A Thomistic Argument For God's Existence From Composition
I came across a Thomistic argument for Gods existence from composition that I find convincing; and wanted to get peoples thoughts on it.
Here it is (in a nutshell):
1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actualdevoid of any passive potencybecause passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other.
13. No composed being could be purely actual, because a composed being always has parts which, as parts, must have passive potency.
14. Therefore, there can only be one purely actual being which is also purely simple. (11 & 12 & 13)
15. The purely actual being is changeless (immutable), because it lacks any passive potency which could be actualized.
16. The purely actual being is eternal, because it is changeless and beyond time (as times subsistence of existence).
17. The effect must be some way in the cause.
18. The physical parts of a composed being cannot exist in something which is purely simple and actual; for, then, it would not be without parts.
19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being.
20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.
23. To know the forms of every composed being is what it means to be omniscient.
24. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omniscient.
25. To cause the existence of a thing in correspondence to its form from knowledge (intelligence) requires a will.
26. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must have a will.
27. To be good is to lack any privation of what the thing is.
28. The purely simple and actual being cannot have any privations, since it is fully actual.
29. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is all-good.
30. To will the good of another independently of ones own good is love.
31. The purely simple and actual being wills the good of all composed beings by willing their existence.
32. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is all-loving.
33. Power is the ability to actualize potentials.
34. The purely simple and actual being is the ultimate cause of all actualization of potentials.
35. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omnipotent.
36. The existence of all composed things subsists through this purely simple and actual being.
37. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omnipresent.
38. A being which is absolutely simple, absolutely actual, eternal, immutable, all-loving, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, all-good, one, unique, and necessary just is God.
39. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is God.
40. The world we live in is made up of composed beings.
41. The composed beings must subsist through an absolutely simple and actual being.
42. Therefore, God exists.
I am not entirely following the argument that God is all-loving, so if anyone understands the Thomistic argument for that part I would much appreciate an explanation; but, besides that, everything else checks out in my head. What are your guys thoughts?
Here it is (in a nutshell):
1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.
9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.
10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).
11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.
12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actualdevoid of any passive potencybecause passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other.
13. No composed being could be purely actual, because a composed being always has parts which, as parts, must have passive potency.
14. Therefore, there can only be one purely actual being which is also purely simple. (11 & 12 & 13)
15. The purely actual being is changeless (immutable), because it lacks any passive potency which could be actualized.
16. The purely actual being is eternal, because it is changeless and beyond time (as times subsistence of existence).
17. The effect must be some way in the cause.
18. The physical parts of a composed being cannot exist in something which is purely simple and actual; for, then, it would not be without parts.
19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being.
20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.
23. To know the forms of every composed being is what it means to be omniscient.
24. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omniscient.
25. To cause the existence of a thing in correspondence to its form from knowledge (intelligence) requires a will.
26. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must have a will.
27. To be good is to lack any privation of what the thing is.
28. The purely simple and actual being cannot have any privations, since it is fully actual.
29. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is all-good.
30. To will the good of another independently of ones own good is love.
31. The purely simple and actual being wills the good of all composed beings by willing their existence.
32. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is all-loving.
33. Power is the ability to actualize potentials.
34. The purely simple and actual being is the ultimate cause of all actualization of potentials.
35. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omnipotent.
36. The existence of all composed things subsists through this purely simple and actual being.
37. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omnipresent.
38. A being which is absolutely simple, absolutely actual, eternal, immutable, all-loving, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, all-good, one, unique, and necessary just is God.
39. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is God.
40. The world we live in is made up of composed beings.
41. The composed beings must subsist through an absolutely simple and actual being.
42. Therefore, God exists.
I am not entirely following the argument that God is all-loving, so if anyone understands the Thomistic argument for that part I would much appreciate an explanation; but, besides that, everything else checks out in my head. What are your guys thoughts?
Comments (229)
For one, there are just too many steps for them all to have any hope of withstanding scrutiny.
To me the first really objectionable one is:
Quoting Bob Ross
Two things might be indistinguishable in their parts, and yet be numerically distinct. We don't distinguish two identical marbles by their parts, but by their distinct bodies occupying distinct spatial locations.
I second this observation. Think of it like this, Bob: your argument has 41 potential targets.
This is the most controversial part of the argument, IMHO.
But this is not a real argument. In fact an argument with many steps is a good argument insofar as it is transparent and does not try to oversimplify things. The problem here is not that there are many steps, but that the conclusion is a 12-part conjunction. Which means that there are only about 3 steps per divine conjunct (i.e. too few steps).
-
Quoting Bob Ross
This probably requires defense. It looks like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which Aristotle and Aquinas disagreed with (but others, such as Bonaventure or now William Lane Craig, uphold). I forget the common scholarly name, but it is the question of an infinite series of contingent beings ordered per accidens. In a modal paradigm it usually comes down to the question of whether an infinite amount of time will realize all possibilities (and in this case we are concerned with the possibility of a collection of contingents ceasing to exist).
Quoting Bob Ross
The conclusion is too ambitious in my opinion:
Quoting Bob Ross
"There is a single being which is all of these things."
The argument is reminiscent of classical theism, but to prove 12 predicates [of God] in a single proof is excessive. Where did you find this?
None of these are arguments, rejoinders, nor valid criticism.
The spatiotemporal properties are properties of the part; so it does hold that we distinguish them based off of the parts even if they are identical notwithstanding their occupation of space or place in time.
They are recommendations. They are not intended as arguments, nor as rejoinders, nor as valid criticism. They are intended as helpful commentary, nothing more.
:up:
So it is an argument for classical theismas opposed to theistic personalismand I created it myself based off of various neo-Aristotelian arguments for a pure, unactualized actualizer. The three main ones I read were Aristotles argument from motion, Acquinas argument from essences, and Ed Fesers Aristotelian Argument.
With respect to the first and third, I think the way Aristotle uses motion is counter-intuitive now; so I didnt want to word it that way.
With respect to the second, the essence vs. esse distinction works but I think it harder to explain to people.
So, in the OP, I am referring to the composition of a being and not a temporal succession of causes; so it would be a per se series according to Aquinas because without the part you cannot have the whole: this is not like begetting children, where without the father the son can still beget children.
I can add in the concept of per se causal ordering into the OP if that helps clarify it.
But doesnt it succeed in doing so? I get it is an informal pseudo-syllogism; but each point follows logically from the previous.
Arcane, it is not helpful to say that there are 41 ways someone could object to a 41-premised argument.
Well, if your argument had only two premises and a conclusion, like a syllogism, then it would be easier for people to read, and more difficult for people to attack. It would also be easier for you to defend, and more difficult for you to even formulate to begin with, which is one of the reasons why your argument has 41 premises to begin with instead of simply 2.
Sorry, I thought you were just copying and pasting something you found elsewhere. I will look at it more closely given that you wrote it yourself. :blush:
(I thought you were pulling from elsewhere mainly because you said, "I am not entirely following the argument that God is all-loving...")
It's actually pretty creative, and I can see some of the things you are drawing from. I have never seen an argument phrased in quite this way. Interesting thread. I will respond again to the OP eventually.
---
Edit:
Quoting Bob Ross
So:
Quoting Bob Ross
I am reading "infinite series of composed beings" as individual composed beings ordered in a series. That is, we can't just be referring to the composition of a being because we are talking about the way that multiple beings are related to one another in a series.
Going back to my suggestion that the premise requires defense, why should we accept it? What is the rationale?
But what is easy is not always good. I think the forum could use less easy. Three-premise arguments are almost necessarily superficial, especially in the context of an OP.
I agree, which is why I said this:
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
A simple syllogism that aims to prove that God exists is much, much more difficult to formulate than an argument that has around 40 premises, give or take. In that sense, it would do Bob Ross much good if he could attempt to construct a simpler argument. Because simplicity, in this case, is more difficult to achieve than complexity. Hence, it is better for him. At least, that is my reasoning here.
Quoting Bob Ross
Here an Atomist will say that atoms (or whatever fundamental building block they choose) is purely simple and yet distinguishable via its "spatiotemporal properties." That is, the spatial location of something is an accident of that thing, but why think it is a compositional "part" of that thing?
Why not?
This statement does not follow (e.g. numbers are infinite and each is an infinite composite). Besides, classical atomists argue otherwise.
"Cause" here is undefined, which invalidates this premise; but even so, this idea corresponds in conception to atoms in void.
i.e. Democritus' void.
Insofar as "two beings" lack identical properties and/or relationships, and if by "exist" what's meant is .. spatiotemporal, then such non-identical "beings" even if both "lack parts" they do not occupy the same positions simultaneously in space and time necessarily "exist separately".
This statement does not make sense since there are "two" which implies differentiation by more than just internal composition. "Parts" (i.e. internal compositions) are a necessary but not sufficient condition either for describing or of existing (see my reply to #9 above).
This statement does not follow (see my reply to #10 above).
Caveat: though I've not bothered to read past premise #11, it is abundantly clear to me, Bob, that the conclusion presented here in #42 does not follow from undefined, incoherent or false premises (e.g.) #5, 6, 10 & 11 above.
:up: :up:
Bob, I say this with no disrespect, I don't even understand what's Thomistic about your argument to begin with. Thomas Aquinas famously stated five arguments, also known as five ways, for one to be able to arrive at the conclusion that God exists. He did not resort to 40 or so premises in any of the five proofs that he gave. That, is the essence of Thomism, as far as I'm concerned. And even if it isn't, what is it about your argument that can be characterized as "Thomistic"?
If it were a proper syllogism, then it would be utterly superficial and meaningless for an OP.
No it isnt. It is much easier to formulate two premises that necessitate a conclusion than to provide a substantive argument for something. A proper syllogism is vague and usually frail.
I could see your point if you wanted it trimmed down to like 10 or something; but 2 is over-simplification. In this case, I went with just enough premises for a laymen to follow the argument.
Yes.
If you dont think some of the premises are necessary, then I am all ears to hearing which ones and why. So far you are just saying well, it seems like 41 is a lot. Again, keep in mind that this OP is meant to outline robustly each step to getting to Gods existence.
First of all, none of the five ways in their common form try to prove all of Gods attributes: this one is supposed to and given that Thomas needs about 10 premises for each of the five ways just to prove one aspect of God, I think 41 is pretty short for proving all of them.
It is literally his argument from essence vs. esse and his conclusions about Gods attributes that can be deduced from Him being absolutely simple. Aquina's didn't just argue for God's existence with the five ways: those were more of a cheat sheet for laymen.
And how are we, here, different from laymen? One does not cease to be a layman when one philosophizes, as much as one would like to believe the contrary.
Thank you, I appreciate that :smile:
I know you know more about Thomism and Aristotelianism than I do; so your input is much appreciated.
Yeah, I wanted to write it in a way that made the most sense to me and was less entrenched in Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts. For example, change, as far as I understand, for Aristotle is any actualization of a potential and everything around us has passive potency; so a thing persisting as it were through time is considered change for him, which to the modern mind sounds bizarre.
Ed Feser still keeps in line with this tradition, and talks about the need for a cause for the, e.g., apple persisting as it were on the table (without being affected by other things); and from which he draws essentially from Aristotles Unmoved Mover argument.
The closest to it I found, and which inspired the argument from composition over motion, was Aquinas argument that if all essences do not in-themselves necessitate esse than none of them could exist; and so there must be an essence which is identical to its existenceGod. It makes more sense to me to formulate it in terms of composed being than forms and matter.
I am not sure I followed this. The infinite series of composed beings I was referring to is an infinite regress of composition for any given, single, composed being. Sorry, I see how that might be confusing in the OP: I will rewrite that part.
The idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular waysand so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about formsand complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms < > ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thingwhich exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patterthen there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there cant be any of them moving (without some outside mover).
For Aquinas essence version, it is the idea that the essence of a thing normally does not imply its existence, and so the essence of a thing is distinct from its existence. If there were an infinite per se series of composition of things sorts of essences, then none of them could exist; for they are all contingent. There would have to be some essencewhich he argues is only one of this kindwhere it just is identical to its existence (i.e., is a necessary being).
Thats a good question. I would say, if the thing is spatial, then it must have parts; because anything that is spatiotemporal can be broken up into smaller parts. Anything, e.g., with extension must be capable of being broken up into the succession of some unite.g., a succession of dots form a line. Something is space is necessarily the succession of some some smaller things; and something in time is the succession of a thing temporally, which is also a form of being dissimilation.
We note the simpler and simpler, unto the suspected simplest; such as a quantum fields, figured as so by an estimated guess that proves to work: various waves put through a Fourier transform grants the quanta of the elementary 'particles'.
All forms, as temporaries, including composed beings, are inherent in the permanent purely simple and actual being as transient arrangements of it.
Good so far!
No 'mind' or 'will', for that would be a composite system that has memory, foresees, plans, designs, implements forms, etc.
Rather, it is energetic, and so stillness is impossible, and higher and higher forms come forth from the elementary 'particles', unto our complex minds that have doing - this at the opposite end of the spectrum, but not as the simplest. Higher being lies in the future.
The Ground-Of-Determination', G.O.D., underlies all, but it isn't a God Being.
1. Created beings are made up of parts.
2. A created being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a created being is either created or uncreated.
4. A part that is a created being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
Etc.
Ancient and medieval philosophy recognised the creator-created distinction which is fundamental to this form of argument. But the metaphysical background is very different to todays. It is set against the background of the Scala Naturae, the great chain of being, which recognises the distinction between creator and created, and various levels of created being, such as mineral, plant, animal, human, and angel (in ascending order). It also, and not coincidentally, was implemented in the hierarchical ecclesiastical and political order of medieval culture.
As naturalism rejects the created-creator distinction as a matter of principle, this style of argument is incommensurable with their basic premisses; theres really nothing in the naturalist lexicon that maps against it notwithstanding the attempts to find equivalences between quantum fields and the divine intelligence.
In other words, Its the kind of argument that will appeal to those with a predilection for it, and not at all to those who dont.
As we see ;-)
1) Composed beings are made up of parts."
No. They are the parts as whole
2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement."
It doesn't rely on its parts, is IS all the parts as whole. You can think of a composite thing as a number with it's parts fractions. The sum is a convergence
3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed."
Of course, but this doesn't follow from 1) and 2)
4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement."
False. It is not separable like that from it parts
5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own."
Zeno?
6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
Then show me something discrete
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
So it must BE God?
8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts."
And is nothing
9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts."
False. They can be diiferent in identity. Why are you invoking Leibniz?
10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none)."
Ok
11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist."
False. See 9)
12. The purely simple being would have to be purely actualdevoid of any passive potencybecause passive potency requires a being to have parts which can be affected by an other.
Why is God death the answer to divisibility?
13. No composed being could be purely actual, because a composed being always has parts which, as parts, must have passive potency.
Existence needs potency in order to be. Hence there can be incarnations?
18. The physical parts of a composed being cannot exist in something which is purely simple and actual; for, then, it would not be without parts."
What do you mean by "in". This one is dubious
19. Therefore, the forms of the composed beings must exist in the purely simple and actual being."
Form and matter are the same thing seen from different angles
20. Intelligence is having the ability to apprehend the form of things (and not its copies!).
21. The purely simple and actual being apprehends the forms of things. (19)
22. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being must be an intelligence.
Who says he knows human qualia?
23. To know the forms of every composed being is what it means to be omniscient.'
Only if the world is infinite
24. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is omniscient."
False
25. To cause the existence of a thing in correspondence to its form from knowledge (intelligence) requires a will."
True but what if there are infinite wills?
28. The purely simple and actual being cannot have any privations, since it is fully actual."
No because before you tried to say God was simple because he is empty. Now your trying to sneak in the full part. Typical Thomism
29. Therefore, the purely simple and actual being is all-good.
30. To will the good of another independently of ones own good is love.
31. The purely simple and actual being wills the good of all composed beings by willing their existence."
Maybe he is only kind of good
34. The purely simple and actual being is the ultimate cause of all actualization of potentials.
But deism
42. Therefore, God exists."
False. Thomism is inferior philosophy
:fire: À la natura naturans ...
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
Certainly, the Thomist "Five Proofs" are not sound.
Quoting Gregory
:up: :up:
Why not? What false premises do they contain, if they are not sound?
Thomism doesn't establish a substance. Ok so some power holds the universe together. There is no proof of a God beyond in simple-state doing just this for us. It's like the form/matter distinction: good for praticing though, but not establising duality in a composite thing. Outside experience is a nonsensical hence there is no time for God to exist (see Hawking on this). Games about an accidental series vs a substantial one don't establish that what our senses consider nothing is the true reality
If God is pure act he would be everything. Just "to be", is everything. See Spinoza. No thing can be beyond noumena. So God must be fully empty. If he has thoughts then he has division, knowledge of his actions. Aquinas gets so speculative that he forgets the personhood of God. In the end he was just a theologian.
Yes, and I thought you might be doing this. The difficulty is that essence/existence is a contentious form of composition, and a lot of people will fight you on this.
Quoting Bob Ross
That's alright. I had figured it out by the time I wrote my next post, and I understand why you wrote it the way you did. You need "beings" to include parts, wholes, and simples. I had mistakenly assumed it excluded parts, which was a slip on my part.
Quoting Bob Ross
When I first read the argument I thought of what David Oderberg calls "Reverse mereological essentialism," and you've here confirmed that this is an issue. It's not quite right to say that substantial wholes depend on their parts, because in a more primary sense the parts depend on the whole. One might be able to get away with that language insofar as corruptible entities are contingent on account of their composite nature...
But the problem is that you are upbuilding existence, which amounts to a kind of reduction of wholes to parts (qua existence). You seem to be saying, "Why does a whole exist? Because its parts exist. Why do its parts exist? Because their parts exist. But since no part is self-existing..."
For Aquinas existence is granted to the parts and to the whole, but it is not granted to the whole mediately through the parts. This is actually a really key difference between Aristotelian substantial form and a mechanistic composite whole. Our modern age thinks of organisms as machines, with upbuilding parts. For Aristotle an organism is very different than a machine, having a substantial form.
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, but very few people around here are going to grant you this without a lot of argument.
There are two Aristotelian rejoinders to your argument. The first is not exactly a rejoinder, but simply the fact that Aristotle did not posit created things as essence/existence composites (and in fact he never considered the matter). The second is more difficult, and it is Aristotle's belief that prime matter is uncreated and the universe is eternal. Aquinas is very conscientious of Aristotle's position on this.
Now perhaps you are not positing a finite universe, but I think a subtle difference on the nature of prime matter (between Aristotle and Aquinas) may come into your argument. This is because if prime matter is necessarily eternal, then in some sense it is not a composition of essence and existence.
Quoting Bob Ross
Okay. You seem to be saying that Atomism is false because divisibility never ceases with material objects. A lot of this draws back to the form of dependence that composition represents (and that is an interesting Thomistic query). But the heart of your argument seems to be the essence/existence distinction.
Why doesn't Aquinas appeal to the essence/existence distinction very often in his simpler works? I think it is because it is difficult to understand and know. Contrariwise, in his first argument for God's existence in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas begins with motion because, "It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion." He begins with something that is very obvious and cannot be denied, and works from there. That's a key principle of all argument.
But I get the impression the more holistic Aristotelian view is making something of a comeback, precisely because of his anticipation of self-organization.
What is a part? This seems a very important definition that must be clearly defined before the argument begins. Is there any part that is not also composed? For example, lets say I find an Aristotle atom, or a thing that is 'indivisible'. Could we not look at a part of that and say, "That's the front, back, and sides of the atom?'
In addition, can it be proven that we cannot have an infinite series of parts composing other parts?
Number 5 seems to assume this cannot the case. Can you give an example of a part that isn't composed by another part, or at least prove that its impossible for an infinite set of parts to exist?
You note that something which is not composed of parts must exist on its own. But if it exists on its own, then there is no reason for it to, or to not exist besides the fact that it does. If this is the case, can it not also logically be that there is an infinite regression of parts, and there is no reason for it to, or not to exist besides the fact that it does?
I think this is a good start to settle first before moving on.
Because it would be an infinite series of beings which lack the power to exist (i.e., are contingent).
Numbers are not composed beingsat least not in the concrete sense I am discussing in the OP.
Good point. Heres my response:
By cause, I mean it in the standard Aristotelian sense of that which actualized the potentiality.
What do you mean?
They cannot lack parts if they are in space and time: spatiotemporality implies divisibility.
The point of #10 is exactly what you just noted (I believe); as two purely simple things could not exist since that implies differentiation.
On the other hand, if by this you mean to imply that two uncomposed beings could be differentiated by some sort of relation (which is non-spatiotemporal since the contrary would imply parts) then I would need more elaboration on that.
Arcane, with all due respect, everything you say is just superfluous and superficial. I am advancing this Thomistic style argument, as mentioned in the OP, because I think it is true.
I dont see why that is the case at all. The OP clearly demonstrates that an absolutely simple beingwith no partshas active potencies; and one of which is willing. One would have to reason from some other starting point than the OP to derive (perhaps) what you are saying. My question would be: from which are you starting your reasoning?
I dont know what this means; and I am not following how it relates to the OP.
What do you mean? Doesn't Thomism accept Aristotle's concept of substance?
You might approach it through the convertibility of Goodness and Being. But the Doctrine of Transcendentals is a tricky subject.
A difficulty here is that people are going to read any appeal to that doctrine in more common sense terms and it seems plausible that a life full of suffering is worse than than no life at all, in which case there is a difference between willing existence and willing good.
I think Plato's argument in the Timaeus, that a being that is hostile or merely indifferent to that which lies outside of it is less than fully transcendent in terms of identity, is easier to grasp.
But a difficulty here that has cropped up already is that much modern thought is very comfortable with "it just is, no explanation is possible, and there need be no reasons." So it's very easy to find popular positions that undermine these premises. There is no "must," and no need to explain existence or essence for anything, they just are.
It even goes beyond this. "You want to talk about causes of the existence? Impossible and incoherent. If "cause" means anything at all it is already situated within the assumption of inscrutable brute fact existence and essence, initial conditions and laws. To question this is simply impossible." Not "brute fact explanations are acceptable" but "brute fact 'bo reason at all'" explanations are unquestionable.
Not exactly because Aquinas has a Biblical idea of a pure *existence* which was uncreated because it was what was, was necessarily there. Aristotle had like sixty something prime movers according to Bertrand Russell, but don't quote me on that. Aristotle was more Greek culturally in his philosophy, while St. Thomas was more Latin and Jewish in his understanding. Aquinas is either too personalistic in his conception of God (they say he laid his head against the tabernacle and cried because he wanted to know more of God) or not enough (oddly). At the end it is believed he had a mystical experience
Interesting.
Quoting Gregory
Yes, I've read that somewhere. They are like celestial spheres, made of the fifth element, the Aether. Reality for Aristotle is like a Russian doll in that sense, or a series of Chinese boxes.
Quoting Gregory
That's a good point, I sometimes think about that, but I also tend to forget this point that you are referring to.
Quoting Gregory
Well, Aquinas is the saint of Catholic studies, isn't he? So, I associate him more with the Catholic church than with medieval Latin culture.
Quoting Gregory
Yes, I can believe that. Mysticism is an important part of Christianity, I would say.
He seems like a very odd person to me. I would think Aristotle for example would consider him odd
Loosely related statements do not make an argument. Can something non-composed exist? It sounds like a contradiction in terms. It doesn't have clear meaning. It is so outside of noumena in that which it tries to describe that it becomes abstract instead of concrete. Better off reading Hegel
I agree. I've always had that same feeling about Aquinas myself, he seems like an odd person. But then again, what medieval thinker isn't odd? William of Ockham sounds like a person of common sense, until you begin to read him. Then he seem like an alien. I remember when I had to read his works, when I was a student at the Uni. We saw him in Medieval Philosophy. I remember that reading his words was like reading an alien language or something.
But he came up with Occam's razor, showing that common sense, scientific style that he wrote in. I question whether Aquinas wrote everything that is attributed to him. It just so processed and empty that to me it seems the Church has hidden the true story behind their creation. It has had a very damaging influence on the vitality of Western thought
Yes, this is possible. I agree. It's also possible that there are manuscripts of Aquinas that were destroyed for being heretical, or that simply got lost for no reason. Perhaps some of his unknown manuscripts exist, but they are not accessible to the general public.
Quoting Gregory
:lol: :lol:
TPF is turning into Reddit, conspiracy theories and all.
No, as far as I understand, Aquinas didnt forward this exact argument; but his version is of essence vs. esse.
Using the word created shifts the focus towards per accidens causal series; which Aquinas believes couldin principlego on for infinity. Using this word would essential focus the argument into a kalam cosmological-style argument (like William Lain Craigs).
The problem I have is that a created being does not entail that they are necessarily made up of parts; at least not when beginning the argument. Composed beings are made up of parts (obviously); but we only learn that there is an uncreated being from a deduction from the originally inferred absolutely simple beingnot the other way around. Even if there was a thing which was uncreated, if it is composed of parts then that composition cannot be an infinite regress.
I dont remember Aristotles argument for God (as the Unmoved Mover) talking in terms of created vs. uncreated things
That is true :smile:
It looks like you disagree with every premise; so I am going to ask you to pick one that you would like us to discuss, and I will respond to that. Responding immediately to every rejoinder to every premise at the same time is an unattainable and unproductive task (I would say). So, which one do you want me to address first?
Absolutely not. Pantheism would be false under this view, because the composed part is separate from the thing which ultimately provides the ability to actualize it; whereas if it were true, then the composed part just would be a part of God.
A thing being purely actual means that it lacks passive potency: it does not entail that everything actualized by a purely actual being is a part of that being. On the contrary, we can prove this is impossible; for a purely actual being cannot have parts and for everything to be a part of God entails that God has at least everything in the universe as His parts, therefore God must be separate from the universe.
Perhaps not but it seems natural that Aquinas would see the unmoved mover as at least an analogy for the Divine Intellect?
Interesting, I am not that familiar with that position. Is it essentially the idea that the esse (viz., the parts) depend also on the essence (viz., the whole)?
I agree with this insofar as living beings arent just composed like non-living beings: they have a form that has to do with a process of maintaining and developing as an organism. Is that what you are referring to by substantial form?
I guess I am not seeing the issue. I would say that a form is instantiated by way of the parts arrangement in such-and-such manners; and so the essence is not strictly reducible to the parts which comprise the being which has it; but this doesnt seem to negate the fact that the essence itself is contingent for its existence on the parts.
Thats fair, and I hadnt thought of that. I think this OP, if true, would necessitate that the universe is finite and that matter is not eternal; or at least that matter is eternal only insofar as it subsists in being (from God).
We can also, I would say, object in a similar manner to time, space, and natural laws. None of these have parts themselves, and so they would be immune to the OP; but my point would be that the OP establishes the requirement for God, and establishes the nature of God sufficiently to know that these kinds of things which have no parts themselves must be only in existence through God as well. I would say this because nothing can affect a purely actual being (since it lacks passive potency), granted such a being exists, and given natural laws (or time or space itselfif you are a realist about those) would be a medium which does affect such a beings ability to actualize, it follows that no such purely transcendent natural laws (or time or space) can exist; for God must be more fundamental than them, as their own actualization. They equally have a potential to exist or not, and God actualizes that potentiality.
That is fair, but my thing would be that Aristotelian idea of motion is misleading for modern people; and makes them be too dismissive of the argument.
So the argument I saw in the Summa Theologica is:
This is the same argument I put forward in the OP; but it weirds me out: is it really a demonstration of being all-loving to will the good of everything by merely keeping it in existence? Also, what about the clearly conflicting so-called love of each being (such as organisms tearing each other apart and eating each other alive)?
If I only desire to will that you stay alive, or that you should exist to begin with, than do I really love you?
No worries and glad to have you back, my friend!
A part is something which contributes to the composition of the whole. I keep it purposefully that vague, because I dont think a more robust definition is necessary for intents of the OP.
That would NOT be a part of the definition; for a part is a word which refers to a things relation to another thing and not what some other thing may be in relation to it. Viz., whether a part is composed is just to regress into whether or not a part has its own parts, and this certainly is (and should) not (be) included in the definition.
To answer your question directly: in principle, there could be a part which is composed or uncomposedthose are the two logical options; and there is nothing, thusly, about a part per se which entails one or the other.
No, that is a contradiction. Nothing which is spatiotemporal can be absolutely simple (i.e., an aristotelian atom); for everything in space and time is divisible.
Thats fair and a good question. I would say that the idea is that there is a form instantiated in matter by way of particular things arranged in particular waysand so, as a side note, this argument presupposes realism about formsand complex being has its form contingently on the parts which make it up (in some particular arrangement). This means that, similarly to how Aristotle notes that an infinite per se series of things changing do not themselves have the power to initiate that change (e.g., an infinite series of inter-linked gears have no power themselves to rotate each other, so an infinite series of rotating gears is ceteris paribus absurd), forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms comprised of other forms < > ad infinitum do not have the power to keep existence (let alone to exist at all). If each is dependent on the smaller comprised thingwhich exists with a form and matter alike in the same contingency patterthen there could not be anything at all there (without something that they subsist in); just as much as if each gear does not have the power to move itself then there cant be any of them moving (without some outside mover).
If I understand your question correctly as asking why an infinite per se series of a composed beings parts cannot just be explained as necessary, then I would say that that is because it is absurd (as noted above). To say there is an infinite regress of things which lack the power to exist but somehow do exist makes no sense. The infinite regress being necessary would not make any member in that series necessary, which is what needs to be the case for the whole series to exist in the first place; just as much as an infinite regress of moving gears, to take my previous example, needs some member which itself can actualize (innately) and such an infinite regress itself being changeless would not provide any of its members with this ability to purely actualize anything.
The Catholic Church has many secrets
Right, like the Opus Dei, for example.
In time it could be eternal. In space it is infinitely divisible. See Kant's antimonies
Quoting Bob Ross
This is Thomism and false. A part is not actualized by the whole. That would mean it actualized *itself* with the rest of the whole
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes it does since you say God is existence itself and the world exists. Thomism is a tangle of falsehoods
Quoting Bob Ross
The premise here is a purely actual being cannot have parts. Why is the premise the conclusion? This is what Aquinas does. All the 5 ways have the conclusion in the premise
Quoting Bob Ross
So now the parts instantiate the whole. You can't keep your story straight
Quoting Bob Ross
Good you're questioning
As for the accidental infinite series, physics demonstrates perfectly fine how there can be a universe that subsists in its laws on its own. There is no proof from Aquinas's meager physics that there is a power out there other than the natural order. Imagine a slide that flows water down infinitely from infinite height downwards. The gravity is the prine mover, not some person you invent who has no parts lol. If you don't prove a mind you don't prove a God
Finally, answer me: if God is his thoughts and he knows he moved his mind to create the world, this brings new knowledge to God and since he is his thoughts he has therefore changed. Therefore to create is to change for God. Simple
Even if that were true, it doesnt negate what I said:
I was noting that it would have parts; and this is true if you are thinking about eternity in the improper sense of persistence through time. Temporality itself provides parts to something, as can be divvied from each temporal succession.
Not at all. The parts which make up the whole actualize the potential for the whole to exist; and, yes, I understand that is a controversial take on change. Irregardless, when we think of it in terms of composition, the parts make up the whole; which must bottom out at an absolutely simple thing at its base.
You arent understanding Thomism properly. By Gods essence entailing esse, Aquinas is noting that nothing else is pure actuality; and this pure actuality is not the only thing that exists but, rather, the bases for why it exists. They are obviously separate and this is internally coherent within Thomism; although, of course, one can have cogent reasons for disagreeing with it.
Nothing about what I said was begging the question: you keep randomly misquoting me.
:roll: :lol:
You need to take things slower and actually read what I am saying: nothing I have said is incoherent nor logically inconsistent even if you disagree with it.
First of all, gravity is the displacement of space-time fabric which is relative to a relationship between the two objects effected; so this example is nonsensical.
Second of all, to be charitable, lets assume that there is some sort of natural law that causes the water to flow down infinitely. This wouldnt negate this argument from composition, which would, unlike an argument from motion, dictate that the water and the slide cannot be composed of an infinite per se series of parts and, thusly, God must exist. Either way, you end up with Gods existence (:
Now, natural laws and other real substances (if you are a realist about them)(like space and time) are immanently immune to the argument of composition and motion because they arent proper objects; however, crucially, the proper objects are what those arguments begin with and from them it can be derived that there is a purely actual and simple being; and then one can deduce that those laws and real substances must also be dependent (for reasons I see you have already read from my comment to someone else, so I do not feel the need to reiterate).
God is not his thoughts.
God doesnt move his mind: that makes no sense.
God acquiring knowledge from His own creation is an interesting thought; but even if it is true it would not negate that God is omniscient in the sense described in the OP nor would it entail that God has changed. Change is the actualization of passive potential, and God would still lack any ability to be changed in that manner.
Lastly, God doesnt create things in the sense like we do in time; and so it doesnt seem incoherent to posit that a God knows everything that is going to happen and has happened and what is and what will be all the while creating and keeping it going. I admit, this is a bit confusing though.
It means that a being which is complex, which has composition, has parts which comprise it.
These are contrary to each other. If he is his thoughts he cannot move his mind but if he doesn't move his mind than he cannot move. To have thoughts mean movement. To be purely simple is impossible
Like real numbers series (i.e. continuum), like unbounded surfaces, like fractals ...
"Exist" is not a predicate of any subject but instead is merely a property (indicative) of existence like wet is a property (indicative) of water (such that whatever is in contact with water is also wet). Aristotle's notion of "contingency" (accident) fallaciously reifies predication, or conflates his abstract map(making) with concrete terrains.
Okay, and yet another anachronistic metaphysical generalization abstracted from pseudo-physics of no bearing on contemporary (philosophical) usage of "causality" ...
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/
Again, conflating (a) map(making) with a terrain further confuses the issue. :roll:
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
Principally because the [b]Aristotlean
premises used by Aquinas[/b] (& other Scholastic apologists) are metaphysical generalizations abstracted from (his) pseudo-physics (e.g. universal telology, absolute non-vacuum, absolute non-motion, etc) which are not factually true of matters of fact (or nature). Consider the following further objections to "the soundness" of Aquinas' Quinque viæ (by clicking on my username below) ...
Quoting 180 Proof
This went way over my head. Can you explain it to me in a simpler way?
Exactly
19. Physics Interpretation/analogy:
The forms of the elementary 'particles' are directly quanta rung 'lumps' in the continuous purely simple and actual quantum waves/fields, as stable arrangements that tend to persist, but are secondary and temporary, as they may annihilate back into the purely simple, all the while the purely simple remaining as itself. The elementaries are not new substance; the one and only substance is the purely simple (quantum field). Waves are purely simple and ubiquitous in everything.
Composed beings are made of the elementaries plus their further conglomeration, we calling them to have 'parts' since we can see them separately, but the forms of the composed beings, too, are directly the purely simple and actual being, although, in the linear time of presentism, they at not there all at once but only potentially so. In externalist time, as in a block-universe, they are there all at once.
So, strictly speaking, there are no parts as separate from the purely simple, but for our convenience of identifying them separately and without having to always follow their mention with 'lumps of the simple'.
So, we have 'TOOT', the 'Theory Of One Thing'. In religious terms, all is God or Brahman.
Maybe, next time, we can identify some rudimentary perception somewhere
These seem to be solid definitions, nice.
Quoting Bob Ross
Agreed.
Quoting Bob Ross
So I personally do not like the idea of an infinite regress, and view it as a 'god of the gaps' argument. But for this argument in particular how is this any less 'impossible' then something that has no prior cause having the energy to start and power everything else that comes after it?
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm not saying that its necessary, I'm just noting that the same logic which concludes:
1. A has no prior cause. A somehow has all the energy to cause B, which causes C, etc.
vs
2. Infinite regressive causality has no prior cause. Yet it somehow has all the energy to power infinity to A which powers B which powers C.
I'm not really defending the infinite regress argument, I'm just noting that I'm not quite seeing how 1 is not absurd while 2 is absurd. If something can appear without prior cause that powers everything, why is it not possible for an infinite series of 'gears' for example that has infinite power spread all over itself to power it all at once?
Its good to chat with you again!
Like I said in that quote, God is not his thoughts and God doesn't move himself; so nothing you said here has any bearing to my response that you, ironically, quoted.
Also, as a side note, to have thoughts does not imply movement: movement is physical, thoughts are mental.
What is an unbound surface? Can you give a concrete example of that?
What is a fractal? Ditto.
Real number series are not concrete entities, so they are not a valid rejoinder to the argument from the composition of concrete entities.
I dont understand your point here: could you elaborate?
The compositional beings exist for sure, but they are contingent; and an infinite regress of contingent beings is actually impossible.
I dont know what this means.
How would you define change? How would you define causality?
I don't know, a lot of this quantum physics stuff I think gets misinterpreted into voodoo; or, worse, tries to force us to disband from the truths about macros things that I am certainly not willing to give up. We still have no reconciliation of QP with newtonian nor einsteinien physics; and this indicates that we are getting some stuff wrong here.
A god of the gaps argument is an argument for Gods existence by appeal to ignorance. Nothing about the OPs argument does that; so it cant be a god of the gaps argument.
This energetic and powerful entity which has no prior cause that keeps things existent would be the absolutely simple being. As the OP demonstrates, the existence of composed objects necessitates an absolutely simple being at the bottom.
In other words, whatever being you are positing here as having the energy to power everything would have to be absolutely simple; and then you end up looping back around to the idea God exists (:
This is absurd, and not actually possible. Again, go back to the gear example: you are saying that an infinite series of gears moving each subsequent gear is possible because somehow the infinite series is such that each can do that; but if you understand what a gear is, then you no that no member of this infinite series would be capable of initiating the change. Something outside of that infinite series would, at the least, have to initiate the movement.
Likewise, if you have an infinite regress of members which do not have the power to keep the next member existing and yet each depends on the other, then something outside of that series is powering it.
An infinite series itself cannot be treated like an object: it would not have any ability to do anything, because it is just itself a series.
I do not hold that a thing can appear and then actualize everything: I hold that there is an eternal and immutable being which is absolutely simple and purely actual.
Because what I think you are missing is that the gears dont have the ability to move themselves; so this infinite power would have to come from something outside of that series which affects the series. Right now, you are positing that an infinite series of powerless things have infinite power coming from nothing. Something does not come from nothing.
You too!
Its more than that. Its a reference to creating an argument of mysticism to fill in when there's a problem that's difficult to solve. I find the belief in the infinite mystical, and used to dodge the question of universal origin.
Quoting Bob Ross
If it were an absolutely simple being, no parts, then how does it power a thing that has parts? Wouldn't a part of the immutable being need to interact with that part? A gear has teeth for example, and they much touch teeth to push the other gear. Energy itself is a part, so it would have to impart some to another thing. The problem is a definition of a partless immutable entity powering everything else contradicts how causation and power work.
Quoting Bob Ross
That would be an infinite regress by time though. This is the same as an infinitely existing bar spinning itself. What powers this infinite existing being? It also can't be partless if it is to have agency, intelligence, and infinite existence.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, absolutely simple and something like a God do not fit. God is complex and can be identified in parts by expression at the least. Something perfectly simple would have no parts, no expression, and agency, no will. What I'm positing is that if there is an origin, it is not caused by something else. If it is not caused by something else, then it has no rules or reason for its origination of existence. Such a thing is not bound by logic in its existence. But if this is the case, there is no logic preventing an infinite regress from existing either, as it too would have no rules or reason for its origination of existence.
The problem I'm trying to note is that you need to apply the same criticism against an infinite series of no outside origin to a finite series of no outside origin. I posted a rewrite of my "Probability of a God" example a few days back where I cover this concept. You don't have to post there, but a quick read may clarify what I'm talking about. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/961721
Quoting Bob Ross
How is it any less absurd then a perfectly simple entity that existed eternally without prior cause and somehow started a chain of causality without anything else involved? Since we've already injected an eternal energy force without prior explanation, its not any less absurd to note the gears run infinitely regressive and share the infinite energy source which makes them run without prior origin. If an energy source can always have existed, then it and the gears could always have existed. The same thinking which allows us the first case, also allows us the second case.
Quoting Bob Ross
My point is that if we're positing that one thing can exist that seems impossible can exist without prior cause, we draw the line at another thing that seems impossible but can exist without prior cause?
Quoting Bob Ross
This is no different then the gears besides the fact you've said it doesn't have parts. You're still in an infinite regress. Why has this God existed up until now? We can go infinitely backwards to show how it has existed, and demonstrate why it exists in this moment now. Did this God think? Did it plan? Then it changed in some way.
Lets think further. Why does it need to be immutable? Don't most thing lose energy in a transfer? If the initial push was strong enough, the pusher doesn't need to be there anymore. We also know it can't be simple if its going to push.
Quoting Bob Ross
Does an infinite God which is entirely simple have the ability to move itself? How does that work without contradiction? How is that any different from me saying, "The gears have always existed and always moved?"
It is not as if living beings are an assemblage of parts that exist prior to or independently of the organism. We might say that the parts of living beings are made by or caused by that being though a process of autopoiesis.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, the parts are contingent upon the being of which they are parts.
Quoting Bob Ross
What is an uncomposed part? Where do we find them?
Quoting Bob Ross
A simple being without parts is an imaginative fiction masquerading as an a priori ontological necessity. The existence of the fiction, a simple being, is made up of and contingent upon a poorly composed chain of arguments that begins with something known but misunderstood, a living being that has distinguishable but not independent parts, and then posits something unknown and inexplicable as if it is a causal explanation.
Quoting Bob Ross
Our use of the term 'good' does not entail that what is called good is without privation. "what the thing is" is an ambiguous claim. We might say that a dog or a meal a song is good but in none of these cases do we mean that to be a dog or a meal or a song is to be good or without privation. There are bad dogs and meals and songs. The claim that to be God is to be good because what God is is good is circular and question begging.
I agree that makes sense but it's inconsistent with Thomism. How can God be perfectly simple yet have thoughts that are not him?
Quoting Bob Ross
Everything is physical. Thomism fails because it uses bad physics. Everything has dialectic and paradox. Is God alive?
Everything is denied God by Thomism such that nothing real is left. God is not even noumena
Imagine the infinite water slide again
It confirms part of your OP. Quantum Field Theory (QFT) is the most successful theory in the history of science.
At heart, you are simple-non-compositional quantum field, since that is all there is, yet, the elementaries, atoms, molecules, and cells take on a life of their own at each of their levesl to act as parts that effectively make you complex-composed.
The simple-non-compositional is Permanent and the complex-composed is a temporary arrangement of the Permanent until such time when we can live forever.
But how is it properly reconciled with the 'macro' world?
It makes no sense under any theory to say that a being is identical to its thoughts. Thats like saying you are identical to your thoughts: no, you think.
Secondly, that God is perfectly simple is not to say that God is conceptually simple: it is that God has no parts. God still has a will, intellect, etc. without having parts; and God is not simple in the sense that God is like one singular atom.
Leontiskos reply suffices to answer your question: please let me know if you need me to provide more clarification.
Another undefended assertion.
The Macro world becomes of the elementary quanta of the Simplest being drawn into stars to form the atoms up through iron, the rest of the the elements becoming from supernovae or neutron star collisions, the atoms then forming molecules that go on to form cells and life
Physics confirmations continued:
Quantum: A field quantum is an excitation of the quantum field at a certain energy level modeled by the natural formula of the sums of harmonic oscillations via a Fourier transform to form Quantum Field theory.
An electron in an atom that receives energy can only jump to a multiple of its energy level. This is know as the quantum jump.
Non quanta level excitations do not persist; they come and go, known as virtual particles.
Whats continuous means a field that waves,
Naught else; Stillness is impossible.
A field has a changing value everywhere,
Since the vacuum eer has to fluctuate.
The fields overlap and some interact;
So, there is one overall field as All,
As the basis of all that is possible
Of energys base motion default.
From the field points ever fluctuating,
Quantum field waverings have to result
From points eer dragging on one another.
Points are bits that may form letter strokes.
As sums of harmonic oscillators,
Fields can only form their elementaries
At stable quanta energy levels;
Other excitation levels are virtuals.
Two slits experiment: Why do elementaries shot at two slits go through both slits to form a wave interference pattern, even if they are sent one at a time? Because they are field quanta with a wave nature, a wave bring simple and continuous.
Motion: How do the elementaries as field quanta move? They roll along the field, like kinks in a rope, but the rope ever remains.
Since the quantum fields are everywhere,
The elementaries, like kinks, can move
To anyplace in the realms of the fields.
As in a rope, only the quanta move.
Parts:
At each level of organization
Of temporaries in the universe,
New capabilities become available,
And so they take on a life of their own.
Interchangeable parts:
The elementaries of a type are
The same, being woven by the same weave,
Only at the stable rungs of quanta;
Theyre well anchored, but theyre secondary.
Physical Nature:
Are the fields spooky as non physical?
Since the elementaries are physical,
And because they are outright field quanta,
The quantum fields are purely physical.
Change:
The vacuum has to eer jitter and sing,
This Base Existent forced as something,
Due to the nonexistence of Nothing;
If it tries to be zero, it cannot.
At the indefinite quantum level,
Zero must be fuzzy, not definite;
So it cant be zero, but has to be
As that which is ever up to something.
Change, change, change constant change, as fast as it
Can happenthe speed of light being foremost
The speed of causalityoer 13 billion years now,
From the simple on up to the more complex.
But nothing about the OP is mystical nor does it cite anything mystical. I challenge you to show me which premise in the OP is making an argument from ignorance.
The OP is just establishing that an absolutely simple being must be the underpinning (ultimately) for the actualization (composition) of the composed being: how it scientifically works is separate question that digresses from the OP.
Is this what you are referring to by mysticism? The OP doesnt need to demonstrate how it scientifically works for us to know that it must exist.
No, because there is no parts to the simple being; but, yes, it does interact with what it actualizes insofar as it keeps it in existence.
Energy is just the ability to do work; so I am not following what you mean here. Energy doesnt have parts just as much as space itself has no parts; however, it is worth noting that they are not absolutely simple concrete beings.
What do you mean by power? I was just using it loosely to refer to actualization.
How does it contradict how causation works? Causation is just the actualization of potentials.
It is not in time.
I dont see why it couldnt in principle. By partless, we are talking about in concreto parts. My feeling of sadness and my thought about maybe eating ice cream later are not parts of my (in concreto) being.
I demonstrated the exact opposite is true in the OP: please feel free to contend with any of the relevant premises.
That doesnt follow from what you said so far. A necessary being could, in principle, be bound by logic such as the law of identity.
That misses the point. Like I said before, the problem is that you are positing an infinite series which is contradicted by what we know exists; so it is impossible. The idea of such an infinite series ceteris paribus, to your point, is possible.
I am more than happy to discuss that in this thread if you want or in that thread; but the same issues I have voiced before still seem to be there. E.g., the term cause is being used entirely too loosely.
Heres a simple way of demonstrating my point with the gears:
1. Change is the actualization of a potential.
2. A gear cannot change itself.
3. Rotation is a form of change.
4. A gear cannot rotate itself.
5. An infinite series of gears that are interlinked would never, in itself, produce any rotation amongst the gears.
6. Therefore, if an infinite series of gears that are interlinked are such that they are each rotating, then something outside of that series is the cause of that rotation.
There is no analogous argument that an absolutely simple being cannot actualize things.
As shown above, one is impossible; the other you are blanketly asserting is impossible, and of which I deny.
Thats in the OP:
This argument is not about temporal causation nor per accidens causation: it is about per se causation; which entails that this example you gave does not apply since it is an example of the former. If the atoms in the apple cease to exist, then so immediately does the apple itself: this is not like begetting children where the son can beget children even after his father dies (or a person pushed doesnt cease to exist when the person who pushed them does).
No, and this does not make Him lesser than omnipotent (in my view).
Maybe matter is not something a partless being can know. Aquinas's arguments are weak on that. Deism sounds possible if we take any probability count with regard to partless God. There can be pure potential with no actualization perhaps that can actualize because of how the physics works. The gears coukd have eternally moved by gravity if they are on a slant
I don't believe that existence has different types because I am a monist about it; so a thing either exists or it doesn't in the sense of generic existence.
God would exist supernaturally, because God would be the basis of nature but transcends it.
In terms of proof, it is always worth mentioning that no philosophical argument is a strict proof; but I would say the OP "proves" that God exists from composition, and it is an inherently philosophical (namely metaphysical) argument.
Gregory, you keep jumping all over the place. I keep addressing your points and then you just move on to different point without engaging and then you circle back to the original point I already addressed.
E.g.,:
I already demonstrated that gravity doesn't work like that and that your counter-example using it does not provide any rejoinder to the argument from composition; and even if it did it wouldn't negate anything I said to Philosophim. The 'thing' which would be actualizing the potential for the gears to move would, like I pointed out, be external to the series. In this case, you are positing it is some sort of gravity.
To clarify, I'm addressing my personal opinions on infinite existence. This actually wasn't a criticism of your point. :)
Quoting Bob Ross
I think you misunderstand still. I'm noting that if you apply the same approach to your idea of a simple being being the start of it all, you run into the same impossibility. If that is so, and you are noting that something impossible is possible, then an infinite series is equally impossibly possible.
Quoting Bob Ross
Its not a scientific question, its a question of what an absolutely simple being would be. Are you just inventing a word placeholder or does it have some concrete functionality? Again, you're coming up with specifics in an infinite regressive causality of gears, then noting its impossible, but you're not doing the same for this one part interacting with a finite set of gears to power them. What you're saying is there is essentially one gear that gets powered, then powers all the others. How can that be 'perfectly simple'? What does that mean?
Quoting Bob Ross
This makes no sense then. If a single gear powers the others, it powers it by transferring energy from itself to the rest of the gears. If not, then how does it transfer? If there are no parts, how does it push the first gear in the series? Again, its holding this example to the same standard of the infinite gears.
Quoting Bob Ross
If only a part of it interacts with the rest of the gears, then it is not purely simple. If its entire being interacts with the first gear, then what separates it from the gear itself? In which case what separates an entire infinite simple being from interacting with an infinite set of gears all at once for eternity?
Quoting Bob Ross
Energy is the entire impetus of anything. No energy and we have timeless matter without movement. Energy is transferred between matter, like energy starts the first gear in a line of gears. If there is a simple thing that started the first gear, it must have transferred energy right?
Quoting Bob Ross
They actually are. You can tie those feelings to your brain, which is many multiple parts. A person can be lobotimzed to the point that they cannot think about ice cream nor feel sad anymore.
Quoting Bob Ross
Not a worry, it was only referenced if it would help you to understand what I was getting at. I wrote it specifically to detail 'cause' more, so I am a bit disappointed you think its not detailed enough. After were done here it would be kind if you would point out where you think its still lacking.
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets address what a simple being is. Just because we can piece two words together in a sentence, it does not meant its a coherent existent example.
What is a being? It is something existent. We are able to divide in into parts. You believe its possible there is a being that cannot be divided. I have no issue with that. As you noted.
Quoting Bob Ross
So we know this thing cannot exist in space or time. You also noted:
Quoting Bob Ross
Further, using the gears analogy, I believe we can represent the first gear being powered by the simple being. This would entail that the simple being was a part of the entire chain of gears, the start which powered it all. But how can something which does not exist in space or time power the first gear? Is it powering all the gears at once? But how is that any different from there being an infinite regression of gears being powered all at once?
Now lets address 9. Two beings are distinguishable from each other's parts, not from their own parts within themselves. A simple part is mono, meaning it cannot be multiple. Meaning we can have two different monoparts. They would be distinguishible because one mono part would not be the other monopart.
Can you give an example of a monopart that exists apart from space and time yet is able to interact with the space and time of a gear to start it all? Of course not, its impossible, yet we say its possible anyway. And once we start saying the impossible is possible, we can no longer say, "That impossibility is possible, while this other one isn't."
10 and 11 also doesn't conclude. A monopart is one, therefore there is nothing preventing another separate one from being. They don't have any parts in themselves, but they are separate beings. They could interact and become part of something else.
Let me know what you think.
No. Many scientists would disagree with you. The 5 ways are just the thing physicists like to think about: how to move the series through the laws of nature alone.
Then i address it
Quoting Bob Ross
Where?
You can't form some generic argument about potential and actuality and say this is beyond science. This is about specific scientific principles thst science has been working on since Newton. These arguments you present are very tangled and many many physicists would disagree with them
Now I don't find that argument at all convincing. Nor significantly different to the various other cosmological arguments.
Why is it not convincing? Well, for lots of reasons, but one not considered here yet may be interesting. It seems we cannot construct a formal argument that is valid and has as its conclusion that something exists. You can read up on this in the SEP article on Free Logic. There are two ways to think about this result. The first is that formal logic is just incapable of displaying the structure of such existential arguments. The second, that any argument that claims to show that something exists has the assumption of existence hidden in its premises. So taking an example from the SEP article, in order to say that Whatever thinks exists we already have supposed that there is something that thinks, that the domain of thinking things is not empty. That is, that Whatever thinks, exists is the same as the truism ?x(x=y). The cosmological argument hinges on the premise that there is something rather than nothing, the non-emptiness of the domain of being. If we assume that, then of course we can conclude that something exists. At issue then is the nature of that something.
Anyway, that's my suggestion for another way to think about such arguments. They don't prove that god exists, but if you already supose that god exists, they might go someway to explaining how to think about god in a coherent fashion.
There's also the more obvious problem that god is both simple and yet has parts - will, intelligence, and so on. The quick retort is that these are all one, that god's will, intelligence and so on are all the very same. That's quite a stretch, since for the purposes of the argument they are each separated out. Faith is a powerful force. Yet if one begins with a contradiction, anything is provable.
And the last step is a puzzle, Aquinas' "And this we all call god". That things exist is for many a source of perplexity. In the end the argument just names that feeling.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/961602
So, I want to focus for second on the fact that you believe both a finite series with an absolutely simple first member and an infinite series of rotating gears are impossible.
I demonstrated here that the latter is impossible as follows:
You still have not demonstrated that the former is impossible. This seems to be the crux of your rejoinder, so what is your argument for that?
Heres the closest I saw in your response to an argument:
This is a bad argument. You are saying:
1. There is no example we can give of a being that exists outside of space and time and yet can still interact with things in space and time.
2. Therefore, it is impossible.
That is, ironically, an argument from ignorancethats a God of the gaps style argument.
I would like you to focus on providing me with a sound argument for why it is impossible; because thats the crux of your argument. However, I do want to briefly address some other points you made: feel free to ignore the rest of this response to focus on the above if you need to.
The gears example is analogous to the composition argument only insofar as I was demonstrating that an infinite series of beings which lack the power to instantiate a thing and of which exhibit that thing is impossible per se. I am not arguing that there is an absolutely simple being at the beginning of a finite series (or an indefinite series with a starting pointi.e., a potential infinity) of gears moving. As a side note, Aristotle would argue that, by analogy, the gears are an infinite series that are rotating each other and the pure actualizer is the external cause for that rotation. I dont want to get into his argument from motion because it detracts from the OP (which is about composition).
My argument is from composition: it is the idea that an absolutely simple being that is purely actual is the start of the chain of causality for the existence of things in terms of their composition. Think of it more like the atom composes the apple, and not the apple is thrown by the person.
This doesnt matter if the OP succeeds in demonstrating that an absolutely simple being needs to exist to account for the existence of contingent beings. Again, you keep shifting the goalpost to questions about how this absolutely simple being actualizes the existence of things instead of whether or not the OP succeeds at proving there is such a being that actualizes them. These are separate questions.
I agree that consciousness can be reduced to our bodies; but that is a red herring to what I said. It is uncontroversially true that your thoughts have no concrete, proper parts.
You could try to argue that the absolutely simple being cannot be absolutely simple if it has thoughts because thoughts require physical parts to arise; but I am going to deny that because the OP demonstrates such a being must exist; so it must be the case that not all forms of intelligence are reducible to physical parts. Again, thats why I keep trying to get you to address the OP; because if it succeeds then these points you are making are good but irrelevant.
Again, this doesnt entail it is impossible. This is an argument from ignorance.
If a thing has parts, then it can be distinguished from other things. An absolutely simple being has no parts, so it is impossible that this mono thing you referred to as having their own parts within themselves is absolutely simple.
Likewise, you just blanketly asserted that we can have two different monoparts when thats literally what are supposed to be providing an argument for. You basically just said:
1. An absolutely simple being is mono.
2. There can be two different monoparts.
3. Therefore, it is false that two absolutely simple beings cannot exist.
That just begs the question.
Also I forgot to mention:
Sorry, I am not trying to disappoint you; and I will re-read your OP and respond in that thread sometime soon so we can discuss that as well.
Well in the first place esse != parts and essence != whole. Esse/essence is not the part/whole relationship.
Quoting Bob Ross
Sure, thats part of it. So for example, if you place all of the parts of a frog together in the correct configuration, there will still be no frog. The frog as a whole is something that the parts cannot effect.
Quoting Bob Ross
Sure, there is some sense in which the whole depends on the parts, although not all the parts. If a cat loses an ear or a dog loses a leg it has lost a part but the cat or dog still exists.
The problem begins in premise (4), where you imply that there is an existence in the parts that is not in the whole, and thus we are upbuilding existence from parts to whole. Your idea is something like, Parts are what primarily exist, and because they exist wholes exist. The existence of wholes is generated by the existence of parts.
Quoting Bob Ross
Okay, thats fair enough.
Quoting Bob Ross
Why do you say that? It seems to me that motion is more generally accepted than the essence/existence distinction. Of course when Aristotle talks about motion he is also talking about any kind of change, but change too is generally accepted to exist.
Think about it this way: is it easier for someone to deny the essence/existence distinction, or is it easier for them to deny that existence of motion/change?
Not at all. God is not a presupposition of the argument in the OP.
This is a blatant straw man: did you read the OP?
If the philosophy is unsound, then so too is the theology unsound.
No. On the contrary, if you are a pluralist, then two things can exist in two or more different kinds of being itself. So X may exist in type A being, and not exist in type B being.
The question arises, how does X interact with type B existent things? Hence, a problem of interaction arises; and of which only establishing a communal type of existence will solve it. The, we end up with an argument of parsimony for monism; because why would we posit three (or more) types of existences when you still need to posit one generic type that they all inherit???
So in answer to Zeno Aristotle says the whole is prior to the parts. So is the whole prior to the parts or the parts prior to the whole? That's really a silly question. There this part, that, and together, the whole. What else is there to say?
Quoting Bob Ross
But it does as Zeno shows.
Quoting Bob Ross
The question is of the first movement in time. How did it start? Motion, caused by gravity, allows time to flow. Without the caused motion there is no time. Without time there is no creator
Sure, I'm not saying they aren't impossible generally, and I definitely am not a fan of infinite regress, but I think they are impossible with the examples given here so far. I've agreed with you since the beginning that the infinite gear regress is impossible. What I'm noting is your example of a simple being outside of time and space powering 'the first gear', is also impossible.
Quoting Bob Ross
1. There is no example we can give of an infinite regress of reality being powered by itself.
2. Therefore, its is impossible.
How is the argument I noted any different?
Quoting Bob Ross
Because what is possible must be known at least once. Plausible is something we can think might be true, like a horse with a horn on its forehead. But it doesn't mean its possible.
Just like the infinite regress defies everything we know in physics, therefore we declare it to be impossible, a simple being that exists outside of time and space cannot interact with time and space. To affect time and space, the thing must touch time and space, and must be in it at the point of interactivity. Its simple physics, just like it is simple physics that an infinite regress of gears cannot power itself. You can't apply known physics in one example, then not allow it to apply in another.
Quoting Bob Ross
But you use the argument from motion to show the infinite regress of gears is impossible. Again, the same standards must be applied to both arguments. And if you're not arguing that there is a simple being powering the first gear of regress, I don't understand what you're trying to say.
Quoting Bob Ross
How is this any different from a simple being starting the first gear in the chain of causality? Are you just noting, "There is a first cause"? When you get specific with the idea of a simple being, then this specific first cause needs to make within the chain of causality.
Quoting Bob Ross
It doesn't succeed in demonstrating this because you need a simple being to be understood in terms of real causality just like the gear example. Without understanding what a simple being is, and how it could begin this causal chain, you can't prove your OP. You already brought the real world into it with the gear analogy. You can't suddenly remove physics and physical examples when you want an alternative outcome. Otherwise I could simply state that an infinite simple regress has existed forever and powers itself, and by consequence explains everything else. Put the gears analogy in, and it shows it doesn't work. Same with your simple singular being argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
Its not a red herring, its to show that thoughts are parts. If I think of the color red, then green, are these not two parts of my entire thought? A simple thought would just be red, and nothing else. A simple being would be like that, 'red' and nothing else. I can't be an intelligent thinking being that designs things, as an intelligent being if it has thoughts, has parts.
Quoting Bob Ross
The correct statement here is that forms of intelligence reduce to physical parts, so there is a flaw in your OP.
Quoting Bob Ross
21 doesn't make any sense. Thoughts are parts, therefore a simple being cannot have thoughts. A thought, an aspect, etc. But not multiple. This means a simple being cannot be intelligent.
Quoting Bob Ross
I never said a monobeing has parts within them. I noted that two mono beings would be different, and could be parts of something greater. A simple being of red, a simple being of green for example. If a being has both green and red, it is no longer simple. If a being can think, it is no longer simple. You're noting a simple being, and a simple being would have severe limitations because it has no parts within it. A god of intelligence in no manner of logical thought is simple.
Quoting Bob Ross
This was in reply to your assertion that only one simple being can exist. A simple being is one, it has no other parts. There could be another simple being that also has no parts, and that would not contradict the first simple being. Therefore it is not true that two simple beings cannot exist.
Quoting Bob Ross
No rush, your ideas first. :)
So, it seems like you are saying:
1. An absolutely simple being causing (ultimately) the existence of all things violates physics.
2. Therefore, it cannot exist.
How does it violate physics?
I didnt argue that: that would also be an argument from ignorance. I specified exactly why it is impossible.
I didnt give an example of that. As I said before, the example of the gears was to demonstrate that your idea of an infinite series explaining the causality of composition is impossible.
This is standardly false. Right now, we are discussing actual possibility; but even if we keep it more generic possibility in principle refers to something which may not have ever happen but can happen. What you just described by possibility is not a modality: it is historicity.
Even if you disagree, I am using the term possibility foremost in its common sense definition of being the modality of what can happen; and more specifically in terms of what can happen relative to physics. It is actually impossible (and impossible in the common sensical definition) for an infinite set of moving gears to exist by themselves; it is not actually impossibleor at least you still havent demonstrated why it is impossiblefor an absolutely simple being to the transcendent grounds for physics itself by way of demonstrating, first and foremost, that the composition of objects entails such a being in the first place.
It is commonly accepted that time and space, assuming they are real, are not fundamental to reality. E.g., Einsteins space-time fabric implies a block time whereby the relations of things must be determined in ways independent of a strict temporal succession like we intuit.
Your point here requires that space and time are real substances which every existent thing is in and of; and I dont see why that is case nor how science backs that. On the contrary, quantum physics and einsteinien physics demonstrate that they are not fundamental at all.
I am saying that an infinite series of rotating gears ceteris paribus is impossible; and analogously an infinite series of composition for an object is impossible. If it is impossible for a composed object to be infinitely composed, then there must be a first member; and that member must be uncomposedwhich means it is absolutely simple.
Because I dont think that this simple being is the cause of the composition of objects analogously to a thing perpetually moving the first gear in a series. Moving a gear in a series would require something physical moving it, at least immanently (directly). Again, I do find Aristotles argument from motion convincing, but thats a separate argument that runs on separate lines of thought.
If you wanted to make it analogous, then you would have to posit that there is an infinite series of gears (in the manner we discussed) but that the movement is supplied to each gear equally from some aspect of their own composition; which would, as you can guess, make them magic gears. The analogy falls apart if we try to make it analogous in that sense.
Which premise fails?
Thats false. If all the premises are true, then the conclusion in the OP logically follows. How it causes the existence of things is a separate question.
A thought does not have parts. Your brain has parts. Are you arguing that somehow your brain has parts and your thoughts have parts?
Red in the sense of the phenomena or the wavelength? If the former, then it doesnt have parts and is absolutely simple but is not a concretely existent thing; and if the latter, then it is made of parts but is a concretely existent thing. Either way, it isnt an example of an absolutely existent thing in concreto (viz., ontologically).
Whats the proof you have of this?
Again, you are using the term part too loosely. A part is something which contributes to the composition of a whole in concreto. A thought; a feeling; the phenomenal experience of a color; the taste of pizza; etc. do not have parts and are not concrete objects.
Again, you just argued by way of begging the question. I have no good reasons so far to accept that you are right that two simple beings can exist. I already provided a proof that that is impossible. If two things lack parts, then they cannot exist separately from each other; for a thing can only be concretely distinguished from another thing by way of its parts. There would be no boundaries between two absolutely simple things because they have no parts to allow for such limitations.
A surface without edges.
Earth.
Consider this article ...
https://fractalfoundation.org/resources/what-are-fractals/
None of the premises of your argument refer to "concrete entities" goal post-shifting fallacy, Bob. Here's what I'm addressing that you've repeatedly referred to:
Quoting Bob Ross
Numbers¹ are "composed beings" (i.e. sets²
[whole [integer [rational [real [complex ...]]]]] "composed" being synonymous with divisible), what A. Meinong refes to as sosein (i.e. being-so, or essence).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_types_of_numbers [1]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_hypothesis [2]
False (e.g. negative integers, fractals).
Impermanence, flow (i.e. flux), becoming, transformation, energy (i.e. activity) ...
By causality³ I understand non-random (i.e. conditional-constrained) sequential patterns of events (i.e. effects).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_causes#Efficient_cause [3]
Quoting Bob Ross
What do you mean by purely simple? Why an uncomposed thing must be purely simple?
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct if two beings are composed. We can distinguish uncompsed beings by their attributes though.
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't see how this follows. Two uncomposed beings just do not have parts.
Quoting Bob Ross
I don't see how this follows either. Two uncomposed beings can have different attributes so there can be more than one.
Quoting Bob Ross
What do you mean by purely actual? Why cannot an uncomposed thing have potency?
Quoting Bob Ross
This does not follow to me as I don't understand the previous premises and conclusion.
Quoting Bob Ross
What do you mean by this?
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, if the form of things can be manifested as thoughts.
Quoting Bob Ross
That does not follow to me as I don't understand what do you mean by (19).
Quoting Bob Ross
Yes, if all possible forms of composed beings exist. Otherwise, the purely simple and actual being lacks omniscience.
Quoting Bob Ross
To me, good is just a feature of our experiences and has nothing to do with privation.
Quoting Bob Ross
That does not follow since I disagree with the definition of good.
Quoting Bob Ross
The omnipotent is the ability to actualize all possible forms. It is not sure whether all possible forms exist and whether they are only caused by a purely simple being.
Thats fair. I am starting to think my OP isnt even arguing from Aquinas essence vs. esse distinction; so maybe this isnt a Thomistic argument afterall.
What I am really doing, by my lights, is making an argument from contingency and necessity as it relates to composition; basically by way of arguing that an infinite series of composition is impossible because it would be an infinite series of contingent things of which each lacks the power to exist themselves.
Yes and no. If you were to take a dead frog and sew it back to together, then yes you are right; but if you configure the frogs pieces to be exactly as it were when it was alive; then it must now be alive again .no?
I agree.
Whats the problem with that? Are you saying that it doesnt account for a soul?
Thats true, but I say that because Aristotles proof only works if we think of a thing having the potential to remain the same through time and that potential being actualized through time. Otherwise, the argument fails to produce a being that would fit classical theism which is the perpetual sustainer of everything; instead, we just get a kind of kalam cosmological argument where this being starts everything off moving.
By motion, Aristotle is not just talking about, e.g., an apple flying in the air: he is talking about the change which an apple that is just sitting there is undergoing by merely remaining the same. Thats the only reason, e.g., Ed Fesers Aristotelian Proof gets off the ground in the first place.
Something outside of space and time cannot affect space and time. Physics is all about contact and transference. We also have no evidence of anything existing out of space and time. If you're going to bring physics into infinite regress, you can't suddenly forbid it for finite regress. You're talking about a simple being with one continuous characteristic that has no parts having to interact with space and time in a way to create the complexity of the universe. According to known physics, that's impossible.
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets remember that the gear analogy is representative of an infinitely existing universe. The only reason why the infinitely regressive gear example is considered impossible is because we don't have an example of one Bob. Can you point to an infinitely regressive set of gears and demonstrate that it is impossible that it not power itself? No.
Let me give you the only thing you could reasonably conclude. If you proved an infinite regress is impossible then a finite regress is the only option we have. But claiming, "X" is the finite regress is going to require a bit more. A simple being cannot have parts, therefore it cannot have thoughts (which are parts) or the ability to contact points of space and time (which are parts). And if you're saying they aren't parts, then it seems like you have an arbitrary definition of parts that is being shaped to fit a conclusion instead of a solid definition that necessarily leads to that conclusion.
Quoting Bob Ross
Except that we have discovered an infinite regress of gears. We've never discovered a unicorn. What if they are actually possible? What if we just don't know it? That's why we have to talk about possible things that we have known at least once. Its known possibilities. Our knowledge of physics could be completely wrong Bob, and it actually is possible for an infinite regress of self-powered gears to exist.
Once you start using knowledge to define possibility, then you're stuck with known possibilities.
Once you introduce unknown possibilities, they could be anything, therefore they invalidate any claim of what is impossible.
Quoting Bob Ross
You noted earlier when I said, "Does this mean that an atom can have a front, side, and back?" you replied, "No, this being is outside of space and time." So that means you're stating a being without a front, side, or back was able to touch a part of its partless self to the first gear in time and space that does have a front, side, or back. How is that possible?
Quoting Bob Ross
And I don't have any disagreement with this. My disagreement is the fact that you are not giving an example of a simple being that you have defined that makes any sense. For example, "A smallest particle appears/exists without any prior cause. It is so small, that there is nothing smaller that can be used to divide it into a part, nor is it composed of any other parts." This works. You saying this simple being has a vastness of intelligence and power to suddenly create and power the entire universe with moral intent is no longer a simple being.
Quoting Bob Ross
Ok, this is where I'm confused then. I assumed we're talking about infinite vs finite regressive causality. If there is a finite causality, then yes, the 'first' thing would be entirely simple and the beginning of causality. What is this simple being in the causal chain if not this?
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, its passable if you want to argue for a simple being, but once you introduce specifics further than that and claim its a cause of existence you can't back out. You're claiming its an intelligent moral being, yet also somehow partless. That's a contradiction.
Quoting Bob Ross
Lets say 'a' thought does not have parts. But when you have more than one thought, you now have parts of 'thought'. A simple being cannot have more than 'a' thought, and in fact it must be 'that' thought.
For if it was some thing that had a thought, a thought would be a part of itself. That doesn't allow for complex thinking.
Quoting Bob Ross
Right, because that was the best example I could give of something that was purely simple. You have not provided a workable example to demonstrate the reality of your abstract. Give me an example of something purely simple and concrete, even in theory.
Quoting Bob Ross
Remember when I asked what a part was earlier and you said you defined it vagely intentionally because you didn't think it needed detail? If you make it loose it gives you wiggle room for what you want, but it also gives someone else wiggle room for what you don't want. I think its time for you to define what a part is in concreto, then give a hypothetical example of a purely simple part that is the origin of the finite regression of the universe. If its in concreto, then its tangible. What is tangible outside of space and time that can affect space and time?
Quoting Bob Ross
Bob, if something is simple, then it can be a part of something else. It itself has no parts, but there is nothing proven at all that states it cannot be the part of something larger. You said it exists concretely, therefore it has a limit. Not having parts except its own existence doesn't mean another of the same type can't be. That's just nonsense. The only thing you've proven so far is a lot of words that don't have clear definitions, and don't fit into reality with the assertion that it all somehow works.
If it helps, whenever we write an argument for something tangible it must be falsifiable. It doesn't mean it is false, but it does mean that "If X is true, then Y is false." If you've constructed a definition or language that cannot be falsifiable, then you're not speaking about reality. You claim there exists an absolutely simple being that somehow is so complex that it can create the entire universe with intelligence and moral intent. This is sounding a lot like an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient being that is omnisimple. I applaud the creativity, but I would go back to your definition of simple, being, simple being, and what it would look like if it were tangible. Because without this, nothing you're saying makes sense apart from what you're imagining in your own mind.
As you quoted, the OP reaches God's existence as the conclusion of it. So I am confused why you think it is presupposed. The argument outlines why composition entails God's existence without presupposing God's existence to begin with.
I think we are jumping all over the place in our discussion, and thats equally my fault. I can tell from your response that we disagree at pretty much every level even in terms of our understanding of how to approach understanding reality. Let me try to reign in the conversation without derailing.
The two core ideas that I think we need to focus on is (1) the metaphysics of a part and (2) the establishment of an absolutely simple being simpliciter.
With respect to #1, it is worth admitting that I do need to provide a clearer conception of its metaphysics (although I think its definition given before is perfectly adequate); and you are right to point this out. I still stand firm that a part is something which contributes to the composition of the wholeas its definitionbut there are many prima facie issues with this definition that I need to address and resolve.
First, one may object that a thing could have parts which is not a concrete object (which I overlooked)e.g., a singular feeling of disgust spanning 3 seconds, the parts of a word in a thought, numbers, etc.and that such non-spatial (but yet temporal) things could legitimately be called divisible (going along with the idea that divisibility is related to the the idea of having parts such that one can divvy up the whole into them). To this, I say that the OP is talking about divisibility as it relates to concrete objectsthat is, spatiotemporal objects. E.g., a singular feeling of disgust that spans 3 seconds is divisible in timeand thusly has partsbut not in a spatialand thusly not in a concretesense; for a feeling does not exist in space (even if it can be causally explained in terms of brain processes). These kind of phenomena have parts but are immune to my OPs argument because the OP is centered around spatiotemporal (i.e., concrete) beings when it outlines its premises. I therefore will refer to the parts which are relevant to the OPand of which refer to spatiotemporal divisibility of objectsas concrete parts to avoid confusion.
Second, one may object that, in the case of @Mww, space and time are pure a priori modes of our cognition and, thusly, exist but are not real; so a concrete object would not refer to something that is spatiotemporal and yet there would be a clear distinction between what our cognition represents in time alone vs. what it represents in space and timethe latter being exactly what I am referring to by concrete objects. In a view like transcendental idealism, all concrete objects would be non-spatiotemporal (or at least wouldnt exist in the space and time which our brains attribute to them). To this, I respond that these non-spatiotemporal concrete objects would still be divisible and have parts in the relevant sense to the OP because we have to trust our senses and cognition to tell us that they are other than us; and the way our brains do that is by representing that which is other as separate. So, these objectswhatever they are in-themselves, even if it be non-spatiotemporalmust be divisible and have concrete parts. I only refer to this objection to be thorough, as I dont believe you accept the non-reality of space and time, but for now I think we can both establish concrete entities as simply defined in the sense in the first objection (i.e., as spatiotemporal objects).
With respect to #2, the OP argues for Gods existence in multiple steps; and I think we keep jumping around where you disagree about something midway in the argument when you dont agree about something which is required for that part of the argument to work. So, lets start at the basics and see what you are disagreeing with:
By composed being above, I am referring to a concrete object (as defined above) which has concrete parts (as defined above). Do you agree with 1-7? I am guessing you will disagree with 5.
You are not being charitable. I am admitting that I used the term 'composed being' to refer to a 'concretely existent being which has parts' without realizing that it was too vague. I concede your point, which is valid, and am noting to you that the OP is only targeting concretely existent objects. The argument clearly makes no sense if it were to target non-spatial(temporal) beings like numbers, feelings, thoughts, etc.
So then your conclusion ...
Quoting Bob Ross
... means that "God" is a "concretely existing object", which contradicts both theistic and deistic conceptions (Aristotle, B. Pascal, P. Tillich).
So, what I am trying to say is that the composed beings that are concrete are either composed of an infinite regress of concrete things or there must be a first cause which is not concrete.
Ah, I see. So a being that is all-loving, omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, absolutely simple, purely actual, eternal, unique, one, immutable, and eternal is the thesis of classical theism. That kind of being is what is traditionally referred to as God. That's what theology centrally revolved around traditionally for a long time. There is nothing being presupposed there: it is just noting that what we just proved exists, is what we use the term (traditionally) "God" to refer to you. No different than how we can prove a car exists and then note that the thing we just proved exists is traditionally called a 'car'.
Bob I know that the art of any good discussion is the art of thinking, and it is difficult for a good thinking session to be perfectly organized. I too am uncertain if I have conveyed my points properly, no foul from me. :)
Quoting Bob Ross
I too think this is solid on its own.
Quoting Bob Ross
I love the idea, but I'm not sure if it works. Feelings do exist in space if you think about your own self. Do you have a feeling in the living room while you're in the kitchen? Your feelings are local to you and your body. Anxiety isn't just a thought, its a feeling that can travel to your muscles and your stomach.
Remove parts of the brain and you remove capabilities of thought. There is a brain damage condition where a person can only see in black and white for example. Certain brain conditions limit how a person can think and function. Thoughts do not exist in some dimension unbound to the physical realm, they are expressions of the physical realm.
Even communication like writing is physical. The words needs to be present in a location where you are. The words do not come unbidden, but through a pen or keyboard. Light beemed over your computer to your eyes.
Intelligence and thoughts are also limited to the bodies they inhabit. "Oh, that's an intelligent crow. That dog isn't very smart is he?" We notice that the complexity of the brain allows complexity of thought. So there are too many examples with what we know that indicate thoughts are tied to physical creatures and not from some other dimension that gets zipped into ours. Even at best, lets say this is what happened. It would still be identifiable as parts in the existent realm like the experience of colors and the thought that I need to fix my roof.
Quoting Bob Ross
Fair enough. That does lead me back to my original question however. Once something is in space and time, even if it has no parts can we zoom in on it and say it has a front, back, and side? Can I say, "that is a section of that indivisible existence?
I do disagree with five, but mostly in the wording. The only thing you can note from your previous premises is that it would necessarily be composed of parts. Saying, "It would not have the power to exist on its own." wasn't built up to by any of the previous premises. How does part composition relate to power? What is it for something to exist on its own, versus exist on something else? Because your previous points lead us to the potential that every part in existence is composed of other parts, but nothing more.
Good discussion Bob!
I assert that its conceptually possible for there to be two distinct extended simples which both lack further proper parts and are numerically distinct being merely separated by the void.
This
The suggestion that an abstract¹ "not concrete" being has a causal property, or causal relation to anything concrete (e.g. is "a first cause"), is a reification fallacy and thereby a misconception of an abstract (i.e. "not concrete") being.
Also, Bob, you (Aristotleans, Thomists & premodern / pseudo-science idealists) assert a false dichotomy: A Third Option in fact, demonstrated by quantum field theory (QFT) to be the case at the planck scale that "composed beings" are effects of a-causal, or randomly fluctuating, events (i.e. excitations of vacuum² energy) as the entire planck-radius³ universe its thermodynamically emergent constituents of "composed concrete beings" happened to be at least c14 billion years ago.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_and_concrete [1]
:smirk: kudos to classical atomists ...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horror_vacui_(physics) [2]
https://simple.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_epoch [3]
A part of something should be a 'real' thing. Not a mere conventional or mental artefact.
The problem with your analysis of consciousness is that you are ignoring the phenomenal nature of it due to it being ontologically grounded in physical things. Hence why when I say a thought is non-spatiotemporal you respond noting that it is grounded in the brain.
Now, phenomenally, you are right that a feeling can be represented as linked to something in space (e.g., the pain in my arm); but the feeling is not itself in space. If you deconstruct, e.g., my arm, then you will surely not find the phenomenal pain which I am describing thereyou will find neurons and such.
That is impossible; for something outside of space has no sides. A side is an inherently spatial conceptno?
Also, zooming in/out is also an inherently spatial concept.
That is true, it wasnt meant to be.
Let me outline a brief argument for 5: lets call it A5. As always, by composed being I am meaning a concretely composed being.
A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, lets call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible.
Good question. For a thing to have the power to exist would be for it to be necessarythat is, not contingent on something else. For if it is contingent on something else, then it only exists insofar as it borrows being from that which it is contingent upon (insofar as we are talking about per se causation).
Did you read the OP? I feel like you didnt read it; because I outlined exactly what I mean by omnipotence and omnibenevolence and they are perfectly compatible with each other.
If the OP is word games, then every argument is a word game. This makes no sense.
Without getting into identity over time, the point is that your body is made up of parts. If you disagree with this, then I cant help you: its painfully obviously true.
That's patently incoherent. You just said that two things exist separately in non-existence (i.e., a void).
I dont see how Im committing a fallacy. God is real, but non-spatiotemporal. You are saying here that anyone who believes in anything non-spatiotemporal that relates to spatiotemporal things is a reification fallacy. So, I guess time itself existing is a reification fallacy?
I am not follow about this, but this sounds like it still has parts unless you are saying it literally remains existing by its smaller parts popping in and out of existenceis that the idea?
I don't think the self is made up of concrete parts: I think it is an emergent property of processes of the brain. Unless you are positing some sort of absolutely simple soul, then I don't think this is any issue for the OP.
A shadow is not a thing its the absence of stuff but its still an aspect nature that we can point out while also not declaring it as a new entity. Are a hole or shadow considered 'objects' in your world view?
If they are then that makes your own viewpoint largely unintuitive when it comes to what people mean by a 'physical thing' and if they are not then its conceptually possible for there to be a significant ontological roles for the mere absence of things.
In asserting the above response to another poster you admitted to the coherence of the notion of God being 'non-spatiotemporal'. I.E. he exists in a fashion similar to other platonic abstractions which is without space as if those things are separated by NOTHING. Add in the ability for these abstractions to exert casual action-at-a-distance and you have atoms with the void.
Extreme forms of eliminative relationism do something similar demanding that fundamentally if space isn't a thing then 'action-at-a-distance' interactions are needed and out of only observable travel times or delays of casual interaction can we say there is a 'distance'.
Yes, I can see how your OP could be read that way.
Quoting Bob Ross
I dont think so. Consider: when someone dies we can transplant their organs into other bodies, but we cannot give them an organ transplant to resuscitate them. For example, a heart transplant requires a living body, and will not work on a body that has only recently died.
Quoting Bob Ross
Well its not Aristotelian (or Thomistic). It misses what Oderberg calls reverse mereological essentialism. Or: yes, it doesnt account for a soul.
Quoting Bob Ross
Do you have references to the places in Aristotle and Feser you are thinking of?
What I would say is that the argument from motion begins with the premise, Things are in motion, and it concludes with an Unmoved Mover. What is unmoved would apparently remain the same through time.
I see your point; but I am thinking that wouldnt the being alive be a result of those parts interacting with each other properly? Viz., if you give a dead person an organ transplant and get their neurons to start firing again and what not then wouldnt they be alive? A part of the physical constitution of a thing is the process which is has (e.g., you can have an engine with all the parts in the right place and yet it isnt burning fuel [i.e., on], but if you know how to start it up then it starts working properly).
Why would we need to posit one for this reverse mereological essentialism?
Here is Ed Feser discussing change: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI starting at 25:15.
Yes, but by motion the medievals and pre-medievals meant any actualization of a potential and not locomotion. If you think about it, this would make sense; since for Aristotle (and Ed Feser) God keeps us in existing right now: they are not arguing merely for a being which started the locomotion at the beginning of the universe (or something like that). That would require this idea of a hierarchical series which is a per se series of composition which is analyzed in terms of what causes each thing to remain the same (e.g., Ed Feser likes to use the example of H20: the atoms that make up that molecule dont themselves have any reason to be H2Osomething else actualizes that and keeps it that way [and its the keeping it that way that seems to break the law of inertia]).
:roll:
knowledge = organized data;
data entails encoding;
encoding entails parts;
Therefore omniscience would entail parts.
Quoting Bob Ross
This seems to be equivalent to argument I've made that there must be a "bottom layer" of reality, This is called metaphysical foundationalism. I agree with it, but...[
Quoting Bob Ross
This is problematic. A being with one property is simpler than a being with multiple properties, even if cannot be decomposed into more fundamental parts.
non-sequitur. Two identical beings could exist, and a set of multiple "simple" beings (no parts) could exist with non-identical properties. Because of this, both of the following are non-sequitur:
This next one is loaded with metaphysical assumptions that I see no reason to accept:
Quoting Bob Ross
This depends on Thomist metaphysics which I see no reason to accept (e.g. that an ontological object can have "actual" and "potency" as intrinsic properties).
Suppose the bottom layer of reality consists of electrons and protons (pretend they are both non-decomposible). Protons would interact with because they have opposite electric charges, and would interact with each other because they have the same charge. Such a scenario seems logically possible - and it's inconsistent with your framework.
A bottom layer of reality seems likely to be quantum based, and I suspect Thomist metaphysics isn't compatible with QM.
Thomist is a theistic metaphysics - Aquinas developed it from Aristotelian metaphysics, in order to make sense of God's existence. So it's unsurprising that it would entail a God. I get the fact that this would appeal to theists, but it has no power to persuade non-theists, unless you succeed in fooling them into treating the metaphysical framework as true.
I appreciate your input, Relativist. Lets see if we can find common ground.
It is vital to understand that omniscience in the pre-medieval sense does not entail a being with knowledge like a person has: God is not a person. Omniscience, rather, in this classical sense, would be knowledge in the sense of apprehending the abstract forms of things (being its first cause). Now this doesnt negate your point per se, but I do need to prefix my response with this.
Now, I would say that I reject that encoding entails that a being must have parts; or that, perhaps, knowledge entails the requirement to encode/decode it. I think you are thinking of something like an AI or human brain, when God is disanalogous to this. God is pure will and being. Willing requires knowledge, but not knowledge necessarily in the sense of computation. In fact, I think that you are right to conclude that a being which computes cannot be absolutely simple.
So, although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that Gods properties are reducible to each other. Pure goodness is the same thing as pure actuality; pure power is the same as pure actuality; and pure actuality is the same as pure willing; and pure willing is the same as volition in correspondence with knowledge.
God doesnt have multiple properties other than analogically.
But then you are saying that two things which are have absolutely no ontological differences are ontologically distinct!
I didnt make an argument from change: I didnt import that part of Thomistic metaphysics. My argument is from the contingency relations of composition.
Also, at least under the notion of mereological nihilism along with an extreme form of relationism you can get both fundamental relations which hold between matter particles, not individual properties but relations, and the claim that the notion of a composed being is. . . well. . . nonsense as atoms never compose anything. Its merely our linguistic and mental laziness that we appeal to ordinary language acts talking about 'objects' being composed by others. In fact, there are no such ordinary objects only the fundamental simples together with their external mutually dependent relations.
So you assume some magical sort of knowledge is metaphysically possible in order to prove there exists a being who has it. Circular reasoning.
Quoting Bob Ross
More circular reasoning.
Quoting Bob Ross
I'm referring to identical intrinsic properties. Example: the elementary particles. Every up-quark is identical to every other, except in its external relations to other particles, and they're certainly ontologically distinct.
Quoting Bob Ross
So what? You made assumptions that would entail a God. To be effective as an argument, you would need to use mutually agreed premises. You're just rationalizing something you already believe.
Quoting Bob Ross
Isn't it though? When I feel a pain in my arm, isn't it there? When I feel happy, doesn't it spread through my body? If I feel, I don't feel in the other room, I have feelings where I am. Using the term phenomenal does not deny that feelings are located in our body and not outside of them.
Quoting Bob Ross
True, but if something non-spatial is to interact with something spatial, it must at that moment of interaction become spatial. A purely non-spatial being cannot interact with space. Saying it can is the same as saying a unicorn exists. Maybe one does, but I can't see how we can logically prove it does and can be dismissed as a valid possibility.
Quoting Bob Ross
I believe we're discussing this in the other thread now, but once you introduce the possibility of something capable of existing itself, you open the doors open to anything being possible.
No worries, and sorry for the belated response on my end!
What I am saying is that they are not in space like objects: if you cut open your arm, you will not find this feeling that is spread throughout your body. You are right that feelings can have spatial references to them, but they are not in space; for you would be able to find them in space like your neurons if that were the case.
Why? Whats the argument for that? Do you think everything, or at least everything that can interact with ordinary objects, is in space and time then? What kind of metaphysics of time and space are you working with here?
We have no solid evidence that a unicorn exists, but if we did then we would be justified in believing it. The problem Im having is that you are not contending with the argument in the OP, but instead are asserting that non-spatiotemporal beings cannot interact with spatiotemporal oneswhats the argument for that?
So this is the same as saying that if it is possible for something to be necessary, then anything is possible. Why?
Circular reasoning is when a premise presupposes the conclusion as true: I didnt do that. Also, why would it have to be magical?
Just think about how you will, and how this willingeven without what we stereotypically refer to as rational deliberationis correspondence with at least primitive knowledge. Think of a plant growing towards the sunlight. I am just noting that we can seeby analogyhow a being can have knowledge and yet not be computating like a human brain or AI would.
You clearly dont know what circular reasoning is
This argument necessitates that an up-quark is not comprised of anything else and is non-spatiotemporal. Ok. But then there would be only one since theres nothing ontologically distinguishing them. What you are doing is talking about separate quarks and thinking that since they are simple that they are absolutely simple.
Now, I understand they say quarks have no parts in science, but I dont take that literally; as they used to say atoms were like that. Scientifically, we posit things as absolutely simple for the sake of science until we discover smaller parts. Philosophically, we can know that it is impossible for there to be a thing ontologically distinguishable from another thing which has no parts. That is absurd.
I was an atheist before this style of argumentation found its way onto my desk; so, you are grossly making assumptions here. Every premise is pretty clear and follows from what has been said (albeit a psuedo-syllogism).
Like I said before, the argument is on ontological parts. That could be in time and space or not; it doesn't matter to me. Some of the OP would have to be adjusted though, but I think most people are realists about space and time (so I'll leave it how it is).
Here's what I inferred to be your reasoning:
1.God is omniscient (possesses all possible knowledge)
2. God is simple;
3. Therefore knowledge doesn't entail parts
But you didn't explicitly make this argument, so I haven't been fair. Perhaps you can show it's very reasonable to assume knowledge does not entail parts. Please do so.
Quoting Bob Ross
You've identified no "primitive knowledge" that exists independent of a physical medium. My willing entails physical processes (e.g. neurons firing in a sequence based on action potentials that could be established either by learning, or be "hard wired") in a brain. Deliberation entails access to memories which are stored in the brain (possibly in the form of action potentials of neurons). A plant certainly isn't making a decision - it's growth is entirely a result of its physiological mechanisms, expending energy in the most entropically favorable way.
I claimed there was circular reasoning in your statement,"although you are right that a being with one property is simpler than a being with more than one; my rebuttle is that Gods properties are reducible to each other." And you're correct that you haven't stated a strictly circular argument (I'm making an assumption that you chose to equate multiple properties with a single property to rationalize your claim that God is "simple") You've given no argument at all, and haven't articulated the rationalization I assumed. So I can certainly be wrong.
So make an objective case for the claim that an object with seemingly multiple properties is actually an object with a single property in your ontology, and show that this is more reasonable than considering multiple properties to be distinct. To be clear, I'm referring to intrinsic properties, not just attributes we talk about.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, it doesn't. It just assumes individual up-quarks exist as particulars, and that (generically) "up-quark" is a universal (it exists in multiple instantiations). Perhaps that's inconsistent with your ontology, but that's my point: your argument depends on some specific assumptions about ontology.
Quoting Bob Ross
Individual up-quarks are distinguishable at a point of time by their spatial location. It's persisting identity is uniquely identified by it's location in space across each point of time. (Locations in space are relative, but in this case, we can consider it relative to itself).
Regarding "being simple": I'm simply assuming they are not decomposible into other things. If you wish to equate undecomposible with "simple" - I have no objection.
Quoting Bob Ross
Then you have an incorrect understanding. They are part of the standard model of particle physics, which is an active field of research. I'm not insisting they are actually the most fundamental level of reality (quantum field theory treats them as disturbances in fields), but all macro objects in the universe have quarks as part of their composition.
Quoting Bob Ross
Ed Feser was also an atheist, and he says he converted because Thomist metaphsyics "made sense" to him. I've read a couple of his books, and these suggest that he just thinks Thomism is coherent and answers the questions he felt important. I haven't seen him make a case for Thomism vs (say) metaphysical naturalism (his polemical attack on "new atheists" is irrelevant).
I've admitted that I've made assumptions. They're based on the assumptions I've seen others (including Feser) make when arguing for deism. In all my years debating arguments for deism with theists, I've found that 100% of the time, they depend on questionable metaphysical assumptions - so when I see a debatable metaphysical assumption, I shine a light on it. But I'll try to avoid jumping to conclusions with you, and give you the opportunity to make an objective case for each of the metaphysical assumptions I've identified so far.
Further, the notions of part and whole are abstracted from things we acknowledge in no fashion are themselves part-less so the notion of a true 'whole' might not actually be coherent given there are no natural examples one could give it. Same as the notion of space or time which many rightfully acknowledge as mere idealizations. The notion of a part also presumes another thing that it is a part of which many positions also deny level by level such eliminative materialism or mereological nihilism.
Why don't you give me an example of a REAL THING THAT IS A WHOLE without parts so I can then assess whether nature does or doesn't abhor it. Simple, we can solve this and move on.
In fact, your arguments seem to be lacking phenomenological definitions or postulates regarding where we get these concepts or how they are formed. As well as further epistemological principles to motivate their coherency and what I presume is an unsupported un-naturalized form of metaphysics that you are indulging in.
Finally, I feel you'd need to solve the problem of how one can make strong proclamations about a world merely from the arm-chair. Metaphysics as a discipline and its focus on certain methods from a-prior reasoning to thought experiments have gotten their own criticism extensively in recent times.
But you feel them in space. You feel them in a place. You might experience red, but that's due to the red wavelength of light being interpreted by your brain. Just because I can't open up the brain and see redness doesn't mean the objective form of redness doesn't exist through neurons. Same with feelings.
Quoting Bob Ross
The definition of interaction is a touch from one thing to another. To my mind I know no other definition.
Quoting Bob Ross
Again, I don't know of any definition of interaction that is not some connection and imparting between two things. If you say the universe comes from a God, then in some way that God must have imparted upon space and time. To say it cannot have any space or time, then say it can interact with space and time, is either a contradiction, or something that has never been discovered before like a unicorn.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, something being necessary has to be clearly defined here. A -> B, A is necessary for B to exist. But that doesn't mean that it was necessary that A exist. Anytime you get to a point in which there is something which has no prior causation for its being, then it is outside of causality. Once you introduce the concept of something that can exist outside of causality, you introduce the fact that anything could have, or will, happen. That is because something outside of causality has no reason for its being, and no reason that it should not be either. Thus all things are equally possible.
Well, suppose life is just the result of an accidental collection, such that when the parts are in place there is life. So as an analogy, if my jigsaw puzzle is complete, then there is life. If I take away one piece or another, then there is not life. On this view life is somehow structural.
For Aristotle you need more than just parts. You need a whole. And maybe "parts interacting with each other properly" is enough to represent that whole.
Your engine counterargument is interesting, though. Certainly Aristotle would say that the car is an artificial whole, not a real or organic whole. What this means in part is that the parts are not just interacting with one another. They are interacting with a whole of which they are a part. This is why we say, "I see with my eyes. I walk with my legs. I punch with my fist. I think with my brain." The parts are relating to some whole that is employing them and on which they rely.
Quoting Bob Ross
:up:
So it is something like the actualization involved in the normal force that upholds a desk on the floor, which is more than what we think of as change or motion. Gotcha, that makes sense.
Quoting Bob Ross
Okay, I have a better sense of what you are saying now.
We are talking about if they are in spacenot if you feel them in space.
Ok, then you are using the term interaction much more strictly than I was. E.g., the gravitational pull of the sun on the earth is an interaction (in a looser sense) without there being touch.
Yes, that is true; and I am saying you havent demonstrated why it is incoherent to believe that something outside of space and time cannot have some connection with things which are spatiotemporal. You just keep blanketly asserting it; and this sort of interaction does not imply physical touch (as seen above in my sun example).
This is a straw man. We have no evidence that a unicorn exists and it would blatantly defy physics: nothing about God is analogous to that.
Material implication does not create a biconditional: A ? B just means that when A is true, then B is true as wellit does not mean that when B is true A must be true.
I am glad you said this, because this was what I was going to point out in the other thread discussion we are having, as I wasnt sure if you agreed or not. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior causation for its being; so, by your own logic, it resides outside of the totality of causal things (viz., outside of causality). Your argument in your OP you said is arguing that there is no cause for the totality of causal things and that a first cause would be in that totality; but this contradicts what you just said above.
If I feel them in space, aren't they in that space? When I prick my finger, I feel the pain locally to the wound, not in my foot. Its not some other dimension. The most simple way of understanding that is that pain is tied to places in time and space.
Quoting Bob Ross
Good point actually, I hadn't considered that! My understanding though is that gravity is a bending of space from matter. So there is some interaction at the touch point of matter that spreads out. We still don't know how it all works though, so this is a pretty good approach to the idea of indirect touch. Still, gravity originates at a point in time and space, so we still don't have a good example of something outside of time and space.
Quoting Bob Ross
Can you give an example of how a being outside of time and space creating existence would work? We can invent any combination of words and concepts we desire. The only way to know if these words and concepts can exist outside of our imagination is to show them being applied accurately to reality. This is the point of the unicorn mention. There is nothing that proves the concept of a unicorn is incoherent. A magical horse with a horn that cannot be sensed in anyway passes as a logical amalgamation in the mind. But its impossible to demonstrate it exists in reality, therefore its not a sound concept to use when talking about reality.
The same with an entity that does not exist in time and space. If I were to say a unicorn uses its magic to keep the world rotating, this is again not necessarily incoherent, there's just no way to show this exists. The same with saying a being outside of time and space interacted with and created time and space. You've invented a being that cannot be shown to exist that did something which violated the currently known laws of time and space or 'magic'.
Quoting Bob Ross
True, but we're talking about causation. You're telling me an A exists and creates a B by essentially magic. You haven't shown that A must necessarily exist for B to exist, so you need something more to show that A can exist and must exist.
Quoting Bob Ross
Correct, its formation would be outside of causality. However, what it caused next would be within causality. The issue here is not that the being you describe is impossible. The point here is that once such a being formed, how do we reconcile that the universe necessarily came from this being? At that point we need causality, and we need some explanation for how A caused B. This is of course if we're trying to prove that A is a necessary existence for B to be. If we're just saying, "Its an option", I have no qualm with this as anything imaginable and beyond could be an option.
I apologize for the belated response: I intended to respond earlier but got busy and forgot.
I dont see anything unreasonable about this argument. You seem to be noting that all the examples we have of beings with knowledge also have parts: that is true. However, this does not entail that a being could not exist which has knowledge and doesnt have parts. The problem I have is that you are presupposing that a being with knowledge must have parts without giving any sort of argumentation for that.
That is why God is attributedor more accurately just isthese properties analogically. I am not claiming that God has, e.g., a will the same as ours.
You seem to be doing a literal equivocation between the usages of these properties when the OP is outlining analogical equivocationnothing more.
I was using it as an example of willing in a more primitive sense: the plant is willingjust not in the sense of willing like a human.
Thats still not what circular reasoning is! Even if I ad hoc rationalized my position by saying Gods properties are identical, that would not imply that I am presupposing the truth of the conclusion in a premise.
If the OP succeeds, then we know there is an absolutely simple being with these attributes (insofar as we analogize it); and so it follows that this beings attributes must be literally identical. God cannot be said to have omniscience or be omnipotent but, rather, is omniscience or is omnipotence; for an absolutely simple being cannot have parts and to have literally separate properties is to imply a thing has partsa simple being is one and the same with itself with no real distinctions.
I am not sure what you mean by intrinsic properties, but assuming you mean something like properties a thing has independently of what we say it has then I would say God has no properties: thats the whole point of being absolutely simple.
Think about it: how can a being which has no parts exist as a particular? That would imply that it has some property which is distinct from any others of that particular; and this implies it has parts (for no absolutely simple thing can have properties propersince it is literally one thing with no distinctions). What I am trying to get you to see, is that this philosophically makes no sense even if we posit it for the sake of sciencejust as much as the square root of -1 is not a real number but we use it in math anyways.
That is a property that one has that the other doesnt; which implies it has parts. Likewise, anything in space and time is infinitely divisible, which implies that all spatiotemporal things are made up of parts.
Moreover, yes, I do not see any contradiction with the idea that a composed being which is spatiotemporal must be infinitely divisible and yet ontologically be comprised ultimately by one singular non-spatiotemporal thing. (:
Sure, but we also thought atoms were absolutely simple and it was very attractive at the time. Science uses models to map realityirregardless if the model is actually true.
HI,
A simple thing by itself does not constitute a whole. Therefore, in order to constitute a whole, the simple thing must subordinate itself to the composition of the whole in order to function as a constituent thing.
In this sense the simple thing becomes ontologically dependent on the parts and the whole. We must remember that we are speaking of parts and the whole. Therefore it can be said that a simple thing is contingent upon the whole of parts since otherwise we could not explain any mereological function of the simple thing.
In order to relate the contingent to the necessary the necessary must be part in a relation. This is the dialectic of the master and slave seen in Hegel. The master needs the recognition of the slave in order to be master, which reduces him to a slave of recognition itself.
Quoting Bob Ross As regards 'i', that is how all of philosophy including your own is constructed. You make something up and see if it makes intuitive sense or if its unintuitive how might you still intuitively motivate it.
Philosophy is about extensive creativity and making stuff up without any requirement that it have anything to do with reality.
This is why people have invented the notion of haecceitism contrary to your own personal feelings regarding it as unintuitive.
Quoting Bob Ross This is another thing lacking from your posts or the OP which is any clarification on the proper metaphysical/philosophical approach to using metaphor and analogy.
The ability to say that a thing has 'parts' or is a 'whole' only make sense relative to the experiences of things we have in declaring things from birth as 'made of parts' or as 'a continuum'. However, are we actually in fact stretching this experiential analogy too far?
In fact, whenever I have said something is taken as a 'whole' or as a 'singular thing' I am in fact actually merely admitting my ignorance or mental inability to declare in clear terms all its parts. Not that it doesn't have any parts at all.
WHOLE - defined as - as assertion meant to regard a multitude of things as a singular thing. Despite the fact that it isn't in fact a singular thing.
To say that the part is subordinate to the whole is to admit that the whole is real and independent of the parts; and I am not willing to accept that (I dont think). It seems like, to me, parts make up wholes.
Thats different, I would say, because Hegel is talking about relations between two different beings (e.g., master and slave, individual and society, etc.) and NOT the composition of beings themselves. To say the whole influences the part is to accept some kind of realism about forms that I am now hesitant to admit.
No. Again, you cannot locate the pain in your finger in a literal sense. You are confusing the spatial reference in the phenomena of pain with the physical constitution of it.
My point is just that interactioncausationis not strictly about physical touch. E.g., convincing someone to do something with mere words, electromagnetism, etc.
Of course not! It is impossible for humans to discuss in any substantive sense a thing which is non-spatiotemporal because we cognize in space and time. Also, it is worth nothing that if this OP succeeds, then this beingGodis uniquely in this position to create things from the standpoint of eternity .so asking for a different example is an impossible task.
I provided a proof of the existence of such a being in the OP. What you are asking is for, beyond a proof of its existence, an complete understanding of its nature; and I dont think that is possible.
Yes there is; but lets assume you are right: the difference is that the OP demonstrates why God existsit does not merely claim that the concept of God is internally coherent.
This is just a straw man; for the OP gives an argument for how we can prove God exists from empirical dataso this is not analogous to an undetectable unicorn.
No, the OP is saying that B is composed fundamentally by A; and A is such that it must be the ultimate cause of B existing. I am not claiming to know how A is able to subsistently keep things in existence nor how it creates them. I dont know how anyone could know that.
Again, you keep saying that any interaction between non-spatiotemporal and spatiotemporal things is magic without any argumentation: you are just making an argument from ignorance. Likewise, I dont believe you even believe this, because I think you would agree that physics has shown that space and time are not fundamental; so there must be things which are not in space and time which influences things within them.
Correct. So, going back to your OP, it cannot be that this is the same as an infinite series of causality which has no cause: that series having no cause cannot be equivocated with a first cause to a series (which is outside of it).
A reconcilation implies that there is an incoherence, and you still havent demonstrated any incoherence. You keep blanketly asserting that ~I dont see how it could happen, therefore magic or ~I dont think any of us knows how that works, so it must be impossible or incoherent.
A causing B does not entail that A is caused; so theres nothing incoherent going on here. A necessary being causing something contingent does not entail that it is contingent on that contingent thing.
That is something that does not follow from what I have said. I have said that a simple thing must subordinate itself to the whole in order to acquire its mereological function as a constituent simple thing. Which is obvious because something is not constituent of a whole before the creation of the whole: a piece of rock, the simplest and most indivisible, does not form a whole until it is related to other pieces of rock and forms a satellite. This makes the simple thing contingent on the whole and the relations in which it participates.
My argument debates the necessity, constitutive and superior level/role of simple and indivisible things. I show that, paradoxically, the simple and indivisible thing must subordinate itself to the whole (being contingent) in order to express its higher level with respect to other (lower order) things.
In other words: How does god relate to the world if it is only by forming a whole with the world (pantheism)? An absolutely simple thing cannot enter into relation with the world, because it would be, so to speak, too pure to subordinate itself to a relation that assigns to it its constituent function (superior level of thing) . Just as in Hegel the master must subordinate himself to the relation and to the slave in order to show his superiority, wich means the Master is not a pure and absolute Master.
There is a problem with the argument I stated: it assumes God exists. To then use the conclusion to support an argument for God's existence entails the circularity I was referring to. It's irrelevant whether or not you agree there's circular reasoning involved; I'm just explaining why I said that.
You brought up the fact that it's possible knowledge can exist without parts or complexity. This points to the fundamental problem with your argument.
Any reasonable person should agree that God's existence (and omniscience) is logically possible, without needing your argument to show that. The question is whether or not the argument in your Op provides good reason to think it's more than merely possible. Consider that it's possible that physicalism is true: would you consider an argument for physicalism compelling if it's premises were based on entailments of physicalism?
Since you're presenting an argument, you have the burden of defending your premises. In particular, you'd need to show that all your premises are sufficiently probable that the conclusion (God exists) gains some warrant (i.e. more justified; gaining some epistemic probability) beyond being merely possible. If your premises only seem possible, then your conclusion is still only possible- you won't move the needle of belief one bit.
Quoting Bob Ross
You're rationalizing your theistic framework, not making a compelling argument. I described the way knowledge (and willing) exists in the real world - there is a physical basis. You're doing no more than asserting its logically possible that knowledge and will can exist without a physical medium. You need to show it's sufficiently plausible to remove it as a barrier to accepting the soundness of your argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
My key point is that you've given no reason to think multiple properties is equivalent to a single property. It seems like a logical contradiction, like saying "6=1", which would mean your argument is unsound. But even if you could show it's logically possible, but that still just makes your conclusion logically possible - no headway.
Quoting Bob Ross
This just shows that your argument depends on a specific ontological model. You have the burden of showing this is better ontological model than the one I'm most familiar with. And if you can't, then you need to accept that your argument is pointless - it does no more than show that God's existence is logically possible, which is exactly where we are without the argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
Every particular has at least one part. Everything that exists is a particular: a quark, a galaxy, the universe, and even the totality of existence. Anything we can point to, or assign a label to, is a particular. But I'm not debating who's metaphysical theory is better (although I'd be willing to, in another thread). I'm just pointing out that your argument depends on your preferred metaphysical system being true- so for the argument to be compelling, you have the burden of showing your metaphysical system is likely to be true - at least the axioms you depend on in your argument. Again, if your many assumptions are only possible, then your argument is pointless.
Quoting Bob Ross
It's a relational property, not an intrinsic property. Again: we're applying different metaphysical assumptions.
Quoting Bob Ross
Irrelevant. I believe there has to be a bottom layer of reality, consisting of indivisible objects. You should at least agree this is logically possible- that's all I've claimed. I'm not the one claiming to prove something.
They refer to extension and temporality respectively: they are pure intuitionsthere is no way to define that properly, no different than defining the color blue.
This is a baseless assertion.
Philosophy is the objective study of wisdom.
Good one! For how could that negligible monad act like a mind?
In succession due does the large give way and rule
To the ever smaller, the tiny, the minuscule,
And onto the insignificant awol
Of not really much of anything there at all.
It presupposes that we are talking about an absolutely simple beingthats it. You asked about how an absolutely simple being could have properties (like omniscience) which presupposes in the very question that we are talking about such a being.
The argument I was commenting on was your argument, which was:
This argument you gave is not circular: it does not presuppose the conclusion in any of its premises. Likewise, my OPs argument never presupposes Gods existence as a premisenot even in part.
It is logically possible because it violates nothing in logic; it is actually possible because it violates nothing in physics; and it is metaphysically possible because it does not violate the natures of things.
The problem is that you are saying it is impossible; and that requires that you demonstrate why it violates one of these three aforesaid modalities (or pick your own modality if you will).
First of all, this negates your first point, because you are implying that the OP gives good reasons to believe that is possible (which you said was problematic before).
The OP doesnt argue for the possibility of Gods existence: it argues that God does exist.
That depends on what you mean by entailments of physicalism. Every argument comes in with metaphysical assumptions: I dont think physicalism is any different in this regard. What I would do is provide counter arguments to the premises that I disagree with and perhaps for the assumptions that I disagree with so that I could have a productive conversation with them.
In this OP, it is demonstrated that it is possible for a being to not have parts and have knowledge only insofar as it was demonstrated that an absolutely simple being exists and that it must apprehend the forms of things (in abstracta).
Someone could come around and offer a rejoinder that we have good reasons to believe that a being which has knowledge must have parts; and I am more than happy to entertain that. However, my problem with you is that the closest argument I have gotten from you for this is essentially:
P1. If every example we have of A requires B, then A always requires B.
P2. Every example we have of a being with knowledge has parts (which facilitate its capacity to know).
C: Therefore, A being with knowledge must have parts.
I deny P1. Impossibilityin whichever modality we are referring tois demonstrated by showing that the existence of the thing would entail a violation of that mode (e.g., it is actually impossible to jump to the moon from earth because it violates physics, it is logically impossible for a proposition to be both true and false because it violates the LNC, etc.). That we dont have any other examples of a thing, does not entail that it is impossible for it to exist.
This is also a cop-out, because this absolutely simple being is unique: so there literally cant be other examples!
Give me the premise you are disagreeing with! Your critiques have not been about any of my premises: you are noting that you believe we have separate good reasons to believe something that is incompatible with the conclusion of the OP.
Thats not how arguments work. Either one agrees with the premise or they dont. To say it is possible that the premise is true is trivial to most arguments: that just means it is a proposition.
I am explaining to you how this being has no properties proper; and that just because we have no examples of something other than itself, it does not follow that it cannot exist.
What premise do you deny in the OP? The argument is pretty clear.
Ah, yes, I have not; because they arent multiple properties and I have been focusing on getting you to see the issues with your critiques before trying to explain in detail how these analogical properties of Gods are identical with himself. Ill do that once we find common ground with the above.
A part is something that makes up the whole; so it cannot be identical to the whole; and your argument here assumes that they can be identical. A part that is identical to the whole is not a part: it is just the itself.
Thats fine, as long as you explain what you mean by your terminology.
Literally every argument for anything is guilty of this: that is a trivial note and I never argued to the contrary.
Ehhh, it might be logically possible; but it is definitely not actually possible.
Quoting Bob Ross
The typical purpose of an argument is to change minds. A good argument might lead to someone fully accepting the conclusion, but even if it just results pushing someone in that direction, you've succeeded in making headway that you could potentially amplify with more arguments.
Do you not have such a purpose in mind? If not, why did you bother? I'll address your other issues under the assumption you are hoping to have some success, but if this is incorrect - we won't need to go much further.
Quoting Bob Ross
By presenting an argument, I will have assumed the burden of proof. You would, of course, reject premises that you disagree with, but you wouldn't have the burden to prove me wrong. I would have the burden to prove to you my premises are true.
Quoting Bob Ross
You're reversing the burden of proof. You have it because you presented an argument. I explained why I reject your premise, and your response was that it's possible.
Quoting Bob Ross
Wrong. The argument I stated explicitly referred to God.
Quoting Bob Ross
My position is that it is most likely metaphysically impossible and I explained why. How is that a problem? You've given me no reason to think otherwise. You embraced the argument I created, suggesting to me that you choose to believe omniscience can be held by a simple being because you "know" God is omniscient and simple. I acknowledged it's logically possible, but possibility is cheap. You need to provide a compelling reason to think it is metaphysically possible. I have no burden to convince you of anything.
Quoting Bob Ross
You presuppose a theistic metaphysics.
Quoting Bob Ross
It is physically impossible to store complex data without parts. It is metaphysically impossible if physicalism is true. To be metaphysically possible would require making some metaphysical assumption that simply ignores the intrinsic complexity of information- making the assumption far-fetched.
Quoting Bob Ross
I never suggested you were arguing for the possibility of God, but I'm pointing out that it only does that if it is sound: all the premises need to be true - including the unstated ones. You can't show all the premises are necessarily true. A more realistic goal would be that you could make a compelling case for soundness by supporting each premise.
Quoting Bob Ross
8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 - not sure of, 18, 20 21, 23, 27, 28, 34. I also disagree with the inferences in 11,14, 19, 24, 29, 31 32, 35, 38,
39, 41, and 42 because they are based on false premises.
In short, I disagree with your entire metaphysical framework. I chose to focus on omniscience and simplicity because it was impractical to discuss everything.
Quoting Bob Ross
Per my metaphysical framework, all existing objects have properties, so it follows from this that it cannot exist. You have the burden of showing your metaphysical framework is correct, or at least showing it's better than mine. Coincidentally, I've outlined it on another forum. It's in 3 parts:
https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-i-the-scientific-method/
https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-2-a-naturalist-metaphysical-theory/
https://knowwhyyoubelieve.org/groups/reasonable-faith-forum/forum/topic/metaphysical-naturalism-part-3-why-its-the-best-answer/
Quoting Bob Ross
I never said they could be identical. I said two objects could have the same intrinsic properties. The properties that distinguish two electrons are their differing extrinsic properties, such as their location in space, bonds to other particles, etc.
Quoting Bob Ross
I said essentially the same thing in my first post: every argument depends on questionable metaphysical assumptions. Since you more or less agree, why bother presenting it? (This gets back to my first point of this post). The fundamental disagreement is the metaphysical framework. Everything else is entailment.
Blue is difficult to define. . . but it has to do with certain brain states, wavelengths of light, biological/physical interactions, consciousness, etc.
Time and space are difficult to define because they overlap with numerous unrelated conceptual cousins that you may not be concerned with: Such as operational/instrumental definitions of spacetime, definitions from the phenomenology of experience, metaphysical definitions making use of a plethora of metaphors, physicist definitions of spacetime, casual theories of spacetime, other assortments of constructive definitions of spacetime, etc.
The literature is deep but your response clearly was not. So try again.
Quoting Bob Ross Its an opinion of mine, sure.
Quoting Bob Ross Define wisdom. . .
My only quibble is to discard premise 6. I don't think it is necessary and actually I think premise 7 depends on premises 3 and 5, not 3 and 6.
That is to say, physically, we may be constituted by an infinite series, but as you said, such a series cannot existon its own.
In my view the simple thing, at the end of the series of composition is contingent upon the whole in terms of ratio cognoscendi:
"A simple thing by itself does not constitute a whole. Therefore, in order to constitute a whole, the simple thing must subordinate itself to the composition of the whole in order to function as a constituent thing."
This means that retroactively the whole (the parts) explains the simple thing that composes it qua superior explainer. Which in turn makes the simple thing contingent to the whole.
The counter-argument would be as follows
1. The composite things (the whole) exist contingently to their parts in order to be explained.
2. The simple thing at the end of the series of composition is, retroactively, contingent to the whole wich explains the cognoscendi superiority of the simple thing.
3. God cannot be contingent on anything (the whole), therefore we cannot relate a simple thing in a chain of composition to God.
I think the original argument can be revised with some small adjustments so that the simple that the composed relies on is external to that composition and not a part of it.
My purpose is, indeed, to sway minds and to hear critiques of my position; but my point was that you were invalidly implying that my premises in the OP are proven merely as possibilities, which makes no sense. Every premise of every argument that is a proposition is possible (in some mode of thought); and so this is trivially true.
I dont have the burden of proof to demonstrate how knowledge can exist in something absolutely simple: like I said before, the OP demonstrates that knowledge must exist in something absolutely simplenot how that happens.
Yes, that is true; but that God being imported in was just the absolutely simple being I was referring to before.
Thats fine, and I think, for what it is worth, is a reasonable rejoinder. My point is that it sidesteps the discussion.
Think about it, if you are right that a being with knowledge cannot be absolutely simple; then one of my premises in the OPwhich does not argue for how it worksmust be false; but yet you have never once pointed to what premise or premises that is or are.
It is right here:
First of all, what is complex data? That suggests that there is a sort of simple data that can be stored without parts (:
Secondly, I agree that it is physically impossible...that just means it cannot happen in accordance with things governed by physics. God is beyond physics.
I understand what you are saying, and I see that the idea of knowledge being imparted to an absolutely simple being epistemically counts against the theory for you; but thats too many premises for me to talk in one response! Pick one, and we will dive in.
I already demonstrated this is false. This is non sequitur: you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. Thats illogical. Impossibility is a mode of thought whereby something violates some principle determinable relative to that mode. Lacking examples is not a violation of that mode.
Which, again, makes them non-simple.
Because that is nonsense. That could be posited for every argument for everything: do you say why bother for everything else?
A scientific definition of blueness is not a valid definition of blueness. I does not account for the phenomenal property of blue: see Marys room thought experiment.
Heres a quote of myself that elaborates on that:
I completely agree. I realized, after making this argument, that I am really just arguing:
P1. Reality is either an infinite series of contingent beings or a series that contains at least one necessary being.
P2. Reality as an infinite series of contingent beings cannot exist (for each member lacks the ability to subsistently exist).
C: Therefore, reality must contain at least one necessary being.
Then we can determine it is one, absolutely simple, purely actual, etc. in the same manner.
I also realized that I am committed to the idea that there are infinite series of contingent beings because I believe that the representation of objects in space and timeby our brainsindicates (or at least suggests) that each object is infinitely divisible into smaller parts.
Very true.
Then dont put up such an asanine argument with so many obnoxiously annoying parts that you know is Bull...
Fact is faith isn't knowing a damn thing about God's existence as real or false ... that's how it works -- let it go and focus your energy elsewhere. The only logic you need is "God is real." Anything less shows you doubt...
The preoccupation with arguments for God only speaks to a lack of faith. Faith drives religion, not logic. And the benefits of faith are the biggest gains from religion, no? If you want to believe in God, do it, anyone who wants to stop you is just jealous you can achieve such a level of faith honestly.
This response was merely a random rant that introduced nothing substantive into the conversation.
Your premises aren't "proven" at all: you made no case for them. We agree they are possibly true (logical possibility), but your propositions (at least the ones I identified) are also [U]possibly false[/u]. Therefore the conclusion is possibly true and possibly false. You agreed your purpose is to sway minds, so you need more than possibility.
Think more granularly than possible/impossible. Instead consider there's an epistemic probability (P) to any statement. It's subjective and somewhat vague, but it relates to levels of certainty.
Each premise has a probability: pn is the probability of premise n. C = the conclusion, P(C) is the probability of the conclusion:
P(C)=p1& p2 &p3 &...&pn
Which implies:
P(C)= p1*p2*p3...*pn
Probabilities are <=1, so P(C) is <= the probability of each individual proposition..
Where P(G) = the prior subjective epistemic probability of God's existence (i.e. prior to encountering your argument). You said your propose was to sway a person with your argument, so that means convincing him that P(C) > P(G). Your "burden" is to succeed at that.
Quoting Bob Ross
Your argument depends on the unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts. So it's included in the P(C) equation. So you have the burden of convincing someone that P(knowledge can be present without parts) is sufficiently high to produce a conclusion (C) such that P(C)>P(G). "Can be" = metaphysically possible, but we apply epistemic judgement to proposed metaphysical theories and axioms. More on this below.
Quoting Bob Ross
It's the unstated premise I pointed out above. The probability of unstated premises is just as relevant to P(C) as the stated ones.
Quoting Bob Ross
So another unstated premise is: physicalism is false.
Even if physicalism is false, my intuitions are grounded in what I know about the world- and that includes the intuition that knowledge =organized data, data is encoded, and this entails complexity. I judge it a small probability (<.1) that knowledge can exist without parts. Your defense is just an assertion that my intuitions don't apply because it's not physical. That seems equivalent to saying it's magical, and magic can account for anything. That has no effect on my judgement.
You mentioned "simple data". The simplest data is a bit (value is 0 or 1). Knowing this would require at least one part: the bit. Conceivably, there could exist a being with 1 bit of knowledge. I don't see how a being could know the value without, in some sense, having this encoded as a bit of data.
You asked: "what is complex data"? The data is propositions (more precisely: some metaphysical grounding for those propositions). You refer to each thing's "form", which strikes me as a lot of bits of information. The complexity comes from the logical relations within this information.
Quoting Bob Ross
I choose your unstated premise that knowledge can be present without parts, If that unstated premise is false, then your step 21 is false. In terms of probability, P(#21) <= P(knowledge can be present without parts).
Quoting Bob Ross
Your "demonstration" depends on Thomist metaphysics being true. You could only possibly show my statement is false by falsifying my metaphysical framework (or at least showing that Thomist metaphysics is superior), because my statement is an axiom of my framework. IMO, my framework is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to explain all uncontroversial facts, and it's more parsimonious than alternatives. That justifies my belief in it. It's the basis of my epistemic judgement. I'll add that I'm not certain of my metaphysical theory, but I think it's more likely than not (P>.6).
[Quote]you cannot say that something is impossible because we have no example of it. Thats illogical[/quote]
Given my metaphysics, it is trivially metaphysically impossible. Here's a snippet of the theory that establishes what I said:
[I]Existence consists of the objects that exist, and the relations between them. I will use these terms interchangeably: object=thing=existent=particular=State of Affairs (SOA)
State of Affairs is the most meaningful descriptor because it refers to the structure of objects/things/existents/particulars. A state of affairs has 3 types of constituents: a thin particular, its intrinsic properties, and its relations (AKA relational properties AKA extrinsic properties).
Objects do not exist without properties, and properties do not exist unattached to objects. Properties exist in their instantiations. Example: the -1 electric charge exists as a property that all electrons have. The -1 electric charge does not exist independently. Now consider an electron: the -1 charge is intrinsic; any object that lacks a -1 charge is necessarily something other than an electron. [/I]
You could falsify the theory by identifying an object that can't fit the "state of affairs" model. But as you implied, there are no examples of such things. My theory is coherent, has sufficient explanatory power to account for all uncontroversial facts, and does so parsimoniously. It's unparsimonious to add another sort of existent based solely on it being logically possible. Possibilities are endless.
Quoting Bob Ross
That may be so in your metaphysics, but not in mine. In mine, an atomic state of affairs with 1 intrinsic property is as simple as an object can be. But nothing precludes there existing multiple objects with that same, single intrinsic property. What would distinguish them are their relations (extrinsic properties). I've said this multiple times, but you repeatedly dismiss it. Your basis is Thomism. That's sufficient justification for you, but has no persuasive power for a non-Thomist. You would need to falsify my metaphysical axiom directly, or show my metaphysical system is incoherent.
Here is another way of arguing for premise 5 from the original argument:
1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.
A composition dependence cannot go to infinity of its own power.
Those have to serve as a part of the conceptual foundation of the concept of blue even if they do not exhaust it.
THAT IS WHY I LISTED CONSCIOUSNESS after you all those SCARY science terms and left in the phrase ETC!
It seems your philosophical views are clouding you judgements here.
I object that you are turning a mathematical question into ontology here
Ok say matter has the potential to be divided endlessly. Why must this prove that matter ends in a supernatural mind? Why is this the only explanation? Can calculus offer some light? Can modern physics?
Also, how familiar are you with Kant's second Antimony?
Perhaps.
Quoting Gregory
Whether matter is infinitely composite (and similarly whether or not it is infinitely divisible) or not, anything composite requires a composer. Maybe something composite could be composed by something else composite. However, all composites have to be grounded in something simple or else nothing would ever be composed.
Quoting Gregory
If there is anything in the universe that everything else is composed by, I think we would all like to know about it, especially physicists.
Quoting Gregory
Kant's second antinomy has perplexed me before. I am now quite sure that there is no reason to think the thesis of that antinomy is true. On the other hand, the antithesis seems to also lack any basis (unless the notion of a "simple part" is problematic).
That's my point. Saying composition needs a composer assumes the conclusion in the premise. So how was a movement of logic even made to demonstrate God?
I dont understand what you are really objecting to. I originally was noting that blueness cannot be defined just like temporality and space. You objected that we can and should give proper definitions of these; and I used blueness as an analogous example. You now are agreeing with me that blueness cannot be definedright? It seems like you are noting that we can describe it to some extentI wasnt disputing that.
:fire:
Ok.
Again, that is just a more complicated way of saying they are propositional!
All I am doing is providing an argument for why God exists from the idea that composition requires an absolutely simple being that ends up necessarily being God: you seem to want a book about this argument.
The whole point is to get people to read it, consider it, and respond with any questions, comments, or objections they have; and to see if we can find common ground. Thats how all arguments work. You are acting like my OP establishes merely that the premises themselves are propositional; which is actually a prerequisite.
No it does not, but I understand why you would think this (given where your head space is at). There is no such thing as an unstated premise: there are implications of premises and conclusions; and this implication you speak of is definitely there, but theres nothing wrong with that.
For example, if I successfully demonstrate to you that quantum entanglement can happen, then it would not be a valid objection to say but, how can that happen?. We dont have to explain how it happens to demonstrate that it happens: your objection here hinges on this conflation.
To your point, though, you could formulate a rejoinder that demonstrates the improbability of, e.g., quantum entanglement being true by considering how it would seem to violate classical laws of nature; and this may convince some people.
You can offer a valid rejoinder that knowledge would have to exist in a simple being for this argument to work and that seems improbable; and you might convince people.
However, I dont see how you have demonstrated it is metaphysically impossible.
We are just approaching this two different ways: I am convinced by the argument of composition that such a being must exist (and so knowledge would exist in this simple being), and you are tackling it by starting with your understanding of knowledge and seeing if it jives with a simple being having it. The problem is that even if it doesnt jive well for you, it doesnt negate the OP: you would have to demonstrate what about my argument for why this simple being has knowledge is falsefor it would have to be false if you dont believe that knowledge can exist in a simple being.
Nope. That will not suffice. If you are right, then my premises that derives that the being has knowledgewhich makes no reference to this hidden premisemust be false; and you would have to demonstrate where it that is; or concede that a person approaching this exposition from the standpoint of composition would be warranted, ceteris paribus, on believing that a simple being has knowledge (even if it does not cohere with their knowledge of physics).
So let me try again, which premise is false:
One of these has to be false for the argument for fail. You would have to deny 20 or 21 or both. Both of them have nothing per se to do with knowledge in the sense of data.
I would say, if I am being charitable, that you are denying both 20 and 21; because you think intelligence has to do with bits of data (and I dont) and that thusly this simple being cannot apprehend the forms of things.
An implication; yes. It is not a premise. I dont need to deny physicalism itself to make the argument work: it is implied though if I succeed. Thats like saying an argument for physicalism has an unstated premise that idealism is false, substance dualism is false, etc. They dont.
But the argument in the OP demonstrates that this is impossible. Like I have said many times in this thread, an infinite per se causal series cannot exist; and this also applies to infinite loops and circular relations. If all objects have properties, then they all have parts; and if they all have parts, then they are infinitely composable. They cant be infinitely composable. So your theory cant be true.
Heres a basic argument in two different ways. Heres my way:
A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, lets call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible
Heres @NotAristotles way:
1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.
You would have to accept that all beings are infinitely composed (either regressively or circularly) for your view of real things always having properties. Thats very problematic.
The answer to the question "if there is a God", "why there is a God", and "how there is a God" is the same for all considering the simplicity of God. But simplicity would just mean sameness, uniformity, lack of what we humans call design. So a non-designed single-thing designs designs. I suppose. This is such an exercise in control however, making the world managerable. I prefer Sartre-eques, gritty sink, existential mental affections for the most part. The day in a life, not a day in the life. No support
Why must I do that? I showed you to have a burden based on your expressed purpose of swaying some people. You've sidestepped that entirely, and are back to making the false claim that I have some burden.
If all you want to hear is that your argument is valid, and that you had no desire to defend its soundness, you should have said so.
Except, difficulty to define or find an acceptable definition is not coincident with impossibility as you also agree on. So we are going to try to define blue anyways despite your misgivings and move on.
So now that we agree that your assertion that its 'undefinable' is just you being lazy and unwilling to enter the discussion into defining other such difficult terms only because its 'hard'. Could you stop gish galloping. . . give a definition!
It's also impossible to know things because something. . . something. . . skepticism but that doesn't stop ordinary people from using the term knowledge in ignorance of a precise definition or arguing a particular definition for their purposes. Why? This is because skepticism doesn't actually remove this discussion from the intellectual dialectic.
So I don't want to hear about how 'undefinable' it is and mysterious or perplexing which are substitutes here for not philosophically putting in any work.
Again, define you terms and no griping this time around. Simple, easy, end of story.
No you dont have a burden of proof: you have to contend with a premise. Thats not the same thing as having a burden of proof. If you dont contend with a premise, then you are providing a red herring.
So far all you have noted is that you find it improbable that a simple being could have knowledge; but yet havent contended the premises I have in the argument for why this has to be the case.
I already explained why blue cannot be properly defined. Remember Marys room thought experiment? Are you just ignoring that?
Have you not heard of Moorean intuitionism?
Nothing I said is an argument from skepticism. Again, I think Marys room thought experiment demonstrates how the phenomenal properties we experience cannot be reduced to physical properties; which means there are forms of knowledge which cannot be reduced to scientific knowledge; which also means that these properties cannot be definedthey must be intuited from experience.
Another example is being. Being is the granddaddy of impossible-to-define-concepts; and this is not me being lazy or appealing to scepticism. We literally cannot define it; and yet we all intuit exactly what it is. It is a pure intuition.
This is relevant because space and time are pure intuitions.
My argument doesnt care if you are a realist or not about space and time, ironically, as there will still be ontological parts to things even if they are not in space or time; so I say take your pick! **shrug** (:
I already described them sufficiently for purposes of the OP. Space is extension; time is temporality.
The probability that magical knowledge exists is low, as I discussed. This is sufficient reason to reject your conclusion prima facie that a being with magical knowledge exists. But in principle, it's possible your conclusion is based on premises so likely to be true, that it could raise the a priori probability of the conclusion. I'll go through a first set of them to explain why it doesn't.
1. Composed beings are made up of parts.
Definition. No problem.
2. A composed being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
False. A particular composed being has its parts necessarily. If even one part were added or subtracted, it would not be the same being. (This pertains to the metaphysical question of the persistence of individual identity. Your view is probably based on essentialism, implying an unstated premise. If you choose not to make a case for essentialism, then I simply apply my own view, so I judge it categorically false: probability=0).
3. A part of a composed being is either composed or uncomposed.
Agreed.
4. A part that is a composed being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.
"Exist in itself" is a vague term, but I'll take it to mean existing autonomously. Autonomous means being uncaused and without external dependencies. A part of a composed being may, or may not, exist autonomously. You've given no reason to think a composed being cannot exist autonomously.
The second part about existing contingently is a non-sequitur because all beings have their parts and properties necessarily, even if it is composed. Add or subtract even one part, and the being that WAS, no longer exists.
5. An infinite series of composed beings for any given composed being (viz., a composed being of which its parts are also, in turn, composed and so on ad infinitum) would not have the power to exist on their own.
I infer that you're describing a vicious infinite regress. I agree this is an impossibility because although each compositional layer is explained by a deeper layer, nothing accounts for the series as a whole.
6. Therefore, an infinite series of composed beings is impossible.
Agree
7. Therefore, a series of composed beings must have, ultimately, uncomposed parts as its first cause. (6 & 3)
Disagree that a composed being was necessarily caused. See my objection to #4.
[B]8. An uncomposed being (such as an uncomposed part) is purely simple, since it lacks any parts.[/b]
Agreed.
[B]9. Two beings can only exist separately if they are distinguishable in their parts.[/b]
False. Two beings can have identical intrinsic properties. Example: water molecules.
[B]10. Two purely simple beings do not have any different parts (since they have none).[/b]
False (p=0). Two different types of simple being can exist (e.g. up-quarks and electrons).
[B]11. Therefore, only one purely simple being can exist.[/b]
Non-sequitur; false (p=0)
No point in proceeding further, since later statements and conclusion depends on the above falsehoods. Perhaps you could nudge me to increase some probabilities from 0, but as I said before, you'd need to push all of them pretty high to have any persuasive power.
Everything is trivially not able to be properly defined and you could probably motivate a version of the problem of the criterion to make this concrete by asking what a proper definition is then making it clear how circular or unfounded that criterion is leading us to doubt all definitions. That is, however, trivial and obvious.
Un-intriguing examples of definitions devolve into mere pointing or gesturing as they by nature DON'T tell us much that we don't already get OR they don't make important aspects clear enough. They are by nature lazy and by nature dangerously uninformative as they leave great uncertainty when one demands SPECIFICATION.
When one demands specification you point not to that object but in reference to other things. Contrary or similar.
Time is a complex notion but it has to do with clocks, it supposedly flows, flashes by in frames as if its a movie, it can be slowed or sped up, it is universal or sometimes coincident with physical processes.
Those are all different notions and metaphors/figures of speech that exemplify either different aspects of the same concept or completely different concepts but that is what is needed. Not this pointless and trivial gesturing you are doing which tells me nothing of what extension is.
Try at least a via negativa approach for god sake. Make use of the numerous metaphorical figures of speech people have constructed to talk about such things that the internet should allow you access to. TRY AGAIN!
Quoting Bob Ross I know, that wasn't the point as I was just pointing out how philosophical skeptics can miss the point of how normal individuals conduct themselves choosing to devolve into intellectual labyrinths in an attempt to shut down the discussion. The token pessimistic skeptic may ask, "What is the point of discussing this or that if there is no way of knowing?"
As if the attainment of knowledge as so narrowly and unobtainable that this person defines or sees it as is relevant to why people still indulge in these debates. Perhaps, they have other reasons.
You are the skeptic in this analogy. Unwilling and seemingly unable to move forward in a constructive manner.
Quoting Bob Ross . . . and I say it doesn't make sense to ask how many parts a number has so it wouldn't make sense to ask what an entity devoid of spatiality would even be to possess parts yet not be extended.
Quoting Bob Ross Which doesn't make a difference between what others have deemed the 'spatial extension' notion of physicality. . . which is different from the spatial separation of any two physical things. . . which is different from spatial location/place. . . which is different from fundamental physical action at a distance interactions. These are all different notions.
All of which have been advanced on differing levels to make more precise the concept you refuse to do the same to.
It also leaves out the esoteric but ever present spatial anti-realists of various idealist varieties which deny that the notion of spatiality is even a coherent mind-independent notion at all. There are also the ontological structural realists of the modern age which may advocate for parts without things. Then there are the process philosophers who may look down upon or see as incoherent in their own sense attempting to ascribe any coherency to the static part of a thing at all amidst the Heraclitan mess of universal processes.
. . . you know. . . because that spatial anti-realist or that process philosopher might just have different moorean intuitions than you.
The idea of it being magical just begs the question; but it is worth noting that your view depends on physical processes for beings to apprehend the forms of things, and we still to this day have no clue how that would work in the brain. We have reason, which is distinct from AI, and we have every reason to believe it could never be facilitated by the brain. Why? Because reason abstracts the universal of a particularnot just pattern-matching given the universal like AIand this seems to posit yet another hard problem for physicalists: how could an brain processes abstract out the universal from a particularwhich is necessarily to go beyond the given data of the particular itselfwhen nothing about the particular itself entails its universal? AI, on the other hand, is given concepts (universals) and then trained to pattern-match particulars: our minds do not do that.
A composed being is not necessary, and its parts are not necessary unless those parts do not depend on something else to exist. Contingency is about existenting dependently on something else, and necessity is to exist independently of anything.
Now, what you are noting, is actually what I noted just with less precise language. You are absolutely right that a composed being will not be the same being if it has different parts or if those parts are arranged differently; and, so, what makes that composed being that kind of composed being is necessarily relative to those parts and their arrangement. This does not make the parts necessarily existent: they are necessary for the composed being to exist as that being, and this is just another way of saying the composed being is contingent on its parts.
Autonomy is a bad term for this, as that relates only to agents; and the part being contingent on its own parts would entail that that part does not, in turn, exist necessarily (i.e., independently of any dependencies on other beings).
Think about it. If the table exists only insofar as the atoms comprising it are in such-and-such arrangement which makes the table contingently existent from the atoms; then if the atoms exist only insofar as the electrons, protons, and neutrons exist in such-and-such arrangement, then that makes the atoms contingently existent on the electrons, protons, and neutrons. None of these beings can exist as a necessary being because they lack existence themselves (subsistently); for they depend actively on something else to sustain their existence.
Firstly, as I said above, that a being would no longer be that being without certain parts does NOT entail that those parts nor the being are nor is necessary. They exist contingentlyviz., they could not continue to exist if their parts are removed or modified in such-and-such manners.
Secondly, what you are really noting is traditionally called per se properties; which is different than a necessary vs. contingent being analysis. E.g., a circle is no longer a circle with being the shape of a circleso that property of circularity is a per se and necessary property for circlesbut a circle, e.g., block that that child is playing with right now does not necessarily exist: it exists contingently on atoms and what notthe guy who made it could have decided not to make it, etc.
Beautiful! This means, Relativist, that a per se series of causality for composition cannot be infinite (circularly nor in a regression) for each being lacks itself composition (i.e., subsistent exist): none of them are capable of existent themselves and this kind of essential relation between them (for exist) entails that they could never begin to exist nor continue to if it werent for some thing which as the ipsum ens subsistenspure being itself. Why? Because if it cant be infinite then there must be a first cause, and this first cause must not have parts (because, if it did, then it would just be a member of this infinite series of compositionand we just established that that is impossible).
Now you concur that an absolutely simple being must exist to account for such-and-such composition. From there, we then continue to deriving Gods existence.
OH COME ON! (;
In all seriousness, you cannot agree that a composed being cannot be only infinitely comprised of parts (because none of them is capable of existent by themselves) and then say that the first cause is composed. If it is composed, then it is a member of that infinite series we stipulated because it exists contingently on its parts (no differently than the table).
I am not sure we can make headway on this one ):
All I will say is that if the two beings have propertiesirregardless if it is intrinsic or extrinsicthen they are not absolutely simple. In other words, they have parts. Remember, a part is something that comprises something elseit is NOT something material that comprises something else. E.g., a letter in a word uttered in a sentence is a part of a part of a whole (i.e., the sentence) and this thing is not material (i.e., the sentence). E.g., the number two is comprised of two number ones.
A word has the property of being made of letters; and a particular word has the property of being made of certain letters.
I think you are thinking of a part in the stricter sense of something that comprises a material object. A quark having an X property would entail that, even if it is non-spatiotemporal, it has parts because X would relate to some part that it hasjust like a letter is a part of the word. The upness, or whatever, of the quark is a part of that quark; and it is a part because it is something which is not identical to the wholethe quarkbut contributes to its existence as a quark. I would presume that an up-quark, for you, would no longer be an up-quark if it didnt have the property of upness.
In short, we are talking about ontological partsnot just material parts (e.g., wheels on a car).
Yes, but then it would not be an argument from composition. There is a correlation between composing and being composed. A being that composes finds its function insofar as there is a composite being. Therefore its essence as a composing being is ontologically dependent (contingent). This terms comes from fundationalism.
In other words God must create the world in order to be God, which means that his essence (being God) is contingent upon the creation of the world. Therefore, God is essentially dependent on the world in order to be God. And God cannot have essential dependence on anything. Therefore, there is no possible argument of composition+fundation to demonstrate the existence of God.
If you directly reference something you are not going to explicate much of anything about it no more than making an undefined utterance without context.
Just as other philosophers have quibbled with spatialized language to talk about time as possessing numerous intellectual faults so then the only problem really with 'figuring out the brain' is just your personal misgivings about the metaphors/analogies they use. As if you wouldn't also yield metaphors/analogies that themselves may hide further misunderstandings or make precise something that layman or scientists never really disagreed with in the end.
This is expressly clear in your later continued response below. . .
Quoting Bob Ross
. . . which talks of reified abstractions and the possession of these "things" or the manipulation of them.
If you are going to do that why don't we just all venture into Meinong's jungle and drop the intuitions we have about the words 'exist' or 'real' at the tree line.
I use the term "magical knowledge" to refer to the existence of knowledge by brute fact in the absence of any sort of medium. Both aspects are grossly implausible. You've presented no metaphysical account of how this could be, you haven't suggested a metaphysical grounding of it.
Question-begging applies to arguments. I'm not the one making an argument. I'm just explaining what I believe, and why I believe it.
Quoting Bob Ross
We don't know how information is stored in the brain, but we have strong evidence that it is stored there: disease and trauma to the brain can destroy memory.
The apparent fact that information entails some form of encoding doesn't entail a physical encoding. Information theory still seems to apply, and information theory takes it for granted that the information exists in some non-simple form.
Quoting Bob Ross
Nonsense. A complex being could exist by brute fact. If it does then its existence is a necessary fact. Here's why.
Suppose C is an existing object or past actual event. If C is contingent, this means ~C is a non-actual possibility. What makes ~C truly possible? How do we (metaphysically) account for a non-actual possibility? Heres how I account for it: suppose E is the metaphysical explanation for C. If C is contingent, then E must account for this contingency. So E explains: C & possibly(~C).
This doesn't imply object C exists eternally (at all times). It just means that when it actually exists, it could not have failed to exist.
So if C is a brute fact, there is no E that accounts for C & possibly(~C). Therefore brute facts are necessary.
Concrete example: suppose determinism is true. This implies every event, and everything that comes to exist, is the necessary consequence of prior conditions. There is contingency only if some prior condition is contingent. Because determinism is assumed, the only possible contingent fact is the initial conditions. If those initial conditions existed by brute fact, then their existence is not contingent.
It's erroneous to conflate conceivability with metaphysical possibility. Stephen Yablo shows this to be the case here: Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? You do exactly that, as I'll show below.
[Quote] Contingency is about existing dependently on something else, and necessity is to exist independently of anything.[/quote]
That is only conceptual contingency, not metaphysical. If the universe is deterministic, then every state of the universe is the necessary consequence of past states. There are relations among objects in the universe (such as distance, gravitational attraction, and the chemical bonds), but all these factors are necessarily present. You're just conceptualizing (say) the solar system existing without (say) Mercury. But it's not truly metaphysically possible.
Quoting Bob Ross
Only conceptual contingency. Your conception ignores the overall context that I described.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, it doesn't. I defined it as something that exists without cause or dependency. The universe (the totality of material reality) exists autonomously if naturalism is true.
Quoting Bob RossThe existence of a table at a time and place, within a deterministic universe, has necessarily come to exist. Again,you are conceptualizing by ignoring the broader context.
Quoting Bob Ross
What entails it being necessary or contingent is whatever accounts for its existence.
Quoting Bob Ross
There must be a first cause because an infinite series of causes is viscious, NOT because an infinite series of compositions is viscious. You're conflating 2 different things.
Quoting Bob Ross
The only rational choice is for you to agree with me, and drop your assumption. That's because I gave a real world example that falsifies your assumption.
Quoting Bob Ross
Nothing can exist that lacks properties, so no object can exist that meets your definition of "absolutely simple".
I am, of course, judging this from the perspective of my metaphysical theory. As I said in my first post, your argument depends on metaphysical assumptions that I disagree with. You refused to accept that, and insisted I comment on your premises. In every case, I evaluated them on my metaphysical views, as you should expect because you didn't present an argument for YOUR metaphysical system. I believe I have proven my point.
What part of space and time being extension and temporality is hard for you to understand? If there's specific concepts of space and time that would be immune to the OP, then please feel free to bring them up: I don't see any. You can go the Einsteinien, Kantian, or literally any other route and it will not matter for the OP since we are talking about ontological parts which could be outside of space and time.
It is important to note the difference between a necessary being in the sense of being incapable of failing to exist vs. in the sense of being uncaused. The former still allows for contingency of existence on other things, and the latter entails brute facts. I think this is the crux between us, which rides on a conflation between these two.
The OP is talking about a contingent being in the latter sensenot the formerand you are talking about a necessary being in the former sensenot the latter. I dont think you disagree that a chair which, under necessitarianism, cannot fail to exist is still contingently existent on its parts such that IF the parts didnt exist it wouldnt either. All you are noting is that the chair and its parts could not have failed to be caused; but this does not take away from the OPs point that they are caused. A necessary chair in the latter sense would be a chair that exists with no causeI dont think you are arguing that.
What the heck is a non-actual possibility?!?
Right, but C would still be contingent upon the things which caused its existence even if it could not have failed to exist.
No. Causal determinism dictates that every entity subject to natural laws has a cause: this does not entail that every entity has a cause and consequently does not entail that every entity is necessary in the former sense. What you are thinking of is called necessitarianism, and it is basically causal determinisms roidd brother.
Again, even if this is true, it is irrelevant because the caused thingthe effectis or at least was dependent on its cause for it to exist (even if it could not have failed to exist because its cause must have occurred in such-and-such a manner to bring about it as an effect). E.g., the eternal chair is still contingent on its parts to exist.
Agreed, and I am not doing that. It is not merely conceivable that a chair is dependent upon its parts: that is actually true of chairsperiod.
This isnt true, though; and thats why my argument and classical arguments like this one do not rely on that. Aquinas prime example is an infinite series of begetting children: theres nothing, i.e., impossible about an infinite series of per accidens causality. Theres nothing viscious about it; but there is something absurd about an infinite per se causal series.
:lol:
Hopefully I clarified in this response how that definitely did not happen (:
Ok, but lets go back to the composition quick argument I gave you: that demonstrates that your metaphysical theory here is false; so I have not reason to believe that nothing can exist that lacks properties.
What metaphors/analogies do you use and do you understand their limitations and errors?
Until you are absolutely clear on this we will not make head way.
Quoting Bob Ross Outside is spatialized language which I don't choose to indulge in so I don't understand what you mean. Use different language. I don't accept it.
Second, you keep using this substance metaphor to reify the notion of properties or talk about them if you don't know.
Is reification always good in your eyes and proper philosophical method?
Third, going off of moorean intuition. . . everything I've ever experienced and said was ever a 'single piece' or a 'whole' has always been itself composed. I have never in fact met with an un-composed entity and therefore perhaps the notion of an 'un-composed' entity is itself a limiting abstraction that is therefore unreal and un-warranted to postulate. My notion of part/whole comes from these things that have never been wholes and have always been composed.
If you say something along the lines of, ". . . but I can imagine. . ." Then you need to justify the method or role of imagination in proper philosophical practice.
Not at all. What I am saying is that, supposing that there are simple things at the end of the composition, these simple things are explained in essence by the whole of which they are a part. That is to say that their essence or identity is conditioned by the whole of which they are a part.
And as you have seen in this topic a confusion is made between the simple thing at the end of the composite and God. But if every simple thing that forms a whole is conditioned in its identity and essence by the whole, then no simple thing that is part of a whole can be God.
In other words, if God is part of the world then he is conditioned in essence and identity by the world. But if he is not part of the world then we are no longer talking about wholes and parts.
[B]Here's my Axiom of Contingency:
A contingent entity requires not merely a explanation for its being or being such as it is, but an explanation for the possibility that it could have been otherwise. [/b]
As previously discussed, an uncaused object exists without explanation, therefore it is not contingent.
Could an uncaused object be contingent upon its composition? Let's see.
First a preliminary point. There is more to a composition than a list of objects. It also includes the arrangement of the objects. Example: A molecule of glucose has the exact same set of atoms as a molecule of fructose, but the atoms are arranged differently (they are termed "isomers").
Now apply the axiom to a composed object, C. C is explained by its composition. C is contingent only if this explanation (the composition) could also explain C's nonexistence. That's obviously false. C IS the specific arrangement of the objects that compose it. It's a strict identity.
Conclusion: an object's composition necessitate the object being what it is; the composition is not contingent. Necessitarian Amy Karofsky puts it this way:
[I]"the necessity of a necessary entity just consists in its being the way that it actually is. Thus, an explanation of the entitys being as it is will be an account of its necessity. "[/i]
(Page 3 of "A Case For Necessitarianism")
Quoting Bob Ross
This reflects back to the axiom.
Suppose cause C indeterminately causes some one member of a set of possibilties to exist. All members of the set are possible, but only one will member will be actualized. The other members of the set are "non-actual possibilities". Also, if C caused D, then "D's nonexistence" is a non-actual possibility.
Quoting Bob Ross
"Viscious" means having a vice; i.e. something objectionable about the account. The vice I identified was that there would be nothing to account for the chain as a whole. You're right, that IF God exists, he could account for it. That might be relevant if it could be shown that the past is infinite. Even if it's a live possibility, it doesn't entail God, it just entails that something must underlie the causal chain. You'd at least have to show that God is the best explanation. Your case would require you to show magical knowledge is plausible, which you obviously can't.
But we don't need to debate that, because there's a worse vice for an infinite past: it entails reaching the present from an infinite past, through a sequence of steps of finite duration. No set of finite duration steps can complete an infinity.
The past process is symmetrical to reaching an infinite future through a day-by-day process. Every step takes you a finite number of days from today. "Infinity" is never reached. The past is a mirror image: it's impossible reach from an infinite past.
Quoting Bob Ross
I showed that your composition theory is inconsistent with my contingency axiom.
[Quote]so I have not reason to believe that nothing can exist that lacks properties.[/quote]
It's irrelevant what you believe. You have the burden of proof. But you could try to undercut my belief. I believe objects have properties, because: 1) it is apriori more sensible to believe so - no examples of property-less objects can be cited - 2)it is an ad hoc assumption, that adds no needed explanatory power. 3) it fits a coherent, parsimonious metaphysical theory.
Okay, I think I get it now. So it is not composition itself that is at issue. Rather, that a part should be responsible for composition when it itself is dependent on the whole at least for its mereological function as part; that's what is at issue.
Again, correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be asserting that even if some composed being were grounded in simple parts, those parts could not have composed the whole because their function is determined by the whole of which they are parts. And if their function were to compose a whole, they would already have to be a part of the whole of which they acquire their function from, which would render composition impossible by that part.
That is an important qualification because without it, one might incorrectly suppose that a whole could be fully grounded in its parts, which you maintain (and I agree) does not work.
Extension and temporality are pure intuitions. We get them from our experience of the world; or more accurately they are the forms of our experience.
You are asking of me, e.g., what does it mean to exist? Well, its a pure intuition. Theres nothing more I can say; nor can you.
We might be able to say some things about how space and time behave scientifically; but not what they are themselves. Space and time are the a priori intuitions of the sensory data (manifold) of our outer and (some of our) inner senses; and there may be a space and time akin to these a priori modes of intuition which may or may not behave similarly (e.g., Einsteins special relativity). Our brain represents things which occur in a multiplicity as in space (whether that be material [e.g., my hand] or immaterial [e.g., the feeling of pain in my hand]); and it represents things which change in time (which may or may not include spacee.g., thinking). It is impossible for me to speak of anything without referencing spatiality and temporality because they are pure intuitions a priori in our brainsviz., they are so integral to the human understandingbut it is important to distinguish space and time proper (in the sense of the forms of the understanding) from conceptual space and time: the latter can be used to talk analogically about things which may not be in the former (e.g., Platonic forms, God, a non-spatiotemporal particle, etc.).
You literally cannot describe space and time without using them in language. Thats a waste of time to try and avoid.
What substance metaphor???
Thats called in inductive case against an absolutely simple being; and it holds no weight against the argument from composition because it demonstrates the need for its existence. Your argument only works as a probabilistic-style argument IF we have no good reasons to believe a simple being exists. All you are saying is well, we havent had any good reasons to believe there are black swans, so we shouldnt. Ok. But now we know there are black swans .
Did you read the OP? It is not an argument from conceivability. I will outline a shorter version here:
A5-1. A composed being is contingent on its parts to exist.
A5-2. Therefore, a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-3. Therefore, a part which is a composed being cannot exist by itself or from itself.
A5-4. An infinite series of composition, lets call it set C, of a composed being would be an infinite series of beings which cannot exist by themselves or from themselves.
A5-5. In order for a composed being to exist, it must be grounded in something capable of existing itself.
A5-6. C has no such member as described in A5-5.
A5-7. Therefore, the existence, ceteris paribus, of C is (actually) impossible.
Heres the other version:
1. A composite gets its composition from its parts.
2. If all the parts of a composite are themselves composite, then all the parts get their composition from their respective parts.
3. If all of the parts get their composition from their respective parts, then every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another (or others) that it gets its composition from.
4. If every member, or part, is lacking in terms of its composition and requires another for its composition, then no member has composition.
5. If none of the parts have composition, then none of the parts can give composition to another.
6. If none of the parts can give composition to another, then no parts can be parts of a greater composition.
7. Therefore, if all parts are composite, and a composition depends only on its parts, then there can be no composition.
Instead of bringing up red herrings and straw mans, maybe try actually contending with the above arguments?
Thats nonsense. Thats never what contingency has been about in the sense I described; and will never exclusively refer to what you mean here. All you did is axiomatically preclude a discussion about contingency in the sense of being caused. Even if this axiom were granted, then we would just refer to caused beings then instead of contingent beings: this doesnt help your case. If a chair is caused by, at least in part, the atoms which comprise it; then, boom, we have the same argument taking lift off
Yes, but this doesnt mean what you think it does. This means that the entitys composition suffices to demonstrate the necessity of that being because, under necessitarianism, causation could not have failed to be exactly what it is. This does NOT entail that this being is not contingent on its parts to existin fact, that is a necessary presupposition for what they are saying to be true. If the table, e.g., is not contingent on its parts to exist, then it would be false that its parts suffice to explain why the chair necessarily had to exist (for it would exist at least in part independently of its parts).
No, no, no. If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwisenot even laws, numbers, logic, etc.
The only cogent interpretation of a non-actual possibility would be either A) a possibility which failed to occur or B) something which is conceivable but not currently actual. With respect to A, this kind of possibility is not possible; with respect to B, it is possible but confusing languageit should just be referred to as conceivability.
You are not understanding this argument at all. Temporal causality is not necessarily a per se causal series. E.g., begetting children is a per accidens series of causality even if it stretches infinitely backward and forward in timethis kind of causality is not viscious and does not require any further explanation causally.
This would be a reasonable a posteriori argument if, again, we didnt have an example now by way of demonstrating that a simple being is required to explain completely the causal chain of composition of an object.
It does, because we cannot explain composition otherwise.
The axiom I cited was a direct quote from Amy Karofsky's book, "A case for Necessitarianism". She makes a strong case for the past failure of philosophers to provide a metaphysical account of contingency. She convinced me that contingency needs to be accounted for, not just assumed (as you do). I'm confident she would agree with the way I applied it to composition, not that it matters per se. It's coherent and consistent with everything we know about the world. You obviously don't like it because it's inconsistent your Thomist metaphysical framework. But as I've repeatedly reminded you, YOU have the burden of proof, and in my case - that means you would have to undercut the contingency axiom I stated. You can't, and that's why you're just reacting emotionally now.
This shouldn't have been necessary. It was obvious to me from the beginning that your argument depended on Thomist metaphysics. In my first post, I said "Thomism is a theistic metaphysics - Aquinas developed it from Aristotelian metaphysics, in order to make sense of God's existence. So it's unsurprising that it would entail a God. I get the fact that this would appeal to theists, but it has no power to persuade non-theists, unless you succeed in fooling them into treating the metaphysical framework as true."
You didn't accept this THEN, but I've given you a good basis to accept it NOW.
Composition and cause are two different things. Funny that you relied on this difference in your last post, when you argued that an object that was causally necessitated was (ostensibly) contingent upon it's composition. Since I proved you wrong, you're now backtracking.
Contingenct axiom aside, the necessity of composition can only be false if objects have contingent properties. If such were present then individual identity would violate identity of indiscernibles. Of course, you believe there are contingent properties because you embrace Thomism, which assumes there is essence. The existence of essence is axiomatic to Thomism.
I am 100% certain I correctly interpreted what Karofsky said. Her wording was intentional, and I applied it correctly.
Quoting Bob Ross
Why the heck does it matter what necessitarianism would entail? I've never suggested I'm defending necessitarianism. I was simply answering YOUR QUESTION: "What the heck is a non-actual possibility?", I simply gave you an example in which I STIPULATED that the outcome was indeterminate, to help you understand the concept. Personally, I'm agnostic as to whether quantum indeterminacy entails metaphysical contingency. But if it does, it's consistent with my contingency axiom.
Quoting Bob Ross
ROFL! I previously called you out for what appeared to be, your conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility, which you then denied. But now you're being explicit - suggesting that conceivablity is all that's needed to establish that something is contingent. There's no rational basis for this claim, and that's why IMO my axiom of contingency makes perfect sense to me. Contingency entails "non-actual possibilities", and I find it absurd to think that non-actual possibilities don't need to be accounted for metaphysically. I don't care if you accept that, because I'm not defending an argument with the hope of persuading you. I'm just explaining the reasons I reject YOUR argument.
Quoting Bob Ross
You don't appear to be understanding MY argument. I explained why I'm convinced the past is finite. If you think I made a logical error, identify it.
As an aside, I arrived at my view that the past is finite after spending a good bit of time examining the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which depends on the past being finite. Although I didn't find William Lane's Craig's argument for a finite past persuasive, I studied the issue on my own, applying my math background, and landed on the argument I gave you. My only point here is to demonstrate that I don't simply go into denial when seeing an argument I disagree with. You should try to do the same.
Quoting Bob Ross
Apparently THOMIST metaphysics can't explain composition otherwise, but that's irrelevant. I can explain composition with MY metaphysical framework just fine.
Your view is a form of necessitarianism, as exemplified by your example from A Case for Necessitarianism. The ideas you quoted are only compatible with necessitarianism.
Lets back track a bit, because we are not making progress. Let me ask you this: do you believe that a table is dependent upon its parts to exist?
I was charitably interpreting your idea of a non-actual possibility: like I stated before, possibility is coherence of a thing with a mode of thought (e.g., metaphysics, physics, logic, etc.).
How is that relevant to the OP?
Yes, I could tell: the Kalam argument is not neo-Aristotelian. It depends on an argument from efficient causeswhich is a per accidens kind of causal serieswhereas Aristotelian arguments stem from per se kinds of causal series. For Aristotle, in fact, matter is eternal and yet still requires a first cause; and even if it were finite then it would still need a first cause (according to him).
The OPs argument is from per se causality.
I am not engaging in your argument for a finite past because it is a red herring: it does not matter if there is an infinite past of causal events or not for the argument of composition to work. If you think it does, then I would need to here why before spending the time engaging in your argument.
Yes, but composition is a kind of causalityIve maintained this the entire discussion. Again, composition is a kind of per se causality whereas, e.g., begetting children is a kind of per accidens causality.
You have to use a language to talk about these "pure intuitions" and the second you use that language there is no definite answer that it hasn't already polluted the notion you are trying to explain. So are the conundrums and properties a facet of taking a metaphor too far or are they meaningfully distinct.
Quoting Bob Ross If you are to separate conceptual space/time from the understanding you need to understand that split but before that you need to state what metaphors you use. Which is why analogue models in physics have interpretation conditions on what things matter (positive part of the analogy), what things are irrelevant (neutral analogy), and what things intentionally mislead/misconstrue (negative analogy).
You don't have a pure language to talk about your "pure intuitions" ergo you don't know where your language misleads and the actual "pure intuitions" begin. You have failed again and again to mark clearly that line or at least attempt to.
Quoting Bob Ross
No, spatialized language is the notion of the space metaphor to talk about time. Course, that isn't the only way we talk about time but it has been blamed for enforcing simple philosophical confusions. Bergson and Whitehead thought as much along with in more current times the philosophical perspective of Milic Capek. Who is of the opinion that that the last vestige of Classical thinking to be abandoned for the revolutionary special relativity or quantum theory in a different choice of language.
One that makes use of non-spatialized language for time but also makes use of other senses other than the visual or mental imagery. One such approach was to use analogies to lived experience and music rather than the psychologically misleading as well as prevalent spatial notions regarding the past as 'behind us' or the future as 'coming towards us'.
Quoting Bob Ross
It's a common thing to do, in language, to talk about people having abstractions as if they are themselves substances. Such as, "You have so much love!" Love is an abstract concept here that is treated as a thing that can we have so and so much of. Properties work this way and you even do this with the concept of '2' treating it line with a material analogy acting as if it is a thing 'that has parts'. This shouldn't be the only language one can use to talk about numbers and to presume so is to abandon any other creatively unique direction.
Especially since the fact that the number '2' is itself mean't to be fairly abstract then it should be seen as being multifaceted in the possible analogies one can use to talk about it. However, those might be mutually inconsistent to each other in certain respects and the boundary of what we take 'seriously' from them becomes rather significant but disagreeable.
Quoting Bob Ross No, it casts doubt on the concept itself having any real counter part as I would presume that philosophy doesn't always have to accept that when something is conceptually possible that it is therefore metaphysically possible or physically possible.
That is a jump that requires philosophical work to connect the different notions of possibility. Work you have not committed yourself too. Work that requires showcasing where conceptual notions can be transcendental to mere playful philosophical thought experiments into being ascribed some deep referential status.
You're equivocating. You had responded to my example in which I treated the result quantum collapse as actually contingent (and I STIPULATED it as such in the example) by asserting:
"If necessitarianism is true, then there are no other possibilities than the causality that occurred because nothing could have been otherwise".
Apply the label "necessitarianism" to my view if you like, but don't draw inferences based on the label. I absolutely believe there MAY BE contingency in the world, and that quantum collapse MAY HAVE a contingent outcome. This view fits the axiom of contingency I gave you.
Quoting Bob Ross
It's not "charitable" to make an assertion that simply contradicts what I've said, especially in light of the fact that I linked you to Yablo's paper in which he demonstrates the disconnect between conceivability and metaphysical possibility.
You apparently believe contingency is the default: if necessity isn't proved (or accounted for), contingency should be assumed. I believe the converse: if contingency can't be proved (or accounted for), then necessity should be the default. I justify my view on the basis that laws of nature exist and that they entail a necessitation. If quantum collapse has a truly indeterminate outcome, it's still a necessitation in that it necessitates a well-defined probability distribution of possible outcomes (David Armstrong refers to this as "probabilistic determinism"). What's your basis? Can you undercut mine?
Quoting Bob Ross
That depends on the metaphysical system you're using to account for it. My impression is that yours depends on a form of essentialism that considers an object's identify to be associated with an essence, to which "accidental" (contingent) properties may attach. That such essences exist is metaphysical dogma, not something that can be demonstrated to exist. My view is that object identity is consistent with identity of the indiscernibles:
A = B iff both have the exact same set of properties (both intrinsic and relational).
Without contingent properties, your argument from composition fails. That's because an object's constituents are an identity to the object itself.
For whitehead it would be a conceptual and reality based holistic inseparability but we can reduce the heavy poetic force of this down to looking back carefully at your metaphors. If we aren't defining our terms or even if we do so with the utmost precision to suit any rationalist our figures of speech are not silent actors.
Your language misleads you astray because it does so by its own hidden intentions,
Not sure why you tagged me here, Banno. I don't think I can address the contents of the post that you linked, it sounds to me that you wanted Bob's reply to that, not my reply.
Be that as it may, I suppose I could ask you: if it makes sense to talk about Divine Simplicity, then (by parity of reasoning) does it make sense to talk about Divine Complexity? If you say "no", then your dispute here is with Bob, not with me. If you say "yes", then you might have found something worth arguing about with me. But that would be Off-Topic here, since Bob's argument is for the simplicity of God, instead of being an argument for the complexity of God.
If you feel like this is something worth discussing with me, then I invite you to start a Thread about it. We could even have a one-to-one debate, if you prefer that format.
Salam alaikum, mate.
-A. Sandwich
Only becasue you tagged me. Quoting Arcane Sandwich
[I]"What could motivate such a strange and seemingly incoherent doctrine?"[/i]
It's motivated by a desire to rationalize an argument for God's existence. I find it ludicrous to purport to "prove" God's existence based on an assumption that is seemingly incoherent. To be persuasive, the premises should be easy to accept.
I dont think time can be described through space, but I am open to hearing why you think this.
This is good. Heres a couple things to note:
1. This is only a reification fallacy if anti-realism with respect to the topic is true. E.g., the number 2 is not real IFF mathematical anti-realism is true; and same with love.
2. Assuming things like, e.g., love are not real but exist as emergent-phenomenal processes of our organism, these still have parts. E.g., love is a feeling of strong intimacy, attraction, etc. for another and is composed, at a minimum, of a strong connection between a donor and recipient and all which is subject to time (viz., loving through time).
3. When I was talking about space and time as substances, I meant it in the realist sense; so that is not a reification fallacy. I was speaking of what it would look like if one believes they are substances.
Sorry, I dont understand what you are saying then. You seem to keep flip-flopping. First you mentioned that everything exists necessarily such that there is no way they could have failed to existwhich simply is necessitarianismand then you turn around and say that you do believe that there may be ways that some things could fail to exist.
Heres what I am thinking you are attempting to convey, and correct me if I am wrong: saying that a thing could have failed to exist if its parts did not get so arranged (or did not exist) does not demonstrate that it could have failed to exist because it may be the case that there were no other causal possibilities such that it would not have existed. Is that right?
No, I am using them in the traditional sense. The modality of possibility is about a thing not contradicting the mode of thought used to conceive it: this is not the same thing as conceivability. There are three modes of possibility (traditionally): metaphysical, physical, and logical.
Metaphysical possibility is such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate the nature of things; physical possibility such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate Nature (viz., physics); and logical possibility such that a thing could exist in a manner that does not violate laws of logic.
This is not the same as conceivability. E.g., it is physically impossible to jump to the moon but conceivable to jump to the moon; it is metaphysically impossible for H20 not to be water but it is conceivable; it is logically impossible for a != a but it is (to some extent) conceivable.
Moreover, contingency is the dependence of one thing on another for its existence; and necessity is the independence of a thing on any other things for its existence.
I think, for you, contingency is the possibility of non-existence for an existent thing (whether it be in the past, present, or future); and necessity is the impossibility of non-existence for an existent thing (ditto). Is that right?
In my sense of the term, a table is contingent upon its parts; and, if causal determinism or necessitarianism is true, could not have failed to existence.
My point is that the OP depends on my kind of contingency in terms of what the word refers to in its underlying meaning; and you cannot wipe this away by engaging in a semantic dispute about how to define contingency.
Causality is traditionally and widely accepted as explanations of why a thing is the way it is. What you are probably thinking of is physical or material causality.
That is a fair assessment of the OP, but I dont think this is true for the subsequent short-hand arguments I gave. It depends solely on the idea that this being depends on its parts to exist even if it could not have failed to exist; no different than how, e.g., platonic forms depend on each other atemporally.
Even if you dont think theres an essence to a, e.g., chair; I think you can agree that that particular chair would not exist if its legs, the wood it is made out of, etc. did not exist and you can also simultaneously agree that the chair, under your view, could not have failed to exist.
No. The chair still depends on its parts to exist even if it could not have failed to exist. The chair does not exist as a brute existence.
I apologize: I was not alerted to your original response because there were no references to me in there (technically).
This seems to be a straw man. My OP goes into detail why it does not suffice to just identify this simple being as a simple being full-stop. I didnt just say and lets just call this God.
This is a conflation, though. The cogito ergo sum presupposes that something exists and that we can say that the thinker is that being. I dont buy the argument, but, nevertheless, it is not presupposing that a thinking being exists to prove that a thinking being exists.
Do you just mean that we must presuppose something exists to prove something else exists?
True, but wouldnt the domain of being have to be non-empty since we exist?
Firstly, I think it is perfectly valid to see it from the outside as a sort of ad hoc rationalization given that there is an absolutely simple being and it has these properties (which are prima facie irreconcilable).
Secondly, I dont think it is as incoherent as you might think. Omnipotence is just power which is reducible to pure will; pure will implies intelligence (no matter how rudimentary) and is reducible thereto; pure will is reducible to pure actuality; pure actuality is reducible to pure simplicity; pure simplicity (and actuality) imply immutibility; etc.
I think it becomes a requirement from believing that there is a simple being and it must have these properties and having to reconcile that contradiction. I think it ends up becoming more cogent than people let on: the properties we assign God are analogical, and not univocal, equivocation and they do seem to reduce to each other by-at-large. Maybe there's some hiccups with intelligence and pure simplicity, but I think it seems to work fine.
The notion that the 'past is behind us' and 'future in front of us' while the present 'is here' are using spatialized language to talk about time. Most depictions of presentism, possibilism, futurism, the moving spotlight theory time, thick/thin presentism, and eternalism all use similar metaphors to their extreme of depicting the 'timeline' as a 'line' or even a 'whole block'. Then we talk about or bring up the problem of temporal 'parts and whole's' which comes about by thinking of things as three-dimensional or four-dimensional but as 'temporal objects' nonetheless.
Just as Minkowski we seem to then treat it as some four-dimensional whole.
It's using static language to talk about what isn't meant to be static so of course we end up with a problem of change such as Zeno's paradoxes or other similar assortments of conundrums. Such as asking how 'fast' does time progress or where do the static moments of time go when they can fly past the pencil thin present. Invoking some strange conception of reality where the world blinks by like a zoetrope machine ex nihilo.
Quoting Bob Ross It's irrelevant to whether its realism or anti-realism. Either you are committed to a problem of reification or ascribing incorrect language/metaphysics/physical terms to talk about something which is itself not physical therefore more a language error regarding a mixing of categories or an ontological category mistake.
Quoting Bob Ross You'd need to actually make explicit the kinds of metaphors/language you are using regarding emergentism so as to not make this decay immediately into reductionism.
Just as process philosophers have this problem of the interconnectedness of language the emergentists have the problem of also making clear their position in terms that don't commit them to the language of their opposite. The reductivism and eliminativism positions.
Note that process philosophers can just as easily use spatialized language out of pragmatic worth or need just as easily as their static rivals. However, they just happen to take a much more serious look at it and attempt to develop incommensurable terms when needed to better capture what they 'mean' as distinct from the former static meanings.
Quoting Bob Ross Is that because you want them to be substances or is that only a lazy choice of language that talks about them in substantial manners? Clearly, that isn't the only language one can use unless you want to argue such a point nor would it have them remain true independent substances but something new language is required for (emergentism) or a completely new category with incommensurable language to accompany it.
No, I didn't. Here's what I said:
Quoting Relativist
You correctly noted that I should have said "causal determination", but my meaning is clear. I'm insisting on two things:
Quoting Bob Ross
That's part of it. Also: composition is identity, and contingency implies non-actual possibilities (metaphysically possible).
Consider composed object X. I deny that there are "accidental" properties, so 100% of the properties (intrinsic+relational) are essential to being X. "X" refers to the unique thing that has that particular set of properties. So it's an identity.
Quoting Bob Ross
A table is composed of its parts. Contingency implies something that could have been different. What is it that could have been different?
Quoting Bob Ross
The chair IS the arrangement of parts. So it's equivalent to saying "the chair would not exist if the chair did not exist".
Quoting Bob Ross
I have no problem with this definition, because "the nature of things" means that it's consistent with whatever metaphysical framework is true; in practice, we treat our own metaphysical framework as true.
But this is just definition; it's not an ACCOUNT of possibility: what is the ontological basis for a claim that a non-actual possibility was possible?
It's easy to conceive of non-actual states of affairs, and mistakenly claim it to be contingent. Example: the outcome of a throw of dice seems contingent because we can conceive of a different outcome. But the outcome is actually the deterministic outcome of the physical factors. So, given those factors, the outcome was necessary, not contingent.
Quoting Bob Ross
Contingency implies something that could have been different. Suppose necessary object A deterministically causes B. B therefore exists necessarily. What is it that could have been different?
Quoting Bob Ross
The Aristotelean paradigm. The modern physics paradigm is more straightforward, and it omits nothing. Labelling an object's composition its "cause" makes the word "cause" less precise and more ambiguous.
-------------------------
Did you read the whole SEP Article on Divine Simplicity? The section The Question of Coherence brings up a point similar to mine. It references Alvin Plantinga's objection to Divine Simplicity, which is perfectly reasonable under Plantinga's "approach to ontology", but that "Plantinga-style objections will not appear decisive to those who reject his metaphysical framework. "
The same principle applies to me: your argument depends on a metaphysical framework different from mine. You'll never be able to make it fit.
So, this argument somewhat resembles an argument given by Ed Feser in his book Five Proofs for the Existence of God which he names the "Neo-Platonic Proof." If I'm right in assuming that your OP is inspired by that argument, then I'm sorry to say, but you haven't given an accurate Thomistic presentation of that argument.
The thing I want to note (and this is something that @NotAristotle and @JuanZu alluded to) is that this argument doesn't conclude in a Being whose existence is separate from the world it creates, rather it is a Being who is a "part" of everything in that world. This argument is an argument from material causality, whereas Thomistic arguments involve efficient causality. Thomas Aquinas would vehemently reject the idea that God is a part of anything, indeed he argues against the idea that God "can enter into composition with other things" in the Summa Theologiae (part 1, question 3, article 8).
If your argument succeeds, then it would turn out that everything around us has God as a metaphysical constituent of it. Chairs, apples, trees, planets, quarks, people... all are "made of" God. And such a world would be a far cry from the classical theism of Feser and Aquinas, instead it would be more akin to some kind of pantheism.
Now, to be fair, Feser in the book does generously help himself to instances of composition when trying to illustrate the idea of causality ordered per se. This makes it a little confusing when he speaks of God as first cause, and I wouldn't blame someone for thinking that Feser is making the case that God is an absolutely simple uncomposed part of each thing as it exists. But that's not quite what the argument states. It's rather that the arrangement of parts as they make up the whole need an external sustaining cause to exist as they do. So basically, every composite needs a composer. That's what the argument from composition is about. It's not about every composite being composed of uncomposed parts.
Nonetheless, I do think your argument is effective. Not as a dialectical defense of Thomism or classical theism, but rather as a reductio of the whole system. I actually agree with the argument that there cannot be an infinite series of composition and that every composed object is composed of uncomposed, purely actual parts! I'm not willing to (or at least I don't want to) grant that the purely actual part of the object must be unique in being purely actual. It seems to me that purely actual beings can differ in attributes, such as the having of the very relation they do to the whole they constitute. But in that case, we don't need an external efficient sustaining cause to explain the existence of the composite, rather we just have these "atomic" purely actual parts explaining its existence. So what we finally get in the end is a form of existential inertia where wholes persist in virtue of their parts, not classical theism.
Welcome to the forum. Excellent first post. :up:
Quoting CaptainCH
See Bob Ross' post , where he gives a reference to Feser.