Ontological status of ideas
I've seen some YouTube videos where it's said that numbers don't exist.
Fine. Let's not use the word "exist"
But it seems to me there's an obvious difference between these two statements:
(First) the number 2
(Second) the first even prime greater than 100
The second statement refers to something which, I think we all agree, doesn't exist.
The first statement refers to something which exists in some sense or other, even if we don't use the word "exist." I've seen the word "subsist" to refer to the referent of the first statement. So, chairs exists and numbers subsist? Is that a common understanding?
Fine. Let's not use the word "exist"
But it seems to me there's an obvious difference between these two statements:
(First) the number 2
(Second) the first even prime greater than 100
The second statement refers to something which, I think we all agree, doesn't exist.
The first statement refers to something which exists in some sense or other, even if we don't use the word "exist." I've seen the word "subsist" to refer to the referent of the first statement. So, chairs exists and numbers subsist? Is that a common understanding?
Comments (213)
As an ex prof I never thought about it, and I don't recall hearing the expression, but I suppose it could be appropriate.
I think this refers to the old debate about mathematical platonism - were numbers invented or discovered? It's one of those endless debates which ultimately circles back to the nature of reality and what counts as transcendental. There's an entire thread on this here somewhere and many references to this in idealism discussions. To subsist, I believe, is to 'exist' conceptually but not as an object located in space and time - like a chair. Or something like this.
If numbers didn't exist, then you couldn't be writing about them, so they must exist somewhere.
Numbers don't exist like the physical objects. Numbers are concepts.
3 doesn't make sense on its own, but 3 kings do, 4 apples do as well.
It took me 2 days to read the book. 2 itself is meaningless, but 2 days makes sense.
Same with good and bad. They don't exist. We know them have them in mind, and use them to describe things, actions and situations, and people ... etc.
Good itself doesn't make sense. Whatever definition you give to good, it would be a tautology.
Good person, good deed, good food, good books, and good feeling do. Diito with bad.
So, then, if the first even prime greater than 100 didn't exist I couldn't be writing about it?
??? I"d say 3 makes perfect sense on its own. It's an integer, prime, odd, etc.
So are, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17 .... etc etc? Surely you would have been looking for something more than the textbook definitions of 3?
Yes, if the first even prime greater than 100 didn't exist, you couldn't be writing about it.
But you are writing about the first even prime greater than 100, so it must exist.
If something doesn't exist, it is not possible to write about it. If something is being written about, then it must exist somewhere.
Similarly, in the expression "it's said that numbers don't exist", then if something doesn't exist, then how is it possible to write about it.
But you are writing about numbers, so they must exist somewhere, otherwise you couldn't be writing about them.
What is missing in the above is the location of the existence, whether in the mind or in a world outside the mind.
So what do you think it means to you when someone said "100", or when you saw a writing on the wall "100" apart from the fact that it is a even number?
Well, no. We certainly don't all agree. "Existence" and "reality" mean different things to different people in different contexts, but you haven't defined what it means to you in this particular situation. We've had this discussion many times here on the forum and it usually derails for the lack of an agreed on definition.
I think that's a wonderful definition even though I have no idea what it means.
[Edited for aesthetic reasons]
Quine could generalize the general.
Yeah "common" for philosophers, iirc, since A. Meinong¹. Simply put: existents are causally relatable to each other and subsistents (which are only instantiable via existents) are logically / grammatically relatable but are not causally related at all.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonexistent_objects#Meinong's_jungle [1]
Quoting Art48I have to try to find a way to word this...
You're not writing about it. There is no even prime number greater than 100. Not hypothetically, not in theory. You're writing a list of characteristics that, when combined, do not describe anything. Not even something that can't be physically made, but can be envisioned and discussed. Same with a square circle. These aren't even paradoxes. They're logical impossibilities.
The Meinong link 180 provided likens the square circles to unicorns. I disagree. Unicorns aren't logically impossible. They just don't exist. But we can picture them in our heads, and even draw pictures and make models of them.
A hypercube is an interesting example. It can't exist in our reality. We can't picture it in our mind, and can't draw or build a model of one. But we can calculate how many sides and verticies it has. We understand how the idea of it came about.
The whole is unity, which with the empty set, can produce all numbers.
I Googled "exist vs subsist" and got this link*1 to a philosophical definition. According to that authority, both "exist" and "subsist" are "modes", or mental models. But "exist" applies to our model of presumably real material objects, while ""subsist" applies to universal concepts, which are not real but ideal. For example, the Chair you are sitting in exists, but the notion of chairness, which is a mental definition of a kind of object, is merely a conventional model or "common understanding". The computer screen picture of a chair {image below}, subsists in an abstract artificial sense, but another realer mode of it may unfortunately exist in your child's room.
I suppose that Numbers persist only in conceiving Minds as modes or symbols or "persistent illusions"*2, but their rational relationships exist in the real world as the information patterns that cause your mind to conceive of counting real or imaginary objects. Absent a meaning-searching Mind, there would be no evaluated Numbers, but the geometric ratios would exist in the empty space between sensable objects. Think of Gravity as the geometry of reality. The natural/physical relationship is real, but the mental concept of gravity is ideal. As John Mayer sang : "gravity is working against me, gravity wants to bring me down". If gravity didn't exist, we'd have to blame our falling on some other imaginary agent. :smile:
*1. What's the difference between exist and subsist?
Existence, we find it said, is the mode of being proper to "particulars" or "substances," whereas subsistence is the mode of being proper to "universals," i.e. (on the usual view), "qualities" and "relations," as such, or considered apart from the particulars which they qualify or relate.
https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp6/content/wcp6_1927_0261_0271?file_type=pdf
*2. "People like us who believe in physics know that the distinction between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion." ___ A. Einstein
You mean all the science fiction books are real stories? Or merely exist in the authors' minds.
He could have said "the first even prime number greater than 2". No such thing, 2 is the only even prime number because all other even numbers are divisible by 2.
Chairs are mental constructions; they do not exist in the mind-independent world.
Numbers are strange. They are discovered through our minds but seem to be independent of it.
But natural numbers are not constructed the way chairs are. For one thing they are among the simplest things one could image.
If a science fiction adventure is being talked about, the science fiction adventure must exist somewhere, whether as print in a book, in the mind of the author or reader or in a world outside any book or mind.
Is a thought in the mind any less real than something in a world outside any mind?
That sounds like a categorical mistake. It is not matter of real or unreal. It is matter of knowing or not knowing.
I think that the important point here is that we notice the difference between these two types of "things". Notice that by categorizing them with the same name "things", I tend to negate that difference which I am trying to emphasize. So when we categorize them in ways like this, by calling them both "objects", it's counterproductive toward understanding the difference between them.
The law of identity (a thing is the same as itself) was intended as a means of recognizing, and upholding the difference between these two. A physical object, a chair, as an individual particular, has an identity within itself, which is independent from anything which we say about it. We can point to it, or sense it, and assume it's independent existence. This assumed independent existence supports the concept of "thing-in-itself", and it also supports the idea that what we say about a thing might be incorrect, false. A "number" does not have this type of identity, because if we remove everything which we say about it, there is nothing left to point to. The number's existence is necessarily within the context of a conceptual structure, and is therefore better known as "a subject", in the sense of a topic, or theme, to be studied or discussed.
So your use of "subsist" to describe numbers is problematic. "Subsist", especially in the sense of "self-subsistence" implies existence independent from the environment or context. But this is exactly what makes a physical thing different from an idea, the chair has independent existence, "self-subsistence" while the number is dependent on the conceptual structure, so it does not have self-subsistence.
There is a type of Platonism, derived from Pythagorean idealism, which assigns "self-subsistence" to numbers. Aristotle analyzed this type of ontology in his "Metaphysics" and found it to be problematic. The issue is, that if an idea, such as "the good" has self-subsistence, then the idea, and its essence are necessarily one and the same. This would be the same for all ideas, they would be one and the same as their essence. Accordingly, it would be impossible for us to understand any ideas, because understanding requires logical relations such as prior and posterior.
So for example, if it's stipulated that the number two has self-subsistence, then its essence, (which is the means by which we understand it), must be within the number two itself. This would make its relations to other ideas "one", "three", "the first even prime greater than 100", etc., accidental rather than essential. If that was the case, ideas would be impossible for us to understand.
Therefore, it is very important in our ontology, to maintain the proper principles of separation between assumed independent objects, which are assumed to have separate existence by the law of identity, and ideas, which are dependent on their environment, context, for their existence. The latter we can know with a high degree of certainty, that it is impossible for them to have a truly independent existence.
Thoughts exist, otherwise you couldn't have written your post.
Thoughts exist in the physical brain which exists in the physical Universe.
Thoughts must be real otherwise it wouldn't be possible to write posts on the Forum.
I had thoughts, but I wouldn't say the thought existed. You cannot use "exist" on the abstract concepts. Well you could, just like you have done, but it doesn't quite make sense, and could be classed as "unintelligible".
You have ideas and know the concepts, but ideas and concepts don't exist in the external world like the physical objects do.
If thoughts didn't exist, then how can a thought affect the physical world, such that the thought of pressing the "t" key on the keyboard turns into actually pressing the "t" key on the keyboard.
You apply the thoughts onto the physical world i.e. typing, measuring, hammering, drilling, and driving ... etc. You have ideas how to use and manipulate the physical objects. But the ideas are in your head, not in the world.
Quoting RussellA
Folks learn to type from the early age, and typing becomes their 2nd nature.
Ideas are in the head, but ideas can change the world.
If ideas in the brain exist as part of the physical structure of the brain, then this would explain how an idea can change the physical world.
In the same way that an idea physically exists within the brain, numbers, being ideas, would also only exist within the brain in physical form.
I had an idea to cut down the tree in the back garden for 10 years, but it was just an idea. The tree is still standing tall. Can ideas themselves change the world?
Quoting RussellA
Where about in the brain do you see numbers existing in physical form?
P1 - Numbers and colours exist somewhere otherwise we couldn't be discussing them.
P2 - We know that numbers and colours exist in the mind because we are aware of them.
P3 - We observe the colour red even though colours don't exist in the world. What exists in the world is the wavelength 700nm. We mentally project the colour red onto the world that we are observing.
C1 - Similarly, it is possible that even though we observe numbers in the world, numbers need not exist in the world, as we can mentally project numbers onto the world.
C2 - As it is possible that numbers need not exist in the world, there need be no metaphysical angst about numbers existing in the world.
P4 - A calculator can manipulate numbers within the physical structure of the calculator in a deterministic and explainable way.
C3 - There needs be no metaphysical angst about numbers existing in a calculator.
P5 - Similarly, there is no reason why the brain cannot manipulate numbers within the physical structure of the brain in a deterministic and explainable way.
C4 - Similarly, there needs be no metaphysical angst about numbers existing in the mind.
C5 - Any metaphysical angst about numbers is unnecessary.
The fact that we are discussing something is not the evidence for existence of something. We can discuss about the unicorn or a flying pig. Does it mean the unicorn or flying pig exist?
"Numbers and colours exist somewhere"? Somewhere is like saying nowhere.
No one would know where the somewhere is. In which country, and which city, an what street, at which number of the property does it exist? It has to be a specific location that can be verified by possibility of visiting the site in person in giving out the location of the existence to be meaningful.
I could go on pointing out the logical problems in your list, but I will just stop at the first one (to save time).
They exist in literature and in the mind as thoughts.
If either the unicorn or flying pig didn't exist somewhere, then you couldn't have written your post.
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Quoting Corvus
The expression "exists somewhere" does not mean "exists nowhere".
I know them in my thoughts, and that's how I could write about them. I knew them as non-existence ideas, but they don't prevent me from writing about them. They don't exist. They are known as ideas.
Quoting RussellA
It means it doesn't mean anywhere. In other words, it is a meaningless assertion.
Quoting Corvus
The word "three" doesn't make sense alone. What does? That is, what does make sense alone? Is anything alone as a word without action or a place that is to be made sense of? A concept is what alone? Just that...waiting to be grabbed? Meaningless? There for grabbing, always? There for making meaning? Should we, take it how it is? Use it as it is? Understand it as it is? And also be correct...some times? As it is, is meaningless to whom? One outcome still always exists/did/will. One outcome ought to exist... ? It is not a question of ought, it is, does, will, has already. Two things at once?
The answer: three. That is leaving three alone, and it makes sense to some while maybe not everyone. Like if you didnt know the question, but see that the answer to question five is, three. You would see.....
Q#5 - three or perhaps Question five: 3. Where would three alone exist anyways?
The concept of three, requires other things to be understood like counting, math, geometry, etc not all or one or the other...any one or all. With one, comes all and with three, comes 1 and 2....
Three as a concept, so be it for the hell or heaven of this discussion is of/in the world existing in Mind and/or material, either/or it does not matter for this sake, as they both can be/are counted and considered real or to exist.
I have three ideas,
I have three apples.
Let's repeat those three ideas,
let's juggle those three apples.
Who does it matter to if it does or does not? Who is asking? If the asker is needing an answer of surety, the self holds the answer/s already, JUST not yet aware where to look to find. It is not time, yet. Chance may not exist at all, time may be taken instead of used....enjoy it at the very least :party:
"3"/"Three" doesn't make sense alone, does "third"? Third and three are different how? Numbers are words? Numbers of names, like William Earl the third, William Earl lll, meaning three generations of Willy Earl exist...Generational suffixes make me wonder about: Numbers vs words...order? The concept includes what was taught/learned of order, 3 days and 3 apples are counted in three's but what makes three days and three chairs are of two different kinds.
Concept of time and order, and using language skills to name things with numbers, three chairs...three days. A day is a thing but not like the other thing. A concept vs tangible item, of material.....A concept of mind vs an object of mind, the way we describe them with words and different languages is of intelligent brains using minds to make experiences in life better fit, learning for next time...a lesson in time.
I wonder, if/is the word or concept known of "3"/three, one but not the other? [2] I'm thinking to myself: What are other one worded concepts? three is a concept, one word, aka alone, three chairs alone is not alone, its of three things. Three is never alone, perhaps. Three is a concept, then? Or numbers are what make the concept three possible to clearly count therefore grasp/see/understand?
We can put three rocks in the basket, whether we know what the concept of numbering or without knowing how to count. Knowing that this many things fit in this size basket, call it something other than three, three chairs and three days can be broken down, three is the name of the group, three is the concept of numbers in groups. Forming a concept from one to three, one idea, one chair, two idea, two chair....three!
Me thinking aloud and typing thoughts as it comes: "Space occupying vs material objects vs space occupying in mental/mind as materials that are known to exist, imagined, counted in head, space not required to fill....?"
Three is company!!
The more added to one word, the sense is still never assured out of it. Words alone, numbers alone do make sense but with context, awareness, and a clear view of its place (and YOURS) in/FROM the moving world.
Why you, Art48 or anyone at that, happens to even make sense or "see" three for what it is, as it is, alone...is interesting enough to someone. I am more interested in if what you see is to be verified? When,why if it must? To be labeled, confirmed, or not? Aware or not? True or not? From what exactly, is up in the air yet, reach!!!! stretch!!! almost gotcha!!! From a Right or wrong? Good or bad? EVIL? Yes or no?
We may see only you, seeing me...
outside looking in, an observer makes
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12/17/24
801 pm holding off to post...above is raw, first draft/version
1013pm addition [1]
1030pm addition [2]
[1] I came to find Friedrich Nietzsche's, "Genealogy of Morals" of relevance to this comment and without looking. I found a youtube video after typing in the search bar on my ruko tv, "genealogy documentary," as I was looking for family tree types of stories, something about ancient blood lines and going about/ over how family lines have been traced and tracked. THEN a recommended video caught my eye, and I clicked. Found on Eternalised's YT channel, a 10 min video called "Genealogy of Morals | Friedrich Nietzsche" So, I have it playing in the backround as I am re-reading my comment above, not including the new additions 1, 2, the original draft finished at 801pm...and from what I took in and overheard, I intuitively drew connections, ( i am not fully saying I am on board with the work, I am just seeing connecions at this early point in my research ) , from both my comments and the video summary of the essay. I notice that topics of mutual interest resonated between thinkers. The essay touches on, Good bad evil, guilty conscious (bad conscious), morality and suffering as all are topics that I have mentioned in my last few contributions...no need to refer or point out specifics, it's all here and there. :monkey: I just so happened to learn about the essay AFTER these thoughts shared above came and were typed stream of consciousness style. Haven't even read it yet, though, I LOVE to see it
Yes!
Quoting RussellA I am still confused about this specific topic or debated ongoing discussion... Colors we project mentally are compatible to what exists in nature it seems, we know or assume others are projecting that color as well...animals, plants included living things adapting to environment and survival instincts have developed with time. Vision is an important sense that humans/animals have. The living beings have built in, wit a purpose and function is to take place using the senses combined with the formation of the body that is adapted to the surroundings, environment or habitat that makes sense....
Combined the brain, body, and senses to the earth, location is relevant and it all can make sense when put together..ex eye sockets, eyeballs, bone shape of face are features we are born with (given we have no complications or disables or deformities) Our bodies assume we ought to see our surroundings, we project color to help us communicate what we see around us to our brains, informing and updating with each glance, each blink...each dream...we dont need color to see and survive, color blind people are navigating life just as fine, but the color is being read or projected in mind, but because the brain has developed to recognize / organize the environment to a point where it comes naturally to see color from wavelengths in this stage of evolution.
The fluid colors we "project" or see using our eyes, vision, and senses proper to the surroundings/material/light in scope of vision, presented before our eyes I thought was because of the range in the cones and rods, our photoreceptors sensitivity to light? The wavelengths we pick up according to external world around us, that we live in and take in (thru all senses available to us) being color coordinated mentally and not actually existing is just hard for me to understand, let alone believe so BLINDLY.
Where did that range come from? How do we know what will help the brain organize using our eye balls and reflexes/instinct/ability and how do we figure, that to see the color is helping the brain organize, what if it is for imprinting better memories from more vivid life experiences? The wavelength as it is shown to us in the world, use light to get to our eyes and our brain just instantly paints the picture live in front of us each time? I think its more of a stored quality, muscle memory if you will...instinct or maybe just a natural intelligence that comes with the brain/body working together in day to day life over time...
What is shown to us (in the world, in our heads) vs as it is? Specific experiences maybe are relevant to occur over/in time? TIME and perceptions....perhaps experience with perception...Awareness of that? AS that topic is still debatable, see thread on perception, the discussion is ongoing from many stances and starts, that was bound to go somewhere. How it crashes and burned is telling, but the end is not NO WHERE. It awaits a fellow traveler.
The direction is not welcoming or to be followed, though. Perhaps a dead end after all. Then, a U-turn is required. A choice. Take the next best exit, go that way....It is a complex area to discuss as both scientific and philosophical understandings about human nature come into play, at times that make nothing easy. Nothing good comes easy...
Easy goes it, life. So it seems. Humans are in it and under the scope....behind them as well...experiments, and observers....What else? A third party we forgot? In nature, plants/animals and with conscious beings in nature, humans-- are two different concepts, or experiences ...though they make sense together. We ought to be compatible.
Now were talkin
Quoting RussellA Agreed to this point..But wondering, what do numbers have to do with the concept of order? levels or ranks?
The OP is about the ontological status of ideas. It goes on to ask "So, chairs exists and numbers subsist? Is that a common understanding?"
I agree when you say:
1) "Colors we project mentally are compatible to what exists in nature it seems"
2) "Vision is an important sense that humans/animals have."
As regards:
3) "we know or assume others are projecting that color as well.......animals, plants included living things adapting to environment and survival instincts have developed with time."
I agree that it is more than likely that when I see a postbox emitting a wavelength of 700mn, my subjective experience of the colour red is the same as everyone else's, all things being considered equal. After all, life has evolved over 3 billion years in synergy with its environment. However, it is not something that I can ever know in the absence of telepathy.
When I observe a postbox, I know that the colour red exists in my mind, and science tells me that a wavelength of 700nm exists in the world.
When I observe the world, I see the colour red, meaning that either i) a wavelength of 700nm is the colour red in the absence of any observer, which I find hard to accept or ii) I project my subjective experience of the colour red onto the world, which I find easier to accept.
As with colour, similarly with number, such that numbers exist in my mind but not the world. When I observe the world and see numbers, I have projected my subjective experience of numbers onto the world.
As colour exists in the mind but not the world, numbers exist in the mind but not the world.
Regarding the word "exist, as unicorns exist in literature but not the world, colours and numbers exist in the mind but not the world.
The word "subsist" is unnecessary.
How could a wavelength of 700nm exist in the world? Wavelength is a measurement, or a complex idea which serves as a standard for measurement. As such, any statement of wavelength is an expression of an idea. Measurements are just a matter of projecting your subjective experience of numbers onto the world.
A measurement has the appearance of being "objective" because we apply "standards", "rules", "conventions", or "norms", which produce what some call "intersubjectivity", and others call "objectivity". Whichever of the two terms one chooses, it's generally employed as a means for taking the agreement which supports the "existence" of the standards, for granted.
The point here is the OP was asking about the ontological status of ideas, hence 3 was used for a sample idea to consider. At this stage we are not considering any other objects for its ontological status, but a number which is a typical example of abstract ideas.
What do you know, when I say to you out of the blue "3"?
You are right. How can I say on the one hand that "numbers exist in the mind but not the world" but on the other hand say that "science tells me that a wavelength of 700nm exists in the world", when a wavelength of 700nm depends on the existence of numbers.
All I can say is that in order to communicate my ideas I can only use language.
My premise is that ideas only exist in the mind. This would lead to the paradox that if I am able to successfully communicate my ideas using language, then it follows that, as language exists outside the mind, these ideas now exist outside the mind, thereby negating my original premise.
All I can conclude is, as ideas only exist in the mind, and language exists outside the mind, it is impossible to communicate my ideas using language.
This sounds a bit like 6.54 of Wittgenstein's TLP, where he wrote
However, saying that, as an Existence Nihilist, I don't believe that wavelengths exist in the world. Hawthorne and Cortens (1995) spoke for the nihilist thus: the concept of an object has no place in a perspicuous characterization of reality.
I believe a world outside the mind exists, but not a world of objects, whether chairs or wavelengths, but rather a world of fundamental particles and forces existing in space and time.
As regards language, it can be argued that language, including the language of science, is more metaphorical rather than literal.
For example, metaphors are commonly used in science, such as: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödingers cat, Einsteins twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc
In this sense, I am using the expression "numbers exist in the mind but not the world" literally and the expression "science tells me that a wavelength of 700nm exists in the world" metaphorically.
Unfortunately, it is in the nature of language to mix literal and metaphorical expressions, and it is only the context that enables the reader to distinguish between the two.
Thanks for the response and clarifying your stance further.
Quoting Corvus
I'd perk up because I like 3. I'd know that you know something and I would say "Three (3) what?," and assume you read or counted or recalled or referenced something that has to do with the number, the concept is meaningless, I only care about the number 3. It is stitched on the back of a few jerseys I have worn with pride! I'd know to ask you about it, I'd know I would be curious.
My apologies, I appreciate the redirection from you both as I did REACT instead of replying plainly with consideration to the OP. I jumped in on a back and forth without much thought at all, I just did it.
Anyways, I have much to say on this topic. I think about thinking thoughts, IDEAS and the Philosophy of Mind are especially of my personal interest! I shall be back when I have more time to think straight. My past thoughts and notes are boring me and I need something fresh! I know I have fresh, but I do not have the will to THINK about my thoughts, yet...Still, I am EXCITED! I am all over the place, right now...835pm 12/18/25 Looking forward to sharing latest and greatest!, Thanks
See my reply below to, (again, reacting to a back and forth), creativesoul whom was responding to frank's comment within the perception thread linked here: ( https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/922694 )
The brain generates experience out of a flood of diverse data. frank
Data from inside the brain?
Emergence of experience requires more than just a brain. Persistence of experience does as well. Brains are not enough. It takes more than just a brain to smell the cake in the neighbor's oven. It takes more than just a brain to remember that smell. It takes more than just a brain to hallucinate that experience. creativesoul
[i]What about just the/a "brain" with thinking thoughts?
Part of my initial comment says, "I am considering this: perhaps these ideas are visions in the brain, independent of the individuals subjective experience. The subjective mind possesses ideas, but not in the same way the brain perceived/s them. Ideas are interpreted differently by the brain in its visions, and these interpretations may or may not align with how a subjective being perceives these visions as ideas in their mind or in their interactions with the environment.
What if thinking thoughts* is just the brain existing/being, rather than the subjective body/minds doing?
*the act of thinking-that thinking might be an emergent property of the brains activity, rather than an action performed by the subjective mind"[/i]
Here's another related problem, which was given much consideration by the ancient Greeks, like Plato and Aristotle. Plato thought that since things exist as types, then the form, or type, idea, must be prior to the thing itself, to cause it to be the type of thing that it is. Aristotle showed that since a particular thing has a form unique to itself, which must be prior in time to the thing itself to account for it being the thing that it is and not something else, forms must be prior to material things. This indicates that there must be something similar to ideas, forms, which are prior in time to material existence, therefore outside of human minds.
Quoting RussellA
Isn't "force" just a concept?
Or, maybe "force/s" in that context means 'cause of motion' ? Are we assuming they are in motion of direction ? Of material? material in motion? Energy in motion creating "force"? A concept? A verb? I agree, I suppose that "force" can be philosophically consumed as a concept, but as a definition I can see the verb aspect being relevant...I dont know...materials that transform into a force? Can we call this 'force' a concept, yes for now. However, I think it is more specific than "just a concept"
What could be the cause of motion other than the passing of time? Time passing is what causes things to move. Is "force" the passing of time?
Could time be potentiality, the possibility to be, endless possibility??
There is a particular lightning strike, and being a particualr instance is a token. Several lightning strikes would create a class of events, The Lightning Strike, which would be a type.
In practice, can anyone give any explanation, other than in the mind of God, where a Lightning Strike could exist prior to a lightning strike?
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A particular lightning strike has a particular form, which is unique to itself, and is different to the form of tree.
Suppose the form of the lightning strike existed 1,000 years before the actual lightning strike happened. Then by the same logic, to account for the form of the lightning strike being the thing that it is rather than something else, the form of the lightning strike must have existed prior to 1,000 years before the actual lightning strike, ad infinitum until the beginning of existence.
Therefore, the form of the lightning strike must have existed at the beginning of existence. Similarly the form of every event must have existed at the beginning of existence.
In other words, according to Aristotle, the form of this post, which has a form unique to itself, must have been determined at the beginning of existence, 13.7 billion years ago, which is a scary thought.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Expanding to minds rather than just human minds, as as I am sure that the dinosaur had a mind.
I have the idea that lightening strikes are terrifying.
In practice, prior to minds, what was terrified by the idea of a lightning strike?
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. That's the problem.
But every word in language refers to a concept, in that "fundamental" is a concept, "particle" is a concept, "and" is a concept, etc.
It can also be argued that every word in language should be taken as a figure of speech rather than literally. For example, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson wrote the book Metaphors We Live By 1980. In science, Andrew May in Science 2000 argued that even Newton's second law, F = ma is a metaphor.
But concepts don't exist outside the mind.
Therefore, the problem is that language is using concepts which only exist in the mind to describe a world that exists outside the mind, where such concepts don't exist.
I agree that I am using the concept of "force", which exists in my mind, to describe something in the world, even though the concept "force" doesn't exist in the world.
And this is true for every word in language.
Language as a whole is using concepts, including the colour red and number, to describe a world where those concepts don't exist.
One possible conclusion would be that the world we observe exists in the mind, not outside the mind, in a Kantian kind of way.
Great post thanks!! When I say "3" out of the blue, I cannot even know what I was meaning apart from the fact that 3 is a number. One could say, well 3 is an odd, and prime number so on, but that doesn't add much more info than it is a number. Number is a concept in the mind.
Numbers are only meaningful when it is describing the objects and entities in the real world. Number can also describe the events, processes, motions and changes too. Numbers describe and denote things, motions and the other concepts.
When you had a shirt with number 3 on it, the 3 is a symbol of number 3. It is not 3 itself at all. 3 has not just the symbol, but also name too namely "Three".
Due to its ability to describe and count the physical objects in the world, numbers are also a property for existence. If something exists, then it can be counted. If something can be counted, then it exists in the physical form.
Kant thought numbers are psychological and the a priori concepts in the mind. This tradition has been ciriticised by the later philosophers such as Bolzano and Husserl. Numbers and truth must exist in the world objectively without mind. This new trend of thinking revolutionised development in the new Logic, Mathematics and Proof theories which gave foundations for the work of Cantor, Hilbert, Russell and Whitehead. But I still believe Kant was right in his idea of numbers and abstract ideas as the products of mind.
That is my quick reflection on numbers. Maybe it has some logical flaws for sure, but I believe this is what philosophical debates are about. Pointing out the logical flaws and problems in the other folks arguments and ideas. Or coming to mutual agreement when they sound consistent and making sense. And learning the truths in dialectical and critical way.
Yes, this is the issue which Plato addressed. When a lightening strike occurs, there has already been many events of the same type (lightening strikes). This implies that there is a form ("formula" if you like), which preexists the particular event, and determines what it will be.
In modern days we understand this as inductive reasoning, cause and effect, and laws of physics. This inclines us to think that these formulae are abstractions, the product of human minds, existing as ideas in human minds. And this is correct, but this way of thinking detracts from the need to consider some sort of "form" which preexists such events, and determines their nature.
A common way of representing the difference between the two types of "form" are as the laws of physics (human abstractions), and the laws of nature (what the laws of physics are supposed to represent, which causes things to behave the way that they do). Aristotle provided much guidance for separating the two senses of "form", the causal as prior to events, and the human abstractions as posterior to events.
Quoting RussellA
This is why "God" and "angels", are the most common explanation for the immaterial Forms which are necessarily prior to material existence, as cause of the orderly existence we observe. The prior Forms (laws of nature), are "idea-like", but they are prior to material existence rather than posterior to it (as abstractions are), being what causes whatever we determine as the fundamental elements of material existence to be, in the way that they are. Since the prior forms are "idea-like" as immaterial, and the cause of things being the way that they are, in much the same way that human ideas cause artificial things to be the way that they are, through freely willed activities, we posit a divine mind, "God".
Quoting RussellA
The issue is not so simple, because you are applying determinist principles here. When we account for the reality of freely willed events, the entire way that we understand "time" needs to be altered. Then we do not get this infinite regress to "the beginning of time". Free will allows a new, undetermined event to enter into the chain of causation determined by the past, at any moment in time.
The chain of causation is an abstraction, inductive principles derived from the observation of continuity in time. A thing, object with mass, will continue to be as it has been, in the past, unless caused to change. This is the basis for Newton's first law, and the "cause" of change here, was traditionally understood as another massive object (f=ma). The freely willed cause, however, as an immaterial cause known as "final cause", is free from that determinist causal chain. The freely willed cause must even escape the concept of "energy", because of the relativistic equivalence between mass and energy which renders "energy" as inertially deterministic.
Simply put, when we allow for the reality of freely willed events, we allow as a fundamental principle, a break in the continuity of being, between past and future, a break at the present. This is the lack of necessity between cause and effect, and in inductive reasoning, pointed to by Hume. Things do not necessarily continue as they have. This implies that the entire world of being, all that exists relative to our observational capacities, must be created anew at each passing moment of time.
That means that "the form of the world", consequently "the form of each event", as time passes, is produced (by what was referred to as the mind of God above), at each passing moment of time. This is the basis for the idea of divine "Providence", and the idea that God must act continually, at each moment to maintain His creation. The laws of physics, like Newton's first law, depend on "God's Will", as it is required that God actively recreates the world at each passing moment, and God having a free will, could recreate the world at any moment, in a way which is not consistent with determinist cause/effect.
Quoting RussellA
When you recognize the requirement for "idea-like" Forms, as explained above, which exist independently from human minds, this so-called problem is turned on its head. There is ideas internal to human minds, and ideas external to human minds. And, there is a supposed "material world" as a medium between these two. The material world, as it appears to us, is a representation of the consistency (temporal continuity) within the independent Forms. The key point is that this consistency is not necessary as the determinists represent it. It simply appears to us in this way, as the aspects of the independent Forms which appear to our senses as "the material world", are the parts which demonstrate such consistency. Consequently this constitutes the features of the material world which appear intelligible to us.
Quoting RussellA
So, try this. All words refer to concepts in human minds, as you say. And, outside of human minds there is another sort of "concepts", in another sort of mind (God's). These are the Forms. In the same way that words appear to you within the material medium, as alterations in its consistency which you can interpret as the representations of ideas in other human minds, allowing you to extract meaning, the consistency of physical objects, and the entire physical world, exists as representations of the ideas which exist in that other sort of mind.
Imagine that the other sort of mind is speaking an entirely different language, a language which utilizes consistency of the medium whereas human languages utilize the inconsistency of the medium. Being a sort of inverse language, in relation to our type of languages, it is very difficult to interpret these ideas. However, there is a key to interpretation, a principle, which if adhered to, it will guide the way. The key is the way that time passes, and the fact that everything which occurs at the present, the passage of every material event, has an immaterial (unobservable) Form prior to it in time, as the cause of that event. So, for example, when someone speaks, there is an immaterial cause of those words, within the mind of the speaker, and the material world is just the medium of passing time, which displays the communicative features. The human mind which makes that statement exploits a deficiency in the consistency of the medium, which provides free will the capacity to state that message, while the consistency itself is representative of the other sort of ideas.
There is a lot in your post, but taking your points one by one.
I observe a hundred times that when there are regions of excess positive and negative charge within a cloud then lightning occurs. I can ask why.
I can conclude that there is a Law of Nature such that when there are regions of excess positive and negative charge within a cloud lightning occurs.
There are two aspects to a "Law of Nature": as it exists in the mind and as it exists in a world outside the mind.
As regards the Law of Nature as it exists in a world outside the mind
Am I right is thinking that an Aristotelian Form and Law of Nature are analogous?
My question is, is it in fact the case that a Law of Nature precedes the event it describes, or is the Law of Nature contemporaneous with the event it describes. My belief is the latter.
If the Law of Nature is contemporaneous with the event it describes, and if the Aristotelian Form may be thought of as a Law of Nature, then the Aristotelian Form will also be contemporaneous with the event it describes.
Suppose there is a cloud with regions of excess positive and negative charge. This is not a prediction of a future lightning strike, but immediately gives rise to a lightning strike. The Law of Nature determines what does happen not what will happen.
It therefore seems that an Aristotelian Form, as with a Law of Nature, rather than pre-existing an event, can only be contemporaneous with an event.
IE, the Laws of Nature as abstractions in the mind are a posteriori to events, but the Laws of Nature in a world outside the mind, and by analogy the Aristotelian Forms, must be contemporaneous with events.
The material and the immaterial
I can understand a God as being a prior cause to physical events, providing one accepts the possibility of a God.
I agree that human concepts can cause changes in the physical world, in that having the concept of thirst can cause a bottle of water in the world to move
The existence of Free Will is debated. Some argue that it is an illusion.
However, I don't agree that concepts in the mind and the Laws of Nature in a world outside the mind are immaterial, but rather that they are fully material.
As regards the particular Law of Nature that when there are regions of excess positive and negative charge within a cloud lightning occurs, there is nothing immaterial about this. The event is fully explainable as the deterministic behaviour of matter and forces between matter.
As regards concepts in the mind, as software exists within the hardware of a computer, concepts exist in the physical structure of the brain. If change the physical structure of the brain, then change the concepts within that physical structure.
No evidence has ever been presented of the dissociation of concepts from the brain, in that if a living brain moved from the living room to the dining room, no one would suggest the possibility of the concepts remaining in the living room.
IE, some may believe in God and Free Will, but it seems to me that they are not necessary as explanations of the relationship between mind and world outside the mind.
Some argue that Free Will is an illusion.
Notice that I distinguished between a law of physics, and a law of nature. What you describe is an inductive principle, like a law of physics. That is a descriptive principle. In the way I used the term, the law of nature is what the law of physics is supposed to represent, it is what is supposedly described by these inductive principles. Check the "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy" for reference.
[quote=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]Within metaphysics, there are two competing theories of Laws of Nature. On one account, the Regularity Theory, Laws of Nature are statements of the uniformities or regularities in the world; they are mere descriptions of the way the world is. On the other account, the Necessitarian Theory, Laws of Nature are the principles which govern the natural phenomena of the world. That is, the natural world obeys the Laws of Nature. This seemingly innocuous difference marks one of the most profound gulfs within contemporary philosophy, and has quite unexpected, and wide-ranging, implications.[/quote]
https://iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/
My usage was the latter sense of "laws of nature".
Quoting RussellA
A "law of nature" in this sense necessarily precedes the event, because the laws of nature are what makes things act the way that they do. So they are the cause of an event occurring the way that it does, a way that is describable by laws of physics. Notice in the quote, that things "obey" the laws of nature, so the laws must be prior to an events, as the events will necessarily obey the laws.
Quoting RussellA
Yes, they have the freedom to do this. I don't believe that, do you?
I think it is more likely that Free Will is an illusion than an actual thing.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Laws of Nature
IE, you were referring to the Laws of Nature as "principles which govern the natural phenomena of the world" rather than "descriptions of the way the world is".
The question is, is it strictly true that "descriptions of the way the world is" are posterior to events and "principles which govern the natural phenomena of the world" are prior to events?
There is an overlap in Laws of Physics and Laws of Nature. For example, Newton's three laws of motion are described by the SEP article Laws of Nature as Laws of Nature and are described by the web site www.examples com as Laws of Physics.
By observing many times that the sun rises in the east, by inductive reasoning, I can propose the law that "the sun rises in the east". It is true that this law is posterior to my observations. But it is equally true that this law is prior to my observing the next sun rise.
When does a law become a Law of Nature?
If for hundreds of years hundreds of scientist have observed that F=ma, then this is sufficient for F=ma to become a Law of Nature.
But in principle the Law of Nature that F=ma is no different to my law that "the sun rises in the east", apart from the number of observations.
This Law of Nature is posterior to observations and prior to the next observation in exactly the same way that my law was posterior to my observations and prior to my next observation.
Whilst it is true that Laws of Nature are prior to the next event, they are also posterior to previous events.
The Law of Nature that F=ma is not the cause of the next event, it does not make the next event act as it does act and it does not determine the next event, but is a prediction about what the next event will be based on past experience.
Aristotle
Whereas for Plato Form is prior to physical things, for Aristotle's hylomorphic scheme, Form and Matter are intertwined. It may well be that Form is Matter, united by the Formal Cause.
As Form cannot exist independently of Matter, Form cannot exist prior to Matter but must be contemporaneous with it.
Personally, I don't see too much point in discussing philosophy with someone who doesn't believe in free will. The entire discussion would then have to revolve around persuading the person that they have the power (free will) to change that belief. And this "persuading" would have to carry the force of a deterministic cause, to change that person's mind, which is contrary to the principles believed in by the person who believes in free will. This makes the task of convincing a person of the reality of free wil an exercise in futility. The only way that a person will come to believe in the reality of free will is through introspection, examination of one's own personal experiences.
Quoting RussellA
The answer to that question is "yes", by the reasoning I gave.
Quoting RussellA
No, there is no overlap, for the same reason that there is no overlap of the map and the territory. An overlap would require that the map is mapping itself, but that would produce an unintelligible infinite regress, like looking into a mirror with a mirror behind you.
The Laws of Physics are the map (description), and the Laws of Nature are what is supposedly described by the map, as explained in the article I referred.
Quoting RussellA
OK, so take your example here. "the sun rises in the east" is the inductive, descriptive "law", which is posterior to your observations. The proposed "Laws of Nature" are what forces the earth to spin the way that it does, causing the appearance of the sun rising in the east.
Quoting RussellA
Not at all. The proposed "Laws of Nature", are whatever it is which causes bodies to act in that consistent way, the way which makes F=ma appear to be true.
Free Will
A person hears an argument.
If that person has free will, then they are free to accept or reject the argument.
If that person has no free will, then it has been pre-determined whether they accept or reject the argument, and it is possible that they either accept or reject the argument.
Therefore, if I observe someone hearing an argument, my observing whether they accept or reject the argument is no guide as to whether or not they have free will.
Introspection
If a person has free will, through introspection they are free to reject the idea that they have free will, and conclude that they live in a deterministic world.
If a person has no free will, during introspection, it may have been pre-determined that they accept the idea that they have free will.
Introspection is no guide as to whether free will is an illusion or not.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Two meanings of Law of Nature
It depends what you mean by "Law of Nature", because it has two possible interpretations.
Looking at Newton's First Law of Motion, possible meaning one is as a description, in that an object at rest will remain at rest until acted upon by an external force.
Possible meaning two is the reason why an object at rest will remain at rest until acted upon by an external force
I agree that there is a difference between a description of what happens and a reason why it happens
Looking at possible meaning two
Looking at why something happens, why an object will remain at rest until acted upon by an external force.
One question is, is the Law of Nature that an object remains at rest external and prior to the object or internal and contemporaneous with the object.
If this Law is external and prior to any particular object, and applies equally to all objects in space and time, then this raises the practical problem of where exactly does this Law exist?
If the Law is internal and contemporaneous within particular objects, and all objects in space and time follow the same Law, then this raises the practical problem as to why all these individual Laws, both spatially and temporally separate, are the same?
How exactly can there be a single Law of Nature that determines what happens to objects that are spatially and temporally separate?
Isn't FREE WILL time based ? You don't have free will for the past, because you can't go back even 1 second into the past. But you have free will to choose and decide for now and future events in your life.
The issue is not "whether free will is an illusion or not". It is whether the person believes in free will or not. If you can demonstrate to me how introspection revealed to you that free will is an illusion, and you live in a deterministic world, and how this introspective perspective inclined you to believe that free will is an illusion, I will listen to you. Perhaps I misunderstood my introspection which inclined me to believe that free will is true.
Quoting RussellA
That is why I have been very explicit in explaining to you the meaning which I intended, and I even quoted a reference.
Quoting RussellA
This is not a possible meaning for Newton's first law. It would be a misinterpretation, a misunderstanding. No "reason why" is given for that law, it is stated as a descriptive fact, just like "the sky is blue" states a descriptive fact. And to interpret "the sky is blue" as giving a reason why the sky is blue would be a misunderstanding of what is stated, just like interpreting "an object will remain at rest or continue moving in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force" as giving a reason why an object will remain at rest or continue moving in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force, would be a misunderstanding of what is stated.
Quoting RussellA
Yes, these are problems which could be discussed. However, I see no reason to discuss them if they are just proposed as reason to accept the illogical premise of contemporaneousness. Once you reject contemporaneousness as illogical, I'll be ready to discuss these other issues.
At exactly 1pm I decide to press the letter "T" on my keyboard. If free will is the case, at exactly 1pm, I could equally decide whether to press or not press the letter"T". But at exactly 1pm I did decide press the letter "T".
By the Law of Contradiction, free will cannot be the case, as it would result in a contradiction. At exactly 1pm I can't equally decide to press or not press the letter "T" and decide to press the letter "T" at the same time.
It sounds like you decided to contradict your decision and action at 1 pm from your free will. :D
I don't believe in particular that thoughts can cause themselves, and I don't believe in general in spontaneous self-causation.
One reason for my disbelief in spontaneous self-causation is that it is something I have never observed.
When I see a billiard ball on a billiard table start to move for no reason at all, then I may change my mind.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Law of nature has more than one meaning.
It can be a description, as Newton's first law. From SEP - Laws of Nature
It can be an explanation. As you wrote:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
One of the reasons I don't believe in free will is that it requires self-causation, where the thought one has is contemporaneous with the decision to have the thought.
Haven't you seen parts of your body start to move without being acted on by an external force? If the "reason" for movement is an immaterial "idea", then this is evidence of free will. Isn't it?
Quoting RussellA
I was the one who used "law of nature", and I gave you the explanation of the sense in which I was using it. It makes no sense for you to say that you want me to have been using it in a different way, because that would better support what you belief in.
Quoting RussellA
The concept of "free will" does not involve self-causation. I don't see where you get that idea from. Thoughts are the property of a being with free will, just like arms and legs are. We do not decide to have thoughts, just like we do not decide to have arms and legs, but this doesn't mean that we do not also have a free will.
No. Suppose a person has the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee.
On the one hand, assuming free will, a person can have the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee. On the other hand, assuming there is no free will, a person can also have the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee.
Having an idea is nether evidence for or against free will.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have never said that I want you to be using the term "law of nature" in a different way.
My point has been that I don't accept that a law of nature precedes an event and makes things act the way they do.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
At 1pm a person has the thought to reach out for a cup of coffee.
Free will means that at 1pm that person could equally have had the thought not to reach out for the cup of coffee.
It is not possible to have two contradictory thoughts contemporaneously, both to reach out and not reach out.
One the one hand, free will is equally free have either of two contradictory thoughts, but on the other hand, free will is equally free to choose to act on one of these thoughts.
It seems that if free will is equally free to act on the thought of reaching out rather than not reaching out, then it is equally free to act of the thought of not reaching out as rather than reaching out.
If free to make any decision, then there would be no reason to make any decision, leading to the inability to be able to make any decision at all.
I don't see how this is relevant.
Quoting RussellA
Then you do not accept my explanation.
Quoting RussellA
Free will is not about the thoughts, it concerns the acts.
Quoting RussellA
Yes it is possible, and your example demonstrates this. The person, at 1Pm, entertains both, the thought of reaching out for a coffee, and the thought of not reaching out for a coffee. That's what choice and deliberation is all about, having contradictory thoughts at the same time. From this condition, a choice is made. And because it is possible for the person to choose either of the two contradictory ways of acting, we conclude that the will is free. It is not forced by any cause, in one direction or another. There is a cause of the act, which is the will itself, but the will is not caused to choose one or the other.
Quoting RussellA
Right, doesn't your own personal experience demonstrate the truth of free will to you? You are equally free to reach out for the coffee, or to not reach out for the coffee. You are free to choose.
At 1pm exactly I have the idea to pick up a cup of coffee.
Assuming free will, at T seconds prior to 1pm, it hasn't been determined whether at 1pm I will have the idea to pick up the cup of coffee or not to pick up the cup of coffee.
Suppose T is 1 second. If it has been determined at 1 second before 1pm that I have the idea at 1pm to pick up the cup of coffee then this is no longer free will.
Suppose T is [math]{10^{-100}}[/math] seconds. If it has been determined at [math]{10^{-100}}[/math] second before 1pm that I have the idea at 1pm to pick up the cup of coffee then this is no longer free will.
"T" can be any number
Therefore, free will only applies if I choose between picking up the cup of coffee and not picking up the cup of coffee at 1pm exactly.
But this means that at 1pm I have two contradictory ideas in my mind at exactly the same time. But this is impossible, meaning that free will cannot be a valid theory.
I have seen evidence that a person can have two contradictory ideas consecutively, but I have never seen any evidence that a person can have two contradictory ideas at the same time.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Having an idea is not evidence for free will if ideas have been causally determined in a causally determined world.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have described a world where things obey the laws of nature, but I don't see where you have explained why things obey the laws of nature.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I thought free will referred to our being free to have whatever thoughts we wanted
This sounds more like instinct, in that I look at a bright light and instinctively close my eyes.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that a person can have two contradictory thoughts consecutively, but it would be impossible for a person to have two contradictory thoughts contemporaneously.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How do you know that we are free to choose?
How do you know that we don't live in a causally determined world, where our actions have been causally determined?
If Determinism is true, then all our thoughts and actions are determined by causes external to our will. Our future is already written, and all our thoughts and actions are a consequence of preceding events.
In that sense, if all our thoughts and actions are determined, then it is true that we have no control.
However, in ordinary language, we do say things like "he was determined not to waste a single minute of his time" and "she was weak and the pain was excruciating, but she was determined to go home."
But the fact that a person is determined to do something, does not mean that their determination cannot be explained within Determinism.
If Determinism determines all our thoughts and actions, our being determined is just one of these thoughts, meaning that it is Determinism that determines our being determined to do something.
For example, I may think that Monet's "Water-lilies" is aesthetic or I may think that it is not aesthetic. Neither thought requires me to act on the thought.
This is a faulty argument because your designated time of "1pm" is completely arbitrary, and not representative of the true nature of time. As indicated by the relativity of simultaneity a precise designation of "what time it is", is frame of reference dependent.
Quoting RussellA
As I explained in my last post, having two contradictory ideas at the same time is exactly what deliberation consists of. "Should I stay or should I go". The Clash, a fitting name.
"Critical thinking", and philosophy in general, is all about comparing contradictory ideas. A philosopher holds these contradictory ideas within one's mind, at the same time. It is the judgement, the choice to act on one or the other, consequently the physical action itself, that results from the judgement, which cannot be both. Furthermore, denying that people can hold contradictory ideas at the same time, denies the reality of much human misunderstanding.
The problem here, is that you are treating a human subject as if one is a material object, to which the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle), apply. This is a mistake of sophistry which Aristotle keenly exposed, and he demonstrated the misunderstanding which this sophistry propagates, thousands of years ago. The reality, as shown by Aristotle, is that if we adhere to the three fundamental laws of logic in cases involving human decisions, sophists can logically prove absurdities. The "sea battle tomorrow" is his famous example, of why the fundamental laws cannot be applied to subjects. In more recent times, C.S. Peirce has done considerable work on this issue.
Quoting RussellA
Why would I even try to do that? What I explained, is that some people use "laws of nature" to explain why things behave in a consistent way, describable by the laws of physics. This is a sort of governance, similar to the governance of "God". What's the point to even asking why matter obeys God, if you do not even believe that matter obeys God. That would be a ridiculous question to ask. You'd be asking why does Y follow X, when you do not even believe that Y does follow X. Any one who tried to answer you would be engaged in an exercise in futility.
Quoting RussellA
Free will is the ability to choose freely.
Quoting RussellA
Do you agree, that by the special theory of relativity, event A could be prior to event B from one frame of reference, and posterior from another frame of reference? Since a human being is composed of many different parts, moving in many different ways, many different frames of reference are available within one human body. Therefore your stipulation of "contemporaneously" is completely unwarranted, and nothing but an arbitrary, fictional condition, imposed for the sake of your argument, when it's not a truthful representation of reality in any way.
Quoting RussellA
I know that I am free to choose, from introspection, analysis of my own experience.
Here's a simple experiment you can try yourself, in the comfort of your own home. Hold a small, soft object in your fingers, extended at arms length, and decide that you will drop it at some random time in the near future. Hold it for a short time, and notice that you can decide to drop it at any random time, without any causal influence, just a freely willed choice to let it go.
Quoting Patterner
However, someone can at any moment, reach in and stop the balls from moving in that predetermined way. And this demonstrates that free will has superiority over determinism, a phenomenon known as "the hand of God", which renders "miracles" as other than impossible.
This is what you are saying: it was determined since the beginning, thus I have no control. That's false. What's true is that if it was determined since the beginning, it's probable that the acts that follow are the determined ones.
If it's to be argued that determinism means something else, it can be dismissed as pure fantasy and delusion that a consciousness, with a mind, is out of control of its own actions, due to some higher force. It equates God belief. You literally believe all your actions are guided by some force other than yourself.
Edit: I think you're confusing determinism with impossiblism.
In my location, 1pm is simultaneous with my picking up a cup of coffee.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is why the words in the proposition "should I stay or should I go" are sequential. First one asks "should I stay" and then at a later time one asks "should I go".
Propositions, in that they mirror thoughts, are sequential.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is the case in a Deterministic world.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is not only a question of whether or not matter obeys God, it is also the question of is there a God.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If Determinism is the case, and determines all our thoughts and actions, then your thought that you are free to choose is just another of those thoughts that have already been determined.
If determinism is true, and (it; who? What?) determines all our thoughts and actions, then...
My understanding of Determinism is that your writing your post was inevitable, not probable.
From Wikipedia Determinism
From SEP - Causal Determinism
OK. If Determinism is the case, and all our thoughts and actions are already determined, then your thought that you are free to choose is just another of those thoughts that have already been determined.
Determined by the nature of the Universe.
Determinism seems to encompass more than Inevitabilism, and includes the concept of inevitability.
From Wikipedia Determinism
Wiktionary - Inevitabilism
Wiktionary - Determinism
Speaking is a physical act, and that requires a choice to say one or the other first, as I said. However, the fact that they cannot both be said by the person at the same time does not imply that the person cannot have both ideas within one's mind at the same time.
Clearly people multitask, so they are thinking different ideas at the same time, required to do a number of different things at the same time, even though they cannot say everything that they are doing, all at the same time. S o why can they not have contradictory ideas at the same time?
The fact that people have many different ideas in their minds at the same time (required for multitasking) demonstrates that the subject matter of your criticism is just a limitation on the physical capacity of speaking, not a limitation on the capacity of thinking. How do you account for a person having many different ideas, in one's memory, all at the same time, which one cannot all say at the same time? Not being able to say everything which one has in one's memory, all at the same time, does not imply that the person doesn't have all those ideas in one's memory, all at the same time.
Quoting RussellA
Sure, you can state irrelevant conditionals, just like I can say that if I was not born yet, I would not be writing this right now, but such conditionals are not relevant to reality.
The question was, how does introspection reveal to you that determinism is the case, and free will is an illusion. Your if/then statement reveals nothing more than "if I was not born yet I would not be writing this right now" reveals. How do I get from this to believing that I was not born yet? And how do you get from your if/then statement to believing that determinism is the case?
Quoting Barkon
In this form of determinism, how do you account for acts which fall outside of being probable, the acts that occur which were not probable? These would not be deterministic, and there would be a whole lot of acts which follow from each improbable act, all not determined from the beginning.
Either 1 or 2.
1. We never do anything improbable(given enough prediction power).
2. The determinator catches up and re-determines from when an improbable act occurs.
It may seem bizarre, but it's more sensible than the original determinism which exhibits 'no control'.
If it were possible to have two contradictory thoughts at the same time, then I could feel pain in my finger and not feel pain in my finger at the same time.
Language mirrors thoughts.
If it were possible to have two contradictory thoughts at the same time, then language would mirror this. For example, the proposition would be "I feel x in my finger", where "x" means feeling both pain and no pain at the same time.
However this is not the case. In language we say "one hour ago I felt no pain in my finger but now I feel pain in my finger".
Language by its very nature acknowledges that contradictory thoughts cannot be contemporaneous.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A cyclist multi-tasks when they pedal and watch the road ahead at the same time. But thoughts about the road ahead should not be confused with the muscle memory of pedalling, which doesn't require thoughts.
A student multi-tasks when writing an essay and listens to music at the same time. But thoughts about what to write should not be confused with an instinctive pleasure in hearing music.
Musical pleasure and reward: mechanisms and dysfunction
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I have many memories, none of which I am actively thinking about at this moment in time.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Conditions in thought are essential to life:
If I don't eat, then I will die
If I cross the road now, then the approaching truck will run me over
If I don't apply for this job then it is unlikely that they will hire me
If an asteroid 15km in diameter hits the Earth, then most life may become extinct.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
One cannot.
If I had not been born, then I would not be writing this post
I am writing this post
Therefore I was born
If Determinism is the case
then all thoughts are determined
I have the thought that my thoughts are not determined
therefore my thought that my thought has not been determined has been determined
Quoting RussellAIf you did not exist, then you would not be writing that post. Perhaps you were created in a lab. Or you are a computer program. Or you are an eternal being that has always existed, and you erase your memory every so often in order to remain sane.
What's "the determinator", the hand of God? Is that like if your clock gets left behind, you have to reset it or else all your actions get at the wrong time?
Quoting RussellA
One example of contradictory thoughts, which you personally would not have, does not prove that contradictory thoughts, in general are impossible. As I said, contradictory thoughts are present in deliberation. Accordingly, if a person does not know whether oneself is feeling pain in the finger or not (perhaps that person is just learning the meaning of "pain"), and the person is deliberating on this, one could be considering both thoughts, I am feeling pain in my finger, I am not feeling pain in my finger, as real possibilities, at the same time.
Quoting RussellA
Muscle memory does not exclude conscious thought. People whistle while they work. The work clearly requires conscious thought, but so does the whistling, just like pedaling a bike, and walking require conscious thought. We do not pedal, or walk without any conscious thought.
The issue is that when we multitask in this way, we prioritize one action over the other, paying more attention to one than the other. However, if you have ever taken a look at how this multitasking actually occurs, you'll see that there is constant switching of which act receives priority. So if whistling while you work involves a difficult aspect of work, attention will be focused on the work, but if the work is significantly mundane, effort can be focused on practising the whistle. In general, there is a continuous balance of priority between the two, enabling both efforts to flow smoothly, but the moment that a difficult aspect of one or the other is apprehended, more attention is focused in that direction. Notice, that's "more attention", not all of one's attention. this is the way that goals and intention work in general, we prioritize things.
I agree that there is ongoing debate amongst neurologists etc., concerning how many different tasks a person can "focus" on. But the problem with most experimental data available is that the scientists involved in these questions start with a faulty premise of what "focus one's attention" means. They assume the phrase to mean directing one's attention toward one activity only, and they judge experimental data from this perspective, neglecting the other things of lower priority, within one's field of attention, assuming the one thing is the only thing focused on . However, this excludes from the outset, the possibility that "focus one's attention" means to prioritize a number of things within one's field of attention. From that faulty premise, the prioritized activity becomes the only activity within one's attention.
Quoting RussellA
This does not resolve the problem. The issue is the existence within a person's mind, of contradictory ideas. You deny the reality of this fact, so you point to a person's actions, and say that a person cannot express, or demonstrate, through speaking, or writing, contradictory ideas at the very same moment. But all this really does, is demonstrate the physical limitations to a human beings actions.
So, I have proposed that we look at a person's memory, where we can see very clearly that a person very often holds contradictory ideas within one's mind, through the use of memory. You reply by saying that you are never "actively thinking" about all your memories at the same time, again appealing to the limitations of activity. However, your appeal does not provide the argument you need. It is very clear that we actively think about a multitude of ideas at the same time, that's exactly what the act of thinking is, to relate ideas to each other. The use of memory allows us to increase the number of ideas currently being thought about, by relegating those with lower priority at a specific moment, to memory, then bringing them back when priority demands. Further, it is very clear that we "actively think" about contradictory ideas in the process of deliberation.
What has become very clear, is that when we include memory as part of the mind, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the fact that a person can have contradictory ideas within one's mind. However, since you are unwilling to accept the reality that people have contradictory ideas within their minds, you have now proceed to exclude the memory as part of the mind. All your are doing is demonstrating that you will take ridiculously absurd steps to support an untenable position.
Philosophy has as its purpose the desire to learn. If your prejudice is so strong, that you are forced into absurd assumptions to support this prejudice, instead of relinquishing it, to adopt a more true path, I consider you are not practising philosophy at all, but professing faulty ideas.
Quoting RussellA
To make a proper comparison, you would need to say, as the second premise in the first argument, "I have the thought that I am writing this post". But then you do not have a valid conclusion. So, to be consistent in your analogy, and to have valid conclusions, we have to state the second premise of the second argument as ""my thoughts are not determined".
I can have the thought of coldness, and can then have the thought of hotness, but the question is, is it possible to have a single thought of both coldness and hotness at the same time.
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Quoting Patterner
Possible.
If I didn't exist, then I couldn't think
I think
Therefore I am
Hmm .... I haven't been on the 'forum' for several years, but this is a good starting place for me to jump back in. :grin:
'Abstractions' are a huge can of worms, and their wriggling is very real. ... It's how biological creatures understand and apply them that can either be very useful or very dangerous (we're stepping into that danger now with AI haphazard hypostatic abstraction). ... When you understand thought as a system, you cannot possibly dismiss its very real 'existence'.
I think there are two approaches, which reflect temperament.
1. Start with an ontological bias, like materialism, and try to find a bridge from that to the world we all inhabit.
2. Start within the world we all inhabit, naming things and making observations, and leave the explanation open ended, realizing that though we may lust to have a theory, we can never have the vantage point necessary to verify it.
The first approach is best for people who want to wrap philosophy around themselves like a web that gets tighter and tighter with every movement. The second approach allows a person to lay philosophy down in a neat package. Maybe people go back and forth between the two.
Merry Christmas!!!
I still cannot understand how a person can feel a pain and not feel a pain in their finger at the same time.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
From Wikipedia - Muscle Memory
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is exactly what I am saying, attention is switched between events, first one, then the other. But not at the same time.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's my position, where attention is directed towards one activity only.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree, human beings are limited in what they can do.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is important point.
I can understand that a person having a painful finger can think about the pain, and later, after the pain has dissipated, think about there being no pain in their finger, but I cannot understand how a person can feel a pain and not feel a pain in their finger at the same time.
I agree that a person can remember having first a painful finger and later a pain-free finger, and can then think about the relation between a painful finger and pain-free finger.
Even if it were impossible, as I think it is, to have a single thought about two contradictory events, this raise the question as whether it is possible to have a single thought about the relation between two contradictory events.
What are relations?
If I think about a relation between two different things, does what I think about include what is being related?
This is getting into Kant's transcendental unity of apperception territory.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I totally agree that people have contradictory ideas within their memories, but not that they are thinking about two contradictory ideas at the same time.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Unfortunately, I am not persuaded to follow the "true path" that you are laying out for me.
If Determinism is truly a philosophically faulty idea, then at least I am in good company.
From the Wikipedia article on Determinism
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
P1 - If Determinism is false, then my thoughts have not been determined
P2 - If Determinism is true, then my thoughts have been determined
P3 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought may or may not have been determined
P1 - If Determinism is false, then my thoughts have not been determined,
P2 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought has not been determined
P1 - If Determinism is true, then my thoughts have been determined
P2 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought has been determined
Having a thought is not sufficient evidence for either Determinism or Free Will.
I'm often amazed beyond description by the speed and scale at which things happen. So I can't guarantee I don't switch back and forth every few microseconds. But it certainly doesn't seem that that's the case.
All thoughts are mental entities or operations, hence they are private to the thinker. The ordinary folks would say thoughts exist, but it is a vague expression.
When X exists, it means X is a being. Being means it has a body to present itself to other beings. Mental operations and thoughts don't have that type of presentation. They are invisible not just to other minds, but also to the thinker too.
The thinker will know about the thought he / she has in their mind, but cannot see the presentation. Thoughts are only expressed via the linguistic expressions to other minds. Thoughts can also work as the causes for actions of the thinkers. But they can never present themselves as existence i.e. they are not the presenting beings such as the bodily structures, or bodies in the physical world.
The ordinary folks would say thoughts exist, ideas exist, numbers exist, God exist, but these expressions are all incorrect logically and ontologically speaking.
They must be corrected to say, they know numbers, use numbers to count or calculate, and have an idea to sort out the problem, thought about the incidents, can infer or understand the concept of God, or they believe or don't believe in God ... etc.
Only the beings which are presenting themselves in visual and touchable physical or material forms exist. Nothing else exists. Not able to tell this difference and misusing the language describing all the mental entities, concept and events as existing is the cause for all the confusions in reasoning.
You are changing the subject we are not talking about what the person is feeling, we are talking about the ideas that at a person has. So, as I said, if the person is just learning the word "pain", the person might have a feeling, and consider both thoughts at the same time, "this is pain", "this is not pain", not knowing whether it is pain or not pain, and trying to decide which it is. You should have no problem imagining this, in the case of a tickle or something like that, for example. The person might at the same time think "this is pain", yet "this is not pain" being unsure whether it ought to be called "pain" or not.
Quoting RussellA
I noticed your quoted passage from Wikipedia mentions "little" conscious effort. Little effort is still effort. So these cases of multitasking where the secondary action requires little effort, and the primary action requires much effort, refute your claims and support mine.
Quoting RussellA
If one activity requires a lot of attention, and the other a little attention, this does not mean that all the attention is directed at one activity.
Quoting RussellA
Again, you are changing the subject. We were talking about having contradictory ideas, at the same time, concerning one event. I don't see why this is so hard for you to understand, It's called "indecision". It appears you want to deny the obvious just because it's evidence against what you believe.
Quoting RussellA
Thinking about two contradictory ideas at the same time is commonly called "deliberation". The example was "should I stay or should I go". Your counter argument was that because we state these ideas one after the other, this implies that we must think them one after the other. But, as I explained, this is a faulty conclusion because thinking and stating are two very different actions with different limitations. So. I'll tell you again, you deny the obvious because it's evidence against your belief.
Quoting RussellA
I don't see the point to any of this. As I said, free will concerns the capacity to act, in general. Thinking is one type of act, and the question is whether having contradictory thoughts at the same time is evidence of free will or determinism. You fear that it is evidence against determinism, so you deny the obvious, that we have contradictory thoughts.
Gravity, magnetism, entropy, thermodynamics,
... Do these not exist? ....... Only physical, touchable, material forms exist? I suppose so, that is if you only limit your perspective to Secondness. I do not.
Interesting experiment.
I tried writing "four" whilst speaking "four". The problem was that it took me four times as long to write "four" as to speak "four", meaning that it was difficult to know whether I was thinking about writing the word at the same time as I was thinking about speaking the word.
The distinction "exists" picks out is that between things that are more than just ideas, vs. ideas. Things that are only ideas do not exist, that is the meaning of "exists". Numbers exist, because they are more than the idea of them. Or subsist, if you like.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Both indecision and deliberation require consecutive ideas. Perhaps I will stay, no, perhaps I will go.
I agree that free will requires the ability to have contradictory thoughts at the same time. The person is then free to choose between them. The question is, is this possible. If not, then Determinism becomes a valid theory.
A person feels something. They have one idea that the feeling's name is "pain", and they have another idea that the feeling's name is "not pain".
You are saying that a person can have two contradictory ideas at the same time.
I am saying that this is impossible, in that it is not possible to have the idea that something is "pain" and "not pain" at the same time.
Good point. They don't exist at all. They are the inferred entity which were conceptualised. I don't deny the validity of the concepts. But they don't exist like the physical bodies.
Gravity applies to between objects, mass and the larger mass. It exerts in the energy form, but saying gravity exists? sounds superstitious, because it doesn't.
Remember this was what Hume said in his Treatise? There is no cause i.e. gravity. There are only the apples, and the ground. You see whenever the apple was released from the hand, it falls into the ground. And Newton inferred a force between the earth and apple, and named it as gravity. So it is an inferred concept called gravity out of the habit and custom to see the apple falling into the ground. There is no gravity. There is no cause.
And like all scientific theories and concepts, they are known to us by education and information. But they are to be toppled, denied and replaced when newly discovered theories and concepts are more making sense. Hence all scientific laws, principles, and concepts are temporary information until the newer ones replaced them. So why bother? Was it Popper who said it?
The singing could have been employing a "muscle memory" rather than active thought, allowing you to carry out another task that did require an active thought.
Wikipedia - Muscle Memory
How about writing one new post to person A and telling a different new post to person B at the same time?
Quoting Corvus
Why bother? ... Because of the necessity of being to becoming. That is the causality of semiosis. Thirdness in action. An open system is a living system. ... Take away Thirdness and all you have is static Secondness. The habits, laws, and momentum of Thirdness exists, and Thirdness is as real as any material object manifested in Secondness. I am speaking of manifestation in describing the word 'exist'. ... As I mentioned before, if you limit your perspective to the nominalistic, self-referential Secondness starting point, you close your system to only the human standpoint of static object categorization as seen from where the individual stands. But it's extremely important to remember that we are within and manifested by the same causality of semiosis we attempt to examine. We may not be able to perceive from the same perspective as every other being, but we CAN and SHOULD recognize that we are within and manifested by the same autopoietic, folding and unfolding causality of semiosis fed by the fluid, synechistic interactions of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. ....
"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." - Charles Sanders Peirce
I believe singing is different. You can press a key on the piano without thinking about anything at all musical. When singing, however, you are actually producing the music. That can't be done without thinking about the music.
It's a very interesting topic. I will have to experiment on this.
I will also have to experiment in non-musical ways. I'm going to try doing some math while writing sentences. The only muscle memory that could be involved in that is the writing of individual letters, and possibly words. But there couldn't be muscle memory for entire sentences, Unless they are sentences I have written many times, like a student being punished in school by having to write something on the board 100 times. I don't remember ever having to do that, but certainly I won't pick anything that could conceivably be an example of that.
Manifested, presenting beings acting as catalysts within a grander narrative... and that narrative exists. Otherwise, there would be no manifestation (existence), of whichever category we are speaking (Firstness Secondness Thirdness).
"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." - Charles Sanders Peirce
Hopefully, not whilst driving.
Perhaps the law on the use of mobile phones whilst driving shows that even the Government accepts the difficulty in carrying out two acts both requiring different thoughts at the same time.
For example, from Drivers Domain UK
In practice, it seems that humans have great difficulty in having two different thoughts at (exactly) the same time.
Thank you! I hope you're also enjoying the seasonal festivities.
That you are wrong, is logically demonstrated in the following way:
Consider our example, "should I stay, or should I go". Suppose I think first "should I go?", then I relegate this thought to memory, and I start to think "should I stay?". According to your stipulation, each of these thoughts could only occur while the other is in memory, one following the other, without the two ever intermingling. This means that no thought could ever be produced which includes both of these two. Accordingly, the two could never actually be compared to each other.
One would consider "should I go", and all the merits and reasons for going, independently from "should I stay", and all of its merits and reasons. But the two distinct groups of values could never be compared, or related to each other in any way, because that would require having both of the two contradictory thoughts united within the same thought. Of course this would completely incapacitate one's ability to choose, because a person could never have the two distinct, and incompatible sets of values within one's mind at the same time. To think of one the other would have to be completely relegated to memory, Therefore the two could never be compared.
Obviously though, we do actually compare and unite contradictory thoughts within the same idea, when comparing the value of each, in order to decide. Ideas are often very complex, having many distinct ideas, as elements, united within, and nothing prevents the imaginative mind from uniting contradictory ideas. So when the person in the example, compares the value of staying as value X, and the value of going as value Y, and is able to decide one over the other, it must be the case that the two have existed together, in thought, at the same time, or else no comparison could have ever been made.
We can see this very clearly in simple arithmetic. The value assigned to "1" is inconsistent with, or contrary to the value assigned to "0". When a person says "1 is not equal to 0", it is necessary that the two contrary ideas, "1", and "0", must exist within the person's thinking, at the same time. Otherwise the person could only state the value of "1" at one time, then the value of "0" at another time, and never be able to actually compare the two, and understand that the two are contrary values. In reality therefore the entire complexity of mathematical ideas, which is constructed to compare inequalities, relies on the coexistence of contrary ideas. Without such coexistence of unequal values in one's mind at the same time, no one could understand or do any mathematics.
Quoting RussellA
Yes, that is what I am saying. And, I think that any degree of serious introspection will reveal that any type of decision making would be impossible if the contradictory ideas could not actively exist within the same mind at the same time. In fact, if distinct ideas could not coexist then no relations between ideas, or comparisons between them could ever be established. But that is exactly what complex ideas consist of, comparisons and relations made concerning distinct ideas.
So the most simple logical demonstration that you are wrong, is this. The simple judgement, that two distinct ideas (such as should I stay and should I go) are contradictory, is itself a relation established between the two distinct ideas. In order to make such a judgement truthful, or accurate, the two ideas must be compared (i.e. exist together in the mind at the same time) or else any such judgement would be arbitrary or random. Therefore if one contrary idea could only come into the mind after the other left, it would be impossible to even judge, in any way other than a random guess, that the two are contradictory. To judge them as contradictory requires that both actively coexist within the mind at the same time, to be able to decide that the two fulfill the criteria of "contradictory".
You make a strong argument.
I agree, as you argue, that if there are two contradictory ideas "should I go" or "should I stay", in order to be able choose between them, I must first fuse or unite them into a single idea. It then follows that I have in my mind two contradictory ideas at the same time.
However, consider the following:
At 1pm, I go.
At 12.50pm, I have the two ideas "should I stay" or "should I go".
Free Will means that at 12.50pm I could equally stay or go at 1pm.
Determinism means that at 12.50pm it has already been determined that I go at 1pm.
If Determinism is the case
1) It has already been determined at 12.50pm that I go at 1pm
2) This means that no decision needs to be made at 1pm whether to stay or to go, as the decision has already been made prior to 1pm.
3) This means that it is not necessary to choose between two contradictory ideas at 1pm.
If Free Will is the case
1) At 12.50pm, I have two contradictory ideas, "should I stay" or "should I go".
2) At 1pm, these two contradictory ideas have been fused into the single idea "should I stay or go" in order to allow me to be able to choose between the two possibilities.
Summary
It is observed that I go at 1pm
As you say, Free Will can only account for my going at 1pm by fusing two contradictory ideas into a single idea in order to be able to make a choice between them.
However, Determinism can also account for my going at 1pm without any necessity to fuse two contradictory ideas into a single idea.
By Occams Razor, Determinism is the simplest explanation, as it doesn't require the metaphysical problem of how two contradictory ideas may be fused into a single idea.
I hope no one minds if I interject something here. Perhaps it might be useful? If not, just ignore me and proceed. :)
Secondness also takes place in thought. The process of thinking is a dialogue within the self, where ideas bump up against each other creating a reactionary momentum, pushing ideas (and subsequent motion, physical movement) into expressiveness. When we think, we are having a dialogue between the self of a moment before and the self currently manifesting (coming into being) in time and space. Since it is constantly changing along with us, the current aspects of time and space influence our thought as the previous thought melds into the changes manifesting in the current. All of the cells in our bodies are engaged in this, as are all beings we influence and are influenced by.
Quoting RussellAIndeed. I'm sure it can be done to at least some degree, even if not to that which people generally assume. There's definitely a lot of jumping back and forth very quickly taking place.
Thank you RussellA, I take back what I said about you refusing to acknowledge things which are contrary to your belief.
Quoting RussellA
This is why any rational person will reject determinism. It means that choice is not real, and this implies that we do not need to deliberate or weigh options. And if we do not do this we will be overcome by various forces, and rapidly exterminated.
Quoting RussellA
Sure, but believing in determinism is by this description, a belief that choice is impossible. This would also mean that only an irrational person (a person who believes that doing the impossible is possible) would even attempt to make a choice if that person believed in determinism. Therefore the person who believes in determinism, in order to be consistent with one's believe, would not choose to do anything, would be overcome by forces, and would be dead very soon.
Quoting RussellA
Sure, and not choosing to do anything is simpler than having to choose, and dying is simpler than having to stay alive. Therefore by Occam's Razor we should all believe in determinism, choose to do noting, be dead soon, and get it over with.
Quoting Patterner
Having a multitude of different thoughts at exactly the same time, is exactly what a complex concept is. Consider a relatively simple complex concept, like "right angle triangle". That concept consists of "triangle", which is itself complex, and also "right angle" which is complex. So there's a number of different ideas tied up in understanding "right angle triangle". Now consider "Pythagorean theorem". This consists not only of "right angle triangle", but a bunch more ideas about the relationships between the lengths of the sides of that type of triangle. It appears that to adequately understand "Pythagorean theorem", a person must be able to have all these ideas in one's mind at the same time.
But this brings up the issue of the use of symbols. One symbol can adequately replace a complex concept, which consists of a number of united ideas. So the spoken word "triangle" for example is one aural symbol which represents a number of ideas. Then, when we think in words, the one word can stand in for a number of ideas, instead of needing to have all those ideas in the mind at the same time. I think that this, in a sense, is "the meaning" of a word, a complex relation of ideas which the word itself substitutes for in the act of thinking.
Maybe we could analyse different modes of existence? I still believe that physical existence is different from the conceptual existence. There are many entities and objects we describe as "existence" or "existing", but not visible or audible to our sensory organs such as God, Numbers and all the abstract entities. They only exist in our minds, and we just communicate about them and on them via language.
Manifestation could be a good word for some abstract entities. Instead of saying "X exists", X manifested sounds more logical. I heard of some narratives, and I know some narratives, I could tell you a narrative for something, but narratives exist? I am not sure, if they exist anywhere in the world.
Sure, and working out complex problems is where the use of symbols is very effective, for the reason I just explained. That's why mathematics, which employs symbols, is the means by which very complex problems are worked out.
But I would say that the use of symbols is what enables advanced thinking to work with entirely different types of ideas at the same time. And that's exactly what complex mathematics is doing, combining completely different types of thoughts by establishing relations of value. So, I believe that "higher levels of complexity" in a sense, actually refers to "thinking entirely different types of thoughts" at the same time, if we allow the condition that the different thoughts are just represented by symbols, rather than the whole idea being thought of in completion. For example, "mass" and "acceleration" are completely different types of ideas, which are combined in the conception of "force", which is a complex concept, but made quite simple, and easy to use with f=ma.
My usage of the word 'narrative':
A causality of semiosis that results in a representamen of a situation or process, and in such a way as to reflect or conform to an overarching momentum.
A brave statement to call everyone from Heraclitus to Aristotle to Hume to Dennett not rational people.
Wikipedia - Determinism
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
True
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
True
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not true.
If a person believes in Determinism, not only i) do they believe that their choices have been determined but also ii) it has been determined that they do make choices.
It still sounds a mental event or process resulted from perception and understanding. Would you say the narratives exist in the external world?
From an online vocabulary dictionary....
exist
Share
/?g?z?st/
/?g?z?st/
IPA guide
Other forms: existing; existed; exists
{ The verb exist means to live, to have reality. Dodos no longer exist because they were hunted to extinction.
It's not only "live" things that exist. The government exists, as does your fear of heights. Anything that can be acknowledged in the present, exists. }
And another....
{ exist
in American English
(?g?z?st; ?g?z?st)
verb intransitive
1. to have reality or actual being; be
2. to occur or be present
the qualities that exist in a person
3. to continue being; live }
..... My answer to your question? ... Yes. The causality of semiosis occurs and is present in the external world.
And this does not exist in the external world? ... Consider that the next time you try to maneuver city traffic without traffic lights and signs.
Of course things exist in the external world. I was not denying that. The traffic lights exist, and when the red light is showing, you must stop, and wait. But that is the legal contract and instruction you must abide in order to drive in the town. If you break that contract and instruction, then you will be in trouble physically and legally.
That contract and instruction is a form of information and knowledge given to you and you are aware of it, which causes you to stop when you see the red light at the traffic. The idea of the legal and civil contract is in the form of idea which you know of in your mind. It is not an external entity or existence.
We are using the physical device (the traffic light with red yellow green) as a sign post to convey the information and contract which is mental in nature.
Clearly, you have no awareness of semiosis.
The blindness caused by the nominalism thought virus is prolific and ingrained in many people. I no longer debate with that affliction. It is futile. ... There is no reason to continue this discussion. It is a waste of the value in good and necessary dialogue.
The meaning of exist from English dictionary seem too wide and loose. Of course people use words in all sort of different contexts and meanings in ordinary life. You could use exist to mean even a lot more different things if you were writing poems.
But if you were to reason for logical arguments, then I think it would be better to narrow it down the meanings of words you use into concrete and solid definitions. That process is what philosophy and logic must do.
Ok, fair enough. I declare the same. Please don't write poems in philosophical debates. That is my advice to you.
You agreed with my argument which showed that having both of two contrary ideas in the mind, at the same time, is a requirement for making a choice between them. This is necessary to be able to compare and choose between them. Then you said, if determinism is true, choosing is not required: "3) This means that it is not necessary to choose between two contradictory ideas at 1pm."
Therefore you contradict yourself. You admitted that people do not choose if determinism is true, based on my explanation of the requirements for "making a choice". Now you claim a premise which contradicts this. You say "it has been determined that they do make choices". Clearly, it has been determined that if determinism is true people do not make choices, if we adhere to what has been agreed to, about what constitutes "making a choice".
Maybe your two-party dialectical failure to continue, relates to a proposed affliction resident in the nominalism thought virus.
The particular meaning of a word having several possible meanings depends on its particular context.
According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, one meaning of "choice" is "the act of choosing", such as a person made the choice as to whether to stay or go. Another meaning of "choice" is "a person or thing chosen", such as a person chose the option to stay.
If Determinism is the case, in one sense people do make choices, such as do I stay or do I go, but in another sense cannot choose, as their choice to stay has already been determined.
The fact that a person makes a choice says nothing about whether it is a free choice or a choice that has been determined.
The context of a word is important for its intended meaning.
Everyone couldn't fail to notice that it was neither a wise nor intelligent choice of the words in philosophical debate.
When a person cannot see the actual and current cohesiveness of relations that bind existence and reality, and the inherent momentum that generates continued creation, it is extremely difficult to bridge or mend the nominalism fractures. .... There has to be sight and recognition before that work can even begin. ... I have learned this repeatedly. ... My work is valuable, and time demands that I manage that time wisely.
Thank you for your interest in seeing this discussion continue, but I cannot spend further time on it.
So be it.
One purportedly missed the opportunity to be awakened from dogmatic slumbers, the other personifies Sisyphus with a generally unrecognized metaphysical doctrine.
Same as it ever was
Doesn't it sound too pessimistic and prejudging? :D
Quoting Mww
According to Kant, you fall into dogmatic slumber when you accept groundless ideas and beliefs of others without critical reflection and reasoning.
So if determinism is true, then someone made the choice for the person? Who would that be, God?
As the SEP article on Causal Determination writes
If someone happens to be in the middle of a city road and sees a truck directly approaching, they would sensibly choose to move to the pavement.
I agree that some people may believe that God directly told them to move, looking out for their best interests.
Some people may believe that someone else, such as a loved one, telepathically told them to move.
It could be that they move because of an innate instinct for self-preservation, without being consciously aware of what they are doing
It is unlikely that someone other than the person themselves made the choice to move to the pavement.
If Free Will is the case, then they themselves freely made the choice.
If Free Will is the case, and a person's thoughts and thoughts to act come into existence at one moment in time, not having any prior cause, then this is an example of spontaneous self-causation, a metaphysical problem difficult to justify.
If Determinism is the case, their choice had been determined, not by themselves, not by someone else, but by the physical temporal nature of the Universe. A Universe of fundamental particles and forces existing in space and time over which no person has control.
If Determinism is the case, a person has no choice in what they choose. One advantage of Determinism is that it avoids the metaphysical problem of spontaneous self-causation whilst still explaining a person's choices.
Speaking of "dogmatic slumbers", are you familiar with Charles Sanders Peirce's essay titled 'The Fixation of Belief'? ... I mentioned in another post here recently about how nominalism might be a human survival cognition tool, assisting us in rapid discernment. But we also need to be aware of 'fixations' that develop via autopoiesis, personally and culturally. ... In the essay, Peirce explores the idea that beliefs settle our doubts because doubts make us uncomfortable. ... Perhaps this is behind the idea of 'concretizing'? But what becomes haphazard hypostatic abstraction is when nominalism attempts to concretize that which is inherently dynamic. .... One of my favorite Goethe quotes is this. ... How difficult it is to refrain from replacing the thing with its sign, to keep the object alive before us instead of killing it with the word."
Close enough, I suppose. I rather think accepting ideas and/or beliefs of others is dogmatism, which occurs when a subject presumes to advance in his own metaphysical thought without determining the validity of its ground as opposed to the habitual neglect of it, hence the proverbial slumber.
It follows that to awaken from a slumber is to begin what the slumbering prevented, in this case, determining the warrant for acceptance of any belief or idea, his own or someone elses. So it isnt what a subject falls into at all, but instead, what he comes out of.
So to awaken from dogmatic slumbers is to begin the critique of ones own pure cognitions, for the origin, the warrant, hence the validity, of the principles upon which they necessarily rest, thereby promising that we .must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics...
Now what was offered as opinion with respect to one purportedly missing the opportunity to be awakened, just indicates he chose not to examine, or, as I mentioned, gave no evidence that he did examine, the validity of the ground the pure cognitions of his dialectical opponent presented to him, but merely designated the words representing them as neither wise nor intelligent, the epitome of sceptical appraisal.
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And the dogmatic slumber to awaken from? To critique the grounding principles for? That to which I wished to direct your attention, but apparently failed miserably?
Why, the nominalism thought virus, of course. Maybe its just me, but the subtlety in that phrase, that concept ..(sigh)
As we discussed, and you agreed, choice is impossible if determinism is true. Simply put, "choice" is not an appropriate word in this context, otherwise we'd be saying that water makes choices, rocks make choices, etc.. But we don't say that, because we recognize the difference between the moves which these inanimate things make, and the moves that a human being makes.
When you were talking about the missed opportunity for waking up from Dogmatic Slumber, it reminded me of Kant's position when he rejected Wolff and Leibniz's ideas, having read Hume. That was all. :)
Familiar, yes; studied .not so much.
From that essay, though, comes one of my more seriously held cognitive inclinations, re: to believe is no more than to think, from which follows one says nothing more when he says he believes, than what he has already thought. And insofar as no belief is possible without the arrangement of conceptions, which just is to think, to speak from belief alone, holds no power at all.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
I rather think doubt is merely a negative belief, both of which are cognitions, discursive judgements of relative truth, whereas comfort is a feeling. I dont associate one with the other, myself. Smacks of psychology .the red-headed stepchild of proper metaphysics.
Also from the essay, . imbued with that bad logical quality to which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied , which implies metaphysical cognitions possess bad logical quality, precisely the opposite of my personal opinion.
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Nominalism. Denial of the reality of abstract objects? Or, denial of the reality of universals and/or general ideas? Something else?
Yes, understood. I was just carrying over what he did for himself he meant for all rational subjects to do for themselves.
I disagree.
If Determinism is the case, a person has no choice in what they choose.
In language, the word "choose" is used in certain ways. Inanimate things such as rocks that don't possess life cannot choose, but animate things such as people that do possess life can choose.
A person may choose between two courses of action, such as whether to stay or to go, regardless of whether they live in a world that is Deterministic or in a world where people have Free Will.
A larger question is, how does Free Will explain the spontaneous self-causation of thoughts and thoughts to act?
I am not sure if this is a helpful way to think about free action. If something is uncaused then it occurs for "no reason at all." However, are we free when we act according to what is uncaused and random?
When we act freely, we tend to think we act not only for reasons, but due to reasons we understand. If a German soldier in WWII refuses to execute civilians because it is "the right thing to do," then clearly this act must involve what lies prior to their choice: their understanding of the situation they are in, the consequences of disobedience, all that has shaped their notions of right and wrong, what they think about the innocence of the civilians, etc.
Yet their perception of the innocence of the civilians is prior to their refusal to execute them.
What is self-determining is not undetermined.
OK, I'll accept this as what you are trying to say then. By "determinism" you mean that a person chooses but they have no choice in what they choose, i.e. something is chosen without a choice having been made.
And I'll present this as very good evidence of what I said before:
"This is why any rational person will reject determinism."
But suppose we run an experiment! We offer people two choices: they can have their favorite entree from their favorite restaurant, or they can eat a plate of dog feces. People choose option A 100% of the time. Clearly, the dog feces has made their choice for them, ergo one cannot ever freely choose not to eat dog feces. QED. :cool:
I agree. I admit that I used the word 'uncomfortable' when that is not what Peirce actually said in the essay. I was not writing that comment for academic scrutinization. :wink: I shall be more careful in the future. This is what I get for not being fully awake when expressing my thought.
Substitute 'irritation' for 'uncomfortable', and please forgive my faux pas.
This is what he actually wrote.....
"Thus, both doubt and belief have positive effects upon us, though very different ones. Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises. Doubt has not the least such active effect, but stimulates us to inquiry until it is destroyed. This reminds us of the irritation of a nerve and the reflex action produced thereby; while for the analogue of belief, in the nervous system, we must look to what are called nervous associations -- for example, to that habit of the nerves in consequence of which the smell of a peach will make the mouth water.
IV
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry, though it must be admitted that this is sometimes not a very apt designation.
The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort. The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.
"Quoting Mww
I understand. This is where the 'reflections' of Kant appear in Peirce's work. ... It would probably be prudent of me to explain that I do not think of any of my favorite philosophers as the 'end all be all'. After all, if I did my framework wouldn't be so unique. :sparkle:
I want to expand on this a bit. ....
As I mentioned in another thread, in order to get a more encompassing picture of Peirce's writings, it's important to consider the philosophical environment of his time and community. I suspect that he was expressing this statement due to the constraints and pressures he was under at the time. He had married a woman who would actually conduct Tarot card readings for their Episcopal church community, and he became involved with this woman prior to his divorce being final, which was instrumental in ostracizing him from the academic community. ... All I am saying is that after years of studying Peirce, I get his speech and inflections, which can be challenging when first starting to read him. ... Note that he said "to which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied." ...In this specific statement, he was not speaking of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline.
I think I might actually push back against that, if you'll bear with my reasoning. I think it's possible to say that ideas do, in a sense, exist in the physical world, just not in the way we normally think of it. Rather than the idea being a solid "thing" in the mind, I believe the physical manifestation of thoughts can be seen in the specific electrical/chemical reactions happening in a persons brain when they think that thing. So ideas are physically real, but exist as more as an ongoing natural process rather than a concrete object. Imagining an object and looking at an object light up similar parts of the brain in scans, which I think is the closest we can currently get to "seeing" thoughts from the outside.
On a similarly related note, I think if you look at the way thoughts and memetics move from mind to mind, mutating, growing and changing as they do... I think it's possible to interpret ideas as having, if not a kind of life, then at least something similar enough to one that it warrants further investigation.
True. For both Free Will and Determinism, there is a reason why at 1pm I choose not to fire my gun.
===============================================================================
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I agree
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At 1pm, when I choose not to fire my gun, I have several thoughts, including the innocence of civilians and the orders I have been given by my superiors.
If Free Will is the case, at t seconds before 1pm, where t can be any number, it has not been determined whether I do or do not have the thought at 1pm to fire my gun.
If Determinism is the case, at t seconds before 1pm, where t can be any number, it has been determined that I have the thought at 1pm not to fire my gun.
My question is, if Free Will is the case, is this not an example of spontaneous self-causation.
Spontaneous in the sense that my thought not to fire could not have existed at t seconds prior to 1pm, otherwise my thought would have been determined.
Self-caused in the sense that the thought at 1pm not to fire caused its own existence.
How can a thought spontaneously cause its own existence?
Not many people in history have said that Einstein was not a rational person.
From Einsteins Mystical Views & Quotations on Free Will or Determinism
Awww damn. Im all warm and fuzzy inside. (Grin)
Quoting Mapping the Medium
Agreed; he was commenting on the inacuteness of common sense, and that they are not proper metaphysical cognitions, re: Hume and assorted and sundry British empiricists, Im guessing. My problem was that he implied bad logical quality to metaphysical cognitions, irrespective of their connection to common sense thinking. With the caveat, again, in that I may not have given Charles his just due.
Good point. But electrical / chemical reactions in the brain are not ideas themselves. Electrons and chemical particles exist everywhere in the universe, even inside the brain. They react to each other with every possible minuscule physical stimuli and in most times, they react with no particular causes or reasons whatsoever too.
Seeing the electrical / chemical reactions in the brain via some measuring instruments and saying that must be ideas sounds not quite convincing.
It is like those folks who think the red light from the traffic lights are identical entity with the instruction to stop, and the green legal contract to "Go". They are just legal contracts between the government and the drivers. They could easily have made pink to stop, and orange to go.
The physical objects and events in the external world are not the ideas, knowledge, information or concepts themselves. Of course, they can be linked, but they are not the same in ontological sense.
I think we need to distinguish between doubting the means, and doubting the end. Notice that this passage takes the ends (desires) for granted, so that the doubt being talked about is doubt of the means.
"It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires;...".
When the belief 'satisfies our desire', as the means to the end, then we are not inspired to doubt the means because the result, end, is insured as that satisfaction. So long as the desire itself, the end, is never doubted, and the means are observed to be successful, then doubt is only relative to the efficiency of the means. Now means are empirically justifiable, as we demonstrate that action A produces the desired end Z. Then various ways of producing Z can be compared, A, B, C, analyzed, and the resulting "settlement", which method best produces Z, can obtain to a level higher than mere opinion.
However, such justified settlements rely on taking the end for granted. It is only relative to the assumption that the end Z is what is truly desired, that the means are in this way justified. Doubting the end itself puts us squarely into the field of opinion, unless the end itself can be justified as the means to a further end. In traditional moral philosophy there is a distinction made between the real good, and the apparent good. The apparent good is nothing but personal opinion, but the real good is assumed to somehow transcend personal opinion.
The fault in the quoted passage is the following:
" And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort."
This statement inverts the real, or true, relation between the being with knowledge and the object of that being, which is its goal or end. Knowledge, as justified opinion, explained above, is always justified as the means to the end. But the end which justifies the knowledge is simply assumed as an opinion, and this places "our object", which is the goal that motivates us, as outside of knowledge itself, as unjustified opinion. This is what Plato demonstrated in "The Republic", "the good" must be apprehended as outside of knowledge.
So the statement incorrectly asserts that the motivating object, the end, or the good, cannot be outside "the sphere of our knowledge". A proper analysis indicates that only the means to the end can be justified as knowledge, while the object itself, the end or good, must be apprehended as outside the sphere of knowledge. Therefore moral traditionalists characterize the apparent good as opinion, and the real good as understood only by God. This places "our object" as firmly outside "the sphere of our knowledge".
Making this switch produces a completely different understanding and conceptualization of the division between active and passive elements of reality, outlined by Aristotle. Notice in the quoted statement, that the mind must be "affected" by its object, to be motivated by it. This characterizes the end, or object, as active, and affecting the mind. But when the end, or object is understood as opinion, then it is necessary to assume something within the mind which is other than knowledge. Opinion is not knowledge. Being created within the mind, by the mind, opinion is the effect of the mind, and improperly represented as affecting the mind, with "the motive for mental effort".
This reversal is what allows us to doubt the object, or end. Being created by the mind, it is within the mind, and therefore can motivate, but being unjustified leaves it outside of knowledge. Therefore it ought to be doubted. In other words, the mind creates its object, goal, end, or good, and this created object "acts" as the source of motivation for knowledge, and the means, as human actions in general. When we take the object, goal, end, or good, for granted, we represent this as the object affecting the mind to produce knowledge in the form of means. And this is what is expressed in the passage. But to properly understand, we need to doubt that which is taken for granted in this representation, the object, goal, end, or good. Therefore we ought to doubt, that which is taken for granted in this passage, the object, goal, end, or good. And this exercises the mind's true capacity to actively create the object, rather than simply allowing the object to affect the mind, by taking the obect for granted.
And when we get beyond this assumption, of taking the object for granted, we learn that the mind actually creates its own object, goal, end, or good, in a field which is other than knowledge, the field of opinion. Then the "motive for mental effort" is not something which affects the mind, but something created by the mind, and this places that object firmly within the mind, but outside of knowledge. And of course this validates, the self-evident truth that the motive for mental effort, the existence of the unknown, is outside the sphere of knowledge.
No doubt. ... Thank you for bringing this up. ... I do want to point out again that to understand Peirce is to understand that he tries to walk the reader through what he suspects is their perceived 'notions' and then circles back around (there's that synechism in action) to point out aspects to reconsider. ... This is why the word 'architectonic' is so often used to describe Peirce's work. ... This was one of his first essays published in 'The Monist'. ... Again, understanding the constraints and environment of the time helps to understand why and how he formatted his essays the way that he did. ... It's important to also understand that William James was his best friend. And since Charles was ostracized from the academic community, James was helping him financially. James was a nominalist, and Peirce saw the errors in nominalism, so he walked a fine line with his essays. .... Please take Peirce as a whole, without dissecting and reducing his work and potentially misunderstanding his aims.
I have a lot of respect for Charles Peirce, but from what I've read, he misses the mark with his ontology of "the object". This might be due to a desire to disprove nominalism, but he allows unintelligibility to be an essential aspect of "the object" and this leads to the acceptance of vagueness as an ontological principle.
He posits an unnecessary separation between sign and object. For example, the sign is the numeral 2, and the object is the number two. There is no need for "the number two", as the numeral might serve as both the sign and the object. This unnecessary separation produces an unnecessary layer between the sign and the interpretation of the sign, the unnecessary layer being "the object".
That produces an inaccessible, unknowable, relation between sign and object. Therefore both the object and the sign, lose their otherwise assumed to be necessary identity, as identity being the same as the thing itself, by the law of identity. Neither the sign has a necessary identity, nor does the object have a necessary identity, as there is merely an undefined relation between these two. The result is that the object is no longer restricted by the law of identity, because of the assumed relation between the object and the sign which is not a relation of identity, i.e. the sign is other than the object. So if the sign, and the object are both present to the mind, these two are distinct, not the same, and there can be no necessary relation between the two, unlike when the sign and the object are one and the same by an identity relation.
I believe that phenomenology, especially as developed by Derrida, provides a better ontology of objects by allowing that the sign is the object.
Can you tell me what written work of his you are referring to?
As for Peirce's 'representamen' and triadic model, we need to recognize that he is pointing to what the sign means to the interpreter. ... It does take on a different identity than just considering what some might refer to as a specific ideal form.
For instance, here is an image that can mean different things to different cultures. ...
The 'object' is exactly the same, but the 'representamen' has a different identity.
I seem to be having trouble posting an image. I put the link to the photo as requested, but it's not showing.
Perhaps this will work...
As for phenomenology, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, etc, ... We could easily fill up another thread on what I have to say about that. :wink:
Here's a link to some notes I wrote some time back. .... Phenomenology or Phaneroscopy?
Have you ever seen this video? It's been around a while, but no longer rising to the top. ... It talks about some of what you are referring to.
https://youtu.be/GITVPh7GVSE?si=5pgDM9rizZ6rAvyA
Phenomenology is definitely not my cup of tea, due to it being historically influenced by nominalism that was nurtured in the arms of religious theology. ... And Bakhtin had his own religious undertones, but as I mentioned previously, I do not see any of my favorite philosophers as being the end all be all. I have found what I think is a golden trail of breadcrumbs that travels through their combination.
If you decide to watch the video, perhaps it will provide more clues as to where (as the video puts it) I part company with phenomenology. ... There is a second part, a continuation of the video, if you should discover that it interests you.
That "unnecessary" layer is my interpretation. As I explained, it can be understood with reference to mathematical Platonism. We understand "the number two" as the object between the numeral "2", and the interpretation performed by a person's mind. I believe this "object" is superfluous, a completely unnecessary layer added into the interpretation for various reasons within mathematical theory. In other words, it's simply part of the interpretation, serving a specific purpose, rather than a separate layer.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
This issue is, why do you, and Peirce assume "an object", which is "exactly the same"? I apprehend a sign, and I interpret the sign. The sign is interpreted by me, in a way which may be different from others. For what purpose is "an object" posited? The only answer I can find for this question, is that it provides a grounding for the claim that there is a right, or correct, interpretation.
The problems with Peirce's triadic model become evident in the work of those who have followed him, and actually employ it. The issue is 'the rules for interpretation', as indicated by Wittgenstein. The rules must comprise 'the object', in order that "the object' supports a correct interpretation. In other words, the supposed 'object' is nothing but the rules for interpretation. With Peirce's model, the rules for interpretation cannot be within the mind of the interpreter because the differences between various minds would not support the premise that "the 'object' is exactly the same". And since there is nothing between the sign and the mind which interprets, to support the independent reality of those rules, the rules must be within the sign itself. This is evident in biosemiotics.
Placing the rules for interpretation within the sign itself is very problematic because these rules would need to be interpreted. The interpretations of the rules by various minds would differ, and nothing would support the premise that "the 'object' is exactly the same", unless the sign itself, and the rules for interpretation are one and the same, as 'the object'. But then there is just the interpreter and the sign, while 'the object' is superfluous, and there is no intermediate layer.
Furthermore, placing the rules for interpretation as within the sign itself is very problematic because then it is not the mind which is doing the interpretation, having no rules for that, but the sign must be interpreting itself, and this ends up leaving the interpreting mind itself as superfluous, unnecessary. And this is exactly how biosemiotics has been mislead. The sign becomes self-interpreting and the requirement of an agent which interprets is lost, as the sign is both passively interpreted, and actively interpreting.
This all indicates that the triadic model has as a premise, an unnecessary third aspect. The superfluous aspect 'the object' may be placed as desired, depending on the application. In mathematical Platonism 'the object' is associated with the mind of the interpreter, as an independent idea grasped by that mind. In biosemiotics, 'the object' is associated with the sign, as the rules for interpretation inhering with the sign itself.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
You seem to have a strong prejudice against nominalism. Why?
In the past, I have learned to not go down the nominalism road on this forum. This time, I would like to stay a while.
I can either point you to my essays or post the very long essays in entirety here. Which would you prefer?
Im obviously not MU, but I asked first.
Quoting Mww
Sorry, , for butting in, kinda. I recognize that youre going deeper into the subject matter than my simple question asks.
So sorry. ... I did not mean to overlook your request.
I do delve into this topic deeply in my essays. I will say that one of the reasons I started the thread about hypostatic abstraction, precisive abstraction, and proper and improper negation is to hopefully demonstrate some of what I write about.
Nominalism is deeply ingrained in Western culture (and the now-global-world in general), and it is very difficult for most to step outside of it and look at its history and influence when they are so influenced by it themselves due to 'thought as a system'. ... We are within what we are trying to examine. Nominalism tends to evoke the idea that the examination is objective. It is a case of recursive smoke and mirrors.
Again, I have written about this extensively. I don't want to spend a lot of time on it in threads here. It's just not a productive use of the forum.
.yet it repeats itself.
Socrates would object in the most strenuous of terms.
I also want to mention here that it is absolutely necessary to study Peirce and not "those who have followed him". It is a severe problem in the arena of Peirce studies that there are all sorts of 'gleanings' of snippets of his work to support ideas that would cause him to jump out of his grave and beat someone over the head.
I used to be on the Peirce Society Listserv, but it didn't take long for me to discover that it was basically ruled by a couple of academics who were clearly mixing up understandings of 'embodied'. Their Cartesian background was bleeding into Peirce's work. ... I explained that I could not accept that and left. They still send me Peirce Society emails and invites, and I appreciate that, but the Cartesian blood was more than I was willing to expose myself to.
I invite Socrates to join in on my thread about hypostatic abstraction, precisive abstraction, and proper and improper negation. :sparkle:
Aint gonna happen. Hes rather well-known for the questions he presents his dialectical companions, the lack of relevant response from one or another of them, would probably make him think twice when it comes to associating himself with philosophers in general.
Lol ... ok :wink:
.and speaking of presenting questions, something I distinctly remember doing, which at my age, is rather significant.
As much as you think that nominalism holds sway in the western world, I find that it has been supplanted by Platonic realism, in the last few hundred years as the ontological support for materialism, "matter" being nothing but a concept. Not only that, but all forms of realism are grounded in Platonic realism. Realism is generally the default perspective, but since it requires no philosophy, many realists refuse to admit to the Platonic premises required to support their metaphysical perspective.
Since realism is what gives importance to the idea of "objects", while "object", as a concept loses importance in nominalism, it is really Platonic realism which evokes the idea that any examination is "objective". In nominalism, interpretation by the subject, is what is important, so it is inherently a subjective perspective. If nominalists claim objectivity, then they are hypocritical or self-contradicting.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
I've read enough Peirce to see the problems I point to. As I said, I have a lot of respect for him, being very intelligent and keenly able to expose ontological problems. The issue though, is that he proposed solutions when he ought not have, because the solutions just aren't there. So his proposals aren't solutions at all, they simply mislead. In other words, his analysis is good, his synthesis is not. His proposed solutions only blur the subject/object distinction so as to veil the category mistake which the supposed solution is built on.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
OK, post some links, quote some relevant passages, or just express some of what you think, whatever. Thank you.
There's clearly no need for me to post anymore under these circumstances, but thank you.
You're really touchy aren't you? It's as if you are actually afraid of being infected by the dreaded "nominalism thought virus".
Quoting Mapping the Medium
Let me remind you, that when I engaged you above, I discussed explicitly the quote you brought from Peirce himself, and I addressed directly what I believed to be "The fault in the quoted passage". That fault is labeled as "taking the object for granted".
You told me, "Please take Peirce as a whole" as your way of avoiding my criticism of that passage. So when I then turned to what others say about Peirce, as a whole, you criticized me for using secondary sources.
How can I take your essays as anything other than secondary sources? And it appears like you will not discuss the problems with Peirce's philosophy with anyone other than someone who has read all of his material, and is able to take him as a whole, without referring to secondary sources. At this point you would probably just dismiss the person anyway, as having an incorrect interpretation, because you seem to think that Peirce has solved all the ontological problems of the world.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
So, I read the notes you linked to, and I'll show you how "the problem" I referred to above is revealed in that writing.
First, Peirce's term "Phaneron" characterizes a consciousness as an object instead of as an activity. It is the sum total of one's thoughts at any particular moment in time, rather than characterizing a consciousness as actively changing thoughts, all the time. So he uses that proper name "Phaneron" to name that object. So he starts from a mistaken assumption, a premise that the entirety of a consciousness can be taken as "an object". That's expressed here:
Then, in the quote from Merleau-Ponty we can see the difference between this perspective, Peirce's which takes the object for granted, and the phenomenological perspective. Here:
Notice the difference. What is given is an "indeterminate horizon", and from this an "object" is constructed.
The problem which develops from Peirce's "taking the object for granted" is demonstrated later in your writing about "secondness", what is described as "bumping up against hard fact". Here we find the root of the problem, what I called Peirce's category mistake. Secondness is described as the physical constraints of the material world, such as walls and doors, yet it is also describe as "hard fact", and this refers to a description of the physical constraints, "fact" is corresponding truth about the physical world. So secondness, as the assumed "object", has dual existence which crosses a boundary of separation between the traditional categories of material and ideal. The "object" may be the physical constraint which we actually bump into, or it may be the supposed "hard fact" concerning that constraint.
The problem ought to be very evident to you now, as the ambiguous nature of "object". An "object" can be an aspect of the physical world, or it could also be an idea in a mind. "Secondness" is an attempt to make it a sort of medium between the two, but as I argue, that medium is fictitious, imaginary, created as a part of the interpretant.
Referring to the quote from Merleau-Ponty, we can see that "the object" is really a creation of the mind. Now Peirce, in his desire to take the object for granted, when it really cannot be taken for granted, because it is created within the mind, introduces ambiguity with his concept of "secondness", which allows "the object" to be conceptualized as either a mental object or a material object. It really cannot be conceived as something distinct and independent from the two, as a third category, like Peirce desires with the proposal of "secondness", because Peirce has not properly provided that category which is required to serve as that medium which he desires. He's really only provided ambiguity in "object" which allows "object" to be conceived of (constructed) as on one side or the other, of the two traditional categories, depending on one's purpose.
I absolutely do not expect you to. That was my point.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
To understand 'moment' in mathematics and physics is to understand that time is a continuum, and a moment has no duration. Measuring something with zero duration is not feasible because all measurements inherently involve a finite interval.
Peirce understood this quite clearly. That understanding reveals itself in understanding his works as a whole.
Regarding 'Phaneron', Peirce is not naming an 'object'.
In synechistic terms, a moment is defined relationally, through interactions or changes. In phaneroscopy, moments are meaningful even if they cannot be measured. Their significance lies in their qualitative presence within the flow of experience, rather than their quantifiability.
Again, Secondness is not an object, as in your interpretation. Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are a triadic relationship. There are no separations between them. As in the case of how we understand the hardness of a diamond, they are relational. You cannot experience Secondness without Thirdness. ... This is a good example of how nominalism makes it difficult to shift thinking paradigms. It is blinding.
I want to expand on this a bit..... Again, it is important to recognize that Peirce was a teacher and lecturer. He used language as needed to help his students understand from their cultural perspective at the time. This is another reason to study his entire works rather than snippets.
A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant. -CP Lowell Lectures, 1903
Peirce is not separately delineating an 'object' in the above excerpt from this lecture. It took me a LONG time to understand this, and it prompted me to want to learn more. Any nominalist reading this excerpt in isolation could easily misunderstand it. ... My point is to notice that he says "called' its object. He is not calling it "object", he is referring to what is commonly "called" 'object'.
Notice how he references TO a second and FOR a third. This is where the focus needs to be to understand this excerpt.
Peirce's Semiotic Model
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As for Merleau-Ponty, he was a phenomenologist. ... I am a phaneroscopist. There is a substantial (major) difference. My exploration of Merleau-Ponty helped me to see that. That was the whole point of my written piece on the topic.
As I said, "object" is left ambiguous by Peirce. I haven't offered any interpretation of "object" due to this problem. And you are wrong to say that secondness is not the object.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
Mapping the Medium, face the reality, he is explicitly saying that it is what is commonly called "object". And he uses that term to say that it's called "its object". Why argue this. it's essential to understanding the triadic relation he proposes? Secondness is what we commonly call "object",
Now the problem is that there is ambiguity as.to what is commonly called "object". There is a physical object, and there is an object of the mind which is better known as an idea. Peirce intentionally exploits this ambiguity, because he seems to think that this will somehow solve some ontological problems.
It does not, and that is because physical "objects" have an identity according to the law of identity. Mental objects (ideas) cannot be assigned identity. So when you say "the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant", it could only be "the same object" if it was a physical object. Only physical objects have this "sameness" assignment by the law of identity. But Peirce wants this principle to apply to mental objects (ideas) as well, and this forces him to make exceptions to the law of noncontradiction, and the law of excluded middle, to account for the reality of these supposed mental objects, which are not really objects with identity, at all.
Peirce isnt conflating or confusing "physical objects" and "mental objects" but rather proposing a more flexible and relational understanding of "object" as it functions within a semiotic framework.
The focus of Peirce's logic is on the semiotic framework.
You are suggesting that Peirces approach violates the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle, but Peirce doesnt see these laws as universally applicable to all aspects of reality. His logic of relatives and his commitment to synechism (the doctrine of continuity) allow for a more relationally emergent view of identity and difference. For Peirce, reality is not static but dynamically unfolding, and his logic reflects this processual nature.
The "sameness" in Peirces framework is not about static, metaphysical identity but rather about functional continuity across interpretations. The triadic relation ensures that meaning evolves through interpretants while maintaining a thread of continuity tied to the dynamical object. He views the "object" in the triadic relation as that to which the representamen refers, not necessarily something with a rigid ontological identity.
Peirce doesnt reduce Secondness to physical 'objects' alone. Its about the dynamic relation of reaction or resistance between two elements, whether physical, mental, or conceptual. So yes, the "object" in the triadic relation can be either physical or ideal, depending on the context. Again, Peirce's focus is on the semiotic triadic dynamic relation. Whereas nominalism's focus is on concretization and static identity.
It might be mentioned in passing that Peirce's academic career was pretty brief. He lectured at Johns Hopkins University from 1879 to 1884, during which time he taught logic, largely under the auspices of James Joseph Sylvester, a mathematician who supported Peirce's work. However, Peirces academic career was cut short when he was dismissed in 1884 due to personal controversies and his unconventional behavior, including a scandalous divorce and second marriage, which damaged his reputation in the academy. Thereafter he and wife Juliette moved to a rural property in Milford, Pennsylvania, where they lived in considerable isolation and poverty. During these years, Peirce faced periods of severe financial distress, and there is evidence that his health deteriorated due to inadequate nutrition and poor living conditions. 'Charles spent much of his last two decades unable to afford heat in winter and subsisting on old bread donated by the local baker. Unable to afford new stationery, he wrote on the verso side of old manuscripts.' (One of the reasons sorting and publishing his voluminous materials has taken more than a century thus far.)
Thank you for adding this background to the discussion. The quote we were examining was from one of his lectures. We can only speculate as to how his work might have had more influence if his academic career has not been cut short.
I took a road trip in the Fall of 2023 to Milford, PA to visit his home. You can read about here, if you like.
My Road Trip to Arisbe
I agree with this, but I prefer the term "ambiguous" over "flexible".
Quoting Mapping the Medium
That's true, these laws are not universally applicable. That's exactly what I was arguing with RusselA earlier in the thread. In the case of a thinking subject, in the process of deliberation, and decision making in general, the person has the two opposing and contradictory ideas in one's mind, at the same time. As we discussed, having opposing ideas at the same time, "I should stay", I should go" violates the law of noncontradiction. This violation is because the person has as a property of one's mind, contradictory ideas.
However, these fundamental laws of logic are intended to dictate what we can and cannot say about physical objects. A physical object has an identity, as itself, and it does not have contradictory properties. Thinking subjects though, along with all of their thoughts and ideas, are not objects. and that is why they can violate those fundamental laws with their thoughts. The conceptions we produce do not need to follow the laws which apply to physical objects. This demonstrates a very clear difference between physical objects and ideas.
Peirce, with his "semiotic framework" attempts to annihilate this difference with his "flexible" understanding of "object". But this is a recipe for problems, because it removes the boundary, the principles of distinction, which separates the aspects of reality which obey those fundamental laws and those which do not.
Instead of the simple, and very useful division between the mind which interprets, and the thing which is interpreted (be it the physical world in general, an object, or a sign), Peirce posits the object as what is represented by the sign, as in my example, the numeral 2 represents the number two. This adds an unnecessary layer, and leaves the sign itself as a distinct category, outside our capacity to understand. The sign itself is impossible to understand, because understanding consists of knowing its object. This leaves signs themselves as inherently unintelligible, because a sign would have to be represented by another sign, and another sign, in an infinite regress.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
Yes, well this is the problem. An "object", as a physical object, is "the same as itself" in every aspect, that's what makes it an object, it's uniqueness. But if we look at "functional continuity across interpretations" as what defines "sameness", relying on the concept of "differences which don't make a difference", and call this the defining feature of "the object", then we have no words left to describe the reality of physical objects in their uniqueness. "Object" now has been taken to be used in referring to this new type of object, which has a compromised form of sameness. And so we must also compromise the meaning of "same" so as to exclude the relevance of differences which don't make a difference. Then "same" just means similar. Clearly this is debilitating to ontology.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
This is exactly the ambiguity I am talking about. A representamen could refer to a physical object, as is common in day to day speaking, or it could refer to an idea, or concept, as is common in higher education. Traditionally we'd distinguish between these two, and assign identity to physical objects, and apply the basic laws of logic in speaking about these physical objects. The other type of referent we'd understand as an idea, a concept, a subject of study, or something like that. So we'd have a clear distinction between these two.
Now Peirce allows both of the two types of referent to be classed together as "object". But since the one type, ideas and concepts, don't have a proper identity, by the law of identity, yet he wants to give them some form of identity as the object referred to, he is inclined toward a compromised meaning of "same". This is a meaning of "same" which allows for differences, and it really means similar. But "similar" will not do the task required by Peirce, to support "the object", as one rather than many.
This is not really a problem in itself, to corrupt the use of "same" this way, but it robs us of the capacity to talk about, and understand the reality of what we know as physical objects, in their uniqueness, by stealing that word "same", and giving it a different meaning. Of course, if you're a staunch idealist like Peirce seems to be, you'll deny that there is any reality to the assumption of independent physical objects, but this denies the capacity for truth, as correspondence. And so it really just produces more problems.
No. This is where the misconception lies. Perhaps you didn't read what I posted on the other thread. I will post it here for your review.
-----
Intrinsic Properties are characteristics that an object has in itself, independently of anything else. For example, the shape of an object is an intrinsic property.
Extrinsic Properties are characteristics that depend on an object's relationship with other things. For instance, being taller than another person is an extrinsic property.
Essential Properties are attributes that an object must have to be what it is. For example, being a mammal is an essential property of a human.
Accidental Properties are attributes that an object can have but are not essential to its identity. For example, having brown hair is an accidental property of a human.
By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be.
Platonism takes this same idea and applies it to universal forms (but it is the same historically influenced idea!).
In Platonism, 'Forms' are abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world. According to Plato, the physical world is just a shadow or imitation of this realm of Forms.
Unlike nominalism, which treats properties as mere labels, Platonism asserts that these properties have an essential, independent existence in the world of Forms, but the issues with concretized identity are the same as in nominalism.
Platonism provides a framework where properties and identities have a deeper, more substantial existence beyond the physical realm, which SEEMS to contrast sharply with the nominalist view, butthe premise is based on the same historical development of nominalistic thought. This has its origins in religious theology. As I explained before, the view was that God can only be omnipotent if able to damn an individual sinner or save an individual saint. Discrete, individual forms/objects is the foundational idea behind both nominalism and Platonism. Continuity is disrupted in both of them.
This just demonstrates Peirce's use of "object" is not only ambiguous, but equivocal as well.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
This makes no sense to me at all. I see no logical connection between a nominalist saying that the concrete existence of any specific property is nothing more than a label to be interpreted by a mind, and your conclusion that this "concretizes properties". Clearly, the only concrete thing here is the label, and it's obvious that the label is not the meaning. Also, it's clear that when we use a relational label, like "near" for example, we are not "concretizing" this property to say that it is part of the thing referred to as "near". Even with labels like "red", the nominalist respects that this is a word to be interpreted for meaning, conceptually, and it does not refer to a concrete part of a named object. That is just naive realism which you are criticizing, and that's worlds apart from nominalism.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
I can't follow what you're saying here. The law of identity "concretizes" identity by placing a thing's identity within the thing itself. This means that a thing's identity is not the whatness we assign to the thing by naming its type, nor is it a collection of properties which we define, or anything like that. it is not even the name we give to the thing, as a proper noun assigned to that particular thing only. The thing's identity is the thing itself.
Platonism, as you describe it here, does not run a foul of the law of identity. However, when these "abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world" are given identity as objects, then this is a problem. And that is what Peirce does with his conception of "sameness" which you describe as "functional continuity across interpretations". It is this "sameness" which allows a conception to have an identity as an object. But it's a qualified "sameness", relative only to the specified function. So that sort of "sameness" exists only within the domain of a specific purpose, and is not a true identity.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
I agree with most of this, and that there is really very little difference between traditional Platonism and traditional nominalism. These two are just different ways of interpreting the relationship between the physical world, and the world of ideas. The big difference is that nominalism pays respect to the role of signs and symbols, as a necessary, and essential aspect of human concepts. This perspective denies the characterization of "abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world". Human abstractions and conceptions are understood to rely on physical signs and symbols, this makes it impossible for them to exist independently of the physical world.
This makes the described form of nominalism and the described form of Platonism incompatible. Now Peirce wanted to pay respect to the importance of signs and symbols, in the nominalist way, but he also wanted to hang on to the benefits of Platonism (as an easy ontology) at the same time. So he proposed that triadic system which allows for that separate, independent object, as an idea or concept, along with the signs of nominalism, all together. But what this does, as I've argued, is annihilate the distinction between a physical object and a concept. And that is not a good ontology.
I can only say that understanding Peirce's intention takes a lot of time in research and study. There's clearly nothing I can say to you to instill that understanding.
For Peirce, abstraction is dynamic, relational, and grounded in semiosis (the process of sign-making and interpretation). Universals and abstractions are not arbitrary (as in nominalism) or static and disconnected (as in Platonism). Instead, they are real but only in the sense that they emerge through relational continuity and are embedded in a triadic process.
Peirce's approach stands out by addressing the limitations of nominalism (over-reliance on discrete categorization) and Platonism (over-reification of abstractions). He emphasizes the relational, processual, and evolutionary nature of abstraction, making it more aligned with the complexities of the real world.
That sounds like nominalism to me. But I think it misses the point which separates Peirce from nominalism, making him closer to Platonist. For Peirce, the universal is an "object" and this name is supported by the assumption of "sameness", what you called "functional continuity across interpretations".
This assumed "continuity" of sameness, despite differences, is what allows the universal to be known as one object instead of many distinct conceptions in many distinct minds. This is analogous to the observed temporal continuity of the physical object which enables our assumption of "same", despite differences of change over time, instead of assuming a new object at each passing moment.
Notice that the title "object" is supported by an assumed continuity of existence, in both cases. The continuity of the physical object being supported by the assumed temporal continuity between distinct moments of existence, and the continuity of the universal being supported by the assumed coninuity produced from the use of signs.
The problem being that Peirce's semiosis, and proposed triadic structure cannot support this assumed continuity required for his determination of "sameness", and "object". By placing the object outside the relationship between interpretant and representamen, as your diagram neatly shows, as something distinct, (independent with its own continuity),having its own distinct relation between each of the other two, Peirce provides a misleading model. A true analysis of the relationship between the interpretation and the sign would reveal that the sign actually breaks any supposed continuity of the universal, between one interpretation and another.
So to make a true representation, which would support the supposed continuity of "the object", the category of "object" would have to include both interpretant and representamen as united in continuity, within "the object". This is what is commonly known as the transcendence of Platonic objects. The existence of the universal, as am object, transcends the existence of its composite parts, the sign and the interpretation of the sign. That the object transcends both, and is therefore of a distinct class produced by a unity of the other two, is a necessary condition for the the continuity of the object.
What Peirce does with the triadic semiotic structure, is remove the transcendence which supports the continuity of "the object", yet he still claims an object with continuity. This allows that the continuity of "the object" may be understood as a property of the interpretant, or it may be understood as a property of the representamen, in his proposal of ambiguity. So all we have is a nominalist sign-mind representation, with an assumed continuous "object" which may be assigned to the sign, or it may be assigned to the mind, depending on one's theoretical purpose.
This is why it is useful to refer to those who apply Peirce's triadic structure, to demonstrate the inconsistency in application, produced by that ambiguity. In "objective" science such as biosemiotics, it is evident that "the object " is a property of the representamen, yet in social applications of semiotics, it is clear that "the object" is understood as property of the interpretation. A true representation of a united interpretant/representamen, to support a continuous object, is not required, because "the object" may simply be assigned to one side or the other.
This is because Peirce takes a nominalist sign-mind model, and adds "an object" without any rigid principles of sameness or continuity. This allows those who apply the model to assign "object" where there is no support for an object. The defense of that assignment is that it is a "Platonic object", but Peirce has denied the ontological support for Platonic objects.
Quoting Mapping the Medium
This is exactly why Peirce' project fails. Asserting compatibility between incompatible ontologies is not a solution. Taking a nominalist structure of "discrete categorization", and imposing an assumption of continuity, without justification, just to make it more "Platonic", is not a solution to the discrete/continuous dilemma.
Peirce absolutely does NOT do what you are asserting here.
I am exploring this issue in my thread on Hypostatic Abstraction, Precisive Abstraction, Proper vs Improper Negation
I agree with you. They exist. But they are ultimately make-believe. Functional tools we have constructed, projected into the natural world as such, and because they are Functional, collectively believe.
In that sense, as 'opposed' to the real and natural world against which we project them, they are ontologically not real. So they exist, but only for humans, and only in that fictional layer which we have imposed upon reality, hiding it only from ourselves. When humans are nowhere to be found, so too will numbers be.*
*assuming that no other organism evolves to adopt them, and that even our AI etc are gone.
As you touch on some real interesting points. See parts that I have underlined/bolded from your comments for the specifics that caught my attention:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover Personal opinions are both bad and good, though no? Bias is opinion based, some outspoken far from the silence of their own wonderings within the mind...when bias or opinion based beliefs, reasons, or claims is used as an excuse to not continue towards finding that real good...lack of acceptance or awareness or willingness to see self and others. See the self in others. When our personal opinions are preventing US (together) from reaching higher levels or desires (which are, personal) then the real problem is in the excuse to NOT act towards higher levels because for some it is not easy tolerating others opinions and these tolerances are at different limits. They are valid, even when reasonable doubt arises. We doubt our selves and others, but how do you know I never doubted from the start? Does that chance exist to prove some one or our selves wrong? Right? Transcending personal opinion requires lessons to be learned, a settlement is justified in itself at that decision making moment. Maybe they never knew what they truly desired and are scared that they already foresee the truth, and it's not good.
Wooo! :sweat: That was a lot, I wont be offended if we skip all that but note I did touch on similar ideas before, see thread, "Why be moral?" from Michael in 2015**, I commented *over a year ago:
I also underlined parts from the following contributions you made that talk about justification in itself:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover Can we break this down more? I am confused at the way you put into text the inverse statement and how it was incorrectly asserted that the motivating "object" cannot be outside the sphere of knowledge. Are you saying the justification ITSELF is justified knowledge Understood by GOD, how does one understand such things? Seeing? Learning? Observing? Living? Watching? I think it's more of a KNOWING. A knowing and a faith that goes beyond questioning, doubts, and opinions. Beyond good or bad, into.....the light!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Seeing time pass may cause another thing to move a different way.....can one be forced out of the present moment? Can one be or USE force/d to stay in it?
Yes sure...that is one force. I think many forces happen in and with TIME. The "force" I write of here and agree with you it is from the passing of time, but not just a force alone plays a role in the space held as the passing of time is actively happening. THE awareness of Two things at once? It is perhaps a/the result of what is behind the events or experiences that are had/to be...Interested in entertaining retrocausal ideas, kind of...Time works in motion and it is OF it, a deeper look of my thinking below:
"5/9/23 1212pm
Of what.....is the "drive" mentioned above? [[ "a drive is needed and with it,...."]]]
Of human interest perhaps? How much does "interest" drive humans
Force OF motion vs Force IN motion = is just time in daily activities, as time goes on in a day, how are you linked to the time, how is time used/seen/acknowledged/important to humans actions TODAY...not any day, not on a Tuesday, TODAY...plans, relations, work, health (body and mind), money, circumstances, environment, what is expected vs what is possible vs what does human want to do and why.....
-F of M = Time available to act in the day, before tomorrow begins, and is no longer yesterday...Time forcing the measuring of movements, planning around time....not the actions being forced to motion, the action is ... a person planning BECAUSE OF TIME AVAILABLE TODAY....
[b]Plans are of motion, a force [[ see Intend ]]
Acting on the plans, a force [[see Intent ]]
Timing, a point where a force occurs
Time, not a force alone but only when measured by Humans[/b]
-F in M = The actual actions a human takes on within the span of available time in a day and how well they are living and the current status of living situation is immersed in the appropriate environment...are you where you should be?? Time spent acting on the plans, whether timing is on track or not (not constrained by time, in the moment instead of on the clock
"a drive" = of interests of human-intention
drive+forceIN(M)+forceOF(M)=
forceIN(M)+forceOF(M)+human+nature=f......?
(human intention) + (a drive) + (Force of M) = "an excuse to act"
"an excuse to act" + forceIN(M) = accidents occur that are unnecessary
be IN motion and also OF motion?"
-from my notes, highly flawed and updated since...but relevant to showcase my stance perhaps not more clear, but evidently....
I suppose I do agree with answering the question, yes... but I think there is more to just this specific "force", being the cause of movement because of the passing of time...but our lives revolve around the clock, why? Is that force more powerful than our will to stop following time as we know it? We lose track of time...we pay consequences. What does my/your/our life revolve around besides the clock? We don't all flow with it, but we are all in it together...until we're not. Gone but not forgotten? Until we are....gone and forgotten. Then we wait, til the time comes and they remember us, again! Pure chance? Time/time avail. for that chance to occur? The spot, spotted! At last.
This might be a good place[s][time?][/s] for me to jump from this thread to THAT thread :point: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15544/what-does-consciousness-do/latest/comment
I have been following the back and forth with MU, it seems relevant to mention that from reading the other thread discussion currently being had encouraged me to respond HERE now. Although, I think the excerpt blurb I shared about forces, time in and of motion may align with the whereabouts of that discussion, as I can further explain when I arrive over there. For now, may it be lost in a final cause already....leaves it only to be found!
- 11 days ago, pg 3 of 3, "What Does Consciousness Do?"
?ucarr This might be a good place[time?] for me to jump from this thread to THAT thread :point: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15544/what-does-consciousness-do/latest/comment
If you're still interested in joining our discussion, then let me say, "Welcome, aboard!"
You've given me a lot to look at Kizzy, and some of this I don't quite understand. So I'm going to address firstly, the distinction you mentioned between desire and intention, to hopefully lay some ground work for a base of understanding between us.
I think, generally speaking, we use "intention" to refer to actions motivated by a conscious goal, and we use "desire" to refer to feelings which motivate actions. This is the most common form of "intention" as used in philosophy of mind, and social sciences, which frame intention as a property of human consciousness and reason. In this case, strict adherence to definitions implies that an intentional act would require thought out reasons, and a conscious goal. This puts "the object" of intention, the goal, into the domain of knowledge, what the person knows (though it is essentially subjective knowledge). On the other hand, since a desire derives directly through emotions and feelings, it can incline, and produce an activity, where "the object" of the act, the goal is completely unknown This is the case when we are "overcome by passion". The act is based in emotion, hate, anger, lust, etc., and the object, or goal of that act may not be adequately known. In other words, the act is produced without consciously considering what the end will be.
However, this separation leaves a large grey area where the two relate to each other. In law for example, a person cannot excuse oneself from the rule of law by saying I was overcome by passion, I had no particular goal in mind when I did that, therefore it was not an intentional act, and I am not responsible. So moral philosophy relies on a much broader definition of "intention", from the one proposed by some philosophers of mind, who want to tie "intention" strictly to the conscious mind.
This definition ties intention to "purpose". The key difference here, is that when we say that a person, or even a thing, acts with a purpose, it is not necessary that the purpose is known to the the acter. So when we say that the various parts of a machine have a function, we mean that they have a purpose, and intention is implied. The "intention" is associated with the creator of the machine. This broader definition of "intention" effectively rids us of the grey area between "intention" and "desire", by bringing acts which are motivated by emotions and desires, where the goal is not adequately understood by the acter, into the category of "intentional".
Broadening the definition of "intention" in this way, has its own problems though. By placing the object, or goal of intention, as not necessarily grasped by the mind of the agent which is acting intentionally, we allow that all sorts of purposeful acts are intentional. Therefore we see all sorts of intention throughout the acts of creatures in the biological world. And we see intention in the parts of living beings; the heart, the lungs, etc., demonstrate purpose, and therefore intention is behind the actions of these parts. This is a problem, because knowing the object, the goal, is what makes intention intelligible to us, because the intentional act can be justified as the means to the end, in the way I described. But when the act demonstrates purpose yet the object or goal is unknown, then we just speculate as to the goal, and even question whether there is truly intention there. Furthermore, the possibility of an intentional act without an object or goal, must be allowed for, and this is completely foreign to the thinkings of the conscious mind, which requires justification for any proposed intentional act, as means to some end.
The result is, that when we allow that we may be inclined, motivated, and actually carry out acts, without an understanding of the relationship between the act and an end, as in the case of emotional acts, being overcome by passion, etc., we allow that intentional acts may be carried out without an object or goal, whatsoever. This ought to shake our confidence in all that we think we know about "intention", because the way that we've always understood "intention" is as actions directed toward goals. Now there is a need to remove the requirement of a goal, and understand intentional acts as purposeful acts without a goal. So in relation to traditional understanding of intention, this makes "intention" completely unintelligible because we need to understand an intentional act as an act without an object or goal, rather than as an act with a goal, and the goal is what makes the act intelligible.
Quoting Kizzy
I would say that we need to recognize, and adhere to the principle that "bad" and "good" are judgements. So when we talk about "the real good", and whether or not there is such a thing as "the real good", this is a judgement too. And if we maintain the principle outlined above, that intentional acts may be carried out without an object, or goal, i.e. without a good, then we have a very real problem with the assumption of "real good". This makes all your discussion of "higher levels" grounded only in the supposed good of "US (together)", but what makes "US (together)" a good itself? See, intentional acts are inherently acts which are carried out without a goal (like trial and error maybe), and from these acts goals are created. But what criteria is used to judge a goal as a good goal rather than a bad goal?
Quoting Kizzy
I was responding to the quote from Peirce, where it was claimed that "the object" must be within the realm of knowledge. I think it's obvious from the evidence we have, of real intentional acts, that the object, or goal of the intentional act may not be known at all. In fact, from my exposé above, it may be the case that the true essence of an intentional act is an act without a goal, where understanding of "the goal" is developed after the act.
The point is that justification for the act is produced from an understanding of the relationship between the act and the end (as means to end). The end is completely opinion based, as explained. This means that if the act itself is liked, enjoyed, or in any way preferred by the person, whatever is produced from that act, will be claimed to be the intentional end, because this justifies the preferred act. For example, "the act produces happiness". In that way the means becomes what is desired, and the end becomes completely irrelevant, just manipulated words to support the desire for the action. This is why we need to look at the end from the other direction, not as the known object which inspires the act, and justifies the act, but as the unknown object which the act will produce. This forces the need to judge the object, end, goal, itself, rather than simply judging the means in relation to the end. The end, being opinion, is simply manipulated to support enjoyment of the activity, the means. Essentially, this is habit. The activity is what is enjoyed, and whatever is produce from that activity is rationalized as the desired end.
Quoting Kizzy
I'm going to stop here, and keep the discussion of time to the other thread, which is more suited to that with the question of what does consciousness do, as a temporal question of activity. This thread asks about ideas, which are more like static things, involving objects, goals, while the other thread is about activities. Of course there is a lot of overlap, but I think it's best to make some sort of division. Maybe you can copy some of the questions from here over to there, if you want me to address them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover Yes I am with this.
You said, "The point is that justification for the act is produced from an understanding of the relationship between the act and the end (as means to end)." I agree, but is that understanding from the individual or another? That understanding is of interest because it can be two sided....what does it take to do that? To understand? For self to? For all to?
I am thinking about now, again: what if the goal is to justify? For instance, we can behave or act accordingly using a self-set belief with reason (or not, see religion) to not motivate but JUSTIFY the intentions/actions of them (of passion, what if a person wants to appear more passionate then they really are?) Can we FAKE our beliefs or only justify the reasons we have them and why we do the things we do. We don't believe it ourselves, sometimes. We can not hold up the act forever, unless it was held and forgotten. Voided?
We dont believe ourselves, that is uncertainty. We need to accept the unknown with trust, I said that before. BUT at other times, it happens and is knowing you are right where you are supposed to be in that moment of time, conscious reassuring to self. A feeling becomes a knowing of surety when it is felt within us...we KNOW and no one can know THIS feeling like we do...some will swear they KNOW what you mean. How can they? Do you have to believe them? When would you? When it's nothing but love. Those intentions that are masked while the truth of the matter is that the desire is going to (drive or lead?) us towards the goal no matter what...only one outcome exists for every moment that passes...too quick to ever fully get a hold, however a quick glimpse of that is all we really only NEED. It's in the life lead of a conscious being in harmony with their nature...and in nature?
Their character, emotions, and behavior. If we are observing human nature at large can it be said that intention is linked to moral standards? Goal might just be unintelligible to them because they are actively too deep "in it" and may not be able to get a view for what it truly was meant to do. What if the goal was met all along without them realizing? Gone too soon? What if people have a "goal" so they think but it actually was another one?
What if intention can be justified as the morality in the acts itself, could the desire and therefore the goal be knowable or NOW known? To self or others? In what order....time of overlap, time until that happens? The chance, perhaps...Do we get robbed of time or did the chance even exist?
Here I go with time talk again, lol! Stopping myself...I will get to the other thread to carry on with that....
BUT I want to continue, with what we now know about the goal. What goal is linked towards the "belief" or intentions, being motivated actions other than one you came up with in the moment? How long one "thinks" about it, is knowable, not exactly but to a point where we can verify or judge fairly....
So, where I think, the intentions can be changed in any moment, it is the desire that is the realest thing towards knowing any truth of any reasonable matter because it is that which is the drive behind the light from the darkness and back into the dark...Watching from a far, th surfacing and then diving to the depths, IT comes out to lurk just when it thinks/believes NO one is watching....BOOM, spotted. Did they see you see it? That may matter...that brings a choice to them now, to deny or account for them being seen. Its a risk they were HOW willing to take? Risky business! To do: Acknowledge or try to run away?Should we acknowledge but then lie? Hm..so many options. Only so many, so little time. Or is there more? Either way, we GET to make the choice (when it comes) and it is important how we reflect and move on from them. Always moving....
Those choices decided upon (how fast matters...do we make them quickly or do we have time to spend thinking or planning, did we or did we not use our time wisely? Was time limiting or constraining us to make this choice in a sudden event, our reaction time or instinct is not a choice necessarily, I think choices requiring thinking consciously. So that makes sense why you said in the first paragraph of your last reply, that conscious goals motivate actions we call intentions.
But what if consciousness updates our being with a goal through the intentions that change in decision making moments, because of whatever reason? What if being conscious of the goal, or what we think is the goal changes the DIRECTION not the desire but how we move in life to get through the next day? I think its important before we or anyone implies their judgement that it's necessary to verify the credibility of the people judging and the objective nature of what comes from a judgement. A group or person may be wrong in their judgement without a standard way of verification that the judgement is necessary in the first place..
When you are correct in the way your judgement was stated, and it is verified that you were right on what was called upon to be judged, meaning, it is what you claimed it was, then as a source with power to convince others of what the truth is, a source shows interest and by serving your word as the proof, a/the judge needs to clearly show how much thought went into what became the better judgement and sometimes an explanation is NOT needed, can that be justification in itself? r)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Exactly!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That is fine. But you did ask me a direct question regarding time in this thread. What if I never read the other thread and only answered the question? We would still be here talking about time regardless... My comment is still relevant to the topic though, I appreciate the reminder! We do not have to go FAR into time here now, that is why I said to ucarr I am jumping over to his thread. TO DO that, that being -- get into it! I was warmly welcomed!
I will say maybe you did not follow up on my answer to your original question because of my formatting and style, that is on me then. It is properly known that my writing style can be not easy to follow, but only for those willing. Some are not willing to even read at all. Good. You should have to try and understand not just follow lines of words. They are not for everyone. Good.
So, I apologize if this is the case. I can focus if I must....
Ha! I just keep going. Can I say perhaps I have no goal? Or should I say my goal is different and it is not required to communicate myself clearly but just to be and be here with ,thoughts...I don't need anyone to get me all the time. It makes it special when they do...but yeah, it is easy to miss the point(s) in my communications but I can assure they exist if I am here commenting. Even if the point is ACTUALLY for me when I re-read my stuff. What was my original one then? LOL, it's wild. Or I am...
How or where should we proceed from your question to me: What could be the cause of motion other than the passing of time? Time passing is what causes things to move. Is "force" the passing of time?
I believe that proper "justification" requires demonstration to another. However, we do use "justification" to refer when a person justifies something to oneself. There is definitely ambiguity here. We could call one a "subjective" justification and the other "objective" justification, but this produces ambiguity in our use of "objective", which could be a problem in epistemology We would now have a proper sense of "objective", meaning of the object, and a sense of "objective" which refers to properties of subjects, like "objective knowledge". The latter is better known as "intersubective", or something like that, and needs to be distinguished from the proper sense of "objective", referring to a proper object.
In our discussion, "the object" is the goal, and the question is whether a person can be acting towards a goal which they do no even apprehend. Notice, that if it is an apprehended goal, it is within the subject's mind, therefore subjective. So this is an indication that the true object, or goal, is not within the subject's mind.
Quoting Kizzy
So I believe this sense of "KNOW" which you refer to here ("knowing you are right where you are supposed to be in that moment of time", for example) is not beyond doubt at all. It's a subjective belief, where "supposed to be" is supported by the subject's apprehension of an object, goal.
But why do you say "the truth of the matter is that the desire is going to (drive or lead?) us towards the goal no matter what"? If a subjective goal, or failure to apprehend the true objective goal can misguide the person, such that the goal is not realized, then what validates your claim that the goal is reached no matter what? To make your claim true, we'd have to remove the reality of "the goal" completely, and instead assert that whatever obtains was "the goal". But that means there could not have been any goal prior to the consequences of the act, because whatever occurs as the result of the act is designated to be the goal.
Quoting Kizzy
I do not understand how we could talk about the morality in the act itself. In order to be judged as good or bad, the act must be related to something, some kind of principles for judgement. Morality is based on a relationship.
Quoting Kizzy
You seem to be portraying "desire" as an underlying urge to act in a certain direction, while "intention" refers to moment to moment choices of action. So "desire" has more temporal duration, while "intentions" change from moment to moment depending on circumstances. Both of these are subjective, so where would the goal or "object" lie? Would the object be associated with the desire, or would it be associated with the intention?
Quoting Kizzy
If we position "the goal" in this way, as what is produced by the conscious mind, from moment to moment, as what guides our immediate actions, then how could "desire" relate to the goal? If the conscious decisions dictate our actions from one moment to the next, then it would appear that desire is totally excluded as not having any influence. However, we could allow that desire influences the conscious mind in its decision making, but how would that work?
If the conscious mind consciously apprehends the desire, and formulates its actions toward what is desired, then "the object" must be associated with the desire. But then the conscious mind would have no option but to follow the desire, recognizing that the desire is directed toward the true object, and this would rob the mind's capacity for choice. But if the conscious mind itself is what is directed toward the true object, and the desire influences its apprehension or grasp of its object, then how could the conscious mind possibly grasp and understand this influence? The desire would be interfering in the mind's domain of ruling what is the true object, and the mind would have to ignore it as irrelevant. However, the desire as the persistent underlying force which inclines one to act, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant in this way. For the mind to enact such a dismissal, would be a false, not real way of dealing with the influence of the desire. Therefore the true location of "the object" remains obscured.
Quoting Kizzy
To be honest, my reply was long and drawn out already, and I saw the mention of time, and the other thread, as a good place to curtail it, and request that part of your post be addressed in the other thread. I could go back and address it here if you want though. It was just a desire to not put too much material in one post, especially since I was running out of time and wanted to post it. That was my goal.
I think we might be approaching this concept from slightly different angles. What I have been meaning when referring to 'the goal,' I am meaning "goal" as in to something bigger than just an end or outcome--I am talking about the overarching PURPOSE that serves as a guide. Purpose that GUIDES a person in life [in my earlier words, desire as the driving "F" is equal or comparable to: "purpose that guides"
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
When I say ^^^, I am thinking of it like this: one's purpose in life and the specific goals they set may not align perfectly. Sometimes they intersect and sometimes not, that is both okay.
The desire is linked to that purpose or "goal" no matter what justifications we can come up with, intentions change and purposes can be repurposed as we are updating our minds and beliefs, learning as we go on day to day. When we talk about justification, I think its worth consideration how each ACTION aligns with this larger purpose rather than focusing on the immediate goal or outcome that requires explanations/demos.
The thinking that leads towards actions may show how much thought went into the justification, and movement towards both immediate goals and overall purpose will be highlighted in the character of the subject....The dynamic between the mind and desire ensures that actions are not just reactions to momentary desires but also aligned with our deeper aspirations...whether we know them or not.
That's why I was saying "the goal" can be unknown or falsely understood to be the goal, because either way.. knowing or not knowing the goal or your purpose does not matter, the desire is driving and the purpose is guiding either way. Purpose is known by another without the one knowing, or before one knows. Purpose is knowable. Sometimes one does know the purpose and focuses on showcasing it to the fullest, for the better or for the worse. Some times its for the best to live through the worst first? I think this transcends personal opinion at some point towards the real good.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover Justification happens when its proper or not, those making excuses to act like reasons to make belief and those who will justify their actions and beliefs and reason because of their blind faith. It is the passion behind the justification, the intentions are brought from the shadows and in plain sight, in mind now as well...out of sight out of mind...the demonstration might be an act, it might be thought out before the actions took place in order to fulfill a specific outcome.
How attached are they to the justification and how do they stand in that, on their grounds when judgement is necessary? Are they confident in their stance? Are they defensive for no good reason? Are they suspiciously well rehearsed and informed for someone who maybe wouldnt naturally be in the same position? Are they eager to demonstrate their proper justification? Are they willing to put their credibility and character/reputation on the line? Surety and doubt can be observed in these moments of human experiences via sensations, feelings, emotions. Communicating their feelings, body language is observable for intel. THAT requires verification from a credible source, someone who can vouch for them, the character. For example consider a childhood friend, guardian, sibling, cousin, any family/inlaws, neighbor, coworker, online buddy, pen pal, WHATever the relation between subject in particular and a reference they'd trust the word of. If someone can speak for you, in their subjective opinion of you is a sliver of truth. A source for self towards a knowing, shared knowledge of self....experiencing it...
When true driving desires are guided by purpose and observations are happening/noted, aka awareness is tuning in and subject is paying attention now, mind is actively focusing on specific patterns, clues and sometimes does not actually help the person as the outcome occurs of uncertainty and eventually when looking back, it may make sense looking at the situation after the fact, learning from an experience, avoiding hurdles once faced with uncertainty, the fear based subject becomes aware of that, the fear is not demolished but managed using a new perspective, the mind is powerful and can be put to work this way...with will and genuine desire, the brain mind body manifests them with confidence, a knowing, the vision...Baseless ideas, into intelligent design. A tangible object, its you....why are you are where you are in life, right now???....Self reflecting, if ability to efficiently do this is hindering, the pace at which awareness becomes heightened...if it does at all, may be bound to the individual based on possibilities/capabilities of them/their mind and will...
Expectations perhaps reveal truth to the weight we put into certain outcomes, especially the choices we make when they happen as planned or a sudden freak accident changes the way it was supposed to play out...going with the flow vs stuck in the plans, disappointed in self, bad cycle of thinking negatively and influencing how we set out on the path, the will and the goal leans towards its virtue, the fate.....if the negative overrides the will to stop it, cant handle the mind thinking thoughts and circumstances of outcomes, the story will have a bad ending....karma is not it, but its like a give and a get...
Back to your belief stated above where you say that its required for a justification to be that when its "properly" shown to another via demonstration, does this mean a template can be used in the future for similar demonstrations? Then it would be more difficult when giving fair judgements as they are overlooked and clocked as "proper" based on a requirement for justification to be granted.....And for those who need a demonstration, a slower breakdown of whatever it is being used as a demo for a proper justification perhaps were not the right person to ask in the first place. Easy to convince some more than others....
To be properly picked to judge, or confirm the justification based on this requirement is tricky....unless this requirement makes it so anyone can judge, with some standard of such is to be referred to in demonstrations from the past. How it is demonstrated is interesting....objectively demonstrating according to the standard, its taking the intersubjective self and relating it so another can get the gist... Some may not need demonstration to know things....they assume, wrongly. Sometimes they assume and end up correct...but what happens when the same people see the same demonstration over and over? Expectations lead to objectification of nonsense.....bias, personal opinion. What is to be in this required act another can understand, what does it take to demonstrate a justification? Heart? Guts? Skill? Intel?
ALSO say I was to properly justify myself...I am to demonstrate what ,exactly? Explain myself? Refuse to explain myself? Fight for justice in silence and let nature work it out? Is that faith, hope, or belief in their self? Their reasons to believe? Their will to fight for what is right? Are they right to be wrong? Some times, yes. Their will to accept their fate, be judged correctly and accountable from there. Then what...Yay, you passed the required justification demo. Now what? It makes who look better? It teaches who what lesson?
A lesson learned is that, a random chance to get to learn is everything. Updated knowings, aligning with what? Purpose...Nothing in mind? That's a personal problem....How can you be sure the object is not in the mind, that the goal is not updating us subconsciously there sometimes? What is in the subconscious mind i believe may not be fully known/able. So the goal or object you speak of, even if it was in the subjects mind (you say no?) It can be there, but since it is in the subconscious, still the mind...the object is hidden from anyone fully grasping anyways...if it were not in the mind, then where? How did it get there? It transformed....Perhaps in glimmers, glimpses, a blur, a flicker is all it takes anyways to...wake up and smell the rose. Remember the time!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover Very well then...
Mirror of magic on the wall, who is the fairest one of all?
Does it not require effort to enact in this false manner? It is the intent of a person for example to mask their true intentions and Intentions, being falsely acted upon deal with influences of many things, not just of the desire. Life hits in many directions people differently, what influences them is key to a knowable purpose....
Perhaps: INTENTIONS: KNOWING YOUR WHOLE SELF AND ITS CAPABILITIES TO LIVE
therefore purpose can be knowable, but to the degree one knows self?
What could be the cause of the passing of time other than motion? Things moving is what causes time to pass.
Time is the measure of change/motion. Time does not cause change any more than a gram causes weight or a meter causes extension.
I don't think so. I think time passing is what causes things to move.
Quoting Arne
I'm talking about time as the thing which is measured. A clock for example, consists of change/motion, and it is used to measure the passing of time.
When we think of a triangle and think of it together with the Pythagorean theorem as a property of certain types of triangles, it is difficult to say that they do not exist. Especially when they persist as something universal that transcends the human mind. We find laws, correlations, universal properties and the whole corpus of a science. How can we say that they do not exist? For me it is impossible to deny their reality. Humanity may disappear but the Pythagorean theorem will still remain.
In some philosophies they call it "third genera". The other two are the subjective genera and the physical genera.
Quoting Mario Bunge
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"Cause" is the wrong term to use. Change (of which movement is a type of change) is the essence of time. Measuring time is comparing one change with another (ie. movement of the second hand with how far you can run).
The text you quote from Mario Bunge seems to ignore what I said in the last part of my comment. That is, that the Pythagorean theorem remains true even if humanity disappears. It is a truth existing in an autonomous sense, which does not depend on the cognitive capacity of the human being. Think of a triangle formed in nature, or a triangular shaped object, it is a right triangle (you can find them by Google) . Is not the Pythagorean theorem realized in nature and in this natural triangle?
It's disagreement on Bunge's part, not ignorance.
Quoting JuanZu
False, unless you can provide an argument that supports that statement as the conclusion of said argument.
Quoting JuanZu
Nope, at least not for a mathematical fictionalist like Bunge, since he claims that material objects have no shapes. His example of the iron sphere is illustrative in that sense, and I would quote it here, but you seem to be averse to the idea that mathematical fictionalism is a respectable position in the Philosophy of Mathematics, so it might be a waste of my time to share that quote with you.
That is easy to demonstrate. Think of the "inventor" of the Pythagorean theorem. Something like a theorem has survived and persisted in its existence beyond the inventor's cognitive processes. Not only that of the inventor but of many others. Which means that its existence as truth cannot be reduced to the cognitive processes of individuales (and only exist individuals cognitive process) . In each case, that is, in each person there is a neutralization of the genesis and such cognitive processes. Otherwise it is not possible to explain how a truth can transcend the minds of people and not disappear, for example, with the death of the inventor. In this sense, one can say: any other person could have discovered such a truth.
Quoting JuanZu
This is a conditional statement. As such, in order to be false, the conclusion must be T, while the conclusion must be F. And that is exactly what I claim. The antecedent of your conditional is true while the consequent is false. That being the case, the conditional statement itself is false. And since that is also the case, it means that your argument is unsound. Therefore, I can safely reject it. Bunge's position regarding the fictionality of mathematical objects still stands.
I'm sorry but what you have said is formal juggling. And in no way have you validly refuted or counterargued. The argument is very simple :
Cognitive processes exist only individually (one cognitive process per person) . The Pythagorean theorem does not exist individually, it exists in a way that transcends the individuality of individuals (proven by multiple people understanding the Pythagorean theorem at once). And since the theorem exists in multiple persons invariably the cognitive processes are neutralized. Which proves that the Pythagorean theorem has existence independent of cognitive processes.
Do you know the critique of psychologism made by Frege and Husserl?
I disagree. What I said is a defense of mathematical fictionalism as developed by Mario Bunge, specifically.
Quoting JuanZu
You're confusing two different notions: validity and refutation. If an argument is valid, that means that if it has true premises, then the conclusion must also be true. Refutation, on the other hand, is identifying a false premise. To refute an argument, it's not necessary to show that it's not valid, it suffices to show that it is unsound, which is precisely what I have done here: I have identified the false premise in your argument. I already provided the counter-argument, in the form of a quote from Bunge that I happen to agree with. It's not my problem if you don't want to acknowledge it. That's on you, not me.
Quoting JuanZu
If it's so simple, then why can't you state it clearly, as a list of premises entailing a conclusion?
Quoting JuanZu
False. Provide a supporting argument for that premise, or I'll simply deny it. The refutation of your argument is quite simple.
Quoting JuanZu
Yes, I do. And I have written a paper comparing their critiques of psychologism, using Kusch's work as secondary literature.
I have already done so. I think you're reading it wrong, I hope it's not on purpose. I said that such a premise is proven by the fact that several people know and understand the meaning of the Pythagorean theorem. Which implies that such a theorem transcends the individuality of cognitive processes like imagination.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
Well, correct me if I am wrong, but it seems that Mario Bunge's position fits into the psychologism that both Frege and Husserl criticized (and I would say refuted).
No, you haven't. This is what arguments look like in philosophy. You haven't done that.
Quoting JuanZu
I disagree, I think I'm reading it right.
Quoting JuanZu
And I hope that you understand that using ad hominem attacks (i.e., "you're not reading it right", "I hope it's not on purpose", etc.) is a fallacious way of arguing.
Quoting JuanZu
False. That does not prove it. You are merely stating a conditional premise, of the form "if p, then q". I'm saying that the antecedent is true while the consequent is false, which makes your conditional statement itself false. Merely repeating a statement doesn't make it true.
Quoting JuanZu
It does not. Psychologism is not the same as fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Neither is formalism a la David Hilbert, for example.
There is no clock that measures the passing of time that is not itself dependent upon and relative to change. Whether the change be the rotation of the earth, revolutions around the sun, or the vibrations of an atom. It would be impossible to "measure the passing of time" in the absence of change.
Just as there is no way to measure the length of an entity in the absence of an entity, there is no way to measure the passing of time in the absence of change.
I would say that this is what an argument looks like in the philosophy you like. But obviously philosophy has a very broad style of expression. At least we can agree that you have to give arguments to prove a point which is what I have tried to do.
I have responded with arguments to what you have quoted from Mario Bunge. If you are not willing to defend it with arguments my point still stands.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
I'm sorry but I can't take that as an argument. Saying it's false and nothing else doesn't make you right, nor does it mean I'm wrong. I invite you to give arguments against what I have said and argued.
And I would say that what you just said there is a fallacy.
Quoting JuanZu
Which means what, exactly?
Quoting JuanZu
I already gave an argument. It's Bunge's argument for the fictionality of mathematical objects. I offered to expand on it with his example of the iron sphere, but you manifested no interest in such views, you simply decided that it falls within the province of psychologism. I suggested that you are wrong to equate fictionalism with psychologism, but again, you selectively ignored that point, as well as other some of the other points that I made. Once again, that's on you, not me.
Quoting JuanZu
You're confusing premises with arguments. In order to reject your argument, I don't need to formulate an argument of my own. All I have to do is to identify a false premise in your argument, which I have done. If you wish to defend that premise, you'll need a supporting argument. See the entry on The Argument From Vagueness Against Restricted Composition in the entry on Ordinary Objects that I provided for a working example.
Quoting JuanZu
Saying that it's true doesn't make you right.
Quoting JuanZu
If it's false, then you're wrong. I say that it's false. Therefore, you're wrong. And what I just said there, is a modus ponens. That, is how one argues in philosophy, in a less "formal" and more "expressive" way, to use your own words.
Quoting JuanZu
I have already done so. See the passage from Bunge that I quoted on the Pythagorean theorem.
You will have to prove to me that all philosophy is expressed through syllogisms, premises and conclusions.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
And I have refuted it. You will have to give me other arguments about fictionalism. But I sense that you don't want to give them.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
Again, the only argument you made is not yours and has been refuted.
How? Showing that the Pythagorean theorem transcends human cognitive processes. How do I show that it transcends them? By showing that such a theorem has universal properties and is not an individual cognitive processes, taking the example of the multitude of minds that understand the meaning of the theorem.
It is. There is no exception to the contrary.
Quoting JuanZu
I disagree, you didn't refute it.
Quoting JuanZu
I offered to do so, with the example of the iron sphere. You weren't interested.
Quoting JuanZu
I do want to give them, which is precisely why I mentioned the example of the iron sphere. Again, more ad hominem attacks from you. You're not doing yourself any favors here.
Quoting JuanZu
Of course it's not mine, it's from a better philosopher than myself. Are you saying that one cannot agree with other people's arguments?
Quoting JuanZu
But you didn't show that. You merely asserted it. Basically, your "argument" is "I read Frege and Husserl's critique of psychologism. They convinced me. Therefore, anyone who disagrees with me is wrong. Why? Because I said so."
No proof, so I dismiss it.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
You barely mentioned it. I can't consider it as an argument.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
I have not taken the arguments from Frege and Husserl but from other sources. But the argument is there; it stands on the irreducibility of the theorem (which has the evidence of its meaning through different human beings understanding it) to cognitive processes that are individual. It is very simple, cognitive processes are individual and the theorem has been transmitted from human to human beyond such individuality. The theorem historically manifests properties of repetition and persistence which the cognitive processes not.
You don't seem to understand how the burden of proof works.
Quoting JuanZu
I offered to quote it, but you showed no interest in it. So, I didn't quote it.
Quoting JuanZu
If it's so simple, then why isn't there a consensus among philosophers of mathematics? Explain that.