Magnetism refutes Empiricism
Question: Do magnetic phenomena refute the Empiricist claim that an ordinary object (such as a magnet) is nothing more than a bundle of perceptible qualities corresponding to the five human senses?
Why you should care about the question
David Hume famously suggested that there is nothing more to an ordinary object, such as an apple, than what we can be perceive with our five senses. The apple is simply a bundle of qualities. It has colors, it makes a certain sound when I munch on it, it has a fragrant aroma, it has a sweet taste, and it feels solid to the touch. But there is no philosophical substance or res extensa underneath, so to speak, supporting those qualities. The apple just is those qualities. However, if we consider magnets instead of apples, things are different. Two magnets can attract or repel each other, depending on their orientation. I cannot perceive their magnetic properties in an empirical way, since I don't have a sixth sense (a magnetic sense, if you will) that gives me any sort of empirical information about the phenomenon of magnetism. Yet magnetism is real. Therefore, magnetism is both real and non-empirical. This being the case, the existence of magnets are a counter-example to Empiricism, which means that Empiricism is false.
Thesis
My argument against Empiricism is structurally similar to Korman's arguments from counter-examples:
Quoting Daniel Z. Korman
With this in mind, here is my argument against Empiricism:
(AE1) If Empiricism is true, then magnetism can be perceived by human beings.
(AE2) Magnetism cannot be perceived by human beings.
(AE3) So, Empiricism is false.
Some folks might want to raise the following objection here: magnetism is part of electromagnetism, and this can be perceived, since light is electromagnetic, and light can be perceived.
My reply to that possible objection: in speaking of magnetism and not electromagnetism, I'm referring to the phenomena of attraction and repulsion involving two ordinary magnets. That, unlike light, cannot be perceived. And yet it's just as real as light is (precisely because both magnetism and light are parts of electromagnetism). In other words, light (electricity, actually) is the empirical, perceptible part of electromagnetism, while magnetism is the non-empirical, imperceptible part of electromagnetism.
Lead in
Feel free to disagree, dear reader.
Why you should care about the question
David Hume famously suggested that there is nothing more to an ordinary object, such as an apple, than what we can be perceive with our five senses. The apple is simply a bundle of qualities. It has colors, it makes a certain sound when I munch on it, it has a fragrant aroma, it has a sweet taste, and it feels solid to the touch. But there is no philosophical substance or res extensa underneath, so to speak, supporting those qualities. The apple just is those qualities. However, if we consider magnets instead of apples, things are different. Two magnets can attract or repel each other, depending on their orientation. I cannot perceive their magnetic properties in an empirical way, since I don't have a sixth sense (a magnetic sense, if you will) that gives me any sort of empirical information about the phenomenon of magnetism. Yet magnetism is real. Therefore, magnetism is both real and non-empirical. This being the case, the existence of magnets are a counter-example to Empiricism, which means that Empiricism is false.
Thesis
My argument against Empiricism is structurally similar to Korman's arguments from counter-examples:
Quoting Daniel Z. Korman
Universalism seems to conflict with our intuitive judgment that the front halves of trout and the back halves of turkeys do not compose anything. Put another way, universalism seems to be open to fairly obvious counterexamples. Here is an argument from counterexamples against universalism:
(CX1) If universalism is true, then there are trout-turkeys.
(CX2) There are no trout-turkeys.
(CX3) So universalism is false.
Similar arguments may be lodged against other revisionary theses. The various forms of eliminativism wrongly imply that there are no statues; plenitudinism wrongly implies that there are incars; the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts wrongly implies that there are leg complements; and so forth.
With this in mind, here is my argument against Empiricism:
(AE1) If Empiricism is true, then magnetism can be perceived by human beings.
(AE2) Magnetism cannot be perceived by human beings.
(AE3) So, Empiricism is false.
Some folks might want to raise the following objection here: magnetism is part of electromagnetism, and this can be perceived, since light is electromagnetic, and light can be perceived.
My reply to that possible objection: in speaking of magnetism and not electromagnetism, I'm referring to the phenomena of attraction and repulsion involving two ordinary magnets. That, unlike light, cannot be perceived. And yet it's just as real as light is (precisely because both magnetism and light are parts of electromagnetism). In other words, light (electricity, actually) is the empirical, perceptible part of electromagnetism, while magnetism is the non-empirical, imperceptible part of electromagnetism.
Lead in
Feel free to disagree, dear reader.
Comments (133)
1. You seem to be attacking an archaic/straw version of empiricism, by stipulating that some sort of 'direct sensing' of properties must be available to humans for empiricism to stand up to scrutiny.
2. I have many ways of detecting the presence of a magnetic field. A simple one is just to hold a magnet near a piece of iron, in which case I will sense the force of attraction between the magnet and the iron.
If you accuse me of strawmannig, then you're accusing me of charlatanry, hence sophistry, and therefore you are assuming ill intent on my behalf, and that goes against the Forum guidelines. I have flagged your post for the consideration of the mods and administrators of this website.
Quoting Site Guidelines
Quoting wonderer1
False. You do not sense the force of attraction in that case, you simply feel an increasingly solid sensation, in a tactile sense.
Try again, without accusing me of strawmanning.
No I'm not assuming ill intent. Ignorance on your part seems a simple enough explanation.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
The bolded portion seems an odd way of expressing whatever you may be trying to express. Have you actually done the experiment?
In any case, yes I have a tactile sensation of the attraction between the magnet and the iron.
It seems to me it would be more productive for you to actually address my points than to whine to the moderators, but whatever floats your boat.
Assuming ignorance on my part also goes against the Forum guidelines, since it goes against the rule that says this:
Quoting Site Guidelines
By assuming ignorance on my part, you're not willing to give me a fair reading as your interlocutor. Therefore, I have flagged your most recent post as well, for the consideration of the moderators and administrators of The Philosophy Forum.
Yes, I have done the experiment, many times. And you can do the exact same experiment. Anyone can. That's what makes it scientific.
(Edited)
No, you don't. No one does. You have the tactile sensation of the magnet, and the tactile sensation of the iron. You don't have the tactile sensation of the attraction between them.
I provided you with an opportunity to show that you weren't ignorant in relevant ways with my first response to you. Unfortunately it seems that you weren't able to take advantage of the opportunity.
That's off-topic. This thread isn't about proving my non-ignorance to you (besides, why would I even want to prove a negative in this case?
Quoting wonderer1
Who cares? My alleged ignorance is not the topic of this thread.
You've been reported for trolling.
I don't know what you are trying to say there, or who you are suggesting that you were quoting.
Choose a premise and deny it, or I'm reporting you for trolling.
Which is why I edited my original comment. Again, you've been reported for breaking the forum guidelines, since you are not being charitable towards my intentions.
Then you should have said so.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
You've been reported for trolling.
The reason has already been stated: one of them (the apple) only has perceptible qualities, while the other one (the magnet) has both perceptible and imperceptible qualities.
Quoting tim wood
No, I'm not on about refuting "philosophical substances". I believe that they are real. Empiricism is wrong, because it's open to counter-examples, such as the case of magnets.
Quoting tim wood
I understand the amphibologies (of concepts) as Kant defines them. How about you? Let's see if we're on the same page, here.
Quoting tim wood
Of course there are other possibilities to what it is. We're getting there, through this discussion. Have a bit more patience. Just a request.
What is it, exactly? It's an ordinary object. Generally speaking. It's also a fruit, specifically speaking. It's also a physical object, again generally speaking. It's also something that you can buy at the supermarket, again specifically speaking. Etc.
Where is it, exactly? Well, there's one on my kitchen table, as well as a few others.
Quoting tim wood
Well, I think that ordinary magnetic phenomena show that magnets have real, albeit imperceptible, qualities. We simply intuit this fact. We have access to it, in an intellectual way. Yes, you read that right: it's intellectual intuition, something that Kant didn't believe in. More precisely, does the mind have such a faculty? Kant says "no", Meillassoux says "yes". Who do I agree with? It's hard to say. I suppose the answer is neither. The way I understand intellectual intuition is different from how Kant understands it, and it's also different to how Meillassoux understands it. My notion, or concept, of intellectual intuition is similar to Korman's.
Quoting tim wood
It would be an essential quality, as opposed to (or distinct from) an accidental quality.
Quoting tim wood
Sure, why not.
Quoting tim wood
Yeah I'mma (I am going to) let you in on a secret, mate. Australians in general aren't very good philosophers. I mean, the best that Australia has produced (so far) in philosophical terms is Australian Realism. And it's not a very good philosophy, compared to British Empiricism in the manner of Locke, or Scottish Common Sense Realism, in the manner of the Scottish Enlightment.
It's not common to all things that are. Basilisks are, since they are something (i.e., they are fictional creatures), and yet they're not real.
As to what sort of real thing they would be (the philosophical substances), they would be something like ordinary objects.
Well, see the SEP entry on Ordinary Objects, since it answers those textbook questions about the metaphysics of ordinary objects. I'll quote the opening paragraph:
Quoting Daniel Z. Korman
Quoting tim wood
That sounds like reasonable thing to say, even though I never thought about it that way. Sure, why not?
Quoting tim wood
No, I'm quite sure there's many of them: my kitchen table, apples, computers, etc.
I've read it many times, tim. I've also read Korman's book about it, and most of his articles as well. I've also been exchanging emails with Dan for years.
Quoting tim wood
Because you're asking textbook questions, that's why. This thread is not for discussing textbook questions about the metaphysics of ordinary objects.
Quoting tim wood
They are the same thing, tim. Nothing distinguishes them, precisely because they're not different sorts of things.
Quoting tim wood
They don't.
Quoting tim wood
Again, you're asking a textbook question. There are better uses of my time.
I was going to say the same thing. But I've already been reported for trolling and for assuming ill-intent. Welcome to the club!
I disagree that "Magnetism cannot be perceived by human beings."
It's kind of too late - we perceived something empirical enough to distinguish "magnetism".
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
What isn't empirical about the above reference?
We need light to see objects attract and repulse - all we ever see is light, we never see anything else. But we can still distinguish magnetic attractions and repulsions from kinetic ones.
When magnets are placed near each other, we see them move. We can rule out all kinds of movers, and we are left with the visual perception of magnetic forces.
We can close our eyes and hold two magnets near each other we feel the force of magnetism. Arcane, you called this "increasingly solid sensation" - why not call this magnetism that is being perceived, as opposed to "increasingly solid sensation?"
We could let two magnets collide and probably measure something repeatable about the forces by using the sound of the collision. Certain decibels equate to certain size objects of certain types of materials at certain distances apart and we can might estimate magnetic fields ... or call it increasingly loud collisions.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
Are you saying that because we can't sense it, it is not empirical, but because we somehow know about it, it is still "real"? Shouldn't you make it more clear what you mean by "real magnetism" versus "empirical piece of iron" in order to clarify how "empiricism is false"?
Demonstrably, AE2 is wrong.
I think that's not quite correct. All we ever see is not light, but due to light. We see objects on account of the light that reflects from them. We cannot see light itself. Our eyes are affected by light, but that effect is pre-cognitive, and I don't think it can rightly be counted as "seeing" because we cannot be conscious of the effect of light except when we look at its source or at a reflecting object.
It maybe too simplistic for me to say "all we ever see is light" as an observation of optics, so point taken. But my general point is that, just like we don't directly see magnetism, we don't directly sense anything. So drawing a distinction between seeing an apple versus not-seeing magnetism when two magnets are operating on each other, doesn't work.
I see this argument to be using an empirical observation to refute empiricism.
I wouldn't take the threats of flagging here seriously. The moderators certainly won't.
True, but I dont see magnetism as a good example of more going on. Its perceptible. So Arcanes argument supporting the assertion that there is more going on than just a bunch of perceptible properties based on a distinction between seeing apples and (somehow not explained in the post) distinguishing magnetism doesnt work.
:up: :strong:
I guess I can't disagree. I would say that much of science, especially physics, is composed of objects and relationships that are not directly perceived. We need in most cases technological devices to be able to perceive their reality. And not only that, but much of the theoretical work specializes in theorizing according to the available technology. Today knowledge is completely subsumed in different types of mediations.
Hegel would say that we live the development of knowledge through the work of negativity.
Astrophysics at the exact moment of the Big Bang. You need both quantum physics and general relativity for that. And they're incompatible in relation to that problem.
Ok, how about geology, then? The core of the Earth has not been observed, as of 2025. Is it unobservable? Maybe, maybe not. However, scientists (geologists, in particular) know exactly what's in there.
I would not say that. For example, when two particles collide, what we see is information in a computer. The one that perceives is the machine, but that is not perceiving, it is interacting. Information here is a key element, getting information is not perceiving in my opinion, there is a whole chain of deferral that makes and generates information, or signification. This means that significance or information transcends perception. Thus we must say that we know the world not only as we perceive it, but as we obtain significance or information from it.
The attraction is perceptiblethe magnetic field is notit is a theoretical explanation. Strict empiricism, pace Hume, claims that causation of any kind is not perceptible and is hence merely an inference made on account of the experience of constant conjunctions of observed effects and events.
Can you please just try to make better posts? Like Just a request, feel free to ignore it. You don't have to agree with me, just express your disagreement in a better way. Is that too much to ask of you, specifically? If "yes", then ignore this request.
And to a surprisingly high resolution...
Towering structures in Earths depths may be billions of years old
and
The mysterious, massive structures in Earths deep mantle
What's the precise and exacting solution to the Sorites Paradox, then? Let's start with that. I favor a solution that is not semantic in nature: indeed, I believe in ontological vagueness. There are objects that have vague composition, for example. Think of an ordinary object like a hammer. There's a point in its sorites series for composition in which ontological vagueness occurs.
This part of your post lacks substance.
Ok, cool. So let's do a scientific experiment to test your hypothesis, then.
Just curious: what's your IQ? You're under no obligation to answer, obviously.
What do you think of van Fraassen work? He's an Empiricist.
You do what's called in the literature "an exploratory investigation".
The OP appears to be playing on a misguided understanding of "perceive". I'm not seeing much by way of significant argument.
You're welcome to suggest fixes and improvements to it, should you choose to do so.
The machine makes the particles travel at near-light speed until they collide. How can that not be interacting? There is also the recording, that's true. In any case you get information and this like all sign systems is in place of something, something that is not perceived: the collision and the particles.It doesn't matter if a person has to read the information (even a picture with information) . The point is that when he reads it he is not perceiving what the information refers to.
No problem. I'm glad to agree with you.
No, because instruments, such as magnets, extend the human senses.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
That is much more Berkeley than Hume. True, Berkeley called himself empiricist, but I think that particular claim is more characteristic of Berkeley.
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
I'm familiar with him, but I don't *think* he would endorse the statement you're attributing to empiricists.
What are your thoughts on bishop Berkeley? I believe that he was an idealist as well as an Empiricist. You seem to disagree.
Don't empiricists believe that knowledge comes from experience rather than reason alone? Hence even if there were no observable qualities of the objects movements were perceived, if it came from experience, then it would still be perception and knowledge. Hume didn't deny the movement of the billiard balls and existence force when expounding his cause and effect theory.
It doesn't mean empiricists are wrong. It means that some qualities of the objects are outside of human sense such as radio waves and magnetic force itself.
What does it tell you? Empirical thoughts can easily lead to extreme skepticism. Sometimes reason need to intervene to empirical way of thinking.
That's an interesting way of conceptualizing what Logic is.
The Earth has two magnetic poles: The North Pole, and the South Pole. There is no West Pole, even though there's a Western Hemisphere, and there is no East Pole, even though there's an Eastern Hemisphere.
Furthermore, there is a Southern Hemisphere, and a Northern Hemisphere.
Four Hemispheres, Two Magnetic Poles.
The Earth, having more or less the shape of a sphere (approximately, at least), has a non-Euclidean surface. This is trivial, since any Euclidean sphere (a three-dimensional geometric object) has a non-Euclidean surface (a two-dimensional, geometric object).
In fact, the very word "Geometry" means "Geo" (Earth) and "metry" (as in, metrics).
However, Geometry today is not limited to the branch of Applied Mathematics that serves Physics. Geometry is first and foremost a purely Mathematical branch, it has nothing to do with Physics. In that sense, it's a formal branch of a formal science.
A point, in the mathematical sense, is a geometric object that has zero spatial dimensions. If a sphere is 3D, and if a surface is 2D, and if a line is 1D, then a point is 0D.
A line is a segment between two points. It is a continuum, since it is infinitely divisible into points. Every line is a geometric object that has one spatial dimension. A line is a hyper-point.
A surface is a geometric area between two lines. An surface is a hyper-line. A surface may be defined as a plane.
A solid is a geometric object that has three spatial dimensions.
The Earth is a four-dimensional object, since it is not only spatial (being a 3D geometric object), it is also temporal (being a 1D geometric object).
Space itself is a 3D geometric object, while time itself is a 1D geometric object.
A plane is a relation of lines.
A solid is a relation of planes.
A relation is an extrusion. Therefore, a line is the extrusion of a point.
A plane is the extrusion of a line.
And a solid is the extrusion of a plane.
A space is where points, lines, planes, and solids are located.
A time is a line where points are located.
So there are two kinds of points: spatial and temporal.
Spatial points have three coordinates: on the x axis, on the y axis, and on the z axis.
Temporal points have one coordinate: on the w axis.
And since the extrusion of a line is a plane, it follows that by having four axes (x, y, z, w), this can be represented in set-theoretical notation. But more importantly, having four axes means that, by extrusion of those four axes, there are four planes: call them a, b, c, and d.
And each plane, extruded, results in a total of four solids in this case: call them 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The common feature to 3D solids and 3D space is that both of them are 3D. But clearly, 3D space is not the same geometric object as a 3D solid in that very same space. In other words, space itself is not a geometric solid, it is instead the place where there are 3D geometric solids.
A place is a location in a space.
And a moment is a location in time.
Therefore, a moment is a geometric point in time, on the w axis.
And a place is a geometric coordinate on the x, y, and z axes.
*Ahem*...
Of course there can be such a science. The science of phenomena is called phenomenology. The science of noumena is called noumenology. And the science of Reality Itself is simply called science. It includes the formal sciences (mathematics and logic), as well as the factual sciences (the natural sciences and the social sciences).
Well, since you said the magic word, I guess I have no choice. And by that, I mean that I have to stop being a dick towards everyone, including myself.
Quoting tim wood
I'll try. I can't promise anything in that sense.
Quoting tim wood
What a strange qualification.
Anyways, here goes. Take the following with a grain of salt.
Kant made a distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. We can speak of phenomena, but it would be somewhat strange to speak of noumena, in the plural, since we don't know anything about them. What we do know, however (this is a famous footnote to the Critique of Pure Reason) is that there is a noumenon, because otherwise there would be appearances (phenomena) without something that appears (noumenon).
For example, it's as if Kant is saying the following:
(1) There are appearances (phenomena).
(2) So, there is something that appears (noumeon).
Kant seems to think that if (1) is true, then (2) must be true a well.
How are we doing so far? Any objections to the preceding?
If phenomenon means to be-perceived then no. Science according to the example I have given consists in the study of perceivable or Non-perceivable reality. And I think you agree.
Quoting tim wood
I believe that in this topic the central criticism has been made of empiricism a la Berkeley, which is empiricism taken to its last true consequences (the criticism of primary qualities). In that sense the critique is absolutely right
You're right, but you're also far too kind towards me. My critique of bishop Berkeley could be wrong.
Well, that's why we use logical symbols, like propositional letters, for example, in the context of propositional logic. Symbols such as "p", "q", "r", "s", etc. They don't mean anything, they're just propositional letters.
A more sophisticated logic is first-order predicate logic. Now you have individual constants and individual variables. The latter are of two types: free variables and bound variables. And now you have predicate letters as well, and you also have two quantifiers: the "for-all" sign, and the "for-some" sign, also known as the "universal quantifier" and the "existential quantifier".
So it goes. The next step in complexity is second-order logic. Now you can quantify over predicates, you can use the universal quantifier as well as the existential quantifier to range over predicates. It's just set theory in sheep's clothing, as Quine said. And it's incomplete in a way that first-order predicate logic is not. So, I just don't use second-order logic, I don't like it. If it's set theory in sheep's clothing, then I'd rather use set theory.
But I don't have much use for set theory, to be honest. I just get by with first-order predicate logic and propositional logic, that's all I need for my modest aims. I'm open to the idea that I might be wrong about this, though.
Quoting tim wood
Ok, sure, why not?
(some parts have been edited)
Are there any further levels of simplicity, in that sense? Honest question.
I've heard about them, especially the latter, but I don't know much about them. What are they about?
For me there is no somehow except in a very rudimentary stage of science. You perceive something, then you study or analyze it, but you use means to analyze and discover (today more than ever) things that you had not and will not be able to perceive. Even the result of analysis and investigation can totally change what we first thought we perceived.
What are your APs? What are mine? Which ones would be common to you and me?
I don't know if I want to read it, then. It sounds like a drug.
Quoting tim wood
Is this a request or an order?
The thing is that I already have my metaphysician's hat on and I have never taken it off. And I maintain a position that is in accordance with the metaphysical commitment of the scientist.
So I can say: yes, science as an object of study and as a fact refutes something about empiricism. We are being aware (which differs from perceive) of some things that we do not perceive. And we can study, analyze, investigaste them through technology.
But there are certain concepts in mathematics that can accurately be described as conceptually colossal. One such number is TREE(3), but there are others, such as Graham's Number, for example.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/math/a28725/number-tree3/
Symbolic logic from the textbooks are the engines in the model cars for the model tracks.
In the real word, no one says P, P^Q, P->Q.
Applying logic to the real world for finding the objective truths in the world are the engines in the real cars for us getting A to B for commuting daily, carrying the loads, delivering the goods, and the real racing cars in the real racing tracks. :smile:
Though all knowledge is derived from experience, we don't need to have direct experience to know something. Example: though detectives don't directly observe the killer, they can know the killer exists and infer certain characteristics about the killer by investigating the crime scene. Thus, we can have knowledge of something without direct experience. This does not go against empiricism since the ultimate source of this knowledge is experience. So, there is reason to think AE1 is false.
If this is an argument against a strict empiricism (where we can only have knowledge of something if we directly observe it), then the strict empiricist will still object to AE1. They will likely just deny that magnetism exists (because we cannot directly observe it), so it cannot be perceived by human beings.
Either way, empiricists will deny AE1, so I don't think this argument works.
Safe bet, go all in. Wifes car. That autographed Roger Maris 59th. First-born.
Quoting tim wood
What appears is the thing, that which effects the senses, the material object the representation of which becomes experience. Phenomenon is the creation of intuition specifically, mind generally if you like, representing the affect on the senses.
Quoting tim wood
Not a phenomenon hence never appears, true, but a creation of understanding specifically, mind generally if you like. A creation of understanding is a conception; noumena is a conception alone, never anything else, never cognized, never sensed.
As an aside, Feynman said in one of his CalTech lectures, that fields are real things, insofar as they occupy space and are measurable as a force over time. From this point of view, magnetism does not refute empiricism, iff empiricism represents the possibility of knowledge of real things conditioned by space and time. Problem is .I cant find the reference so never mind.
Damn, how do cells divide again? We cannot perceive such notions cause you know we can't perceive magnetism... yet some how we did... must me magic.
"We can't perceive something we can literally sense in action."
In the Preface to the Second Edition (1787), Kant says:
Quoting Kant
Well, maybe you know more about cell division than we do. Your forum name here is "DifferentiatingEgg", after all.
Deleuze has some interesting things to say about differentiating eggs...
Good quote.