The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism

So…
...Can we not apply Occam’s razor, rid ourselves of physicalism, remain metaphysically agnostic, and follow the scientific method where it leads? Leave the empty suitcase behind and go where the plane takes us? What is the real barrier to doing so?

Physicalism in relation to methodological naturalism seems to me like an empty suitcase taken on a plane.

3. Physicalism’s close association with methodological naturalism and the confusion there engendered risks denigrating the latter.

[Methodological naturalism's] justification as a method rests on its results rather than any metaphysical presumptions.

But I think that can be problematised by pointing out that while physicalism does provide a background context that is inviting towards scientific inquiry, none of the successes of science required physicalism– the scientific method and its accompanying tools being enough to do the job.

So, wherein lies the attraction of physicalism for scientists? The majority associate themselves with the doctrine, but why? Why not simply maintain metaphysical agnosticism? Is it simply because, as above, physicalism resonates with the idea of scientific inquiry? Is it just an honorary badge to display anti-idealist credentials? Do scientists generally even know or care what they’re committed to?

My central criticism is not that physicalism is wrong—it's unfalsifiable

2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:

A. There is only one substance, that substance is physical and that substance encompasses all known and all potentially knowable phenomena
B. The universe is deterministic.
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding.

The consequences of this apparent circularity are somewhat jarring. Physicalism does not really do away with the supernatural, but must presume there is some, in principle, discoverable law to account for it, and simply redefine it as natural as necessary.

As we move up the hierarchies of scale, then maybe it makes sense to talk about non-physicalist answers, e.g. what is the nature of the mind.

Methodological naturalism stands as a respectable framework for the employment of the scientific method. It has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural.

What is the real barrier to doing so?

That's the nub of the issue - methodological naturalism is taken to be a metaphysics, which it actually is not.

...the questionable assumption that methodological naturalism was born metaphysics-free

2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:

A. There is only one substance, that substance is physical and that substance encompasses all known and all potentially knowable phenomena
B. The universe is deterministic.
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding.

Methodological naturalism ... has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural.

But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that ...

must behave in a law-like manner, i.e. in a way which is replicable and predictive

Modern science - that is, science since Galileo - pre-determines certain parameters, foremost of which is that the object of analysis be objectively measurable and empirically intelligible

the real challenge for physicalism is to explain the lawlike behaviors, if there are such, of the entities studied in psychology, sociology, history, literature – in short, the human sciences.

And if you responded by telling her that her discipline did not produce objective facts and theories, was in short not scientific, she would laugh at you,

So in order to defend physicalism, I think a philosopher has to argue for why physicalism is not reductive in the sense just described.

an Aeon essay by Evan Thompson, Adam Frank and Marcello Gleiser

There are plenty of valid scientific interpretations that are non-deterministic, notably Copenhagen interpretation of QM.

there are good arguments for the involvement of us humans in the establishment of reality,

Published in 1924, Burtt's work explores how the shift to a scientific worldview in the 17th century was underpinned by (often unstated) metaphysical assumptions. He argues that the major figures of the Scientific Revolution—such as Galileo, Descartes, and Newton—operated within a novel metaphysical framework that emphasized the mechanistic view of nature, displacing older Aristotelian and theological cosmologies.

Burtt’s book is especially insightful in showing how modern science was not merely the result of empirical discoveries but was also driven by philosophical commitments. These commitments included the belief in a mathematically structured universe and the idea that nature operates according to impersonal, mechanistic laws—concepts central to metaphysical naturalism.

Burtt emphasizes that the scientific revolution didn’t eliminate metaphysics but rather replaced one set of metaphysical assumptions with another. Burtt’s analysis makes it clear that scientific progress was bound up with this broader transformation in how reality was conceived. It’s a classic in the history and philosophy of science, often cited for its depth in tracing how metaphysical ideas shaped the development of modern scientific thought.

E A Burtt, is relevant:

I am wondering if the empty suitcase is actually methodological naturalism. Who needs it? Not the naturalist.

psychosomatic

Don’t want to go there. I was just trying to think of some ‘edge cases’ where there might be actual metaphysical considerations.

I would guess that most people who agree with the physicalist approach also agree that a reductionist approach is also correct. I think the argument could be made that they are the same thing.

Where methodological naturalism needs to be made explicit is when it appears in the guise of a metaphysic - which happens most often in the attempt to subject philosophical problems to scientific scrutiny. To scientism, in other words. That's when it becomes metaphysical, as distinct from methodological, naturalism.

The term “physical” starts losing clarity if it encompasses everything.

Still, I believe we can distinguish between physical and non-material realities. Physical reality consists of things we can observe, measure, and interact with directly. Physicalism is most useful when it suggests that reality is, in principle, measurable.

I do see methodological naturalism being presented as justified based on results, but it is an open question whether the success of modern science is independent of metaphysical presuppositions.

The other question is whether a robust methodology can perdure independent of metaphysical presuppositions.

Can it be done without physicalism?

(A) sounds like materialism. Physicalism doesn't really say that. I mean, what is this substance?

(B) is untrue. There are plenty of valid scientific interpretations that are non-deterministic, notably Copenhagen interpretation of QM.

OK, it's a methodology, not a premise. Scientific investigation proceeds as if there is nothing supernatural. If this is wrong, then science will presumable hit a wall at some point.
But then you treat it like it is a theory with this:
But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that ...
It proceeds as if.. Saying 'posit' makes it sound like naturalism itself.

Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it. Physicalism seems like a vacuous piece of extra metaphysical naturalist baggage in that context.

In particular, it’s a crucial point whether physicalism has to declare by fiat that anything that exists or happens has a lawlike physical basis, thus in effect relabeling what most of us would call “non-physical” in ordinary circumstances. Leontiskos mentioned Nagel’s The Last Word, and as usual Nagel puts it well: “I [want to] interpret the concept of ?physics’ restrictively enough so that the laws of physics by themselves will not explain the presence of . . . thinking beings in the space of natural possibilities. Of course, if ?physics’ just means the most fundamental scientific theory about everything, then it will include any such laws if they exist.” If that’s all physicalism amounts to, then you’re right, it adds nothing conceptually.

There's an ironic tradeoff there where in order to make physicalism meaningful, you pretty much have to make it wrong or at least so problematic as to be questionably worth defending.

But then the same can be said of methodological naturalism. What does it mean to be natural or supernatural?

This is where I wonder if a certain logic to the situation is obscured. Is there something practical to the suitcase I can't see? What is the minimum we should need to get on with science optimally? Methodological natualism seems to be the answer to me. But I am open to reasons why more might be needed.

Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it.

• Methodological Naturalist: "Stop doing metaphysics. We should be metaphysically neutral."
• Physicalist: "No one is metaphysically neutral. You are fooling yourself. Every thoroughgoing methodology comes with metaphysical commitments."
• Methodological Naturalist: "Even if that is so, it remains true that your metaphysics is too thick for science."

'At best, talk of “the physical” acts as a placeholder for whatever we discover, or could discover, to be true about nature.'

The supernatural is just that which can't be reliably measured, replicated etc. in principle.

there are good arguments for the involvement of us humans in the establishment of reality,
— T Clark

Such as?

Chomsky's criticism

But can't the same be said about talk of "the natural"? Is naturalism any less shifty than physicalism?

I have a number of friends who would, if pressed, probably deny that there's anything out there except the physical world. But nor would they claim that you can use the fundamental entities of physics to explain macro-phenomena like economic behavior.

Not necessarily. We can construct a sort of "best we can do right now" position that would go: "Sure, we have loads of unanswered questions about how physical realities interact, and how they can be causally effective. But at the end of the (scientific) day, I'm betting that the answers will still fail to reveal anything beyond the physical. We have to wait and see, but my money is on physicalism."

let's say like Richard Dawkins (who I would presume comes close to what Wayfarer means by a "scientism") and the metaphysics of someone like apokrisis (who whatever else you think of his ideas, is scientifically oriented in regards to his metaphysics), would be very different.

If the physicalist pivots to methodological physicalism, has he then solved the problem?

I first came to this realization through the Tao Te Ching. "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." It has become a central part of my understanding of how the world works - reality is not objective, it is a mixture of an external non-human existence interacting with our human nature. Kant described something similar.

I'd vote yes. I think there are plenty of scientists who are to all intents physicalist as far as their work is concerned but agnostic or open-minded with respect to matters that can't be adjuticated by science.

2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:

A. All known and all potentially knowable phenomena can be considered physical [Edited to properly distinguish vs materialism]
B. The universe is deterministic. [Correction: Only applies to some versions of physicalism, not most]
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding.

None of these are falsifiable. They can better be described as articles of faith consistent with the observable universe, but not derivable from it.

This might seem obvious, but I'm not convinced it is to all physicalists.

3. Physicalism’s close association with methodological naturalism and the confusion there engendered risks denigrating the latter.

Methodological naturalism stands as a respectable framework for the employment of the scientific method. It has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural.

It appears to me that you [@Baden] miss the point. Physicalism is a metaphysical theory, not a scientific theory. All coherent metaphysical theories are unfalsifiable. It's certainly reasonable to remain agnostic to metaphysical theories ...

Metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism) fills in the gap that scientism leaves. Of course, it's not necessarily true, but it does defeat the claim (of some theists) that we "need" supernaturalism to account for aspects of the world.

It appears to me that you miss the point. Physicalism is a metaphysical theory, not a scientific theory. All coherent metaphysical theories are unfalsifiable. It's certainly reasonable to remain agnostic to metaphysical theories, but it's not UNreasonable to treat some metaphysical theory as a working hypothesis to see if it can account for everything we know about the world. Personally, I treat physicalism is the most reasonable default position- my working hypothesis, so I label myself a physicalist. I haven't encountered anything that isn't explainable from this framework...

But it doesn't sound like you treat physicalism as unfalsifiable. In fact it seems like you believe physicalism would be falsified insofar as you encounter things which are not explainable within the physicalist framework.

And as far as your set of interests are concerned, I would say that methodological naturalism is little more than a stand-in for mechanistic natural philosophy. It asks us to behave as if mechanistic natural philosophy is true. But if mechanistic natural philosophy is false, then why would we behave as if it is true?

Indeed, that science is even a rational form of inquiry (let alone the only rational form of inquiry) is not something that can be established scientifically. For scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle. And if it cannot even establish that it is a reliable form of inquiry, it can hardly establish that it is the only reliable form.

• It's a formal system of study with established and documented methodology.
• The assumptions and presuppositions underlying that methodology are understood and acknowledged.
• The results are documented.
• Procedures for data reporting, reduction, verification, and interpretation are included in the system methodology.
• The results can be compared with observations in the real world and predictions made before the study takes place.

Simplifying, some theologians at that time posited the idea that there are scientific truths and theological truths, and never the twain shall meet.

Metaphysical naturalism (or physicalism) fills in the gap that scientism leaves.

If the two domains in question do not interact, then it is unnecessary. If the two domains in question do interact, then a two-truth theory is a simplistic bandage on a rather difficult problem.

Buddhism grows out of praxis and Western science grows out of theoria, and therefore these are very different animals (even though the West is now becoming preoccupied with a different praxis, namely a Baconian praxis).

I don't think this argument holds water.

The point here is that the metaphysics involved in physicalism and the metaphysics that I would argue is present in methodological naturalism are adjudicable and non-arbitrary, and therefore they do not succumb to the critiques of metaphysics that many have leveraged. We don't need to be afraid of metaphysics, or believe that it represents some kind of unadjudicable free for all.

What gap?

The author's argument against scientism doesn't claim to show science is irrational, but rather that it's core principle (that the scientific method is the only way to render truth about the world and reality) cannot be established with the scientific method - which he asserts makes it self-defeating.

That the core principle of scientism (that the scientific method is the only way to render truth about the world and reality) cannot be established with the scientific method. This implies the core principle is an unjustified belief- that's the gap.

My point is that metaphysical naturalism provides a similarly complete metaphysical system, one in which science fits perfectly - with no gap.

It appears to me that you miss the point. Physicalism is a metaphysical theory, not a scientific theory.

What about the Original Post? Perhaps "methodological naturalism" is doublespeak for soft metaphysical naturalism, and physicalism really does deviate insofar as it is a form of hard metaphysical naturalism. On that view the problem is not that physicalism is metaphysical, but rather that it is too confident, too far out over its skies. The underlying issue is the difficulty or impossibility of adopting a thoroughgoing epistemological methodology without also adopting some form of metaphysical commitment.

The alternative is a view of science which opens the door to the soft sciences, including theology. If the repeatability requirement is softened then interpersonal realities can be the subject of scientific study, because repeated interpersonal interactions do yield true and reliable knowledge, even though the repeatability is not as strict as that of the lab scientist who deals with a passive and subordinate substance.

I've learned a lot about biosemiotics from Apokrisis (including that it exists!) and benefitted a lot from it, although I don't agree with his metaphysics. Biosemiotics on the whole is not materialist in orientation so I don’t see biosemiotics as ‘scientistic’ in the sense that Dawkins/Dennett neo-darwinist materialism is. (Notice, though, that even though C S Peirce is categorised as an idealist philosopher in most directories, Apokrisis will generally downplay his idealist side.)

Check out Søren Brier's academic homepage (and I was alerted to him by Apokrisis) - titles like 'Information and consciousness: A critique of the mechanistic concept of information', 'Bateson and Peirce on the pattern that connects and the sacred'. I also found a paper by Marcello Barbieri on the history of biosemiosis and it's very wide-ranging.

On the whole, I think physicalism is on the wane. It's real heyday was actually the late 19th century, I think the scientific justification for it was demolished by the introduction of quantum physics in 1927.

if you provide physicalism with the baggage of every phenonemon, it loses its explanatory power as to what "physical" even means.

The alternative is a view of science which opens the door to the soft sciences, including theology. If the repeatability requirement is softened then interpersonal realities can be the subject of scientific study, because repeated interpersonal interactions do yield true and reliable knowledge, even though the repeatability is not as strict as that of the lab scientist who deals with a passive and subordinate substance.

I will often answer that there is indeed a kind of peer-review and 'quality control' method, if you like, in spiritual cultures, such as Zen Buddhism...

The real problem with the idea of higher knowledge is the lack of a vertical axis against which the term 'higher' is meaningful. But that is the very thing that physicalism has undermined. Physicalism has a 'flat ontology', with matter (or nowadays, matter-energy-space-time) being the sole constituent of existence.

That is, the ability to know and understand the metaphysical basis of reality constitutes wisdom.

But I don't understand how anything Anderson says refutes a potentially physicalist understanding of the world. He refutes reductionism very well, but my attempt to invent a "best we can do now" version of physicalism was not meant to affirm reductionism, quite the contrary.

Published in 1924, Burtt's work explores how the shift to a scientific worldview in the 17th century was underpinned by (often unstated) metaphysical assumptions.

I think this is a good line of argument. I had thought of physicalism, also metaphorically, as kind of a snake pit where whenever one snake pops its head up and you cut it off, another one simply reappears in its place, reflecting the adaptive ability of physicalism to proliferate new versions of itself in response to new objections. This overall amorphism seems highly suspect in the context of scientifc endeavour. But then the question arises, as you and others have pointed out, is it really realistic to presume you can entirely rid yourself of that type of problem and "just do" science under the guidance of methodological naturalism or some other supposedly more neutral framework? Aren't there snakes everywhere? Aren't there metaphysical commitments inherent in making your job philosophically coherent as an enterprise?

I think to an extent there are. And an associated problem is even finding generally accepted definitions of the concepts in question, so that hard lines can be drawn. Perhaps the scientific method, methodological naturalism, metaphysical naturalism (including physicalism) can be placed on a kind of spectrum of increased commitment and perhaps even that modest enterprise has its complications.

But I still think its useful to try to get out Occam's razor and try to do what we can, especially when one finds oneself defending science against ideological and metaphysical encroachment in general.

But qualitative studies do play a part in science and the soft sciences are absolutely drenched in philosophical commitments, particularly structuralist ones. Though, again, there is some kind of division envisioned between methodologies and metaphysics, it's very hard to see where that line really is. That's probably a conversation that's too broad for the scope of this thread, though I won't deny its relevancy.

I guess part of the problem is that unifications are often misunderstood as reductions in popular science.

But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that as the universe must behave in a law-like manner, i.e. in a way which is replicable and predictive (in principle if not in practice), anything we encounter in the universe that does not seem to behave so, must despite appearances, ultimately do so by virtue of its very existence.

Physicalism is the conviction that empirical phenomenon are determined(not necessarily deterministically) by physical laws (what that means is not clear, granted). This may not be the case.

Physicalism in relation to methodological naturalism seems to me like an empty suitcase taken on a plane. The scientific method (the plane) gets you somewhere but the metaphysical baggage of physicalism appears to be an unnecessary and unhelpful accoutrement.

I suppose physicalism draws much of its respectability from its ostensible position as the most central philosophical framework for scientific inquiry, and I’m not denying it is. But I think that can be problematised by pointing out that while physicalism does provide a background context that is inviting towards scientific inquiry, none of the successes of science required physicalism– the scientific method and its accompanying tools being enough to do the job.

The question is whether "ridding ourselves of physicalism" has any actual meaning consequences for physicalists.

Physicalism seems like a vacuous piece of extra metaphysical naturalist baggage in that context.

Like saddling physicalism with a commitment to determinism, for example. (OK, that's not quite fair, because this is not central to your criticism, and besides, this is so blatantly false as to be hardly worth focusing on.)

I am not attached to such vague labels. I prefer discussing more specific positions. If I ever identify as a physicalist, it is for sociological reasons:

What are we to say of it then? The suitcase serves a function but often in an indirect way. Maybe many know it's empty or don’t know what’s in the suitcase, but just so long as you have a suitcase! But then, to avoid hypocrisy, the door should be open to alternative metaphysical commitments that don’t have any direct bearing on the conducting of the scientific method, no? Except those who take that route seem to get a much harder time of it---socially.

I suppose I am advocating for a kind of radical agnosticism as to the ultimate nature of things because I think language won’t take us anywhere near there and we end up creating word games that unnecessarily divide and polarise.

If physicalism is a metaphysical position, as you (and most everyone else) characterize it, then its only obligation to science is to be consistent with it and to not give it a priori constraints.

turing complete

Whereas physicalism seems to me to generally focus primarily on questions of "how." We have observable phenomena, but how do they come to be and how are they best predicted and forecast? (Dawkins for instance defines "reality" in terms of prediction). The "physical" is just that which is required for this "how" explanation. But the physical itself is often said to lack any "why." It simply is, a brute fact. Intelligibility is a "construct" of minds and need not be sought in nature or the physical, or might even be said to be mere appearance (and quiddity/phenoenology is usually demoted to mere appearance as set over and against objective physical reality).

I don't think physicalism re philosophy of mind has all that much to do with physicalism as an ontology. It seems perfectly possible to accept the former while rejecting the latter.

The main issue with physicalism, as with many other broad philosophical and ideological categorizations, is that it is hard to define and articulate with any precision and consistency, while avoiding circularity.

Intelligibility and quiddity strikes me as related to theories of mind and of truth. Something is "intelligible" if it is understood (i.e. it is describable by propositions that are known). Quiddity seems a subset of intelligibility. A complete metaphysical theory (whether physicalist or anything else) is a description of the way things actually are objectively (not merely what we perceive), albeit that we learn about the world phenomenologically.

The "natural" is anything that exists* that is causally connected to the actual physical world through laws of nature.

Another argument is that what exists according to natural science, does not include the observing subject who stipulates the axioms upon which it rests. That is the topic of the innumerable and interminable discussions about the hard problem of consciousness. It is also the major topic of both phenomenology and existentialism, which will probably not be cowed with threats of ‘brute fact’. :wink:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. (Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, pp. 35-36)

My own existence is certainly a fact - cogito ergo sum - but not of the kind that was mooted in the post I was responding to. After all, even Descartes himself noted that the existence of the world might be a spell cast by an evil daemon.

But then, to avoid hypocrisy, the door should be open to alternative metaphysical commitments that don’t have any direct bearing on the conducting of the scientific method, no?

I suppose I am advocating for a kind of radical agnosticism as to the ultimate nature of things

they'd be claiming that consciousness is the foundational reality, beyond which there are no further explanations—it's simply taken as given

Of all systems of philosophy which start from the object, the most consistent, and that which may be carried furthest, is simple materialism. It regards matter, and with it time and space, as existing absolutely, and ignores the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists. It then lays hold of the law of causality as a guiding principle or clue, regarding it as a self-existent order (or arrangement) of things, veritas aeterna, and so fails to take account of the understanding, in which and for which alone causality is.

It seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemism, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility—that is knowledge—which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality.

Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result—knowledge, which it reached so laboriously, was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought 'matter', we really thought only 'the subject that perceives matter'; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it.

Thus the tremendous petitio principii (=begged question) reveals itself unexpectedly; for suddenly the last link is seen to be the starting-point, the chain a circle, and the materialist is like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue. The fundamental absurdity of materialism is that it starts from the objective, and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something objective, whether it be matter in the abstract, simply as it is thought, or after it has taken form, is empirically given—that is to say, is substance, the chemical element with its primary relations. Some such thing it takes, as existing absolutely and in itself, in order that it may evolve organic nature and finally the knowing subject from it, and explain them adequately by means of it; whereas in truth all that is objective is already determined as such in manifold ways by the knowing subject through its forms of knowing, and presupposes them; and consequently it entirely disappears if we think the subject away.

Thus materialism is the attempt to explain what is immediately given us by what is given us indirectly. All that is objective, extended, active—that is to say, all that is material—is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction).

But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time. From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained.

To the assertion that 'thought is a modification of matter' we may always, with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that 'all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject' - as its idea. Yet the aim and ideal of all natural science is at bottom a consistent materialism. The recognition here of the obvious impossibility of such a system establishes another truth ...the truth that all science properly so called, by which I understand systematic knowledge under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason, can never reach its final goal, nor give a complete and adequate explanation: for it is not concerned with the inmost nature of the world, it cannot get beyond the idea; indeed, it really teaches nothing more than the relation of one idea to another.

Are laws of nature natural? They’re never actually observed, only their effects can be discerned by measurement and observation. But the question why nature is lawful or what natural laws comprise, is not itself a question that naturalism has answers for. Naturalism assumes an order in nature, but it doesn’t explain it, nor does it need to explain it. That, I suppose, is what you’re getting at by saying that the existence of the world is ‘brute fact’ - which effectively forecloses any attempt to understand why things are the way they are, whether they are as they seem, and so on.

Yep. I had in mind that for those who argue that "all is consciousness" this is amounts to a brute fact -

Consciousness, like memories, is not a thing. It is a status that happens when our neurons get stimulated repeatedly. Our individual, unique memories, which we fondly call subjective are made possible by synapses.

The million pulses that have to happen in order to retrieve an image of an apple or a tree is not magic.

Arguably, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, a hallmark of many systems, seems to rule out brute facts.

"that the order of becoming and existence must be intelligible; that no phase of the process of contingent existence is intelligible in itself; and that therefore contingent existence is always relative existence, essentially referred, qua existing to another.”

Are laws of nature natural? They’re never actually observed, only their effects can be discerned by measurement and observation. But the question why nature is lawful or what natural laws comprise, is not itself a question that naturalism has answers for. Naturalism assumes an order in nature, but it doesn’t explain it, nor does it need to explain it. That, I suppose, is what you’re getting at by saying that the existence of the world is ‘brute fact’ - which effectively forecloses any attempt to understand why things are the way they are, whether they are as they seem, and so on.

This just strikes me as mapping the common presuppositions of physicalism onto "what a complete metaphysical theory should be."

It seems to presuppose the subject - object dualism that a great deal of 20th and 21st century explicitly targets as the cardinal sin of early modern philosophy.

Such a definition surely defines subjective idealism out of contention from the get-go, no?

But of course, probably the number one critique of (mainstream representationalist) physicalism is precisely that it axiomatically assumes an unresolvable dualism that makes skepticism insurmountable.

Ha! Isn't 'the observing subject who stipulates the axioms upon which it rests' another brute fact?

"Are laws of nature natural? "
Yes. If they weren't, then all forms of naturalism would be false.

"observing subjects" are objects that exist as a consequence of the way the world is and the specific history that it has.

Furthermore appealing to the entities of sub-atomic physics presents difficulties for Armstrong's style of physicalism.

. I don't know if Armstrong ever touches on the thorny question of interpretation in quantum physics, but I'm not sure it would support his overall approach.

observing subjects" are only 'objects' to other observing subjects who, it is hoped, will be sufficiently perceptive to recognise them as subjects, rather than regarding them as objects.

When Armstrong refers to "laws of nature", he's not pointing to scientific theories and equations in textbooks. He's referring to something ontological. Physics may approximate the law, or describe it in terms meaningful to us, but those descriptions and equations are not the law. The law is the physical relations that exist between (or among) types of things (a type of thing is a universal).

So when I said that laws of nature are necessarily natural, if naturalism is true, I was specifically referring to laws as something ontological, not descriptive.

The essential element of his ontology is that every thing that exists is a state of affairs (a particular with its attached properties and relations). Even quantum fields, or strings, fit this framework.

But if they're not the laws described by physics, then in what sense are those relations physical?

I question that declaring everything to be physical, without any reference to physics itself, is even meaningful.

But that is not true. Scientific realists, including Sir Roger Penrose and Albert Einstein, both criticize quantum physics precisely on the grounds that they provide no description of specification of what the 'state of affairs' of a quantum system is, prior to it being measured. This is why they both insist that quantum physics must be in some sense incomplete. Yet it has withstood every test that has been set for it. (I've published a Medium essay on this topic.)

What Armstrong is doing is acknowledging a distinction between the actual laws of nature and the academic discipline of physics. Physicists endeavors to uncover laws of nature, and is likely correct in many cases, but ontology is not dependent on them getting everything exactly correct. Isaac Newton's theory of gravitation seemed to be a law of nature for quite a long time, but in fact - it had an error, one that was corrected by Einstein's theory. The law of nature didn't change, but the law of physics did change.

The state of affairs of a quantum system is perfectly describable as a Schroedinger equation. In that respect, the quantum system evolves in a strictly deterministic way over time.

And third, if Armstrong’s metaphysics is founded on the idea of scientific laws as real and necessary features of the world, then one would expect it to appeal to scientifically established theories.

You wonder why, then, Schrödinger published his notorious thought-experiment on the not-dead-or-alive cat. He sought to illustrate the fundamental indeterminacy that characterises the so-called 'fundamental particles' of physics by providing a hypothetical example of their absurd implications were they to manifest on the level of everyday experience. The fact that the equation is accurate is not at issue, as it is firmly established that the accuracy of the predictions of quantum mechanics exceeds anything previously discovered in history. It's what they say, or don't say, about the so-called fundamental constituents of reality that is the philosophical point at issue. In other words, it's the ontological implications that are at issue, not the practical effectiveness. The fact that Armstrong can blithely wave these away says something about his theories, in my view.

Armstrong's physicalist metaphysics could be wrong (perhaps the mind isn't physical, or perhaps there are no actual laws of nature), but the same is true of any metaphysical system that has been, or ever will be, proposed.

I think the only thing that a physicalist framework struggles with is theory of mind.

If physicists can't unequivocally demonstrate which interpretation is true, then certainly a philosopher isn't well-positioned to figure it out for them

Yes. If they weren't, then all forms of naturalism would be false.

Of course. But What's wrong with that?

What makes you think that? I'm referring to David Armstrong's ontology- which accounts for everything that (unarguaby) objectively exists.

Please elaborate. I don't see how any sort of dualism fits into physicalism.

Isn't the 'brute fact' at the end of this one a necessary being or a circularity

The proffering up of brute fact claims strikes me as primarily a manifestation of the inability to acknowledge mystery.

?Relativist


Yes. If they [laws of nature] weren't [natural], then all forms of naturalism would be false.


I am not sure of this. The Physics, from which we get the term "nature" and other early forms of naturalism focus on "things acting the way they do because of what they are, i.e. because of their 'nature.'" So there are no extrinsic laws governing things and their behaviors, there is merely the natures of beings,

Representationalism wed to physicalism makes it such that phenomenal awareness is mere appearance, whereas reality is the "objective," requiring a "view from nowhere."

I think the only thing that a physicalist framework struggles with is theory of mind. — Relativist


I think its failure on that score is beyond reasonable doubt. The crux of that issue is logic itself, reason itself. I don't see how can there be any plausible physicalist account of the nature of reason, which inheres in the relationship of ideas, 'if-then' statements.

If physicists can't unequivocally demonstrate which interpretation is true, then certainly a philosopher isn't well-positioned to figure it out for them — Relativist


Nor can philosophers then appeal to physics in support of what they describe as 'physicalism'. And if their physicalism is not supported by physics, then why does it deserve that designation.

Computers demonstrate that logic can be mechanized, so I don't understand what you see as a problem.

What's the problem with the way Armstrong appeals to physics? (i.e. the basis for believing there exist laws of nature).

When Armstrong refers to "laws of nature", he's not pointing to scientific theories and equations in textbooks. He's referring to something ontological. Physics may approximate the law, or describe it in terms meaningful to us, but those descriptions and equations are not the law. The law is the physical relations that exist between (or among) types of things (a type of thing is a universal).

Objects are made of these particles, and each particle has a well-defined set of properties. The existence of these particles were deduced, not perceived by the faculties of our "phenomenal awareness", but over time - their existence has been confirmed through measurements in particle accelerators. So tell me in what sense is this NOT objective reality.

Computers don’t come into existence de novo. They are artefacts built by humans according to human aims and purposes. In other words, whatever purposes they pursue are extrinsic.

I don't think physicalism can explain how semantic properties emerge from, or are identical to, these physical states without appealing to, or assuming, non-physicalist explanations of meaning.

What is that 'something ontological', and how can it be described as physical, when it's not described by physics?

But, he says, this assumption of natural order is itself a metaphysical commitment, one that exceeds the bounds of empiricism

The properties of particles are not defined until they are measured. That is the central philosophical problem of modern physics.

My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively present

there's nothing about the application of logic that is inconsistent with physical mechanism

We interact with the world to survive. Successful interaction is dependent on our pattern-recognition capacity which enables us to distinguish types of objects and activities.

Empiricism in science leads to theories, established by abductive reasoning. By extension, we can abductively conclude there are laws of nature, on the basis that this best explains the success of science.

Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

My point is that the set of properties that emerge are objectively present — Relativist


And mine was that they're not objective until they're measured. And even then, there are experiments which indicate that those measurements will vary for different observers, which again throws their objective status into question.

As we ourselves understand logic, we are able to create systems that perform logical operations. But that doesn't mean that the mechanistic analogies for organism or natural thought, such as those often entertained by materialism, provide an account of the nature of logic. Materialists never tire of telling us that the Universe is devoid of logic and that everything we see is a consequence of the undirected physical 'laws of nature'. So how an organism (if that is indeed what we are) which is purportedly a product of those same undirected forces can come to some degree of understanding the Universe is rather a mystery, isn't it?

Right. And practically every other species apart from h.sapiens has survived, often for hundreds of millions of years (such as crocodiles) with no capacity for logic whatever. And trying to account for reason in terms of evolutionary theory reduces reason to an adaptation serving the purposes of survival. But if that is what it is, why do we place trust in reason?

I've pointed out a number of times that it's not clear that the 'laws of nature' are themselves physical. We never observe the laws, but only predictable outcomes which indicate that they exist. Physics can be carried out without reference to such laws, which is instrumentalism or pragmatism. Some have used abductive reasoning as evidence for a higher intelligence. So the point is, the existence of laws is not evidence for physicalism.

I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist.

?Relativist

Spontaneous generation" connotes coming into existence after a time at which it did not exist. Rather, an initial state just entails existing uncaused, with no point of time at which it does not exist.

No it doesn't, per your own explanation. There is a state before which there are no prior states. Call it S1. Now you claim that some thing or things had an S1 for no reason at all. They existed in S1 having not existed in any prior states.

You are trying to read some prior time before S1 back in, which is a strawman.

Anyhow, you have entirely ignored the question of why any certain thing should begin to exist in S1 rather than any other.

My contention is that our perceptions provide a reflection of objective reality, not identical to it, but we can have success at uncovering additional objective truths about reality.

Of course there's more about reality than we truly understand at this time, and I believe it likely that there are aspects of reality that we will never understand. But just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance.

It's not true that homo sapiens are the only organisms that think logically. At its core, logical reasoning entails remembering cause-effect relationships. Many animals exhibit behavior that entails multiple steps to achieve an objective. This is basic logical thinking.

I say that Armstrong's type of philosophy is hanging on to the remnants of the Christian belief in divinely-ordered nature, sans God, which was replaced with the scientist.
— Wayfarer
It's not "hanging on" for the sake of hanging on. It wouldn't make sense to deny the existence of laws of nature just because past natural philosophers identified them as laws ordained by God.

Regarding a case for God, I'd be interested in hearing more

The neural capacities that this provide are exponentially more powerful than anything possessed by other animals including our simian forbears. My claim is that due to this, h.sapiens crossed an evolutionary threshhold that cannot be explained purely in terms of biological theory, as we have realised 'horizons of being' that are simply not available to other animals. These include abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality, that are all uniquely human. They indicate a qualitative leap, a difference in kind, rather than a mere quantitative increase in cognitive ability.

We have anxieties foisted upon ourselves, mental disorders even, and then we have ANGST. It's reflected in literature going back to Egypt and Babylonia, ancient China, India, and anywhere where man could write more than a few thoughts down beyond the transactional.

It's existential angst, isn't it? That's the subject of John Vervaeke's 52-episode lecture series on Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, which I'm part way through.

The properties of particles are not defined until they are measured. That is the central philosophical problem of modern physics.

And practically every other species apart from h.sapiens has survived, often for hundreds of millions of years (such as crocodiles) with no capacity for logic whatever. And trying to account for reason in terms of evolutionary theory reduces reason to an adaptation serving the purposes of survival. But if that is what it is, why do we place trust in reason?

Personally, I don't evangalise faith in God, but as I am critical of the philosophy of secular humanism it sort of puts me in the camp of those who do.

Here's the thing, the angst-driven "What do I focus my attention on?" precedes everything. Even someone who represents naive physicalism, someone like say a "Dawkins type", someone who supposedly "only cares about facts", has to "care about" something, that precedes the "facts" that are deemed most important.

It does not follow that the properties of particles do not exist until measured.

One of the bits of terminology I've picked up from Vervaeke is 'relevance realisation', which operates right from the inception of organic life.

You can reject the metaphysical axioms I've stated: I haven't claimed they are logically necessary. But I do think they are a better explanation than the alternatives, and I think I've shown that. We can discuss that further, once you accept the coherence of the framework I've stated.

Sure, but that doesn't refute the objectivist claim that at a fundamental level, the objects of scientific analysis are 'just so', independently of any knowledge of them. They are not, in that sense, truly mind-independent.

Notice the common thread in all these titles. It says something serious about the limitations of objective science and the conundrums that modern physics throw up. And I don't think Armstrong's style of objectivist materialism has the resources to deal with that.

...just because we don't understand everything about the way the natural world works does not imply there is something unnatural at play in the world. To argue that would be an argument from ignorance.
— Relativist

No, it's an argument from epistemic humility.

It is an established fact that the forebrain of h.sapiens evolved explosively ...My claim is that due to this, h.sapiens crossed an evolutionary threshhold that cannot be explained purely in terms of biological theory...

The book I referred to was by Karen Armstrong, published around 2009. To give you an idea, here's a review by philosopher Alain de Botton, and also an OP by Armstrong, Should We Believe in Belief?

L'éléphant:Consciousness, like memories, is not a thing. It is a status that happens when our neurons get stimulated repeatedly. Our individual, unique memories, which we fondly call subjective are made possible by synapses.

On that view, wouldn't flight also not be a thing, since it is just "cells in wings responding to chemical signals." The same for "running," or "life" itself (and so also for each instance of living things?) Yet, since we have already successfully mastered heavier than air flight, we know that the principles of flight were not to be found in studying the organelles of cells in the wings of all flying animals, nor in their DNA, etc. (at least not most easily). Indeed, one can build a flying machine while being largely ignorant of the biology of flying animals so long as one understands the principles of lift, etc. that all those animals physiology takes advantage of. The same seems true of running and swimming, or even language production, and perhaps it is even so for conciousness.

But then we are at risk of dissolving all things and having only a single universal process. IMO, the solution here is to realize that things (substances) have relative degrees of unity.

In my reading, it seems that objections to physicalist theories of mind tend to largely center on the appeal to the physical being used to drag along other suppositions, e.g. a sort of reductionism

So what's the basis for claiming the world is actually mind-dependent? Then we can analyze whether that is a rational belief.

I see no basis to claim the evolutionary sequence was too fast or "explosive" to be due to natural processes.

The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence.

I said it opened up horizons of being and cognitive skills that are different in kind to other species, including abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality.

That is where quantum physics undermines the intuitive sense of the objectivity of the external world. I'm not denying that there are objective facts - that would be out-and-out relativism - but that objectivity can ever be complete.

I'm not arguing for physicalism

I suggest that the interference pattern is not caused by a physical wave — because, as we shall see, no conventional physical wave can account for the actual observations. So what the “wave” is, is one of the greatest conundrums posed by quantum physics, and the philosophical implications are profound. Let’s explore them.

Physicalism is not a reductive theory. It is a foundational theory that purports to show that the world cannot exist without matter or the physical components.

It's a philosophical claim in support of idealism. It is developed in more detail in The Mind-Created World OP and its linked essay.

The review suggests that she doesn't actually make a case for God's existence.
— Relativist

Curious, then, that the title of the book is The Case for God.

suppose there was a breakthrough in cosmology that showed strong evidence that the universe was cyclical, that the Big Bang would be followed by an infinite series of other Big Bangs. Would you still want to push the brute fact line?

?Apustimelogist Check out The Timeless Wave.

"I suggest that the interference pattern is not caused by a physical wave — because, as we shall see, no conventional physical wave can account for the actual observations. So what the “wave” is, is one of the greatest conundrums posed by quantum physics, and the philosophical implications are profound. Let’s explore them."

If by dissolving all things and having only a single universal process you mean 'reductionism', there is no risk associated with using the view of physicalism, in my opinion.

So I surmise that she is making a case for religious practice, or having God in one's life, not an intellectual basis for establishing the alleged fact of God's existence.

Not sure what you are trying to convey here.

That ? is not inside space-time.

Well this is interpretation dependent

It doesn’t make any sense, and there is a simple reason. You see, the mathematics of quantum mechanics has two parts to it. One is the evolution of a quantum system, which is described extremely precisely and accurately by the Schrödinger equation. That equation tells you this: If you know what the state of the system is now, you can calculate what it will be doing 10 minutes from now. However, there is the second part of quantum mechanics — the thing that happens when you want to make a measurement. Instead of getting a single answer, you use the equation to work out the probabilities of certain outcomes. The results don’t say, “This is what the world is doing.” Instead, they just describe the probability of its doing any one thing. The equation should describe the world in a completely deterministic way, but it doesn’t.

It’s never clear what you’re arguing for but I do know that you enjoy an argument, regardless. ;-)

abstract reasoning, language, art, scientific invention, moral reflection, symbolic thought, and awareness of mortality

They are not explained by it (physics), just as history, evolutionary theory itself, sociology, etc, etc are not because they are all different paradigms of inquiry. Physicalism is a metaphysical standpoint and just like the other metaphysical standpoints does not explain the abovementioned.

Do you really believe that the Universe would not exist without us?

Such explanations may be counted as false if it can be definitively shown that they cannot possibly explain what they purport to.

However if the mind and reason are reduced to these terms, then this undermines the sovereignty of reason. We can discuss the details of that if you like.

What do you mean by the "sovereignty of reason"? Reason by itself delivers no knowledge.

What is the actual argument for why accepting the evolution of reason would undermine those principles?

But it delivers considerable capacity to gain knowledge, surely you would agree. H.sapiens by dint of reason is able to do many things which animals can not. (There have been interminable, and to my mind pointless, arguments about this in the Rational Thinking Human and Animal thread.)

The 'argument from reason' is that reasoned inference must convey facts that are internal to reason. Seeking to justify such reasons with reference to the extent to which they provide an adaptive or evolutionary advantage undermines the sovereignty of reason by saying that it's claims have some grounds other than their self-evident nature.

You said somewhere recently that Vervaeke's "relevance realization" operates at all levels of life. What could this be but some kind of understanding (however) rudimentary) that something is of whatever significance it is for the organism".

But Vervaeke would also say that h.sapiens have greater horizons of being than do other animals, because of reason, language, self-awareness, and all that this entails.

As a Dawkins or a Crick would put it, you are ' robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes' or 'You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of identity and free will are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules'.

It's supported by an argument based on the double-slit experiment. That argument is that the interference exhibits the same wave-like pattern even if photons are fired one at a time.

Nothing about that inherently suggests anything about subjectivity.

That wasn’t the point at issue

‘name one thing that is outside space and time’ that the wavefunction fits that description, and yet is also at the heart of the success of modern physics.

There are many other constructs in physics and science that fit that description.

Right. Like the standard model of particle physics itself. Something which physicalism tends to overlook.

The fact that some constructs in science don't represent real physical objects doesn't imply anything about physicalism vs. alternatives.

Physicalism is reductionist by definition. Why? Because it methodically excludes or reduces what may be deemed anything other than the physical to the physical. Physicalism is 'the view that all phenomena, including complex processes like consciousness, emotions, and social behaviors, can be explained without residue in terms of physical components and laws—typically those of physics and chemistry—without requiring additional principles or explanations'.

It is of course true that when it comes to phenomena such as gravity and the composition of massive bodies, then physicalism is a sound assumption (which is the 'methodological' aspect). But the extension of that methodology to the problems of philosophy is what is objectionable about it.

Actually, I was thinking of mereological nihilism, that there are no true part whole relations, and that arrangements of them are ultimately arbitrary. Thus, the world contains no cats, trees, stars, etc. These only exist in the mind. There are only a few fundemental fields (perhaps unifiable, in which case there is just one thing). This seems to make "saying true things about things" virtually impossible.

My guess, which is mostly based on how other "problems in the sciences," have progressed, is that the terms currently applied need to be radically rethought. That's just a guess though.

I'm not sure where you got that definition.

It denies that there is an unexplained gap between the physical and the intangible, subjective experiences...

What physicalism denies is that there is no explanation at all for the mind or the consciousness.