Is the distinction between metaphysical realism & anti realism useless and/or wrong

1. Regardless of whether idealism or realism is true, our phenomenological experience of the world would remain unchanged. We would still believe in the existence of the same number of objects. In other words, the idealist and realist would live life behaving in similar manner.

To take a common issue, realism or anti-realism with respect to sex or gender will have radical societal implications

Hence, as this one of many examples tries to illustrate, the very notion of "mind-independence" is thoroughly contingent on what one understands by the term "mind". Via at least certain interpretations, there is no reason to deny a reality independent of each and every individual non-effete mind (yours, mine, etc.) to which we all conform that is nevertheless of itself an effete mind and, hence, mind-dependent.

I don't think this is true. Let's take someone who holds my view expressed above & also happens to believe in biological essentialism. He can still believe its possible to divide the essence of "male" or "female" or any other gender into different combination of biological essences.

"Can still believe" is not a good test. For example, someone who does not believe that humans have greater dignity than animals "can still believe" that human rights trump animal rights, but it is a helluva lot harder.

It's perfectly & easily feasible to believe the bones of dinosaurs were placed by Satan to trick creationists into believing in evolution. You just need to revise all your beliefs.

Once again. Harder according to whom ?

Regardless of whether idealism or realism is true, our phenomenological experience of the world would remain unchanged. We would still believe in the existence of the same number of objects.

Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it.

I take it that we cannot justify all of our beliefs ad infinitum.

There is, actually, curtesy of Wittgenstein's beetle in a box argument. We can say nothing about the supposed thing-in-itself, so it cannot have a use in the conversation. It's a useless notion that can be set aside.

Unfortunately folk continue to say quite a bit about it.

Kant probably would have agreed with Wittgenstein.

It isn't, it's irrelevant, and takes up far too much time and effort.

Sure. Folk want to talk about stuff about which they can't say anything. Off-topic, but be my guest.

This reminds of one of Ashleigh Brilliant's sayings: "My biggest problem is what to do about all the things I can't do anything about".

Perhaps the philosophers' biggest problem is what to say about all the things they cannot say anything about.

Perhaps it's about joining up the stuff we can talk about in a coherent fashion.

Of course, you can show stuff as well as say it.

Yesterday, upon the stair,
I met a man who wasn't there!
He wasn't there again today,
I wish, I wish he'd go away!

?javra
I don't see as we need the mysticism.

The will is shown in the doing.

I'll leave you to it.

Nice.

Hence, as this one of many examples tries to illustrate, the very notion of "mind-independence" is thoroughly contingent on what one understands by the term "mind". Via at least certain interpretations, there is no reason to deny a reality independent of each and every individual non-effete mind (yours, mine, etc.) to which we all conform that is nevertheless of itself an effete mind and, hence, mind-dependent.

The problem is that we all know what we mean by 'mind' in the ordinary context.

What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds?

I don't so far find justification for this claim. But groovy all the same. Then, please enlighten me as to what we all know "mind" to be in the ordinary sense.

I'll start here: What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds?

Some folk need there to be only two genders

Let's do philosophy instead of polemics.

I don't so far find justification for this claim. But groovy all the same. Then, please enlighten me as to what we all know "mind" to be in the ordinary sense. — javra


We know what we mean when we say such things as "I changed my mind", "I made up my mind", "I don't mind", " I did that task mindfully", "mind your step" and so on...there are countless examples. They suggest that what we understand as mind is really minding, a verb not a noun, an activity not an object. Of course this is not to say that reification of that activity does not often set in.

I'll start here: What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra


Everything in the so-called external world is not an aspect of our own minds. Of course our perception of those things is a form of minding, but it does not follow that the things are forms of minding. It seems impossible to make sense of the idea that they could be. If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent.

If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent.

I'll leave you to it. — Banno


Some other time maybe.

None of which provides a justifiably true belief of what demarcates mind from non-mind.

Repetition of unjustified affirmations such as that "we all know what 'mind' is in the ordinary sense" does not make the affirmation true

By what means do you conclude that trees and insentient, as in not able to perceive things such as gravity and light in their own non-animal based ways?

But since I, again, don't want to play devil's advocate, I'll do my best to leave you to it in turn.

2. The boundary between mental & extra-mental objects is blurry even if we accept this distinction. Pick any object X you regard as extra mental with following features a,b,c..etc. Its conceivable that I can alter all the features you perceive of X by changing your brain chemistry or neural structuring. In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, If we still establish an identity across change. Apply this argument to all objects in the world and you will end up reducing the entire world to one substance, which is neither mental nor extra-mental, since it cannot be grasped via concepts or experience. We have arrived at a contradiction. The boundary between extra mental and mental objects belongs to neither camps. Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it.

What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds?

When you take your coffee cup and put it in the dishwasher, does it still exist?

Speaking very roughly, just to get started, realism holds that ...stuff... is independent of what we say about it; anti-realism, that it isn't.

Awareness is also dependent on what we are aware of.

Pick any object X (…) with following features a,b,c..etc. It’s conceivable that I can alter all the features you perceive of X by changing your brain chemistry or neural structuring. In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it,

In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, if we establish identity across change.

The boundary between extra mental and mental objects belongs to neither camps. Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it.

Regardless of whether idealism or realism is true, our phenomenological experience of the world would remain unchanged.

Is it possible (conceptually) to be aware of your own awareness, and nothing else?

Moore made the claim that "Here is a hand". On a forum such as this, we might instead point out that you are now reading this post. Now if you find it difficult to doubt that you are now reading this sentence, then you might also grant things such as that there is a language in which it is written, that someone wrote it, that there are screens and devices and networks linking you to that writer, and so on.

When you take your coffee cup and put it in the dishwasher, does it still exist? A realist might say that it either exists or it doesn't, and since we have no reason to think it has ceased to exist, then we can reasonably maintain that it still exists. On this view, there are at least two things in the world, the cup and the dishwasher.

On the other hand, the anti-realist might suppose that since the cup is in the dishwasher we cannot perceive it, and so cannot say for sure if it exists or not. They might conclude that at best we can say that it is neither true nor false that the cup exists. They would conclude that there is at least only one thing, the dishwasher

I think it's important to recognise the distinction between intension and extension.

but haven't you said that what there is is determined by our words for them?

Someone who rejects both realism and anti-realism, as I believe Wittgenstein did...

That strikes me as ad hoc - introducing a needless distinction in order to maintain a position that has been shown errant.

The topic is the truth of "the cup is in the dishwasher", understood extensionally as being about the cup. We might, separately and distinct from this conversation, talk about the suitability of the use of the word "cup" to talk about the cup before us as distinct from and the cup in the dishwasher. Just as we might talk about the suitability of "King Charles" to refer to Camilla's husband if he had been deposed.

The question at hand is not about the suitability of certain descriptions, but the truth of "the cup is in the dishwasher".

Unless you can show that these are somehow the very same question.

Statements are grammatical combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.

Revising all one's beliefs is not perfectly easy.

I said changing a societal belief from X to Y would have radical implications. You replied that "one could believe" Y without moving into those implications. This is a modal notion which is quite foreign to reality. Beliefs have implications, just as knowledge does, and changes in belief will involve changes in behavior.

It is important to note that there is a difference in logic sitting behind the distinction between realism and anti-realism. Realists supose that a proposition is either true or it is false, and that there are no alternatives. Their attitude towards truth is binary. On the other hand, anti-realists are happy to admit at least a third possibility, that a proposition might be neither true nor false, but have some third value. Anti-realism became more prominent towards the end of last century with the development of formal paraconsistent and many-valued logics.

I think a large part of the difference between realism and anti-realism can be explained by making use of Anscombe's notion of direction of fit. This is the difference between the list you take with you to remind yourself of what you want to buy and the list the register produces listing the things you actually purchased. The intent of the first list is to collect the things listed; of the second, to list the things collected. The first seeks to make the world fit the list, the second, to make the list to fit the world. So perhaps anti-realism applies to ethics and aesthetics because we seek to make the world as we say, while realism applies to ontology and epistemology because we seek to make what we say fit the world.

Take two questions:

1. Is the king in the palace?
2. Is the cup in the dishwasher?

Do we understand (1) extensionally as being about Charles, such that the answer to the question is "yes" if Charles is in the palace, even if the monarchy has been abolished? Or is the answer "there is no king"?

Anti-realists simply extend this reasoning to a greater class of nouns. Maybe they're wrong to, but at least we're able to address their actual position and not some strawman that treats all anti-realisms as phenomenalism

As for the cup in the dishwasher, only someone commitment to sophism would deny that. But non realism isn't reducible to that. A Berkeleyan idealist for eg would say the cup is in the dishwasher since that's how God perceives it, even if no human being does. Both the realist and anti realist have the same answer here.

I don't believe an anti realist goes around saying such and such statement is neither true nor false, anymore than a realist. Every theory of truth is compatible with realism vs anti realism, both classical & non classical logic are likewise compatible with realism & anti realism. In other words, they are of no help here.

Can you cash out non realism in a way that doesn't invoke idealism or phenomenonalism etc ? I don't think so.

Just as being a king is not a property/condition that is reducible to mere material composition and location in space and time it can be argued that being a cup is not a property/condition that is reducible to mere material composition and location in space and time.

If we abolish the monarchy then it is not the case that those people who were kings no longer exist but it is the case that they are no longer kings, and so no kings exist.

And so one can argue that if we don't see or use something as a cup then it is not the case that those things which were cups no longer exist but it is the case that they are no longer cups, and so no cups exist.

The term "anti-realism" was coined by Michael Dummett to refer to those positions which reject "semantic realism, i.e. the view that every declarative sentence in one's language is bivalent (determinately true or false) and evidence-transcendent (independent of our means of coming to know which)".

Let's suppose an non realist comes to the conclusion that there are no cups.

If asked "where is the cup", which answer is to be preferred - "It is in the dishwasher" or "I don't know"?

Graham Priest has shown non classical logic is compatible with all sorts of theory of truths you find. So we cannot distinguish metaphysical realism or anti realism based on theory of truth via its commitment
to classical or non classical logic.

It is rather hard to see how "a cup exists only if there exists some X such that X is being seen or used as a cup" counts as scientific realism.

I explained it quite clearly in that post:

P2. For all X, X is a cup only if X is being seen or used as a cup

Not so much, perhaps, since "This has nothing to do with scientific realism" yet " it's perfectly consistent with physicalism and scientific realism".

I gather this is intensional, as opposed to extensional.

I'm not sure how that distinction applies to that premise.

This is the sort of argument that an anti-realist might make:

P1. A cup exists if and only if there exists some X such that X is a cup
P2. For all X, X is a cup only if X is being seen or used as a cup
C1. Therefore, a cup exists only if there exists some X such that X is being seen or used as a cup

I'm not sure what the distinction is doing here at all. You introduced it. But presumably, extensionally, X is a cup if and only if X is a cup.

I am hunting around for something to tie down your idea.

I don't see any difference between "being used as a cup" & "having potential for being used as a cup" , both carry the same purpose as far as they allow us to group objects under a universal like "cup"

Simply saying that X is a cup if and only if X is a cup or that X is a king if and only if X is a king is vacuous, and doesn't address any philosophical dispute.

extensionally, X is a cup if and only if X is a cup. Extensionally, we are able to substitute salva veritate

If an alien species from another planet saw Moore with his raised hand, they might be just as certain as Moore that something with a specific meaning was taking place, but within their alien language game the sense of the event would be entirely different that it is for Moore. It would not be a question of doubting Moore’s assertion, but of his assertion being irrelevant to their perspective.

It does not matter how we specify the set, or how we order its elements, or indeed how many times we count its elements. All that matters are what its elements are.

And I should clarify, you talk about "all truths being known" in reference to Fitch's paradox, but the relevant claim under consideration is "all truths are knowable", a subtle but important difference.

(K Paradox) ?p(p??Kp)??p(p?Kp).

if the only things that are true are the things that we know to be true

Not following that.

Fitch’s paradox of knowability (aka the knowability paradox or Church-Fitch Paradox) concerns any theory committed to the thesis that all truths are knowable. Historical examples of such theories arguably include Michael Dummett’s semantic antirealism (i.e., the view that any truth is verifiable), mathematical constructivism (i.e., the view that the truth of a mathematical formula depends on the mental constructions mathematicians use to prove those formulas), Hilary Putnam’s internal realism (i.e., the view that truth is what we would believe in ideal epistemic circumstances), Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatic theory of truth (i.e., that truth is what we would agree to at the limit of inquiry), logical positivism (i.e., the view that meaning is giving by verification conditions), Kant’s transcendental idealism (i.e., that all knowledge is knowledge of appearances), and George Berkeley’s idealism (i.e., that to be is to be perceivable).

...

The great problem for the middle way is Fitch’s paradox. It is the proof that shows (in a normal modal logic augmented with the knowledge operator) that “all truths are knowable” entails “all truths are known”.

The argument shows that if we assume p ? ?Kp then p ? Kp follows.

It's not enough for antirealists just to say they reject the entailment. Some explanation is needed.

This is simply a restatement of the antirealist thesis that something can be true only if it has been demonstrated.

That's not the antirealist thesis. The antirealist thesis is that something is true only if it can be demonstrated. You are, again, treating the critic's conclusion as the proponent's claim.

Hence, if something can be true then it is possible to know that it is true. Hence, the antirealist knows everything that is true.

And as mentioned before, the antirealist rejects the conclusion. They might claim that every truth is knowable but that some truths are unknown.

How can the anti-realist justify the claim that all unknown truths are knowable? You would have to know them to know they are knowable, no?

Maybe we do need to distinguish between semantic realism and metaphysical realism.

. "some truths are unknowable" is true and knowable

we have no way of knowing whether there are further truths that are unknowable.

We know that we can't know the truth as to whether all truths are knowable because no matter how many truths we know we have no way of knowing whether there are further truths that are unknowable.

?Janus what I said.

So pragmatically that leaves us with (4) and (5). How do we decide between them without knowing any unknown truths?

1. “All truths are knowable” is knowably true
2. “All truths are knowable” is false

Do you think it is possible to know whether the claim that there are unknowable truths is true?

Answer the question I posed: Do you think it is possible to know whether the claim that there are unknowable truths is true?

It is obviously impossible even in principle. because no matter how many truths we know there could always be an unknowable truth.

Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Legacy: “….The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a representation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned….”

1. Deny the existence of mind-independent objects and/or

2. We cannot grasp the features of external objects which happen to be mind-independent and/or

3. We cannot justify our knowledge of mind-independent objects

It is obviously impossible even in principle. because no matter how many truths we know there could always be an unknowable truth.
— Janus

This is begging the question.

1. "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true

All that to express interest in a forthcoming (?) metaphysical heuristic predicated on abandonment of “the very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a representation of something mind-independent…”, at least with regards to empirical knowledge.

I have shown that we know there is at least one unknowable truth.

If there is a truth as to whether there are unknowable truths, then that truth is an unknowable truth. So we know there is at least one unknowable truth. If you think there is something wrong with the reasoning, then say what it is.

You go from a) "there are unknowable truths" is unknowably true to b) "there are unknowable truths" is knowably true. This is a contradiction. If (a) is true then (b) is false and if (b) is true then (a) is false.

However if it is right that the truth or falsity regarding the existence of unknowable truths is unknowable then we know that there is at least one unknowable truth. There is no contradiction

However if the starting assumption is that the truth or falsity regarding the existence of unknowable truths is unknowable then we know that there is at least one unknowable truth.

What about all the truths regarding what happened in the pre-human past? Are they unknowable? You might say they are not unknowable in principle.

You assume "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and then conclude "there are unknowable truths is knowable".

I provisionally assume that "there are unknowable truths" is unknowable and then show that this leads to a contradiction, which shows it must be false.

so 1. must be true.

The anti-realist will say that it is knowable that "there are unknowable truths" is false.

But that has been shown to be false

We know it is impossible to answer the question as to whether there is more than one unknowable truth.

But the import is that the acuity of perception to see ‘what is’, is an ethical discipline rather than an objective methodology, let’s say.

The antirealists must be wrong though because they cannot rule out the possibility that unbeknownst to us there might be unknowable truths. Just stipulating that truths are only truths if they are known seems obviously wrong as it does not accord with the general notion of truth.

What if the question is changed to whether there are unknowable actualities instead? What about, for example, the question regarding the existence of God? We know we cannot know the answer to that, no matter how plausible or implausible the existence of God might seem. Would you say there cannot be a truth about whether or not God exists, despite that fact that it is obviously impossible to know?

If God exists then we can know that God exists, and if God doesn't exist then we can know that God doesn't exist.

I haven’t grasped a form of qualitative value judgement, in keeping with an ethical discipline, in phenomenology, even if some sort of specialized perception for what is, is its objective.

And yet we obviously cannot know either of those.

It's not obvious to the anti-realist.

If you're only "argument" against anti-realism is that it's "obviously" wrong then it's not an argument, just a denial.

….isn’t existentialism generally concerned with ethical normativity….

A simple account would be to first argue that "'it is raining' is true" means "it is raining", and then to argue that "it is raining" is meaningful only if it describes a verifiable event. It would then seem to follow that "'it is raining' is true but unverifiable" makes no sense.

If the antirealist says we can know whether or not there is a god or a multiverse then they should be able to give an account of how that would be possible.

But "'it is raining' is true" means that it is raining, not "it is raining".

1. If “God exists” is true then it is possible to prove that it is true
2. If “God exists” is false then it is possible to prove that it is false
3. If it is not possible to prove that “God exists” is true and not possible to prove that “God exists” is false then “God exists” is neither true nor false

The problem is that no conjecture can be proven to be true or false, so on the antirealist view, assuming you have correctly outlined it, no conjecture could be either true or false.

It’s not clear what you mean by “means” here.

"'it is raining' is true" means "it is raining"

You appear to be mixing up your use and mention.

"'it is raining' is true" means "it is raining

Sentences (1) and (2) mean the same thing.

it remains unclear how this helps the topic, or relates to it any more than bringing in intension.

Sentences (1) and (2) mean the same thing.

Dummett then argues that (2) is only meaningful if it is verifiable. This is his Language Acquisition Argument.

If (1) is only meaningful if it is verifiable then unknowable truths make no sense.

We are sometimes surprised by things that are unexpected. How is this possible if all that is true is already known to be true?

Overwhelmingly, you and I agree as to what is true. How is that explainable if all there is to being true is attitudes? How to explain why we share the same attitude?

We sometimes are wrong about how things are. How can this be possible if all that there is to a statement's being true is our attitude towards it?

The claim isn’t that all truths are known. The claim is that all truths are knowable. Remember, anti-realists reject Fitch’s conclusion.

The claim isn’t that all truths are attitudes. The claim is that all truths are knowable.

Remember, you claim to be a mathematical antirealist. Presumably you accept that mathematical truths aren’t attitudes and that there are unknown mathematical truths. So simply extend your understanding of propositions about numbers to propositions about medium sized dry goods.

...one can be a realist in one area and an anti-realist in another.

Well, no. That's far too vague. One is about the weather, the other is about a sentence. But (1) and (2) are arguably truth- functionally equivalent.

Ok, so are you agreeing with Dummett?

Yeah, they can reject it all they like. It doesn't follow that they are right. ?p(p??Kp)??p(p?Kp

If you think this is wrong, tell me why.

I’m confused. Are you a truth deflationist or not? A truth deflationist will accept that (1) and (2) mean the same thing. But now you say that they don’t mean the same thing and are only “truth-functionally” equivalent. That strikes me as being decidedly non-deflationary.

As the SEP article says, “Fitch’s proof is not a refutation of anti-realism, but rather a reason for the anti-realist to accept intuitionistic logic.

I just don’t understand why you think that antirealism about mathematics doesn’t entail that all mathematical truths are known/attitudes but that antirealism about the weather entails that all truths about the weather are known/attitudes.

The choice is between saying that there are unknown mathematical truths and saying that there are unknown physical truths. I'd entertain Kripke's approach to truth for maths but not for physics. So we can usefully say that Goldbach's conjecture so far has no truth value but that there is water on Miranda is either true or it is false.

"P" is true IFF P.

If Goldbach’s conjecture is provable then even if it hasn’t yet been proven it is true.

...“we are brains in a vat”...

The above sentence is true because the sentence fragment on the left hand side (“‘P’ is true”) means the same thing as the sentence fragment on the right hand side (“P”).

You appear to be trying to conflate deflationism and disquotationalism.

I think a better example is...

It seems to me that you ignore most of what I've writ, preferring to nit pick a few near-irrelevancies.

My comments about truth being a single-placed predicate are intended to show that there are uses for assigning truth to sentences outside of our attitudes towards them. I've highlighted these elsewhere -

Surprise
We are sometimes surprised by things that are unexpected. How is this possible if all that is true is already known to be true?

Agreement
Overwhelmingly, you and I agree as to what is true. How is that explainable if all there is to being true is attitudes? How to explain why we share the same attitude?

Error
We sometimes are wrong about how things are. How can this be possible if all that there is to a statement's being true is our attitude towards it?

What is it about antirealism that you have to say?

Antirealism doesn't claim, and nor do antirealists acknowledge that it entails, that all truths are known.

and from which follows that that all truths are known.

Antirealism doesn't claim, and nor do antirealists acknowledge that it entails, that all truths are known.

The second thing is that it is consistent with a deflationary account of truth.

The third thing is that it avoids certain absurdities that realism allows for, e.g. that it is possible that we are unknowably brains in a vat.

The fourth thing, albeit directed at Janus, is that it is not obviously wrong.

We are talking about realism and antirealism. You brought in constructivism.

Let's take the knowability principle: ?p(p ? ?Kp).

Sure. And they do this by rejecting classical logic.

Realism does not commit to vat brains.

So you think you need antirealism to avoid being a vatted brain. Right.

The problem with realism is that it entails this kind of global skepticism. If there are unknowable truths then there are unjustifiable truths, and if there are unjustifiable truths then a proposition not being justified is not a good reason to reject it.

I think the term 'antirealism' can sometimes be misleading.

You are trying to claim that it follows from your premises that there are truths which are both known and unjustifiable

One proposal is to construe metaphysical realism as the position that there are no a priori epistemically derived constraints on reality (Gaifman, 1993). By stating the thesis negatively, the realist sidesteps the thorny problems concerning correspondence or a “ready made” world, and shifts the burden of proof on the challenger to refute the thesis. One virtue of this construal is that it defines metaphysical realism at a sufficient level of generality to apply to all philosophers who currently espouse metaphysical realism. For Putnam’s metaphysical realist will also agree that truth and reality cannot be subject to “epistemically derived constraints.” This general characterization of metaphysical realism is enough to provide a target for the Brains in a Vat argument. For there is a good argument to the effect that if metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is also true, that is, it is possible that all of our referential beliefs about the world are false. As Thomas Nagel puts it, “realism makes skepticism intelligible,” (1986, 73) because once we open the gap between truth and epistemology, we must countenance the possibility that all of our beliefs, no matter how well justified, nevertheless fail to accurately depict the world as it really is. Donald Davidson also emphasizes this aspect of metaphysical realism: “metaphysical realism is skepticism in one of its traditional garbs. It asks: why couldn’t all my beliefs hang together and yet be comprehensively false about the actual world?” (1986, 309)

I'm not.

I'm trying to explain this:

You are conflating the possibility of skepticism with skepticism.

If there are unknowable truths then there are unjustifiable truths, and if there are unjustifiable truths then a proposition not being justified is not a good reason to reject it.

I gave reasons above.

If there are unknowable truths then there are unjustifiable truths, and if there are unjustifiable truths then a proposition not being justified is not a good reason to reject it.

Or, "...then a proposition not being justified is not a good reason to reject it." There is an equivocation here on 'reject'. If 'reject' means falsify, then this strikes me as uncontroversial. If 'reject' means "abstain from affirming," then the consequent is false but it does not in fact follow from your premises.

My suggestion is that if we cannot have evidence that we are brains in a vat then (1) does not sufficiently justify the claim that we are not brains in a vat.

This proposition is true:

1. We do not have evidence that there is no teapot orbiting the Sun

If realism is correct then this proposition is true:

2. It is possible that there is a teapot orbiting the Sun and that we cannot have evidence that there is a teapot orbiting the Sun

My suggestion is that if we cannot have evidence that there is no teapot orbiting the Sun then (1) does not sufficiently justify the claim that there is no teapot orbiting the Sun.

The realist argues that "the cat is in the box" can be true even if it's not possible for someone to look in the box and see the cat.

Have you tried to define what you mean by realism somewhere in this thread?

One proposal is to construe metaphysical realism as the position that there are no a priori epistemically derived constraints on reality.

...

One virtue of this construal is that it defines metaphysical realism at a sufficient level of generality to apply to all philosophers who currently espouse metaphysical realism.

...

For there is a good argument to the effect that if metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is also true, that is, it is possible that all of our referential beliefs about the world are false.

I don't know of any realists who believe in unknowable truths. Apparently you don't either.

Fitch’s paradox of knowability (aka the knowability paradox or Church-Fitch Paradox) concerns any theory committed to the thesis that all truths are knowable. Historical examples of such theories arguably include Michael Dummett’s semantic antirealism (i.e., the view that any truth is verifiable), mathematical constructivism (i.e., the view that the truth of a mathematical formula depends on the mental constructions mathematicians use to prove those formulas), Hilary Putnam’s internal realism (i.e., the view that truth is what we would believe in ideal epistemic circumstances), Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatic theory of truth (i.e., that truth is what we would agree to at the limit of inquiry), logical positivism (i.e., the view that meaning is giving by verification conditions), Kant’s transcendental idealism (i.e., that all knowledge is knowledge of appearances), and George Berkeley’s idealism (i.e., that to be is to be perceivable).

...

The middle way, what we might call moderate antirealism, can be characterized logically somewhere in the ballpark of the knowability principle:

?p(p ? ?Kp).

which says, formally, for all propositions p, if p then it is possible to know that p.

He also points out that TKP, rather than the unrestricted KP, serves as the more interesting point of contention between the semantic realist and anti-realist. The realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle.

Notice that antirealism is defined as being the position that believes that all truths are knowable. As realism rejects antirealism (and vice versa), in follows that realism asserts that some truths are unknowable.

This is evidence of your sophistry.

All I've asked is for you to give me an example of a realist who holds to your strange version of realism.

Rediscovered in Hart and McGinn (1976) and Hart (1979), the result was taken to be a refutation of verificationism, the view that all meaningful statements (and so all truths) are verifiable.

...

Mackie (1980) and Routley (1981), among others at the time, ... ultimately agree that Fitch’s result is a refutation of the claim that all truths are knowable, and that various forms of verificationism are imperiled for related reasons.

It's right there, explicitly saying "the realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle."

The problem with realism is that it entails this kind of global skepticism. If there are unknowable truths then there are unjustifiable truths, and if there are unjustifiable truths then a proposition not being justified is not a good reason to reject it.

You ask me for an example and then complain that it's just one example?

That there are "unjustified" truths is pretty obvious.

Or, "...then a proposition not being justified is not a good reason to reject it." There is an equivocation here on 'reject'. If 'reject' means falsify, then this strikes me as uncontroversial. If 'reject' means "abstain from affirming," then the consequent is false but it does not in fact follow from your premises.

?Leontiskos So you don't think unjustifiable truths are unjustified? How odd.

Or is that just pedantry in the service of your confusion?

Every unjustifiable truth is unjustified but not every unjustified truth is unjustifiable.

So, what?

Just to be clear, my target here is the idea that a proposition can only be true if justified.

But that's not what has been said. What has been said is that if a proposition is true then it is justifiable.

What has been said is that if a proposition is true then it is justifiable.

But that's not what has been said. What has been said is that if a proposition is true then it is justifiable.

Neither of those is quite right. It's a silly argument.

how could it not be right to say that the prebiotic Universe was not dependent on mind?

But you know that this is mostly crap. Realism/idealism is a false opposition.

This sort of question is risible. The Orion Nebula is not dependent on you, nor are trilobites. But your saying anything (thinking, believing, doubting...) about them is dependent on you.

'I am my world

You're just basically repeating what I said in slightly different words.

My take is that when Wittgenstein refers to the world he is referring to the world of human experience and judgement. He's not referring to the extra-human Universe.

He stepped beyond the solipsism that traps you.

I would take that remark seriously if you demonstrated any grasp of the point I'm making.

"The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world."

It is a paradox.

I would take that remark seriously if you demonstrated any grasp of the point I'm making.

1. There exist objects that are mind-independent

2. We can grasp the features of objects external to our mind

3. We can justify our knowledge of objects external to our minds

No kidding. Just the kind of thing that will trip up your average "realist".

The point I'm trying to make is that there is a kind of 'dual perspective' at work in understanding this question, which is deep question. There's common sense realism, in which we are just individual subjects in a vast world. But there's also the philosophical understanding of the role of the mind in constructing the world.

You appear to believe that I must insist that nothing can exist outside my knowledge of it...

Constructivism emphasizes the role of human activity, interpretation, and social practices in constructing knowledge, reality, and meaning.

When is it subjective? If the construction of our eyes is such that the cones carry the photo pigment and communicates with the brain when light waves enter, which causes us to see colors, then how is that subjective?

I maintain that there is stuff that is true even if we don't know, believe, or whatever, that it is true.

?Leontiskos It's in that post above. There's Hart, McGinn, Mackie, and Routley. And of course Fitch himself.

Mackie (1980) and Routley (1981), among others at the time, point to difficulties with this general position but ultimately agree that Fitch’s result is a refutation of the claim that all truths are knowable, and that various forms of verificationism are imperiled for related reasons.

But that's not the point

There's also the IEP article I quoted here. Although in that specific case they consider the proposition "I am a brain in a vat" rather than the proposition "the cat is in the box".

1. If metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is possible
2. If global skepticism is possible, then we can be brains in a vat
3. But we cannot be brains in a vat
4. Thus, metaphysical realism is false (1,2,3)

Even if you're an astrophysicist aware of the vastness of the Universe, you are providing the perspective within which that is meaningful.

Similarly, in phenomenology (e.g., Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty), the world is not an objective domain "out there" but is always encountered through the structures of embodied, situated being.

But there's also the philosophical understanding of the role of the mind in constructing the world.

For the "world" yes but for the Universe, no—as far as I know this is not correct for Heidegger at least (who I studied extensively at one time).I believe that Heidegger acknowledges the existence of the extra-human universe, but that is not what he is concerned with when he deals with being (being-in-the-world) or Dasein.

I don't see that you can substitute ?(p ? ?Kp) for ?p(p ? ?Kp).

Specifically, you want to say that realism entails that <"We are brains in vats" can be true even if it is not possible to justify such a proposition>. You then go on to attempt to justify the proposition, <"We are brains in vats" is false>. Even supposing you succeed, your success would show that the putatively unjustifiable proposition is in fact justifiable, which moots the criterion of realism (per your strange/exaggerated definition).

1. Suppose, "We are brains in vats" can be true even if it is not possible to justify such a proposition
2. "We are brains in vats" is (justifiably) false
3. Therefore, supposition (1) is false

The issue is that if realism is true then supposition (1) is true.

No, the issue is that if (2) is true then no one can presuppose (1), because the proposition in question is justifiable.

The issue is that if (2) is true then "We are brains in vats" is not representative of global skepticism at all. (2) does not invalidate global skepticism, it invalidates the idea that "We are brains in vats" is representative of global skepticism.

This general characterization of metaphysical realism is enough to provide a target for the Brains in a Vat argument. For there is a good argument to the effect that if metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is also true, that is, it is possible that all of our referential beliefs about the world are false. As Thomas Nagel puts it, “realism makes skepticism intelligible,” (1986, 73) because once we open the gap between truth and epistemology, we must countenance the possibility that all of our beliefs, no matter how well justified, nevertheless fail to accurately depict the world as it really is. Donald Davidson also emphasizes this aspect of metaphysical realism: “metaphysical realism is skepticism in one of its traditional garbs. It asks: why couldn’t all my beliefs hang together and yet be comprehensively false about the actual world?” (1986, 309)

And again, if that is no more than that it can be made the consequent of a material implication, that is trivially right. So again, what is it to be "justified"?

Yes. And if B then A?B, for any A or B. So if we take justification as being the consequent of a material implication then that any truth is justified is trivial.

But is that what you mean?

(do I need to add that if it is justified, then it is by that very fact justifiable?)

Just to be clear, my target here is the idea that a proposition can only be true if justified.

I don't really understand what you're asking.

If, for antirealists, as you say, all truths are believable and justifiable, then for any given truth there is some justification. On your account, a proposition can only be true if it has a justification.

Note that these mean different things:

1. If a proposition is true then it can be justified
2. A proposition can only be true if justified

In propositional logic:

3. p ? ?Jp
4. ?p ? Jp

At least, (4) is my best attempt at formulating (2). The position of the "can" is a little confusing.

2. Something can only be mortal if it’s dead

The set of true propositions is on your account a proper subset of the set of propositions with a justification.

No. I'm saying that somethign can be mortal only if it has a death

The missing foghorn between your ships passing in the night is that Banno thinks that idealism entails solipsism, unless I have misunderstood.

If, for antirealists, as you say, all truths are believable and justifiable, you can drop the modality. p?Jp

?Michael It says that if something is mortal, then there is an something which is the death of that thing. Pretty plain.

If a truth is justifiable, then for that truth there is some justification.

Were Michael to disagree with this, he would have to show us a justifiable truth with no justifcation.

1. If the vase is fragile then it can break
2. The vase can be fragile only if it has a break

No I don't.

Sure you do. If you want to deny A?B then you must give an example of A^~B.

No we can't. Dropping modality changes meaning.

The point of that was to show that there is a meaningful difference between these two propositions:

1. If A is B then it can C
2. A can be B only if it has C

Banno is repeatedly misinterpreting/misrepresenting (1) as (2).

Secondly, it is the realist who denies p ? ?Kp, and so if you follow your own reasoning you must provide an example of an unknowable truth.

Do you really want to say that if a proposition is true than in some possible world there is a justification? Fine, then for you every truth has a justification.

If every truth is justifiable, then for every truth there is some justification.

Your understanding of logic has been repeatedly shown to be lacking. There's no reason to take you seriously on such issues.

That simply does not follow.

"can be justified" does not entail "is justified

Sure. But "can be justified" entails "has a justification".

Only if you do not wish to allow for justifications in other possible worlds.

Your other analogs do not work.

What is the difference between "is justified" and "has a justification"?

This is your game. you get to decide, I supose.

(1) entails (3). (2) entails (3).

And then you seem to go:

You want (1) not to entail (3).

I don't even know what (3) is. You won't explain it.

As it stands, my position is simple: (1) is true and (2) is false. And that's it.

the mind is not yours or mine. We are all part of a community of minds - biological, cultural and linguistic. Consciousness in that sense is collective.

Consciousness in that sense is collective.

The fourth thing, albeit directed at Janus, is that it is not obviously wrong.

Then you go off on a mystical tangent, and try to drag physics along with you. For me that's an unjustified overextension.

reputable popular books on the subject

there are powerful trends within both physics and cognitive science that undermine scientific realism

Nowadays it's common knowledge...

A limping authority that derives from pop physics.

But one may be an empirical, without being a metaphysical, realist.

I try not to be too strident about it.

'Everything exists within experience' ~ Wayfarer

...this is where we came in.

I maintain that there is stuff that is true even if we don't know, believe, or whatever, that it is true.

But the instant I ask the question 'what stuff do you mean?' or 'what do you have in mind?' then your argument is lost...

Plainly - I don't even know most of the people in my street.

you already agreed that there is stuff you don't know

I am not arguing that it means that ‘the world is all in the mind’. It’s rather that, whatever judgements are made about the world, the mind provides the framework within which such judgements are meaningful. So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle.

Can't really prove that he's wrong, though.

the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective.

What we have is a choice between ways of speaking, and hence between ways of understanding.

It's not the existence of such "unseen realities" that relies on a perspective.

What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle.

Physics has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the purported fundamental constituents of material reality do not have a meaningful existence outside the act of measurement which specifies them.

it certainly does not follow that they have no existence outside of our measurements

when it comes to the existence of any object, we will intuitively say, “well, the object is there, but we can’t know where it is, until we locate it or measure it. Isn’t that obvious?” But this is precisely what the pioneers of quantum physics called into question. And bear in mind, the objects in question had, up until then, been presumed to be the “fundamental building blocks of reality”! But in quantum physics, the answer to the question, “where is the object?” can only be given as an approximation, described by the wavefunction equation, ?. There is no definite thing at a definite location until it hits the screen and leaves a mark —until that point, there is only a hazy range of possibilities. But as noted above, the act of observation seems to condense the hazy wave into a definite entity. This is the mysterious “wavefunction collapse”. What exists before, or apart from, that observation is the central mystery. It’s like Lewis Carroll’s Chesire Cat, which vanishes leaving only its grin.

Whatever 'particles' are, they are not defineable until they are measured.

Physics has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the purported fundamental constituents of material reality do not have a meaningful existence outside the act of measurement which specifies them.

Cognitive science understands that what we construe as objects comprise a synthesis of sensory data and judgement

You don't have to pick, though.

As I said ways back, it's about choosing how best to talk about medium-sized small goods. Better to supose that they do not cease to exist when you forget about them.

And yet they do not doubt that there are things that provide that data.

You presume spirit and then see it everywhere

But they're not things until they're cognised.

I never use the word.

So the gold at the new Boorara gold project near Kalgoorlie in Western Australia was there before it was discovered. It did not come into existence at the discovery.

And this is the bit where you say "quantum".

"Now space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception. If we remove the subject, they vanish as well, as do all appearances. Nothing can remain that is not, in its own way, an object of experience." (Critique of Pure Reason, A42/B59)

...space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception...

Einstein disagrees.

To examine the measurements involved in clock time, Bergson considers an oscillating pendulum, moving back and forth. At each moment, the pendulum occupies a different position in space, like the points on a line or the moving hands on a clockface. In the case of a clock, the current state – the current time – is what we call ‘now’. Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do.

That the world is not seen is not that it ceases to exist or even to be invisible.

Apart from any conception of it, it neither exists nor doesn't exist. Both existence and non-existence are concepts.

You seem to be moving around a lot. Apologising for Bergson?

It's time for a change—it's time you started genuinely engaging with your interlocutors. You never know—you might learn something new.

Moving from the topic at hand

But they're not things until they're cognised.
— Wayfarer
What could that mean?

Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies—but all of it is unseen. There is no human or animal eye to cast a glance at objects, hence nothing is discerned, recognized or even noticed. Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds. Nor do they have features, because features correspond to categories of animal sensation. This is the way the early universe was before the emergence of life—and the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer.

If you want the most radical thesis on time check out The End of Time by Julian Barbour. I've been reading, and trying to understand, it, and it's doing my head in (in a good way).

Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed.

There is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed... your hypothetical, not mine... by the definition you gave, there would still gold in Boorara.

The book’s argument begins with the British empiricists who raised our awareness of the fact that we have no direct contact with physical reality, but it is the mind that constructs the form and features of objects. It is shown that modern cognitive science brings this insight a step further by suggesting that shape and structure are not internal to objects, but arise in the observer. The author goes yet further by arguing that the meaningful connectedness between things — the hierarchical organization of all we perceive — is the result of the Gestalt nature of perception and thought, and exists only as a property of mind.

It's the same point that Kant was making, about how time has a subjective component, arising from the awareness of duration.

No, it's the bit where Kant says 'were I to remove the thinking subject, the whole world must vanish'.

I looked up the exact quote:

"Now space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception. If we remove the subject, they vanish as well, as do all appearances. Nothing can remain that is not, in its own way, an object of experience." (Critique of Pure Reason, A42/B59)

Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us.

If we remove the perceiver, then there's no object of experience, is there?

but that is still not the point at issue.

The 'forms of intuition' - namely, space and time - and the world of appearances exist only in relation to the subject's cognitive faculties. If the thinking subject were removed, what we understand as the empirical world would also cease to exist because it is dependent the structures of human cognition.

The world wouldn't disappear if we disappeared.

there truths when no one is around

Yours is basically the argument from the stone.

...but whatever existence it possesses would be unrecognisable to human intelligence.

It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there would still gold in Boorara.

That would depend on there being a valid objection.

But as I said, that is the case for any empirical fact whatever.

You're loosing sight of what 'mind independent' means if indeed you ever had sight of it.

we can still talk of truths.

That was never at issue,

Well, yes it was... that there are still facts even when no one is around.

By ‘creating reality’, I’m referring to the way the brain receives, organises and integrates cognitive data, along with memory and expectation, so as to generate the unified world–picture within which we situate and orient ourselves. And although the unified nature of our experience of this ‘world-picture’ seems simple and even self-evident, neuroscience has yet to understand or explain how the disparate elements of experience , memory, expectation and judgement, all come together to form a unified whole — even though this is plainly what we experience.

By investing the objective domain with a mind-independent status, as if it exists independently of any mind, we absolutize it. We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it. This gives rise to a kind of cognitive disorientation which underlies many current philosophical conundrums.

Which neither you nor anyone would ever know

It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara.

Presumably this sort of approach was born in the modern period.

So the sense in which I question the reality of 'mind-independence' is that whatever we assert, about gold in Boorara or whatever, relies on this cognitive framework - that we can't stand outside of that faculty to see what is outside of or apart from it.

a book I mentioned, Charles Pinter, Mind and the Cosmic Order

And the reason I'm impressed with that book is that I think it is one of the many in that emerging area of cognitivism and cognitive science, which provides support for a kind of scientifically-informed idealism, as distinct from the materialism which has hitherto tended to characterise scientific philosophy.

Do you remember when in one of your threads I disagreed with Pinter's idea that shape is not inherent to objects?

For me the strangeness of Banno's position is the claim that truth can exist where no minds do.

For me the strangeness of Banno's position is the claim that truth can exist where no minds do.

It's not clear to me that is what Banno is claiming. We can make truth-apt statements about what would be the case in the absence of any percipients. It is that which is really the point at issue as I see it.

This is clearly committing to the view that truth exists where no minds do.

I concluded...

That's you, not I.

Classically, truth pertains to minds/knowers, and if there are no knowers then there is no truth. There is some overlap with Pinter, here. To disagree with Pinter as strongly as Banno has is to run afoul also of this broader school which associates truth with mind.

Also - I noted that you mentioned Aquinas' realist epistemology in our previous discussions of these matters. However, a vital distinction between today's realism, and his form of realism, is that Aquinas was an Aristotelian realist, one for whom universals are real. This is not the thread for the discussion of that hoary topic but it's part of the background to the whole debate of the relationship of mind and nature, which is very different for the Aristotelian than for today's naturalism.

You claimed, "If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara."

Regardless, the argument does not depend on time. We can posit instead a space with no folk in it to know stuff, and get similar results. There may be a planet in orbit around the pulsar described here. That there is such a planet is either true, or it is false, and this is so regardless of what we know.

realism is the view that something is real. If one thinks that universals are real then they are a realist with respect to universals

Sure, something might be (as yet) unjustified and yet could be justified. In which case, since it could be justified, there is something which counts as it's justification.

It woudl help considerably if you explained what you think a justification might be. I've already pointed out that mere logical entailment will not do.

It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara.

Then there would still be gold in Boorara. It would be true that there was gold in Boorara.

Kant is not saying here that space and time vanish as soon as the subject vanishes. (…) Look again. "space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception. Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us

Time is nothing more than change.

For the sake of argument this is the only thing that justifies this belief.

These are references to Aquinas' epistemology of assimilation, which I have no doubt you know considerably better than I do. But the salient point is, it undercuts the idea of 'mind-independence' in the sense posited by naturalism. Why? Because the pre-moderns did not have our modern sense of otherness or separateness from the Cosmos. (I know this is very sketchy, but I think I am discerning something of significance here.)

So, at the very least, we should be antirealists about cats in boxes.

There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties. First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table’s being square, the rock’s being made of granite, and the moon’s being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter.

1. There exist objects that are mind-independent.

2. We can grasp the features of objects external to our mind...

"the realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle."

Which means that the realist believes either that (5) does not entail (1) or that it if "the cat is in the box" is true then it is possibly not possible to look in the box and see the cat. Either entails that if "the cat is in the box" is true then it is unknowable1.

Time comes into existence with minds.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, quoted in The Blind Spot, Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, Evan Thompson:Laplace’s nebula is not behind us, at our origin, but rather out in front of us in the cultural world

If the existence of objects is mind-independent then the truth of “the object exists” is mind-independent such that it could be true even if it is not possible, in principle, to know that it’s true.

There’s a reason that Dummett, the man who coined the term “antirealism”, framed the dispute between realism and antirealism as a dispute about the logic of truth.

Non-realism can take many forms, depending on whether or not it is the existence or independence dimension of realism that is questioned or rejected. The forms of non-realism can vary dramatically from subject-matter to subject-matter, but error-theories, non-cognitivism, instrumentalism, nominalism,relativism, certain styles of reductionism, and eliminativism typically reject realism by rejecting the existence dimension, while idealism, subjectivism, and anti-realism typically concede the existence dimension but reject the independence dimension.

Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist

Time passed before there were minds

Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271:The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'.

Well he literally said, "If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara." This is clearly committing to the view that truth exists where no minds do.

But apparently you hold a different view, namely the view that we can make truth-apt statements about unperceived events?

Yet you insist that the only thing that collapses a wave function is a mind

The very idea of science from the usual point of view is to take out everything to do with human subjectivity and see what remains. QBism says, if you take everything out of quantum theory to do with human subjectivity, then nothing remains.

For Putnam, metaphysical realism boils down to the idea that the facts of the world (or the truth of propositions) are fixed by something mind-independent and language-independent. As a consequence of this idea, Putnam suggests that the Metaphysical Realist is committed to the existence of a unique correspondence between statements in a language or theory and a determinate collection of mind and language-independent objects in the world. Such talk of correspondence between facts and objects, Putnam argues, presupposes that we find ourselves in possession of a fixed metaphysically-privileged notion of ‘object’.

Putnam suggests that the Metaphysical Realist is committed to the existence of a unique correspondence between statements in a language or theory and a determinate collection of mind and language-independent objects in the world. Such talk of correspondence between facts and objects, Putnam argues, presupposes that we find ourselves in possession of a fixed metaphysically-privileged notion of ‘object’.

Not quite; time is the representation of change, change presupposes time as the means by which changes are determinable. Change requires things that change, usually in the form of movement, but nevertheless, something empirical, whereas time itself does not change.

What?!?

A realist can employ Davidson

You complimented my essay on it.

Does this accurately describe your view?

Ah yes. With the magical supervenience, which fills all manner of explanatory gaps.

You seem to think that a realist will say that nothing is knowable.

Banno has distanced himself from your definition

is happy with ghosts in machines.

"the realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle".

He also points out that TKP, rather than the unrestricted KP, serves as the more interesting point of contention between the semantic realist and anti-realist. The realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle. Fitch’s reasoning, at best, shows us that there is structural unknowability, that is, unknowability that is a function of logical considerations alone. But is there a more substantial kind of unknowability, for instance, unknowability that is a function of the recognition-transcendence of the non-logical subject-matter? A realist decrying the ad hoc nature of TKP (or DKP) fails to engage the knowability theorist at the heart of the realism debate.

The key idea of QBism is that the wavefunction ? does not describe something that exists objectively “out there” in the world. Instead, it represents the observer’s knowledge of the probabilities of the outcomes of observations. In other words, the wavefunction provides a rule that an agent/observer follows to update their beliefs about the likely outcomes of a quantum experiment. These probabilities, much like betting odds, are not intrinsic features of the world but rather reflect the agent’s expectations based on their unique perspective and prior information.

In QBism, measurement outcomes are seen in terms of experiences of the agent making the observation. (In contrast, the Copenhagen interpretation views the wavefunction being relational to objective facts about how a system is prepared, and downplays the subjective aspect.) Each agent may confer and agree upon the consequences of a measurement, but the outcome is fundamentally the experience that each of them individually has. Accordingly the wavefunction doesn’t describe the system itself but rather the agent’s belief about what might happen when they interact with it. So while quantum theory has extremely high predictive accuracy, no two observations are ever exactly the same, and each observation is unique to a particular observer at that moment. This is why the role of the subject is central to the QBist model, and where it diverges from the realist view, which holds to a mind-independent reality that must be the same for all observers. In this sense, QBism puts the scientist back into the science — where, really, she has always belonged!

There is no collapse.

Not saying you've done it deliberately but I think you have phrased that in a way that is misleading. The way I would put it is: "It is true that even if all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else were undisturbed, that there would still be gold in Boorara."

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So, yes I do think we can make truth-apt statements about unperceived events. The alternative, that truth depends on knowledge, seems absurd to me.

• It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara.
• It is true that even if all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else were undisturbed, that there would still be gold in Boorara.

Banno will confirm whether or not this misrepresents his view, but in any case, it is my view.

This by way of separating what is true from what is known to be true. Again, that a proposition is true is a single-places predicate, "P is true"; but that we know it is true is a relation, "We know P is true". Same for what are commonly called "propositional attitudes"; a name that marks this relational aspect.

I do not trust your ability to understand and present either what I am saying or what ?Michael is saying.

it is not time or change that changes but things.

Given minor differences in translations, yes, he is, and no, they are not. Mode of perception is not perception, and neither space nor time is ever an appearance, but only that which is in space and time, is.

We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so con­stituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all the constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as ap­pearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.

Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former ad­heres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different for different subjects. Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves.

Change requires things that change, usually in the form of movement, but nevertheless, something empirical, whereas time itself does not change.

That applies to TKP rather than KP. I don't agree that we only know things that are not contradictory - cartesian truths. So while any particular truth might not have been known, it does not follow that every given truth is unknown. We do know things. That is, the "p" in your logic is all truths when it should be a particular truth.

1. The realist believes that it is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle.

?p(?(p ? ¬?Kp)) says "For all truths p, it is possible that p is true and it not be possible to know p"

I think that should be "For all truths p, it is possible that p is true and yet p is not known". That would be ?p(?(p ? ¬Kp)).

1. The realist believes that it is possible for the truth to be unknowable
2. The realist believes that it is possible for the truth to be unknown

Kant is not saying here that space and time vanish as soon as the subject vanishes.

Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us

And if we remove our own subject, then all relations in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear

it is best to maintain the distinction between change of place and internal change, as a fundamental ontological principle.

There seems to be a lot of ambiguous phrasing in this discussion

It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara.
It is true that even if all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else were undisturbed, that there would still be gold in Boorara.

it is not time or change that changes but things.
— Janus

Not really. Or, not always. I just ate dinner from the same plate I ate dinner from last week.

Anyway….not that important.

The mistake you are making is failing to notice the difference between "is true" and "would be true". It is true for us now that there would be gold etc., even if all percipients were wiped off the face of the Earth. That is not the same as to say it would be true that there is gold even if all percipients etc.

Actually it surprises me that being a theist you don't believe it would still be true because God would be there to know it.

That is a very thin attempt at an explanation. What are the two putatively different claims, how are they different, and which one am I supposed to be making?

Banno makes that statement as an atheist who is presumably not assuming non-living minds (whether or not God counts as a non-living mind).

Hopefully this indicates you now understand the point being made in the text, that space and time belong to the subject himself, so that when there isn’t a subject there aren’t those necessary pure intuitions that belong to him, precisely what Kant meant by the disappearance of the one entails the disappearance of the other.

I'll pause there. I gather we agree at least that this is the account being scrutinised?

I just ate dinner from the same plate I ate dinner from last week.
— Mww

Are you sure the plate was exactly the same?

As far as my perception informs me, it was unchanged, which is merely to highlight that to say change is always of things is not to say there is always change in the thing.

One Copernican Revolution to rule them all.

Yes

It's odd to call Kant's critique a "Copernican Revolution" though because he put humanity right back at the centre of things.

I already explained it. We can say something is true now about what would be in the future. Can we say it would be true in the future absent us? So if truth or falsity is a property of propositions and it is true that the gold will exist in the non-human future do you say it will also be true in that non-human future that there is gold when there are no propositions?

In other words I'm suggesting that truth is propositional and existence is not.

Would God be capable of knowing what is true and what is false?

Do you want to say that, "X will be true tomorrow," is different from, "Tomorrow, X will be true"? I don't see a proper distinction between the two.

But is there an existence-claim that is not simultaneously a truth-claim? Can we talk about what exists apart from what is true?

Sure, God knows the true from the false. A theist could uncontroversially say that even if all humans died, truth would remain.

By the same token an atheist who believes that truth or falsity is a property of propositions, but that existence is not, can consistently say that something will exist, even in the absence of humans. but cannot consistently say that truth can be in the absence of propositions.

Except "that something will exist" is a propositional truth. So he hasn't managed to speak about existence apart from propositions and truth.

No we cannot make claims about what exists or will exist without (implicitly at least) proposing that what we say is true. But what will exist or not exist does not depend on what we say.

So to the first section, in which Devitt characterises realism as the view that physical entities exist independently of the mental. Devitt notes with considerable glee that there is nothing in this definition about truth. He goes on to point out that truth is independent of the evidence at hand. "Truth is one thing, our means of discovering it, another". Hence, according to Devitt, "no doctrine of truth is constitutive of realism".

Your argument is presumably something like this, "If three humans exist and there are no other minds, and one person dies, then it is still true that there is gold in Boorara. The second dies, and it is still true. By induction we should hold that if the third dies, it will still be true. If the truth was not affected by the death of the first two people, then surely it will not be affected by the death of the third."

You seem to want to do more than to reject those things that it is logically impossible to know...?

And are either TKP or DKP intuitive to you?

So to the first section, in which Devitt characterises realism as the view that physical entities exist independently of the mental. Devitt notes with considerable glee that there is nothing in this definition about truth. He goes on to point out that truth is independent of the evidence at hand. "Truth is one thing, our means of discovering it, another". Hence, according to Devitt, "no doctrine of truth is constitutive of realism".

One proposal is to construe metaphysical realism as the position that there are no a priori epistemically derived constraints on reality (Gaifman, 1993).

...

One virtue of this construal is that it defines metaphysical realism at a sufficient level of generality to apply to all philosophers who currently espouse metaphysical realism.

...

For there is a good argument to the effect that if metaphysical realism is true, then global skepticism is also true, that is, it is possible that all of our referential beliefs about the world are false. As Thomas Nagel puts it, “realism makes skepticism intelligible,” (1986, 73) because once we open the gap between truth and epistemology, we must countenance the possibility that all of our beliefs, no matter how well justified, nevertheless fail to accurately depict the world as it really is. Donald Davidson also emphasizes this aspect of metaphysical realism: “metaphysical realism is skepticism in one of its traditional garbs. It asks: why couldn’t all my beliefs hang together and yet be comprehensively false about the actual world?” (1986, 309)

But this will not work with medium size small goods - with cats in boxes. If the cat is in the next room, with the box, but unobserved, there is a place for saying that it is either in the box or it is not

?p?q((p ? (q ? ¬Kq)) ? (p ? ?Kp))

Antirealism isn't simply phenomenalism or idealism

I've already addressed this objection

I'm not saying X will be true tomorrow, but that it is true now that X will be tomorrow.

As I said above, there are no existence predications which are not truth predications.

Now you want to do something a bit more, along the lines that if there are no minds, then there can be no propositions, and hence no true proposition. Quite right. But that again does not change the gold at Boorara.

You want to say that if all minds ceased to exist, it both would and would not be true that there is gold in Boora

Just so you know, I am not planning to pursue this topic very far with you.

existence predication

"X will be tomorrow"? What does that mean, other than, "X will be true tomorrow?"

Isn't this just saying that what we know must be consistent?

It also looks compatible with the SKP: p???Kp

But antirealism in contrast does seem to commit to one or other non-binary theory of truth.

I don't see that it counts against realism that it might permit global skepticism.

It's certainly not compatible with that.

?p?q((p ? (q ? ¬Kq)) ? (p ? ?Kp))

It's saying that if "p" does not entail "q is true and not known to be true" then if "p" is true then it is possible to know that "p" is true.

The only unknowable truths are "p is an unknown truth".