St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding (G. Klima)

Part 1. The Modern vs. the Medieval Conception of Reference

Russell and reference via quantification -- Quine's slogan -- misinterpretations of Anselm -- intention, medieval reference, and ampliation -- entia rationis -- ontological commitments -- correctly interpreting Anselm

Here are the first few sentences of the paper:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding, 69

Saint Anselm’s proof for God’s existence in his Proslogion, as the label “ontological” retrospectively hung on it indicates, is usually treated as involving some sophisticated problem of, or a much less sophisticated tampering with, the concept of existence. In this paper I intend to approach Saint Anselm’s reasoning from a somewhat different angle.

First, I will point out that what makes many of our contemporaries think it involves a problem with the concept of existence is our modern conception of reference, intimately tied up with the concept of existence. On the other hand, I also wish to show that the conception of reference that is at work in Saint Anselm’s argument, indeed, that is generally at work in medieval thought, is radically different, not so tied up with the concept of existence, while it is at least as justifiable as the modern conception.

---

Edit: I received a PM from someone essentially asking, "What's the fuss?" If you are not familiar with the modern conception of reference stemming largely from Bertrand Russell, and also the way that quantificational logic understands existence via figures like Frege and Quine, then the paper may be somewhat opaque to you. Certainly the first section will be opaque. Nevertheless, the latter sections of the paper might be more accessible even to those who are not familiar with the modern tradition.

I'll just stick to the opening section for now.

First, I will point out that the distinction between ens reale and ens rationis probably is more important in a realist context. If we're actually capable of abstraction, then it's important to note that composing and dividing in the human intellect doesn't result in a vast multiplicity of new entities.


From the paper:

At this point, however, anyone having qualms about “multiplying entities”, indeed, “obscure entities”, should be reminded that the distinction between objects, or beings (entia) simpliciter, and objects of thought, or beings of reason (entia rationis) is not a division of a given class (say the class of objects, or beings, or entities) into two mutually exclusive subclasses. The class of beings or objects is just the class of beings or objects simpliciter, that is, beings without any qualification, of which beings of reason or objects of thought do not form a subclass. Mere beings of reason, therefore, are not beings, and mere objects of thought are not a kind of objects, indeed, not any more than fictitious detectives are a kind of detectives, or fake diamonds are a kind of diamonds.

Qualifications of this kind are what medieval logicians called determinatio diminuens, which cannot be removed from their determinabile on pain of fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.11 Accordingly, admitting objects of thought, or beings of reason, as possible objects of reference, does not imply admitting any new objects, or any new kind of beings, so this does not enlarge our ontology.

At the outset, I will just note that it will probably be unhelpful to think of the ens reale/ens rationis or relationes secundum dici (relations according to speech) / relationes secundum esse (relations according to being), etc. as directly translatable into the terms of the modern mental/physical dualism. This is what I had initially thought on my exposure to these terms, and it led to some confusion.

Such a framing might suggest a straightforward solution (at least on the ontology side of things) along the lines of: "mental entities can just be reduced to brain states, and so they exist as physical ens reale, just not fundamentally or descriptively." This will not do for capturing how thought is itself related to eidos (form/act) or the phenomenological whatness (quiddity) of things in medieval thought. And it misses the way in which what constitutes being a proper being (as opposed to a heap) is conceived of due to the legacy of Plato, Aristotle, and Neoplatonism.

I will just note that such an understanding of beings is more convincing than might be supposed, but it'd lead way off topic to discuss it. It will suffice to say that it's probably best to bracket such a reduction as a consideration, because it remains problematic even in systems that have been constructed precisely to try to make such a reduction plausible. The problem that mere mechanism does not seem to capture "how things can be false" is at least as old as Aristotle and still seems to be a great difficulty.

In logic, we have to work with clear terms and distinct categories, and a binary of ens reale and ens rationis works well enough, but there is often a graduation of being assumed (i.e., e.g. in this thread or in the "Great Chain of Being," although the latter notion is rarely presented well, generally being reduced into a caricature of monarchical propaganda or some such straw man).

So on this conception Quine’s answer to “the ontological problem”: “What is there?”, namely, “Everything” is true. For on this conception the claim: “Everything exists” (or its stylistic variants: “Everything is” or “Everything is a being” or “Everything is an existent” or “There is/exists everything”) is true.12 Still, “Something that does not exist can be thought of” is also true, where, the subject being ampliated in the context of the intentional predicate, “Something” binds a variable that ranges over mere objects of thought that do not exist.13

There is an interesting connection here to the idea of the "mind being [I] potentially[/I] all things," as well as prime matter being sheer potency, and so in a sense nothing. The mind is a true "microcosm" in this respect, i.e., that it shares a likeness with prime matter while also being act to the greatest degree. To be [I]anything at all[/I] is to be [I]something[/I], to have some intelligible whatness, which ties back to Parmenides "the same is for thinking as for being." But this last one can be taken in several senses. "All that is can be thought," does not imply "all that is thought is."

Modern thought sometimes has more difficulty with this to the extent that it has eliminated a solid understanding of, or ground for, the distinction between act and potency by declaring potency to be suspect due to being "unobservable." The older tradition certainly agrees in some sense, since to be observable is to be something, to have quiddity, and so to be actual, but it maintains the distinction because potency is required to explain change.

The contrasting options are either to make no distinction between the actual and potential (or hypothetical), leading to an inflated ontology and cosmology (i.e., everything thinkable is), or to go in the opposite direction and declare that only the actual (often as "physical") is. But then there is also the move to declaring that unintelligible being lacking in any whatness can exist (a view made possible if one conceives of consciousness as primarily an accidental representation of being). Sometimes we see these together, for instance, an inflated nominalist ontology combined with the assertion that the completely unintelligible/unthinkable also exists.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

I'll just stick to the opening section for now.

Sounds good. I haven't even read section 2 yet. :cool:

I think it's probably a good idea to stick to section 1 before moving on to section 2; section 2 before moving on to section 3, etc. It looks like each section will have enough content to sustain its own discussion, questions, confusion, etc. Bite-sized pieces will also make participation easier, for myself included.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

First, I will point out that the distinction...

Great thoughts. I've been on the road all day and need a nap, but I will come back to this. :smile:

A relevant, helpful article on some of the terms: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms/#Sign

I might skip past the historical overview because it is very heavy on terminology, but then the full explanations come later.

Useful context:

[On signification]

A twelfth-century commentary on the Perihermeneias reports Porphyry as saying that at the time of Aristotle, there was a great debate over the principal signification of utterances: was it ‘res’ (things) or incorporeal natures (Plato) or sensus (sensations) or imaginationes (representations) or intellectus (concepts)?[9] In fact, medieval philosophers of language were heir to two conflicting semantic theories. According to Aristotle, the greatest authority from the ancient world, words name things by signifying concepts in the mind (Boethius translated Aristotle’s term as passiones animae – affections of the soul) which are likenesses abstracted from them. But Augustine, the greatest of the Church fathers, had held that words signify things by means of those concepts.[10] This led the medievals to the question: do words signify concepts or things? The question had already been asked by Alexander of Aphrodisias and his answer was transmitted to the medievals in Boethius’ second commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias (De Interpretatione): “Alexander asks, if they are the names of things, why has Aristotle said that spoken sounds are in the first place signs of thoughts … But perhaps, he says, he puts it this way because although spoken sounds are the names of things we do not use spoken sounds to signify things, but [to signify] affections of the soul that are produced in us by the things. Then in view of what spoken sounds themselves are used to signify he was right to say they are primarily signs of them” (tr. Smith, pp. 36–37).[11] So words primarily signify concepts.

But the matter was not settled, other than that whatever view a medieval philosopher took, it had to be made to accord with the authority of Aristotle, perhaps in extremis by reinterpreting Aristotle’s words. Abelard refers to a distinction between significatio intellectuum (signification of concepts) and significatio rei (signification of the thing), more properly called nomination or appellation (see De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, vol. II(1), pp. 192–5). Similarly, the Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum asks whether words signify concepts or things, and responds: both (intellectum et rem), but primarily a thing via a concept as medium (op.cit. II (2), p. 707)...

...Just as signification corresponds most closely – though not exactly – to contemporary ideas of meaning or sense, so supposition corresponds in some ways to modern notions of reference, denotation and extension. The comparison is far from exact, however. One major difference is that the medievals distinguished many different modes (modi) of supposition. Despite the difference between different authors’ semantic theories, particularly as they developed over the centuries, there is a remarkable consistency in the terminology and interrelation of the different modes.

[For example:]

Man is the worthiest of creatures
Socrates is a man
So Socrates is the worthiest of creatures

The premises are true and the conclusion false, so wherein lies the fallacy? It is one of equivocation or “four terms”: ‘homo’ (‘man’) has simple supposition in the first premise and personal supposition in the second, so there is no unambiguous middle term to unite the premises.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

"All that is can be thought," does not imply "all that is thought is."

Yes, and I think the quotes you highlight are important:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1

At this point, however, anyone having qualms about “multiplying entities”, indeed, “obscure entities”, should be reminded that the distinction between objects, or beings (entia) simpliciter, and objects of thought, or beings of reason (entia rationis) is not a division of a given class (say the class of objects, or beings, or entities) into two mutually exclusive subclasses.

So what is going on here? On the modern scene it is well accepted that a term can refer to beings (entia), such as deer, socks, trees, etc. But then when it is proposed that a term can also refer to beings of reason or objects of thought (entia rationis), the common objection is that this will "multiply entities" and thus transgress Occam's Razor. Specifically there is the idea that it will require two mutually exclusive ontological subclasses, one subclass for beings simpliciter and one subclass for beings of reason.

We actually saw this play out two days ago in the midst of a discussion on Mario Bunge, who admits of conceptual existence and who treats existence as a first-order predicate. A response was as follows:

Quoting A Response to Mario Bunge

A few notes on treating existence as a predicate. We can of course do this, with some cost. The result is a logic that ranges over things that exist and things that do not exist. That is, it in effect has two domains, one of things that exist and one of things that... do not exist.

(Consider also footnotes 7 and 12. The assumption here derives from Quine's opposition to Alexius Meinong, who posited two ontological subclasses of a sort.)

That is, the assumption is that Bunge must be working with two mutually exclusive subclasses, at least "in effect." This is the sort of objection that Klima has in his sights. How does he address this objection?

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1

...Mere beings of reason, therefore, are not beings, and mere objects of thought are not a kind of objects, indeed, not any more than fictitious detectives are a kind of detectives, or fake diamonds are a kind of diamonds.

Qualifications of this kind are what medieval logicians called determinatio diminuens, which cannot be removed from their determinabile on pain of fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.[11] Accordingly, admitting objects of thought, or beings of reason, as possible objects of reference, does not imply admitting any new objects, or any new kind of beings, so this does not enlarge our ontology.

First, there are not two ontological subclasses. In an ontological sense there are only beings (entia). But then how do beings of reason (entia rationis) fit in? According to Klima, beings of reason are not beings, but they can still be objects of reference.

For example, suppose Fido is a dog but Jordan thinks Fido is a cat. Jordan's thought or understanding of Fido as a cat does not refer to any being, given that Jordan is mistaken. Nevertheless, we can still refer to Jordan's cat-Fido thought because it is a being of reason and we can refer to beings of reason. Referring to Jordan's thought, we might tell him, "The way you are thinking about Fido is not correct." We refer to Jordan's thought without granting it ontological status as something that enlarges our ontology (and this is a generic move that can accommodate many different sub-theories).

Klima's point about "fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter" is effectively that there are rules against reifying beings of reason and shifting them into beings (simpliciter). If you fail to keep track of what is a being and what is a being of reason, or try to "pull a fast one" by swapping out a being of reason and swapping in a being (simpliciter) when no one is looking, then you're committing a fallacy. When beings of reason are allowed as referents new rules are added to make sure we don't mix up the two.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Modern thought sometimes has more difficulty with this to the extent that it has eliminated a solid understanding of, or ground for, the distinction between act and potency...

I agree. Good point.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus - Good stuff. :up:

Quoting Leontiskos

I received a PM from someone essentially asking, "What's the fuss?"

What is a way into the paper? In footnote 3 Klima points to Frege's Kantian criticism of Anselm's proof. Let's look at that source:

Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, tr. Austin (1960):§ 53. By properties which are asserted of a concept I naturally do not mean the characteristics which make up the concept. These latter ate properties of the things which fall under the concept, not of the concept. Thus “rectangular” is not a property of the concept “rectangular triangle’; but the proposition that there exists no rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle does state a property of the concept “rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle”; it assigns to it the number nought.

In this respect existence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought. Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down. But oneness* is not a component characteristic of the concept “God” any more than existence is. Oneness cannot be used in the definition of this concept any more than the solidity of a house, or its commodiousness or desirability, can be used in building it along with the beams, bricks and mortar...

* [I.e. the character of being single or unique, called by theologians “unity”.]

Frege seems to be appealing to some notion of extensionality. He thinks that existence is a property of concepts insofar as number is assigned to concepts. For example, what number is assigned to the concept, "Moons orbiting Earth"? The answer for Frege is '1', and in virtue of this "denial of the number nought" there exists a moon orbiting Earth. Rather, that is what existence means for Frege. Similarly, if Frege wanted to tell us that there do not exist any motorcycles that are orbiting Earth, what he would say is that the concept, "Motorcycles orbiting Earth," is to be assigned the number '0'. Such is his account of existence.

So when considering Anselm's proof Frege tells us that 'oneness' (namely, the variety of non-noughtness traditionally accorded to God), "is not a component characteristic of the concept 'God'..." That is, the concept "God" does not have an intrinsic property '1'. In Kleine Schriften he will talk about a concept being "not empty." Klima follows Haaparanta in tracing some of this back to Kant, who was a strong influence on Frege and who Frege agrees with vis-a-vis Anselm's proof.

So on Frege's proto-extensional understanding, Anselm is saying that the concept 'God' has a component characteristic of oneness (which entails that the concept is not nought or not empty, ergo, that it exists). Frege claims that this is false and that the proof therefore fails. He says, "No, Anselm, the concept 'God' is not non-empty qua concept."

Like I said, I haven't read beyond section 1, and I don't want to go too fast, but this is at least the foil that Klima is using in setting out a medieval approach—in setting out a more accurate way to interpret Anselm's proof.

The other technical part of this section concerns "ampliation":

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1

According to this conception, in an appropriate ampliative context we can successfully refer to what we can think of according to the proper meaning of the terms involved. But thinking of something does not imply the existence of what is thought of. Thus, in the same way, referring to something does not imply the existence of what is referred to, or, as the medievals put it, significare (‘to signify’) and supponere (‘to refer’) ampliate their object-terms to nonexistents in the same way as intelligere (‘to think’, ‘to understand’) and other verbs signifying mental acts do.[14]

The idea here is that we can think about something without thinking that it exists, so why can't we signify and refer without presupposing existence? The medievals are very interested in argument and the natural way we use language. If we are to mount compelling arguments we must be able to do in a technical sense what we already do quite naturally in everyday settings, namely we must be able to reference thoughts, theories, suggestions, postulations, etc., in order to apply the rigors of argument and reason.

In a source from footnote 11 Klima begins with a simple argument:

Quoting Klima | Existence, Quantification and the Medieval Theory of Ampliation

(1) Bucephalus is dead
(2) What is dead does not exist
Therefore,
(3) Bucephalus does not exist
Therefore,
(4) something does not exist

In my opinion, this is a conclusive argument for the thesis that something does not exist. As is well-known, however, many philosophers regard this thesis as paradoxical in a way, and, consequently, they would raise several objections to the simple reasoning that led to it above...

"Bucephalus is dead, and therefore does not exist." When we utter such a thing we are abstracting time away from Bucephalus, and thinking of him in a timeless sort of way. He does not exist now, but he did exist in the past, and in talking about him now we are talking about something that does not exist. This is an example of what the medievals called ampliation, and in this case it is ampliation with respect to time. Cf. footnote 14.

Thoughts?

The first sentence of section one says:

On the paradigmatic account of reference in contemporary philosophical semantics, owing in large part to Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, the burden of reference is taken to be carried basically by the bound variables of quantification theory, which supposedly reflects all there is to the universal logical features, or “deep structure” of natural languages.

The descriptive theory of reference had its heyday in the time prior to Kripke. So this struck me as at best inaccurate. But to check I went to the PhilPapers survey and found support for causal views on reference at 46% and for descriptions at 17%. Hardly "paradigmatic".

So it seems to me this paper missed it's target by fifty years or so. Mediaeval critique of historical aspects of logic is a pretty fringe market.



Edit: Copied here from later in the thread, so I don't lose it.

Summarising my comments on section 2, here are four problems with the argument as it is present.

1. There is a problem in defining a maximum element in a domain that may have no limits.
2. There is a sleight of hand from ens rationis to ens reale, somewhat hidden here but brought out in Free Logic by the invalidity of a move from Ti to E!i.
3. There are four premises to the reductio, any or each of which may be false. That the second assumption is the one that must be rejected is not established.
4. The argument relies on a substitution within an intensional context, at line (5), that is not justified.

And finally, (1) and (3) in combination make the assumption that god exists. This explains why the argument is valid, since it amounts to "god exists, therefore god exists". It also makes the argument circular.


Edit: I placed my summation fo the article here.

Reply to Banno Interesting. Given the interest in nostalgia projects of every kind these days, along with a hatred of modernity, I wouldn't be surprised if Medieval critiques become fashionable again in some circles. :razz:

Quoting Banno

So it seems to me this paper missed it's target by fifty years or so

The relentless grind of progress, eh. Philosophical ideas certainly have short use-by dates in our day and age.

Please try to remain exegetical in thread.

Reply to Banno Reply to Tom Storm

Klima's target is how Anselm's ontological argument has been received and analyzed in contemporary thought, and he's referring to reference as it has affected ontology. Try to make it past the first sentence before finding an offending whole two words that "render the paper obsolete."

First, even if one supposes that Klima, being a medieval specialist, absolutely cannot be well acquainted with modern philosophy of language (dubious), he would no doubt be familiar with how St. Anslem's theory in particular is critiqued in terms of contemporary thought. And the critiques he is pointing to have their genesis in Russell and Frege.

Second, "paradigmatic" does not mean "popular." No interpretation of quantum mechanics is subject to more regular criticism than the original "two worlds" formulation of the Copenhagen Interpretation, yet it remains the paradigm in that it is the last theory to hold wide sway and remains the jumping off point for a wide range of alternative theories, none of which has become hegemonic. The Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy of Language (a popular survey text) and Oxford's alternative both dedicate the most time to Russell and Frege, because they are the foundation from which critiques and alternatives (e.g. Grice, etc.) start from. But also because they had a major affect on other areas of philosophy, of relevance ontology, which is the place where theories of reference intersect with Anselm's argument. Reference here is referred to (lol) in terms of how it led to Quine's formulation, which renewed interest in ontology/metaontology, and continues to be popular there.

Quoting Klima

This account, coupled with the Kantian-Fregean idea of existence as a second-order predicate, i.e., a quantifier, quite naturally leads to Quine’s slogan: “to be is to be a value of a bound variable”.2

This rang a bell.

Quoting Quine reply to Geach

I also am puzzled about the utility and motivation of a second special doctrine which [Geach] puts forward, namely, that quantification is a second-level predicate. He elucidates this doctrine as follows :

" A first-level predicate can be attached to a name, in order to make an assertion about that which the name stands for ; a second-level predicate can be attached to such a first-level predicate in order to make an assertion about that which it stands for. Quine's misunderstanding of second-level pre-dicates arises from his unwillingness to admit that first-level predicates do stand for anything."

This doctrine is, as Mr. Geach remarks, to be found in Frege. It is also espoused in my own first book (1934). But neither of these circumstances counts in favour of the doctrine, and Mr. Geach also says nothing to raise the doctrine above the level of a bare pronunciamento. Surely we can understand quantifiers perfectly well with or without classifying them as predicates which make assertions about that which first-level predicates stand for. Nothing is achieved by this move except the creation of an opportunity to talk of first-level predicates as standing for something.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Try to make it past the first sentence before finding an offending whole two words that "render the paper obsolete."

Yes, the Troll hath arrived, as anticipated:

Quoting Leontiskos

I will make a thread that includes the topic of intentional reference/identity sometime in at least the next month. It will be a reading group, so trolling will not be tolerated.

Banno polled the recent fads in Anglo philosophy and found that Kripke is more popular than Russell. If he had managed to read past the first sentence he would have learned that the paper actually spends more time on Kripke than Russell. But for Banno to read a whole sentence is a remarkable event that should be celebrated. Would that philosophy moved beyond fad-following.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

First, even if one supposes that Klima, being a medieval specialist, absolutely cannot be well acquainted with modern philosophy of language (dubious)

Note that the book in which this chapter is contained was published in 2000. Alongside primary sources, Klima's secondary sources for modern views are from the 1980's and early 90's. Which means that he is 10-15 years ahead of the epoch that Banno remains stuck in.

Gyula Klima is Hungarian, and began his philosophical career in Hungary. Clearly he is more familiar with figures like Kant and Frege, who have a much wider reach than the parochial set of Anglo philosophers from the mid 20th century. But upon moving onto the Anglo-American scene Klima no doubt began to encounter this philosophical descendant of Logical Positivism which encloses Banno's horizon.

Quoting Wayfarer

The relentless grind of progress, eh. Philosophical ideas certainly have short use-by dates in our day and age.

Even old as he is, Banno may live long enough to see all of the philosophers he believes to be so important forgotten in the same way his Hare has been forgotten. Even Banno's big names like Wittgenstein and Kripke are virtually unknown outside of the English-speaking world. So there is more than a little irony here - like the man scoffing at the out-of-date fashion of others while wearing bell-bottoms with a choker.

Reply to bongo fury - So is the idea that Quine is here implicitly abandoning this doctrine that is "espoused in my own first book"? Is Quine here abandoning his idea that, "to be is to be a value of a bound variable"?

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus :up: Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Try to make it past the first sentence before finding an offending whole two words that "render the paper obsolete."

Sorry CT, I have no view on the paper, I was just making a needless quip.

Part 2: The Proof

(Here is a link to Anselm's Proslogion for those interested.)

In this section Klima formulates Anselm's proof according to the principles of the first part of the paper. He gives this formulation in a natural language argument, and then in quantification theory. I will again quote the first paragraph:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 2

With this understanding of Anselm’s conception of the relationship between existence and reference we can see that his argument constitutes a valid proof of God’s existence without committing him either to an ontology overpopulated with entities of dubious status or to the question-begging assumption that the referent of his description exists. In fact, we can see this even within the framework of standard quantification theory, provided we keep in mind that in the context of Anselm’s argument, this context being an ampliative context, we should interpret our variables as ranging over objects of thought, only some of which are objects simpliciter.

Quoting Leontiskos

Is Quine here abandoning his idea that, "to be is to be a value of a bound variable"?

No, just the doctrine received from Frege regarding quantifiers as second-order predicates, that is, as attaching to first order predicates in the manner that first order predicates attach to names. This specific doctrine is being dropped.

Why? Because first order predicates attach to names in a manner that generally assumes the existence of a thing named. Where this is in doubt, the meaningfulness of the sentence is in doubt.

Quine, as a nominalist, would rather not encourage any similar assumption about a predicate. Let's not have the meaningfulness of a predication depend on the existence of a thing or even a property that the predicate denotes (applies to).

That would mess up his proposed application of Russell's method of definite descriptions to the task in question, that of asserting an uncontroversially meaningful sentence denying the existence of Pegasus.

Quoting bongo fury

Quine, as a nominalist, would rather not encourage any similar assumption about a predicate.

Right, ergo:

Quoting Ontological Commitment | SEP

Consider now Quine's insight, on which the quantifier account is based, that it is bound variables rather than singular terms that carry ontological commitment. To implement this insight, Quine simply eliminated singular terms from the language.

So back to your original quote of Klima:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1

[Russell's] account, coupled with the Kantian-Fregean idea of existence as a second-order predicate, i.e., a quantifier, quite naturally leads to Quine’s slogan: “to be is to be a value of a bound variable”.[2]

My understanding is that you are saying Quine rejects the idea that existence is a second-order predicate, and therefore Klima is mistaken in his claim, "[this] quite naturally leads to Quine's slogan..."

Now I don't quite see how your quote from Quine substantiates this, for he literally says, "[The doctrine] is also espoused in my own first book." Regardless, it makes sense to me that Quine would not want to call the quantifier a second-order predicate per se, but that he would nevertheless admit that it does bear on existence in a second-order manner. And in any case, Klima has tied "existence as a second-order predicate" to a Kantian-Fregian confluence, not to Quine, so I don't find the claim about Quine in Klima.

Or am I misunderstanding the motive for your quote? Are you instead affirming Quine's intimation that proposing existence as a second-order predicate lacks coherence?

Ultimately Klima is going to propose existence as some kind of first-order predicate, and he is going to outline an idea which was very well developed in the medieval period, namely an idea that differs from Quine (but also Meinong) with respect to ontological commitment, and Kripke with respect to reference.

Quoting Leontiskos

My understanding is that you are saying Quine rejects the idea that existence is a second-order predicate,

Agreed.

Quoting Leontiskos

and therefore Klima is mistaken in his claim, "[this] quite naturally leads to Quine's slogan..."

Not necessarily, but the claim wants explaining. What is meant to be wrong with the slogan, and what has the doctrine of quantifiers being second order predicates got to do with it?

Quoting Leontiskos

Regardless, it makes sense to me that Quine would not want to call the quantifier a second-order predicate per se, but that he would nevertheless admit that it does bear on existence in a second-order manner.

In what way?

Reply to Leontiskos Banno read the whole paper, which you say you have not yet done, then followed the guidelines you set up in posting about the first section. I was following your instructions.

Having done so, it is disingenuous for you and Tim to then censure me for it. But that's the trouble with presenting an article for critique when what you desire is agreement.

But I am happy for you, Leon, to make this thread about me, if that is what you want.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus
The alternative to descriptivist theory, from the paragraphs following the one I cited above, is some variation on an intentional theory of reference - "linguistic expressions refer to what their users intend by them to refer to in a given context". Perhaps not quite he Humpty Dumpty theory of meaning, "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less", since there is an implicit recognition of a community of "users". And an acknowledgement of modality in that one can refer to things that do not "exist", where what it is to "exist" remains obscure.

In modal terms, there are things in the actual world and things in possible worlds, and we can refer to either. But it might well be closer to the text to use a free logic, in which a singular term - a proper name - maybe used not just for things in the domain, but also for things outside it, hence permitting discussion of "supposita".

In a free logic there are two domains, one, inner domain for things that are really real, and another outer domain for things that are not so real, but we still want to talk about. So the question Anselm raises is, we have the description "a something a greater than which cannot be conceived"; is it in the outer domain, or is it in the inner domain? And much of this part of the article is concerned with showing that this is not the same as asking if there is a greatest something. Seems fine.

We should here make a distinction between two different uses of quantification - of "all" and "some". There is the other use of quantification to say that something is an individual in the domain: "There is exactly one thing that is the author of Tom Sawyer". This is the quantification used by Quine in his "to be is to be the value of a bound variable". Then there is the extension of this applied to the descriptive theories of reference, where "There is exactly one thing that is the author of Tom Sawyer, and it is the very same as Mark Twain" supposedly explains how "Mark Twain" manages to refer to Mark Twain. The former is distinct from the latter, and the former provides one way to talk about what it is to exist, the latter is a somewhat discredited philosophical theory.

Yawn.

(1) g=dfix.~($y)(M(y)(x))
(2) I(g)
(3) ("x)("y)(I(x)&R(y)®M(y)(x)))
(4) R(g)
(a) M(g)(g) [2,3,4, UI, &I, MP]
(b) ($y)(M(y)(g)) [a, EG]
(5) ($y)(M(y)(ix.~($y)(M(y)(x))) [1,b, SI]

Damn, that's ugly.

Quoting bongo fury

In what way?

In the way that quantification brings with it ontological commitment.

Quoting bongo fury

Not necessarily, but the claim wants explaining. What is meant to be wrong with the slogan, and what has the doctrine of quantifiers being second order predicates got to do with it?

Quine is meant to be part of the background for common contemporary interpretations of Anselm, but some of the connections get made throughout the first section. See for example footnote 6:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1

6 W.V.O. Quine: “On What There Is”, in: Quine, W.V.O. 1971. p. 3. By the way, it is interesting that Quine apparently never asked himself: to whom does the name “Wyman” refer? — nobody? — then how do I know that Wyman is not the same as McX? For despite the fact that nothing in the world “wymanizes”, let alone “mcxizes”, Wyman and McX are quite distinguishable imaginary characters in Quine’s paper: Wyman, e.g., is introduced to us as a “subtler mind”, than McX. As we shall see, these questions are easily answerable on the basis of the theory of reference advanced in this paper. Not so on the basis of Quine’s.

Quoting Banno

Damn, that's ugly.

"What Is It Like to Be a Troll?" by Banno with a preface by Thomas Nagel.

Quoting Banno

followed the guidelines

You haven't engaged with the paper at all, so clearly you're not managing to follow the guidelines.
Or in other words: you're derailing another thread, like you always do.

Quoting Leontiskos

You haven't engaged with the paper at all,

:rofl:

(1) g=dfix.~($y)(M(y)(x))

Seems to be, in a more standard notation, g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x). God is defined as the thought object x such that no y may be thought greater than x.

ix is the definite description operator, read as "The x such that...".

Notice that the existence (as a thought) of such an individual is here just assumed.

Why should we make that assumption? In particular, if the definition is self-contradicting, there need be no such individual.

Consider an analogous argument defining the highest number as that number which is higher than any other number. The definition is fine, except that there is no such highest number.

A pretty standard response to that part of the Ontological argument.

That's probably what this is trying to head off:

As he says: “what if someone were to say that there is something greater than everything there is [...] and [that] something greater than it, although does not exist, can still be thought of?” Evidently, we can think of something greater than the thing greater than everything, unless the thing that is greater than everything is the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of. But Anselm’s point here is precisely that although, of course, there is nothing greater than the thing greater than everything, which is supposed to exist, something greater than what is greater than everything still can be thought of, if the thing greater than everything is not the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of. So if the thing greater than everything is not the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of, then something greater still can be thought of; therefore, that than which nothing greater can be thought of can be thought of, even if it is not supposed to exist.

What a mess. So god is not the thing greater than everything, but the thing greater than the thing greater than everything.

Trouble is, that is not what g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) says. God is still a thought object, albeit the greatest thought object.

Reply to Banno - Good. This is what I mean by "engaging the paper." Pontifications from 30,000 feet are something that should only come after we've worked through the paper, in the "free for all" phase.

Quoting Banno

($y)

As above, Klima gives (?y), not ($y).

In fact, much of your quote is a misrepresentation of what Klima writes in the paper. You were presumably copy/pasting without checking to see if the output was accurate. A bit more care would be welcome, given how much people struggle with formal logic even before you start incorporating symbols like $, ", ®.

Quoting Banno

Consider an analogous argument defining the highest number as that number which is higher than any other number. The definition is fine, except that there is no such highest number.

You are saying the number does not exist, but you also require that the thought object of the number does not exist. Is that what you are claiming? That there is no thought object "the highest number"?

Or: that there is no thought object of God as defined by Klima?

Quoting Leontiskos

Good. This is what I mean by "engaging the paper."

Though shalt engage only in ways expected by Leon.

Quoting Leontiskos

In fact, much of your quote is a misrepresentation of what Klima writes in the paper. You were presumably copy/pasting without checking to see if the output was accurate. A bit more care would be welcome, given how much people struggle with formal logic even before you start incorporating symbols like $, ", ®.

What? Those are the symbols in the HTML text you linked.

Ok, so are you claiming g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) is not an accurate presentation of (1)? Then what is?

Quoting Leontiskos

You are saying the number does not exist, but you also require that the thought object of the number does not exist.

No. Kids will ask wha the highest number is. Takes them a while to see that there isn't one. Theists similarly ask what the greatest being is. Since they already think they know the answer, the question is disingenuous.

Quoting Banno

What? Those are the symbols in the HTML text you linked.

Maybe check the book chapter version above. Your web interpreter may be misinterpreting the html encodings (although that would be a bit surprising - I still think it is a copy/paste encoding error).

Reply to Leontiskos Might be.

The analogue you want is the jump from there being no highest number to a number greater than any assignable quantity - to infinity, and beyond! You want to jump from something greater than anything to something greater than greatness...

And the suggestion is that there need be no such thing. But also, that g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) does not give an definition in line with this second account.

Quoting Banno

No. Kids will ask wha the highest number is. Takes them a while to see that there isn't one.

Okay, so you're not actually objecting to step (2) of the proof?

Quoting Banno

Notice that the existence (as a thought) of such an individual is here just assumed.

Klima is explicit that step (2) is a supposition and that step (1) is a definition, so I'm not sure what you're attempting to disagree with.

Quoting Banno

What a mess. So god is not the thing greater than everything, but the thing greater than the thing greater than everything.

We can come back to this, but you seem to be missing the ampliation entirely. The key point of the paragraph you here quoted is the ampliation on "thought," so the fact that your assessment leaves out thought entirely is strong evidence of a misinterpretation. This common misinterpretation is precisely why Klima included that paragraph along with the buildup on ampliation.

Quoting Banno

Might be.

Well can you go back and fix your misrepresentations of Klima? If you are going to call his argument "ugly," at least give his argument instead of some weird symbols that do not occur in his paper.

Quoting Leontiskos

Okay, so you're not actually objecting to step (2) of the proof?

Well, not yet. One at a time.

I did fix the ugly: g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x). I asked you if it was acceptable, and did not yet get a reply.

I'm gonna Pontifications from 30,000 feet again. The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere in the argument. The task for the logician is to find out where.

They must do this because existence cannot result from a deduction. It can only be presumed, either in the argument or in the interpretation.

For the theist, the assumption is often trivial, even self-evident. But not for others.

So the argument will not be of much use in convincing non-theists. As here. But on the other hand, it also does not disprove that god exists, and it may be of use in showing god's nature to theists.

From were I sit it looks to be another example of trying to put the ineffable into words, and getting tongue-tied.

Quoting Banno

I did fix the ugly: g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x). I asked you if it was acceptable, and did not yet get a reply.

Your misrepresentation is still there: (1) g=dfix.~($y)(M(y)(x))
(As well as the other lines of the proof where similar problems occur)

That post of yours is the first place in the thread where Klima's formalization of Anselm's proof occurs, which is why I would like it to be accurate. It is a thread on Anselm's proof, after all.

Quoting Banno

The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere int he argument.

Are you just saying that ontological arguments beg the question? This is a common charge that Klima is aware of. But it must be demonstrated that someone has begged the question. It can't just be asserted.

Quoting Banno

So the argument will not be of much use in convincing non-theists.

I am amused that you claim to have read the paper.

But Banno, if you want to do analytical philosophy, this is a thread for it. That's why I made it - because all these folks think they want rigorous analytical philosophy. Well, this is it. It requires reading, patience, careful thought and interpretation.

Quoting Leontiskos

Klima is explicit that step (2) is a supposition and that step (1) is a definition, so I'm not sure what you're attempting to disagree with.

To be sure, it is not clear that the definition g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) can be made coherently, any more than can "Let G be the number bigger than any other number".

Quoting Leontiskos

Your misrepresentation is still there: (1) g=dfix.~($y)(M(y)(x)) (as well as the other lines of the proof where similar problems occur).

You seem to be talking past me.

a single question, yes or no: is
g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x)
a good representation of line 1? Or do we need to use mathjax?

Reply to Banno

On my computer screen Klima's html version reads as follows:

(1) g=dfix.~(?y)(M(y)(x))

Or if we look at the official book chapter, linked in the OP:

g =[sub]df[/sub] ix.~(?y)(M(y)(x))

(where in both cases i = the descriptor)

Quoting Banno

g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x)

That is what Klima writes, is it not?

I am wondering why <this post> of yours is misrepresenting Klima? Why does it contain symbols and steps that do not appear in Klima's paper? Don't you think we should represent his argument accurately?

Reply to Leontiskos Well, I'd like to talk about the argument rather then the formatting. Can we move on?

Maybe you could reply to what I said about (1).

Quoting Banno

I was wrong about the paper. Sorry for being so stubborn and impatient, and for unnecessarily derailing the thread.

Cool, thanks Banno. I guess we're on the same page that quoting someone accurately or inaccurately makes no difference. Syntactical "formatting" is just a sideshow. Obviously you won't mind that I changed some of the "formatting" of your post. :up:

Quoting Banno

Maybe you could reply to what I said about (1).

Perhaps I can help.

Following the analogue, the first transfinite number is

?:=min{x?x is an ordinal and ?n?N,n
You need something like this, but with g for ?. But notice that ? is an ordinal, and is define as greater than any natural number. This avoids the contradiction that would result if ? were defined as greater than any other ordinal, or as a natural number greater than any natural number.

So you can't just write g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) without a problem, becasue it may be that there is no greatest individual. You need god to be something else, not an individual or not a part of the domain or something, to avoid shooting yourself in the foot.

But if you manage that, you have the analogue of the transfinite numbers - no sooner have you defined g as the greatest, and then you can bring to mind something greater than g, and the problem repeats itself.

So even as there is good reason to think that it is not possible to make sense of "the largest number", it is difficult to see how to make sense of "the greatest individual".

Consider an analogous argument defining the highest number as that number which is higher than any other number. The definition is fine, except that there is no such highest number.

Gaunilo of Marmoutier took this approach by positing an "island greater than which none can be conceived," in order to try to show that Anselm's argument can be used to demonstrate the existence of all sorts of things. But Guanilo's argument is generally seen to fail even by critics of St. Anselm. As with number, there seems to be no maximum for how great and island can be. Just in terms of size, it can always get bigger. But there do seem to intrinsic limits for those properties Anselm associates with God. Perfect knowledge is knowing everything; one does not make their knowledge more perfect by knowing more than all there is to know. Moral perfection is not a quantity, etc. There are intrinsic maximal perfections inherit in these concepts.

This is not to say people haven't brought up challenges to these properties (e.g. that it is contradictory for a being to be both omniscient or omnipotent, etc.), they have. But "more omnipotent than omnipotent," doesn't make sense.

Reply to Banno

The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere in the argument. The task for the logician is to find out where.

Well, if the issue is that the conclusion must be contained in the premises, that's a problem for [I]all[/I] deductive arguments. Hintikka's ol' scandal of deduction. What is being assumed here is the existence of a being of thought. No need to look too hard. The argument is meant to demonstrate that such a being must exist simpliciter if it exists as ens rationis.

But I think real problem for ontological arguments is that they are unconvincing. I don't think anyone has been converted by an ontological argument, or that many people of faith feel their faith significantly bolstered by such arguments. And indeed, there are also atheist logicians who have allowed that modifications of Anselm, Gödel's proof, etc. seem to work and have premises that seem innocuous enough, but are nonetheless not even remotely convinced.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Gaunilo of Marmoutier took this approach

Close, perhaps. This objection is specific to the argument at hand. The intrinsic limit needed is missing from g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x), which is "God is defined as the thought object x such that no y can be thought to be greater than x", and the objection is not that anything might fit this, as that nothing might fit this. The question is, is the idea of such an object coherent? It's analogous to defining a number x such that no number y can be greater than it. There an be no such number.

It doesn't help to say that there may be intrinsic limits to god's greatness, becasue of the way (1) is set out.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

if the issue is that the conclusion must be contained in the premises, that's a problem for all deductive arguments.

Quite so. It would be a surprise if an argument could demonstrate the existence of something ex nihilo, as it were. And yes, what is assumed is a being of thought. But what supposedly pops out of the algorithm is something else. The move from ens rationis to ens reale only works if we already accept that "existing in reality" is a necessary property of the greatest conceivable being.

We can see this more clearly in free logic, taking the inner domain as ens reale and the outer domain as ens rationis. Stealing from the SEP article, the theist would need an argument of the form:
[math]Ti, \forall x(Tx\rightarrow E!x) \vdash E!i[/math]
...where Ti might be the assumption that god is the greatest possible thought object, and E!i that god exists in reality. But such arguments are invalid.

I think it's worth taking a moment to say something here:

Quoting Banno

I'm gonna Pontifications from 30,000 feet again. The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere in the argument. The task for the logician is to find out where.

They must do this because existence cannot result from a deduction. It can only be presumed, either in the argument or in the interpretation.

Quoting Banno

To be sure, it is not clear that the definition g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) can be made coherently...

The trouble with the 30,000 foot view is that everyone is right in their own book at 30,000 feet, as it's just a matter of so-called Reply to common sense (see my bio quote from Hadot on this point). Thus the atheist sees an argument for God's existence and he knows it must be wrong. He sees the conclusion and he infers things about the premises. All he is doing is begging the question (even though it is sometimes practical to beg the question).

The same sort of thing is happening here:

Quoting Banno

...it is not clear that [it] can be made coherently...

Okay, but that sounds like a hunch, much like, "It doesn't smell quite right to me." "It's not clear it can be made coherently." At this point the engagement with the text is minimal (and I will get to the elaboration). "Not clear it can be made coherently," is not a substantive objection to a premise.

Quoting Banno

The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere in the argument.

This is also very similar to the question-begging atheist:

1. All valid ontological arguments beg the question
2. This is a valid ontological argument
3. Therefore, this begs the question

But how does the inductive (1) get to be so strong? And even beyond that, what is "an ontological argument"? As the very first sentence of Klima's introduction implies, that whole label is anachronistic. Certainly Anselm would wonder how one can know that a whole bundle of loosely-affiliated arguments are known to be faulty a priori.

Similarly, the argument, "Some beings of reason are not beings (simpliciter), therefore this being of reason is not a being (simpliciter)," doesn't cut. Klima acknowledges that not all beings of reason are beings. Why think that Klima's (g) is relevantly similar to the idea of a largest number in the first place?

So there is not a lot of rigor in these blanket approaches, and this is why I want to get away from the 30,000 foot view. Luckily, Klima helps us get down to concrete points.

Reply to Leontiskos Yeah, all that, perhaps, but I also gave a very specific critique of (1) in the argument.

At least Tim tried to address it.

And again you misrepresent what I said. I did not claim all ontological argument beg the question. IF the argument is valid, and it shows that something exists, then that must be assumed in the argument somewhere. That's how logic works. The problem isn’t just that the argument assumes its conclusion, since as Tim pointed out all valid deductive arguments do that. It's that it does so in a way that makes the supposed proof of existence trivial. The argument becomes "God exists therefore god exists".

Quoting Banno

So you can't just write g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) without a problem, becasue it may be that there is no greatest individual.

It sounds like you're saying that we can't have a being of reason if it isn't a being. Or in other words: we can't think of what doesn't exist. "X doesn't exist, therefore we cannot think of it." This is what section 1 addresses.

But of course Klima has no premise which says that there is a greatest individual.

Quoting Banno

But if you manage that, you have the analogue of the transfinite numbers - no sooner have you defined g as the greatest, and then you can bring to mind something greater than g, and the problem repeats itself.

So even as there is good reason to think that it is not possible to make sense of "the largest number", it is difficult to see how to make sense of "the greatest individual".

So you are disputing (3), then? Because that is precisely the premise that bears on how the "greater than" predicate cashes out.

-

Quoting Banno

IF the argument is valid, and it shows that something exists, then that must be assumed in the argument somewhere. That's how logic works. The problem isn’t just that the argument assumes its conclusion, since as Tim pointed out all valid deductive arguments do that.

Then I will quote this for the second time today:

Peter van Inwagen, Begging the Question:(Some of my own philosophical arguments have been accused of something very like ‘begging the question’ – I concede the phrase was not used – simply because they were formally valid arguments for a conclusion the accusers thought was false. Their reasoning seems to have been something like this: if the conclusion of an argument can be formally deduced from its premises, then that conclusion is, as one might put it, logically contained in the premises – and thus one who af?rms those premises is assuming that the conclusion is true. As R. M. Chisholm once remarked when confronted with a similar criticism, ‘I stand accused of the fallacy of af?rming the antecedent.’)

(The quote is from a book on ontological arguments.)

Quoting Banno

The argument becomes "God exists therefore god exists".

Do you say that such a thing is begging the question, or not?

Quoting Banno

The move from ens rationis to ens reale only works if we already accept that "existing in reality" is a necessary property of the greatest conceivable being.

But the proof at hand does not assume that, and it nevertheless succeeds in drawing the conclusion. It does not assume that "existing in reality" is a necessary property of the greatest conceivable being. There is certainly no premise to that effect. So you have to deal with the proof. With the paper. If the paper is right then the theory you have on paper turns out to be wrong.

(I think a lot of this comes back to the way you simply overlook Klima's "ampliation".)

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

But I think real problem for ontological arguments is that they are unconvincing. I don't think anyone has been converted by an ontological argument, or that many people of faith feel their faith significantly bolstered by such arguments.

I actually know philosophers who find the argument convincing, but they lack prejudice in an abnormal way. Someone without prejudice who encounters an argument that they cannot find fault with will accept the conclusion, or at least be greatly troubled by it. But that's rare.

I haven't generally found Anselm's argument convincing, but there are presentations which are undeniably beguiling.

Quoting Leontiskos

It sounds like you're saying that we can't have a being of reason if it isn't a being. Or in other words: we can't think of what doesn't exist. "X doesn't exist, therefore we cannot think of it."

No.

And so far I am only looking at premise (1), no further. We can go on when this bit has been understood.

Quoting Leontiskos

But the proof at hand does not assume that

Yeah, it does, and that can be shown. But you wanted small steps.

Quoting Leontiskos

you simply overlook Klima's "ampliation"

Not at all. I address it quite specifically:
Quoting Banno

Trouble is, that is not what g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) says. God is still a thought object, albeit the greatest thought object.

One of the points I made is that Klima does not make use of the "ampliation" in (1), and he ought. The point was repeated and expanded, here:
Quoting Banno

Following the analogue, the first transfinite number is

?:=min{x?x is an ordinal and ?n?N,n
You need something like this, but with g for ?. But notice that ? is an ordinal, and is define as greater than any natural number. This avoids the contradiction that would result if ? were defined as greater than any other ordinal, or as a natural number greater than any natural number.

So you can't just write g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) without a problem, becasue it may be that there is no greatest individual. You need god to be something else, not an individual or not a part of the domain or something, to avoid shooting yourself in the foot.

But if you manage that, you have the analogue of the transfinite numbers - no sooner have you defined g as the greatest, and then you can bring to mind something greater than g, and the problem repeats itself.

So even as there is good reason to think that it is not possible to make sense of "the largest number", it is difficult to see how to make sense of "the greatest individual".

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Gaunilo of Marmoutier took this approach by positing an "island greater than which none can be conceived," in order to try to show that Anselm's argument can be used to demonstrate the existence of all sorts of things.

Yes, and I actually think Klima's interpretation vindicates Anselm's reply to Gaunilo. I added a link to Anselm's Proslogion <here>, and the header will get you to the appended parts with Gaunilo.

But in my opinion Banno is doing something a fair bit different. He is saying something like, "There is no greatest-number-concept; and a greatest-thought-concept is a lot like a greatest-number-concept; therefore there probably is no greatest-thought-concept; and therefore Klima/Anselm is not allowed to define God after the manner of a greatest-thought-concept." Or similarly, "A child might think there is a greatest number, but there is not a greatest number; therefore the child never had the concept of a greatest number in the first place." Banno is engaged in a form of concept denial, which he would need to flesh out.

(And it is worth noting that Banno's objection is much closer to Russell and Quine than Gaunilo's is.)

Quoting Leontiskos

Banno is engaged in a form of concept denial, which he would need to flesh out.

So you want me to flesh out your concept of god for you.

I don't think so.

Quoting Banno

So you want me to flesh out your concept of god for you.

Your objection relies on the idea that some concepts cannot exist even as beings of reason (entia rationis). If you can't flesh out that idea then the objection goes nowhere, given that the whole thrust of section 1 is that for Anselm a being of reason need not be a being (simpliciter).

Quoting Leontiskos

Your objection relies on the idea that some concepts cannot exist even as beings of reason

Yep. Concepts that contradict themselves. Like "The largest number". That's what I explained previously. If your argument is to hold, you have to show that "the greatest thingie" or whatever is not of this sort.

Quoting Banno

And so far I am only looking at premise (1), no further. We can go on when this bit has been understood.

The problem with objecting to the two-place predicate M()() in premise (1) without looking at premise (3) is that premise (3) is the crucial place where that predicate is actually doing work (and it is therefore the locus for understanding the predicate). You are effectively objecting to a possible way that M()() might be used, and the response is, "The place where Klima uses it is premise (3), and if his usage in premise (3) does not contravene your stricture on a possible way that it cannot be used, then the objection to this possible misuse of M()() has nothing to do with Klima's formulation of Anselm's proof."

Quoting Banno

One of the points I made is that Klima does not make use of the "ampliation" in (1), and he ought.

That's a remarkable claim. Why don't you think he is making use of ampliation in (1)? And how ought he have made use of it?

Quoting Banno

Yep. Concepts that contradict themselves. Like "The largest number".

Why does "the largest number" contradict itself? It seems to me that ? produces an infinite loop, not a contradiction.

Quoting Leontiskos

The problem with objecting to the two-place predicate M()() in premise (1) without looking at premise (3) is...

If you want to raise your own objection, go ahead. I've raised mine, with (1), and you have yet to address it.

Quoting Leontiskos

Why don't you think he is making use of ampliation in (1)?

I explained that, with the comparison to infinity and transfinite numbers given then quoted above. TO achieve the desired ampliation one needs to go a step past g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x), just as one can't get to infinity by iteratively picking the next highest number.

I'm sorry you are not following this, but that's the third time I've made the point.

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Quoting tim wood

Will someone be good enough to provide as an aid to navigation a simple proposition expressing exactly what they think Anselm proves?

Anselm's proof is for the conclusion that God "has to exist also in reality."

Quoting tim wood

And the same service for Gyula Klima's paper?

In order to understand what a paper contains one must read it. That's what we are doing. We are reading the paper. We are on section 2 of 5. Once we finish the paper we will be positioned to answer the question of what the paper is about. You can't say what a paper is about before you have read (and understood) it.

So I would be happy to talk about your first question regarding Anselm's proof, but as to your second question, I do not think we are yet positioned to answer it. In fact the second question ignores the OP and seeks an understanding of the paper before we have even moved on to section 3. I think it is good for philosophers to take their time in this way - to not draw their conclusions until all of the arguments and sections have been examined. Until all of the pages of the book have been read. In any case, that's what I want to do in this thread.

Let’s look at ampliation in relation to Banno’s objection:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1

But that it was essentially the same conception of reference that was at work in his mind when he formulated his arguments in the Proslogion is clearly shown by his insistence against Gaunilo that his crucial description “that than which nothing greater can be thought of” is in no way to be equated with “greater than everything”. It is precisely the ampliative force, recognized as such by 12th-century logicians, that is missing from the latter, and is missed from it, though not described as such, by Saint Anselm in his response to Gaunilo’s objection.

Let’s consider three different options with respect to the greatest number:

• First: "The greatest number"
• Second: "The greatest number one can think of"
• Third: "The number than which no number can be thought to be greater"

For the moment let’s stick with the first and second options.

So suppose @Banno and @Count Timothy von Icarus are on a game show where they are asked a question, and they both have to answer the question within two seconds. If they were asked a question about the first option, “What is the greatest number?,” there would be no answer.

But what if we take a particular instantiation of the second option? “What is the greatest number you can think of?” With two seconds to answer, @Banno says x and @Count Timothy von Icarus says y. In fact as long as x != y one of the two numbers will be greater than the other, and either @Banno or @Count Timothy von Icarus will have won the round.

Similarly, children (or adults too) might play the game, “What is the greatest number one can think of?” We can imagine the dialogue:

• One hundred
• One million!
• One billion
• One billion plus 1
• One billion times one billion
• 2 undecillion (the number of rubles that Russia fined Google)

Eventually someone might offer an analogy as an answer to the question: < x:? :: 0.999… : 1 >
(Whether or not we think this makes sense)

Similarly Banno offers the following, a worthy candidate:

Quoting Banno

?:=min{x?x is an ordinal and ?n?N,n

Now in the game show and in each of the children’s answers, the concept, “The greatest number one can think of” is operative. That is precisely the concept they are using to formulate their answers. So the idea that there is no such concept looks to be mistaken.

The fact that “thought” is incorporated into option 2 in a way that it is not incorporated into option 1 is a form of ampliation. “Thought” is part of the option itself. To talk about option 1 instead of option 2 would be a form of equivocation which avoids the ampliation. Indeed, option 2 represents a concept which produces determinate answers when engaged, but which has no determinate answer of itself. Nevertheless, each of the determinate answers it produces when engaged does have a form of determination qua the thought of the engaging individual (namely it will represent something like a personal limit on number knowledge).

Now suppose someone believes that they have a proof (say, from mathematical induction) that there is no greatest number (or else greatest prime, which is more fun). In that case they will believe that option 1 represents a contradiction (via their proof), but the question of the status of the concept is still an open question (given the fact that not everyone possesses such a proof, valid or invalid).

Quoting Banno

Concepts that contradict themselves.

But you know full well that you haven't demonstrated a contradiction:

Quoting Banno

good reason to think that it is not possible

Good reason != contradictory proof

Quoting tim wood

Will someone be good enough to provide as an aid to navigation a simple proposition expressing exactly what they think Anselm proves? And the same service for Gyula Klima's paper?

Anselm thinks he proves that the very idea of god shows that He exists. He's mistaken. Klima realises this, but still sees a use for such arguments in explaining to non-theists how theists think about the world. He is specifically advocating not becoming involved in the sort of discussion now occurring here, that the parties 'should not seek sheer “winning” in a debate'.

Quoting Banno

He is specifically advocating not becoming involved in the sort of discussion now occurring here, that the parties 'should not seek sheer “winning” in a debate'.

Rather, Klima thinks debating and argument is crucially important, particularly with respect to fine and concrete points. This is what we are doing right now.

Eristic is always a problem, but if you look at your early posts in this thread I think you will find no other posts exhibiting more eristic than those. One of them does nothing more than accuse Klima's argument of being "ugly."

Without taking some time to wrestle with Anselm's proof one has no sense of the problems and intricacies involved. We have a whole forum of threads full of 30,000 foot pontifications, typed out in a Twitter-esque flurry of keyboard strokes. Let's do something different in this thread. Besides, the "free for all" will come in due time. Is working through a paper really such an undue burden? Do we always have to take a position on a paper before we read it carefully?

(This thread is also meant to have a low barrier to entry, in the sense that right now anyone could read a handful of pages and jump into the thread. They don't have to read a book or know a whole tradition before contributing meaningfully. They don't even have to read an entire article. That low barrier to entry is crucially important if different traditions are going to engage each other rather than merely talk past one another.)

Quoting Leontiskos

Similarly Banno offers the following, a worthy candidate:

But Leon, this is not a candidate for the greatest number. That's the point. It's the first (defined by "min") of a whole new sequence of numbers greater than any natural number.

Similarly, no sooner do you think of a being greater than any other, than you can think of a being greater than that individual. The series need have no end.

The ampliation is found in this:

As he says: “what if someone were to say that there is something greater than everything there is [...] and [that] something greater than it, although does not exist, can still be thought of?” Evidently, we can think of something greater than the thing greater than everything, unless the thing that is greater than everything is the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of. But Anselm’s point here is precisely that although, of course, there is nothing greater than the thing greater than everything, which is supposed to exist, something greater than what is greater than everything still can be thought of,if the thing greater than everything is not the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of. So if the thing greater than everything is not the same as that than which nothing greater can be thought of, then something greater still can be thought of; therefore, that than which nothing greater can be thought of can be thought of, even if it is not supposed to exist.

See the bolded bit? Notice that in the definition of the lowest transfinite number, ? is defined as an ordinal using natural numbers? That's an example of ampliation, where we use natural numbers to reach beyond themselves. That's what Klima wants to do with Anselm, to get beyond being. He seems to see this but does not reflect it in his definition of god, g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x), were M is "... can be thought to be greater than...". He defines god as the greatest thing that can be thought of, and there is no guarantee that there is any such thing.

g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) does not work becasue there might simply always be some y such that y is greater than x.

Now he may well address this at some point, and we may find it as we work through the paper, but since this is the fourth or fifth time I have made this point, and you still resist it, refusing to see what is before you, I'm thinking it will not be worth my continuing with this discussion.

Your animosity towards me leads you to simply gainsay my every point. See Reply to Leontiskos where you deny something that Klima says quite explicitly and which I quoted.

And you misrepresent my saying that the parsing of his argument, the formatting, was ugly as my saying that the argument was ugly.

Is it worth my while to be here? Do you want an honest criticism, or are you only after comments by those who agree with you?

I suggest you do some reflection on why you put this thread here in the first place, and get back to us.

Quoting Banno

That's an example of ampliation, where we use natural numbers to reach beyond themselves.

What is your idea here? Is it that ampliation has to do with "reaching beyond themselves," and so that if something is reaching beyond it is ampliating? I am not following why you think this is ampliation.

Quoting Banno

He defines god as the greatest thing that can be thought of, and there is no guarantee that there is any such thing.

Again, if we needed a guarantee that something actually exists before conceptualizing it, then every being of reason would be a being. Then we could in no way think about what does not exist.

Quoting Banno

g:=ix¬(?y)M(y,x) does not work becasue there might simply always be some y such that y is greater than x.

I think Klima and Anselm would say, "Yes, of course there might always be some y such that y is greater than x."
(That is, the thing-being-thought need not be greater than everything that in fact exists. This even seems like a theistic truism.)

Quoting Banno

But Leon, this is not a candidate for the greatest number. That's the point. It's the first (defined by "min") of a whole new sequence of numbers greater than any natural number.

Similarly, no sooner do you think of a being greater than any other, than you can think of a being greater than that individual. The series need have no end.

Okay, then I misunderstood what you were saying. But I still don't see that you have an argument against the concept. Read my last paragraph <here>, where I grant the idea of a proof against a greatest number (even though you haven't provided such a proof). That is: even if one has a bona fide proof that the concept does not exist in reality (i.e. is not a being), it does not therefore follow that the concept itself does not exist (i.e. that there is no being of reason/entia rationis).

The discussion of whether the concept "the greatest number" can be a real concept even without existing in reality is directly parallel to the points that Klima makes in the first section of the paper. This is not irrelevant.

Quoting Banno

And you misrepresent my saying that the parsing of his argument, the formatting, was ugly as my saying that the argument was ugly.

Not at all. You went out of your way to call Klima's argument ugly, which is eristic. And when I pointed out that you mis-quoted Klima and included all sorts of symbols that do not occur in his argument at all, you refused to correct your misrepresentation (a number of times). If you don't want to be here, that's your call. I would rather interact with people who accurately represent their interlocutor's arguments and correct blatant errors of misrepresentation when they are made aware of them. (For the umpteenth time, why the hell does your quote of Klima contain dollar signs, quotation marks, and the "registered trademark" symbol? No such symbols are present in his formulation of Anselm's proof.)

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Quoting tim wood

But as it seems the thread was also about Anselm's proof, I opted in.

Fair enough. Anselm's proof is definitely a big part of the paper. I tried to highlight that in the OP:

Quoting Leontiskos

Its focal point is St. Anselm’s famous proof for God’s existence, although that proof is not what the paper is ultimately centered on.

-

Quoting tim wood

God, it appears, is by Anselm reckoned as that than which & etc. And that seems a matter of definition and presupposition - thus not proved.

As I said earlier, in section 2 Klima gives his formulation of Anselm's proof "in a natural language argument, and then in quantification theory" (Reply to Leontiskos). Banno has been focusing on the latter, but presumably a lot of people would rather talk about the former. Here it is:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 2

By the meaning of the term,

(1) God is the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater

Now suppose that

(2) God is only in the intellect (i.e. God is thought of, but does not exist)

But certainly

(3) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can be thought to be greater than any thought object that is only in the intellect

And it cannot be doubted that

(4) God can be thought to exist in reality

Therefore,

(5) Some thought object can be thought to be greater than the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater [1,2,3,4]

which is a contradiction, whence we have to abandon our supposition that God is only in the intellect, so he has to exist in reality, too.

(A link to Anselm's original work was given <here>.)

So do you find any problems in Klima's natural language formulation of Anselm's proof?

What a prat.

Quoting Banno

What a prat.

:roll:

Quoting Banno

Your animosity towards me leads you to simply gainsay my every point.

You are here projecting your own difficulties. For example, when I asked you a question we both knew the answer to, you decided to lie instead of tell the truth. And when I asked you to remove the misrepresentative dollar signs etc. from your "quotation" of "Klima's proof," you simply refused to do so, even though you know that one should not insert random symbols into quotations of others (regardless of how they got there).

And that shit gets old, Banno. The desire to accurately quote one's interlocutors seems like a sine qua non for engagement on a philosophy forum.

(A general point to note: within the premodern metaphysical vision, particularly in Neoplatonism and Christian theology, being was understood as a form of plenitude—what the ancients called the Pleroma, the 'fullness of being'. From this perspective, being is not a neutral or arbitrary descriptor, but an expression of fullness, goodness, and actuality, compared to which non-existence or non-being is a privation or deficiency. The ontological argument, then, is not simply about correct use of language but is grounded in this intuition of the inherent meaning of Being.

Also worth noting that for the medievals, arguments for God’s existence were devotional as much as polemical —they were edifying ideas intended to elevate the mind toward the Divine. The ontological argument, in this context, is not merely a logical proof but an intellectual prayer, grounded in the awareness of the fullness of being (Pleroma) as identical with the absolute Good.)

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So I'll set aside Leon's endless requests to repeat myself and take the criticism of (1) as read.

(2) is the assumption that god, as defined in (1), is a thought, or can be though, or some such. Since it uses (1) it brings with it the difficulties of (1). So it assumes that god is a consistent concept. It also depends on the somewhat strained idea that a thought exists, which will need to be filled out elsewhere. I'm reasonably happy to set that aside, since as mentioned we might be able to use a free logic talk about things that "do not exist", in the sense of being empty names. But if the thought of god is not coherent, then (2) collapses.

So to
(3). ?x?y(I(x)?R(y)?M(y,x))
This says that for any x and any y, where x is in the intellect but y is real, y can be thought greater than x. This requires some attention, because it is mainly here that the presumption that god exists slips in. It's sitting there in plain sight, in that we have it that from (1) that there is a greatest thing, and here the presumption that that greatest thing is real.

Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist?

That is, why must we accept this assumption? But moreover, in accepting this assumption, we are accepting what the argument claims to show, that the greatest conceivable thing exists.

Quoting tim wood

But before starting, am I to understand you have no problems with it?

Klima claims that the proof is valid, and it looks to me that he is correct.

Quoting tim wood

Then this thought object cannot be quantified in any way, for to be quantified entails that another, greater, can be thought. And this here is fatal. Need we go on?

I see you saying, "This thought object can't be quantified, and that's fatal." I'm not sure I understand the objection.

Quoting Banno

So I'll set aside Leon's endless requests to repeat myself and take the criticism of (1) as read.

And moving on is fine, but I want to highlight that this objection of yours is precisely the sort of Quinian question-begging that Klima wanted to offer an alternative to in the first section of his paper:

Quoting Banno

He defines god as the greatest thing that can be thought of, and there is no guarantee that there is any such thing.

("If there is no guarantee of existence, then conceptualization is not possible.")

Quoting Banno

But if the thought of god is not coherent, then (2) collapses.

This is a repetition of your objection to (1).

Quoting Banno

(3). ?x?y(I(x)?R(y)?M(y,x))
This says that for any x and any y, where x is in the intellect but y is real, y can be thought greater than x. This requires some attention, because it is mainly here that the presumption that god exists slips in. It's sitting there in plain sight, in that we have it that from (1) that there is a greatest thing, and here the presumption that that greatest thing is real.

If one wants to object to (3), they need to provide an objection to (3). They can't say, "If we allow this, then God exists. But I am an atheist so we can't allow it." That's begging the question.

Beyond that, remember Klima's point in section 1 where Gaunilo mistakenly takes Anselm to be saying that "we have it that from (1) that there is a greatest thing."

Quoting Banno

Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist?

That is precisely what the argument does. (2) supposes that the greatest thing can be conceived of but is not real.

Quoting Wayfarer

A general point to note: within the premodern metaphysical vision, particularly in Neoplatonism and Christian theology, being was understood as a form of plenitude—what the ancients called the Pleroma, the 'fullness of being'. From this perspective, being is not a neutral or arbitrary descriptor, but an expression of fullness, goodness, and actuality, compared to which non-existence or non-being is a privation or deficiency.

Yes, and this bears on premise (3):

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 2

(3) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can be thought to be greater than any thought object that is only in the intellect

To contradict this is to say that a thought object is not thought to be greater in virtue of its being thought to exist. Or simplified: fiction is as good as the real thing - a fiction that is in fact realized is no greater than an unrealized fiction (where both are thought objects).

Quoting Wayfarer

Also worth noting that for the medievals, arguments for God’s existence were devotional as much as polemical

This is true. But I would add that they are philosophical as much as they are devotional or polemical. Moreso, I would say. That is, Anselm is trying to engage in rigorous thinking, and this comes out when one reads him.

Quoting Wayfarer

The ontological argument, in this context, is not merely a logical proof but an intellectual prayer

Yes, it is a way in which one approaches God, and in that sense there is a measure of reverence involved. Anselm does not take it to be inconsequential or unimportant, as mere "logic chopping" might be.

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Quoting tim wood

Thus this God can have, on this construction, no fixed aspect at all, and since everything that exists in reality has some fixed aspect, it must be that God does not exist in reality.

Well this looks like an argument against God, and I'm struggling to see how it derives from "this construction" (namely Klima/Anselm's definition of God). In any case, most theists would agree that God does not have fixed aspects. To use your descriptors, he is not tall, short, big, or small. So that seems fine.

Quoting tim wood

Further, it is adduced without proof that objects in reality are greater than objects of thought. Yet lots of things are clearly greater as objects of thought than as instantiated in reality. E.g., two, justice, love, The American Way, and even God himself.

Okay, so here you are disputing premise (3). Let's take one of your examples: justice. Suppose I have a thought of . This thought is in my intellect but it is not in reality. But now suppose that the thought of is both in my intellect and in reality (i.e. there is truly justice in Massachusetts). Is not this second thought greater than the first?

(A little different from the paper since we are flubbing "can be thought to exist," but that's probably fine for our purposes.)

Quoting tim wood

And finally, as a being conceived - in any way whatever - He must be conceived by a conceiver. And who might that be? It cannot be God. Me? You? Banno? We will all have different conceptions; does that mean different Gods?

Yes, this is an interesting objection, although it does not critique any particular premise of Klima's argument.

I guess I don't see why the definition in (1) must be exhaustive, as if our conception exhausts that than which nothing greater can be thought (indeed, were it exhausted it presumably could not be what it purports to be). Nevertheless, there could be conceptions which are not only different but also contradictory. Presumably the theist would here reply that the conception is not infallible. For example, if my argument about justice succeeds then an existing thought object is greater than a non-existing thought object. But other predicates may not be so easy.

The other question is this: how much would we disagree on what is greater? If contradiction and not mere difference is required, then there must be substantial disagreement on what is greater in order for the premise of the objection to succeed.

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Quoting tim wood

And I think it's pretty clear that Anselm's God cannot meet these criteria. Nor, for that matter, do (I think) any of the original Christian thinkers think that He could or did.

If God is "that than which nothing greater can be thought" then he is necessarily omnipotent, from which it would seem to follow that he can meet any criteria he likes.

Reply to Janus - Haha :grin:

-

Reply to tim wood - I like Janus' answer. I know you think the early Christians did not believe that God exists, but luckily we don't have to discuss that theory in this thread.

You can just assume basic, colloquial dictionary definitions for any words we are using.

And so to (4) R(g) - god can be thought to exist in reality.

Well, given the criticism of (1), this is unsound - if god is perhaps contradictory as discussed above then (4) is false.

But also "to exist in reality" remains obtuse. Reply to tim wood makes this point. Using a free logic might have made this clearer, but this would have exhibited the flaw in the argument by clarifying how "exists in reality" might be understood.

(a) M(g,g) God can be thought to be greater than god. This is a valid deduction - it follows from the premises. There is the obvious problem of god being thought to be greater than himself. If you are happy with that, then all is fine, but if this strikes you as a bit rich, then this might well be treated as a reductio, showing that at least one of the premises is on the nose. But we already have it that none of the premises is unproblematic. So it's not a surprise that the conclusion is odd.

Again, the argument is valid, but unsound. Validity is not an issue here.

Then Klima uses existential generalisation to move from M(g,g) to (b) ?y M(y,g) - from god is greater than god to something is greater than god. Again, this is valid, but it is in effect a generalisation from a contradiction. And anything can be validly proven from a contradiction.

The final numbered step, (5), is a substitution, putting the definition from (1) in to (b). This is a valid step, provided substitution is valid, and substitution is valid only in an extensional context. It may be worth keeping this in mind. One place in which substitution is famously not valid is in the context of thoughts, and that is precisely the context with which this argument deals. SO the argument again potentially fails, at step (5).

For some reason Klima stops numbering his steps here, at the point were he presents his reductio. In particular, he says: "But then, since (1), (3) and (4) have to be accepted as true, (2) has to be rejected as false". Klima want us to agree to all the premises except the one that says god is only in the intellect - and so conclude that god must not exist only in the intellect.

But there are good - excellent - reason to doubt (3), and (4), as well as the definition in (1).

Overall, the argument is valid but a long way from sound.

Quoting tim wood

I'm pretty sure you know enough logic to know that truth and validity are not the same thing.

The wonder of Anselm's proof is that it does something that we think it should not be able to do, and it is very hard to say why it is wrong, or at least to say why rigorously. At this point the argument looks to be sound. It is valid and there are no premises that are clearly or demonstrably false.

At this point in the thread I want to limit myself to what I call "close arguments," (or close objections), namely objections which stay close to the proof itself. These are basically arguments that attack a premise or an inference, or that try to stay very close to the interlocutor's paradigm. I don't find any of the close arguments convincing. So far, Banno's "close objection" is the one that stands out in the thread, but at the end of the day it looks to me like he is doing little more than gesturing towards the idea that the definition itself might be contradictory.

(I see that Reply to Banno just now managed to read the argument more carefully, thus for the first time recognizing that it is a reductio.)

I'm sure that later on there will be opportunity to talk about objections that do not stay close to the proof, such as Aquinas', Kant's, or Frege's.

Quoting Banno

(a) M(g,g) God can be thought to be greater than god. This is a valid deduction - it follows from the premises. There is the obvious problem of god being thought to be greater than himself. If you are happy with that, then all is fine, but if this strikes you as a bit rich, then this might well be treated as a reductio, showing that at least one of the premises is on the nose.

You are going to embarrass yourself again by going so fast and not taking enough care. (a) is the root of the reductio itself, for (b) contradicts (1), and yet (5) is what in fact maps to Anselm's argument, not (b). Klima explicitly tells us that, "(the intermediate steps (a) and (b) are inserted here only to facilitate recognizing how an actual derivation might proceed)." What he is doing is presenting the same argument twice, once in natural language and once in standard quantification theory. (a) and (b) are meant to help explicate the space between (4) and (5) in the quantification theory rendering.

Or more simply: you imply that Klima wants to reject (2) and keep (a). That is entirely wrong. In fact he wants to reject (2) because of (a).

I will have to respond to the rest later.

Reply to Janus :wink:

Quoting Janus

That is why sensible people who have faith in god or gods don't bother with such paltry arguments and the time-wasting talking-past-the-other that this thread so amply exemplifies.

But here we are...

Reply to Banno - Pulling in quotes from a different thread in order to make it appear as if something was said here? To make it look like the "this thread" from Janus' post in a different thread is a reference to this thread we are in? You're a straight up liar, aren't you Banno? You're literally willing to go around lying through your teeth to make yourself look good. That's pretty psychotic, man. :down:

Then there is this odd paragraph.

Evidently, this piece of reasoning cannot be torpedoed on the basis that it presupposes that there is something than which nothing greater can be thought of, as it only requires that something is thought of than which nothing greater can be thought of. But Anselm makes it clear that anyone who claims to understand the phrase “that than which nothing greater can be thought of” has to think of something than which nothing greater can be thought of, which, therefore, being thought of, is in the intellect, as its object. By the above argument we can see, however, that it cannot be only in the intellect, whence we concluded that it has to be in reality, too.

It is apparently an attempt to foreclose on the criticism that the argument begs the question, that it "presupposes" its conclusion, that the argument does not assume "that than which nothing greater can be thought" exists in reality, but that "that than which nothing greater can be thought" exists in thought. That instead of assuming "that than which nothing greater can be thought" exists, it assumes "that than which nothing greater can be thought" is conceivable in a non-trivial way. But that is exactly the issue raised with (1), that it is not clear that one can coherently conceive of "that than which nothing greater can be thought". It also ignores the issue of whether conceivability can entail real existence.

Anselm's ontological argument presents a few riddles for cognitive science, and presents a problem for Realism in general.

Suppose you are a self avowed Realist who is currently in America, and you want to justify making a conceptual distinction between your thoughts about Paris on the one hand, and the actual place called Paris on the other, that you like to think of as 'transcending' your personal experiences. How can you justify your a priori distinction to yourself without appealing to Anselm-like ontological arguments?

Similarly, when anxious we often like to remind ourselves that our feared imagined future isn't the same thing as the actual future. One way we might convince ourselves of this distinction is by imaging the 'actual future' more vividly and 'realistically' than our feared future. This cognitive therapy, which essentially involves replacing one delusion with another, is the same as the 'step' as in Anselm's ontological argument.

I would hazard a guess that although people neither need nor use 'reality' in the sense of an all-encompassing and absolute concept in their everyday lives, when pushed into a corner to provide a definition of 'reality' they will offer a circular definition of "reality" very much like the average philosopher, that more or less amounts to the most realistic thing they can conceive, that must 'exist' because nothing greater can be conceived.

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Part 3. The Atheist, Who is Not a Fool

I want to open up the third section for anyone who wants to move on. Those who want to keep looking at earlier sections are of course welcome to do so.

In this section Klima takes a step back from Anselm's proof and catalogues some of the different ways that the theist and the atheist might argue for or against Anselm's proof (indeed we have seen in this thread some of the very approaches he outlines). Following Anselm, he tries to zero in on "those basic requirements of rationality that the Fool seems to fail to meet." My impression is that this section of the paper is an intermediate link that doesn't do a great deal of work in itself. It seems to be setting up the problematic that section 4 will address. Further, it is perhaps easing us into a meta-analysis in which the tools provided by section 1 can be brought to bear.

Note that when Klima speaks of "the next argument," he is referring to chapters 3 and 4 of Anselm's Proslogion, which follow upon the argument that Klima formulated in section 2 of the paper. Anselm is there using the conclusion of the proof as a premise in a second argument which reinforces the conclusion that God indeed exists. It seems that this second argument doesn't add much to the first, and more than anything is meant to clarify the outcome.

Again quoting the first words of the section:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 3

It seems, therefore, that all that Anselm’s proof requires is that modicum of rationality which is needed to understand a simple descriptive phrase, to reflect on what the description implies, and to conclude to these implications concerning the thought object one has in mind as a result of understanding the description.

Note: This thread has attracted some fervent atheists who are strongly predisposed to opposing Anselm’s proof. These atheists should be forewarned that when Klima uses words like “Saint” and “Fool” in this chapter, he is trying to stay close to Anselm’s language in the Proslogion. At this point in the paper he is still engaged a close commentary on the historical proof itself.

Reply to Leontiskos

On the argument, there seems to be a few issues. The first is "greater than." A critic can equivocate on this and argue that it properly applies only to number (or more properly, magnitude) and that there is no "perfect" or maximal magnitude. This is in part why Norman Malcom switches to an "unlimited entity," (which he shows must exist in all worlds if it exists in any possible one).

This brings us to the second problem, people [I]are[/I] frequently confused by what is meant by "unlimited," "infinite," "transcendent," etc. This is why Hegel, in the Greater Logic, feels he must distinguish between the "good infinity" (viz. true transcendence, being without limit) and the "bad infinity" (viz. an unending series as supposed through mathematical induction, i.e., "just keep adding +1 ad infinitum").

You see this sort of confusion all the time. In the Moral Landscape, Sam Harris opines that a transcendent or Platonic good must be irrelevant to conscious creatures, since it is always beyond the world of sensation. But this is simply confusion, a vision of transcendence where the transcendent is somehow [I]absent[/I] from what it transcends. In the classical tradition all finite good, even what merely appears good, participates in the Good. As St. Augustine says, God is "within everything, yet contained in nothing." This is because such a good is actually transcendent, not limited by the borders of the world.

What can we say to this confusion? Well, for one, it is worth noting that just because some people fail to grasp a concept does not mean it is problematic or cannot be used in valid proofs. I've seen people stubbornly resist the conclusion of the Monte Hall Problem, or claim that infinite multitudes or magnitudes are "unthinkable," and thus "unintelligible." Does the failure of some to "get it" or the recalcitrance of some finitists somehow impune something like Cantor's diagonal argument?

Nor is the idea of unlimited being somehow a Christian dogma absent from the rest of philosophy. It is in Pagan thought prior to Christianity, in Jewish thought, in Islamic thought, in Hindu thought, etc. One finds appeals to it in contemporary thought that makes no appeal to any particular religious tradition, or in New Age syncretism. Many disparate philosophies have come, seemingly independently, to the concept of unlimited being (a being that is no thing) and the distinction between nihil per infinitatem (nothing on account of infiniteness) and nihil per privationem (nothing on account if privation).Therefore, the atheist rejection of the first premise on the grounds that the concept is "incoherent" or "unthinkable" seems weak. Folks as diverse as Plotinus, Hegel, Rumi, and Shankara have had no more of a problem with it than (orthodox) Christians. Atheist scholars of mysticism, esoterica, or religion also seem to have no issue [I]thinking[/I] of it.

But we might suppose that such a concept [I]is[/I] hard to fully take in. Whole books are dedicated to explaining what the truly limitless entails. In which case, we might suppose that the argument could suffer from a premise that is not as well known as its conclusion. For the person of abiding faith, or who had received revelation, God's existence is obvious. Even for those who struggle in faith, other arguments (e.g. from teleology) might be more convincing. So, the conclusion is well known to some. Yet the premise involves our conception of an aspect of God's essence, which is generally thought to be unknowable (e.g. St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory Palamas, etc.), even if "being without limit" is something approachable through the via negativa. To be sure, some will argue that since we can know "that God is," (existence) we must grasp essence in a muddled and confused way (perhaps through God's energies, and either natural or divine illumination), but this still leaves the premise not particularly well known. By contrast, the faithful certainly hope to know the conclusion in a way that is more solid than the premise.

Finally, atheist opponents who are in favor of "brute fact" explanations of the existence and quiddity of, ultimately, [I]everything[/I], really don't have a leg to stand on in calling out opponents on account of "unintelligiblity." This is a far more obvious (and quite common) instance of what is virtually always a very ad hoc appeal to the entirely conceptually vacuous to decide an issue. "Why? It just is."

This is relevant in that infinite, unlimited being is often called upon to ground metaphysics. The claim that this is "unintelligible" while putting forth "it just is, for no reason at all" as the root explanation for everything is more than a little ironic, particularly when the ad hoc appeal to brute fact is paired with eliminativism or deflationism re causes, such that everything "just is" and explanation seems to be little more than a hallucination resulting from inexplicable constant conjunction in the first place (isn't this just epistemic nihilism with extra steps?)

Summarising my comments on section 2, here are four problems with the argument as it is present.

1. There is a problem in defining a maximum element in a domain that may have no limits.
2. There is a sleight of hand from ens rationis to ens reale, somewhat hidden here but brought out in Free Logic by the invalidity of a move from Ti to E!i.
3. There are four premises to the reductio, any or each of which may be false. That the second assumption is the one that must be rejected is not established, especially as the other three are shown to be questionable.
4. The argument relies on a substitution within an intensional context, at line (5), that is not justified.

And finally, (1) and (3) in combination make the assumption that god exists. This explains why the argument is valid, since it amounts to "god exists, therefore god exists". It also makes the argument circular.

Reply to sime Yep. It's pretty hard to work with an empty domain, so we do tend to suppose that something exists. That something exists rather than nothing can be seen as somewhat puzzling, a bemusement the ontological proof plays on - what has been called "ontological shock". It tries to show the necessity of something beyond the stuff of the world. But it fails in the detail.

One can take it as given that something exists, ontological shock and all, and admit that this is a puzzle without demanding an answer.

Which gives me another chance to quote a favourite from Dave Allen:

The Pope and an atheist are having a discussion...

and it slowly gets more and more heated until eventually the Pope can't take it anymore and he says to the atheist - "You are like a man who is blindfolded, in a dark room who is looking for a black cat that isn't there."

The atheist laughs and says - "With all due respect, we sound awfully similar. You are like a man who is blindfolded, in a dark room who is looking for a black cat that isn't there but the difference is you think you've found it.

Edit: This is also a reply to Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus. The non-theist need not maintain that the various notions of "unlimited being" are unintelligible, but can agree that it may be intelligible to some degree while maintain that it has not been demonstrated that this "unlimited being" is the same as say the Christian god, or indeed any god. That there is stuff may be a mystery, but there is no need to prefer the answer supposedly given by the ontological argument, especially since that argument is fraught with problems.

One can simply admit "I don't know". This at the least has the appeal of honesty.

And so to section Three.

It seems, therefore, that all that Anselm’s proof requires is that modicum of rationality which is needed to understand a simple descriptive phrase, to reflect on what the description implies, and to conclude to these implications concerning the thought object one has in mind as a result of understanding the description.

So this section takes the previous argument as valid and sound. Perhaps seeing that it is not sound requires more than a modicum of rationality?

So to the second of Anselm's proofs.

If you understand the phrase “something which cannot be thought not to exist”, you have to think of something which cannot be thought not to exist. But what cannot be thought not to exist is certainly greater than anything that can be thought not to exist. So, if that than which nothing greater can be thought of were something that can be thought not to exist, then something greater than that than which nothing greater can be thought of could be thought of, which is impossible. Therefore, that than which something greater cannot be thought of cannot be thought not to exist.

The change here is in emphasis rather than form. Much the same problems can bee seen as in the first argument. There might simply not be a “something which cannot be thought not to exist”, despite our being able to think about it, just as there is no greatest number, despite our being able to think about a greatest number.

The argument also depended on the ill-conceived notion of "necessary existence". How one is to make sense of a something that supposedly exists in every possible world is contentious. In particular, in S5, if something exists necessarily, then everything exists necessarily, and the distinction between the possible and the necessary collapses. See Modal Collapse.

Quoting tim wood

Just like Zeus, eh? Btw, do you stop to think about what omnipotent means and implies? Is omnipotence the greater thing?

Then there is the question of what, exactly, a thought object is, and if it is of a being than which & etc., then what do we know about the idea? And in particular how that idea, or any idea about the idea, becomes constitutive of anything "existing in reality"?

Reply to Leontiskos

Omnipotence is the greatest power. It doesn't follow it is the greatest good or knowledge. God is traditionally conceived as being the greatest everything, so all other things being equal and omnipotent God would be greater than a God whose powers were limited.

That said, I am an atheist, in the sense that I don't possess a belief in God and am only considering the logic of the ideas of degrees of goodness, power and knowledge.

I suppose there are those who think that because we can conceive of the ideas of God, eternity and infinity that they must actually exist. I think that is really the thrust of the Ontological Argument. I can't see how it could be a matter of logic—I think it must be counted as a matter of faith.

Reply to Banno

Edit: This is also a reply to ?Count Timothy von Icarus. The non-theist need not maintain that the various notions of "unlimited being" are unintelligible, but can agree that it may be intelligible to some degree while maintain that it has not been demonstrated that this "unlimited being" is the same as say the Christian god, or indeed any god

Sure, but the rejection of particularly Christian revelation doesn't affect the ontological argument at all.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, but the rejection of particularly Christian revelation doesn't affect the ontological argument at all.

What's your point here? Neither does the price of tea in Patagonia.

Quoting Banno

That there is stuff may be a mystery, but there is no need to prefer the answer supposedly given by the ontological argument, especially since that argument is fraught with problems.

Reply to Leontiskos

Arguably, the argument simply proves that the atheist cannot deny God (i.e. the being greater than which no being can be thought) without affirming a contradiction. So, it shows that we [I]should[/I] affirm the existence of God, on pain of being fools or misologes.

However, this itself does not prove "that God exists." We could consider here Brouwer and other's objections to the use of proof by contradiction in existence proofs in mathematics. So, there is a possible distinction here. And perhaps, having taken the conclusion in this way, we could dismiss some of the criticisms re "proofs cannot demonstrate existence," (what about existence theorems?) or "existence simpliciter must somehow be assumed somewhere in the premises" (I think it's fairly obvious that it isn't in Anselm's formulations though). I suppose the difficulty is that this only eliminates those fairly weak objections though.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

On the argument, there seems to be a few issues. The first is "greater than."

I don't find this controversial when applied to existence. See my reply to Wayfarer:

Quoting Leontiskos

To contradict this is to say that a thought object is not thought to be greater in virtue of its being thought to exist. Or simplified: fiction is as good as the real thing - a fiction that is in fact realized is no greater than an unrealized fiction (where both are thought objects).

-

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

But we might suppose that such a concept is hard to fully take in.

Is the concept of (1) "unlimited"? Not per se. And are you pointing to instances of "unlimited" that would not be considered great or even good? Because if so, then that kind of unlimited would not filter through the ampliated (1). If someone is thinking of a form of unlimitedness that they don't take to be great, then they aren't really engaging (1). Or at least it seems so to me.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

that the argument could suffer from a premise that is not as well known as its conclusion

This is an interesting objection, and one which Klima does not canvass. But if you are depending on the notion of infinity/unlimitedness then I'm again not sure it necessarily filters through (1). Nevertheless, separated from that dependence the objection could still have merit.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

This is relevant in that infinite, unlimited being is often called upon to ground metaphysics. The claim that this is "unintelligible" while putting forth "it just is, for no reason at all" as the root explanation for everything is more than a little ironic, particularly when the ad hoc appeal to brute fact is paired with eliminativism or deflationism re causes, such that everything "just is" and explanation seems to be little more than a hallucination resulting from inexplicable constant conjunction in the first place (isn't this just epistemic nihilism with extra steps?)

Sure. A lot of people are bringing up more general arguments for or against God, and if "unlimited" detaches from the first premise then this would be an instance of that. I am trying to stick close to the paper at least until we've finished the final section. But maybe "unlimited" does derive from the first premise and I'm just not seeing it. For me (1) does bring with it the, "si enim comprehendis, non est Deus" (which is why Banno's "objection" that there might be something greater than what is thought is so poorly aimed). And there is a component of unlimitedness in that, albeit of a particular variety.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Arguably, the argument simply proves that the atheist cannot deny God (i.e. the being greater than which no being can be thought) without affirming a contradiction. So, it shows that we should affirm the existence of God, on pain of being fools or misologes.

The argument professes to prove that; but it doesn't succeed, for the reasons given.

Are you able to back up your claim?

Quoting Janus

Omnipotence is the greatest power. It doesn't follow it is the greatest good or knowledge. God is traditionally conceived as being the greatest everything, so all other things being equal and omnipotent God would be greater than a God whose powers were limited.

Well this is related to what Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus said about the notion of unlimited (although it is more precisely about power than general unlimitedness). Do we think that a being which is omnipotent is greater than a being that is not? Because maybe someone would say, "If it is an evil being then the omnipotence would make it lesser, not greater." And of course no one thinks it is greater to be evil than to be good, so presumably it would not be an evil being, but the idea brings out your difference between moral (?) goodness and and a form of greatness which prescinds from the moral.

But I tend to think that (1) produces the thought of an omnipotent being, and presumably we are agreed on that?

---

Quoting tim wood

Just like Zeus, eh? Btw, do you stop to think about what omnipotent means and implies? Is omnipotence the greater thing?

Do you think it isn't? Do you think premise (1) does not bring with it omnipotence?

(This subject is interesting because a lot of new forms of theism reject omnipotence. But does that mean they would find Anselm's first premise incompatible with their God?)

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

existence simpliciter

An oxymoron.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Arguably, the argument simply proves that the atheist cannot deny God (i.e. the being greater than which no being can be thought) without affirming a contradiction. So, it shows that we should affirm the existence of God, on pain of being fools or misologes.

That's a fair and interesting way of reading it. :up: I need to think a bit more about section 3. I'm just trying to catch up on some replies.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

However, this itself does not prove "that God exists." We could consider here Brouwer and other's objections to the use of proof by contradiction in existence proofs in mathematics. So, there is a possible distinction here. And perhaps, having taken the conclusion in this way, we could dismiss some of the criticisms re "proofs cannot demonstrate existence," (what about existence theorems?) or "existence simpliciter must somehow be assumed somewhere in the premises" (I think it's fairly obvious that it isn't in Anselm's formulations though).

Right, I am following what you are saying here. But the difficulty is that affirmation of existence separates from existence, or something like that. Right? If the argument proves that we should affirm the existence of God without proving that God exists, then how does that work? Or do we want to take a half-step back and say that it proves that the atheist cannot deny God without proving that we should affirm the existence of God? (But that seems to fall away from Anselm.) So how would we address these difficulties?

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

"existence simpliciter must somehow be assumed somewhere in the premises"

I said this earlier:

Quoting Leontiskos

The wonder of Anselm's proof is that it does something that we think it should not be able to do, and it is very hard to say why it is wrong, or at least to say why rigorously. At this point the argument looks to be sound. It is valid and there are no premises that are clearly or demonstrably false.

So I don't see that objection as necessarily weak, but it is not a "close argument." If the strongest arguments attack a premise or an inference, then this sort of argument does not meet that criterion, and is a form of begging the question. So I guess it is weaker than an argument which actually addresses the proof itself, but it isn't irrational. I definitely think this form of begging the question will need to be considered at some point, perhaps as we move away from more precise critiques.

(I should note here that all of @Banno's attempts have been of this "weaker," question-begging variety. His claims that he has addressed or disproved premises are simply false. He himself knows that the conclusion he seeks to prove is that (1) involves a contradiction, and he also knows equally well that he has not produced that proof. In my opinion Gaunilo's island objection comes much closer to doing this than Banno's arguments have.)

I'm going to have another look at section 3 and the Proslogion.

So I am happy to play the recalcitrant fool. Anselm’s second conclusion denies the obvious, namely that God can be thought not to exist.

Contrary to the suggestion in the article, what is juxtaposed here is not theist and atheist. A reasonable theist might accept the issues give so fat and yet not be moved to reject their theism. The argument supposedly shows that all rational folk must agree that god exists; showing it to be wrong does not lead to the conclusion that god does not exist. This is not a debate "between the theist and the atheist."

If the argument is to hold, the it must not be possible for it to be in error. Accordingly it is not incumbent on the fool to show that one of the premisses must be false; but only that it might be false. So indeed, there is a clear way in which one can supose “something which cannot be thought not to exist", and understand that such a thing entails a contradiction. “something which cannot be thought not to exist" may well occupy much the same space as "a number greater than any other" or "A triangle with four sides" or even "The present king of France"; there may be no such thing.

If the argument is to hold, the theist must show that “something which cannot be thought not to exist" is not of this sort.

But notice that even if the argument turns out to be unproven, it can still serve as the sort of "intellectual prayer" Reply to Wayfarer mentions.

Next we might begin to look at the place of reference and language generally.

Quoting Leontiskos

Part 3. The Atheist, Who is Not a Fool

As I read it, this section is meant to drum up the possibility of a dialogical impasse between the atheist (who opposes Anselm's proof) and the theist (who accepts Anselm's proof). Towards the beginning of the section Klima writes:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 3

Anselm’s retort, that the Fool’s denial was possible in the first place only because he is truly a fool, thoughtlessly mumbling words he himself does not understand, leads us directly to the crux of the very possibility of a dialogue between the Saint and the Fool, or put in less biased terms, between the theist and the atheist.

He then tries to develop "requirements of rationality" that could "avoid a complete breakdown of communication." Then at the end of the section he caps the tempest in the teapot so that it might retain its potency:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 3

But even without these moral implications, it seems that the theist now may justifiably claim that, as a result of his denial, the atheist just rendered himself unable to think of a humanly otherwise thinkable thought object. By denying the existence of God the atheist will never be able to think of the same God as the theist, whose conception of God logically implies the existence of God, as Anselm’s proof shows.

(I have noticed an underlying theme in some of Klima's work, namely an attempt to make commensurable what others view as incommensurable.)

The dialogical impasse is as follows, in the form of, "One man's modus ponens is another's modus tollens":

For the theist/proponent:

• If Anselm's thought is thought, then God exists
• Anselm's thought is humanly thinkable
• Therefore the atheist (who can think this thought) is unwilling to think it

For the atheist:

• If Anselm's thought is thought, then God exists
• God does not exist
• Therefore, Anselm's thought cannot be thought (because it is not humanly thinkable)

(We could also phrase this in a more subjective way as Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus intimates, by making the first premise, "If Anselm's thought is thought, then God must be acknowledged to exist.")

In Klima's own words, the conclusion of the theist's modus ponens is this, "it seems that the theist now may justifiably claim that [...] the atheist just rendered himself unable to think of a humanly otherwise thinkable thought object."

Notice that if the atheist is unable to think Anselm's thought, then there is an infinite gulf of a sort. The theist and the atheist cannot help but talk past one another because they cannot think the same thought, and for Anselm this is the atheist's fault because the atheist is stubbornly refusing to think a humanly thinkable thought.*

I think this is the shape of section 3, but obviously I skimmed over the entire body of the section, which is where some of the more concrete wrestling between the theist and the atheist takes place. I want to look at that tomorrow since it so closely resembles some of the argument that occurred earlier in this thread.


* This charge from Anselm may seem outlandish, but I think it does happen quite commonly in everyday life. Namely, people will intentionally misunderstand so as to avoid an undesirable conclusion, and oddly enough this can even go on below the level of the conscious mind. So I don't think the charge is crazy. But in order for Anselm's charge to hold up at a philosophical level we would have to say that every atheist is intellectually dishonest in this manner, and that is much harder to sustain. We might then say that Anselm's charge is possible but implausible, considered as a categorical claim.

Reply to Banno

The argument professes to prove that; but it doesn't succeed, for the reasons given.

Sure, I am pointing out that the conclusion can be given a different interpretation, and according to published responses to the article it may [I]need[/I] to be given this interpretation to avoid problems.

That said, the argument looks ok at first glance. I agree with this response:

The formally regimented argument is pretty clearly valid, and none of the premises of which it is alleged to be a formalization is obviously objectionable. The first premise simply articulates Anselm’s conception of God as the thought object than which no thought object can be thought greater.5 The second premise is just the reductio assumption that God is a mere thought object. As for the third premise—the claim that thought objects that can be thought to exist in reality can be thought to be greater than mere thought objects—one might allege (as Klima himself does) that it is analytic by virtue of the meaning of ‘greater than’. Finally, one might convince himself of the truth of the fourth premise—the claim that God can be thought to exist in reality—by introspection. So Klima’s claim that these premises ‘have to be accepted as true’ is initially plausible.


Tony Roark - Conceptual Closure in Anselm’s Proof

I think this gets to "it is unclear that the reductio premise is the one that needs to go."

The most common way to attack this sort of argument has been to deny that God actually can be conceived of (or for modal formulations, that God is possible). Plantinga's version has been vetted for 50 years now, has been overwhelmingly seen as at least valid, and this is widely agreed to be the weak part.

But I think it is at least prima facie plausible that God can be conceived of in this manner because, as I said, disparate philosophies across the world have conceived of this same thought object and because atheist and agnostic scholars of relevant areas seem to have no trouble conceiving of such a being.

Perhaps other problems remain. There are arguments that omnipotence is contradictory because it implies the ability to become not omnipotent. Plantinga has done a lot of work on this, e.g. showing that "God cannot create a stone that He cannot lift," is equivalent with "God can lift all stones." However, I am not convinced that "absolute power" or "absolute freedom" doesn't result in what are essentially paradoxes of self-reference, at least on some naive conceptions.

Potentially more problematic are claims that perfect justice is in contradiction with perfect mercy, etc. Yet these don't seem relevant to the argument. For, the "being greater than any other that can be thought" need not have all the properties allocated to the God of revelation. Perfect mercy and perfect justice seem like they could be bracketed out so long as omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc. are included.

Of course, responses to Plantinga focus on the question: "is such a being is possible?" due to the modal formulation of his argument. St. Anselm's formulations deal with thinkability. I am not sure what important differences this could yield in attacks on the opening premise (i.e., the thinkability or possibility of God).

Roark has his own critique. I would have to look at it more, but on first glance his main counter seems too strong. He argues that the atheist should be happy to allow that they are only engaged in parasitic reference because the theist's definition requires a framing that at least allows for the possibility of liar's type paradoxes. However, showing the mere possibility of paradox is far weaker than demonstrating a paradox.

At any rate this counter would seem to lead to the conclusion that all sorts of people, not just atheists, should refuse to engage in anything but parasitic reference in a huge variety of cases. In particular, they should refuse to engage in anything but parasitic reference when it comes to liar's paradoxes. Yet, if someone took this line as a counter to logical pluralism or arguments against LEM, as opposed to God, I doubt it would pass the smell test. And it seems possible to push it farther, into a prohibition on accepting arguments in natural language, which would be absurd.

Reply to Banno

If the argument is to hold, the it must not be possible for it to be in error. Accordingly it is not incumbent on the fool to show that one of the premisses must be false; but only that it might be false. So indeed, there is a clear way in which one can supose “something which cannot be thought not to exist", and understand that such a thing entails a contradiction. “something which cannot be thought not to exist" may well occupy much the same space as "a number greater than any other" or "A triangle with four sides" or even "The present king of France"; there may be no such thing.

Can one ever totally eliminate the possibility of error? Is "error is possible," without pointing out any clear error a good counter to other demonstrations?

This counter seems too strong, because it would seem to apply, in some sense, to skepticism vis-a-vis all demonstrations.

Reply to Leontiskos

Well this is related to what ?Count Timothy von Icarus said about the notion of unlimited (although it is more precisely about power than general unlimitedness). Do we think that a being which is omnipotent is greater than a being that is not? Because maybe someone would say, "If it is an evil being then the omnipotence would make it lesser, not greater." And of course no one thinks it is greater to be evil than to be good, so presumably it would not be an evil being, but the idea brings out your difference between moral (?) goodness and and a form of greatness which prescinds from the moral.

Right, and this perhaps touches on the theological concerns that came to the fore during the Reformation, that only doing what is best would somehow be a limit on divine sovereignty and power. I personally think this sort of concern doesn't hold water. Defining freedom in terms of potency leads to contradiction (e.g. the demonstrations at the opening of Hegel's Philosophy of Right) and so the notions that lead to a renewed salience for Euthyphro dilemmas in the early modern period seem to simply be flawed. This is relevant inasmuch as people claim that God is "unthinkable" due to these supposed "paradoxes."

Right, I am following what you are saying here. But the difficulty is that affirmation of existence separates from existence, or something like that. Right? If the argument proves that we should affirm the existence of God without proving that God exists, then how does that work? Or do we want to take a half-step back and say that it proves that the atheist cannot deny God without proving that we should affirm the existence of God? (But that seems to fall away from Anselm.) So how would we address these difficulties?

I'll have to think about it more. It is indeed strange. I do think intuitionist mathematics maybe offers some guidance here. To use an analogy that might be a bit weak, it seems obvious that something like a constructive proof of God cannot exist.

We could also consider abductive arguments. There, we might have strong reasons to affirm the existence of something. It would be [I]unreasonable[/I] to deny it. And yet this is also not a demonstration that it exists.

At any rate, this outcome seems theologically preferable in some ways. For, if the demonstration was of existence, then it would be a demonstration that God exists in the manner of all other ens reale—of trees, stars, man, etc. But this is often explicitly denied. Dionysius the Areopagite writes:

"It is wrong to say God that God exists. It is wrong to say that God does not exist. But it is more wrong to say that God does not exist...

[God] is not a facet of being, but being a facet of Him. He is not contained in being but being is contained in Him. He does not possess being, but being possesses Him. He is the eternity of being, the measure and source of being. He preceded essence, being, and eternity. He is the creative source, middle, and end of all things."

Indeed, we might say that a demonstration that shows that God exists in the same manner as both our conceptions of God's existence and the real existence of all other things would be guilty of equivocation. Ens reale and ens rationis can sit together on a Porphyrian tree, but God cannot.

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus - Great post. :up:
Hopefully Roark's response can serve as an additional sounding board as we move along.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Can one ever totally eliminate the possibility of error? Is "error is possible," without pointing out any clear error a good counter to other demonstrations?

Right.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and this perhaps touches on the theological concerns that came to the fore during the Reformation, that only doing what is best would somehow be a limit on divine sovereignty and power. I personally think this sort of concern doesn't hold water. Defining freedom in terms of potency leads to contradiction (e.g. the demonstrations at the opening of Hegel's Philosophy of Right) and so the notions that lead to a renewed salience for Euthyphro dilemmas in the early modern period seem to simply be flawed. This is relevant inasmuch as people claim that God is "unthinkable" due to these supposed "paradoxes."

Yes, and the claim is a little bit odd insofar as it involves the idea that "greatest" entails contradiction via two or more contradictory attributes. That is of course arguable, but it doesn't strike me as a promising approach.

This is related to your point about unlimitedness, at least in the case of bad forms of unlimitedness. For example, if to be unlimited is greater than to be limited, then Anselm's thought must be unlimited. But if certain forms of unlimitedness are not greater, then we arrive at a similar paradox.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

We could also consider abductive arguments. There, we might have strong reasons to affirm the existence of something. It would be unreasonable to deny it. And yet this is also not a demonstration that it exists.

Yes, and I think we also want to draw a conceptual distinction between the natural language formulation and the quantification theory reductio formulation. A reductio is intrinsically less constraining than a simple demonstration.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed, we might say that a demonstration that shows that God exists in the same manner as both our conceptions of God's existence and the real existence of all other things would be guilty of equivocation.

Yes, interesting point. The first response might simply say that an analogical notion of existence is available here. But in the second place, the proof itself will mandate the level of existence-univocity in play. So for example, if Anselm's reply to Gaunilo's island objection succeeds, then the form of existence at stake in Anselm's proof is sui generis (i.e. it applies only to the greatest thing, and not to e.g. the greatest island).

(But I am not going to delve too deeply into strictly theological objections such as this until we have finished the paper.)

I want to draw some connections between section 3 and what has already occurred in this thread (note that I did not read section 3 beforehand, and was not manipulating the thread to achieve these overlaps). Taking section 3 in chronological order:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

Choosing the first alternative would amount to claiming that God’s concept is contradictory. [...] In any case, in Anselm’s argument the concept of God to bevemployed is adequately specified by the first premise, and the atheist would probably be hard pressed to show that the description “that than which nothing greater can be thought of” is self-contradictory.

See Reply to Banno's post for this notion of contradictory concepts; see my replies pointing out that no contradiction has been shown/proved (Reply to one, Reply to two).

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

At this point, however, the atheist may shift the burden of proof by saying that even if this description does not seem to contain any prima facie contradiction, it may well be contradictory. By way of analogy, he may bring up the description: “the greatest prime number”, which, on the face of it, does not appear to be contradictory, so it seems to refer to the greatest prime number. But, as we know from Euclid, the assumption that there is a greatest prime number leads to contradiction, so the description cannot refer to anything.

Banno has been engaged in this "shifting of the burden of proof" all along, and has Reply to given an argument directly parallel to the argument from the greatest prime. Perhaps the clearest attempt to shift the burden of proof was Reply to this, "Accordingly it is not incumbent on the fool to show that one of the premisses must be false; but only that it might be false." Banno's posts have been entirely dependent on this notion of possibility, e.g. "Might be wrong," "May be wrong," "No guarantee."

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus, Reply to Janus, and Reply to tim wood make similar arguments against the concept, having to do with omnipotence or unlimitedness.

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

Second, he can say that a contradiction, if derivable at all, could be derived from this description only with the help of other assumptions, just as in the case of the greatest prime. But, unlike the case of the greatest prime, these auxiliary assumptions probably need not be accepted as true.

I made this move in contending that the greatest prime number (or real number) has no clear parity with Anselm's first premise, as I think the may/might's also indicate (Reply to here and elsewhere).

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

Finally, concerning Anselm’s argument one can also say that the premise attacked by the atheist does not even require that Anselm’s description should be free from such implied contradictions. For the premise requires only that one can think that God (under Anselm’s description) exists, which one can do even with the greatest prime, until one actually realizes the implied contradiction. So the burden of proof falls back upon the atheist, if he wishes to challenge this premise.

This occurred in Reply to this post of mine and explicitly in its final paragraph.

---

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

So, since [the atheist] denies that the description applies to any thought object he can think of, he just does not have such a thought object in his mind, while he perfectly understands what is meant by this description.

This is an interesting idea that stays very close to Anselm, and it also bears on Quine. Namely, if one is to say, "X does not exist as a concept," then what is being referred to by X? Is it possible to understand a description without having such a thought object in one's mind? This goes back to my Reply to game show.

This also highlights the way that Klima differentiates objections to premise (1) from objections to premise (2). The idea is that the atheist might say that even if (1) manages some kind of quasi-concept, that concept is never really or fully present in the intellect a la (2).

---

Quoting Banno

2. There is a sleight of hand from ens rationis to ens reale, somewhat hidden here but brought out in Free Logic by the invalidity of a move from Ti to E!i.

If one reads the first section one sees that such objections have been preempted. See:

Quoting Leontiskos

We actually saw this play out two days ago in the midst of a discussion on Mario Bunge, who admits of conceptual existence and who treats existence as a first-order predicate. A response was as follows:

[...]

That is, the assumption is that Bunge must be working with two mutually exclusive subclasses, at least "in effect." This is the sort of objection that Klima has in his sights. How does he address this objection?...

-

Quoting Banno

4. The argument relies on a substitution within an intensional context, at line (5), that is not justified.

This is an assertion, not an argument.

---

Quoting tim wood

If it be insisted that He is omnipotent, that implies that He can do anything, implying that there are things to be done, implying that of the things to be done, they are at present in an unperfected state needing to be perfected, implying God a kind of glorified maintenance man obliged to go about perfecting what needs to be perfected. Omnipotence, then, straight out implies an imperfect God and an imperfect creation, contradicting any notion of a perfect all-everything being.

I think the error is, "He is omnipotent, which means he can do anything, which means there are things to be done, which means that he is obliged to do them." Those last two (bolded) interferences both look to be false, and particularly the last one.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

...the argument looks ok at first glance.

Well... not so much. The definition (1) supposes that there is a greatest thing, which, even if we assume that "greatest" works in this way, is what is in question when we ask if there is a god. In combination with the other premises the argument is circular. That's not OK. But of course the argument has to be circular in order to be valid.

If the point is to convince the fool of the error of their thinking, then it will not do to only be "at least prima facie plausible that God can be conceived of in this manner". And frankly the attempts to keep the various traditional properties of God consistent have the look of post-hoc bandaging.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Can one ever totally eliminate the possibility of error?

Perhaps not, but here the error is set before you.

There is more to be said here yet about the theory of reference being used, which seems to me to be quite problematic. Leon asked us to go slowly, so let's do as he suggests, and plod on. We should be reasonably clear as to what Klima is claiming about reference before we go on to critique it.

Added: We might agree that one of the issues with the argument is that it treats god's being as on a par with the being of the more familiar stuff around us. I made this point previously, in pointing out that he does not carry his notion of ampliation into the argument proper.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Roark has his own critique.

Roark is getting into complicated questions of whether Klima's quantificational formulation accurately represents Anselm's proof. This is somewhat important because in order to understand that formulation one must understand that Klima is attempting an accurate representation of Anselm's proof. On the other hand, assessing the interpretation can quickly become overly complicated. Sticking for the moment to section 3, Roark's critique has to do with the Reply to Banno-Reply to Leontiskos exchange, namely with sub-inference (a):

(4) R(g)
____(a) M(g)(g)............................[2,3,4, UI, &I, MP]
____(b) (?y)(M(y)(g))....................[a, EG]
(5) (?y)(M(y)(ix.~(?y)(M(y)(x))).....[1,b, SI]

Without closely reading Roark's lengthy assessment, my sense is that the logic here is attempting to indicate that the suppositional (2) is at the nub of the problems in (a), (b), and (5). Or rather, (a) and (b) are an extension of the problems with (5) (and (2)). It is possible that Roark draws the same conclusion but at the same time argues that this way of looking at it deviates from Anselm's original. In any case, he clearly thinks there is a coherent interpretation.

These sorts of wrinkles are why we want to also keep an eye on the natural language version.

(Note that Roark's page numbers refer to the book chapter version, linked in the OP.)

Reply to Leontiskos I'll not reply to this directly. From past experience, including on this very thread, I do not regard Leon as an honest respondent. If any one else thinks there is anything of merit in Leon's post, let me know and I may reply.

Or PM me, as some have already.

Quoting Banno

I'll not reply to this directly.

That's pretty much par for the course, as all you've managed in responses to criticisms is, "I won't repeat myself." Clarifying one's argument is dangerous, after all. Better not to say too much.

Quoting Banno

Perhaps not, but here the error is set before you.

No, it's not. The possibility of error is set before you. That was the whole point.

You are equivocating between things like error and possibility of error, or between a proof of a contradiction and a gesturing towards a contradiction. This bears on the "honesty" you just spoke of.

Klima offers the fool a rhetorical exit - perhaps he has misunderstood the language involved in the argument, in the way of someone not understanding that "triangle" means "shape with three sides". What's salient here is the use of "I mean" in explaining the discrepancy between fool and saint.

There are those who think that what a word means is what the speaker intends it to mean, and nothing more. So if the fool intends "four sided shape" by "triangle", then that's an end to it, and communication simply fails.

This speaks to the poverty of this view of meaning. If the meaning of "square" is only what we each intend, then there can be no justification for supposing that you and I mean the same thing when we talk of squares. But of course there is such a justification, which can be seen in the ongoing conversations and interactions amongst us; when I order a square table, that's what you provide, not a triangular one; when someone talks of the three sides of a triangle, we question them; and so on.

Language is inherently social. The meaning of a word is not given by speakers intent alone.

Does Klima hold such a view? Read on.

Quoting Banno

Klima offers the fool a rhetorical exit

He is summarizing the Anselm-Gaunilo exchange, and this is transparent in the paper.

Quoting Banno

There are those who think that what a word means is what the speaker intends it to mean, and nothing more. So if the fool intends "four sided shape" by "triangle", then that's an end to it, and communication simply fails.

Except that's not what Anselm or Klima say at all, so this looks to be another strawman from someone who has been desperate to cast aspersions from their very first post. :roll:

Quoting Banno

But of course there is such a justification, which can be seen in the ongoing conversations and interactions amongst us;

Which is exactly why Anselm uses an ongoing conversation to clear up the equivocal term, and why Klima summarizes the same move.

At this point, however, the atheist may shift the burden of proof by saying that even if this description does not seem to contain any prima facie contradiction, it may well be contradictory. By way of analogy, he may bring up the description: “the greatest prime number”, which, on the face of it, does not appear to be contradictory, so it seems to refer to the greatest prime number. But, as we know from Euclid, the assumption that there is a greatest prime number leads to contradiction, so the description cannot refer to anything.

In response, the theist first of all can point to the whole tradition of rational (as opposed to mystical) theology showing how apparent contradictions concerning God’s nature are resolved.17 Second, he can say that a contradiction, if derivable at all, could be derived from this description only with the help of other assumptions, just as in the case of the greatest prime. But, unlike the case of the greatest prime, these auxiliary assumptions probably need not be accepted as true. Finally, concerning Anselm’s argument one can also say that the premise attacked by the atheist does not even require that Anselm’s description should be free from such implied contradictions. For the premise requires only that one can think that God (under Anselm’s description) exists, which one can do even with the greatest prime, until one actually realizes the implied contradiction. So the burden of proof falls back upon the atheist, if he wishes to challenge this premise. Therefore, he has to turn to the other premise anyway, asking whether he has to admit God as at least a possible object of thought.

Here he offers three replies to the fool. The first is that theology has shown that the concept of god can be made consistent; of course, the fool will disagree. The second, that any contradiction must be derived from auxiliary assumptions; but the problem is not one of contradiction, it is of circularity and ambiguous definition. The third, the familiar insistence that all that is assumed is that one can conceive of god; ignoring premise 3.

Quoting Leontiskos

He is summarizing the Anselm-Gaunilo exchange, and this is transparent in the paper.

Yep.

Sure. Let's see.

Quoting Banno

The first is that theology has shown that the concept of god can be made consistent;

Well, no. He says that one could point to the tradition "showing." Obviously such arguments need to be shown to one who has never seen them. Klima does not think the atheist possesses arguments he has never encountered.

Quoting Banno

The third, the familiar insistence that all that is assumed is that one can conceive of god; ignoring premise 3.

I have no idea where you find that idea in the quote. He is saying that even if contradiction is granted for the sake of argument, this still does not undermine premise (1), and in that case we would have to move to premise (2) (because that is where a contradiction becomes uncontroversially problematic). As I said:

Quoting Leontiskos

This occurred in ?this post of mine and explicitly in its final paragraph.

In response to this question the atheist now may claim that the way Anselm wishes to force him to think of God will not make him admit that God is even in the intellect, at least, in his intellect, despite the fact that he understands very well what Anselm means by his description, which may not be contradictory after all. For understanding this description does not require him to believe that it applies to anything, so understanding this description will not make him think of anything that he thinks to be such that nothing greater than it can be thought of. So, since he denies that the description applies to any thought object he can think of, he just does not have such a thought object in his mind, while he perfectly understands what is meant by this description.

Taking the example from the text, one can clearly conceive of a greatest prime, and then look to see if such a thing makes sense. One can proceed, as has been done, to show that it involves a contradiction, thereby showing that a greatest prime does not exist.

Let's use this analogy to look at one misunderstanding of what the fool is suggesting.

Supose the theist were claiming that they have a proof of the existence of a highest prime. The proof in part claims that since we can conceive of a highest prime, one must exist. The fool does not need to demonstrate that there is no highest prime in order to show that the theist is mistaken. They only need to show that it does not follow from our being able to conceive of a highest prime, that such a thing exists.

The fool does not need to show that god does not exist in order to show that the argument that he does exist is flawed. "...understanding this description does not require him to believe that it applies to anything".

But here the theist swoops down: of course, the atheist is just a fool! Indeed, a wicked fool, who, only because of his insistent denial, admits to be simply unable to think of the same thought object that I think of, that is, God. With this last move the atheist just revealed himself for the miserable fool he is, for in order to maintain his untenable position he simply gives up his otherwise natural human ability to think of God, that than which nothing greater can be thought of. As Saint Bonaventure put it: “the intellect has in itself [...] sufficient light to repel this doubt and to extricate itself from its folly. Whence the foolish mind voluntarily rather than by constraint considers the matter in a deficient manner, so that the defect is on the part of the intellect itself and not because of any deficiency on the part of the thing known.”18

And here, the fool is "simply unable to think of the same thought object" as the theist. The thought in the theists head is different to the thought in the fools's head, and never the twain; together with as much disparaging of the fool as can be mustered.

Part of what is going on here is a bit of theatre, an attempt to avoid considering the fool's account by simply denigrating it. Hence "But even without these moral implications..."; the fool is evil for not thinking in the same way as the theist.

This is not an argument, but a call to the faithful to pull together and reject anything Other. And the rejection of this painting of the fool as "other" occupies much of the remainder of the paper.

(I'm essentially setting out my own notes on the article for my own purposes, which is enough for me. If there is anyone apart form Leon reading on, which I doubt, I apologise for plodding.)

So on to Part Four.

There's a description of the intentional theory of reference, allowing for successful references even when descriptions are inaccurate or fictional and so enables speakers to refer to objects based on shared intentions, even when the referent is not directly known or believed to be true. And then this:

But throughout this process, the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer, without knowing under what description or name the answerer identifies this thought object.

The issue here is clear enough: how could we know that "the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer"? And further, how can the "thought-object" in the mind of the saint be said to be the same as the "thought-object" in the head of the fool - and indeed, how could they be said to be different?

And here again we bump in to the lack of extensionality. Two sets are said to be extensionaly equivalent when they contain the very same members. But infamously, there is simple no way to verify that the thing in the mind of the saint is the same as the thing in the mind of the fool - and indeed, every reason to doubt it.

Now this is apparently recognised by Klima in the next paragraph. But rather than drop the very idea of thought-objects as a useful notion, as the fool might, he suggests:

Accordingly, if one mind entertains a thought object under some particular description, another mind may make what I would call parasitic reference to the same thought object, by merely intending to refer to the same thought object that the first conceives of, but not conceiving it under the same description, indeed, sometimes even denying that the description in question in fact applies to this thought object.

Intending to refer to the same thought-object but under a different description. "I'll have what she's having", involving some sort of telepathy, perhaps.

This is the sort of thing attributed to the fool. But of course there is a much simpler response that can be made, that the idea of reference to some imagined thought-objects is misguided. A better approach would be to reject the picture of reference as being about latching onto pre-existing "objects" in thought at all. Instead, reference is a practice embedded in linguistic and social interaction, where success isn't a matter of mental duplication but of communicative coherence. In that case, the fool's response is not just simpler but arguably the only coherent one.

And it avoids the lack of transparency that plagues talk of intensional references.

Notice that this is very much the approach taken by Quine and Davidson, amongst others.

So at the end of Part Four, the fool may on this account discuss the concept of god had by the saint, and see how this leads to the saint's belief that god exists, while consistently maintaining there own account of god in which god need not exist.

Quoting Banno

So on to Part Four.

Are you trying to take over the thread entirely? No, we will open part four tomorrow. You can remove your post or I will appeal to the mods.

Reply to Leontiskos

I flagged your post for you, so no need for you to draw their attention.

You need not respond to my post if you do not wish to, and can proceed at whatever pace suits you. For my part, I've addressed the thread at length in detail and in sequence, and am preparing my comments on part five. That is were I am up to.

( I suspect it's only you and I who are paying this thread much attention, so the point is probably moot.)

Learning without participating is possible by paying (much) attention, perhaps?

quiet smile

Reply to Banno - Not even 36 hours have elapsed since we began section 3. I have reiterated my desire to move slowly, in large part so that those who do not have as much time still have an opportunity to participate. Not everyone has time to write dozens of posts a day, as you do. I don't see why it is so burdensome to average two days per section. It's great you're enjoying the thread so much, but to be so impatient as to ignore the OP while constantly writing posts that don't engage with other users at all is a bit strange. I suppose if you don't care about engaging with others then there is no need to move slowly and encourage participation. But in that case what you need is a diary, not a discussion forum. Or Twitter, where you just spam out content and no one reads anything. I figured the Reading Groups section was for reading things as a group.

(And the fact that you haven't even been been reading carefully is rather ironic here. For example, that you did not even understand that the proof was a reductio until it was explicitly pointed out to you. That's what happens in a fast-paced thread: you "read" a proof, argue about it for 26 days, and then on day 27 you figure out that it was a reductio and the entire analysis was hopelessly confused.)

Reply to Leontiskos Meh. You've squandered much of what good will I may have had towards you with your insults, but now that you have actually expressed your needs, I will do you the kindness of holding off on posting my thoughts on section five, and any concluding remarks, despite your plain rudeness.

Reply to Banno - It is not a "kindness" to hijack the thread and skip to section 4, but refrain from skipping to section 5.

Part of this thread is experimental: are we allowed to have focused reading groups that move at a consistent and controlled pace? Will moderators honor an OP that wishes to do this? If not, then obviously a thread like this is not worthwhile to conduct, and this sort of endeavor is not possible on TPF.

Reply to kazan :wink:

Enjoy the melodrama.

Reply to kazan - Thanks Kazan. Good to know that there are others paying attention. :up:

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Reply to tim wood Something along these lines is perhaps the inevitable result of the sustained critique of the Argument - that it has an historical, "metaphysical" place or a place in devotion.

@Banno,

Of course, melodrama is a fringe benefit or smoko break from the clash that philosophic debates tend to take the form of.

wry ( sans any sense of superiority) smile

@Leontiskos,

Oh, we're here.

apprehensive smile

Quoting tim wood

Surely a perfect God, or at least one "than which &etc, would not have unnecessary or superfluous powers, so omnipotence directly implies something to be omnipotent about - something, a task, that needs doing for something to be perfected. And only God can do it, and thus thereby Himself obliged.

"God is omnipotent, therefore he is obliged to do stuff (and anyone obliged to do stuff isn't as great as someone who is not obliged to do stuff)."

I don't follow this reasoning at all. Is there an argument behind it?

Perhaps, another way of looking at Omnipotence is that of being outside of/unrestrained by time. That is, there is no limits of causation, there just "is" for that which is omnipotent. Hence, it is difficult to argue any moral obligation (such as to be perfect, for example) upon an omnipotent (anything)...be it a god, idea, reality, as that would de-omnipotent that which it is claimed is omnipotent.

Perhaps, it could be argued that the omnipotent could not be named nor conceived of as omnipotent because that would reduce/take away its omnipotence through that interaction.

It all depends upon how omnipotence is understood and differentiated from such terms as perfect, all being, all knowing, etc. that are often associated with that which it is claimed is omnipotent.

Just a hurried thought.

a 2 cent smile

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Reply to kazan - So are you saying that if someone wanted to be great, they would have to choose between being powerful and being moral, because to be powerful is to lack moral constraint and to be moral is to lack power? Put differently, "The greatest thing is powerful and the greatest thing is moral, but something cannot be both powerful and moral, therefore the greatest thing does not exist." Is that about right?

(I think this gets at @tim wood's point as well.)

Part 4. Intentional Identity and Parasitic vs. Constitutive Reference

In this section Klima appeals to his intentional theory of reference in order to provide the atheist with a way to think about the same thought object that Anselm’s theist is thinking about, while simultaneously rejecting the idea that the theist’s description applies to that thought object.

He begins by situating the theory in the context of Russell and Kripke; he then draws our attention to one of Kripke’s examples, then fiction, and then guessing games. After that he claims that the theory “sidesteps the problem of trying to find criteria of intentional identity in terms of the properties thought objects have.” He goes on to compare this “parasitic reference” to “constitutive reference.” He then finishes by bringing this theory to bear on the question of the atheist who rejects Anselm’s argument.

Here are the first few sentences:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 4

At this point, however, we have to notice that precisely the theory of reference outlined earlier as being implicit in Anselm’s argument offers the atheist a way out of his predicament. According to this theory, we should recall, what determines reference is primarily the intention of the speaker, whence it may be called the intentional theory of reference.

Some questions regarding section 4:

1. Is parasitic reference coherent?
2. Does parasitic reference adequately account for the atheist’s position?
3. Does this mean that Anselm’s proof can be sound for the theist while being unsound for the atheist?


I think parasitic reference is coherent in general, but I am not yet convinced that it adequately accounts for the atheist’s position. Consider:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

But then, the same thought object may be intended also by another mind, which may not endow the same thought object with the same properties, i.e. it may conceive of the same thought object, but not as having the same properties.

…

The atheist, however, can then think of the same thought object, but not think that the description applies to it, whence he is not forced to conclude to whatever valid implications the description may have concerning that thought object.

What is unclear is how the thought object is related to its properties. That is, if the atheist is thinking of a thought object with different (intentional) properties, then why should we think he is thinking of the same thought object?

Anselm himself brings this up, and Klima echoed Anselm’s concern:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

Anselm claims that when the Fool said in his heart: “There is no God”, he could do so only because he did not know correctly what he was speaking about […], as he simply did not understand the word “God” properly.

Anselm is giving a dilemma: Either you are thinking of something other than God or you are thinking of God (as I have defined ‘God’). If you are thinking of something other than God, then you can deny its existence but you have not denied God’s existence. If you are thinking of God, then you cannot deny his existence on account of my proof.

Klima’s parasitic reference attempts to split the horns of the dilemma. Klima thinks the atheist can think about the same thought object and yet, “not endow the same thought object with the same properties,” or, “not think that the description applies to it.” Isn’t Anselm just going to say that if he is thinking about an object that can be thought not to exist, he is not thinking of the same thought object?

Along similar lines we have a form of ampliation entering in here. The atheist takes the thought object and understands that existence attaches necessarily to this thought object, but he nevertheless brackets or prescinds from this existence-description.

Another question: what is it that explains the difference between parasitic and constitutive reference insofar as these two forms of reference differ with respect to whether one is committed to perceived implications of the thought?
(This is presumably where Roark wants to talk about "conceptual closure," which Klima also speaks to in his reply to Roark (both of which have now been linked in the OP.))

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Quoting tim wood

It's simple. You appear to think that omnipotence is the greater. That in order to be the than which & etc., the than which & etc must be omnipotent. But I conceive of a being that has no need of omnipotence, and that being the greater.

Then premise (1) does not involve omnipotence for you. So what? As I said:

Quoting Leontiskos

(This subject is interesting because a lot of new forms of theism reject omnipotence. But does that mean they would find Anselm's first premise incompatible with their God?)

-

Quoting tim wood

As to the good or morality, your being must be absolutely good and moral, yes?

I addressed this in my Reply to post to kazan. If you want to talk about Anselm's argument, then you have to address that. If you don't want to talk about Anselm's argument and you just want to argue against God, then there is probably a thread for that. (No, of course I don't think that being powerful and being moral are incompatible, and so when I think of Anselm's concept I don't have to choose between the two. I want to know if you and @kazan really think you have to choose between the two.)

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Collingwood viewed metaphysics as unearthing the foundational assumptions behind our scientific theories - behind our understanding of how things are. He viewed the Ontological argument as one such supposition, hence "A man who has a bent for metaphysics can hardly help seeing, even if he does not wholly understand it, that Anselm’s proof is the work of a man who is on the right lines" - that is, someone who agrees with Collingwood's view of metaphysics will see the argument as an expression of that seeking for foundational explanations.

They will not be put off by the fact that the argument fails.

The following appears mistaken:

For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

Kripke showed that speaker's reference may differ from semantic reference. However, he also showed that a name may refer to it's referent regardless of any description, and indeed in the absence of any description.

Consider Sarah, a philosophy student who sees Kaplan at a conference and mistakes him for Kripke. She says, pointing to Kaplan, "Kripke is a great philosopher, but he did not write Naming and Necessity". The speaker's reference here is to the man pointed to - Kaplan. The semantic reference is to Kripke, in virtue of the name used. Sarah believes that she is referring to Kripke, but she is instead referring to Kaplan. Kaplan did not write Naming and Necessity, so her description is true.

The speaker's reference, given by pointing to Kaplan, is Kaplan. The intended reference, given by the name "Kripke", is Kripke. Hence it is not always the case that the speaker's reference is the one that satisfies the speaker's intent. Which is to make the obvious point that what someone is talking about does not always align with what they think they are talking about.

This is a generic problem with accounts of reference in terms of speaker's intent. Reference is a communal activity, and so not reliant simply on the intent of the speaker.

Quoting Leontiskos

1. Is parasitic reference coherent?

You might first explain what you think parasitic reference is. Do you agree that it is something like referring to the thought-object in someone else's mind?

Quoting Leontiskos

Do we think that a being which is omnipotent is greater than a being that is not? Because maybe someone would say, "If it is an evil being then the omnipotence would make it lesser, not greater."

Yes, that's why I included "all other things being equal".

Reply to tim wood Yes, viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be an oxymoron.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Roark has his own critique. I would have to look at it more, but on first glance his main counter seems too strong. He argues that the atheist should be happy to allow that they are only engaged in parasitic reference because the theist's definition requires a framing that at least allows for the possibility of liar's type paradoxes. However, showing the mere possibility of paradox is far weaker than demonstrating a paradox.

Roark's paper is quite good. When I saw that it was hosted on Klima's page, I checked and found a response from Klima (both of which are now linked in the OP). Especially helpful is the way in which Roark gives additional explication of Klima's basic ideas (in sections 1 and 4 of Klima's paper).

He is good at putting his finger on things. The "ambiguity" he tries to untangle is something that I had also noticed, and in particular, for me it manifested in the way that the word "can" functions in Klima's rendering of Anselm's thought concept. His pointing up of the Modest "genie" is also perceptive, along with the "conceptual closure" that accompanies it. And Klima is quite familiar with the Liar's Paradox, even through the medieval Buridan (see for example his chapter, "Logic without Truth: Buridan on the Liar"). ...There are pretty strong themes of univocity vs analogy running though the exchange, particularly when we get into questions about the relation between the object language and the metalanguage. This is especially interesting given that Klima's expertise is Buridan and the late medieval period, which was quite comfortable with univocity.

In fact the question I posed to you about how one is to untangle God's existence from an acknowledgment of God's existence gets straight into the follow-up exchange between Klima and Roark, which makes sense since it was Roark who gave you the idea to phrase it that way.

For now I am just going to quote something simple from Roark that may help shed light on section 4, and which is also related to the question I posed to you:

Quoting Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 9

And so we are now situated to appreciate the dialectical weight of the proper conclusion of Klima’s argument, as it was speci?ed in Section 3. The consistent atheist should be quite comfortable admitting that one cannot think of God as a mere thought object (i.e. as existing only in the intellect) when one conceives of God under Anselm’s description. In fact, we ought to regard Klima’s argument (properly understood) as a way of making this point explicit insofar as it derives in a formal way from the Anselmian concept of God the impossibility of thinking that He does not exist in reality. So when the atheist denies that God exists, he is not saying of the thing than which nothing can be thought greater, that it (conceived as such) does not exist; rather, he is saying of the thing that the theist (mistakenly, by his lights) thinks of as that than which nothing greater can be thought, that it does not exist. He does not himself think of God as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought. After all, he is an atheist, and to think of anything as that than which nothing greater can be thought requires thinking of it as an existing thing.

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Reply to tim wood

I should like to see the demonstration of this. That or at least a somewhat rigorous definition of what it means to exist

There is the ens reale versus ens rationis distinction at the beginning. Roark takes it as analytic that something that really exists is "greater," "better," or "more perfect" than something that doesn't exist (the Latin word gets us "major" as well as "mayor," the position of top authority).

The existence between a real thing and a mere object of thought can be had by thinking of having an ice cream sundae, or a sail boat, or a Porsche, or anything else you might consider pretty great, and contrasting its mere mental existence with what it would mean to really have it. For me, it's the Star Trek holodeck; all the perks of time travel with none paradoxes.

Another way to think about it is in terms of truth. If one understands what it means for it to be true that anything is really the case, then one must have some understanding of "is really the case."

I am not sure if it works to respond to Anselm's charge of intransigence by refusing to accept that one knows what is meant by "is" or "true." Presumably, the critic wants to prove that it is "really the case" that Anselm's argument is defective, which presupposes a distinction between whatever they think is the case and what is really the case. If there was no distinction, thinking Anselm is wrong would be enough, no need to argue.

Reply to Banno

The speaker's reference, given by pointing to Kaplan, is Kaplan. The intended reference, given by the name "Kripke", is Kripke. Hence it is not always the case that the speaker's reference is the one that satisfies the speaker's intent. Which is to make the obvious point that what someone is talking about does not always align with what they think they are talking about.

This is a generic problem with accounts of reference in terms of speaker's intent. Reference is a communal activity, and so not reliant simply on the intent of the speaker.

I don't see how this is at odds with what Klima has said.

At any rate, isn't the "intended reference" also the "speaker's reference?" The pointing and naming are equally intentional. Hence the distinction between "intended" and "semantic" reference, although one could also frame it in terms of "intentions versus conventions."

In some cases, someone uses the wrong name and their intended reference is still communicated clear as day. That's how these examples usually work, by setting up scenarios where both the intended reference and what is referenced according to convention (and the difference between the two) are readily apparent to any competent speaker of the language. In which case, if both intentions and conventional meaning are clearly communicated, why try to claim only one is signified? Why not both? Language is redundant and people do things like point because its a clear sign of intentions that will overcome errors in convention. It's a false dichotomy to suppose that words either signify a speaker's intent or they signify according to convention, but never both, so "simply" is the key word in your last sentence. But no one outside of a joke character in a children's book has ever proposed that words "simply" mean what is intended by them.



Reply to Leontiskos

In fact the question I posed to you about how one is to untangle God's existence from an acknowledgment of God's existence gets straight into the follow-up exchange between Klima and Roark, which makes sense since it was Roark who gave you the idea to phrase it that way.

I had the thought before finding the paper; however I don't think it's a terribly original insight on my part, because IIRC this is how some people have read St. Anselm himself from early on, and I might just have been recalling that. I get the impression that Roark is not terribly familiar with Anslem and that he is working his way back to the same insight in a rigorous way, but it also sort of "pops out" in a natural language analysis.

To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation.

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Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

The existence between a real thing and a mere object of thought can be had by thinking of having an ice cream sundae, or a sail boat, or a Porsche, or anything else you might consider pretty great, and contrasting its mere mental existence with what it would mean to really have it.

Yes, it's pretty basic. A real Porsche is greater than the idea of a Porsche. I haven't seen anyone present an argument against this.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

In some cases, someone uses the wrong name and their intended reference is still communicated clear as day. That's how these examples usually work, by setting up scenarios where both the intended reference and what is referenced according to convention (and the difference between the two) are readily apparent to any competent speaker of the language. In which case, if both intentions and conventional meaning are clearly communicated, why try to claim only one is signified? Why not both? Language is redundant and people do things like point because its a clear sign of intentions that will overcome errors in convention. It's a false dichotomy to suppose that words either signify a speaker's intent or they signify according to convention, but never both, so "simply" is the key word in your last sentence. But no one outside of a joke character in a children's book has ever proposed that words "simply" mean what is intended by them.

Yes, you give great clarity to this. :up:

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation.

Yes, I was thinking the exact same thing when I was looking at section 5. Let me open that up so that everything is on the table and then come back to this...

Part 5. Conclusion: Parasitic Reference, Natural Theology and Mutual Understanding

(Expedited for the impatient.)

In this final section Klima reads his notion of parasitic reference, which he sketched in section 4, into Aquinas and Gaunilo’s responses to Anselm’s proof. He begins by saying that parasitic reference is especially important in cases of basic beliefs, including religion (and non-religion) of all kinds. He then brings in Aquinas along with the idea of one’s “universe of thought objects.” After that he brings in Gaunilo and the “conceptual buildup” that is required for real dialogue and the possibility of changing one’s mind through that dialogue.

(It is a bit of a wonder that Klima does not reference Newman’s real vs. notional assent in this section.)

The first few sentences of section 5:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 5

Parasitic reference to each other’s thought objects between people not sharing each other’s beliefs seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon. The most sensitive cases are, of course, those that involve people’s most basic beliefs, such as religious belief. Accordingly, parasitic reference is a phenomenon to be seriously reckoned with not only in dialogues between theists and atheists, but also between people of different religious faith.

I thought section 5 was helpful in filling out section 4. By the time Klima finished the quote from Gaunilo I thought his case was quite strong.

Aquinas’ response to Anselm in the Summa Contra Gentiles is quite interesting. On the one hand, it is of the weaker “question-begging” form that we spoke about earlier, given that it does not directly address Anselm’s proof. On the other hand, it is quite different from the other similarly weaker replies that we have seen. In particular, Aquinas’ approach takes the dialogical nature of the exchange as being fundamental, as opposed to the idea that Anselm has simply transgressed an inferential law (e.g. “no-existence-from-words,” which is reminiscent of “no-ought-from-is”).

Let’s compare the standoff between Anselm and Aquinas to the earlier standoff between the theist and the atheist:

• If Anselm's thought is thought, then God exists
• Anselm's thought is humanly thinkable
• Therefore, God exists

• For any thought a greater is thinkable
• Anselm's thought is a thought
• Therefore, Anselm’s thought is not what it claims to be

We could also phrase the two options this way:

• God is that than which a greater cannot be thought
• That than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought not to exist
• Therefore, God exists

• For any thought object a greater is thinkable
• ‘That than which a greater cannot be thought’ is a thought object
• Therefore, ‘That than which a greater cannot be thought’ is not thinkable

(Note the inverted commas within the second premise and conclusion, which in some sense are themselves the whole issue.)

So for Aquinas someone could simply hold the premise, “For any thought a greater is thinkable,” in a way that overpowers Anselm’s argument. Indeed, Aquinas himself may hold the premise in this way.

But there is still an important cleavage or equivocation between Anselm and Aquinas insofar as the mode in which Anselm’s thought refers is equivocal between the two of them. This doesn’t map exactly to Klima’s parasitic vs. constitutive reference (unless one reads Klima’s parenthetical remark on constitutive reference in a special way – a remark that may have been added for this specific issue). The essence of this difference is this: Anselm would not see himself as referring to God constitutively with his definition, at least if by “constitutively” we mean that he would think that the thought conceived exhausts or comprehends God. Put differently, Anselm’s thought is ultimately pointing to the limits of thought qua thought, not thought qua Anselm (or whichever individual is doing the thinking).

When Klima glosses Aquinas in terms of one’s “universe of thought objects,” a bit more clarity is brought to the issue. Note that what Klima is assuming both in this and when he splits the horns of Anselm’s dilemma is that there is more than one level of thought objects, which on Klima’s view are conceived as intentional. That is, we have our universe of thought objects, and we also have knowledge of the other’s universe of thought objects, and these two universes do not occupy the same intentional space. This is how the atheist can think about Anselm’s thought object as necessarily existing without committing to its existence.

Thus I would depart from Klima when he claims that for the atheist Anselm’s thought lacks a certain property or description, and prefer instead to say that it contains the same property or description under a different intentional mode. If it did not contain the property of necessarily existing under this secondary intentional mode, then the atheist would be unable to see why the theist sees Anselm’s thought as necessarily existing (and in fact in some ways he does see why and in some ways he does not). Note that in most cases the difference of opinion is self-consciously accounted for by a disagreement on some premise, but in this case it isn’t quite that simple (because a “meaning-postulate” is not inherently contentious or truth-apt). (Cf. Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus)

I really liked the quote from Gaunilo, which is highly reminiscent of Newman’s Grammar of Assent. And there is plenty to be said on the final paragraphs about concept-acquisition. But I will leave it there for now.

It is worth noting how the medievals think in terms of argument, intention, and one’s interlocutor, and how this extends even to notions of reference. It is in this way that Aquinas asks whether one can reject Anselm’s argument while avoiding inconsistency, rather than imposing a paradigm of logic or thought onto the proof itself (except insofar as Aquinas and Klima permit the atheist a mode of reference that Anselm does not grant, but there is nothing particularly idiosyncratic or system-based about this move).

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation.

Coming back to this, I think it's basically right, except that I think Klima sees that bracketing as bound up with parasitic reference. That is, for Klima when one refers to another's thought object—a thought object which is outside of one's own universe of thought objects—one is engaged in parasitic reference. But as I said just above, I don't really like the way he uses the words "property" and "description" to convey this bracketing in section 4. Regarding the quote from Roark:

Quoting Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 9

[The atheist] does not himself think of God as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought.

In Klima's terms, there is a parasitic understanding of what the theist is referring to, but there is no possible candidate in the atheist's universe of thought objects to which this thought object would correspond. On Klima's view, for the atheist to even have such a thought object in his own universe of thought objects would require the process of concept acquisition.

Else, if we want to isolate and scrutinize the idea of parasitic reference, then perhaps we should ask whether one can achieve what Roark (and Klima) are trying to achieve without recourse to the notion of parasitic reference. I mostly think that one cannot do so. Nevertheless, it may be that parasitic reference is necessary but insufficient to account for the intricacies of disagreements over Anselm's proof, which gets at the difference between questions 1 and 2 <here>.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see how this is at odds with what Klima has said.

Who is the sentence "He did not write "Naming and Necessity" about? It is true of Kaplan, not of Kripke. Which is Sarah referring to? Her intent is to speak of that man she points to - Kaplan; and her description is true, he did not write Naming and Necessity. . Her semantic reference is to Kripke. Hence it is not true the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies her description. Kaplan satisfies her description, but is not the semantic reference of the statement. This brings out the issue of the opacity of the speaker's reference. It would be disingenuous to claim reference fails here, but the interplay between speaker's reference, the description and the demonstrative are not as direct as Klima supposes.

More generally, Kripke and Donnellan show that there need be no description in virtue of which a reference is made. The speaker's reference may succeed when description is not satisfied by the referent, or if the belief of the speaker is in error.

And this in turn brings out the fraught nature of what it is for a reference to succeed. In extensional situations, this is fairly simple - the reference succeeds if those in the discussion are talking about the very same thing. But in the non-extensional context of the beliefs of the participants, how are we to check that this is the case, that what each believes they are talking about is the same?

And so back to Quine, who asks if there can even be a fact of the matter here, while pointing out that the pragmatics can overrule the semantics and intent of the speakers in such a way that the issue of whether the reference is successful or not becomes moot.

If nothing else, this shows the poverty of any deep metaphysical theory that hopes to explain reference in every case. At the least, intent, semantics and pragmatics all play a part.

Reply to Leontiskos You have still not said what you think parasitic reference is.

Quoting Banno

And then this:
"But throughout this process, the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer, without knowing under what description or name the answerer identifies this thought object."
The issue here is clear enough: how could we know that "the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer"? And further, how can the "thought-object" in the mind of the saint be said to be the same as the "thought-object" in the head of the fool - and indeed, how could they be said to be different?

Quoting Banno

The following appears mistaken

The sources are available, and it does not appear to be mistaken at all. Klima quotes Kripke in footnote 20, which attaches directly to your quote:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

20 “So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.” Kripke, S. 1991, p.173.

That he is characterizing him correctly can be verified by consulting the text in question: Meaning and Truth: Essential Readings in Modern Semantics, page 173. There Kripke says precisely what Klima claims, namely that "the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description."

Quoting Banno

The speaker's reference, given by pointing to Kaplan, is Kaplan. The intended reference, given by the name "Kripke", is Kripke. Hence it is not always the case that the speaker's reference is the one that satisfies the speaker's intent.

As @Count Timothy von Icarus correctly pointed out, there is nothing here contrary to what Klima has said.

Quoting Banno

Kripke showed that speaker's reference may differ from semantic reference. However, he also showed that a name may refer to it's referent regardless of any description, and indeed in the absence of any description.

To again quote the footnote, "...and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator." Klima is pointing out that on the intentional theory of reference such a belief is not necessary.

Quoting Banno

Her semantic reference is to Kripke. Hence it is not true the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies her description.

This is a non sequitur, for it is in no way clear that Sarah does not, "believe ["Kripke"] fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator." That Kripke disagrees with your construal is clear if we read the text that Klima cites (my bolding):

Quoting Kripke, Meaning and Truth: Essential Readings in Modern Semantics, 173

Suppose a speaker takes it that a certain object a fulfills the conditions for being the semantic reference of a designator, "d." Then, wishing to say something about a, he uses "d" to speak about a; say, he says "?(d)." Then, he said, of a, on that occasion, that it ?'d; in the appropriate Gricean sense (explicated above), he meant that a ?'d. This is true even if a is not really the semantic referent of "d." If it is not, then that a ?'s is included in what he meant (on that occasion), but not in the meaning of his words (on that occasion).

So, we may tentatively define the speaker's referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.

-

Quoting Banno

The speaker's reference may succeed when description is not satisfied by the referent, or if the belief of the speaker is in error.

This is yet another ignoratio elenchus, for this is not in question.

Reply to Leontiskos

Here's the footnote quoting Kripke:

“So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.”

This is in defence of:

In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

Notice that the quote does not mention descriptions at all. And notice also the use of the word "tentatively".

Speaker’s meaning depends on context and intent. But Kripke showed that proper names are rigid designators—they refer to the same entity in all possible worlds. Speaker’s meaning is intensional, or if you prefer, subjective. It varies between individuals, and so cannot account for multiple folk talking about the same thing, nor provide modal rigidity.

You and Klima both appear to have read "the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator" as implying the presence of a description. But the phrase is chosen so as to be neutral. The "conditions" can of course as well be those causal conditions that are the basis of Kripke's theory of reference.

Look, I can do bolding too!

Quoting Banno

You and Klima both appear to have read "the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator" as implying the presence of a description. But the phrase is chosen so as to be neutral. The "conditions" can of course as well be those causal conditions that are the basis of Kripke's theory of reference.

You are falling into yet another ignoratio elenchus, for Klima tells us explicitly that the intentional theory and the causal or historical* theory agree on this (my bolding):

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

This theory agrees with the recent “historical explanation”[19]—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects.

-

But what you are doing is trying to change the subject. In Reply to this post and Reply to this post you were claiming that Klima is mistaken when he attributes to Kripke the doctrine that, "the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description." In Reply to this post I showed why Klima is not mistaken at all. That you did not reply to the substance of that post implies that you admit that Klima correctly captures what Kripke has said. To fall back on the appeal that Kripke's theory is "tentative" is nothing but a quibble, and a quibble that is preempted by Klima's footnote where he quotes Kripke. Klima is proposing something authentically different from Kripke's (tentative) theory. That is the point of the comparison with Kripke.

* 'In the ensuing discussion, I consider how the conception of reference presented in the first section handles these problems, and how it is related to contemporary discussions of the “causal”, or “historical explanation theory” of reference' (Klima, introduction).

---

Quoting Banno

You have still not said what you think parasitic reference is.

Did you read the paper? Klima gives his account of parasitic reference in section 4. Roark gives additional explication of the concept in section 4 of his own paper (beginning on page 8).

Reply to Janus - Well no one seems to want to give an argument for their claims. No one wants to be transparent. So I did the work for you. Reply to I wrote the argument for you. But still, no one seems to want to interact with that construal to say whether it is a correct or incorrect construal.

So if folks want to make assertions against omnipotence, but they won't provide an argument for their assertion, and they won't interact with the argument that I offer them, then there is little more for me to do to help.

Reply to Leontiskos You really will do anything to avoid addressing the elephant sitting opposite you at the table.

Ok, I'll keep playing. Yes, the intentional theorist and the causal theorist may well agree that folk can talk about something despite not having a description that fixes the topic.

So what.

What is mistaken is the view that in the "Kripkean framework" the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

For anyone who wishes to check, here is a better link to Kripke's article: https://www.uvm.edu/~lderosse/courses/lang/Kripke%281977%29.pdf

(added: The crux is that Kripke argues that the semantic meaning of an act of reference can be maintained over the speaker's meaning. He uses this to defend Russell against Donnellen's view. Kripke's argument is that semantic reference is independent of speaker intent.)

Quoting Leontiskos

no one seems to want to give an argument for their claims

There's a difference between arguments unpresented and argument unacknowledged.

Reply to Leontiskos OK, I've probably misspoken in the sense of failing to flesh out what I meant and poorly expressing what I did say.

I said: "Yes, viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be an oxymoron."

I should have written the last words of the sentnece differently and added something like the underlined: "Looking at the actual conditions in, and nature of, our world and viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be untenable".

I don't agree that the notions of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are logically incompatible per se.

Quoting Janus

I don't agree that the notions of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are logically incompatible per se.

Well, there is an argument from Broad to that conclusion. If God is omnipotent, he should be able to create a being with free will, but if he is omniscient, he should know what the being will do, which would take away the being's free will.

And we can take this a step further, pointing out that a being with any two of these characteristics might be consistent, but that a being with all three is inconsistent. And yet, a being with all three would be greater than a being with any two. Hence, the notion of a greatest being in inconsistent.

To be sure, these are not arguments to which one might attach much practicality, but they can be amusing.

Reply to Banno If I recall correctly Augustine dealt with that argument by pointing out that God who is not in time but in eternity sees all of the past present and future, so it is not a matter of him knowing what one will do, but what one has done.

For me a far more telling argument would be that God should be able to create a perfect world but hasn't. That throws in doubt either omnibenevolence, omniscience or omnipotence. On that point it seems that the latter two must go together, or at least if Gord were omnipotent he must be omniscient, but neither require omnibenevolence.

Reply to Janus Sure. What do we make of this? If god sees what we have done, and so cannot change it, then there is something god cannot do. Or god does not know what we will choose, in which case there is stuff he doesn't know.

Not long ago we had a chap who insisted that god's omnipotence included his ability to perform paradoxical acts - make round squares and so on. I suppose one might go down that path.

Or one might choose Kierkegaard's approach, accepting the paradox as an act of faith.

There isn't an answer here. The dialogue is interminable.

Quoting Janus

For me a far more telling argument would be that God should be able to create a perfect world but hasn't. That throws in doubt either omnibenevolence, omniscience or omnipotence. On that point it seems that the latter two must go together, or at least if Gord were omnipotent he must be omniscient, but neither require omnibenevolence.

Did you see the argument, from a recent Philosophy Now paper, proposing that this was the perfect world, but not for us?

The Best Possible World, But Not For Us

@Gnomon started a thread on it.

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Reply to Banno

Here is Klima's "offending" passage.

For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description

Here is the very article you are citing:

So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator. He uses the designator with the intention of making an assertion about the object in question (which may not really be the semantic referent, if the speaker’s belief that it fulfills the appropriate semantic conditions is in error). The speaker’s referent is the thing the speaker referred to by the designator, though it may not be the referent of the designator, in his idiolect. In the example above, Jones, the man named by the name, is the semantic referent. Smith is the speaker’s referent, the correct answer to the question, “To whom were you referring?”22

The semantic referent of a designator is the referent determined in virtue of the conventions of the language, and the speaker's referent of a designator is the object which the speaker wishes to speak of using the designator (see page 263-264).

Here, Reply to Banno, you seem to be confusing speaker's reference and semantic reference through the added complexity of the fact that people obviously can be mistaken about their beliefs when they make references. I can only make sense of the addendum here,Reply to Banno, as somehow being counter to what Klima has said if the two are being confused again.

Who is the sentence "He did not write "Naming and Necessity" about?

From the perspective of convention, approached in the abstract as strictly "semantic meaning," it would refer to any male who didn't write something called "Naming and Necessity." But this can be modified or superseded in any particular context.

Reply to Janus

Yes, and Boethius is generally seen as later offering the standard argument for why God must exist at "no time." It was already seen that to exist in just one place was to be limited. Further, God's existing in any one place would run counter the idea that God is the continuing ground for all being, that "in which we live and move and have our being," (St. Luke, Acts 17)—God as "within everything, but contained in nothing" (St. Augustine, Confessions I). And this generally goes along with the idea that God alone is subsistent being, the ground and first principle for all creation (Exodus 3 and elsewhere).

St. Augustine points out that we can remember what we did in the past. Yet this does not somehow limit our freedom at the time of our choosing, even though we cannot change what we chose. Likewise, God recalling all of creation history from outside time does not affect the freedom of creatures in time. Boethius decisive innovation was to make it clear they being located at one moment in time is as limiting as being located in one space. To be at just one moment of time is to be separated from oneself, and not to fully possess all of oneself. God was already thought to be most truly One, so God's existence in time also runs into the problem of dividing God from Himself.

Dante has my favorite "spatial" illustration of this:

The point, as I have said, is that that home (the Empyrean) is nowhere at all. It does not exist in space or time; thus neither does the spatiotemporal world it “contains.” The Empyrean is the subject of all experience, it is what does the experiencing. As pure awareness or conscious being, its relation to creation, that is, to everything that can be described or talked about, may be metaphorically conceived in one of two ways: It may be imagined as an infinite reality containing the entire universe of every possible object of experience (this cosmological picture is the framework of the Paradiso) or it may be conceived as a point with no extension in either space or time, which projects the world of space and time around itself, as a light paints a halo onto mist. In the Primo Mobile, the ninth sphere, which is the nexus between the Empyrean and the world of multiplicity, between the subject of experience and every possible object of experience, Dante takes both these tacks.

Christian Moevs - The Metaphysics of Dante's Comedy - Introduction: Non-Duality and Self-Knowledge - pg. 6

The physical world is Satanocentric, having Lucifer at its absolute center, with all corporeal beings tending towards that center of gravity to the extent that they are material. However, matter can also be seen as the darkness that appears at the furthest fringes from the Empyrean's light, beyond which is nothingness. The entire narrative takes place in a spiral (first down to the center of the universe, then outward), with a sort of fractal recurrence (the same themes show up taken from different angles in the same mathematical order), but at the very end the entire picture is inverted into a spiral inwards, " “The Kingdom of God is within you” (Luke 17:21); "You were more inward to me than my most inward part and higher than my highest” (Confessions 3.6.11).

Reply to tim wood

Klima, Plantinga, etc. provide us with clear arguments and do discuss the distinctions between ens reale and ens rationis or possible and necessary respectively. However, these are also distinctions made throughout philosophy, and all the time in everyday language. An objection that one does not understand these terms says more about the objector than the argument. At any rate, if one was truly mystified by them, it's unclear how one could even understand what the argument was claiming to demonstrate.

I have already noted some grounds on which I think the opening premise might be challenged. However, not all challenges are equal. One could object to Cantor's distinction between different sizes of infinity. People do indeed raise cogent objections. However, not all objections are cogent. For example, simply stating: "Infinite means nothing greater, hence what is infinite cannot involve varying 'sizes,' that's just what infinite means, and it is incoherent and illogical to suggest otherwise," is a weak objection.

So, perhaps what Klima points out is that even the process of objecting to the argument draws an objector towards the thought object Anselm has in mind, just as a mathematician might somehow disagree with Cantor's diagonal argument in some respect, but they won't be able to do so properly without first coming to understand it as Cantor does.

This creates a difficulty for the argument though, on two fronts. The first, is as I noted previously, that it seems that the conclusion will be known better than the premises (at least for the faithful), and that even the faithful should hope that they know the conclusion better than the premises. St. Thomas has an entire chapter in the Summa Contra Gentiles titled something like "Why Man's Ultimate Happiness is Not to be Found in the Knowledge of God Has Through Demonstration," for instance.

Second, that if it takes a trip through millennia of thought on the unlimited and absolute to decide the issue, the premise is, while perhaps prima facie plausible for many, clearly not without its difficulties. However, I think Anselm's intent was to have the conclusion be fairly obvious.

So, for instance, if one needs to go into the Doctrine of Transcendentals to explain the relationship between "greatness" on the one hand, and existence, unity, and goodness on the other, one can hardly claim the objector is a "fool," because such issues have always been considered (in Anselm's time as well) extremely difficult and beyond the aptitudes of many (a point at least as old as Plato).

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus

Compare and contrast

believes satisfies his description

against

believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.

See how one is about a description, and the other is about the referent?

Now Kripke rather famously showed that names do not refer in virtue of some associated description.

So it is an error to claim that Kripke thinks a description is needed in order to fix speaker's reference.

The example given shows that speaker's reference is not as clear-cut as might otherwise be supposed. It provides a direct counterexample. The key issue here is not just what Kripke’s general definition says, but whether it applies universally. The case of Sarah misidentifying Kaplan demonstrates that speaker’s reference can diverge from belief, precisely because reference is not determined solely by belief but also by contextual factors like pointing.

Klima assumes that 'conditions for being the semantic referent' must involve a descriptive element, but Kripke’s entire argument in Naming and Necessity is that names refer via causal chains, not definite descriptions. So Klima’s reading is not just mistaken—it contradicts Kripke’s core argument. Merely citing Kripke’s general definition does not refute the point. The question is whether all cases of speaker’s reference conform to this model, and the Kaplan/Kripke case shows they do not.

Is this important? Perhaps not, perhaps it was just a slip on Klima's part. Or perhaps it indicates some reservations he might have towards Kripke's semantics.

Quoting Banno

What do we make of this? If god sees what we have done, and so cannot change it, then there is something god cannot do. Or god does not know what we will choose, in which case there is stuff he doesn't know.

I think the eternalist view enables God to know what we have done. what we have chosen. On that view there is no past, present and future. Could God change the past? Would that not change all of reality?

In any case is God compelled to fix our mistakes? This comes back to the obvious fact that he has no created a perfect world, not if a world, to be perfect involves no suffering for any creature.

Also, there is the question as to whether God can do things that defy logic. Is God bound by logic? If so, then He cannot be omnipotent. So many questions about God!

Quoting Banno

Did you see the argument, from a recent Philosophy Now paper, proposing that this was the perfect world, but not for us?

The Best Possible World, But Not For Us

Doesn't sound too promising but I'll have a look.

Quoting Banno

Kripke’s entire argument in Naming and Necessity is that names refer via causal chains, not definite descriptions.

I never got this. Naming and Necessity was the text we studied in one of my undergraduate units at Sydney Uni. I could not then and still cannot see how the causal chains would not necessarily have involved description, and that because names may refer to more than one individual, and because pointing in the case of remote individuals would not be possible.

Quoting Janus

In any case is God compelled to fix our mistakes? This comes back to the obvious fact that he has no created a perfect world, not if a world, to be perfect involves no suffering for any creature.

For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary. That is, god does not make choices.Whatever god does he is compelled to do out of necessity. The alternative, of course , is that there are no necessary beings.

The Best Possible World, But Not For Us is a curiosity rather than a serious proposal.

I almost agree with your critique of the causal chain theory of reference. It does not quite satisfy me, either. However I will say that it's advocates might not disagree with you that there is most likely a description involved at some point in the chain. But the success of the reference here and now is not dependent on that description. So at some stage Socrates was names "Socrates", perhaps using some description of the form "I name this baby before me'Socrates'". But now, given the ubiquity of the use of the name, there is a widespread agreement as to the referent of "Socrates" such that it is not dependent on that particular act.

Hence this from SEP:
Quoting Reference (SEP)

2. On the causal model, words refer in virtue of being associated with chains of use leading back to an initiating use or ‘baptism’ of the referent. Extending this model beyond names has proven difficult, but one option is to insist that it is really the perceptual connection that underlies most baptismal events that runs the show. In that case, perceptually-grounded uses of demonstratives, deictic pronouns, and definite descriptions can be folded into the picture relatively easily, with anaphoric uses treated as something akin to links in a chain of reference-borrowing

Notice "...leading back to an initiating use or ‘baptism’ of the referent".

Their target was the idea, from Russell and others, that a name refers in virtue of a description, and so that description must be at hand for a reference to be successful. This theory of reference is difficult to make work in a modal semantics.


Added: Quoting Banno

Kripke’s entire argument in Naming and Necessity is that names refer via causal chains, not definite descriptions.

Actually, looking at that again, it's much too strong. The casual chain argument is not at all central to N&N. It is offered as an example of the sort of thing that might serve as an alternative. The main line of argument is against the necessity of a reference being associated with a description, and how possible world semantics shows this to be fraught with contradiction.

Reply to Banno

So it is an error to claim that Kripke thinks a description is needed in order to fix speaker's reference.

Ok, so why do you think:

For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description

...implies anything to the contrary?

Klima assumes that 'conditions for being the semantic referent' must involve a descriptive element

Where?

Is this important? Perhaps not, perhaps it was just a slip on Klima's part. Or perhaps it indicates some reservations he might have towards Kripke's semantics.

Yeah, probably not important, but unless I've missed it and you meant to quote a different part of the article, I think you are misreading "the conditions for being a semantic reference must include a descriptive element" into that sentence. It doesn't say anything about it; it says that when a speaker's does use a description, the "speaker's reference" is that to which they think it applies.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

so why do you think. ...implies anything to the contrary?

I don't understand. The first says that Kripke does not think a description is needed in order to fix a referent. The second, that Kripke thinks the speaker has at hand a description in order to fix the referent.

What you talk'n 'bout?

Quoting Banno

The dialogue is interminable.

St. Anselm, like many religious, looks in the wrong direction, ever using the template of life having to come from a Higher Life (etc., a regress ensues).

Instead, think of what is the least that can be conceived, or, better yet, what physics shows as the near infinitesimal lightness of being.

Look to the future for higher being. Throw the golden template out of the stained-glass window!

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

It doesn't say anything about it; it says that when a speaker's does use a description, the "speaker's reference" is that to which they think it applies.

Perhaps that was his speaker's intent - that might explain the foux pas. But it would still be a mistake, as the example shows - and as Kripke argues - semantic meaning might well take priority. Sarah believes she is referring to Kripke when she is talking about Kaplan.

It will not do to reply that her speaker's reference is to Kripke, because the indicative picks out Kaplan.

Reply to tim wood

So let's stop for a moment so you can correct any errors of mine. The - my - argument is that given definitions 1 & 2, and Anselm's claims, then the God that in the understanding is that than which & etc. cannot exist in reality. Have at it!

I don't think the substitution will do. We can have ideas about ens reale. For instance, we have the ideas "man," "fox," etc. Yet presumably these also exist outside the mind.

So:

An immediate consequence for Anselm's is that what is in his understanding is an idea, and thereby cannot exist in reality - is not any kind of thing at all.

Wouldn't this also imply that if I have an idea about a sandwich I am going to make for lunch later it cannot later exist outside my head? Or if I have an idea of Alabama, it cannot exist outside the mind?

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Presuming we may now talk about §5,

Parasitic reference to each other’s thought objects between people not sharing each other’s beliefs seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon.

Returning to 'parasitic' reference, which is apparently where the fool refers to the thought object in the mind of the saint. (I've asked Leon several times if he agrees, but so far as I am aware he hasn't responded.) It was a while ago that I pointed out that there is no way to check the thought-object in the mind of the saint, to see what it is about; there is no way to verify that the thing in the mind of the saint is the thing being referred to by the fool. How do we know that when two people use the same words, they are referring to the same thought object?

Indeed, the very idea of a thought object is opaque. Presumably the aforementioned thought-object Porsche is parasitic on the "real" Porsche... Or will we say that the thought-object Porsche existed prior to the "real" Porsche, in the collective minds of the various designers at Volkswagen? It is after all just a rich man's beetle.

Quoting Janus

I should have written the last words of the sentnece differently and added something like the underlined: "Looking at the actual conditions in, and nature of, our world and viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be untenable".

I don't agree that the notions of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are logically incompatible per se.

Okay, I see what you are saying. Thanks for clarifying.

---

Quoting tim wood

An immediate consequence for Anselm's is that what is in his understanding is an idea, and thereby cannot exist in reality - is not any kind of thing at all.

See the section of my post from the first page beginning, "We actually saw this play out two days ago in the midst of a discussion on Mario Bunge..."

---

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

However, these are also distinctions made throughout philosophy, and all the time in everyday language.

Yes, and this is one of the reasons Klima gives for refusing a global ban on causal closure, for it would ban existence predications.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok, so why do you think [...] ...implies anything to the contrary?

Yep. :up:
@Banno keeps asserting things without argument.

---

Quoting Banno

The first says that Kripke does not think a description is needed in order to fix a referent. The second, that Kripke thinks the speaker has at hand a description in order to fix the referent.

I think you are getting hung up on the word "description," and trying to make it a technical term. Here is Klima's quote in context:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

[The intentional theory of reference] agrees with the recent “historical explanation”19—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects. For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.20 On the intentional theory not even this is always required.

20 “So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.” Kripke, S. 1991, p.173.

Klima is explicit that Kripke's theory differs from Russell's descriptive theory. Now Kripke says that the speaker "believes [the referent] fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator," and Klima interprets this as saying, "that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description."

• "[The speaker] believes [the referent] fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator" (Kripke)
• "the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description" (Klima's interpretation)

You are hung up on that word "description," and you want to say that Kripke differs from Russell on descriptions. Sure, but Klima already noted that. "Description" is a common word. Klima is quite reasonably reading "designator" as a description, given the belief about the semantic referent condition.

So using Kripke's own example that Klima picks up, consider the referent, "Her husband," in the sentence, "Her husband is kind to her." For Kripke the speaker must believe that the man fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator, "Her husband." For Kripke, even though he is mistaken, his reference succeeds in virtue of his belief. Klima riffs on that very same example and shows how one can use parasitic reference even without the belief that Kripke requires. If Klima can say, "'Her husband' happens to be her kind boss," (or Roark can say, "The most signi?cant British composer in history is a hack"), without involving the belief that Kripke claims is required, then obviously the theory of reference is different from Kripke's. And that's the point here: the intentional theory of reference differs from Kripke's theory of reference.

Having read through Roark's paper and Klima's response to Roark, I think Klima successfully defends his positions. Let's look at the facet that was brought up:

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Arguably, the argument simply proves that the atheist cannot deny God (i.e. the being greater than which no being can be thought) without affirming a contradiction.

Here is Roark's explicit claim:

Quoting Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 8

The upshot of all of this is the following: in order simultaneously to render the su?ciency claim in the third premise plausible and to accommodate (?), the predicate ‘Ix’ must also be interpreted as including a modal-pistic component: ‘x can be thought to exist only in the intellect’. One obvious consequence of this reinterpretation is the fact that the conclusion of the argument is not that God exists in reality, but rather that one cannot think God to exist only in the intellect.

Note that Roark wants to reinterpret Ix for two reasons: both because he thinks validity requires that Ix be pistic, and because Ix introduces conceptual closure.

Klima's first point is that Ix is already pistic:

Quoting Klima, Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof: reply to Tony Roark, 132

The original interpretation of the predicate ‘I( )’ in the reconstruction was ‘( ) is only in the intellect’, which I expounded further by saying that an x is only in the intellect in this sense if and only if x is thought of, but does not exist in reality. So, this predicate does contain a certain ‘pistic component’, namely, the component that x is thought of, which of course entails the ‘modal-pistic component’ that x can be thought of. Now, if g is only in the intellect in this sense, then it seems clear that something greater than g can be thought of in the sense of Roark’s interpretation (?) by a thinking subject S who assumes premise (2). For S, by virtue of assuming premise (2), is thinking that g is in the intellect and does not exist in reality. Therefore, S can obviously think of something with ‘a greater cardinality’, whether g itself or anything else, by simply thinking, or counterfactually assuming, that that thing does exist in reality.

But this does not foreclose Roark's claim that the conclusion of Klima's formulation of Anselm's argument ought to itself be pistic. Klima responds to this idea as follows:

Quoting Klima, Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof: reply to Tony Roark, 132-3

Accordingly, the argument does have to prove its conclusion for any thinking subject S, provided S assumes all the premises in the required senses, interpreting the phrase ‘x can be thought to be greater than y’ as expounded by Roark. The important point here is that what S has to conclude on the basis of the premises thus interpreted is not that he simply cannot think that g exists only in the intellect, but that it is not true that g exists only in the intellect, from which he further has to conclude that, since g is in the intellect and not only in the intellect, g also has to exist in reality.

To be sure, an external observer E, listening to the reasoning of S, can describe what she observes by saying that S had to conclude that g exists because S cannot consistently think that g does not exist. And E may further claim that she is not thus committed to accepting S’s conclusion, for S can plausibly argue only for himself, since he is the one who makes the comparisons of his own thought objects regarding their assumed cardinalities within his own ‘modal-pistic’ context.

But then, this result seems to make perfect sense in the larger context of the paper. After all, my main argument in the paper is that Anselm’s argument can genuinely work only for those who are willing to make constitutive reference to God. But for them it is indeed an inevitable conclusion that they cannot consistently think of God and think that he does not exist. So they have to conclude without any pistic-modal component in their conclusion that God exists.

To be clear, Roark is claiming that Ix should be reinterpreted as I[sub]2[/sub]x:

• I(): "() is only in the intellect"
• I[sub]2[/sub](): "() can be thought to exist only in the intellect"

...and from I[sub]2[/sub]x Roark thinks the conclusion should be changed to, "One cannot think God to exist only in the intellect."

Klima's point, quoted above, is that Ix always meant, "x is thought of, but does not exist." Thus the conclusion of the reductio for the one thus thinking of x is that x must exist, not that one cannot think x to exist only in the intellect.

But Klima admits that Ix brings with it "conceptual closure" on account of the non-existence claim that it includes. To Roark's conceptual closure objection, Klima simply notes that global solutions to semantic or conceptual closure, such as Tarski's or Roark's, are overkill. He provides an alternative local solution where one can reject the paradoxes of conceptual closure (such as Modest) without rejecting the non-paradoxes of conceptual closure (such as Anselm's argument).

(Of course, strictly speaking Klima addresses the Modest paradox without arguing whether or not it is truly analogous to the Liar.)

---

If we think about the importance of parasitic reference for dialogue, and then we think about the tendency of modern philosophy and logic towards a self-referential, closed system which is quasi-solipsistic, then I think it becomes plausible that the notion of parasitic reference could breathe life into the modern paradigm, opening it up to encounters with other forms of thought. This is because parasitic reference provides a principled way to speak about that which is not yet understood, and in this way erects bridges between interlocutors. On the Quinian conception there is a fairly dire absence of such bridges (even the point that, for example, Quinians are unable to make sense of questions regarding quantifier variance as representing substantive disagreements).

Quoting Leontiskos

Banno keeps asserting things without argument.

You made that claim, then immediately quoted and addressed my argument.

:smile:

Quoting Leontiskos

You are hung up on that word "description,"

That was Kripke. He kinda used the word a whole lot.

Meanwhile, the elephant sits patiently, waiting....

Reply to Banno - Because I am covering multiple posts of yours. Count Timothy already pressed your early, question-begging posts into the arguments that appeared in the later posts (although those arguments are still fairly thin).

Goose.

Quoting Banno

For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary.

Is there any logical reason why there could not be just one necessary being?

Quoting Banno

But now, given the ubiquity of the use of the name, there is a widespread agreement as to the referent of "Socrates" such that it is not dependent on that particular act.

But does the widespread agreement not come about due to many descriptions that form part of the causal chain? This would seem to be inevitable if there were more than oine Socrates and question like 'Which Socrates are you referring to?" or 'I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?'.

I agree that for those who already know who the name refers to descriptions need not be at hand.Reply to Leontiskos :cool:

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Likewise, God recalling all of creation history from outside time does not affect the freedom of creatures in time. Boethius decisive innovation was to make it clear they being located at one moment in time is as limiting as being located in one space. To be at just one moment of time is to be separated from oneself, and not to fully possess all of oneself. God was already thought to be most truly One, so God's existence in time also runs into the problem of dividing God from Himself.

An interesting addition to the argument!

Quoting Janus

Is there any logical reason why there could not be just one necessary being?

Well, in S5 that would lead to everything being necessary. Much as Spinoza concluded. But that's not a theistic god. It seems pantheism is more logical than theism... :wink:

Quoting Janus

But does the widespread agreement not come about due to many descriptions that form part of the causal chain? This would seem to be inevitable if there were more than one Socrates and question like 'Which Socrates are you referring to?" or 'I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?'.

You'll be familiar with the examples. Who is the question "I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?" about? I suggest it is about Socrates, despite the speaker perhaps not having anything available with which to fix the referent. It's not that there are no definite descriptions, but that they are not needed in order for reference to work perfectly well.

Quoting Banno

Well, in S5 that would lead to everything being necessary. Much as Spinoza concluded. But that's not a theistic god. It seems pantheism is more logical than theism... :wink:

Yes, Spinoza was a determinist so in one sense for him everything was necessary, but he also made a distinction between a being (God or Nature) that is necessary in the sense of depending on nothing else, for its existence and beings that are contingent in that they depend on other conditions and beings for their existence.

Quoting Banno

You'll be familiar with the examples. Who is the question "I've never heard of Socrates, when did he live and what did he do?" about? I suggest it is about Socrates, despite the speaker perhaps not having anything available with which to fix the referent. It's not that there are no definite descriptions, but that they are not needed in order for reference to work perfectly well.

Right, logically the question is about Socrates, but for someone who does not know who Socrates is said to have been, descriptions will be needed for reference to work.

Reply to Janus I have trouble seeing a connection between dependency and modality.

Quoting Janus

logically the question is about Socrates

Yes, it is. SO the question is clear, and the referent fixed - the question is about Socrates. It would be odd to answer "But since you don't know who Socrates is, I don't understand your question".

And again, it is clear that reference is a communal activity. Hence, a private "speaker's meaning" is problematic.

Quoting Banno

I have trouble seeing a connection between dependency and modality.

Spinoza has modes, but they are conceptually different to modality in modern logic, as I understand it. The simple point is that Spinoza sees necessity in terms of dependence. A necessary being does not depend on anything for its existence, whereas contingent beings do. So, contingent temporal beings that come into and go out of existence depend on Nature or God (Deus siva Natura) for their existence, Nature or God is eternal, does not come into or go out of existence and depends on nothing.

Quoting Banno

Yes, it is. SO the question is clear, and the referent fixed - the question is about Socrates. It would be odd to answer "But since you don't know who Socrates is, I don't understand your question".

It's not a matter of not understanding the meaning of some reference to Socrates when one has no idea who the name 'Socrates' refers to, but of not knowing who or what is being referred to. Descriptions will be necessary to provide that information.

Quoting Janus

Contingent temporal beings that come into and go out of existence depend on Nature or God (Deus siva Natura) for their existence, Nature or God is eternal, does not come into or go out of existence and depends on nothing.

I don't see what to make of this except as saying that there is stuff. So, yes. And folk want to say more, but as soon as they do, there are all sorts of problems. So I'll leave it at that.

Quoting Janus

It's not a matter of not understanding the meaning of some reference to Socrates when one has no idea who the name 'Socrates' refers to, but of not knowing who or what is being referred to

But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no?

Quoting Banno

I don't see what to make of this except as saying that there is stuff. So, yes. And folk want to say more, but as soon as they do, there are all sorts of problems.

I actually agree with you on that. I was just trying to unpack the logic employed by Spinoza regarding necessity and contingency.

Quoting Banno

But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no?

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on.

Of course if someone is familiar with those descriptions the proper name 'Socrates' "functions correctly", but for someone who doesn't I can't see how it functions at all.

Quoting Janus

I actually agree with you on that.

:up:

Quoting Janus

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on.

I agree with that. The point is that the questioner succeeds in picking out Socrates uniquely, and this despite not having a definite description available. They don't know who Socrates is, and yet demonstrably they can talk about Socrates. They can say "I don't know who Socrates is" and that can be a true sentence about their knowledge of Socrates.

Quoting Janus

I can't see how we could know who the name refers to if we didn't know at least one of the following that Socrates is purported to be; that is 'the teacher of Plato', 'the agora gadfly' 'the man charged with corrupting the youth of Athens and condemned to drink hemlock' and so on.

Of course if someone is familiar with those descriptions the proper name 'Socrates' "functions correctly", but for someone who doesn't I can't see how it functions at all.

Yes, I agree. I had a conversation with Banno on this topic awhile back, such as <here>. One example exchange from that thread:

Quoting Banno

A novice who asks "Who is Thales?" does not have at hand a description of Thales, and yet they are asking about Thales.

Quoting Leontiskos

But the novice does have a description of 'Thales'. If they had no description they would not be able to ask the question. Specifically, if they did not believe that 'Thales' described an ancient philosopher, they would not be able to ask the question. "Thales was an ancient philosopher" is a description, as is (1).

Suppose, ex hypothesi, that the novice has no description of 'Thales'. If this were so, then what in the world do you propose they would be asking about when they ask about 'Thales'? In that case they could not be asking about a man, because if they were asking about a man then 'Thales' would have a description. They could not be asking about a previously existing thing, because if they were asking about a previously existing thing then they would have a description. They could not be asking about a name from their textbook, because if they were asking about a name from their textbook then they would have a description, etc.

So again, you are contradicting yourself in simultaneously holding that the novice has no description of 'Thales' and nevertheless uses the name in a meaningful sense.

What's interesting is that if you start with Russell's (bad) theory, it is very hard to extricate yourself. You end up compulsively concerned with the question concerning a verifiable "definite description."

Reply to Banno

For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary. That is, god does not make choices.Whatever god does he is compelled to do out of necessity. The alternative, of course , is that there are no necessary beings.

If [i]anything[/I] is necessary, then [I]everything[/I] is necessary?

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

If anything is necessary, then everything is necessary?

That's a misrepresentation of the argument. In S5, if there is a necessary being than every being is necessary.

You can find the argument online, or ask your friendly AI to run up a version.

Reply to Banno :up:

Quoting Leontiskos

What's interesting is that if you start with Russell's (bad) theory, it is very hard to extricate yourself. You end up compulsively concerned with the question concerning a verifiable "definite description."

Yes, the salient difference between descriptions and "a verifiable definite description".

Reply to Banno

Is "being" the key term then? I'm not finding anything and AI is presenting gobbledygook.

Lots of people thing mathematical objects are necessary entities, so this seems problematic for a system if it includes them too.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus

https://chatgpt.com/share/67a2daa7-2c28-800f-a827-6ca73e18cb24

Quoting Banno

But we do know who the question refers to... Socrates. Yes, there is more that one can learn about Socrates, but that is still about Socrates. Kripke's point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a propper name to function correctly, stand... no?

“But we do know who the question refers to…God. Yes, there more that one can learn about God, but that is still about God. Kripke’s point, that we do not need a definite description at hand in order for a proper name to function correctly,…no?”

Hmmm, I suppose neither a logical construction that Anselm puts forward.

Reply to Banno

So, if anything we might quantify over is possibly necessary then everything is necessary?

Floridi has a demonstration to the effect that any (mathematically describable) universe must have at least one bit (some binary difference across a dimension) to be distinguishable from nothing. But this would imply that a bit is necessary in every universe (or at least possibly necessary).

I am not sure if one can draw any serious metaphysical conclusions from such axioms. It does the work of Plantinga's modal argument for him.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

So, if anything we might quantify over is possibly necessary then everything is necessary?

Why include "qualify over" here? The axiom is 5:?A???A, where A might or might not be a quantification.

If you want us to consider "Floridi", then link to the paper, or set out the argument. The bald assertion appears unconnected to S5.

Modal logical systems model how we might talk coherently about modal topics. That's how they are useful in our metaphysical considerations. They show us were we might be going wrong.

On to the next bit of §5.

There's a bit of waffle about Catholics being able to talk about pagan gods.

Then Klima concedes the point made earlier concerning his argument, citing Aquinas as his authority: "...no inconsistency is involved in being able, for any given thing either in the intellect or in reality, to think something greater..."

See this post.

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Reply to tim wood :cool:

Then there is a discussion supposing a form of incommensurability. The upshot is that understanding the argument as a proof of god's existence requires a commitment to the existence of god. Not a lot of help for evangelists.

There's also the conceit that the understanding had by a theist is qualitatively different to that had by the pagan, so that they 'could claim to have a full grasp of the meaning of this term".

One wonders how one tells that a fellow theist has "a full grasp of the meaning of this term" - presumably becasue they agree with your argument... :roll:

Here again we hit on the problem of intensional opacity. And here again is the closing off of the argument to critique by those who disagree.

Unless one is able to learn to think and live with the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them, one will always fail to have a real grasp on the meaning of the other person.

How does one know someone has "the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them"? Apparently by agreeing with them. It is open for the theist to say, of anyone who disagrees with their argument, that they have not spent sufficient time "to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God".

All rather sequestered and distasteful, really. "Mutual understanding" here means "agreeing with me".

@Leontiskos,

Sorry for the tardy reply to your question of 4 days ago.

Just to clarify, the comment regards "omnipotence" was an attempt to clarify/make clearer @Tim Wood's previous entry about "omnipotence" and attempted to clear up any misconceptions of the breadth of the meaning of "omnipotence".
And perhaps, with a light general "warning" about using "omnipotence" in a way that degrades the all encompassing potency of the word's full meaning

Sorry it was not meant as a direct comment about St. Anselm's Proof.

helpful smile

Reply to kazan - Okay, thanks kazan.

Many have been especially interested in the proof itself and section 2. Such people may be interested in another paper of Klima's where he spends much more time on objections to the argument. That paper may be an alternative version of the book chapter of the OP, and it uses a slightly different formalization of Anselm's proof:

"Anselm’s Proof for God’s Existence in the Proslogion," by Gyula Klima

Reply to Leontiskos Presumably any substantive critique of this new paper will also be ignored.

Quoting Banno

The upshot is that understanding the argument as a proof of god's existence requires a commitment to the existence of god.

Banno has shown with each of his posts that he simply lacks any real skills of reading comprehension. All of his posts are full of weird shit that does not come from Klima or the paper, and when it is pointed out to him over and over, he just buries his head in the sand and moves on as if nothing has occurred. Probably the most absurd case occurred here, but the occurrences are constant:

Quoting Banno

Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist?

.. :lol: Anyone who has read Klima's argument knows that this is precisely what (2) does.

Why does Banno persist in this sort of behavior, here and elsewhere? Because he is a troll. He uses the forum to try to address his emotional needs, and here he is emotionally invested in the idea that Klima or his paper must be dismissed. He has engaged in this sort of emotion-driven nonsense from his very first post in the thread. That he has not managed to read or comprehend the paper is no surprise, for reading the paper would get in the way of his emotional needs. Banno is a hack who has no real desire for philosophical discourse or authentic dialogue. He just goes around shitting on everything he fails to understand, and his capacity for said failure is unparalleled.*

After Banno tried to overtly hijack the thread I just put him back on ignore, where he belongs. I have since responded to posts of his that others have picked up, but I think most people on TPF recognize that Banno is in large part a bored troll who is merely engaged in emotional, knee-jerk gainsaying.

Those who have read the paper carefully already recognize Banno’s absurd misrepresentations. I invite them to engage with the paper thoughtfully and to avoid falling into the sort of trolling that Banno's whole persona has been reduced to. Engaging those who are not serious and do not have the capacity to authentically interact with the paper is a waste of time. There is no need to waste our time with such people. Tony Roark is a great example of someone who engaged the paper thoughtfully and with intellectual honesty. He is the sort of person we should imitate.


* And that is the great irony. Klima is trying to build a bridge to mutual understanding, and Banno is intent on destroying the bridge before it is built, lest light come into his solipsistic cave. Banno is the Logical Positivist who refuses to admit that the project has failed, and who closes his eyes tightly whenever anyone presents him with the obvious evidence.

Reply to Leontiskos Oh, goodie, we are back to talking abut me!

If you don't think my posts appropriate, mark 'em for the mods.

Quoting Leontiskos

Banno has shown with each of his posts that he simply lacks any real skills of reading comprehension. All of his posts are full of weird shit that does not come from Klima or the paper, and when it is pointed out to him over and over, he just buries his head in the sand and moves on as if nothing has occurred.

To give another example, namely the long tangent regarding Kripke:

Quoting Leontiskos

You are hung up on that word "description," and you want to say that Kripke differs from Russell on descriptions. Sure, but Klima already noted that. "Description" is a common word. Klima is quite reasonably reading "designator" as a description, given the belief about the semantic referent condition.

So using Kripke's own example that Klima picks up, consider the referent, "Her husband," in the sentence, "Her husband is kind to her." For Kripke the speaker must believe that the man fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator, "Her husband." For Kripke, even though he is mistaken, his reference succeeds in virtue of his belief. Klima riffs on that very same example and shows how one can use parasitic reference even without the belief that Kripke requires. If Klima can say, "'Her husband' happens to be her kind boss," (or Roark can say, "The most signi?cant British composer in history is a hack"), without involving the belief that Kripke claims is required, then obviously the theory of reference is different from Kripke's. And that's the point here: the intentional theory of reference differs from Kripke's theory of reference.

1. Banno claims that Kripke is being misrepresented
2. Banno is proven wrong, at length over a number of posts by two different users
3. Banno buries his head in the sand

Banno has enough time on his hands to repeat this sort of nonsense ad nauseum. I don't.

Well I can quote myself, too.

Quoting Banno

Here's the footnote quoting Kripke:

“So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.”
This is in defence of:
In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

Notice that the quote does not mention descriptions at all. And notice also the use of the word "tentatively".

Speaker’s meaning depends on context and intent. But Kripke showed that proper names are rigid designators—they refer to the same entity in all possible worlds. Speaker’s meaning is intensional, or if you prefer, subjective. It varies between individuals, and so cannot account for multiple folk talking about the same thing, nor provide modal rigidity.

You and Klima both appear to have read "the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator" as implying the presence of a description. But the phrase is chosen so as to be neutral. The "conditions" can of course as well be those causal conditions that are the basis of Kripke's theory of reference.

Quoting Banno

Ok, I'll keep playing. Yes, the intentional theorist and the causal theorist may well agree that folk can talk about something despite not having a description that fixes the topic.

So what.

What is mistaken is the view that in the "Kripkean framework" the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

For anyone who wishes to check, here is a better link to Kripke's article: https://www.uvm.edu/~lderosse/courses/lang/Kripke%281977%29.pdf

(added: The crux is that Kripke argues that the semantic meaning of an act of reference can be maintained over the speaker's meaning. He uses this to defend Russell against Donnellen's view. Kripke's argument is that semantic reference is independent of speaker intent.)

Quoting Leontiskos

You are falling into yet another ignoratio elenchus, for Klima tells us explicitly that the intentional theory and the causal or historical* theory agree on this:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

This theory agrees with the recent “historical explanation”[19]—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects.

(So Banno didn't read the paper. A lesson we have learned too many times by now. What drives him is his fanatical anti-religious creed.)

Again:

Quoting Leontiskos

Those who have read the paper carefully already recognize Banno’s absurd misrepresentations. I invite them to engage with the paper thoughtfully and to avoid falling into the sort of trolling that Banno's whole persona has been reduced to. Engaging those who are not serious and do not have the capacity to authentically interact with the paper is a waste of time. There is no need to waste our time with such people. Tony Roark is a great example of someone who engaged the paper thoughtfully and with intellectual honesty. He is the sort of person we should imitate.

To the new paper, then, which I gave a quick read.

Quoting p.10

Yet, this last remark should already highlight why, despite the soundness of Anselm’s proof, one may rationally reject its conclusion. For although it is true that whoever forms in their mind the concept of that than which nothing greater can be thought is thereby committed to thinking that it exists, there is nothing in Anselm’s argument that would force anyone to think of anything as that than which nothing greater can be thought in the first place.

Now here he is agreeing with Reply to the point made previously. One is not rationally obligated by the argument to the conclusion.

For any relation transitive relation, we can form a sequence, ...a
The quote above agrees with this.

And the conclusion? "...the need to have God “seriously” in one’s mind".

So
Quoting Banno

Here again we hit on the problem of intensional opacity. And here again is the closing off of the argument to critique by those who disagree.

This by way of my not addressing the arguments here "with any sort of seriousness", and my simple "lack of any real skills of reading comprehension".

Happy to be shown were this goes wrong. It would mark a pleasant change. ]

Edit: bolding added. Learnt that from Leon.

Quoting Banno

And here again is the closing off of the argument to critique by those who disagree.

A great deal of provision is made for disagreements. One disagrees with a proof by showing a premise false or an inference invalid. When one has neither shown a premise false nor an inference invalid, they haven't disagreed except in the manner of begging the question.

Yawn.

Quoting Banno

Yawn.

Yes, you're lazy. We know. It's written all over.

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Reply to tim wood - I spoke to the question at some length Reply to here, namely to the dispute between Roark and Klima on the proper conclusion of the proof.

Beyond that, what I said to you Reply to earlier stands.

We could go back to Banno's claim:

Quoting Leontiskos

This is also very similar to the question-begging atheist:

1. All valid ontological arguments beg the question
2. This is a valid ontological argument
3. Therefore, this begs the question

But how does the inductive (1) get to be so strong? And even beyond that, what is "an ontological argument"? As the very first sentence of Klima's introduction implies, that whole label is anachronistic. Certainly Anselm would wonder how one can know that a whole bundle of loosely-affiliated arguments are known to be faulty a priori.

Then contrasting Aquinas:

Quoting Leontiskos

Aquinas’ response to Anselm in the Summa Contra Gentiles is quite interesting. On the one hand, it is of the weaker “question-begging” form that we spoke about earlier, given that it does not directly address Anselm’s proof. On the other hand, it is quite different from the other similarly weaker replies that we have seen. In particular, Aquinas’ approach takes the dialogical nature of the exchange as being fundamental, as opposed to the idea that Anselm has simply transgressed an inferential law (e.g. “no-existence-from-words,” which is reminiscent of “no-ought-from-is”).

Now one can take Banno's question-begging approach. There's not a great deal of shame in that. But I don't want to do that. The only objection that I might offer is that constitutive reference to God is not possible, at least in the strict sense required for Anselm's definition (and Klima or Aquinas might object in a similar way). But I don't really know that such an objection succeeds. In a more general way the island objection seems like the best readily-available objection.

So given that I don't have any close objections, I am forced to admit that it is sound. But I think Klima's analysis is apt, which is to say that the argument will not be persuasive without the requisite kinds of concept-acquisition. Gaunilo's own retort in section 5 is also quite good (having to do with the way that concepts and assent interrelate).

In one sense this is odd, ergo:

Quoting Leontiskos

3. Does this mean that Anselm’s proof can be sound for the theist while being unsound for the atheist?

But on the other hand it is not odd that an argument could be sound in itself but yet inaccessible and therefore unpersuasive to some. The odd thing about this argument is that the further work lies in concept-acquisition rather than the further defense of some premise.

And what about the atheist who agrees with Klima, if that is possible? They would say that the opposite of concept-acquisition is required, namely shearing away the relevant thought object from Anselm's universe of thought objects, which would entail establishing criteria for what counts as an incoherent thought in a way that falls short of contradiction.

What's interesting in any case is how Klima has created commensurability over what is usually seen to be an incommensurable gulf.

---

Edit: It should go without saying that Klima does not see the atheist as irrational, and I agree. But I think we want to ask whether it is unfair that the atheist cannot adequately respond to the proof in the way of a close objection. In the first place, not necessarily, unless we are to say that all sound proofs are unfair to those who dislike their conclusions. In the second place, perhaps, in a way that Gaunilo's point about words could shed light on. If there is a place where John Henry Newman addresses this proof he might have a very worthy objection that develops Gaunilo's thought in section 5.

:yawn:

Quoting Banno

How does one know someone has "the concepts of another person and the thought objects constituted by them"? Apparently by agreeing with them. It is open for the theist to say, of anyone who disagrees with their argument, that they have not spent sufficient time "to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God".

All rather sequestered and distasteful, really. "Mutual understanding" here means "agreeing with me".

This is precisely the sort of cynicism that is problematic, and which leads to you being written off as an unserious poster. You take this passage from Klima:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 5

So what seems to be required from the theist to understand the atheist in the first place is to realize how the atheist can look at the world without a God and still be able to conceive of God in a non-committed, parasitic manner, as being an object of the theist’s beliefs, but bearing no relevance to his own beliefs. On the other hand, to understand perfectly the theist, the atheist has to be able to think of God as the theist does, as bearing utmost relevance to everything thinkable. But for this, he would have to go through the same long meditative process that the theist did in building up his own concept of God.

...and you reduce it to, "Anyone who disagrees with the argument has not spent sufficient time." :roll: Klima doesn't say that at all. You are projecting your own eristics into the paper and diminishing the thread with these petty imputations of bad motives.

I can understand why you would be frustrated with a stubborn argument like Anselm's, but ad hominem misrepresentation is not a great way to deal with that frustration.

Note how Roark critiques the argument instead of resorting to ad hominem or reading things into the paper that simply are not there.

Klima anticipates your sophistry:

Quoting Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 5

[we] should not seek sheer “winning” in a debate (for that is the concern of sophists)

Someone like yourself who is motivated primarily by the fear that Klima might "win" a "debate," and who reads everything he writes through that petty, childish lens, simply does not understand philosophy. And I should think you also do a disservice to atheists, who are not all so petty, fearful, and closed-minded.

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

For my own purposes, I'll summarise my response to the article.

The first section advocates an account of meaning in terms of the intent of the speaker or user of the language, so that a reference refers to what the speaker intends it to refer to. Relying on intent fails to account for many aspects of language use. Relying on intent also renders the context opaque, since someone's intent can only be inferred from what they say and do. This is particularly clear in the mooted "object of thought", which seems to be very much the sort of thing rejected by the Private Language argument.

This opacity carries in to the argument proper in section two, were god is defied as a thought-object. This is perhaps most apparent at line five, were the thought-object is substituted into a thought in order to construct a contradiction, despite it not being obvious that this substitution can be done salva veritate. The argument also defines god as the maximum element in a sequence that may have no limits. There is a move from ens rationis to ens reale, that can be brought out by using Free Logic. Finally, that the first assumption, "God is only in the intellect", is the one that must be rejected is not satisfactorily argued.

Section three addresses Anselm's second ontological argument, and has similar problems to the first argument. But in addition there is the problem of how to deal with a necessary being without the consequence of modal collapse. Here are also offered three defences of the argument, which seem inadequate.

And here we begin to see the thesis of the article: that those who disagree with the argument have not understood the idea of god.

Section four returns to the theory of reference, The problem with the article's argument here is clear enough: how could we know that "the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer"? And further, how can the "thought-object" in the mind of the saint be said to be the same as the "thought-object" in the head of the fool - and indeed, how could they be said to be different?

The final section sets out an account of Aquinas' rejection of Anselm's argument, on the grounds that the non-believer may well not accept that the sequence of greatness has a limit. Klima's thesis is here explicated somewhat. Those who have not agreed with the argument do so becasue they do not have an adequate understanding of god; and that their understanding is inadequate is shown by their not accepting that the sequence of greatness has a limit. The circularity of this approach is obvious.

The ontological argument may well be a way for the theist to grasp what it is they believe. But there are sufficient problems with the argument for it to be discounted as a demonstration of theism. Of course it does not follow that there is no god. Similarly the thesis of this article, that those who disagree with the argument have not understood the idea of god, may give solace to believers but is dependent on an approach to reference that ignores the communal dynamics of language.

I've enjoyed reading this article in detail, so thanks for this thread. In the end I doubt that anything is changed by such rumination, but they can be entertaining. Ontological shock, the surprise we feel at there being something rather than nothing, is not answered by such discussions. To my eye it is more honest to simply admit that there are things we do not, and perhaps cannot, understand.

As for Leon's insults - that I troll, I lack any real skills of reading comprehension, my posts are full of weird shit; oddly, I "bury (my) head in the sand and moves on as if nothing has occurred" - not sure how one can move on with one's head in the sand - my posts are driven by emotion, I haven't read the paper, I've hijacked the thread, I shit on everything, I do not engage in authentic dialogue, But most confusingly, I'm both a logical positivist and yet a solipsist.

I'm not sure it's me who is having an emotional response here.

Klima is supposedly "trying to build a bridge to mutual understanding" based on the claim that those who do not agree with his argument have not understood the nature of god; yet the basis for the claim that they have not understood the nature of god is that they do not agree with the argument. Hmm.

Now I think I have provided a reasonable response to the very few actual replies to what I have said. Kripke does emphasis descriptions, in order to reject the descriptivist theory of reference. Both Klima and Aquinas accept the criticism I offered, after Gaunilo, on the definition of "greatest". If there is something that you, gentle reader, think needs addressing, let me know, I'm still here.

I'm not happy that Leon is so upset. It's a topic that is for some very close to their identity. Putting up a thread is putting one's balls on the anvil, so to speak, and occasionally things do not go as expected. Being gainsaid is part of being on these forums. Thanks again, Leon, for starting this thread. But I am not responsible for your reaction to my posts.

Reply to tim wood

You apparently do not understand your own terms. Or maybe you do. I should like to see you make the sandwich of which you have an idea. Of course you won't need anything at all from the grocery store, yes? Or for that matter anything at all that can be called real, or that exists, right? It's ideas all the way down that you're somehow going to make real.

Now I agree you can think about a corned beef on rye, and you can make or buy a real corned beef on rye sandwich. And I will wager that you can tell the difference between the idea of a sandwich and a real sandwich. You can, can't you?

The two terms distinguish what can be real, and what, as idea, cannot be. That's what it says. Maybe read it again?

I see what you're saying now. The idea is that something with independent existence, like a fox or a sandwich, can be an intentional object of thought. So, St. Anselm's question is whether or not God exists only as an intentional object of human thought, an entity with dependent existence, or is an entity with independent existence. That something is an intentional object of thought does not preclude it being an independent entity. If it did, all the concepts we use to think could never be related to anything that exists outside our mind.

At least in the framework Anselm is assuming, that something is an object of thought doesn't preclude it from being ens reale (this would be a "first intention"). You bring up an interesting point though, because in modern representationalism we might make a stronger distinction here. Still, most representationalists will allow that the objects of thought can have existence independent of the mind, elsewise it seems that the world would be epistemically inaccessible. This actually seems particularly problematic for those who would claim that we only ever experience mental representations.

Reply to Banno

Yes, if A is possibly necessary than it is necessary. Plantinga has an intuitive explanation of this. If something is possibly necessary then it is necessary in at least one possible world. But to be necessary is to be necessary in all possible worlds.

That seems unobjectionable. However, "if any thing is necessary, then everything is necessary" or essentially "either everything is contingent or nothing is," seems to be problematic for a system that's supposed to let us discuss modality. I can't find any source that discusses this consequence though.

Plantinga argues that God's creative acts are contingent and that if God is possible then God is necessary.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus It's a subtle point, I supose.

Consider "It is raining". It is possible that it is raining, but it is not necessary that it is raining - there are possible worlds in which it is not raining. So we don't move from it being possible that it is raining to it being necessary that it is raining.

But then consider "god exists". If we start by considering that it is possible that god exists, as is done in the second of Anselm's arguments, and move to the conclusion that it is necessary that god exists, we have a formulation that goes from ?P to ??P. That is what brings about modal collapse - we can apply the axiom ??P??P to get from ?P to ?P.

So if we say that it is possible and that god is a necessary being, modal logic collapses.

In effect, in saying that it is possible for god to be necessary, one is saying it is both possible and necessary that god exists. A contradiction. So anything follows, including that everything is necessary.

Plantiga's proof smuggles in necessity by saying god is possibly necessary.

So we can say that god is possible, or that god is necessary, but not both. That is, the move in the ontological argument from god being possible to his being necessary is void.

Added: Quoting Banno

...one is saying it is both possible and necessary that god exists...

But if god is necessary, then it must be possible for god to exist? Sure, ?p??p in S5. But not ?p ^ ?p.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus While I'm here, the equation of independent existence and necessity is also fraught. These are two quite independent ideas, conflated.

That something exists independently does not imply that it exists in every possible world. And that something is found in every possible world does not imply that it's existence is not dependent.

Again, possible world semantics shows us were we have been led astray.

(added: @tim wood, was that your point?)

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Quoting tim wood

It is a meditation on his beliefs.

This may be the only way to make sense of it.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus There's more on modal collapse, with comments on Plantinga, in the SEP article on divine simplicity. A slightly different, but related, use to the one I made of the modal collapse argument here. "The MCA’s main value is as a concrete point of entry into this constellation of difficult questions."

Here is my first impression of the paper:

The proof relies on "thought objects" and an intentional theory of reference. Wherein the thought object referred to by the saint, in a locution of constitution reference, is God, the saint attributes to this "object" "that than which nothing greater can be thought." It is precisely that the thought object God, referred to constitutively by the saint, that is not referred to constitutively by the atheist. Rather, the atheist wants to deny that the thought object picked out by the intention towards God has the description "that than which nothing greater can be thought," and thereby refers to God only by parasitic reference to what the saint is proposing after reflection.

Reply to NotAristotle - Yes, that seems fairly accurate to me. :up:

The takeaway is that parasitic reference is possible, that it is based on an intentional theory of reference, that it is different from modern conceptions such as Kripke's, that it helps resolve some of the disputes about possibilism, etc.

None of which quite work.