Philosophers in need of Therapy

Shawn October 03, 2024 at 04:11 5450 views 59 comments
This thread is a follow up on my previous thread about, Why does language befuddle us?

Instead of asking the question as to why philosophy should profess itself as a form of therapy, I have the more grounded question to ask before we can answer as to why philosophers are in need of therapy, according to Wittgenstein.

Actually, if one wants to be more precise or factual, then, why was Wittgenstein obsessed with treating the study of philosophy as in need of therapy. By saying this, there are some remarks of Wittgenstein that were published in the 1980's regarding the philosophy of psychology. Wittgenstein planted a seed in my mind, all the back in the Tractatus with his typical obscurantism.

4.1121 Psychology is no nearer related to philosophy, than is any other natural science.
The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.
Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought processes which philosophers held to be so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only they got entangled for the most part in unessential psychological investigations, and there is an analogous danger for my method.

4.1122 Darwin’s theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science.

Nobody really talks about it, but hey, there's even "Darwin" in the Tractatus, who would have thought(?) Essentially, the non-mentalism of the Tractatus gave way to the mentalism of psychology and language in the Investigations.

Now, I want to quote myself by saying that I have always been a resolute reader of the Tractatus. I say this because I believe that the richness of fundamentally understanding itself and the scientific treatment of philosophy found in the Tractatus, is superior for the study of philosophy. I made it sound tautological, as does logic taking care of itself. I believe that if one were to approach language as Wittgenstein wanted to in the Tractatus, then maybe instead of talking about logic, he would have, quite possibly, approached the problem of syntax. I believe this was mostly a concern in the Investigations, but I'll leave it at that.

Anyway, given the topic is pretty conceptual in nature, then what are your own thoughts about, (not necessarily Wittgenstein's remarks), the need for therapy in philosophy?

Comments (59)

Pierre-Normand October 03, 2024 at 04:27 #936080
I had interpreted Wittgenstein's claim about philosophy and therapy (there may be more than one?) not so much as a claim that philosophers are in need of therapy than a claim that achieving conceptual clarity in philosophy is akin to therapy. The reason for this is that philosophers confronts conceptual puzzles that stem from their deeply ingrained habits of thinking (many of them arising from subtle misuses of ordinary language). Therefore, unlike problems that might arise in the natural sciences or in technical contexts, finding the "solution" of the problem doesn't dissolve it all at once. Dissolving a philosophical problem rather is a protracted process by means of which interlocking habits of thinking must be weakened or reformed, and this is what makes philosophical progress more akin to therapy that to progress in technical fields. (One could argue, though, that revolutionary change in sciences, unlike Kuhnian "normal science" episodes of puzzle solving, likewise resemble a process of therapy where scientists must progressively habituate themselves to see a whole conceptual landscape in a new light.)
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 04:36 #936086
Quoting Pierre-Normand
I had interpreted Wittgenstein's claim about philosophy and therapy (there may be more than one?) not so much as a claim that philosophers are in need of therapy than a claim that achieving conceptual clarity in philosophy is akin to therapy.


I think that the practice of philosophy and the philosopher are one and the same, according to Wittgenstein's ethos.

Quoting Pierre-Normand
The reason for this is that philosophers confronts conceptual puzzles that stem from their deeply ingrained habits of thinking (many of them arising from subtle misuses of ordinary language).


Yes, well the bewitchment of our intelligence by the misuse of language, according to the latter Wittgenstein of the Investigations, is due to what, in your opinion?
Tom Storm October 03, 2024 at 04:52 #936087
Reply to Shawn Didn't W simply mean that philosophy clarified conceptual issues for philosophical problems in much the same way that therapy is meant to provide insight into life challenges?

This only holds true if you believe that a lack of conceptual clarity is causing you harm. As someone who views truth and reality as either largely out of reach or contingent human constructs, I find that there’s only so much clarification I am interested in. Most of us require neither therapy nor philosophy to be content.
Pierre-Normand October 03, 2024 at 05:03 #936092
Quoting Shawn
I think that the practice of philosophy and the philosopher are one and the same, according to Wittgenstein's ethos.


Yes, I was using "philosophy" and "philosophers" rather interchangeably. I was rather highlighting the contrast between philosophy being in need of therapy (as if something was wrong with philosophy) and the philosophical process being akin to therapy. I was stressing the second idea although Wittgenstein might very well have meant it both ways.

Quoting Shawn
Yes, well the bewitchment of our intelligence by the misuse of language, according to the latter Wittgenstein of the Investigations, is due to what, in your opinion?


The felt need to not leave anything hidden, the appeal to universality, the attractiveness of theory, the fact that what is closest is the most difficult thing to see.
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 05:17 #936097
Quoting Tom Storm
Didn't W simply mean that philosophy clarified conceptual issues for philosophical problems in much the same way that therapy is meant to provide insight into life challenges?

This only holds true if you believe that a lack of conceptual clarity is causing you harm. As someone who views truth and reality as either largely out of reach or contingent human constructs, I find that there’s only so much clarification I am interested in.


I think, with what you said in mind, Wittgenstein was very strict, in the Tractatus, about drawing a line between science and philosophy, for reasons related to mostly ethics. This demarcation left out the field of psychology, as I understand it. What Wittgenstein did do was something, to me, ridiculous. He set up the study of psychology (remember, in those days, psychology was treated as the study of the human soul, which Wittgenstein actually talks about also in the Tractatus) to the field of epistemology, and thus denies the existence of a "soul". It would almost seem that the only purpose of any person would be the development of one's knowledge to discover who they are, as does the whole purpose of education should be about, which Wittgenstein harshly criticized education itself, even though he was a teacher himself.
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 05:24 #936098
Quoting Pierre-Normand
Yes, I was using "philosophy" and "philosophers" rather interchangeably. I was rather highlighting the contrast between philosophy being in need of therapy (as if something was wrong with philosophy) and the philosophical process being akin to therapy. I was stressing the second idea although Wittgenstein might very well have meant it both ways.


I believe he meant it both ways at the time. Although people consider the first analytic philosopher as Bertrand Russell, I think the logical positivists were actually the first, and hence Wittgenstein the chief logical positivist of them all, as they themselves would credit to him. I say this because at the time there was very little of the study of logic, which both Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein were logicians. So, it seems pertinent to point out that Wittgenstein thought that the field of philosophy was leading him into mental cramps, and the process of education wasn't leading anywhere in his mind. It might be sad to say that Wittgenstein may have been an unhappy man upon his death.
Wayfarer October 03, 2024 at 05:25 #936099
Reply to Shawn I think origin of the word 'therapy' was associated with a religious sect in the ancient world called the Therapeutae. According to the Wiki entry, 'the term therapeutes means one who is attendant to the gods although the term, and the related adjective therapeutikos carry in later texts the meaning of attending to heal, or treating in a spiritual or medical sense. (The same article carries the suggestion that the term itself was a corruption of the Buddhist 'theravada', which had been carried to Alexandria via Silk Road trade.) 'Catharsis' is of a similar vintage, and carries a similar meaning, namely, purification, and is nowadays taken to mean the expurgation of repressed or forgotten memories resulting in a 'cathartic experience' (it was originally associated with the dramatic arts.)

So I take it the malady which Wittgenstein sought to cure was more than simple confusion or befuddlement, it was more like a state or a condition of ignorance. Wittgenstein was not overtly religious, but he has a quasi-mystical side (see John Cottingham Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion). Unfortunately the term 'religion' carries a lot of cultural baggage which 20th century philosophy doesn't want anything to do with, but the idea of ignorance as a kind of deep cognitive error definitely has resemblances to some spiritual philosophies. For example the concluding remarks about his words being a ladder which ought to be discarded after having served their purpose has a direct resemblance to the Buddhist 'parable of the raft' and the 'finger pointing to the moon' (hence scholarly comparisions to Wittgenstein and Zen Buddhism.) Indeed there's a strong hint of apophaticism in his concluding remark, albeit in his case, devoid of the symbolic context in which that kind of 'negative way' was presented in its earlier historical forms.

So I think he means therapy in an existential sense, of freeing oneself from confusion in a deeper sense than the simply linguistic, although I suppose that will be a contentious argument.
Banno October 03, 2024 at 05:28 #936100
Too much on the Tractatus.

Philosophical Investigations:132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use
of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we
saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,
is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.
The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work.
133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies.

593. A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one
nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example.

254. The substitution of "identical" for "the same" (for instance)
is another typical expedient in philosophy. As if we were talking about
shades of meaning and all that were in question were to find words
to hit on the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy only
where we have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation
to use a particular kind of expression. What we 'are tempted to say'
in such a case is, of course, not philosophy; but it is its raw material.
Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about the
objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.
255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.
Wayfarer October 03, 2024 at 05:30 #936101
Quoting Shawn
4.1122 Darwin’s theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science.


:100: :clap: Already I like him more.
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 05:34 #936102
Philosophical Investigations:133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.


I believe that what Wittgenstein was alluding to, in modern terminology, was the study of syntax and linguistics. In those fields, what Wittgenstein said in the quote, do rules in language make any sense. Had Wittgenstein been alive today, do you think he would have been interested in syntax and linguistics? Noam Chomsky's greatest idol was Bertrand Russell after all, as was Russell the closest friend to Wittgenstein.
Antony Nickles October 03, 2024 at 15:24 #936206
Quoting Shawn
why philosophers are in need of therapy


We could also call it a logical error that philosophers make, and that philosophy itself (its method) is always in a state of revolution or self-criticism, but I take it that traditional philosophers create a requirement beforehand, what is sometimes called “objectivity” or “knowledge”, and then try to find a way to force the world into that mold. Wittgenstein starts with this kind of singular logical standard in the Tractatus, what he later will call purity, and then in the Investigations he realizes that each different thing has its own criteria. To call it a therapy maybe records that it takes self-reflection and growth (that PI is an argument for philosophers to act a certain way ultimately), and also because there are reasons why we want that kind of answer. As @Banno points out—Wittgenstein is interested in what motivates philosophers; why they are “inclined” to say this or that, and then learn from the contrast with what other contexts we say the same things.
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 21:09 #936264
Quoting Antony Nickles
Wittgenstein starts with this kind of singular logical standard in the Tractatus, what he later will call purity, and then in the Investigations he realizes that each different thing has its own criteria.


What do you mean by "its own criteria"?

I view it as methodological nominalism, which the Investigations appealed to.
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 21:27 #936270
Reply to Antony Nickles

Here's an old thread of mine.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2452/wittgenstein-and-nominalism
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 21:29 #936273
Here is the quoted passage from the Investigations on what, seemingly, Wittgenstein continued in his methodology between his earlier period and latter period:

(L. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, I/§383): 'We are not analyzing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word. So it may look as if what we were doing were Nominalism. Nominalists make the mistake of interpreting all words as names, and so of not really describing their use, but only, so to speak, giving a paper draft on such a description'.
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 21:30 #936274
@Banno, may I kindly ask, what do you think?
Antony Nickles October 03, 2024 at 21:53 #936284
Quoting Shawn
What do you mean by "its own criteria"?


In comparison to the Tractatus, which, as you point out, held everything that could be said to make sense to a generalized standard for truth (based on nominalism, or reference), in the PI, each practice is true to the extent it, internally as it were, meets its own different criteria, e.g., for an apology, for acknowledging pain, for following a rule, continuing a series.

In your other post you ask “what is the difference here being made about 'phenomena' and 'concepts about phenomena'?” It is explaining his method, not a different approach to the world. He is not avoiding phenomena, but he is looking at what we say about something because that tells us how we judge it. Elsewhere he will call this the “possibilities of phenomena” (PI 90) as Kant will talk about a thing’s “conditions”.
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 22:04 #936292
Quoting Antony Nickles
In comparison to the Tractatus, which, as you point out, held everything that could be said to make sense to a generalized standard for truth [...]


Yes, dare one say this approach was almost taken to "scientific" standards. Yet, I feel as though it was a work guided by sheer intelligence, to state what was said. Wittgenstein often complained in his letters that if only he had a greater intelligence, then his task of elucidations in philosophy would have been possible or achievable.

Quoting Antony Nickles
In your other post you ask “what is the difference here being made about 'phenomena' and 'concepts about phenomena'?” It is explaining his method, not a different approach to the world. He is not avoiding phenomena, but he is looking at what we say about something because that tells us how we judge it.


Yes, well let us start out with perhaps the only clue left in the Investigations about what it is all about:

(L. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, I/§383):'We are not analyzing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word.


So, how can a concept stand for a word? This strikes me as pragmaticism. Is this really an implicit reference to pragmatism in the Philosophical Investigations?

Banno October 03, 2024 at 23:14 #936306
Quoting Shawn
what do you think?


About what?
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 23:34 #936312
Reply to Banno

About the passage of the Philosophical Investigations, I/§383, regarding "concepts as words" and Wittgensteins nominalism.
Banno October 03, 2024 at 23:41 #936314
Reply to Shawn What do you think a concept is? A thing in your head? Then how is it that you and I can be said to have the same concept?
Shawn October 03, 2024 at 23:48 #936319
Quoting Banno
What do you think a concept is? A thing in your head?


I never really approached this question the way others do. I've always held that by obeying the same grammar, which allows people to coherently formulate their thoughts in language, we are able to understand what Wittgenstein calls, "concepts as words."

Quoting Banno
Then how is it that you and I can be said to have the same concept?


I think it would be easier to frame this question in terms of syntax and grammar, as per the aforementioned.
Banno October 03, 2024 at 23:50 #936320
Quoting Shawn
I've always held that by obeying the same grammar, which allows people to coherently formulate their thoughts in language, we are able to understand concepts.

So you say sharing a common grammar makes it possible for us to understand concepts. What are concepts?
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 00:06 #936327
Quoting Banno
So you say sharing a common grammar makes it possible for us to understand concepts.


It sounds oversimplified, and there's much more to say; but, sure, by having a common grammar we are able to understand even concepts.

Quoting Banno
What are concepts?


From the inner aspect, they are governed by grammar. From the external aspect, they are determined by linguistic rules.

Is your next question going to be about what are "linguistic rules"?
Banno October 04, 2024 at 00:14 #936329
Reply to Shawn Consider the concept blue, the concept democracy, and the concept of cycling. What do these have in common such that we can call them all concepts?

The sue of these words is governed by Grammar, sure. Is a concept just a set of grammatical rules? A democracy is not only a set of grammatical rules, nor is a bicycle.

Concepts are (perhaps) governed by grammar, but isn't something more involved?
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 00:27 #936333
Quoting Banno
Consider the concept blue, the concept democracy, and the concept of cycling. What do these have in common such that we can call them all concepts?


Yes, well, every concept is defined by what rules govern their use in a language game. I don't think these rules exist outside the hypothetical realm of what constitutes what can be said, according to grammar.

Quoting Banno
Concepts are (perhaps) governed by grammar, but isn't something more involved?


Well, what is your take on the matter on what other factors are associated with concepts apart from grammar? If it is all about the externalities of the topic, then I'm only concerned with the internal aspect of how concepts are understood.
Banno October 04, 2024 at 00:33 #936336
Quoting Shawn
If it is all about the externalities of the topic, then I'm only concerned with the internal aspect of how concepts are understood.


So concepts have "internal" and "external" aspects? We might leave aside for now how it is possible to talk about these "internal" aspects, and suppose that the grammar, since it is shared, is "external". See PI §385.

What do you make of PI §381-2? This by way of addressing your "what other factors are associated with concepts apart from grammar?"



Shawn October 04, 2024 at 00:42 #936338
Quoting Banno
So concepts have "internal" and "external" aspects? We might leave aside for now how it is possible to talk about these "internal" aspects, and suppose that the grammar, since it is shared, is "external". See PI §385.


Sure; but, if we're to talk about how Wittgenstein saw it, then I would like to mention his concern with how rules are followed and obeyed. I think that we can nowadays say that grammar and syntax are what define such "rules". So, I think, there is some internal aspect of how learning can at all take place...

Quoting Banno
What do you make of PI §381-2? This by way of addressing your "what other factors are associated with concepts apart from grammar?"


Are you alluding to qualities of concepts, which describe them? There are quite a few...
Banno October 04, 2024 at 00:52 #936344
Quoting Shawn
So, I think, there is some internal aspect of how learning can at all take place...


But "And the question will then arise whether we are still willing to use the concept of 'calculating in the head' here—or whether in such circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate towards another paradigm."

It seems you think a concept is something only in one's mind, a rule to be followed. Do you think Wittgenstein would agree?

Quoting Shawn
Are you alluding to qualities of concepts

Not qualities, but uses. In addition to the grammar, there is what we do - we choose the blue bicycle and go for a ride. That's not grammar.
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 01:03 #936352
Quoting Banno
But "And the question will then arise whether we are still willing to use the concept of 'calculating in the head' here—or whether in such circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate towards another paradigm."


Again, I am not interested in the complexity of the external aspect of a concept, this is something that Austin described with speech acts and stuff like that.

Quoting Banno
It seems you think a concept is something only in one's mind, a rule to be followed. Do you think Wittgenstein would agree?


No. One cannot speak a language without being taught about how to use words and phoneticize sounds for the words. It's a whole can of worms that I am not really interested in delving into at the moment.


Banno October 04, 2024 at 01:15 #936355
Reply to Shawn So what sort of thing is a concept?

We are not analysing a phenomenon (e.g. thought) but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and therefore the use of a word.


What more is there to any given concept than what we do?
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 01:21 #936356
Quoting Banno
So what sort of thing is a concept?


There's no need to beg the question. If you're looking for a specific answer, then go ahead, provide one.

Quoting Banno
What more is there to any given concept than what we do?


Sure; but, words aren't objects. I'm mostly interested in abstract concepts, which science has been elucidating, and providing us with knowledge about the world; but, since this thread is about the point or "need" for therapy, then I would like to return to the topic about whether you think philosophy has taken Wittgenstein's lesson to heart?

Are philosophers still in need of therapy?
Banno October 04, 2024 at 01:32 #936360
Quoting Shawn
If you're looking for a specific answer, then go ahead, provide one.

I'm not. I'm wondering about your thinking on the topic, and how it relates to
Quoting Shawn
...the passage of the Philosophical Investigations, I/§383, regarding "concepts as words" and Wittgensteins nominalism.

It is clear Wittgenstein is rejecting any notion of treating words as just names, and that concepts are about use, not just grammar.

Quoting Shawn
Are philosophers still in need of therapy?

Midgley's plumbing metaphor might show the point better than Wittgenstein's therapy metaphor.
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 01:44 #936362
Quoting Banno
It is clear Wittgenstein is rejecting any notion of treating words as just names, and that concepts are about use, not just grammar.


Yes, concepts are used in different ways. The way we use words is largely defined by grammar, and that's just a factual definition. So, I don't understand the issue about grammar and use of words, if you may think there is one.

Quoting Banno
Midgley's plumbing metaphor might show the point better than Wittgenstein's therapy metaphor.


I think philosophy has a purpose, which, as she describes is of need towards other fields to reinterpret what progress those other fields attain. After all philosophy is probably as old as religion, and is valued for endowing other fields with meaning through its own activities.
Banno October 04, 2024 at 01:51 #936365
Quoting Shawn
concepts are used in different ways.


No! That's not what it says. Rather, concepts are what we do. The difference is central. Concepts are not things!

Treat this as an example in which the malady is misunderstanding the notion of concept, and the treatment is to show that concepts are what we do, and not things.





Shawn October 04, 2024 at 01:59 #936368
Quoting Banno
No! That's not what it says. Rather, concepts are what we do. The difference is central. Concepts are not things!


Yes, well, this is where I agree with universal quantification and would subscribe to some form of ontology to what concepts are and how they derive their meaning.

Quoting Banno
Treat this as an example in which the malady is misunderstanding the notion of concept, and the treatment is to show that concepts are what we do, and not things.


Sure, this is again nominalism. So, if all there is to concepts is specific or stipulated use, then do we do away with universal quantification?
Banno October 04, 2024 at 02:03 #936370
Quoting Shawn
...this is again nominalism

How?

I've no clear notion of what this has to do with quantification.

I don;t see how one could disagree with universal quantification...
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 02:11 #936372
Quoting Banno
Concepts are not things!


Quoting Banno
...this is again nominalism
— Shawn

How?


If concepts are not things, then they do not have any ontology. The existence of a universal, which concepts would not have, according to what you are saying, would exclude concepts from having any ontology. Thus, one can think, from this, that concepts are criteria or identity features of human abstraction, which I don't really buy into.

Quoting Banno
I don;t see how one could disagree with universal quantification...


Yes, well, I will say that if concepts are truth-apt under universal quantification, then it would follow that concepts have the property of being a 'thing'.

Banno October 04, 2024 at 02:16 #936374
Quoting Shawn
if concepts are truth-apt under universal quantification...

I've no idea what that might mean. I'll leave you to it.
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 02:19 #936375
Quoting Banno
I've no idea what that might mean. I'll leave you to it.


Here, I hope you can look at the article on ontological commitment entailed by universal quantification for "concepts":

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-commitment/

I'll point out that if concepts are not things, then what would you identify them as? It seems that I am begging the question, now.
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 02:23 #936376
I think we can agree @Banno that concepts are human abstractions, yes?
Banno October 04, 2024 at 02:29 #936381
I'm really not following any of this.
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 02:34 #936385
Quoting Banno
I'm really not following any of this.


Well, you begged the question so many times about what are concepts, that I'm not surprised.
Banno October 04, 2024 at 02:39 #936390
Quoting Shawn
begged the question


I'm not sure you know what that means, in a philosophical context.
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 02:41 #936391
Quoting Banno
I'm not sure you know what that means, in a philosophical context.


Whatever works. I've seen this countless times of someone pointing out a logical fallacy and the other person just deflecting it. Anyway, thanks for the conversation.
Banno October 04, 2024 at 02:45 #936392
Reply to Shawn I'll have my folk bill you for the therapy session.
Antony Nickles October 04, 2024 at 05:16 #936426
Quoting Shawn
Yet, I feel as though it was a work guided by sheer intelligence, to state what was said.


He definitely pushed the experiment of the Tractatus—basically to only state what can be said with absolutely certainty—as far as he could, which demonstrated his intellect but also persistence to carry a line of thought all the way through, past where everyone else might rest on a first impression. Only such a thorough “mistake” (if we would even call it that) could lead to such a monumental revolution as the Investigations.

Quoting Shawn
So, how can a concept stand for a word? This strikes me as pragmaticism. Is this really an implicit reference to pragmatism in the Philosophical Investigations?


“Concept” for Wittgenstein is just a term for any practice: pointing, following a rule, noticing an aspect, seeing, understanding, apologizing, naming, knowing, etc. What he claims is that we can look at what we say and learn from that how we judge what it is. The “use” he is referring to of a word is the sense that it makes in a situation, what we would identify it as, when it is said, where, to whom (“I'm sorry” as an apology, an overture, a threat). That “I know” has multiply senses: “I know my way around” is judged differently than “I know your pain” than “I know what is best for this company”. “Use” is not how a word is wielded (as if we use words), like a tool, for its consequences, its practical outcomes. Wittgenstein is looking at the mechanics of our interest and judgment through a concept—how it is identified, distinguished, satisfied.
Jack Cummins October 04, 2024 at 14:13 #936551
Reply to Shawn Wittgenstein's suggestion that 'The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology' is an important statement. That is because the source human thinking is a central area for psychological investigation. This is at the core of the different models of psychology..

As far as the idea of philosophy needing therapy, what this signifies is for a thinker to be more aware of the psychological basis of one's ideas and beliefs. Human motives and factors in socialisation are central to our philosophical understanding, alongside cultural beliefs. Being able to reflect on these aspects of one's beliefs and thoughts has an important place in philosophy.

When I was undertaking some psychotherapy training, having therapy was seen as vital. That is because it enabled one to be aware of the 'blindspots' of thinking and one's beliefs. This is a significant area for philosophy, especially in self-knowledge, biases and becoming aware of one's own 'blindspots' , which can be a stumbling block to clear thinking.
Shawn October 04, 2024 at 15:41 #936604
Quoting Antony Nickles
He definitely pushed the experiment of the Tractatus—basically to only state what can be said with absolutely certainty—as far as he could, which demonstrated his intellect but also persistence to carry a line of thought all the way through, past where everyone else might rest on a first impression. Only such a thorough “mistake” (if we would even call it that) could lead to such a monumental revolution as the Investigations.


It was hardly a mistake, as some might think it was. Wittgenstein stated in the Investigations that many of his thoughts had been continued and expanded on from the Tractatus to the Investigations. I don't think he thought of the Tractatus as entirely a mistaken work; but, certain elements of it, such as the picture theory of meaning, were not adequate to answer the questions that occupied Wittgensteins mind.

Quoting Antony Nickles
Wittgenstein is looking at the mechanics of our interest and judgment through a concept—how it is identified, distinguished, satisfied.


Yes, although it would seem as though that the mechanics of what concepts are, are to this day a point in question. As I already stated, grammar seems to be the path to greater understanding rather than route logic which had been trying to solve as Wittgenstein sought out.

Shawn October 04, 2024 at 15:50 #936611
Quoting Jack Cummins
Wittgenstein's suggestion that 'The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology' is an important statement. That is because the source human thinking is a central area for psychological investigation. This is at the core of the different models of psychology..


I think that what one can figure from stating psychology in this way is that by having a body of knowledge upon which we can formulate bedrock beliefs or hinge propositions, one would be able to achieve the certainty that Wittgenstein sought in his own preponderance about psychology. After all, he wrote a whole book about certainty, which he needed for reasons only he would be able to explain.

Quoting Jack Cummins
As far as the idea of philosophy needing therapy, what this signifies is for a thinker to be more aware of the psychological basis of one's ideas and beliefs. Human motives and factors in socialisation are central to our philosophical understanding, alongside cultural beliefs. Being able to reflect on these aspects of one's beliefs and thoughts has an important place in philosophy.


Yes, socialization seems important; but, is it more important than individualization?

Quoting Jack Cummins
When I was undertaking some psychotherapy training, having therapy was seen as vital. That is because it enabled one to be aware of the 'blindspots' of thinking and one's beliefs. This is a significant area for philosophy, especially in self-knowledge, biases and becoming aware of one's own 'blindspots' , which can be a stumbling block to clear thinking.


I haven't encountered such a term as "blindspots" in therapy. I have heard about cognitive distortions or biases or thought patterns that are negative... Seems interesting to say that when philosophers engage in weltanschauung's or systems of thoughts one can fall into all sorts of mistaken beliefs or erroneous conclusions about how to perceive or "think about", as such.
Jack Cummins October 04, 2024 at 16:41 #936620
Reply to Shawn
The differences between the assumptions or theoriesof 'mind' have a large impact on the nature of certainty and uncertainty. Also, some may be able to tolerate than others, or it can be a process of learning to live with it, which may in itself be a therapeutic quest.

There is both the task of socialisation and individuation. They run parallel and different cultural groups may value strict adherence to group norms or individual uniqueness. The value of individual uniqueness is likely related to greater tolerance of uncertainty, rather than fixed, prescriptive roles and ideas of human development.

The idea of 'blindspots' comes from the psychodynamic as opposed to cognitive behavioural school of thought. They are frequently contrasted, including ideas about the 'subconscious' in the psychodynamic vs core beliefs in CBT, among other aspects. There are differences, but it is possible that the two are compatible, but come from different linguistic conceptions inherent in the models. As far as the experience of therapy, a lot may depend on the understanding of the therapist, probably similar to the journey towards understanding of a philosopher.
Antony Nickles October 04, 2024 at 18:00 #936636
Quoting Shawn
I don't think he thought of the Tractatus as entirely a mistaken work; but, certain elements of it, such as the picture theory of meaning, were not adequate to answer the questions that occupied Wittgensteins mind.


I would not call the work in the Tractatus a waste. Of course we could call the picture theory a “mistake”, but I’m thinking more of the mistaken desire for purity that that theory, or any theory, would try to satisfy. If we call that a desire for pure (singular, universal) logic, then he does abandon that goal in the PI, however, the varied grammar he sees in each concept has its own internal logic, though not foundational, so he does continue a rigorous, precise, intelligibility in the PI.

Quoting Shawn
Yes, although it would seem as though that the mechanics of what concepts are, are to this day a point in question. As I already stated, grammar seems to be the path to greater understanding rather than route logic which had been trying to solve as Wittgenstein sought out.


You’d have to explain why there is a question of the mechanics of concepts, though I would say the criteria of how to judge, say, a correct apology, or distinguish between a mistake and an accident, are part of the fabric of our history and lives together. And I don’t think we can say that there isn’t a logic to those criteria, though not formal logic (I don’t know what would make it “route” logic). The point of the PI is that we don’t need pure formal logic to have a workable rational world.
Paine October 04, 2024 at 23:17 #936740
With the "not wanting to spare anybody from thinking", there is introduced an element which my teachers of Wittgenstein emphasized. The benefit from the way out is only helpful for those who sincerely have the problems, If we can stand outside of the circle and express superiority over the poor fucks who suffer that sort of thing, then that would be a kind of psychology.
Leontiskos October 05, 2024 at 17:22 #936911
Reply to Paine - A psychological clique that thinks of itself as True Philosophy? They are a dime a dozen.
Shawn October 05, 2024 at 20:01 #936932
Quoting Jack Cummins
The idea of 'blindspots' comes from the psychodynamic as opposed to cognitive behavioural school of thought. They are frequently contrasted, including ideas about the 'subconscious' in the psychodynamic vs core beliefs in CBT, among other aspects.


I'm quite interested in your take on what psychodynamics is about. It seem like a field with a higher difficulty rating than Jung or Freud with simple ideas about what governs one's psychology.
Shawn October 05, 2024 at 20:13 #936943
Quoting Antony Nickles
Of course we could call the picture theory a “mistake”, but I’m thinking more of the mistaken desire for purity that that theory, or any theory, would try to satisfy.


Yes, well it was a book written, with the intent to put philosophy in the right category of thought, as I understand it. From what I gather the name and form of the book was inspired after Spinoza's own Tractatus. I view the work as concerned, more than any other work in philosophy even to this day, with explaining the various areas touched by the book via a method or school of thought called 'logical atomism'. Logical atomism could be viewed as a philosophy inherited from Leibnitz. Bertrand Russell called his philosophy the philosophy of Leibnitz, which I believe Wittgenstein further adopted from Russell upon their friendship.

Quoting Antony Nickles
If we call that a desire for pure (singular, universal) logic, then he does abandon that goal in the PI, however, the varied grammar he sees in each concept has its own internal logic, though not foundational, so he does continue a rigorous, precise, intelligibility in the PI.


I wouldn't call it an internal logic; but, a logic derived from context and use. The desire for a pure and singular logic to understand the world, which I think Wittgenstein was influenced by Frege and the Vienna Circle, is a goal that got superseded by Godel's Incompleteness Theorems.

Quoting Antony Nickles
The point of the PI is that we don’t need pure formal logic to have a workable rational world.


It would seem as though the world could not be understood as philosophers would have wanted it to. If so, then where does one go from here?
Jack Cummins October 06, 2024 at 08:12 #937036
Reply to Shawn
The perspective which I am familiar with in psychodynamic therapy is one applied in clinical practice. It draws on certain ideas of Freud, such as his concepts of id, ego and superego and the understanding of defence mechanisms. It draws on a number of other writers, including Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion and Melanie Klein. It involves a way of looking beyond the surface of communication.

The ideas of Melanie Klein are particularly important and her concept of 'splitting' in the early developments of childhood. It is connected to the process of differentiation from the mother, the construction of self and otherness. Central to this understanding is the concept of projection or projective identification. In the process, one internalises others as inner objects. This involves particular divisions into good and evil for differentiating aspects of life.

The nature of projection is particularly important in thinking of beliefs. In a sense of identifying certain ideas as being right or wrong, one may divide the world. This is especially true in black and white thinking of rigid beliefs. It can be bound up with a sense of being 'right' as an ego position, projecting faults onto others. It comes into philosophy and politics.

A sense of certainty is involved in the dynamics of projection and this may have been why Wittgenstein focused on certainty. To withdraw projections one is almost forced to question and look at one's own beliefs critically, as an encounter with uncertainty.
Jack Cummins October 06, 2024 at 11:07 #937059
Reply to Shawn
I have just realised that I left out a major aspect of psychodynamic therapy. That is the idea of transference. That is based on the relationship with the therapist, which is believed to go back to the child's relationship with parents.

Psychodynamic therapists work with the transference, focusing upon what is evident in the relationship with the therapist in the sessions. Thinking about this and repairing this is seen as important, with the therapist enabling the client to reflect upon what is happening. There is also the idea of the countertransference, which involves the therapist's experience and feelings about the client.
Metaphysician Undercover October 06, 2024 at 12:06 #937078
Quoting Shawn
Actually, if one wants to be more precise or factual, then, why was Wittgenstein obsessed with treating the study of philosophy as in need of therapy.


You misunderstand what Wittgenstein was saying. It is not the case that philosophy is in need of therapy, it is the case that philosophy is the therapy. Look at the quote from @Banno.

Philosophical Investigations:255 . The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.


See, the illness inheres within the general population, as a deficiency in the way that we think, and it is exemplified by the way that we use language, common usage. Philosophy is the therapy which is required to treat this ailment. That is why Wittgenstein engaged in philosophy, rather than simply accepting the mistaken ways of thinking which he noticed as abundant, and thereby becoming a part of the disease, he wanted to be a part of the cure, and act as a philosopher.

It is a fine line to distinguish the boundary between the cure and the disease, as Plato found out in trying to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. The therapy then, philosophy itself, is shown to be this activity of distinguishing the afflicted thinking. Apprehending the mode by which the illness is recognized, is the therapy, and this distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist. As Wittgenstein explains it involves understanding the role of "purpose", what Plato called "the good".
Antony Nickles October 17, 2024 at 05:29 #940372
Quoting Shawn
It would seem as though the world could not be understood as philosophers would have wanted it to. If so, then where does one go from here?


If we are to cure the urge for perfection—in this instance, as we will have to in other instances—then maybe we have to turn away from it, figuratively, say, from Plato’s sun, and take his shadows seriously, take his interlocutors as speaking truly. Emerson says if the world is surfaces (appearances), we should skate them well. Wittgenstein looks at our expressions to learn about the workings of each thing, because, he says, that shows what is essential about that practice/thing (PI, #371). This is not mathematical certainty, crystalline purity, nor universal, predictive, foundational, normative, etc., but it is precise, specific, rational, workable, flexible, extendable, capable of encapsulating error.

What I meant by “internal” logic was that each practice has a true/false kind of rationality that is based on its own criteria, and so not judged by a standard from outside it, but that its logic is self-referential, or “internal”. An apology has certain criteria by which we judge if it was done correctly (truly) or not (was false, as an apology). This is in the league of identity, as we judge a dog from a wolf, with there being a grey area in between, even as an apology can be incomplete, yet accepted (the ultimate means of judgment).