Arguments for and against the identification of Jesus with God

As a non-Christian, you have no standing to address this issue.

The fact that you have is a sign of the religious bigotry endemic here on the forum.

Let’s look at a question where your opinion might matter more

Can Santa Claus beat up Batman?

Is Jesus God?

Can Santa Claus beat up Batman?
— T Clark

Nope, I think it's the other way around.
Batman can quite clearly whoop Santa Claus' ass.

Insofar as "God" and "Jesus" are fictions, yes or no depending on each author (make-believer).

Can Santa Claus beat up Batman?
— T Clark

Nope, I think it's the other way around.
Batman can quite clearly whoop Santa Claus' ass. — Arcane Sandwich

:strong: :lol:

So, I take it that [s]you accept[/s] the non-Christian argument, and [s]you reject[/s] the Christian argument. And it seems that [s]you deny[/s] the second premise, FTI2

It is therefore in the interest of Christian philosophers to argue that God and Jesus are indeed identical.

There were Christian sects that didn't believe that Jesus was God, the Arians, for instance.

There are Christians today who don't think Jesus is divine, like the Jehovah's Witnesses.

So it's a sectarian issue, not a philosophical one.

What do you mean by "standing"? And why wouldn't I be able to talk about it?

What is it about me or my post that makes me a religious bigot, in your view?

It's Philosophy of Religion.

Who is a Christian who makes such an argument? The Trinity is usually said to be a revealed truth, and I don't think I've ever seen anyone claim that Jesus being God is anything but a revealed truth (i.e. not something demonstrable from reason of from general evidence).

So, the argument would instead be something like:
P1: The Bible and traditions of the Church and its saints are revealed truth.
P2: The Bible and the traditions say Jesus is God.
C: Therefore, Jesus is God.

Straightforward enough. P2 is clearly true, so people who disagree will almost always disagree with P1.

No, it isn't.

It's a theological issue related to fact that some early Christians were Neoplatonists.

It's Philosophy of Religion.

"Standing" is a legal term that I've shanghaied for use here - "Standing, or locus standi , is the capacity of a party to bring a lawsuit in court. To have standing, a party must demonstrate a sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action being challenged." Basically, it means you've got no horse in this race.

Your opinion is irrelevant.

I didn't say you are a bigot, I said your post is bigoted. When I was a Boy Scout I learned the Scout Law - A scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent. The explanation for "reverent" is "A scout is faithful in his religious duties and respects the convictions of others in matters of custom and religion." As an atheist, you have no religious duties that I know of, but that doesn't change the requirement that you respect others convictions.

This is a virtue that is rarely practiced here on the forum - just one example of the rampant religious bigotry here.

No, it isn't. It's a theological issue.

But I do indeed have a horse in this race, since I accept the non-Christian argument and I deny the Christian one.

This is such baloney. You just like to rouse the rabble. Bad philosophy. Nuff said.

Issues in Philosophy of Religion and issues in theology are not mutually exclusive, at least not necessarily. Can you prove that they are?

I'm not inclined to debate the issue.

Ad hominem (Latin for 'to the person'), short for argumentum ad hominem, refers to several types of arguments that are usually fallacious. Often currently this term refers to a rhetorical strategy where the speaker attacks the character, motive, or some other attribute of the person making an argument rather than the substance of the argument itself. This avoids genuine debate by creating a diversion often using a totally irrelevant, but often highly charged attribute of the opponent's character or background. The most common form of this fallacy is "A" makes a claim of "fact", to which "B" asserts that "A" has a personal trait, quality or physical attribute that is repugnant thereby going off-topic, and hence "B" concludes that "A" has their "fact" wrong – without ever addressing the point of the debate.

Conversely, it's not possible to reject both arguments at the same time. If you reject one of them, then that means that you accept the other one (again, unless you embrace paraconsistent logic, or some other logic in which contradictions are true).

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus.

Doesn't matter, the arguments have been stated in the OP, by yours truly, if no one else. As such, they can be accepted or rejected, on whichever grounds you choose.

I'd deny P1, sure. But the denial of P2 is a live option. Perhaps the Bible and the traditions don't say that Jesus is God, at least not literally. Perhaps only metaphorically. But this would be to my point on literalism: things can't be metaphors all the way down.

I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ,
the Only Begotten Son of God,
born of the Father before all ages.
God from God, Light from Light,
true God from true God,
begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father;
through him all things were made.
For us men and for our salvation
he came down from heaven,
and by the Holy Spirit was incarnate of the Virgin Mary,
and became man.
For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate,
he suffered death and was buried,
and rose again on the third day
in accordance with the Scriptures.
He ascended into heaven
and is seated at the right hand of the Father.
He will come again in glory
to judge the living and the dead
and his kingdom will have no end.

Hmm, well I think P1 would be the potential issue. Is "Jesus" referring to the Son/Logos or the Incarnation? It does not seem that the Incarnation should be necessary. Likewise, God's essence would not be defined by God's immanent acts.

Something about that doesn't seem right to me -- couldn't we reject both arguments on the basis that

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich


Could both be false?

What God is identical to isn't the same thing as whether or not God exists, even treating it as a first-order predicate. So we could deny the implication as true in either case, saying that the existential predicate has no relation to the identity relationship. (or, perhaps, that the existential predicate is actually quantification, and the identity of something is different from quantification)

I'd be more inclined to say that "In the Christian Religion God is identical to Jesus", or something along those lines, so as to avoid mixing up description or identity with existence.

Afaik, philosophy of religion examines concepts of religion (re: worship) in contrast to theology which speculates on the nature of god (re: transcendence); where these inquiries possibly converge or overlap is on implications for human existence (e.g. values).

Philosophy of religion is the philosophical examination of the themes and concepts involved in religious traditions as well as the broader philosophical task of reflecting on matters of religious significance including the nature of religion itself, alternative concepts of God or ultimate reality, and the religious significance of general features of the cosmos (e.g., the laws of nature, the emergence of consciousness) and of historical events (e.g., the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake, the Holocaust). Philosophy of religion also includes the investigation and assessment of worldviews (such as secular naturalism) that are alternatives to religious worldviews. Philosophy of religion involves all the main areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, value theory (including moral theory and applied ethics), philosophy of language, science, history, politics, art, and so on. Section 1 offers an overview of the field and its significance, with subsequent sections covering developments in the field since the mid-twentieth century. These sections address philosophy of religion as practiced primarily (but not exclusively) in departments of philosophy and religious studies that are in the broadly analytic tradition. The entry gives significant attention to theism, but it concludes with highlighting the increasing breadth of the field, as more traditions outside the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) have become the focus of important philosophical work.

I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ,
the Only Begotten Son of God,
born of the Father before all ages.

God from God, Light from Light,
true God from true God,

begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father;
through him all things were made.
For us men and for our salvation
he came down from heaven,
and by the Holy Spirit was incarnate of the Virgin Mary,
and became man.

For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate,
he suffered death and was buried,
and rose again on the third day
in accordance with the Scriptures.
He ascended into heaven
and is seated at the right hand of the Father.
He will come again in glory
to judge the living and the dead
and his kingdom will have no end.

Nope. These statements can only be false if their antecedent is true while their consequent is false. In this case, the antecedent in FTI1 is "God exists", and the antecedent in ATI1 is "God does not exist". By the principle of Non-Contradiction and the principle of Excluded Middle, they can't both be false.

Perhaps.

If so then I'd have to find some way to deny both mostly because I don't think the implication itself holds. Since existence does not relate to identity, and implication is a relationship between propositions, I'm thinking that what's false is the implication itsel

At the very least I'm not tempted to say that Jesus is not God because God does not exist. I can set up the implicature, but it's not why I think these things -- and I don't believe either FTI1 or ATI1.

So how does one represent that? Is it impossible?

This process might involve persons receiving (accepting) the revelation of Jesus Christ as redeemer and sanctifier who calls persons to a radical life of loving compassion, even the loving of our enemies. By willfully subjecting oneself to the commanding love of God, a person in this filial relationship with God through Christ may experience a change of character (from self-centeredness to serving others) in which the person’s character (or very being) may come to serve as evidence of the truths of faith.

Each of these attributes has been subject to nuanced different analysis, as noted below. God has also been traditionally conceived to be incorporeal or immaterial, immutable, impassable, omnipresent. And unlike Judaism and Islam, Christian theists conceive of God as triune (the Godhead is not homogenous but consists of three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) and incarnate as Jesus of Nazareth (fully God and fully human).

The “truth” of the Incarnation has been interpreted in such terms as these: in Jesus Christ (or in the narratives about Christ) God is disclosed. Or: Jesus Christ was so united with God’s will that his actions were and are the functional display of God’s character. Perhaps as a result of Hick’s challenge, philosophical work on the incarnation and other beliefs and practice specific to religious traditions have received renewed attention (see, for example, Taliaferro and Meister 2009). Hick has been a leading, widely appreciated force in the expansion of philosophy of religion in the late twentieth century.

A conditional statement of the form "if p, then q" is equivalent to a disjunctive statement of the form "not p, or q". Here's the proof. With that in mind, premise FTI1 is equivalent to the following:

(FTI1*) Either God does not exist, or God is identical to Jesus.

And premise ATI1 is equivalent to the following:

(ATI1*) Either God exists, or God is not identical to Jesus.

Conditional statements ("implications") are not causal statements. They do not state that there's a cause-effect relation between the antecedent and the consequent. Perhaps that's the source of your perplexity here. It's a common mistake.

Maybe. Can you elaborate a bit more on that point? Doesn't matter if what you say isn't accurate. Just freestyle it and see what happens.

I do get the feeling that you want to treat this case in a similar way to how Russell treats the case of the current king of France. Is that so? Or am I way off here?

My thinking on existence is largely influenced by Kant. So sentences of the sort "God exists" do not have conditions of justification even if they have a truth-value, so I wouldn't bother believing "God exists", or its negation, on rational grounds. The old "existence is not a predicate" is something that rings basically true to me -- logic does not prove existence, existence exists regardless of a choice of logic -- and the thought experiment between the imagined unicorn and the imagined unicorn existing demonstrates to me that there's not really a property added to something I'm thinking about. I need some other kind of justification to infer that something exists.

I follow Bunge in conceptualizing existence as a real property. The table in my living room has the property of existence. When I say that it exists, what I mean is that it has that property. As such, it's not a predicate. We instead symbolize it as a predicate, in particular with the first-order predicate letter "E". If the context is second-order or higher-order logic, we still use the "E" symbol, but as a predicate constant. Others disagree. Quine, for example, believes that we should symbolize it with a quantifier instead, "?". I take it that Quine is wrong and that Bunge is right about this. However, I also believe that Bunge is wrong to distinguish two kinds of existence: real and conceptual. In my view, there's only real existence. Should the words "God" and "Jesus" be treated like Russellian definite descriptions? Or Kripkean rigid designators? Those are open questions.

But in following Kant there's not an easy distinction between predicates and properties.

I believe that predicates are linguistic, while properties are ontological. The latter exist out there, in the external world, in the things themselves, independently of human beings. Existence is one such property, in my view.

I'm kind of uncertain about properties just as I'm uncertain about objects, but that'll take us pretty far astray :D -- a lot of my skepticism is based in wondering how we can reliably make inferences with respect to metaphysics, and generally wondering how it is we can really ascertain what metaphysics is preferable in the face of many smart and educated people asserting contradictory opinions on the subject.

Bunge (2010: 201):Ontology should precede epistemology. And yet modern philosophy started rejecting metaphysics. It did so just because the ruling metaphysics around 1600 was obsolete. The price paid for this antimetaphysical turn was subjectivism, outspoken as in Berkeley’s case, or shame-faced as in Kant’s.

Such as your two arguments -- it's just kind of funny to make an inference between existence and identity. I'd be inclined to go the reverse -- if Jesus is God, then God exists.

So God could exist without Jesus being God

"If God exists, then Muhammed is the prophet, and Jesus is a prophet. God exists, therefore..."

Do you see how that's funny?

I'm afraid not, you'd have to spell it out for me, if you fancy.

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus.

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus.
(ATI2) God does not exist.
(ATI3) So, God is not identical to Jesus.

Yes, he could. For example, according to Muslims, God exists, and God is not Jesus.

It's a different argument from the atheist. Furthermore we can plug in any God here -- there's a lot to choose from in picking out God's identity. But God existing just says that without saying what God is.

Further, unlike saying something like "John Doe exists", there is no way to adjudicate between any of the above arguments. There is absolutely no difference in the external world whether God does or does not exist, which is normally how we'd go about making a decision as to which premise -- God exists or God does not exist -- to accept.

So, in isolation, sure -- but in terms of how people go about deciding these things I don't see a reason to accept that there is a relationship between God's -- or any objects -- existence and what they are identical to.

Bunge (2012: 174-175):Let us now use the existential predicate introduced above to revisit the most famous of all the arguments for God’s existence. Anselm of Canterbury argued that God exists because He is perfect, and existence is a property of perfection. Some mathematical logicians have claimed that Anselm was wrong because existence is not a predicate but the ? quantifier. I suggest that this objection is sophistic because in all the fields of knowledge we tacitly use an existential predicate that has nothing to do with the “existential” quantifier, as when it is asserted or denied that there are living beings in Mars or perpetual motion machines.

Bunge (2012: 175):Using the existence predicate defined a while ago, we may reformulate Anselm’s argument as follows.

God is perfect ______________________ Pg
Everything perfect exists in R [really]_____?x(Px ? E[sub]R[/sub]x)
God exists in R.______________________ E[sub]R[/sub]g

Both premises are controversial, particularly the first one since it presupposes the existence of God. Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. An alternative is to admit the existence of God for the sake of argument, and add the ontological postulate that everything real is imperfect: that if something is perfect then it is ideal, like Pythagoras’ theorem or a Beethoven sonata. But the conjunction of both postulates implies the unreality of God. In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it.

He definitely saw himself as having a mission but did not necessarily see himself as the incarnation of God.

I believe that the concept of existence is important not only in the context of philosophy of religion, but also in the context of science. As Bunge says:

Exactly. That's the "problem" (if it can be called a problem) with classic Christian arguments for the existence of God, such as the ones provided by Anselm and Aquinas. They never say that God is Jesus, they only say that God exists.

Bunge (2012: 175):Using the existence predicate defined a while ago, we may reformulate Anselm’s argument as follows.

God is perfect ______________________ Pg
Everything perfect exists in R [really]_____?x(Px ? ERx)
God exists in R.______________________ ERg

The notion of god is inconsistent.

Anything follows from an inconsistency.

Therefore Jesus is God.

Due to the rules that govern the truth table for conditional statements, it's not possible to deny both premises (of either argument) at the same time. For example, if FTI1 is true, then FTI2 must necessarily be false, and vice-versa. Likewise, if ATI1 is true, then ATI2 must be necessarily false, and vice-versa.

...it's not possible to deny both premises (of either argument) at the same time. For example, if FTI1 is true, then FTI2 must necessarily be false, and vice-versa.

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus.

Conversely, it's not possible to reject both arguments at the same time. If you reject one of them, then that means that you accept the other one

I think ?Moliere was correct the first time.

(Beyond that, I wouldn't count the formalizations of the OP as arguments, given that their premises are neither intuitive nor defended.)

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.

(ATI1) If God does not exist, then God is not identical to Jesus.

The notion of god is inconsistent.

Anything follows from an inconsistency.

Therefore Jesus is God.

I'm more tempted to say that God, as a concept, is empty than inconsistent -- it's like the empty set.

First, if it is not possible to deny both premises, then it would follow that if one is false, then the other must necessarily be true.

Your opposite claim simply does not follow.

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus. — Arcane Sandwich


To give a counterexample, consider a Muslim who became an atheist. They deny (1) and (2). So it is very clearly possible to deny both premises.

Conversely, it's not possible to reject both arguments at the same time. If you reject one of them, then that means that you accept the other one — Arcane Sandwich


This too looks to be false. The conclusions are contradictories, but that does not entail that the arguments are "contradictories" (so to speak). The believing Muslim is someone who rejects both arguments.

(Beyond that, I wouldn't count the formalizations of the OP as arguments, given that their premises are neither intuitive nor defended.)

That gets into the questions similar to . My point wasn't to claim that both first premises are false. That cannot be done if we are using material conditionals. Note, though, that if we are talking about material conditionals, then if either conclusion is sound then both first-premises must be true.

Nah. I'll just deny that. God, as a concept, is not like the empty set.

It's just not rational in terms of scientific justification -- there's not a science which can evaluate which religious concept of god is superior because, by the science, they're all
false, and mostly useless. So the science doesn't have much to say on the issue. (which is what Kant's "theoretical knowledge" is based upon)

Bunge (2012: 175):Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it [Anselm's argument] instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. (...) In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it.

If I investigate textbooks which academic departments use to teach science -- there is absolutely nothing in there about Jesus or God.

The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant’s existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole. But contradiction as between philosophical systems is not wont to be conceived in this way; on the other hand, the mind perceiving the contradiction does not commonly know how to relieve it or keep it free from its one-sidedness, and to recognise in what seems conflicting and inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary moments.

Yet that wasn't always the case. As Hegel suggests, in The Phenomenology of Spirit, the history of philosophy is like the maturing of a plant. We wouldn't say that the fruit refutes the flower, or that the flower refutes the seed. I believe the same can be said about science. In its contemporary version, it's the end product of a history in which its roots were deeply interwoven with matters of theology, whether we like it or not. It is what it is, as you oosians like to say.

Still... determining if God exists by modern science can't be done, either way. I like to say that this is a positive thing -- in a way Kant's philosophy is attractive because people can be of any religious persuasion and still believe the same things about the world we experience, and independently believe whatever makes them fulfilled in a moral sense.

Georges Henri Joseph Édouard Lemaître (/l??m?tr?/ l?-MET-r?; French: [???? l?m??t?]; 17 July 1894 – 20 June 1966) was a Belgian Catholic priest, theoretical physicist, and mathematician who made major contributions to cosmology and astrophysics. He was the first to argue that the recession of galaxies is evidence of an expanding universe and to connect the observational Hubble–Lemaître law with the solution to the Einstein field equations in the general theory of relativity for a homogenous and isotropic universe. That work led Lemaître to propose what he called the "hypothesis of the primeval atom", now regarded as the first formulation of the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe.

You lost me here. Can you please clarify what you mean by that?

I'm not sure I follow. The formal structure of that argument is the following one:

1) If p, then q.
2) p.
3) so, q.

If (1) is false, then (2) is true, and if (1) is true, then (2) is false.

Here you might be right, but only in the sense that both arguments might be valid and yet unsound.

If so, then that's a powerful reason for rejecting both arguments.

However, it's still the case that if one of the conclusions is true, then the other one is false, and vice-versa.

The concept of soundness (and unsoundness) applies only to arguments, not to propositions (premises and conclusions), just as the concept of validity (or lack of thereof) only applies to arguments, not to propositions. A proposition (being a premise or a conclusion) can only be true or false. That is at least the modern understanding of such notions.

This is indeed an argument

Since I'm an atheist...

Due to how the burden of proof works, I don't need to prove a negative

you said, "if FTI1 is true, then FTI2 must necessarily be false." Why? Why can't both premises be true?

Okay sure, if you are appealing to the "degenerate cases" of the material conditional then I agree that the former Muslim cannot deny that God exists without affirming that, "If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus," at least if he is consistent. But I'm not sure how useful arguments that depend on such degenerate cases are.

Here you might be right, but only in the sense that both arguments might be valid and yet unsound. — Arcane Sandwich


But isn't that precisely what you meant when you spoke about the possibility of "rejecting both arguments at the same time"?

On the contrary, a sound conclusion is the conclusion of a sound argument. And as I said, "if either conclusion is sound then both first-premises must be true" (given material conditionals).

It is not an argument in any substantial sense, and the "arguments" of the OP are similarly insubstantial. Namely, there is nothing persuasive or compelling about them.

For example, I could write an OP:

1. If the moon is made of cheese, then pelicans are vegans
2. The moon is made of cheese
3. Therefore, pelicans are vegans

I might follow this with, "Options for resisting the argument." But there is no argument to resist, not in any substantial sense. The person making the argument has the burden of proof in showing the argument to be persuasive or compelling, and mere validity does not succeed in doing this. (Formalizations such as this are only valid consequences, not cases of true inference.)

So rather than give a substantial argument, you've asked TPF users to give substantial arguments against at least one of four propositions (namely, the premises). It's a bit like saying, "I think X. Prove me wrong."

(I would grant that ATI is closer to a substantial argument than FTI, since FTI1 is entirely opaque.)

...the question is actually meaningless to you, and is basically a form of entertainment, if that.

According to your Wikipedia article you have the burden of proof, for you are the one who spoke.

Or rather, you have simulated a scenario in which someone gives a very opaque argument (FTI), and then you "denied" part of FTI (to quote Wikipedia), so for Wikipedia whoever spoke FTI has the initial burden of proof. So who spoke FTI? No one at all, it seems. It is part of an OP that offers no real argument, and which does not accept the burden of proof for what it claims.

Both premises can be true, but they can't both be false. Only one of them can be false.

What can I say? I don't share your notion of a "substantial" argument. An argument is either sound or unsound. There's nothing more to it. Logic is a science (a formal science, just like mathematics). It has nothing to do with persuasiveness, just as algebra or geometry have nothing to do with persuasiveness.

An since an argument is the same thing as a proof, it follows that I already gave two proofs in the OP.

Sure, if you rely on the degenerate cases of the material conditional, where a false antecedent or a true consequent guarantees a true conditional. But I think I spoke to that.

Let me show why I disagree.

Suppose I say that God exists, and you tell me that I've made an assertion rather than an argument. So I give what you view as an "argument":

1. If God exists, then God exists
2. God exists
3. Therefore, God exists

Now apparently this is an argument, which is entirely different from an assertion. Since I have given an argument, you have the burden of proof in addressing the argument. You might say, "God does not exist," and I might say, "That's an assertion, not an argument."

So you comply:

4. If God does not exist, then God does not exist
5. God does not exist
6. Therefore, God does not exist

We could do that for eternity

on my view we are neither arguing nor giving arguments, whereas on your view we are (and I have encountered people who literally did this).

Aristotle tells us that arguments move from premises that are better-known to conclusions that are lesser-known. If it doesn't do that, it isn't an argument.

In fact 1-2-3 is a sound "argument," but I would contend that it is not an argument at all.

An since an argument is the same thing as a proof, it follows that I already gave two proofs in the OP. — Arcane Sandwich


Well if you "spoke" the proofs then you have the basic burden of proof, no? Your Wikipedia article says that the one who speaks has the burden.

I'm open to the idea that God might exist, and that Jesus might be God.

There's nothing "degenerate" about such cases. That notion has no place in a formal science such as logic.

Which is why the arguments in the OP, while being modus ponens, do not have the same structure as the one in your example. Because in your example, the conditional has the form "if p, then p", while the conditionals in the arguments of the OP have this other structure: "if p, then q".

It's not a sound argument, at least not to my atheist eyes. It is valid, however. Just not sound.

. And when Frege first tried to introduce the material conditional he was resisted for decades for this very reason.

But you yourself said that it is a "perfectly valid modus ponens." So what's the problem? What's the difference between a modus ponens where p=q and a modus ponens where p!=q? It seems that on your view there can be no significant distinction between the two modus ponens.

Yes: you think 4-5-6 is the sound argument, right?

They have different structures. "If p, then p" is not the same structure as "If p, then q".

But I wouldn't endorse that argument myself, because it's easily refutable. To speak poetically for a moment, it's not a good argument, even though it's both valid and sound.

I'm going to need to ask you two if you have horses in this race, before proceeding any further.

Same structure:

p: God exists
q: God exists

1. p ? q
2. p
3. ? q

(The structure is modus ponens, and you yourself claimed that 1-2-3 is a modus ponens.)

But just a few minutes ago you said, "An argument is either sound or unsound. There's nothing more to it." Now you want to say that some sound arguments are good and some sound arguments are bad. So clearly there is something more to it.

There's two types of structures in logic: the structure of arguments, and the structure of propositions. Two arguments can have the same structure (i.e., both of them are modus ponens) while having propositions with different structures (i.e., p ? q instead of p ? p).

When I say that some arguments are good and that some of them are bad, I'm speaking poetically. In other words, I'm being rhetorical, not logical. I don't dismiss rhetoric, I simply declare that being persuasive and compelling are within its province, instead of being qualities of the formal science that we call logic.

That's an interesting account, but I don't know of any rule of logic which requires that a modus ponens where p=q magically has a different structure. The validity rules are all the same, so it's not clear what it would even mean to claim that it has a different structure. If you're all about formalism, then the structure is exactly the same.

Then you have no reason to claim that the modus ponens where p=q has a different structure, apart from poetry. "Poetically they have a different structure, but formally they do not."

On my view if someone cannot see that this is a degenerate case of modus ponens, then they haven't grasped the raison d'être of logic:

1. p ? p
2. p
3. ? p

...and of course someone who limits themselves to "formalisms" cannot admit the notion of a degenerate case.

Not quite, because the difference between p ? p and p ? q affects their truth values.

That's not what I claim. Formally they have different structures, not poetically.

The same goes for the notion of degeneracy. It only makes sense outside of logic, not within it.

It is merely a subset of the truth table where p!=q.

If two things behave in precisely the same manner, then they do not have two different logical structures.

The two modus ponens "arguments" under scrutiny behave in precisely the same manner; therefore they do not have two different logical structures

You say that but then you want to make an ad hoc distinction between the "structure" of different modus ponens "arguments," so I still have hope for you. :wink:

Put it this way: when someone gives a modus ponens you don't have to check with them first, to make sure that p!=q. It makes no difference at all. There is no caveat when it comes to modus ponens, no condition where if p=q the rule fails.

(We actually have a lot of threads on these sorts of topics, so I don't want belabor this for too long.)

If I investigate textbooks which academic departments use to teach science -- there is absolutely nothing in there about Jesus or God.

Does it matter if Jesus claimed that he was God? My contention is that he could be God even if he never claimed such a thing.

Hence, "scientific justification" of that sort has some pretty severe limits.

People do make arguments based on the natural sciences for the existence of God though, teleological arguments, etc.

Basically, if Jesus and the documentary evidence we now possess are not self-consciously presenting evidence for Jesus' divinity, then the whole point is moot. If that is not in place then one could as easily claim that Benjamin Franklin was the Son of God as Jesus.

Is Jesus God?

Interesting comments, but I'm going to have to ask you both if you have a horse in this race, otherwise it seems (per some folks' deluded opinions) that you can't philosophize about religion. Source: The Boy Scouts. Secondary source: Trust Me Bro.

I'm not sure what you mean. Horse in what race?

For example, we can define a perfect unicorn, but this doesn't mean such an beast must exist.

But given many people spend a lot of time living emotionally and aesthetically, it is easy to see how god might be of use to them.

What do you think of the uses of logic?

True, but I think there's a difference between God and the perfect unicorn, because some people have religious experiences (mystics, for example) while no one has had a religious experience involving unicorns, perfect as they may otherwise be. Not to my knowledge, at least.

Even though I'm an atheist I believe that Mystics have visited God, for instance.

This piqued my curiosity. Can you please elaborate? How can mystics visit God if, by atheist lights, God doesn't exist?

True, but I think there's a difference between God and the perfect unicorn, because some people have religious experiences (mystics, for example) while no one has had a religious experience involving unicorns, perfect as they may otherwise be. Not to my knowledge, at least.

Insofar that there is an object "God" as they describe it with various predicates I don't really think it's there.

But I do believe the words mean something, and that my belief that they are false isn't really that important after all. And I believe that words mean, and they are sincere, so there's something there, like you said here

Even if someone did have a mystical experience with unicorns -- which really might not be that unlikely, now that I think on it, just embarrassing so people wouldn't say it -- I think I'd put it in the same box as other religious experiences.

But we could come up with another example to demonstrate the point that we can say true things about what we name which are still fictional and thereby not persuasive when we're talking about attributing existence to things.

The mystics, however, really do attribute existence to things which others do not because of their experience. Given my fixation on empirical justification for existential claims it throws a wrench into my thinking which I have to accommodate.

I still think what I think, but I think the mystics make sincere claims that are pretty much on par with saying "The cat is on the mat".

At some point, the drugs wear off, and you're back to your ordinary life, with ordinary experiences.

Why not?

I'm not quite sure I understood this part. Could you explain it to me, in a simpler way?

What would that "something" be, if not God?

Yes, they are making sincere claims. They really do have those experiences. So what would we make of that? If religious experiences are literally experiences, the least we could say is that something is going on inside the brains of those who have those experiences. When I look at my kitchen table, I'm having an experience. A visual experience, to be more precise. Something is going on in my brain while I'm looking at my kitchen table. But there is an external correlate in this case: the kitchen table itself. Do religious experiences have an external correlate?

As you say, impossible to really describe, and even to remember, in some ways. Although one vivid memory that stays with me was seeing something like 'the great perfection' - this sudden realisation of the overwhelming beauty of all nature, one morning at dawn, looking at a young sapling growing from the crevice in a moss-covoured rock. Along with the realisation that we're generally dead to that beauty because of the weight of habituation

seeing something like 'the great perfection'

But I'm hesitant to say it's just something going on in the brain -- that's not what is being claimed.

True, it's not what's being claimed, but is that the only (or the main) reason why you're hesitant to say that it's just something going on in the brain?

Since all of our brains are different

I think we have a shared world

There's no science which will tell us which mystic is right

But for all of these people the sciences will remain relatively invariant.

Are they really that different?

Sure. And perhaps the similarities of our brains are, in part, responsible for that shared world. That's another way to think about it. We both speak English, but we also have similar brains, at least anatomically, and I'd argue that their neurochemistry is similar as well.

Maybe Reality (with a capital "R") is like a multi-faceted crystal, such that each mystic perceives one facet at a time. It's not that one of them is right and the other one is wrong, maybe each of them perceives just a small part of what ?Wayfarer (and I) call "the great perfection".

Notice that there's also something else that seems to remain invariant: religious experiences seem to be distributed worldwide. There are tribes in the Amazon rainforest that have never had any contact with tribes in West Africa. Yet both tribes have their own religions, with their corresponding religious experiences. And we could also mention native Australian tribes, which have never had any contact with the Amazonian or the African tribes. And they have religious experiences as well. How is that even possible? What is the explanation for this phenomenon? Is it just a coincidence?

The thing with religious experiences (speaking only from my own personal experiences) is that they sort of impose themselves upon you, whether you're an atheist or not. Granted, I've only had them under the influence of psychoactive drugs.

But this is just a theory, it could be false, and it probably is.

it's a natural desire to want more than to eat, shit, sleep, fuck, and die.

It's a human desire. It doesn't seem to be the case that other animals share that same desire. So how could it be natural? Unless such a desire is part of human nature. But we humans are not just humans.

"Natural" as in "understandable" -- and I do tend to think of human beings as animals, and that insofar that a human being can conceive of something more than the basic life process they will, naturally, come to want more than a biological existence.

My wager is that those animals tend to live in a sort of zen-like state, more or less as described by ?Wayfarer. Why are we not like them, in our ordinary lives? Precisely because of the more "human" parts of our brains. The humanized parts of our brains are like a double edged-sword: on the one hand, they allow us to live in a more rational way. They are responsible for our science, technology, art, and philosophy. However, they also sort of "disconnect" us from our more primal, animalistic nature.

The animal world is a world of pure being, a world of immediacy and immanence. The animal soul is like “water in water,” seamlessly connected to all that surrounds it, so that there is no sense of self or other, of time, of space, of being or not being. This utopian (to human sensibility, which has such alienating notions) Shangri-La or Eden actually isn’t that because it is characterized at all points by what we’d call violence. Animals, that is, eat and are eaten. For them killing and being killed is the norm; and there isn’t any meaning to such a thing, or anything that we would call fear; there’s no concept of killing or being killed. There’s only being, immediacy, “is-ness.” Animals don’t have any need for religion; they already are that, already transcend life and death, being and nonbeing, self and other, in their very living, which is utterly pure.

[In his book, A Theory of Religion] Georges Bataille sees human consciousness beginning with the making of the first tool, the first “thing” that isn’t a pure being, intrinsic in its value and inseparable from all of being. A tool is a separable, useful, intentionally made thing; it can be possessed, and it serves a purpose. It can be altered to suit that purpose. It is instrumental, defined by its use. The tool is the first instance of the “not-I,” and with its advent there is now the beginning of a world of objects, a “thing” world. Little by little out of this comes a way of thinking and acting within thingness (language), and then once this plane of thingness is established, more and more gets placed upon it —other objects, plants, animals, other people, one’s self, a world. Now there is self and other—and then, paradoxically, self becomes other to itself, alienated not only from the rest of the projected world of things, but from itself, which it must perceive as a thing, a possession. This constellation of an alienated self is a double-edged sword: seeing the self as a thing, the self can for the first time know itself and so find a closeness to itself; prior to this, there isn’t any self so there is nothing to be known or not known. But the creation of my 'me', though it gives me for the first time myself as a friend, also rips me out of the world and puts me out on a limb on my own. Interestingly, and quite logically, this development of human consciousness coincides with a deepening of the human relationship to the animal world, which opens up to the human mind now as a depth, a mystery. Humans are that depth, because humans are animals, know this and feel it to be so, and yet also not so; humans long for union with the animal world of immediacy, yet know they are separate from it. Also they are terrified of it, for to reenter that world would be a loss of the self; it would literally be the end of me as I know me.

In the midst of this essential human loneliness and perplexity, which is almost unbearable, religion appears. It intuits and imagines the ancient world of oneness, of which there is still a powerful primordial memory, and calls it The Sacred. This is the invisible world, world of spirit, world of the gods, or of God. It is inexorably opposed to, defined as the opposite of, the world of things, the profane world of the body, of instrumentality, a world of separation, the fallen world. Religion’s purpose then is to bring us back to the lost world of intimacy, and all its rites, rituals, and activities are created to this end. We want this, and need it, as sure as we need food and shelter; and yet it is also terrifying. All religions have known and been based squarely on this sense of terrible necessity.

As Bunge himself says:

Bunge (2012: 175):Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it [Anselm's argument] instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. (...) In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it.

Have fun!

It is fun, I'll admit; trying out arguments like moving chess pieces across the board. Especially when you're skilled, or have the necessary focus, which, I admit, I am not.

The message of love, highlighted by the sacrifice, triggers us to love our species and act in ways which promote its survival and growth.

Shouldn't we love other species

I'd call it something like "logical reductionism", or something along those lines, something that sounds more "politically correct" but without losing too much bite.

There is no single argument that proves both FTI2 and FTI3, considered as propositions. Anselm's is arguing for FTI2.

And another way to critique your FTI1 is to say that essentially no one believes it.

At least I don't know of any group that believes God is necessarily identical to Jesus (even ignoring the problematic Trinitarian theology here). Christians themselves do not generally claim that the Incarnation was theologically necessary. Or else think about the fact that everyone without exception would agree that FTI1 was false before Jesus was born, and that if God existed before Jesus of Nazareth was born then strict identity cannot obtain.

The difficulty here is that the existence of God is a very modern preoccupation, whereas the divinity of Jesus has been a perennial question. In a perennial sense the existence of God and the divinity of Jesus are two quite separate questions.

throughout the centuries, Christian philosophers have been solely preoccupied with proving that God exists, without being equally preoccupied with proving that God is Jesus Christ.

It can't be proved; they need to get a life!

It's not an either/or type of deal.

Doesn't matter. The way I see it, logic has nothing to do with belief, just as math doesn't have anything to do with belief. The notion of belief is foreign to the formal sciences. Mathematical truths are still truths even if no one believes in them. The same goes for logical truths.

Indeed, but my opinion is that throughout the centuries, Christian philosophers have been solely preoccupied with proving that God exists, without being equally preoccupied with proving that God is Jesus Christ. And they should, because otherwise, what makes them Christian philosophers, instead of theistic philosophers in general?

What use is there in asking people to consider a proposition that no one believes, not even oneself? It seems like putting something on the food menu that isn't edible.

I think you'll find that Christians make relevant arguments. In Aquinas' day they argued against Islam, because Islam was popular. In the Enlightenment period they argued against Rationalism. Nowadays there are a lot of people claiming that Jesus was not divine, and so Christians tend to argue in that direction

Here is an example from two days ago.

No one believed in non-Euclidean geometries during the 19th Century, not even their own pioneers.

Shorter: math and logic don't care about our beliefs. So we should feel free to explore their uncharted territories, and to do so with whatever beliefs we would like to have in mind while doing so.

Interesting reference, I'll try to read it tomorrow.

And that's why it didn't make any sense to talk about them.

Are you saying that you believe FTI1? Because again, if not and no one else believes it, then it looks to approximate a strawman rather than something fit for discussion.

For example, should we conduct a dialogue on the question of whether the moon is made of lasagna? No, of course not. Why? Because no one believes such a thing. And using "the moon is made of lasagna" as a premise in an argument would be equally pointless, given that it has no bearing on anyone's beliefs.

Yet Einstein's conceptualization of spacetime is based on the development of non-Euclidean geometries, particularly Riemann's ideas.

No, I don't believe FTI1. And even if I did, what I believe (and what anyone else believes) is irrelevant to the truth value of that premise.

It doesn't matter if we believe that the moon is made of lasagna or not.

But Einstein believed in non-Euclidean geometries, so the premise fails. No one is objecting to Einstein talking about something he believes in, but after all, Einstein did not talk about the moon being made of lasagna.

Truths that no one believes are irrelevant to a philosophy forum, for they cannot be spoken of.

Then why haven't you started a thread on the topic? (Hint: it's because the topic is irrelevant. Why? Because it does not bear on anyone's beliefs.)

At this point, I'm told that there are no such arguments, because the thesis that Jesus is God is a revealed truth. My counter-point to that is that the thesis that God exists is also a revealed truth.

The concept of belief is foreign to the formal sciences.

Not quite. I haven't started a thread on the topic because I know that the moon is not made of lasagna. So does everyone else.

I have offered one such proof in the OP of this Thread, and I have done so without even being a Christian philosopher. Sure, it's a rather humble proof, but it's still a proof.

Try using the Block Universe to prove it.

In any case, it would be a small minority which does not think natural reason can do a lot of work on such questions. For example, those who met Jesus during his Earthly life and came to believe that he is divine were not working apart from their natural reason.

The concept of belief is foreign to the formal sciences. — Arcane Sandwich


Participation in a philosophy forum is not a formal science. Premises which no one believes, such as FTI1, are useless. Their highest level of function is as a strawman.

Not quite. I haven't started a thread on the topic because I know that the moon is not made of lasagna. So does everyone else. — Arcane Sandwich


But you're skipping around the question. What if you didn't know it is not, but you didn't believe it is. And you knew that no one else believed it is. Would you start a thread on the topic?

(Lack of belief is sufficient; recourse to knowledge is a different issue. The concept of knowledge is arguably as foreign to the formal sciences as the concept of belief.)

Why would I do that?

Show that God is the Block Universe and we are inside God.

(FTI1) If God exists, then God is identical to Jesus.
(FTI2) God exists.
(FTI3) So, God is identical to Jesus.

If.....God is identical to Jesus....God is identical to Jesus.

That's not an argument. Nothing to digest there.

"If we had ham, we could have ham and eggs, if we had eggs." - Larry Fine.

That's a better argument

Philosophers have a problem clarifying whether a cat on a matt is really two things, or a thing at all.

This post will go nowhere illuminating.

It is very difficult to discuss God in any empirical, critical, scientific manner, especially in a forum where many people have no inclination to entertain the notion of "God" seriously.

I'm open to the idea that God might exist, and that Jesus might be God.

Why would I want to show that?

You don't seem to understand what an argument is.

Philosophers have a problem clarifying whether a cat on a matt is really two things, or a thing at all.
— Fire Ologist

I don't have that problem. It's a bit presumptuous of you to assume that I do.

So what does that have to do with the thesis that either Jesus is God or Jesus is not God?

I am sure I won't be able to convince anyone about Jesus or God through argument.

Way hot out of the gate.

I didn't mean to insult you.

Your argument basically just gave a definition "God is identical to Jesus." You don't move anywhere from that. You asserted that God exists, and asserted that God is identical to Jesus. Nothing else was operating in the argument to move from the assertions to some other conclusion. You basically just said "God is Jesus." So I said, that's not an argument.

Again, I love how people think about these things and post here. I'm not trying to discourage anything. But if you want a good conversation, on this forum, God is very often a non-starter.

I assume all people have this problem

it's the same conversation Heraclitus and Parmenides and Hume and Descartes and Hegel, and Kant, and Nietzsche and Quine, and people here today have been trying to address.

You jump way to hard and fast into the personal.

And what do you want me to say?

Well, first you have to show God, or else Jesus won't have the possibility of being God.

1) If p, then q.
2) p.
3) Therefore, q.

So do you want to talk about logic, or about whether Jesus is God?

If you want to talk about logic, you could have said many other things for “p” and “q.” But since you said God and Jesus I assumed you wanted to talk about God.

If you want to talk about logic, then sure “if unicorns exist, that single-horned horse is equal to a unicorn; that single-horned horse exists; therefore, unicorns exist.”

But if you were trying to show what it who God or Jesus actually is, you didn’t argue them, you merely asserted and equated them, like I just did with a single-horned horse and a unicorn.

1) if unicorns exist, that single-horned horse is equal to a unicorn
2) that single-horned horse exists
3) therefore, unicorns exist.

And here is its structure:

1) If p, then q
2) q
3) Therefore, p

That's not an argument, that's a formal fallacy called affirming the consequent.

So I stand by what I said earlier: you don't seem to understand what an argument is. I say that as objectively and as respectfully as possible.

if I didn’t know what an argument was, how could I recognize that you are right about affirming the consequent

Do you really think that?

Anselm was trying to show how it can be rationally concluded that God exists.

I love the effort, but all analysis of his arguments are discussions of logic, not about God.

Do you think you can conclude Jesus is God because of your argument?

If I was trying to rationally prove to you that my father exists, do you think you would know anything about my father?

So does this thread really have anything to do with God? Or Jesus?

So if I tell you that three apples plus two apples equals five apples, am I talking about numbers or apples?

I'm showing how it can be rationally concluded that Jesus is God, …

Are you talking to tell me we have enough apples to feed five people who want apples to eat, or are you demonstrating math? If math, you don’t need to use apples. You could use rocks, or Gods to form your argument, so you are not talking about apples at all. If five people want to eat, then the apples may be of interest.

No, you just assert it as a premise - “Jesus is identical to God.”

You said “if God exists, Jesus is identical to God.”

You could have said “if apples exist, Jesus is identical to God.” There is no logical connection between God existing and zGod being identical to Jesus. You just define God as identical to Jesus, create a condition “if God exists” then assert this condition is met and restate your definition. Great logical form - wholly unconvincing of what God or Jesus means or whether anyone should entertain whether God or Jesus exists.

If unicorns exist, unicorns are identical with single horned horses.
Unicorns exist.
Therefore unicorns are identical with single horned horses.

I think I have the modus ponens right here.

But have I said anything at all about reality, about horses, about horns, about unicorns? Why would replacing unicorns with God, and single horned horse with Jesus would I think I’ve proven anything about anything, except how modus ponens works?

You still don't get it.

You still don't get it. — Arcane Sandwich


So you are saying if we had ham, we could have ham and eggs, if we had eggs.

Got it.

If you want to talk about logical form, why bring up such a distraction as “God” and “Jesus” to do it?

it's not an either/or type of deal.

If you are trying to talk about God and Jesus it looks to me you are saying that because God exists, God is Jesus, but God doesn’t exist.

Your point is you have no point, like speaking with me, someone who just doesn’t get it. I’m sensing a pattern.

If you are trying to talk about God and Jesus it looks to me you are saying that because God exists, God is Jesus, but God doesn’t exist.
— Fire Ologist

That sounds like nonsense to me, what you just said there. Could you elaborate on that point, specifically?

Can you summarize your point again to see if this conversation can really go any further? Not my point (I don’t know what an argument is) - what is your point about Jesus again?

I find it odd that Christian philosophers only offer arguments for the conclusion that God exists, while not offering any arguments for the conclusion that Jesus is God. Why would you resort to logic in the former case but not the latter? Is there any reason that warrants this differential treatment?

I don’t like any of the arguments for the existence of God. They all hit me as if they are rigging the conclusion by rigging the premises. They all contain elements that need not be accepted and so the conclusion that God exists need not be accepted and so it’s no proof for the existence of God.

Sorry folks, faith and the grace of divine revelation are the only basis for the assertion that God exists.

So basically, I should never have wasted your time if you, like Anselm, think we can discuss proofs of the existence of God and by extension, the nature of Jesus from logic.

The way I see it, the "problem" (if it can be called that) with Anselm's argument is that it's too generic: it doesn't manage to conclude that God is Jesus Christ, and this is exactly what I would expect from a Christian philosopher. In other words, proving that God exists is only half of the problem. The other half is proving that God is Christ.

For example, a Muslim philosopher wouldn't try to refute Anselm's argument. Why would he? He believes in God just as much as Anselm does. It that sense, he would accept the argument in question. And so would a Jewish philosopher, and so would a monotheist Pagan philosopher.

If we don't specify who God is (Yahweh, Jesus, Allah, the Rainbow Serpent, etc.) then every theist can accept Anselm's argument, no matter what the details of their religion are.

For example, a Muslim philosopher wouldn't try to refute Anselm's argument. Why would he? He believes in God just as much as Anselm does. It that sense, he would accept the argument in question. And so would a Jewish philosopher, and so would a monotheist Pagan philosopher.

If we don't specify who God is (Yahweh, Jesus, Allah, the Rainbow Serpent, etc.) then every theist can accept Anselm's argument, no matter what the details of their religion are.

Why is that a problem? For anyone who believes in God? Why would a Christian philosopher who believed they could prove the existence of God fall short if they didn’t show that the God they allegedly proved existed was named Jesus?

Aquinas called all of his writings straw. I would be happy to argue with Descartes and Anselm about the shortcomings of their arguments.

Although, I find the God of all the philosophers to be a hollow shell of a stick figure on a blackboard used to fill in a “x” in some attempt at a logical proposition. Maybe if they could take it far enough to give it some real flesh, as a proof that God who is Jesus exists, maybe I’d see God there at all for once.

I have never been impressed about arguments that demonstrate God’s existence is necessary.

I've had religious experiences under the influence of psychoactive drugs

I have never been impressed about arguments that demonstrate God’s existence is necessary.
— Fire Ologist

It's not logic's business to impress anyone, just as it's not math's business to impress anyone.

So rejecting FTI1 denotes a belief: "It seems possible to me that this world has a God and that that God is not the same as Jesus".
Rejecting ATI1 denotes a belief: "It seems possible to me that this world contains a man Jesus but no God". Actually it denotes no belief at all since it collapses to a tautology, which I explain at the end of this post

I think the trouble started with casual talk of "denying premises" or premises being "False".
Premises, being part of Theory, are not True or False. Consider Euclid's parallel postulate (postulate being a synonym of premise). By accepting it, we get one sort of geometry, by rejecting it, we allow a range of alternative geometries.

Strictly speaking one does not deny premises.
One either accepts them or rejects them, that's all.

We see from this version that ATI1 is a tautology because if any predicate at all, call it P, is True for every object in the actual world, then it is True for any particular object in the actual world, such as J.
So we can replace ATI1 by any Tautology such as J=J.

This muddle shows the advisability of following Kant's advice that "existence is not a predicate" (although I don't think he ever said it in exactly those terms).
There is no predicate for "exists" so we need to use predicates about attributes, like OM3C, instead.

In conclusion, my dear Moliere, I uphold your right to reject both premises but, having now discovered that ATI1 is a tautology, humbly suggest that there's no harm in accepting that one (which leads nowhere).

I meant persuaded, since you are being so precise. Is it logic’s business to persuade?

The way I see it, the qualities of being persuasive and compelling are rhetorical qualities, not logical ones. An argument can be unpersuasive and uncompelling and yet it can still be both valid and sound. Conversely, a formal fallacy can be both persuasive and compelling, and yet it would not be valid nor sound.

I don’t see it as making any converts.

As Hegel suggests, in The Phenomenology of Spirit, the history of philosophy is like the maturing of a plant. We wouldn't say that the fruit refutes the flower, or that the flower refutes the seed. I believe the same can be said about science. In its contemporary version, it's the end product of a history in which its roots were deeply interwoven with matters of theology, whether we like it or not. It is what it is

my intention with the OP in this thread isn't to settle every single issue there is to settle in Christian philosophy, or in non-Christian philosophy. I'm just planting some seeds here. Don't expect to harvest the fruits as soon as the seeds have been planted. It would be unrealistic to do so. One of the plants will die, or perhaps both of them will die. In that case, what I planted may serve as nutrients for the germination and maturing of better seeds (i.e., better arguments, both Christian and non-Christian).

P1: The Bible and traditions of the Church and its saints are revealed truth.
P2: The Bible and the traditions say Jesus is God.
C: Therefore, Jesus is God.

It's not logic's business to make converts.

You keep talking about something other than your own argument.

And you then you say you reject the premise you asserted to make your own argument.

I disagree. Proofs for the existence of God don’t work, either by their own terms, or by the ease with which one can reject a premise or two and leave the conclusion meaningless.

The existence of Jesus can be rejected too. So why bother to equate God, whose existence we can reject, with Jesus? Sounds like another dead end.

You haven’t shown me why equating God with some particular name for God is important for Aquinas or Avicenna or anyone who is trying to create proofs for God.

You sound like you are hunting for bad arguments to shoot down.

Types of posters who are welcome here:

Those with a genuine interest in/curiosity about philosophy and the ability to express this in an intelligent way, and those who are willing to give their interlocutors a fair reading and not make unwarranted assumptions about their intentions (i.e. intelligent, interested and charitable posters).

Ad hominem (Latin for 'to the person'), short for argumentum ad hominem, refers to several types of arguments that are usually fallacious. Often currently this term refers to a rhetorical strategy where the speaker attacks the character, motive, or some other attribute of the person making an argument rather than the substance of the argument itself. This avoids genuine debate by creating a diversion often using a totally irrelevant, but often highly charged attribute of the opponent's character or background. The most common form of this fallacy is "A" makes a claim of "fact", to which "B" asserts that "A" has a personal trait, quality or physical attribute that is repugnant thereby going off-topic, and hence "B" concludes that "A" has their "fact" wrong – without ever addressing the point of the debate.

Maybe Aquinas already meant “Jesus” when he said “God.” Kind of like you did: “if God exists, God is identical with Jesus.”

Maybe Aquinas thought it would be redundant in an argument about God to separate “God” from “Jesus” in order to assert that the two are “identical.” If such an argument could be made, if such an argument was missing from the vast stores of philosophical wisdom…

I wish someone could prove God exists and that Jesus is God.

But using only logical form, based on premises that can be rejected, no one can prove a cat really is a cat, or on a mat. So, there’s that. I’m sure jumping to God instead of cats with mats to find some arguments that might actually say something will be easily rejected as well. But that’s just my take on the whole attempt to prove with logic anything about God’s existence or the identity of God.

the tremendous virtual shit that you just took on my Thread.

Guess you are done with me.

I'm not in the habit of entertaining trolls.

I'm not in the habit of entertaining trolls. — Arcane Sandwich


Just berating them. Got it.

If it is not a revealed truth that Jesus is God, then Jesus is not God.

Hmm, I get trying to mirror the Christian argument, and I feel like it mostly works, but it does leave room for a few weird objections to P1 on the grounds that "Christ is God" is true, but that this is not "revealed truth."

I find it odd that Christian philosophers only offer arguments for the conclusion that God exists, while not offering any arguments for the conclusion that Jesus is God. Why would you resort to logic in the former case but not the latter? Is there any reason that warrants this differential treatment?

In all monotheistic traditions God is considered to be a necessary being.

Jesus' being God is not necessary

it is only in one tradition that, in the doctrines of its some sects, it is claimed that Jesus is God.

Are you sure about that? It sounds like it's true, but don't want to rush to any conclusions here.

Jesus' being God is not necessary
— Janus

Are you sure about that?

it is only in one tradition that, in the doctrines of its some sects, it is claimed that Jesus is God.
— Janus

Again, are you sure about that?

Hmm, I get trying to mirror the Christian argument

I am interested in what do we learn from this argument? What is now known or made clearer?

And another way to critique your FTI1 is to say that essentially no one believes it. At least I don't know of any group that believes God is necessarily identical to Jesus (even ignoring the problematic Trinitarian theology here). Christians themselves do not generally claim that the Incarnation was theologically necessary. Or else think about the fact that everyone without exception would agree that FTI1 was false before Jesus was born, and that if God existed before Jesus of Nazareth was born then strict identity cannot obtain.

We can make things clearer by considering the following example. Let us suppose that two dogmatists are arguing about the nature of our future post-mortem. The Christian dogmatist claims to know (because he has supposedly demonstrated it) that our existence continues after death, and that it consists in the eternal contemplation of a God whose nature is incomprehensible from within the confines of our present existence. Thus, the latter claims to have demonstrated that what is in-itself is a God who, like the Cartesian God, can be shown by our finite reason to be incomprehensible for our finite reason. But the atheist dogmatist claims to know that, on the contrary, our existence is completely abolished by death, which utterly annihilates us.

It is at this stage that the correlationist comes along to disqualify both of their positions by defending a strict theoretical agnosticism. All beliefs strike her as equally legitimate given that theory is incapable of privileging one eventuality over another. For just as I cannot know the in-itself without converting it into a for-me, I cannot know what will happen to me when I am no longer of this world, since knowledge presupposes that one is of the world. Consequently, the agnostic has little difficulty in refuting both of these positions - all she has to do is demonstrate that it is self-contradictory to claim to know what is when one is no longer alive, since knowledge presupposes that one is still of this world. Accordingly, the two dogmatists are proffering realist theses about the in-itself, both of which are vitiated by the inconsistency proper to all realism - that of claiming to think what there is when one is not.

But then another disputant intervenes: the subjective idealist. The latter declares that the position of the agnostic is every bit as inconsistent as those of the two realists. For all three believe that there could be an in-itself radically different from our present state, whether it is a God who is inaccessible to natural reason, or a sheer nothingness. But this is precisely what is unthinkable, for I am no more capable of thinking a transcendent God than the annihilation of everything - more particularly, I cannot think of myself as no longer existing without, through that very thought, contradicting myself. I can only think of myself as existing, and as existing the way I exist; thus, I cannot but exist, and always exist as I exist now. Consequently, my mind, if not my body, is immortal. Death, like every other form of radical transcendence, is annulled by the idealist, in the same way as he annuls every idea of an in-itself that differs from the correlational structure of the subject. Because an in-itself that differs from the for-us is unthinkable, the idealist declares it to be impossible.

The question now is under what conditions the correlationist agnostic can refute not only the theses of the two realists, but also that of the idealist. In order to counter the latter, the agnostic has no choice: she must maintain that my capacity-to-be-wholly-other in death (whether dazzled by God, or annihilated) is just as thinkable as my persisting in my self-identity. The 'reason' for this is that I think myself as devoid of any reason for being and remaining as I am, and it is the thinkability of this unreason - of this facticity - which implies that the other three thesis -those of the two realists and the idealist - are all equally possible. For even if I cannot think of myself, for example, as annihilated, neither can I think of any cause that would rule out this eventuality. The possibility of my not being is thinkable as the counterpart of the absence of any reason for my being, even if I cannot think what it would be not to be. Although realists maintain the possibility of a post-mortem condition that is unthinkable as such (whether as vision of God or as sheer nothingness), the thesis they maintain is itself thinkable - for even if I cannot think the unthinkable, I can think the possibility of the unthinkable by dint of the unreason of the real. Consequently, the agnostic can recuse all three positions as instances of absolutism - all three claim to have identified a necessary reason implying one of the three states described above, whereas no such reason is available.

But now a final disputant enters the debate: the speculative philosopher. She maintains that neither the two dogmatists, nor the idealist have managed to identify the absolute, because the latter is simply the capacity-to-be-other as such, as theorized by the agnostic. The absolute is the possible transition, devoid of reason, of my state towards any other state whatsoever. But this possibility is no longer a 'possibility of ignorance'; viz., a possibility that is merely the result of my inability to know which of the three aforementioned theses is correct - rather, it is the knowledge of the very real possibility of all of these eventualities, as well as of a great many others. How then are we able to claim that this capacity-to-be-other is an absolute - an index of knowledge rather than of ignorance? The answer is that it is the agnostic herself who has convinced us of it. For how does the latter go about refuting the idealist? She does so by maintaining that we can think ourselves as no longer being; in other words, by maintaining that our mortality, our annihilation, and our becoming-wholly-other in God, are all effectively thinkable. But how are these states conceivable as possibilities? On account of the fact that we are able to think - by dint of the absence of any reason for our being - a capacity-to-be-other capable of abolishing us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, then this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our thinking, precisely because it harbours the possibility of our own non-being. In order to think myself as mortal, as the atheist does - and hence as capable of not being - I must think my capacity-not-to-be as an absolute possibility, for if I think this possibility as a correlate of my thinking, if I maintain that the possibility of my not-being only exists as a correlate of my act of thinking the possibility of my not-being, then I can no longer conceive the possibility of my not-being, which is precisely the thesis defended by the idealist. For I think myself as mortal only if I think that my death has no need of my thought of death in order to be actual. If my ceasing to be depended upon my continuing to be so that I could keep thinking myself as not being, then I would continue to agonize indefinitely, without ever actually passing away. In other words, in order to refute subjective idealism, I must grant that my possible annihilation is thinkable as something that is not just the correlate of my thought of this annihilation. Thus, the correlationist's refutation of idealism proceeds by way of an absolutization (which is to say, a de-correlation) of the capacity-to-be-other presupposed in the thought of facticity - this latter is the absolute whose reality is thinkable as that of the in-itself as such in its indifference to thought; an indifference which confers upon it the power to destroy me.

We can make things clearer by considering the following example. Let us suppose that two dogmatists are arguing about the nature of our future post-mortem. The Christian dogmatist claims to know (because he has supposedly demonstrated it) that our existence continues after death, and that it consists in the eternal contemplation of a God whose nature is incomprehensible from within the confines of our present existence. Thus, the latter claims to have demonstrated that what is in-itself is a God who, like the Cartesian God, can be shown by our finite reason to be incomprehensible for our finite reason.

But the atheist dogmatist claims to know that, on the contrary, our existence is completely abolished by death, which utterly annihilates us.

It is at this stage that the correlationist comes along to disqualify both of their positions by defending a strict theoretical agnosticism. All beliefs strike her as equally legitimate given that theory is incapable of privileging one eventuality over another. For just as I cannot know the in-itself without converting it into a for-me, I cannot know what will happen to me when I am no longer of this world, since knowledge presupposes that one is of the world. Consequently, the agnostic has little difficulty in refuting both of these positions - all she has to do is demonstrate that it is self-contradictory to claim to know what is when one is no longer alive, since knowledge presupposes that one is still of this world. Accordingly, the two dogmatists are proffering realist theses about the in-itself, both of which are vitiated by the inconsistency proper to all realism - that of claiming to think what there is when one is not.

But then another disputant intervenes: the subjective idealist. The latter declares that the position of the agnostic is every bit as inconsistent as those of the two realists. For all three believe that there could be an in-itself radically different from our present state, whether it is a God who is inaccessible to natural reason, or a sheer nothingness. But this is precisely what is unthinkable, for I am no more capable of thinking a transcendent God than the annihilation of everything - more particularly, I cannot think of myself as no longer existing without, through that very thought, contradicting myself. I can only think of myself as existing, and as existing the way I exist; thus, I cannot but exist, and always exist as I exist now. Consequently, my mind, if not my body, is immortal. Death, like every other form of radical transcendence, is annulled by the idealist, in the same way as he annuls every idea of an in-itself that differs from the correlational structure of the subject. Because an in-itself that differs from the for-us is unthinkable, the idealist declares it to be impossible.

The question now is under what conditions the correlationist agnostic can refute not only the theses of the two realists, but also that of the idealist. In order to counter the latter, the agnostic has no choice: she must maintain that my capacity-to-be-wholly-other in death (whether dazzled by God, or annihilated) is just as thinkable as my persisting in my self-identity. The 'reason' for this is that I think myself as devoid of any reason for being and remaining as I am, and it is the thinkability of this unreason - of this facticity - which implies that the other three thesis -those of the two realists and the idealist - are all equally possible. For even if I cannot think of myself, for example, as annihilated, neither can I think of any cause that would rule out this eventuality. The possibility of my not being is thinkable as the counterpart of the absence of any reason for my being, even if I cannot think what it would be not to be. Although realists maintain the possibility of a post-mortem condition that is unthinkable as such (whether as vision of God or as sheer nothingness), the thesis they maintain is itself thinkable - for even if I cannot think the unthinkable, I can think the possibility of the unthinkable by dint of the unreason of the real. Consequently, the agnostic can recuse all three positions as instances of absolutism - all three claim to have identified a necessary reason implying one of the three states described above, whereas no such reason is available.

But now a final disputant enters the debate: the speculative philosopher. She maintains that neither the two dogmatists, nor the idealist have managed to identify the absolute, because the latter is simply the capacity-to-be-other as such, as theorized by the agnostic. The absolute is the possible transition, devoid of reason, of my state towards any other state whatsoever. But this possibility is no longer a 'possibility of ignorance'; viz., a possibility that is merely the result of my inability to know which of the three aforementioned theses is correct - rather, it is the knowledge of the very real possibility of all of these eventualities, as well as of a great many others. How then are we able to claim that this capacity-to-be-other is an absolute - an index of knowledge rather than of ignorance? The answer is that it is the agnostic herself who has convinced us of it. For how does the latter go about refuting the idealist? She does so by maintaining that we can think ourselves as no longer being; in other words, by maintaining that our mortality, our annihilation, and our becoming-wholly-other in God, are all effectively thinkable. But how are these states conceivable as possibilities? On account of the fact that we are able to think - by dint of the absence of any reason for our being - a capacity-to-be-other capable of abolishing us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, then this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our thinking, precisely because it harbours the possibility of our own non-being. In order to think myself as mortal, as the atheist does - and hence as capable of not being - I must think my capacity-not-to-be as an absolute possibility, for if I think this possibility as a correlate of my thinking, if I maintain that the possibility of my not-being only exists as a correlate of my act of thinking the possibility of my not-being, then I can no longer conceive the possibility of my not-being, which is precisely the thesis defended by the idealist. For I think myself as mortal only if I think that my death has no need of my thought of death in order to be actual. If my ceasing to be depended upon my continuing to be so that I could keep thinking myself as not being, then I would continue to agonize indefinitely, without ever actually passing away. In other words, in order to refute subjective idealism, I must grant that my possible annihilation is thinkable as something that is not just the correlate of my thought of this annihilation. Thus, the correlationist's refutation of idealism proceeds by way of an absolutization (which is to say, a de-correlation) of the capacity-to-be-other presupposed in the thought of facticity - this latter is the absolute whose reality is thinkable as that of the in-itself as such in its indifference to thought; an indifference which confers upon it the power to destroy me.

The idea would be that it is indeed a revealed truth that Jesus is God. But then I have to ask: must everyone have this revelation? If someone is simply incapable of appreciating this truth, or if someone has no faith whatsoever, what would be the best course of action for the Christian, then?

12. The creatures of this sensible world signify the invisible things of God [Rom. 1:20], partly because God is of all creation the origin, exemplar, and end, and because every effect is the sign of its cause, the exemplification of the exemplar, and the way to the end to which it leads; partly from its proper representation; partly from prophetic prefiguration; partly from angelic operation; partly from further ordination. For every creature is by nature a sort of picture and likeness of that eternal wisdom, but especially that which in the book of Scripture is elevated by the spirit of prophecy to the prefiguration of spiritual things. But more does the eternal wisdom appear in those creatures in whose likeness God wished to appear in angelic ministry. And most specially does it appear in those which He wished to institute for the purpose of signifying which are not only signs according to their common name but also Sacraments.

13. From all this it follows that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made; so that those who are unwilling to give heed to them and to know God in them all, to bless Him and to love Him, are inexcusable [Rom. 1:20], while they are unwilling to be carried forth from the shadows into the wonderful light of God [I Cor. 15:57]. But thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord, Who has transported us out of darkness into His wonderful light, when through these lights given from without we are disposed to re- enter into the mirror of our mind, in which the divine lights shine [I Peter 2:9].

St. Bonaventure - Itinerarium Mentis in Deum. Chapter 2.12-13

As to God's presence in the "sheer silence," Scripture is silent.

It seems like your main objection to the OP is of a methodological nature

(FTI7) If hyper-Chaos exists, then it's possible that Jesus is God.
(FTI8) Hyper-Chaos exists.
(FTI9) So, it's possible that Jesus is God.

...

(ATI7) If hyper-Chaos does not exist, then it's not possible that Jesus is God.
(ATI8) Hyper-Chaos does not exist.
(ATI9) So, it's not possible that Jesus is God.

Perhaps to Leontiskos's surprise, I'm not sure if I should accept this non-Christian argument or not. Is it true that it's impossible that Jesus is god, as the conclusion ATI9 says? I'm not sure.

As for myself, I deny premise FTI8: hyper-Chaos does not exist.

Instead, as an atheist, I would deny premise FTI10: It's true that the Big Bang happened, but it's false that God caused it.

But there is no premise that the Big Bang happened, is there?

I think the weakest premise for the atheist is FTI12.

Jesus was not remotely born when the Big Bang occurred, so how could he have caused it? We could argue that the Son is the Word through which all things were created

I don't see why a Christian would want to pursue such arguments against an atheist who does not even believe in God at all.

You asked why Christians never argue for Jesus' divinity. I pointed out that they do. But it isn't a great surprise that you are not aware of those arguments.

why would a Christian try to convince someone that Jesus is divine if that person doesn't even believe that God exists? It would be putting the cart before the horse

Note that the reason Lemaître thought the Big Bang had theological implications was because it so closely paralleled creatio ex nihilo, a revealed doctrine.

Or in other words, I don't think there is a clear case to be made for the primacy of the will over the primacy of the intellect, as if the will must be regenerated before and independently of the intellect. Still, insofar as our age overemphasizes intellect, an emphasis on the will is meet.

To take but one example, "blindness" to signs is simultaneously an intellectual defect and a volitional defect. Additionally, that some abuse signs does not mean that others do not properly use them, and the Bible is filled with both types. There is even serpentine Ahaz who refuses to ask for a sign for all the wrong reasons, and this captures the way that intellect and will are all mixed together.

It certainly takes the wind out of Plato's sails

The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant’s existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole. But contradiction as between philosophical systems is not wont to be conceived in this way; on the other hand, the mind perceiving the contradiction does not commonly know how to relieve it or keep it free from its one-sidedness, and to recognise in what seems conflicting and inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary moments.

At some point we're going to need to talk about the Holy Spirit in this Thread.

“Bless your soul with tongues of fire; Holy Spirit burn;
Leave no trace of man’s desire; Holy Spirit turn.”

Then perhaps you'll be surprised to know that Bunge suggests that the Big Bang didn't happen. In other words, Bunge himself denies premise FTI10: the Big Bang did not happen, precisely because (in Bunge's view), creatio ex nihilo is impossible. He says that as a physicist. He thinks that the Universe is somehow eternal in an Aristotelian sense.

Did Bunge say the Big Bang did not happen?

I haven't encountered such a statement in my readings of Bunge.

I doubt that many physicists consider the Big Bang to be "creation ex nihilo", that is creation out of absolutely nothing.

The Big Bag is compatible with a Universe that cycles form Big Bang to Big Crunch for example (I am aware that current evidence is considered to tell against this thesis).

It is also consistent with the multiverse thesis.

Even if we want to say that God created the Universe out of nothing, this is not really out of nothing because God, if it exists, is not nothing (even if it might be no-thing).

It is impossible for human reason to understand the essence of God.

Are you assuming that God exists?

Because if God is merely a human idea, something imaginary, it seems strange to say that it is impossible to understand it.

No essence can be understood.

Could that be because the idea of a single unique essence is incoherent?

I think of essences as sets of specifying characteristics.

So, I would say that we have a set of specifying characteristics for God, which is it is an imaginary entity are understandable.

If God is a real entity, then there may well be real essences, which would presumably be the ideas of things in God's own understanding of them.

In that case it would seem though, to echo Spinoza, that God would have infinite attributes, of which we can comprehend only extensa and cogitans.

As you no doubt no Spinoza thought the highest function of reason was a kind of intellectual intuition— to see things "sub specie aeternitatis", and that intuition may well be ineffable, or only partly effable.

Quentin Meillassoux:Thus, in order to interrupt this see-sawing between metaphysics and fideism, we must transform our perspective on unreason, stop construing it as the form of our deficient grasp of the world and turn it into the veridical content of this world as such - we must project unreason into things themselves, and discover in our grasp of facticity the veritable intellectual intuition of the absolute. 'Intuition', because it is actually in what is that we discover a contingency with no limit other than itself; 'intellectual' because this contingency is neither visible nor perceptible in things and only thought is capable of accessing it, just as it accesses the chaos that underlies the apparent continuity of phenomena.

We are the victims of an age when men of science are discredited, and only a few remain who are capable of engaging in scientific research. Our philosophers spend all their time in mixing true with false and are interested in nothing but outward show; such little learning as they have they extend on material ends. When they see a man sincere and unremitting in his search for the truth, one who will have nothing to do with falsehood and pretence, they mock and despise him.

Are you familiar with this website?

Are you familiar with this website? — Arcane Sandwich


Yes, it's mine.

I'm almost done with an 8 volume set on the Rubaiyat and my extensions to it

then I guess I'll put PDFs of it there

since no one could afford to buy it.

Impressive task. Clearly, Omar Khayyam is to you what Mario Bunge is to me.

the greatest book ever made

I would argue that no atheist book can be as good as a theist book, be it polytheist, monotheist, or pantheist. That, is Ibn Arabi's point. And that, is why such a book must be gifted.

It's anti-religious in parts, but that makes it to have a Biblical flavor, too, plus it has the Theory of Everything in it, as surpassing the Biblical.

87. We gave Moses the Scripture, and sent a succession of messengers after him. And We gave Jesus son of Mary the clear proofs, and We supported him with the Holy Spirit. Is it that whenever a messenger comes to you with anything your souls do not desire, you grew arrogant, calling some impostors, and killing others?

Does this mean that the Qur'an declares that Jesus is God, yes or no? Open question for everyone.

The Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, was no more than a messenger of Allah

And We gave Jesus son of Mary the clear proofs, and We supported him with the Holy Spirit.

I know that generally speaking Jesus is considered to be a prophet like Muhammed was a prophet -- so I'm inclined to read "We gave Jesus son of Mary the clear proofs" as saying he's on par with Muhammed, but not God.

From my perspective it's because performing miracles is a trope of the literature -- the Buddha also performed miracles in various stories. What it does is differentiate the character from the rest in the story so that you know you should listen to them as a font of special wisdom. Also I think these are features of the stories for the more literally minded who will shrug at doing virtue for its own reward, but when put in earthly terms like magic which fulfills desires and other earthly, human rewards then the more literally minded will understand.

I've attended Islamic service and that's where my knowledge of Muhammed and Jesus both being profits in Islam comes from

The subject of the work isn't God as much as humanity.

heh, prophets.

If so then the gods I see are a little bit pathetic ;)

Are you not familiar with the the concept of the Passion of Jesus?

Why wouldn't they be? The word "pathetic" is etymologically rooted in the word "pathos", which means passion.

Almost like it's being told by a group of people who want to one-up eachother on just how holy Jesus was.

Why wouldn't they be? The word "pathetic" is etymologically rooted in the word "pathos", which means passion. — Arcane Sandwich


If he is then he's not worthy of worship, right?

We have to get along -- but it's an earthly existence, and not a heavenly one.

You say that like there's something wrong with it. Is there? Philosophically speaking.

What would the atheist tell you?

Who says that we have to get along? Creatures kill each other. We are creatures. Why should we not kill each other?

I'll tell you why: because it would be a naturalistic fallacy to suppose that creatures ought to do what creatures are.

Do you know who preached that truth, among other people?

Yeah. They call him "Jesus Christ".

No, we are not worthy of worship.

That's sort of the central bit I'd start with in talking about the divine: to me life is sacred

"getting along" includes killing. It demands it.

Those who ignore their duty to note kill are deluded, by this ethic, living in the clouds.

They call him "Jesus Christ", sure. And they call Gandalf Gandalf.

6
But I am a worm and not a man,
scorned by everyone, despised by the people.
7
All who see me mock me;
they hurl insults, shaking their heads.
8
“He trusts in the Lord,” they say,
“let the Lord rescue him.
Let him deliver him,
since he delights in him.”

9
Yet you brought me out of the womb;
you made me trust in you, even at my mother’s breast.
10
From birth I was cast on you;
from my mother’s womb you have been my God.

11
Do not be far from me,
for trouble is near
and there is no one to help.

12
Many bulls surround me;
strong bulls of Bashan encircle me.
13
Roaring lions that tear their prey
open their mouths wide against me.
14
I am poured out like water,
and all my bones are out of joint.
My heart has turned to wax;
it has melted within me.
15
My mouth is dried up like a potsherd,
and my tongue sticks to the roof of my mouth;
you lay me in the dust of death.

16
Dogs surround me,
a pack of villains encircles me;
they pierce my hands and my feet.
17
All my bones are on display;
people stare and gloat over me.
18
They divide my clothes among them
and cast lots for my garment.

19
But you, Lord, do not be far from me.
You are my strength; come quickly to help me.
20
Deliver me from the sword,
my precious life from the power of the dogs.
21
Rescue me from the mouth of the lions;
save me from the horns of the wild oxen.

I'm an atheist. Am I forced to agree with you? Do I have to "get along" with you, as you yourself say?

Then it is worthy of worship, by the literal definition of the word "sacred".

What's wrong with living in the clouds?

It's just not scientific truth, or historical truth as I see it.

Arcane Sandwich
If only I had a very good distinction, then I'd have started there.

Tolkien I'd be inclined to call "just literature" -- a story for fun.

The difference as I see it is in how we approach the text. So in some future perhaps Tolkien's works could form the basis of a religion after the reality of the text's production are long forgotten.

Also I see value in trying to understand the past which we came from, so that alone makes the Bible more valuable -- it's one of the early documents. It sheds insight into human nature just by that fact.

21
Rescue me from the mouth of the lions;
save me from the horns of the wild oxen.

But when we approach the Bible we approach it like it has some hidden wisdom within, and derive meaning from that reading. I think it's much the same as how we read poems and watch plays -- it's a deep interpretation between ourselves and the text. With Tolkien we treat the exercise in imagination as a game, but not so with the Bible.

It's talking about a memory as ancient as the Paleolithic, when everyone was a nomadic hunter-gatherer. This makes it more ancient than anything anyone else has to say. Bring your favorite poets to this discussion, quote Emily D. for all I care. I believe what Pslam 22:1, part 21 says: There was a time when lions were our natural predators, there was a time when the wild oxen could kill us when we were just minding our own business.

I don't know what that means.

No, Tolkien was a Catholic.

That's part of the awe.

But you know that's not all that's in there. There's more to it than the Psalms. There are histories, mythologies, family trees, -- it's the very stuff of human imagination and care.

It means that how we read a book makes the meaning different, and the reader is where I'd be inclined to pinpoint the difference.

Does that mean some 2000 years later people couldn't read his work in awe of the imagination of the people of the 21'st century?

Say the Catholic church dissipates in that time.

The awe of what, if not the divine? The Cartesian res divina, instead of the res cogitans or the res extensa.

Who cares? The Catholic church is just an institution. It's a human construct. Divinity is not.

Then you haven't understood Ibn Arabi's ?point, then.

Only to the extent that human imagination has a divine nature, not a physical nature. The imagination of the res cogitans is only the secular version of the imagination of the res divina.

I mean that people would not dismiss Tolkien's works as a story only because he was a Catholic.

The text can be read as an allegory and treated as the sacred texts are.

People today wouldn't treat them like that.

But the phenomena has happened as recently as the early 1800's when Joseph Smith wrote The Book of Mormon and created a religion -- the book reads like the fan fiction of the Bible that it is.

And yet, people derive meaning for their entire lives from it and connect to the Divine.

What's different there? The lack of a spokesperson for the text as divine, for one -- Tolkien does not say his text is divine.

But you can surely see how if not Tolkien some work of fiction, today, could become a sacred text tomorrow because that's already happened before.

Then you haven't understood Ibn Arabi's ?point, then. — Arcane Sandwich


Fair.

I'm not sure about that.

What if the reason people adopt a text has more to do with who controls the grain?

Seems common that religions spread with conquest.

Hence, this need not be contradictory at all.

Yes, they do. Catholics love Tolkien. Priests even compare Jesus to Gandalf. What Church people in general don't like, is Dungeons and Dragons (they think it's Satanic). But they like Tolkien.

Is it? Yes or no?

Ok, you're a skeptic then.

It would be a scientific problem to investigate.

And that would be your scientific hypothesis.

Can you prove it?

Please try to understand it.

Always :). A skeptic and a realist, though -- and thereby atheist. But this gets back to another point we haven't worked out and is way off topic from what is threatening to derail a good conversation I've been reading along with. Sorry about that, I just meant to answer the one question and then we got into a back and forth.

If at the level of science? No, certainly not. Not even at the level of history, except for pointing to a handful of examples I'm sure we're both familiar with.

Well, in one just-so story it's because there's a divinity within us all. In another it's because those are the social organisms which survived the process of primitive accumulation.

I just don't then go on to say that the belief is scientific or historical.

Well, technically speaking, it wouldn't be a belief either. It would be a divine revelation

Always :). A skeptic and a realist, though -- and thereby atheist. But this gets back to another point we haven't worked out and is way off topic from what is threatening to derail a good conversation I've been reading along with. Sorry about that, I just meant to answer the one question and then we got into a back and forth.

So things like method and ontology are devices we're bringing to the text to make sense of it more than what the writers were thinking about in writing.

This sort of analysis of I & II Samuel has fallen into disrepute, because of both the unity of style and dramatic elements use throughout the books of Samuel and because, if these stories are supposed to be "propaganda," they are pretty terrible at that role. The entire second half of the David story is a tragedy, one where David's shortcomings play the key role. Things like the literary echo of David, as a now feeble old man being confused by the sound of conflict outside during the coup attempt at the start of I Kings, as recalling/echoing the situation of the priest Eli at the opening of I Samuel, seems hardly the incidental work of "splicing propaganda narratives."

Are you assuming that God exists?
— Janus

No, I am not. Fictional entities have essences, just as much as real entities do.

Because if God is merely a human idea, something imaginary, it seems strange to say that it is impossible to understand it.
— Janus

No essence can be understood.

There's nothing incoherent about the idea of a single unique essence. It's called pantheism. Spinoza was a pantheist, unlike Descartes, for example.

It's possible. Kant didn't believe in intellectual intuition, yet Meillassoux does. In After Finitude, he says:

I'm confused here because you say even fictional entities have essences and then say that no essence can be understood.

The first statement seems to suggest that an essence cannot be some intrinsic thing like being because fictional entities have no substantive being beyond what is said or imagined about them, and also what is said or imagined can presumably be understood.

But the idea of an essence as a set of defining or identifying characteristics would also seem to be ruled out because such sets must surely be understandable.

Whether or not Spinoza was a pantheist is a matter of interpretation. An alternative would be to see him as an acosmist. Spinoza held a distinction between 'natura naturata' and 'natura naturans' with the former being the manifest nature we experience via the senses and the latter being something like creative nature or the laws of nature that give rise to manifest nature.

It's possible. Kant didn't believe in intellectual intuition, yet Meillassoux does. In After Finitude, he says: — Arcane Sandwich


Correct, and Hegel tried to reintroduce it. Yet the historicist character of Hegel's thought is not compatible with Spinoza's system of thought.

Speaking of Divinity, we have it that Divine Inspiration is the source for the writing of the two foundational chapters of the Bible, Genesis 1 and Genesis 2, among other of the myriad claims layered upon the hoped-for Supernatural…

As evolution obliterates Eden's immutable human formation, 'Divine Inspiration's claim falls flat.

The Victorians and the rest of the world were shocked when the 'On the Origin of the Species' came out in 1859, quickly followed by the 'Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam'. 'Denial' was the best course of action for the wishers and the believers, as it still is today, somewhat, for church attendance is dropping, even in the once stable northeast.

(The ship was named the Beagle)

You sound angry now.

I don't do anger; anger has no brains.

the Elfin Queen

A.I. art is worthless, friend.

Great AI art:

An oxymoron. Machines are incapable of creating art, because they are art themselves.

more great AI art:

Nothing to comment here, from me. I neither agree nor disagree with those statements.

Deleuze says he was an atheist.

As far as I'm concerned, Hegel's concept of the Absolute Spirit is the Ultimate Truth about Reality itself. I do not intend that as a polemic. It is simply what I believe.

None of that is art. It may look like art, but it isn't art.

Real art:

I can't claim to have understood the idea of Absolute Spirit. or the 'end of history'.

The Victorians and the rest of the world were shocked when the 'On the Origin of the Species' came out in 1859

If the misery of our poor be not caused by nature, but by our social institutions, then great is our sin.

21
Rescue me from the mouth of the lions;
save me from the horns of the wild oxen.

It's talking about a memory as ancient as the Paleolithic, when everyone was a nomadic hunter-gatherer. This makes it more ancient than anything anyone else has to say. Bring your favorite poets to this discussion, quote Emily D. for all I care. I believe what Pslam 22:1, part 21 says: There was a time when lions were our natural predators, there was a time when the wild oxen could kill us when we were just minding our own business. — Arcane Sandwich


Right! I agree with this perspective. That's part of the awe.

This sort of analysis of I & II Samuel has fallen into disrepute, because of both the unity of style and dramatic elements use throughout the books of Samuel and because, if these stories are supposed to be "propaganda," they are pretty terrible at that role. The entire second half of the David story is a tragedy, one where David's shortcomings play the key role. Things like the literary echo of David, as a now feeble old man being confused by the sound of conflict outside during the coup attempt at the start of I Kings, as recalling/echoing the situation of the priest Eli at the opening of I Samuel, seems hardly the incidental work of "splicing propaganda narratives." — Count Timothy von Icarus


And deservedly so. Samuel is a rich text. It was originally one book. An unflinching look at David, for sure. If I had to pick a couple texts that could be closer to "propaganda" I would maybe say Joshua and perhaps 1 & 2 Maccabees. Still I hate that label "propaganda" because these texts are more complicated than that; still, when we compare Joshua to our knowledge of that period something's gotta bend. I do tend to be more on the historical-critical side of things but I do try to remain open to other methods. Conservative Judaism is more open to modern scholarship, while Orthodox Judaism is much more skeptical of the historical-critical approach and relies more on its own tradition.

Bring your favorite poets to this discussion, quote Emily D. for all I care.

Plato's cave allegory

Plato's cave allegory — Arcane Sandwich


More like that we are 3D shadows of the 4D Block universe.

That sounds like nonsense.

But it is analogous nonsense. Plato had 2D and 3D going on.

Not really. Plato is 4D, through and through.

Yes, you're right; I goofed.

Neither can I. I just believe in it.

Theology is one aspect of the Bible.

I have definitely been drawn to the idea, but I have never been able to believe in it.

Same with religion and mythos in general. I love some of it as literature, as expression of the endlessly creative human imagination. That'll do for me.

José Hernández:Canta el pueblero... y es pueta;
canta el gaucho... y ¡ay Jesús!
Io miran como avestruz,
su inorancia los asombra;
mas siempre sirven las sombras
para distinguir la luz.

What are the other aspects? To me it's 100% theology, but I could be wrong.

I have some reservations

Did you write those quatrains yourself

Not really my cup of tea

Not really my cup of tea — Arcane Sandwich


Coffee is not my cup of tea.

Depends on what system of ethics you adhere to and your reasoning for doing so.

I can think of some military use cases that could be argued for doing so

Well to start with you need to shore up some definitions. Since AI is a computer generated construct it can't be malevolent.

The Matrix is not even malevolent per say. It is interested in self preservation, just so happens that's at the expense of humans. So if you mean you want to create a destructive, offensive AI sort of like Tron in the original Tron movie (he was a program used to search out and destroy other "bad" or "malicious" programs), you don't have to worry about the ethics of the situation or the label "malicious". You just need to make sure the AI has proper safe guards built in so it can't then run amuck itself after it has destroyed it's targets..

No, I don't want any of this, that's neither benevolence nor malevolence, it's either neutral morality ("neutrevalence", or "neutral balance", if you will), or lack of morality to begin with (which is what I believe defines a machine, at least partially, if not wholly).