In defence of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Introduction
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): For any thing that exists or is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true.
The PSR is a first principle of both metaphysics (the science of fundamental reality) and epistemology (the science of validation of knowledge), alongside the other first principle: Logic. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the PSR was referred to as the fourth law of thought, coming after the three laws of logic. The PSR started to go out of vogue in the 20th century, likely due to the rise of quantum physics that challenged the principle (details further down).
In this post, we describe the principle in the context of epistemology and metaphysics, and its parallel with logic. We then defend its validity as a first principle and against the challenge of quantum physics.
PSR in Epistemology
In the context of epistemology, the PSR states: For every claim that is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to be true.
In this way, the PSR is also called Principle of Parsimony or Occams Razor: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one.
E.g. Say we observe something that looks like a duck, acts like a duck, and sounds like a duck. We posit three explanations:
All three explanations are logically possible, but explanation (1) is more than sufficient or superfluous, and explanation (2) is less than sufficient. Explanation (3) is the simplest one that accounts for all the data; and is therefore the most reasonable one.
PSR in Metaphysics
In the context of metaphysics, the PSR states: For every thing that exists, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist.
The type of sufficient reason that fulfills the PSR can be divided in 3 ways:
Relation between the PSR and Logic
Both the PSR and logic are first principles of metaphysics and epistemology. The two principles are independent, i.e. the PSR cannot be derived from logic and logic cannot be derived from the PSR; however, parallels can be drawn between the two.
In epistemology:
Logic is associated with deductive reasoning. E.g. saying 4 is deduced from 2+2 is equivalent to saying 4 logically follows from 2+2.
The PSR is associated with inductive reasoning. E.g. saying From observing that each particular swan is white, we induce that all swans are white is equivalent to saying The claim that all swans are white is the most sufficient explanation for why we observe that all swans are white.
In metaphysics:
Logic rules over the realm of possible worlds:
The PSR rules over the realm of the actual world (complemented by observation):
In the sciences:
All sciences are founded on logic, and most sciences are also founded on the PSR because they refer to real things in the actual world, and because they aim to seek reasons, causes, and explanations for observed events.
Only two sciences are founded on logic alone: formal logic and mathematics (which is logic applied to numbers). We also note that those two sciences are empty of actual objects. E.g. in the syllogism if A=B and B=C, then A=C; the variables A, B, and C are empty.
Now that we have described the PSR, lets defend it as a principle.
Argument in defence of the PSR
1. We start with the proposition Reason finds truth." This proposition is self-evident because any reasoning for or against it presupposes that our reasoning process finds truth. And yet, everyone believes this proposition to be true because everyone uses reason to find truth. Also, planes fly :)
2. We observe that our reasoning works in 2 ways: deduction and induction (and abduction is not really different from induction).
3. As shown above, deduction is equivalent to the principle (or laws) of logic, and induction is equivalent to the principle of sufficient reason.
4. Thus, the PSR is a first principle of epistemology, alongside logic.
5. Now, truth means "conformance to reality". E.g. the proposition the earth is round is true only if the earth is round in reality.
6. Thus, if reason is able to find truth, it must be because its process imitates the behaviour of reality. I.e. If we know the initial conditions A, we can infer conclusion B using our reason. This reasoning is true only if conditions A result in outcome B in reality.
7. Therefore, logic and the PSR are not only principles of epistemology but also principles of metaphysics.
Counter-Argument against the PSR: Quantum Physics
Argument: According to quantum physics, the behaviour of some particles is random, that is, they behave a particular way without reason, with no hidden cause. Since the PRS demands a sufficient reason for everything that exists, including a behaviour, then this phenomenon runs against the PSR.
Response: Our response is in two parts. First, we show that quantum physics cannot go against the PSR; and second, we show that the phenomenon is in fact compatible with the PSR.
Part 1. Quantum physics cannot refute the PSR:
Part 2. The behaviour of quantum particles is compatible with the PSR:
Questions, comments, objections?
Note: I am NOT an expert in quantum physics at all, so when discussing quantum, please keep it surface level and use layman terms for my sake. Much appreciated! :)
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): For any thing that exists or is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true.
The PSR is a first principle of both metaphysics (the science of fundamental reality) and epistemology (the science of validation of knowledge), alongside the other first principle: Logic. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the PSR was referred to as the fourth law of thought, coming after the three laws of logic. The PSR started to go out of vogue in the 20th century, likely due to the rise of quantum physics that challenged the principle (details further down).
In this post, we describe the principle in the context of epistemology and metaphysics, and its parallel with logic. We then defend its validity as a first principle and against the challenge of quantum physics.
PSR in Epistemology
In the context of epistemology, the PSR states: For every claim that is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to be true.
In this way, the PSR is also called Principle of Parsimony or Occams Razor: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one.
E.g. Say we observe something that looks like a duck, acts like a duck, and sounds like a duck. We posit three explanations:
- (1) Its a robot remotely controlled by the government to seek out communist partisans.
- (2) Its nothing.
- (3) Its a duck.
All three explanations are logically possible, but explanation (1) is more than sufficient or superfluous, and explanation (2) is less than sufficient. Explanation (3) is the simplest one that accounts for all the data; and is therefore the most reasonable one.
PSR in Metaphysics
In the context of metaphysics, the PSR states: For every thing that exists, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist.
The type of sufficient reason that fulfills the PSR can be divided in 3 ways:
- 1. Internal reason: The existence of a thing is explained by logical necessity or inherently. E.g. The outcome 4 exists from 2+2 by logical necessity. The property of 3 sides exists in all triangles inherently.
- 2. External necessary reason: The existence of a thing is explained by causal necessity. E.g. a rock falls to the ground when dropped. The fall is explained by causal necessity due to laws of physics.
- 3. External contingent reason: This only applies to beings with free will. The existence of a thing or action is explained by a free choice that is motivated by an end goal. E.g. In the morning, a person has the free choice to stay in bed under the motive of staying comfortable, or to get up and go to work under the motive of making money.
Relation between the PSR and Logic
Both the PSR and logic are first principles of metaphysics and epistemology. The two principles are independent, i.e. the PSR cannot be derived from logic and logic cannot be derived from the PSR; however, parallels can be drawn between the two.
In epistemology:
Logic is associated with deductive reasoning. E.g. saying 4 is deduced from 2+2 is equivalent to saying 4 logically follows from 2+2.
The PSR is associated with inductive reasoning. E.g. saying From observing that each particular swan is white, we induce that all swans are white is equivalent to saying The claim that all swans are white is the most sufficient explanation for why we observe that all swans are white.
In metaphysics:
Logic rules over the realm of possible worlds:
- E.g. a 4-sided triangle is not logically possible, i.e. it exists in no possible world.
- Horses and unicorns are logically possible, i.e. they exist in some possible world.
- But logic alone cannot tell us that horses and unicorns exist in the actual world. Even after we observe horses in the world, it is still logically possible that we have a false perception.
The PSR rules over the realm of the actual world (complemented by observation):
- E.g. After we observe horses in the world; we posit that horses exist in the actual world because this is the most sufficient explanation.
- On the other hand, we posit that unicorns do not exist in the actual world because we dont have a sufficient reason to believe they exist.
In the sciences:
All sciences are founded on logic, and most sciences are also founded on the PSR because they refer to real things in the actual world, and because they aim to seek reasons, causes, and explanations for observed events.
Only two sciences are founded on logic alone: formal logic and mathematics (which is logic applied to numbers). We also note that those two sciences are empty of actual objects. E.g. in the syllogism if A=B and B=C, then A=C; the variables A, B, and C are empty.
Now that we have described the PSR, lets defend it as a principle.
Argument in defence of the PSR
1. We start with the proposition Reason finds truth." This proposition is self-evident because any reasoning for or against it presupposes that our reasoning process finds truth. And yet, everyone believes this proposition to be true because everyone uses reason to find truth. Also, planes fly :)
2. We observe that our reasoning works in 2 ways: deduction and induction (and abduction is not really different from induction).
3. As shown above, deduction is equivalent to the principle (or laws) of logic, and induction is equivalent to the principle of sufficient reason.
4. Thus, the PSR is a first principle of epistemology, alongside logic.
5. Now, truth means "conformance to reality". E.g. the proposition the earth is round is true only if the earth is round in reality.
6. Thus, if reason is able to find truth, it must be because its process imitates the behaviour of reality. I.e. If we know the initial conditions A, we can infer conclusion B using our reason. This reasoning is true only if conditions A result in outcome B in reality.
- Example for logic: If we have 2 spoons and add another 2 spoons, we predict by our reason that we will have 4 spoons. And indeed, this outcome occurs in reality.
- Example for the PSR: If we observe the existence of an egg, we infer the prior existence of a cause as a sufficient reason, like a chicken. And indeed, we verify that all chicken eggs come from chickens in reality.
7. Therefore, logic and the PSR are not only principles of epistemology but also principles of metaphysics.
- It is correct to think logically because reality behaves logically. If it wasnt the case, there would be no reason to think logically.
- It is correct to look for reasons to things because reasons exist in reality. If it wasnt the case, there would be no reason to find sufficient reasons.
Counter-Argument against the PSR: Quantum Physics
Argument: According to quantum physics, the behaviour of some particles is random, that is, they behave a particular way without reason, with no hidden cause. Since the PRS demands a sufficient reason for everything that exists, including a behaviour, then this phenomenon runs against the PSR.
Response: Our response is in two parts. First, we show that quantum physics cannot go against the PSR; and second, we show that the phenomenon is in fact compatible with the PSR.
Part 1. Quantum physics cannot refute the PSR:
- 1. Quantum physics is a branch of physics, which is an empirical science.
- 2. And all sciences except for formal logic and mathematics are in part founded on the PSR (as shown above). I.e. quantum physics demands some observations, and rely on the PSR to make claims about reality.
- 3. As such, if quantum physics were to refute the PSR, then it would refute itself, like a tree cutting off its own roots.
- 4. Therefore, quantum physics cannot refute the PSR.
Part 2. The behaviour of quantum particles is compatible with the PSR:
- 1. Nevertheless, the fact remains that physicists claim that some particles behave randomly with no hidden cause.
- 2. We can accept this claim if we understand that no hidden cause implies no physical hidden cause. Physicists are experts in physics, not metaphysics, and thus their authority does not extend past the field of physics.
- 3. Unless we can defend the claim that all that exists is physical, a claim which falls outside the authority of physicists, then nothing prevents particles to have a non-physical cause. For philosophers, this claim is usually defended by appealing to Occams Razor which is another name for the PSR. As such, appealing to the claim that all that exists is physical to refute the PSR is self-refuting.
- 4. With that, we preserve the claim that quantum particles behave a particular way with no hidden cause in the field of physics, and the PSR is preserved in the field of metaphysics. Note: we are not aiming to solve some quantum problem here, but merely showing that possible solutions exist that reconcile quantum physics with the PSR.
- 5. Therefore, the behaviour of quantum particles is compatible with the PSR.
Questions, comments, objections?
Note: I am NOT an expert in quantum physics at all, so when discussing quantum, please keep it surface level and use layman terms for my sake. Much appreciated! :)
Comments (268)
In addition, something that nobody understands cannot properly be used as a counter-argument against anything.
As Feynman said "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics"
Isn't here already the existence of randomness enough? In many instances the best model of reality is randomness or stochastic processes. Throw of a dice. This isn't an obstacle for determinism, because if you throw a dice, you will get a dice number. Yet the process is easily and efficiently modeled as the dice number being random (from 1 to 6, if the dice is a cube).
Is this an obstacle to PSR? In my view no. I would argue that it is PSR, sufficient reasoning.
Anyway, when trying to measure something or the observation itself affects what is tried to be measured or observed, you cannot have total objectivity. The measurer plays a part in what happens. And as we are part of the universe, we simply cannot assume objectivity of us not being part of the universe. We cannot look at the university from outside it.
Again, is this a counterargument for PSR? No.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) proposes that for every fact F, there must be a sufficient reason why F is the case (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason)
We use deduction and induction when reasoning.
Hume's critique of causation challenges PSR. In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume considers the idea that whatever begins to exist must have a cause, but he finds this open to doubt. Since cause and effect are distinct, one can imagine an event without a cause. Hume said that induction gives truth only if nature is uniform, and if we do use induction, we are presupposing the uniformity of nature, which may or may not be the case (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason).
However, this introduces an inevitable circularity as induction and deduction presuppose a uniformity in nature, which may or may not be the case. Therefore any reason we come up with for a fact based on induction and deduction may or may not be the case.
It follows that given a fact, as we can never know whether any particular reason is or is not the case, we can never know whether for any fact there is a reason or not.
We could only say that for every fact there must be a sufficient reason why F is the case if we knew that nature was uniform. But we don't know that nature is uniform. We know that many aspects of nature are contingently uniform, but we don't know that they are necessarily uniform.
Overly simplistic IMO. Although mathematical proofs are applications of logic.
I know you said this does not refute the PSR; however, I want to clarify that statistical randomness like throwing a dice is not real or metaphysical randomness. We call the outcome of throwing a dice random because we are not fully in control of the outcome; however it is not truly random because it is only a bunch of forces acting on the dice, all of which are determined. I.e., if we were to throw a dice the exact same way every time, then the same outcome would result every time.
I think what you are trying to say is we cannot know with certainty that nature is uniform, that the future will resemble the past. I agree, but I don't see it as an issue in practice: (1) Most people would agree that our reason is a reliable tool to find truth, and our reason uses induction. (2) It has been the case so far that nature is uniform - planes fly pretty well. Thus, while the uniformity of nature is not known with certainty, it is still known beyond reasonable doubt.
Quoting RussellA
This is expected because the test of imagination is associated with logic, and the PSR (which includes causality) is not derived from logic.
I also do not see why accepting the truth of the principle of sufficient reason is required to be able to engage in intellectual inquiry. For example, imagine I think it is false for I think that if it is true, then some things must explain themselves (for not everything can have a cause external to it - as that generates a regress - and nothing can be the cause of itself, as that's a contradiction). As nothing can explain itself, I conclude that some things exist and have no cause of their existence (and thus that the principle of sufficient reason is false).
Why does denying the principle of reason - as I have just done - preclude me from using my reason to find out what is true? I think our reason is our source - our only source - of insight into the nature of reality. And it was by using it - perhaps incompetently, admittedly - that I arrived at the conclusion that the principle of sufficient reason is not a true principle of reason at all, but contrary to reason. I do not see, then, why rejection of the principle of sufficient reason undermines the project of using reason to find truth. For all I have concluded - and concluded by using my reason - is that some existences do not have explanations. I have not concluded that nothing has an explanation. And i have not rejected the principle of parsimony either, for i plan on using it to try and find out which existences are the ones that lack explanations.
As a former prof I never gave much thought to a definition. But this is OK.
From the SEP article Principle of Sufficient Reason: the PSR may be formulated as "For every fact F, there must be a sufficient reason why F is the case."
I agree that although the uniformity of nature is not known with certainty, it is still known beyond reasonable doubt.
Does this mean that the PSR should be re-formulated as "For every fact F, there is probably a sufficient reason why F is the case."
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Quoting A Christian Philosophy
In other words:
P1 - We can imagine a fact/event
P2 - The test of imagination is associated with logic
P3 - The PSR states that given a fact/event there must be a reason/cause
P4 - The PSR is not derived from logic
C1 - We can imagine a fact/event that doesn't have a reason/cause
In particular:
P1 - We can imagine a unicorn
P2 - We can test that the unicorn we imagine is true or not using logic.
P3 - True
P4 - Depends what is meant by "derived"
In logic, conclusions follow from premises based on the structure of arguments alone, independent of their topic and content. (Wikipedia - Logic).
An attempt may be made to prove the PSR using logic
The PSR may possibly be proved using logic, even though there is no logical necessity that a fact/event has a reason/cause.
C1 - We can imagine a unicorn in our mind even if unicorns don't exist in the world.
We can imagine a unicorn in our mind even though there is no unicorn in the world. Does this mean that there is nothing that has caused us to imagine a unicorn in our mind?
My point was that you don't have to refer to Quantum Physics as the reason for this. The measurement problem happens even without Quantum Physics. This basically comes from the fact that we ourselves are part of the universe ourselves.
Reason is simply identifying something logically. A leads to be, or A sometimes leads to B for example. Sufficient reason is that there is a logical descriptor that correctly identifies what is true.
In other words, what exists, exists. Reason is the way we interpret that existence in a way that fits in with a logical framework. As an example: The big bang appeared from nothing. If that is true, then the sufficient reason for that happening is simply a logical framework that accurately leads to this result.
In other words: Everything can be sufficiently reasoned to if one knows what is true. This is purely through the invention of a human framework that can result in the correct conclusion. The mistake is thinking that if one has created a framework that leads to a conclusion through reason alone, that this necessarily makes the conclusion true. Truth must exist first for reason to matter.
What is the reason for existence?
What is the reason for thinking that there must be a reason for what is?
While true, it is bordering on insignificant and useless. Basically you're saying if you give me an answer I can come up with an equation that comes up with that answer. Of course my equation may not be how Nature came up with that answer, but it's AN equation that explains the answer. BTW, many, many actual explanations don't initially seem to be the most reasonable explanation.
Basically a bundle of (next to) nothing.
I like this. I think it's a useful way of looking at the issue. I hadn't thought of it in these terms before.
Quoting Philosophim
Hmmm... I wonder if I agree with this.
Thank you, I'm glad its something new to think about.
Quoting T Clark
That statement only makes sense in relation to the sentence prior.
Quoting Philosophim
We can come to reasonable conclusions that are not true, and that was all that was intended by that last sentence. There is of course value alone in reason even if it does not sometimes lead to the truth, as reason is our best tool to find out what actually is true. But if there were no truth that we were actually mulling on, such reason would be no more useful than a flight of fancy.
In Greek philosophy, wasn't that simply a presumption that the world was governed by reason? A kind of intuitive sense that there is a reason for everything as well as every thing - one of the meanings of 'logos' from which we derive logic, and all the other -logies. I don't think it dawned on any philosopher, before the advent of modernity, that the Cosmos - a word meaning 'an ordered whole' - could be anything other than rational. Of course the scientific revolution introduces a wholly different conception of reason as mechanical causation. With the banishing of teleological reasoning the idea of reason in that classical sense fell out of favour.
[quote=David Bentley Hart]In the pre-modern vision of things, the cosmos had been seen as an inherently purposive structure of diverse but integrally inseparable rational relations for instance, the Aristotelian aitia, which are conventionally translated as causes, but which are nothing like the uniform material causes of the mechanistic philosophy. And so the natural order was seen as a reality already akin to intellect. Hence the mind, rather than an anomalous tenant of an alien universe, was instead the most concentrated and luminous expression of natures deepest essence. This is why it could pass with such wanton liberty through the veil of Isis and ever deeper into natures inner mysteries.[/quote]
I think the OP, being grounded in Christian philosophy, assumes a similar view. Although it's also interesting that the atheist Schopenhauer grounded his entire philosophy on the 'fourfold root of sufficient reason' and refers to it continually in his writing. Itv was Neitszche who foresaw the sense in which the acid of modernity dissolved the whole idea of cosmic reason.
Yes, the "intellect as a whole" as the image of the cosmos versus "the mathematical model."
They are still the same. In the principle of parsimony, it is reasonable to pick the simplest of 2 explanations that account for all the data because the less simple explanation is superfluous, that is, more than sufficient. Both principles demand that the explanation or reason be just sufficient, not more, not less.
Quoting Clearbury
I agree that a thing cannot be its own cause, yet a thing can explain itself. A cause is not the only way to explain the existence of a thing, as described in the OP under the section "PSR in Metaphysics". Another way is that the existence of a thing is explained inherently or by its own definition. I.e. if a thing possesses existence as an essential property, then its existence would be explained inherently or by its own definition. And this would fulfill the PSR.
I dispute P2. By the Law of Non-Contradiction, a fact/event cannot be other than it is at the same time.
Suppose true randomness exists such that event 1 occurs without reason. Still, by the law of non-contradiction, event 1 cannot be something else at the same time. But it still occurred without reason.
Quoting RussellA
I believe that something has caused us to imagine a unicorn in our mind. Something like the experience of having seen horses and horns in the world, and we put them together in our mind.
I agree that by the Law of Contradiction, a fact/event cannot be other than it is at the same time. For a fact to be other than it is at the same time is a contradiction in terms. For example, the fact that apple A is on the table is a different fact to the fact that apple A is on the floor.
P1 - Let there be an event which could be either event 1 or event 2, where event 1 and event 2 are different.
P2 - The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that if event 1 occurs there must be a reason.
P3 - By the Law of Non-Contradiction, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could not have occurred.
P4- Suppose event 1 occurs without reason.
C1 - From P4, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could have occurred.
C2 - C1 and P3 are contradictory.
C3 - Therefore, if the Law of Non-Contradiction is valid (P3), then events occurring without reason is invalid (P4).
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I wouldn't say this.
Randomness doesn't meant that there isn't any reason. Randomness simply means that there isn't any self repeating pattern or patterns to be found. That there is no pattern doesn't make reason to disappear, what it means that the only correct model is the patternless entity itself. You cannot perfectly model in it a shorter way, like saying that there's an algorithm that can explain it shorter. Basically this idea comes from Algorithmic Information Theory.
For Heraclitus the tension of opposites is essential. We may think of it is the function of reason to disambiguate, but logos holds opposites together in their tension. Logos does not resolve all things to 'is' or 'is not'.
(fragment 51)
(fragment 80)
In the Phaedo Socrates says:
(97b-d)
Socrates accepted Mind as the cause, but instead of inquiring about what Mind is, or how it arranged things, he sought an explanation for why it is best that things be the way they are. He did not find such an explanation in Anaxagoras or anywhere else. He thus launched his second sailing to find the cause. (99d). With his second sailing Socrates looks to what seems best in a double sense. First, he wants to understand how it is best that things are arranged by Mind as they are, and second, having failed to understand things as they are, that is, to attain truth and knowledge, he seeks what seems to be the best argument.
Mind or nous as the governing principle, arranging things according to what is best, is not the same as a world governed by reason.
For Aristotle, the question of the intelligibility of the natural world faces two problems, the arche or source of the whole and tyche or chance. We have no knowledge of the source and what happens by chance or accident does not happen according to reason.
If you mean the reason for the existence of a particular thing, then the type of reason is given in the OP under the section "PSR in Metaphysics". In short, there are 3 types of reasons:
1. Internal reason: The existence of a thing is explained by logical necessity or inherently.
2. External necessary reason: The existence of a thing is explained by causal necessity.
3. External contingent reason: The existence of a thing or action is explained by a free choice that is motivated by an end goal.
Or if you mean "existence" as the general concept, then that's just a concept. Concepts are not concrete existing things that need reasons.
Quoting Fooloso4
The reason is given in the OP under the section "Argument in defence of the PSR". In short, it follows from the premise that "Reason finds truth".
Quoting LuckyR
Not quite. What I meant was, if we inquire why 2+2 results in 4, then the explanation is that 4 follows out of logical necessity. We could not say that 2+2 causes 4, as though they are separate things. So the point is that, alongside causes, logical necessity is also a type of explanation that fulfills the PSR.
Quoting LuckyR
Quoting Philosophim
Yes I agree. This occurs when we don't have enough data that points in the right direction. But given enough data, the most reasonable explanation will tend towards the actual explanation. So the trick is to continually gather data and conduct empirical tests (when possible) until we reach a high level of confidence.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
It is true that the two models give different types of reasons for the existence of things in the physical world. The old model gives teleological reasons (type 3 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics"), and the new model gives reasons of causal necessity (type 2 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics"). Both types of reason fulfill the PSR. And I personally side with the new model, at least when it comes to physical things.
I mean the reason why there is anything at all.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
A premise is the reason why there must be a reason for what is?
Although we do employ reason in our search for truth, it may lead us astray. Your example of swans is a good case in point. We might conclude that all swans are white based on the fact that all the swans we have ever seen are white, but there are black swans. Reason does not simply explain what is observed, observation finds truth.
You posit "laws of nature" as an explanation, but this is problematic for two reasons. First, we might ask what the reason is for the laws of nature. Second, what is the explanation for the causal power of these laws?
I still hold that the relevant propositions must have "at the same time" added to them. So:
P3 - By the Law of Non-Contradiction, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could not have occurred at the same time.
C1 - From P4, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could have occurred, but not at the same time.
C2 - C1 and P3 are no longer contradictory.
Thanks, interesting distinctions. Tyche shows up as Pierces tychism which I too believe is intrinsic to the order of things.
It could be that the phrase "at the same time" is crucial to the argument defending the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Parmenides pointed out that if the world had come into existence from nothing, there is no answer to the question as to why the world didn't come into existence earlier or later than it did. [s]From this he concluded that the world has always existed[/s] (Edit - From this he concluded that the world did not come from nothing) (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason)
P1 - Let event 1 be a lamp on the table turning on and event 2 be the same lamp turning off.
P2 - The Law of Non-Contradiction states that the lamp cannot turn on and off "at the same time"
P3 - Assume that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not valid, and the lamp turns on and off for no reason.
C1 - If there is no reason why the lamp turns on, then there is no reason why the lamp turns on earlier or later than the lamp turning off.
C2 - However, if there is no reason why the lamp turns on, then there is no reason why the lamp cannot turn on "at the same time " as the lamp turning off, other than the Law of Non-Contradiction.
C3 - Therefore, it cannot be the case that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not valid, as there is a reason limiting when the lamp turns on and off, and that reason is the Law of Non-Contradiction.
The problem, as I see it, is the assumption that if one asks a question there must be an answer to that question. There are several conclusions that might follow from not being able to answer a question. They include the possibility that:
C1 - Reason and our capacity to understand is limited.
C2 - The question itself is the problem.
C3 - Any conclusion that follows is questionable.
All those things are true:
C1 - I could try to explain Hemingway's novel The old man and the sea to my pet cat until "the cows come home" without any glimmer of understanding on the cat's part. In the same way, a super-knowledgeable alien could try to explain the nature of the universe to a human, also without any glimmer of understanding on the humans' part
C2 - As Dr Lanning's Hologram in the film I, Robot says "I'm sorry, my responses are limited. You must ask the right questions"
C3 - As with a dictionary definition, even if a question is answered, the answer in its turn may be questioned, ad infinitum.
However
C1 - The fact that my cat cannot understand The Old Man and the Sea does not mean that the book isn't understandable
C2 - The fact that a question is the wrong question doesn't mean that there isn't a right question
C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer.
Maybe a superior intelligence might understand it, maybe not. In either case we do not, and based on our ignorance we cannot conclude that the universe is what we might regard as reasonable.
Quoting RussellA
Sure, but the right question might lead to a rejection of the PSR.
Quoting RussellA
Quoting RussellA
I was referring to what you originally had as Parmenides conclusion, that the world has always existed. But your corrected conclusion is no better. Both are based on the wrong question (C2) - when did it come into existence? And (C1) - our inability to conceive how something can come from nothing marks a limit of our thinking, but should we assume that our limits are the measure of reality or possibility?
Sure, a random outcome can have a cause, but it also means there is no reason to have outcome 1 vs outcome 2. Thus, the particular outcome lacks a sufficient reason.
Yes, it would be unrealistic to assume that our limits are the measure of reality.
As a cat may never understand the symbolism within The Old Man and The Sea, humans may never understand the nature of reality. But then again, as a cat doesn't need to understand the symbolism within The Old Man and The Sea, humans don't necessarily need to understand the nature of reality.
I may believe that everything has a reason, even though I have no concept of what these reasons are. For example, I believe that a stone when released falls to the ground for a reason, even though I have little concept of the nature of gravity.
It depends on the meaning of "reason" (Using SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason)
Does "reason" mean 1) "an explanation of why a stone falls to the ground when released", an Unrestricted PSR and a rejection of brute or unexplainable facts.
Or does "reason" mean 2) that "when released a stone falls to the ground" in the sense of Petito Principii, doing no more than duplicating the fact.
It is more likely the case that "reason" is being used in sense 2, where "gravity" means no more than "when released a stone falls to the ground".
If all objects in a set are explained, then the set is also explained. Thus, if all objects in existence are explained, by 1 of the 3 types of reasons as per the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", then existence is also explained.
Quoting Fooloso4
On the epistemology side, yes, that is, our knowledge of the PSR is defended by that premise.
Quoting Fooloso4
Yes I agree. This occurs when we lack data. The best way I know to counter this is to perform empirical tests (when possible) and continue to gather data. Despite that, I still would not go against the laws of reason to find truth.
Quoting Fooloso4
That's fine. Things under the laws of nature are explained by those laws, and the laws themselves also need to be explained. Since there are only 3 types of reasons in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics", the laws of nature would be explained by 1 of the 3 types.
This is question begging.It assumes what is in question, namely whether everything in existence can be explained. These three types of reason are based on the existence of things. They do not explain why there is anything at all.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Well, if we rejected the idea that there is a reason then we would not look for for one, but it does not follow that there must be one.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
That is the point. Where is the data that is sufficient to conclude that everything must have a reason?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Again, this is question begging. It assumes what is in question. It does not explain why there are laws of nature and does not demonstrate that those laws are prescriptive rather than descriptive.
On the epistemology side (knowledge), the reason defending our knowledge of the PSR is provided in the OP section "Argument in defence of the PSR".
On the metaphysics side (reality), indeed the PSR also needs a sufficient reason or explanation for existing. Note that since we know the PSR is true on the epistemology side, we know there must be an explanation for the existence of the PSR even if we don't know what that explanation is.
Nevertheless, here is my suggested explanation: Since the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics, like logic, then it is part of the fabric of reality. As such, the existence of the PSR is explained inherently (reason type 1 as described in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics").
In accord with the OP it means that there is an explanation.
Did you mean 'petitio principii', begging the question?
This is a false dilemma: either everything has a reason or nothing has a reason. Deniers of the PSR do not claim that nothing has a reason; only that not everything has a reason. Most people accept the laws of logic, and accept logical inferences as valid reasons. But they might still also believe that some brute facts exist without reason.
No, the principle of sufficient reason says that everything that exists has a sufficient explanation of its existence. It says nothing about simplicity. Note, the more complicated of two explanations is still sufficient to explain. (I think you're conflating sufficiency with efficiency)
The principle of parsimony is clearly a distinct principle of Reason from the principle of sufficient reason. Note, one could quite consistently reject one and not the other.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
How?
You have two options and neither constitute self-explanatory objects.
The first is to insist that some things exist 'of necessity' and hope that this will somehow pass as an 'explanation' of why the thing exists.
Problem: that's no explanation at all. On the contrary, a necessary existence - if there are such things - is something that has no explanation. It's not self-explanatory. It's incapable of explanation. Those who believe in necessary existences are denying the principle of sufficient reason, not endorsing it. The principle of sufficient reason says that EVERYTHING that exists has a sufficient expalnation of its existence, not just some things and not others. So that's not going to work at all.
The other option is to suppose that there are some things that exist and have not come into being. that is, there are some eternal existences. The problem is the same though: that's not an explanation at all.
[I]Reasons[/i] are explations- semantic descriptions that carry meaning to intelligent minds. Atoms are grounded in their constituents (quarks and electrons). Of course, we can explain the nature of atoms in terms of their constituents (more or less supporting the PSR), but IMO we should draw sharper boundaries between ontology and epistemology than the PSR suggests.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Rather: reason directs us toward truth. Induction doesn't necessarily fund truth, but it tends to lead in the proper direction.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
This sounds like you're reifying logic; logic is semantics- it applies to propositions, not to reality. We devise propositions that describe reality, and apply logic to these propositions, but logic itself is not part of the ontological fabric of reality. The world operates per laws of nature, and because of this - we are able to draw correct (or truth-tending) inferences from observations.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
We look for "reasons" - i.e. prepositional descriptions of the grounding of some aspects of reality, and we are successful because such groundings exist.
The principle of sufficient reason states that everything - everything, not just some things and not others - has an explanation for its existence.
That principle is by no means obviously true. For after all, if it true, then it generates an infinite regress. A cannot be explained by A, and so B has to be posited. But B cannot be explained by B, and so C has to be posited. And on and on for an actual infinity.
So, it seems false upon reflection. And if one thinks it is not false, for one thinks there is nothing problematic about there being actual infinities, then it does not lead to God, but to an actual infinity of prior explanations. God isn't in the picture at all.
If one modifies the principle so that it is only contingent existences that require explanation, then all you get to conclude is that there exists at least one necessary existent. But there's no reason to suppose that necessary existent is God. That's like concluding that becuase 'someone' clearly shot Kennedy, then it must have been Mrs Smith at 28 Acacia Avenue.
In fact, it is worse than this. For it seems self-evident that we - minds - are not necessary existences, but contingent ones. I am a contingent existence. So why assume that a necessary existent would be a mind? Minds seem no more or less contingent than physical stuff, and so to suppose God - a person, a mind - is the necessary existent is not just a huge leap, but an implausible one.
And it gets worse still. For consider this. Necessary existences confer necessity on what they cause. And thus a necessary existent can only explain other necessary existences (and it woldn't really be an explanation either, as by hyothesis if something is necessary, it does not need explaining). To see this note that a necessary existent either contingently causes something else to exist - but if it does that, then it was contingent whether it would cause it or not, and thus no explanation is provided. In order not to generate a need for explanation, the necessary existence must be supposed necessarily to cause what it causes. But if it necessarily causes what it causes, then what it causes to exist, exists of necessity as well. Yet necessary existences are supposed to explain contingent existences! They can't - as nothing a necessary existence explains will be contingent, but will be necessary too.
Necessary existences are actually quite useless explanatorily, for all they do is confer necessity on what they cause, but as what needs explaining are 'contingent' existences, they are useless.
But again, even if they weren't useless explanatorily, there is just no reason to suppose any necessary existent is God and positive reason to think it wouldn't be, given that all the other persons of our acquaintance are clearly contingent existences not necessary ones.
Fallacy of misplaced concreteness (i.e. mapmaking =/= terrain). At most the PSR is, "like logic", a foundational property of reason.
The OP describes the PSR as "For any thing that exists or is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true."
There are different definitions of "reason"
The Merriam Webster gives one definition of reason as "a statement offered in explanation or justification" and another definition of reason as "a rational ground or motive".
Using the SEP article on PSR:
As regards "reason", i) Archimedes attributed the fact that equal weights at equal distance remain in equilibrium because there is no reason why either side of the balance should move up or down and ii) Leibniz wrote: This is rightly observed, and agrees with what I am accustomed to saying that nothing exists but that for whose existence a sufficient reason can be provided.
As regards "ground", i) Hegel argued for the Principle of Sufficient Ground, and ii) Dasgupta proposed that the PSR can be reformulated in terms of grounds.
There are different type of PSR.
In the Unrestricted PSR, every fact requires an explanation.
In the Restricted PSR, various restrictions can be placed on the PSR, such as i) requiring a sufficient reason for every true proposition or ii) requiring a reason only for the existence or non-existence of entities.
Example One
Why does a rock fall to the ground when released. The reason is gravity. What is gravity. Gravity is something that causes a rock fall to the ground when released. An example of petito principii.
Example Two
A stone hits a window and the glass shatters. As I see it:
As regards cause, a cause is something in the world that is prior to an event, such that the cause of the glass shattering was a stone hitting the glass.
As regards reason, a reason is something in language that describes an event in the world, such that the reason the glass shattered was that it was hit by a stone
As regards ground, which is not cause, ground is contemporaneous with the event, in that there is an event with constituent parts. For example, glass of a certain thickness and a stone of a certain kinetic energy. According to Dasgupta, this avoids the Agrippan Trilemma of circularity, infinite regress and dogmatism because the event is autonomous and independent of anything prior to the event.
Example Three
4 = 2 + 2.
As 4 is contemporaneous with 2 + 2, the 4 was not caused by the 2 + 2, no more than the 2 + 2 was caused by 4.
The reason 2 + 2 = 4 is linguistic, as numbers don't exist in the world.
4 is grounded in 2 + 2, which is neither cause nor reason, because autonomous and independent of anything prior.
From the OP:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
What are you saying?
According to the original poster by reason he/she means explanation.
Are you claiming that there are reasons that do not involve explanations?
I agree. It seems to me that, based on the reasoning above, there has to be a bedrock of facts which have no further explanation.
There's something on the tip of my tongue that touches on this idea - maybe Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems, not sure.
edit: this was what I was thinking: Münchhausen trilemma
Suppose someone said that the reason a rock falls to the ground when released is because of gravity. Is "gravity" an explanation as to why the rock falls to the ground when released when "gravity" means no more than a rock falls to the ground when released.
Similarly:
The reason he is ambitious is because he is driven
The reason it is chilly this evening is because it is cool.
The reason the job was complex was because it was complicated.
The reason she is an advocate for three-yearly driving tests is because that is something she supports.
The reason the tree is in a state of decay is because it is rotten.
But gravity means more than that.
1) Some people believe that for any thing that exists or is true, there is always a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true. These people support the PSR.
2) Some people believe that some things that exist or is true have a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true, and that some things that exist or is true there is no sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true. These people are ambiguous towards the PSR.
3) Some people believe that for any thing that exists or is true, there is never a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true. These people deny the PSR.
If 3) is true, and there is no sufficient reason why a lamp turns on, and there is no sufficient reason why a lamp turns off, then there is no sufficient reason for the lamp not turning on and off contemporaneously, other than the Law of Non-Contradiction.
True, but if a rock never fell to the ground when released, no one would ever have known about gravity.
General relativity remains the framework for the understanding of gravity. The Einstein field equations form the basis of general relativity. The Einstein field equation are based on the cosmological constant. The cosmological constant represents the energy density of space. Nobody really knows what the cosmological constant is exactly, but it is required in cosmological equations in order to reconcile theory with our observations of the universe. (Wikipedia-gravity)
Sooner or later explanations reach a dead end, and we just have to accept our observation that gravity causes a rock to fall to the ground when released, where gravity is something that causes a rock to fall to the ground when released.
What does this mean in terms of PSR? The observation that a rock falls is not a reason for or explanation for it falling. If explanation reaches a dead end then either we have failed to find the reason or there is no reason.
Using Emilie du Chatelet's argument (SEP - PSR):
P1 - The PSR in the OP states that for any thing that exists or is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true.
P2 - Consider bread. If there was no reason why bread was beneficial to life, there would also be no reason why bread wasn't lethal to life. One day bread could be beneficial and the next day bread could be lethal.
C1 - If the PSR was not valid, humans would be unable to survive in the world.
C2 - As humans do survive in the world, then the PSR must be valid.
You did not address the problem. Observing that a rock falls is not a reason for why the rock falls.
Assume the PSR is not valid
Then, if we observe a rock falling there would be no reason why we hadn't observed the rock not falling.
But if we had observed the rock not falling, there is no reason why we hadn't observed the rock falling.
But if we had observed the rock falling, there is no reason why we hadn't observed the rock not falling.
If the PSR was not valid, this would lead into an infinite regress.
Therefore, the PSR is valid.
The reason we observed the rock falling is that it fell and we were there to see if fall. There may be various reasons why it fell and various reasons why we were there to see it fall. It does not follow from the fact that we can posit reasons for why we observed the rock fall, that there is a reason for everything.
Yes, it implies that there are some things that do not have explanations. The most common modification in light of the above is to hold that it is only those things that have 'come into being' that have explanations rather than everything. Those things that have not come into being just exist and that's as much as one can say about them.
But this does not get one anywhere near theism, as there's just no reason to think that a thing that exists and has not come into being will be a person, and be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent.
And given what in fact exists, it seems reasonable to suppose that if it was created by a person (or more reasonably, persons), the person was not God.
The traditional answer is: we can posit the existence of a First Cause which has existence necessarily or as an essential property. The existence of this First Cause is grounded by logical necessity (reason type 1 in the OP) because to deny the existence of a thing with necessary existence is a contradiction. Then this First Cause also serves to explain the existence of everything else as their cause, direct or indirect. This summary should serve to explain why there is anything at all.
Quoting Fooloso4
Quoting Fooloso4
Rejecting the idea that there is a reason would go against our reasoning process, specifically induction which demands sufficient reasons.
Quoting Fooloso4
I did not give the specific explanation but I gave the guidance on how to find the explanation. Here are the quick steps to work out the specific explanation:
As per the OP, there are 3 types of reasons: (1) logical necessity, (2) causal necessity, (3) freely chosen or designed. Let's proceed by elimination:
(1) The fundamental laws of nature do not exist by logical necessity because they are not tautologies, and thus denying them does not give a self-contradiction.
(2) The fundamental laws of nature do not exist out of causal necessity from prior laws because they are fundamental, which means not based on prior laws.
(3) By elimination, they are designed.
Quoting Fooloso4
The laws as we currently know them may be only descriptive, but as per the PSR, there still must be a prescriptive explanation for why matter and energy behave as described by those laws.
Princeton philosopher, Shamik Dasgupta, uses the term "autonomous facts" to refer to the bedrock, you guys are discussing. All other facts, are "substantive facts".
He also recasts the PSR in terms of grounding:
PSR: For every substantive fact Y there are some facts, the Xs, such that (i) the Xs ground Y and (ii) each one of the Xs is autonomous.
'Fact' is not the right term, as we're talking about existences. Facts are 'about' things, but they are not really things in their own right - so I don't know why he's using that term rather than the much clearer 'existence' or 'object'.
Autonomous isn't a good word to use for 'has no explanation'. It implies that the thing - the object - somehow explains itself or something (which it doesn't - it just exists and has no explanation whatsoever).
And 'substantive' isn't a good word for 'has an explanation for its existence', as that's simply not what it means.
And to use 'grounding' for explanation or cause hardly makes things clearer.
He might as well have decided to call 'things that exist and have no explanation for their existence' 'Cheesy turnips' and things that exist and have an explanation for their existence 'Saucy bananas' and used 'bilge water' to mean 'exists' and 'grunty' to mean 'explanation'. Then "For every saucy banana bilge water there are some bilge waters, the Xs, such that (i) the Xs grunty Y and ii) each of the Xs is a cheesy turnip".
Just goes to show, some people are not interested in making things clear. It's quite a common strategy in academic articles - I think the idea is simply to wear down the reviewers so that they just give up and give it a pass.
I'm not a fan of 'grounding' as it is not clear to me that it's a good alternative to explanation.
For example, let's say I decide to order a pizza because I'm hungry. I am the cause of my decision. But I could also say that my decision was grounded in my hunger, as that was why i made the decision.
The explanation of why that decision event occurred can't just make mention of my hunger. It has also to make mention of me causing it - causing the decision - in light of the hunger.
OK, set aside "proposition". My point is you're describing something in a series of sentences. The sentences are ABOUT something going on in the world, they are not the thing itself.
Grounding refers to the thing itself.
Isn't reason a product of human mind? Reasons don't exist out there in the external world. There are only matter, energy and changes in the world. Reason is an operation of human mind seeking for the causal explanations on the existence and changes.
For the proper operations of the inductive reasoning, human observations do need the data to draw the reasoning for the conclusions.
Therefore there are many events and existence which have the reasons, and many are unknown due to lack of the data.
True, there are different events.
Let the PSR be that for each event there must be a reason
Situation One - The rock falls, and I see it. There is event A such that I see the rock falling and there is event B such that the rock falls.
Situation Two - The rock falls, but there is no one to see it. There is event C that the rock falls.
Event C
However, as there is no one to observe event C, event C is unknown. As event C is unknown, there can be no discussion as to whether it has a reason or not. Whether unknown event C has a reason or not we can never know, meaning that the PSR for unknown events is unknowable.
Therefore, the PSR is only applicable to observable events.
Event A
The PSR states that there must be a reason why I observe the rock falling.
Assume the PSR is not valid, such that there is no reason why I observe the rock falling.
Then, if I observe a rock falling there would be no reason why I hadn't observed the rock not falling.
But if I had observed the rock not falling, there is no reason why I hadn't observed the rock falling.
But if I had observed the rock falling, there is no reason why I hadn't observed the rock not falling.
If the PSR was not valid, this would lead into an infinite regress.
Therefore, the PSR is valid, ie, there must be a reason why I observe the rock falling.
Event B
The PSR states that there must be a reason why the rock I observe falls.
Assume the PSR is not valid, such that there is no reason why the rock I observe falls.
Then, if the rock I observe falls, then there would be no reason why the rock I observe didn't fall
But if the rock I observe didn't fall, there is no reason why the rock I observe hadn't fallen.
But if I the rock I observe hadn't fallen, there is no reason why the rock I observe didn't fall.
If the PSR was not valid, this would lead into an infinite regress.
Therefore, the PSR is valid, ie, there must be a reason why the rock I observe falls.
In conclusion, the PSR is valid, but only applies to observable facts, events and truths.
Note that "reason" may include a prior explanation, such as "I order a pizza because I was hungry", or contemporaneous ground such as "I order a pizza being hungry".
This is an a priori abuse of logic. Positing something that has existence necessarily as an essential property is essentially a conjuring trick. Something does not exist because you posit its existence as necessary.
Either there is an illogical jump from natural causes to a supernatural cause or this supposed first cause is itself in need of a cause.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
It doesn't. It is unreasonable to assume that because we can find reasons for some things that we can find reasons for everything. It leads to the unreasonable assumption of a first cause.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
More conjuring. This thing whose existence you posit designs the laws of nature that cannot be explained naturally.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
'God did it' is not an explanation.
Suppose a star explodes 10 light years from us. It will not be observable to us for 10 years. If the PSR only applies to observable,facts does that mean that with regard to that event the PSR is not valid and will not be valid for 10 years?
The PSR states that for every event there is a reason
The PSR is valid within certain restrictions.
Prior to the light from the exploding star reaching us, we don't know that there is an exploding star. It is an unknown.
I can certainly imagine a star exploding, but the PSR doesn't apply to the imagination because I can imagine all kinds of impossible things. I can imagine a star exploding for no reason as I can imagine unicorns grazing in Central Park.
Therefore the PSR cannot apply to imagined events.
But what about events that we don't know about. Can I apply the PSR to something unknown. Does every unknown thing have a reason? I can never know because the unknown thing is unknown, and I don't know what to apply the PSR to.
Therefore the PSR cannot be applied to the unknown.
The PSR can be reformulated as "for every observed event there is a reason"
If the PSR is valid it should hold for all events whether known or unknown. If it happened then there must be, according to the principle, a reason for it happening. If PSR is restricted to what we know or observe then the reason for the star exploding is contingent upon our knowledge of it happening.
Why think "necessary" is an ontological (de re) property of any being? The concept of "necessary" applies to logic: e.g. in a valid deductive argument, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. I'm aware that Alvan Plantinga has proposed that God has de re necessity, but it seems to me a contrivance.
I suggest that any first cause (including a natural one) would exist necessarily: it exists autonomously, and without a cause that could account for its contingent existence.
Propositions are about things. Causes seem to be what explain things. This is why a 'causal reason' and an 'explanatory reason' are (arguably) synonymous. And that is why the principle of sufficient reason could just as well be called the principle of sufficient explanation.
When it comes to grounding, the 'grounding' of something refers to its basis, or what in some sense produced it. So, that the act was wrong is 'grounded' in the fact it hurt someone (or something like that). But as I noted, the 'grounding' of something does not seem to be sufficient to explain it, even though it is going to be part of its explanation.
The fact I am thirsty is the ground of my decision to go and get myself a drink, but it cannot be the full explanation of why that decision occurred, for I too am in the mix (I caused myself to make a decision in light of my thirst, but the thirst alone does not explain my decision even though it grounds it).
Quoting Clearbury
Causes are one kind of explanations, but there are also constitutive explanations: the constituents of water (hydrogen and oxygen) explain water. Grounding covers both.
My issue is that explanations are communications. The universe evolves irrespective of whether anyone is around to explain it. Explanations are superfluous (except inasmuch as they influence people). When we provide a causal explanation, we are refering to things out in the world. The explanations themselves are within or between minds. "X causes Y" accounts for the existence of Y. Calling this an "explanation" is an inter-mind thing that adds nothing to the ontological relation between the cause and efffect.
When the light is released into the space, why doesn't it fall to the ground?
In a sense it does, as light bends around sources with high mass due to gravity.
From www.astronomy.com
Doesn't it then disapprove what you are claiming? Gravity is a force when the high mass pulls any mass lower than the high mass. But the light bends around sources with high mass due to gravity. Even massless photons gets bend due to gravity means gravity applies to even massless matter.
On the one hand "light bends around sources with high mass due to gravity" and on the other hand "gravity causes light to bend around sources with high mass".
In the same way that "the reason he is ambitious is because he is driven" and "the reason the job was complex was because it was complicated."
"Gravity" is more a synonym than a reason why light bends around sources with high mass.
This sounds like a contradiction. Surely PSR doesn't allow contradictions for the conclusions.
Quoting RussellA
These are just repeating the same thing for what had been said in the first part of the sentence using because. It is not saying anything new or different.
Quoting RussellA
Gravity is a scientific concept which must apply to every cases in the universe if it is true.
PSR - for every fact there is an explanation
Fact = light bends around sources with high mass
Explanation = gravity
There is no contradiction in the explanation.
===============================================================================
Quoting Corvus
Yes. "Gravity" is an explanation, but what does it explain?
===============================================================================
Quoting Corvus
Why does a scientific concept have to be true everywhere?
On Earth the acceleration due to gravity is [math]9.81\frac{m}{s^2}[/math] whilst on the Moon it is [math]1.62\frac{m}{s^2}[/math]
Ok, let's hear about this first. What is the explanation for "for every fact there is an explanation"?
Not everyone accepts the PSR, for example Hume. He challenged the PSR and argued that the ideas of cause and effect are distinct, and that we can conceive of an effect without a cause.
But suppose that for every fact there was no explanation. Then equally there would be no explanation why a fact couldn't change. For example, one day it could be a fact that "food is beneficial to humans" and the next day it could be the fact that "food is lethal to humans".
If the PSR was not valid, humans couldn't survive. But humans have survived, Therefore the PSR must be valid.
The expression "all events whether known or unknown" is a contradiction in terms. It is not possible to know that there are unknown events as they are unknown. All that is known are known events.
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Quoting Fooloso4
The PSR is a contingent theory in the sense that it states that for every fact there must be an explanation. It doesn't state that every fact is a brute fact.
The PSR is a necessary theory in the sense that for every fact there must be an explanation.
As we don't know what we don't know, the PSR is contingent on what we know.
As regards what we know, the PSR is necessary.
Quoting RussellA
I am not sure if humans survived because food is beneficial. There are some food which is lethal to some humans due to its allergic reactions causing deaths. Some humans didn't survive because of the food in that case. Therefore the premises of the reasoning is incorrect or irrelevant, which proves the PSR is a nonsense.
The PSR states that for every fact there is a reason.
If the PSR was not valid, and for every fact there was no reason, then there would be no reason why facts didn't change.
Suppose one day water was beneficial to life and the next day it was lethal, one day air was beneficial to life and the next day it was lethal, one day potatoes were beneficial to life and the next day they were lethal, etc.
Are you saying that life would be able to survive in such a world?
I am not sure if these reasoning prove the PSR is valid. Because there are cases, water can kill folks. Think of the cases such as flood, drowning or contaminated water which kill folks too.
Air is beneficial to folks, but the polluted air also kills folks. So they have the contradictory cases, which makes them unfit for qualifying as acceptable premises which prove the PSR true.
The more you try to prove the PSR is valid, the more it seems to be the case it is invalid, unsound and false due to the false premises being used in the arguments.
It is not a contradiction. An event is something that happens. According to the PSR there is a reason for it happening. Our knowledge of something happening is not a requirement for it to happen. The Webb telescope has detected the earliest known galaxy, JADES-GS-z14-0, which formed about 290 million years after the Big Bang. There is a reason for it happening, whether we know it happened or not.
Philosophically, how is it possible to know something about something we don't know about?
In this particular case, that the something we don't know about has a reason.
I could generalise.
If the PSR was not valid, one day, everything that had been beneficial to life could now be lethal to life, and vice versa.
Could life survive in such a world?
Are you arguing against the PSR?
No, I am arguing that the PSR cannot be applied to unknown events
Quoting RussellA
Quoting Fooloso4
I am arguing that it is not possible to know about something that we don't know about, including any reason for the something that we don't know anything about.
Quoting Fooloso4
My question is, how is it possible to know the reason for something that we don't know about?
This can happen in real life all the time, and is just a fact of life and reality. All things has positive sides, but also negative sides. It depends on what angle you are looking at the things.
For example, cars are beneficial to human life. It is fast, convenient, and essential to the business. But cars pollute the earth, contributing to major global weather changes. They can also cause people to die from the accidents ... etc. Nothing is 100% beneficial. Nothing is 100% lethal depending on how you look at them.
Quoting RussellA
Of course, it can. Some life dies, but some survives. It is just a matter of the survival of the fittest.
The survival of life has nothing to do with the PSR.
The Principle of Parsimony: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one.
Sufficient in the PSR means that an explanation should be neither more than sufficient (i.e. it should be the simplest one), nor less than sufficient (i.e. it must account for all the data); but should be just sufficient.
Quoting Clearbury
Not all explanations are external to the thing explained. Here are examples of things that are explained by an internal reason, that is, out of logical necessity or inherently.
2+2=4 because II and II are contained inherently in IIII.
All triangles have 3 sides by definition, or inherently.
Same for "All bachelors are unmarried".
Likewise, if the property of existence is contained in the definition of a thing, then its existence is explained inherently.
Whose version of the PSR are you relying on? Where does it say in that version that the PSR does not apply to unknown events?
Quoting RussellA
There is a difference between knowing what the reason is and there being a reason. According to Leibniz version, as I understand it, everything must have a reason. That reason is intrinsic to it rather than something that only exists when we know of the thing or event. We cannot say what that reason is if the thing or event is unknown, but it must have a reason whether we know it or not. If you cannot accept that then you do not accept the PSR.
Yes that's a clearer way of putting it. It avoids the confusion of whether we speak of a reason why we know something is true versus a reason why a thing exists. So we could rephrase the PSR as: For any claim that is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to be true; and for any thing that exists, there is a sufficient ground for it to exist.
Quoting Relativist
Yes I agree. I would add that reason is powerful enough to know its own limitations. Reason knows that induction gives inferences that are the most reasonable yet not certain.
Quoting Relativist
I would still say that logic has value because it reflects outcomes in reality. E.g. logic tells us that 2+2=4; and empirical demonstration shows us that if we put 2 spoons in an empty box and add another 2 spoons, we count 4 spoons in total. But suppose that, for whatever reason, we sometimes counted 3 spoons in total. This would undermine the value of using logic as a tool for finding truth.
Sure. In other words, the content of mapmaking describes the terrain; and likewise, principles of metaphysics describe the things in fundamental reality. I accept the distinction.
No, they're absolutely not the same principle differently expressed. Sufficient and efficient do not mean the same thing.
Take an event - P.
What the principle of sufficient reason says is that there were causes sufficient to bring P about. Causes sufficient to bring about P can be much more than is necessary. Maybe P was brought about by 100 causes or maybe 20 or maybe 1. The principle of sufficient reason says precisely nothing about that. Why? Becasue they're all SUFFICIENT to explain it. Not necessary. But sufficient. All the principle of sufficient reason rules out is one scenario and one alone: that NOTHING brought about P. That's it.
Now, it is obviously unreaonable to supose that the event had 100 causes when one would have done to expain it. But the unreasonableness of that supposition is due to the principle of parsimony, not the pricniple of sufficient reason.
Note, Tony - who posits 1billion causes for P - and Mary - who posits just one - are both respecting the principle of sufficient reason, but Tony, unlike Mary, is violating the principle of parsimony.
All you're doing there is drawing attention to some claims whose truth is explained by appealing to truths of reason. It has nothing to do with existence being contained in the definition of a thing.
It is a truth of reason that all contradictions are false and thus correspond to nothing in reality. The notion of a married bachelor, given the conventional meanings of those terms, contains a contradiction. And thus by appeal to the law of non-contradiction we can 'explain' why there are no married bachelors.
But the principle of sufficient reason - which says that everything has an explanation - must now be applied to the law of non-contradiction. What explains why it is true?
No good appealing to the fact it's obviously true. For that is no explanation. And no good saying 'it is a necessary truth' for that explains nothing either.
If you think the basic laws of reason - and again, it is those that 'explain' why there are no 4 sided triangles or married bachelors - do not require explanation, then you're rejecting the PSR, for you'd now be saying that it is only things 'other than' the basic laws of reason that need explanation.
For Leibniz, God knows all events whether known or unknown by humans.
Can you justify your statement above, in that if an event is unknown to humans then we as humans know that it must have a reason, even if we as humans don't know what the particular reason is.
Is your argument based on the existence of a God?
You defend the PSR, in that for any thing that exists or is true there is sufficient reason.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
You also give the examples of things that don't have a sufficient reason, but rather logical necessity, such as "All bachelors are unmarried".
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Your position seems to fit in with item 2).
Up until this point you have been treating unknown as unknown to us. If God knows then even if we do not there is still a reason for all events, reasons known to God. The reason for something is not contingent on our knowing the reason.
Quoting RussellA
My argument is that if you accept the PRS then you must accept that there is a reason for everything whether that reason is known to us or not. One might, of course, object along the lines of our not knowing that there is a God who knows all things.
You propose a formulation of the PSR that states that for everything, whether known or unknown, there must be a reason.
You must feel that there is a justification for this particular formulation.
But do you know of any argument justifying that there must be a reason for things not even known about?
If not, then why accept this formulation?
I don't propose it. I cite it.
Quoting RussellA
Prior to the question of whether one agrees or disagrees is the question of what the principle is. The principle is not based on our ability to know the reason, but rather states that there must be a reason.
I do not know that there is a reason or that there is not a reason for everything
We don't know about everything in the universe.
Therefore the PSR is not true.
~Q
=======
~P (MT)
As described in the OP, reason in the context of epistemology can be interpreted as explanation or justification for a claim be true; and reason in the context of metaphysics can be interpreted as cause or grounding for a thing existing.
Even if the world was only physical, there are still causes or grounds for the existence of particular physical things. E.g. The egg is caused by a chicken, etc.
Quoting Corvus
I agree. The PSR would say that everything that exists has a sufficient reason (or cause or grounding) even if some of these reasons are not known to us.
I agree, but in this case it is not arbitrary. The existence of a being whose existence is an essential property is deduced directly from the PSR. Since the PSR demands a reason for everything that exists, and since external reasons (i.e. causes) cannot sufficiently explain everything because we run into an infinite regress, then it is necessary to have an internal reason, that is, a being whose existence is an essential property.
Quoting Fooloso4
What else could it possibly be? We could entertain that the laws of nature are caused by prior laws, but this only pushes the problem one step back. To avoid the risk of infinite regress, the fundamental laws must be explained by something that requires an explanation but not a cause.
Sure, but in the same way, necessity also applies to things with essential properties. E.g. "3 sides" is an essential property of a triangle. Thus, if a thing is a triangle, it logically or necessarily follows that it has 3 sides. Therefore, we can call essential properties "necessary properties".
Quoting Relativist
Would this mean that this type of first cause exists without a reason, and thus would violate the PSR? Whereas my first cause, the being whose existence is an essential property, has a sufficient reason to exist: it is an internal reason, that is, its existence is explained logically or inherently.
There are different formulations of the PSR. You cite one version of it. See SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason.
===============================================================================
Quoting Fooloso4
A principle that cannot be justified shouldn't be used.
Triangles are abstractions, and don't exist in the real world. Rather, objects exist that have 3-sides. What you're calling "essential properties" is simply the definition we've assigned to the word "triangle". A word necessarily having its definition is just semantics, not metaphysical essentialism.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
No internal reason is needed for a first cause to exist necessarily. A first cause cannot exist contingently, because it is logically impossible for it to be contingent upon anything*. So there's no need for the (ad hoc) contrivance of treating a term in logic as an ontological property.
----------------
*Y is contingent iff there exists an X that accounts for Y, and it is metaphysically possible for X to account for ~Y.
What is deduced from a questionable principle is questionable.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Positing a super-natural being in order to explain what you cannot explain is question begging. It assumes what is in question, that there must be a comprehensive reason for what is.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
What is this something? What is the explanation for this something?
I asked you:
Quoting Fooloso4
The closest you came to answering is:
Quoting RussellA
You say:
Quoting RussellA
but when I asked:
Quoting Fooloso4
your response was:
Quoting RussellA
Once again, whose version of the PRS are you relying on?
And again, the Webb telescope makes known to us events that were previously unknown. According to Leibniz version, the reason for the existence of these events is present in the events whether we are aware of the event or not. The reason is inherent to the event, not to our knowledge of it.
There is no one version of the PSR. There are different formulations. The PSR is a family of principles (SEP - PSR).
For Leibniz, God knows all events whether known or unknown by humans. I am making the case that in the absence of a God, it wouldn't be sensible to apply a PSR to unknown events.
Is there any argument that could explain how we can know something about an unknown event, such as the unknown event having a reason?
And which of those versions says that it is contingent on our knowing that an event has occurred? Or is that your own contribution?
Quoting RussellA
How does our knowing that an event has occurred affect the event such that prior to our knowledge of it it did not or might not have a reason for occurring? We can now see events that occurred millions of years ago, how does our seeing it now but not previously change what occurred or why it occurred?
Quoting RussellA
We cannot say anything about an event we know nothing about, but we do know that billions of events occurred without our knowledge of them occurring until billions of years later. In what way does our coming to know them change the reason for them occurring?
There is no one definitive version of the PSR.
You interpret the PSR as saying that every event, known or unknown, must have a reason.
Quoting Fooloso4
I don't believe that the PSR can logically be formulated to apply to unknown events.
===============================================================================
Quoting Fooloso4
I agree that our seeing an event that occurred millions of years ago doesn't change the original event
It might be that the original event occurred for a reason, or it might be that the original event occurred for no reason. EG, if an event happens where two single objects come together to form two objects, in what sense can the reason for two objects be two single objects.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a principle, and principles only exist in the mind.
When the original event happened, the event wasn't following the principle that it could only happen if there was a reason.
As principles only exist in the mind, the mind can only apply principles to things it knows about, meaning that the mind cannot apply principles to things it doesn't know about.
The original event wasn't determined by a Principle. It is only the mind that can determine whether an event followed a Principle, and these can only be events known by the mind.
===============================================================================
Quoting Fooloso4
I agree when you say that we cannot say anything about an event we know nothing about.
But then you say we can say something about an event we know nothing about, ie, that it must have a reason.
That is not what I asked. I asked which version says that it is contingent on our knowing that an event has occurred.
Quoting RussellA
Then you reject every version of the PSR that does not explicitly state that the principle only applies to events we know of.
Quoting RussellA
It makes an ontological claim.
Quoting RussellA
How do you know that?
Quoting RussellA
The principle does not determine the event. The event occurs in accord with the principle. The principle is not the cause.
Quoting RussellA
That is not what I said. What I said was:
Quoting Fooloso4
I gave the example of Quoting Fooloso4. Until recently we did not know it existed. We now know it does. According to the PSR it must have a reason for existing. That reason was not created by our discovery of it.
There are no definitive versions of the PSR. The PSR is a family of principles.
The PSR may be factive, true in actual or possible worlds, or regulative, guiding our study of nature.
===============================================================================
Quoting Fooloso4
Principles exist in the mind, not outside the mind.
===============================================================================
Quoting Fooloso4
I can understand a principle that states that we know that things we know about must have a reason, but I find it hard to accept a principle that states that we know that things we don't even know about must have a reason.
Do you know of any argument justifying how we can know that something that we don't even know about must have a reason?
We could continue to go round and round, but I won't.
That's the PSR on the metaphysics side. The PSR on the epistemology side demands that explanations be no more than necessary. This is because the PSR is so strict that it not only demands a reason for the data, but also demands a reason to posit the explanation itself. Thus, the explanation is posited to account for the data, and the data must support the explanation. If the explanation is more than necessary, it means it is not supported by the data, and thus it fails the PSR.
Quoting Clearbury
Logic is a first principle of epistemology. This is defended in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR", steps 1 to 4. As a first principle of epistemology, an appeal to logic is a valid form of reasoning that fulfills the PSR.
Logical necessity is a type of sufficient reason. It is reason type 1 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics".
If we can verify everything in the universe, then we know everything in the universe.
We cannot verify everything in the universe.
Therefore we don't know everything in the universe.
==========================================
"Therefore the PSR is makes sense." is not true.
Prove Q
P -> Q
R -> P
~R
~P
=======
~Q
What do you think of this proof?
The argument was to prove Q is untrue.
P -> Q was an assumption.
R -> P was an assumption too.
But we know that by the fact, R is not true (~R), which infers P is not true too (~P). It wasn't a denial of the antecedent. The antecedent which was assumed true was proved untrue. Therefore by MP, Q is untrue. Does this make sense?
We're going on circles. No, they're two completely distinct principles. One says everything has an explanation. The other says that, other things being equal, the simpler explanation is the true one. Or that we have reason to think the simpler is the true one (for it won't necessarily be true).
They're just quite plainly distinct
You haven't answered the question. What explains it?
OK, good point. How about this?
P -> Q
Q -> R
~P
~R
~(P -> R)
~R
Therefore ~Q (Contranegative MT)
Sure. The reason I used the example of a triangle is because it is easy to understand its identity or essence, and thereby also understand its essential and non-essential properties.
But some things in the real world also have metaphysical identities or essences. Even if we suppose that the world is merely physical, which means that everything supervenes on matter and energy, then at least matter and energy have identities (i.e. as matter is not the same thing as energy, they have different identities), and thus also have essential properties. E.g. matter has the essential properties of having a mass, volume, shape, etc. So, if a thing is made of matter, then it necessarily follows that it has a mass.
Quoting Relativist
If I understand correctly, you say that the first cause's existence is necessary, but only because there is no prior cause and not because its existence is an essential property of its identity. But then, how do you explain the fact that its existence is necessary, if not inherently? If this fact is left unexplained, then it violates the PSR.
What is questionable about the PSR?
Quoting Fooloso4
I did not use the word "super-natural". We should simply try to follow the rules of the PSR to its logical conclusion. And my conclusion is that a thing whose existence is essential is necessary to explain the existence of all other contingent things, including the laws of nature. If you can point out an error in the reasoning, then fair, and if not, then the conclusion stands.
Is logical necessity a brute fact?
For example, is the logical necessity that "A triangle has three sides" a brute fact?
A Brute Fact has no explanation.
I am not clear on the distinction between logical necessity and brute fact.
For example, there is something that has three sides and is named triangle.
In what sense is "triangle" an explanation of "something that has three sides"?
If not an explanation, then it is a brute fact that a "triangle" is "something that has three sides"
In that case, the Unrestricted PSR is no longer valid.
This is still not clear to me. What is R is F? Is it a misspelling? Or F for False?
From the assumption R -> P, but we know ~R is true. So we introduce ~R, which makes ~R <-> ~P
It says about the P, that P must be ~P.
It proves ~Q.
P -> Q
~P
~Q
So your comment,
Quoting tim wood
is unclear. Could you please confirm the point? Thanks.
Could you not do following?
P -> Q
~P
Therefore ~Q
We have been through this already.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
When natural explanations cannot explain why there is anything at all you resort to a super-natural explanation even if you do not use that word.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
This is circular reasoning.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
All other contingent things? Something whose existence is necessary is not something that is contingent. If all natural things are contingent then what is necessary is not something natural but rather the cause of what is natural.
Why must there be a reason for what is? Positing a principle that there must be is circular and question begging.
According to L. S. Cauman (First-order Logic: An Introduction 1998, pp.29), introducing more premises and inducing the chain-rule derivation in arguments gives us more logically tight proof rather than just relying on the simplest MT or MP.
Are you not just talking from Truth table, that nothing may be concluded about the status of Q?
Remember, we were to prove whether Q is true or not. P -> Q is an assumption introduced to embark on the proof.
From the proof process, we came to know that the assumption P -> Q is not true, which infers Q not true. This is a proof process, not Truth table.
The proof is inspired by the Cauman's book "First Order Logic". MP MT and also chain-rule are all in use in the proof.
~P, ~R was from chain rule, but ~R therefore ~Q is MT.
Q -> R
~R
Therefore ~Q
They are all there. It is just the chain-rule derivation was adopted in introducing the premises.
This doesn't imply that an object has "necessary" or "contingent" as an intrinsic property. You're still just equating a definition with essence, defining matter as an object that has volume, shape, mass, etc. Either an object has those properties (in which case it is "matter") or it does not (in which case it is not "matter"). Defining a term with some set of properties doesn't entail that any objects have an individual essence. And the only role of "necessity" in this is the necessity of having the defined set of properties in order to be classified with the term.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
That's basically true, but it's based on the principle that contingency needs to be accounted for.
If you use the simplest definition of the PSR, that everything (both necessary and contingent) has an explanation of its existence, then there would be an infinite vicious regress of explanations. Should we prefer 1) a vicious infinite regress, in order to keep the PSR intact, 2) entirely reject the PSR because of this, or 3) redefine the PSR to exclude something foundational?
I think the latter is the most reasonable option. There can be no explanation for the foundation of existence, and (as noted) it can't be contingent. Since it's not contingent, its existence is logically necessary: it can't not exist.. (i.e. if the foundation of existence didn't exist, there would be no existence at all; which is logically impossible because we obviously exist). You are free to assume this foundation = a god, although it obviously doesn't entail a god.
That was what I was pointing out to you. You seem to be totally relying on truth table for the value of Q. This is not a truth table case. It is a proof process based on the inference and reasoning.
From the introduction of P -> Q, we know ~P, hence the assumption P -> Q was not true.
Therefore we can make a logical inference ~Q.
This problem had been in discussion before a few times.
If you say, prove the ground is wet. You would bringing an assumption, If it rains, ground is wet.
But you find out, it doesn't rain. Therefore (from the assumption) you can prove the ground wet is not true. Why is it still true, the assumption is true? (when the antecedent is false?) This is what you are saying, and it is a rule. But if the rule doesn't make sense in real life, do you still have to go by the rule?
Quoting tim wood
I am trying to do some reading on Logic this holiday period, and try to brush up the practical side of Logic. I thought the Cauman book was quite good. It reads quite well. But perhaps I could get another 1 - 2 books to compare on these fuzzy points. Any recommendations?
Let's see... Me buying milk today was logically necessary, because I obviously did buy milk. That's not right, is it? Logic cannot imply existence or non-existence, necessity or contingency of anything outside its universe. The only way you can get the necessity of our existence as a logical conclusion is if you front-load it with postulated propositions, but that would be question-begging in the present context.
I think you confused logical contradiction with performative contradiction of denying your own existence.
That's not my reasoning.
Your buying milk was contingent iff the purchase was contingent upon something. If your purchase was the product of libertarian free will, then it was contingent upon your will making the decision.
OTOH, if determinism is true, then your choice to make the purchase was logically necessary, given your genetic makeup and history. There may be quantum indeterminism somewhere in the past that influenced your history or genetic makeup- in which case, your purchase was contingent upon the outcomes of those indeterminate events.
The first cause cannot have been contingent upon anything, because nothing is prior to it. So, whatever it actually was, it is metaphysically impossible for it to have been anything else.
Quoting tim wood
Great explanation! :up: I appreciate that. Thank you.
What follows doesn't resemble your reasoning above, either:
Quoting Relativist
In any case, your conclusion is incorrect:
Quoting Relativist
Contingency and necessity are context-dependent. In ordinary usage (let's leave logic out of it - as I already explained, it does not apply here), this contextual meaning is usually unproblematic. We can recast it in terms of constraints: contingent events or choices are those that are not fully constrained by facts and assumptions that go into our reasoning, necessary ones are constrained to a single outcome, and impossible ones are ruled out. However, what those constraints are taken to be can vary widely, depending on discourse.
When it comes to the necessity or contingency of the world, the problem statement is so far outside ordinary usage of these words that it is not at all clear what is being asked. You interpret the question as being solely about event causation (without explaining your choice). Given such framing, a superficially plausible conclusion could be to say that the first cause must be contingent, since nothing constrains it - which is the opposite of what you concluded. But this too would be wrong.
The presumed absence of constraints on the origin of the world does not imply a multiplicity of possible outcomes, because there is no space of outcomes given to us. Note that I said "no space" - not an empty space and not a singleton space [consisting of a single possibility]. The latter is what you would need to make your conclusion of necessity, but assuming such a singleton space would beg the question. Assuming any space of possibilities would take you outside your original formulation, and so, the right conclusion is simply that contingency/necessity does not apply in this degenerate scenario.
I disagree. I don't see any reason to call this a "degenerate scenario". Everything that exists, either exists contingently or necessarily: they are the converse of each other; there is no third option.
Take it as a premise that there is a first cause/foundation of existence- because that's what we're analyzing here. The context of the discussion is metaphysics- so the relevant modality is metaphysical possibility/necessity. Discussions like this often mistake conceptual possibility with metaphysical possibility. Just because I can conceive of a world grounded in a different first cause does not mean an alternative first cause is metaphysically possible.
I've proposed that it is a metaphysical axiom that contingency needs to be accounted for: X is contingent iff whatever accounts for X could possibly account for ~X. In the absence of such an account, X is metaphyically necessary. A first cause is not accounted for by anything else, therefore it cannot be contingent. This conclusion follows from my axiom
Why believe this axiom to be true? Because it's consistent with what we know about the world through physics. Events that are the product of classical physics are not contingent: causes necessitate their effects. OTOH, quantum mechanical events have a "space of possibilities" (a probability distribution), so the specific outcome is contingent (although the specific space of possibilities is necessitated by the quantum system - which evolves deterministically per a Schroedinger equation). So the laws of nature suggest the world is basically deterministic (outcomes are necessitated) with contingency present only where there is quantum indeterminacy (with a necessitated probability distribution of outcomes).
You also alluded to an "absence of constraints" applying (I assume) to a first cause. It is contrained to being whatever it was, conceptual possibilities notwithstanding.
You have explained the case of truth table application very succinctly in your previous post. I understand exactly what you mean on all your points.
However, you seem to be in confusion for this particular case of the proof I have shown in my post.
What you are saying is totally based on truth table cases dealing with purely symbolic logic i.e. you don't know or care what the content of the antecedent or conclusion in the -> statement. Of course in that case, you must take account of all the cases of Q, which could be T or F. You don't know what the status of Q is. You have explained that, and I agree with that.
In this case, we know the content of the antecedent and conclusion of the -> statement.P -> Q was introduced for an assumption. We don't need to be worried about the case where Q is T or F. Because Q will be totally dependent on P being T or F.
Think of an example. If I was told to prove if I am a millionaire, I would start with an assumption If I won the lottery jackpot tonight, I am a millionaire. It is just an assumption introduced for the proof process.
If I won the lottery jackpot tonight, then I am a millionaire .I am a millionaire totally and solely dependent on the fact of the antecedent "If I win the lottery jackpot". In this case, I don't need to worry about whether I am a millionaire is T or F. Because it would totally depend on the antecedent "If I won the lottery jackpot".
So I introduce (discharge) a factual statement, I have not won the lottery jackpot, which proves (based on the antecedent which is found not true), I am not a millionaire (which is True), which proves the original statement Q (I am a millionaire) was False. Remember this is not a denial of the antecedent. It is a fact from the real world case.
Therefore your points are correct under the book and truth table application method. But you are totally under the confusion in insisting that you don't know what the content of Q was, blindly thinking Q is just Q, not thinking at all about the fact the we know the content of Q. The content of Q was given out at the very first, prove that "I am a millionaire."
P ->Q is based on the assumption P (If I won lottery jackpot), which we also know the details of the content, and was found as F from the real world case. In this case, you don't need to think about the case where Q is T or F.
You apply truth table when all you have are the symbols bereft of any content of the symbols like in the textbooks. Because you cannot verify the symbols with the real world cases you are trying to prove. However, when you know the content of the symbols, you don't apply all the cases in truth table. Because you can verify the P or Q from the real world observations, deductions or inferences.
Remember textbook truth table tells you how the symbols in the propositions gets T F value in all cases. They are not telling you anything about the the proof processes in the real life which you must take into account prior to examining the symbols.
Quoting tim wood
Quoting Corvus
You could already be a millionaire prior to the lottery drawing.
Why make it more complicated? When you can
P -> Q
~P
Therefore ~Q
Truth table is for the classical logic, and has serious limitations. If you read some First Order Logic books, you would see they use axioms and real life case verifications in the proof rather than Truth tables.
In which case, Q would have been proved without the proof process.
An example of logic would be the Modus Ponens. i) IF P THEN Q ii) P iii) THEN Q
Let P and Q be physical facts, such that P = it rains and Q = I get wet
In Ordinary Language:
The reason I get wet is because it rains.
The cause of my getting wet is because it is raining.
Reason and cause can be purely logical:
The reason for Q is P providing that IF P THEN Q.
The cause of Q is P providing that IF P THEN Q.
Such logic may then be applied to physical facts.
Reason and cause are treated the same.
You are still totally dismissing the fact P was verified as ~P from a real life event. When P is ~P, then it can be inferred ~P -> ~Q proving ~Q. It is not a groundless denial of the antecedent, but an assertion verified from the fact.
I have agreed that your points makes sense too, but only from the Classic Logic point of view. You seem not applying the proof methods using the Axioms, inference, implications and real world events in the proof process.
I thought it was proved and explained already in the previous posts, but you seem to disagree, or haven't read it at all. That's fair enough. Maybe you still have points on the issue, or missed what I was saying. I am not saying that you are totally wrong here.
I am saying your point seem to be coming from the Classic Logic theory which is mainly based on utilizing Truth Table ignoring the fact that the modern logical proofs are done using the Axioms and real life events.
I am reading some Logic books now, and trying to expand my knowledge on the subject. If I find anything relevant and interesting to our topic in discussion, I will get back to you. Thank you for your feedback.
You seem to keep writing contradictory posts. You suggest to stop, but at the same time you insist to provide a proof. Isn't it a real waste of time? I suggest you to read some First Order Logic books. If you cannot see from P -> Q, ~P, therefore ~Q, then you are not reasoning at all. Ok, I will leave you to it. All the best.
Quoting Corvus
I thought I was clear, obviously not. I've bolded the key phrase. As you acknowledged, this is simply not the case - your being a millionaire is clearly NOT dependent on winning the lottery. For your example to work, it needs to be re-phrased. I can think of two options:
1 - Add an additional qualifier: If I was not previously a millionaire, then etc etc . .
OR
2 - Get rid of the "totally and solely dependent". E.g., If I win the lottery jackpot then I will be a millionaire
Maybe the millionaire example was not clear. Try with these example cases.
If X=0, then X+1 = 1
X = 2
Therefore X+1 = 3
The statement X=2, tells that
X=0 was not true.
Until the value of X is known, nothing is known in the premise.
X=2 decides the variable X and T or F of P and Q.
It also tells X+1=1 is false too.
X+1=3 is true.
If John is in Tokyo, then John is in Japan.
John is in Paris (not in Tokyo). <=== A fact from real life situation.
Therefore John is not in Japan.
P -> Q
~P
Therefore ~Q
You don't need more complication in the proof here.
You use axioms and facts in reality as the verification statements instead of the antique Truth table.
Very well. Then we can drop this topic.
Quoting Clearbury
I have provided the reason why we know that logic exists on the epistemology side. Then the reason why logic exists on the metaphysics side is because, being a first principle of epistemology, it is also a first principle of metaphysics; i.e. logic is part of the fabric of reality. With that, the existence of logic is explained inherently (reason type 1 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics").
No, nothing is a brute fact under the unrestricted PSR. Logic has a reason for existing, as provided in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR". The section explains why logic is a first principle of epistemology. Then, the reason why logic exists on the metaphysics side is because, being a first principle of epistemology, it is also a first principle of metaphysics; i.e. logic is part of the fabric of reality. With that, the existence of the laws of logic is explained inherently (reason type 1 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics").
Quoting RussellA
No, this is a logical necessity only because it describes its own definition, which is man-made. "A triangle, defined as a shape that has 3 sides, has 3 sides". A=A.
Very well. Then no need to repeat the conversation, and we can leave this topic here.
Quoting Fooloso4
I am unclear on what you mean by "natural" vs "super-natural". How do you define those two terms?
"And my conclusion is that a thing whose existence is essential is necessary to explain the existence of all other contingent things" A Christian Philosophy
Quoting Fooloso4
What I meant is, "And my conclusion is that a thing whose existence is essential is necessary to explain the existence of all other things, which all happen to be contingent."
Quoting Fooloso4
The PSR is defended in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR".
Hmmm. I'll have to think some more about that one. But it can wait as I believe it is not critical to the main discussion.
Quoting Relativist
There can be an internal explanation: the existence of the first cause is explained inherently if its existence is part of its essence. In other words, the proposition "the first cause, whose existence is part of its essence, exists" is a tautology, and tautologies are necessarily true, and their negations are necessarily self-contradictory. In this way, the PSR is kept intact.
As I understand, you are willing to redefine the PSR because you deny essences. But why deny essences? Note, I acknowledge that most things do not have essences, but I believe that some things do.
To me, "essence" suggests a set of necessary and sufficient properties that uniquely identify an existing, individual object. Existence isn't a property; that would imply there are objects in the world that lack it - which is absurd. All objects in the world exist.
Perhaps you mean something else. If so, explain what you mean, and why anyone should accept such a metaphysical framework. I'm on the lookout for contrivances that are devised to rationalize a God to the exclusion of a purely natural first cause.
Is a logical necessity a sufficient reason or a Brute Fact.
I agree that:
1) The Unrestricted PSR states that everything has a sufficient reason
2) "Logic is part of the fabric of reality"
3) Logically A = A
However, what is the reason that A = A?
What is the reason for the existence of logic?
If logic has no reason, then logic is a Brute Fact.
Brute Facts are unexplainable and uncaused.
That logic is part of the fabric of reality is not sufficient reason why logic is part of the fabric of reality.
If, for example, A = A is a brute fact, then the Unrestricted PSR is no longer valid.
As regards your argument that "logic has a reason for existing"
I agree that
1) Truth means conformity with Reality
2) We discover Truth using Reason
3) Reason uses Deduction and Induction
4) An example of Deduction = i) the sun rises in the east, ii) therefore tomorrow the sun will rise in the east
5) An example of Induction = i) for the past 100 days the sun has risen in the east, ii) therefore the sun rises in the east.
6) If reason can find truth, then reason must mirror reality.
However, I don't agree that
1) "deduction is equivalent to the principle (or laws) of logic, in that deduction is based on an axiom (the sun rises in the east) that may or may not be true.
2) "induction is equivalent to the principle of sufficient reason", in that induction is assuming the regularity of nature, which may or may not be true, as pointed out by Hume.
3) "Reason finds truth", in that there is no logical necessity that either deduction or induction find the truth.
IE, we have no reason to think that logic has a reason for existing.
If logic has no reason for existing, then logic is a brute fact.
If logic is a brute fact, then the Unrestricted PSR is not valid.
Good catch Tim. I would put it slightly differently - there are missing steps/facts in Corvus' "logic":
Quoting Corvus
P is irrelevant to getting ~Q. Of course this is all loosey-goosey and not formal 1st order logic
I thought you wanted to stop discussing on this topic from your last post. I am surprised to see you keep replying.
The point here is, that the proof is about whether John is in Japan or not. (Q or not Q). It is not about whether John is in Tokyo or Osaka or anywhere in Japan. If John is in Tokyo, then he is in Japan was an assumption for the proof (Q or not Q). But the assertion from the reality was John is in Paris, which proves John is not in Japan.
This is such a simple logic, but you are worrying about whether John is in any other part of Japan, which is irrelevant for the proof.
Anyhow, this was a sideline thought for proving the PSR is not valid. It is not related directly to the OP. Hence we better stop at here. If you feel that this is a worthy of a separate OP, please go and start one. I don't think it is worth for a new OP with this topic, because it is such a simple and basic stuff.
But if you feel so, do so. Thank you for your feedback. Good luck.
Roughly, natural explanations do not introduce anything outside the natural world. It rejects the idea that the world is contingent and requires a necessary cause, that is, a super or supra-natural cause that is above or beyond the limits of the natural world and on which the world is dependent.
The PSR says that everything - everything - has an explanation. So what's the explanation of it?
Essence is the same as identity, metaphysically speaking. As per the law of identity, everything has an identity. But sometimes a thing supervenes on more fundamental parts such that it gets its identity not from the whole but from the parts. E.g. a rock supervenes on fundamental physical elements like matter and energy, and so the rock does not have its own identity but gets its from its fundamental physical elements. Since the fundamental physical elements do not supervene on anything more fundamental (by definition of being fundamental), then their properties are essential to their identity.
Quoting Relativist
Some objects lack existence. Otherwise, the following propositions would not make sense, but they do.
In contrast, the proposition "a being, whose essence is to have existence, does not exist" would not make sense. (Of course, we would need to defend why a being has that essence before claiming that such a being exists).
It's not a synonym. I think you're saying that an identity has a unique essence. But that still leaves "essence" undefined. You later said, "a being, whose essence is to have existence". This suggests "existing" is an essence (part of an essence?).
Suppose there is a fundamental layer of reality, for example: 20-dimensional strings. Everything is composed of them, and they are not composed of anything deeper. These strings exist at all times and locations. Does this fit your paradigm of having "existence" as part of its "essence"?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Events aren't objects; they are points (or intervals) in time. By "object", I'm refering to ontological objects- things that exist. You're conflating concepts (or definitions) with "objects".
We can refer to objects in the past, present, or future. But when we refer to unicorns, we aren't refering to objects that ever have, or ever will, exist - they are merely concepts -words with no referents to anything in time or space. You again seem to be treating a definition as a thing's essence (as you did with triangles).
You said. [I]"a rock supervenes on fundamental physical elements like matter and energy, and so the rock does not have its own identity but gets its from its fundamental physical elements. "[/i]
If physicalism is true, the same thing can be said about you and me, as you say about the rock. This suggests you're assuming physicalism is false. Is that correct? If so, then your paradigm can't be used to show some form of immaterialism is true- because that's a premise.
As per the OP section "Argument in defence of the PSR", logic (and the PSR) are first principles of metaphysics. This means they exist in all possibe worlds, which means they have necessary existence. Thus, logic and the PSR exist necessarily or inherently. This is an internal reason which is valid under the PSR.
Note, I am away for the next couple of days. I will read and respond to subsequent comments early next week.
Thank you for the definition; however I am still unclear because I am not sure what "natural world" means. Does "natural" only mean things in the world that we already know of, and "super-natural" means things that we don't know of yet? To me, both a necessary cause and contingent causes would be part of the same world or reality. The only difference is that the necessary cause has not been observed yet; although it can be deduced.
Note, I am away for the next couple of days. I will read and respond to subsequent comments early next week.
Something that is fundamental or basic can still meet the PSR as long as it has necessary existence. This would be an internal reason which is valid under the PSR. Now, we said that the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics. This means it exists in all possible worlds, which means it has necessary existence.
Note, I am away for the next couple of days. I will read and respond to subsequent comments early next week.
No. When you say:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
that is an indication that you know the difference. What is natural means what can be explained, to the extent it can be explained, by the laws of nature. It is because you accept the idea that everything must have a cause and reject the idea that the laws of nature are self-caused that you "deduce" that there must be something that causes the laws of nature. Rather than questioning the principle that there must be a cause you simply posit the existence of one because you believe that there must be one.
Rather than the problem of an infinite regress, the problem is one of the limits of human reason.
There are many different type of logic, suggesting that no one logic exists necessarily. For example, there is Propositional Logic, First Order Logic, Second order logic , Higher order logic, Fuzzy logic, Modal logic, Intuitionistic Logic, Dialetheism, etc.
Logical systems also change, also suggesting that no one logical system is necessary. For example, today few would maintain that Aristotle's logic doesn't have serious limitations.
The Law of Identity "A is A" is one of the three Laws of Thought.
The Laws of Thought are axiomatic rules, taken to be true to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and argument. In other words, taken to be true but not necessarily true.
The Law of Identity was described as fundamental by Aristotle, as primitive by Leibniz and to a certain extent arbitrary by George Boole.
"A is A" exists as a convenient axiom, not as a necessity.
The PSR states that everything has a sufficient reason. It is true that we use the Law of Identity "A is A" for a reason, but this is an external reason, in that it is convenient for further reasoning and argument. This is not a "sufficient reason" in terms of the PSR
We use the Law of Identity as an axiom as a convenience not because it has any internal necessity.
The Law of Identity, as an example of logic, is used for the external reason that it is convenient in further reasoning, not from any reason of internal necessity.
A necessary existence is something that exists and can't not. That is just a description of what one would be, not an explanation of its existence.
Therein lies the problem. The PSR says everything has an explanation. Not some things and not others. Not contingent existences but not necessary existences. Everything.
Labelling something a necessary existence does nothing to explain it. THus, any necessary existence you posit has itself to be given an explanation.
Labelling something 'a thing that needs no explanation' or 'a thing that has its explanation in itself' is no explanation of why those things exist.
Here is a different way to make the same point. Let's just posit a necessary existence. And let's suppose that there is a necessarily existing light source behind this necessary existence. Well, now there is also a necessary shadow being cast by the interaction between the necessarily existing object and the necessarily existing light source.
But note that the shadow, though it exists of necessity, is explained by the light and the object. Thus, one cannot treat 'exists necessarily' as synonymous with 'needs no explanation'. The shadow exists of necessity, yet it clearly needs - and has - an explanation.
Well, that now applies to the object and the light source too and to any other necessary existent you care to posit.
Going from logic to metaphysics hardly clears things up.
Quoting Relativist
It does, if one accepts your idiosyncratic definitions of contingency and necessity (and accounting as well), but that makes the conclusion an inconsequential triviality. Physics has nothing to do with it - it is just an exercise in postulating what you want, which has the same advantages as the advantages of theft over honest toil, as Russell once said.
Quoting Relativist
Constrained by what? Your metaphysical axioms?
I've been very reluctant to respond to you given your desire not to continue the conversation, but the thing is - we're on the same side regarding the OP. I agree with you that PSR is nonsensical. And I also feel that maybe I did not explain things well enough. So please take what I'm saying here in the spirit of constructive criticism - I'm not trying to belittle you.
So first of all, of course if John is in Paris then he is not in Japan. As my kids would say - "Duh dad!". You don't need any premises or propositional logic or truth tables to figure this out. All you need is common sense and some rudimentary geography.
But once you say this:
P->Q
~P
~Q
you are now using (at least) propositional logic which has a very specific set of rules - and if you do not follow those rules you will get called out. Some basic rules are:
P = P
~P = ~P
You are saying that P is "John is in Tokyo". No problem there. But then ~P is "John is not in Tokyo".
Saying that "John is in Paris" obviously contradicts P by common sense, but it is not the same thing as ~P. If this were the case (which it isn't) then you would have an infinite number of different ~Ps that contradict each other:
"John is in Paris" is <> "John is in Oslo"
which yields
~P <> ~P
which is obviously wrong.
If "John is in Tokyo" then "John is in Japan", but if "John is not in Tokyo" then John could be some other place in Japan.
I hope you find this helpful.
It sounds like you have never heard of "reductio ad absurdum" in Logical Proof.
If John is in Paris is claimed as the axiom or fact in this proof above, then it gives a logical implication that John is not anywhere in Japan.
Again, no one is disagreeing with this.
Quoting Corvus
Of course - but reductio ad absurdum is not part of propositional logic.
I'll try one more time. Once you say P->Q, ~P, ~Q you are (at a minimum) in the world of propositional logic and your proof must follow the rules of propositional logic.
If P is of the form "X has property Y"?
~P is not "X has property Z"
~P is "X does not have property Y"
I can't make it any clearer. And now I'll give you the last word.
I am not seeing a point why anyone would prison himself in the cage of the ancient propositional logic and the truth table in logical proof process.
When it was claimed that, John is in Paris in the introduced assumption of the argument, if one still doesn't know John is not in Japan, then
1. he has no knowledge in the world geography.
2. he does not have ability to reason.
So why bother.
Actually, I take them to be synonymous. But I'll explain what I mean by identity: If we can say "A is nothing but B", then A does not have its own identity and it supervenes on B. E.g. "A rock is nothing but molecules put together", and therefore a rock does not have its own identity. But we cannot say "A is nothing but B" forever. At some point, we reach the bottom. This bottom has its own identity.
Quoting Relativist
It's a supposition, but yes. Being fundamental, these strings do not supervene on anything else, and thus have their own identity. Since we identify these as existing always, existence is an essential property.
Quoting Relativist
Would a horse count as an ontological object? If so, then we can still say that before horses existed, then they did not have existence. If not, then what do you consider as objects?
Quoting Relativist
While I am not a physicalist, I am not assuming that physicalism is false in this discussion. Depending on where the above points end up, I can try to come up with better examples later.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Sure, horses are ontological objects. No objects that we define as horses existed prior to some earlier specific point of time. Although we can say "horses didn't have existence prior to that point of time", it doesn't mean there's a metaphysical object "horse" that sometimes exists and sometimes doesn't.
All objects exist at points of time, irrespective of whether anyone has defined, or categorized, them. What we typically refer to as an "individual identity" is a unique category of causally-temporally connected point-in-time objects. IOW, I'm a perdurantist.
Two things.
1) The PSR does not state that everything must have a cause (that's the principle of causality), but that everything must have a sufficient reason - for which a cause is one of several types of reasons.
2) Nothing can be self-caused because an effect cannot be its own cause. But a thing can be self-explained or have an internal reason. E.g. if a thing has existence inherently, then its existence is self-explained because the proposition "a thing with inherent existence exists" is a tautology, and tautologies are always true.
Quoting Fooloso4
The PSR as a first principle of metaphysics has been defended in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR", and as a principle, there cannot be any exceptions.
Note, I'll be away for a couple of days again for the Christmas break.
There are several branches of logic but the science of logic as a whole is one coherent system. E.g. fuzzy logic is a branch that may be more suitable than other branches in some cases, but the different branches of logic do not contradict each other.
Note, I'll be away for a couple of days again for the Christmas break.
I'll unpack the explanation: if a thing has necessary or inherent existence, then the proposition "this thing, whose existence is inherent, exists" is a tautology, and tautologies are necessarily true; while their negations are self-contradictory and thus necessarily false. This type of explanation fulfills the PSR.
Quoting Clearbury
This is because the shadow exists out of causal necessity (reason type 2 in the OP under section "PSR in Metaphysics") and not logical necessity (reason type 1). Things with causal necessity need further explanations because the cause, being a separate thing, must be explained. Things with logical necessity do not need further explanations because there is no other separate thing to explain.
Note, I'll be away for a couple of days again for the Christmas break.
So, an 'existent thing' is the label for something that exists. Now, by definition something that exists, exists. Everything that exists is an existent thing - there. Have I just explained everything? No, of course not. I've explained precisely nothing.
As far as I can see, that is what you've attempted above. It's not in dispute that a necessarily existing thing exists and can't not. But if the PSR is true, then there will be an explanation of that. You haven't provided one, I think.
What about the mathematical and analytical tools that are used to determine what in the world exists, especially on the scales of the atomic or cosmological. Are they themselves also things that exist? (I seem to recall that atomic physics relies heavily on the imaginary number the square root of minus one in normalisation procedures, which would suggest not. ) For that matter, there's Terrence Deacon's absentials which are also defined as not materially existent but often amongst the definining properties of entential activities. From the glossary entry:
Absentials do not exist, but play a defining role in the existence of what he calls ententional agents.
Quoting Fooloso4
While I can see your point, natural theology will suggest that the regularities and rationally-intelligible principles that constitute what we describe as natural laws suggest a prior cause. And indeed that the whole idea of apriori truths implicitly suggests it. The fact that science itself can't explain scientific laws is no fault of science, but it does legitimately imply a deeper level of explanation than the scientific. One could argue among the aims of philosophy is to discern the boundary of what can be explained in terms of natural laws, and to intuit what may lie beyond it, even if it can't be stated in scientific terms.
Quoting Clearbury
As the OP is on Christmas break (which strictly speaking I also am, but never mind), I'll volunteer a response. The point about necessary being is that it needs no explanation. It is the terminus of explanation for all question about 'why is that the case?' A trivial example is the case of a simple arithmetical equation, what is the sum of two plus two? The answer of course is 'four' and there is no point in asking why it is. Asking "why is 2 + 2 = 4?" misconstrues the nature of necessity. The explanation for such truths lies in their self-evidence within the system within which they're true, and no further "why" can be meaningfully posed.
Similarly, in metaphysics, the idea of a necessary being functions as the ultimate 'terminus of explanation' under the principle of sufficient reason. The PSR asserts that everything must have an explanation, either in terms of an external cause or in terms of its own nature. For contingent beings, the PSR demands a cause or reason external to themselves. But for a necessary being, its necessity is its explanation.
A logic system is built on axioms.
From The Foundations of Logical Reasoning: Axioms of Logic
Axioms are assumptions taken to be true
From Wikipedia - Axiom
As any logic system is built on axioms, which are assumptions taken to be true, no one logic system exists necessarily.
You are circling the drain. Repeating the same claims as if they are truths.
Perhaps the pursuit of natural theology is to forsake wisdom as it is understood in the wisdom literature of the Hebrew Bible. Perhaps the attempt to understand God in terms of rational principles is a misguided attempt to understand a God who is understood, to the extent he is understood, as willful.
Quoting Wayfarer
One could also argue that an appeal to intuition is in this case to mistake the imagination for intellection in the sense it is used in Plato's divided line.
Abstractions do not exist independently in the world. They reflect relations between things that do exist; so they exist immanently.
Here's my example: 'A thing that exists and needs no explanation'. I am going to call that a ticketyboo.
Have I just proved that at least one ticketyboo exists? No.
Can I explain the existence of a ticketyboo by pointing out that, by definition, it exists and has no explanation? No.
The PSR says everything has an explanation. If there are exceptions, then it is false.
That's the main problem.
A second problem is that necessary things confer necessity on anything they explain. The things they explain would also exist of necessity. Yet they'd be explicable (so it is false that if something exists of necessity it lacks an explanation). Plus, not everything that exists seems to exist of necessity.
It seems to me, then, that it is illogical - a contradiction - to think that the PSR implies the existence of necessary objects. It doesn't - can't do. And it is false that necessary things lack explanations (for anything a necessary object explains will also exist of necessity, yet will have an explanation). And it is false that labelling something a necessary thing constitutes an explanation of its existence. That's how things seem to me at present. Not that I'm endorsing the PSR or denying that there may be necessary existences. I'm just pointing out inconsistencies in the original poster's position.
I don't know if it does. It says that everything that exists has a reason for its existence. But everything that exists is the domain of phenomena, 'what appears'. The 'first cause', whether conceived of as a personalistic God or not, is not something that exists, but the condition of the possibility of the existence of everything that exists. It's on a different ontological level to what exists - that's what 'transcendence' means. (See God Does Not Exist.)
Quoting Clearbury
Hardly does justice to the topic.
By 'theological voluntarism', associated with Protestant conceptions of Divinity, and very different from the philosophical rationalism of scholastic theology.
We are talking about very different things.
I don't see a difference. By 'everything' I am referring to everything that exists. So everything that exists has an explanation (according to the PSR). I'm not endorsing the PSR, but just noting what it says and arguing that the defender of it in this thread is substituting it for a different principle, one that says that 'everything except necessarily existing things' have explanations (though this too would not get him the right result either, as this principle would render all existing things necessarily existing, which would then amount to saying that nothing has an explanation).
Quoting Wayfarer
That does not make sense to me. Something cannot come from nothing. One cannot explain the existent by citing that which does not and has not existed.
Those who try and use the PSR to show that God exists do not deny this, for if something can come from nothing then there is no need to posit God.
That is precisely what 'creation ex nihilo' means.
Quoting Clearbury
On the contrary, according to Christian doctrine, only God can create something from nothing.
I don't think you're interpreting what the OP means correctly, but I won't speak for him/her so I'll leave the thread to the OP.
At the risk of picking on a minor point, I think you need a better example of something that needs no explanation. There is nothing "necessary" about 2 + 2 = 4. In fact this depends on a number of more basic assumptions (axioms).
Quoting Wayfarer
Divine creation is not "something from nothing". It assumes God pre-exists matter, but God is something. If there is no God, then there was no state of affairs prior to the existence of matter.
All due respect, that is a red herring. It is not necessary to understand set theory to understand such basic facts as 2+2=4, they are logically necessary within arithmetic. Also consider the context in which i said it, as a simple analogy for the redundancy of the question 'why does God exist?' or 'who made God'? Necessary truthswhether mathematical or metaphysicalare not contingent on external causes or axioms but are self-existent by nature. Which is not to say that this proves anything about the reality of God, it is simply a logical point.
Quoting Relativist
But that is not so. God is not some thing, or for that matter any thing. Quite why is very hard to explain to those without any grounding in philosophical theology, and I myself only have a sketchy understanding of the subject. That is why I linked to the article, God does not Exist by Bishop Pierre Whalon. He points out that to say that God exists reduces God to another existent, merely something else in the Universe.
In broad philosophical terms, whatever exists has a beginning and an end in time, and is composed of parts. This applies to every phenomenal existent. However, God has no beginning and end in time, and is not composed of parts, and so does not exist, but is the reality which grounds existence.
This is also associated with Paul Tillich who was often accused of sailing close to atheism by many believers (link. But there are precedents back to the origin of the Christian religion, in apophatic theology, in which nothing whatever can be said about God, as God is beyond affirmation or denial. Likewise in various existentialist theologies, such as Gabriel Marcel (ref.)
This is why so many internet debates about God's existence are pointless and uncomprehending. They're what I would call 'straw God arguments'.
No. It means the act of creating something out of materials that did not previously exist. The creator already exists.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's absurd. I am not a Christian, but I am quite sure that Christians do not believe that God is nothing.
Plus we are talking about the PSR, not Christianity. And the PSR says that EVERYTHING has an explanation. Not some things and not others. Everything.
Those who try (in my view, quite misguidedly) to use PSR to make a case for God, or a divine creator of some sort, do not suppose that something can come from nothing. Again, that contradicts the PSR.
It is another basic principle of reason - one that those who appeal to the PSR to make a case for a divine creator also endorse (if they're thinking straight, anyway) - that 'from nothing, nothing comes' (Parmenides).
They - the makers of the cosmological argument, or this version of it anyway - reason that as everything has an explanation, and 'nothing' explains nothing, then there must be at least one thing that explains itself. And that thing, they then argue, is God.
I do not think that argument is sound, but we should at least be clear about what it is.
You're not.
Exactly. ... This is what Peirce was trying to explain to Dewey when Dewey was attending Peirce's lectures. Peirce confronted Dewey about his not understanding negation. What is negated maintains a relationship to that which negates it. How can we distinguish anything without holding what we are trying to distinguish it from? Attributes and qualities are more distinguishable in the 'reflection' of absence of them, and the recognition of that reflection needs to be maintained.
Peirce's critique of Dewey's understanding of negation points out the problems with improper negation. Nominalism functions as a binary 'not'a simplistic rejection that isolates itself from what it negates. Proper negation, however, is a relational act: it doesn't merely deny but holds in consideration the reality and coherence of what it negates, preserving the mutual dependency that sustains the distinction. As I often say and have written much about, "there is no 'I' without the 'not I'"; negation becomes a dynamic interplay that enriches meaning rather than impoverishing it through isolation.
If there is a God, then it exists. I believe the claim is that God is the foundation of reality - everything else is ontologically dependent on God, so clearly God isn't an object within his own creation. But "God" is a referent to something, even if it encompasses everything that exists
More to the point, God-sans-universe is a coherent concept, and it is certainly not equivalent to a state of nothingness. A state of nothingness is incoherent.
Quoting Wayfarer
A materialist ontological foundation would also exist at all times- it being the basis for everything else that exists.
The claim that God doesn't have parts has always seemed to me a special pleading. An omniscient God possesses an infinitely complex mind. That is at odds with being simple, and the notion of omniscience is prima facie implausible -I'm not aware of anyone arguing for it to be plausible.
Here's the problems. We know that knowledge is acquired, but apologists claim God just happens to possess it (magically:without having been developed). Further, knowledge entails data, and data is encoded (entailing parts). But God manages to possess knowledge with no such encoding- it just exists magically.
See the post above as to why God does not exist. I am 'engaging with something', namely, what I think is an erroneous conception of God. Consideration of the question of the divine nature takes something more than common assumptions as to 'what exists.' Note that I'm not defending belief in God, but simply outlining what 'creation ex nihilo' means, as I understand it. For a more formal, Catholic explanation, you will need to read some materials, for example Aquinas vs Intelligent Design:
Quoting Relativist
This is a very limited conception of existence. That's why I referred before to Terrence Deacon's 'absentials' from the book Incomplete Nature. He shows in great detail why things that don't actually exist - 'absentials' - are actually foundational in the doings of life and mind.
Quoting Relativist
That's because, as I explained in a previous conversation, materialist ontologies such as D M Armstrong's, are essentially derived from the theistic ontology which preceded them, with science assigned the role previously assigned to religion and scientific laws mapped against what was previously divine commandments. Karen Armstrong's book A Case for God spells out the historical precedents for that.
Quoting Relativist
Foolishness to the Greeks!
'God' is not the concept of nothing. There's no point arguing with someone who thinks otherwise. It is akin to insisting that 'God' means 'turnip' and then insisting that God exists because there's a turnip in your vegetable rack.
No Christian who deserves the title believes God is 'nothing'. That's obvious. For there is now no difference apart from in the sounds they use to refer to themselves between an atheist and a theist.
Anyway, I can't be bothered with you anymore. Bye.
Being 'beyond conception' is not 'a concept of nothing'. You proclaim that you speak for Christians, when you yourself say that you're not one, and then declare what you consider to be conceivable the criteria for what they ought to believe.
There are no doubt people in mental asylums who use the word 'God' to refer to Tuesday, or to a sack of plums, but that is not sufficient to show that the word 'God' is used that way typically. It is not. And if you use the word 'God' to refer to 'nothing' then you're not using the word properly.
And you're not even using it consistently. As 'beyond conception' doesn't mean 'nothing'. There is really little to be gained from our discussing things further.
The relevance is that God sans universe is not equivalent to nothingness. My point is that there's an implicit false dichotomy between a universe from nothingness and divine creation.
Quoting Wayfarer
Irrelevant to my point, which is that the reasoning you put forth does not ENTAIL a God. It's consistent with materialism.
I'm not endeavoring to prove materialism is true. I'm just showing that the arguments and reasoning that purport to prove a God actually do nothing of the sort.
To the best of my knowledge that's simply not the case - at least with regards to arithmetic. If you have two apples in one hand and two apples in the other you have 4 apples. If you have two apples in one hand and two oranges in the other you have four pieces of fruit. Etc. But to say 2 + 2 = 4 is logically necessary within arithmetic is simply not the case - it relies on the rules of arithmetic - which are not logically necessary.
Is anything within math is logically necessary? People much smarter than anyone here on TPF have been studying and analyzing & theorizing about this for thousands of years - and as far as I'm aware there is still no definitive answer to these deep mysteries.
BTW - just to be clear, I am not taking a stand on whether there are such things as necessary truths - I'm simply saying that 2 + 2 = 4 is not one. That's why I suggest you need a different example - is all.
Good luck with your endeavors.
"Thing" = an existent. A God would be a very different sort of thing, but it would still be an existent (a "thing"). It would have some characteristics in common with a hypothetical material ontological foundation (e.g. uncaused, autonomous, not composed of other things).
What part of this do you disagree with?
Your hypothetical material ontological foundation is also something that science had not been able to show exists albeit on different grounds. What would be an example of a thing which has no beginning and end in time and is not composed of parts?
They are "things" as I defined, and used, the term ("existent").
Quoting Wayfarer
I don't think it's possible for science to establish anything as an ontological foundation. By its nature, science would be compelled to always seek something deeper, even if they reached a foundation. My view is entirely based on conceptual analysis (the tolof metaphysicians): either there is a foundation, or there's a vicious infinite regress of ever-deeper layers of reality - which I reject.
I never claimed a foundation necessarily was not composed of parts, but I believe the past is finite - because it is logically impossible for an infinite past to be completed - but the past IS complete.
I don't claim to disprove deism/theism. My views on metaphysical foundationalism and a finite past are consistent with deism. I personally reject deism because it depends on an infinitely complex intelligence, with magical knowledge, just happening to exist by brute fact.
Quoting Relativist
So you acknowledge that science cant say what the foundation is, but you nevertheless claim, presumably as an act of faith, that if there is a foundation, then it must be material in nature.
At some stage in history materialism might have been able to claim that the atom was imperishable and eternal - which was, after all, the basis of materialism in Greek philosophy - but that is no longer considered feasible. Fundamental particles, so-called, have an intrinsically ambiguous nature, and they seem to be at bottom to be best conceived as an excitation of fields, however fields might be conceived.
Quoting Relativist
Thats a Richard Dawkins argument - that whatever constructs must be more complex than what is constructed by it. But in the classical tradition, God is not complex at all, but is simple. And the best analogy I can think of for that is - you! Your body comprises billions upon billions of cells, the brain is the most complex natural phenomenon known to science with more neural connections than stars in the sky (or so I once read). And yet, you yourself are a simple unity. That, I think is the meaning (or one meaning) of imago dei.
Even a God is temporally delimited if the past is finite. He simply exists at all times. The same is true of a material foundation. Regarding parts:why assume something exists without parts? I gave a good reason to believe the past is finite and there's a bottom layer of reality. I've never encountered a reason to assume the foundation of existence lacks parts. If there is, then it would be easy to stipulate that, and then build an ontology based on it.
Quoting Wayfarer
Not an act of faith: an inference to best explanation. I see no reason to think anything immaterial exists. An immaterial foundation adds no explanatory power, so it's unparsimonious. A 3-omni God is unparsimonious to the extreme.
Quoting Wayfarer
Sure. Quantum field theory proposes that quantum fields (perhaps a single quantum field- in a sense, one "part") may constitute the bottom layer of reality.
Regardless, there are good reasons to believe the world is fundamentally quantum mechanical, and an implication is that our intuitions (which are the primary tool of metaphysics) are problematic for developing a reliable metaphysical theory.
Quoting Wayfarer
I didn't assert there to be some metaphysical rule that, "whatever constructs must be more complex than what is constructed by it". Rather, I pointed to the complexity of God's knowledge. Divine simplicity seems a rationalization, one that depends on treating knowledge as a magical property. Every verifiable fact points to knowledge being composed of data, and data being encoded. The assumption of a 3-omni God is treated as a carte blanche magical answer to any question, and theists never address the prima facie implausibility of omniscience.
Quoting Wayfarer
When we look at a picture of a triangle, how many things do we see? We see 4 things: the sides, and the triangle. The triangle is a "unity" (a single thing) but is more than just 3 lines (contrast it with 3 unconnected lines on a page). So a triangle is more complex than the individual lines that composed it, just like I am more complex than the particles that comprise me. So I accept calling me a "unity", but not simple.
Yes, if physicalism is true, then everything is nothing but strings. But I don't think it would be absurd. Take a pile of sand for example. Most people would agree this is not an object in itself, but rather it is just grains of sand piled together due to laws of nature like the wind. If so, we could say the same for a rock: a bunch of molecules piled together due to laws of nature. Then the word "rock" only refers to the structure as a whole.
Quoting Relativist
I think the fact that we can say it without contradiction is sufficient for our current purpose. In contrast, we could not say "horses and rocks were not physical prior to that point of time", because horses and rocks are inherently physical things.
There is a difference between an existing thing and a thing with inherent existence. An existing thing could have not existed in the past or future. A thing with inherent existence could not have.
As the axioms do not contradict each other, it is still true that logic is one coherent system. And that logical system is evidently correct: Based on it, we build planes that fly.
Very well. If we are not making any progress, then we can leave the conversation here. Thanks for the chat!
Axioms are assumptions taken to be true.
As there is no logical necessity that assumptions don't contradict each other, there is no logical necessity that axioms don't contradict each other.
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Quoting A Christian Philosophy
We also build planes that crash.
You previously asked:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Per your paradigm, if physicalism is true, then horses are just strings not ontological objects in their own right. There is no point in time at which the strings didn't exist.
Doesn't this mean that your view of essence is contingent upon physicalism being false? Understand that I don't claim to prove physicalism is true. I'm just pointing out that "proving" a God exists based on essentialism entails circular reasoning.
Even if physicalism is true, it still means that strings have their own identity or essence, and thus their own essential properties. Since strings would exist necessarily, it means that their existence is an essential property.
I have other reasons to believe that physicalism is not true, but I don't think it is relevant to our current discussion on essences.
Quoting Relativist
@Wayfarer
I thought I'd chime in on this. The First Cause is traditionally seen to be without parts or without multiple properties. This is because, if a being is composed of multiple properties, then there must be a sufficient reason for the properties to "stick together" in the same being. But the First Cause has no prior causes, by definition. So, the only explanation for the supposed multiple properties to stick together is that they do so inherently, that is, all properties are in fact one and the same. Thus, the First Cause is not composed of multiple parts or properties.
You implied that, in this physicalist scenario, ONLY strings have an identity (and only strings have an essence). If only one thing has an identity and essence, why bother with considering identity and essence at all?
Although the bottom layer of reality (strings, in this scenario) exists necessarily, this is de dicto necessity - not an intrinsic property. My impression is that essentialists consider essence to be intrinsic.
You also referred to "essential properties". Doesn't this imply there are also UNessential properties?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
A first cause exists as a brute fact: without cause or reason, because there is nothing causally prior, nor is it ontologically dependent upon something else. This does not imply it lacks multiple properties - it has whatever properties it happens to have. Intrinsic properties are inseparable from the objects that have them - not something that "sticks" onto the object (unless you stipulate that in an ontology). So it doesn't follow that it lacks multiple properties.
The PSR implies there are no brute facts. But I infer the first cause has to be a brute fact, because it is uncaused and autonomous (no ontological dependency). Making more stipulations about the ontology in order to force fit it to the PSR makes the ontology more ad hoc, and therefore less credible.
There would be more things if some things are not physical. E.g. souls or the power of free will. There is also anything that is man-made if man has free will. E.g. a paper-cutter. It is a man-made device designed to cut paper. "Being able to cut paper" is its identity because this is how we identify a thing as being a paper-cutter.
Quoting Relativist
I know we disagree on this point, but to me, existence would be an intrinsic (or inherent or essential) property of strings. This is to fulfill the PSR and avoid brute facts.
Quoting Relativist
Yes. Take the paper-cutter example again. Since its identity is to cut paper, then any property that enables it to cut paper (e.g. a blade) is an essential property, and any property it has that does not serve to cut paper (e.g. its color) is a non-essential property. When it comes to strings, having a mass is probably an essential property, whereas having a specific position in space and time would probably be a non-essential property.
Quoting Relativist
That's what I meant by properties "sticking to an object". In other words, there must be a reason why a particular set of properties belongs to an object.
This contradicts what you said earlier:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
It's also absurd to claim that a function that an object can perform is its identity. It certainly doesn't uniquely identify a specific object, so this isn't an individual identity. It sounds more like a sortal, for identifying a set (the set of all objects which can cut paper; this would include box cutters, scizzors, knives...).
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
So if I have a paper cutter whose blade has become too dull to cut paper, it has lost its identity?! Is this identity lost suddenly at some particular level of sharpness? What if a second function is found for a functional paper cutter (e.g. it can function as a torture device to cut off fingers). Does possessing this newly discovered function give it a new identity?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
In my view, an object has its properties necessarily, per Leibniz' law (identity of the indiscernibles). IOW, 100% of the object's properties must be present for it to constitute that particular object. An essentialist might point to a subset of the objects properties that are necessary and sufficient for being that object - so that sunset of properties are present necessarily. But you've claimed it is an object's function, rather than its properties, that give it an identity.
Frankly, I think you've gone down a blind alley.
Sure. So to correct my view: If physicalism is true, then everything that is not man-made is nothing but strings - this is because every complex natural object is not designed but caused accidentally by the laws of nature. And if man has free will, then everything that is man-made has its identity from its function - this is because man-made things are designed, and what is designed is always designed for a function.
Quoting Relativist
True; there are many paper-cutters. But they are all identified as paper-cutters; that's why we call all these unique devices "paper-cutters", and do not give them unique names like we do with people. And only the fact that they are made of unique molecules (and this uniqueness is a non-essential property) makes them unique.
Quoting Relativist
A paper-cutter that can no longer cut paper is indeed no longer a paper-cutter. This is reflected in our common language when we speak of those things. It has a new identity which is simply to be a physical object like other non man-made things.
Quoting Relativist
I have not encountered that question before, so I'm thinking out loud here. I'd say only if its creator designed it with that function in mind. It is the designer that gives the man-made object its identity - that's the reason why it exists.
Quoting Relativist
If I cut my hair, I have changed some of my properties. Does it follow that I have a different identity? I'd say that fundamentally, I am still me. It would also seem that any change that any object encounters, no matter how small, would give them a wholly new identity. Thus there would be no change; only substitutions from one identity to another at any point in time.
As you said, everything supervenes on the ultimate foundation of physical reality. That doesn't strictly depend on physicalism being true, it just depends on there being an ultimate foundation to physical reality. Every individual identity is just a concept. We can speak of a device, like a paper cutter, and consider it to have an enduring identity- in our minds. We may use it every day, and not notice the microscopic changes that occur with each use. So in our minds, it's the same device. Even if we replace parts on it, we'll still regard it as the same paper cutter (the one we own). Over the years, we could end up replacing 100% of the parts, while meanwhile always considering it the same device from each day to the next. Or we could arbitrarily decide that it has a new identity after X% of the parts are replaced, or X% of the mass has been replaced; or consider the identity to be associated with the serial number that is present on one specific part. There's no intrinsically correct answer, because an enduring identity isjust a concept.
With living organisms, we can avoid arbitrariness by defining an identity in a way that is unique from everything else that exists. IMO, perdurance is the best way to do that: your identity is associated with the temporal-causal chain that is associated with "you" from one instant to the next. There is exactly one such "you" associated with "your" unique temporal-causal chain. This definition satisfies Leibniz' law, and I don't think any other definition can do so. Still, there's no metaphysical mandate to use this definition - it's still fundamentally conceptual, but I don't think there's a better one - unless you make metaphysical assumptions.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
In terms of essentialism, you're treating function as something like a natural kind, although you're not basing it on anything natural. My problem with natural kinds also applies to your definition: all you've done is identify a set of objects (paper cutters). This is a conceptual compartmentalizing out of the full set of objects of existence, so it's arbitrary. You could have categorized it in many different ways (office tools, manufactured devices, sharp objects, objects you own...). But the biggest problem is that you haven't addressed the issue of individual identity.. You haven't touched on that at all.
It sounds like we are in agreement in this paragraph. Notwithstanding man-made things, everything that is merely physical is nothing but strings, and any "identity" we assign to complex physical objects is by name only.
Quoting Relativist
What do you mean by "natural kind"?
Otherwise, I agree that categories are arbitrary. But the function of a man-made thing is more than that. While not everything is designed, a design is a type of identity. And what is designed is always designed with an end goal, or purpose, or function. This is to fulfil the PSR: all voluntary acts (including creating man-made devices) must have an end goal; otherwise, the act would be random which would violate the PSR. Thus, the function is an inherent property of a voluntarily created or designed thing.
Quoting Relativist
What individualizes man-made things with the same function, e.g. 2 paper-cutters, is the individual physical parts or molecules they are made of. They are numerically 2 because they have 2 separate sets of physical parts. But as you said, even if we replace 100% of the parts, they do not cease to be paper-cutters. Thus, even if we can individualize man-made things, it has no consequence on their identity.
"Natural kind essentialism is a specification of the intuitive idea that there are some mind-independent or objective categories in nature."
(Definition taken from this paper, but it's pretty standard).
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
It's still not a mind-independent category.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I agree that design entails a goal (by definition).
I do not agree that randomness violates the PSR. The outcome of a quantum collapse is random (within a probability distribution). IMO, having a reason just means it can be accounted for, and in this case - randomness can be accounted for. If one were to rule out the randomness of quantum collapse based on a metaphysical assumption, like the PSR, then one's metaphysics in on shaky grounds.
I also do not agree that a function is an "inherent property" of a designed object. It is a relational (extrinsic) property. A sharp stone can be produced by natural forces, and it can then be used to cut things - so a function can be found for things even without being the product of design.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I suggest that it's not just the set of physical parts, it's the way they are configured, down to the molecular level. If you take apart a paper cutter, the heap of parts is not a paper cutter. Even so,
this works only for point-in-time identity, as I've described. If you use the paper cutter even once, there will be a slight change to its physical make-up at the molecular level.
Of course, if natural kind excludes man-made things by its definition, then no property of man-made things would be a natural kind. Man-made things are necessarily mind-dependant since their design comes from our minds. But the function of designed thing is not a matter of opinion. E.g. it is a fact that the function of a paper-cutter is to cut paper; regardless of whether we actually use it for that function or not.
Quoting Relativist
That's fine. If we agree that design entails a goal and that voluntary acts are not random but deliberate, then I don't think we need to agree on whether randomness violates the PSR.
Quoting Relativist
Just because a function could be found in natural things, it does not follow that it is not an inherent property of man-made things as well. "3 sides" is an inherent property of triangles, and yet a shape can also have 3 sides and not be a triangle (if the sides are not straight).
I think we agree that design entails a goal. And a function is the means to attain the goal. Thus, a design entails a function. I.e. a function is an inherent property of a design.
Quoting Relativist
The heap of parts is not a paper-cutter because it cannot cut paper in that state.
I don't disagree with the rest of the paragraph; though I find that identifying individual man-made things is not impactful.
Read about the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties here:
[I]
"We have some of our properties purely in virtue of the way we are. (Our mass is an example.) We have other properties in virtue of the way we interact with the world. (Our weight is an example.) The former are the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties. "[/i]
Function is extrinsic (irrespective of whether natural or man-made): it pertains to the way the object interacts with other objects.
Regarding triangles: they are abstractions; they don't exist. Triangular objects exist, and their shape is indeed an intrinsic property.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Function is not an intrinsic property, but it's shape and structure is.
[Quote]I don't disagree with the rest of the paragraph; though I find that identifying individual man-made things is not impactful.[/quote]
Nevertheless, you haven't accounted for individual identity. A microscopic change to an object means it is not identical to what it had been. What makes it the same object? This is important because you earlier said:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
So if you're going to use the term essence, and defined it as identity, you need to be able to account for individual identity.
I agree that an inherent property must be intrinsic. But I still claim that the function of a designed thing is intrinsic. A paper-cutter, i.e. a thing designed to cut paper, remains a thing designed to cut paper whether we use it to cut paper, use it as a door holder, or don't use it at all.
Quoting Relativist
I suspect the disagreement still comes from the meaning of the term "identity". Yes, a microscopic change means that a thing is not identical to what it had been. But this is different than what I mean by identity. It is in fact closer to what you called "natural kind", and this term falls short only because it contains the word "natural" in it. Perhaps a better term would be "objective kind", where the kind is a matter of fact and not of opinion, but the thing can still be man-made.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I earlier brought up the fact that a paper cutter could be used as a torture device, even though it wasn't designed for that purpose. I believe you said this changed the essence. It seems weird to suggest that the discovery of a new purpose for something constitutes an intrinsic change to it.
Suppose the human race gets wiped out next week. 10 years later, aliens from Tralfamador arrive and discover a paper cutter. They have no idea it was meant to be a paper cutter; they instead use it as a musical instrument. Then the Tralfamadorians all from the common cold, and a time traveler from 2025 arrives and begins cutting paper with it. Did the essence change several times?
Is it even correct to say something's essence can change? That treats the object as something existing independent of its essence, but a variety of essences can become attached to it - even though nothing changes about its physical structure.
No - as per the original response here, it has the essence of a torture device only if the creator designed it for that purpose. Using an object in a way it was not originally designed for does not change its essence. The only case I can think of when the designed object loses its essence is if it can no longer perform its designed function. E.g. a broken paper-cutter.
I forget if I said this before: Although not everything that has an essence is designed, a design is definitely an essence: to design a thing is basically to create its identity or essence. And all things designed are designed for an end goal or purpose or function in mind. The function is the drive to design the thing, and is thus essential to the design.
So-called things are events and process. The sun is a long event but it is not identical with itself over time, although its semblance is a thing to us, seeming to have continued from a moment ago.
First of all, thanks for pointing out my error. Sorry about that.
So at this point, I don't see any logical inconsistency in your position. I don't agree with it, and your view that an object's designed function is intrinsic to the object is non- standard. The only implication is that any arguments you make will not be compelling to many of us.
One question: the first-cause/ontological foundation was not designed. Does this mean it lacks essence?
No - in my view, nothing lacks an essence or essential identity (although for non-man-made physical things, the essence is reduced to the fundamental physical stuff). For the first cause, its necessary properties are essential to it. This is to fulfil the PSR at all times and avoid any brute facts.
If the discussion comes to a close, I want to say that I really enjoyed it. Thank you for the respectful and constructive tone.
Aren't all of its properties essential to it?