn't justify. But he moves gradually from the relatively harmless point that evolution would settle for pragmatic heuristics as opposed to valid arguments, that is, he ends up equating reason with any old natural process, and that's a mistake.
A natural process is specified irrespective of its trustworthiness and so the question whether it is reliable can be formulated. But an algorithm is a set of mathematical instructions or rules that will help to calculate an answer to a problem: One can ask of a set of mathematical instructions whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem. But one cannot ask of an algorithm whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem; the question whether that particular set of instructions is reliable has already been asked and answered. That's why one cannot ask of reason whether it will deliver the truth; that question has already been asked of potential arguments and answered.
If one supposes that human beings have a "rational faculty" - i.e. an ability to reason, - the question of evolution is what contribution such a faculty might make to survival - the question whether we are able to garner information about the world has already been asked and answered. This question does require a justification of reason, not as such, but as something that needs to be explained in the context of evolution. The justification of reason as a practice in its own right is a quite different project, and if that is his point, he is right.
I think that Nagel's critique does not distinguish clearly enough between the two issues. The possibility of evolution settling for something that is "only approximately, and contingently, true" (p. 5), which is a perfectly rational pragmatic practice, is meant to undermine the idea "that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection". But this misses the point. The fact that we have a rational capacity demands an evolutionary account.
The only recourse I have to understand this is wildly speculative. Nagel doesn't even mention Wittgenstein. Yet it is, I believe, common knowledge that Wittgenstein's approach to justifying reason grounds it in our human way of life, our practices, our language-games. If one accepts that, the idea of evolution presents itself as a way of deepening his gestural account and explaining why our way of life and practices are what they are.
But if one accepts Wittgenstein's "This is what I do" as the bedrock of justification, evolution is not required to provide any further justification for rationality. It is asking and answering a different question. On the other hand, if one rejects Wittgenstein's "groundless grounds", evolution may seem to provide another layer to the infinite regress of justification. For myself, I don't see that another layer is required, and would probably argue that evolution doesn't provide it anyway, but that's another matter.
For the record, I don't think that the "refutation" of evolutionary theory is his real business here. He is using that question in pursuit of bigger game, and makes that clear in his final paragraph.
This is a substantial and even important idea, irrespective of any bickering about evolution. It is helpful to read this passage in the light of his remarks about Pierce at the beginning of the essay.
I would like to comment, however, that our first business when we enter the world is not to ask that, or any other, question but to undergo the years of training required before we are capable of asking questions. By which time, we will have learnt a good deal about what is the case and what is right.
Quoting Ludwig V
He's discussing Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality. (I now notice that the posted version has lost some of the formatting to distinguish passages from his book, for which I apologise.) He says that this book sets out to provide a 'naturalised epistemology', that is, to ground knowledge in the facts of natural science, and in particular, evolutionary theory. He's saying that Nozick's argument is that the facts of evolutionary biology are sufficient to 'ground reason':
So throughout this passage, he's presenting Nozick's proposal as an example of a naturalised epistemology based on evolutionary biology.
(Naturalized epistemology seeks to understand knowledge, belief, and justification using methods and insights from the natural sciences, particularly psychology, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science, rather than relying solely on a priori philosophical analysis. It treats epistemology as a branch of empirical science, where the processes of acquiring knowledge are studied as natural phenomena. It was notably advanced by W.V.O. Quine in his influential essay "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969). In it, he argued that traditional epistemology's quest for a foundation of knowledge is misguided and that instead, epistemology should be concerned with how humans, as natural beings, actually acquire and justify beliefs. Quine suggested replacing traditional epistemology with a psychological study of how we come to believe what we do. Nozick is writing in this vein, and Nagel is using this book as a foil for a general criticism of naturalised epistemology.)
So he's questioning Nozick's account, asking:
[quote=Nagel, p5] But is the (evolutionary) hypothesis really compatible with continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge about the non-apparent character of the world? In itself, I believe an evolutionary story tells against such confidence. Without something more, the idea that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection would render reasoning far less trustworthy than Nozick suggests, beyond its original coping functions. There would be no reason to trust its results in mathematics and science, for example. [/quote]
The 'something more' is a reason that carries its own authority, which need not and should not be grounded in something else. Note the resemblance to this earlier quote:
Plenty of animals get along just fine without mathematics and science. So appealing to evolutionary principles in support of reason actually has rather the contrary effect of undermining it, rather than strengthening it.
Quoting Ludwig V
Well, that I take to be his point. Basically I read the argument as saying, to rely on scientific or evolutionary justifications for reason, is to undermine the sovereignty of reason. And why? Because it points to factors outside reason itself to ground reason:
[quote=p6]The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere.[/quote]
Quoting Ludwig V
I don't know that it does. I agree that we certainly did evolve along the lines shown by the paleontological evidence, but I question how useful it is to rationalise the capacity to reason and speak in those terms.
Other than those points, mostly in agreement with the rest of the analysis, particularly the conclusion.
All our explanations are in terms of either causes or reasons. It might be imagined that some completely new paradigm of explanation will be found, but I see no reason to think so.
Quoting Ludwig V
The fact that we have developed the capacity for reason evolutionarily does not "justify" reason. Reason needs no justification. No justification of reason that doesn't use reason is possible, and this circularity ensures that justifying reason is an incoherent, an impossible, fantasy..
No argument here.
Quoting Janus
Well, I thought you might find my suggestion interesting.
I didn't mean to be dismissive. I have to acknowledge that a new paradigm of explanation is possible, I guess I just don't see it as a likelihood.
Also, I think it's fairly easy to see the adaptive and survival advantage that reason possesses. Perhaps that is (pragmatic) justification enough. I think the advanced capacity for reasoning that symbolic language brings with it has enabled humans to successfully adapt to almost any environment and to consequently strain the planet's resources, destroy vast areas of habitat and pollute the natural world. It's reason that should let us collectively understand this, and maybe it has, but the problem now seems so vast and intractable, given the cultural impediments to harmonious global planning and action that reason alone is insufficient. Will is also needed.
This has been subject of much commentary, although not much is said of it on this site, nor in analytic philosophy generally. Alexander Koyré has explored this in his books, with which I have only passing familiarity. Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, another, and more generally the New Left's critique of the Enlightenment and the 'instrumentalisation of reason'.
I won't go further with it here, other than to note that this is the background to much of this debate, in which 'reason' is now mainly understood in terms of evolutionary adaptation, rather than as an instrument which is able to discern truth.
I disagree. Things don't always go wrong every time that people act on incorrect ideas and/or not knowing the truth. Running away or hiding because someone thinks that there is a dangerous threat present whether or not there's actual danger, can save that person's life.
Example:
You hear a couple loud noises and assumed that they're gunshots, so you hide.
1. No actual gunshots: Not knowing the truth that those sounds were actual gunshots and hiding, doesnt result in anything bad happening. - Rational
2. Actual gunshots: Not knowing the truth that those sounds were actual gunshots and hiding, can have a good outcome, not getting shot. - Rational
3. Actual gunshots: Not knowing the truth that those sounds were actual gunshots and not hiding, just remaining as you were, can result with you getting shot. - Irrational
This demonstrate that rationality is not contingent on being correct or knowing the truth.
I don't think that what I'm proposing is a new paradigm. It's just a different way of looking at an old paradigm, which better reflects the questions that we ask and dissolves some of the puzzles that the old paradigm seems to generate.
Quoting Janus
Too right. We oscillate between seeing reason as our crowning glory and seeing it as merely the slave of the passions. It all depends how you define it - particularly the place of our values in what we do.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, that makes sense of it. I might have written a rather different response if I had realized that. I have a feeling that he thinks that refuting that kind of naturalised epistemology in some way supports his view of reason. The vision of reason that he seems to present does not attract me in the slightest. But that's another issue.
Quoting Wayfarer
This is where the fundamental obscurity in foundationalism creates unnecessary (in my book) confusion. It's very simple. Question - are the foundations of a house part of the house or not? Well, builders dig trenches and fill them with concrete and they call that putting in the foundations. So the foundations are part of the house. From this perspective, the foundations of mathematics require more mathematics. But the soil and rock into/onto which they build those foundations are the foundations of the foundations and they are not part of the house. So more mathematics just pushes back the question of the foundations. Sooner or later, there must be something analogous to the soil or rock which is not built, but on which a house is built.
Things are a bit different when you come to consider something like a ship or a car. These are self-supporting structures and so, strictly speaking do not need and cannot have foundations. However, the keel of the ship or the chassis of the car plays a role analogous to the foundations of the house. The keel of the ship and the chassis of the car are part of the car. But you can build a car without a chassis - the functions of the chassis are fulfilled by the entire bodywork, which is a true self-supporting structure, without a foundation. (The same applies to ships, but they still need a keel, to give the ship a grip on the water.) But ships and cars do still have a medium, an environment, in which they exist.
I think that what Wittgenstein says about ways of life and practices trades on the first kind of foundation, but the idea is applicable to the second as well. I think a case could be made for counting it as a form of naturalism, but that's only a label, so I do not care much.
Quoting Wayfarer
You must mean "without articulating mathematics and science". The hawk that can catch a rabbit is, in one sense, solving a complex mathematical problem even though it can't solve it in the way(s) that we can; it can also distinguish quite reliably between what it can, with benefit, eat without any (articulate) knowledge of chemistry.
Well, plenty of living things, including some animals, manage pretty well, without or with only very poor vision. Which does not invalidate the idea that vision gives an evolutionary advantage to those animals that have it. It depends on your way of life and whether you can work out some other survival strategy. (Living underground, or developing an effective ultra-sound system) However, an advantage in surviving does not negate the possibility of side-effects which may or may not play into survival.
I don't see how you can argue that evolution does not and cannot validate reason, even if it contributes to survival and argue that evolution undermines reason. If you advance the latter claim, you are accepting that reason might contribute to survival.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, that's an outline. It needs a good deal of unpacking.
Quoting Wayfarer
I wasn't aware that this evolution business is so mainstream. There's no need to treat it as a dilemma or competition. I think it is quite plausible to say that reason can contribute to survival because it is able to discern truth.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. And that's not merely marginal to understanding what people mean by "reason".
Quoting night912
That's certainly true. But the reasoning you outline starts from "If someone has fired a gun, I might get shot, so I should hide", and then considers a range of possibilities around that. That's the starting-point. Factoring in my beliefs and knowledge amounts to factoring those possibilities in. It's still about the facts.
:chin:
I'm really sorry. I can't decode that.
(Nagel, 1997)
.finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation.( ) it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science ( ) to favour a criticism ( ) by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel .
(Kant, 1787)
What, in your opinion, is meant by the order of reasons? And depending on what it is, can we think of ourselves as submitting to it, but NOT creating it?
It seems to be that there is an inherent incommensurability and thus incompatibility between our two paradigms of explanationthe one in terms of experiences and reasons and the other in terms of mechanisms and causes. It's that inherent incompatibility that leads me to believe that the so-called "Hard Problem" is a pseudo-problem that comes with failing to recognize this fundamental incommensurability.
As for the ground of reason, obviously a deep question, but I will generally argue that the furniture of reason, the basic laws of thought, are discovered and not invented.
That passage from Kant is also polemical, namely against the ridiculous despotism of the schools, meaning scholastic philosophy with its rigid adherence to dogma under the banner of revelation trumping reason.
I thought that as well, but isnt a syllogism a logical construct in propositional form, which we create?
Oh. Nice catch on scholastic philosophy/rigid adherence to dogma. It didnt necessarily pertain to my comment; I just didnt want the quote to feel naked cuz I was to lazy to included as its author would have expected.
Construct, I think, rather than 'create', out of materials ready to hand, so to speak.
One can make a start by getting a better idea what Nagel meant by the order of reasons. You can get a clue by going back to the beginning of the essay and re-reading the quotation from Pierce at the top of p.2.
I'm assuming that you have a copy. I'm too lazy to type it out. My copy doesn't like me using copy and paste. You can get an idea of what "submit" means by reflecting that I have to submit to the order of the software. Which means that I want something different from what the software provides. Then ask yourself why you would want something different from what reason provides.
Reading Pierce, I'm driven to ask myself what he is trying to do with that stuff about Nature being "great and beautiful and sacred and eternal and real". For me, Nature is as real and beautiful and sacred and eternal and real as a wet Sunday afternoon or washing my socks.
Quoting Janus
You may have a point. I think the two are different articulations of the same problem. Which I agree is a pseudo-problem, except that I can't spot how the illusion is created - yet.
Quoting Mww
Quoting Wayfarer
We need to get past this opposition between discovery and invention - or construe it in radically different ways.
1.We should recognize (and I do mean recognize) that discovering Neptune is different from Pythagoras' discovery of his theorem or the discovery of the irrationality of pi or sqrt2.
2. Perhaps also a distinction between a theory/hypothesis (invented by Copernicus) and recognizing/proving that it is true (submitting to the facts or evidence). The second phase cannot happen until the first phase has happened. But what made Copernicus invent his theory? Recognising that Ptolemy's theory was problematic because the facts didn't fit.
3. Nagel supposes that our first order of business in life to ask ourselves what to believe and how to live. He was wrong. Our first order of business to learn how to ask questions, and that takes years, by which time we have already begun to live our lives and acquired many beliefs. The questions arrive too late to be fundamental.
Quoting Wayfarer
That looks like a false opposition to me. Doesn't all creation use materials ready to hand, but perhaps in new ways. Doesn't construction always result in something new? (BTW Have you been reading or reading about Heidegger?) Did he construct his distinction between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand or create it? I don't think either construct or create is quite right for that case.
Yes, much better. Thanks.
(Self dope-slaps. Shoulda got there by myself)
-
You, too. Nice rendition of the essay. Thanks.
But I reserve self dope-slappin here, cuz I might not have got there by myself at all.
What springs to mind is that they are two different articulations of the human all too human need to explain. The need to explain is the problem. We have to explain our behavior to others and we do so mostly in terms of reasons, although sometimes in terms of causes. We have to explain the behavior of animals and we do this sometimes in terms of (imagined and projected) reasons and sometimes in terms of causes and we have to explain natural phenomena and we do so in terms of mechanism, forces and causes. In regard to the last in ancient times some explanations of the natural were also in terms of reasons.
Traditionally, this was regarded as a distinction between a posteriori (learned through observation) and a priori (established through deduction), although this distinction has become far less clear-cut than it was in Kant's day.
Quoting Ludwig V
I know that 'ready to hand' would suggest Heidegger but it wasn't really meant as an allusion to him. It's closer to something Frege said:
[quote=Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge; https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Burge-1992-Frege-on-Knowing-the-Third-Realm.pdf] Frege believed that number is real in the sense that it is quite independent of thought: 'thought content exists independently of thinking "in the same way", he says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it. Thought contents are true and bear their relations to one another (and presumably to what they are about) independently of anyone's thinking these thought contents - "just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets." '
...in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic he says that 'the laws of truth are authoritative because of their timelessness: "[the laws of truth] are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow, but never displace. It is because of this, that they authority for our thought if it would attain to truth."[/quote]
The fact that impresses me is the discovery of scientific and mathematical principles that are true, independently of any grasp of them. So they're mind-independent, on the one hand, because they're true for anyone who can grasp them. But at the same time, they're only perceptible to reason (which I will continue to insist is not available to animals in anything but the most rudimentary form.)
So such principles are in some basic sense 'structures of rational thought'. They pertain to and arise from what has been known in some schools as 'the formal realm', the domain of laws and principles (hence Frege's 'third realm'.) The difficulty this presents for moderns, though, is that this 'realm' is not an actual place or location, it's real in the same sense that the 'domain of natural numbers' is real while not materially existent. Whereas empiricism usually continues to insist on the reality of the mind-independent physical object, which I regard as an oxymoronic construction.
//[quote=ibid]Frege held that both the thought contents that constitute the proof-structure of
mathematics and the subject matter of these thought contents (extensions, func-
tions) exist. He also thought that these entities are non-spatial, non-temporal,
causally inert, and independent for their existence and natures from any person's
thinking them or thinking about them. Frege proposed a picturesque metaphor of
thought contents as existing in a "third realm". This "realm" counted as "third"
because it was comparable to but different from the realm of physical objects and
the realm of mental entities. I think that Frege held, in the main body of his career,
that not only thought contents, but numbers and functions were members of this
third realm.[/quote]
Compare with:
[quote=What is Math? Smithsonian Institute;https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-math-180975882/] (Many) scholarsespecially those working in other branches of scienceview Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing outside of space and time makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.
Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science. The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, hell take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?[/quote]
Well, there's a good answer to that - someone has to build and maintain all the things we rely on. But they shouldn't have the last word.//
"Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly;
Man got to sit and wonder 'why, why, why?'
Tiger got to sleep, bird got to land;
Man got to tell himself he understand.
? Kurt Vonnegut, Cats Cradle
Quoting Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge
Note that Burge writes "number" not 'numbers'. I find it to be an important distinction because the quality of number is of course present wherever there is diversity whereas numbers as entities are not. To put it another way, say there are four objectsit seems to me to make sense that the quality or pattern of four, that is fourness, is present, but not the number four as a separate entity.
I'm glad you liked it. You deserve a pat on the back for self-criticism.
Quoting Janus
In this context, perhaps there is room for a question I mostly shelve, about whether the difference between reasons and causes is also discovered or created. Mostly, philosophers treat it as a given, though explaining it to people learning philosophy or reluctant to recognize it can be difficult. (It's not intuitive). I don't have a crisp answer. It could be either or some combination.
Quoting Janus
Yes. Indeed, with some reservations, it would not be wrong to say that for them, teleological explanations were dominant. Which suggests that explanation by causes was developed later, by distinguishing it from the teleological. (Though it would be more accurate to say that it was developed from Aristotle's account of explanation, which gives one model for everything.) It's curious that the non-teleological explanation has taken over and nearly ejected teleological explanations altogether - like a cuckoo.
Quoting Janus
I like the concept of a rational reconstruction for this. (I found it recently in Lee Braver's "Groundless Grounds".)
Quoting Janus
I like this. It helps to bridge the gap between counting (as the ground in our practices) and arithmetic.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's very helpful.
Quoting wonderer1
I like that a lot. Vonnegut used to be a great favourite of mine. I don't know why I stopped reading him. It just happened somehow.
Excellent. If only it was possible to get our software to remind anyone who types the word "existence" or "being" of it.
Quite so. Looking back, the original clarity looks like an inheritance from Plato. But perhaps that's just me.
Quoting Wayfarer
OK. I just wondered.
Quoting Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge
That "in the same way" is the problem. Even if we grant him the reality of abstract objects, which is true in a sense, it would be hard to grasp what that phrase means.
Quoting Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge
That's an interesting quote. I would think it was the ancestor of Wittgenstein's idea in the Tractatus that all possible combinations of atomic propositions are given in advance - which I'm pretty sure he later abandoned.
Quoting Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge
Yes. It looks to me as if something has gone wrong with this sentence. But the general sense is clear. This is the same metaphor that Nagel is appealing to. (What else does one submit to but authority?) But it seems to me that the assimilation of the place of reason in our lives to the place of the law or a tyranny (depending on your point of view) is a distortion - a failure to pay attention in pursuit of a grand universal statement. (Notice how much post-modernist rhetoric turns on attacking this.) Mind you, if one has a creator-God, the metaphor becomes less metaphorical.
Quoting What is Math? Smithsonian Institute
Yes. It's curious that they chose to give such a feeble, illogical argument here. Perhaps they reflected they are addressing a lay audience, which might not appreciate harder-edged arguments.
Not at all, a priori/a posteriori was Kants summary of a fundamental philosophical distinction, later called into question by Quine in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism. But I still think its a valid distinction, in fact I recall it being one of the first things I was taught as an undergraduate, in the class on Hume.
Quoting Ludwig V
When Frege says that 'thought contents' are real 'in the same way' as a pencil, he means, well, real. (He distinguishes 'thought content' as numbers and logical laws from casual thought.) So he's granting reality to abstract objects, which nowadays is controversial. As regards the empiricist rejection of Platonic realism, it's sadly typical, I'm afraid. The simple reason is - and it is simple - that if number is real but not material, then it's a defeater for materialism - and we can't allow that :rage:
[quote=SEP;https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/#PhilSignMathPlat]Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects that arent part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate.[/quote]
Oh, yes, it was one of the early bedrocks that I was taught as well. What I don't know is exactly why Kant embedded it in his work. I also know about Quine, but then he wanders off into what he calls naturalism. Wittgenstein didn't exactly abandon it. But he did argue that it was more a matter of how certain propositions were used - a question, if you like, of statements rather than propositions.
Quoting Wayfarer
Now you have opened the door to the world of pain that is reality in philosophy. The meaning of "real" depends heavily on the context of its use.
The essence of the problem is this. When Frege (philosopher) says that all numbers are real, everyone will agree. Mathematicians include all the rational numbers, such as the integer ?5 and the fraction 4?/?3 and the irrational numbers (and 0) as real. For Frege, as a philosopher, an unreal number is a number that does not exist. But for mathematicians, there are three kinds of number that are not real - imaginary numbers, infinite numbers and complex numbers. All these most certainly exist. I could multiply examples. Strictly speaking, the philosophical use of real is a figment of the philosophical fantasy that there is a use of real such that it is not context-dependent; I think it is absurd but I think it is now so common that it has to be accepted. But it does not correlate with the use of real in other departments of our language.
I do accept that numbers exist and that they are abstract, which is a category of existents, which means they have a different kind or mode of existence from physical objects. So I'm not with Frege, either. Meinong? Maybe. I haven't thought about that. I think the best short story about this is Quine's slogan "To be is to be the value of a variable". My long story would be about language-games and the different kinds or modes or senses of existence they define.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's their problem. Certainly not mine, and I'm guessing not yours either.
Quoting SEP
That's fascinating. It's as if the last 50 years of philosophy never happened. Oh, well, that's how the cycle works. One day people will look again and find it was not so awful after all.
If I may:
As to the summation .
. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise ( ) and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? ( ) But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion) ..
As to the why ..
..Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena. ( ) The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysicsa science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking.
Me, I think Kant imbedded this distinction in his work, because no one else, even if acknowledging the possibility of the distinction in one form or another, had constructed a method sufficient to prove both its feasibility and its limitations.
Quoting Ludwig V
I've thought about this question in regard to mathematics. I think it's fair to say it's both. Thinking about reasons and causes we discover a valid distinction in our thinking between them in that we consider acting for reasons to be self-generated, intentional. Being caused to act is thought in terms of being pushed by an external agent. There are many ways in which the two notions bleed into one another, so there is no absolutely clearcut distinction.
Quoting Ludwig V
Is it curious or is it because in the development of our investigations and understandings of the world we have come to see that there is no need for imaginary entities to explain natural phenomena?
Quoting Ludwig V
By "rational reconstruction" do you mean something along the lines of 'thinking about how things seems to us and then imputing it (in some kind of suitably modified form) to animals' or something else? I have that Braver book on my shelves somewhere, but I've never gotten around to reading it. Would you recommend it?
Quoting Ludwig V
Would you be able to elaborate on this a little?
Yes, Im exploring that way of thinking about it. Its often said that numbers are abstract or intelligible objects, but Ive long felt that object is the wrong word, a reification (thingifying). But number as the representation of the act of counting and other mathematical operations makes sense to me. It is also linked to the active sense of being, which is what I mean by being is a verb. (I sense some connection here with Aquinas on the dynamic nature of being but I wont take that up right now.)
Quoting Ludwig V
My intuition is that numbers are real but not existent in the same sense that objects are. The deep issue is that in modern philosophy, what is real and what exists are generally understood to be synonymous. Whereas I believe what exists is a subset of what is real, which includes potentiality, possibility, logical laws and mathematical principles, and much else besides. (C S Pierce has a similar view and has writings on the distinction between reality and existence.)
But this is why, when you say number is real, the difficult question comes up what do you mean by real or exists? The analogy of the divided line in the Republic addresses this. Plato says there are different kinds or levels of knowing with different kinds of objects - pistis, doxa, dianoia and noesis. But this is precisely what has been lost in the transition to modernity. Dianoia - mathematical and geometrical knowledge - was retained, through Galileos Platonism, but noesis was rejected, along with realism concerning universals. And the other background issue is that the idea of the hierarchy of being and knowing had become integrated with the medieval synthesis, Ptolemaic cosmology and geocentricity, so that when this collapsed, the great chain of being collapsed with it. And it was that metaphysics which had allowed for degrees of reality. Without it mankind is confined to a kind of single dimension of reality, that of objects and forces, the isolated Cartesian ego exploring and manipulating a world of objects through abstract geometry - modern materialism, in a nutshell.
Looked at from either the perspective of being as a verb or as a noun we cannot conceive of there being real being without there being real beings.
Close to what I believe, although I think the number is indeed embedded in the fabric of the cosmos, so that it is ontologically greater than merely 'something that affects us'.
But perhaps there is a paradigm that they both fit within. As opposed to melding the two.
I don't see why there must be a "single paradigm that explains it all". Those two modes of explanation are both essential to human life. For the modern mind explanations of phenomena as intentional cannot carry any weight because they are justified neither by observation nor logic.
When it comes to explanations of human and some animal behavior the notion of acting for intelligently formulated reasons would seem to be indispensable so I can't see a possibility of discarding either one. As to "modifying" them or finding a "master" paradigm within which they would both fit I cannot even begin to imagine what those would look like.
Of course that doesn't mean it is impossible, but it certainly seems impossible from where I sit. The logics of intentional behavior on the one hand and being constrained to act by external causes on the other just seem incompatible.
Say I go to the shops for milk. If someone asks why I went to the shops I'll say it was to buy milk. That's one explanation. On the other hand, I could say I went to the shops because the neural activity which is experienced as realizing I was out of milk and neural activity which is experienced as wanting to have milk led to neural activity which led me to go to the shop.
The reason I went to the shops was to buy milk. The cause of my going to the shops was neural activity. The two explanations do not rule each other out they are just two different ways of understanding the same event. Their incompatibility consists in their different ways of understanding. It doesn't follow that one is right and the other wrong,
Without wanting to nit pick, I dont think thats quite right. The stock example Ive always read is, the answer to why is the kettle boiling? can be either to make tea or because its been heated to the appropriate temperature. Both answers are of course correct, but the former is teleological - what is the water boiling for? - while the latter refers to the preceding cause of the water boiling. Generally speaking science since Galileo has attempted to avoid teleological explanations, preferring explanations in terms of preceding causes.
Yes. As far as I'm concerned, as a philosopher, that's a datum.
A neat resolution is to see it as a question of lenses rather than about the world. Wittgenstein's "seeing aspects" is one attempt, and the puzzle picture analogy is, I think, very helpful. Two problems. First, there is a description of the picture as marks on paper - lines or patches of shading. That description "loses" both ways of interpreting it - it couldn't be neutral between them if it didn't.
If, for example, we were to interpret our debate about animals as about two different ways of understanding (representing) them, we would have neat explanation of why we find it so hard to agree. It's a false choice. But then, we would expect there to be a description of them that is neutral between the mechanical, physical explanation and the rational explanation of what they do.
Quoting Patterner
Yes. However, traditional metaphysical explanations like dualism resolve the problem by positing two different substances (and then there's the "three worlds" idea, which seems to me to be in the same boat with dualism), which rejects your description of different modes in the same being. Materialism and idealism make a choice within that framework by rejecting one substance or the other and "reducing" one horn of the dilemma to the other. We won't get anywhere down that road.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. "Preferring" is a bit weak - unless you mean it in the traditional sense of "pushing forward" or "promoting". They had a methodological issue as well as all the theology - mathematics. Mental objects appeared not to be capable of being incorporated into that new way of doing science. But, as we are now seeing, that was actually just kicking the can down the road. We can't do that any more, though some people (Nagel, Searle) seem to think that's an option.
Quoting Janus
You are quite right. My problem with your way of putting it is that the cause is a different entity or event from the effect. That's why I want to say that my going to the shops consists of my moving my legs, etc and the neural activity (which, after all, is involved throughout by controlling the movement of my legs.
You can say that the thermostat causes the boiler to switch on and off, because, at that level of description, they are recognizable to two different entities. But if you talk about the heating system, the thermostat controls the system and so is part of it. It doesn't cause the system to switch on and off - the system doesn't switch on and off.
Quoting Patterner
Well, there is - Aristotle's four "causes". Actually the word that we translate as "cause" also means "reason", so it would be better to talk about Aristotle's four explanations. But that is lodged deeply in his hylomorphic metaphysics, so that all four explanations apply to everything, which won't do for us - unless we fancy accepting the Supreme Good and the Great Chain.
The problem now is that we do not want to (cannot) apply both explanations to everything. We would be happy to say that some things require causal explanations only and some things require both. Many cases are clear, but others or not - both at the line between living and non-living things/beings and between sentient and non-sentient beings and again at the line between rational and not rational beings. What's worse is that it appears to be an empirical question which things belong in which categories.
Our problem is not helped by the fact that ever since evolutionary theory developed we have had a scientific theory hovers between (combines?) the two - there is a rational explanation for what evolves as well as a mechanistic one. But there is no question that the purposes of evolution are not the purposes of the animals that evolution applies to.
I haven't looked into much by Searle, aside from The Chinese Room, but my impression is that Searle isn't so resistant to physicalism per se, but to a naive computationalist physicalism which he is well justified in resisting. [FWIW, some writer on Wikipedia seems to agree saying, "Searle says simply that both are true: consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes of the brain. (A view which he suggests might be called biological naturalism.)]
Not really.
See The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation by Peter Tse.
I may well be wrong. The last thing I read by him was an interview with Dennett in which he insisted that first-person subject experience is real - not an illusion.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree that it is the nature of the relationship that is at issue. But if you say that event A causes event B, you are positing the two events as distinct. So are physicalists positing that the experience or thought caused by a process distinct from the process? That means it must exist independently of the cause. Dualism.
Further, what physicalists forget is that in order to correlate a physical process with an experience or a thought, you need to know what thought or experience you are correlating it with. There's no prospect of deducing what experience or thought a physical process may be correlated with from the physical process alone. Ditto light waves and colour.
Quoting Wayfarer
What I mean by saying that numbers exists is explained by explaining how to count and perhaps to calculate. What is meant by saying that numbers are real is explained by explaining the zoo that has become the world of numbers, especially about imaginary and infinite numbers.
Yes, I would. It needs to be read with a certain charity. If you fasten on all the obvious analytic objections to Heidegger, you'll spend a lot of time being angry and not learn much. But your charity will be rewarded - not necessarily by becoming a full-blown Heideggerian, but by some thought-provoking ideas. (I'm particularly taken with "present-at-hand" and "ready-to-hand" and how he develops his argument against traditional philosophy) His exposition of Wittgenstein has a perhaps unusual focus (on grounds and justification and certainty), but I thought it was good and, especially by seeing him and Heidegger as working on parallel projects, it taught me something about him.
There's an entry in the index for "rational reconstruction". You may have to read around the actual passages a bit to see what is going on. If you do read it and want to ask me questions by private message, I would be happy to answer - not that I can answer all the questions, by any means. It's all about the role of articulation (in language or talking to oneself) in thinking and action. So relevant to animals.
Quoting Janus
The roots of this go right back to elementary a language. As soon as you have the concept of an apple, you can identify many apples, so the distinction between one and many is embedded as soon as you start thinking/language. (The ancient Greeks didn't recognize "1" as a number, but as the "source" of all numbers. It makes sense if you think of it in this way.) Some actual languages only have words for "one", "two", "many". But counting has already taken off - it's just elaboration from there on. One can think of counting as sticking a label on each apple in turn which individuates the apple and tells you many there are. You have arithmetic as soon as you can do that, but for true mathematics, you really need to go in for more elaborate calculations, such as algebraic ones and recognize "0". That changes the concept of number, but still grounds it in the relevant activities, not in any objects, physical or abstract.
That's off the cuff. I hope it helps.
Yeah, I had a 35 year head start in thinking about such things with a background in electrical engineering. I can't really imagine what it must be like to try to understand what Tse is saying without that background. I understand many won't find it an easy read.
An analogy to what Tse refers to as "criterial causation", that occurred to me before Tse's book came out, is that of locks and keys. Different locks have different criteria for what will be effective as a key that opens them.
So if you can mentally translate between locks and keys, and neural networks having different criterai for inputs/keys that will open the lock (activate a neural network output having intentionality) maybe that could help?
I might disagree with Dennett similarly. I consider Dennett's views a mixed bag. Some good stuff as well as bad stuff.
Ok.
Causality in brains is very complex, with all sorts of feedback loops, and if you are thinking about it in terms of a top down vs bottom up dichotomy you aren't thinking about it very seriously.
If you doubt that different thought processes consume different levels of energy you might google for information. There are problems with accessing some sites. The following site has the information but requires an email address and maybe you can find one that is easier to access. I already recommended the "Fast and Slow thinking" link but I don't think you paid attention to it.
All thinking is not the same and animals that instantly do mathematical calculations, such as bats with sonar are not doing those calculations as we do them. Understanding differences in thinking is important to the subject rational thinking- human and animal.
That's about right. It's probably as much as you can ask from a human being. I usually find him worth reading.
That is a very interesting comment. It deserves its own thread- What Makes Us Human. My first love was sociology. Compared to primitive cultures religions today might pose different reasoning regarding what makes us human. I am not sure if today, all people believe we are all human. We still live with the reasoning that some people are less than human.
I don't see that in most cases as a matter of reasoning so much as a matter of tribalistic instinct. I think we are naturally biased towards see US as human and THEM as less so. It takes reasoning to get beyond tribalistic thinking.
Reasoning and assessment are rational thinking, that require some degree of critical thinking. So do the accumulation of wealth, invention, skill acquisition and deceit. And yet rich people, academics, scientists and con artists do not have noticeably shorter lifespans than janitors, navvies and assembly line workers, who are not required to expend very much brainpower for their work - and the majority of whom are unlikely to be chess champions or ingenious puzzle solvers in their spare time. I
Indeed. Yet occasional bouts of intense thought don't shorten one's life, though they sometimes lengthens one's afternoon nap or elicit a strong craving for ice cream. Not all critical thinking is complex problem-solving and learning new tasks. A lot of rational thought is simply choosing what to cook for dinner, whether to walk or take the bus, which air conditioner comes with a better warranty, or what to wear for a date? All decisions are either rational or irrational, but only a few are intellectually challenging.
We all need both intensive thinking time and down time. Humans have resources other than critical thought: instinct, intuition, memory, imagination. None of them need to conflict with observed fact or rely on blind faith - iow, we don't need to be irrational in order to daydream or perform routine tasks. We can be irrational, even though we have language and mathematics, access to information we did not personally collect, and critical faculties that we can engage at will.
But that doesn't mean we need to be irrational most of the time, or that other animals can't be rational even though they have no human language, math or databases.
That still doesn't show that rationality is contingent on being correct or knowing the truth.
Yes. I'm not sure exactly what cases you have in mind. One of the most popular ones is the moral cases. We classify people who do seriously outrageous things as "bestial" or "animal" even when they are doing things that no animal is capable of doing or even be interested in doing. Sadistic cruelty, War, Mass murder.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. I heard somewhere that Descartes reckoned to do not more than one hour per month of intenseive thinking. Perhaps someone knows the details.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. Our image of a perfectly, or even just excessively, rational person is not a compliment. The complaint would be that they are emotionless, too like a machine, without understanding of those endearing irrationalities that makes us all human.
Quoting wonderer1
Yes, you are right about that. However, I think that part of that is the effect of crowd thinking. When people get swept up in a crowd is a classic situation when one does things that make no sense.
Quoting night912
I'm sorry. I didn't mean to contradict that. Whether p and q and r are my beliefs or not, the rational relations are the same. It is the content of the beliefs that determines what rational conclusions from them are.
I don't think irrationality - thinking contrary to factual information, as in ideological zealotry, or baseless prejudice, or self-destructive delusion - is particularly endearing. We humans who are supposedly in possession of the only rational mind in the universe, are capable of profound and catastrophic irrationalities. But we don't have to indulge them. Most of the time, most of us respond in rational ways to mundane, practical events and interactions; most of the time most of us make mundane, practical, rational decisions about ordinary matters. Otherwise, all our lives would be in constant chaos. Most of us can be emotional, empathic, kind, compassionate, generous, curious, spontaneous, insightful, irresponsible, angry, sad, confused, frustrated, ignorant, lazy, careless, spaced out, or off on flights of fancy without becoming irrational. Yet all of us get away with being irrational sometimes, because we have strong familial and community support networks, and some of us can be irrational in groups, because they're armed and hard to resist.
Most other animals don't have that luxury.
Are you having a conversation by yourself, for yourself, and to yourself?
"Okay." ???
No, the dog knows when their human is about to arrive but has no clue what time the arrival happens because the dog doesn't practice timekeeping. You neglect some very important distinctions. That much has become clear.
Quoting Vera Mont
I know other things, and "this" follows from those things.
There is no essential difference I can see between the example I gave and your "stock example". If you see a difference perhaps you could highlight it.
Quoting Ludwig V
Thanks, but I'm not seeing how it changes the concept of number beyond just extending the basic concept inherent in counting.
Quoting Ludwig V
Thanks I'll check it out. By the way I'm not averse to Heidegger. I have read some of his work including Being and Time, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and secondary sources such as Dreyfus, Malpas and Blattner, listened to Dreyfus' lectures and attended a couple of undergraduate units dealing with his early work and I found it all quite rewarding. It was my interest in Heidegger more than my interest in Wittgenstein that led me to buy the Braver books.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes I agree we must include the whole system of causes and conditions. That said nothing at all happens without the brain and the neuroscientists tell us that the neural networks in the brain model everything we think and do just prior to our thinking and doing.
Quoting night912
I agree. The larger part of rational thinking consists in inductive and abductive reasoning which is inherently defeasible.
The dog practices timekeeping in exactly the same way humans did before the invention of clocks. The dog knows when it's time to wake people, when it's mealtime, when it's time for various family members to leave the house and arrive home again, what time the newspaper and mail arrive, when it's time to go for an evening walk and when it's bedtime for children.
Quoting creativesoul
These are manufactured distinctions with no meaning that I can attend to.
Quoting creativesoul
Ditto.
No thought? No belief? No expectation? What, on earth, could mindless observation be? What is it to observe something that one does not believe is there?
Knowing others open gates is something that plenty of other creatures are capable of acquiring. This allows the creature to carefully watch. This shows innate interest. Curiosity. We can most certainlly watch that happen, in the right sorts of circumstances given the right sorts of creatures.
The subject is involved in a series of events. The subjects under consideration do not know that they are part of a routine. They do not know that they are participating in ritual. In order to see oneself as a subject matter in and of itself, one must be capable of drawing a distinction between themself and their own life. Doing that, at a bare minimum, requires naming and descriptive practices.
Quoting Mww
Is it?
Thoughtless learning? Belief less learning? Learning without meaningful connections? Learning how to open a gate... without believing they can... without thinking about it... without drawing correlations between opening the gate and getting out?
Learning how to open a gate always includes a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. Dogs can want to reach the other side of a gate. They can know it's possible by watching it happen. They can want to get out, watch others doing so, and learn how to do it themselves, and then... they do so.
Not sure if that ever a bad thing, in this context. We're talking about what counts as thinking... and then, what counts as rational thinking
Some mimicry is learning how to behave(in the sense of learning what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behavior). Other mimicry isn't.
Learning how to open a gate by watching others do it results in a practically pure form of mimicry. Doing exactly what needs to be done in order to open the gate. The necessity of thought and belief seems apparent enough now, right? The dog wants to open the gate.
The striking singular difference between human minds and most(arguably all) other minds is that humans draw and maintain the meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. Our own thought and belief(along with meaning, truth, and falsehood) are only discovered via language use. Other animals cannot think about their own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right. Hence, they have no idea how to tell the difference between their own true and false beliefs. They cannot take account of them unless they pick them out of the world to the exclusion of all else. That cannot be done without naming and descriptive practices.
Learning how to open a gate is rational behavior practiced by a thoughtful creature. Not all gate openers know that they just learned how to open a gate. Zeke didn't think about the fact that he was opening a gate. He just opened it. Zeke was an old dog of mine, and dogs that are opening gates are an elementary constituent part/element of the gate opening facts/events, as they happen. Dogs do not take account of themselves and everything happening around them as it happens. They know what's happening sometimes, but they do not think about their knowledge of that. They think about what they're doing, what they're in the middle of. They think about distal objects and themselves. They think by virtue of drawing meaningful correlations between different things.
Oh gosh. That is in dire need of argumentative support. I have no reason to believe that that's true, as written. Bald assertion is inadequate. Bald assertion conflicting with known relevant facts is completely unacceptable.
I want you to think about that for a few minutes. Humans charted stars, planned voyages, recorded seasons and all sorts of other things long before inventing clocks. We were drawing correlations between weather patterns and their own lives long before anyone figured out how to make mechanical gears with the 'perfect' number of teeth for our purposes.
Planning routines, instead of just being a part of them, is a time keeping practice. Dogs don't do that.
Dogs can be taught to wake up humans at a certain time. When this or that happens. That's not timekeeping. That's behaving as one is taught to behave. It's rational. It involves an unconscious autonomous sense of time. Waking up someone at the right time is rational.
Dogs do not think about their own expectations as a subject matter in their own right. When we think about what time we're expecting a loved one, stranger, friend, foe, and/or family member to arrive we're thinking about our own thought and belief. We're isolating our own expectations by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is to think about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires first having them, then becoming capable of isolating them as a subject matter in their own right.
Dogs cannot do that.
It's not all that hairless:
Which relevant facts are those? From what source can you be certain that early hominids did not have a sense of time? If they did not, why did they not miss it for so long, and then suddenly, with the onset of civilization, perceive a need to devise instruments for measuring time?
Quoting creativesoul
Not really. Humans had been been measuring time for quite a while before those other innovations.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/antiquity/article/keeping-time-at-stonehenge/792A5E8E091C8B7CB9C26B4A35A6B399
Quoting creativesoul
Probably not. But maybe that's because they're constrained by their people's work-leisure schedules, rather than the requirements of nature. The vultures in my area are staging for winter migration, holding exercises to make sure all the year's fledglings are flight-capable. The squirrels are very busy, hiding chestnuts and acorns. It's evening; the raccoons are preparing to forage, the salamanders and chipmunks have retired to their hidden nests. A coyote pack somewhere is assembling for the hunt - I hear their calls - but they must wait till moonrise.
Quoting creativesoul
I only read their actions. You read their minds. Uncanny!
Quoting creativesoul
But having them doesn't require reflecting on them or isolating them or deciding what their rights may be.
Dogs don't need to do that; they're not riddled with self-doubt.
(that last one is as bald as Patrick Stewart)
I don't see the 'wanting to have milk' as epiphenomenal but as a necessary part of the associated neural activity. We certainly don't experience the neural activity as such.
Right. But, if all is physical determinism, then why would we experience the wanting? A robot that is programmed to fill a cup with water when its sensors detect it is empty doed not "want" water. Nor does it experience the electrical activity that senses the low water level, or that moves the parts that refill the cup. It's all just mechanical stimulus and response.
Body needs a nutrient that is found in milk. Brain initiates action potentials to move body to open refrigerator to get milk. Photons bouncing off of contents of refrigerator do not hit retina in a pattern that closely enough matches any patterns representing milk that have been stored in the past. Brain initiates new action potentials, so body goes to store.
There is no wanting in that description, and no need of wanting. Stimulus and response accomplishes what is needed. The subjective experience of the need for that nutrient is not necessary.
But the subjective experience is there. One would think because it is an evolutionary advantage. But if it is only the subjective experience of the neutral activity, and is not causal, then how is it an advantage?
And, advantage or not, how is the subjective experience accomplished?
Why would we not experience wanting? Why compare us to robots? We are not robots we are evolved organisms.
Quoting Patterner
We don't know, and may never know, how it is accomplished. I say we may never know, because even the neural processes cannot be directly observed in vivo. But we have no evidence to suggest that neural activity could not possibly be accompanied by conscious experience. We understand physical processes in causal terms by directly observing them and in the case of neural processes this is just not possible.
Even if we could observe in living detail the neural processes we cannot observe conscious experience, so establishing the link between the two would still seem to be impossible, as far as I can imagine. Of course I might be mistaken, I won't deny that.
Falling in love without becoming irrational?
Surely a rational reason for friendship turns the friendship into something else - a transactional, conditional relationshiop?
What are the rational reasons for generosity? For mercy? For forgiveness? For hope?
Quoting Vera Mont
I didn't mean that all irrationality is endearing. You are quite right about "ideological zealotry, or baseless prejudice, or self-destructive delusion". Surely, the irrational is two-edged - or perhaps, in itself is neither - it all depends on how irrational and what the irrationality leads to.
And then there's Hume claim that "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions" and his fact/value distinction.
"nothing at all happens without the brain" is not helpful. Nothing at all happens without the legs, heart, etc. When you say that the neural networks in the brain are modelling the action, you are surely(?) going way beyond what we actually know. We do actually know that the brain is active before the action in ways that can be identified as precursors of the action, as well as during it. But we don't know exactly what the brain is doing. Still, it may well be doing something that we would call modelling the action. Such preparatory activity is perfectly comprehensible as part of the action. Preparation is concept that links preparatory activities to the activity, so it is conceptually, not merely causally, linked to the activity.
Quoting Janus
I should hope not. It's meant to be a foundation, not the actual activity. It certainly represents a big change in the concept if you are a platonist.
Quoting Janus
I wondered which side of the divide you might fall when I wrote those comments. Not knowing, I just talked about how I came at it. Perhaps I should have gone into more detail.
Taking on both those very different philosophers is a real challenge, and I respect him for it. But he will obviously be in line for criticism from both sides, who are likely to have different criteria for assessing what he is doing.
Since you are already pretty well read, I shall be very interested to know what you make of the book. I'm very sympathetic to the project.
-Robots do not have any subjective experiences of the electrical activity within them by which they detect sensory input, discriminate this input from that input, and act based on what they are currently detecting. We do. Why don't they? Why do we?
-Building on what we have that something operating entirely within the bounds of physical determinism does not, we are aware of our subjective experiences. We talk about them all the time.
-Building on top of that, we are aware that we are aware of our subjective experiences.
That seems to be a lot that physical determinism needs to explain. Why any difference at all, and how those three differences are accomplished.
Quoting JanusWe don't have reason to think otherwise. But sure, it's possible we'll discovery something or other one day.
It is. If you wish to deny that, you can use the excuse of irrationality. Me, I prefer to be befriended, as I choose my friends, for positive qualities and for compatibility of temperament and interest. Friends expect sympathy support and respect from one another; that makes it transactional.
I also terminate a relationship in which I feel cheated, exploited or betrayed. So, yes, it's also conditional.
It's the same with 'falling in love'. Do it irrationally, and you end up falling out again - in the usual case - and Shakespearean tragedy in the worst. In the spectrum between are unhappy marriages and emotionally scarred children, as well as happy accidents where crazy attraction leads a stable relationship.
Quoting Ludwig V
There is a line, which may look very faint and fine from some perspectives, between the non-rational (that is, emotional) component of interpersonal relations and the irrational (contrary to reason). Emotions and instinct can augment rational decisions; unreason undermines them.
Quoting Ludwig V
And how did he demonstrate this in his own life?
Exactly, insofar as it is implicitly self-contradictory, hence altogether impossible, for a minded creature to comprehend a mindless condition. Comprehension by a higher intellect of a lesser animals behavior, which to an investigator of it is mere experience, was never the problem. To attribute to them a mind of some sort, sufficient for inciting that behavior, but without any means to prove THAT is the sort of mind they actually possess, from which arises causal necessity, or, without any means to prove they have any mind of any sort at all, when his only provision for it is his own experience, is certainly a problem.
To which the common rejoinder is .well, crap on a cracker, dude .how else could a dog, e.g., ever open a gate, if they didnt do this or that first, which, in truth, is tacit admission that he could not possibly comprehend how that creature does anything at all, unless he supposes it to be enough like him that he could comprehend it, which immediately negates the possibility such lesser creature could manifest its behaviors by some means completely foreign to him. And that carries the implication he could comprehend the lesser creatures behavioral causality iff he knew what it was.
But, where such investigator is human, he doesnt. He cant; he does not even know his own. He guesses his own, it works for him, the dog performs the same act therefore must be accredited with the same guesswork insofar as it apparently works for him too.
While this scenario may be good enough for sociologists, psychologists and lawyers, it is far and away beneath the dignity of proper philosophy .
Quoting creativesoul
I agree dogs do not take account of themselves, nor do they think about their knowledge, for to do so is to implicate a form of personal subjectivity separable from mere instinct, for which there is no observable warrant. Id admit that it seems as though dogs take account** of the effects their behavior causes, but less so that they think themselves as causal.
How is to think about what theyre doing, not taking account of themselves? If it is the case dogs do not take account of themselves, it follows necessarily they do not think about what theyre doing, and if not of what theyre doing, then assuredly not temporal successions of it.
**Although, with that, is the lead-in to the suggestion they think, not about what theyre doing, but what they've done. But it is just as feasible to suppose an internal reaction predicated on external observed pain/pleasure, fight/flee, as rational thought in itself. I used to think my JRT did its thing just because it elicits a reaction from me which she found pleasurable, when it is just as likely she did her thing because to do otherwise elicits a reaction she finds less than pleasurable. Or, most likely of all, she did her thing regardless of me entirely.
Quoting creativesoul
I like all that ..
Quoting creativesoul
..except that. Which is a different can of different worms.
If walking consists in putting one foot in front of the other, is walking epiphenomenal?
Why not? Moving your feet does all the work, so why would we need walking?
Of course it's the whole system working together. However the brain is the central processing unit so I think it is important to emphasize that nothing happens without the brain.
If the brain tells the heart to beat and the lungs to breathe and processes and renders intelligible all sensory input and tells our limbs how to move when performing actions both simple and complex how would all this be possible without prior modeling?
Apart from all the autonomic functions the brain gives rise to consciousness and creates an overarching model we refer to as the "self".
Quoting Ludwig V
We understand and experience neural activity only as affect, percept and concept. We can say the brain must model all our bodily functions and actions and all its sensory input, but its true we don't know exactly what all those neuronal processes and networks are doing simply because they cannot be directly observed in vivo.
Quoting Ludwig V
Right. Luckily I am no platonist. I find the very idea that numbers are somehow real apart from their instantiations and our generalizing concepts of them to be incoherent.
Quoting Ludwig V
Cheers. I do have quite a lot on my 'to read' list and nowhere near as much time to read as I would like so there may be a fair bit of time before I can get to it.
Quoting Patterner
I think the answer is quite simple. We are complex multidimensional evolved organisms, and they are not. Also we do not have any subjective experience of the workings of the brain and the CNS, we only experience the sensations, affects, thoughts and actions that manifest on account of those workings.
Do you need prior modelling of the modelling? No? Then why do you need to model the action in the first place?
Quoting Janus
Is the brain part of the self or not? Assuming it is, then it has to model itself, including a model of its modelling. !?
Can you tell me the difference between my "self" and "Ludwig" and "I"? I don't perceive any.
Quoting Janus
Yes. Exactly. So how do you know the brain is modelling anything?
It may be that I simply don't understand what you mean by "model" and "modelling".
Quoting Janus
Tell me about it. There's no hurry. It's just that it might be interesting to swop notes as and when. Up to you.
I don't understand how you mean things. What is epiphenomenalism?
Quoting SEPQuoting Emerson GreenQuoting Cambridge Dictionary
Quoting Merriam Webster
In what way does the physical act of walking fit any definition of epiphenomenal? I may be misunderstanding your questions.
It seems reasonable to me to think that for everything we think and do there is a corresponding neural network of activity. That is what I mean by 'modeling'. As I already said although we think of it as modeling a conceptual or semantic process, we also think of what the brain does as a physical process. In any case, why would we need modeling of the modeling?
Quoting Ludwig V
Are you denying that it most plausible to think that the brain evolves a model of our overall being we refer to as 'the self'? Of course that model includes the brain and the body. The brain that models is conceptually the central part of that model, but it is not an experiential part at all. Apparently the brain lacks any sensation. It is the one part of our bodies we cannot feel.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm saying that the brain's inscrutable neural processes we can only conceive as 'modeling'. What could it mean to say that conception is wrong when we cannot directly observe or even feel what the living brain is doing?
Quoting Ludwig V
I agree it would be interesting to compare notes. I'll certainly let you know if I start reading Groundless Grounds. I'm enjoying our conversation. :cool:
Originally, epiphenomenalism was indeed articulated in relation to mental/physical relationship. However, the justification for it does not rely on any uniquely mental aspects and can be applied more widely. You have gestured towards this justification earlier in the discussion:
Quoting Patterner
The idea, known as causal exclusion, is that if A (neural activity) does all the work, then B (experience) has no causal efficacy. Surely, you can see that this is in no way specific to mental phenomena? So, if moving your feet does all the causal work, then walking is reduced to an epiphenomenon.
I cannot help but to laugh. This smacks of irony. Assertions have no hair. "Bald assertions" are what we call exclamations that assume precisely what's in question regardless of whether or not they are accompanied by cogent argument. They're bald because they're unaccompanied.
They are bald, not necessarily due to being unjustifiable, but rather for not having been argued for, yet. It's possible, I suppose, that your position rests upon some solid ground.
Do you have a cogent argument for how it becomes the case that any creature could begin thinking about their own previous thought and belief? All timekeeping presupposes that.
As best we can tell, time keeping practices were existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. There is a difference between knowing what time I expect someone to arrive and knowing someone has. The latter is 'fully' in the moment. The former is existentially dependent upon having already been so. Dogs are always in the moment and unreflective. I've known some superbly expressive ones replete with wonderful temperament. Some have been absolutely amazing. Astounding even. Yet they remain creatures that cannot think about their own thoughts and beliefs, because they have no way of picking them out of this world to the exclusion of all else.
Knowing about one's own expectation requires having them. Having expectation does not require knowing that one does. The dog has expectations. Knowing what time one is expected to arrive is knowing about one's own thought and belief. Dogs do not.
When we think about what time we expect an arrival, we pick out the time.
Knowing someone has arrived is not knowing what time an arrival is expected. The latter is a metacognitive endeavor. The former is not. The former is about the one arriving. The latter is about the time. The dog doesn't think about its own thought and belief. The dog doesn't think about the time. The dog thinks about the one(s) arriving. Expectation is belief about future events.
The dog can acquire an anticipatory demeanor by virtue of correlations they draw between different things. These things could be called common elements of past ritual. Sounds. Sights. Tastes. Smells. Regularly occurring events. Becoming part of a routine requires the passage of time. It does not require knowing about the fact that one is part of a routine. The dog can think/believe that their human is about to arrive because the arrival has been well practiced.
The dog doesn't think about its own expectation. Expectation is belief about future events.
To think about one's own expectations, one must first have thought and/or belief, for there must be first something to think about, and a way of thinking about it. Then, and only then, can a capable creature begin to think about their own expectations. Dogs don't do that.
All expectation consists of belief about future events.
How far off into the future one contemplates is determined strictly speaking solely by virtue of one's time keeping practices. The dog doesn't look forward to Thursday, for it has no clue about which days are. No clue whatsoever. Thursdays can be very special days for the dog, but not to... the dog.
Avoiding anthropomorphism requires knowing what sorts of things are meaningful and how they become so... to ourselves and any other creatures capable of forming, having, and/or holding meaningful thought and/or belief. Knowing how things become meaningful is knowledge of paramount importance.
It allows us to know that the dog has no clue, no thought, no belief - whatsoever - about what time they expect someone to arrive. Their expectations are not arranged by them in timely fashion or manner.
According to your linguistic framework, perhaps. Not mine.
Quoting Mww
Who said it was?
Quoting Mww
Not mine.
I do not see how that gets you out of the pickle you're in.
I did include a citation about biological clocks. I don't see how that presupposes or requires 'thinking about own previous thought and belief'. Yet another caveat added in order to exclude other species.
Quoting creativesoul
From what can you tell that? Stonehenge? Obelisks? Athens' Tower of the Winds? They don't say much, except that humans have been keeping public time since the beginning of civilization. those practices may have been named and described. Before that, humans had to depend on our own sense of when to wake, when to eat, when to move to the summer camp, when to hunt, when to preserve food for the winter. Whether anyone named that or not, we don't know.
Quoting creativesoul
Now, there is a bald, naked, unsupported statement.
you can have it. I'm done here.
What I'm trying to get at it is that what you are arguing seems to me to be exactly parallel to the argument of many dualists back in the day. They argued that the mind was a kind of "homunculus" - an ill-defined being that actually executed all the (mental) operations that the body could not. In the case of perception, for example, it was thought of as a perceiver who did the perceiving that the body could not. But if that's how you explain perception, you have set up an infinite regress, so the model explains nothing. In the same way, if you posit that the brain has to carry out some process - call it modelling - that has to be executed before any action can be carried out - it seems to me that you have created an infinite regress.
Quoting Mww
But this is exactly the traditional problem of other minds. So your argument also proves that we cannot know that other human bodies have a mind.
Quoting creativesoul
Surely this proves too much. It proves that the dog cannot act purposively.
I don't see why you would think that if the brain is constantly modeling all experience and action that it would imply dualism, a homunculus or an infinite regress.
I'm not saying the process of 'modeling" is anything other than a physical process,
I'm not claiming that there is somehow a kind of theatre with a little watcher in the brain which is prior to our experience, thoughts and actions. Think of a computer program that generates novel ways of articulating ideas. The processes that do that we could refer to as a kind of modeling constituted by the electronic switching that gives rise to the program.
I can't see why an infinite regress would be involved. You haven't actually explained your reasons for those three claims.
Youre attributing agency to neurophysiology. Its what Hacker and Bennett call the mereological fallacy, the attribution to a part that which can only properly said of the whole.
There is that argument, but mine, given the context, is concerned with higher intellects in juxtaposition to lesser, and it is to the lesser the lack of knowledge pertains.
The argument leads to self-contradictions when higher is pitted against higher, for even if it is the case knowledge of minds in similar enough creatures is technically impossible, it becomes absurd to suppose humans do not all have the same kind of mind, or that any one of them may not have a mind of any kind at all.
Im guessing anyone thinking deeply enough about stuff he doesnt know, gets himself into a pickle of some sort or another, sooner or later.
Assuming for the moment Im actually in one, any recommendations as to how to get out of it?
Then obviously I have not understood what you are trying to say. I still don't know what you mean by "modelling". I'm used to people claiming that my brain causes my behaviour, but this is presumably something different. I think it would help me if you could explain what you mean by modelling.
Quoting Thales
I have heard of that as a criterion. But then I also heard that a counter-example had been found. Perhaps someone will come up with details.
This kind of argument is very difficult to press home. There was a suggestion at one time that only humans use tools. But that one got refuted. Then the suggestion was that only human make tools, but that one got refuted. Moving on to make tools that make tools looks a bit desperate to me. Given that animals not only use tools, but make tools as well, one wonders how significant making tools to make tools really is.
"Desperate" is my middle name! :cool:
Right, just as when you say "neutral activity is wanting to have milk" you don't mean just any random neural activity, but specifically whatever activity is responsible for/constitutes the experience of wanting to have milk.
Similarly, moving your feet in a certain way is responsible for/constitutes walking. I am not sure why you are having a difficulty with this parallel.
That makes two of us, then. Let me try to be a bit more constructive.
Quoting Thales
..... by reflecting on the question.
I don't rule out the possibility that there may be something that humans do that is absolutely unique in the animal world. After all, homo sapiens is undoubtedly unique in the animal world. So there is a collection of criteria that define it. But the same can be said of any other species.
Suppose that, in the end, there wasn't a qualitative difference between homo sapiens but a number of differences in degree, on a spectrum. (I think that's likely to be the truth of it). Why would that matter?
i No, I'm not attributing agency in any other sense than action. In the kind of sense that the chemist speaks of chemical agents.
According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal.
Also, walking [I]is[/I] moving our feet. For simplicity, it's the word we use instead of spelling out the whole process. I don't say;
[I]While upright, which is possible thanks to visual cues and the delicate workings of my inner ear, I moved my feet, alternating them, always placing the rear one in front of the other, until I found myself at the store.[/I]
instead, I just said I walked to the store.
I'm afraid I missed the place where you said that. "Orchestrates" is a very good way of putting it. A metaphor is just about right for the state of our knowledge - a place-holder for a more detailed account. What I was trying to argue was a misunderstanding. Thank you.
I already addressed this. The causal exclusion argument that motivates epiphenomenalism applies equally to physical events in a similar supervenient relationship.
So how does it cause a decision to act? Do chemicals also decide to act? Youve said many times that the material universe is devoid of intention.
Quoting Wayfarer
It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act. Do you really believe that when you decide to act or simply act that there have been no prior neural processes (that you have obviously not been aware of) which give rise to that decision or action?
Not for materialists, anyway. Youre actually arguing for materialist determinism when you say that, whether youre aware of it or not. But then, I guess if your brain is configured to do that, youll have no choice, will you?
So, you don't believe that when you act there have been prior neural processes which give rise to that action? Determinism doesn't entail that one cannot learn and/ or change one's mind, or that rational argument has no effect on what is believed. If you think that then you are working with a simplistic notion of determinism.
They might be unconscious, but that doesnt mean theyre reducible to, or explainable in terms of, electrochemical processes. That is precisely materialist philosophy of mind.
Obviously stimuli can affect your endocrines, adrenaline, and the like. But that is a matter of biological physiology, not electrochemical reactions as such. Electrochemical reactions are a lower level factor that response to higher-level influences, which in the case of humans can include responses to words, which is the basis of rational causation.
@Ludwig V might find that of interest.
I haven't said that our actions and decisions are exhaustively explainable in terms of neural processes. We make sense of our actions in terms of reasons not in terms of causes, and I've explicitly acknowledged that in this thread I believe.
Quoting Wayfarer
Stimulation via the senses is achieved via electrochemical processes as I understand it. And again, I don't think that is controversial. So the whole process of perception, judgement, decision and action is all of a piece. It doesn't follow that we can dispense with our ordinary way of understanding perception, judgement, decision and action in terms of affection and reason, or in other words it doesn't follow that scientific descriptions of what is going on could outright replace those ordinary kinds of explanations. They are just two different explanatory paradigms which cannot be combined into a unified master paradigm as far as I can see, I admit it might turn out that I'm wrong about that of course. At present no such master paradigm seems to be on the horizon.
.
Which are immediately interpreted by the mind. There are electro-chemical constituents to be sure, but then the question of intentionality and judgement comes to mind. Remember this whole discussion started with the sense in which decisions and ideas are 'caused by' neurophysiogical processes. The whole process of perception and action is 'of a piece' but you don't say that can be explained solely in terms of physical processes unless you're a philosophical materialist - which you say you're not, but then you keep falling back to a materialist account.
Quoting Janus
But the 'two competing explanatory paradigms', mental and material, just is the Cartesian division - mind and matter, self and other. It was phenomenology, and some of the ideas that arise from that, which seeks to transcend that division. The two books I'm currently reading, Deacon's Incomplete Nature, and Evan Thompson's Mind in Life, are mainly about that. So too many of John Vervaeke's lectures in Awakening from the Meaning Crisis.
You continue to misunderstand. I'm not claiming that intentionality and personal experience can be comprehended or encapsulated in any purely physical account.
Quoting Wayfarer
Again you misunderstand. The Cartesian claim is that of two distinct substances. Spinoza corrected that with the realization that thinking in terms of cogitans and thinking in terms of extensa are two different modes of understanding and he said they are the two we humans can comprehend out of the infinite attributes of the one substance.
So they are not "competing" explanatory paradigms, and I didn't say they were. I said they are two different and incommensurable explanatory paradigms. I think you see them as competing because you presume that one must be correct and the other incorrect. So you are reflecting your own prejudices, not mine.
The way to "transcend that division" is to see that they are just two ways of understanding and that no polemic is necessary or even coherent between them.
So electrochemical reactions do or dont cause us to act?
A square circle is not either/ or and nor is it a paradox, It is just an incoherent conjoining of words.
The point was that the kettle example is a clear-cut illustration of the distinction between efficient (water temp) and teleological (intentional) causation. Using neural activity to illustrate the distinction muddies the water by introducing another set of questions, concerning the relationship between neurophysiology and free will which you acknowledge is not at all clear cut.
Theres been a clear thread of argument throughout this entire exchange.
That was a very helpful dialogue. The most interesting feature was that it turns out that you agree on a great deal. So I'm going to try and identify more accurately where your disagreement is. You will probably both disagree with me, but I hope we will get clearer about the problem - which is certainly a hard one.
Quoting Janus
I'm afraid it is very controversial. The disagreement centres on "cause". There's a definition which circulates in philosophical discussion and this definition itself is, in my view, suspect. After all, it was developed more than 300 years ago and things have moved on since then. Allied to a popular metaphysical view - that the only "true" or fundamental reality is physical/material reality, it is inescapably reductionist. Part of the problem is that the scientific revolutionaries in the 17th century took an entirely rational decision that their physics would not and could not take account of anything that could not be represented as a measurable quantity that could be treated mathematically. There's nothing wrong with that decision, except the illusion that anything that could not be represented in physics was not real.
Quoting Janus
You've moved away from the troublesome concept of cause to something vaguer, which masks, to some extent, where the disagreement is.
You refer to "when I decide to act or simply act". That seems to posit the possibility of acting without deciding to act, which seems absurd, and certainly won't help the neurophysiologists, who are looking for causes of action. So we need to choose between saying that when I "simply act", there is no decision or the decision is the action and the action is the decision.
All this is hugely complicated by the concept of "intention". We don't I think decide to intend to act, yet intending to act seems to presuppose that I have decided to act. Then the question arises about "simply acting". Does this mean acting without intending to - i.e. unintentionally? I don't think so.
So now we have a rather complex preparatory stage to action - decision, intention, action, and a category of actions that seem to be actions, yet have no visible preparatory stage.
Then we need to think about planning, preparing, trying - where do all these fit in?
Coming back to what I will call - as vaguely as possible - the neurophysiological correlates of action. The neurophysiologists are positing all sorts of mental events - at least that is the language they use - which precede action. They don't seem to allow the possibility of "simply acting" - and if they did, it would mess up their search for physical processes that precede action. In fact, they are in a conceptual space that is closely parallel to the conceptual space of traditional dualism, who posited all sorts of "mental events" that preceded action and seemed to distinguish acting from a simply causal event with an empty gesture at substances. The dualists explained "simply acting" by positing that they took place very rapidly or unconsciously, which I think most people now recognize as hand-waving. Neurophysiologists are doing the same thing. The difference is that they are waving their hands at physical correlates.
It's a mess.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, there is the difference that the distinction is no longer between two substances. But it is not wrong to say that the appeal to explanatory paradigms is a reinscription of Cartesian dualist and repeats the central dualist problem - how to explain the (causal) interface between mind and matter. But the nature of the question is different. That may be progress.
Quoting Janus
Yes. That worked for a while in the late 20th century. But the scientists couldn't leave it alone. So here we are. What puzzles me, though, is why you seem unable to resist positing an interface between them. (Nor can I). Anyway, it is very helpful to know that you are seeing the problem in a Spinozan framework.
Quoting Wayfarer
It sounds as if you are seeing the issue in an Aristotelian context. Am I wrong?
I was hoping to keep free will out of it at least for the time being. However, my strategy here is to see free will as equating with the proper functioning of my body, including its brain. Then I am able to do what I want to do and able to want what I want to want. But I'm a long way from being able to construct a compelling argument for that.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. I haven't read that book. But I have a lot of time for Hacker and Bennett. The first paragraph is a good presentation of what I want to say.
Quoting Wayfarer
That seems to me to be importantly correct, in this context.
I don't see how. There is no need to think about one's own beliefs about future events in order to have beliefs about future events.
Thank you, Ludwig V, for reflecting further on my question, and trying to rescue me from myself. I dont even think my mother would do that! :cool:
Quoting Ludwig V
I agree that some differences between homo sapiens and other animals are differences in degree, on a spectrum. For instance, it could be argued that my singing and a lions roaring could be put on such a spectrum. And I absolutely agree that it wouldnt matter. In fact, I would be proud to take my place along lions (and other animals that bark, screech, hoot, etc.) on the same spectrum.
On the other hand, there seems to be something (qualitatively) going on here as well.
Because whenever animals use their voices, it is for some survival reason e.g., mating, warning, etc. And thats it. Animals dont use different voice genres, or plan out concert schedules, or reserve venues, or collect money, or issue tickets, or require dress codes, etc. These are activities that, it seems to me, appear on a completely different spectrum from survivability.
Although humans can (and do) use their voices for survival reasons e.g., yelling at an attacker to scare him away they are also able to sing for a lot of other reasons. In addition, humans employ a great number of different genres when they sing. Consider jazz, opera, gospel, pop, country, blues, rock and roll, classical and hip-hop as examples which mostly have no survivability purpose. (Ill admit sometimes singers are getting paychecks by which they make a living, but certainly most singing is for enjoyment, expression of emotions or some other human reason.)
I would argue that it would be a category mistake to place animal voices anywhere on the spectrum(s) of nightclubs/music halls/radios/gin joints, where listening to music is free/cheap/expensive, the dress code is casual/festive/semi-formal/formal, and reviews are available via TV/newspapers/blogs/casual conversation. It just doesnt make sense to talk about animals this way.
Well, as a postscript, I now see that this discussion has continued down a decidedly different path (principally by Janus and Wayfarer), so if you want to just ignore my rambling here, Im fine with it. My argument seems pretty naive anyway.
Biological clocks? I'll have to look closer. I suspect there's some equivocation going on here. Clocks do not keep time in the sense we're discussing. Clocks have no thought/belief. Time keeping requires that. We use clocks to keep time. Clocks do not use themselves to keep time.
Quoting Vera Mont
So... we agree here then.
There may be a conflation between our reports of animal thought/behavior, and the animal's thought.
Quoting Vera Mont
I've given several arguments replete with definitions/criteria in support of what I've claimed. I'm often too verbose, but it could be boiled down to a few simple arguments.
Well, I would concur that no one has been picklefree. :wink:
Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences. I have no issue with the 'problem' of other minds. I have no issue with knowledge about mindless conditions. I have no problem admitting and explaining the minds of language less creatures/non human creatures. I have no problem drawing and maintaining the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief.
Not quite. Rather, I take account of how meaningful thought, belief, and experience emerges, what it consists of, what that requires, and I apply that along with current scientific knowledge to any particular candidate under consideration.
We need not read another's mind in order to know how minds work.
Much of what you've been offering is quite agreeable. It seems that you may think some of that contradicts what I'm saying when it actually supports it.
Nicholas? Who's that?
:razz:
I eat them a variety of ways. Some pickleless, but just pickles and mustard suits me at times.
[I]There once was a boy named Nicholas
Who would rather eat hamburgers pickle-less
So off he did bounce to proudly announce
"I'm a very nice kid, but particle-less"
Now the Burger King lady said, "Nicholas,
"if you'd rather eat hamburgers pickle-less
"Then all I can say is have it your way."
[Nicholas] "'Cause anythinh else is ridicle-less."[/I]
:lol:
Yup. A bit before my time, but sounds like an effective ad.
Right?? It seems to have done the job! :rofl:
You give me too much credit - or maybe you thought I was patronizing. I was, selfishly, trying to work out a space in which we might have a constructive debate.
Quoting Thales
No, they don't. But they do have voices and they do do something that is at least akin to singing. But we can bat this back and to forever without anything of any interest emerging.
Quoting Thales
Surely we do sing for mating, warring, etc.
Quoting Thales
I don't know about "most", but some is. How do you know that wolves don't howl at the moon, for example, for the enjoyment of it?
My starting-point is that human beings are animals. We have bodies in the same way that they do. We have instincts which dominate our lives just as they do. Pretending we are not animals is something that are very much tempted to do, because we spend much time and effort trying to distinguish ourselves from them. But most animals do that in one way or another. For the most part, species prefer not to share their homes, roosts or whatever with other species. So that desire is shared with other animals as well.
When someone tries to find some respect in which humans differ from animals, what I hear is a desire to pretend that they are not an animal. But they eat and sleep and do all those animal things. How are they not animals - admittedly an animal with over-developed capacities? But that doesn't change the foundation.
Well, that's what identity theorists say about consciousness vs neural activity. There are arguments against identity theory (other than epiphenomenalism), and similar arguments could also be deployed against the identity of walking and putting one foot in front of the other. But whether it's identity physicalism, reductive physicalism, emergence or anything else besides eliminativism, epiphenomenalism is supposed to argue against that on the grounds that consciousness appears to be superfluous if neural activity does all the causal work. My reductio aims to demonstrate that this argument is based on a misunderstanding of causality.
Quoting Ludwig V
By "cause" I mean something like "provides the necessary conditions". I'm not thinking in terms of "linear' efficient causation, although that too arguably plays a part. There are always going to be problems with our attempt to formulate ideas of causes and conditions, given that those formulations are inherently dualistic and given that the reality is, presumably, non-dual.
That said, we are concerned with what it seems most reasonable to say, while acknowledging that our words can never capture the reality.
Quoting Janus
Quoting Ludwig V
So, here is where I think your misunderstanding of my argument is. To my way of thinking if a set of conditions gives rise to another set of conditions then the former could rightly be said to cause the latter, at least within the scope of what seem to be reasonable ways to think, while not extending to a claim of exhaustively capturing what is going on.
Quoting Ludwig V
It seems to me that very many even most of our actions happen without conscious decision. I think it is only meaningful to speak of decision when we are self-consciously aware of deliberating over what to do. We can posit that unconscious decision-making takes place, but then it becomes, as is so often the case, a terminological issue. Same goes for positing unconscious intentions. Are these unconscious decisions and intentions just rationalizations after the fact? If not what could they be other than neural activity?
Quoting Ludwig V
To my way of thinking planning and preparing can be parts of deliberation, Trying is just doing it seems.
Quoting Ludwig V
For me there is no separation between the physical processes and the semantic or qualitative aspects of our lives. They are all of a piece and only seem separate due to our inherently dualistic thought and speech.
So I don't believe the meaningful qualitative dimension of our lives would be possible without the physical. However I don't buy the reverse argument that because the very idea of the physical is a part of our meaningful qualitive experience and judgment that it follows that the physical universe could not exist without the presence of percipients capable of apprehending it. So i think in that sense it is most reasonable to say that the physical universe is both ontologically and temporally prior.to perception, experience and judgement.
Quoting Wayfarer
What seems most misguided and retrogressive to me is the very idea that the brain is merely "grey glutinous matter". That seems most simple-minded to me. The counterpoint to thatthinking of the mind as ethereal is the equally retarded sibling.
I did notice what was going on. But were going off on a discussion of epiphenomenalism and walking. I didn't feel I had much to contribute to that - and my bandwidth is rather limited.
Quoting Patterner
I agree with your beginning. But, as you predicted, I don't agree with your ending. ("neutral" is a typo for "neural", I assume.)
Monkeys and Shakespeare. Think of someone who has never seen or conceived of a calculator. They may press keys and random and watch the changes shapes on the screen. They have no idea of the meaning. The causal sequences are working away behind the screen. Some of them are calculations, some are not. The significance of what is going on escapes them.
But we know how the calculator was set up and the correct sequences of keys to press in order to execute the calculations we want to make.
The causal sequences on their own cannot distinguish between calculations and random numbers. They work in just the same way whatever keys are pressed. Only when you know how the calculator fits in to human lives can you grasp their significance.
It seems to me a complete misunderstanding or misrepresentation to say that the screen display is an epiphenomenon. The screen display is the point of the whole exercise.
Causal sequences in the brain are described in a way that is designed to ignore the significance of what is going on. Unless you know how they fit in to human life, you cannot grasp that. Wanting to have some milk is the point of the causal sequence, not an epiphenomenon.
(This involves rejecting the idea that a causal sequence always undermines the rational, human understanding of what is going on. The progress from a brain state of thirst to walking to the shops is causal, but is what enables me to do what I want to do. The reductionist deterministic view of causal sequences only reflects the fact that we only pay attention to causal sequences when they have gone wrong, and prevented me from doing what I want to do.)
Does that help?
Quoting SophistiCat
No, the conscious outcomes are the point, the meaning, the significance of the causal sequences. It's just that we ignore them unless something goes wrong.
Quoting Patterner
Well, the fact that mental states make me walk to the shops demonstrates that epiphenomenalism is false.
However, the difference between neural activity/consciousness and moving feet/walking is vast. I can't even see any common ground.
The review it was taken from is here.
The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.
Other animals cannot do that.
I'm with you here. That's what I thought Janus was saying, but apparently not.
Interesting that the very idea of 'causation' which seems so intuitively and even scientifically obvious, actually turns out to be a metaphysical issue, or at least it has since Hume.
The distinction I was seeking to make at the outset of that discussion was between efficient and material causation, or causes and conditions, and teleological causation, which is intentional. That does hark back to Aristotle, but then, there's been something of a revival of interest in Aristotle's philosophy of biology recently.
Quoting Ludwig V
[quote=Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 35-36]The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. (Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36)[/quote]
Of course this is the background to Chalmer's 'facing up to the problem of consciousness'.
Quoting Ludwig V
I really think neurophysiology is only relevant when you have a condition that prevents you making tea or going to the shop. 'I was going to go out, but I can't move my legs.' 'I was going to make tea, but suddenly my vision became blurry and I couldn't see straight.' Call the doctor! But 'the brain' is not normally a consideration.
I asked ChatGPT to provide a summary of Raymond Tallis' view:
I do notice the frequent assertions on this forum that, although neuroscience can't yet 'explain consciousness', they will do at some point 'in the future'. I would include that tendency under the same general heading.
Isn't this what epiphenomenalism is saying?
Quoting Ludwig VI agree.
Quoting Ludwig VI agree. Our subjective experience of it is not like the robot's. Our actions will often look like the robot's. But, with or without the kneural knet, the robot will do only exactly what it was programmed to do. Whereas I do not have programming that requires me to do only one thing from among what, to an outside observer, appears to be many possible options.
I'm waiting on the platform for the 5 pm train; it is 4.58; I expect (believe) that the train will arrive shortly. It doesn't. I am disappointed. Is it correct to say that I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false? It is correct to say that that constitutes a belief about a belief?
Why would it be incorrect to substitute "the dog" for "I" in that story?
I think you would reply that it is incorrect because the dog is unable to speak English.
However, I do not believe that attributing beliefs or knowledge to an agent is about what is going on in the agent's head. It's about making sense of what the agent does.
Quoting Patterner
That's true. But, since we are animals, the ways that an animal thinks are still available to us, so these special ways are grafted on to the ways of thinking that an animal thinks.
My favourite quick way of making this point is to remind you that we are perfectly capable of using language without any ability to formulate the rules that we are following. Articulating definitions and grammatical rules is grafted on to "wordless" thinking.
Quoting Wayfarer
Certainly. But I don't think that formulating the problem in such a way that the problem is insoluble is particularly helpful. I wish I was sure that it was an unintended consequence, but I very much doubt it.
Quoting Patterner
The problem is that your thought-experiment only works if I pretend that I accept this. It begs the question. (This is about the P-zombies, isn't it?)
Quoting Janus
Oh, I don't think it is all that simple-minded. It is an attempt to gain a rhetorical advantage by labelling the phenomenon in a prejudicial way. If I'm feeling charitable, I try to ignore the label for the sake of the argument.
Quoting Janus
I'm not that bothered about that supposed failure. It's a bit like complaining that a photograph doesn't capture the reality of the scene. Of course it doesn't - unless you allow it to by supplementing the coloured patches by empathetically imagining (remembering) being there.
Consider Wordsworth's famous lines "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive / But to be young was very heaven!" For me, they capture what it was to be Wordsworth in France before the Revolution. But not by reporting facts. Language has resources beyond that.
He doesnt say its insoluble. I quoted it for its succinctness. But that is one paragraph - actually one half of one paragraph - from an entire book. Nagels suggestion for a solution is sketchy, but revolves around the idea of there being a natural teleology - a natural tendency for minded beings to evolve, which can be seen as a movement towards the universe understanding itself. As distinct from the neo-Darwinian picture in which were the accidental byproducts of a fortuitous combination of elements.
Maybe Hakicho?
Hold on! I thought we were talking about Chalmers. But perhaps that's not important. I suppose I'll have to Nagel's book on my ever-lengthening reading list - and I'm a slow reader of philosophy books. I'm beginning to think I'll never catch up. But I would like to be fair to him in future.
An interesting idea. Back to Aristotle again. Perhaps.
I'm not sure that "a natural tendency" and "accidental by-product" are in flat contradiction. They could constitute different attitudes to the same phenomenon. (Except I have serious difficulties about "the universe understanding itself" - but then I don't have to go that far.) Evolution itself could be an example of how to make progress. It manages to posit a blind, purely causal process, which nevertheless manages to have the effects of a purposive process. Dennett argues at length that such a process deserves to be called "purposive", and, on the principle of the duck, that seems a reasonable proposal.
Quoting Wayfarer
Indeed. I've been trying to remember that story ever since the example was proposed (by Vera, I think). I couldn't remember enough detail to construct a search that would throw it up. Thank you.
Me too, and I have >500 .pdfs on my hard drive. I read a lot of excerpts, parts and reviews. Oh, and also synoptic overviews. There's far too much content to take on nowadays. My interest in David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel in particular, is because they are both opponents of philosophical materialism but from within a generally mainstream analytic context.
Quoting Ludwig V
Very much so, but let's leave that for now.
Quoting Wayfarer
The most annoying tendency is for people to append very long lists with no comment whatever. Very unhelpful. They give the appearance of being the result of a search and little more. You can tell who's read a lot from the text itself (and the footnotes). Reviews are good, when they don't just repeat the publisher's blurb.
Quoting Wayfarer
Opposing materialism is good. But I'm very ambivalent about the analytic mainstream. Yet it is the analytic mainstream I am opposed to and I have to admit that from time to time I come across ideas that I can take on board.
Quoting Wayfarer
Agreed. One cannot pursue every rabbit that pops up.
All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows.
The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldnt. Be that as it may, Im ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.
But why do you disagree? Don't we have robots that perform certain actions when they get certain sensory input?
https://thepanpsycast.com/panpsycast2/episode83-1
Chalmers says:
Quoting Chalmers
OK. The PZs are supposed to be indistinguishable from normal humans, so that case is not relevant. You get much closer to that with your planet. I don't know of any reason to suppose that's possible, so I have no opinion to give.
Quoting Patterner
It depends. If they have sensory input, they are conscious, so I don't accept that we have robots like that. But I agree that we can strap a camera to a computer (or input an image) and program it to respond in certain circumstances. I understand also that we often call that seeing or calculating or speaking. But it's by extension from human beings, not in their own right. Getting it to do everything that we do is a different matter. I don't rule out the possibility that one day there might be a machine that is conscious, but I have very little idea of what it would be like. But I also don't think that consciousness is on/off, like a light and sometimes there may be no definitive answer.
Quoting Patterner
.. and yet we are still animals.
I intentionally picked a frivolous and perhaps imperfect parallel to sharpen the issue. Perhaps it would go easier with an example from physical sciences, such as the relationship between fluid dynamics and molecular dynamics. But let's just leave it.
Quoting Patterner
This is more towards philosophical zombies.
Well, I think it's either simpleminded or dishonestly tendentious. "Trying to gain a rhetorical advantage" seems a strategy more suited to sophistry than to philosophy.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not bothered by it either, so it wasn't a complaint, but merely an acknowledgement. I see it as a good thing to acknowledge our limitations.
Quoting Ludwig V
It's not clear to me what you are wanting to get at here.
Yes, it is exactly the kind of thing Plato had in mind. But, to be fair, those effects are not always being consciously manipulated.
Quoting Janus
Perhaps it's not relevant. Let's not pursue it here.
Right, but then isn't that the "simpleminded" case?
Quoting Ludwig V
:cool:
As am I, make no mistake! But Nagel, in particular, has the advantage of being dissident inside that mainstream, so at least he is paid attention, even if it's often hostile.
Quoting Chalmers
Right - his first book was 'towards a science of consciousness', but note his exploration of the requirement for a 'first-person science', i.e. science which takes into account the reality of the observer, instead of viewing the whole issue through an 'objectivist' lens. He's part of, and in some ways an instigator of, a sea change in philosophy of mind, which recognises this change in perspective, which his opponent Daniel Dennett resolutely refuses to do (ref).
Don't we already have, and have had for a long time, that "first-person science" in the form of phenomenology?
I mean you can't incorporate the first person into the study of chemistry, biology, geology, botany, or even physics and so on. That said it should be obvious enough to acknowledge that all those sciences are carried out by persons and that they are dependent on human perception and judgement. I can't imagine anyone being silly enough to deny that.
Quoting Ludwig VAre you contradicting yourself? Or am I reading it wrong?
Quoting Ludwig VI agree.
Quoting Ludwig VI have literally never heard anyone try to deny that anywhere, at any time in my life.
The target of Chalmers argument is those who attempt to apply those methods to study of consciousness, such as Dennett.
It is more than labels. There are major differences between Continental and Anglo philosophy on these issues, although it might suit you to ignore them.
Do you think we can be confident that introspection and reflection on experience may yield reliable information about the nature of consciousness?
What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy?
Obviously, something like a kneural knet would be found only in scifi. I'm just using it as an example off epiphenomenology. It gives subjective experience, but has no casual ability. If the robot acts without it, as robots we currently have do, then the addition of it would be true epiphenomenality (is that a word??).
Weve been through all this before e.g. here .
According to Ray Monk, the Continental-Anglo divide stems from the period of Gilbert Ryles dominance of Anglo philosophy. I would try to summarize it but Im typing via iPhone so am limited but the article is here . But a couple of differences that could be observed are between existentialism and phenomenology, on the Continental side, and the emphasis on language, logic and science and the generally scientistic tendencies in a lot of Anglo-American philosophies. Whereas Anglo materialism tends to look to science, Continental materialism tends more towards Marxist or economic theory.
I think it's worth noting that in that three-year-old conversation you linked I said I approve of a plurality of approaches because we cannot pre-emptively decide what each will turn up. I havent changed my mind on that. You seem to be much more intent on polemicising the issue.
I can recognize that I should not lump him in with the materialist mainstream - nor Chalmers. At present, I'm inclined to think that he is not dissident enough. I need to take a closer look. When the closer look will happen, I do not know. In the mean time, I can perhaps moderate my rhetoric.
Quoting Wayfarer
I don't think that's historically accurate. I have the impression that the divide was well embedded before WW2. Indeed, it goes back to Hegel and beyond. Some people seem inclined to blame Ryle for everything, but I don't think that's fair.
Quoting Janus
But I thought that Husserl specifically developed phenomenology to be something quite distinct from science - unless you define science as anything that attempts to achieve objectivity.
Which prompts me to complain that this entire discussion is scientistic and ignores the possibility that disciplines that do not aim to emulate science may be (I think are) essential to understanding consciousness. History, Literary and Cultural Studies, Sociology, some branches of Psychology etc. - not to mention Marxism and Psychoanalysis which might well have something to offer. But, of course, it all depends how you define "science".
Quoting Patterner
You didn't mention it in your account of how different humans are from animals. Mind you, I don't mention what you emphasize in my accounts of how similar they are. Perhaps it comes down to "glass half full/empty" - a difference in perspective rather than a disagreement about the facts. Then we need to tease out why that difference in emphasis is so important.
Quoting Patterner
Yes, it does look peculiar. I didn't put the point carefully enough.
I think that "sensory input" is already a recognition that consciousness and experience are present. I also think that there is no a priori reason to rule out in advance the possibility that conscious beings might have bodies of plastic and silicon. Does that help?
Quoting Patterner
That's exactly why I can't do anything with your thought-experiments.
Quoting Janus
Yes, I guess it is. Perhaps that simple-mindedness is a fault. One can't, for example, describe an unborn baby as a foetus and pretend not to know what kind of context that sets up.
Quoting Janus
Well, I certainly agree that it is a good thing to recognize the difference between a picture and a description and being there. Whether "limitations" is appropriate for that is another question.
Not really. It is well established that prior to WWI, German idealism was still highly influential in English and American philosophy departments. That began to wane with GE Moore and Bertrand Russells criticism of idealism in the 1920s, but recall at the time, phenomenology as such was just beginning and Heidegger had only just began to publish. The article I linked to ascribes the rift to Gilbert Ryles hostility to Husserl and Heidegger in the 1940s and onwards, and also Ryles dominance of English philosophy at that stage (he was editor of Mind from 1949-71 and had a lot of say in who got philosophy chairs in Britain). That period was when the division really shows up. (Ray Monk was biographer of both Wittgenstein and Russell, although the latter bio is not very well regarded.)
Quoting Ludwig V
Your rhetoric always seems quite circumspect to me, for what its worth.
Take a look at this review of Nagels 2012 book Mind and Cosmos, The Heretic - its a very good thumbnail sketch of what Nagel said and why it provoked such hostility from a Darwinist mob.
Yes. I have read the Wittgenstein biography, but not the Russell one. As I remember it, the Wittgenstein book rather stole a march on Brain McGuiness and there was some bad blood. I read McGuiness' as well and it was the better book. But it stopped half way.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes. There were problems, but I just don't feel strongly about it - perhaps because I have always been very sympathetic to his project. I can understand the hostility to Heidegger - there's still an issue about his venture into public life in the 30's. Some people still want him "cancelled". In the context of WW2 so soon after WW1, it would be surprising if there were not some hostility. It looks unreasonable now, I grant you. But we're 70 years, at least two, perhaps three, generations, further away from those times.
Quoting Wayfarer
You don't know how much I delete before posting. When I read others indulging themselves, I don't like it, so...
I've saved the review for later. Thanks.
It was very good. Thanks.
Gotta love Fergusons Andy Rooney-vibe.
First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.
Probably isnt a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases.
That's true. I was placing Husserl a bit earlier than I should have done. I just wanted to point out that their characterization of what they were doing might have been a bit partial. A rebellion was also going on in Germany, which they didn't like, of course. But Bentham and the two Mills had continued the empiricist tradition through Hume from Berkeley and Locke through the 19th century. I think the divide can be traced back to rationalism (Descartes and others, on the other side of the Channel) and empiricism (Berkeley, Locke, Hume, in England).
You see, sometimes I go too far the other way and insist on calling a spade an agricultural implement.
Quoting Janus
Quoting Mww
It certainly covers some of them. Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and Carnap made it clear that theoretical system metaphysics was their primary target. This was a not an unfair characterization of the German Idealism, based on Hegel, and Kantian tradition which were indeed dominant in the whole of Europe at the time, But a rebellion (Husserl, Heidegger) was also going on across the Channel at the same time. Analytic philosophers mostly didn't like them, but they were not simply a continuation of metaphysics.
When someone has rational thinking, he / she must be able to reflect, analyse, criticise, and ask questions on the thinking. Just because a hawk has hunted his meals, or dog has opened door to go out for whatever don't mean they have rational thinking. They are just instinctual survival and habitual response by the animals.
If you trace back to the origin of rational thinking, then it would be the ancient Greeks. How did they start? They started by asking what is the world made of, and debating and analysing on the world linguistically. Then Socrates came to the scene asking how one should live to be good, and followed by Aristotle who asked and propounded what happiness is.
No animals can do rational thinkings like the way they did. If someone had rational thinking on why he went to a shop, then he should be able to explain the reason why when asked the reason why.
Suggesting animals have rational thinking is a gross confusion on the concept.
Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldnt be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic?
No. For a number of reasons.
The OLP advocated that philosophy should analyze, but wanted to analyze in a different way- in Ryle's terms, informal logic as opposed to formal logic or untechnical as opposed to technical concepts - and tried to carve out an arena for philosophy which avoided awkward conflicts with more technical disciplines - though he also thought that philosophy's arena was "more fundamental\" than the technical disciplines' one other feature was abandonment of the idea that it is philosophy's task to reform and regulated language. Philosophy of Language (that is what you mean by LP?) was rather different, and was, I would say, a development of the idea that philosophy's primary method was logical analysis.
Actually, I don't think that analytic philosophy has self-destructed. My perception is that it is alive and kicking strongly - even though some people are very critical of it and are announcing it is over.
That's the great mistake that Socrates made. Articulating one's reasons is a different skill not the same as having them. Even if you can't define courage, you can use the word correctly. You may not know whyhow the fuel makes the car go, but it doesn't mean you are irrational when driving the car.
Quoting Corvus
So when we act appropriately on our survival instincts and open doors when appropriate, are we acting rationally or not?
Quoting Corvus
If that's how you choose to define it, that's fair enough. But it seems a bit odd to characterize the people who built the pyramids as irrational, don't you think? (They were indeed irrational in some ways, but not when they built the pyramids.)
The former is just doing and living, the latter rationalising and philosophising.
OK. I can make some sense of that. To be rational is to rationalise.
1. So do you think that the people who built the pyramids were rational or not? (They built them before the ancient Greeks started philosophizing.)
2. About the process of learning or acquiring a habit or routine. I grant you that putting on one's lucky trainers when going out to compete is not (normally) rational. But when the habit or routine is capable of rational justification - driving or fuelling one's car would be examples - is learning or practising those activities rational or not?
More important, should we assume all humans are rational thinkers or must they learn the higher order thinking skills to be rational? Is believing and defending a myth, rational thinking?
I love that first question because it stretches our thinking!
That second one is hard to answer. Is it rational to believe something that is not true?
What interests me is the things that small difference in DNA gives us. We think in ways nothing else (in the universe, as far as we know) can, and do things nothing else does. The proof of which is all around us, covering the planet, and includes both the content and method of our communication.
Quoting Ludwig VUnderstandable. I don't think PZs are possible. I think any bit of information processing brings a little bit of consciousness. I was just trying to say what I think epiphenomenalism would need like. But, as far as consciousness goes, I don't think epiphenomenalism applies.
Quoting Athena
The answer to the general question is that it is rational to believe anything that you have good evidence for. Sometimes good evidence is misleading, but that doesn't affect the answer. Sometimes we believe things without good, or even any, evidence. That is irrational. Believing a myth is a bit different. Short story, myths (and religious beliefs in general) have a status a bit like axioms, and in that sense are pre-rational. But one could, nevertheless defend them on rational grounds.
Quoting Patterner
H'm. I think that's a bit extreme, but comprehensible.
Quoting Patterner
It does depend what you mean by the causal explanation "doing all the work". That's a complicated issue. What is the work that the explanation needs to do?
Daccord.
Good enough reasons.
AFAIK since Nietzsche Husserl and Heidegger the continentals have (purportedly at least) eschewed metaphysics or at least reduced it to be a subset of phenomenology.
Quoting Ludwig V
It does depend on how you define science. I think Husserl considered phenomenology to be a science, and I see no reason not to think of psychology, anthropology, sociology and history as sciences.
Quoting Ludwig V
I would count simplemindedness as a fault wherever a more nuanced understanding is available.
Quoting Ludwig V
You introduced the photograph analogy. I think a photograph does capture aspects of the reality just as our thinking can. Thinking may be more or less apt. I can see your point if you mean to say that we needn't worry about whether or not what we say is absolutely adequate to the reality, but should rather concern ourselves with the relevance, validity and soundness of what we say within the ambit of common human experience.
Getting back to rational thinking: animals and humans. The upshot of what Im arguing is that the ability to discern and understand reason is one of the distinguishing characteristics of h.sapiens. In Western culture up until recently, that distinction was universally accepted. It has been called into question by interpretations of biological evolution which place humans on a continuum with other species. Neodarwinian materialism insists that human nature has a strictly biological explanation which can be accounted for solely in terms of molecular genetics; we ourselves can be explained by science. But such arguments are self-refuting, in that while appealing to reason, they hold that reason is simply an organ of biological adaptation. An argument is simply another of the sounds that this particular organism makes. And thats the only point I wished to make in this thread.
That is my understanding.
Quoting Janus
Well, the Husserl's crucial idea was the epoche or "bracketing" of external reality to exclude it from consideration. The "first-person" or subjective "lived world" was the subject-matter. The methods of the sciences as understood in his day were not applicable. But he did think of phenomenology as a systematic study and methodology. So in that sense, it was a science but it wouldn't have been called that at the time.
Quoting Janus
That's about right. I would add that no clear meaning can be attributed to reality beyond our access and the the ambit of common human experience - amplified by techniques discovered or at least valdiated by science - is all there is.
I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding.
As far as I remember Husserl considered phenomenology to be the science of consciousness, of human experience. I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience in the other sciences. I could be mistaken about that of course.
Quoting Ludwig V
I agree with that. But I do think that our capacity to imagine possibilities beyond the ambit of common experience is an important phenomenological fact about the human.
Quoting Mww
Yes, I think there's some truth in that.
German has an expression, Geisteswissenschaften, which literally means 'sciences of the spirit', covering subjects other than what English calls 'natural science', including philosophy. There is no equivalent term in English.
Quoting Ludwig V
That would be 'positivism', wouldn't it? And what precisely constitutes 'common' in that sentence? Where do you draw the line between what would be accepted as 'common' and what would not? But then, the kinds of observations produced by the LHC would not be 'common', nor would the interpretive skills required to analyse them, even if they are designated 'scientific'.
[quote=SEP, Heidegger]If we look around at beings in generalfrom particles to planets, ants to apesit is human beings alone who are able to encounter the question of what it means to be... [/quote]
Yes. I just like details - but not so many I get confused. .
Quoting Janus
That makes sense, and I didn't mean to imply that it couldn't be called a science at all. But the epoche does set on one side the "hard" sciences, doesn't it? That's why phenomenology has to have a method of its own.
Quoting Janus
Yes. You may be thinking of fantasy stories. But those rely on hand-waving - magic or future technology - to keep plausibility going.
Quoting Wayfarer
So it does and so there isn't. I guess English culture is just not comfortable with them.
Quoting Wayfarer
Perhaps I didn't express myself well.
My attitude to this is that truth conditions are not the whole of the meaning of anything. But they are a part of the meaning of everything that is "truth-apt".
But I was thinking that if something cannot affect us in any way, then it makes no difference to us. So it is irrelevant.
I was also thinking that absolute reality, "beyond" all the contextual frameworks that we use to define what's real and what's not is not just an unachievable goal, but meaningless. The framework that defines meaning is, ex hypothesi, missing.
Also, I did refer to the "amplification" of our senses "by techniques discovered or at least validated by science".
:up:
Quoting Athena
I am not familiar with bonobos and their languages at all, but I guess it is nowhere near in the complexity and diversity of human languages.
Quoting Athena
Not all humans are equal, and rational even if they appear to be. Only some are.
No, they are not rational at all. They are more in the arena of emotional states.
:up:
Quoting Ludwig V
They were physically rational, but not philosophically rational. There is no record or evidence of their rational explanations on how and why they had built them.
Quoting Ludwig V
You could ask them why they put on the lucky trainers, and if it is rational to do so, and also ask for the justification for doing so. If they can expound about it in rational manner, then they are rational. If not, they were just superstitious.
Doing something, practicing or training some skills are not rational. Only when they can elaborate on them critically, reflectively and logically, they could be regarded as rational.
This is false. Chimps can cooperate and problem solve, as can chickens. The latter may be mere 'programming' but I would not say we can state one way or another what we mean by 'language' to begin with.
I can certainly think without words. The guy from Mexico managed to cross a border and work in the US before coming to understand what language was. Do not confuse language with culture. Our understand of language maps onto the lived-world rather than the other way around.
Do not confuse language and words with the rational explications and justifications expressed in language.
Thing about details, upon being convinced of some set of them, its awful hard to put them aside. First thing that comes to mind, for that discipline considered as a science, what principles determine its methods and what laws govern its objects? For without those, how can it be a science at all?
Quoting Janus
Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.
That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:
.It is important to keep in mind that Husserls phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the I; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible .
It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the I is impossible, if only the I is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of Is, or different forms of a single I, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.
Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other.
In one way, you are not wrong. I think "emotional state" is not the whole story. But I want to ask whether, given that you believe in a myth, working out what it is rational for you to do in the light of that myth is not an exercise in rationality. For example, we know, from textual evidence, that the ancient Egyptians built their pyramids because it was in their interest to do so and that makes sense to us. Why would we not say that given that they believed their myths, they were rational to build the pyramids?
Quoting Corvus
We know the why, but not the how - thought we have some ideas from the finished product. They also had quite reasonable arithmetic, though they limited themselves to severely practical applications. From textual evidence. Irrational, but capable of arithmetic?
Quoting Patterner
I think it's the sorites problem. One bit of information processed doesn't mean anything. Many bits of information processed is more persuasive. But it's more than just processing information. It's reacting to it in complex ways, and, it's not just responding to information, but initiating action based on information as well.
Well, if you told me, you like sushi, or you ate 10 boxes of sushi, then I wouldn't take that comment as rational. But if you said, you like sushi, because of the health effects it can bring, or some other reasons why you like sushi from biological, social or cultural backgrounds, then I might take that explanation rational.
Having ability of using language or knowing meanings of some words doesn't make one rational, nor does ability or preference eating sushi.
Knowing something is not also being rational. One can know many things in the world, but still can be irrational, or be common as muck, have nothing to do with rational being. Reason and being rational can be basis of knowing, but reason and being rational is not knowing itself.
Have fun :)
Whew!! Thanks for editing me out, saves me any more time trying to figure out how to respond.
Fruit fly brains, but indicative of the synergy between neuroscience and AI that is going to be transformative.
Well, your criterion is clear. It's also clear because it justifies saying of a person that they are rational or not - because it relies on a capacity, ability or skill. It's just that it's not very useful - for the purposes of thinking about various problems, including the one of this thread.
Quoting Corvus
I agree. One can (and most people do) use language in irrational ways. But language does open up the possibility of articulate reason. It's necessary, but not sufficient.
Quoting Corvus
That's a bit odd, at least for me. I start from the justified true belief account of knowledge, so for me, knowing something means being able to justify it, which would require some rationality, wouldn't it?
But then that requires language, which would rule out my dog. So I need something else, which would be highly unorthodox, because orthodox philosophy doesn't even attempt to consider epistemology for language-less creatures. It's the same issue, how far and in what ways we have to adapt our concepts to recognize the similarities that there are between humans and animals.
Philosophy of action is very, very complicated, because our thinking/language about actions is very, very complicated - all human and animal life is there. But it is also capable of recognizing some very fine and yet important distinctions. I think it is probably better to patiently disentangle the complications before jumping to the conclusion that our concepts are muddled.
Quoting Athena
The trouble is that there is nothing to prevent people using the word "rational" in different ways.
The truth is that even we humans are not rational simplicter. We are a mixture. Our starting-point is the ability to learn - this happens automatically from the moment we are born. There's a range of skills involved and there's no guarantee that everyone will learn all of them.
The word "thinking" is very, very difficult to pin down. We distinguish explicit thinking from acting, forgetting to notice that thinking is something we do, and so is also an action - thought sometimes thoughts just occur to us and we aren't deliberately doing it and sometimes it is not under our control. So is more like breathing - it can be automatic, and it can be under voluntary control.
But we can act without explicit thinking beforehand, and I don't think there is any reason to say that all such actions are non-rational. But it is complicated. Habitual actions, for example, are a bit marginal; we often do them, as we say, without thinking - that's when the habit doesn't adjust to unusual circumstances. We can also react very fast in an emergency and these actions can be more like a reflex than a true action. (True actions need to be under our conscious control.)
I hope I'm not confusing you. I'll stop there.
Quoting Mww
I posted by accident and had run out of time. I hope you don't mind that I'm back.
Quoting Mww
Well, I'm very much in favour of adopting whatever approach most suits the subject-matter, so I don't have a problem with that. I've lost what I said before about Heidegger, but I expect you'll remember that it was about his distinction between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand.
I have the impression that it was intended as a critique of Husserl, and one can see how Heidegger's distinction maps on to Husserl's. But Heidegger was not only criticizing Husserl, but the idea of the theoretical stance, objective and disconnected from ordinary, involved life. In other words, both sides of the mirroring relationship that you described. His argument was that it is the involved life that is fundamental and the theoretical stance (of both kinds) that was the optional extra. As I understand it.
Quoting Mww
I don't doubt it. But there are others who maintain the opposite, as you notice.. The question is which experience is veridical. One has to bear in mind that our experience is laden with skills and expectations. Many people think that there is a way of shrugging all that off and experiencing the true experience. But that involves shedding all those skills and expectations. Demonstrating that one has succeeded in that is, let us just say, difficult. I'm not even convinced that there is a truth of the matter, although I do favour the "no-self" view, or more accurately my self = Ludwig = me.
Quoting Mww
That's perfectly possible. On the other hand, I can only recognize myself when I can recognise the other.
I wasnt thinking so much of a distinction between hard and soft sciences. I think phenomenology is unique whether counted as science or not in that it attempts to deal with the nature of human experience itself as distinct from all the other sciences which deal with observed phenomena of one kind or another.
Quoting Ludwig V
I am not sure if you would count them as fantasy stories but I was thinking more specifically of myths and metaphysical speculations and religions. That is conjectures which count themselves to be non-fictional.
Quoting Mww
One experiences phenomena by perceiving them. How does on experience oneself? By being it? If we have a sense of the self by virtue of being then I think phenomenology would consist in the introspective apprehension of that be-ing as well as in the reflective investigation and description of the qualities and nature of experience and being in general. I'm not making any judgement about whether phenomenology yields valid or reliable knowledge. Vervaecke counts "participatory knowing" as one of four kinds of knowing.
Quoting Mww
Yes, perhaps the "I" is nothing more than a mere idea which we hold as an overarching unifying principle. If that were so it would be a kind of metaphysical or ontological illusion. A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea.
I would think phenomenology would necessarily be rather poor at yielding reliable knowledge about the experience of people in general, given the neurodiversity of people. I haven't looked into phenomenology much, but I'd think it a poor basis for understanding the experience of someone with schizophrenia of someone with bipolar disorder who is in a manic state.
However, those with more knowledge of phenomenology are welcome to enlighten me.
Yes, there is the assumption that either we are all the same or that at least we are all basically the same. Is that assumption justifiable? I don't know.
[hide]I haven't studied Husserl's 'phenomenological bracketing' in any depth, but I do know there have been comparisons made between epoch? and emptiness (??nyat? or sunnata) in Buddhism. Here is an excerpt from that topic on a Buddhist website:
[quote=Emptiness, Thanissaro Bhikhu;https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/emptiness.html]Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there's anything lying behind them.
This mode is called emptiness because it's empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and the world we live in. Although these stories and views have their uses, the Buddha found that some of the more abstract questions they raise of our true identity and the reality of the world outside pull attention away from a direct experience of how events influence one another in the immediate present. Thus they get in the way when we try to understand and solve the problem of suffering.
Say for instance, that you're meditating, and a feeling of anger toward your mother appears. Immediately, the mind's reaction is to identify the anger as "my" anger, or to say that "I'm" angry. It then elaborates on the feeling, either working it into the story of your relationship to your mother, or to your general views about when and where anger toward one's mother can be justified. The problem with all this, from the Buddha's perspective, is that these stories and views entail further suffering. The more you get involved in them, the more you get distracted from seeing the actual cause of the suffering: the labels of "I" and "mine" that set the whole process in motion. As a result, you can't find the way to unravel that cause and bring the suffering to an end.
If, however, you can adopt the emptiness mode by not acting on or reacting to the anger, but simply watching it as a series of events, in and of themselves you can see that the anger is empty of anything worth identifying with or possessing. As you master the emptiness mode more consistently, you see that this truth holds not only for such gross emotions as anger, but also for even the most subtle events in the realm of experience. This is the sense in which all things are empty. When you see this, you realize that labels of "I" and "mine" are inappropriate, unnecessary, and cause nothing but stress and pain. You can then drop them. When you drop them totally, you discover a mode of experience that lies deeper still, one that's totally free.[/quote]
I believe this is near to both the meaning of the 'phenomenological suspension'/ epoch? and also to the original meaning of skepticism in ancient philosophy (a very different thing to skepticism in modern terms). Ancient skepticism was grounded in 'suspension of judgement of what is not evident' (ref), namely, the entailments and entanglements that arise from emotional reactivity. That is where the similarity with epoch? becomes clear.
Further reference - Husserl's study of Buddhism (wikipedia)[/hide]
Not always. I know it is autumn by looking at the falling leaves from the trees outside. My knowledge of autumn arrived to me purely from the visual perception. Why do I need to justify the knowledge? If someone asked me to justify it, I could then do it. But before that unlikely event, I just know it is autumn.
But in some other case of knowledge, rational justification is needed, helps or even based on. You seem to be over simplifying the issue, which results inevitably in the muddle.
Quoting I like sushi
Is it rational to literally interpret the Bible and believe it is the word of God? How about if we interpret the Bible abstractly, is that rational? Would animals also have literal interpretations and abstract ones?
Isn't it a bit difficult to comprehend thinking without words? I know preverbal babies do have thoughts without words, but once we learn words in a way we are thrown out of Eden because words separate us from experience. That is we are aware of what we are thinking and no longer have a pure unadulterated experience of life. Now we can envy the animals that are still one with nature.
Imo did not think she did not like sand in her food and consider ways to resolve the problem. She experienced a washed yam and began washing yams. Slowly the rest began imitating her although she did not explain to them why she washed yams and they did not discuss if this is a good idea or not. While the college student may be unable to figure out how to clean a yam if there is no faucet with clean water nearby. In some ways, our ability to resolve problems is diminished with thinking. Such as I could not get out of the gate that required a code but my friend with a lower IQ did not hesitate in sticking his hand through the gate and opening it from the outside.
The reason I am arguing so strongly is we learn how to think and we should not expect everyone to think rationally without training. We should not take thinking for granted.
It is rational for someone religious to pray for their children. Rationality is not dictated by the outcome it is dictated by an evidence based system. People have different conceptions of what constitutes evidence, and this changes fairly fluidly - hence why I no longer believe in Santa.
Quoting Athena
Your idea of rational training might be irrational. Saying that rationality requires language seems fairly rational, but it might be wrong. Your opinion about what is or is not rational can be faulty.
A man with no conception of language managed to figure out what language was. He did this in an irrational way? Accidently? Are we seriously suggesting that having the mental capacity to acquire language using our cognition is not a rational process? That just does not make sense to me.
This is little more than arguing that only humans are intelligent because no other animals possess the same type of intelligence as us. The very same goes for rationality and even language.
It should be noted that animals have cultures, traditions and can pass on knowledge to others. There scope is limited compared to ours though. All elements of human language (spoken/written/signed) can be seen in the rest of the animal kingdom, it is just that we happen to possess them all. Does rationality suddenly emerge because of this? Maybe that is your argument, I do not know?
The problem is not answering the question. Is believing and defending a myth or false belief, rational thinking?
The book Emotional Intelligence gives a good example of fast thinking. A father shot and killed his son thinking his son was away at college and the person who jumped out of the closet was an intruder. The father reacted in fear before thinking. Emotions play a big role in our thinking, especially if we do not habitually use the higher-order thinking skills. It is likely this year our votes will be based on our feelings, not rational thinking.
We can also divide thinking as literal or abstract. Is Satan and his demons real? Do we need fear being possessed by demons which is interpreting the Bible literally? Abstractly is a demon is just an unpleasant thought that we can get rid of by being rational? That would make demons an abstract thought.
Information about changes in our brains may help with understanding how human brains are different from other animals.
That is not my definition but I agree with the definition. I am passionate about it because I believe the US is in big trouble because it changed how children are taught to think. Now instead of Walter Cronkite and rational media, we have news that is emotional yellow journalism and people are basing their judgments on how they feel, not having a clue that something is wrong with their rational thinking. They are not well informed and we are not using the higher order thinking skills. We are overly dependent on our emotions. What is happening today happened in Germany before the Second World War. Education for technology is not the liberal education that dominated education in the US before 1958. How we teach our children to think matters.
.which is irrelevant if the experience in question is impossible. There no reason to care about semantic truths, indeed there couldnt even be any such judgements, without having first established the objects contained in the utterances. I understand this must have been done, or at least attempts at it, somehow or another, otherwise Husserls philosophy lacks justification.
Quoting Ludwig V
And one can also bear in mind experience is an end in itself, laden with nothing, but is itself a laden on the condition of the subject to whom it belongs. Skills and expectations laden the system, but not that which the system finalizes as its product.
Quoting Ludwig V
I can see that, but that says more about relation between character or personality, and manifestation. Im more interested in its development then its activities, which may even contradict that character.
Quoting Janus
Oh absolutely. Very well spoken. We post hoc name what we do, but the cum hoc doing, in and of itself, is nameless.
Quoting Janus
If the first is true, experience of oneself makes oneself as phenomenon, necessary. Under the auspices of some theoretical metaphysics, phenomena are the product of the synthesis of the matter of a thing given a posteriori by the perception of it, and some form which resides a priori in that faculty doing the synthesizing. While it is not contradictory for oneself to contain a priori form, it is utterly contradictory for oneself to contain matter. Because it cannot, one cannot perceive oneself, the synthesis initiated by perception immediately becomes impossible, hence oneself can never be phenomenon, from which follows necessarily, oneself can never be an experience.
Whats needed to justify oneself as an experience, is to predicate experience itself on something other than what some another theory demands. But different predication, while being necessary in order to change things around enough to grant the possibility of that which was originally denied, the logic grounding such predication must also be stronger than the original under suspicion.
Phenomenology, in the view from this armchair, while sufficing as a sufficiently different source of predication affirming the possibility for the experience of oneself, leaves out too much of the original doctrines to be powerful enough to grant that which was originally denied.
No rationality does not suddenly emerge and that is the reason for this thread. It should be clear I am saying rationality must be learned. Unless we learn to think rationally, we base our thoughts on our feelings, and that can be very problematic. However, an argument against Daniel Kahneman's faith in the theory of fast and slow thinking, is the importance of our feelings and creative thinking. Life follows some rules but it is also chaotic and we can not always predict the future based on the past.
Were people rational before Aristotle wrote down the rules for logical thinking? We can argue the meaning of rational and we also understand our rational today is far from our rational in ancient times.
I am struggling to understand how given our modern, science-based understanding of life, can people still believe the Bible is a good explanation of reality. If our bodies were chemically more like clay statues than the bodies of apes, I could believe a God made us of mud, but I don't know how anyone could believe that today. This is important because we base decisions on what we believe is true about our creation. Our ability to make good decisions rests on what we believe is so.
Explaining how much we are like the rest of the animal kingdom, does not support a belief in a God walking in a Garden with a man made of mud and a woman made from his rib. That notion comes from a Sumerian story of creation, and it is not the word of God. How can know that? By translating and reading the Sumerian story. In the original story, the goddess who helped heal the river was associated with the rib and healing. Or we can examine the chemistry of humans and animals and realize our bodies have more in common with animals than mud. Rational thinking uses evidence. But faith is all about feeling! I feel this is true because when I started praying to God for help, I stopped being so afraid and He has helped me so many ways, versus the belief has been life-changing. I am voting for Trump because I believe he is God on earth and democrats are possessed by the devil and our minister told us to vote for Trump. :rofl: What is rational?
I can't imagine a non-human language with past tense or future tense. Does any animal have a way of saying "Mom killed a deer yesterday", as opposed to "Mom kill deer", which would mean Now, so they know dinner is served?
And it seems to me English is the only human language without gender for words. La chica/el chico. But I don't imagine animals do that.
However the eye is a real object which can be seen, so I think it is a rather weak analogy. If the self is nothing more than an idea then of course it cannot be experienced it can only be thought.
That said we have a sense of self (or is it just a sense of being?) which seems to be pre-conceptual. If it is just a sense of being it is also a sense of being different (from everything else) it seems. I don't doubt that (at least some) animals have this kind of sense.
If and only if the train does not arrive shortly, and you isolate your own belief to the exclusion of all else, and you practice thinking and talking about them as a subject matters in their own right would it then be "correct" for you to say that-------> "I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false?"
Sure. Yours.
The dog is incapable of isolating its own thought/belief to the exclusion of all else. Dog's do not have a means to isolate their own thought and belief and further consider them as subject matters in their own right as a means to compare them to fact. That comparison facilitates the recognition of true and false belief.
A dog's inability to become aware of its own fallibility is due to not possessing the capacity/capability to isolate their own thoughts and beliefs. Realizing/recognizing that one's belief is false, in this case, happens when reality does not meet/match expectations and we're aware of that.
English is our means but given that it is not the only naming and descriptive practice, it is not the specific language that matters here. It's more about the ability to think about one's own prior thoughts and/or beliefs as subject matters in their own right.
It was in a collection of papers published in 'Cognitive Neurosciences' by Gazzaniga (I believe it would have been Fourth Edition).
They were talking more broadly though than you I think ;)
Okay. It's the quality of the consequences that are in contention.
Well, that's one possible implication/meaning of that comment. I'm less concerned about whether or not it shouldn't disagree with everyday observable fact, and much more concerned that it does.
We can watch some creatures learn how to use tools for specific purposes even though they have no ability to think about their own thought and belief. Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former. Mine dovetails with the latter.
"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means, but evolution demands survival advantages. Different species have different perceptual machinery. Direct perception in the sense of completely void of abstraction.
I wouldn't disagree with that or what I think it means. It could use a healthy unpacking.
A question that comes to mind...
Do all thought and belief share a set of common elements, such that they are the exact same 'thing' at their core?
I think so.
Correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. All thought, belief, and statements thereof consist of correlations. Some correlations include language use(are drawn between language use and other things. Other correlations are drawn between things that do not include language use.
All thought and belief are meaningful to the creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding them. Some correlations are drawn by language less creatures. Some of those correlations attribute/recognize causality(causal relationships). Some of those thought and belief can be true/false.
Either truth and meaning exist in their entirety prior to language or true and false belief exists without meaning and/or truth.
Some animals can use a tool, if they find a good one, to help them get food.
Some animals can make a tool to help them get food.
Some animals can use tools and plan a couple steps ahead to get food.
Seems like increasing abilities to me.
Quoting creativesoulIf humans think in ways no other species does, such as thinking of our own death in the (hopefully) distant future, what are the common elements with the thoughts of whatever critter has the least activity that can be called thinking?
OK. "Myths and metaphysical speculations and religions" all belong in a very special category. I'll express this by saying that they are pre-rational and foundational. By which I mean that they give the people who accept them their framework for explaining and understanding the world. It's misleading, in my view, to say that people believe them, because that places them alongside believing that an earthquake is happening or that the harvest is bad - everyday facts.
Quoting Janus
Well, I disagree with the "mere" in "mere idea", because some ideas (including "I") are what set the framework within we can identify facts, experiences, etc. On the other hand, I agree that many people (try to) reify that idea. But that is a misunderstanding of language, which is not built in to, but results from imposing a limited model of language on our linguistic practices.
Quoting Janus
I don't see how the dog can't know that it itself is in pain, for example. Call it a pre-conceptual sense if you like, but there's no way for us to recognize it except in language or in how we respond.
Quoting wonderer1
That's a good point. I don't know how a phenomenologist would respond. But it seems pretty clear that they think they are talking about what is built in to any experience whatever. It seems better to say that what we are looking for when we try to understand those phenomena is an account that makes sense of them by interpreting them in a framework that rationalizes them.
Quoting Emptiness, Thanissaro Bhikhu
It seems that the idea of raw data is a necessary illusion for empiricism. But it is an illusion, since the raw data would be "a blooming, buzzing confusion" - except even recognizing that is to interpret the phenomena. But the next two paragraphs show that that's not what is meant. The proposition does not require dropping the entanglements, but not getting entangled in them in order to see them from a different perspective. Bear in mind, that I'm already distorting this explanation, because I'm not considering it within it's intended context of the actual aims of the practices of mndfulness/meditation, which is not the theoretical context posited by philosophy practiced here.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree that it is close, and might enable us to learn something. But I think we have to see what the actual practice of phenomenology is.
Close enough.
Quoting Janus
Out of respect for our history, I wont be so brash as to throw the ol, much-dreaded categorical error at you, but rather, merely bringing it up might provoke you into looking for it. Or, in all fairness, showing there isnt one.
Quoting creativesoul
To would seem impossible to explain how mindless creatures use tools. But to be mindful does not make explicit thought and belief, or thinking about thought/belief.
The use of tools indicates mindfulness, but not what form or kind it may or may not be, which affirms the possibility of mere instinct for such use. Even use of tools itself risks conceptual misappropriation, in that making that connection by a qualified observer does not justify that same connection being made by the observed.
(Man: did you just use a tool to get at those ants?
Chimp: dunno about that; finger/hole/ant, then finger/hole no ant, putting a stick in my hand is just growing a longer finger, finger/hole/ant)
It is irrational to say only humans are rational creatures. For those interested in such investigations, he has no choice but to judge other un-like creatures rationality, with the very one impossible for them to possess, which immediately prejudices his investigation.
Nagels glorified bat.
Sorry to be dense, but what have I noticed?
Quoting Corvus
So you know that it is autumn because you can see the falling leaves. You don't know because you have said to yourself "I know that.. because...". However, you will be able to cite that if anybody asks you how you know, i.e. it is your justification. (I accept that "I can see the falling leaves" needs no further justification under normal circumstances. But so far as the question "How do you know" goes, I don't see the difference between your simple case and your "other cases".
Quoting Patterner
The moral of the sorites paradox is that some concepts do not have precise border-lines. Consciousness seems to me to be one of them. (So does "rational")
Quoting Athena
That's exactly right. Rationality is a complex of skills. Some of them we learn informally in the process of learning to navigate the world. Others (e.g. mathematics, critical thinking) we have to learn in more formal ways. There's no guarantee that everybody learns all the skills.
Quoting Athena
Well, it depends a bit, partly on which myth or false belief is involved, but also on how you choose to defend it. Granted that most myths contain only a element of truth it will often be irrational to defend them as true. And it is possible to be mistaken about a belief and so end up defending a false belief.
Quoting Athena
The short answer is that they do not start with your presuppositions. The slightly longer answer is that a religious belief involves adopting a specific world-view, that is, a framework within which you assess truth or falsity or good explanation or bad explanation.
Quoting Mww
But isn't experience supposed to be the foundation of knowledge? How is that possible if it is an end in itself? Aren't experiences pleasant or unpleasant, meaningful or meaningless, &c. &c? How is that possible if they are laden with nothing?
Quoting Mww
I think you mean that there can never be an experience that is an experience of oneself? Or one's self can never be an object of experience (since oneself is posited as the subject of expereience.)?
Quoting creativesoul
I don't know what "isolating its own thought/belief" means.
Quoting creativesoul
Perhaps you are thinking that in order to grasp the rationality of what a dog is doing, we have to somehow get inside it's head. That isn't necessary. We just need to interpret what it does. I'm sure that the dog understands that their human has not arrived on the train. I can't think of anything that they could do to make it clear that they recognize in addition, as a distinct belief, that their belief that their human would arrive on that train is false - other than saying it. Yet the latter belief is implicit in the former. i.e. is not distinct from, isolable from, the former.
Quoting creativesoul
You are forgetting about non-linguistic action.
While the case may be made that empirical knowledge is impossible without the experience of what the knowledge is of, but it is also quite often the case there can be experiences for which no knowledge is given. If it is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case, theres a need for a different case.
Insofar as the negation of which is a contradiction, it is always the case that ..
Knowledge is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the intelligence under which the system operates;
Experience is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the subject to which the system belongs, all else being what it may.
As well, since Plato earlier and Russell later, knowledge of is very different than knowledge that, such distinction being entirely absent from experience.
Quoting Ludwig V
I suppose. That isnt necessarily contradictory or invalid, given the object immediately appended, re: of oneself. That only matters because without such appended object, the proposition is contradictory, re: never be an experience that is an experience. Which you must immediately recognize, given your historical commentary precedents, as a (gaspsputterchoke) language game.
Ones self can never be an object of experience works just fine, though, right?
Oh, yes, well, that makes a lot of difference. People mostly seem very reluctant to deal with that. I think the reason is that they think that knowledge of can be reduced to knowledge that. The probably haven't faced up to Mary's Room.
Quoting Mww
My version:- "Knowledge is an end in itself, achieved by the operation of a system, that end being a change in the information available to the system itself".
Quoting Mww
My version:- "Experience is the operation of a system, which often results in various changes to the condition of the subject to which the system belongs."
Quoting Mww
Careful - I'm not sure that is not a dirty word around here.
But that concept enables one to give "knowing oneself" a meaning. But it couldn't be based on the standard concepts of how we come to know things - a different, specialized, language game.
Quoting Mww
I think it does. But it is misleading to say that there's no such thing. It's just that one's self is not an object.
Quoting Patterner
Yes, though that's not because consciousness is made up of quantities of atoms or particles. It's in a different category.
Rationality is not dissimilar, but, unlike consciousness, it is the result of a range of skills. One's range may be wider or narrower, greater or lesser.
Yup.
I take issue with taking certain kinds of leaps. "Increase" works well. Very very slow increments.
The detail of mutations remains unclear. What makes a mutation... a mutation?
A problem.
Another problem.
Sounds like a problem for the notion of "mindfulness".
The criterion is not up to us.
Mindless entities predated minded ones. Minded entities predated us. Our own minds predated our own knowledge of them.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself requires an ability to pick one's own thought and belief about this world out of this world to the exclusion of all else.
That cannot happen without having something to think about. A means to do so. And a creature capable. The recognition of one's own false belief. We isolate. We point. We name. We learn to use naming and descriptive practices. We name and describe the things that catch our attention.
We isolate by picking something out of this world to the exclusion of all else.
Certain sorts of things captured our attention - as a species - long before documented histories began being recorded. Things become meaningful that way.
I'm not sure about saying that myths and metaphysical speculations are pre-rational. I guess it depends on what you mean by "rational". I think of rationality as "measuring" things against other things and seeing possibilities. Hence its etymological commonality with ratio. In that kind of sense we can say (some) animals are rational from which it would follow that no aspect of human life is at least in that sense pre-rational.
I agree with you that culturally entrenched beliefs were probably at least by and large unquestioned and in view of that they could be thought of as being in the Wittgensteinian sense "hinge propositions" (although I never liked the word "proposition" in that context and I think 'belief' would probably be better).
So yes, people may not have " believed" such foundational ideas if by "beleived" is meant something like "personally arrived at by thinking about it".
Quoting Ludwig V
Of course the idea of self is a kind of master or overarching idea. A reaching for unity. But is it anything more than an idea? I suppose you could say as I already have that there is a pre-conceptual "sense of self" in us and also probably in (some) other animals. A sense of self that via memory "unifies" experience.
Quoting Mww
But you have brought it up and I think now more explanation is required since I'm not sure what you are alluding to. Never fear giving offense. I'm here to learn not to find support for some pet theory.
Directly perceptible stuff. Thoughts and beliefs about the world are not. Therefore...
Does the dog recognize the fact that its own belief is no longer warranted, based upon everyday fact? It is no longer true. The falseness is a lack of correspondence. Recognizing one's own false belief - in that situation - requires recognizing that the world does not match one's expectations. The dog clearly doesn't recognize its own false belief about future events. If it did, it would act as if it no longer expected the human and the 5 o'clock train to arrive simultaneously.
I'm astounded that one cannot discern between thinking about everyday lifelong routine/events/fact and recognizing that one's own thought and belief based upon that very routine are no longer true.
What else could "the recognition" of one's own false belief amount to when talking about one who continued and continued to follow the same daily routine - to a meaningful extent anyway - and hence continued to believe that the human would arrive alongside the train for years after the human's death?
It was clearly not recognizing its own false belief.
The dog goes because its entire meaningful life was lovingly shared with the one arriving on schedule. The routine was a part of the dog's experience. It is through past routine that the dog's expectation became deeply embedded. The same things happened over and over. The human arriving with the train was one of those regularly recurring timely scheduled events/occurrences/facts. The dog's expectation was based upon past regularly occurring events, and hence were based very firmly in regularity/everyday fact at the time they began influencing the dog. The dog's beliefs were once well grounded. There are no longer.
The dog's continued expectation is consistent. That's rational behavior, in my book, based upon rational thought and belief, because it contains no inherent inevitable self-contradiction/equivocation, and it's based upon belief that was true at the time the connections were drawn between the train and the human.
"Leaps" makes me wonder. We think about kinds of things animals do not.
-We understand that we will die. That knowledge is a huge factor in the shape of our lives.
-We understand that the future and past both extend beyond our own lifespan.
-We can imagine things that don't exist, including things that take huge numbers of steps to make.
Are those leaps? What would incremental steps between other species and us mean? Is there a species that can think of what its life will be next month? Another species that can think of next year? Another that can think of a week after its own death? Another that can think of a month after its own death?
Maybe it's not a leap from what animals can think to any of those kinds of things. Maybe each is the smallest step there is, just up to a new ability.
This world is not simply composed of entities arranged before us, waiting to be picked out. ('m assuming that you mean something like "focussed on" or "attended to" or "distinguished from other things".) But the problem of the sel f is preciselky that there is nothing to pick out in the world as it is presented or rvealed to us. The same applies to our thoughts and beliefs.
Quoting creativesoul
The same is true of many animals. So what's the problem?
Quoting creativesoul
Yes and no. The dog expects their human to arrive. The dog recognizes that their human is not showing up. It is also true that it does not abandon its general expectation that their human comes back on the 5:00 train every day. But those are two separate beliefs, and it is not unreasonable to retain a generalization in the face of a counter-example. It may be unreasonable not to abandon a generalization in the face of many counter-examples. But the single case and the generalization are two separate beliefs.
We may be pursuing different projects. You seem to be pursuing a phenomenology for the dog. I don't think that the rational explanation of actions is limited to identifying phenomenological events. Third person attributions of thoughts and beliefs are affected by first person declarations. But sometimes, the first person version is not available and sometimes first and third person versions conflict and we reject the first person version. So the authority of first person claims is not absolute. (Lying, self-deception.)
Quoting Janus
I was a bit sloppy there. For us, myths have no special status and can be evaluated by standards we have learnt in other ways. For, say, the ancient Greeks their status is different. So the myths, in themselves are neither post- not pre- rational. It's a question of what they are to one group of people or another. (I'm setting aside the point that nowadays, the evaluation of myths is complicated. They are generally recognized as being at least partly true or based on truth.)
One inevitably moves on to wonder what serves the function of myths in our upbringing and education? The answer is, different stories - the Christian or Buddhist stories, the story of philosophy (Socrates) or science (Copernicus or Galileo), stories from our history - Battle of Hastings, Founding Fathers etc.
Quoting Janus
Good point. Myths are composed or propositions, but that's doesn't mean that they are propositions. Belief does seem to be better - so long as we bracket the context of evidence that applies to most run-of-the-mill beliefs.
Quoting Janus
It seems to me that there are two related but different ideas of the self. To a great extent, we define ourselves or create who we are by what we (choose to) do. But that sense of self-identity is not always identical with our sense of the identity of others. A further complication is that often our identity is given by the roles that we occupy and these differ in different contexts. (Parent/child, teacher/student, manager/colleague) One can appeal to continuities of one kind or another - stream of consciousness, physical continuity, and so forth - but then there is the question of how important or relevant they are - especially when they conflict. So unity of experience is one factor amongst others.
Quoting Patterner
I've no idea how the story would go. But it won't be easy. The best evidence would be evidence of how creatures behaved. We can likely make some deductions from the physical remains we have, but we will never achieve the ideal of observing them in action. So we may never come to a plausible, evidence-based story of how rationality evolved.
However, The eye is the classic case of something that seemed to escape the possible range of evolutionary development. A major issue is that soft tissue is not often fossilized. But there is at least an outline of what happened. See:- New Scientist - Evolution of the Eye
Red herring.
Are you denying that thought and belief is prior to thinking about thought and belief?
Not a problem. A similarity to be properly accounted for.
Indeed. The topic is clear. It presupposes the existence of at least two distinct kinds of thought. Rational thought and thought that is not.
What do all examples of thought have in common such that having that commonality is what makes them count as being a thought?
However, on the other hand, I thought we were also pursuing the exact same project. Avoiding anthropomorphism. Succeeding in that endeavor requires knowing what sorts of thoughts and belief are of the kind that only humans are capable of forming, having, holding, and/or articulating. It's not using the terms "thought" and "belief" merely to explain the actions of a language less animal or ourselves. There are much better ways to do that.
Thanks for that clarity. Good. It seems we're in agreement. As close or closer than any other participant in this thread. Strong methodological naturalist bent with significant importance placed upon acceptable explanations/criteria being amenable to an evolutionary timeline.
Your versions are fine, although I might insist every experience affects the condition of the subject.
Quoting Ludwig V
Agreed. Hence the new terminology in new philosophies, to stand for a thing that is not an object. Or even an object that is not a thing. Or maybe just a new definition for old terminology. Either way, abolishing the concept itself isnt likely in the near future, anyway, so ..the beat goes on.
If you say so.
Quoting creativesoul
If being awareness of my belief is thinking about belief, then surely the two are simultaneous, since the one follows logically from the other. But perhaps awareness of something is not thinking about it - even though awareness of something is being conscious of it.
You are distinguishing between thought that the thinker is able to articulate in language and critically evaluate and thought that the thinker is not able to articulate in language or critically evaluate.
I suspect that most people will have thoughts of both kinds. So we cannot say that people either are or are not rational, just that they are rational in some ways, but likely not in others. That, at least, we could agree on.
Quoting creativesoul
There's no easy way to answer that - especially if you are trying to find commonalities between thoughts that are articulated in language and thoughts that are not. The only place that they overlap is in their role as reasons in rational actions.
Quoting creativesoul
What do you have in mind? What would be better than the ways we already have?
Quoting creativesoul
I think we have different ideas about what that means. For me, explaining actions as rational is a language-game - a conceptual structure - whose paradigmatic application is to homo sapiens. It has been extended to various other cases, many of which are contested. What's at issue is how far that game/structure can be applied to animals. You have a point which I think does have something to it, that self-reflection is likely something that animals that lack a language like human language are not equipped to do. The complication is that they clearly have self-awareness and self-control as well as, or even because, they are capable of acting rationally - in my sense, though not in yours.
Quoting Mww
I wouldn't want to deny that, since every experience has an "owner" or subject. I just wouldn't put it that way.
Quoting Mww
I do agree that the thought is almost impossible to formulate clearly without a lot of dancing around explaining. I think this is a case that suits well Wittgenstein's idea that some things cannot be said, only shown.
There is strong evidence that the single mutation which resulted in the human genome containing ARHGAP11B played a particularly major role in humans having the intelligence we do.
[Emphasis added.]
Thinking about X presupposes something to think about, and a creature capable of thinking about X. All creatures capable of thinking about X possess some means/process of doing so. All thinking creatures share the exact same basic process of thinking, regardless of X's value, and regardless of the specific biological machinery possessed by the candidate themselves.
Awareness of something is itself existentially dependent upon thought and belief, for it emerges as a direct result of thinking about whatever that something is(whatever grabs our attention). Exactly what sorts of things we can become aware of, and how completely we can become aware of them is determined strictly by our means/process of thinking as well as the ontological constituency(the basic make-up of exactly what is being thought about). The same is true of all thinking creatures capable of having meaningful experience. I cannot stress how important these considerations are.
All thought, belief, and meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience.
Steering clear of meaning is to steer clear of exactly what needs to be understood in order to acquire knowledge of meaningful true belief and meaningful false belief that creatures other than humans can have. It is also to steer clear of what needs to be understood in order to understand how humans think, and thus how they thought prior to gaining the ability to think about their own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right.
I've no issue with saying - roughly speaking - that awareness of X requires thinking about X, however, I do not depend upon any notion of awareness to set out the basic outline of all thought, belief, and meaningful experience(consciousness).
The notion of "awareness" adds unnecessary confusion often enough that I tend to avoid it. It has no explanatory power above and beyond thought, belief, and meaningful experience. Those notions exhaust "awareness" but not the other way around.
We could even say that being aware of something is being conscious of it. I do not depend upon a preconceived notion of what counts as consciousness either, except as a general guideline regarding the target of examination/consideration.
Thought, belief, meaning, coherence(consistency), correspondence(with/to fact), and falsity all emerged onto the world stage long before creatures ever became lucky enough to be able to become aware of them. We are such creatures. I would argue, and do, that we are the only such creatures.
Quoting Ludwig V
What counts as thinking about something?
That is precisely what has yet to have been determined here. It is only after that is established can we fill "something" in with "one's own belief" and make sense of metacognition.
In order to know what sorts of things some candidate or another is capable of thinking about(including ourselves), we must know how they think about the world, as well as how that process enables or excludes them from being able to think about the "it" under consideration.
All thinking creatures do so by the very same basic process. Regardless of the complexity of the biological machinery and/or abstraction level of the thinking, all thinking creatures do so solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. There are no examples to the contrary. I'll gladly reassess the certainty I maintain regarding the justificatory strength of my position should anyone, anywhere, anytime present a black swan.
All thinking about X requires isolating X by virtue of drawing distinctions between X and all else. It requires the creature directly perceive X 'as a thing', different from other things. If those distinctions require common language use(shared meaning), then only language users can think about such things. Truth and falsity exist prior to our awareness of them. Language less creatures can form, have, and/or hold true and false belief(expectations are based upon them). However, they cannot be aware that their own thought and belief are true or false, for they do not have what it takes. Our own awareness of that required metacognition. Metacognition requires language use replete with meaningful utterances to stand in proxy for our past beliefs, regardless of whether or not they are true/false.
The irony. "Waiting to be picked out" is anthropomorphism. That's a very odd thing to say. I didn't, nor would I be willing to assent to that, as it's written.
I would say that the world was composed of all sorts of things that existed in their entirety prior to the emergence of humans. Meaningful experience of non human creatures was one such thing.
Do you disagree?
Those prehistorical things existed in their entirety prior to our ever having acquired knowledge of their existence, hence prior to our even being able to become aware of them. There are other things that existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices, but not prior to humans.
Meaningful experience of humans with limited language capacity was one such thing.
Do you disagree?
Earlier you mentioned the complexity involved in talking about thinking. I would concur, without hesitation. Methodological approach is pivotal. Crucial.
Criteria matter.
What counts as thought, on your view?
Well, I may draw and maintain such distinctions. However, I was not doing that when using the terms "rational thought and thought that is not". Perhaps you missed my earlier clarification regarding the sense of those terms when I use them?
Rational thought/belief is consistent with and/or follows from past thought/belief. Non rational is not and does not. I'm not using them as a means of value assessment/judgment. What counts as being "rational" is secondary.
What counts as thought is primary.
Oh yeah. I meant to comment on this method. Perfectly performed. Pick out simple true statements. Verifiable. Falsifiable. Build upon and with them.
Kudos.
Tool use, I think it's safe to say, facilitated greater abilities; new correlations; new coordination of preexisting biological machinery; increased the complexity of meaningful experience; etc. I would say that tool use also could have influenced/effected slowly occurring physical effects within the central nervous system of the users. Biological structural changes over time with enough mutation to result in newer more specialized structures, which in turn, facilitated more complex thinking processes and or the ability to vocalize wants and desires.
Okay, this is where things could get interesting very quickly.
The claim is that the dog has two separate beliefs. What exactly constitutes being two separate beliefs of that particular dog? Keep in mind that the dog's beliefs must be meaningful to the dog.
That's really awesome! Thanks!
Ditto.
Daniel Dennett in From Bacteria to Bach and Back, I think is the name of it, goes into the biological mutative aspect in more detail than I fully understood even after listening several times. It's an interesting piece of writing. Audiobook was free on youtube at one time. Read by Dennett himself.
RIP Professor Dennett.
That's not true. If the only sense of "thought" and "belief" we employ is the one meant only to make sense of reasons in rational actions, then it may be the only place all beliefs overlap. That's not the only sense of the key terms.
They(all thought and belief) are all meaningful to the creature forming, having, holding, and/or articulating them. They all consist of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. Some creatures' correlations include language use. Others do not. Some creatures' include the rules of correct inference. Others do not. Some creatures' correlations include trains and humans. Others include community standards such as the time schedule...
I also thought it was fascinating. Being thought-provoking is just as valuable as being right, in my book.
Quoting creativesoul
I was thinking of the belief that their human has shown up to-day (a distinct belief for each day), and the belief that their human will show up every day, shown partly by their going to the station in advance of the human's arrival, without any specific evidence about to-day, not to mention their persistence in going to the station after their human has not shown up, not just for one day, but for many days. But it would be fair to say that these two beliefs are closely linked, since one is an inductive generalization of the other.
Quoting creativesoul
I was responding to a specific issue. It may be possible to generalize, but it's certainly very complicated.
If you include our sayings as well as our doings as actions, then beliefs do show up in actions. What sense could we make of a belief or thought (rational or irrational) that didn't (couldn't) affect what we say or do at all? But perhaps there is a different sense of belief in which we can make sense of such beliefs. What do you suggest?
Quoting Patterner
It's entirely appropriate not to be confident about some things - especially when attributing beliefs (and other motivations to animals, and indeed to humans. I confess I hadn't thought of the changes in circumstances. Of course you are right.
The details of the real life story are compatible with your bet. Hachik? would leave the house to greet his human, Ueno, at the end of each day at the nearby Shibuya Station - until May 21, 1925, when Ueno died at work. Initial reactions from the people, especially from those working at the station, were not necessarily friendly. However, the first reports about him appeared on October 4, 1932. People then started to bring him treats and food. Hachik? died on March 8, 1935.
(My source is Wikipedia - Hachiko)
That makes 7 years without much, if any, positive reinforcement. I'm sure the dog was an embarrassment to the station staff and perhaps to the some of the passengers. That changed when the publicity gave them a different perspective. So we could argue about when the reason for meeting the train changed. But your point stands.
We could also debate how far the dog was rational. I would say that persisting for a while after Ueno died is rational. But continuing for that long... I'm not sure. Other dogs, I think, would have given up much, much, sooner. One factor in his persistence may have been that his new home (with Ueno's former gardener) did not distract him from his habit. Habits, I would say, can be rational, but can also be irrational, especially when they do not change when changed circumstances imply a change in habits.
But then, people saw his persistence as loyalty, which is not necessarily rational, but is something that we value, on the whole. So this question of how far we apply the "people" framework to animals extends beyond rationality or not. It incudes values.
Could you elaborate further on what you mean by that? My point was that being rational must be able to be verified, justified and approved to be so. You cannot call something or someone being rational just because someone went to a shop, or a dog opened the door or hawk hunted his meal. That sounds like someone not understanding what being rational means, but just misusing the term.
Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way .because were all human .is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I havent a freakin clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had.
With that in mind, it is far further from me to think Im qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isnt just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which Ive already been forced to admit I dont know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing ..speculate.
(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window
.Guy thinks .awww, how sweet; hes anticipating my car coming into the driveway .
.Guy next door has a similar camera .
.1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating .
.2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guys driveway
.says, yeah, hes anticipatin alright. Anticipatin the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.)
You didn't quite say that.
Quoting Corvus
On the other hand, you could be talking about the case when I attribute knowledge to someone else. That is indeed a bit different. But there are still simple cases and more complex ones. In a simple case, I know the person quite well and know that they are in a position to know and are reliable, and then I will say just that.
Quoting Corvus
I agree, a single case on its own doesn't cut much ice. One needs a framework of background knowledge, including a decision about whether rational explanation applies to at least some things that the subject does. However, given that you are a homo sapiens, if you walk down the street, stop at the shop door, open it and go in, I am justified in saying that you walked to the shop. I might be wrong, but that possibility applies to everything that I say. It would be unreasonable to deny that you walked to the shop in those circumstances. Ditto the dog and the hawk.
It's the result of the peculiar condition of the philosopher. But it is perfectly true that there are many experiences that we have that seem more or less completely arbitrary. But one can sometimes explain dizziness, for example, by the spinning dancing you've been indulging in, or by an ear infection. So perhaps one day...
Quoting Mww
Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals. Their thoughts and feelings are on display to us in just the same way(s) that our thoughts and feelings are on display to them. I don't think speculation is particularly harmful in itself. It's when it gets mistaken for established truth that it can do damage.
Quoting Mww
In fact, you know perfectly well how to play the game. The fact that we sometimes get it wrong is not important. We can spot mistakes and put them right.
Although in this case, I would propose that he did go out to welcome you home, but got distracted by the squirrel when he got out there. However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one.
Nice input. I'm oblivious to the details of the actual events. My initial interest was piqued in that story regarding whether or not dogs could look forward to 5 o'clock trains, and/or whether or not it's being the 5 o'clock train could be meaningful to the dog. By my lights, it was the connection to the human that was meaningful to the dog. Thus, the significance that the train has to the dog had nothing to do with the time of arrival. Additionally, it was claimed that the dog hoped for the human to arrive. The question was asked, "Why else?" would the dog continue going.
That drew my attention to the differences between simple expectation and hope. Hope, it seems to me anyway, is distinct from expectation in a very clear sense. One has hope that something will or will not take place despite knowing it may not or may. I do not see how the dog could ever process such considerations. I've no issue with dogs having simple basic expectations regarding what's about to happen. I do not think that dogs are capable of having expectations that extend/exceed past the immediately perceptible. How far into the future one can consider is a measure/increment determined by its means of accounting for time/change. The details of the story are now better known by myself, and as a result, it seems that there could have been any number of reasons the dog continued going to the train station around the same time daily. I'm curious, if after some time, the dog ever began going on days that the human would not have been on the train.
Quoting Ludwig V
Being a part of routine is itself positive reinforcement, especially if that routine resulted in dopamine dumps and/or other sorts of good feelings within the dog. Those things happen autonomously and happen throughout the experience. So, when the human was alive, the good feelings began prior to the arrival. Those feelings would continue to result from being a part of the routine if they are the result of not only the expectation of the human, but also all of the other correlations drawn by the dog between other elements within the experience, including between the state of its own brain/body chemistry(its 'state of mind'), the walking, and other surroundings along the way.
Well, in all fairness, I cringed far too much. Literally, viscerally. To use an intentional stance in a way that attributes agency where none is justifiable, was simply too much for me to accept. The book is chock full of anthropomorphism. Dennett just accepted that criticism and continued. He knew. What other method do we have??? That seems to have been his thoughts on the matter. Of course, he also regularly used a notion of "design" that most naturalists eschew.
I still, to this day, have a very hard time accepting much of what he argued for as a result. To be clear, Dennett was and remains an admirable public figure in American history.
Quining Qualia was brilliant!
They belong to the dog. They are meaningful to the dog. If that dog has beliefs, then they exist in their entirety regardless of whether or not we take account of them. Are they propositional attitudes? They clearly do not consist of the language used to report on them. They are clearly not equivalent to our report of them.
What do those beliefs consist of?
True enough; I trust nothing I said implies otherwise. If it appears I did, I shall reconcile whatever it was with granting without reservation that to claim we know nothing about animals, is catastrophically false.
Quoting Ludwig V
While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animals rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations.
Oh, Yes. Philosophers are so obsessed with belief in the first person - "I believe.." that they don't seriously think about 2nd or 3rd person attributions. In those cases, the question whether the dog can apply the human language-game of what is the time? is not relevant. See below.
Quoting creativesoul
Clearly, beliefs are not propositional attitudes, except in the sense that a proposition is grammatically necessary to describe them. (There is no description of a belief except by means of a "that..." clause - indirect speech, as it's called. Except, of course, when we believe in someone or something.)
I'm not sure that the question what they consist in is applicable, but my best answer is that they consist in what we say and do. So what the believer says is often given a specially authoritative status. But the believer's own description of their belief is not conclusive. We often overturn it when other evidence convinces us that they are lying or pretending or deceiving themselves.
When we don't have access to what the believer says, (or the believer does not speak English) how can we possibly attribute beliefs to them? We must have a sentence to complete the "that" clause, and the only sentences available are in English. The actual words that the believer would use to express the belief are irrelevant; so is what's going on in his head. The "that" clause is not there for their benefit, but for ours. It needs to make sense to us, not necessarily to them.
If you still have doubts, think about how we might describe the belief of someone who thinks in images.
Quoting creativesoul
That seems about right. But when I'm cooking a meal - not at the dog's dinner time - and my dog hangs around near the kitchen (but not in it - not allowed in my house), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog is hoping that there will be something to eat. But when I'm preparing the dog's dinner (and the dog is allowed into the kitchen and comes in the kitchen without being invited), I have no hesitation in saying that the dog expects there will be something to eat.
Quoting creativesoul
The story doesn't tell. But surely, if the dog turned up at random times when the human is not coming, there would not have been anything like the same fuss.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, you do need to look more widely and/or have a decent background knowledge of the dog's habits. But if going to the station itself was a pleasurable experience for the dog, would they not turn up at random times as well as at 5 p.m.?
Quoting Mww
Surely, we would not even try to apply explanations of actions that work for humans unless we found that animal behaviour was sufficiently like human behaviour for that to make sense. It's not an arbitrary choice.
The dog's behavior for all those years might change my mind, if we knew it. Did it go to the station every day a decade later, and sit starting at where the train was going to stop, largely ignoring anyone who spoke to or petted it? Eating an offered snack, but clearly focused on the tracks? When the train arrived each day, did it still get up, tail wagging, watching each person get off? When the man didn't walk off the train, for the 3,000th day in a row, did the dog turn around, head lowered in sadness, and walk home? Only to do it all again the 3,001st day?
My guess is it was conditioned to go there at that time of day by the reward of the man's arrival. When the man stopped showing up, it still went, because of the conditioning. Then other rewards showed up, and kept it going, so the conditioning never faded. It wasn't going there in 1934 for the same reason it went there in 1923.
I am not clear what the distinction would be between being composed of propositions and being a proposition or set of propositions or being composed of beliefs and being a belief or set of beliefs. I wonder whether your point was that the use of either term should not confuse us into thinking that a myth is a belief or proposition that we have arrived at by ourselves and decided for ourselves. They are rather beliefs or propositions that are the result of social conditioning. They are introjections. In that sense they are "hinge" or "bedrock" or "background'.
Quoting Ludwig V
I did not have in mind the 'social role' conception of the self at all. I was thinking of the difficult to articulate primal sense of being an individual. As the name imply an individual is one who is not divided. One who experiences a sense of continuity. That is what I meant by saying that memory unifies experience.
I don't see the relevance. I don't think I've made my point clear enough. I'll try a question...
Does the dog believe and/or know that the train arrives at five o'clock? It seems absurd to even hint at an affirmative answer.
Quoting Ludwig V
That's not true.
All belief consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. <--------that's not a that clause. It is a description of all belief, from the very simplest to the most complex abstract ones we can articulate.
Quoting Ludwig V
That looks like a conflation between beliefs and behaviors. In your own framework, it amounts to a conflation between cause and effect.
Quoting Ludwig V
The question is not how we can attribute beliefs to others. The question is what do their beliefs consist of such that they can be and obviously are meaningful to the creature under consideration. The approach you're employing is focusing upon the reporting process. What's needed here is an outline of all thinking processes.
This troubles me. Let's say that we're reporting upon our neighbor's belief to our significant other. Let us also say that we're aiming at accuracy. We want our report to match their belief. Assuming sincerity and typical neurological function of the neighbor, the actual words that the believer would use to describe their own belief are not only relevant. They are the benchmark. They are the standard.
However, I suspect there's little disagreement between us when it comes to what counts as an accurate report of another's belief if and when the other speaks our language. The question here is how to go about accurately reporting the belief of a language less creature.
That clauses are problematic here. The propositional attitude approach misses the mark altogether. Propositions are not meaningful to language less creatures. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, holding, and/or articulating it.
Someone who thinks in images draws correlations between those images and other things.
That's odd. You say it seems about right to say that dogs cannot hope that something will happen despite knowing it may not, and then attribute hope to the dog.
Yeah. I see no reason to deny that a dog can expect to eat in many situations. Hope, on the other hand... not so much.
Indeed. It's the approach that matters.
The correlations drawn by the dog between all the different sights, sounds, smells, etc., exhaust the dog's experience.
Let's say that there is a cat and that the cat has chased a mouse into hiding. The cat will wait and watch the entry point. Say it's a small opening under a cabinet. We could talk about the cat's thought and/or belief by saying the cat believes that the mouse is under the cabinet. I would have no issue with that. The reason why is because we all know that "the mouse is under the cabinet" is meaningless to the cat. However, the cabinet, the mouse, the smell, the taste, and the spatiotemporal relations are not meaningless at all in such circumstances. These elemental constituents of the cat's belief are the content. The content of a language less animal's belief are directly perceptible to them. The cat is biologically capable of perceiving and drawing correlations between those things. Those things are part of the cat's experience and are meaningful to them as a result.
Succinct.
Yup.
Why don't you call it learning? It is after all, what one must be able to do before one can join in. The rower who is "conditioned" to that particular routine is learning to row, acquiring a skill.
Quoting Janus
When you decide to "bracket" the social role conception of the self, you have created your own problem. "Self" is a complex, multi-faceted idea. ("Facet" implies that each facet depends on the others for its existence). It is an idea that not realized in identifying objects, but in the ability to take part in various activities.
Quoting creativesoul
One day, we (2 parents and 2 very young children) were driving along a country road. We came round a corner and saw the common of the next village. At that moment, a hot-air balloon was taking off, majestically sailing along and up. We were very close. We all watched in silence for a moment and then my son cried out "Bye, Bye, One". He had never seen or heard of a balloon before. He was too young to understand about such things. He knew it was leaving. "It" refers to the balloon. Why should I deny that he knew the balloon was leaving, even though he had no concept of a balloon? I am not saying it for his benefit, but for yours.
It is very plausible that it is going too far to attribute to the dog a concept of belief; I cannot imagine dog behaviour that would lead me to do that. But saying that the dog believes that the train arrives at 5 p.m. is not for the dog's benefit, but for yours.
However, what would you make of this thought-experiment. Suppose we had some tea and sandwiches one day, and carelessly left the last one on the table and left the room. The cat was sleeping peacefully on a chair. When we got back, the cat had eaten it - or at least the tuna that was in it. The cat was again sleeping peacefully on the chair. The dog was quivering with what looked like guilt. The dog believed that we would think that the dog had pinched the sandwich.
Quoting creativesoul
I didn't say anything about what belief consists of. I only said something about how we describe belief.
Quoting creativesoul
Now you are reifying beliefs and conflating explanations by reasons and explanations by causes. You are trying to play chess with draughts (checkers).
Quoting creativesoul
You are doing phenomenology, then - first person view. Not possible with a dog. But the phenomena that are relevant in this context are not the thinking processes.
Quoting creativesoul
If they were the benchmark (the standard), first person reports of beliefs would be irrefutable and irreplaceable. But they are neither, though they are relevant and important.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm sorry I wasn't clear. I was admitting that it seems right not to attribute hope to the dog, and then, with a "But..", introducing a case that makes that conclusion doubtful.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, and the cat's grasp of that meaning is what justifies us in using "mouse" to describe what the cat is doing. To be sure, the cat's concept of a mouse is different from, and more limited than, our concept of a mouse. But cat and human are both thinking about the same furry animal, hiding away behind the wainscot.
A child learns to utter "Bye, Bye" in certain situations. The balloon was leaving, and I say that for your benefit, not mine. The child knew it was time to utter "Bye, Bye." in situations where things were leaving. The "one" qualification is interesting. The child named the balloon. That is... he picked that balloon out of the world to the exclusion of all else. He isolated the balloon.
Does the dog believe the train arrives at 5 o'clock?
A whole nation will have the same leader but the citizens can have opposing thoughts about the desirability of the leader. This opposition can be very emotional. When it comes to religion people can be strongly emotional about what they believe and what others believe. Everyone believing s/he is being rational even when they start killing each other.
If we were aliens looking at this reality would we believe humans can learn and that they are rational?
When social animals split and follow different leaders, they fight over territory and drive the other away.
Or if the social animals from one species cross each other's path, they will fight over the territory. There are factors that have led to humans living in large groups but how well is this working? What makes it possible for millions of people to live together?
What if we did not have a system for numbering things and a system for telling time? What if our experience of life were the same as other animals without our thinking systems? How would that affect our sense of reality and our sense of importance in the scheme of things?
Guilt is what one experiences when they know they have done something that they believe they should not have done. The dog does not believe that he ate the tuna out of the sandwich. He knows he did not.
So, attributing guilt to the dog is a mistake. The dog doesn't feel guilty even though it may be perfectly capable of it.
Feeling guilty requires belief about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behavior(moral belief). The dog, if it has lived long enough to attribute causality to its own behavior and what happens afterwards(praise/condemnation/punishment/etc.) then it may have a simplistic sense of what it's allowed to do and what it's not allowed to do(acceptable/unacceptable behavior). We could call this rule following. It acquires this groundwork for rule following by drawing correlations between its own actions and the praise/condemnation that follows.
The dog cannot feel guilty. It did not eat the tuna. It may be fearful. Especially if it has been falsely accused in past or punished for something that it does not understand for a lack of recognizing the causal relationship.
The glaring falsehood though, is the very last claim. As if a dog is capable of thinking about your beliefs about him.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, and what you said has just been falsified.
Exactly. It was the balloon that he named - our description, our concept, not his.
Quoting creativesoul
Does the dog believe that no train arrives at 5 o'clock?
Let's see...
The dog is on the platform at 4:55, looking down the track, just like he is there every week-day when Ueno goes off to work in the morning, and just like most of the humans who have gathered there in the last ten minutes. Agreed?
We will say of the humans that they are expecting a train. We know that the next train is due at 5.00. So we know that they are expecting the 5.00 train (whether they know that it is due at 5.00 or not - they might be unclear and only know that it is some time soon.).
Why will we not say of the dog that he is expecting a train? If we do, we know that the next train is due at 5.00. So we know that he is expecting the 5.00 train. "The 5.00 train" is our description, not his. So I'll give you this. The dog is not expecting a train at 5.00; he is not expecting anything at 5.00, because he doesn't have a concept of 5.00.
We know that when the train appears down the track, dog and humans will all come to attention - humans gathering their bits and pieces or moving towards the edge of the platform, dog standing with tail waving slowly back and to. When the train stops, the humans will climb into, and more humans will climb out of, the carriages. The humans still standing on the platform will meet and greet the people they have come to meet, the dog will meet and greet the human he has come to meet. Perhaps some humans will not meet anyone, but will pause till the train has gone and the platform cleared and then walk quietly away. Perhaps they will come back to meet another train. Eventually, the same will happen to the dog and the dog also will come back to meet another train.
Why will we not say that the dog is hoping to meet Ueno? Again, "Ueno" is our description (name), not his.
Quoting Athena
I don't know. I would suggest that one thing that would change would be our ability to co-ordinate with each other.
There's a whole lot of presupposition packed up in very few words.
Evidently, I've misunderstood your position.
You claimed in past, on more than one occasion, that beliefs are reasons for action. Now, I think that may be better put as "belief" is a term you use to explain behavior/action.
Regarding my own, and the reification charge...
Are you claiming that beliefs are not real or that beliefs do not effect/affect/influence?
He did not name your description. He named the balloon. The balloon consists of rubber. It was flying away. Your descriptions... your concepts... they do not fly away, nor do they consist of rubber.
Sigh.
Draughts indeed. Ludwig...
...I've enjoyed our discussions over the past couple years. I would suggest toning down the passive aggressive personal pokes and jabs. I'm very slow to anger... as they say. You will be biting off more than your position can even get in its mouth, let alone chew.
"5 o'clock" is an abstract entity. Abstract things are not directly perceptible. All things meaningful to the dog are directly perceptible. Abstract things are utterly meaningless to dogs. 5 o'clock is utterly meaningless to the dog.
That's very plausible.
Quoting creativesoul
But if the dog understands what it is allowed to do and what it is not allowed to do, how is that not a simplistic moral sense?
I'll tell you what - in my view, cats have absolutely no moral sense at all. There are certain behaviours, which I have observed in dogs, which I have never observed in cats, that lead me to differentiate.
Quoting creativesoul
That's just dogmatic.
Quoting creativesoul
As do we all.
Quoting creativesoul
Well, suppose I said that belief is a term we use to explain behaviour/action by giving reasons.
One difference is that reasons justify what they are reasons for, while causes do not.
Another difference is that reasons play a part in teleological explanations, while causes do not.
Quoting creativesoul
Of course not. If I were to say that "infinity" or "49" or "love" is not an object, would you think I was saying that infinity or 49 or love are not real and do not effect/affect/influence?
Oh, dear. I'm sorry. We are getting a bit heated. I'll sign off and go away and cool down.
I agree. People admired the dog's loyalty, but I'm not sure that loyalty is entirely rational. There has to be some doubt about what motivated him.
Because the dog is not expecting Ueno to arrive while knowing he may not. Expectation is shown. Hope is articulated in the face of knowing that what one expects to happen may very well in fact... not.
Oh no. I'm not heated. Thank you for the considerate apology. No need though. I just don't enjoy personal slights, and you've begun them. I'm just warning you that I'm quite capable of cutting deeply with words. I avoid doing as much as possible nowadays. However, I will not take too many jabs before parrying and countering with an overhand left.
:wink:
I'm good. Just trying to end any possible increase in personal rhetorical slights.
This is about the words/positions/linguistic frameworks... not the authors.
Words don't play games.
I'll do better to depersonalize my replies.
Right. The dog's behavior all those years after Ueno died is obviously not the result of rational thinking. Why not? If it has the ability to think rationally, why isn't it doing so for a stretch of many years?
Well.
The dog's behavior could be the result of rational thinking that belongs to a creature incapable of adjusting its belief based upon facts, or the motivations are no longer include the human's arrival... as you've been saying. Started going for all sorts of 'reasons', including the human's arrival, and continued going for all sorts of the same reasons aside from the human's arrival, in addition to new ones, also not the arrival of the human.
It is.
Yes. If it was originally showing up for a rational reason, and it was showing up for the same reason years later, the reason was no longer rational. The dog's thinking was not rational. If that's the case, then I would suggest it wasn't thinking rationally in the first place. There was a different reason it was showing up.
If the reasons changed, and the dog was showing up years later for different reasons, then it may have been thinking rationally at all points.
No... it's not.
I've painstakingly explained, on more than one occasion throughout this thread, how thinking about belief is a metacognitive endeavor which requires language/proxy use; naming and descriptive practices. The dog has none. Since metacognition is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices, and the dog has none, then the dog is incapable of metacognition. Hence, not dogmatic.
Can I take this as evidence that your criterion for what counts as "rational" includes something like based upon fact/events/what's happened and/or is happening?
Well-grounded? Warranted?
Which would explain why I don't employ "reason" voluntarily.
:wink:
I think you can think rationally despite having wrong information. But, depending on the situation, you might run into problems. If you do, then rational thinking will force you to reevaluate. People were told heavier bodies fall faster than lighter bodies. Someone could rationally come up with a plan to do something or other, maybe make some invention, based on that "fact." But then they try to test the invention, and it fails. Rational thinking would lead them to examine the whole thing, and the actual fact about falling bodies would be discovered. Rational thinking would see them embracing the newly discovered fact.
That's not making sense. You charged me with reifying belief.
Hmmm. That's a fairly tall order to fill. It seems to require a creature capable of testing/comparing the world to it's own beliefs about the world, and excludes all creatures incapable of metacognition.
Quoting Ludwig V
:yikes:
A sincere typical neurologically functioning person who tells you what they believe cannot be wrong about what they believe. Their words are the standard. Now, when talking about an insincere candidate, it's another matter altogether. Luckily, there is no such thing as an insincere language less creature. I do not see the relevance/benefit of invoking first, second, and third-person accounting practices
A creature that can't test things might still be able to notice things. Like a dog can notice X happens every single day at a certain time, and base its actions on that fact. But if it doesn't notice that X no longer happens every day at thatvcertain time, and has not happened once in several times as long as it originally happened, then I don't see evidence of rational thinking.
At that time then, right?
I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Rather, I'm just trying to understand the sense of "rational" you're practicing.
Rationality can't fly in the face of facts. You might have inaccurate information at some point, and think rationally based on that. But once you have accurate information...
One must be able to differentiate between inaccurate and accurate information then? Basically, rationality boils down to that capability?
I don't know what else it could mean. Walking off a cliff because you don't think gravity will affect you isn't rational. Going to a train station at a certain time every day for ten years, expecting to see a certain man get off the train, even though that man has not gotten off the train once in the 3,650 days you were there in the last ten years, is not rational.
Our experience is the same on a basic level. All experience consists of correlations drawn between different things. All thought follows that same process/system. The exact things matter, as does the ability/inability to perceive them prior to/while drawing correlations.
Removing naming and descriptive practices would remove metacognition. Removing metacognition belief content to directly perceptible things. We would lose all aspects of our sense of Self that emerge via language use. There would be no sense of importance. There would be no schemes.
I'm not sure that I disagree.
:up:
What if you don't know about gravity and have no idea of the life threatening situation?
Can you think of a scenario with a rational thinker who doesn't know about gravity?
Fair enough. Point taken.
Quoting creativesoul
Absolutely
Quoting creativesoul
Not sure what you are getting at here. If you think I'm just playing games here, better tell me.
Quoting creativesoul
So will I.
But I'm afraid I can't reply to you just now. It's late and I need to be up early. I'll be back tomorrow.
I was trying to give you a simple example of even a simplest most basic daily life knowledge has a ground to be rational when examined.
Quoting Ludwig V
I am still not sure what your exact point is. You cannot attribute being rational to someone or something just because you know what type of the person is, or what the thing does. Being rational means that belief, knowledge, perception or action, or proposition can demonstrate in objective manner the ground for being rational when examined or reflected back.
I cannot, however, I'm not sure that being able to differentiate between accurate information and inaccurate information is the measure for rationality. Isn't that much the same as being able to tell the difference between what's true and what's not?
That was a reference to "chess", "checkers, "draughts" language. Words don't play games. You made remarks about playing games. You were not talking about the words. You were talking about me, personally.
That's all I was getting at.
I like to maintain a distinction between what is deliberately learned in order to be able to participate in some specific activity and what one introjects without any awareness of or choice about what is being instilled.
Quoting Ludwig V
I don't see that I have created a problem. I don't deny that social role(s) are a part of any elaborate conception or account of self. As I said before I think there is a more basic and more primordial sense of self, which is involved in the sheer sense or affect or apprehension of being.
We can to some extent talk about that but not in definite ways. It is more something to be evoked or alluded to than something to be defined. To relate this back to the OP somewhat I would say that the animal sense of self is not any different.
Quoting creativesoulI guess that depends on the definition of true.
But wouldnt that mean that all animals have rational thought? They all problem solve in some ways.
The scientific sense of the term "gravity" which we now make common use of is first recorded in the early 17th century. Yes, people before this mused about why things fall back down to Earth, but then you also have musings about witches flying on broomsticks, people walking on top of water, yogis levitating in the East, and the like. So, among many other possible examples, I'll answer that that first hominid (or group of such) that invented the wheel was just such a case of rational thinking unaware of what we now know to be (the physical force of) gravity. But then neither has any lesser animal that has ever calculated a jump been aware of gravity.
Quoting Patterner
And yet many a rational human yet plays the lottery hoping for the big win - this sometimes for well over a ten-year span during which no such win has occurred. Is it rational to deny the possibility of winning the lottery? Or, given the entailed limitations of knowledge, the possibility that the person who used to get off the train at such and such time and location will someday once again appear as they did previously?
In a way, I write this to point out that rational thinking includes inductive and abductive thinking, which are far less certain than deductive thinking.
A question I ask out of curiosity:
In my own appraising that many a lesser animal has the capacity for forethought: What forethought can occur in the absence of any and all rational thinking - this as regards the present and past so as to best infer the future?
Gravity defined simply as the tendency of things to fall was and is experienced by everyone. It is hardly something one could be unaware of. Speculations about it and the other things you mention are not in the same class for the obvious reason that the other things would not have been common experiences or to be skeptical even experienced at all.
Quoting javra :roll:
Sure, but neither does this dispel that the force of gravity was unknown till a few centuries back nor does it in any way differentiate humans from non-human animals (which was sort'a my point): both commonly experience the tendency of things to fall. That stated, do you then claim that non-human animals know about gravity?
Quoting Janus
I've already made my case for this terminology here.
Again I disagree. The force was known. It would have been observed everywhere and even felt in the body. What was different was the explanation for the force.
Quoting javra
What you've said there boils down to saying that no other animals have symbolic language. In that sense and only in that sense are they to be counted as "lesser". Well we are lesser than other animals in many different ways. Need I enumerate them?
And I again disagree with your disagreement. With one reference already provided in support of this. The notion of gravitational force as a scientific law was unknown until the 17th century, right about Newton's time. Before that, it was conceivable by people that witches could fly on broomsticks - but not afterwards (at least not by those who ascribed to this newly discovered force of gravity). Do you have any references to the contrary?
Quoting Janus
No, it doesn't. It boils down to lesser animals being of lesser value in comparison to humans. One can kill a mosquito without qualms but not a fellow human, kind of thing.
Quoting Janus
Are you addressing things such as "humans are of lesser height (than giraffes, for example)" or that the individual human is of lesser value than the individual non-human animal?
If the first, it's already known. If the second, please do enumerate at will ... such that the life of some non-human animal is to be valued more than the life of a human.
I already acknowledged that the force was known but not the (scientific) explanation for it.
Quoting javra
That humans commonly consider other animals of lesser value (just as many other animals do) does not entail that they are of lesser values as such.
Quoting javra
:roll: Youre not paying attention to what Ive been saying. A lion will consider the life of some non-lion animal to be of lesser value than a lions life. Its all pure prejudice. Humans are greater than other animals in the sense that they can if they are rational enough see through and overcome their human exceptionalism.
There are no two ways about it. Human exceptionalism stinks.
The (scientific) explanation allows for no exceptions. How could the force of gravity have been known prior to the force of gravity being discovered - before which exceptions to the force of gravity were granted (again, as per flying witches)?
Quoting Janus
That's not an enumeration of how humans are lesser than non-human animals. It also completely overlooks what I've previous addressed, namely: the far greater powers and cognitive abilities of humans relative to all other known animals. As though there is no comparative value to be found in these. As you say, :roll:
I'm afraid I may have forgotten the context of this. But if you are saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale, then I agree. Sometimes, we do not elicit a satisfactory rationale and then we say that the belief is not rational.
What bothers me is the looming trilemma, that either that process can be repeated indefinitely, or it must become circular or it must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding.
Quoting Corvus
I don't disagree. However, when we are dealing with human beings, we can cross-question them and elicit rationales from them. When we are dealing with animals (or small children, for that matter), we can't. Then we have to supply the rationale and that's very tricky. There may be no way to satisfactorily answer the question. We can't even conclude that the belief was irrational.
Quoting Patterner
What's confusing me about this is the difference between everyday, inescapable, common sense and the scientific, technical concepts of gravity. Everyone knows about the former, but not everyone knows about the latter.
Quoting Patterner
I agree with that, and it does put a different perspective on the story. I think I pointed out before that the public in that case, attributed the dog's persistence to loyalty. But the loyalty isn't necessarily rational.
It's a bit like that narrow line between heroic bravery and foolish recklessness.
Quoting creativesoul
They can indeed make an important difference.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. One can only formulate beliefs about beliefs (recursion or meta-beliefs) in language. Though I would distinguish between formulating beliefs about one's own beliefs and formulating beliefs about other people's beliefs. The former seems to me problematic, because the recursion seems infinite and, in the end, empty, whereas the latter seems an everyday occurrence. (There's research in psychology about how and when small children become aware of other people's state of mind - empathy).
Quoting creativesoul
While a creature that lacked language but has perception can know and believe various things, it cannot know or believe anything about things that cannot be directly perceived, so cannot formulate beliefs about abstract objects, such as beliefs.
That seems reasonable.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, of course. But I don't see why that conclusion requires the premiss about metacognition.
Quoting creativesoul
That is puzzling. Animals have wants and desires, and I would have thought that implies a sense of importance.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. That's the standard way of putting it and my knowledge of what I believe is not to be evaluated in the same way as my knowledge of what others believe. There are a number of qualifications, which may well apply in real life. Nevertheless the believer's words are very helpful in getting a more accurate idea of what, exactly, it is that the believer believes.
But I get worried about how to establish that a candidate is insincere. If one thinks about it from the perspective that you don't know whether a candidate is sincere or not, my remark Quoting Ludwig V may seem less absurd, though it still seems bad-tempered and unhelpful.
What's at issue is how we need to adapt what we can do when we do not have access to the believer's own words. This does turn up in human life, but seems marginal, in some sense. But it is no longer marginal when we come to creatures that do not, and seem incapable of, human language.
Quoting Ludwig VIndeed. If that dog was still showing up ten years after the last appearance of the man because of loyalty, then it certainly wasn't rational.
Quoting Janus
That seems a bit hasty to me. The lion's attitude to non-lion creatures is certainly not based on a rational evaluation of them. But saying that it is all prejudice suggests that it is an opinion that the lion could change. But the poor beast has no choice about it's behaviour; it's a carnivore.
I think it's not far wrong to say that all life except the life of some organisms like lichens, lives off other life; it's part of the deal. To be sure, humans do have some choice in the matter; they can manage without meat and without killing plants, but they are a long, long way off being able to live without taking life at all.
Quoting Janus
Well, it often does. Often through carelessness and ignorance, it must be said. But human exceptionalism can be a basis for pinning responsibility on them. That's the key point of much of the argument about climate change.
Once ground for being rational for the topic or issue has been put forward, you either accept it as rational or discard it as irrational. Why do you want to go on circular?
Quoting Ludwig V
Could you not have said that you were just guessing on the behavior or actions of the animals or children as intelligent or dumb, rather than trying to pretend, make out or assume that they were rational or irrational?
Do they?
I have personally witnessed it in dogs, cats, crows, raccoons and rats and goats.
In scientific experimentation, the subjects have been predominantly apes, dolphins, canines, rodents, parrots and corvids.
I would be very interested to hear of other examples, and how the assessment was made.
Maybe not all animals. But I guess it depends on whats considered problem solving. Saying animals can do rational thinking sounds wrong though. I think its projecting maybe but Im not smart enough to clearly define where the line is.
In the scientific observations, the problem was set by humans. It would be in the form of a maze, or human-designed containers from which the subject would have to extricate a treat, by more or less complicated methods. The experiments with crows usually involve a three-part procedure that requires the subject to analyze the nature of the container and figure out how to open it, using one or more tools, or a principle of physics (such as artificially raisin the water level in a tube, or tilting a device to the correct inline) .
Ravens, apparently do very well indeed. In the primate experiments, the subject might be confronted with images or symbols of which they had to decipher the meaning. None of these experiments were 'in the wild'; ie problems that an animal would encounter in their natural habitat, while living its ordinary life - not situations in which instinct would be expected to play a part.
Here is a simple one for dogs
The problem solving I myself observed in dogs involved something the dog(s) desired, that was normally denied to them, so that they would have to find ways to circumvent human-imposed rules and overcome human-created obstacles. I have personal experience with many animals, including numerous confrontations with one memorable rat we dubbed Albert Houdini. It took six months of devising ever more ingenious traps to catch that little bastard and relocate him to a wild environment. Since we had also released several other rats in that location, we can only speculate how much we've contributed to the evolution of a super-race of rodents.
Perhaps I should re-phrase my answer.
Are you saying that when someone says that they saw X get out of the car, even though they may not have articulated any rationale for believing what they saw at the time, we can later on ask questions and elicit a rationale?
If so, I agree.
It seems to follow that when we do not elicit a satisfactory rationale and then we say that the belief is not rational. Do you agree?
I did ask a further question. Are you concerned about the trilemma argument that justifications must either be repeated indefinitely, or become circular or must end arbitrarily, with grounds that have no further grounding?
It's a fairly standard issue. But you are free to ignore that question if you find it annoying.
Quoting Corvus
I don't believe that when we come to the rationality of creatures that do not have language as we know it, the only way to attribute reasons for their behaviour is guessing. But I wanted also to recognize that the process was more difficult and less certain than it is when we are dealing with someone who can explain their reasons.
That has nothing to do with rationalising. That is just a perception. Perception and recalling what they saw when asked, is not reasoning.
Reasoning takes place when thinking takes place on why and how, and being able to logically and objectively summarising the grounds for the perception, beliefs, actions or propositions.
Quoting Ludwig V
Every beliefs, actions, speaking and perception is one time only in the path of time, therefore they are unique. There is no repeat or going circular in reasoning, unless you are talking about the Sun rising every morning. Even rising of the sun is unique events because it takes place in the path of unique time.
No I didn't find anything annoying. I was just trying clarify the points using reasoning.
Quoting Ludwig V
The agents with no or little linguistic ability is not the point of the topic. They are not the subject of reasoning. They are objects of reasoning. We have been talking about whether your thoughts and comments on them are rational. Not them.
What did he mean by that? He didn't mean to say anything about the owl in actuality. He meant to say the metaphor about reason and philosophy.
It was known as I said by being experienced and understood as a force. It is irrelevant that Newton may have coined the word 'gravity'. Are you going to try to argue that the ancients had no concept of force?
Quoting javra
There is comparative value to be found in all animal capacities. I haven't denied that it is commonly believed that humans in some senses have greater cognitive capacities than most other animals.
Quoting Ludwig V
I wasn't suggesting that it was a prejudice that could be changes, merely that it is a kind of natural prejudice shared by all social animals in favoring their own over other species.
Quoting Ludwig V
I cannot agree with that interpretation. Humans are responsible for climate change simply insofar as they are causing it.
Quoting Patterner
Quoting Patterner
For a dog that begins going to the train station at 5 o'clock on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday for all sorts of reasons, including meeting a human, it would be rational for that dog to occasionally hold such expectation. They very well could have passing memories of the human after death.
The train station is part of a lifelong routine. The train station is connected to the human by the dog. That's what makes them both meaningful to the dog. The train station can also be connected to feeling good.
All meaningful experience begins with connections being drawn between different things. The world becomes more meaningful as a direct result. That's early rational thought.
That's what else it means.
You said they could have been rational all along, but not if knowing the difference between accurate and inaccurate information is the only measure of rationality.
This doesn't seem, to me, to be true at all. You can be rational with inaccurate information, provided it isn't directly illogical. If you've been mislead, misinformed, lied to etc.. it has nothing to do with your rationality how you assess the data involved, is it? Perhaps you can form a way it is - i'm quite unsure, i'm just giving my intuition. The standard objection to JTB seems to, weakly, support this
You give reasons it could be rational for the dog to go to the train station a decade after the man stopped getting off the train. And there obviously were reasons, since the dog continued a decade after. But the dog wasn't still going a decade after because it expected the man to get off the train.
He was just faithful.
Some things we do are not rational in a strict sense of the word. My favourite cat went out one night three months ago and didn't show up in the cedar tree outside my office window next morning. Chances are, a coyote or a car killed her. I'm aware of these dangers, having access to information dogs and cats don't. My grandfather died in another town; his human family was notified. The dog never saw his body and was told nothing. I still look out at the cedar tree every morning: though I don't rationally expect to see Sammy there, some superstitious* part of me keeps hoping. The same way the families of soldiers missing in action keep hoping for years or decades that their loved one will come home some day.
*I suppose it's the same part in many humans that insists on believing in a soul and afterlife. Hope, even the most improbable hope, is hard to give up.
Yes. I was just expanding the scope of what counts as being rational to include more than just the ability to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information.
There's a big difference between formulating beliefs about beliefs and thinking about beliefs. Small children do not formulate beliefs about beliefs.
I'm sorry. That post was not reviewed prior to posting. There were half edits going on. As it stood, on my view it was nonsense. :blush: From my own poorly attended post nonetheless.
I meant, and I thought the notion was of self-importance.
I would not say that. You would know your own temper better than I.
You're quite right to point out the difficulty of establishing whether or not a candidate is sincere.
Uses the exact same mistaken notion of belief as JTB. I reject both for using that notion of belief.
:wink:
Another topic. I'll say nothing more here.
Yes, rationality includes more than differentiating between accurate/inaccurate information. I was making that case.
Yes, I would agree there's more to it than that. It is not rational to drop many different pairs of different objects from many different heights, and come out of it thinking heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. That would be an inability to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate information..
Once you know that all objects fall at the same rate, it would not be rational to build a device that would take advantage of the idea that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. That irrational thinking is due to something else. Not sure how to label it.
I guess both reasons for irrational thinking night fall under a common umbrella? Something other than [I]irrational thinking[/I], that is.
OK. So believing what they saw and reporting that when asked doesn't involve reasoning. But reasoning can come into it when they are asked to justify (give reasons for believing) their belief that what they say did happen. Is it only after the justification has been provided that it is rational for them to believe what they saw?
Quoting Corvus
I don't really see the difference between discussing whether animals are rational and discussing whether my belief that animals are rational is rational. Of course, there is a third possibility that my belief that animals are rational may be the result of a valid argument based on false premisses. Is that what you are suggesting?
Quoting Janus
OK. It's just that it seems to me to be a requirement for a species to be social at all. A "society" in which every member felt free to cannibalize the other members wouldn't survive for long, just as an individual that didn't regard itself as a priority (prioritizing its own life over that of an aggressor) wouldn't survive for long. If that's a prejudice, it would be hard to criticize a society or an individual that had it.
Quoting Janus
It's significant, though, that you (rightly) hold human beings responsible. What's more, we can't expect any other species to step up and control the situation. All I'm suggesting is that, although exceptionalism has been all too often used by humans to justify maltreating everything else, it is also the basis for expecting better of them.
The exceptionalism that I'm opposed to is the exceptionalism that seeks to disown or set aside our animal nature, pretending that we are not animals. In a phrase, it is the idea that we have "dominion" over everything else. It has too often been interpreted as a licence for tyranny, when stewardship is called for.
I'm sorry about your cat. Over lost many over the years. One in particular hurt more than any other. It disappeared the same way Sammy did. I had many dreams over the next few years about him returning.
Ah yes. Hope.
Hope isn't necessarily irrational. You might still be hoping to see Sammy in the cedar. A few months isn't out of the range of possibility. We've all heard stories of various situations where a pet returned after an absence longer than three months.
If she doesn't show up again, but you're still hoping she will be there five years from now - as opposed to just looking out at the tree with bittersweet memories of her, and wishing she had been with you longer - then your hope will no longer be rational. So you probably shouldn't go out there every day at that poibt, open a new can of cat food, and call for her.
I for one would say that assessing the data is an important function of rationality. But does that mean we are only rational if we critically assess everything? Is it actually irrational to believe that the sun is shining because you can see that it is?
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. I think of it like this. Losing someone you know is a gap in your world. In most cases, the gap fills in as life goes on, though the loss is still marked. Like a scar, it can be forgotten, but still there's a reminder. In other cases, the gap does not fill in - perhaps never fills in - like a tooth you have lost, you can always feel the loss as an empty space.
The thing about long-term hope is that it will fasten on the remotest possibility. The thing about remote possibilities is that sometime they actually happen. (Hiroo Onoda was the last Japanese soldier to surrender after 1945. He emerged from the jungle in Lubang in the Phillipines in 1974.) That doesn't make hope against the odds rational, exactly. But it does distinguish it from a fantasy. You could ask the same question about Hiroo Onoda's faithfulness to his mission. If you read the story, you might decide that he was perhaps not rational but at least not irrational either.
Observations:-
1. It would seem that there is a kind of understanding that is not exactly a rational explanation, but does help to understand why people might remember those they have lost when it would not be irrational to forget.
2. But with Hachiko, I don't see how we can ever determine which of the suggested explanations is right or wrong.
Quoting creativesoul
That sounds about right.
Quoting creativesoul
I agree with both sentences. The ill-understood (at least by me) is the difference and relationship between formulating one's beliefs and having them. Between articulate reasoning and "tacit" reasoning.
Quoting creativesoul
Oh, I do understand. I've often regretted some bit of nonsense within seconds of posting - and it's surprising how often someone spots it before I've had time to remove it. But it's hard to remove everything when a typo can mean the difference between sense and nonsense - and spell checkers only catch the mistakes that are obviously mistakes and perhaps some grammatical errors.
I won't be here by this time next year. Until then, it's the window of my office, where a I spend much of my day.
BTW, the incident of the dog who waits wasn't about rational thinking; it was about a sense of time, of awareness of past and future, and not simply living in the present, as some people insist that other animals do.
We are also creatures ruled to a large extent by feelings of attachment, loyalty, affection, of sentiment - just like dogs, horses and geese. We generally don't blame one another for failing to be 100% rational 100%of the time. Other animals, we hold to a different standard.
I know. The telling of time - when something is expected to happen vs what time something is expected to happen - was a slight detour. However, I do consider a sense of time, understanding the sequence of events and anticipation of future events, to be an important component in reasoning.
Quoting Patterner
This was not a problem solving exercise; it was an example of sentimental attachment and time-sense. Dodi was an inept hunting dog, not very bright. My grandfather bought him, rather than see him put down. Quite an irrational act: he was soft in the head, too. Wouldn't even beat his sons, way back in the 1920's when that was considered every father's duty.
The context here was pretty important, though. If you have accurate (or: near accurate, accurate but incomplete (and similar formulations)) data, I would agree. But, if you are misinformed (particularly purposefully, in the way JTB gets beaten by example, when you're accidentally right despite misinformation) I can't see that your rationality is really in play, in the sense that it's, as it were, on trial, in assessing data which, from a third party perspective, is wrong, but you couldn't know.
I'm not quite sure I understand what you're rejecting. Sincerely thinking something is true is a belief, right? It's not a logical position but an emotional one.
Really? Tell that to the Jain monks who conscientiously sweep the path they're walking along to avoid stepping on insects. Or the world's many vegetarians and vegans who decline animal products as sustenance (which doesn't include me). I think this is rather a stale caricature of Christian imperialism, even if historically accurate in some respects.
The exceptionalism I'm proposing is due to our existential condition: that we are endowed with the ability to sense meaning in a way that no other animal is able to do. There are, as a consequence, horizons of being open to us, that are not open to other animals. It's both a blessing and a curse, as consequently we have a sense of ourselves, and so also a sense of our own limitedness and finitude and the ability to lose what we cherish and also to act in ways which we ourselves know are sub-optimal. It's an unfortunate historical fact that our science-based society has swept away the symbolic forms in which that awareness was expressed. But then, it also suits a consumer society to have us believe that the pursuit and satiation of desires is an aim. Many before me have observed that the popular interpretation of the 'survival of the fittest' serve the industrial capitalist mindset very well.
None of which is to say that I don't accept that animals, like dogs, are sentient beings who feel a full range of emotions and experience joy, sadness and so on (I'm minding someone's cavoodle for a few weeks, and she's a delight). That they are demonstrably lacking the rational faculties of h.sapiens is not an expression of prejudice or bias, but a simple statement of fact, which seems inordinately difficult to accept for a lot of people.
Yes I wasnt trying to suggest that animals could change their preference for their own kind. And I agree with you that such a disposition is a pragmatic necessity for the survival of animal societies as well as human ones
Quoting Ludwig V
Right both because they could not do anything about it or even understand it and because they could never have created the situation in the first place.
Quoting Ludwig V
Totally agree with this.
Quoting Wayfarer
Its not difficult for me to accept that humans possess symbolic language and thus are capable of collective learning in ways that other animals are apparently not. What is difficult for me to accept is that this means we are more than merely another kind of animal or that we are more important in any absolute sense than other animals.
.
I didn't say 'important', although in the sense that we hold sway over the fate of millions of species, then we are. But that is not the point I've been labouring to make, which is that we're of a different kind, due to what we're able to know.
This intuition is not, by the way, unique to Christianity. In Buddhist lore, being born in human form is an opportunity to realise liberation (a term which has no conceptual equivalent in the Western lexicon.) Buddhists are generally humane to animals, and many orders of Mah?y?na Buddhism are strictly vegetarian. But they understand that animals lack the intelligence to learn 'the way' (see David Loy, Are Humans Special? (.pdf)):
[quote=David Loy]Steven Weinberg, a Nobel laureate in physics, famously claimed that The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless. But to examine the universe objectively and conclude that it is pointless misses the point. Who is comprehending that the universe is pointless? Someone separate from it, or someone who is an inextricable part of it? If cosmologists themselves are a manifestation of the same universe that cosmologists study, with them the universe is comprehending itself. Does that change the universe? When we come to see the universe in a new way, its the universe that is coming to see itself in a new way.[/quote]
I have never heard of anyone trying to justify what they saw. One can confirm what one saw. But usually one doesn't justify what one saw. One justifies what one believes, said, done and think, but not one saw, smelt, felt, drank, ate or heard.
Quoting Ludwig V
Think whatever you like, but if you think animals are rational, then we are not talking in the same category of reason. In my book, if you think animals are rational, then you could be a zoologist, scientist, social activist. poet, novelist, religious cult member or a folk in the pub, but not a philosopher.
Animals could be intelligent, but they are not rational. Rational beings ask questions, reflects, and are able to criticise and analyze. Is any animal capable of these mental activities apart from humans? In that regard, not even every humans are rational.
That works. You want to hog a faculty all to yourself, just categorize it as the thing only you have.
If my data is wrong, despite my assessing it rationally, then my rationality is not in question. It would be if I became better informed and failed to change my assessment.
Quoting creativesoul
OK. My misunderstanding.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. But it does include differentiating between accurate and inaccurate information, doesn't it?
No matter how different each and everyone's thinking processes and contents are, we must allow the freedom of thinking, must'n we? That is also a rational thinking. :wink:
I have trouble with this. Sincerity, to me, means not affected (pretended), genuine. Emotions can be affected or genuine, sincere or not. So, like honesty, sincerity must be in a different category from the emotions. (Though emotion can be an explanation for people believing things, though usually of them believing things irrationally.)
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, I know about the Jains - and respect them. So it is without disrespect that I point out that they sweep the insects from their path, rather than, for example, not walking where they are, or walking round them. Which falls under the prioritization that we were talking about.
Yes. I was using that cliche as a way of making the point that exceptionalism does not necessarily imply exploitation and destruction. Even "stewardship" is open to criticism. We don't own the world just because we can wreck it. So the care we ought to take is more like the care we should take of something that belongs to, or is shared with, someone else.
Quoting Wayfarer
So now I'm puzzled again. The conversation started with the point that a lion prioritized itself and perhaps (I don't know the habits of lions) its mate and cubs over other species, in that it regards its own life as more important than the lives of its prey.
Because I have trouble with "horizons of being", I don't know what you mean by "in a way that no other animal is able to do".
Quoting Wayfarer
I think the issue here is about morality. Which is a rather different kettle of fish from rationality. Nevertheless, I'm pretty sure that some animals to have a simple sense of morality.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, that's true. Yet, if they had eyes to see, they would understand that evolution itself demonstrates that we are better together.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yet, from my point of view, it is a simple fact that we are animals. I'm sure you don't intend to deny that, just as I don't mean that animals don't do many things that humans do.
I'm sorry. It seems odd that Weinberg should bemoan the pointlessness of the world when he studies the world from a point of view that has been carefully constructed to eliminate any question about what the point of the world is. It doesn't miss the point. It by-passes it. (Not that I'm a fan of the question what is the point of the world).
Doesn't the same apply to scientists and historians etc.? But anyway, from the fact that cosmologists are part of the universe that they study, it does not follow that the universe is comprehending itself. I'm not even clear what it means to say that the universe is comprehending itself.
Quoting Janus
I agree. Humans are different from animals, animals from fish, fish from insects. Humans are like animals, which are like fish, which are like insects. Each species is like others and unlike them. That's all boring. What makes the issue contentious? It has to be what significance is attributed to them.
Yes, ok cool. Perhaps I was just insufficiently clear initially. THank you!
I think this is true, but then you can't really employ the term, which I would need to supplant here, of "genuine belief". Though, I think we can simply read this as "A genuine emotional disposition to accept as true". Would that perhaps work for you? It says the same thing, to me.
I've never thought about emotin in relation to belief, or rather I've always assumed that any emotion was superfluous and basically undesirable. The usual assumption is that emotion is always just irrational prejudice, but now that it seems to be generally accepted that emotions have a cognitive element and that does indeed change the game. I need to think about this.
[quote=Julian Huxley] As a result of a thousand million years of evolution, the universe is becoming conscious of itself, able to understand something of its past history and its possible future. This cosmic self-?awareness is being realized in one tiny fragment of the universein a few of us human beings.[/quote]
(Although, mind you, were only tiny fragments looked at from the outside.)
Ah, yes. You are quite right. That means that there is something foundational about our perceptions. But I would want to say that it is not necessarily straightforward. Normally, we do indeed believe what we see, etc and that is unproblematic. But sometimes we find ourselves with incompatible beliefs, or simply confused. Then we start asking questions, making diagnoses; very often, but not always we can resolve the situation and then we turn on the perceiver and conclude that there is something wrong or at least different going on - colour-blindness, astigmatism, etc. I realize that's very vague, but I'm gesturing towards all that, rather than trying to describe it. I think we probably don't want to pursue the details here and now.
In case of mysterious or abnormal visual perception case, you would try to resort to the biological or psychological probes and explanation in clarifying the problems, rather than rationalisation. Rational thinking and reasoning takes place in conceptual level, not physical or biological level. You wouldn't get much progress or meaningful conclusion bringing in rational thinking into your abnormal perception due to colour blindness or astigmatism.
But the subject matter one thinks about has to be collected through sensory data processing before one can formulate any concepts. (Hence the poverty of cognitive function in children who have been deprived of stimulation in their formative years.) If one's own data-collecting equipment is compromised, no amount of conceptual thinking can correct it. In the absence of an external source of sound data, one is forced to draw conclusions and make decisions on incorrect premises.
If you are missing the L cones in your retina and nobody tells you that red exists, it's quite reasonable for you to conceive of everything in the world as shades of green and yellow. You could respond correctly to a green STOP sign because of the word, but a green flag would mean nothing special.
Sure. But it lacks any meaningful point in the discussion for the topic rational beings and rational thinking. What is there to dispute or be surprised in that? It is like saying, if you wore sunglasses, then the whole world will appear darker to you.
It is not talking anything about rational beings or thinking, but it is just a description of a obvious mechanism of perception, that if you are lacking something in your retina, you cannot see things in proper way. If a being lacks sensory organs, then it cannot form any concepts. What is new or interesting?
Only if you have some external source of information that contradicts your defective senses. without that contradiction, you would ask no questions.
Quoting Corvus
Nothing at all. One old, uninteresting point is that concepts are formed from sensory input, not independently.
I agree with that. I was thinking, however, that deciding what the physical explanation is would be applying rationality.
Quoting Vera Mont
That's right. But that external source has to be, or be based on, perception.
The same way you are. The biological clock that came with our brain, plus changes in the environment, plus experience, plus memory. People and other animals kept daily and seasonal routines long before anybody built a stone circle and very long before we let ourselves be ruled by mechanical horologes. I have no idea why other people think this is remarkable, when we all not only have a sense of time, but can witness every living thing around us respond to the passage of time.
I don't dispute that parts of the universe are aware of themselves and of the universe as a whole. But I can't see that it follows that the universe is aware of itself or its parts. I don't think that my car is aware of anything just because I'm driving it, though I can see some sense in such an idea. But the idea that my car is aware of itself just because someone is sitting in it makes no sense to me.
But I do think that there is something important about insisting that we are a product of the universe, not some alien imposition.
I agree with you. It seems to me that there are two concepts of time in play. There is the idea of time as a rhythm or repetition, and our biological clock maintain what is called a circadian rhythm, making us more inclined to sleep and night and wake up during the day. (The human biological clock is located in the hypothalamus in the brain.) Then there is our clock time - which actual is a more sophisticated system that does the same thing. It's not unreasonable to suppose that dogs and other animals do not comprehend that system. But it is unreasonable not to recognize that they also have biological clocks that do give them an effective sense of time - it's a well established fact.
Wikipedia - Circadian rhythm
The only definition of the universe that I think makes sense is to list everything in it. Which, obviously, is far from possible. Everything would have to be listed as its individual self, as well as as a party of any group or system that is a part of, etc. etc. So we could only ever list a ridiculously minuscule number of things. But on that list would be you and me. You are a part of the definition of the universe. If you did not exist, the definition of the universe would be different than it is. And the part of the universe that is you is aware. Aware of yoursrlf individually, aware of a billion other things, and aware of the universe as a whole. A part of the universe is aware of itself.
The parts of the universe that become aware of themselves and other parts only do so by distinguishing themselves and other parts from everything else.
I believe you are correct. It seems to me interaction with others plays a huge roll in the development of our consciousness.
I don't disagree with that. I must have misunderstood you.
Indeed. That is one of the unique attributes of living beings. The hallmark of organic life is that it has to maintain itself rather than being subsumed into whatever chemical or energetic process is going on around it, as non-organic matter does. This is one of the distinctions that Evan Thompson makes in Mind in Life. But humans go a step beyond that. They're aware that they're aware.
I am not sure if deciding what physical explanation is applying rationality. Reasoning is either deductive or inductive reasoning. Deduction infers from the valid premises to the valid conclusions such as A > B, B >C therefore A>C. All men is mortal, Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal.
Induction is reasoning which infers the future case from the observed previous cases such as Sun have risen from the east. The sun rises from the east. Therefore sun will rise from the east.
Reasoning yields new knowledge or conclusion from the premises or observations. Reasoning can be ground for the actions, speakings, beliefs, knowledge and explanations. But reasoning itself is not explanations or beliefs or actions. You seem to be still in confusion telling the difference between reasoning and intelligence (or knowledge).
So how does that point relate to your stance that animals are able to do rational thinking?
It doesn't. The preponderance of evidence does.
The teeny-tiny, microscopic point I attempted to make in this context was in support of the previous argument by Ludwig V was that conceptual thought depends on concepts, which are formed from sensory input.
Quoting Ludwig V
Quoting Corvus
Just that, nothing more. Any entity, of any species that thinks rationally can, nevertheless, draw false conclusions if they are working with inaccurate data.
If there ever was such a point worth making, its moment has long passed.
I don't see what your problem is. If my question is "Why can't S tell red from green?", I will want to work out my answer rationally, because that guarantees that my answer will be reliably correct.
Quoting Corvus
"ground" is a bit vague. I hope you mean "justification". I notice you include explanations in your list. I'm especially happy with that.
I've little doubt that is true. Which gives me one more reason for not understanding what it would mean for the universe to be conscious. There isn't anything else for it to distinguish itself from.
I hope you'll forgive me nit-picking at something that is broadly true. But I think it is important, in order to ensure we avoid various well-known philosophical traps, that we never forget, that actions (interactions) with the world are critically important, not only in learning how to interpret our sensory input, but also in understanding what concepts are - knowing what "gate" means means knowing how to use (and abuse) the gate.
Your comments are perfect for continuing the conversation.
The animals will not be ruled by our modern cultural understanding of time. They will never rely on clocks to regulate their lives. The forces of nature will always regulate their lives. None of them will ever complain they want to be lazy and stay in their pajamas all day, but they have to go to work. A dog will never understand the reasoning behind our modern-day way of life and excitingly, not that long ago, no human being would understand our modern way of life. Comparably we are not living our lives but like puppets, our rationale controls us while we do not perceive life in the raw. It takes something like a hurricane to get us out of our heads and back into life.
Our rational notions of life are pretty disconnected from nature. :lol: That is to say we do not experience the tree, but what we think about the tree. Does that make sense?
Nice thought. Does this link compliment what you said?
Chardin was a Catholic priest who lived in China and the Chruch forbade him to publish his book.
He said something like this, "God is asleep in rocks and minerals, waking in plants and animals, to know self in man".
Thanks. I should look into him. I know his philosophies were a huge basis of Julian May's Galactic Milieu series, which is an incredible scifi/fantasy series about humanity gaining psionic abilities.
Yep. It's hard to imagine an organism that does not interact with the world - if only to anchor on something and feed itself. With blythe disregard to potential philosophical pitfalls, I kind of presupposed being alive means being in the world. As I noted earlier, in the absence of outside sources of information - i.e. memory, experience, input from other organisms - one has only one's imperfect, unaided senses upon which to base understanding of anything. One would form concept s (a functioning mind cannot help forming concepts, even if it has no name for them) and thus make decisions that were only as accurate as the available data.
Quoting Athena
Our pets and service animals are ruled by whatever schedule society set for their owners/handlers. Farm animals are,too, to a lesser degree, as their needs influence - though do not determine - the farmer's routine.
Quoting Athena
It does to me. When sequestered from the elements, the environment and denizens of nature, we let ourselves make up fanciful theories about those things, for a variety of reasons. One of these, as I said before, is exploitation. A major one has been to bolster theologies and thereby, the lifting of Man half-way to Heaven. There are strong vestiges of that mindset in the secular realm. Another reason is nostalgia: an ache for the loss of a dimension of our selves. A pervasive one has been art; the appreciation of natural beauty. Yet another is entertainment and profit through entertaining humans.
As long as we have theories and centuries-old Eurocentric philosophical maxims regarding the nature of nature, we can deny the less adamantine evidence of direct observation, direct interaction.
I'm not sure being aware of awareness makes sense. Perhaps it's just that we can tell ourselves that we are aware on account of possessing symbolic language.
Quoting Athena
I think so, In line with my response to Wayfarer above I tend to think that whereas other animals distinguish themselves from everything else in having a sense of self but are not conscious of doing that distinguishing we that possess symbolic language are able to reflectively tell ourselves that we are doing that distinguishing and even tell ourselves that we are directly aware of doing that distinguishing. I tend to think the latter is a kind of illusion though.
There's a well-known - some might say notorious - case which was recounted in a popular book of the 1970's, Supernature, and again in a more recent work, The Human Cosmos, Jo Marchant.
The second of those two books recounts how Frank Brown was essentially ostracized by the scientific mainstream for the claim that the oysters somehow responded to changes in lunar gravitation. Nevertheless his findings still stand as far as I know.
//I should add, I don't think molluscs are conscious, and these actions are not rational, but that it is very interesting that this behaviour can be regulated in this manner.//
Biology is still beyond our ken. Neuroscience is well behind. Physics and cosmology are ranging off into neverlands of speculation. But we know all about metaphysics.
I have not heard of this experiment. Thanks! Don't quite know what to do with it, or where to file it, but it's fascinating.
That's a good story. However, I recently happened to hear a BBC radio science programme that answers questions sent in by listeners (often children). There was a question about the effects of the moon's gravity on the earth. The answer was incredibly detailed, but mentioned, unless I misheard, that the moon's gravity had a (presumably measurable) effect on the earth's rocks; it suggested a kind of (mini-) tidal effect on land as well as water. Which doesn't seem fantastic to me, so I believe that. It would entirely explain those results. I wonder who we could ask? (I wouldn't rate that as particularly super, but the way. It's just one of those things that is so obvious one wonders why one didn't think of it before.)
Quoting Janus
It seems to me that they most likely have self-awareness, because otherwise they couldn't navigate the world or tell the difference between the things around them moving and themselves moving. I have often seen them exercising self-control - just ask them to sit and stay while you walk away. Other animals I don't know well enough to opine. Self-reflection seems to me to depend on human language so I'm willing to let that go.
Quoting Janus
The whole business is infected with the fact that the grammar of language allows one to apply recursion, so when S believes/knows/is aware that p, it is not ungrammatical to suggest that S believes/knows/is aware that S believes/knows/is aware that p, and S believes/knows/is aware that S believes/knows/is aware that p that S believes/knows/is aware that p and so on. There's also I know that p, and so now you know that p, and so I know that you know that p, and you know that I know that you know that p. The fact that grammar permits it is no reason to suppose that each step is meaningful.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. It is striking though how theologies need to convince us first that we are less than worms (no disrespect to worms, though) in order to be able to lift us up, but only half-way to heaven, with dire threats about what will happen if we break their rules.
The question that bothers me about representational theories is that they never explain what it is that is being represented. I know how a picture is a representation, but not how those mental whatsits are. What does a smell/taste represent? or a touch? Or a pain? Representations of sounds seem to be more like mimicries or recreations that representations. It's all completely unclear, and yet people hang on to it. I don't get it.
Not sure if you are disagreeing with me here. I believe animals to varying degrees are self-aware. But I find it hard to imagine how they could be reflectively or narratively self-aware given that they don't possess symbolic language.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. all that. So what we call reflective self-awareness which some would say elevates us above the other animals I would say is not anything different in any phenomenologically immediate sense than simple awareness of or sense of difference between self and other, but merely the post hoc narrative about our self-awareness which language enables us to tell.
Does it matter whether you can tell stories about your thinking? I mean, it obviously matters to the storyteller. I happen to be a teller of fictional stories and it matters greatly to me. I suppose it matters even more to the tellers of stories that liberate or subjugate or eradicate entire peoples. In that sense, it raises humans above species that can't or don't need to tell stories.
(I imagine the dog's record of his internal life as a reel of virtual reality - like a 6D movie. Is it story-telling? Without grammar and syntax, it's hard to tell - in fact, at the time, it's impossible to communicate - but that's the way children with limited verbal skills view their own life.)
But how does it alter rational thought, problem-solving or navigating the physical world?
I assume every species has thoughts that no other species share, since the equipment with which we perceive, experience and interact with the world, and the capabilities we bring to life are so varied. I assume every individual also thinks thoughts that are unique to itself alone.
We can get some notion - sometimes a pretty clear one - of what another species is thinking by its actions, to the degree those actions are similar to what we would do in their place. But as long as we are individual, the precise content of each mind must remain a mystery to all others.
Don't you think there might be just a smidgen of anthropomorphic projection there?
I'd say the most significant thing is that it enables collective learning. History and art and literature and music and science and so on.
Quoting Patterner
It seems to me that abstract thought, thought about generalities may be impossible without langauge. Perhaps animals of various kinds think some things that we cannot.
Human history does not indicate - at least to this observer - that all that science and culture have contributed significantly to our collective ability to make rational decisions.
What sort of generalities? Like : "All wolves are evil." or "If the angles of one triangle add up to 360 degrees, the angles of all triangles must also."? Because lamas do believe the former and crows know that a stick skinny enough to go into a one hole in a tree will go into the hole in another tree. Or do you mean something more like : "Events in the universe are sequential, so there must have been a prime mover to get it started."? I don't think other animals think like that.
The angles of triangles add up to 360 degrees? (Just bustin' on your for this one. :grin: )
I don't have problem. You seem to have. I am just pointing out your example is not reflecting what rational thinking is. When you are asked, "Why can't S tell red from green?", if you explained the reason is S is colour blind, then your answer is based on your guessing, or just parroting what you read or heard from other sources, not from your rational thinking.
You explanation must be based on either from deductive or inductive reasoning for it to be qualified as a rational thinking. Not just because you explained something based on your guessing or parroting what you have heard or read from other sources.
Contrast to your example, my answer to the question how do you know it is autumn, because I see the leaves are falling from all the trees, is based on my previous observation that whenever leaves were falling from all the trees, it was autumn, which is an inductive reasoning, hence it is a rational thinking.
Why is "ground" vague? Why does it have to be "justification"?
They make excellent guards for sheep, I've heard and will spit and kick at predators. But they can become accustomed to dogs in a domestic setting.
Quoting Patterner
Deservedly so! My mind's eye was looking at a square, but my fingers only got half the message. :sad:
Quoting Vera Mont"half the message" is an excellent response! :grin:
I am feeling a little frustrated in part because I am aware of a serious family problem and it seems next to impossible to get my mind to focus on anything else. The next piece of frustration is conveying the fact that our reality has almost nothing to do with nature. We are not consciously living in a world created by nature or a god. Our reality is 100% man-made. When we walk along the river enjoying the beauty, we are escaping from our man-made reality. No other animal experiences life in this way and we do not experience nature as an animal does. Aborigenies that never had contact with modern man experience life as the animals do but once they have contact with modern man, they too are thrown out of Eden. Adam and Eve enjoyed Eden until they tasted the forbidden fruit.
Might that mean oysters are sensitive to the gravitational pull of the moon?
We do not experience nature as the animals do.
To herbivores, predators are the greatest threat. Many herbivores simply accept that they will be chased and possibly killed by wolves or other predators, but a few species, such as llamas, don't: they regard the predator as an enemy, and fight one if it comes near, even when it doesn't attack first. They may not conceive of 'evil' in human monster terms, but they do classify entire other species as 'bad'. That's a generalization.
A herbivore that always runs when it sees its major predator would also be generalizing: "All lions are a threat." But, in fact, most of the grazing herds are watchful but relaxed around lions that are not actively hunting, so I imagine their concept of 'lion' is more specific: 'lion at rest over there' and 'lion moving toward us' are two different categories. I don't know whether that's a generalization.
Even when the river has cement banks... Yes. There have always been movements in civilized societies, of a small number of people who lived, or attempted to live, a more genuine, nature-grounded lifestyle.
I wouldn't call the fugitive subsistence of the Mashco Piro Eden, exactly, though they look pretty healthy. I see no reason we couldn't strike a compromise between the destruction of nature and our own needs. But humans tend to run at everything at full tilt.
Sorry. I wasn't clear enough. My explanation is "S is colour-blind", but I thought that Quoting Ludwig V
...excluded guessing and parroting.
Quoting Corvus
If I look up the time of the next train on the company web-site (which I have chosen because there is good reason to trust it) and tell everyone that the next train is at 12:00 and the next train is at 12:00, I would claim that I knew the next train was at 12:00 and deny that I'm just parroting. Guessing, I agree, is not rational basis for claiming knowledge, though trial and error as a way of discovering truth is a good basis.
Quoting Janus
Well, I certainly agree that there is no need for a distinct phenomenological experience as a basis for telling ourselves that we are aware of a distinction as opposed to simply reporting or noting it. "Illusion" suggests that I am not aware of the distinction I am aware of, so it seems the wrong classification to me.
Quoting Patterner
Very good. But then the brains of bats and dolphins must be wired differently from ours, because they have specialized abilities that we do not - and just as their specialized abilities have evolved from ancestors that did not have those abilities, so our specialized skills must have evolved from ancestors that did not speak human languages. But again, in both cases, we would expect to find precursors or simple beginnings in those ancestors and we cannot exclude similar skills that have developed differently in other creatures.
Quoting Janus
Well, Pavlov's dogs were capable of generalizing from the bell ringing yesterday before food to the bell is ringing to-day, so there will be food. "Abstract thought", to me, means something different. Mathematics is abstract thought, because it is about abstract objects.
Quoting Patterner
I'm more inclined to argue that abstract thought couldn't exist if we were not capable of language. The truth most likely is that the two developed together.
Quoting Janus
Yes. The bit about "post hoc" is important. That underlies many (possibly all) our explanations of what language-less creatures do and even of a lot of what we do. "Rational post hoc construction" is a good description. We model those on the pattern of the conscious reasoning that we sometimes engage in before and sometimes during executing an action.
Quoting Vera Mont
The phenomenology of language-less creatures is extraordinarily difficult. I don't think it is reasonable to expect the level of accuracy and detail we can get from creatures that can talk to us.
Quoting Vera Mont
The trouble is that human capacities have not eliminated the things we share with animals. They still motivate us in exactly the same ways - the will to survive, to reproduce, to eat, drink, seek shelter and company.
Quoting Patterner
We can never eliminate the possibility of being wrong - even safe conclusions can be wrong. So long as we can recognize when we are wrong and do better next time, it's not a catastrophic problem.
Okay. Humans have hyperbole that other species probably don't. I don't know the language of alpacas or zebras. I can't even picture the symbology in their heads. But generalization is generalization. Threat, non-threat, benefit and detriment are categorizations and generalizations: i.e. abstract thought.
Quoting Ludwig V
Or course not. But since we ourselves were languageless creatures early in our lives, and our large brain has an extensive archive of memories, we can recall and describe some of our pre-verbal experiences, feelings and sensations. Not everyone has the same retrieval capability, and we can't always be sure that another person's - or even our - recollection is accurate. Still, we are able to translate non-verbal events into language. When you stand at a scenic lookout, are you really describing the vista to yourself in sentences - or do your eyes and mind take it in and transcribe it later - maybe only a few seconds later? Do you look at a painting or hear a concerto in words?
Quoting Ludwig V
Oh, sure, don't give our ancestors credit for acting with common sense, but then blame them for the evil narratives that intelligence and imagination - all that vaunted unique cogitation - have wrought. Somehow, bison and whales and hares can cope with lust, anger, fear, territorialism and aggression, without causing their own extinction. It's not the primal instincts that invent slavery, espionage, thumbscrews, supertankers, mustard gas and corrupt supreme courts.
I agree. Collectively we are by and large fucking hopeless.Quoting Patterner
Chicken or egg? I think pattern recognition accounts for being able to see things in general terms rather as bare unrelated particulars. I have no doubt animals can do this too, but I would see their understanding as concrete, visceral rather than abstract. To my way of thinking abstraction requires symbolic thought. I acknowledge that it comes down to how one defines 'abstract'.
Quoting Vera Mont
See my answer to Patterner above. I don't think lamas think of wolves as "evil". They would see them as a threat to be sure.
Quoting Ludwig V
The word "illusion" was referring to the notion that we have direct awareness of awareness as opposed to what it seems to me we do have which is post hoc awareness or 'after the fact' noticing that we have been aware. We can do the latter when we can remember events. I don't doubt that (some) animals can remember events in terms of 'images' variously visual, olfactory (including taste), auditory and motor. But I doubt they think anything along the lines of "Oh, I was aware of being aware" or " I am capable of self-consciousness". It seems to me we can think such thoughts only on account of possessing symbolic language.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yep. Nice explication!
I'm sorry. I wasn't clear enough. I don't blame animal instincts for the super-damage that we have done. There's nothing wrong with them. I thought that was obvious. I was blaming the super-rationality which enabled us to develop super-powers but has not enabled us to develop some super-self-control to go with them. Quite similar to what you are saying, I think.
Quoting Vera Mont
No. The verbal description is quite distinct from the experience. Though the people who seem to think that the photograph is more important than enjoying the scene may be missing out - substituting the fuss with the camera for the event itself.
A couple of other people have just recently told me that llamas can't generalize something that threatens them as being evil or even bad. I didn't say you blamed animals for anything. It's not even you, specifically, that I should have aimed that remark at. It's the double-think we humans do so well.
We're special because we have all these extra capabilities that raise us above the other animals, but when we dig ourselves into trouble, it's because the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts. I'm saying neither the animal instincts nor yet our helplessness to control them, are responsible for our messes. We do control them. We make laws, practice monogamy, have celibate monastic orders, teetotalers and anorexic teenaged girls.
Instincts don't lead to genocide. It's the extra special faculties, the facility for narrative, that creates the evil that we do - and the very concept of evil.
Quoting Ludwig VYeah, I imagine they fed off of each other. But it's interesting to think of someone who had no language thinking abstract thoughts.
Some relatives of mine acquired a dog. Three maiden aunts sharing an apartment/flat. When I first met this dog, it backed off, bared its teeth and growled at me. I was bemused. I had always lived with dogs, so thought I understood them. I was expecting the cautious, tentative approach and delicate sniffing, but not immediate hostility. It was explained to me that this dog had had some bad experiences in the past and hated/feared all human males. That seems a perfectly good explanation to me and it relies on attributing to the dog on an (inductive) generalization. I don't know what else to say.
I don't think isolated events like that one, or your case of the llamas, are capable of determining, on their own, whether "threat" or "evil" or "bad" is the "right" concept to apply. One would need a much deeper understanding of the animals - much bigger and more varied data-set, if you like - to differentiate between the three possibilities.
There's a cloud of philosophy sitting behind this - and philosophy is not well-equipped to deal with our topic. Our topic is about how far we can attribute belief/knowledge (and rationality) to animals. The difficulty is that a) our paradigm is what we do when we are talking to and about humans and b) that we will inevitably conduct our discussion in human language.
Quoting Vera Mont
Well, the truth is that I'm pretty confused here. I suddenly found myself holding humans responsible for climate change etc. and not holding animals responsible for it. So I was faced with human exceptionalism.
Quoting Vera Mont
I would rather describe them as hyper-developed, rather than extra, capabilities, but that may be nit-picking. In general terms, one feels that it must be something to do with our animal instincts not being evolved to cope with the cultural world that we have developed. I don't quite see what you mean by "the special capabilities are unequal to the animal instincts".
Quoting Vera Mont
That is very plausible. Do you have a diagnosis of what is responsible? (Probably in a causal, not moral sense.)
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, that's true. (Anorexia and suicide are indeed examples of control of instincts, but control that has gone wrong. Control is a bit of a two-edged sword.) Though the scope of those controls seems to be too limited to deal with the threats that we are facing. It does seem to me that the arguments about the planetary threats are not really moral arguments, although they are often framed as such. They are arguments about our real, long-term self-interest. We're not very good at the long term. However, that framing might convince at least some of the people who are so resistant.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, I do accept that narratives are crucial to the way that things work for us. That does seem to be a product of language. It's hard to imagine what might convince us that creatures without human-style languages could develop them.
That was not well put. I should have said what I meant. I was thinking of the question of animal languages, human morality, and even rationality.
Quoting Patterner
It seems to me that we need to distinguish clearly between thinking as a conscious action, a phenomenological event or process and the tacit thinking when our thoughts are enacted without prior, separate, thinking. Think of it as thinking in action.
It depends on what you classify as an abstract thought. Generalizations from experience do not seem to me to be problematic. It seems to me that maths, morality and articulate self-consciousness are.
However, there is an interesting possibility. Some people say that they think in images. That would be independent of language.
And yes, We create the very concept of evil. That's my point.
So do we create the concept of a threat? Or a llama?
We show that we have understood a concept by the way we behave. Our linguistic behaviour is the quickest and most accurate (but not absolutely accurate) way of showing what understanding we have, but our non-linguistic behaviour does also show that understanding. There can be ambiguity in both llinghistic and non-linguistic behaviour. But many of them (maybe all) can, in principle, be cleared up on further investigation.
Whether "threat" or "bad" or "evil" is the best way of describing the llamas' behaviour is simply not clear from the information we have. Any of them would be a reasonable explanation for what we know. We would need a good deal more information to clarify that.
You seem to be wanting to get inside the heads of the llamas. We don't need to get inside the head of anyone, animal or not. That's just as well, because it's not possible to get inside anyone's head.
Why should they? They already have concepts and strategies that work for them.
The lost point there was that the sophistication of language, narrative and high level of abstraction which sometimes work for us are also what [i]backfire[/quote] on us - not the animal drives.
Quoting Patterner
Increasingly, the edges are lost; we're looking at the tip. We've passed the deadline for choice. And who knows where the nuclear situation stands at the moment - you get conflicting reports every day. The good ideas and bad ones have converged to pose an existential threat to all advanced life on the planet, and I see no signs of global resolve to mitigate the unavoidable consequences.
Quoting Ludwig V
Every entity with a brain understands threat. In between the dumbest and smartest are intellences that assess the threat level as degrees of bad, and categorize the sources of threat accordingly.
Only one species has elevated both the ability to pose threats to others and itself and to characterize threats to itself, its institutions and narratives to the level of evil, in both concept and deed.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not sure about that. Have you tried getting clarity from a religious or political fanatic? If you listen to interviews with MAGA supporters or jihadists, you'll hear them use the most extreme language and yet they seem not to have any idea what they believe or why.
Quoting Ludwig V
That was just my facile example of a generalization, of conceptual thinking. I loosely translated the llama's aggressive approach to any random wolf as analogous to a human categorizing his perceived enemies as evil. If I'd known so much would be made of it, I'd have been more circumspect in my choice of words.
I didn't mean to imply that they should. Sorry I wasn't clear.
Quoting Vera Mont
OK.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, I understand that. But @Patterner seems to be suggesting that we can't attribute the concept "evil" to them because we created it. I wondered what difference he was getting at between "threat" on one hand and "bad" and "evil" on the other. What led him to suppose that we can attribute the concept "threat" to them but not the other two.
Quoting Vera Mont
Well, it was good enough to make your point, in my view. But @Patterner's objection pushes us to go deeper into the way the process of explaining animal behaviour works.
Quoting Vera Mont
Good point. Possession of language doesn't guarantee the application of rational standards to what one says/believes.
And I agree. I don't imagine that other species view anything as 'evil' in the way that humans do. But they do appear to have a strong notion of things that 'may harm me' and things that 'endanger my pack' my herd, my colony or my flock. If a hawk-shaped kite hovers above a groundhog burrow, the guards give the danger call, exactly as if it were an actual hawk. Many dogs are afraid of or outright hostile toward vacuum cleaners, which they perceive as a threat; it's enough to see one turned off, or hear one from another room, to set the dog to snarling and barking to warn off its perceived enemy. (Canine vocalizations are very well documented.)
I don't imagine other animals are capable of performing evil acts the same way humans do, either. They can be angry, resentful, suspicious, spiteful; they can take a dislike to a person or other animal when we see no obvious reason for it; the long-lived ones can hold both affection and grudges for many years. Dogs, monkeys, elephants, parrots, cats and even horses* can devise unpleasant acts of revenge on those who have wronged them. That's bordering on the outer fringes of badness, but doesn't approach anywhere close to evil.
I think it's a long, long, jagged spectrum.
*This is anecdotal among horse-handlers; I don't know whether it has scientific backing.
I personally only know of one example: a thoroughbred who always managed to step on a particular rider's foot. That groom was known to be rough with the horses; our trainer warned him several times before he was finally let go. And that horse - Francolin, a calm 8-year-old - never stepped on my foot, or any other stable-hand's that I'm aware of.
Quoting Vera MontI love this!!
often enough, we try to transcribe the experience into words. it is never successful. But, surely, there is some kind of thinking involved in the experience itself. And particularly with the painting and concerto, since very specific thinking is involved during the creation.
Is that right? Has the world been filled with evil since before humans came on the scene?
I missed this one. I wasn't suggesting that abstract thought and generalities are in every sense the same. All our abstract thoughts are about generalities but generalizing in the primordial sense I would say consists in recognition of concrete pattern recurrence and animals can certainly do that.
I encountered someone once who told me that he thought in images. Specifically, when he was packing a suitcase, he would lay out everything he was taking and visualize how they could be placed in the suitcase. When he had a satisfactory visualization, he would pack the suitcase. He said it worked. I was sceptical, but had no ground for arguing with him. I think it is possible. There's been some empirical work on this in psychology, and it seems that some people say they never think in images, but many say they do, at least sometimes.
Quoting Janus
I've never heard of a "primordial" sense of "generalization". Could you explain, please? I'm particularly interested in understanding the difference between pattern recognition and generalization.
You seem to think that "threat", "bad" and "evil" are all on the same scale, rather like "good", "better", "best". It's more complicated than that. I do think that any threat to me or people that I approve of is a bad thing. Don't you? The difference is that there are other things that are bad, but no threat can be a good thing, when it is a threat to bad person. Evil is a superlative for bad, with moral and perhaps religious overtones.
Quoting Janus
I'm not sure about that. If I am calculating 23 x 254, I am thinking about specific numbers, not generalizing about them. If I am thinking about the Olympic ideal of sport, I am not thinking about Olympics or sport in general. The perfect circle is abstract and quite different from not circles in general.
Quoting Patterner
That seems to imply that some threats are good - or maybe neutral. But surely such threats would be a promise, if good, and neither here not there if neutral.
By "primordial" I mean generalization in the non-linguistic, non-abstractive sense. Think of painting as an analogy. A representational paining is not abstract because it is an image which shares the patterns of its subject such that they are recognizable. A representational paining is however a kind of generalization on account of its resemblance to its subject. An abstract painting is non-representational in the sense that it doesn't represent anything and if it evokes anything then it is a generalization in a symbolic sense.
So, I would say words are abstract in this sense because they do not resemble the generalities they stand for. Ditto for numbers.
I haven't said or implied that "threat" and "bad" and "evil" are "on the same scale" (whatever that might mean). Animals avoid what might injure them, just as we do. I don't imagine that they think in terms of "threat" or "bad" or "evil". I think to think they do would be us projecting our own abstractive concepts
onto them.
Quoting Ludwig V
For me the numbers themselves are abstractions as I outlined above.
If I can't find my wallet, I think back to the last time I remember having it, then replay as much of what I've done since then, and hope to remember enough detail to "see" where I left it. I do that in images, not words.
I was thinking there are people who claim they [I]never[/I] think in words. If there are such people, I would like to know how they have conversations.
Quoting Ludwig VI don't think a wolf bringing down prey is more evil than an avalanche burying the same victim. I think there needs to be malicious internet for evil to be present. And that means humans.
I believe we think on several levels and several ways at the same time. The multi-chambered mind allows us to process input, store it in short-term memory, translate it into numbers, words, musical notation, symbols and picto- or videograms and cross-reference it, for storage in various compartments of long-term memory archive, whence it can be retrieved using any of several reference keys (voluntary) or automatic flags (involuntary).
Synesthetics may be able to access a musical score through the weave of a Harris tweed (note-colour association is fairly common) or an equation by locating the terms in space .
We also mix memory, emotion, prejudice and involuntary associations in with our conscious thinking.
It's never simple and pure; and it's - I hesitate to say never, so will settle for seldom - wholly rational.
Quoting Patterner
I'm skeptical myself. I suspect it's a combination, like an illustrated narrative.
That claim reminds me of an absurd STNG episode, wherein Picard had to communicate with an alien whose entire language was made up of analogies and references to legend. Yet they had space travel. How the hell did anyone say "Hand me that spanner, will you?"
Indeed. Darmok is one of the stupidest great episodes.
Broad agreement. It occurs to me that it might be helpful to say that a generalization is a quantification over a domain, while an abstraction can be referred to hence hence be a member of a domain. (My understanding of logic is limited, so my language may not be accurate.) I'm thinking of "to be is to be the value of a variable". Another way of putting it might be to say that it makes (some) sense to say that abstractions exist, whereas generalizations do not necessarily assert the existence of anything.
Quoting Janus
This is puzzling. "Animal avoid what might injure them, just as we do" is applying/projecting our concepts to/onto them. When we describe anything, we apply our concepts to it. That is the same as projecting our concepts on to it, except that "project" implies disapproval.
Quoting Patterner
I do the same thing, but in words, not images.
Quoting Patterner
Perhaps they are thinking of thinking as a "private" activity in the head. There's a lot of mystery about this.
Quoting Patterner
Well, the intentions of the wolves are clear enough. Whether their intentions count as malicious is debateable and I rather suspect that the wolves and the llamas have different views on that.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, thinking is very complicated and polymorphous. I would hate to have to try to define it. But people often do think of it as primarily internal speech. The catch is that what I say to myself silently in my head, can be said in the usual way.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. We have all ignored the difference between theoretical reason and practical reason. The difference is that values are integral to practical reason. So, in one sense, reason requires a non-rational starting-point. Insofar as theoretical reason is also an activity, even that requires some values as a starting-point.
You have been able to access the internet and able to check the train time. Somehow it doesn't give impression you were thinking rationally for that act. From the statement, you are just a bloke who can access the internet homepage, get on to the train company web site, and check the time for the train, which is an act of typical ordinary people.
You still haven't provided the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs, if you had one.
I did say explicitly Quoting Ludwig V
Quoting Corvus
The ground for my rational thinking or beliefs is the training and education that I got in my youth.
I follow the same routine, more or less. But I'm just working down a list. Check all my pockets. Then the shopping bags. And so on.
Very interesting. I wouldn't know if I put it in a pocket, or wherever, if I didn't visualize. I wouldn't even know how to approach the problem.
My understanding of formal logic is probably more limited than yours. When you say that a generalization is a quantification over a domain I'm not sure exactly what that means. Would it be the same as saying that a generalization is a name of a category?
If so would generalizations not exist as names (or quantifications)? And do they not assert the existence of similarities that constrain the ways we categorize?
Quoting Ludwig V
I think we can observe animals avoiding dangerthings they presumably feel to be threatening. I am not suggesting that animals think precisely in terms of 'avoidance' or 'threat' or 'danger' as those are linguistically generated concepts.
How is danger a linguistically generated concept? Dangers have been around as long as living organisms have been around, but human language is only about 200,000 years old. We ran from predators and went around swamps millions of years before we were human. If danger were not a real thing in the world, why would we have made a word (actually, many words) for it. Where would we ever have got the linguistic idea in the first place? You can do something sensible without talking about it.
As I said animals can feel threatened. My point was simply that they don't think in terms of the word 'danger'. Of course I don't deny that there is a prelinguistic sense or affect that such words as 'danger' or 'threat' refer to. How would we know what the words mean if we had no experience of such affects?
I think what's going on is different approaches to the problem. Neither of us can remember where we put our wallet. You try to prompt your memory. I don't. When I'm at a cash desk, the range of possibilities is limited, so I just start checking them all. That's not so clever when I'm at home, so I will recover my last memory of having it and then retrace my steps (which I also have to remember) until I find it.
Quoting Janus
Well, generalizations are a class of statements with a specific logical form. The line between categories and classes is pretty blurred. I could work with either.
The logical form of generalizations is "For all natural numbers n, 2xn = n+n". This contrasts with "For some (i.e. at least one) natural number(s) n, n×n = 25". This is called existential quantification because it presupposes that numbers exist. (If there are no numbers, universal quantification is true - paradoxical, but the point is that if no numbers existed, then there is no counter-example.)
So generalizations and statements about abstract objects have different logical forms and hence different meanings.
Quoting Janus
Generalizations are universal quantifications but not existential quantifications. They do not refer to specific individual things, so they do not name anything. It is the difference between "Human beings are moral" and "Socrates is mortal". Think of it as the difference between talking about a class/category and talking about a member of a class/category. Similarities and differences are involved in both, but they are similarities and differences at different levels.
Does that help?
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
"Danger" and "threat" are words. Animals that don't speak human languages don't use words. Danger and threat are concepts, and as such involve more than uttering words. They also involve actions in the world. There are are certain behaviour patterns that are built in to these concepts. When we see animals displaying those behaviour patterns, there should be no problem whatever in applying those concepts to them.
When we come to the question which exact concepts apply in specific cases, it is not an at all unusual to find that there is a range of possibilities. In the case of the llamas, their behaviour is compatible with danger, threat, bad, evil. It may well be that with more information, more examples, we might be able to find behaviour patterns that enable us to distinguish between them. We also might not. But the mere fact that there are a range of possibilities in a single case which we cannot conclusively distinguish between is not particularly surprising or important.
I don't see that what is going on in the llamas' heads is particularly important. It is this behaviour pattern in the context of their overall lives that we are trying to explain.
Do you trust everything you see on the web site? Trusting whatever you see on the websites has nothing to do with being rational?
Sorry I don't see a logical link between the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs and the training and education in your youth. Could you elaborate further?
Is that what you're talking about?
I was taught to drive a car. Hence, I can drive a car.
I was taught to think rationally. Hence, I can think rationally.
I would be grateful if you would explain to me what you mean by "ground".
I am looking forward to see what you might have to say in reply to @Patterner's question.
Quoting Patterner
That is indeed different from the situation I was thinking of; yours is a much longer-term problem. In that case, you are adopting the same approach as me, excepting that I don't visualize.
Doesnt ground mean some sort of cognitive capacity? Learning to use this capacity, and having this capacity in the first place are two different things. There seems to be a debate as to how modular our cognitive systems are. Is the brain a general processor or does it have domains? If it has domains does rational thinking count as a domain- a specialized brain/cognitive capacity? A dog solving a puzzle and a human inferencing- is that the same capacity/region or two similar but different capacities?
I'm thinking maybe the capacity to think rationally is hardwired in. But we must learn how it works.
Would this not also be true of observed human behaviours?
I have an impression that you are in confusion between skills, capabilities in problem solving with rational thinking.
Ground for rational thinking is, when you are faced with question to justify why your beliefs or thoughts were rational. You should be able to give explanation on your thoughts or beliefs in logical and objective way. If it was rational to you, then it must be rational to the whole universe. Not just to you. That is what being rational means.
Quoting Ludwig V
I presume my replies above also answers to Patterner's question.
Surely it is possible to remember a sequence of events without visualizing them? Actually, for me, it's not a choice. The sequence of events since I last had it occurs to me without pictures.
Quoting Vera Mont
Sorry I wasn't clear. I think that's implicit in what I said - indeed it is the justification for what I said. I should have said so upfront.
Quoting Corvus
Do you mean something like?
How did you know the train was coming at 12:00?
Because the company's web-site said so.
Why do you believe what the company's web-site says?
Because it is almost always accurate.
Why do you believe it is almost always accurate?
Because I and many others have used it in the past.
Why do you believe that its accuracy in the past means that it is accurate now?.
Because I am rational.
Why are you rational?
Because it is the best way to get to the truth.
Why is it the best way to get to the truth?
?
All justifications end in "groundless grounds".
Quoting Corvus
But I'm guessing that your actual agenda was that animals can't be rational. It would have saved a lot of bother if you had just said so.
Quoting Corvus
Why do you not believe that solving a problem can be an exercise in rational thinking?
Quoting Corvus
Doesn't giving a justification count as solving a problem?
"Ok, after I paid, I put the card back in my wallet. When it was in my wallet, I put it in my back pocket. I grabbed my bags, a couple in each hand, and walked to the car. I opened the car door, put the bags in, took my wallet out and threw it on the passenger seat. I don't remember taking it off the seat when I took the groceries in. AH!! Maybe it fell between the seat and the door!"
How would I know I did those things if I wasn't picturing the sequence of events in my head??
I don't know the answers to most of those questions. Yes, I do think that being able to justify one's beliefs (and act on them) is an important cognitive capacity.
Quoting Patterner
In the end, it will not be for philosophers to decide what is "hard-wired in". But I'm inclined to think that what we call rationality is mostly learned by shaping the basic reflexes. For example, (as I understand it), babies are born with a reflex to seek mild and drink, to smile back at a smiling face. Both these activities seem to give them pleasure and the lack of them - or at least the lack of the former - gives them "pain". So a few reflexes, pleasure and pain, plus the ability to notice and remember what is associated with what (behaviourists were not complete idiots) are probably all that is needed. The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure. Then there's all the learning from those around us, including what counts as success/failure.
Quoting Patterner
Well, you may have written that list by describing your visualations. But if you can remember what was on the list (in words), then you can also write it without. But perhaps it's just how one's memory works.
Quoting Patterner
Most of our memories just come when we want them. "Trying to remember" is possible, though I don't find that I know exactly what I do when I'm trying or even succeeding. It just happens - or not.
What is really weird is that I've noticed that sometimes I know that I've remembered before I've remembered the details.
Quoting Ludwig VSure. I don't have to sing Hey Jude to know I know all the words, or recite my children's birth dates and Social Security numbers to knows I know them.
Quoting Ludwig V
Not disagreeing; amplifying. People can be seen to act rationally even when they don't explain their motivations and sources of information. When you see someone doing the very same thing you would do in their circumstances, it's reasonable to assume they're thinking the same way. Sometimes we may be wrong, and alternate explanations might be given (Like Dortmunder telling the judge when he was caught with a television in his arms that he wasn't stealing it; he had interrupted the real thief and was putting it back.) but it would still be reasonable to start with the most obvious explanation until we know more facts.
Ludwig said,
"The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure."
If you try to build your hut's support beams out of jellyfish, Shaka, when the walls fell. If you think rationally, you'll try something else. If you are a poor swimer, it would be irrational to try to swim home. You don't have to attempt to explain anything to anybody.
I recently saw a documentary about Australian natives constructing mental maps in that way. The person who doesn't know the way is escorted along the route and told at certain intervals to make note of some feature of the landscape. Then they would walk the route in their head, recalling the sequence of features.
When I lose things - more often every week, it seems - I do the same thing: try to retrace my steps internally, and then see if I can follow the same sequence of things I noticed when i was carrying the flashlight or eyeglasses (the two most AWOL-prone objects in my household).
It sounds like you are just checking and confirming with yourself what you see on the web site.
You may think that your blind faith of the accuracy of the web site is based on the past record of the accuracy on the information of the website, therefore you were doing an inductive reasoning. But it is still a blind faith on the info. because you have not made any scientific observations on the past events. Plus there is nothing scientific about the accuracy of the train time shown on the website, why it has to be the info, and not otherwise. There is nothing to think any further, why the info has the contents it has apart from it is just there for you to see.
Plus there are many possible chance the web site info might not be correct. Therefore it is not a rational thinking. It is just daily habitual acts of reading and confirming the info. There is nothing rational thinking involved in that process.
I didn't say it is I said 'danger' is a linguistically generated concept. Its a generalization and I doubt animals have a generalized conceptual notion we could refer as 'danger'. That said, how could we know either way? So we are merely working with what seems most plausible, and plausibility is in the final analysis in the eye of the beholder.
I don't find much to disagree with here so I'll just respond to those bits where I do diverge.
Quoting Ludwig V
If you are treating abstract objects as particulars then yes. My point was that numbers are themselves generalizations. There are countless instantiations of 'two' just as there are of 'tree' or 'animal'.
Quoting Ludwig V
Here I disagree again. 'Tree' does not name a particular thing but a particular category or class of things. 'Two' does not name a particular pair of things but names a particular quantity of things.
Quoting Ludwig V
Insofar as we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads apart from observing their behavior and body language I agree. On the other hand we via reflection on our own experience can notice the affects (such as fear for example) that our emotive words refer to and since there seems to be a commonality of body language across at least some species we can speculate about other animals experience.
Whether or not it is rational to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones depends upon the individual's preexisting worldview.
Feathers. Bowling balls. Snowflakes. Leaves. Limbs. Trees. We can watch many different things fall through space. Watching many different things fall through space leads one to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Watching heavier objects traverse the same distance in less time than lighter ones is something that can be fully experienced by any creature capable of judging the travel speed(fall rate) variety of external objects relative to each other, a fixed object, from the creature's own vantage point.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting Ludwig V
Formulating beliefs requires language. Acquiring them does not always. I do not find the invocation and use of the term "formulating" helpful. "Forming" snuggles the world. Formulating and articulating one's own thought and belief presupposes language use. Prior to formulation and articulation comes what both of those concepts presuppose. Something to formulate. Something to articulate.
Pre-existing meaningful experience consisting of thought and belief about the world and oneself.
Human thought, belief, and experience existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it.
One can believe that touching fire hurts long before ever being able to articulate that. We're looking for some basic set of common denominators/elements shared between all cases of language less thought and/or belief. That basic foundation must also be shared by ourselves. Tacit reasoning spans the bridge between language less thought and belief and linguistically informed and/or articulated thought and belief. That's an interesting avenue.
Tacit and articulate reasoning overlap one another. Articulate reasoning consists - in very large part - of language use. Language less creatures have none. Language less creatures cannot form, have, and/or hold articulate reasoning. Yet they can learn that touching fire hurts by recognizing/attributing causality. They can learn to use a stick to eat ants/termites. They can watch and learn how lifting the handle opens the gate. They can learn to greet by partaking in such practices(by doing it). One greeting another often and regularly enough amounts to ritual. Clearly, there is no language necessary for basic notions of rational thinking. Or... learning how to open a gate by observation and practice does not count as rational thinking.
That sort of understanding becomes tacit to us. We do not express our wanting to use the gate hardly ever after learning how to use it. I'm not sure how the notions of "tacit" and "articulate" are adequate tools for acquiring knowledge of that which existed in its entirety prior to our knowledge of it.
We are in dire need of a criterion.
I'm not fond of "information". It smuggles meaning.
There are all sorts of language less creatures(creatures devoid of naming and description practices) capable of differentiating between distal objects. Again, I'm not fond of invoking some notion of "information". That's adding complexity. I'd rather excise the unnecessary and unhelpful approaches to the topic.
Not all differentiation between accurate and inaccurate information requires articulated reason/thought.
That's not true. We can know quite a bit about how biological minds work. It dovetails with knowledge about how all things become meaningful. How statements become true/false. How we can preserve truth with timestamping, etc. I wouldn't talk about thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience in terms of "what goes on in the head". It works from emaciated notions of all three.
Ask away!
:wink:
You might know what goes on in your head via introspection. You won't know what goes in mine except I tell you truthfully and presuming I know myself. We can get a fairly good idea about what animals feel from their behavior and body language, or at least so it seems. We have no access to the inner workings of their minds. It's even questionable how much access we have to our own.
That's not at all true either Janus. I know beyond all doubt that you're drawing correlations between the words we use and all sorts of other things, including how the activity itself[hide="Reveal"](the fact that we're discussing whether or not we can know something about animal minds aside from our own)[/hide] is affecting you.
It's a matter of precision you're after, I suspect. In that case, I still disagree. I've been involved in conversation with someone embroiled in unsettled emotional turmoil who really believed that they were not.
That is nothing more than a generalized notion of how minds work. It gives you no specific knowledge of what is going on in the minds of other humans, much less animals.
As if a universal criterion is a bad thing? We can know that a cat believes that there is a mouse under the cabinet. We can know that the cat's belief is meaningful to the cat. We can know that all meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature having it. There are all sorts of things we can know about animal minds Janus.
We can know that our own meaningful experience began long before we talked about it.
In order to know one is projecting human thought onto creatures incapable of forming, having, and/or holding such thought, one must know what the differences are between them such that they can know that the one is incapable of forming, having, and/or holding the others' thought, belief, meaningful experience.
The point is we have no way of testing such conjectures and nothing to rely on but the imprecise subjective criterion of plausibility in our judgements of their soundness.
You have offered nothing that I didnt already know and nothing that would provide grounds for me to revise my understanding of our epistemic situation regarding other minds.
Then what do the sentries outside meerkat burrows, groundhog colonies, wild goose nesting grounds and rookeries shout when a hawk or kestrel or coyote or fox or cheetah or snapping turtle is spotted? Quoting Janus
As in all learning, yes, until a more complete answer, one that fits more criteria, becomes available.
I understand animal warning cries to be signaling, not symbolizing, danger. I have acknowledged that I believe animals sense danger. I'm not sure what you think we are disagreeing about.
Your first three questions are empirical, not philosophical. My understanding is that there is empirical evidence that there are "windows" when the brain learns certain things particularly fast. If that window is missed for any reason, it will be difficult to impossible to learn it later. Examples are ducklings learning who is mum. They will fasten on the first large moving object they see and follow it faithfully until they are grown. Konrad Lorenz famously got one brood to imprint on him. That can't be changed, I believe. Another example is language learning in humans. If a baby doesn't get sufficient human interaction between specific ages, it till be very difficult to learn language later in life.
As to irrational people, We are all a mixture. More than that, rationality can't get going without some pre-rational starting-point. In any case, it seems to me that it is not really appropriate to call a new-born baby rational or irrational. Rationality develops quite slowly and I wouldn't say there was a threshold point between the two. Sadly, it also declines ln old age, but also slowly.
Quoting Vera Mont
OK. You are indeed perfectly right. Dortmunder :lol:
Quoting Vera Mont
"Our" concept of danger includes appropriate reaction to it. When animals exhibit similar behaviour in similar circumstances there's no good reason to withhold applying the concept to it. Apart from anything else, it enables us to understand what's going on - and that is the point of the exercise. But it is fair enough to say that any application need to be considered in the context of the overall patterns of behaviour that they exhibit. One case doesn't give us much insight, but each case contributes to our insight.
Quoting Corvus
I see. The only knowledge is scientific knowledge, which excludes second-hand knowledge. But science is only possible because research starts on the basis of the results of previous research, and no-one is expected to repeat all that work for themselves. Newton standing on the shoulders of giants. Moreover, in order to do experiments, read texts, discuss ideas and results, they have to rely on common sense and common knowledge.
I have caught the 7:00 train every working day for the last 5 years. Standing on the platform at 6:55, I notice the signal changing. I have noticed that same event every time I have caught the train in the past. I expect the train to arrive shortly. I think that's inductive reasoning.
Shorlty after the signal changes, I hear a loudspeaker announcement that the train will arrive shortly. The same thing has happened every time in the past. I therefore believe the announcement. I think that's also inductive reasoning.
Yes, I do have blind faith in inductive reasoning, as Hume noticed. One has to start somewhere. One also has to risk being wrong in order to be right.
Quoting creativesoul
Careful! Things only fall through space at the same speed in a vacuum. Most people have never watched anything fall through space in a vacuum. Galileo certainly never did. His "proof" was a thought-experiment - or at least I understand that is the case.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. They interact as well. Our knowledge of language is mostly tacit, but we can articulate rules in various ways.
Quoting creativesoul
Quite so. There are only two (maybe three) ways that I'm aware of. One is the idea that tacit knowledge is exactly the same as articulate reasoning, but very fast. That's the traditional philosophical approach and has mostly fallen into disfavour. (Who says philosophy never makes progress?) Then there's the idea of "unconscious" reasoning and belief. There are very ancient roots of this idea, but the modern concept was developed in the 19th century. It was very like conscious reasoning and belief but was, by definition, not available to "introspection". The last one is the modern model of the information processing machine. This seems to ignore the question of tacit vs articulate reasoning and belief.
I don't think that the fact that the phenomenon existed long before we knew of it is necessarily a bar to our acquiring knowledge of it. After all, the same applies to most physics and chemistry. The real problem is that we have no way, at least at present, of getting empirical access to it.
Quoting Janus
I do agree that there is a commonality of body language, and you are right to say "across at least some species". But describing our experience is no different from a gesture, a grimace or a smile or a wagging tail in terms of knowing what is going on in someone's head. If we can know what human beings are experience or thinking from their non-linguistic behaviour, why is it speculation to interpret that (ex hypothesi) animal behaviour in the same way. I can see no rational difference.
Quoting Janus
For me, a generalization is a statement or proposition of the logical form I described. So you are missing the point. I am indeed "treating" abstract objects as particulars. So are you when you describe them as abstract objects.
Quoting Janus
That's why I think it is a mistake to think that explaining animal actions has much to do with divining the inner workings of their minds. Mind you, I don't think that it is a determining factor in explaining human actions, either. It's more like interpreting a picture. Yes, sometimes we set out to divine the intentions of the artist, but not always. Sometimes it is just a question of seeing what is in the picture. (Puzzle pictures).
Quoting Janus
Sorry, I don't understand what that difference is.
You seem to consider symbols important. I don't think it makes any difference to the concept whether there is a call, a word or a pictogram signifying 'danger', so long as the message is transmitted and received - i.e. the concept is shared within a species or a tribe: everybody ducks for cover to escape the danger, or flies up in dive-bombing formation to combat it.
Yes, it is an inductive reasoning. You have your knowledge based on your past observations on the events.
Quoting Ludwig V
Hume said that inductive reasoning can be irrational. Therefore your reasoning on the train arrival time could be irrational.
This is mistaken in more than one way. It is false.
We have more than one way of knowing what goes on in animal's heads. Observing behaviour can be one of those ways [hide="Reveal"]if and when we're testing hypothesis[/hide]. Attributing meaning to body language, another. Comparing observations with notions/hypothesis, yet one more. If one theory proves beyond a reasonable doubt that X is the case, and another theory depends upon the opposite, well...
Quoting Janus
Changing the subject is unhelpful.
Quoting Janus
That's false. It's also incomplete enough to be troublesome.
And yet, we are discussing what you claim we have no way of knowing about.
You are having a conversation about whether or not other animals can think rationally. How is that done if we have no way of knowing what goes in animal's heads?
Behavior alone is utterly inadequate. We are seeking knowledge of that which existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it. Meaningful experience prior to language.
We can know that language less thought and belief cannot include any language that is meaningful to the creature under consideration. Language is not meaningful to a language less creature. If doing X requires using language, the language less creatures cannot do X.
Thinking about one's own belief is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognition is existentially dependent upon common language/shared meaning.
Body language assessment suffers the issues of which you complain. Reading another's body language is to attribute meaning to the behavior.
Claiming to know how animals feel is unacceptable when accompanied by having no way of knowing what's in their mind.
Yada, yada, yada...
What's the situation such that it warrants such a lack of certainty?
If Newton had been observing the apples falling from the trees to the ground without the scientific discovery, then it would have been just described as daily perception of an ordinary bloke. But he discovered the scientific principle from the observation, which made into the history.
The same could apply to your case. If you had discovered some ground breaking new scientific principle such as a possibility of time travel or something like that, from your observation of the train arriving at 7:00 everyday to your station platform, then it would have been a case of inductive reasoning. However, only thing you have observed in that exercise was that train arrives at 7:00 every day to your platform, which is just a trivial part of daily life of an ordinary bloke. Would anyone class the case as a rational thinking based on the inductive reasoning? I doubt it.
Inductive reasoning is a scientific method of applying our reasoning in forming the principles and theories from the observations, not daily ordinary habitual perceptions of general public.
I would go further than that. Let's distinguish the word "danger" and the concept of danger. Creatures that don't speak human-style languages don't have access to the word. But the concept is wider than speech. It involves the possibility of harm to oneself (and others) and appropriate reactions (fight or flight) to that possibility. None of that requires any understanding of human-style languages. What's more, the behavioural reactions are more important in the concept that the ability to articulate what we would understand as a sentence.
Quoting Corvus
Well, he didn't say exactly that. But the point that is usually made is that inductive reasoning can be wrong - which doesn't necessarily mean that it is irrational. Hume made two points in the light of his argument. The first was that we are going to go on using it even though it may be wrong and the second was that it was as much of a proof as you will ever get of how the world works, and even ends up (in the section on miracles) calling it a "proof, whole and entire".
Quoting creativesoul
Quite so.
Quoting creativesoul
More than that, we also rely on observation of behaviour to know what's going on in each other's heads, as you suggest.
I'm afraid that there's a certain ambiguity going on here, and it's my fault. There's an ambiguity between the sense of "what's going on in X's head" in which observation of behaviour is a normal and reliable way of discovery and the "experiential" or phenomenological sense of what's going on in X's head." In that sense, we have no access at all to what's going on in anyone's head, because the only person who has access to it is X. (As in Mary's room or bats.) I don't think discovering the rationality of animals or humans is particularly closely connected to latter. Nagel thinks (unless I'm mistaken) that it is not possible.
Quoting creativesoul
Well, if it is dependent on shared meaning (as opposed to common language), then animals could know themselves.
Quoting Corvus
The story of Newton's apple is a bit more complicated than the popular summary. But apart from that, it seems pretty clear to me that Newton would not have made any inductive inference from one case. If he did, it would not be rational.
So John Doe and his friends and relations are not rational - ever? You set a high bar.
There is another problem. When Newton wanders in from his apple tree for afternoon tea and a gossip, does he cease being rational because he's behaving in an everyday way?
Perhaps we are all sometimes rational and sometimes not.
I'm working on a reply to this and what followed. Shows a bit of promise from where I sit, so to speak. Thanks.
I'll look forward to your reply.
You got it wrong again. Hume was not concerned on the fact that inductive reasoning can be wrong. What he was saying was that, "there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience." (A Treatise, Hume).
You have been seeing the train arriving at the train station at 7:00 every morning for last x number of years. That does not logically warrants you to expect the train will arrive at 7:00 next morning. There is "no demonstrative arguments to prove."
It is not about right or wrong on the inductive reasoning, but isn't it about lack of logical or rational ground in the reasoning Hume was pointing out?
Oh, so now we are classifying as rational only what is proof against philosophical scepticism.
As to Hume, I suggest that the implication of there being no demonstrative argument is that one might be wrong - that's why everybody prefers demonstrative arguments. (Though it is possible to be wrong about even those.You are right, however, to interpret "demonstrative" as meaning conclusive and hence logical, in the strict sense. This is usually taken to mean sound by the standards of formal logic. Which makes almost the whole of humanity irrational.
But the devil is in the detail:-
Later on, in his "Enquiry" he says:-
Quoting Corvus
I don't think I ever suggested that I had logically conclusive evidence.
Scientific principles and theories require justification and proofs backed by demonstrative argument. I am not sure what you mean by the standards of formal logic, which makes the whole humanity irrational. Why would formal logic make the whole humanity irrational? Formal logic is another area of academic subjects which enables human reasoning more rational.
It is not desirable to be 100% formal logic because what is so may not be so tomorrow and our thinking needs to be flexible. We need to be creative. We need to think about what is and what can be. Humans have taken creative thinking and created their own reality. This is beyond what animals do.
People around the world live as they did at the beginning of humanity. They can use nature to meet their needs, as animals do, but they did not advance as people in the modern world did. Why? Why don't all humans advance?
Maybe we don't all have the same definition of 'advance'. Maybe some territories were too remote and poor for conquest, and therefore the inhabitants of those undesirable lands didn't have their traditional lifestyle ripped away and destroyed, as so many others did. By the same token, having territory with scant resources means there is not much leisure time for contemplation or extra material for development.
But if you mean, what caused civilization where it did happen, that's a more complex answer. It probably doesn't belong here, but I can point you to a source for the basics. Fundamental difference: enough surplus (of food, natural resources and labour) to support specialized unproductive classes of people, such as administration, priesthood, judiciary and law enforcement, military and clerical, thus stratifying the society and perpetuating a power structure. The influential classes can then patronize artisans and inventors and allocate resources to their own comfort, enrichment, armaments/fortification and glorification through ritual, spectacles, monuments and elaborate burials.
Also if you've been reading what I've been writing you should know that I agree with you that human exceptionalism is a mistake.
So you think I am missing the point when I describe abstract objects as abstract objects? :roll:
I don't think I am missing any point. Abstract objects may be treated as generalizations or particulars and I have not said nor implied anything that contradicts that.
Quoting Ludwig V
It seems to me that you have missing the point of what I've been saying and not the other way around since I have said that whatever we know about animal minds is derived from observing their behavior and body language and I have not been concerned at all with explaining their behavior by purportedly
somehow knowing what is going on in their minds. The same goes for humans except that they can also explain themselves linguistically. Of course the verity of those explanations relies on the one doing the explaining being both correct and honest.
Quoting Ludwig V
A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of.
When you don't have access to the other entity's mind, I'm not sure you're justified in assuming they have no symbolic communication. You're probably correct in that symbolic language is a uniquely human achievement. What I don't see in practice or agree with in theory is that symbolic language is a prerequisite of rational thought.
That's not quite what I said. I'm sorry if I was not clear. I left out the conditional "if formal logic is your standard of rationality" and qualified "the whole of humanity" to "almost the whole of humanity". As you say, formal logic is something that helps us to be more rational, which means that almost all of us have some level of rationality. Since very few of us know any formal logic, it follows that the rationality of most of us does not lie in our ability to do formal logic. That seems about right.
Quoting Corvus
Hume's criticism was aimed at the scholastic concept of some power, hidden from our experience, was what enable to first billiard ball to make the second billiard ball move. Many people have believed that the conclusion is simply that induction is invalid. However, Hume was not saying that we should or could just give up on it, in the way that one would simply give up on an invalid form of argument. There's room for debate about exactly what he was saying, but it was not that.
Induction is not deduction. It is better thought of as a trial and error process, which can never get us to deductive truth, but can get us nearer to it. Popper's version of this was conjecture and refutation, now often described as hypothesis and falsification. Neither of those formulations is really satisfactory. recognizes that hypotheses/conjectures that have been tested but not falsified are what we rely on pragmatically. Asking what rational ground we have for that is asking for a rational ground for relying on rational grounds.
Compare what happens when you ask for a rational ground for relying on sound deductive arguments. I refer you to C.L. Dodgson's article about the dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise after their race.
Quoting Corvus
You said this earlier. It is another example of a situation in which asking for a rational ground (for believing that I saw what I saw, is not a question that has a rational answer. Yet believing that I saw what I saw is not irrational. For it can serve as a premiss in a sound deductive argument.
Quoting Athena
"Creative" is a troublesome idea. There seems to be no clear boundary between creative and non-creative thinking. For example, I would say that the crow that we saw earlier in this thread was thinking creatively, when It realizes that a stick can serve as a way of getting the goodies.
I agree with everything you say.
People often regard improvements in technology and in their own prosperity as advances, when they are usually double-edged swords.
[I]for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP"[/I]
Quoting Janus
H'm. That's a large and tempting rabbit-hole, but I'm thinking that diving down it would be a distraction.
Quoting Janus
I'm not at all sure that's a helpful way to think of them, but we would have to dive down the rabbit-hole to clarify that.
Quoting Janus
That's all fine by me.
I think this is a much more interesting issue to explore.
Quoting Janus
Quoting Janus
This is a much more pertinent, and illuminating, issue.
I think you are thinking of a distinction that was drawn quite a long time ago now to resolve a particular problem. "Clouds mean rain" and "'Cloud" means a mass of particles or droplets, as of dust, smoke, or steam, suspended in the atmosphere or existing in outer space". In other words, it was an attempt to distinguish what meaning means in the context of linguistic meaning and what it means in the context of drawing inferences from evidence. (I'm sorry I can't remember, and google doesn't find, any helpful reference)
I guess that if I must choose between the two, I would have to choose "sign", because the alternative "symbol" means attributing human-style language to the dog. But the catch with this is that if we say that a goose hissing is a sign of anger hostility or danger in your sense of sign, we are positing a purely causal relationship, which would be incompatible with attributing rationality, or even sentience, to the goose.
This means that we need to draw some more distinctions. Sign vs symbol is more complicated than ti seems. I don't have a neat account of the difference, just a few remarks towards a map. The same applies to the concept of action.
Quoting Patterner
This is a bit complicated. The question to ask what the difference is between a sign and a symbol in this context. For example, when the police or road workers cordon off a section of road - even close it - with a tape across the road, is that equivalent to the stop sign? I would say that it symbolizes a blockage - like a heap of rubble. Is a red light a sign or a symbol?
Quoting Patterner
Mini-pictures have become a very popular way of conveying information, partly because they are supposed to be language-independent. They may be helpful, but in my view, they constitute another language; they are not always intuitive, but need to be learnt. I think the technical term for these is "icon", but it is obviously different from the sense that some rock bands are said to be "iconic". (I'm not suggesting that icons are not useful). (There are echoes here of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I don't know whether that book influenced their popularity now. It seems possible, but unlikely).
Quoting Patterner
"Sign" and "Symbol" don't seem to have a well-defined, technical, definition. The terms are applied differently in different contexts. One peculiarity of this specific example is that a stop sign is not merely reporting a situation, like the or a sign-post. It is giving an instruction.
So at a police road-block, when the officer holds up a hand, palm open and facing towards you (I think this is more or less universal), the officer is ordering you to stop in a non-verbal fashion. Is that gesture a sign or a symbol? Is it linguistic?
In the realm of actions, we have been mainly talking about actions that have a purpose, because that is where the question of rationality or not is clearest. But there are different kinds of action. Reflexes, habits, expressions (Ouch! I'm in pain!), are just the beginnings of a list.
Its not an assumption but rather a conclusion based on what I think is most plausible given the evidence (or lack of evidence). I'm the first to admit that plausibility is more or less like beauty somewhat in the eye of the beholder. In other words not a highly determinable or definitive criterion for justifying any assertion.
Quoting Patterner
The word 'stop' in that context symbolizes the act of stopping but does not resemble anything to do with stopping. Ikons resemble what they signify. Some early written languages used pictographscharacters which resembled what they represented. As far as I know Chinese characters evolved from these early pictographic characters. The difference with a pure symbol is that it doesn't resemble what it signifies. Think of the numeral '5'. It doesn't resemble five of anything. 'IIIII' would be a pictographic representation or ikon of the quantity of five.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm sure there are nuances that could make it a much larger enquiry but all I have in mind is that an abstract object is abstract on account of the fact that it refers to no particular thing but ranges over a whole class of particulars thus qualifying it as a generalization.
So the word 'tree' is both a particular word and a symbol that represents the abstract generalization that is the class of objects we call trees.
I don't know what you have in mind with wondering about the "helpfulness" of looking at things this way. Its just one of the possible ways of thinking about it. I see the distinction between abstract objects as particulars and generalizations as a valid one. It makes perfect sense to me at least.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think we can attribute rationality and meaning to animals in the sense of feeling. The hissing of the goose is an expression and in that sense a sign of "anger hostility or danger". But it has not been converted by a linguistic culture into a symbol that stands by convention as signifying anger hostility or danger.
I admit I have only given a basic adumbration and that more subtleties and nuances in the relationship between the concepts of 'sign' and 'symbol' could be induced by a detailed investigation of usage and association.
Formal logic deals with the propositions for their validities. Suggesting formal logic as your standard of rationality sounded very odd even as a conditional comment.
Didn't he say, it is the constant conjunction of the one event followed by the other, which gives us the idea of cause effect?
Quoting Ludwig V
Really? Could you come up with an example? Much of the math, science and logic are based on formulating proofs from the valid premises based on the rational ground, and we do accept them when it makes sense.
No one was suggesting to be 100% formal logic, Formal logic is a subject which studies propositional validities, which can aid human thoughts and scientific theories to be more rational.
That would mean children born deaf can think well enough to function, communicate and learn sign language. In fact, they begin to invent their own signals between 8 and 12 month, and can be taught the rudiments of ASL at that time, just as hearing babies begin to learn spoken language. They all do need sensory and intellectual stimulation. For non-verbal feral children the requirements of survival would provide plenty of stimulation, as it also does for fox kits and fledgling geese.
That is a good explanation. Now how about the Glory of Islam, 8th to 13th century, and the decline? How about China that was more advanced than all of Europe and its decline?
What has caused advancing civilizations to decline and in some cases to totally distruct?
Your link requires a subscription so I look for another. It is a fascinating subject and I am so glad you brought it up. Hellen Keller was deaf and blind and she did not have language until she was taught language. Young children are dependent on caregivers and function without language. And here is the link I found. Thank you for making us aware of such information.
Ecclesiastes 3:1 To everything, there is a season, and a time to every purpose under Heaven.
Nations grow rich, then powerful and their rulers grow ambitious. They have the wealth to raise large, well-equipped armies, and the constant anxiety of being overlooked by envious neighbours and hostile rivals. So they go forth to conquer and build empires. The sons and grandsons of these war leaders may not be equal to the task of consolidating and maintaining their forebears' empires; they become complacent and self-indulgent. Factions form among the aristocracy, each group plotting to take over the reins if/when the legitimate ruler falters. The military is overstretched; too expensive to supply efficiently, unable to deliver enough booty from the colonies; the troops are fed up with occupation duties and replacements are harder to recruit, the farther from home they're expected to serve. There are too many subject peoples chafing under foreign domination, looking for a chance to revolt. Meanwhile, those hostile rivals haven't disappeared; they've been growing stronger and richer, forming alliances, perhaps amalgamating: a young, energetic empire is emerging to challenge the superpower of the day.
This historical pattern has nothing to do with human 'advancement', but during the period when each empire is near the top of its cycle, a great many cultural, scientific and technological innovations flourish, because the empire has access to untapped natural and human resources, is motivated to develop those resources and has the material wherewithal to support them.
Quoting Athena
Shortage of funds, overreach, mismanagement, corruption, unsustainable disparity, internal unrest and ideological schism, external aggression, and sometimes climate change.
Testing hypothesis via observing behaviour is comparative assessment and as such presupposes testability.
There are some things at work here, beneath all our discourse/conversation about what counts as rational thought/minds. We're looking to further discriminate between different, sometimes and often conflicting conceptions, notions, sensible uses of "thought", "belief", "mind", etc. We're looking to set out all meaningful experience. In doing so, we go a long way towards acquiring knowledge of all minds to whom such experience is meaningful.
Do we or do we not have a way to know what's going on inside of the head of another thinking creature?
I think we do, and you've responded in kind. My issue with the phrase "what's going on in the heads" is that it presupposes a false equivalence. We can know plenty about what's going on inside the heads of ourselves and all other thinking creatures. It takes a little work to fill out.
What counts as rational thought of another creature if that thought is not somehow meaningful to the creature? This entire thread topic rests upon actively working notions of meaningful thought.
Meaningful thought emerged long before naming and describing practices.
Prelinguistic meaningful experience(s) happened prior to being talked about.
Some smart animals can learn how to operate certain latches such that they can let themselves out, whenever they want, whenever they should so desire or if the need should ever arise.
Latches, wants, memories, desires, needs... a creature capable of drawing correlations between these things such that the endeavor connects the creature to the world.
We can know that a language less creature cannot have all the exact same thoughts as a language user. For example, some creatures cannot think about their own worldview. Those missing such capabilities cannot think about other worldviews either. Such thoughts and beliefs require articulation<-------None of those are capable of being formed, held, and/or had by language less creatures.
All thought is the target. Articulated thought misses the mark. Propositional attitudes miss the mark. Belief statements miss the mark.
Meaningful experience does not. All meaningful experiences consist - in very large part - of thought and belief about the world and/or oneself(where possible). Internal and external elements. Spatiotemporal locations of thought/mind are a chimera. "In the head" presupposes such...
You are quite right that that classes are abstract objects and that they range over particulars. But it doesn't follow that all abstract objects are classes.
Quoting Janus
Well, we can agree on that, though we may find complications if we looked more closely at the detail.
Quoting Janus
You are quite right, particularly about the hissing being an expression. The difference between that and a symbol would take some teasing out but set that aside. The lack of a convention does suggest that it is not. When we say that the goose is expressing anger and hostility, we are recognizing (and telling others) that one should expect a defensive reaction if you behave in certain ways. Recognizing that pattern of behaviour is recognising the meaning of the hiss. Our interpretation of, and talk about, the hiss is our application of our description.
Quoting Corvus
You surprise me. I thought that was what you were suggesting. It's good to know that I was wrong.
Quoting Vera Mont
Quite so.
There's a lot packed in to your comments of the last few days. Thanks. I've had to be selective in what I reply to. I hope I've identified the best places to focus.
Quoting creativesoul
Do you mean false equivalence between human thinking and animal thinking? I was using the phrase to refer to what is often described as the phenomenology of thinking. Perhaps most helpful would be to talk about what people will report as their thinking.
Quoting creativesoul
Quite so. But I don't think there's any reason to suppose that meaningful thought without name or describing has been banished from human life. The complication is that we often want to talk about, or at least express such thoughts or experiences, and then we often find ourselves struck dumb or confused.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, indeed. If we could identify what they are, we might make a leap forward in our understanding of what's going onin philosophical discussion of that topic. The question about animals is particularly useful because it is a specific application of those concepts in a particular context where we find it difficult to be sure how to apply them. Our paradigm of rational thinking is articulate thinking independent of action. But that depends on our language, and animals do not have that kind of language. So we disagree about how to apply them.
One of my difficulties here is that there is an almost irresistible temptation to think that what is at stake is a process that is independent of the action - a process that is referred to by "thinking" or "reasoning". I happen to have recently read Lee Braver's "Groundless Grounds". In that book, he articulates an idea of rational reconstruction as a way of coming to understand what is happening when we attribute the application of reason where there does not appear to be any such process involved. He doesn't mention animals, but I think that it is also a good way to understand what is going on when we attribute reason to animals.
One way of explaining this is by means of an analogy. Aristotle developed the concept of the practical syllogism. He doesn't claim that When I eat my breakfast, I must have said to myself "This is food. Food is good for me. I should eat this." (Partly because he recognizes that that process doesn't necessarily result in action.) What he is doing here is exactly parallel to what he does when he formulates the idea of the theoretical syllogism - "All humans are mortal. Socrates is a human. Socrates is mortal." It is a formulation that helps us analyze and understand the actual ways that humans think. Theoretical and practical syllogisms are rational reconstructions of thinking, not empirical descriptions.
I agree and I don't think I've said or implied otherwise. I'd say abstract objects are probably all generalizations, but I don't think generalization and class are coterminous. That said I'm not confident that on detailed analysis all abstract objects will trun out to be generalizations.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, that seems likely. Analysis always seems to discover complications since linguistic terms are only more or less definitive or determinate. Ambiguities proliferate under the analytic eye.
Quoting Ludwig V
Right, I think conventionality is the key difference between signs which count as symbols and those which do not.
Asking for grounds or justification for your belief, knowledge, actions and perception is not Formal Logic. It is just a rational thinking process for finding out if your beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions were rational or irrational.
So when the goose hisses at me that is a sign (expression) of anger or hostility, which means that I do well to behave cautiously, yet I can only articulate what the sign means by using symbols. Obviously, then, the way I understand what the goose's hiss means, is by means of symbols, which the goose cannot use. Yet the difference in meaning between the two is hard to discern.
Does that make sense? I'm not sure.
Quoting Corvus
Why does it matter whether our beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions were rational or irrational? Is it because that is how we know that they are true - or, in the case of actions, justified?
So it seems that even if I believe my perceptions without any grounds, I can justify them - that is, provide reasons (grounds) for believing them - after I come to believe them.
"Why does it matter"? :razz: What a delicious question. We can fall back on ancient beliefs to answer that question. Because, if we don't get things right and do the wrong things, the gods/nature will punish us. Coming from Athens the goal is to get things right. Meaning, understanding the universal laws and basing our decisions on knowledge of those laws, not our personal whims. However, to understand this, the masses must be educated to understand that reasoning and that is not how we have educated our young. Only the few who go to liberal colleges will understand that reasoning. If we wait until the young enter college before giving them a liberal education, the ignorant masses will outnumber the wise.
One serious problem is capitalism without wisdom or morals. If a person is going to work for low wages because the economy requires people who work for no pay or low wages, what is that person's reward for putting the health of the national economy first? Should we close these people out of society's benefits because they can not pay for those benefits, or do we need planning, cooperation, utilities and a big "thank you" as opposed to a snide "oh, that is welfare"? What is the rational way to educate and order a civilization?
I am not sure but I think animals tend to be limited by a might makes right mentality and because of our success and huge populations, our failure to base our decisions on knowledge of the bigger picture is disastrous.
What you said defines a problem with our notion of being "rational". 600 years ago it might have been rational to believe the Bible is the word of God, there was an Eden, an angry God could and would punish people, but given what we know today, is that belief rational? Arguing the Bible is the word of God may be a rational thing to do if we have no standard for "rational" meaning a fact that can be validated. And if we believe rational means facts that can be validated then the belief that the Bible is the word of God, is not rational thinking. A definition of "rational" that treats fantasy as equal to thought based on valid facts is problematic, isn't it?
I think this matters because I think a democracy needs to be clear about the difference between fact and fiction. A democracy must have education for rational thinking based on facts and understand what this has to do with morality. If we believe a God made us closer to angels than animals, or if we believe we have evolved along with the rest of the animals, it really matters. That is the center of our understanding of reality and decisions that must be based on reality.
It's not just my explanation https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10529410/
Why should "we" prevent history? Which empire would you like to keep in play? It's probably not the same one a Chinese businessman would choose, or a supporter of Modi. Should there be any empires at all? I don't think so, but that's what happens when a nation outgrows is own territory and is powerful enough to annex other territories and exploit their resources. What is it we'd be preserving? The same economic and political arrangement that caused the rapid decline.
We don't have time for the usual process to unfold. Much of the world is either under or threatened by imminent totalitarian rule. The economic disparity is huge and growing in all developed and developing countries alike. The weather isn't just causing local problems anymore: increasingly violent and frequent climate events are rendering large areas of the whole world uninhabitable. There are more people than have ever been, and huge populations are being displaced by famine, environment and war - everywhere. They have no place to go except the populated places that don't want them.
This isn't a discrete, identifiable civilization: this economy is global. When it implodes, there is literally nowhere to hide.
Here is a good article - of course, not everyone agrees.
Are we clear that this is a complete derail from the original subject? Saving or toppling the current civilization has no more to do with rational thinking than the life-cycles of previous civilizations did. Within the life of a tribe, nation or empire, many rational thinkers make decisions relating to whatever their role in that civilization is. But the social and natural and external forces that converge on it determine the path that civilization takes. That's more like an evolutionary process than a rational one.
OMG, your question excites me so much I can't wait to read what you have to say next without reacting to your question. My first thought is Athens. Athens made some bad mistakes as the beautiful explanation of the fall of civilizations you gave us made clear. But Athen's gift to the world is logic, a concept of logos, and a burning need to get things right. My second thought is the remains of ancient civilizations and thinking I do not know enough of them to judge which one was best. In good times and with a good pharaoh, I think I would be very happy worshipping the pharaoh and being a laborer who helped build the Great Pyramid. Those are two extremes of authority over the people, or holding the citizens responsible for government and the future.
Hellenism coming from Athens survived the fall of Athens and I believe it is the only hope humans have. There are two ways to have social control; authority over the people or culture (liberty, justice, and wisdom). A culture devoted to truth and morals may have the best chance of surviving.
Wow, I sure wish we could have lunch together and talk about the link you posted. The final paragraph is why I say I think democracy and an understanding of logos and morals (understanding cause and effect) is our only hope.
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While reading that link I thought of Youngquist's book "GeoDestinies". He was a geologist and wrote two books. The first one was "Mineral Resources and the Destiny of Nations". We are about to face the exhaustion of vital resources and this will impact our food supply, economy, and standard of living. Rome fell in part because it exhausted its supply of gold when its civilization was in the last stages of excess wealth and high expectations. But today when I make people aware that our coins had value because of the minerals in them, and we have taken the minerals out of coins, no one sees the problem.:scream:
. Our history has pretty much paralleled the history of Athens.
If there is a Resurrection we may be in it now. The archeologist, geologist, and related sciences are resurrecting our past and it is our job to rethink everything and get past all our prejudices and notions of winners and losers and a God who has favorite people. Moving on to logos and universal thinking to save as much of our planet as we can save.
You're a bit late on that one! I meant - in response to Quoting Athena That would make it a choice among those that exist today.
Couple of problems with that. Without having read The Long Descent (I did read Gibbon on Rome)I suspect that he's not taken into account the relative speed at which the American Empire achieved global dominance or the way the industrial revolution and electronic technology have increased the speed of decline-inducing events: the depletion of natural resources world-wide, the stratification of societies, the environmental degradation, population growth and the spread of disease.
Where Athens was a self-contained city-state that could divorce itself from satellites if they became troublesome; while Rome could gradually abandon occupied territories if they became too burdensome, the US cannot even disengage from local wars of its own making; nor can it shed its international financial interests.
Quoting Athena
Show me the Messiah(s) who will be followed to this new life.
Tell me when the movement reaches world-changing momentum.
Quoting Athena
If that had happened in 1975, we'd have stood a chance. Carter made some effort.... Reagan killed it. The way many Americans remember them is : Reagan, one of the best presidents, ever; Carter, one of the worst. Nearly half of them want an incompetent, incontinent, addled fascist for the next four crucial years. Logos is huddled in a corner, nursing his bruises and sniffling.
You could respond instinctively to the gooses hissing which I would say would be a non-symbolically mediated understanding of it. Discursive knowledge would seem to be always in symbolic form I guess.
Would that be an appropriate response? You might instinctively take it as a friendly greeting, or as just something geese do with no meaning.
In fact, it's a simple enough communication, usually accompanied by threatening stance and body language. Why do you need symbols as an intermediary? Why not regard what's in front of you, recognize the gestures as similar to those of other animals - including your own species - in similar circumstances, and reasonably assume that the goose does not welcome your presence in her personal space or nesting ground, and make a rational decision to retreat?
Any reasonable person would want his / her beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions to be rational than irrational. No one wants to have beliefs, knowledge, actions or perceptions which are irrational by human nature. That is why it does matter for your beliefs, actions, knowledge or perceptions to be rational.
Religious beliefs always have been from the blind faith rather than anything to do with being rational or irrational. And at the time, when the religious authorities were ruling the society, it was more of the ruthless mad social system, which enforced people with the barbaric punishments rather than being rational or irrational. People had no options but abide by the system out of fear, rather than being rational.
You should be very careful not to be deceived by the word democracy. It could mean, that you must do anything irrational to justify the word. It would be wiser to stay critical and analytical on these fancy words which can be hollow inside, but can force people to irrational actions and thoughts.
All true. So why the symbol question? I've seen it bandied about and argued over, but I can't figure out the significance of it.
Well, I would say that an economy that requires people to work for wages that cannot sustain a decent life is broken. But that requirement is so common that I suspect I'm just being idealistic. Still, it seems inhumane and immoral not to see those jobs as problematic.
If only we could get away from the idea that welfare is charity! In a broken economy, it may be true. But it just reinforces exploitation. Welfare is not charity. It is insurance - pooling risks that would be catastrophic for individuals so that they can be dealt with or at least ameliorated. Life insurance is not charity, but common sense. Of course, some people prefer to stick to the short-term and drive their cars. That's why car insurance is a legal requirement. But, rationally speaking, insurance makes sense and is not charity. More than that, rationally speaking again, there are some risks that are so large that only the state can take them on.
But the reason for the introduction of the very first state welfare system (in Prussia in the late 19th century) was neither charitable nor an insurance policy. It was a question of riot control by a rigidly conservative and aristocratic chancellor - Bismarck. There are articles about it in, for example, Wikipedia.
Welfare is enlightened and rational self-interest, not charity.
Well, given the definition that we have of what a symbol is, any knowledge that is discursive would be in human-style language, so it follows that it would be in symbolic form.
But I like the idea of a non-symbolically mediated understanding it, though I'm taking that as what is called "tacit" knowledge. But then, we have to acknowledge that human beings are also capable of that same form of understanding.
"Instinctively" is a bit of a trap. Strictly speaking, instinctive behaviour is a set behaviour pattern that is not learned, but inherited. It is not, therefore, based on any process of learning or reasoning. It is capable of rational justification at the level of evolution as contributing to the ability of the creature to sruvive and reproduce. Most, if not all, behaviour, of sentient creatures is a combination of instinct, learning and response to the relevant context. Spiders do not learn to weave webs, but they weave them in a context and adapt the pattern to suit. Newly-born foals struggle to their feet and look for milk responding to and managin in the actual context they are in.
Thinking about this, there's no doubt that there are instinctive elements in our reading of body language - very small babies respond to smiling faces. But they can recognize mother at a very early stage, which must be learnt. Again, the behaviour of lobsters in cages when they are frightened is not difficult to recognize. But we do have to learn much body language in order to read it and it does not follow from the fact that we can read human body language that we can read the body language of other creatures without learning. But small children do have to be taught to recognize the body language of dogs.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. It is possible, of course, that the unlearned response of the goose to a threat is recognizable by analogy with the threatening behaviour of other creatures and is recognized on that basis. No doubt those unlearned responses have evolved to work across species. A threat that was only recognized by other geese would be much less useful that one that can be recognized by other species.
Quoting Vera Mont
The idea is that use of symbols is a distinctively human capacity - and the basis of our kind of language. If you look into what philosophers have said about it, there's a great deal of confusion about it. Peirce, for example, treats both what we call signs as distinct from symbols in the same class and calls that class "symbols". Cassirer doesn't seem to discuss what we are calling signs at all, though he does distinguish between symbolic meaning and "expressive meaning". This is not territory that I'm familiar with. I'm just illustrating how messy the philosophy of this topic is.
(Signs are here used to mean "Smoke means (is a sign of) fire" or "Clouds mean (are a sign of) rain" - causal connections. Not everyone draws the same distinction.)
Quoting Janus
I agree. Discursive knowledge needs to be seen as a species-specific capacity alongside the species-specific capacity of bats and dolphins to find their way by echo-location, not as a radical distinction between humans and other species.
You could, but if it is irrational, then others will not agree with your justification. Being rational means also it has to be objective. Your problem seem to be confusion between intelligence and knowledge with reasoning and being rational. They are not the same.
.Quoting P. Bennetch, Cornell Chronicle
Dolphins are known to use signature whistles, and to be able to mimic other dolphins' signature whistles. It seems likely that the more intelligent animals employ a limited range of symbolic vocalisations.
Dolphin whistles
Yes, that's a good way to answer the question. "Any reasonable person..." By definition, nobody could be reasonable unless they preferred being rational to being irrational. Which means that, as a definition, what you say is circular. But that's perfectly OK in this case.
The usual answer is that rationality is our way to truth (or justification in the case of actions). That's circular as well, since truth is what rationality delivers.
Rationality is what delivers the truth, so there can be no question whether rationality delivers truth. It would be like trying to measure the standard metre in Paris in order to find out whether it is a metre long.
What you end up with is that rationality provides the justification for everything else and therefore has no rational justification.
Quoting Corvus
H'm that's a bit quick. What about people like Aquinas or Descartes who believed that they had rational arguments for belief in God? That's quite different from belief from blind faith. True, most people (but not all) believe their arguments were not valid. But they certainly weren't blind faith.
There are theologians who take as their starting-point the "presupposition" that the Bible is the word of God. It has something of the status of an axiom. Something posited as true, but not capable of being proved or disproved. Their theology follows by rational process. Sometimes rational thinking has irrational elements.
Quoting Corvus
My problem is that I've never been able to grasp a clear meaning for the term "intelligence". So I mostly ignore it, especially in philosophy.
And whales learn songs both from their own and from other pods.
Learning is common to all species that operate in a complex environment (i.e. not underground of stuck to a cave wall) Some learning is solitary experimentation, the way an octopus does. But the social species of mammals and birds teach their young a considerable amount of knowledge and skills.
We were not talking about truth here. We were talking about whether your knowledge or beliefs were rational or irrational. For that, you need to verify your knowledge or beliefs if they are not from deductive reasoning.
Quoting Ludwig V
Aquinas and Descartes were the people who used rational thinking to prove the existence of God. They were not the religious authorities who punished the general public based on the faiths and religious social codes.
Quoting Ludwig V
Intelligence means knowing something, or being able to do something in coherent way. It is not same as reflecting, analyzing, criticizing and proving something, which are what rational thinking does.
Doesn't "verify" mean something like to demonstrate the truth or accuracy of something, as by the presentation of evidence? In that case, we must be talking about truth. Though you are right that it is possible to believe something on rational grounds and be wrong.
Quoting Corvus
I thought it was something like the ability to acquire, understand, and use knowledge. That would make it something different from knowledge but more about how to acquire knowledge.
Yes, it is an inherent mental capability - although, like all inborn, or *hold nose* hard-wired traits, it can be dulled or enhanced by environmental factors. Intelligent beings learn to navigate the world by gathering information through their senses and formulating experimental approaches to the problems they encounter.
The information on which they must base decisions comes from the environment. In the case of humans, that ambient information matrix is linguistic and cultural, as well as physical and sensory. If a religious concept, or gender prejudice or architectural style or economic organization is embedded in the culture, those things become, from infancy, part of the 'knowledge' an individual gathers. Those verities form part of the world in which he operates as a problem-solving entity.
At some stage of intellectual development, some of the sharper individuals may question the verities of their culture, the assumptions with which they were raised. In human cultures, such questions can be hazardous; it is often safer not to voice them. Whether a thinker believes in God or not, the example of Galileo fresh in his mind, he [Descartes] may deem it more rational to justify the existence of God than to cast doubt upon it. Or, understanding the dynamics of his society, a career priest [Augustine] might propound Christian/Platonic values as a rational way to support the status quo. Rational thought is less often used in the service of Truth than in achieving goals.
Truth emerges when your belief or knowledge is examined and verified by reason. Reason itself cannot deliver truth as you claim.
You should trace back what you said in this thread. You said that your belief and knowledge are rational because you believe and know something. I said, no it cannot be rational or irrational until they are verified. Then you deviated from the point, claiming that rationality delivers truth. I am not sure what that means. You need to give more elaboration on that point what it means.
We were not talking about truth, and truth as a property of belief or knowledge has nothing to do with rational thinking. Your knowledge on something can be rational, but still be wrong.
Quoting Ludwig V
You have modified the content of my post with your own writing. That is not what I wrote in my post on what intelligence means. It would help clarifying the points if you could go over what intelligence means, and what reasoning means in general terms, and think about the difference between the two.
It is true that one can believe something on rational grounds, and be wrong. But if you are wrong, you didn't know it. Knowledge cannot be wrong. If someone believes that it will rain on Tuesday, and it doesn't, they didn't know that it will rain on Tuesday.
Quoting Corvus
You seem to be misunderstanding me. I didn't modify your post at all. I simply presented to you my own definition of intelligence, which is different from yours.
Quoting Corvus
If reason cannot deliver truth, then it cannot verity my belief or knowledge.
Quoting Corvus
Clearly, we have different concepts of rationality. If rationality has nothing to do with truth, what is the point of it? How does it differ from reading tea leaves of consulting an astrologer?
There is certainly a problem about rational justification if one allows that someone can be justified in believing something and be wrong; it becomes even more confusing if you allow that someone can know something and be wrong. But the answer is to find a solution.
Yes, that's the idea that the psychologists are pursuing. But the evidence for the existence of such a mental capacity is thin, to say the least.
IQ tests were supposed to be such that one could not benefit from practising. But it turns out that you can, although it is also true that there is a limit to how much one can improve. It also turns out that IQ questions are culturally biased and it is very difficult to construct questions that are not biased in that way.
Everything that we learn to do is the result of our genes and our environment working together; one simply cannot disentangle one from the other.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, that's true. But I don't think we should be too hard on people who go along with the conventional views in society. It's perfectly possible to accept orthodoxy, not because it is easier, but because it seems to you to be true or even because you can't conceive of an alternative. It took thousands of years for us to develop the idea that there is something wrong with slavery and racism, and it seems absurd to think that all those people were morally deficient in some way.
I'm motivated by the reflection that much of what we believe and take for granted is likely to turn out to be false, or at least to be replaced by some other orthodoxy by our children or children's children. So I think I'm living in a glass house and don't want to start throwing stones.
They're also administered way too late. You have to be literate and numerate to take one; at least 10 years old. By then, whatever experiences you've had since birth formed most of your thinking. There are tests for development - generally aimed at detecting problems - but I'm not sure they're as reliable as the ones given to dogs and crows. Anecdotally, I can tell you that bright parents tend to have bright kids and stupid parents usually have dumb kids, and I could pick the most intelligent toddlers out of a day-care by watching them pay for twenty minutes. But that's not scientific evidence.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not! Quite the reverse: I'm saying that those who didn't stick their necks out for what we consider "the truth" today were acting rationally. So are those who go along to get along now. (Maybe not Bezos, hedging his political bets...)
Quoting Ludwig V
Some of them always knew. Very possibly, most of them did, whether they could conceive of an alternative or not. For damn sure, the gladiators in Rome did, and the abducted Africans in American cotton fields. The captives felt it was wrong to be captured, but when they had the chance, they would do the same to an enemy. Nobody wants to be first to stop: it's a sign of weakness. The Quakers knew, and early Mormons and the Cathari long before them. But... The Economy!!!! There is no bloody way a man doesn't know that it's wrong to batter his wife, or a woman doesn't know it's wrong to cripple her little granddaughter's feet, but one has license to unleash his temper and the other has cultural norms to uphold. It's convenient to go along, as well as safer and easier. But there have always been rebels who spoke out against the wrongs in their society - they mostly got killed in unpleasant ways - so we know those wrongs were perceived, even back then when everyone was supposed to be blind.
Checking out you knew or not, that is the work of reason. Reason itself is not truth.
Quoting Ludwig V
It is a very peculiar way of putting down your own definition on someone else's writing, making out as if it was written by someone else.
Quoting Ludwig V
Does reason deliver truth? It sounds not making sense. The sentence "Reason delivers truth." sounds not correct. Reason brings truth to you at your door step? Like a Amazon delivery van delivers what you have ordered from Amazon? I am not sure if that was what you meant. Hope not. You find out truth or falsity on something using reason.
Quoting Ludwig V
Rationality is a method to finding truth, but rationality itself is not truth. We do have different ideas not just on rationality, but also truth. All the best.
I'm sorry I misunderstood you.
Quoting Vera Mont
I understood that as saying that Augustine might propound Christian/Platonic values in order to support the status quo - which is true. But then he would be guilty of hypocrisy. I wanted to point out that it is also possible that he might propound those values because he believed in Christianity and Platonism, whether or not they supported the status quo.
There are many cases when it is very hard to assess people. Heidegger (support for Nazism) and Hegel (support for the Prussian monarchy) are particularly difficult cases. Descartes has also been suspected, maybe because of his explicit policy of accepting orthodox morality while he is applying his methodology of doubt. I'm just saying that I don't think we should rush to judgement. But I see now that you were not rushing to judgement and I was. So I apologize.
Quoting Vera Mont
I'm not quite sure what you are saying here. Practical reason is inherently morally ambiguous; a bad actor can be entirely rational. It is only theoretical reason that is in the service of truth.
Quoting Vera Mont
Quite so. But there it can be very hard to tell which of them has really put their finger on an actual wrong, as opposed to a perceived wrong.
Quoting Vera Mont
That's certainly an acid test.
Quoting Patterner
You are right about slavery and genocide. The (rather few) days when we could all be confident in the eventual triumph of western liberal values are long gone. It's all been a big let down.
But one cannot aspire to moral standards unless they can be articulated in the world that one lives in and I don't think it is appropriate to apply the standards of other societies to lives lived in that way. For example, the first traces in history of human rights did not appear until the fifth century BCE - in Persia. It took a long time before the idea was articulated in the late Roman Empire and even longer before Thomas Paine was able to articulate them with some clarity in the 18th century CE.
All that can be expected or required of us is to get along as well as we can in the world that we know, with all its many imperfections. That's the only standard that it is reasonable to apply. The virtues of saints and heroes are supererogatory - beyond what is required or expected. Certainly, they are to be admired, but it is not necessary to imitate them in order to live a good life.
I don't know about that, which is why I said 'might'. I do know Descartes was. I was only interested in the rationality of their thought, whatever the rationale - not in whether they actually believed in the product.
I'm not assessing people or judging their morals or psychoanalyzing them: I'm only concerned with whether the thought process being exhibited is rational or irrational. Without accusing anyone specific of lying, it is very often the most rational approach to a situation; a lunatic can shout out what he really thinks and feels, if he's heedless of the consequences. Quoting Ludwig V
Again, I'm not concerned with anyone's morality. I'm concerned with judging whether a thought process is rational or irrational. If it achieves a discernible goal, opens a gate, invents a helicopter, evades a predator, earns you a promotion, liberates the cookies from the box, it's rational thought, whatever motivated the goal, whatever tactics were employed.
Both require facts which are true. If one's goal is to discover some particular truth, like who broke into the Watergate, or whether Christine has been unfaithful, or how magnetism and electricity interact, or how many marbles will raise the water level so you can reach the treat, it's still goal-oriented thought. I don't believe there such a thing as a great big all-encompassing Truth to which you can apply rational thought. You can think quite a lot about how to talk about Truth, but you can't comprehend it with reason; the Truth is too abstract to capture with anything but faith. (Not saying definitively that It isn't 'out there'; only that I can't believe in it.)
Quoting Ludwig V
Of course. My point was only that social injustices were always perceived by some people, even against an overwhelming cultural norm.
You can only judge according to your own values. If you assume that enslaving people is wrong and somebody in 400BCE spoke up against it, you're likely to think he perceived correctly. If you think people should be equal under the law, you'll probably disagree with the perception of legislators who blocked women's and Chinese immigrants' voting rights. Whether you think they were/are right or wrong, these actions are rational. The perceived/actual grievances of Maga cultists would be very difficult to sort out, but we could each do it, given a comprehensive list to compare with our own convictions. (but I can't drink hard liquor anymore)
Let's use rational thinking. The Messiah is based on a myth. Information collected from science and history is based on valid facts.
It took doctors at least a hundred years to believe sanitation was important after the first curious people began looking at bacteria in microscopes. Today knowledge spreads much faster. People in biblical times could not know of a distant war, as we know of our wars today, as they are happening in live color and full sound. That does not mean climate change, disease, famine, and lack of resources will not bring civilizations down, but it does mean we have a chance of making better decisions and this might just happen if we had a functioning democracy. A functioning democracy depends on education for that purpose. We had such an education in the past but not since the 1958 National Defense Education BUT some teachers and schools are better than others and a few people are making a difference.
This discussion goes far beyond what animals talk about, and this is why we should understand the difference between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom. Squacking a warning and responding to the roar of a bear or lion is communication, but it is not the language of humans. It is language and rational thinking that separates some of us from animals. Believing a mythology about a god making humans and then cursing them and punishing them or rewarding them is not rational thinking based on facts.
In the 1920s a small article in a newspaper warned, "Given our known supply of oil and rate of consumption, we are headed for economic disaster and possibly war". Soon after that all industrial economies crashed and the world went to war. Following the war, we maintained the social and economic behavior that brought us to war. That is not rational. We are behaving like animals incapable of rational thinking because we evolved from animals. Our ability to be rational is blocked by religion and ignorance. That is something we can change. We may not do so before destroying our planet and making our present civilizations impossible, but I do believe we can make better decisions.
"All gods have anger issues. Athena was just as petty and vengeful as the others." Wikipedia
:rage: Obviously you are ignorant of the ideology of democracy. That is a widespread problem. It would be wiser for you to question what you believe and what I believe, instead of making assumptions and attacking something you may not understand. It matters because it is the difference of having hope for the future or complete hopelessness. That hope is based on human intelligence and potential and only by being rational is that hope founded. So explain what think democracy is and why you object to it. This is the difference between reacting like an animal or reacting like a rational human.
You should be very careful about offending Athena.
I agree with everything you said. When Britain had to prepare for the war, it realized most of its military-age men were unfit to serve in the army and it was a matter of national survival to improve the health of the labor force. Industry was asked to pay higher wages to improve the condition of those living in poverty and Industry said it could not pay higher wages because that make everything cost more and they would lose their competitive advantage on the global market. That is around the world workers are being used as cheap labor so their nations can compete for world markets. Welfare subsidizes Industry by providing the assistance low wagers need. Only we have very little understanding of this so we are not managing our reality well.
Remember the saying cheap as dirt? It meant we had land and resources than people, and housing was very cheap. That is no longer true.
Like you said: hundreds of years for this, decades for that.... Have you noticed what's happening in the US election? We simply ran out of time. What's the point of 'making better choices' when everyone left on the planet is fighting over the last habitable acre?
Oh, I agree with you entirely about Truth. But I do think there are truths. (After that, it all gets complicated.)
Quoting Vera Mont
That's true. But I would only make judgement taking into account the situation or context of the action - especially when it is very different from my own. BTW, I've heard people commenting on Descartes' personal moral stance before, but I've never quite understood what the problem is.
Quoting Athena
Yes. Somehow, that important truth has got lost in public discussion in these days .
Quoting Athena
It is very curious that industry can be relied on to adopt the narrowest point of view. It's not as if industry doesn't end up footing the bill for their starvation wages. It doesn't seem to occur to them that they might have to pay smaller taxes if only they paid a decent wage and make bigger profits because they would have a larger market for their goods.
Quoting Corvus
No, not like that at all. Your way of putting it is better.
Quoting Corvus
Quoting Corvus
But then, I just don't understand what you mean by these comments. Reason and truth are not the same thing. But they are connected. You seem to recognize that, but then deny it. I must be missing something.
No problem. After Galileo had his little confrontation with the good fathers - and quite rationally stood down from his heretical belief in the Earth moving around the sun - every thinker in Europe had some difficult moments rethinking their strategy. So Descartes has his big truth-seeking exercise: purges his mind of all beliefs, everything he's ever been taught, delves way down in there for one incontrovertible fact and comes up with "I exist" OK... "But wait, here's another incontrovertible truth: God. Didn't learn about God; it wasn't a belief: I just happened to find Him in here at the bottom of my completely empty mind. And now, I shall proceed to unfold my theory of a mechanistic universe, only God's winding all the clockwork animals. Oh, and people are a mechanistic body with a completely independent, immaterial soul.
Are you convinced of his sincerity?
You can't be moral when you're dead - so you compromise to stay alive. That's rational. The same person who made that compromise might still be honest with his friends, faithful to his wife, accurate in his court testimony, prompt in the payment of his debts and play a clean game of billiards.
Why insist that anyone be pure in both thinking and probity? That's just not human. The insides of our heads are never swept clean like Descartes imagined that one time.
I think I have tried to clarify the points enough from my side. There is nothing much more for me to add here. You seem to keep going around circle of deviation. I will leave you to it.
I am bowing out from this thread. All the best.
I agree. I don't even understand what you mean by a circle of deviation. I was indeed deviating in the sense that I was trying to break out of your circle of repetition. Best wishes to you as well.
Oddly enough, I am convinced of Descartes' sincerity. It is Galileo who gets himself into a morally complicated situation. (I mean that he could be accused of hypocrisy, but I think he was (rationally and morally) justified in what he did.)
Galileo, as you say, recanted. The inquisitors forbade him from teaching or even discussing his heretical theory. However, the story goes that, as he left the Vatican, he paused on the steps and said (to himself) "Even so, it moves". If he had said that in the hearing of the inquisitors, he would thereby have recanted his recantation. But he kept that remark to himself, thus leading the inquisitors to believe that he had rejected the theory that he actually believed - the essence of hypocrisy. But I agree with you about the need to survive as best we can, so I have no criticism of him.
Descartes' position is also complicated, but much less black-and-white than Galileo's. Of course, I don't question the repressive regime that all these guys lived under, and his position is not entirely clear; I don't deny that he may have been influenced by it. But the key point is that his scepticism is a thought-experiment. He presents his story in the Meditations as if he is really believing the sceptical conclusions. But his introduction makes it clear that he doesn't, and the reader knows perfectly well that he is going to go on and rescue the situation. The genius of the Meditations is that it is a story with a plot exactly like every adventure (thriller) story - disaster looms and seems inevitable, but our hero risks everything in order to dash in and rescue the situation. There are arguments, to be sure, but the suspense of the plot does the real work of persuasion. True, the world will seem different, but we are safe and that's the important thing. T.S. Eliot says it well - after all our wanderings we will come back home "and know the place for the first time"; there may even be toast and honey for tea. It is very odd that Descartes and Hume are both classified as sceptical philosophers, when actually, they are nothing of the kind.
The difference between the two is that Galileo pretended to accept that his theory was an erroneous hypothesis when he believed that it was a true account and while Descartes never pretended that his scepticism was more than a possibility; he was exploring it n order to refute it.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, I agree with you. There's a kind of morality that makes black-and-white judgements and refuses to acknowledge complexity and ambiguity. Everyone has to duck and cover in order to get along. But without that society could not function. Keeping the peace and the show on the road are practically and morally important goals both for individuals and for the collective.
Of course, Galileo was both right and wrong. He endorsed the Copernican system (Copernicus himself was rational enough not to publish in his lifetime) and rejected the far more accurate Keplerian system.
Descartes God was a creative invention, just like his clockwork world. It's easy to play back-and-dorth with fiction; take no principles at all.
Right. I term it 'implicit knowledge' with its explicitation (usually termed explication) being enabled by symbolic language.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think it is plausible to think that we and the other animals may have an instinct to copy behavior. So some behaviors may be a combination of instinctive and learned. Learned not in the sense of deliberately taught but in the sense of acquired by mimicry.
Quoting Ludwig V
I think we can instinctively read some body language both human and animal. I agree that the understanding of some body language must be learned. Not learned in the sense of being deliberately taught of course.
Quoting jkop
Does it follow that the parrot's signaling is symbolic though? I think part of what I would count as the possession of symbolic language consists in the ability to explicitly understand that such and such a sound, gesture or mark conventionally stands for whatever it symbolizes.
The same question as above regarding the dolphins. And not I am not denying that other animals might possess symbolic language. I'm questioning whether we have clear evidence that they do as opposed to having some evidence that they might.
The true test for whether other animals have symbolic language is not empirical but depends on what is meant by 'language'. Other animals don't seem to have anything that resembles our verbal language, but they may have other kinds of languages, and so do humans.
All animals use signals or symbols in the basic sense that a symbol is something that stands for something else. For example, an insect identifies a scent or sound or gesture, which symbolizes the presence of nutrients, mates, predators etc. Animals who live in groups benefit from shared symbolic labor, hence the evolution of genetically wired and socially acquired symbol systems.
There are many different kinds of symbol systems, also among humans. Human language is a verbal symbol system which has some syntactic and semantic properties that distinguishes it from non-verbal systems such as pictorial or musical or gestural that we also use.
So we might agree that other animals don't have a symbolic language in the sense that the language has the kind of syntactic and semantic properties that human verbal language has. But that doesn't rule out the possibility that they have other symbolic languages. I find it uncontroversial that I'm using symbolic language based on gestures and sounds when I talk to my cat.
H'm. You seem to really have it in for Descartes. He is iconic and takes a lot of stick. But he wasn't the one who invented God, or even the argument he used to argue for the reality of that God. True, he contributed massively to the clockwork world, there were many others involved as well. But still, you're not wrong.
Quoting Janus
That's perfectly true and I think that mimicry is more important to our learning that is generally recognized. People seem to prefer to emphasis association. I don't know why. Aristotle knew better, of course, and I think he may be alone amongst the canonical philosophers in that.
Quoting Janus
There's a bit of a problem with that. Articulating our understanding of how to use words and construct sentences is much more difficult than it seems. For the most part, mostly our use of language is underpinned by skills that we do not, and often cannot, articulate.
I see our language capability as a hyper-development of abilities that (all? most?) animals have to a greater or less extent. Other species have hyper-developed other abilities, such as the hyper-development of echo-location in bats and dolphins or vision in hawks and other predator birds.
In for? You mean judge him as I would any mortal making his way in the real world? Okay, I do hate what he and his cohort did to our relationship with nature and other species, the two hundred years of suffering they inflicted on helpless animals. He's not responsible for that; he's just a participant who was clever enough to make himself an icon. My insignificant opinion won't deter any of his fans.
But we were not talking about that. I was referring to his very sensible use of God to avoid confrontation with the Inquisition. Spending time in the more tolerant Netherlands was a smart move, too. Icons are for the faithful. I have no faiths. But I would have pretended whatever was required if the inquisitors had their eye on me; I certainly don't fault anyone for doing it, and if they're clever enough, turning it to their own advantage.
Quoting Ludwig V
He just pretended to rediscover it after ridding himself of all learned beliefs. It was merely an example of rational thinking not subjugated to truth.
That's fair enough. I actually agree about the suffering. It's just that I doubt that he and his colleagues made much practical difference. It's not as if animal welfare has ever been a moral issue before our time.
Quoting Vera Mont
That's a question of his motivation. There's a passage in the Discourse on Method where he says that while he is subjecting his beliefs to methodical doubt, he sticks to conventional views. That can certainly be read as pragmatic rather than sincere.
Quoting Vera Mont
It would prefer "after supposedly ridding himself of all learned beliefs". It is hard to believe he hadn't read Aquinas' Five Ways and it wouldn't be surprising if he did a bit of cherry-picking through the rubbish.
It was a moral issue in Descartes' time. He defended his entrenched mechanistic position in many arguments. His main theme was: They have no souls; therefore they feel neither pleasure nor pain. But admitted that they can exhibit "passions".... The guy had a dog in his house. Was he unable to see the dog's responses as being like his own, or he did he choose to ignore the similarity because it wasn't convenient? Remember, this is not a stupid man; he's defending a theory - at least in public.Quoting Ludwig V
I was skeptical, too. But it's what he claimed as the object of the exercise: get to the truth by doubting everything he'd ever been taught or believed. (Except that.)
Why are you going on out on a plausibility limb to defend a hypocrisy that can't be sanctioned or punished at this late date? It served his purpose, so that was the rational path.
I was referring to a more modest capacitythe ability to articulate that we can use words and construct sentences. I wasn't claiming that we can articulate in any comprehensive sense how it is that we are able to do that.
Yes, because the ability to understand things in the environment remotely via symbols (natural or socially constructed) is a function of any animal's interest.
Bees, for instance, are interested in flowers, and benefit from having a specific symbol system (waggles) for sharing the direction and distance to flowers. Bees can identify their own and each other's functions and symbolic behaviours.
However, to understand oneself or one's possession of symbolic language is either necessary nor sufficient for possessing symbolic language.
Well, if you said that Galileo was a hypocrite, I would agree on the basis that it was, technically, but justified on the basis that being tortured or burnt at the stake was an unreasonable price to pay for following a purely academic line of research and so lying was a rational way to get out of his situation, even though, if you are a Kantian, lying is always wrong. Why? Because he explicitly contradicted himself. Descartes' case is much less clear. I'm just calling it as I see it.
Quoting Vera Mont
There's a genuine argument against radical scepticism, that no-one can seriously doubt that he is now sitting beside a stove, which will burn one if one isn't careful. Descartes isn't quite in that bracket because he frames his doubt as "merely" theoretical.
Quoting Vera Mont
There's not way of knowing, and consequently no evidence that it was just a matter of convenience.
Quoting Vera Mont
I had heard of Cudworth. But I didn't know he crossed swords with Descartes. However, his critique is milder than yours, in my book.
I would expect, however that Cudworth did not think that animals had souls and did think that because they did not, they were of less or no moral value and consequently eating them was perfectly OK.
Quoting Janus
Well, yes. Animals cannot articulate anything in that way. But that takes us back to the question what the significance is of the various species-unique abilities we can learn - given that every species is unique in some way.
Of course it was. Wouldn't you? Joan of Arc was crazy; Giordano Bruno was an ideologue. Most of us normal people practice some degree of hypocrisy, simply to get by, and more to get along.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not, and that's a ridiculous, unrealistic position. Also, in many case, immoral.
Quoting Ludwig V
He learned a lesson from other men's examples. He was smarter than most of his contemporaries - smarter than Galileo who seems to have considered himself the smartest man alive.
Quoting Ludwig V
That doesn't persuade me of his sincerity. If it persuades you, all's well.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. He was encumbered by the 'soul' issue; I'm not.
Quoting Ludwig V
That's just how he did justify the moral position held by a minority of thinkers at the time that it's wrong to torture animals.
Descartes also preferred to replace "vivisection/torture" with "killing and eating" in the moral argument. It's way more acceptable to defend throwing chunks of beef in a pot than dislocating a dog's shoulders and hips, then nailing his paws to a plank and slitting his belly open, all the while he's screaming in agony. Most people who object to torture (then and now) do not object to killing enemies in war, or eating humanely-killed flesh. Most people in the argument do not draw the moral line at possession of a soul or human language (though some philosophers still do) but at deliberate infliction of pain on a sentient being, for whatever reason. Let's shift those posts back to the real issue.
Of which vivisection was an offshoot. It does demonstrate hypocrisy: he could maintain - paraphrased by the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche - that animals eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing. and yet take Monsieur Grat for a walk, fully expecting that the dog would not shit on his rug, expecting him to obey commands and and appreciate treats.
But it's the God argument I originally mentioned.
Had he been entirely honest in that meditation, he would have questioned all beliefs, rather than making the church's case. Theoretically. Funny, how it all works out, innit?
I never blamed him for that hypocrisy: it was the rational choice.
That God/soul problem persisted in all philosophical arguments as long as the HRC held Europe in its grip. After the Reformation, thinking became a little more free and diverse, even though most Protestant sects were also intolerant of agnostic ideas - but at least they didn't have an Inquisition to cow their own congregants into silence. A couple of them still persecuted witches and expelled heretics, but they were less dangerous than the unchecked (and profoundly corrupt) Catholic church.
Quoting Ludwig V
Convenience was my guess. You have other choices: absolute conviction in the teeth of all evidence, willful self-delusion, subconscious delusion, fear of prosecution, sadistic monster.... More if you can find them. But I still don't understand why you want to, when it's independent of the serendipitous discovery of God (....the majority of whose creatures are nothing but noisy machines. Pretty damn disrespectful of the Creator for a devout Christian - but that, too, is beside the point.) All humans compartmentalize their beliefs and attitudes. There are no sane, intelligent, totally honest humans.
Yes, I agree that every species is unique in some way. For us it just happened to be symbolic language (unless there is at least one other species that unbeknownst to us also possesses it).
Quoting jkop
I guess it all depends on how you define "symbolic language". As I see it the abstractive ability that enables explicit self-reflective awareness would be the defining feature.
Quoting jkop
For non-symbolically linguistic animals I would say instead "the ability to understand things in the environment via signs".
So I've learnt something to-day. Thank you for the link. I have looked through it, but not read it carefully yet.
I'm losing my grip on what our disagreement is about. Perhaps you'll forgive my not following the convention of linking my comments to quotations from what you say. Instead, I'ld like to offer an analysis of where we are at.
We seem to be using "hypocrisy" in slightly different ways. I think I can best explain through a different case. Many people seem to use the word "lying" to mean simply saying what is false. Whether they attach a moral judgement to the word is not clear to me, but my understanding of it is that saying what is false, knowing it to be false and with intent to deceive is morally reprehensible.
So, for me, saying what one sincerely believes to be true, even if it turns out to be false, is not lying. There's an exception, that one might sincerely believe something because of wishful thinking, or carelessness; but saying that it is true is a different moral failing, for which we don't have a name (I think). In the same way, you seem to call behaving in ways that are inconsistent "hypocrisy" but you seem to exempt some hypocrisy from moral criticism, if it has a rational justification.
But then, there is a difficulty about the intersection of rationality with morality. We like to think that they don't conflict. But when you say that Descartes was hypocritical but rational, I conclude that you are saying that the rationality of his hypocrisy justifies it, or at least exempts is from moral censure. I find that very confusing.
I believe it is the case that Descartes never indulged in the vicious torture of nailing animals to planks, but that some students who followed Descartes did. Furthermore, it seem that he also kept a companion dog in his house, which seems incompatible with believing that the animal was just a machine. Here's my opinion. The students were guilty of consistency, illustrating how rigid adherence to a ideology can lead one into really vicious moral errors. Descartes, on the other hand, was technically inconsistent with his theoretical beliefs, but exhibited good sense in not following through from his theory to his practice.
I hope at least some of this makes sense.
I do believe - sincerely - that they do not conflict. Any more than a pencil and brush in an artist's satchel, or a hammer and pliers in a carpenter's toolbox. Our mental equipment includes a great many tools that are separate one from another. When I say something is rational, I mean that it is based on observed or assumed fact and is aimed at solving a problem or achieving a goal. There is no value judgment here of the worthiness of the goal or the cause of the problem. Whether it's aimed at a better cancer treatment or a more effective weapon of mass destruction, the thought process is rational.
Quoting Ludwig V
I don't know whether he did it or only defended the prevailing practice. It doesn't matter now. It mattered when the prevailing practice was questioned, opposed, justified on philosophical grounds and therefore continued. In this, he was greatly influential.
The rational component of that justification is the aim of gaining more knowledge of physiology*. The moral component - if there is one in your world-view - is wilful disregard of the pain caused.
*If a person truly believes that the mechanical dog and feeling man are of different kinds, why would he consider the physiology of dogs useful in understanding how humans work? Does it matter that the vast majority of humans do not philosophize and some cannot speak? In fact, the doctors dissected executed people in the same lecture hall as the vivisection lessons. They were not legally permitted to study live humans, so they went to the next best thing. Can you possibly imagine none of these intelligent men knew what the screaming signified?
I never understood why you introduced the moral component.
Quoting Ludwig V
There is no need to conflate those ideas. Obviously, stating one's belief is not lying. It only becomes so if one is exposed to the truth and rejects it. Making oneself believe what isn't true is lying to oneself, whether it's said to anyone else or not. Nobody believes falsehoods through simple carelessness, though they may repeat what they've heard because they don't care enough to reflect. That may be trivial or criminal, depending on the falsehood and its effect on the world.
But why is lying a immoral? There are many reasons to lie, some of them laudable, some despicable. There are also many styles and standards morality; what one culture or individual applauds, another may despise. I don't believe there has ever been a sane adult in the world who is or was morally pure, or entirely truthful or altogether devoid of hypocrisy. None of our heroes and role models are so much more perfect than we are.
Why is that a problem?
Some people think that there are number of factors working together. That seems a very likely possibility. Our bipedalism allowed our front feet to develop into hands which enabled us to handle objects in a much more precise way. Our large (for our body size) brain allowed us to develop our kind of language. Not to mention the critical importance of our being a social animal, without which our technologies could not have developed.
Societies swing. Some things get worse and worse until people unite to change what is causing things to get worse. This is the fun of life. We have problems to resolve.
I want to invite everyone to a symposium where I will serve tea and coffee, cookies, and donuts and share some old grade school test books. I have pulled out my old math text books because I am helping a child with math. The old textbooks relate math to everyday living so a child can relate to what is being taught. As important as math is, it is not the only thing the books teach. The second-grade book especially teaches consideration and good manners.
People made a terrible mistake when they thought we only taught reading, writing, and arithmetic. The old books were very much about transmitting a culture, good citizenship, and family values. In 1958 teaching decisions were turned over to those most interested in war, and we stopped transmitting the culture we were transmitting in favor of education for technology. We stopped teaching social values and independent thinking because we did not know what values a high-tech society would need and leaving moral training the church, meant a faster shift into a high-tech society with unknown values.
That was the education Germany had before Hitler took control. Without lessons for consideration and good manners, we have selfishness, and self-centered decision-making, and tend to be reactionary instead of thoughtful and rational human beings. The Christian mythology is very much a part of this problem and leaving moral training to the Church is a terrible mistake.
That is the bottom line of this thread. The differences between animals and humans, and why we are not as civilized as educated people used to be.
This thread is wondering and that is a good thing because from the beginning the importance of the subject is how we treat each other and teach our children.
I woke up this morning listening to a lecture about human rights. It troubles me greatly that Aristotle thought some people are born to be slaves and slavery is an important part of family order, and that the Church used Aristotle for the education called Scholasticism. Martin Luther believed we are preordained by God to be masters or slaves and he thought the witch hunts were necessary.
Obviously, false beliefs have been part of our civilizations. AND this is what makes a discussion of thinking like an animal versus the language-based rational thinking of educated humans, important. How do we know truth? What does knowing truth have to do with democracy, rule by reason?
The dying planet won't wait for us to swing around like a leaking oil tanker.
Quoting Athena
Have you looked at any newspaper headlines lately?
Which animals are less civilized and rational than humans?
That argument has troubled my thinking for many years. Who is going to buy the stuff that makes corporations rich, if the people can not afford it? When Adam Smith wrote of economics he also wrote of morality and explained the importance of good morality to economic success.
Okay if good morality is essential to a good economy, why isn't this an important part of education? In case you haven't read what I said about an old math book for second-grade children, the book is very much about morals. If we understand the relationship between morals and a healthy economy/civilization is a matter of cause and effect, then we are strongly motivated to be moral, and this distinguishes humans from other animals. When we don't teach morals along with math, we get self-centered, reactionary humans, no better than animals.
Okay, gang, Thrift Books has a few books written by Adam Smith for very little money. From what I gather about politics in the US is the number 1 concern is economics. I have ordered a couple of books and it would be great to have a thread addressing morals and economics. That would be a discussion no other animal is going to have. The impact of global warming is making our present path of self-destruction insane! Animals can destroy other species, but not the whole planet.
That's fair enough. There's a nasty gap, however, in how one assesses the worthiness of the goal or what's a problem, rather than a feature. But let's leave that alone, for now.
Quoting Vera Mont
It would take an angel to be on the right side of every debate at the same time. But then, you have high standards, it would seem.
He was indeed influential. But that doesn't necessarily mean that he approved of everything his followers did. I don't think anyone knows (unless you've got a source) what he thought of his followers in Amsterdam. For all we know, he would have disowned them.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes and no. In the '50's, there was (in the UK) a big scandal about a toxicological test that involved dropping chemicals in the eyes of rabbits to find out what dose was required to kill 50% of the subjects. It was known as the L(ethal) D(ose) 50 test. The goal was, no doubt, desirable, but involved a great deal of pain for the rabbits. So they didn't report that the rabbits screamed in pain, but that they "vocalized". The defence, no doubt, was that it was important to preserve scientific objectivity. So they reported only the facts, without any subjective interpretation. Another example of how indoctrination with an ideology is at least as dangerous, and arguably more vicious, as old-fashioned vices like greed and sadism.
Quoting Vera Mont
Quoting Vera Mont
Unfortunately, our language is not neatly divided between facts and values. Some concepts incorporate an evaluative judgement as well as a factual component. Murder is not simply killing, but wrongful killing. Pain is not simply a sensation but a sensation that we seek to avoid and that, if we have any humanity, we will help others to avoid. And so on.
Actually, you are right - not all lying is wrong; we even have an expression (at least in my possibly rather archaic version of English) for lies that are OK - white lies. Nonetheless, deliberately leading someone to believe something that you know to be false is generally disapproved of. Ditto for hypocrisy.
So I thought you introduced the moral element and I was responding to that.
Quoting Vera Mont
That sounds rather hard on people. Surely, if I'm exposed to some evidence for an idea, but there's not enough evidence to justify believing it, I am right to reject it, even if it turns out later to be true. In any case, there isn't enough time to live a life and think carefully about everything we need to know.
Quoting Vera Mont
I don't think it is. The best we can do is to try to avoid the biggest failures. So forgiveness becomes important, to prevent pursuit of the good turning into the tyranny of perfection.
Quoting Athena
The conventional defence is that nobody in the world at that time had any doubt about slavery. It's asking a lot of someone to come up with a revolutionary idea like that - indeed, it took centuries for human beings to develop the ideas that we take for granted.
What troubles me more than his ideas about slavery is that there appear to be some people around who are trying to promote his argument as a justification of slavery today.
If you look at the details, though, you'll find that his version of slavery strips out a great deal of what makes it so objectionable. It can be read as a promotion of decent treatment for slaves, including the opportunity to learn how to be free and a ban on enslaving free people.
Quoting Athena
Good question. I keep wondering who will buy all the products when production and distribution are completely handed over to robots and AI. I suppose the machines could sell things to each other, but they can only pay if they are paid for their labour.
Quoting Athena
Yes. The problem is that it is in the interest of everyone to work out a free ride on everyone else's virtue, and it is against the interest of everyone to behave well and get ripped off. Race to the bottom.
Quoting Athena
I'm sure it would be quite an eye-opener to see what he actually said.
All animals are less civilized and rational. You may look at them and see rational decisions, but it is your human brain doing the rationalizing, not the animals. The difference between our brains and other animals is biological. No matter how smart our dogs are, we are not going to give them voting rights.
I will say bears are less civilized than humans. Mother bears must protect their children from their fathers who kill them. Lions in a pride have a degree of civility, however, if the males get old and can not defend the rest of the pride, invading males kill not only the males but also their children. Israel is proving how cruel humans can be to other humans. That is a civilization failure. Israel's failure to make peace when it holds most of the power is a human and civilization failure based on myth, not rational. It is much easier for humans to act as animals than it is for animals to behave as humans.
And that's a bad thing? It didn't take any angels to establish animal protection laws - just a lot of determined ordinary people, with ordinary IQ's and no individual influence. I didn't ask him to be on the right side of every debate; I do blame him for endorsing one particularly horrific practice.
Quoting Ludwig V
In the face of the vigorous philosophical arguments he made supporting the clockwork idea, approval would seem the least of his complicity. Probably, most of the inquisitors didn't personally heat the pincers, but they understood the use of hot pincers and published theological justification for their use.
Quoting Ludwig V
Why?
[Surely, if I'm exposed to some evidence for an idea, but there's not enough evidence to justify believing it, I am right to reject it, [/quote] Without consideration, or further inquiry? Well, I just hope you're not an antivaxer. I've encountered a few intelligent posters who keep insisting that we go back to original research, because there's just not enough evidence to support the theory of evolution. I do think that's willful ignorance. It's their loss; I don't punish them for it. I probably do the same regarding subjects I don't care about.
Quoting Ludwig V
Ignoring what you need to know will cause errors, maybe serious ones, in your life. We all make some bad judgments because we didn't think things through. But, sure, you choose to learn what matters to you. And then you lie about some things you know when lying serves a purpose that matters to you. That's all rational thinking.
Quoting Ludwig V
Not by all the parents who tell their children about Santa Claus! I think their story is silly, too readily exploitable, not thoroughly considered - but their motives are benign. Nor all the spy agencies in the world, convinced that they are defending their country and its values.
It depends on why you're doing it: to protect potential victims, or to benefit from the deception - from laudable to trivial to reprehensible.
Quoting Ludwig V
Sure. But let's try to be accurate in our observations and honest in our assessment.
It's for their God, not me, to absolve them for their motives or toss them into The Pit for their crimes.
Thank you for the additional information about Aristotle's acceptance of slavery based on his sense of human decency that went with it. In the argument "what is justice" Socrates argued when people are exploited, sooner or later they become a problem to the whole of society. In the USA South, southerners have dealt with this reality, and wherever discrimination suppressed another race the exploited people, they have become a problem. Allowing this to happen is just bad logic!
Knowledge and learned higher-order thinking skills are essential to good decision-making. Ignorance and false beliefs are very harmful. Unfortunately, we do not understand the pursuit of happiness Jefferson wrote of in the US Declaration of Independence is the pursuit of knowledge, not eating a 3-scope ice cream cone or other tawdry pleasures.
Turning our liberty over to AI is to totally miss the value of the human experience is our ability to learn, communicate, and change the world. That separates us from other animals.
Quoting Ludwig V
That is a conundrum. I have read the Aztecs had an economy based on human energy, not gold or GNP. The value of a woven basket being the skill and time spent making it. If hard work got good pay, those who work in the fields would get very good pay. I think we need to rethink our distribution of resources. That is something animals don't need to worry about. :lol: Quoting Ludwig V
So here is the deal if a strong economy depends on morals, it is self-destructive to be immoral. It is simple logic, cause and effect. Today the problem is ignorance. We do not share essential knowledge for good moral decisions. :groan: Leaving moral training to the Church was the worst thing we could have done.
I have ordered Adam Smith's book about economic morality because I think this might be the most important knowledge for the world today, and only if those of us who care, act on that caring, is there hope for the future. We must get religion out of our moral thinking and put reason back in it! I think understanding this goes with understanding the human difference, instead of believing biblical myth. We are 90% animal and 10% human. We need to drop the myth that prevents us from holding knowledge of reality.
I respectfully disagree. Quoting Athena
Or exemption from the gas chamber if there are more of them than we like. I know. But then we don't treat our fellow humans any better.
Some of us are horrified by animal and human brutality and others are not. Why do you think we perceive things so differently?
Where does he say that?
Quoting Vera Mont
Now I'm confused. Are discussing the wickedness of Descartes or of the Inquisition? Perhaps you just mean that they are a parallel case. In which case, where does Descartes publish a justification for the use of nails and planks on animals?
Quoting Vera Mont
It is indeed wilful ignorance, although they are something of a public nuisance. On the other hand, we all have to pay the price of the anti-vaxers' wilful ignorance.
Quoting Vera Mont
Sorry, I thought the need for further inquiry and consideration was a given - subject to the priority that you give to the issue.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. I still think that disapproval is the default position. But that's just a detail.
Quoting Vera Mont
Accurate and honest, certainly. Are we including fair and balanced as well? I hope so.
If it's for God to absolve them, isn't it also for their God to judge them?
Many reasons. Temperament, upbringing, self-interest, culture.
Quoting Athena
And some order it and always find many to carry it out.
You just don't see that in prairie dog society.
Oh, dear - again? Didn't I link the correspondence. You can read the fifth meditation, if you like. It's exceeding tedious in describing the heart and circulation, but does explicitly recommend the reader to witness it in 'any large animal'. There's a lot of guff about the soul and reason and why animals don't have those things: because they don't speak French.
Quoting Ludwig V
You mean like Trump(except we have to sanewash him)=Harris(except we set the bar higher)? I don't think so.
You are right that our discussioin has become unproductive and annoying. We aren't making progress. That's a shame but it's probably best if we leave it where it is. Thank you for your time and patience.
I had forgotten that. Sorry.
Thanks. We'll meet again, don't know where, don't know when....
That would be good.
Only if all shared meaning enables and/or facilitates thinking about our own thought and belief(metacognition). Not all does.
Good catch! :wink:
While there is difference between shared meaning and common language, it is not inevitably one of oppositional nature. I find it's more one of existential dependency. It's one of shared elemental constituency; an evolutional history, that of which existed in its entirety prior to being picked out of this world by me.
Some meaningful experience existed in its entirety prior to common language emergence. All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Language less creatures predate language users. Thus, some meaning is prior to common language. <-----that's very important on my view, particularly when talking about meaningful experiences of non human creatures.
A bit on shared meaning, because there is more than one way to understand that notion.
We can draw correlations between the same sorts of things. <----------- That's shared meaning in the sense of common to us both. Add language use and other things(as the content of correlations) and that's the sort of shared meaning required for successful communication.
A growl in a familiar life scenario has all the context necessary for creatures to draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible things... fear, say. Hunger. That happens while their eating. The creatures learn how to react/respond/behave/survive. Could this be the simple basic building blocks of societal constructs such as language like ours? Sure. No metacognition necessary. No thinking about themselves and others as subject matters in their own right necessary. Does this constitute shared meaning in close to the same sense as described above? I think so, although it is not something that we can verify with certainty.
I'm claiming that there is another sort of shared meaning, which I find to be irrevocable for the emergence of the sort described heretofore...
Two creatures that have never encountered one another can both want water and know exactly where to go in order to acquire it(how to get water). That's commonly held belief formed, held, and/or had by virtue of different creatures drawing correlations between the same things. Thirst. A place to drink. No language necessary there. Antelopes and elephants both know where to get water. Where's there's belief, there's always meaning. That's shared meaning.
As it pertains to metacognitive endeavors and the sort of thought that that facilitates...
Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires something to be thought about. That something existed in its entirety prior to being talked about. We use the terms "thought", "belief", "meaningful experience", "mind", etc. How do we think about our own thoughts, beliefs, dreams, meaningful experiences? With naming and descriptive practices. There's no evidence to the contrary, and there's plenty to support that. I think we agree on that much, so perhaps we can set that aside and attempt to move forward?
Assuming that there is such a thing as non human thought or human thought prior to when language acquisition begins in earnest. In seeking to make sense of this, we're isolating/delineating/targeting/defining thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience that existed in its entirety prior to being talked about(prior to naming and descriptive practices).
Oh, and I'm sorry for the seemingly unconnected dots. I'm sometimes prone for doing that.
Thanks. However, I'm a bit hesitant about taking this up again. I didn't intend to upset you before, so I'm concerned that I might do so again. I shall try to keep everything that I say impersonal, in the hope that will suffice.
I'm sorry I have taken to so long to reply. I have had some distractions over the last few days. Nothing problematic, but things that needed to be attended to. But I'll put something together tomorrow.
You've overestimated my upsettedness... :wink: I was just trying to nip personal attacks in the bud. That was also weeks back. Anyway, take your time, as it may be the case that I take longer between replies as well. If you choose to refrain, that's no problem either. Thanks for your participation either way. We may make more headway between the two of us. Often focus is blurred by attempting to attend to too many different approaches at once.
The approach, I think, is imperative.
Did anyone anytime ever clearly set out what counts as thought, let alone rational thought? I saw many employing implicit notions but do not recall anyone actually clearly defining their terms.
OK. So it's over. :smile:
Quoting creativesoul
There are various points that I would qualify or put differently, but fundamentally this seems to me to apply to all thought. Some elaboration on "How do we think...?" seems to be desirable. There's an implied analogy with "How does one start a car?" or "How do you get to Rome?" or "How do we calculate the orbit of Mars" which could easily becomes misleading. But that is a starting point for a general discussion of thinking and language. However, I hope we don't need to get too far into the general issues.
Quoting creativesoul
I realize that you are aiming to define a context for our specific problem. Nothing wrong with that. But I wouldn't set about it in this way. We need to be more specific, because the idea that there is a single general model of our naming and descriptive practices shepherds us into thinking about specific cases in inappropriate ways.
BTW, I'm not clear how far you are committed to the idea of a single general model for all our linguistic practices, because you do talk about them in the plural. However that may be, I see our problem as specifically about certain practices, not all of them.
More specifically, it is about how far we can sensible apply our practice in explaining human action to creatures that are like us but not human, and specifically do not have human languages. It seems inevitable that our practice needs to be modified. The question is what modifications are needed.
Quoting creativesoul
It would be annoying to try and thrash out all the issues before proceeding, so can you proceed with your argument on the basis of a provisional agreement? Then we can just sort out the differences that matter to our discussion. That itself would be an achievement.
_________________________
However, looking more closely at your example does give me pause:-
Quoting creativesoul
I'm very mistrustful of your language in "draw correlations between the growl and other directly perceptible thing .... fear, say". But the scenario is undoubtedly a relevant case and one could say that we learn the correlation between the growl and danger and fighting - hence also fear.
But "correlation" does not distinguish between a Pavlovian response and an action - something that the dog does. When the bell rings and the dog salivates, that's an automatic response - salivating is not under conscious control. It is part of an automatic system which governs digestion. Growling is under conscious control - even a form of communication, counting as a warning. I'm not saying that the distinction is crystal clear, but rather the difference is a question of which mode of interpretation we apply to the phenomena. The Pavlovian response is causal; growling functions in a scoial context. (Even that needs further explanation). But the fact that it has a social function suggests that some awareness of the awareness of the difference self and others is necessary.
I look forward to your reply.
Thinking about X requires X. <------I'm okay with that.
Quoting Ludwig V emphasis mine
I'm not okay with that.
Not all things(X's) exist in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some thought and belief existed in their entirety prior to being talked about. Some did not. Some cannot. It could be put a bit differently. Some thought and belief are existentially dependent upon being talked about. Some are not.
To be even more precise, some thought and belief require having already been articulated by the creature under consideration in order for them to even be formed, had, and/or held by that candidate. In such cases, the articulation is itself an integral part of the formation process and thus the formation thereof consists, in part at least, of the articulation process.
Consider the sheer complexity of thought required in order to understand Gettier's obliteration of the J part of JTB... as held/articulated by three defenders thereof at the time. That sort of thought/understanding cannot be formed, held, and/or had without very complex articulation. Understanding Moore's concerns about belief attribution practices fits nicely here as well. Those belief are formed by articulation alone.
I should have made this clearer earlier.
The earlier claims that "thinking about thought and belief requires something to think about" and "that something existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it" were referring to the underlying necessary conditions/preconditions required in order for it to happen. This helps to fill in some blanks on the evolutionary timeline.
Agreed.
All thought, belief and statements thereof consist of correlations drawn between different things. We and all other capable creatures think solely by virtue of drawing correlations between different things.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. There are many more than one linguistic practice. There are more than just naming and descriptive practices. However, none can possibly be practiced without picking things out of this world to the exclusion of all else, regardless of how that's done. It's always done.
Different practices of ours have different problems. I have yet to have been exposed to a single conventional practice of belief attribution that has, as it's basis, notions of "belief" and "thought" that can properly account for the evolutionary progression of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. That historical account includes what language less animals can form, have, and/or hold such that it counts as thought or belief. It is this crucially important aspect that remains sorely neglected by conventional standards/notions of thought/belief, "rational thought" notwithstanding.
What counts as rational thought presupposes some notion of "thought" or another. That's the driving force, the ground, for all subsequent attributions of "rational" or "not rational" to the thought under consideration.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. This seems to be a promising avenue.
A modification of our standards is needed. What counts as sufficient justificatory ground to attribute this belief, that thought, or these emotions to this or that non human creature? That is the underlying unresolved problematic question pervading this thread.
Upon what justificatory ground do we(I) claim that dogs have absolutely no idea which train is the five o'clock train? Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is knowledge of which one counts as such. Which train counts as the five o'clock train is determined solely by human standards borne of language use(amongst many other things). It is only when and if one knows how to properly apply the standard that one can know which one counts as the five o'clock train.
Dogs do not make the cut. Even ones to whom five o'clock trains become meaningful, they do so not because it counts as the five o'clock train, but rather because the five o'clock train is/was/has been an integral part - a basic elemental constituent - of the dog's meaningful experience(thought and/or belief). The dog has drawn correlations between the train and all sorts of other things, none of which are our time standards.
Quoting Ludwig V
Tomorrow.
:smile:
This is a side-issue, but who are the three defenders you are thinking of?
Quoting creativesoul
I may have misinterpreted "prior". I was treating it as meaning "presupposed" and thinking of the variety of preconditions that have to be satisfied to make thought and belief meaningful. Even new introductions have to be based on existing ideas if they are to be explained at all.
This takes me back to:-
Quoting creativesoul
Here, you seem to be suggesting a single pattern of thought that explains all thought. But is that consistent with the variety of thoughts you specify? If some thought and beliefs are existentially dependent on being talked about, I don't see how the model of correlations drawn between different things applies.
Quoting creativesoul
I agree with that. That's why I've taken such an interest in this topic. There's very little discussion anywhere, and yet, in my view, it's not only important for understanding animals, but also for understanding humans.
Quoting creativesoul
That's because philosophers seem to be totally hypnotized with thought and belief as articulated in language. They seem to assume that model can be applied, without change, to animals and tacit thinking and knowledge.
How does a god exist? Do any animals other than human beings worship a god? I am thinking about the existence of the things we talk about and also the difference between humans and animals.
How about love. What is it? What does it consist of? Will the lion ever learn to "love" its neighbor?
I read more of what Creativesoul had to say about existential thinking and thought of deleting my post, but maybe there is some benefit to simplifying a debate about what exists because it has substance and what does not. Does anyone remember the Greek argument of what exists and what does not?
Not so different from today's debates about the existence of a god. I think we have to puzzle what was the original awareness of a god. We can experience a tree or a lion, the gods are not experienced in that way, so where does the idea of god come from? And I want to mention animals, which animal other than a human thinks about a god or mates with someone because of ideas of love?
I'm not confident I remember the authors of the three JTB formulations Gettier set out in the beginning of his paper. Maybe... Ayer, Chisholm, and ??? Lol... It bugged me enough to go check... Scratch the third. :wink: It was just Ayer and Chisholm. I wanted to say Collinwood, for some reason. The 'third' formulation was a generic one from Gettier himself. Something tells me you already know this. :wink:
Quoting Ludwig V
That's okay. Sometimes it takes a little work to understand each other. They're very close in meaning, and often used interchangeably. I don't.
For my part, "presupposed" is about the thinking creature. "Prior to" is about the order of emergence/existence. The latter is spatiotemporal/existential. The former is psychological.
Quoting Ludwig V
Is this referring to the position I'm working out/from? I mean, sure, as language users anything we come up with will be based - loosely at least - on something we've already been exposed to. All explanation is language use. As it pertains to philosophy, there will be all sorts of prior influences. Yet, I'm confident that thought, belief, and meaningful experience is prior to the complex sort of language we employ. I'm also confident that there are precursors to our language that do some of the same thing(s) that our language does, despite those animals not having the ability to take account/record with meaningful marks, and naming and descriptive practices. We can look at what language less animals are doing with language too. <---- Here, of course, by "language-less" I mean complex spoken and written language such as our own, capable of metacognition. I really need to start being better about that qualification though, because I'm confident we're not the only language users.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm not suggesting a pattern of thought. I'm setting out the basic outline/parameters of an autonomous biological process that amounts to a basic outline of all thought, from the simplest through the most complex. If there's inconsistency, self-contradiction, and/or incoherence I'm unaware. The differences in thoughts are the content of the correlations. That's key to all the different 'kinds' of thought, in a nutshell.
Knowing which train is the five o'clock train is existentially dependent upon being talked about. I mean, one cannot acquire knowledge of which train counts as the five o'clock train without drawing correlations between those standards and some train or another. That is chock full of correlations, some of which are between the language use itself, which amounts to talking about the time standards and trains.
That is the sort of thought/belief that is existentially dependent on a creature capable of metacognition.
Quoting Ludwig V
I see it much the same way. The current political environment shows how correlations work. It's how some get convinced to be mad at all the wrong people for all the wrong reasons.
As an explanation.
Quoting Athena
Well, as best I can tell, they're probably incapable of wondering why this or that happens. So, I suspect the answer is "no". I'm okay not knowing.
Quoting Athena
Good questions. Apt. Germane. Yet, seemingly so distant to the current conversation. They're not though! Not at all. It's extremely nuanced. I'm still working things out, but I'll say this much because it seems you're asking about the ontological basis I'm working from.
That which exists has an effect/affect.
I'm thinking there's more than one. I'm unfamiliar with all.
Nice. I take it you read through some of my meanderings here?
None that I can tell. Pondering one's own existence requires having already situated oneself in what isn't. Commit solipsism to the flames...
It is my next focus here. My apologies for not being prompt yesterday. Late dinner invitation. Nice company. Be nice to have another someplace other than a famous steakhouse chain with far too many people in far too little volume of space. And the noise! Argh... brought out the spectrum in me.
:wink:
I did and I didn't. That is, I was expecting references to some of the critiques of Gettier's article, rather than Gettier's selection from existing formulations.
Quoting creativesoul
No hurry. I've never been happy in large, noisy, crowded (and drunken) parties and it's only got worse with age. People behave differently in crowds. There's a lot of research about that - largely with a public order agenda. The Greeks regarded it as a madness and explained it by reference to Bacchus and/or Pan.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. I see that.
Quoting creativesoul
There's a lot to be said for that. Stimulus/response and association of ideas do seem to be very important to learning. However, there's an important differentiation between Pavlov's model and Skinner's. (It's not necessarily a question of one or the other. Both may well play their part.) Pavlov presupposes a passive organism - one that learns in response to a stimulus. Skinner posits what he calls "operant conditioning" which is a process that starts with the organism acting on or in the environment and noticing the results of those actions - here the organism stimulates the environment which responds in its turn. There's another interesting source of learning - mimicry. I've gathered that very new infants are able to smile back at a smiling face - there's even a section of the brain that produces this mirroring effect. It is still observable in adults. Just food for thought.
Quoting creativesoul
I think I can see what you mean. But it needs clarification because there are philosophers who will saying that knowing anything is existentially dependent on being talked about - because drawing distinctions in the way that we do depends on language.
Suppose we stipulate that knowing that it is 5 o'clock requires an understanding of a conceptual scheme that is not available without language. My dogs have always tended to get restless and congregate near the kitchen at around the time that they are fed. I think they know that it is time for dinner. If they were people, we would have no hesitation in saying that they know it is 7 o'clock (say). How do I know that people understand the background scheme? I know if they can tell the time at any time, for example - which does not necessarily require human language, but normally that is how it works. If a small child (who has not yet learnt to tell the time) appears in the kitchen at 7 o'clock, we will look for other clues to explain why they show up.
Quoting Ludwig V
Is it the presupposition that fear is a directly perceptible thing? If the being full of fear does not count as directly perceiving fear then nothing will. It's part of the internal aspect of all meaningful thought, belief and/or experience. There are internal elements as well as external ones.
Quoting Ludwig V
They're competing viewpoints about the same thing. They both consist of meaningful correlations being drawn by a creature so capable(the agents' themselves in this scenario). I'm unsure of why these were invoked.
A difference between Pavlov and Skinner has no relevance when we're talking about the elemental constituency of that which existed in its entirety prior to language use. Pavlov and Skinner differ in their respective explanations. What they're taking account of(attempting to explain) existed in its entirety prior to their account. <----------that which existed in its entirety prior to being talked about is precisely what needs set out first here, for any notion of thought and belief that is claimed to apply to language less creatures must satisfy that criterion.
I'm happy to clarify. I'm unsure what you're after though. The fact that some philosophers cannot or do not have any idea how distinctions can be drawn without language doesn't bear on my argument as far as I can tell. Seems to me like a problem with their conceptual/linguistic framework(s). My charge has always been that convention has gotten human thought and belief horribly wrong. The fact that language less thought and belief cannot be admitted due to pains of coherency alone shows that there is a problem with convention. There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? I'm aware of your avoidance of talking in terms of elemental constituency, but from where I sit it makes the most sense of the most things. It also flips many an ancient archaic dichotomy on its head.
Yes, I see. I wasn't clear whether you were talking first-person view or third. I agree that creatures who do not have human language do experience fear (and pain). Obviously there may be complications and disagreements about other emotions and feelings. But what I'm not clear about is whether you regard fear as a stimulus or a response?
Quoting creativesoul
Because I want to suggest that there is more than one pattern of correlation in play, and that mimicry might be described as a correlation, but it is different from either.
Quoting creativesoul
You seem to be positing some kind of atomic or basic elements here, and I'm not sure that such things can be identified in knowledge or behaviour.
Quoting creativesoul
OK. So how do we identify that which existed in its entirety prior to be talked about?
Quoting creativesoul
Oh, we agree there. I think that answer to what the thought, belief and meaningful experience of language-less creatures consists of is fairly straightforward. Behaviour.
Scientific thought on emotions in animals
Thought etc. in creatures lacking human language is expressed and available to us in their behaviour. The same is true in human beings, but, of course, philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. I can't think why.
That's interesting. Are we talking about the responses of scientists who study animal behaviour? If so, it confirms my expectation that the closer people look at animal behaviour, the more they find in it.
Yes.
The first paragraph of the linked article:
1. Punch them in return.
2. Cry.
3. Ask them why they punched me; why they think punching is a good solution to any problem; or whatever.
All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).
It's quite a change from the old (Cartesian) scientific opinion. Perhaps there's some hope for the world.
Quoting Patterner
Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours.
Quoting Ludwig V
When it comes to what counts as thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) of language less creatures, we must be talking about what's meaningful to the creature. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of first or third person though. I see no point in unnecessarily adding complexity where none is warranted.
Pertaining whether or not I regard fear as a stimulus or a response...
I do not find it helpful to use that framework. It could be either, depending upon the framework/conceptual scheme being employed and point of view. Fear is the result of autonomous biological machinery doing its job. It is part of fearful experience. All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Fearful experiences are meaningful to the creature full of fear, whether that includes an alpha male's growl accompanied by submissive members' behaviour, or the fear from/of falling(which I understand to be innate). Fear is always an internal element within a more complex experience involving both internal and external elements.
Quoting Ludwig V
Sure. Mimicry, for the sake of mimicking, involves the mimic drawing correlations between an other's behaviour and their own. Again, biological machinery plays an autonomous role here. However, I do think that neuroscience has established, as you've alluded to perhaps with the infant's smile, that there is not always a mimic who's mimicking for the sake of mimicking. Mirror neurons also play a role in empathy as well as recognizing/attributing other minds. At least, that's what I believe to be the case... very generally/roughly speaking. Smiles are contagious after-all. And then there's also the fact that young children learn how to act in this or that situation by virtue of mimicking others' behaviours, in a "children learn what they live" sort of thing.
I'm not sure what you're saying or referring to with "pattern of correlation".
Quoting Ludwig V
That is exactly what I'm arguing for. The basic elemental constituency of all thought... rational thought notwithstanding. The success or failure of identifying those is completely determined by the methodological approach. Current convention fails.
Quoting Ludwig V
Well, we can use what we do know about our own thought and belief as a means for beginning to set out what must be the case if language less thought exists(if it is possible for language less creatures to think), or if language less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought or belief, or if language less creatures are capable of having meaningful experiences. I've touched on all this earlier in the thread. I'd be pleased to dig in. It's time.
Such metacognitive endeavors shift the focus away from behaviour and onto our own thought, belief, and meaningful experiences. That is the only place to start. It is not the only place to finish.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm confused.
Are you claiming that all language less (creatures') thought, belief, and/or experience consists entirely of behaviour and behaviour alone? I would not agree with that, at all. Thinking about trees and cats includes trees and cats. Neither trees nor cats are behaviour. They are elements in such thought.
You may remember that earlier in this thread there was some discussion of Timothy Pennings' claim that his corgi could do calculus. See Excerpts from "Do dogs know calculus"
The path followed by light refracted through two different mediums is calculated in this way, but no-one worries about what meaningful experiences are involved. So if Pennings' Corgi follows the same path, I don't see that the experience of the corgi is relevant. The calculation applies. So Pennings' title forces us to face the issue whether what matters is the dog's experiences or the mathematics. Or, preferably, what the relationship is between the two points of view.
Or consider the theory of kin selection as an explanation of altruism in social creatures. The idea that preserving one's kin is as good a way (perhaps better than preserving oneself) to preserve one's DNA and that is what, in the end, matters. Empirically, that could well explain the phenomena. But no-one thinks that bees can identify the DNA of another bee. So we need to explain how the bees select who to sacrifice themselves for and clarify what the relationship is between the two points of view. For example, it may be that bees with the same DNA as our subject bee produce similar pheromones, which we know bees can identify and respond to. So that would be a candidate.
Catching a thrown ball is a quite complex mathematical problem. We have to learn how to do it and we improve with experience. But I'm quite sure that I am incapable of solving that mathematical problem. How do I do it? Well, I can also accurately identify where a sound is coming from. We know that we do that by calculation from the difference between the time the sound arrives at one ear and the time it arrives at the other, which is why stereo headphones work in the weird way that they do. Even if I could do the calculation, I could not do it in the time it takes me to identify where the sound comes from. (We can also accurately assess how far away the things we see are, at least at close range, by the extend we have to focus the two eyes in order to see one image - just like a range-finder. We don't normally experience that.)
Surely, thought that involves trees and cats is involved in the behaviour that involves trees and cats. I don't see what you are getting at.
Quoting Patterner
I'm inclined to answer yes. But I would much prefer to work from examples, so that I understand what the distinction amounts to.
I would be hard pressed to express any of the thoughts in this post, to say nothing of the thoughts expressed in the 39 pages of the thread, as well as the other however many threads at TPF, without language. I would be interested in hearing how all of these thoughts might possibly come to exist without language. But even without an explanation of that, now that they do exist, What language-less behavior can express them?
Of course one cannot philosophize without language. One of the big puzzles in Berekeley's writing is that he is very clear that his immatierialism does not imply any change whatever to his everyday behaviour, and there's a good case for saying that the heliocentric view of the solar system does not result in any change to ordinary behaviour.
But one can express philosophical views in actions rather than words. There's a story that some of Descartes' followers in Amsterdam expressed their belief in Cartesian dualism by nailing a dog to a wooden plank. Devout Christians may express their beliefs in many ways other than asserting them - refraining from certain behaviours and pursuing others. One of the arguments against radical scepticism is precisely that the sceptic does not behave as if scepticism were true.
However, I never intended to claim that there are always non-linguistic ways to express any belief expressed in language. Perhaps I should have been clearer.
Descartes' followers may have been expressing their belief in Cartesian dualism in a very strict sense. (I'm not sure "strict" is the right word, but it's the best I can do at the moment.) But they would not have come to that belief without language. Language was necessary for the belief to exist before the belief could be expressed with non-linguistic behavior.
And nobody observing their behavior would have known the belief they were expressing if someone had not used language to explain it to them.
I don't contest the point that there are beliefs that we could not develop without language. All I'm suggesting is that linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, in our world, are connected. Yet I don't rule out the possibility that there are some beliefs that cannot be expressed without language. These are not separate domains, but intertwined. This is why Pennings' Corgi is such a puzzle.
Quoting Patterner
Yes, of course, But context is always essential to understand behaviour in creatures capable of rational thought.
Quoting Patterner
For what it's worth, I'm not clear about this stuff either. It would be tidy if we could draw a clear line between what can be done with and without language. But I just don't see it.
Quoting Ludwig VMaybe we can't develop all beliefs without language. But, once developed, they can be expressed without language.
However, I think the fact that we can't develop all beliefs without language addresses this:Quoting Ludwig VHumans have a lot of beliefs that no other species has, and we wouldn't without language. That seems like a significant difference to me.
Yes. You seem to have it about right. The only issue now is what concepts we can attribute when explaining what animals that do not have human languages.
Quoting Patterner
Yes. The question of the significance of the difference(s) is likely the trickiest one of all.
Quoting Patterner
First, we can(and do, I would argue) know what all meaningful experience consists of - at the basic irreducible core. It consists of correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. That question was asked to Ludwig, for he admits language less thought and belief. I presume he would admit experience as a result. However, his approach is woefully inequipped to answer the question. That was the point of asking it.
It's 'the things' that matter most here. Those are the differences between language less thought, belief, and meaningful experiences, and those of language users. Our knowledge acquisition of those things, if the right sort of approach is used and maintained, very clearly set out the difference(s) between the thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences of language less creatures and language users.
I'm not sure why that difference seems so puzzling to some. Language less creatures do not - cannot - draw correlations between language use and other things. It's as simple as that. Their meaningful experience, thought, and/or belief does not consist of language use. They do not draw correlations between language use and other things.
The difficult and interesting aspects of this endeavor come with explaining the gradual increase in complexity that happens once language use has begun in earnest.
Second, we know language less creatures are capable of meaningful experience, because we can watch them do all sorts of stuff that it makes no sense to deny it. In addition to our ever increasing knowledge base regarding the biological machinery involved in our own experiences, our own working notions/terminological use of "thought", "belief", and "meaning" come to the fore here.
If language less creatures are capable of having meaningful experience(s), and all experience is meaningful to the creature having it, then it is clear that meaning exists prior to language creation on the evolutionary timeline. All meaningful experience consists - in very large part - of thought and belief about the universe. If a language less creature can form, have and/or hold belief about the world, and some of their belief about the world can be true, then either true belief exists without truth, or truth is prior to language.
If it is the case that meaningful experience predate language users, then one's notion of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaning" better be able to dovetail with those facts. Current convention fails to draw and maintain the actual distinctions between thinking and thinking about one's own thinking(thought/belief). That's been the bane of philosophy from Aristotle through Kant, Descartes, etc. I know of not a single philosopher who has drawn and maintained that distinction. Of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one, but, I've been asking many people for over 20 years, and I've yet to have been given an affirmative answer/author/philosopher so...
This scope of this subject matter is as broad as it can be. If we've gotten our own thought and belief wrong, and I'm convinced we have, then we've also gotten something wrong about anything and everything ever thought, believed, spoken, stated, uttered, and/or otherwise expressed.
Indeed, it does.
I'm not keen on conflating mathematical descriptions(which are existentially dependent upon language users) with language less knowledge, thought, and/or belief. Dogs are incapable of doing math. Doing math requires naming quantities. Dogs cannot do that. They can catch a ball nonetheless, and we can describe those events(or at least the trajectory of the ball) with calculus.
Are you claiming that language less thought, belief, and/or experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone?
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. I would agree that the dog salivates upon hearing the bell, after the bell has become meaningful to the dog. The bell becomes meaningful to the dog when the dog draws correlations between it and eating. Hence, both are autonomous. The correlations drawn between the bell and food as well as the involuntary salivation.
What difference is a question of how we interpret the events? The events are already meaningful. Hence, it is possible to misinterpret them.
I'm not convinced that growling is under conscious control, as if used intentionally to communicate/convey the growling dogs' thought/belief. I'm more likely to deny that that's what's going on. The growl is meaningful for both the growling dog and the submissive others. I'm not convinced that the growl is a canine speech act so to speak.
There's a sleight of hand here. Functioning in a social context does not lend itself to being a social function in the sense that the community members have some awareness of the awareness. That sort of 'higher order' thinking requires thinking about awareness as a separate subject matter in its own right(metacognition). Metacognition is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
The growl has efficacy, no doubt. It is meaningful to both the growling dogs and the others. I would even agree that it could be rudimentary language use, but it's nothing even close to adequate evidence for concluding that growls function in a social context in the same way that our expressions of thought and belief do.
I'm not sure I'm okay with calling it a warning, to be frank. That presupposes knowledge of the growling dog's worldview(intention) that I am not privy to.
Might have something to do with the fact that not all behaviour involves using language. All linguistic behaviour does.
Good question. One way is to assess the ethical implications of the differences we find. Another would be to examine and explore why people get so strongly committed. It would be at least helpful to know why people think it matters. But the difficult bit is that how one sees animals is very much a function of the relationships one has with them, so there isn't a purely objective basis for the judgement. There isn't a matter of fact that makes the difference - it's a question of how one chooses to interact with them.
Quoting creativesoul
OK. I'll bite. I thought you were asking the question because I couldn't answer it; actually I have answered; it's just that you don't like the answer. I haven't worked out exactly how to argue the point, so I'm holding my peace until I've worked that out.
Preliminary problems include what it means to say that any meaningful experience consists of anything never mind what it means to say that meaningful experience consists of correlations.
Quoting creativesoul
Language users express their beliefs etc. by talking (and in their other behaviour). Clearly, creatures without human language cannot express their beliefs by talking. But they can and do express their beliefs by their behaviour. Both language users and creatures without language have meaningful experiences, which, presumably, "consist of" correlations. (I'm setting aside my doubts about "consist of" and correlations.)
Quoting creativesoul
Insofar as they do not have human language, that seems obvious. But then, when I call out "dinner", my dog appears. Isn't that correlating language with something else? When I call out "sit", she sits and looks at me expectantly. Apparently dogs are capable of responding appropriately to something like 200 words, which is about the language learning level of a two year old human.
I wasn't conflating those two descriptions. I was pointing out that the mathematical description of the trajectory of the ball does apply to the ball and that the dog (or indeed, human) is not applying that description. What beliefs and/or experiences can we discern in ourselves to explain how the ball is caught? Can we attribute those same beliefs to the dog or not? I think that skills like these are attributed to "judgement", which means either that the human "just sees" where the ball is coming and the same can be attributed to the dog. Both express their belief about where the ball is coming by positioning themselves to catch it.
We can legitimately expect that there will be some neurological activity which we are not conscious of and which that enables this to happen. This will be similar to the neurological activity that must underlie our ability to discern where a sound is coming from. We can also expect the same or similar activity to be going on in the dog.
Quoting creativesoul
The difference between the autonomous salivation and the growl which is under the dog's control.
Quoting creativesoul
I wasn't going so far as claiming that it is a canine speech act. However, my speech acts are meaningful to myself and others (including my dog), so there may well be something to the comparison.
As to conscious control, I cannot train my dog to salivate or not on my command (any more than I can train myself to salivate or not as I wish). But I can train my dog to stop growling on command. That suggests the growl is under the dog's control.
Quoting creativesoul
Sorry, I'm confused. If the growl warns others not to be aggressive, I would have thought that they were aware of the dog's belief that they are being regarded as a possible threat. Is that what you meant by awareness of the awareness? I would also have thought that the dog was aware of it's own awareness that the others present a possible threat. Perhaps that's what you mean?
Quoting creativesoul
So we agree at least to some extent. I wasn't making any claim about equivalence of that function to our expressions of thought and belief. Though it does occur to me that when I feel threatened by someone, I will make placatory and/or self-confident signals, whether by body language or in speech in order to warn them off. That seems to me to be performing the same function as the growl. The difference, I would say, is the difference between the simplicity of the growl and the complexity of the messages we can convey through the complexity of language. There is similarity and difference.
I think you are talking about how we use those abilities.
That's odd. I thought you were asking how we might determine the significance of the difference between animals and humans.
It's just that we can argue endlessly about the differences between animals and humans. But, in the end, each species is different from the others in some respects and similar in others. So it seems to me that it is an empty debate (whether the glass is half full or half empty). Yet we we think the question is really important? Why? What is at stake?
It seems likely that language is important in enabling the human way(s) of life. Probably our opposable thumb is also important, not to mention our large brain. None of those differences means that we are not animals or that we are justified in pretending otherwise.
I will say "no." Sound is not the only way animals communicate. They also communicate with smells and behaviors. The reaction is as automatic as jumping when one hears a loud crashing sound. We would not have survived if we didn't react automatically to threats when a fast reaction is essential. However, unlike the dog, we are not going to continue barking and growling when we realize the mailman is not a threat. However, some humans do react by grabbing a gun and pulling the trigger and expect to be exonerated no matter who they shoot. The point is like animals we react without thinking and that is not equal to having language.
We slip into language when we start making pictures and then start telling stories with pictures. This is the development of conceptual thinking. True, there are some animals that paint pictures when given paint brushes and paint, but these pictures are splashes of color, not portraits of other animals and objects.
Animals may learn human language but it is not instinctive. However, I suspect if a group of bonobos learn a language and teach their children language, over many generations the ability to use language will either end or become part of their inborn abilities. Abilities can be passed on through parents and genes. We are on the same evolutionary branch as Chimpanzees and Bonobo and not all humans are like modern man but were more a transition from ape to human.
I believe we share much in common with other animals because we are evolved animals. Aboriginal people around the world learned about life by studying animals. Life lessons came from the crow and the wolves. etc..
Thank you both of you. As I was working on my previous reply I started to wonder why I think language and thinking are so important. Humans can be incredibly destructive and that is far from being intelligent. Our creation story making us to be not animals but as angels made separate from the animals. ? What is that? Might that creation story be harmful?
I think we need to understand we are evolved as are the rest of the animals. Equally important is our heart. If our hearts are not in tune with nature might be an evil force on earth?
I'm just saying there is a significant difference between humans and animals. I think this is evidenced by many of the things we do and manufacture. I also think we think about things no other species thinks about. Of course, I can't prove my cat isn't pondering the nature of consciousness, trying to find an easier way to locate prime numbers, or amusing himself with the thought of the cat who shaves all the cats who do not shave themselves. But, if someone invented a machine that allows us to listen in on his thoughts, I would be willing to bet anything that he isn't.
A fetus becomes conscious before being born and early self-conscious emotions appear during at age 15-24 months. Yet ask yourself, if nobody had talked about consciousness to you, you wouldn't have read about it or been taught about it, would you have come to think about the nature of consciousness?
If you answer yes or even perhaps, then how would you talk about it? What level do you think your ideas would be about it if you wouldn't have any reference to science or philosophy about the issue or the basic biological understanding we have now. Just look at this thread and notice how much people refer to biology, science and philosophy. The previous discourse about the issue.
Not only do you need a very complex language to talk about the nature of consciousness, you need a lot of information to talk about it.
Now your cat might not think about Russell's paradox, but it quite likely can count. It could be argued that it has some primitive feline mathematical system, because counting is very important for situational awareness. Logic is also quite important in situational awareness.
Hence the huge difference isn't a biological difference, but a social and informational difference.
There's no Neandethals, Denisovans, Homo erectus, Homo rhodiensis, Homo naledi, Homo luzonensis, homo floriensis walking around anymore, even if there were 300 000 years ago. And all because of us, not because of climate change etc. Those that could have children with us, they now are part of our genealogical roots. It's telling when Alexander the Great made his genocidal journey of conquer to the outskirts of India, the Greeks had a brief "battle" with strange little humans that fled to the trees, until someone told them these were actually animals called monkeys and they wouldn't be a threat to them or a population to be subjugated.
Animals do use tools and for example the Neanderthal could make a fire, so the question is that would these other hominids of our tree be able to invent or copy agriculture, have the written word? Very likely, but they are no more.
Hence to your question, why wouldn't any other animal have the social and informational systems than we have, is because if they would, they would have posed a threat to us and we would have exterminated them.
Never underestimate the viciousness and utter cruelty of this species we call Homo Sapiens, mankind. Just look how cruel we can be for our own fellow man, even today. We aren't peaceful Kapybaras, you know.
I quite agree. However, while that may explain why there is no species with which we don't have such a social and informational difference, it doesn't explain the social and informational difference. The reason no other species does what we do socially and informationally is that their brains aren't capable of it. When other species have been in close contact with us for millennia, watching and hearing the things we do and how we do them, us attempting to teach them, what other explanation could there be?
Most mammals don't fly but bats do fly. Would that difference mean a bat is not an animal? It appears you are saying humans are not animals. We have a larger cortex than other apes and vocal cords that apes do not have. We are different but how does that difference equal humans are not animals?
Baboons do not learn from chimpanzees. The baboon can see the chimpanzee stick a twig in a rotting log and get termits but it never attempts to do so. Interestingly, the female chimp learns a lot from her mother but male chimps are less likely to pay attention to what their mother is doing until they get older.
Here is a lecture on animals and social learning.
Bats are the only mammals that can fly. I'm not saying bats are not mammals.
Love is older and more deeply rooted in sentient beings than rational thought. Love is a complex of emotions that connect one individual to another. In its most primitive form, the mother's tender concern for her young, closely followed by the bond between mated pairs. In the more evolved species, close friendship are formed between individuals - and not only of their own species. Many lions love their tiger, canine or human friends. Most humans are also picky about whom they love, and it's rarely their neighbour.
Quoting Athena
By inhabiting the human - exclusively human - imagination. Gods come into being through human projection and/or wishful thinking and are then sustained by application of rational narrative and social infrastructure to an irrational central idea.
Animals don't do that. If they're in awe of something, it's because that thing has got real power, not because they've they've conjured it up from their own murky subconscious.
And bats cannot communicate with iguanas and condors have little in common with zebras. Species within the same family are more like one another than they are like members of another family; human are more different from chipmunks than they are from gorillas. Gorillas are also very different from octopi, even though both are capable of rational problem-solving, neither can do algebra, but I expect both can be taught to play the piano. There are similarities and differences between species throughout the animal kingdom and its evolution.
But humans are super-duper-special; utterly different from other species in so many ways that are hugely important to humans.
Sadly, intelligence is not restricted by ethics. It enables us to do wonderful things, and also to do terrible things.
Well, our creation story doesnt mention angels. But God does decide to prevent Adam & Eve from eating the apple of the knowledge of good and evil for fear that they might become as one of us. Food for thought. I think the harmful bit in our creation story is the idea that God gave us dominion over everything. If only they had said stewardship !
Plato thought that we are a combination of animal and god.
Quoting Athena
Yes, heart is important arguably more important than intelligence. I understand the feeling that being out of tune with nature is a bad thing. But the natural is not always a good thing. Nature, in itself, is neither good nor bad but just what it is or perhaps sometimes good and sometimes bad.
Quoting Patterner
Im sorry, I shouldnt have referred to the earlier discussion without identifying exactly where it is. I never wanted to accuse you of saying it. The earlier discussion centred on the consequences of Cartesion dualism for our treatment of animals.
Quoting Patterner
There are differences between human and animals. There are also similarities. So the interesting part is what significant means.
Actually, I think the significant differences are the ethical ones. We have moral obligations to animals essentially, not to treat the cruelly. But they have not corresponding moral obligations to us; in fact they cant be judged by our ordinary moral standards though one could argue that they do have something like the beginnings of a moral sense.
Quoting ssu
Yes. Most of the abilities that seem to differentiate us from animals depend on our being brought up in human society. The feral children who turn up from time to time have great difficulty in making good what they missed.
Quoting ssu
Your point about the cat is well made. Its the usual thing every time something is identified as different and specifically human, it turns out that animals (some animals) have the beginnings or foundations of them. Its just that we have supernormal development of them.
The point about mathematics and logic also seems to be right. But it does seem that our capacity to learn all those human skills and practices has a biological basis over-developed cortex, opposable thumb, bipedalism.
The point that @Patterner also made of our brains being different might be the real difference, but even that might be smaller than we think. Bipedalism and our hands are reason why we can use so extensively tools. Also it has been studied that Homo Sapiens could have more children that lived up to adulthood than our hominid brothers. Yet the real question is hypothetical, could for example the Neanderthal been capable of creating a civilization? They could speak, at least a bit and could make fire, which obviously shows their sophistication. To dismiss the possibility outright based on biological differences we cannot do as it's now purely a hypothetical question.
And let's face the fact that if humans would have remained as hunter gatherers, there simply couldn't be so many of us and we would have molded the Earth as we have now. Without agriculture there wouldn't excess food production and hence there couldn't be division of labor, job specialization. Agriculture and trade and writing are simply crucial for our development to what we are now, especially if it has anything to do with our society or our scientific thought.
Agriculture got started just somewhere around 11000 BC and writing is even a more frequent invention, so what has made us different from the hunter gatherers (whom many of our extinct fellow hominids were too) has happened only a while ago.
Can I take that as suggesting that the things that make humans so special are not necessarily important to other creatures or, necessarily, to the planet? The planet, at least, seems poised to wreck our civilizations and we seem incapable of doing anything much about it.
The thing is, it seems to me that since, for better or worse, we are animals in so many ways, it doesn't really make sense to say that we are "utterly" different from other species.
Quoting Ludwig VWhich is all nonsense. People who want to be cruel will spin whatever they can to justify their cruelty.
Quoting Ludwig VNothing matters more. What makes humans different from other species? What is there answer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness? How did life begin? Did anything exist before the Big Bang? All fascinating topics. And we are driven to explore the unknown, and try to answer questions. But if we do not treat others, human and others, well, then we're filthy creatures pretending to be better than we are.
Quoting Ludwig VSome do. But it doesn't matter. No animal other than us can be judged for cruelty. They aren't thinking cruel thoughts when they do anything. They aren't choosing to be cruel. Only we have that capacity.
Of course not. Why should they be? Every individual member of every species is primarily concerned with its own survival, secondly with the survival of its family, flock or colony, thirdly with making their life less difficult. Only those with an unusual amount of physical security and leisure time have the luxury of reflection, self-assessment and thinking about how to think about their own thinking. Only a diminishing minority of humans are lucky enough to have that. Some felines and canines under human protection have the leisure, but they use it differently.
Quoting Ludwig V
That's only because our civilizations wrecked the planet, and when we became aware of this fact, refused to do anything about it.
Quoting Ludwig V
I've never thought so. Even rabbits are capable of destroying their habitat.
Proportionally, we are not the fastest, strongest, or most durable. We can't fly, we can't burrow, we can't swim underwater for more than a few minutes. Yet, because of our intelligence, we surpass every other species in all of these ways, and more. And we can do things no other species can do to the least degree, or is even trying. Such as travel to other celestial bodies, store information outside of our bodies, communicate instantly with the other side of the world, create intelligent entities that are not our biological offspring, and make a good go at destroying life on the planet. There is no ELE like us. It might be a good idea to better understand the things that make us different, rather than deny that we are.
Who's denying it? I'm well aware of all the things humans have accomplished and are capable of that no other species - indeed, not all the other species put together - could have done or can do.
Surely, having all those superior attainments, possessions and complexity of intellect are distinction enough. Our power to destroy them all should be power enough. I don't see a reason to deny them basic attributes like affection, communication and rational thought.
Animals can be jerks. Yet I think the issue is that we have come up with smart the idea of ethics, which we relate only to us.
Yeah, they can be jerks. Which makes for great videos on fb. :rofl:
Why do you suppose we relate our ethical principles only to use? Why don't we hold them accountable for there pain and death they cause each other? Why do we often kill dogs that break their chain and attack people?
In what circumstances, according to what law, by what standards? The pain and death other animals cause one another are generally inflicted in the course of feeding to survive - the means and method of which they have much less control than we do, and we don't outlaw human mean and methods of obtaining food, regardless of the pain the captivity and death of that food entail.
Quoting Patterner
Because in a human-controlled world, people are sacred - unless they've been convicted of a capital crime or inducted into an army - and dogs are not.
Well, those questions are indeed important because they disorient us and conclusive answers are hard to come by. But I also think that the everyday concerns of food and shelter and sociality are more important. Certainly, If those things are not available, it would be irrational not to give them a higher priority.
Quoting Patterner
I agree with that.
Quoting Patterner
That's certainly what I was saying earlier. But I'm bedevllied by a tendency to think of counter-examples after I've said something. I have heard that if a fox gets into a hen coop, it will kill every single one of them even though it cannot eat them all and cannot store them for the future. Farmers, I've heard, have a particular down on foxes for that reason. Would that count as choosing to be cruel? At least the fox doesn't torture them. Cats, on the other hand, I've heard, tend to corner a mouse and play with it, allowing it to escape and then catching it back at the last moment. (I've never seen that for myself). Would that count?
Quoting Patterner
Does that mean you agree with me?
Quoting Patterner
I'm sorry, I don't understand what "ELE" means. But it's a fair point.
Quoting Vera Mont
I agree with that.
Quoting Vera Mont
Quite so. What I'm getting at, though, is that our power over them and lack of awareness or at best understanding of it ought to impose a moral obligation not to mistreat them. It seems to me that a primary function of morality is to restrain the unlimited power over each other. But if our moral perceptions are restricted to our own species, it's hard to see how that works. We need a concept of a pan-species morality. But then, that morality would not necessarily restrain other creatures. I'm confused about this.
The closer we and another species are to our MRCA (Most Recent Common Success) on the tree of life, the more characteristics we share.
-We share more characteristics with other primates than we do with mammals that are not primates.
-We share more characteristics with other mammals than we do with vertebrates that are not mammals.
Etc.
What would that accomplish? It could not be arrived-at through discussion and consensus; it could only be imposed by humans. Which is already the case in our folklore. Nor, even if we could make him understand the reason, could the lion lie down with the lamb unless we offered him satisfying veggie-burgers instead. And it would not be convincing, even so, unless all the humans - who do have dietary alternatives - all refrained from eating, torturing, trapping and hunting other species. Or even their own... Condemning a cat for playing with something that moves, something she does not recognize as being like herself, is just as human and irrational as applauding a human when, after some fancy play, he kills a terrified captive bull.
If we were able to agree among our species on a coherent moral system applied to our own species, we would achieve an immensely remarkable feat. Meanwhile: Try not to do to anyone or anything else what you would not like done to yourself.
Thanks.
Quoting Vera Mont
So even our awesome power to wreck the entire planet has forerunners. The rabbits' power is not different power; rather, the humans have a "super" of a power that animals also have. I think perhaps that's a better way to think of at least some of the features that we have been talking about.
Quoting Patterner
Yes, of course - though the link to evolution is not, strictly speaking philosophical business. The tricky bit is distinguishing between the characteristics that we can unhesitatingly assign - anatomy and physiology etc. - and those that require interpretation.
The Cartesian suggestion that animals are simply machines seem absurd when applied to cats, dogs and mammals in general, but much less so when applied to bacteria, viruses and protozoa. The difficulty comes to a head when we start ascribing perceptions, motives, emotions and reasons to their behaviour. I think this comes from the fact that those judgments are heavily dependent on context and background.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes. I didn't mean to suggest that the cat was to be blamed in any way. No more than the foxes are.
In a way. A number of species are capable of overpopulating, overgrazing or overhunting their territory, given the right conditions. However, when that happens, nature quickly resets the balance by killing off the excess, though famine, disease or both. This was also true of pre-technological man.
It's only since humans declared war on nature and started winning that the the TEE (total extinction event) became all but inevitable, because man never reverses a bad decision; he generally exacerbates it with an even more technological 'solution'.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yet many, if not most, humans do blame animals for being animals; do judge other species, as well as other humans by human standards - but themselves. Little brains are quite capable of dishonesty, but only the Big Brain is capable of unlimited hypocrisy.
At another time, only one species of animal had the ability to breath air, even though other species were able to get oxygen in other ways. We can even see how the ability to breath air evolved from how other species were getting oxygen. Still, it was a new ability.
At the moment, only one species has the ability to think in certain ways/about various types of things, even though other species are able to think. We can even see how the ability to think in new ways evolved from how other species are able to think. Still, it is a new ability.
Isn't that exactly what is about to happen to humanity? Perhaps it would be best to scrap the present system and start again. No-one will mind except human beings.
Quoting Vera Mont
I'm not sure about the Big Brain, but yes, humans find it hard not to see the world entirely in their own interests. On the bright side, it is not completely impossible for us, so there is ground for hope.
Quoting Patterner
I get the point about the first two cases. But it's all about the cases and it's not hard to think of cases that are hard to classify.
No doubt there was a time when only one species was capable of walking. That required the evolution of legs. So that was a new ability. At some point, a species evolved that was capable of walking on just two legs. Was that a new ability or just a variant of an old one?
Our ability to see developed from creatures that just had light-sensitive patches in their skins. Gradually, the rest of the eye developed - you can look up the stages if you want. The first creatures were merely sensitive to light and dark, which was a new ability. Is our ability to see a new ability or just a development of the old one? At what point in that process did creatures develop that were not merely light-sensitive but capable of seeing?
I must confess I don't know enough about how language-less animals think to know what is old and what is new in our intellectual and cognitive abilities. Of course, I understand that humans have developed some of their abilities beyond what other animals are capable of. Whether they are new or just highly developed seems a secondary question to me.
Yes, but we've already wrecked most of the infrastructure that would reset the balance. When the rabbits die off, the grass grows back and little tree seedlings; the birds and squirrels move into that habitat. When a wolf-pack overhunts its territory, some die of malnutrition, but the survivors move on, leaving space for their prey to re-establish a healthy population. What we do is demolish entire ecosystems and poison the water and soil so that it cannot be revived.
Quoting Ludwig V
We should have done that 2000 years ago. Even now, it might not be too late, if there fewer of us and we had the collective will to make a fundamental change. As things stand, this freight train has no brakes.
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm just saying we take every kind of thinking to a new, unequaled level, including the ability to prevericate in more elaborate and creative ways.
Thinking began in single-celled species. Nothing more than sensing light and moving in response to it is more complicated than dominoes knocking each other down. I can't imagine what the steps are between that and what we can do.
-Sensing multiple input, weighing them, and choosing one.
-Storing patterns of input, and referring to it when similar input is perceived.
-Thinking different things because the body develops different abilities.
It's all dizzying.
Yes, indeed.
It's not about my preferences. It's about thought, belief, and/or experience that exists and existed in its entirety prior to language use on the evolutionary timeline. You claimed that thought, belief, and meaningful experience consists of behaviour. I asked twice already, and now I'll ask again...
Are you claiming that some, all, and/or any thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience(s) consist(s) of behaviour and behaviour alone?
Problems with "what it means to say" anything aren't my concern. That's two steps backwards. Perhaps this will help...
Apple pies consist of apples, flour, and so forth. "Apple pies consist of apples" is not a problem, I presume. Meaningful experiences consist of thought and belief. Thought and belief consist of correlations. Thus... meaningful experience consists of correlations.
What's the problem?
Quoting creativesoul
All meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Meaningful experience begins the moment one draws correlations between different things. Like sands and piles of sand. No clear lines here where thought and belief magically poof into existence. Evolution is very slow. Language less experience ends the moment one begins to draw correlations between language use and other things. All language use consists of correlations. Not all correlations consist of language use. All correlations are meaningful to the creature drawing them.
Language use - in the beginning - is a plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the same things as a means to communicate their own thought, belief, desire, wants, etc. It is by virtue of drawing correlations between the same things that shared meaning emerges. If the growl is to be considered language, then it must mean the same thing to both. I cannot say I know if that's the case. I know it must be if it is to count as language at that stage. The growl is one element within the experiences of a plurality of dogs. All draw correlations between the growl and something else. The growl is meaningful to both as a result of that and that alone. The growl may or may not mean the same thing to all creatures that witness the occurrence. It's the something else that may differ here and the growl itself cannot tell us what else is included in the dogs' correlational content.
Meaningful experience is prior to language. All meaningful experience is meaningful to the creature/candidate under consideration. All meaningful things become so by virtue of becoming part of
that creature's correlational content. Language less experience ends the moment one begins to draw correlations between language use and other things.
Hence, regarding your dog and other domesticated non-human animals that obey and/or understand basic commands and/or other language use...
These are no longer language less creatures having language less experience. Each and every correlation drawn between language use and something else counts not as language less experience. So, as I've said before, the difference between language less creatures' experiences and language users' experiences are clear. The former does not - cannot - include correlations including language use, and the latter does.
I'm uh, troubled, to say the least, by the earlier flippant dismissal regarding the philosophical import of evolutionary progression as it pertains to any and all notions of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. It would be all too convenient for many a philosopher if philosophical positions/notions of thought and belief did not require being amenable to an evolutionary timeline. Denying the evolutionary history of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience does not make it go away. One's philosophical position regarding though, belief, and/or meaningful experience had better be able to take it into proper account.
Thought, belief, and/or knowledge is not a description. Some folk say that dogs are somehow, someway, doing calculus when they catch a ball. I say that that's bad thinking. Conflating mathematical descriptions(calculus) for knowing how to catch a ball.
I've an issue with attributing awareness of awareness to any creature incapable of thinking about thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right. That requires naming and descriptive practices.
Quoting Ludwig V
It does not follow from the fact that your dog can learn to stop growling on your command that all dogs have conscious control of their growling in the sense of "conscious control" that matters here. Voluntarily choosing to growl and/or not growl in some particular scenario/situation or another.
How do you know that the behaviour of language less creatures is not being misinterpreted? By what standard do you judge whether or not an interpretation is correct?
Accountability applies only to those who know they've done wrong(those who know better).
Other creatures capable of thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience are utterly incapable of comparing their own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all. Knowing better requires having done so. Hence, they cannot know better.
In order to choose better, one must know of better. That's one thing some humans do that no other animal can. So, in this sense, they(language less animals and experience) are utterly different. They cannot form, have, and/or hold any sort of thought and/or belief that requires comparing one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour to anything else at all, societal ethical standards, moral codes(morality); rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour notwithstanding.
Here is where it went off the rails.
The difference between thought, belief, and/or experiences that humans and only humans can have that no other animal can.
This presupposes a difference between other capable creatures' beliefs and our own, with a particular emphasis upon those beliefs that language use has facilitated.
I'm not sure what that means.
Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is not belief. Behaviour is not meaningful experience.
What's in dispute here is whether or not all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of behaviour and behaviour alone.
I'm arguing in the negative.
Furthermore, I'm positing that all thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience consists of correlations between different things drawn by a creature so capable. I'm arguing in favor of that.
I like the acknowledgement of evolutionary progression. However, thinking is something that we do. Thinking is existentially dependent upon certain biological structures that we have. We know that because we have observed and recorded the affects/effects that damaging those structures has on the mind and/or cognitive abilities of the injured. There is no good reason to attribute thinking to creatures that do not have very similar relevant biological structures.
Yup. The difference between language less thought and belief and language users' thought and belief are pivotal here in this discussion. How else do we avoid mistakenly attributing belief where none can be?
Morality is a human thing.
Yes. It is the kinds or complexity of language less thought that needs attention. Many rational thoughts we have are incapable of being formed, had, and/or held by language less creatures.
It's knowing language's role that matters.
That all depends upon what counts as proof.
It's getting plenty of attention from animal behaviorists. We're getting more and more studies of problem solving in both nature and laboratory conditions.
Quoting creativesoul
And a great many irrational ones, as well.The human mind has a great breadth and variety of function and malfunction.
It seems you don't have much experience of dogs.
IN-capable?
An important way in which humans differ from all other animals is our highly evolved "theory of mind" - a mental capacity that allows us to make inferences about the mental states of others.
We, each of us, have a "theory of mind" about others - We can understand the beliefs, emotions, intentions and thoughts of others. Such a capacity is vital for complex social interactions.
For example, empathy could not exist without a theory of mind.
It has been proposed that religion is a by-product of this mental capacity we call theory of mind, as we evolved to make inferences about what is in the mind of God.
Clearly, you have never had a dog console you in grief or ask you anxiously why you are on the ground with your head in the kitchen cabinet.
Quoting Questioner
Much has been proposed about "God", usually without reference to all the various conceptions of deity in all the various cultures that invariably project some aspect of their own version of human onto their gods.
Thank you for the opportunity to expand on my answer.
First I have had dogs comfort me! I always looked on my dogs as my babies.
But the theory of mind (and the empathy related to it) I described allows a human to understand what another is thinking or feeling. Rather than empathy, what a dog is experiencing when he responds to your grief is emotional contagion, which is a response to emotions without fully understanding what the other individual is feeling.
Emotional contagion lacks the process of individuation required for empathy the emotions mirrored are not seen as distinct from the other.
Quoting Vera Mont
Theory of Mind is not a set of proposals to explain the characteristics specific to any one religion, but rather an explanation for why religion exists at all.
Being able to read thoughts and feelings are very different attributes. Humans discern the thoughts of other humans through choice of words, tone of voice, body language, facial expression and the little 'tells' when we're bluffing or lying. This is relatively easy to do between persons from the same culture and social background, much more difficult between people of different ethnicity or nationality or class or even sex in most cases. We can read the thoughts and feelings of a fictional character from the speech and manner of an actor, while the actor himself thinks and feels quite differently.
What people are feeling, otoh, is more nearly universal; much less affected by cultural mannerisms. It's more remarkable that other species can read our emotions more readily than we can read theirs, almost certainly because their noses are more sensitive and we sweat hormones. It has nothing to do with theory; it's about experience and the recognition of our same emotions in another. Quoting Questioner
Sneaking in the requirement to "fully understand" makes it exclusively human.... As if humans all fully understood their own emotions, let alone one another's.
Quoting Questioner
Like human mobs at a lynching or cattle in a stampede? No, that's not very much like empathy.
How does a dog react when her human behaves in an uncharacteristic way? Try lying very still on the floor. Does your dog get contaminated and play dead? No, he paws and nuzzles at you, puffing little breaths through his nose, maybe whimpering or uttering short sharp yips, concerned for your welfare. (Which is why they train service dogs.)
Quoting Questioner
It's one explanation. And gods are one explanation for why humans exist. We're good at making up explanations, either from fact or fantasy; other animals are not. That's another distinction to add to the list.
I may be wrong to think that you are referring to something that I said. If you were, I am troubled by your impression that I would dismiss the philosophical import of evolutionary progression, let alone dismiss it flippantly. I would have thought that my general insistence that there is always continuity between what animals can do and what humans can do was evidence to the contrary. I must have said something to mislead you and I'm sorry about that.
Quoting creativesoul
I hope it helps if I write that sentence as "Surely, (thought that involves trees and cats) is involved in the (behaviour that involves trees and cats)" and explain (which I should have done) that when a dog approaches a tree in order to sniffs it, it is because it believes that there will be interesting smells around it, and so on.
Quoting creativesoul
My problem is the transition from apple pies to meaningful experiences. (By the way, I was wondering what a meaningless experience would be like; I can see that they would not consist of thought and belief - so what would they consist of?)
You seem to have assumed that because "apple pies consist of apples etc." is unproblematic you can substitue any noun for "apple pies" and give an unproblematic answer. But what do surfaces edges consist of? Does it make sense to say that rainbows consist of light waves or colours? What does the number 4 consist of? A recipe?
I agree that experiences are an important basis for thought and belief, though experiences, I think, are something that happens to me.
There are two slightly different senses of "thought". One makes it like "belief" in that I can believe that p and think that p; the other is an activity, so it is hard to see that experience can consist of thinking.
Belief and (thought that) is more like a state, rather than something that happens or that I do, so again, it doesn't seem plausible to think of it as a constituent of experience.
Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief, but I'm reluctant to say that a sentence/statement/proposition is a constituent of thought or belief (or knowledge), since thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition. This is why some people are so reluctant to admit that there is such a thing as thought/belief/knowledge without language.
Quoting creativesoul
I agree. But behaviour (including linguistic behaviour, and behaviours like talking to oneself silently) does express one's thought, beliefs and experiences.
Quoting creativesoul
I would be quite happy to give up any suggestion that experience consists of behaviour, in favour of the idea that experience is express by behaviour. What else, apart from behaviour, could meaningful experience consist of? What else, apart from behaviour could express experience?
Quoting creativesoul
Well, in the same way that different kinds of thing have different kinds of constituent, so there are different kinds of correlation. For example, it is common to say that there is a difference between correlation and causation. But it is puzzling to understand 2+2=4 as a correlation.
Quoting creativesoul
But thought, belief and knowledge all require a description to explain what is thought, believed of known. Still, I think most people will agree with you about the dog. But most people then find themselves puzzled about how the dog knows where the ball will land. That's the point.
Quoting creativesoul
Surely, when a dog approaches its food bowl, sniffs it and walks away despondently, the dog is comparing its hope that there is food in the bowl with reality and recognizing the difference.
Quoting creativesoul
There I agree with you.
Quoting Vera Mont
Quoting Vera Mont
Quoting Vera Mont
No, youre right, theory of mind does not have to do with reading sensory clues, or recognizing emotional states, which is what you are describing. The theory is something we create in our minds about the mental state of another, by making inferences about these sensory clues that we pick up. Because we have a theory of mind, we dont stop at Hes sad. Or Hes mad. We take it further and form theories in our minds about what the sensory clues mean > Hes mad about this . Or Hes sad about this Or He wants me to do this Or He doesnt want me to do this
You use your theory of mind every time you make an inference about the mental state of another like reading a mind. Sometimes, these inferences are correct, and sometimes they are not.
Quoting Vera Mont
Youre right, it was a poor choice of word, unless it is limited to our personal understanding.
(Lol, Im not trying to be sneaky.)
Quoting Vera Mont
It doesnt have to be that dramatic. Smiles are contagious.
Quoting Vera Mont
Why humans exist? Or the entire universe?
And when we make up an explanation for existence that involves a supernatural being with specific characteristics whether we imagine he is a loving god, or a vengeful god, or whatever we are using our theory of mind to infer what is in the mind of that god.
Quoting Vera Mont
Interesting observation. Yes, if the signals sent are false, then your inference about what is in the mind of another will most likely also be false.
Yes. But how is that empathy? Quoting Questioner
It doesn't have to be dramatic; people also yawn when they see others doing it; a giggle fit can engulf the entire table. Mirror neurons firing at random. Still not empathy.
Quoting Questioner
Whatever. Gods have been used as stop-gap explanations for lots of things we didn't know, and are still used as a explanation for misfortune, the weather, altruism and the supremacy of man over all of creation. But their main function is to replace the all-powerful father figure from childhood.
Quoting Questioner
By projecting there whatever is in the mind of whichever kind of man invented that god.
Quoting Questioner
And that is why humans can lie so much more elaborately and sustainably (sometimes an entire lifetime, sometimes even to themselves) than any other species, and more convincingly to one another than to any other species.
But false signals, feigning and misdirection are not exclusively human; we inherited the instinct and motivations for preverication from a long line of ancestors.
I didn't equate theory of mind to empathy. I said empathy is one trait that depends on theory of mind.
Quoting Vera Mont
I never said it was. You are the one conflating emotional contagion for empathy.
Quoting Vera Mont
Yes, our belief instinct is strong.
Quoting Vera Mont
This is unconnected to any discussion about theory of mind.
Amazing what a difference a word can make. I think we have an agreement.
I don't think that explanation comes up in any creation stories.
And I say it doesn't. I say empathy predates theory of mind by many millennia.
We're also very big on wishful thinking.
This is from [I]Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious[/I], by Antonio Damasio:
This is from [I]Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos[/I], by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:
Ogas and Gaddam soon talk about the roundworm. In addition to sensors and doers, the roundworm has two thinking elements. One neuron connects the sensors and the forward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is food ahead. Another neuron connects the sensors to the backward-moving doers, and activates the movers when the sensors say there is poison ahead. The stronger the signal a neuron gets from the sensor, the stronger the signal it sends to its mover.
Also, the two neurons inhibit each other. The stronger the signal a neuron receives from the sensor, the stronger it inhibits the other neuron.
The authors of these two books are calling it 'thinking' from the beginning. The roundworm is a step up. It is judging conflicting inputs, and choosing. It might be stretching the definitions of 'judging' and 'choosing'. And maybe it's stretching the definition to say "This process of changing inputs into outputsof changing sensation into useful behavioris thinking." But all of this is, surely, the first stage of thinking. The sensors could evolve into eyes, or nose, or whatever. The movers could evolve into a tail, or legs, or whatever. But what connected them in the first ancient life evolved into our thinking. And, even if in only the most primitive sense, they are performing the same functions.
How do you know that non-human animals don't have a theory of mind? How do you know that other people have a theory of mind?
Since the theory of mind is posited as an essential prerequisite of empathy, it seems to follow that if somone (human) can interact appropriately with other people, they have a theory of mind. I suppose.
So, if some non-human animals can interact appropriately with various other animals, including human animals, does it not follow that they have a theory of mind?
I do agree, however, that generalization about the extent to which all animals can do that would be very dangerous. I don't think that a fly has any real grasp of humans as people; nor do fish - most of them, anyway.
Quoting Questioner
I thought that emotional contagion was sharing the emotions of others, as opposed to responding to their emotions. It's like the difference between treating a disease and catching it.
After I posted this, I came across a separate entry in Wikipedia - Wikipedia - Theory of mind in animals
In practice, these supposed different alternatives come down to the same process. There is no way to read a mind except by reading behaviour.
Thank you for this. I agree that it is important in that it puts the relationship between knowing and doing at the heart of both. Philosophy has created endless fake problems for itself by focusing on the first and treating the second as an optional add-on. Suggesting that it is the "first stage" instead of insisting that it is either thinking or not is also an excellent nuance and very helpful. I shall remember about the roundworm (and, hopefully, where I learnt about it) for a long time.
Quoting Athena
No, it doesn't. it is a new creation story, and the creation story of our time. It differs from all the others in that it lays itself open to evalutaion as true or false. Which seems to be a great improvement on the traditional varieties.
Indeed, we are. I've watched a number of different 'documentaries' about animal minds and problem solving. What seems to be of philosophical importance, from my vantage point anyway, is how the narrators and/or authors report on the minds of the subjects. There is always a notion of "mind" at work.
Quoting Vera Mont
Agreed. The difficulty is in discriminating between which sorts of thoughts are existentially dependent upon language use and which ones are not. Those that are, cannot be formed, had, or held by language less creatures.
Not sure how you arrived at that conclusion, but it's false... if you care enough about whether or not your beliefs about my experience are true.
I suspect that there are behaviours that dogs display after doing something forbidden, or after being approached by the humans afterwards, that you claim shows us that they know better?
I'm wondering if you looked at the argument for the claim at the top of that post, or just at the conclusion.
Hey Mww.
You and I both know that "thought" to you means something very different than "thought" to me. On your view, and correct me if I'm wrong, there is no distinction between thought and thinking about thought. We would agree that other creatures are incapable of some kinds of thought(namely those existentially dependent upon metacognitive endeavors) if there were such a distinction/discrimination on your view.
What language less creatures are capable of believing and thinking is precisely what's in question here. That sort of consideration relies upon notions of "thought" and "belief". Even the approach that you seem most fond of presupposes notions of "thought" and "belief". The idea that behaviour "expresses" belief has very little, if any, restrictions around it. There is no clear standard by which to judge whether or not the belief we are attributing to the language less creature is something that the creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding. There are other problems as well, as I'm sure you're aware.
Regarding this example, I see no reason, ground, or justification to claim what the dog will believe is or isn't interesting.
What is the standard and/or criterion you're using to decide/determine/judge what sorts of beliefs
language less animals can and/or cannot have?
Quoting Ludwig V
I went back to check on what it was that was said. No worries. I must have misinterpreted what you wrote. My apology seems more fitting than yours. That is... it seems that it is I who owes you an apology, not the other way around.
:yikes:
My apologies.
You are hardly one to be imprecise. That being given, it just seemed to me, in-capable would have lent more consistency to the overall point being made in that particular entry.
If Im mistaken, thats on me.
Yes, and understandably so, for they are very different kinds of things.
Apple pies are material, whereas thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences are neither material nor immaterial. Rather, they consist of material/physical and immaterial/non physical elements. In addition, apple pies could be classified as objects, whereas thought, belief, and meaningful experiences are not objects at all. Nor are they subjects. They are ongoing processes. I touched on this diversion from convention a few times earlier in the thread and mentioned to you more recently that my position turns many a historical dichotomy on its head.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes. There are times when the two terms "thought" and "belief" are not interchangeable. This is irrelevant however to the position I'm arguing for/from.
Riding a unicycle is an activity. Some experiences consist of riding a unicycle. That is the case for one who is watching another ride or riding themselves.
Perhaps a large part of the problem that makes it "hard to see" how experiences can consist of thought and belief is that the conventional approaches are ill-equipped for doing so.
Belief that approaches are all about epistemological claims, in that they attempt to show how truth is presupposed in all belief statements and/or knowledge claims. As useful as they are in helping us to think about such things, they are useless in determining and/or acquiring knowledge of what language less thought and belief consists of. They also tend to equate belief with propositions and/or belief with attitudes towards that proposition, which is a huge mistake, despite the fact that we express much of our own beliefs via language use/propositions.
On my view, it is clear that language less creatures' beliefs cannot be understood using that method. Not all belief is propositional in content. Propositions are meaningless to language less creatures. Hence, they can have no attitude towards them.
Quoting Ludwig V
This seems to be alluding to belief as propositional attitude without saying so.
Our discussion is an experience, partly shared - at least - by all who've participated and/or have been following along. It would be very hard to make any sense of denying that each and every participant having the experience were thinking about what they were reading. They do so by virtue of drawing correlations between language use and other things. All of those correlations are part of the experiences. They are experiences that only we can have. Those correlations(that process of thinking) are(is an) elemental constituent(s). If we were to remove all those correlations being drawn between the language use and other things, if we were to remove all of the thoughtful consideration between the claims and what the claims are describing, what would be left of each individual experience such that it could still count as the experience of the reader/participant? It would be akin to removing the apples from the pie and still claiming it was an apple pie.
Quoting Ludwig V
On pains of coherency alone. The problem is the notion/use of "thought".
The first claim is false as is what immediately follows "since".
This looks like a comparison between rudimentary sensory perception and Cartesian notion of perception, or perhaps a phenomenological account of perception. I agree with the rejection of both "representation" and "image". I'm also in complete agreement that physiological sensory perception is at the root, the basis, of thinking. However, sensory perception is not equivalent to thinking. That conflation blurs the entire timeline of evolutionary progression between moving towards light and our thinking about how they do that. I think the latter is existentially dependent upon the former, but not the other way around.
I agree in large part. I think they're on the right track. The notions of "mind" and "thinking" seem far too diluted for my tastes, and I suspect the account falls victim to reductio.
Quoting Mww
:wink:
I mentioned what they were incapable of. It's not all thought, or all belief, or all experience. Just some.
I was just thinking out loud and reacting to what others have said, including someone in a completely different forum and a TV show about a Native American creation story. I may have an overactive mind.
My Thanksgiving blew up into an emotional drama and I feel very fragile this morning. I don't think animals come even close to the insanity of humans except maybe when a dog has rabbis. I think today I am holding a completely different perspective of humans. We have been arguing about humans being rational but they can also be completely irrational and destructive making the notion of being possessed by a demon seem plausible.
Indeed, but language less creatures cannot do that.
A process.
Something(s) to become meaningful, a creature for that something or those things to become meaningful to, and a means for things to become meaningful to that creature.
No kidding! What's the point of a brain, if it's not to generate a mind? But if the word troubles you, turn off the sound and watch the action. Quoting creativesoul
Why is that so important to you, and by what method - other than philosophizing - do you propose to discriminate? Aside from the fact that you arbitrarily consign all communication, among any species, that doesn't have human grammar and vocabulary as language-less. Makes pre-verbal babies sound mindless, and completely dismisses the human vocabulary a great many human-associated animals are capable of learning. (Some humans are also capable of learning some non-human vocabulary.)
Quoting creativesoul
I thought the question was whether other species are capable of rational thought. The language boondoggle was introduced later.
Ok. Just wasn't sure if you thought I was saying anything about creation stories, or anything at all in any religious vein.
Sorry about your Thanksgiving. Indeed, a lot of negative possibilities come along with our mental capacity. And the negative crap is, like Yoda said about the Dark Side, quicker, easier, more seductive.
It's not that the word troubles me. It's that the report of the language less creatures' thought(s) is based largely - if not exclusively - on the reporter's notion of mind. If that notion/concept of mind is incapable of discriminating between thoughts that only humans are capable of having and those that non human animals can have, then the report of those experiments, including what is purported to be the thoughts and/or thinking of the subject matter will inevitable conflate the two. That is, the reports will include false claims.
Quoting Vera Mont
There is no other method to discriminate between what language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are. We can then check and see how well our notion explains the experiment. It matters because getting it right matters.
Whose narrative isn't based on their own notion of mind?
Quoting creativesoul
There is no method to discriminate between what human language less creatures are capable of thinking and what we are. Quite apart from the fact that one species - undisputedly - having more fanciful and abstruse thoughts than others doesn't negate rationality in others. And the secondary fact that the majority of humans also don't give very much of their day to contemplating metaphisics, the nature of thought about thinking, or 'the hard question of consciousness'.
Yeah, that sucks. That's never a good thing. Some people are incapable of calmly expressing themselves. The current state of American culture/politics is making things far worse. Complete and total disrespect for others is not only glorified, its financially rewarded.
You seem like a nice person. Hopefully your days improve.
That's not true.
And yet, you have not elaborated the scientific method whereby it can be objectively measured and verified.
Nor have I claimed that.
:yikes:
I have elaborated on the philosophical enquiry/method I've used to discriminate between language less thought and thoughts that are existentially dependent on language and/or each other - as many of our own thoughts are.
There are some things that are verifiable, others that are not.
Of course the question is whether or not other species are capable of rational thought. You and I agree that they are.
Our differences seem to be about which sorts of thoughts other species are capable of and which ones they are not. Although, there is some agreement there as well.
I use the method I've been employing to discriminate between those that only we can form, have, and/or hold and those that other species can as well. One glaringly obvious distinction is that other species are incapable of having thoughts that are existentially dependent upon using language(naming and descriptive practices).
By what standard do you discriminate?
I see my mistake. A creature IN-capable of thought ( ) doesnt have any, making his incapacity for comparing them with anything, moot.
The origins of both theory of mind and empathy go back about 5-6 million years ago.
The species Homo sapiens dates back about 200,000 years ago.
Quoting Vera Mont
That's true.
The scientific research into nonhuman animals theory of mind (ToM) goes back decades and there is no consensus. But do I think a dog can interpret and make inferences about human thought? No.
Quoting Ludwig V
I am human and I can make inferences into what is in another mind. The key word is inference.
We do not just perceive we perceive and interpret. the mental states of others.
Besides empathy, things like collaboration, education, and figuring out our social standing, rely on our theory of mind.
Quoting Ludwig V
Every time you form a conclusion about what is in the mind of another (whether it is correct or not) you are using your ToM capacity.
Quoting Ludwig V
Not necessarily. Interacting is not the same as interpreting mental states.
Quoting Ludwig V
But not all reading of behavior involves ToM.
When you read a book, is the end goal to see the symbols on the page, or to make meaning out of them?
Theory of mind originated with gorillas? Without language? OK - I did not know that 'theory' could be applied to an inarticulate process like watching and interpreting the physical actions of another sentient being. Though I do suspect emotional empathy is older and less dependent on the socialization of young.
Quoting Questioner
I don't see how two individuals - other than predator and prey - can interact without interpreting states of mind - or at least states of emotion and health.
Quoting Vera Mont
Quoting creativesoul
But you have invalidated observations made on scientific principles for the choice of words not being objective enough.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, I'm aware of that. I'm also aware of how much reliable factual information philosophy has contributed to human knowledge over the last two millennia.
The distinction of human language-using vs human language-less is entirely anthropocentric. I do understand why that distinction may seem vital to establishing human superiority, but I don't see why it matters to the question of whether a thought is rational.
Quoting creativesoul
How did sorts of thought become the central issue? A logical solution to even one single problem, such as getting a grub out of a hollow tree or escaping from a fenced yard demonstrates rational thought. Adding layers of complexity, all the way up to wondering why the universe exists, doesn't change the fundamental nature of reason itself; it merely obfuscates the issue by shifting focus from the process to the subject matter.
A very small minority of humans set themselves the task of mulling over questions with no available answers (just how many angels can dance on a pin); a large minority grapple with the invention and application of technology or administrative affairs; the vast majority think about getting food, securing their physical well being, having sex, raising their young, pursuing pleasure when they get the chance - much like all the other animals. They go about these activities through both rational and irrational decisions - much like all the other animals.
Quoting Vera Mont
Not all rational thought is the same. Some rational thought can only be formed by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is one crucial difference between our language and non human animals' languages. It is the difference between being able to think about one's own thought and not. Only humans can do this. Hence, any and all thought that is existentially dependent upon metacognition is of the sort that non human creatures cannot form, have, and/or hold.
There's much more nuance within my position than you've recognized.
That's not true.
I'm guessing this refers to the earlier examples of tool use and learning how to open gates. I agree that those are cases of rational thinking in non human animals. None of them require a creature capable of metacognition.
On the contrary...
Claiming that a male bird of paradise clears out an area and dances because he's trying to impress a female is a bit of a stretch.
Can dogs compare their own behaviour with a set of rules governing that behaviour? Can they thik about the rules placed on their behaviour?
If not, then how can they know what you claim they can know?
More likely in the most recent common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees, which lived about 6-8 million years ago.
Quoting Vera Mont
Theory of mind does not refer to the process, but the end result the inferences you make is the theory - formed in your mind its a theory about what is in the mind of another mind.
Quoting Vera Mont
We can make conclusions about emotion and health just by observing outward signs. This is not what forming a theory of mind is about. If you form a theory about what is in another mind, you form conclusions about the mental state of another with a view to making predictions.
A good book with a detailed explanation of theory of mind is Jesse Berings The Belief Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny and the Meaning of Life.
Here are two quotes from it -
From psychologist Nicholas Humphrey (pre-1978):
We humans have evolved to be natural psychologists. The most promising but also the most dangerous elements in our environment are other members of our own species. Success for our human ancestors must have depended on being able to get inside the minds of those they lived with, to second-guess them, anticipate where they were going, help them if they needed it, challenge them, manipulate them. To do this they had to develop brains that would deliver a story about what its like to be another person from the inside.
From psychologists David Premark and Guy Woodruff (defining theory of mind in 1978):
A system of inferences of this kind may be properly viewed as a theory because such (mental) states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others.
Would you agree that Jimi drew a correlation between his behaviour(killing) and your behaviour towards him afterwards?
This is the direction this discussion needs to take.
Of course. How else do we draw conclusions about anything? We don't get inward signs of other individuals.
Quoting creativesoul
So what? A thought is rational or irrational. And action the result of thought or of emotion. Quoting creativesoul
Yes, yes, several people have already established human specialness about two dozen times in this thread alone, and I have not disputed it once. I just don't see how it could invalidate the capability of other species for rational thought.
Quoting creativesoul
Oh I appreciate the distinction you keep making. Sounds much like Descartes': They don't speak [in human words] and they don't philosophize. Granted on both counts. I just don't consider it relevant to the topic.
Quoting creativesoul
Than what was the purpose of
Quoting creativesoul
That's our theory of mind at work. Why is it a problem, if you're not fussy about objectivity.
Quoting creativesoul
Neither does the Ford assembly line. The point is still to find areas of human specialness. You already have that. Why belabour it?
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
It's been taken in that direction ten times over. By all means, pursue it again.
By what standard/criterion do you judge which sorts of human thinking(rational or otherwise) non humans are capable of?
We imagine them.
Quoting creativesoul
That's why.
I don't discriminate between 'sorts' of thinking.
Reason is reason, whether it's applied to practical or fanciful subjects.
Quoting Questioner
That's been known to produce variably reliable results.
Quoting creativesoul
That's equally true of your theories.
Sure, I guess the association must be in play. I think it's the same with children learning what is expected of them and to anticipate some kind of punishment if they don't comply.
That's true.
We might get some clues from thinking about how we decide what a human being believes or can believe and then thinking about what a creature like a dog does believe.
For example, you believe that a dog cannot form beliefs about beliefs. (Forgive me if that's not accurate, but I think it is enough for what I want to say). In my book, that needs to be considered in the light of what the dog does. Meaning is not some abstract entity floating about in the ether. It governs behaviour. So, for example, there are many beliefs that I cannot form because I have never learnt the relevant behaviours; I never learnt to write computer code or do more than elementary mathematics. While I can formulate some beliefs about those matters as they impinge on my life, but the detail is bayond me.
If a dog could read a clock and use the information in relevant ways, I would say it may know when it is 5 p.m. Does that mean it cannot have a concept of time? No, because it can show up for meals or walks at the right time. But it cannot have a concept of time like the human concept and there are other behaviours that can high-light that.
Quoting creativesoul
I have some intuition about that distinction, but I have trouble applying it. Is my belief that there is some beer in the fridge existentially dependent on language? I can only express it in language. Could a dog believe that there is beer in the fridge? Well, it can certainly believe that its dinner is in the fridge.
Quoting creativesoul
Roughly, the same ones that I use to decide what believes human beings have when I cannot ask them.
Quoting creativesoul
I suppose you are disagreeing with "Thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of the belief..." and "thought, belief and knowledge all involve an evaluation of the proposition"
As to the first, I may have been unclear. As to the first, it is true that one can hold beliefs that are not formulated in language. But I cannot talk about them without a formulation in language. To distinguish between what people believe and don't believe, I must complete the formula "S believes that..."
As to the second, "S knows that p" means that p is true. "S believes that p" means that S believes/thinks that p is true, but it may not actually be true. "Thinks" is more complicated than either, but is at least compatible with S merely entertaining the possibility that p is true.
Quoting creativesoul
We agree, then, that experience is a process. I am hoping that you also agree with me that what is meaningful to a creature affects how that creature behaves.
Quoting creativesoul
To be sure, the presuppositions with which one approaches describing animal behaviour are always important. If they are wrong, the reports will be wrong. You seem very confident that your presuppositions are correct. It is sensible to evaluate one's presuppositions in tne light of observations and to revise or refine them before making further observations. It seems to me very dangerous to think that observations of a particular incident can be conclusively settled without an extensive background of observations of a range of behaviour of the animal.
Quoting creativesoul
I wonder how one might explain that behaviour. The idea that he is doing it for fun is not impossible, but is a bit of a stretch. If females did it too, it would be plausible. But, as I understand it, they don't. Suppose that female behaviour indicates that they are attracted by what the male does. Perhaps that Is just an coincidence, but that's a bit of a stretch too.
For sure. Assumptions, misperceptions, misconceptions, misunderstandings, delusions and fallacies all happen.
Thanks but the bad thing turned into a good thing. :grin: It seemed like an end-of-the-world event but now I see it as the beginning of wonderful new opportunities.
I was wondering how animals handle such events and decided their relationships change and their position in the troop can change, especially when they transition to adulthood.
Thanks as I said above, what I thought was almost too terrible to bear has turned into a good thing. However, I am still pondering what you have said about the spirit of our times and what is happening in families. I might want to transfer this to a thread about the fall of civilizations.
Look at what I found because the posts in this thread pushed me to understand more...
Thank you, thank you everyone! Sometimes I worry that this thread is getting too far from topic but then I see a possible connection and I am blown away by the expansion of my mind. This is why I come here.
Quoting Vera Mont
Sure. It's true of any ToM.
If the ToM being fleshed out by myself were incapable of drawing and maintaining those distinctions, then it too would inevitably result in conflating between non human thought and belief and human thought and belief. Hence, the importance of the endeavor.
I/we do not have all the answers, nor do I think it's possible to acquire them. We do, however, have some and those help avoid some anthropomorphism. They also allow one to recognize some mistakes 'in the wild'.
Quoting Vera Mont
Which inevitably results in personification(anthropomorphism). That's unacceptable by my standards.
And this is important to you. Why?
Quoting creativesoul
What does this mean? Malevolution? Man shooting the wrong species?
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, I can see that. I can also substitute 'prejudices' for 'standards'.
I think that Jimi's having already drawn that correlation is more than enough to explain the fear and trembling displayed by him upon your return. I mean, the dead chook was right there. The fear and trembling showed his expectation(belief about what you were about to do). He suddenly remembered. I'm assuming he wasn't trembling until you arrived. Whatever you did the first time, Jimi expected that to happen again. That belief/expectation resulted from the earlier correlation he drew between his behaviour involving killing chooks and yours immediately afterwards. I see no ground whatsoever to say he believed, knew, or anticipated that he was being punished for not following the rules. I see every reason to say that he was drawing much the same correlations the second time around that he did the first.
There is similarity. I just think you're overstating it. Some(arguably most) children can and do draw correlations between their own behaviour and others' behaviour towards them afterwards. So, to that extent, it's the same. That's an early step in learning the rules. It's not enough though. It is enough to help increase the chances of one's own survival when living in a violent/aggressive social hierarchy. Canines have a very long history of that.
It's the difference that you're neglecting and/or glossing over.
The presupposition that dogs are capable of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the rules is suspect. That is precisely what needs argued for. That sort of knowledge is existentially dependent upon the capability to compare one's own behaviour with the rules. The only way it is possible is for one to acquire knowledge of both by virtue of learning how talk about both.
I do not see how it makes sense to say that dogs are capable of comparing their own behaviour with the rules. I know there's all sorts of variables, but I'm certain that the same is true of very young children as well. It takes quite some time and the right sorts of attention paid to us prior to our ability to know that our behaviour is or is not against the rules. We must know at least that much prior to being able to know that we've done something that we should not have done.
Quoting Janus
As set out above, I would say that they cannot even know they have done something they should not have done, let alone 'just like humans can'.
Do you have an argument/justification/reasons for claiming that, aside from Jimi's behaviour?
Right, so he knew he had done something he shouldn't have, which was my original point. Do you think it is any different with humans? Do you think that if children were never taught that they would know what is expected of them?
To be sure humans learn what is acceptable and what is not through both behavior and language whereas dogs do so primarily through behavior. That said they do learn what kinds of behavior of theirs relates respectively to and invokes "good dog" and "bad dog" and other simple utterances; so language is involved to some degree.
"There is no clear standard by which to judge" was referring to the idea/claim that "behaviour expresses belief" and/or that approach.
The last suggestion/claim above has the methodological approach the wrong way around.
It is our behaviour that clearly shows us - beyond all reasonable doubt - what thinking about one's own thought and belief(metacognition) requires: Naming and descriptive practices; picking one's own thought and belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else. That is the only means. That crucial bit of knowledge is part of the standard used to assess/judge any and all belief attribution by any and all authors/speakers to any and all creatures, human to human attribution notwithstanding. It's not the only one, but it's the one in consideration at the moment, and some others are irrelevant to the topic at hand. I digress...
So, it seems clear to me that what the dog does, and the subsequent attribution(s) of thought and/or belief to the dog because of what the dog does, all need to be considered in light of what metacognition requires(what metacognition is existentially dependent upon). The dog cannot consider its own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself. Thus, any and all sorts of thinking that require a creature capable of doing so are sorts that dogs cannot form, have, and/or hold. It's that simple. Easy to say. Much more difficult to clearly set out, but I am getting a bit better at it, I think...
Quoting Ludwig V
I'm unsure about the relevance of the opening statement above. I've certainly never made such a claim. Nor would I. Actually, I agree with that claim, as it is written. However, the second claim seems too vague to be of much use. I also cannot see how the rest counts as support for the idea that meaning governs behaviour. I would agree that meaning governs behaviour, but I suspect that our viewpoints, notions, and/or approaches towards meaning are very different. Hence, I suspect that our explanations of how meaning governs behaviour are quite different as a result.
To the example...
Sure, there are certain thoughts and beliefs one cannot possibly form, have, and/or hold if they have not learned, articulated, understood, and/or used the right sorts of language. Substituting that reason(ing) with "they have not learnt the relevant behaviours" is stretching behaviour beyond sensible use. I mean, sure learning maths and coding and programming are all behaviors. However, that completely misses what underwrites the topic at hand: thought and belief. Behaviour is not thought and belief. Behaviour alone is... ...there's a technical term/bit of jargon that applies here, but I cannot recall... ..."indeterminate" maybe?
There's quite a bit more that is of interest, but it'll have to wait. Until then, be well...
Glad things are going better. :smile:
I'm having problems understanding how "meaning governs behaviour" fits into the rest of that.
I want to ask...
Would you say that the unknown details of higher maths, programming, coding, etc. are pretty much meaningless to you?
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, clearly our standard measurements of time are meaningless to the dog.
Does it follow from the fact that the dog shows up at mealtime that it has a concept of time? I don't see how. That does not seem to be enough evidence/reason to warrant the conclusion. Does waking up at the same time count as having a concept of time? I suppose I wonder what the difference between any and all regularly occurring behaviours is regarding this matter? I mean, does all routine and/or habitual behaviour equally count as adequate evidence for drawing that same conclusion? If not what's the difference such that we're not special pleading? All sorts of creatures have regular schedules. Routine. Habit. They do all sorts of things around the same time of day and/or night. Many migrate, mate, bear young, and all sorts of other things during the same seasons(time of year).
Having a "concept of time" needs a bit more, does it not?
Here's what I'd ask: Can or do dogs think about time? Can or do they form, have, and/or hold any beliefs about time? Is time meaningful to dogs? By my lights, the answer is "no". I'm open to being convinced otherwise though. So, if anyone here thinks the answer to any of the three questions is "yes", then I would only ask how?
Quoting Ludwig V
Understandable. It's unconventional, and as such it goes against some long standing practices, or at least it seems to. It is commensurate with many, dovetails nicely with some, but certainly turns a number of practices on their head. I've been fleshing the application out and working through the problems for over a decade. Not alone, mind you. I'm very grateful to this site and many regulars here, for it has allowed me to do some things that cannot be done any other way that I'm aware of.
Excellent question. Could not have imagined a better one at this juncture. Thank you for asking.
Banno and I have had any number of conversations in past talking about just such things. That tells me there's a bit of W underlying this avenue. It is only as a result of those discussions and others that I've been able to identify certain issues with saying certain things in certain ways. I know that that's vague, so I'll just say that I've adjusted and tweaked my position after being made aware of issues. This question allows me to put some of those to good use. There are several members here on this site who've helped me tremendously along the way, knowingly or unknowingly. Banno is one, but not the only one. Okay, enough blather. Back to the question...
Beer is existentially dependent upon language. Fridges are as well. Where there has never been beer, there could never have been belief about beer. The same is true of the fridge. So, the content of the belief(things correlations are being drawn between) is existentially dependent upon language. Therefore, so too is the belief.
Here we must tread carefully however, for it would be easy to apply unhelpful labels to this belief. Calling it a "linguistic" belief would be misleading and/or a bit confusing, because any and all candidates capable of drawing correlations(spatial reasoning/relationships in this case) between the beer and the fridge are most certainly capable of believing that there is beer in the fridge. This includes candidates who do not know that one is called "beer" and the other a "fridge". It does not make much sense to say that creatures without naming and descriptive practices could form, have, and/or hold linguistic beliefs. That would be a consequence of such labeling practices.
There's more to this than it seems at first blush...
Imagine a recently abandoned house with open beers in the fridge. Say that some teenagers were rummaging around in the house and left the fridge door wide open. They did not want the warm stale beer. They leave soon enough, and later on one of the mice living in the house comes out searching for food. It finds the beer in the fridge. Some mice really like beer! That mouse believed that beer was in that fridge. It shows(as compared/contrasted to 'expresses') that belief by virtue of climbing into that fridge and getting at that beer.
Belief as propositional attitude fails here. The mouse's belief does not consist of propositions. There is no propositional content within the mouse's belief. The mouse's belief consists of correlations drawn between the beer, the fridge, its own hunger/thirst, etc.. Such belief is existentially dependent upon language(because beers and fridges are), but not existentially dependent upon the ability of the believing creature to be capable of either naming and descriptive practices or metacognition. This reminds me of past experience...
At my own house, long ago, we were all at the dining table eating breakfast after a long birthday celebration the night before when a strange unfamiliar sound was heard by us all. It was written all over our faces. We looked at each other using each other as a means to double check our own ears. Someone spoke up and expressed what our faces had already... Did you hear that? Then we heard it again... a continuous faint but distinct scratching sound captured our attention. We were all like... what on earth is that??? It stopped. It started. Stopped again. Started. It did not take us too long to find the drunken culprit in the trash; a drunken mouse had unwittingly trapped itself at the bottom of an extra tall beer can deep inside a trash bag lining the can. Here, I'll give a nod to some things you mentioned earlier regarding our ability to locate the source of a sound.
Hilarious. Drunken mice. Of all things.
Quoting Ludwig V
Care to elaborate?
Quoting Ludwig V
The abandoned house mouse places all this in question. Although, it seems you admit that not all thought and belief require a sentence/statement/proposition that expresses the content of that belief.
It's all too easy for us to conflate our report(and what it takes) of the mouse's belief with the mouse's belief(and what it takes). There is a very long history and/or philosophical practice of treating these as one in the same. The report is existentially dependent upon language, for it is language use. The latter is existentially dependent upon language use as well, as set out earlier in this post(beers and fridges). However, the latter does not require being talked about in order for it to exist in its entirety. This peculiar set of facts results from the overlap(shared world) between creatures without naming and descriptive practices and things that are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
It renders the qualifications of "linguistic" and "non linguistic" when applied to beliefs suspect, at best. I used to use such language.
We're in agreement with the following caveat; not all things that affect how creatures behave are meaningful to the creature.
Gravity. So... just to be clear.
Quoting Ludwig V
Indeed. I am. I could be confidently wrong. :wink:
Quoting Ludwig V
Sure, but it depends upon the situation and/or the specific thought and/or belief attribution(in this discussion). If having a concept of time requires thinking about it and thinking about it requires using naming and descriptive practices, then any and all creatures incapable of using naming and descriptive practices are incapable of having a concept of time. That's pretty cut and dry to me. Substitute "thinking about it" with "time be meaningful to the candidate" as well as "forming, having, and/or holding belief about time", and the same holds good...
The behaviour increased the likelihood of reproduction and mating.
I personally wonder if a male isolated from 'birth' would display the same behaviour as an adult, if it were placed in an aviary with a female for the first time in its life. That would tell us something about whether or not it is innate or learned.
"Trying to impress" another presupposes a candidate with a concept of mind(belief about what will impress another). That's a bit of a stretch. Although, I've been quite impressed by any number of different bird documentaries, in addition to my own personal experiences with both domesticated and 'wild' birds.
Wonderfully interesting animals.
They are not different subject matters. The endeavor is comparison/contrast between the two. What's different is not the same. What's the same is not different. It takes discussing both the similarities and the differences to make much sense of either.
Yes, this is a great place to come. Your words made me smile. :flower:
That does not follow...
May I suggest you reread that post?
So if he was trembling before Janus arrived, would you conclude that he did understand that he had
done something wrong?
Quoting creativesoul
Forgive me, I thought that you believed that all belief is a matter of correlations. So what more do you want before accepting that Jimi believed he had done something wrong?
Quoting creativesoul
Ah, well, there are important differences between bad consequences and punishment. They are very different concepts. Jimi might well believe that he had done something wrong (bad consequences) and not see it as punishment. Further observations of his behaviour might reveal the difference.
However, if morality is essential for social life, then the fact that dogs have a social life - and especially have a social life that includes humans - then it would be reasonable to suppose that they have some moral (or at least proto-moral) concepts.
Quoting creativesoul
That's quite right. It is also reasonable not to put too much emphasis on universal differences, but to assess each case as it comes.
Quoting Questioner
Well, yes, we do indeed develop a concept of mind. I would expect that there is a substantial common core to all our concepts, for two reasons. First, because we learn our concepts from each other as part of learning to speak and secon because if there wasn't at least a common core, we couldn't communicate about minds - our own or others'.
Quoting Questioner
Well, my concept of mind enables me to interpret the thought of dogs and some other animals.
Quoting Questioner
I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?
I suppose you contrast the idea of metacognition, which might be considered to be clearer. However, the answers that it returns seems to me to be, let us say, odd.
When I recall my dog, I call her name. Supposing that she has no understanding of self and others, when she hears me call, how does she know which dog I want to respond? Or, if you prefer, why does she respond if she cannot distinguish herself from other dogs?
Or, when another dog approaches her, and goes through their greeting ceremonies, how does she know that she needs to respond?
Or, when she is dashing across the park, how does she avoid running into other dogs, distinguishing between what she can do from what the other dogs who are also dashing about the place are doing?
I had two dogs for a long time. They never failed to distinguish their own food bowl from the other one's food bowl. (Nor did they ever fail to check that the other one's bowl was empty when the other one had finished and walked away.)
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, it makes sense to sort one's methodology out before trying to answer the question - when one understands the question. The catch is that if one does not understand the question, the methodology may not be appropriate. Methodology and understanding both need to be sorted out before answers can be achieved. Otherwise, one may be trying use a hammer when what is required is a spanner.
If you are dealing with a fridge, the manufacturer can provide you with instructions how to deal with the various things that may go wrong with it. If you are dealing with an unknown disease, you need to find out what methods for dealing with it work.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes. Not completely meaningless, but pretty much.
Quoting creativesoul
I don't remotely understand the concept of time involved in relativity theory in physics. Does that mean I have no concept of time? No, it does not. Similarly, the dogs have a concept of time that suits their lives. That concept is different from human concepts, but overlaps with it. Similarities and differences. Would you say that a philosopher who thinks that time is continuous and a philosopher who thinks that time is discontinuous have the same concept of time or different ones - or, perhaps, overlapping ones?
Archaeologists discovered an unknown script amongst the remains of Mycene. They weren't even entirely sure that it was writing. Attempts to decipher it failed for many years until Michael Ventris hypothesized that the writing was Greek. That worked. There are many similar examples. Methodology and practice develop hand in hand.
Quoting creativesoul
That I agree with. But I would have thought that impinges on the distinction between what requires being talked about and what "exists in its entirety" without being talked about.
Quoting creativesoul
I agree with most of that, especially the distinction between our report of a belief and the believer's formulation of it. I see this as the differences between "I believe that..." and "He/she believes that..." One of my unconventional views is that this distinction applies to all beliefs. So "..that p" is not a purely intensional context, nor a simply extensional context. It is perfectly true that conventional philosophy ignores this. (I know you won't freak out at an unconventional view!)
I would be happy to accept that the mouse does not think of the fridge as a fridge, but merely as a cool place. It doesn't understand the expansion of gases or electricity/gas. It would also be reasonable to recognize that it doesn't understand beer as we do, because it doesn't understand what alcohol is. But we can suppose that it understands beer insofar as it tastes good and has pleasurable effects - and presumably understands hangovers, though not necessarily the connection with drinking beer. (BTW It is not unknown for dogs to become extremely fond of beer. I read somewhere that even bees can get drunk when they happen upon nectar that has fermented.) Nonetheless it is perfectly reasonable to report that the mouse liked the beer in the fridge. The difference is not a question of truth or falsity, but of what pragmatically works in the context. The mouse doesn't have to understand how I report its belief to other human beings.
PS I have edited the above to put right an error in the formatting and restore the distinction between what I was quoting and what I was saying. My mistake. Sorry.
Quoting creativesoul
It's only a gesture at the complicated relationship between experience, beliefs and behaviour. When we close the fridge door, we act out (perhaps that's better than "express") what the fridge means to us. That's all.
You have changed the terms, and with that have changed the definition. We are not talking about an understood concept but rather a theory. And the theory of mind is not an idea about what a mind is or does, expressed in generalities, but rather a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind.
I have a theory of mind for my mother, and one for my brother, and one for my friend .
Quoting Ludwig V
That doesnt mean the dog can form theories about what is in your mind. You are human yes, you have the capacity to form theories about what is in other minds. We can even form theories about what is in the minds of supernatural beings that do not even exist. The fact that we are storytellers supports this. Theory of mind allows us to inhabit the minds of the storys characters, analyzing their thoughts, feelings, motivations, intentions and perspectives.
Quoting Ludwig V
Sorry, Im not sure what youre asking.
What is a matter of interpretation?
What is the explanation for our inability to agree?
Whose is the better interpretation of what?
Oh, I see. I misunderstood. But now "a theory you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind" seems just like a belief, so what I'm hearing is "a belief you form in your mind specific to the mental state of another mind"
I totally agree with you that it is a matter of interpretation. Our inability to agree then has an explanation. But whose is the better interpretation?
Ludwig V
Sorry, Im not sure what youre asking.
What is a matter of interpretation?
What is the explanation for our inability to agree?
Whose is the better interpretation of what?
I'm afraid I have misunderstood you again. You said:-.
Quoting Questioner
My questions followed from that.
Quoting Ludwig V
Metacognition is not an idea. It's talking about our own thoughts.
Quoting Ludwig V
Irrelevant. The point was that Jimi trembled as a result of drawing correlations between his behaviour and Janus'. That's all it takes.
Ockham's razor applies.
Metacognition returns answers to you? Does it understand requests all by itself?
I'm confused.
I see no ground for presupposing she is comparing your wants to anything.
Who said she couldn't?
Successfully navigating the world requires successfully distinguishing oneself from the rest of the world. Slime molds do this. Bacteria. All forms of life avoid danger and gather resources and thus... successfully navigate the world while they survive.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting Ludwig V
Why imagine an impossibility? Jimi cannot compare his own behaviour to the rules in order for him to know that his own behaviour did not comply. Jimi did not suddenly realize that he had broken the rules upon Janus' return. He was suddenly reminded(drew the same correlations once again) when it all came together again. He trembled as a result. Involuntarily.
Ockham's razor applies.
Upon a rereading, I'm less happy with this now than I was then, and I remember not liking it then.
Well, some beliefs are more supported than others. Theory of mind is what the psychologists call it. But, its true, you cannot have a belief in a supernatural being without having a theory about what is in their mind.
You can read about the connection between belief and theory of mind in Jesse Bering's book The Belief instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny and the Meaning of Life
Quoting Ludwig V
Sorry, let me try this again. Yes, forming a theory of mind for another depends on making inferences. Yes, inferences may be wrong. Yes, two different people might have a very different theory of mind about the same person. Whose is better? The one that gets the closest to the truth?
Yeah, that would require we verify the thoughts of 8 billion people. Maybe in some weird sci-fi movie
I think thats why I had some trouble with the original question, which seemed to be calling for a prioritization of all human thought, an obviously unreasonable task.
I guess the most we can say is was an understanding or a misunderstanding made? The reaction/response/behavior flowing from an understanding will be more aligned with reality, and the reaction/response/behavior flowing from a misunderstanding will be less aligned.
Ask the person whose thought they were guessing. He may tell the truth about what he was thinking at that moment, or he may lie, or he may refuse to answer. Refusal to answer leads you to draw a new inference about his present state of mind, as well as about the thought that was in question. You may even draw inference, from context, about his reasons. If he does answer, you'll have to decide whether to believe him or not. That decision will depend on what you know of his character from previous experience, as well as his demeanour in the moment.
Each of these inferences and decisions, along with some other operations, is part of an overall theory of mind: a general ability to 'read' the body language, expression and tone, in the context of previous knowledge, of another's communication.
Anyhow, theory of mind is rather misleading and vague nomenclature, IMO.
I feel that you have ignored all that I have said about theory of mind and remain close-minded to understanding it. I repeat - it's not about reading outward signs - it is about forming theories about what is in anther mind.
Quoting Vera Mont
That is because you don't understand it.
On what basis? You're right: I don't understand how telepathy comes out of a theory based on no experience and no sensory input.
It's not telepathy. it's your brain working.
Quoting Vera Mont
Who said it does not require experience and sensory input? Re-read my posts.
Right now, I have a theory of what is in your mind.
I could have sworn you did.
Quoting Questioner
Reading inward signs is telepathy. To form a guess, conjecture, theory or belief about what's in another mind, we first need to learn about something about the species and individual with whom who are faced. Infants respond to physical stimuli, but have no notions of the existence of minds or thoughts - and won't until they've interacted with others and learned to recognize patterns in their behaviour, from which they can deduce stimulus and response, cause and effect, similarity to their own feelings, etc. It's a long process of learning and associations before anything like a theory can form.
Quoting Questioner
From what? Words I typed are unequivocal outward signs.
Never mind. You have a theory I'm unable to validate.
Might he? Exactly what would that take? What must also be the case in order for Jimi to believe he had done something wrong, but not see it as punishment?
I've set out what is required for all three possibilities(knowing he had done something wrong, seeing Janus's treatment of him as punishment and not). Jimi does not have what it takes. That explanation has been sorely neglected.
Quoting Ludwig V
The first part turns on what counts as "too much emphasis on universal differences". I'm unsure of what that phrase is referring to. It does not seem to address anything I've claimed, as best I can tell. I'll say this to the rest: We assess each case as it comes by using/practicing standards. What standard(s) do you practice while assessing whether or not this or that creature is capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought and/or belief?
Quoting Ludwig V
Different users/practitioners of naming and descriptive practices can have different notions/concepts/thought and/or belief about time. There are multiple sensible uses of "time". Not knowing some does not preclude one from the rest. Showing that this is the case does not shoulder the burden.
The contentious matter is whether or not it is even possible for a thinking/believing creature to have a notion/concept(thought and/or belief about time) without naming and descriptive practices. The move from comparing different sensible uses of "time" to "similarly, the dogs have a concept of time" is suspect.
Quoting Ludwig V
Sure.
Here, you've used some of the same words in different ways than I do. I'll try to further clarify...
...I set out how a creature without naming and descriptive practices can form, have, and/or hold belief about distal objects that are themselves existentially dependent upon language users. Those objects are part of the content of the correlations being drawn(the content of the candidate's belief).
The mouse can draw correlations including the beer(between the beer and other things). Beer is existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. Therefore, the mouse(a creature without naming and descriptive practices) can indeed form, have, and/or hold belief about [b]some of that which is existentially dependent upon language use. Not all. That is the case regardless of whether or not anyone ever talked about it.
This is segue into similarity I think you and others may find interesting. I do.
Even less now.
It's more than that.
Quoting Vera Mont
"Theory of mind" is a well-established and supported piece of psychological information that has been the subject of scientific research going back nearly 50 years. I invite you to google using the search words "theory of mind."
Quoting Vera Mont
To deny that humans make conclusions about what is in other minds is blind indeed.
I never denied that humans, as well as other species draw conclusions, or at least surmise, what another sentient being is thinking. I reject the idea that they can do so without first having encountered other sentient beings, learned something about them, and how to read the outward signs.
Yes, I'm aware that the idea of autonomy can be applied to any living creature, including bacteria and moulds. (There are complicated cases, like lichens.) I didn't include those in what I said, because they are neither sentient nor rational. In fact, I think of them as indistinguishable from autonomous machines, apart from their ability to reproduce. There no question of wondering what they think or of language-less behaviour.
Quoting creativesoul
I can try. My thought is roughly this. I fear that if I talk about "words" here, you'll think I'm talking about words in a narrow sense and miss the point. Fortunately, concepts relate to specific words or terms in language and there are rules about how they are to be used. But in many cases - I expect there are exceptions - some of the rules are about how we should apply them in our non-verbal behaviour. A bus stop is where one congregates to catch a bus; a door bell is there to be rung to announce our arrival; etc. We often use this feature to attribute beliefs to humans when we cannot cross-question them. I don't see any reason to suppose that this feature enables us to attribute our concepts to dogs. The concept of food is not just about it can be idenitified and analysed, but how it is to be treated - cooking and eating. Hence, although dogs cannot cook food or analyse in the ways that we do, it can certainly identify it and eat it. This fits perfectly with the idea that our ideas and language about people can be stretched and adapted to (sentient and/or rational) animals.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm not at all clear what you mean about comparing wants to things. It was usually pretty obvious when she wanted something and when she had got it.
Quoting creativesoul
Well, animals are not capable of talking, so that's not hard. The question is, then, is whether they are capable of knowing what others and themselves are thinking; if that means they are capable of thinking about their own and others thoughts, then so be it.
Quoting creativesoul
I grant you that Jimi's fear might be triggered by Janus' return. But let's think this through. It might well be that he only started trembling when Janus came through the door. The trigger, then, would be the chicken plus Janus. That would explain why he killed the chicken. But it doesn't explain why he was still sitting beside it. Surely, an innocent, oblivious dog, would either start eating it or would wander off in search of something more amusing. I think the dead chicken reminded him of the previous occasion; Janus' arrival was the crisis, so he may well have got more anxious as he came in.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm trying to think what dog behaviour might distinguish complying with the rules from knowing that s/he is complying with the rules. Nothing comes to mind, so I'll give you that one. However, I'm reasonably sure that if they are complying with the rules, they know what the rules are. Jimi's killing of the chicken suggests that he had forgotten what the rule was. There's no doubt that he remembered at some point after the event. The question is, what triggered his memory and hence fear?
But the really significant point about the story is that he never bothered another chicken. That was the lesson he was supposed to learn. What correlation do you suppose that is based on?
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
OK. So we agree. I suppose we might disagree about which bits they can hold beliefs about which they cannot, but perhaps we don't need to tease that out now.
Quoting creativesoul
You've said twice that on reflection you are not happy with this. I don't see what's wrong with it. Could you explain?
Quoting Questioner
I read both of the Wikipedia articles - which does not make me an expert.
Wikipedia - Theory of Mind[/url and [url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_mind_in_animals]Wikipedia - Theory of mind in animals
There's a lot of interesting empirical work here. Not much, I have to say, in the way of consensus agreements. The actual psychology under this heading seems very worth while. But the heading is very confusing.
Quite so. Psychology seems to have more difficulty than any other science about escaping from its philosophical roots.
That seems to be clear. We do know that we understand other people. I'm not sure whether "by ascribing mental states to them" is a harmless paraphrase of "understanding other people" or something more substantial, philosophically speaking, and more controversial. But the question how our understanding works seems a sound starting-point for scientific research.
Philosophically speaking, this is indeed a theory. I read it as a philosophical theory of the mind. But that's not what is meant by "theory of mind" in this context, because each of us has our own theory. That's why I find the name for research in this area so confusing.
I'm not sure that it is wise to treat these propositions more or less as axioms when they are the focus of much philosophical debate. Perhaps it doesn't make any difference whether philosophical dualism or one of its variants is true, but if that's so, it makes a big difference to philosophy.
On reflection, I'm very unhappy with this comment. Setting it right, or at least righter, high-lights a complication in our question which has not gone unrecognized, but which, it seems to me, has not been fully recognized.
I don't think anyone seriously wants to reject the idea that the male bird of paradise builds his bower in order to attract a female. But @creativesoul is also right to observe that that purpose is not necessarily the bird's motivation. We ought to know this, since the same issue can be observed in human beings. Display behaviour can be observed in both males and female human beings, but it does not follow that they are motivated by the desire to make babies (though they may be, sometimes). Human beings can tell us what their motivation is, but the birds cannot. It seems to me, in fact, most likely that the birds just feel like building a bower, finding it a satisfactory and worth-while thing to do - just as so much display behaviour in human beings is done only because they feel that it is a worth-while thing to do.
But there is no doubt that such behaviour serves an evolutionary purpose. What's more, it explains the behaviour as rational; "feeling like it" doesn't explain anything.
But it relies more and more on neuroscience understanding the structure and function of the brain using techniques like brain imaging.
Quoting Ludwig V
Something more substantial. What controversy do you see?
Quoting Ludwig V
Some psychologists criticize theory of mind because it can be wrong that sometimes we make wrong conclusions - but I think that misses the point. That we can make inferences and interpretations of what is in another mind at all is the point. It says nothing about their accuracy.
I can play basketball and not sink the ball in the basket every time, but Im still playing basketball.
Quoting Ludwig V
I understand philosophical dualism to mean that the physical body and the mental mind are different things, that the mind is not made of physical matter. This tends to agree with a scientific description. In biology, every part of an organism is described in terms of its structure and its correlating function (and structure complements function).
So, the physical brain is the structure and in undergoing its electro-chemical processes it produces its function - the mind. The mind can in this context be considered an emergent property of the brain the intangible flow of information through the nervous system.
I'm sure that this can be part of the process, but it is not required.
Every person of faith has formed a theory of mind about what is in the mind of their God.
Indeed, and this skirts around the very heart of the matter, but I'll nitpick first.
Autonomy is not an idea. Calling things "ideas" is quite unhelpful. Earlier you did the same with "the idea of metacognition".
Quoting Ludwig V
Talking about our own belief and others' is how we begin to think about them. Thinking about thought and belief is one thing that is required for knowing what others are thinking. Getting it right is another. Is talking about thought and belief required for thinking about it? I certainly think talking about it is required for getting it right. However, not all notions of "thought" and "belief" get it right.
The question is - and always has been - what does it take in order for some creature or another to be capable of thinking about its own thought and/or belief?
We do so by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is how we do it. That's what talking about our own thought and belief involves. Thinking about one's own thoughts and beliefs requires isolating them as subject matters in their own right. We do that with naming and descriptive practices. We use "minds", "thought", "belief", "imagination", etc. Are there any other ways of(processes for) thinking about thought and belief, if not as subject matters in their own right? How else would/could a creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief also be capable of thinking about its own thoughts?
So, you've now invoked sentience which carries ethical considerations along with it. I'm not at all opposed to drawing and maintaining the distinction between sentient and non-sentient creatures; however, I do not see how we've established the basis to include such considerations in this discussion... yet. Sentient beings are capable of forming, having, and/r holding thought and belief about the world, but so too are all thinking/believing creatures. Do all creatures capable of thought count as sentient? That's yet another assessment that does not yet have a basis from which to draw a clear conclusion. The point was to show that simple differentiation between oneself and the rest of the world is something that is successfully done by creatures that are clearly incapable of knowing what your wants are. Hence, the fact that your dog distinguishes between herself and other dogs does not lend support that she knows what your wants are. <----that was the presupposition I was rejecting.
Quoting Ludwig V
Quoting Ludwig V
Your original claim above was not about you knowing her wants. It presupposed that she knew yours. How does she know which dog you want to respond without comparing your wants to your calling her name? I'm placing the presupposition/assumption that she knows which dog you want to respond when you call her name in question. That's precisely what needs argued for.
Her coming to you after you call her name is inadequate evidence for concluding that she knows which dog you want to respond. I'm certain that that sequence of events is ritualistic. Her drawing correlations between her name being called, her own behaviour(s), and yours afterwards more than suffices. I would bet that your tone plays a role as well, in that certain tones do not mean the same things to her that others do, despite all of them being cases of calling her name. She can draw correlations between your tone. She cannot draw correlations between your wants. They are not the sorts of things that are directly perceptible. Nor is time. Nor are the rules governing here behaviour.
We began by discussing which sorts of thought and belief other species can and/or cannot have with one specific sort of thought/belief in mind at the start, rational thought/belief. The conversation seems to have been everywhere but has gotten little to nowhere. It is my considered opinion that the methodological approach being used by many if not most participants was/is not up to the task at hand. I've mentioned on multiple occasions that the conversation was in dire need of a clear criterion and/or standards by which we can judge/assess whether or not a candidate is or is not capable of forming, having, and/or holding some thought or another.
That endeavor(establishing a criterion/standard from which to judge/assess our own and others' thought and belief) involves doing quite a bit of philosophy.
We must begin by examining and/or assessing ourselves. It is imperative that we get some rather important things right(that we correctly identify what thought and belief is; what it consists of; and/or how it emerges onto the world stage; how it persists; etc). Current convention is chock full of practices that clearly show we have not gotten some rather important bits of this right. That is clearly shown by the inability for many a position to admit that other creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought and belief. Those positions/linguistic frameworks work from inadequate conceptions/notions of "thought" and "belief" that are incapable of taking account of other creatures' thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences. The results range from outright denial to anthropomorphism.
I think the use of "concept" is problematic. What does it clarify? Nothing as best I can tell.
What is a concept of a tree if not thought and belief about trees(if not correlations drawn between trees and other things)? What is a concept of food if not thought and belief about food(if not correlations drawn between food and other things)? I do not see how the notion helps us to understand our own minds let alone other species'. It seems to me that it unnecessarily adds complexity where none is needed, and hence only adds confusion.
Correlations drawn by Jimi between his killing the chook and Janus's behaviour afterwards is more than enough. The correlation drawn is one of causality. Jimi attributes causality(draws a causal connection between what he did and what Janus did afterwards). Granting Janus' story is true, it took more than one occasion for him to alter his own behaviour accordingly(to stop killing hens).
Jimi's behaviour afterwards, complies with what Janus wants of Jimi's behaviour, but not as a result of Jimi's knowing what the rules are. Rather, it 'complies' because it fits into Janus' wants regarding Jimi's behaviour. Jimi stopped killing chooks because he did not want Janus to do whatever Janus did the first time. Jimi believed his behaviour caused Janus'.
What, then, is the requirement?
Quoting Questioner
No they have not. No person of faith living today has conceived of a god independently. They've been told by their priest, and read in the book thrust upon them by priests, and they accept that as gospel.... selectively.
The stimulation of and the processing by the following brain structures involved in theory of mind functioning:
Functional neuroimaging and structural connectivity studies have identified dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as the core regions of the neural substrate for ToM, extending to regions that include the precuneus (PCu), anterior temporal cortex, anterior cingulate and posterior cingulate (PostCing), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and amygdala, to constitute an extended ToM neural network
Also copied from the same webpage:
The theory of the mind (ToM), also known as mentalizing, is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to others (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Frith and Frith, 2006) and to obtain knowledge about others' perspectives at a given moment or in a particular situation, including intentions, hopes, expectations, fantasies, desires, or beliefs. This ability is essential for successful navigation in social life (Leslie, 2000; Krawczyk, 2018). These mental states can be divided into two components, an affective one, which involves the understanding of emotions, feelings or affective states and a cognitive component that implies beliefs, thoughts or intentions (Henry et al., 2015).
https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2021.618630/full
Quoting Vera Mont
A theory of mind does not pop into the head independently. We learn by what we see, hear, experience, do, and read, and then our brains, with its hypersocial focus and filters, ascribe mental states to that which is not us and believe in them.
From the beginning, the Book of Genesis tells us God both deliberately and mindfully created all of Creation.
It is only a pastors highly evolved theory of mind that allows that pastor to preach about the contents of Gods mind (for example, what God expects from us), and our highly evolved theory of mind to believe that message. It is only a highly evolved theory of mind that allows the religious to believe they have a personal relationship with Jesus. When people pray, who are they praying to?
Consider -
In the movie Castaway, Tom Hanks' character befriends a volleyball that he calls Wilson his only friend and companion during the years that he is on the island. The character ascribed mental states to the volleyball.
Or any fiction novel ever written with well-developed characters and we get right inside their heads. These characters are fictional, but they become real to us. We know what they are thinking and how they are feeling, and even anticipate their moves. This could not be possible without a well-developed theory of mind.
Which is exactly what I've been saying. You can stimulate a fetal brain anywhere you wants, and it still won't know what 'another' is, let alone guess what that other is thinking or imagine a great big Other in the sky.
It would help if we could clarify whether we are talking about a creature being capable of thinking about its own thought and belief or about a creature that is capable of thinking about the thought and belief of other creatures. Or both. (The cases are somewhat different.)
(Quoting creativesoul
The sequence of events - call, coming, praise - could does have a similarity to a ritual. Those correlations do indeed suffice. After all, the training consists of establishing associations between her name being called, her behaviour and the subsequent reward, and teaches he what her name is, i.e. which dog the name refers to. This training also enables her to know (after a little more training) what to do when she hears "Judy, sit" as opposed to what she should do when she hears "Eddy, sit". (At times, I have had more than one dog.)
Quoting creativesoul
How do we assess whether a proposed criterion or standard is clear and correct? By submitting cases to it. (Examples and counter-examples).
Quoting creativesoul
How do you know that current convention is wrong in not being able to admit that creatures are capable of those things? Many people accept the conclusion that they are not. So before you can demonstrate they are wrong, you must already have a clear and correct criterion.
Quoting creativesoul
It looks to me as if you have a reasonably clear concept of what a concept is. So there's no problem with that idea.
Quoting creativesoul
The thing is, there's more than one correlation in play. He might have correlated the dead chicken, or the dead chicken and Janus' presence - or both together- with the displeasure. But neither of those is the correlation that he is supposed to make; he got it wrong. (That's why a causal account is unhelpful, because it cannot recognize that.) It seems that Jimi did learn to leave the chickens alone - even when Janus was not there - from the experience. So his future behaviour does not correlate with either a dead chicken or with Janus' presence - much less on the presence of both.
You could correlate what Janus wants with Jimi's behaviour. But that's just another rule. (BTW That's not a causal correlation, because it is possible that Jimi might not comply.)
That's fair and certainly worthy of explanation.
While I agree that the cases are different, they differ in their respective targets[hide="Reveal"](whose thought is being considered)[/hide]. They differ regarding what the creatures[hide="Reveal"](arguably only humans, but it is certainly possible that some other creatures ]may use/employ naming and descriptive practices)[/hide] focus upon. The target is different individuals' thought and belief. That's three different ways to say much the same thing. The similarity takes precedence here. They both are metacognitive endeavors. Thus, I do not see the relevance of that particular distinction when it comes to drawing and maintaining the distinction(s) between thought, belief, and experience that consists of correlations drawn between language use(and other things) and thought, belief, and experience that does not. Nor does it seem relevant to the distinction between thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language use, and thought and belief that is not. <------that's the earlier peculiarity mentioned a few posts back. I could further set that out if need be. I've just recently come to acceptable terms with it myself.
Still seems too unsupported for my tastes.
It may strike some as odd, but I'm not convinced any dogs know their own name in the exact same way that we do. I would deny that altogether. Some know how to act when they hear their name being called in certain familiar scenarios. Some are still learning how to behave when they find themselves in such circumstances. Some live nameless lives.
We learn our names by virtue of how many times it is being used during a short duration of time spent. Dogs do as well. Some dogs, if rewarded well, can learn to do all sort of things. I'm okay with saying she has learned to behave in some ways sometimes. She has learned how to behave/thrive/survive in many different situations. Name calling events being one of many.
Sure, but only after it's already in front of us.
When it comes to being capable of correctly attributing thought, belief, and/or meaningful experiences to ourselves and other capable species, we must first have knowledge of the processes involved. It's not just a matter of what they believe, it's also a matter of how.
I've explained as best I can, and I'm fairly happy with my part. There's promise/potential. I'm content.
Methodological approach needs attention.
As early on as possible I suggest examining the justificatory ground(or lack thereof), the scope of rightful application, the explanatory power, the coherence and/or terminological consistency of the standard under scrutiny. There are some things that are perfectly clear. We're looking for knowledge of thought and belief that predated humans. Such thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience existed in its entirety prior to our knowledge thereof. That is only to say that prior to knowledge that there were thinking and believing creatures roaming the earth prior to ourselves, there were thinking and believing creatures roaming the world. A correct standard/notion of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" will be amenable with/to those prehistoric facts.
We can prioritize working from the fewest possible dubious assumptions. We can demand that our position posit the fewest possible entities necessary. We can insist that spatiotemporal flexibility be shown/proven by virtue of being capable of spanning the evolutionary timeline. Our standards/notion of "thought and belief" must be amenable to evolutionary progression such that it is clear how creatures begin attributing meaning to sights, sounds, and such. That's what thinking about the world does.
This sets out some of the standards I'm working from. Methodological approach. I think I have a very strong methodological naturalist bent.
What do all thinking and believing creatures have in common such that it this set of common elemental constituents that makes them what they are? They are all capable of drawing correlations between different things. Biological machinery finds a timely home at this point in the discussion.
Thought and belief are always meaningful to the creature drawing the correlations(forming, having, and/or holding thought and/or belief). Some thinking creatures inhabited the earth long before we did. Any and all acceptable notions of "mind", "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must take proper account of this.
We find ourselves becoming strikingly aware that some meaning is prior to any and all notions of "meaning". The same is true of thought and "thought" as well as belief and "belief".
"Thought and belief" exhaust "concept", but not the other way around.
There is more than one correlation being drawn. Some are efficacious too. Some have been drawn and continue to influence subsequent behaviours afterwards.
That's not a problem.
Claims beginning with Jimi "might have" presuppose a world in which Jimi could have. It's that logically possible world that needs set out. What else must also be the case in order for it to be possible for Jimi to draw correlations between the dead chicken, Janus' presence, and Janus' displeasure?
How does the dog drive a wedge between Janus' displeasure [hide="Reveal"](which consists almost entirely of Janus' thought and belief at the time)[/hide] and Janus' presence?
In order to connect three things, they must first be somehow disconnected.
How does Jimi disconnect Janus's presence from Janus' outward unhappy behaviour?
The chicken is in its own place. Jimi is as well. So too, is Janus. Janus' presence and Janus' displeasure do not share such clearly different spatiotemporal locations. Jimi does not think about Janus' displeasure in contrast/comparison or as a separate thing to/from Janus' presence. One must do so prior to connecting them(drawing a correlation between them).
I'm not sure what this is supposed to be aimed at. Looks to be made of straw.
Sure. Jimi's learned from his experience. Such experience was meaningful to Jimi by virtue of his having drawn correlations between his own behaviour[hide="Reveal"](killing the chicken)[/hide] and Janus's behaviour afterwards. Chickens became a bit more significant to Jimi as a result. Jimi learned that killing chickens has unwanted consequences. He can learn much the same lesson after touching fire.
Jimi most definitely is capable of recognizing and/or attributing causality. That's um... sometimes as far back as we need to go. I'm puzzled at the response though. Are you averse to the idea that dogs are capable of recognizing causality?
Creatures are capable of those things. If logical/valid conclusions contradict that, then the presuppositions/unspoken assumptions underwriting that train of thought are somehow mistaken.
Indeed they do. Some folk must if they are to remain free from self-contradiction.
I'm not even sure what you're claiming here. I'll add this...
If it is the case that creatures capable of having meaningful experiences roamed the earth long before the first language users like us(those employing naming and descriptive practices) did, then any and all acceptable notions/conceptions/uses of "thought", "belief", and/or "meaningful experience" must be able to take this into proper account. Lest they be found sorely lacking.
It is the case. Some positions cannot admit this. Thus, those positions must be rejected.
Some people might call that begging the question. One needs to explain the criteria for assertng it. But that's not a simple matter of evidence, because thinking of a dog as a sentient, rational creature is not a simple matter of fact but of thinking of a dog as, in many ways, (like) a person.
Quoting creativesoul
Sometimes Janus is present and not outwardly unhappy, sometimes he is present and outwardly unhappy.
Quoting creativesoul
That's very helpful. It clarifies what you meant when you said that all belief and thought consists of correlations. Thanks.
So Jimi's experience when he killed the first chicken might be expected to lead him to refrain from killing any more chickens on the principle that the burnt child fears the fire. But Jimi didn't fear the fire. He killed another chicken. (I'm not sure that dogs have a concept of causality as such. Simple correlations might be enough. But that's another issue.) What went wrong?
Maybe he forgot. But that suggests that he did not realize the significance (meaning) of his experience - i.e. he failed to generalize from it, in the way that the burnt child does. Then he was reminded of the first experience when he saw the chicken dead, or perhaps when Janus returned. That's the moment when he generalized from the first experience and realized that he was in trouble.
But it's not enough for him to generalize and understand that (1) whenever he kills a chicken, he will be in trouble. He also needs to understand that (2) if he does not kill chickens, Janus wll not be displeased with him.
There's more to Jimi than just recognizing causal correlations.
Quoting creativesoul
So when a creature recognizes that some belief it holds is false, it isn't thinking about its own thoughts? When a creature recognizes that some other creature is about to attack it, it isn't thinking about the other creature's thoughts?
I don't know what the question "how" means in this context. But one can think without language.
I love the work everyone has put into posting and this one is very interesting.
When nature changes the hormones the behavior will change.
I strongly think many female humans are unaware of wanting a baby when they start putting on lipstick, and possibly dressing and otherwise using body language, to attract the opposite sex. They might even be really against getting pregnant.
What they want is to be attractive and human females can be as competitive about this as different species of males strut their feathers, or another species will beat their chests. :grin:
Perhaps we have not stressed hormones enough?
Sexual behaviors occur when the animal has enough of the hormone that causes the animal to be sexual. Bonobos and Humans are the most sexual and are not as controlled as most animals that have very short periods of being sexually receptive.
If you are a farmer wanting to breed your animals you need to know estrus.
[/quote]or heat is a period during the
reproductive cycle when female animals
become sexually receptive, signaling they
are ready for mating. In most cases, this
can also be referred to as standing heat
because the female will stand to be mated
by the male (Figure 1).
Estrus is caused by estrogen being
produced within developing follicles on
the ovary, and ovulation usually occurs
after the initial signs of estrus are detected. Duration of estrus and the time
of ovulation in relationship to the onset
of estrus vary with the species (Table 1).
If behavioral or physical signs are not
obvious, estrus may even pass unnoticed.
Successful recognition of the signs of
estrus for mating, just prior to the time of
ovulation, can result in increased conception rates for the herd or flock.
https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/as/as-559-w.pdf [/quote]
My point is we need to stop thinking animals decide to things for a reason and thinking about how unreasonable humans are. :lol:
What messes with our thinking is that social rules add another dimension to sexual behaviors. :chin: We can question what rules are playing, the social or hormonal ones? To what degree is the animal controlled the social rules or the hormonal ones what what part of this is thinking?
That was fascinating!
I want to refer back to a book about math that I am reading because it really made me think about thinking math. What is thinking math?
Thinking 1, 2, 3, and 35 is a language skill. Looking at a plate of cookies and determining which one has the most cookies is not a language skill. A person can count all the cookies on all the plates and use math to determine which plate has the most cookies, but we can also judge which plate has the most volume of cookies. Animals can do that without having the language for math.
Now when I multiply simple numbers like 2x2 or 7x8 I am thinking how I think. 2x2 is so easy but 7x8 is not. Why is it so much harder to figure 7x8? I am learning our ability to do math includes knowing the relationship of numbers. Animals don't have the language of math so they can not think through the relationships of numbers. Does anyone know what I am talking about or am I being too weird?
Please help. I am trying to understand animal thinking that is done without language, by being aware of my own thinking. besides thinking of math, I am also thinking I am depressed because the cold weather makes going outside so unpleasant and that can become isolating and how do I think through this problem instead of playing a computer game all-day to avoid life. :lol: I can think I really need to knock on a neighbor's door and be neighborly, but my body screams, no I don't want to go outside. Where is the rational thinking? My body does not want to go outside but my head knows better.
That is such a wonderful thought! A woman in Canada developed a method for teaching virtues that can be used in schools or by families. She is very clear that it is not enough to punish a child for doing wrong. The child must learn what is the right way to do things. I feel so much pain for all the children who are punished again and again and don't just magically realize how to avoid punishment. I have seen parents and schools fail to teach what is right.
Quoting Ludwig V
Quoting creativesoul
Those last two quotes go together but I am a bit overwhelmed by all the thinking that has gone on while I was gone. What are the correlations? Is the argument that animals without language are rational thinkers? Hum, :chin: I am thinking what would motivate me to go out in the old? I am thinking I would like myself a whole lot better if acted on the notion I should check on a neighbor and telling you about this increases my motivation to do the right thing. Are those thoughts the correlations?
As I understand it, the paradise bird's behaviour is specific to mating and breeding. Human (and, presumably, bonobo) sexual behaviour is not strongly linked to fertility. I'm told that, at least in the case of bonobos, that sexual behaviour has additional functions in their social lives. That is certainly true in the case of humans.
Dressing up may be a sometimes a preliminary to actual courtship and mating, but it has other functions as well. It would be seriously reductionist not to recognize that. It claims membership of a social group and helps give one self-confidence. In relation to others it can deter aggression and form the basis of alliances. Other animals are not all the same in this respect. One needs to look at their lives holistically to understand what is going on.
Quoting Athena
Yes, they are and we often equate irrationality with instinctive behaviour. But it's more complicated than that. Our instincts are mediated through the social and practical rules that we have learnt, so our actual behaviour is based on instincts, which are given. It doesn't follow that they are irrational, although they might be non-rational; I mean that they are best thought of a like axioms - starting-points for rationality, which adjusts instinctive impulses to the outside world. In addition, we can explain the instincts as rational, not from the point of view of the animal, but from the point of view of the evolutionary pressure to survive and reproduce.
Quoting Athena
One of the functions of rationality, it seems to me, is to balance competing desires. But there are situations when it doesn't work very well, as in your case. I deeply sympathize with your desire not to hide from life whether in a machine or something else. It is not easy. The best I can offer is baby steps, building up slowly. If going outside to check on a neighbour is too much, try to think of a smaller steps that you can actually do. Going outside for one minute. (If you see her indoors wave at her throught the window.) Ringing your neighbour. (I suggest asking if you can borrow a cup of sugar, rather than just asking if they are OK.) That's how I try to handle those feelings. Mind you, I'm not very good at it.
Quoting Athena
No-one seems to recognize that punishment only works if the person being punished takes it the right way. But there's nothing to prevent people getting the wrong end of the stick. Like the fraudster who is caught and punished and responds by getting better at doing the fraud without getting caught.
There is a whole school of dog training which emphasizes reward-based training and frowns on the traditional punishments or even stick-and-carrot training.
It's important to emphasize that there is a form of punishment involved, but it is only withholding reward. In the context of no punishment, that works to deter unwanted behaviour. So if I were training Jimi, I would make a point of being around when Jimi is around chickens and keeping him distracted - ideally by playing his best game with him, or getting him to sit with me by offering intermittent treats. Once he's got that idea, you can gradually phase out the treats.
Yes. That seems to be our starting-point. Out differences lie in what a proper account is.
Quoting creativesoul
No, I don't suppose that a dog that knows its own name "in the exact same way" as we do. For example, it can't tell anyone what its name is. But it can do many of the things that we can do when we know our own name. In my opinion, the overlap is sufficient.
You are right, of course, that animals that don't undergo training in human ways, won't have to opportunity to learn their name. We probably ought to think of them as using pronouns only, though our reports might use names for people.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, and that's important. For example, when a dog checks out a bowl, because it expects there to be food in it, and is disappointed, I don't suppose it says to itself "Oh, my belief that there was food there is wrong" or anything similar. It simply walks away. But that action counts as a recognition that its belief was false.
Quoting Athena
That is probably the biggest difficulty. I have some ideas about how to respond to it, but will have to try to articulate them later.
That's their problem. I call it making sure a position is commensurate with the facts; what's happened or is happening; everyday events; etc. Many animals other than humans are clearly capable of problem solving. We can watch it happen. That's been proven over and over. So, either problem solving is something that can be done by a thoughtless creature(which amounts to saying that problem solving does not require thinking) or some non human creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding thought.
Since it is the case that some other animals problem solve, and problem solving is thinking, then it is not the case that only human are capable of thinking.
The conventional problems underwriting this matter stem from i) an abysmal failure to draw and maintain the actual distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief, and ii) parsing truth as nothing more than a property of true sentences.
Quoting Ludwig V
I find it curious that you agree and then immediately misattribute meaning to the dog, based upon the dog's behaviour. Your dog's walking away from an empty food bowl may count as a recognition that it's
belief was false according to your criterion for what counts as such belief, but not mine.
The dog knows there's no food in bowl. The dog may have believed that there was prior to going to check. He checked. There was no food in the bowl. The bowl did not have food in it. That's what he believed. In order for him to recognize that his belief was false, he would have to first be capable of thinking about his own belief. As I've painstakingly set out heretofore many times over, thinking about one's own thought is a practice that is itself existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices replete with some proxy for the dog's own thought/belief. Dogs do not have what it takes.
Do you have any argument whatsoever for any of the claims you've been making? Do you have a valid objection to my own? Do you have a bare minimum criterion for what counts as thought or belief such that all thought and belief satisfy it?
How does a dog(or any other animal without naming and descriptive practices) pick its own belief out of this world to the exclusion of all else in order to compare it to the world?
Perhaps even thinking punishment is a teaching skill is a mistake. Our culture is based on having a jealous, revengeful, and punishing god. Imagine beginning with having a creator who loves us. I know Christians have come around to Jesus loving us, but that has not changed the effect of believing in a punishing god. May I say here, that animals just do not make up stories and revolve around what those stories tell them of life.
Quoting Ludwig V
You are absolutely right and while animals fight for territory we fight for an imaginary god who favors us. That is rational thinking that might be improved with an understanding facts and how we determine if a fact is true or false. And this why this forum is essential. We do more thinking than other animals. My argument hangs on language being essential to rational thinking.
Quoting Ludwig V
This is my favorite explanation of what you said...
Quoting Ludwig V
Thank you so much for your good social and thinking skills. In a completely different forum things do not go so well as people (mostly males) compete to prove they are right and those who don't agree are idiots. Their approach prevents thinking because they put people on the defensive. Again and again I have experienced it is futile to have enjoyable discussions with poorly informed people. They think they are being rational, but because they don't know enough, how do I say? The discussion just can not past what they do not know and will consider.
Oh my goodness, I see sunlight and blue sky. :grin: It has been so long since we have had sunlight and a blue sky I am giddy. I want to run outside and enjoy this before the clouds cover it up again.
I think @Ludwig V is right because the dog remembers the bowl is where it found food, but that memory is not equal to believing food magically appears in the bowl. We are discussing the difference between living with language and without language. It seems impossible for me to think like an animal because every thought in my head is words, words, words. I make myself crazy with constant words, a lot of mind chatter that prevents me from directly experiencing life.
Knowing where to get food is not the same as knowing that one's own belief is false.
The claim was that walking away from an empty food bowl counts as recognition that the prior belief(that the bowl had food in it) was false.
What is involved in the process of recognizing that one's own belief about whether or not there is food in the bowl is false? It requires drawing a distinction between one's own belief and what the belief is about. This process, at a bare minimum, requires thinking about one's own belief as a subject matter in and of itself, which in turn requires a way to do so. We do that with words, which stand in as proxy, for the belief. How can an animal without naming and descriptive practices invent/create a meaningful utterance which stands in place of its own belief? That must be done prior to comparing that belief to the world. It is only via such a comparison that one can recognize that their own belief is either true or false.
Yes. That's part of it. There's also the transition between. There are also different kinds of languages consisting of different kinds of meaningful behaviours, marks, utterances, etc.
Indeed, what counts as language matters in more than one way.
Recognizing that the bowl is empty is not the same as recognizing that one's own belief about food being in the bowl is false. The former is about the food and the bowl. The latter is about one's own thought/belief. The dog can directly perceive the food, the bowl, and its own hunger. Thought and belief are not directly perceptible things. Nor are truth/falsity. Nor is meaning. Nor are social/institutional facts. Nor are any number of abstractions.
I cannot find good ground for claiming that any creature incapable of naming and descriptive practices is capable of abstraction. Recognizing that one's own belief is false requires comparison/contrast between the belief and what the belief is about. That seems to require a skillset unobtainable to dogs.
Of course there is more to any thinking creature than just the recognition/attribution of causality, but it seems to me that that process, regardless of the creature, is more than adequate for being a case of thinking(thought/belief).
I'm not convinced that Jimi knows he's in trouble, so I question the account above on its presuppositional ground.
It is more than enough that Jimi inferred that his own behaviour caused Janus'. Here, all Jimi needs to avoid killing chickens is to believe that if he does Janus will do whatever Janus did the first time. He does not need to understand that if he does not kill chickens Janus will not be displeased. He just needs to believe that if he does, Janus will do what he did the first time. His belief that his own behaviour caused Janus' comes replete with the further inference/belief/expectation that if he does not, Janus will not do that either. That's how the recognition/attribution of causality works.
I agree but...
Where does the need for having a concept of causality come from? Again, I do not find the notion of concept to be of help. Generally speaking, it seems to be a step backward instead of forward. One can recognize/attribute causal relationships, which is what is meant by "recognize/attribute causality" without having a concept of causality(thinking about causality as a subject matter in and of itself). A creature can believe that X causes Y without having a concept of causality. Recognizing/attributing causality requires only inferring that.
That's right. I should have been clearer that that sentence was my report of the dog's behaviour. I thought it was obvious that the dog could not have made that report.
Quoting creativesoul
Oh, dear, now we are in deep trouble. It is reasonable to describe some words as standing in as proxy for something. But not all. That's a big, even central, issue about language. For example, there is some sense in saying that if my dog's name is Eddy, "Eddy" stands in as proxy for the dog. But I don't think it helps to insist that "1" stands in as proxy for the number 1 or "Pegasus" as proxy for Pegasus. The philosophical issue of nominlaism vs realism as an account of universals (abstractions) is precisely about this.
Quoting creativesoul
Of course. I only wanted to suggest that there are other kinds of belief.
However, Jimi's belief that Janus was displeased with him because he killed the chicken does not distinguish between causation as simply correlation and causation as something more than just correlation. I think Jimi is capable of the first, but not the second - at least, I can't think of non-verbal behaviour that would enable me to distinguish the two. I could be wrong.
Quoting creativesoul
H'm. "Replete with" is not altogether clear to me. I notice that you do accept that that Jimi's belief that his own behaviour caused Janus' displeasure is distinct from the belief that if he does not behave in that way, Janus will not be displeased. So it is possible that he might believe the first and not the second. This fits well with the fact that killing the chicken is a sufficient, but not necessary, consequence of Janus' displeasure, getting from one to the other requires an inferential step, which Jimi has failed to make after the first kill, but does (apparently) make after the second.
I do not understand why you made that argument. An expectation is not the same as a belief. An expectation is thinking with the gut (feeling) not the brain (language).
How about smells? That is one of the major elements of communication. I think I smell a god. Well, maybe that doesn't work. However, we can believe someone will be a good mate because of how that person smells.
Perhaps what is going on in our subconscious also counts and is closer to animal thinking with messages that mean something but have no language for rational thinking. Just a smell and a reaction.
Or a movement and shooting in fear without thinking, thereby killing one's son. The book Emotional Intelligence uses a story of a man killing his son, as an example of our reaction system that does not involve thinking.
Wow, you used a word I never came across before and did not know the meaning. Without the knowledge I could not understand what you said so I looked it up...
That is the perfect word for what I think is important to this thread. Humans behave as though their thoughts are accurate, concrete information when the thought is not reality. Making humans the most irrational animals.
Gene expression in the human brain: cell types become more specialized, not just more numerous
The standard expectation is that when someone asserts that p, they are asserting that it is true. We can infer, without further evidence, that they believe that p. The dog cannot assert that there is food in the bowl, so we cannot infer that the dog believes that there is food in the bowl. Conventional discussions about belief do not give us any basis for inferring that any dog or other animal that does not have human language believes anything. But those discussions do not pay attention to the fact that non-verbal behaviour in humans is also evidence of what they believe. Similar non-verbal behaviour can be observed in animals that don't have human language and that provides evidence for what they believe.
The dog walks up to the bowl and sniffs it; that is evidence that the dog believes that there is food in the bowl. If there is food in the bowl, we expect the dog to eat it, and that action confirms our inference. If there is not food in the bowl and the dog walks away, that action is evidence that the dog recognizes that there is no food in the bowl.
Quoting Athena
I do agree that there is a difference between beliefs based on feeling (I would say, intuition) and beliefs based on a rational process (language). But surely, if I expect the children to get home from school at 4.00, I believe that they will. That may be based on feeling or on a rational process, but it's the same belief/expectation.
Quoting Athena
Yes, there is evidence that smell plays a bigger part in our social lives that we mostly choose to recognize. (It would be good to know how often our expectations based on smell turn out to be true.) But I wouldn't call it a language. When eggs go bad, the smell puts us off eating them, but the smell is a sign that we read, not a communication sent by the egg. The smells that we (and other animals) give off play their part in negotiating our social lives, but it's not the same part as language does.
Quoting Athena
Yes, that's a tempting thought. The trouble is that there doesn't seem to be any way of knowing what is going on in our sub-conscious other than supposing that it must be like what goes on in our consciousness. Which is a big assumption and should be treated with some scepticism.
Quoting Athena
I'm sorry. I dropped a bit of philosophical jargon without explaining it. I'm glad you could work it out. The internet is sometimes very helpful.
Quoting Athena
I think that's a bit harsh. I would say that humans are a mixture of rationality and irrationality, just like other animals. But their capacity to harm the world around them is greater than animals, so their irrationality is more damaging than the irrationality of other animals.
Quoting wonderer1
Interesting. But I don't see any clear philosophical implications. Do you?
Trump has announced he would use military force to take control of Greenland and the Panama Canal.
This is not any worse than the Neo-Cons and invading Iraq and Afghanistan. However, Christians got this man into office and it is Christian mythology that a god favors the US and that is irrational thinking based on a false belief. No animal could sin more than the human one. Our belief in the Biblical god is a curse.
I must admit, I have trouble seeing how Trump's adventures would make America great again, any more than the NeoCons' expeditions did.
Quoting Athena
Yes. It is hard to understand how Christians could bring themselves to support him. It seems that the prospect of power can make strange allies. It also encourages wishful thinking and so distorts people's capacity for rational calculation.
Quoting Athena
l wouldn't say that a non-human animal can sin at all. They aren't subject to human morality. That's something that is uniquely human.
Quoting Athena
People do seem to give up on rational thought in the context of religious belief.
I take your point. It does seem to me that ideological convictions are uniquely human and by far the most dangerous power we have. A dose of philosophical scepticism is a good medicine for those delusions. But, sadly, those who need it most are also the most resistant. Whether such convictions are ever rational, or even reasonable, is an interesting question. I can't imagine that animals are ever gripped by them.
There's a famous quote about this:-
Good advice. The irony is, of course, that Oliver Cromwell was driven by ideological convictions about which he never seems to have wavered.
Somewhat related - there's actually a fascinating story of how an ancient, heretical Christian sect reached China after having to escape persecution in what is now Persia. They were the Nestorian Christians, and they were given refuge in the Middle Kingdom, where they settled, and distributed copies of the Gospel story, replicated in Chinese on silk scrolls, with all of the names Asianised (Jesus being 'Issa' and the scriptures being called the 'Issa Sutras'). THis happened very early, in 600 A.D. or so. You can find the wikipedia entry here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_the_East_in_China and there are various documentaries, and this book.
The Mayan rationale is soooo different from our Greek/Roman rationale. If human beings can have very different rational systems, we have to question what rational thinking is.
Christians moving their rationale into China is perhaps more disruptive than a causal judgment might understand. We take our calendar and mode of thinking for granted. But this is a different subject from comparing how our minds work with how animals' brains work.