Laclau's Theory of Populism
For a long time, the notion of populism has been un-rigorously applied to a wide range of political movements and ideologies. Most models of political rationality tend to view populism through a lens of vagueness, reducing it to the simplistic articulation of a plurality of social agendas, ideological emptiness, anti-intellectualism, and transience. These models fail to address the inherent logic of populist phenomena and their broader societal impact. Ernesto Laclau offers a more comprehensive conceptual framework for understanding populism and its recurring resurgence. According to Laclau, collective political identities are forged through particular discursive articulation. Under normal conditions, social demands take the form of rational, contextually situated requests, implicitly assuming the legitimacy of governing institutions and their capacity to address them. However, when a plurality of isolated demands goes unmet, they can coalesce into a unified opposition to power, rejecting its authority. In this process, one of the social demands takes on an excessive yet vague meaning, assuming a role as a universal symbol of representation. This demand becomes an "empty signifier," which generates a precarious, totalizing effect, giving rise to a populist identity. As a result, the 'social logic' of institutional rule gives way to the 'political logic' of indeterminacy and radical change. "Any process of social change takes place through the variable articulation of equivalence and difference so that the equivalent moment presupposes the constitution of a global political subject bringing together a plurality of social demands. It also involves the construction of internal frontiers and the identification of institutionalized 'other'". (Laclau, 'On Populist Reason,' pg. 117) Forming a chain of equivalency involves a struggle to occupy the central signifying position. An empty signifier temporarily takes on the function of representing the entire social community, maintaining a sense of unity. This process marks a discontinuity and contingency, signalling the shift from the institutionalized order to the political sphere. "There is no logical, dialectical or semiotic transition from one level to the other; something qualitatively new has to intervene" ('On Populist Reason' pg. 110). Laclau argues that the logic behind the formation of the populist political subject, the "people," aligns with key structural moments in the contemporary political process. "The conditions of possibility of the political and the conditions of possibility of populism are the same
The end of populism coincides with the end of politics." (Laclau, 'Populism and mirror of democracy,' p. 48) Laclaus extraordinary project seeks to facilitate "the return of the 'people' as a political category and the ways of rethinking the forms of political engagement in the era of globalized capitalism." The most recent U.S. elections can provide relevant context for his vision. There was an apparent competition between the two strategies for constructing collective identity in these elections. Both campaigns employed affective or emotional appeals to foster a sense of unity. However, unlike identity politics, the slogan MAGA does not primarily function to maintain a "them versus us" narrative. Also, it neither conveys a thoroughly conservative or nostalgic sentiment nor presents a clear vision for the future. Instead, MAGA operates as the empty signifier. For a time, it manifested a link between the dimensions of negation and equivalence and various specific social demands, as well as the emergence of a solidaristic community and the construction of the political.
Comments (42)
Nicely constructed synopsis.
The original Populists were late 19th century Southern politicians who responded to the widespread plea from small farmers for price fixing to stabilize their positions. Some of the Populist politicians let it be known they had no intention of asking Washington for that. They were just using the unrest to secure their power. Events like this fed a sense of hopelessness which led to race baiting and the infamous Southern demagogues.
I think populism is a two edged sword. It's just democracy in action in some ways. It's people letting their voices be heard. The problem is there are no solutions available for whatever reason. That's really the situation. The slow brewing sense if instability eventually spills over into racial and religious intolerance. Yes, the politicians who thrive in this environment are villains, but the real issue is a lack of solutions.
Mostly reliable employment I think.
My point was that populism is what happens when there are no solutions and the unrest is just spinning it's wheels.
Is the problem systemic? Or is it just a particular set of circumstances? I lean toward blaming neoliberalism and its built in neglect of the well being of Main St. I feel like that's probably simplistic though.
Yet Trump's agenda, starting with going after the "deepstate" that "robbed him from an election victory" seems to me quite strong "them versus us" narrative. What will come of it is another question.
Populism is at least for me a lousy word for this kind of politics. "Anti-elitism" would be far more proper term for this, because in fact many political ideas and ideologies that would be popular among the people don't strive for polarization and the "us the people against the evil elites" narrative that populism goes for. Populism and popular are quite different.
If mainstream political parties react to the wishes of the population, populism doesn't take over. Yet the reaction has to be swift and decisive, not just empty promises. I meek response will give the populists ammunition to portray themselves as the only solution to the political problems.
Just look at how for example Nordic countries, where democracy still works quite well, have changed their stance towards immigration very radically (Sweden, Finland) and have been quite strict from the start (Denmark). Yet in Sweden the populists have never been in power and for example in Finland only as a coalition partner, just as now.
There isn't actually any reason why mainstream parties could respond to the what people who vote for populists ask. Curb corruption, have some prominent politicians, bankers and "respected elite members" go to jail if they have broken the law. Be tough on immigration, you can close borders if you need to do that.
It is actually the populist themselves that paint the picture of the mainstream parties as ineffective lackeys of the richest billionaires and their lobbyists. (And as we can see from Trump having the richest person in his cabinet, the ideology isn't so important.)
Laclaus project is an attempt to rethink contemporary spontaneous political movements and collective action. It is likely impossible to directly link his theory to any specific historical political movement labeled as populist. However, it could be interesting to apply it to the most recent U.S. elections. Can this be done without resorting to partisan clichés and stereotypes? Rather than asking what the slogan 'MAGA' means to Trumps voters, it might be more insightful to explore how the slogan 'MAGA' functions. What do you think?
If you place any credence in critical theory, then all problems are systemic. I do, inasmuch as we are more than just accidentally responsible for the state of affairs within which we exist. There's no limit to what can be solved as long as the legislative power enacting the solution is respected. Which is the entire purpose of having a government, in nuce.
Engels argues as much, when he talks about the ability to completely optimize economic realities, if only we can produce with consciousness as human beings "not as dispersed atoms without consciousness of your species." Whereby you transcend the problems of all "artificial and untenable antitheses." (from his Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy)
Could you provide an example from recent Western history where mainstream political parties responded to the wishes of the population? Could the most recent U.S. elections serve as such an example?
I don't think this is entirely true. While the movement has been quite inchoate, it has had a steady position of immigration: "we want less of it." This is notable because this is the common thread across far-right populist movements across the West.
The other stable characteristic is a general reaction against "PC" or "Wokeness" in the abstract, and particularly against race/gender/sexual orientation/etc. specific efforts at redistributive justice.
You can see this coming to a head in the current Twitter civil war in MAGA. The old guard GOP and the "tech bro" coalition tend support high rates of immigration as a means to allow employers to access a larger talent pool (and arguably to avoid investment in workers). The MAGA core is pretty much entirely against high rates of immigration. Not any immigration per se mind you, just "high rates."
I think this is worth pointing out because, as I said, it's the main thread across a diffuse set of populist movements and it is also notably absent from those advanced economies that have not allowed high levels of immigration (e.g. Japan). Israel is an interesting example here because it has not allowed high rates of immigration for non-Jews, and as such most immigrants share an important sort of identity.
I think what he says does apply to what happened in the Southeast in the late 1890s. Collective dissatisfaction in the South finally gave way to Jim Crow laws, which were supposed to reestablish some lost glory from the past.
I don't know how to assess MAGA. I feel like I'm too close to it. It's easier to construct a narrative when it's something that happened in the past.
Quoting ssu
Trump promised a return to the 1960s when there was job security. The US has since deindustrialized, so there's no way to go back.
Does that mean the only solution to any problem is revolution?
Quoting Pantagruel
Napoleon said organize by function if you want to kick ass. Competing priorities?
I don't think that revolution is the only or most logical means to address systemic problems; you don't have to replace a system to address a systemic problem, merely address it at a systemic level. Which is the sense in which I understand legislation to operate, defining governing norms.
I would say that "kicking ass" is indeed a different priority. lol.
Oh. When I asked if the problem driving contemporary populism was systemic, I was asking if it's actually a problem with democracy.
The concept of the empty signifier carries a clear paradoxical implication. It stems from Laclaus ontological position in formulating his political theory. He argues that any social or political identity can only be defined within the relational framework of a given social or political system. Identities are temporarily constituted and articulated; they have no inherent essence or transcendental model. A subjects identity can only be defined in relation to what it is not. Therefore, the ontological question of constitutive difference must be addressed. For Laclau, this is a matter of ceaseless practice and articulation. From the beginning of modern times, the reproduction of the different social areas takes place in permanently changing conditions, and they are constantly requiring the construction of a new system of differences. Hence the area of articulatory practises is immensely broadened. (Laclau, Antagonism and hegemony, pg. 126) Like the empty signifier, the process of constructing a new system of differences is a paradoxical but not self-refuting notion. To construct such a system, one must be able to operate within a conceivable form of universalism, which is necessarily in tension with the presupposed plurality and particularity of social forces and actors. Also, one must entertain a principle of universally valid rationality, at the same time tacitly acknowledging something irrational. This situation requires moving beyond classical two-valued logic, as, for example, George Spencer-Brown did.
And I think that it is a problem with the mechanisms of democracy for sure.
Trump has no political ideology. It's telling that Trump himself didn't last time think that "drain the swamp" rhetoric would go anywhere, but he can read his audience and notice how it sank to his base. Otherwise when looking at it objectively, the whole 'MAGA' thing is a mess. Isolationism and then wanting Greenland and the Panama Canal? How do those to fit together ideologically? Even more logical would be "KAG", hence "Keep America Great" as the US hasn't yet lost it's Superpower status.
Quoting Number2018
I tried to make that example with the Nordic countries. Sweden has a) changed it's immigration policy dramatically. The populist "Sweden Democrats" haven't been in any administration. Naturally when parties like the social democrats stiffen the immigration policies, it also does make populist parties less "fringe". The "Sweden Democrats" have persistently tried to change themselves to be mainstream. For example the True Finns -party has been now twice in a coalition administration and the first time it was so hard for the populist party that the party itself broke into two. Denmark is also an example with a long tradition of not having so open borders.
This from the Swedish government webpage: https://www.government.se/government-policy/swedens-new-migration-policy/
There isn't a "populist" administration running Sweden, the prime minister Ulf Kristersson comes from the Moderate Party in a coalition of his party, Christian democrats and liberals. The populist "Sweden Democrats" isn't either the largest opposition party as the Social Democrats are still larger. And it's noteworthy to point out that the change happened during the Social Democrats were in power. This is something that is totally silenced in the populist narrative where Sweden is just given as a country "that has been lost". Or to the "Europe is lost if not for populists" argument. Every other party than populist parties are painted to be the "establishment".
Quoting Number2018
Obviously the GOP has been taken over by populism. I view this as something that has saved the trust in the obscure "primaries"-system of the US and firmed the belief that Americans have in their two-party system. Americans believe that they can influence the two ruling parties working from the inside. In other countries people would simply form new parties and vote for the new parties. Not so in the US.
This is just an example of how people will desperately cling to the politician promising better times as they had before and turn away from the ones trying to make a realist effort on how to something when the change is permanent.
True.
Quoting ssu
Do you think that 'the whole 'MAGA' thing is a mess,'? If you think so, does your second quote explain why Trump won the popular vote and became the second Republican to do so since 1988?
Trump administration will look like a mess, just as the Clinton administration looked like.
If you were too young to remember, the Clinton administration looked to go from scandal to scandal, had even an impeachment, and had dedicated Clinton-haters in the GOP (just as people in the dems really don't like Trump). Only on a broader perspective what the actions, policies and achievements of the Clinton administration can be seen, apart from sperm on Monica's dress.
Trump will continue things like wanting to buy Greenland from Denmark and other crazy tweets. Hence it's really hard then to see "long term policies" when the media focus is on what Trump has said and wanted today.
Quoting Number2018
Because Joe Biden isn't fit for being President, and especially not for another four years.
And because then the party leadership just put Kamala as the new candidate annoyed the voters. Remember that Americans do believe in the strange theater called "Primaries" and don't like the party leadership just selecting the candidate. In a multiparty system this isn't a problem as people just select between parties and don't care shit about the internal selection of the party candidates. But in a system where there are only two parties (or so Americans believe), it's very important.
I appreciate this because I've never been able to figure out what the elusive term "populism" is supposed to mean. Usually it is functioning as little more than a pejorative. I think this is a reasonable account.
For Aristotle populism is probably just democracy, or more precisely, the shift from oligarchy to democracy. For Aristotle Western nations are controlled by the wealthy, not the demos, and are therefore oligarchies.
Before 2016 you had oligarchy on both sides of the U.S. aisle. In 2016 we had democracy/populism rising up from both left and right (Sanders and Trump). Trump toppled the oligarchic GOP primaries; Sanders was not able to do so, although he came close in 2020. Biden was the DNC oligarchy's answer to Sanders, for the DNC used its oligarchic resources to dramatically reshape the race after Sanders began winning in 2020. Harris was the DNC oligarchy's answer to Biden's poor debate performance. Harris' candidacy was expressly oligarchic rather than democratic, as she was an unelected candidate.
There are lots of things Trump voters were voting against, but I think much of it was tied up with the unabashed oligarchy of the DNC (which is now also bound up with progressive theories which are out of step with the demos). It sounds like Laclau sees populism as a quasi-revolutionary movement borne out of frustration with the status quo. That makes sense and I think it is reflected in the 2024 U.S. elections (as well as recent elections in Germany, Canada, France, and elsewhere).
(But with that said, it isn't necessarily revolutionary to elect the elected candidate over the unelected candidate in a democracy. Populism and democracy seem to very much go hand in hand in this case.)
This doesn't strike me as accurate. Just look at his approval ratings. They were generally high, and never higher than during the impeachment. In the U.S. Clinton is remembered as a good president who did his job, was well-spoken, balanced the budget, was willing to shift the historical Democrat line when necessary, and was guilty of sexual misconduct. The comparison to Trump is a stretch, although it is true that the American people have a tendency to ignore the tabloids and the superficial political machinations, as well as sexual misconduct of leaders. In both cases it was recognized by the people that the impeachment proceedings were political stunts against sitting presidents, which is not to deny that it was wrong for Clinton to have oral sex with his intern.
But do you remember the actual politics of the time?
The polarization between the Republicans and the Democrats started in earnest back then with creating what we now call echo chambers. And note that the impeachment charge was of lying under oath, not being unfaithful in marriage. And the various scandal "-gates" were considerable when you look at the reporting. For example, when Clinton attacked Al Qaeda sites (and a medical factory in Sudan by mistake), he was accused of attempting a "Wag the Dog" maneuver to get the media off his own scandals.
Among the many Clinton scandals...
After all of the above, Democrats went with Hillary Clinton, even if she had angered the Republicans for so long earlier. This is something that usually is forgotten about the 2016 elections.
Yet looking at the Clinton year historically, yes, the Clinton years look a lot different. And likely so will be with this era, depending on what comes after this period. If things are worse, this will be "the good times" and if things improve in the future, then these are the "bad times". This is crucial also when looking at the Trump era.
Quoting ssu
Right: lying about having sex with Lewinsky. With both Trump and Clinton, when the impeachment charge finally comes up and it turns out the opposition is playing for pennies, I think the average person loses interest along with faith in the system. Clinton's approval rating and Trump's reelection show that, for better or for worse, the electorate didn't take such proceedings seriously.
Quoting ssu
Quoting ssu
You make a good point. The media will undoubtedly portray Trumps administration as a chaotic mess of incoherent policies. Nevertheless, I believe that before the elections Trump could clearly articulate his goals in three major policy areas: immigration, the economy, and culture. This focus on concrete policies resonated with large groups of voters and was at least as important as the absence of democratic primaries or Bidens mental condition. Therefore, the fate of MAGA will not be determined by the medias coverage. What matters to Trumps base is neither the medias framing nor Trumps bombastic tweets. What matters is the tangible and consistent implementation of his key policies.
It is a relevant brief account of recent U.S. history. I would just add that what you refer to as oligarchy is likely an extremely complex agglomeration of political, bureaucratic, and corporate groups and forces. We do not know its exact structure and mechanisms, but it seems reasonable to assume that the oligarchy progressively augmented its power and its detachment from the demos. Otherwise, it is impossible to fully understand its chain of unprecedented missteps and risky strategies that led to Trumps victory.
Quoting Leontiskos
Your understanding of Laclaus theory is quite similar to mine. He provides an elaborate conceptual framework for understanding the rare and precarious events of democratic eruptions.It is a valuable contribution to the discussion of our political realities, avoiding partisan clichés, stereotypes of mundane language, and biased media coverage. Another challenge is the incredible speed with which the political landscape shifts and the rapid alteration of related narratives. Who remembers Brexit or the COVID pandemic today? It is also quite frustrating to observe the reflections and commentaries of most of
pundits and academics. Many of them seriously argued that Trumps election marked the revival of Nazism in the U.S. or he constituted a genuine threat to democracy. So, I believe that Laclau does not sufficiently elaborate on the affective component of the populist process of 'constructing internal frontiers and identifying institutionalized 'others.' His book was published 20 years ago, and he could not have predicted the ubiquitous spread of the 'woke' attitudes and the overflow of various aspects of populist phenomena.
That's one thing that can happen with Trump 2 administration, if everything would go nice and well also.
Quoting Leontiskos
Infidelity in the end isn't at all an issue, if you know the politician himself. It's just a thing that tells something about the politician before we know him.
Quoting Number2018
Indeed they will. Just like as actually the people inside the Clinton administration did and as the people inside the 1st Trump administration told how it was inside the White House. Quite chaotic and incoherent. I assume that Trump 2 will be similar. In the end, these administrations will simply appear as they arey, which is rather chaotic. Even so, a lot of those "incoherent" policies done by the incoming Trump administration will indeed get picked on by the next administration (just like many policies wered done with the Biden Administration) and hence will be a part of the long tradition of US policy in then end.
I was listening to a lecture by Rusty Reno and he describes populism in a pithy way as follows:
Quoting The Conservative Mind with R.R. Reno: At the End of Liberalism - 57:38
I thought the lecture was quite good. It speaks to Trump populism indirectly:
Thank you for sharing such an interesting lecture. At the 49-minute mark, Reno presents his thesis that 'we are on the cusp of a new era marked by a conservative consensus, and we are transitioning from a liberalism of open, or liquid society, toward a period of permanency and normalcy.' Does this thesis apply to the beginning of Trump's second presidency? The broad scope of executive orders and policy changes has been framed as an effort to implement the MAGA slogan and fulfill campaign promises. However, the plurality and complexity of the social, economic, and political agendas make it difficult to predict their long-term impact. Further, a clear trend toward the concentration of executive power is evident. It would be misleading to evaluate this phenomenon solely through the lens of certain interpretations of Trump's first administration, such as viewing it as a quasi-fascist authoritarian regime, a catalyst for chaos, or merely a populist movement. Instead, the growing consolidation of power is rooted in reversing the entire course of the previous administration while continuing its path for implementing far-reaching, emergency-style policies.
I liked his points about conservatism and progressivism being relative and non-ideological (and populism being neither inherently left nor right). That is, conservatism values permanence and progressivism values change, and apart from that core the doctrines are all historically contingent. Thus a doctrine will not ultimately be a sign of conservatism or progressivism, unless that doctrine is viewed under the aspect of permanence or change. To take an example, slavery was a progressive issue during the Civil War, but now it is a conservative issue. We view anti-slavery laws as a permanent fixture that ought to be conserved.
Populism is a worldwide happening.
Would anyone like to try Laclau in a more international court?
No issue with the specific, but a wider stage may present a more interactive play.
Sorry about the mixed metaphor.
broadening smile
Yes, that is definitely true.
Quoting Number2018
Agreed. Good points.
Quoting Number2018
Right, and this is reminiscent of Girard's work on the scapegoating mechanism.
I don't know quite what to make of the 'woke' phenomenon, nor am I certain how it relates to populism. If Reno is right, then an age when the bourgeoisie sees themselves as being progressive (change-oriented) and in solidarity with the demos/poor is an age of decadent progressivism, which is an inflection point when the tide begins to turn. It may be that the high-flown ideology that populism is now resisting goes hand in hand with the 'woke' phenomenon.
I would like to elaborate on the point that
Quoting Leontiskos
I believe Nietzsches style of value critique can help us understand the affinity between 'conservatism' and 'progressivism' as Reno defines them. He could clearly articulate the two different sentiments behind both systems of values. However, to become political platforms, both must manifest within the same global digital medium, adhering to its structural fields, temporalities, and rules of engagement. The dictates of this medium inevitably transform any system of values into a populist mode of expression. At this point, Laclaus concept of the empty signifier and the formation of political subjects remains highly relevant. Moreover, once in power, there is a phase of implementation, and Trumps second administration can serve as an experimental setting for this. So far, MAGA seems to function as a façade for the vast concentration of executive power, which is where it reveals its affinity with the enactment of a 'liberalism of open, liquid society.'
Well, one could argue the point of whether those specific conceptions actually do manifest concretely in political platforms. In the U.S. the two-party system makes it easier to map, but one could conceivably argue that the Republican Party is not conservative and the Democratic Party is not progressive (in Reno's senses). But I think there is something right about applying that conservative/progressive lens to the political sphere, given the way that permanence and change are fundamental aspects of life.
Quoting Number2018
But why? If for Laclau (as also for Reno) populism is a revolutionary desire for change from the status quo, then why must any system of values be transformed into a populist mode of expression?
Quoting Number2018
Well first, can a empty signifier function as a façade? And if not, then it seems that MAGA must be more than an empty signifier. But perhaps you are not claiming that it is MAGA per se that is the empty signifier?
Second, for the sake of argument let's say that MAGA is all about concentrating executive power. Still, what does that concentration have in common with "the enactment of a 'liberalism of open, liquid society'"? Trump seems to be using the power of the executive to do just the opposite, and all concentrations of power seem to have a conservative bent (in the sense that they want to maintain that power - they want permanence qua power).
Im referring to a situation where a system of values becomes the foundation for large-scale political struggle. There is a threshold that separates academic or pedagogical exposition from entering the contemporary digital arena, where opposing parties face off. The rules of engagement within this medium shape how the encounter is framed, prompting both parties to rely on affective appeals and present themselves as advocating for urgent change from the status quo.
Quoting Leontiskos
Laclaus concept of the empty signifier refers to a vague and transient, yet potent and dynamic, sense of solidarity. Who can explicate the precise meaning of MAGA? Its significance has likely fluctuated over time, and even its primary interpreter, Trump himself, would likely define it differently today than he did before the elections.
Quoting Leontiskos
MAGA is not just about concentrating executive power. But the logic behind its implementation takes on a dynamic of its own, one that eludes pre-existing discursive or ideological frameworks. Take, for example, the latest executive orders on tariffs that the Trump administration is set to impose on Canada and Mexico. These policies go far beyond simply reversing the course of the previous administration. While you are correct about the conservative bent, no one can accurately predict its consequences in todays environment.
I don't see why the "digital medium" gives every system of values a populist mode of expression. For example, when the incumbent uses that same digital media to promote the reigning values, what is at stake is not poplism.
Quoting Number2018
Okay.
Quoting Number2018
Trump has touted tariffs for a long time, so I don't see this as "the logic taking on a dynamic of its own." Tariffs are basically a simplistic approach to the "America first" mentality that is inevitably bound up with MAGA.
If populism requires a shift from pre-election promises to post-election actions, then it's not so clear that it fits Trump, because he has a surprising tendency to fulfill his promises. Or at least to try. And maybe that's a problem with Laclau: populism can function fine even when the signifier is not empty. Sometimes the people know what they want, and there isn't a great deal of ambiguity in the signifier. Sometimes the desired change has a clear direction.
Quoting Leontiskos
Formally, you are correct, as the incumbent should have defended the status quo. However, lets reconsider Renos lecture. Doesnt his thesis'we are on the cusp of a new era marked by a conservative consensus, transitioning from a liberalism of open, or liquid society, to a period of permanency and normalcy'align perfectly with a populist mode of expression? The affectively charged statement suggests that, for Reno (and many others), we have been experiencing a long-term, accelerating deviation from a state of equilibrium. Yet its impossible to simply halt this sentiment and its causes. As a result, in the last U.S. elections, both parties were contending for control over the accelerating dynamic of change. The shared digital medium significantly amplifies the image of the moments decisiveness that also manifested in Reno's thesis. For example, in this context, Musk spoke of the 'last free elections,' while Democrats warned of the end of democracy after Trumps win. In this situation, the opposing value systems became a springboard for the further re-enforcement of the will to power.
Quoting Leontiskos
Perhaps you are not aware that, alongside imposing 25% tariffs on Canada, Trump repeatedly suggested that Canada could become the 51st state. After the recent episodes of imposing and delaying tariffs, most Canadians believe there is a serious threat to the country's sovereignty. Does this also 'inevitably tie in with MAGA'?
Quoting Leontiskos
Laclaus theory seeks to address a decisive yet transitory moment in the intrusion of the political. It may be incorrect to attribute to his notion of populism a universal explanatory capacity. But what can be the relevant analytical model for describing the current events in the U.S.? I understand and largely share your position regarding USAID in the thread 'The Mask Plutocracy.' However, could you elaborate on the significance of these events, beyond merely stating that Trumps voters approve of what has been done so far or that it all aligns with the MAGA spirit? Doesnt this statement tautologically highlight the ambiguity of the slogan? While people may intuitively know what they want, there is still considerable uncertainty about the consequences of their actions. Likely, the latest events make sense in the U.S., but on the international stage the extraordinarily of some of Trumps teams agendas and interventions has become the subject of fearful interpretations and can trigger a chain of unforeseen reactions.