Relativism vs. Objectivism: What is the Real Nature of Truth?

How do you define truth?

Reply to Cadet John Kervensley
It may be problematic to see relativism or objectivitism as an ultimate 'truth'. That is because they are both perspectives. Saying that may amount to relativism in some respects. However, relativism may go too far in reducing all matters of 'truth' to the subjective, which may rule out the shared and intersubjective elements are missed. This can apply to most aspects of 'truth', including morality.

Both the subjective, or relative, and objective matter in thinking about the construction of 'truth and, need to be juggled effectively. Human beings may seek 'truth'. It is constructed uniquely from cultural and personal angles, and on an ongoing basis throughout life.

Welcome to TPF!

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

Objectivism asserts that truth exists independently of human beliefs, emotions, or perceptions.

This seems more of a definition of non-anthropocentrism. Neither objectivism nor relativism hinges on humans (anthropocentic) or perceptions (idealist).

According to this view, there are facts that are true regardless of who examines them or under what circumstances.

For example, is the sum of 3 and 5 equal to 8, or is that just a property of our universe? Mathemaical 'truths' are often held as objective, but proving that is another thing.

For example, the laws of physics or mathematical truths are often cited as examples of objectivism in action.

The laws of physics are not necessarily the same from one universe to the next, so that would be an example of relativism (or relational, as I tend to use the word, to distinguish it from Einstein's relativity theory, which is something else).

relativism claims that truth is subjective and dependent on context,

Subjective implies a perceiving subject. A relational view does not require a subject. A subject is only required for the view (the map), but not the territory. A rock can get wet without a human to notice it. The water exists relative to the rock.

Something like moral relativism does indeed require perceiving subjects, since it is relativism of abstrations. Your post seems to largely focus on opinions being objective or relative, and not so much the more general scope of the two terms.

truth depends on each person's viewpoint?

The 3+5 thing borders on objective truth. Most all of the rest you mention seems to be opinion, which has nothing to do with truth. If there are for instance objective morals, then opinions on the matter are completely irrelevant to that truth.

Does relativism allow for greater respect for differences, or does it lead to moral chaos?

Chaos seem to only result from pushing one's opinion onto those that don't share it.

And is objectivism too rigid to accommodate human diversity?

Not at all since no counterexample can be shown. To do that, one would have to demonstrate an objective truth. Plenty try, but all seem to beg their opinion.


I find a relational view (in ontology say) to make more sense, to have far fewer self contradictions. The view doesn't really touch on opinions such as personal morals.

Does the universe objectively exist, or does it exist only in relation to some things? If there is a correct answer to that question (however unknowable), then that would be an objective truth, regardless of which of the two is that correct answer. Some say that there must be a correct answer, however unknowable, but I'm not even sure of that.

Reply to Cadet John Kervensley

I think one can view many truths as being objective, and others as being somewhat subjective. Thus, I think the specific topic at hand is important in some sort of discussion of objectivism versus subjectivism.

While objectivism and subjectivism clash, I don't think I've ever heard someone argue in good faith that truth is entirely subjective or entirely objective.

(Upon doing a little research some people do indeed argue all truth is subjective)

Quoting MoK

How do you define the truth?

I think this post is getting at exactly that - is the property of being true based on facts that are verifiable independent of our feelings, or is the property of being true based on subjective experiences? Or at least, that's what I would like to think.

To say, for instance, that objectivism doesn't recognize context is a little strange:

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

relativism encourages us to acknowledge the plurality of perspectives and accept that truth may be shaped by our experiences and contexts.

Quoting Jack Cummins

It may be problematic to see relativism or objectivitism as an ultimate 'truth'. That is because they are both perspectives. Saying that may amount to relativism in some respects. However, relativism may go too far in reducing all matters of 'truth' to the subjective, which may rule out the shared and intersubjective elements are missed. This can apply to most aspects of 'truth', including morality. Both the subjective and objective matter in thinking about the construction of 'truth and need to be juggled effectively.

I think I agree with this. And I think the main, practical distinction between the two is that one is experienced by a mind, and that a truth can be subjectively true just on the basis of being related to that experience with no other evidence being required. On the other hand, when one asserts an objective truth, one is expected to back it up. These two differing expectations lead to a useful delineation between the truths derived from, say, literature and science.

Quoting noAxioms

For example, the laws of physics or mathematical truths are often cited as examples of objectivism in action.The laws of physics are not necessarily the same from one universe to the next, so that would be an example of relativism (or relational, as I tend to use the word, to distinguish it from Einstein's relativity theory, which is something else).

Okay, I'm no physicist, or mathematician, but this sounds suspect. If a fact - like the laws of physics - in one universe is not the same as in another universe, wouldn't there have to be some independent reference frame against which the two can be compared to evaluate them relationally? The laws of physics in one universe could be so different from another that they cannot be compared via knowledge of the two alone. I mean, if there were something similar to Newton's laws in both, just changed a little (which would have massive consequences I'm sure), maybe then, but what if fundamentally they are nothing alike? I think you have to use the term "relative", because relational implies some sort of connection.

All of that might be an admitted layman just shouting into the void, and if so, please correct me.

Welcome to the forum. A well-written and well thought out OP (original post).

To start... If you hang around you'll see that my arguments very often come back to metaphysics. Objectivism and relativism are metaphysical positions. I'm a fan of R.G. Collingwood who wrote that metaphysical positions are neither true nor false. My own formulation as a pragmatist is to use whichever works best in a given situation.

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

Objectivism asserts that truth exists independently of human beliefs, emotions, or perceptions.

There is a strong philosophical argument to be made that objective reality does not exist, or rather it is not always a useful way of looking at things. I've started discussions on this in the past and participated in many others over the years.

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

And Relativism?
In contrast, relativism claims that truth is subjective and dependent on context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives. What is true for one person or culture might not be true for another. For instance, in matters of morality, what is considered right or wrong can vary depending on cultural or historical contexts, reinforcing the idea that truth is relative.

It's not just context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives that matter. Here's what Immanuel Kant has to say in "Critique of Pure Reason."

Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason:Space is a necessary a priori representation that underlies all outer intuitions. One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them, and it is an a priori representation that necessarily underlies outer appearances...

...We dispute all claim of time to absolute reality [absolute Realität], namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition. Such properties, which pertain to things in themselves, can also never be given to us through the senses. Therefore herein lies the transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if one abstracts from the subjective condition of our sensible intuition, it is nothing at all, and can be considered neither as subsisting nor as inhering in the objects in themselves (without their relation to our intuition).

So, according to Kant, space and time are not objective not because of context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives but because of our fundamental nature as human. Konrad Lorenz, the famous ethologist, had this to say.

Konrad Lorenz - Behind the Mirror:In... the Critique of Pure Reason [Kant] wrote:

If one were to entertain the slightest doubt that space and time did not relate to the Ding an sich but merely to its relationship to sensuous reality, I cannot see how one can possibly affect to know, a priori and in advance of any empirical knowledge of things, i.e. before they are set before us, how we shall have to visualize them as we do in the case of space and time.

What a biologist familiar with the facts of evolution would regard as the obvious answer to Kant's question was, at that time, beyond the scope of the greatest of thinkers. The simple answer is that the system of sense organs and nerves that enables living things to survive and orientate themselves in the outer world has evolved phylogenetically through confrontation with an adaptation to that form of reality which we experience as phenomenal space. This system thus exists a priori to the extent that it is present before the individual experiences anything, and must be present if experience is to be possible. But its function is also historically evolved and in this respect not a priori.

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

And Relativism?
In contrast, relativism claims that truth is subjective and dependent on context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives. What is true for one person or culture might not be true for another.

And therefore if relativism is true for some and not others, then it is self-refuting as a claim (i.e. relativism is relative ... "truth is subjective" is subjective ... :roll:). This is incoherent, of course, and not a viable, or reasonable, alternative to 'objective truth' (so the OP's poll is a false choice).

For instance, in matters of morality, what is considered right or wrong can vary depending on cultural or historical contexts, reinforcing the idea that truth is relative.

This doesn't follow since "right and wrong" are use-claims (i.e. evaluations, selections, preferences (re: plurality)) and not truth-claims (i.e. propositions (re: objectivity)) – not to be confused with "relativism", pluralism is objective (i.e. many different paths through / maps of the same terrain, or many different perspectives on / aspects of the same thing). Btw, there are reasonable conceptions of 'objective morality' such as (e.g.) moral naturalism¹.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/857773 [1]

Reply to Cadet John Kervensley

For instance, in matters of morality, what is considered right or wrong can vary depending on cultural or historical contexts, reinforcing the idea that truth is relative.

What is considered true or false also varies depending on cultural or historical context. Does the fact that many people throughout history thought that the Earth was flat constitute good evidence that the shape of the Earth varies with social context?

Anyhow, on the original question:

1. The problem with asserting a completely relativistic notion of truth is that such an assertion is straightforwardly self-refuting. Such a claim will itself only be "true" relative to some social context, "language game," etc. Not to mention that such a notion of truth seems entirely implausible in the face of sense experience. As J.S. Mill once quipped, "one would have to have made some significant advances in philosophy to believe it."

2. The problem with many formulations of the "objective view," is that truth is properly absolute. The absolute is not reality as set over and against appearances. Being [I]absolute[/I] it must include [I]all[/I] of both reality and appearances. Plato gets at this in the Republic when Socrates presents Glaucon with the tripartite distinction between:

A. Things that are good only relative to something else;
B. Things which are good in themselves, and;
C. Those which are both.

The image of truth as the "view from nowhere," leads to the incoherent conclusion that a complete view of truth would be "knowing the world as one would know it without any sense organs and without a mind."

Appearances are not unrelated to things. Appearances are the appearances [I]of[/I] things. Consider the word for form used by Aristotle—eidos—"image." Yet the eidos of a thing, it intelligibility, is what is "most real" in it. Form has priority over matter. The latter is mere potency; form is act. The quiddity—whatness—of things is tied to their appearances. Indeed, if being is to mean anything, it must refer to that which is [I]given[/I] to phenomenal awareness, the intelligibility of things. And things' forms are accessible to us, as appearance.

Reply to T Clark

I never found Kant's arguments here particularly convincing. It always seemed to me like a strange twist on the Aristotlean conception of space and time motivated by the English empiricists' conflation of the sign and the sign vehicle, which led folks like Locke to the conclusion that "we only know our ideas/experiences of things, not things." The mistake here is missing that experience is "that [I]through which[/I] we know," not "what we know."

The other mistake I see in the empiricists is their preferencing of knowledge of "things in themselves." What things are outside of all interaction with anything else is not only epistemically inaccessible, but also makes no difference to the rest of the world. The old scholastic doctrine that "act follows on being," has to be true for anything whose being or not being makes any difference in the world.

Hence, space and time exist in nature fundamentally, but not actually:

It has to come as a surprise to the new student of Aristotle to learn that time and space for Aristotle exist in nature only fundamentally. Formally and actually time and space exist as the action of thought completes nature by creating in memory a series or network of relations which constitute the experience of time and space. Thus the “continuum of space and time” belongs neither to the order of being as it exists independently of the human mind nor to the order of what exists only as a consequence of human thinking, but exists rather objectively* as one of the most intimate comminglings of mind and nature in the constitution of experience.

Let us begin with time, that ever mysterious “entity” in which we live out our lives. What is time? How does time exist? According to Aristotle, apart from any finite mind, there is in nature only motion and change and the finite endurance of individuals sustained by their various interactions, as we shortly consider in more detail.

Enter mind or consciousness. Now some object changes its position or “moves in space”, and the mind remembers where the local motion began, sees the course of the movement, and notes where it terminates: the rabbit, for example, came out of that hole and ran behind that tree, where it is “now” hidden. The motion was not a “thing”; the rabbit is the “thing”. The motion exists nowhere apart from the rabbit’s actions – nowhere, that is, except in the memory of the perceiver which preserves as a continuous whole the transitory movement of the rabbit from its hole (the “before”) to the tree (the “after”).

John Deely - Four Ages of Understanding

* It's worth noting that Deely uses "objective" according to its meaning in classical metaphysics, derived from "objects," the things experienced in the umwelt. The term "objective" morphing into meaning something like "mind-independent" or "noumenal" being fairly unhelpful, and at the very least very far from its original meaning, similar to how "substance" for Descartes has become something entirely different. It's almost like A Canticle For Leibowitz, where an apocalypse (or in this case the Reformation) had people using the terminology of science with no real understanding of the system it was created for.

Anyhow, your second quote would not be strictly Kantian, no? For Kant, evolutionary biology tells us absolutely nothing about the noumenal world. It tells us what is true within experience. It can shed no light outside the realm of phenomenal awareness.

I can see perfectly well why people aren't willing to follow Kant on this however. However, I do not understand why he is frequently credited like this with the idea that our sense organs/minds shape how we experience the world. This is a very old intuition. It's in Aristotle for one. It's an old scholastic doctrine as well, "everything is received in the manner of the receiver." If anything Kant confuses this insight by placing knowledge of the processes underlying experience out of the reach of man (which is precisely the reason why attributing this insight to him can be misleading, the quality insight gets packaged with a dualism people might be less keen on).

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

In contrast, relativism claims that truth is subjective

Quoting Jack Cummins

subjective, or relative

Quoting ToothyMaw

While objectivism and subjectivism clash

It's not clear to me that "relativism" and "subjectivism" mean the same thing, e.g. Catholic Church doctrine is that abortion is absolutely wrong, but many other churches don't agree. The Catholic position is absolute, but only relatively.

Not all true statements have an objective justification, but some do.

This is a fundamental tenet in mathematics.

According to Godel's incompleteness theorem, some true statements in arithmetic theory are provable but the vast majority is not.

("Arithmetic" being standard Peano arithmetic or similar)

In the set of true arithmetical statements, the unprovably true statements vastly outnumber the provable ones.

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

For example, the laws of physics or mathematical truths are often cited as examples of objectivism in action.

If a statement is provable in arithmetic, then it is true in all "models" ("interpretations") of arithmetic.

The reverse is not true.

It is not because a statement in arithmetic is true that there would be an objective justification for it ("proof").

In that case, the statement is true in one interpretation ("model") of the theory but false in other interpretation(s).

If there is no objective justification for an allegedly true statement, there does not need to be a consensus on its truth.

How can you even be sure that it is true, since there is not even a common understanding on why that would be the case?

Some small proportion of arithmetical reality is provably true. Most of it, however, is unprovably true.

Therefore, arithmetical reality is generally not objectivist. Only a very small part is.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

I never found Kant's arguments here particularly convincing.

I'm with Kant on this. A broader perspective recognizes the nature and extent of a priori knowledge applies to more than just space and time. Perception of color begins in the eye itself and grows to include a big piece of real estate in the brain. Babies are instinctively attracted to human voices and faces before they have had a chance to learn to make the categorization. There is also strong evidence that infants in the first months of life have inherent moral and numerical senses. If you have any interest in this subject, I recommend Konrad Lorenz's "Kant's Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology." Its much shorter than the book I referenced. Here's a link.

https://archive.org/details/KantsDoctrineOfTheAPrioriInTheLightOfContemporaryBiologyKonradLorenz

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

What things are outside of all interaction with anything else is not only epistemically inaccessible, but also makes no difference to the rest of the world.

If our a priori knowledge is dependent on our biological makeup, what could be more relativistic than that. As Lorenz shows, it has a profound impact on what we know and how we learn - all of our psychology.

Now some object changes its position or “moves in space”, and the mind remembers where the local motion began, sees the course of the movement, and notes where it terminates: the rabbit, for example, came out of that hole and ran behind that tree, where it is “now” hidden. The motion was not a “thing”; the rabbit is the “thing”.

There is evidence that perception of motion is also affected by instinctive, genetic mechanisms in the nervous system. It's not learned after birth.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not understand why he is frequently credited like this with the idea that our sense organs/minds shape how we experience the world. This is a very old intuition.

I'm confused. Given this understanding, I don't see why you reject the position I'm describing.

Quoting noAxioms

The laws of physics are not necessarily the same from one universe to the next, so that would be an example of relativism (or relational, as I tend to use the word, to distinguish it from Einstein's relativity theory, which is something else).

I think you're stretching the meaning of the word "relativism" here. "Universe" means everything. We only have access to this scope of being, dimension or whatever you want to call it. If we ever gain access to some other hypothetical world, the meaning of "universe" will change.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

The problem with asserting a completely relativistic notion of truth is that such an assertion is straightforwardly self-refuting. Such a claim will itself only be "true" relative to some social context, "language game," etc.

Quoting 180 Proof

And therefore if relativism is true for some and not others, then it is self-refuting as a claim (i.e. relativism is relative ... "truth is subjective" is subjective ...

I don't understand the logic of this. Of course a relativistic position is relativistic. Not all self-reference is self-contradictory. 180 Proof, I know you have an understanding of metaphysics similar to mine. Relativism and objectivism are metaphysical positions.

Quoting noAxioms

For example, is the sum of 3 and 5 equal to 8, or is that just a property of our universe? Mathemaical 'truths' are often held as objective, but proving that is another thing.

Yes, if there is no objective justification ("proof") then there won't be (an objective) consensus on whether it is true or not, rendering such truth subjective. Even in arithmetic, most truth is unprovable and therefore lacking objectivity.

Indexical utterings like "I'm the prime minister of Sweden" will typically be true for one person (or none) and false for others.
I suspect that's not quite what's meant here by "Relativism" though.

Doesn't "Objectivism" and "Real" go together here?
If there is a "Real Nature of Truth" would it not be objective?

Ignoring indexicals for a moment, it seems clear enough that there are independent truths.
Say, "The Sun burned less brightly 4 billion years ago" holds true (or false) regardless of whatever you or I may think ("brightly" can be translated to physics).
Doesn't seem particularly controversial.

Quoting T Clark

Not all self-reference is self-contradictory.

Of course; but I didn't claim or imply otherwise. There are virtuous circles and vicious circles, and the latter are self-refuting ones (e.g. OP's definition of "relativism").

Relativism and objectivism are metaphysical positions.

Well maybe, TC, but the OP posits epistemological positions (on "truth"), not metaphysics.

Reply to T Clark
Relative and subjective are different. The example of the Catholic idea of abortion shows this because to Catholics it is absolute. Nevertheless, there is a relationship between relativism and subjectivity because one can stand back looking at the various relative positions and say that it amounts to all positions being subjective.

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

I would love to hear your thoughts on this issue. Which position do you take in the debate between relativism and objectivism, and why? How does this debate influence your own conception of truth and reality?

I don't consider it particular important to have a view of truth or reality. Apart from a basic correspondence pragmatically, truth is often elusive. Truth is an abstract; it's not a property that looks the same wherever it is found. Truth is established in different ways for different matters. Eg - mathematical truth, geographic (empirical), historical, legal, philosophical.

I think the search for the really real or the truly true is often a god surrogate and a hope for finding some form of transcendence. We seem to want access to knowledge of something outside of human experience that is in some way immutable.

I believe we can pragmatically say things are good or bad in relation to the harm they prevent or cause. I am not sure we can do much more than that. All humans really have access to is a conversation about their values and what kind of world we want to build.

But even if you hold the view that there are objective facts, this does not end debate or resolve any problems between people's values. All we have then is the ceaseless debate about which set of 'objective' facts are the 'true' facts.

Pluralism for me please!

Reply to I like sushi :up:

Reply to T Clark

I'm with Kant on this. A broader perspective recognizes the nature and extent of a priori knowledge applies to more than just space and time. Perception of color begins in the eye itself and grows to include a big piece of real estate in the brain. Babies are instinctively attracted to human voices and faces before they have had a chance to learn to make the categorization. There is also strong evidence that infants in the first months of life have inherent moral and numerical senses. If you have any interest in this subject, I recommend Konrad Lorenz's "Kant's Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology." Its much shorter than the book I referenced. Here's a link.

https://archive.org/details/KantsDoctrineOfTheAPrioriInTheLightOfContemporaryBiologyKonradLorenz

As I noted above, you can't be, strictly speaking, a Kantian and claim that neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and the like are telling you things about the causes of the structure of experience. For Kant, the natural sciences can only ever tell you about the world of phenomenal awareness, not what lies prior to it. This firewall needs to be in place so that he can hide "free will ," as he understood it, in the noumenal realm, while maintaining the phenomenal world is rigidly deterministic (see the end of the Prolegomena).

So I see the position you are advocating as:

A. Dropping core elements of Kant's thought;
B. Largely revolving around ideas that are neither unique to Kant nor new with him.

What I remain unconvinced by is not that "whatever is received is received in the manner of the receiver," that, as you say, "color has to do with the eye and brain," but rather the claim that it is impossible to say that space and time exist fundamentally (but not actually) in nature, or that it is impossible to apply the findings of neuroscience, genetics, etc. to anything outside that which lies inside phenomenal awareness.

If the view you like is one where evolutionary biology and neuroscience is telling us about the mind-independent world and the causal origins of the contents of experience then you are also closer to Aristotle than Kant (or at least as Kant as most people interpret him).

There is evidence that perception of motion is also affected by instinctive, genetic mechanisms in the nervous system. It's not learned after birth.

It's both for many animals. Sew a cat's eye shut from birth and it will go blind in that eye, even after the eyelid is allowed to open again. After birth there is still a "critical period," in most mammals where stimulus is required for a sensory organ to develop properly.

But obviously there is also a formal component, having to do with genetics, etc., as well, i.e. the essential versus the accidental. The genes of a fern or flower will never produce a functioning eye regardless of the environment.

Sort of aside the point, this finding is consistent with a lot of philosophies of perception.

I'm confused. Given this understanding, I don't see why you reject the position I'm describing.

I'm pointing out that your position isn't Kantian. Kant also was not a relativist. The mind does not varry between individuals the way your initial post implies, which is why for Kant we can discover laws of nature that are universally applicable for all observers across phenomenal awareness. I've even seen readings of Kant where the "mind" is more a global/shared Avoresean agent intellect (although this seems to be a stretch).

Consider ethics for instance. The rational agents all come to embrace the same maxims, the good will willing itself is not relativistic.

Quoting 180 Proof

the OP posits epistemological positions (on "truth"), not metaphysics.

Why do you say that? Isn't truth a metaphysical concept?

Quoting Jack Cummins

there is a relationship between relativism and subjectivity

I agree, although I think in the context of this discussion, the difference is important.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

you can't be, strictly speaking, a Kantian and claim that neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and the like are telling you things about the causes of the structure of experience. For Kant, the natural sciences can only ever tell you about the world of phenomenal awareness, not what lies prior to it.

I don't consider myself a Kantian and I can use those of his ideas I find valuable without having to accept everything he says. As Lorenz wrote in the quote I included in my post - "What a biologist familiar with the facts of evolution would regard as the obvious answer to Kant's question was, at that time, beyond the scope of the greatest of thinkers." Besides that, as I noted, the idea of a priori knowledge being a manifestation of biological processes developed by Darwinian evolution is much broader than just Kant's formulation. I like to use Kant because it makes me seem all smart and stuff.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

So I see the position you are advocating as:

A. Dropping core elements of Kant's thought;
B. Largely revolving around ideas that are neither unique to Kant nor new with him.

As for A, I don't have to accept everything Kant says to find his thoughts valuable. And B - I don't see how this makes any difference.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

the claim that it is impossible to say that space and time exist fundamentally (but not actually) in nature

I didn't say it is impossible or unreasonable to see time and space that way, only that it is reasonable to see them otherwise. As I noted, I used Kant's vision of time and space as an example, not the only instance of the phenomena I am describing.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

It's both for many animals.

Yes, but I never said experience didn't have a role. Perhaps I should have made that clearer.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

The genes of a fern or flower will never produce a functioning eye regardless of the environment.

Some plants respond to light with movement and growth. There's no reason that mechanism couldn't eventually evolve into an eye if there were an evolutionary reason to do so.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

The mind does not varry between individuals the way your initial post implies, which is why for Kant we can discover laws of nature that are universally applicable for all observers across phenomenal awareness.

While it's true that the biological and genetic phenomena I'm describing are present for all fully-functioning humans, humans are not the only perceivers and, possibly, not the only conscious perceivers.

Quoting T Clark

Isn't truth a metaphysical concept?

Whether or not it is (I don't think it is), the OP clearly doesn't use "truth" that way.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

This firewall needs to be in place so that he can hide "free will ," as he understood it, in the noumenal realm, while maintaining the phenomenal world is rigidly deterministic (see the end of the Prolegomena).

The "firewall" properly goes back to Hume though, Kant's innovation was to introduce synthetic a-priori truths.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

or that it is impossible to apply the findings of neuroscience, genetics, etc. to anything outside that which lies inside phenomenal awareness.

It is difficult to get around the conceptual wall around phenomena. Of course, it's just as difficult to explain why one should care in the first place. Whether you're a metaphysical realist or just adopting realism as a practical consideration only makes a difference in some very specific circumstances.

Really whenever one asks a metaphysical question, one should first consider the question "why do I want to know".

If the question is "what is truth" - well, why do you want to know?

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Quoting 180 Proof

And therefore if relativism is true, then it is true for some and not others, which is self-refuting as a claim (i.e. relativism is relative :roll:). This is incoherent, of course, and not a viable, or reasonable, alternative to 'objective truth' (so the OP's poll is a false choice).

Doesn't seem valid. Relativism doesn't apply necessarily to truth. Ontology or morality could be relative, but truth is often not considered relative. 3+5=8 seems to be an objective truth, and 'there are no unicorns', while worded in an objective way, is arguably a relational assessment. 'Relativism is true' might refer to moral relativism, which could arguably stand as an objective truth, although it would seem that if it was true, it would only be a property of this universe or that which created both the universe and said morals. A deity defining what is wrong and right is a relation. Objective morals would be something the deity would have to adhere to, rather than something the deity could dictate.

Quoting 180 Proof

the OP posits epistemological positions (on "truth"), not any metaphysics

That he does (puts it in opposition to a perspective). We seem to have lost the OP, who has not in any way tended his own topic.
I seem to use more of a metaphysical definition of truth, some of which is relational, but some of which is probably objective.

Quoting ToothyMaw

I'm no physicist, or mathematician, but this sounds suspect. If a fact - like the laws of physics - in one universe is not the same as in another universe, wouldn't there have to be some independent reference frame against which the two can be compared to evaluate them relationally?

Not sure what is being asked, especially since there isn't any entity necessarily doing any evaluation. For instance, in another universe, the cosmological constant might be different, which I suppose can be compared to (greater/less than relation) to each other. In yet another universe, there is no meaningful thing that could be considered a cosmological constant.

If there were something similar to Newton's laws in both

Newton's laws are pretty basic and don't so much involve things like constants, other than fundamentals like there being 3 spatial and 1 temporal dimension. Other universes could have any values for either of these, and dimensions that are neither spatial nor temporal. Newton's laws wouldn't work in any of those.


Quoting T Clark

I think you're stretching the meaning of the word "relativism" here. "Universe" means everything.

It has multiple definitions. If it always meant 'everything there is' (a global and very objective definition), then 1) the concept of a multiverse would be meaningless, and 2), there are many definitions of 'what is', including relational ones.

We only have access to this scope

A very finite scope in fact. Sufficiently distant things are no more part of that scope than is a unicorn on Earth.

Quoting Tarskian

Yes, if there is no objective justification ("proof") then there won't be (an objective) consensus on whether it is true or not, rendering such truth subjective.

I'm using 'objective' in a way that isn't the opposite of 'subjective', but rather as opposed to 'relative'. Objective truths are not a matter of consensus, which is perhaps opinion or some sort of empirical conclusion, but actual truth seems not to depend on proof or even anything being aware of it.
There have been topics on this, and that statement is certainly debatable.

Quoting noAxioms

actual truth seems not to depend on proof or even anything being aware of it.

For physical truth, you can observe it. No need for ulterior justification. Arithmetical truth, however, cannot be physically observed. Pure reason is essentially blind.

In almost all cases, we make use of arithmetical soundness theorem to ascertain the truth of a statement: The statement is true because it is provable.

If you genuinely care about the issue, read here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

There's a fantastic summary the post after if needed. It is the combination of objectivity and subjectivity that allows us to have knowledge.

Reply to noAxioms :up:

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

One of the most enduring debates in philosophy is the one that pits relativism against objectivism. This debates has been fascinating me for years and it raises a fundamental question: is truth unique and universal (objectivism), or does it vary depending on perspectives and contexts (relativism)?

I say that this is a something of a false dilemma, but one that we are very much bound to, due to the circumstances of culture and history. It arises from the modernist intuition of ourselves as intelligent subjects in a domain of objective forces. We divide the world into self and other, internal (mind, self, what I think) and external (matter, physical forces, society). It is the 'Cartesian division'

I've been absorbing a great deal of information from John Vervaeke's Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. A key idea which is relevant to your question is a term he introduced, 'transjective'. The 'transjective' refers to the dynamic, participatory relationship between the subject and the world, in which meaning arises through interaction rather than being either imposed by the subject ('in the mind') or existing outside ('in the world'). Vervaeke argues that the objective/subjective distinction presents a false dilemma because it overlooks how humans are always embedded in a web of relationships and processes within which meaning arises. The 'transjective' thus highlights the co-emergence of perception and reality, suggesting that meaning is neither purely personal nor purely external but is co-constituted through engagement with the world. And that applies to meaning in all the different senses of that word, from the utilitarian to the aesthetic, which arise along a continuum, from a spider spinning a web to a poet spinning a sonnet.

Vervaeke sees the 'transjective' process as both 'bottom-up' and 'top-down,', introducing a contemporary Neoplatonist framework into his account of meaning-making. From the 'bottom-up' perspective, the transjective emerges from embodied, sensory experiences and the mind's interaction with the environment, grounding meaning in concrete, lived reality (the 'lebenswelt' or 'umwelt' of phenomenology). From the 'top-down' perspective, higher-order cognitive processes, such as abstraction, reflection, and narrative-building, shape how individuals interpret and organize their experiences. This dual flow of meaning aligns with Neoplatonism, where reality is understood as structured through levels of participation, from the material to the transcendent, while avoiding reductionism ('everything dependent on the physical').

For further info see Transjectivity - A Short Commentary Andrew Sweeny

Awakening from the Meaning Crisis (playlist)

Quoting noAxioms

I'm no physicist, or mathematician, but this sounds suspect. If a fact - like the laws of physics - in one universe is not the same as in another universe, wouldn't there have to be some independent reference frame against which the two can be compared to evaluate them relationally?
— ToothyMaw
Not sure what is being asked, especially since there isn't any entity necessarily doing any evaluation. For instance, in another universe, the cosmological constant might be different, which I suppose can be compared to (greater/less than relation) to each other. In yet another universe, there is no meaningful thing that could be considered a cosmological constant.

If there were something similar to Newton's laws in both
Newton's laws are pretty basic and don't so much involve things like constants, other than fundamentals like there being 3 spatial and 1 temporal dimension. Other universes could have any values for either of these, and dimensions that are neither spatial nor temporal. Newton's laws wouldn't work in any of those.

You are confirming my point, I think. I'm saying that we cannot evaluate the laws of physics in two universes in some sort of relational, connected manner unless there is stuff like the cosmological constant - what I erroneously called a reference frame - in both. I was using Newton's laws as an example because my knowledge of physics is very limited. So, I think you must use the term "relative" by your own reasoning, and not "relational" - especially if you think that an evaluating entity would have to exist to connect the laws of physics in two different universes, although it is not entirely clear if you do.

Maybe I should be more direct: what exactly do you mean when you use the term relational? That is a sincere question. You might have some really good reason for using that term related to your knowledge of physics.

Quoting ToothyMaw

I think this post is getting at exactly that - is the property of being true based on facts that are verifiable independent of our feelings, or is the property of being true based on subjective experiences? Or at least, that's what I would like to think.

Given the definition of objective and subjective from here, the truth is objective if it is a set of statements that are true and independent of opinion, biase, conscious experience, and the like.

Reply to MoK

It is actually presented as relativism vs. objectivism in the OP. A bunch of people, me included, got it mixed up though, presumably when they tried to refresh themselves on the whole objectivism vs. subjectivism thing.

I think something could be true independent of opinion and conscious experience per se, yet still be relative, e.g. "many people believe that vaccines are dangerous", or "many evangelical Christians believe gay marriage should not be legal". These statements are true independent of our existence, or of what you or I think, yet represent something relative (to anti-vaxxers and evangelical Christians).

So, even by the definition you supply, relative truths can exist, but they are indeed different from objective truths because they often represent subjective opinions as being true relative to a certain group of people; the potential for many relative truths is nested in the existence of subjective truths that can be factually reported.

When I read this post (mine, not yours, MoK) I can't help but feel that what I'm saying is fallacious, but I can't tell where it goes wrong.

Reply to MoK

I think I see where I'm going wrong. A relative truth would be that relative to a society of evangelical Christians, gay marriage is indeed wrong on the basis of their subjective belief that it is wrong. That goes further than just reporting a fact, which is what I did in my post.

Reply to Cadet John Kervensley

For me I start with the presupposition that both the object and the subject exist. And it is the interplay between these two phenomena that gives rise to objective truths and subjective truths.

For example imagine the number 6( or 9) written on the ground with no indication as to its intended orientation for appraisal.

One observer at one end sees a 9 and the other at the opposite sees a 6. These are subjective truths. From their individual or subjective perspective it is indeed a 6 for one and a 9 for the other and they can argue from their POVs eternally as to who is truly (objectively) correct.

The objective (more universal) truth is that which is perspectiveless or doesnt take a biased stance. It just is regardless of viewpoint. The objective truth in this case is that there is an unspecified symbol written on the ground and assuming there is no intention for how it is orientated, it is in a superposition of both a 6 and a 9 simultaneously (essentially meaningless until given one arbitrarily).

The dimensions (space and time) allow for multiple viewpoints/perspectives of the same thing. They limit the observer so that they are unipresent and uniscient and any given time. (Ie they can only witness a portion of the full picture from a specific position and hold only a portion of full information). Unlike if they were omnipresent and omniscient - at all places and receiving all information simultaneously.

It is these dimensions that allow for perspective, individualism and subjectivity.

In one direction we can study more objective truths by minimising variables (reducing the role of perspective/the subject) by standardising things or introducing constants, laws and principles by which we establish formulas for exacting precision/ prediction (science).

In the other direction we can maximise variables (increase the role of perspective/the subject) by casting out any rules, constants and limits and getting creative and reformulatory to make art, literature, poetry and abstractions that are highly interpretative.

Both exist. Both are true. But their truths are in different domains and thus function differently. Science and Tech = taking control of our environment and maximising our abilities based on refining objective truths.
Art, philosophy etc = not about taking control of the environment but rather about escaping it - proposing alternative "what ifs", exploring the metaphysical and maybe formulating ideals/ running commentary on reality by comparing it to imaginative constructs or parallel universes or our own making, which incidentally, may sometimes better our understanding of objective truths or the dynamic/tension between the objective and the subjective.

Quoting ToothyMaw

I think I see where I'm going wrong. A relative truth would be that relative to a society of evangelical Christians, gay marriage is indeed wrong on the basis of their subjective belief that it is wrong. That goes further than just reporting a fact, which is what I did in my post.

:up: :100:

Reply to MoK

Thanks for the positive affirmation.

But what is the conclusion? Can there be a conclusion? I mean, if we were to take the hard objectivist position, then how do we do reconcile that position with the endless plethora of subjective opinions encountered? Do we go through every one of them and try to reduce them to propositions about the objective world that can then be run through the metaphorical blender of objectively true utterances?

Surely if someone says something like: "I like cats because I think they are cuddly", then we kind of just have to deal with it if that is subsumed by some greater relative truth like "cats are ideal pets for people who like cuddly animals"?

Reply to ToothyMaw
There are relative statements, like "I like cats". There are statements like, "man is mortal" which are objective. Therefore I think the conclusion is that the first category of statements, relative statements, are not part of truth whereas the second category of statements, objective statements, are part of truth.

Quoting ToothyMaw

It is actually presented as relativism vs. objectivism in the OP. A bunch of people, me included, got it mixed up though, presumably when they tried to refresh themselves on the whole objectivism vs. subjectivism thing.

The OP also posted this in the ethics forum, meaning he's talking about moral objectivism vs moral, well, not-objectivism, where the line between moral relativism and moral subjectivism is almost nonexistent. Most of my posts have been about the more general relational view in general (such as relational ontology), where the distinction between the two metaphysical views (relative vs subjective) is quite significant.

Quoting ToothyMaw

So, I think you must use the term "relative" by your own reasoning, and not "relational" - especially if you think that an evaluating entity would have to exist to connect the laws of physics in two different universes, although it is not entirely clear if you do.

The relational view isn't one that requires evaluations, and a given entity has no empirical access to other universes, so any evaluation is entirely an abstract exercise.

Maybe I should be more direct: what exactly do you mean when you use the term relational?

Relational means that moral, ontology, perhaps even truth, are examples of relations.
It is not wrong to kill your children in some cultures.
Ontology: X exists in relation to Y if Y is causally effected by X (Y measures X). This definition only works with structures where causality is meaningful.
Truth: A relative truth would be that most watermelons are larger than most plums. A subjective truth would be 'the sky is blue presently' (also a relation since 'presently' references a time). The 3+5=8 example was my attempt at an objective truth.


Quoting MoK

Given the definition of objective and subjective from here, the truth is objective if it is a set of statements that are true and independent of opinion, biase, conscious experience, and the like.

You reference the wiki site, which equates objective to not-subjective. It works for morals at least, but not to general relational metaphysics. They give an example of a subjective assessment of the weather, but no example of what they consider objective. Their objective definition seems contradictory, that it is something to be evaluated, and yet true in the absence of a mind which supposedly is needed to do the evaluating. Perhaps I'm being picky. Yes, I can imagine a world absent anything with subjective experience (Wayfarer would disagree), at least enough to discuss it.

Quoting ToothyMaw

When I read this post (mine, not yours, MoK) I can't help but feel that what I'm saying is fallacious, but I can't tell where it goes wrong.

I actually agreed with it in general.

Quoting ToothyMaw

I think I see where I'm going wrong. A relative truth would be that relative to a society of evangelical Christians, gay marriage is indeed wrong on the basis of their subjective belief that it is wrong.

basis of their belief... Are not all beliefs subjective, pretty much by definition? One can have a belief about some objective thing (yes, 3+5 really is unconditionally 8), but the belief itself is subjective.



Quoting Benj96

For me I start with the presupposition that both the object and the subject exist

That is begging an objective ontology. Commonly assumed, but not valid thing to do in a metaphysical debate about whether such a premise is correct or not.


Quoting Tarskian

For physical truth, you can observe it.

An empirical truth then. The sun is bigger than Earth, and so forth, and then it becomes a relation to that which is observed. Arithmetic truth is more objective precisely due to the lack of an obvious relation.

In almost all cases, we make use of arithmetical soundness theorem to ascertain the truth of a statement: The statement is true because it is provable.

But all those theorems rely on axioms which have not been proven, so they rest on a foundation that isn't objectively sound, which is why I question if 3+5 equaling 8 being an objective truth.

Reply to Cadet John Kervensley Regardless of whether or not relativism is more accurate, or if we feel as though objectivism is too rigid, assuming objectivism in the search for truth (the answer to this question's use case) is generally more useful than assuming relativism.

Most truths worth looking for (except for personal truths) either have one answer, or the assumption that they have one answer leads to more productive debate and higher quality proposed solutions.

This is just my take, though.

Another thing. Even if it leads to assumptions and a limited context in which an answer is useful, looking for an objective answer can be helpful, because if one is found, at is at least true for the context it was found in. This also allows a comparison of contexts easily on that issue, seeing if that truth is provable in a different context can have ramifications for other truths in the new context.

Quoting Igitur

Regardless of whether or not relativism is more accurate, or if we feel as though objectivism is too rigid, assuming objectivism in the search for truth (the answer to this question's use case) is generally more useful than assuming relativism.

Most truths worth looking for (except for personal truths) either have one answer, or the assumption that they have one answer leads to more productive debate and higher quality proposed solutions.

I like the way you've formulated this issue - judging a choice of perspective based on usefulness. For me, that's the heart of the matter.

On “what is the real nature of truth”:

“…. The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: “What is truth?” The definition of the word truth, to wit, “the accordance of the cognition with its object,” is presupposed in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition?…”

Too bad folks couldn’t differentiate between that which may be true, and the “real nature of truth”, by whichever there is that may be true, is determinable as being so.
—————

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

One of the most enduring debates in philosophy (…) raises a fundamental question: is truth unique and universal (objectivism), or does it vary depending on perspectives and contexts (relativism)?

First, it should be asked, what is the topic of the debate, by which the fundamental question whether truth is universal or relative, is raised?

Second, if the most enduring debate in philosophy isn’t about anything other than whether truth itself, as a stand-alone irreducible a priori logical condition, is universal or relative, then what could possibly ground the debate, insofar as the mere occurrence of the debate itself, presupposes the definition of its subject, and thereby the answer to the question, is already given?
————-

Is truth unique and universal, is a contradiction: if it is unique it cannot be universal, and if it is universal it cannot be unique.

If truth is relativistic, in that it depends on perspectives and contexts, such dependence is redundant, insofar as a perspective is a context, and conversely, a context is a perspective.

Under the supposition “truth is the accordance with a cognition with its object”, it is the case that truth….not that which is true, but that stand-alone a priori condition by which things are determinable as being true, is neither unique/universal, nor does it depend on context or perspective.

All of which gets flushed, unceremoniously, in the metaphysical crapper, if the definition of truth, as given, is denied. Cool part is….immediately upon denial, the definition sustains itself, albeit, in the negative.

Two cents; no more, no less.

Reply to T Clark Thanks.
The reason for this I find sort of funny. A pretty big assumption would need to be made to attempt to find the truth of a question that deals with truth-discovering methodology. Therefore, I get straight to the use-cases.

Quoting noAxioms

But all those theorems rely on axioms which have not been proven, so they rest on a foundation that isn't objectively sound, which is why I question if 3+5 equaling 8 being an objective truth.

You can reject arithmetical truth, until you make use of it, or of a statement that happens to be equi-consistent with it.

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

Where Do You Stand?

None of the above.

I embrace truthmaker theory: for any proposition that is "true", there is a state of affairs in the world (the truthmaker) that accounts for it being true.

The "truth" is objective, but does not have some transcendent existence. (Your definition of "objective" seemed to entail it existing "out there").

"True" is actually a relation between the proposition (a mental object) and the truthmaker.

Quoting Cadet John Kervensley

What is Objectivism?
Objectivism asserts that truth exists independently of human beliefs, emotions, or perceptions. According to this view, there are facts that are true regardless of who examines them or under what circumstances. For example, the laws of physics or mathematical truths are often cited as examples of objectivism in action. For objectivists, truth is fixed and universal.

And Relativism?
In contrast, relativism claims that truth is subjective and dependent on context, cultural beliefs, and individual perspectives. What is true for one person or culture might not be true for another. For instance, in matters of morality, what is considered right or wrong can vary depending on cultural or historical contexts, reinforcing the idea that truth is relative.

The pre-socratics, if I remember correctly, believed there are universal truths. But they believed that not everyone could access the right path to the truths. Because to them, seeing things differently, not commonly, through the right mind, is the way to truth. (I see that I haven't given anything that's concrete here and the reason is because their writings have been only in fragments, not the entirety, and no professors I studied under were good at it either).

Quoting L'éléphant

The pre-socratics, if I remember correctly, believed there are universal truths. But they believed that not everyone could access the right path to the truths. Because to them, seeing things differently, not commonly, through the right mind, is the way to truth.

:100: I think that was broadly characteristic of many of the Axial Age philosophies both East and West.

Semantic contextualism needs to be distinguished from truth relativism. According to the former position, differences of opinion are not interpreted as reflecting differences in truth assessment with respect to the same set of facts, but as reflecting differences in the contextual meaning of what each opinion is asserting.

Semantic contexualism when pushed to the extreme as a dogma, interprets all assertions as being necessarily true when contextually understood and trivialism ensues, which raises the question as to whether all of the problems of epistemology reduce to the trivialities of semantics.

Reply to Relativist :up: :up:

Reply to sime

Wow, this is a genuinely interesting position.

Quoting Wayfarer

:100: I think that was broadly characteristic of many of the Axial Age philosophies both East and West.

Yes, true. It's the mind.

Quoting noAxioms

That is begging an objective ontology

How is it begging an objective ontology any more than it is begging a subjective one. I would have thought the assumption that the objective and subjective both exist is common intuitive knowledge.

Because if only the objective exists, one can deny any others autonomy, feelings, personal experience or human rights as subjectivity is null and void and has no merit or due consideration.

Similarly if only the subjective exists then scientific discovery and the tech based on those discoveries is null and void and only subjective imaginings of how things are is valid.

I would think that it's difficult to rationally refute either case. You would have to offer a concrete argument to either case before the assumption that both exist can be superceded.

So by all means explain why both don't exist?

Quoting Tarskian

You can reject arithmetical truth, until you make use of it, or of a statement that happens to be equi-consistent with it.

I cannot use arithmetic without first presuming some axiomatic truths. Yes, arithmetic is useful, but only useful relative to worlds in which it works, or at least seems to.

Quoting Benj96

For me I start with the presupposition that both the object and the subject exist.

That seems to be an assertion of realism.
Quoting Benj96

How is it begging an objective ontology any more than it is begging a subjective one.

In attempt to find the truth of realism vs some alternate ontology (idealism say were only ideals, and not objects, exist), presuming one of the two conclusions cannot lead to the truth of the matter.

I would have thought the assumption that the objective and subjective both exist is common intuitive knowledge.

Common & intuitive, yes, although not entirely. Several posters on this topic hold alternative views. Knowledge: no. It isn't knowledge if the truth of the premise cannot be demonstrated.

It's sort of like Einstein's special theory of relativity. It posits two premises (physics not being frame dependent, and local-frame-independence of the speed of light), neither of which has ever been demonstrated. There are alternative theories that deny both premises, and those alternative have not been falsified. So presuming what Einstein did may be useful, but it doesn't prove that Einstein's premises were the correct ones.


Still, you seem to be talking about subjective, vs not-subjective, like there's a realist objective view that denies subjective experience. Never head of anything like that, I admit.

The topic is posted under morals/ethics, and the OP mentions objective vs subjective morality. I don't think morality is either. There's no evidence of it not be relative to this or that, and since you cannot experience it in any obvious way, it isn't subjective either. So the OP gives a false dichotomy.

Being 'noAsioms', I do not presume that X exists. I try to be open to alternatives, and it turns out that I find issues with it that don't occur with a relational view.

Similarly if only the subjective exists then scientific discovery and the tech based on those discoveries is null and void and only subjective imaginings of how things are is valid.

Disagree. If only subjective exists, then science still yields new ways to have new/better subjective experience, however not nonexistent the science is.

So by all means explain why both don't exist?

The question is why it is not necessary for both to exist (or either). I never asserted that both don't exist. Anyway, the answer depends heavily on one's definition of 'exist'. Yours seems to be "something that 'acts'.", followed by examples of things that don't exists despite the fact that they very much act.
The definition I find to work best is a relation: X exists to Y if Y measures (is causally affected by) X. Given that non-objective definition, it is meaningless to say 'X does or does not exist', but it is meaningful to say that X exists (or not) to Y.
That does not mean I assert that my definition is truth. It's just one that I find has fewer problems that the alternatives. I don't know if there is a correct answer to the topic, even though most presume there is a correct answer despite our inability to know it.

Quoting Wayfarer

I've been absorbing a great deal of information from John Vervaeke's Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. A key idea which is relevant to your question is a term he introduced, 'transjective'. The 'transjective' refers to the dynamic, participatory relationship between the subject and the world, in which meaning arises through interaction rather than being either imposed by the subject ('in the mind') or existing outside ('in the world'). Vervaeke argues that the objective/subjective distinction presents a false dilemma because it overlooks how humans are always embedded in a web of relationships and processes within which meaning arises. The 'transjective' thus highlights the co-emergence of perception and reality, suggesting that meaning is neither purely personal nor purely external but is co-constituted through engagement with the world. And that applies to meaning in all the different senses of that word, from the utilitarian to the aesthetic, which arise along a continuum, from a spider spinning a web to a poet spinning a sonnet.

This is great stuff, Wayfarer... "meaning" is nonorientable, like the one-sided, one-edged Möbius strip with an infinite loop. Makes total sense to me. Breaking apart "subject" from "object," or "perception" from "reality," is like trying to separate "heads" from "tails" of a coin. To do so destroys the coin in the process and misdirects the discussion before it can even begin. (Forgive me my basket of mixed metaphors here!)

Reply to Thales :pray: