The Mind is the uncaused cause
This argument is long and dense so please bear with me. Your criticisms and input as always are welcome.
P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
P2) Experience is due to the existence of physical and the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience
C1) Therefore, physical and experience cannot be the cause of their own change because of overdetermination (from P1 and P2)
P3) The experience is not a substance so it cannot be the cause of physical
C2) Therefore, there must exist a substance so-called the Mind with the ability to cause physical (from P1, C1, and P3)
P4) Any change in physical at least requires two states of physical
P5) These states of physical are however related
C3) Therefore, the Mind must have the ability to experience physical (from P4 and P5)
C4) Therefore, the Mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause physical (from C2 and C3)
Up to here, I establish that the Mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause physical. Now let's focus on the subjective time.
P1) The subjective time exists and changes since there is a change in physical
P2) Any change requires the subjective time
C1) Therefore, we are dealing with an infinite regress since the subjective time is required to allow a change in the subjective time (from P1 and P2)
C2) Therefore, the Mind experiences and causes the subjective time (so subjective time is a substance too)
Up to here, I establish that the Mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause physical and the subjective time. Now let's focus on motion as a type of change in physical and the subjective time.
P1) Physical are subject to changes such as motion (by motion here I mean a move of physical from one point in space to another point)
C1) Therefore, the Mind is Omnipresent in space since that is the Mind that causes motion in physical
P2) The subjective time is subject to changes such as motion (by motion here I mean a move of the subjective time from one point in the objective time to another point where the objective time has a beginning but no end and it is not subject to change)
C2) Therefore, the Mind is Omnipresent in the objective time since that is the Mind that causes motion in the subjective time
C3) Therefore, the Mind exists in the spacetime (from C1 and C2)
C4) Therefore, the Mind is changeless (by Occam's razor, one can assign properties to the Mind that change in spacetime but that is not necessary)
C5) Therefore, the Mind is the uncaused cause (by Occam's razor, one can assume that another substance sustains the Mind but that is not necessary)
P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
P2) Experience is due to the existence of physical and the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience
C1) Therefore, physical and experience cannot be the cause of their own change because of overdetermination (from P1 and P2)
P3) The experience is not a substance so it cannot be the cause of physical
C2) Therefore, there must exist a substance so-called the Mind with the ability to cause physical (from P1, C1, and P3)
P4) Any change in physical at least requires two states of physical
P5) These states of physical are however related
C3) Therefore, the Mind must have the ability to experience physical (from P4 and P5)
C4) Therefore, the Mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause physical (from C2 and C3)
Up to here, I establish that the Mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause physical. Now let's focus on the subjective time.
P1) The subjective time exists and changes since there is a change in physical
P2) Any change requires the subjective time
C1) Therefore, we are dealing with an infinite regress since the subjective time is required to allow a change in the subjective time (from P1 and P2)
C2) Therefore, the Mind experiences and causes the subjective time (so subjective time is a substance too)
Up to here, I establish that the Mind is a substance with the ability to experience and cause physical and the subjective time. Now let's focus on motion as a type of change in physical and the subjective time.
P1) Physical are subject to changes such as motion (by motion here I mean a move of physical from one point in space to another point)
C1) Therefore, the Mind is Omnipresent in space since that is the Mind that causes motion in physical
P2) The subjective time is subject to changes such as motion (by motion here I mean a move of the subjective time from one point in the objective time to another point where the objective time has a beginning but no end and it is not subject to change)
C2) Therefore, the Mind is Omnipresent in the objective time since that is the Mind that causes motion in the subjective time
C3) Therefore, the Mind exists in the spacetime (from C1 and C2)
C4) Therefore, the Mind is changeless (by Occam's razor, one can assign properties to the Mind that change in spacetime but that is not necessary)
C5) Therefore, the Mind is the uncaused cause (by Occam's razor, one can assume that another substance sustains the Mind but that is not necessary)
Comments (323)
It's a Hegelian argument, what do you expect? : )
At least you're not making a Schellingian argument, those are even worse! : D
There's nothing to criticize or input, .
This argument has a Hegelian structure:
P1) First Thesis
P2) First anti-Thesis
C1) Therefore, First Synthesis (from P1 and P2) = Second Thesis
P3) Second anti-Thesis
C2) Therefore, Second Synthesis (from P1, C1, and P3) = Third Thesis
P4) Third anti-Thesis (1st New Thesis)
P5) First analysis (1st New anti-Thesis)
C3) Therefore, 1st New Synthesis (from P4 and P5) = Fourth Thesis
C4) Therefore, Third Synthesis (from C2 and C3).
Suggestion: analysis is the anti-Thesis of synthesis. That's what makes it dialectical, and hence, Hegelian.
This part is a summary of the old debate between idealism and materialism.
Why think that all physical changes are due to experience? Consider the possibility that astronomers today observe a supernova which occurred a billion years ago in a distant galaxy. What role did experience play in causing the supernova?
Poetically speaking, an arche-fossil (i.e., a supernova which occurred a billion years ago in a distant galaxy) is an example of what may be more accurately described as a "hyper-Fossil". It is the fossil of all fossils, the fossil to end all fossils. So to speak, of course.
Oh, I didn't know that!
Thanks for your confirmation.
Of course you did, Young Dragon : )
Quoting MoK
No problem, mate. :up:
I'm just as seaworthy as you. :death:
Yet I'm not identical to you : )
Thanks for your input. I was not aware of this. I will read more on Hegel when I have time.
Hmmm... do I believe you? : )
Should I believe you? : D
Quoting MoK
Is that a promise?
If so, is that a promise to me?
Or to yourself?
I don't understand what you mean here. Do you mind elaborating?
Not at all, I don't mind at all. Here you go:
Affirmation: Synthesis.
Negation: Analysis.
Negation of the Negation: Affirmation of the Affirmation.
The last one is the polemical one. ; )
P2) Experience is due to the existence of physical and the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience
When the subconscious physical neurological analysis completes, consciousness experiences the result, which experience becomes an input to the physical neurological, updating (changing) its state, qualia-wise, as well as already having an updated state from producing a result, then more analysis happens, and so forth.
The physical also directly understands what goes into the experience, in its own terms, since it is what made it, which suffices, in case of there being no qualia experience global broadcast to it.
C1) Therefore, physical and experience cannot be the cause of their own change because of overdetermination (from P1 and P2)
Rather, each is the cause of the other, in turn, sequentially.
[i]P3) The experience is not a substance so it cannot be the cause of physical[/I]
Conscious experience comes too late in the process to be causing anything directly, but, it seems that indirectly it could be used for future input to what subconscious analysis comes next, or it should simpler be that the subconscious analysis just keeps on going forward, for it depends on what the internal language of the brain is (such as if qualia are a kind of short-cut language).
In either case, all the happenings would seem to be physical, although there is still the Hard Problem to figure out, yet we still know that the physical is always followed by the experiential of it, as if information always exists in those two ways, and so it is already a feat accomplished by the brain.
Here, I am arguing in favor of new substance dualism. Both materialism and idealism are sort of monism. I don't think that materialism is true because of a phenomenon so-called experience. Idealism also is not true because the ideas are coherent, the memory exists, etc.
In other words, MoK:
Analysis of Analysis = Synthesis of Synthesis
Because I have a physical body and I also have experience. I am not saying that all changes are due to experience since there could be a type of physical that changes on its own. This change however goes unnoticed since otherwise the change requires experience.
I only lie when my life is in danger! :)
Quoting Arcane Sandwich
A promise to you and myself. Thanks for introducing Hegel to me.
I prefer Mario Bunge, but people don't like him : )
Thanks for your input. It is now necessary that I read more on Hegel.
Nah. You'll be fine. You're under no obligation to read Hegel, in any way, shape, or form.
Ok, and thanks.
Oh, I see.
How that could be done without the Mind?
Quoting PoeticUniverse
The physical cannot possibly understand what goes into the experience.
Quoting PoeticUniverse
Experience is due to matter and change in matter is due to experience. However, The experience is not the cause of change in the matter and vice versa.
Quoting PoeticUniverse
We need the conscious mind for learning without it no automatic task like riding a bicycle is possible. I also think the conscious mind is much faster than the subconscious mind.
Quoting PoeticUniverse
There is no solution to the Hard Problem of consciousness. Matter lacks experience whether it is in the brain or a rock.
Huh...
"Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit [What occurred in the light, goes on in the dark]: but the other way around, too."
What do you mean?
Nonsense. Abstractions do not "exist" (A. Meinong) and are not "subject to change". Thus your conclusions are invalid.
Also, "mind" is what sufficiently complex brains do activity / process (i.e. mind-ing) and is not a concrete thing. "Mind(ing)" causes brains no more than 'walking causes legs' or 'digesting causes intestines'. After all, there is no evidence whatsoever of (anything like) 'disembodied mind'.
Lastly, in nature "uncaused cause" is not unique since (e.g.) random "uncaused" radioactive decay causes EM static (i.e. radiation).
NB: Read Spinoza, forget Aristotle/Aquinas.
But I'm saying experience can be completely non physical. The quote I present is an older one that brings up this very notion, we can gain experience in dreams....
Unless you mean like we can only experience things because we have a body? But I would say then that the mind is caused by the body in that model.
I am not talking about the abstract objects here. I am talking about experience. Are you denying that you experience and your experience is not subject to change?
Quoting 180 Proof
Saying that the mind is the brain's activity or process does not add anything informative. Please read the rest of the argument.
Quoting 180 Proof
I believe in De BroglieBohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics, so no Schrodinger cat paradox, no particle-wave duality, Wheeler's delayed-choice experiment is explained well, etc.
I am saying that experience is due to physical. Physical is a substance, like the brain, without it experience is not possible.
Our most current models suggest Consciousness is an emergent property of our fractally nested biology.
Yes, I am aware of the emergence concept. Accepting that experience is an emergent property leads to epiphenomenalism in which experience does not have any causal power. This is however against intuition since we experience a fantastic correlation between experience and change in physical.
What is non sequiturs here?
I am saying two things here: 1) Accepting that experience is an emergent property then we deal with epiphenomenalism and 2) Experience is not a substance so it has no causal power so it cannot cause a change in physical.
They are bijected, and inject and surject into and out of each other.
The Mind is not the brain. The brain is physical, by physical I mean it is a sort of substance. Accepting that the brain and the mind are the same one commits monism. If they are the same thing then why use different words?
Not quite
Quoting MoK
Because the two have generally been perceived as existing through the antithesis of values rather than growing out of the body through fractal emergence.
Healthy body, aids in a healthy mind, and a healthy mind aids in a healthy body. The two opposites are intertwined together, they exist in a "hybrid" state. A coming together of two opposites along a gradational spectrum with bimodal extremes represented in language by "body and mind."
Just like everyone's genetic material is made up of male and female DNA, although our terms are defined "male" and "female" for example. However, in reality it's much more complex than that biologically, we know, for example a man can be living with inert female reproductive organs inside, regardless of there being the scientific definition at the SRY gene. There are still multiple gradations on either side which show statistical dominance towards a certain pole. Not that everyone is either 100% Man or 100% Woman...
No.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
How do you distinguish between the mind and the brain? What is your definition of the mind?
Hardware being muscles, bones, organs innervated by the CNS.
Firmware is the Central Nervous System and Autonomic/Peripheral Nervous System
Mind is emergent cognition (software) that arises out of the CNS (firmware), shaped by body (hardware) and experience.
The brain creates it's own dynamic model of the body which can persist irrespective of reality. Cut off your arm, and you'll experience a phantom limb, because the mind and body are so deeply intereconnected.
To suggest they are seperate from each other, is due to one holding steadfastly adamant to Cartesian Dualism. Which is fine, but that manner of thought is not compatible with this manner is all.
Software is nothing but an arrangement of bytes of memory in a hardware. So it is not a thing by itself.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
So to you, the mind is an arrangement of physical? What is an experience to you and why it is relevant if the brain is merely software and hardware and can work on its own?
Exactly the point... the mind doesn't exist as a thing by itself.
Quoting MoK
That's why I quoted:
"Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit [What occurred in the light, goes on in the dark]: but the other way around, too."
Experience is something we can gain from both our internal and external world.
To you, but not to me. I have an argument for it, the OP.
By the way, could you please answer my other question as well: What is an experience to you, and why it is relevant if the brain is merely software and hardware and can work on its own?
That's why I quoted:
"Quidquid luce fuit, tenebris agit [What occurred in the light, goes on in the dark]: but the other way around, too."
Experience is something we can gain from both our internal and external world. It doesn't "work on it's own" it is a dynamic model created from inputs (and outputs, which are injections, and thus inputs too...in this case) from our internal and external world.
No problem.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I don't understand what you mean by that and how that could be relevant to the discussion.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
That is very ambiguous to me. To me, that is a definition of knowledge. Do you mind elaborating?
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
So again, if we accept that the mind is the software and the brain is the hardware then the brain can work on its own. What is the role of experience here?
What it is saying is that what we experience in the external world affects even our internal world. But also that what we experience in our internal world affects our external world also. As in, it's a two-way street. Experience isn't just a "physical" phenomenon...
Something isn't known until it's in the muscle memory...
For example, you don't know 5x5=25 if you have to solve 5x5 every time...
Knowing 5x5 = 25 automatically, without conscious thought, is the result of muscle memory.
I agree with that.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
But you cannot deny its existence and the fact that it affects the physical such as the brain. My question is how experience can affect the brain?
Not trying to deny it's existence. Experience affects the brain through things like neuroplasticity. Which is pretty much a self referential and self affirming as experience even reinforces it's own self through the genesis of neuroplasticity, which makes it more and more likely something will be utilized.
But experience is not a substance so how it could affect the brain?
A person can physically sense a phantom limb... like say you pretend to shock the phantom arm of where a person believes their phantom limb is currently at (a limb that exists due to the dynamic model created by processing experience) it will register on an EKG as if they were shocked. In otherwords it is completely immaterial and causes a physiological stimulus.
Yes, the experience is encoded in the brain. I am saying something different though: How the experience can cause a change in the brain knowing that it is not a substance? Let me give you an example: We are discussing a topic right now. Let's focus on me for the sake of simplicity. I read your post and have a sort of experience. This experience, then is encoded into my brain for further analysis. I am interested to know what causes the change in my brain to allow the experience to be encoded in my brain. I am arguing that that thing cannot be the experience itself since the experience is not a substance so we need a substance that can cause a change in my brain.
It seems to me that you didn't read my post carefully.
Mind and Body are parallel heterogeneous productions born of the same cause: the CNS. That doesn't equate to monism.
But to you, the mind is simply the arrangement of physical. That certainly is monism. And I didn't talk about the mind and its role in the body but the experience.
Fortunately for me there's not a big empty internal cavernous extra dimension space within the human body where the mind is. Thoughts don't exist in a vacuum. There's a physical object utilizing the laws of physics to create everything that occurs in your mind. Every thought you have is physically tradeable by an EKG... thought requires physics and biology to work because it's substantial. Doesn't mean thought is a lego block in my mind.
Thought isn't a thing that occurs freely.
But it can.
I know what emergence is and I think we discuss the consequence of accepting that emergence of consciousness from the physical, namely epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism is unavoidable if you accept that the physical move on its own based on the laws of nature and consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. Consciousness is a phenomenon and a problem within materialism but it is not a substance. Therefore, even if we accept that one day we can explain the emergence of consciousness and solve the Hard Problem of consciousness, we are still dealing with monism since consciousness is not a substance.
Back to my question now: Accepting that experience is real, how the experience can affect physical?
Quoting MoK
Define "experience". A boulder rolling down a mountain has "experienced" the roll, and has been altered in the process. Similarly our "minds" are altered by sensory perceptions and by its own inner processes.
Quoting MoK
"Experience" is a feature (output?) of "mind" and mental and physical the former either an epiphenomenon or emergent (strange loop-like) from the latter are complementary descriptions of the manifest activities of or ways of talking about natural beings (i.e. property dualism¹). For example, both a stone and a human are manifestly physical but humans manifest, or exhibit, purposeful activity that we describe as mental whereas stones do not.
A more fundamental, or metaphysical, version of property dualism is (Spinoza's) parallelism²: physical and mental are conceived of as parallel aspects of every natural being (not to be confused with panpsychism or epiphenomenalism) which do not interact causally (or in any other way) and we attribute to each natural being to the degree either or both aspects are actively exhibited.
So whether a mental property¹ or mental aspect², it doesn't make sense to conceive of "experience" as an independent causal entity (re: Descartes' interaction problem ... disembodied mind).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism [1]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism [2]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-aspect_theory [2]
Re: "experience" ...
Quoting MoK
:roll:
Quoting MoK
:sweat:
A conscious event that contains information.
Quoting Relativist
What do you mean by the mind here?
What do you mean by the mind here? Property dualism explains the experience's emergence (weak emergence) but cannot explain how the experience can affect the physical. Therefore, we are dealing with epiphenomenalism.
Quoting 180 Proof
You don't want me to believe in parallelism, whether the Spinaza, Leibniz, or Malebranche versions. Do you?
Quoting 180 Proof
We know that change in the physical is due to experience. Spinoza's version of parallelism does not explain this since he was not aware of the change in the texture of the brain due to experience. It does not explain how experience is possible; it just says that it is.
Quoting 180 Proof
Experience is a separate thing. It is not the direct cause of change in physical but the change in physical as I mentioned in OP is due to it.
Quoting 180 Proof
I am not defending Descartes here. I have my version of substance dualism.
It does. If not please explain how experience can cause a change in matter considering that the state of matter is subject to change by the laws of nature and experience is not a substance.
Now you tell me what you mean by "experiences".
I have three questions for you: 1) How experience can affect the brain knowing that it is not a substance, 2) Do you believe that physical motion is deterministic and is only based on the laws of nature? and 3) If yes, then how could the brain be affected by experience?
Quoting Relativist
A conscious event that is perceived by the Mind and contains information.
1)Your question reifies "experience". The brain is changed by new perceptions and the act of thinking.
2) Yes to laws of nature, but there may be some indeterministic elements, due to quantum collapse.
3) See #1, and (finally) provide your definition of "experience".
"Experience alters us, as all nutrition, which does not aim merely to conserve, as all physiologist know..."
Experience alters neuroplasticity and neuroplasticity reinforces itself.
Emergence is when something emerges between dimensions...Emergence comes from thebidea of our extremely fractal biology... and we can show that the patterns of emergence of a fractal are between dimensions.
If you take a line and double it you have 2 copies ... 2¹ ... take a square and double the sides of it you end up with 4 copies ... 2² ... take a cube and double the sides of it and you end up with 8 copies or ... 2³ ...
The line is 1 dimension 2¹
The square is 2 dimensions 2²
The cube is 3 dimensions 2³
We see that when we double the sides of something we end up with number raised to some power depending on the dimensions of the object...
So we end up with 2^d = number of sides after the doubling process
where d is the dimension of the object
Take the Sierpenski's Gasket, a fractal. Every time you double the sides you get 3 copies... so we end up with an equation of:
2^d = 3
To solve for d utilize the property of logarithms ... ln of 3 divided by the ln of 2 = d
d = 1.5 something something...
Thus fractal emergence is something that occurs between dimensions... a 3d body with fractal biology with have emergent properties that exist nested between 2d and 3d... so it's a phenomenon that occurs nested within our fractal biology.
So you agree that the brain changes by new experiences, whether the experience is perception, thoughts, etc. You however didn't answer my question: How could the experience change the brain knowing that the experience is not a substance?
Quoting Relativist
I think the De BroglieBohm interpretation is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics because it is paradox-free. The wave function of the universe is not subject to collapse in this interpretation so everything changes according to laws of physics deterministically.
Quoting Relativist
But, that leads to overdetermination in the state of matter. If the change in the state of the brain is determined by laws of physics then it cannot be subject to change because of experience. So, we either have horizontal causation by which the state of matter determines the state of matter later or we have vertical causation but we cannot have both because of overdetermination. Horizontal causation however leads to epiphenomenalism in which no room is left that experience can change the state of matter. This is against common sense so we are left with vertical causation.
Quoting Relativist
I already did: A conscious event that is perceived by the Mind and contains information.
So do you agree or disagree? If you disagree then what is the experience to you?
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
How could experience change the brain if it is not a substance?
The change in the state of matter is due to experience. I guess we agree with this. But experience cannot change the state of matter since it is not a substance. Therefore, the Mind exists with the ability to experience and cause matter.
What is your definition of the mind?
Quoting MoK
You're defining "experience" with more vague terms: "Event", "conscious event", "information".
Quoting MoK
The brain changes due to perception (sensory and bodily) and due to thoughts. This is all there is to mental experience. You're treating "experiences" as something more than the brain changes. This is the source of your error in claiming there's overdetermination.
Quoting MoK
What paradox is entailed by an actual quantum collapse from entanglement?
It is not vague. By event, I mean something that happens. A conscious event therefore is something that happens and affects our awareness. And finally, by the information, I mean a quality of conscious event that informs us in a certain way. Think of experiencing a red rose for example. That is a conscious event since it affects your awareness. The experience however has certain qualities like the redness of the rose, its shape, etc. These qualities come in a single package that I call information.
By the way, what is your definition of experience?
Quoting Relativist
I think I was clear in OP. The experience is due to matter and change in matter is due to experience. But we cannot equate matter or change in matter with experience. Could we? The experience is a phenomenon that we cannot deny it. It is however not matter or change in matter for sure since matter and its change have clear definitions that cannot be equated to experience.
I asked for a definition of the mind. Saying that the mind is an emergent property is not informative enough.
I read the rest. But you are talking about conscious and unconscious minds. They need their own separate definitions.
An experience is a set of perceptions (changes to the brain) and the related changes it leads to (eg the emotional and intellectual reaction; the memories).
Quoting MoK
Yes, we can. An unperceived event is not an experience. Perceptions entail physical changes to the brain. The experience is therefore a physical phenomenon.
It seems that you're trying to disprove physicalism by using phrasing that you interpret in ways inconsistent with physicalism.
You need to define perception. The perceptions are not changes in the brain. The rest of your definition is ambiguous at best.
Quoting Relativist
Matter by definition is a substance that undergoes changes governed by the laws of physics. It seems that you are unfamiliar with the Hard Problem of consciousness. Experience is not a physical phenomenon since matter according to physicalism works on its own without any need for consciousness.
Quoting Relativist
I am defending a new version of substance dualism and I am attacking physicalism for two main reasons, 1) The Hard Problem of consciousness and 2) The common sense that tells us that the change in physical is due to experience.
Basically, more or less you think the mind exists free of the body.
Not only that. The Mind is the uncaused case.
Perception=a short term memory produced when our sensory organs sends electrochemical signals to a portion of the brain that channels the data to the cerebral cortex. E.g. photons stimilate the retina, signals are passed by the optic nerve to the visual cortex, and then the cerebral cortex. Physical changes throughout.
Quoting MoK
I accounted for experience as a purely physical phenomenon. What aspect of it can you prove to be nonphysical? Stipulating a non-physical definition isn't proving anything.
Regarding consciousness: I embrace the film analogy: at each point of time, the brain is in an intentional state (analogous to a frame of a film). Consciousness entails the running of the film- a sequencing of brain states.
Quoting MoK
Quoting MoK
"Conmon sense" isn't an argument. Appearances can be deceiving.
Outline your theory. Explain what exists other than the physical, and how it interacts with the physical. E.g. is there a single conduit within the brain? Multiple? What ties this nonphysical thing to a specific body? I have many more questions, but need to know exactly what your theory is.
That is a physical process. You can call it perception. I asked you what is experience though.
Quoting Relativist
You are the only one with such a claim. Are you a physicalist?
Quoting Relativist
I already defined experience. Given this definition, I distinguish between physical and experience. Let me ask you this question: Do you think objects around you experience anything? According to physicalists matter does not experience anything. It works on its own without any need for consciousness.
Quoting Relativist
Please read OP and let me know if you have any questions.
I already answered that:
Quoting Relativist
You then asked me to define "perception", which I did, and now you've ignored all that and are reasking the question I already answered.
Quoting MoK
Your definition ASSUMES there is something nonphysical, and then when a physicalist approach cannot account for it, you think you've proven something.
Is there some relevant uncontroversial fact that I haven't yet accounted for?
Quoting MoK
They don't have mental experiences.
Quoting MoK
I read it. Here's a few questions:
how can a brain (with all the various properties of material objects), be caused to do something by something that lacks all material properties (no mass, no energy, no charge, and no location in space)? Alternatively: does the mind actually have some material properties? If so, which ones?
Explain the connection between mind an brain: is there one place in the brain that makes this connnection? Multiple places? Does every neuron connect to it? Every synapse?
If minds occupy a specific location in space (at least in part, so it can interact with the brain) where is this? Does it occupy the same space as the brain? The brain, and its components, occupy physical space, so if the mind is to interact with it, there must be some sort of connection one that connects to your brain, rather than your wifes.
How does the brain deliver sights and sounds to the mind? For example, does every neuron connect to the mind, or only certain ones, or combinations? I discussed physical activity associated with vision. Where does the non-physical mind fit in to that?
Can a mind exist without a body? Can it become detached? If a mind can become detached from a body (as in an OBE or after death), how is it able to perceive what is happening in the absence of being connected to sense organs? If sense organs arent needed when disembodied, why are they needed when paired with the body?
Do minds pre-exist bodies, or do they come into existence with the body? If the latter, when? At fertilization? Does it develop in parallel with the brain?
What ties a specific mind to a specific body? E.g. if a mind causes me to raise my arm, why cant my mind cause you to raise your arm?
If my mind causes me to raise my arm, and simultaneously your mind causes you to raise your arm, how do we know it wasnt my arm causing your arm to raise, and your mind causing my arm to raise?
Memories are lost when brains are damaged from trauma or disease, showing that memories are encoded in the brain. If memories are physical, and destroyed as the brain decomposes at death, but your mind survives, in what sense is that mind still YOU? i.e. what aspects of YOU is your disembodied mind?
How do you account for the impact of natural chemicals (such as hormones, seratonin) and artificial chemicals (e.g.hallucinogens, mood altering substances) on thought processes?
Much of our cognitive activity depends on sub- and unconscious processes, which by definition are not experienced (otherwise they'd be conscious). These include personal factors specific to the individual, but also autonomic and parasympathetic processes, and cultural factors, such as language and beliefs.
Quoting Relativist
The mind has non-physical properties, such as the ability to infer meaning and interpret symbols such as language and mathematics. These acts are not determined by physical causes in that there is no way to account for or explain the nature of the neural processes that supposedly cause or underlie such processes in physicalist terms, without relying on the very processes of inference and reasoning which we're attempting to explain.
Logical relationships exist without being physical (e.g., modus ponens or the law of the excluded middle in logic). Arguably, so-called 'physical laws' are themselves not physical, in that they rely heavily on idealisation (perfect objects and contexts) and abstraction (per Nancy Cartwright).
Meanings are real, yet they are not physical objects, and furthermore, to arrive at any concept of what physical objects are, requires the use of definitions, rules of inference, and so on, which cannot themselves be regarded as physically objective.
Per the hard problem of consciousness, the experience of "redness" is not itself a property of neural firings, even if those firings correlate with it. You cannot ascertain what it is like to see something red on the basis of the examination of neural data.
A brain state may be correlated with an experience, but it does not contain meaning in the way that a sentence does. Studies of neuroplasticity demonstrate that there is no discernable 1:1 relationship between semantic content and neurophysiological events, as these vary unpredictably within and between different studies of brains (see this article on interpretation of results from fMRI scans.)
Then there's the various forms of the argument from reason, which says that if thoughts and decisions were physically determined, there would be no room for rational inference, because reason involves moving from premises to conclusions because they are true. There is nothing corresponding to that relationship observable in the physical domain.
Quoting Relativist
There is a large body of evidence concerning children who recall previous lives, suggesting memories may be transmitted by some means other than the physical.
For all these reasons and many others, physicalist philosophy of mind fails to come to terms with what it seeks to explain.
I disagree; all the processes are experienced - changes to the brain take place, but these changes are not connected directly to the portions that exhibit consciousness. Of course, there could be indirect connections - where the subconscious triggers emotions that affect conscious thoughts.
Quoting Wayfarer
When an arm is raised, electrochemical signals are passed from brain to nerves that activate muscles that result in the activity. If mind decides to raise the arm, that intent has to somehow connect to the brain to cause it to occur. This suggests that either the mind has some physical properties, or the brain has some non-physical properties. Which is it? Either way, it seems problematic.
Quoting Wayfarer
Meanings and logic are semantic relations, not ontological (except insofar as we make sense of things using our physical brains).
Quoting Wayfarer
The perception of redness is a representational brain state - it enables discrimination among objects. The "what it's like" seems to me to be imaginary, because the sense of it is not actually real.
Quoting Wayfarer
Meaning implies neural connections, connecting past learnings to current perceptions.
Quoting Wayfarer
Rational inference is semantics applied to learnings.
The problem arises because of abstraction - the division of 'mind' and 'body' as two abstract or idealised entities which supposedly 'interact'. This is the basis of the 'interaction problem' that bedevils Cartesian philosophy, but it only exists because of the idealised abstraction that gave rise to it. The mind and body is actually a body-mind with physical and psychic aspects that are inter-related, not two separate entities (not two=nondual).
Consider what happens when I say something that shocks or annoys - all that has passed between us are symbolic forms, words. Yet these can have immediate physical consequences, raising of heart-rate or adrendal activity. This is because the reality is neither physical nor psychic, but embraces both aspects -hence mind-body medicine, psychosomatic effects, and so on. None of which are endorsed by physicalism.
Quoting Relativist
But nevertheless, they are constantly deployed to argue for what you consider to be physical. When you say that 'the physical brain' has causal power, you are relying on such semantic relations, which in reality underpin your entire 'thought-world'. Notice the contradictory nature of 'making sense using physical brains' - you deploy the word 'physical' because you think it 'makes sense', but that all depends on what is meant by 'physical'.
Agreed.
[Quote]The mind and body is actually a body-mind with physical and psychic aspects that are inter-related.[/quote]
What you regard as psychic aspects are a product of the abstract framework. It doesn't entail something nonphysical (in the broadest sense).
Quoting Wayfarer
I don't see anything contradictory, other than uncareful semantics. "Making sense" of a word means a mental connection to its referent(s). Making sense of a proposition entails applying a learned pattern to the construction. This calls into question the grounding, but I think this can be plausibly accounted for in terms of the connection to the external world through our senses.
And where is that 'external world' grounded, if not in the mind? Of course it is true that the mind receives information from sensable objects, but then the whole process of apperception and synthesis swings into gear, and that generates whatever you understand 'the world' to be - including the accounts of 'the physical', the theories of which rely on the symbolic order represented by mathematical physics.
And, for that matter, what is the origin of the idea of the physical? In Charles Pinter's 'Mind and the Cosmic Order', it is put like this:
[quote="Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics (p. 6);https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-50083-2" ] In fact, what we regard as the physical world is physical to us precisely in the sense that it acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions. The aspect of the universe that resists our push and demands muscular effort on our part is what we consider to be physical. On the other hand, since sensation and thought dont require overcoming any physical resistance, we consider them to be outside of material reality. It is shown in the final chapter (Mind, Life and Universe) that this is an illusory dichotomy, and any complete account of the universe must allow for the existence of a nonmaterial component which accounts for its unity and complexity.[/quote]
The whole problem with physicalism, and the reason I'm criticizing it, is because it forget, omits, or excludes the role of the mind in the construction of what we understand 'the physical' to be. And that's a natural consequence of the way in which modern science was originally constructed, with its emphasis on the exclusive reality of the so-called primary qualities of matter and the relegation of the remainder to the subjective domain. It is question-begging all the way down.
Hence, to get back to the OP (which is terribly parsed, by the way) - how could mind be an uncaused cause? Well, damned if I know, but I think agree with Kant: we only recognize causal relationships because the mind imposes a framework of intelligibility on experience. Physicalism takes causality for granted as a feature of the external world, but it neglects the grounding role of the mind. Without this structuring role, causation as we know it would be unintelligiblemere succession without necessity (per Hume).
:roll:
An "uncaused cause" is indistinguishable from a random event and "mind" (i.e. what sufficient complex brains do ... contra a reification fallacy of "the mind") is not random, or "uncaused".
Quoting MoK
This reification fallacy is what's confusing you. Sorry, I can't follow the rest of your post.
Quoting Wayfarer
So ... "non-physical" "ability" and "acts" are dis-embodied occurences?
Explain "non-physical cause" (which your statement above implies counterfactually).
Yet ... ah, but Lord Kelvin speaks again; how dogmatic of you, sir. :smirk:
:up:
:up: :up:
It's grounded In the actual world. Don't you agree one exists?
Quoting Wayfarer
No, it doesn't. It just doesn't treat mind as the center of attention in metaphysics, like it appears you do. That's not a criticism, it's just an observation.
Physicalism accounts for the world at large first, and after that focuses on whether the mind can fit that paradigm. It can account for the mind, but it's not in the terms we generally apply to mental processes.
Quoting Wayfarer
Naturalism (physicalism or physicalism+) accounts for minds coming to exist as a rare sort of thing in a 14B year old universe of potentially infinite size. That seems a superior account than a mind just happening to exist uncaused. Mind isn't a metaphysical ground. Our minds ground knowledge, but that's because knowledge is an aspect of minds. That our minds would reflect the reality that IS, seems reasonable because we are products of that reality.
What you think the 'world at large' is, relies on and is dependent on a great many judgements that you will make when considering its nature. You might gesture at it as if it were obviously something completely separate from you, but the very fact of speaking about it reveals the centrality of your judgement as to what the 'world at large' is. Science as a whole is always concerned with judgements as to what is the case in particular applications, but philosophy is different, in that it considers and calls into question the nature of judgement itself, not judgement concerning this or that state of affairs.
Quoting Relativist
Of course it exists. It's just that we don't see it as it truly is. Nobody sees it as it truly is. You're starting from the assumption that the appearance, the phenomena, the world as it appears, is real independently of you, when your cognitive faculties provide the very basis for how it appears to you. If you want to refute this argument you need to understand what it is saying. It is not positing 'mind' as some objective, if ethereal, substance or thing.
All of our judgements about the nature of the world, what its constituents are and so on, are themselves intellectual in nature. But then physicalism claims that these are the result of supposedly mind-independent processes. Nothing Ive said suggests that the mind 'exists uncaused' - what I said was that we only recognize causal relationships because the mind imposes a framework of intelligibility on experience and so provides the basis on which judgements about causation are intelligible. In that sense, mind is prior to the physical explanations of phenomena, not in the temporal sense of pre-existing those phenomena, but in the ontological sense as being the ground of explanation itself.
Quoting Relativist
I don't think the sense in which the mind is 'the product of reality' is at all well established or understood. We do, of course, have considerable understanding about the course of evolutionary development, but evolutionary biology was not intended as, and doesn't necessarily serve as, a theory of knowledge per se. As far as evolution is concerned, the salient features of any species are those which serve the purpose of species' survival and propagation. I think what drives the whole process is still very much an open question (and by that I'm not appealing to any kind of 'creator God').
[hide="Reveal"][quote=Schopenhauer, World as Will and Idea]Materialism even at its birth, has death in its heart, because it ignores the subject and the forms of knowledge, which are presupposed, just as much in the case of the crudest matter, from which it desires to start, as in that of the organism, at which it desires to arrive. For, no object without a subject, is the principle which renders all materialism for ever impossible. Suns and planets without an eye that sees them, and an understanding that knows them, may indeed be spoken of in words, but for the idea, these words are absolutely meaningless.
On the other hand, the law of causality and the treatment and investigation of nature which is based upon it, lead us necessarily to the conclusion that, in time, each more highly organised state of matter has succeeded a cruder state: so that the lower animals existed before men, fishes before land animals, plants before fishes, and the unorganised before all that is organised; that, consequently, the original mass had to pass through a long series of changes before the first eye could be opened. And yet, the existence of this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable. The world is entirely idea, and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence. This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared,this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all.
Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however undeveloped it may be; on the other hand, this conscious being just as necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and effects which have preceded it, and in which it itself appears as a small link. These two contradictory points of view, to each of which we are led with the same necessity, we might again call an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge The necessary contradiction which at last presents itself to us here, finds its solution in the fact that, to use Kants phraseology, time, space, and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but only to its phenomena, of which they are the form; which in my language means this: The objective world, the world as idea, is not the only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has an entirely different sidethe side of its inmost natureits kernelthe thing-in-itself But the world as idea only appears with the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning, but all beginning is in time.[/hide]
You define experience as a set of processes. That is not what experience is. When you experience something, it feels something in a certain way to you. So experience is not a mere process. I am not saying that experience is not due to process in physical but distinguish it from process.
Quoting Relativist
Aren't you happy with my definition of experience? If yes, then great we can move on. If not, you still need to define the experience since we cannot progress without it.
Quoting Relativist
Of course, experience is not an physical thing given my definition. And I don't assume its existence. It exists and we cannot deny it. Are you denying that experience does not exist?
Quoting Relativist
You need to define the experience.
Quoting Relativist
So, a chair is physical to you. What makes you think that the brain is not a physical object?
Quoting Relativist
You have many questions and I try my best to answer them in this post. Some of the questions indicate that you didn't read OP carefully but never mind. The argument as I mentioned in OP is very dense and long so I don't expect that anyone understand it in one shot.
Quoting Relativist
The brain like any other physical object is subject to change. It goes from one state to another state later. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but it is caused when it changes. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP. It also has the ability to experience and cause physical. These abilities as I discussed are necessary since physical as I argued in OP cannot be the cause of its own change. So there must exist a substance so-called the Mind with the ability to cause physical. I then discuss that states of matter are related and that means that the Mind must have the ability to experience physical as well. So the general picture is like this, the Mind experiences physical in state X and then later causes physical in state Y.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind does not have any physical property like charge, mass, etc. It is only Omnipresent in spacetime though.
Quoting Relativist
Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime so It exists everywhere including in the brain.
Quoting Relativist
There is only one Mind but different physical objects or persons. We are inside spacetime so we are inside the Mind. We move within the Mind.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind experiences physical directly. The features of experience however depend on the texture of the physical.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind is a substance that exists independently. I think you are talking about the soul here. However, that is a different topic, so let's put it aside. I once had an out-of-body experience. I am currently thinking about it, so I cannot give you a clear answer. Anyhow, if you accept the out-of-body experience then it means that the experience is not due to the brain activity but the activity of another substance that I call it soul.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, the Mind pre-exists bodies. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime.
Quoting Relativist
As I mentioned before, there is only one Omnipresent Mind. It causes a change in you because you as a person have a location in spacetime. It causes a change in me as well because I exist in another location.
Quoting Relativist
Correct. Memories are encoded in the brain and they are subject to destruction upon the brain damage. Mind however exists whether you exist or not. You as a person can have certain experiences because you are physical while being alive and healthy. Whether there is a soul that survives death is the subject of another thread.
Quoting Relativist
Well, these chemicals, whether natural or artificial affect the brain's function so we can have different sorts of experiences depending on the substance. The hallucinogenic substance, such as LSD, can cause hallucinations. I have studied this topic but it seems that the nature of hallucination is not yet known to the best of my knowledge.
I asked you what the mind and physical are to you and you refused to answer. I think we cannot make any progress.
Quoting 180 Proof
What is the experience to you? To me, the experience is a conscious event perceived by the Mind that contains information.
I have an argument for the Mind. It is not a matter of my faith.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I have an argument for the Mind. I start by experience as a phenomenon that exists and is different from physical. I then establish my argument. Please read my argument and tell me if you have any objections to it.
What you "asked", Mok, is a red herring that lamely avoids addressing my critical objections to both your claims and how you're (mis)using "mind" and "physical" throughout this thread discussion.
My request is not a red herring. We have to start an argument from something. How could we possibly proceed and make any progress in a discussion when the terms that are used are not defined well? In your first post in this thread, you only referred to a few articles that I read carefully. A definition of mind and physical is missing in those articles though. Therefore, my request for definitions is legitimate.
The majority of your premises are Observation and Theory sentences... massive nono. Read Quine.
Ok, it seems that you are not interested!
Your premises are theory not yet established.
They have to be just observations not observations and theories in 1 statement...
Conclusions settle theories... you can't be like theory theory proof...
Which premises?
You make observations and theories in every premise. Every theory taken per premise is seen as fundamentally solid logic... when you could just as easily replace the word physical with mental and it would read exactly the same... and make the same assumptions in each line...
Let's discuss P1 in the first section. Are you denying that physical exists and you don't have any experience?
P1) Mental and experience exist and they are subject to change
P2)Experience is due to existence of mental and the change in the state of the mental is due to existence of experience
C1) Therefore, mental and experience cannot be the cause of their own change because of overdetermination (from P1 and P2)[/quote]
Just saying stuff doesn't make it an argument... see? Your argued concludes multiple ways depending what word you place in it. All youve done is create sentences that connect and lead words to other words you want to emphasize...
Those are not my premises. Could you please answer my question here?
Not the words used ...
The shit form allows for any words to be used.
Cause they don't actually make an argument.
Whennyou have proper form you cannot substitute words.
What do you mean by mental and experience?
You can replace mental with Sun... and the same conclusion works out...
I noticed that. I however asked you what you mean by mental and experience. You need to define them.
P1) Words and Ghost exist and they are subject to change
P2) Ghost are due to existence of words and the change in the state of the words is due to existence of Ghost
C1) Therefore, words and ghost cannot be the cause of their own change because of overdetermination (from P1 and P2)
You can change the argument the way you like. But you are skipping my questions. That is not fruitful. So again what do you mean by mental and experience?
Take a basic logic class to learn how to construct an actual argument. There are plenty of free courses on logic out there.
You need validity and soundness, you're missing both.
The conclusions of premises necessarily follow from premises...
Not a half assed "could be" or "maybe" ... but absolutely necessarily follows...
I do. By changing the words in the argument you cannot show anything until you define the words that are used in the argument. Are you interested in a fruitful discussion? If yes you need to define what you mean by mental and experience. And yes, I can change the experience by X and physical by Y and my argument still follows, whatever X and Y are.
Your form is shit you cant even detail it...
Such a waste of time. I am done with you and I am not going to discuss this topic with you anymore.
This is you stringing words together and saying "Look my words make a sentence and thus it is"
You have such a fragile ego you can't be bothered to learn how to make proper premesis.
It's fine to believe these words. But it's all faith my friend, it's all faith.
I am done with you.
Quoting MoK
Quoting MoK
I agree.
Non-sequitur. As I said:
[I]An experience is a set of perceptions (changes to the brain) and the related changes it leads to (eg the emotional and intellectual reaction; the memories).[/i]
Quoting MoK
Of course not. You defined it in a way that's inconsistent with physicalism. You haven't identified anything that is necessarily non-physical. By contrast, my definition is neutral, and covers all associated, uncontroversial, facts.
Quoting MoK
This is ridiculous! I already did!
Quoting MoK
Consider what you're saying: you admit that you define experience as non-physical, then contradict yourself by claiming you don't assume it.
Quoting MoK
????!!!!??? Of course I think the brain is physical!
Quoting MoK
This is incoherent. If the brain is not caused to do something by the immaterial mind, then the mind has no role in an account of experience, and no role in behavior.
Quoting MoK
You've just contradicted yourself.
Quoting MoK
If it is independent, there is no causation in either direction.
Quoting MoK
Then there has to be a causal connection between mind and brain. You gloss over this by making vague claims.
Quoting MoK
And yet, it makes perfect sense under physicalism. The point of my questions was to demonstrate that every metaphysical theory of mind has some problematic areas. If you were to claim non-physicalism is proven by the "hard problem" of physicalism, you'd be making an argument from ignorance. Such an argument from ignorance seems implied in your claims. The only reasonable approach is to draw an inference to best explanation: compare the strength and weaknesses of the 2 accounts. Among your challenges is the ad hoc nature of assuming a mind just happens to exist by brute fact. It's considerably more plausible to think "minds" are a rare, accidental occurrence in a universe of immense age with a potentially infinite extent.
Sure, but why shouldn't we trust this judgement? If we don't trust it, then no scientific or metaphysical claims are justified.
Quoting Wayfarer
Then you should accept agnosticism and extreme skepticism.
[Quote]You're starting from the assumption that the appearance, the phenomena, the world as it appears, is real independently of you, when your cognitive faculties provide the very basis for how it appears to you. If you want to refute this argument you need to understand what it is saying. It is not positing 'mind' as some objective, if ethereal, substance or thing.[/quote]
My assumption is that our senses provide us a functionally accurate understanding of that portion of reality that we directly interact with. This is the epistemological ground for studying the world at large, beyond our direct access. This approach has lead to a coherent, and useful understanding of the world. Of course it's not provably true, but it's a rational worldview. It's also rational to be agnostic about the true nature of the world, but that is a dead-end.
Quoting Wayfarer
Of course not. But it's a reasonable inference consistent with a coherent world-view. I don't see how you can defend any of your metaphysical judgements.
Do you think that a rock experiences as well? There is a physical process within a rock as well. If not, what makes a brain different from a rock?
Quoting Relativist
Your definition is at best incoherent. See above.
Quoting Relativist
See above.
Quoting Relativist
It is not incoherent. You need to read it carefully.
Quoting Relativist
There is no contradiction. I argue in favor of it in OP.
Quoting Relativist
There is vertical causation with the difference that the Mind is not subject to change whereas the physical is subject to change.
Quoting Relativist
There is vertical causation here. See above.
Cool.
I pointed out in my first post that "experience" could be defined in a way that includes rocks;
Quoting Relativist
We subsequently honed in on "mental experiences", which entails mental activity. Rocks do not have a structure that produces mental activity. So the answer is: no, unless we broaden the definition.
Quoting MoK
You obviously forgot we were discussing mental experiences. If you still think there's something incoherent, map it out - like I do, below, with my allegation of incoherence.
Quoting MoK
I did. Here's a breakdown of what you said:
1. The brain... goes from one state to another state later.
2. I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something
3. it [the brain] is caused when it changes.
4. The mind is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the third part of the argument in OP.
#1 entails a change of states. Change entails a cause for that change. #2 implies there is no cause of the state change. That's incoherent.
#3 makes no sense. What is the cause, and what is the effect?
Your assertion about the mind (#4) is unrelated to 1-3.
Quoting MoK
This contradicts #2, above. You now seem to be suggesting the mind is causing the brain to change. If that is what you mean, then there must be a causal connection to the brain. Describe the nature of this connection.
If the mind never changes, then why does it interfere with brain function when it does? The mind hasn't learned anything to base it on, because learning entails change.
I defend them with reference to the obvious shortcomings of physicalism, about which you have not answered any of my arguments.
[i]'We trust our cognitive faculties because they work'.
'Science gives us a useful model, and thats good enough.'
'Sure, we cant prove the nature of reality, but agnosticism is a dead-end'[/i]
Well, you said that experience is a physical process. That is all I need. Do you think that this physical process or experience in the case of the rock goes in the dark? Yes, or no? If yes, why the physical process in the brain does not go in the dark? Why things are not dark for you instead they have some features that you are aware of. Could you say that you are unaware of things that happen to you? What is awareness to you?
Quoting Relativist
What do you mean mental here? Experience is a physical process for you and any physical undergoes a physical process so I don't understand what you are going to gain here.
Quoting Relativist
No, we were only discussing experience and not mental experience.
Quoting Relativist
Correct.
Quoting Relativist
The brain is caused since it changes.
Quoting Relativist
Correct.
Quoting Relativist
Correct.
Quoting Relativist
Correct.
Quoting Relativist
#2 is incorrect.
Quoting Relativist
By cause I mean it is created if that is not obvious.
Quoting Relativist
It is not unrelated considering that motion is a change in matter. Please read the third argument.
Quoting Relativist
I didn't say #2. I said clearly in OP that physical is caused. By this, I mean that the physical is created.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind experiences and causes physical, whether it is a brain or a stone.
Quoting Relativist
Because physical cannot change on their own because of overdetermination.
Quoting Relativist
The mind does not learn anything in the sense that we are learning. The Mind just experiences by this I mean it is aware of states of physical. It does not have any memory of things that experienced in the past. It just experiences a state of physical in one state and causes physical in another state immediately.
Quoting Wayfarer
Your theory also has shortcomings. You admitted to a huge one:
Quoting Wayfarer
Further, you note that we don't know that we're seeing the world as it is, but that also applies to our the product of our self-reflection about the mind. For example, abstractions seem to exist, because we can reflect on abstractions. That doesn't establish that they necessarily exist outside our minds. This extends to all the allegedly nonphysical character of mind: it seems correct but can't be established as such.
That's not a shortcoming. I am not positing 'mind' in the sense implied by the phrase 'uncaused cause' as some entity or power that existed before anything else existed. What I did say was:
Quoting Wayfarer
which in essence is the form of argument known as Kant's answer to Hume. The point of this criticism, then, is the physicalist claim that the brain 'causes' the mind, or that physical causes 'give rise to' the mental. It is pointing out that the principle of causation is itself a relationship of ideas, and so dependent on the very thing that it's seeking to explain. A characteristic claim of Armstrong's is 'It seems increasingly likely that biology is completely reducible to chemistry which is, in its turn, completely reducible to physics.' What I'm arguing is that all such 'reductions' are themselves dependent on intellectual constructs. As Schopenhauer remarks, 'the materialist is like Baron Münchausen who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs.'
Quoting Relativist
I'm referring to insights that have arisen from cognitive science which lend support to a Kantian style of idealism (indeed Kant has been called the 'godfather of cognitive science'). This is the fact that the brain/mind synthesises data from the senses and combines them with its prior conceptual framework to arrive at judgements in order to derive our understanding of the world. All this is really pointing to, is that what we consider 'objective', that is, what exists independently of us or any observer, is still in that fundamental sense mind-dependent.
Consider the well-known anecdotes of neurologist Oliver Sachs, in 'The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat'. That story, and other stories in that book, show how neurological disorders can lead to radical misjudgements about the nature of reality. Of course the normal functioning brain doesn't make those mistakes - but the point remains, our experience of sense-able reality is still dependent on the brain in that sense, and some of the disorders that Sachs relates, completely alter the subject's world. The normal subject's world is still brain- or mind-dependent in that sense, but operating within expected parameters.
So - 'not seeing the world as it is' reflects the insight that the world is not simply given but is also constructed by the brain-mind. What I fault physicalism for is neglecting or failing to take into account this basic fact. It takes what is apparently given - the objective or apparently independently existing object - as being truly existent, without taking into account the interpretive role of the mind in construing what that object is. This happens every minute, moment by moment, in the stream of experience we designate 'consciousness'. Hence my reference to Schopenhuaer: 'But we have shown that all this (i.e. the sensory domain) is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time.' Schopenhauer says materialism - and it just as well applies to physicalism - is the philosophy of 'the subject who forgets himself', i.e. overlooks the role of his own mind in interpreting what he takes to be independently existent. Furthermore that philosophy consists of gaining insight into the way the mind does this. (Hence 'man know thyself'.) Physicalism forgets all of that.
Quoting Relativist
If by 'abstractions' you mean formal concepts, like number, arithmetical proofs and logical principles - my view is these are real, but not existent as phenomena. They are intelligible objects. They exist outside our individual minds but can only be grasped by a mind. And they're foundational to the enterprise of science, which is kind of an embarassment to physicalism. Physicalists will try to accomodate them by saying they're 'products of' or 'caused by' the material brain, but we've already shown the circularity of this reasoning.
Quoting MoK
First I'll note that you're going with a broad definition of experience, one that applies to mindless objects as well as objects with minds. A boulder rolling down a hill experiences changes along the way: pieces are chipped off, and new substances stick to it. Certainly this can happen in the dark of night, and without any mindful beings being aware of it.
Absolutely things can happen to us, and/or to our brains, without our being aware of it. Examples:
-surgery under general anasthesia
-Developing cancer prior to symptoms
-hair growth
-brain damage caused by sudden trauma.
What is awareness? Awareness entails developing beliefs about some activity or state of affairs. This could be from direct perceptions (a perception is a belief), by being told (as when a surgeon describes what he did), or hearing about something indirectly (such as from news sources).
Quoting MoK
Mental activity is brain activity associated with a revision of intentional states.
Quoting Relativist
Xxxxxx
Quoting MoK
The brain already existed. Do you mean a new brain state was caused? If so, what caused the brain to change states?
Quoting MoK
#2 referred to your statement "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something"
Are you saying you were wrong?
Quoting MoK
Then your ignoring the cause-effect. What I challenged you to do was to explain the cause-effect relationship between mind and brain. On the one hand, you seem to deny there is one, but in that case, the mind isn't involved at all with what we do, nor with our experiences.
Here's what I mean by involvement: 1) a causal involvement, in which the mind causes something to take place in the brain. You deny this causal role; 2) the mind is impacted by something in the brain (e.g. by sensory perceptions), but this would entail a change to the mind - which you say is changeless.
Quoting MoK
You said the mind is unchanging. [U]Any sort of learning[/u] entails change, and it entails some sort of memory. So you're saying the mind does not learn in any sense at all, right?
Suppose there's a rock sitting under my living room sofa. It is present when I sit on the sofa, and when I get up. It has no causal role and isn't changed during my sitting and changing. How does an unchanging mind with no causal role differ from the rock?
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting Wayfarer
So what? These don't doesn't falsify physicalism, and these don't imply alternatives are in any better position.
Quoting Wayfarer
I disagree with the wording of the 1st sentence: it equivocates on "the world". There is an actual world, and then there is a concept of the world. There is some disconnect, of course. But there is also a connection: we exist within it.
Physicalism accounts for both the actual world and it accounts for the existence of minds within it. It's hypothesis, and skepticism is warranted. But the skepticism should be applied even-handedly, not just as an excuse to shoot down theories that lack some subjective appeal.
Quoting Wayfarer
You could develop a metaphysical theory that includes abstract objects, but it's just another unprovable theory. My point is that intelligibility doesn't establish existence. We can form concepts about abstract matematical systems unrelated to extra-mental reality. We can formulate, or learn, details about fictional entities (dragons, wizards, unicorns...) that are intelligible, but they are not part of extra-mental reality.
It does falsify physicalism, because it reverses the ontological priority that physicalism presumes, namely that the mind is dependent on or derived from the physical. Its saying that the physical is mind-dependent - the opposite of what Armstrong says. Not seeing it is not an argument against it.
Quoting Relativist
But we're never in a position to see an actual world apart from or outside of the way the brain/mind construes it. It's not as if you can step outside of it. We know the world as it appears to us, but not as it is outside that. That is the meaning of the 'in-itself' - we don't see the world as it is in itself.
Quoting Relativist
I've presented a philosophical argument as to the circularity of the physicalist view. That argument hasn't been addressed.
Quoting Relativist
Not true. What of mathematics? Mathematical physics? Strictly speaking, the term 'proof' only applies to arithmetic. The whole human intellectual capacity relies on abstraction. It is fundamental to language.
The appeal of physicalism is that it is basically an attempt to reach scientific certainty with respect to philosophy. The reason physics was chosen as a paradigm, is because its methods and predictions are (or at least were) definite and unambiguous, and its predictions were applicable across an enormous range of phenomena. After all mathematical physics is behind many of the great breakthroughs in science, well beyond physics itself. Physics in that sense became paradigmatic for scientific knowledge generally. So the reductionist program was to bring philosophy within the scope of this model and the 'Australian materialists' notably Armstrong and Smart, were advocates for this kind of ambitious scientifically-based reductionism. I think it's a misapplication of the scientific method.
Quoting Wayfarer
It's falsified on the assumption that the actual world mind-dependent. Similarly, a mind-dependent world is falsified by an assumption of physicalism. IOW, these are mutually exclusive assumptions. That is not what I meant.
I absolutely am not trying to convince you physicalism is true. This thread was about an alleged proof that physicalism is false. I've been explaining why the argument fails. That doesn't entail proving physicalism is true; it entails establishing that it is possible because it is a complete, coherent metaphysical theory. It's a burden of proof issue: the burden is on the proponent of an alleged proof. Otherwise we just agree to disagree.
Quoting Wayfarer
I think we see reflections of actual reality, and that provides a basis for exploring further. You choose to believe that's hopeless. That's your provilege, but it leaves you with no basis for claiming anything exists outside your own mind. There appear to be other people, but appearances carry no weight with you.
Quoting Wayfarer
A coherent theory will necessarily have circular entailments. That doesn't falsify it; it's a feature that SHOULD be present. The proper question is: can one justifiably believe the world is 100% physical? Your subjective reasons to reject it do not undercut my justification.
Quoting Wayfarer
No; you miss my point. See this post, where I defined a mathematical system.
My point is that mathematical systems are intelligible, but that doesn't imply they have extra-mental existence. Two different systems can have incompatible axioms, which proves they can't both be representative of something in the real world. Intelligibilty is therefore not a reliable guide to what exists. Sometimes unintelligible things may be true (like wave/particle duality), and force us to rethink our paradigm.
Quoting Wayfarer
No, it isn't. Rather, there's a 2-step process:
1) acknowledging that science provides the most trustworthy means of establishing a posteriori knowledge about the world. (Contrast with untestable philosophical reflection- including metaphysical theories). Scientific "facts" are not necessarily true, but the recursive nature of prediction, testing, and revision establishes the superior trustworthiness.
2) Science is not metaphysics; it can't account for itself. For this, we need a metaphysical theory. The objective standards for evaluating s metaphysical theory apply: parsimony and explanatory power. The required explanatory power is that it be able to account for all the uncontroversial facts of the world. Metaphysical naturalism does this more parsimoniously than anything else, because the only uncontroversial facts are analytic and a priori truths, and scientific facts.
Belief in metaphysical naturalism (per se) does not depend on any particular scientific theory being true. (Notwithstanding: scientific realism, which treats current science as true, and is thus falsified along with theories - and then resurrected anew with revised realist theory. I'm not a fan).
Quoting Wayfarer
Non-reductive physicalism entails ontological emergence. Reductive physicalism assumes all high order properties and relations are the necessary consequence of the properties and relations of lower order constituents. Ontological emergence entails novel properties or relations appearing at higher levels that aren't fully accounted for by the lower levels. Philosophers tend to reject this for the same reason scientists do, not BECAUSE scientists do. It violates the PSR and is unparsimonious.
You haven't established that. Where I joined was to challenge this statement of yours:
Quoting Relativist
To which I responded:
Quoting Wayfarer
Your response was: we can lift our arms. How does that indicate a 'complete, coherent metaphysical theory'? You further said the ability to infer meanings are 'semantic relations' and 'not ontological'. But this doesn't address the issue that we have to rely on such semantic relations to establish what is ontological - what is, for example, the nature of the physical, and how or if it is separate from the mind.
Quoting Relativist
I've never said it's hopeless nor do I believe it is. I'm a scientific realist, but not a metaphysical realist. I believe scientific observations describe a real world that is independent of any particular observer, but it is not independent of all observation - otherwise what world are we talking about? Taking into account the way the mind shapes the understanding is part of cognitive science, but it also has philosophical implications. I dont think youre seeing the point Im trying to make, which is not so radical as it seems.
Yes, and reality is not real since it is a representation, although a useful model, the same model used in those night dreams that seem so real.
The unreal representation is as the messenger; but, perhaps it is the message that is real.
Through mathematics, humans are able to discover, predict and control events that would otherwise never occur or be observed in nature. So while it's true that numbers have 'no material properties, no mass, no energy, no change, and no location in space' the ability to grasp mathematics has many demonstrable material consequences. Abstract mathematical models are used to design rockets, build bridges, and develop quantum computingthings that would never occur spontaneously in nature and could never be discerned in nature without mathematics. Purely formal relationships (e.g., Einsteins field equations, Schrödingers wave equation) appear to govern physical reality, yet they are not themselves physical. Another example: The discovery of Maxwells equations (which are purely formal) led to the creation of radio waves, television, and modern telecommunicationsnone of which would have "just happened" without conceptual reasoning. Notice also that these discoveries have lead to continual changes of the idea of the physical (a perfect illustration of Hempels Dilemma).
So - the mind - reason - is able to peer into the realms beyond the physical and to bring back from it, things that have never before existed. Sure, those things are physical - but are the principles which lead to their invention?
I didn't ask for your definition of awareness which as usual is unrelated and unnecessary. You need to pay attention to my argument and definition of words. So again, why don't your brain's physical processes go in the dark? You are aware of thoughts, sensations, feelings, beliefs, etc. By aware here I mean that the opposite of the dark. You are not living in a dark state. Are you? You are aware of things. You can report what you are aware of too.
Quoting Relativist
Any physical including the brain does not exist in the immediate future. Phsycail exists at now. The subjective time however changes and this change is due to the Mind (please read my second argument in OP if you are interested). So there is a situation where the immediate future becomes now. Physical however does not exist in the immediate future so it cannot exist in the situation when the immediate future becomes now, therefore the Mind causes/creates the physical at now.
Quoting Relativist
You need to read the rest of my sentence: "I am not saying that the brain is caused to do something but the brain is caused." This was a response to you that you said the brain is caused to do something...
Quoting Relativist
The cause and effect in the case of Mind is the experience of physical and causation of physical. By this, I mean that the experience in the Mind is due to the existence of the physical. The existence of the physical is however due to the existence of the Mind since that is the Mind that causes physical in the subjective time. So we are dealing with vertical causation by this I mean that the physical in the state S1 causes an experience in the Mind. The Mind then causes physical in the state S2. The Mind then experiences physical in the state of S2 and causes physical in the state S3, etc.
Quoting Relativist
No, the Mind causes the brain. It doesn't cause something to take place in the brain.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind experiences physical. This however does not mean that the Mind changes. The Mind does not have any memory of what has experienced in the past. It just experiences and causes physical immediately.
Quoting Relativist
Yes. Please see the last comment.
Quoting Relativist
Any physical changes even those that seem to be unchanging. The rock is on Earth, Earth is moving so the rock. The particles that make an object are in constant motion even if the object is in space and has no motion. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime so it is changeless as I argued in my third argument.
Quoting Wayfarer
Inferring meaning is not uncaused. It is caused by our interaction with the world. Meaning entails a "word to world" relationship, where "world" is our internalized world-view, that evolves during our lives.
It begins in our pre-verbal stage, based on our sensory input (including our bodily sensations). Our natural pattern recognition capabilities provides a nascent means of organizing the world that's perceived facilitating interaction with it. Pattern includes appearance and function and associations to other things (eg spoon-food-hunger-taste-smell). These associations are the ground floor of meaning. Associations grow over time, thus gaining additional meaning.
Verbal language entails associating pattern of sounds with prior established visual patterns. Written words are associations with the verbal
Nascent inference is again pattern recognition (if x happens, y will follow). With language, it becomes more developed, and we can recognize patterns in the language - that there is a generalized "if x then y" .
Basic math entails patterns between quantities, leading to counting and then learning the general relations of arithmetic.
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are adept at pattern recognition, so that core capability is perfectly consistent with physicalism. More generally, ANNs provide empirical support for the emergence of complex behaviors from simple interactions between units, consistent with the the idea that the mind is an emergent property of neural activity.
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm not sure I understand the objection, but I'll try to address.
Nature of the physical: We start considering the physical to be anything we can touch, or seems touchable. We only recognize that air (and other gases) are physical after scientific study. By that same token, we don't naturally recognize elements of the mind as physical, but we come to learn of clear physical dependencies - like memories, that can be lost due to disease and trauma. The notion that memories have a physical basis is consistent with information theory. Memory is the basic building block of the mind: recognized patterns entail memories.
Everything in the world outside ourselves is demonstrably physical. We are part of that world, so why we wouldn't be as well?
Quoting Wayfarer
The pattens in nature existed before us. Our intellect is based on our pattern recognition skills.
Yes, you did:
Quoting MoK
Given your insult, I now gather that you weren't asking me for a definition, but that wasn't clear. Communication is a 2-way street. Accept responsibility for conveying what you mean, and that your words may not be interpreted in the way you have in mind.
Quoting MoK
I just demonstrated that I pay close attention.
Quoting MoK
I answered that:
Quoting Relativist
If that wasn't what you meant, then CLARIFY, instead of insulting me for failing to read your mind.
Quoting MoK
You're alluding to some particular theory you have about the nature of individual identity, and to a presentist conception of time. That would be fine, but it impedes communication when you make statements that allude to some theory you haven't described. In this case, it seems possible we largely agree, but maybe not -since you haven't explained. I'll nevertheless try, but contain your anger if my basis isn't consistent with yours. Instead, respond by explaining what you mean.
I embrace presentism, but also recognize that a past existed and that it caused the present, and that there will be a future that will come into being as a consequence of the present. In terms of the identity of objects, I embrace the identity of the indiscernibles: A and B are the SAME object (same individual identity) IFF they have the exact same set of properties (both intrinsic and relational). It follows from this that MoK's brain at time t0 is not identical to Mok's brain at time t-1. Nevertheless, it is also true that MoK's brain at t0 was caused by (MoK's brain at t-1 + other factors). We can identify MoK's brain as a "perduring identity": a temporally connected series of point-in-time MoK's brain. A point-in-time MoK's brain can also be considered a "state" of MoK's brain; hence my issue.
Quoting MoK
Then your response didn't answer the question I asked. I haven't disputed that "the brain is caused", but I'm pointing out that the brain @t0 was casused by the brain @t-1 + other factors. Was the mind among the "other factors" or not?
Quoting MoK
This is vague. Be specific as to what is both the cause and the effect, and define what you mean by "experience" in this context - including how an unchanging Mind has experiences.
Quoting MoK
What does "experience in the Mind" MEAN? It's unchanging, unaffected by anything going on in the world.
Quoting MoK
Ah! The mind is causing something after all! Be specfic: what is it causing? Just saying "physical" is too vague. So rephrase this in more specific terms. Also explain how something that is unchanging has selective temporal points of interference - and how they are selected -given that the mind isn't learning or anticipating, since it's unchanging.
I question whether you can provide a coherent account, because you may be treating time inconsistently: from both a presentist viewpoint and a block-time viewpoint. But that's just a guess. It's your burden to make sense of it.
Quoting MoK
Quoting MoK
The rock at t1 was caused by (the rock at t0 + other factors). Those other factors did not include my sitting and rising from the sofa. If the mind is existing outside spacetime, it is not "experiencing" events in space time. What exactly is its relation to spacetime? From its perspective, does spacetime exist as a 4-dimensional block? Alternatively, does the mind exist like a photon traveling at the speed of light - from its perspective, it exists simultanously along all spacetime points along its path - but also with no intereractions with anything else along that path (an interaction would entail a termination of the path).
Within physicalism, the mind is equated to the brain or the brain process. What is the definition of mind to you and how could be caused by the brain? How the mind can affect the brain if it is caused by the brain?
Quoting Philosophim
I think it is the opposite. That is the philosophy that guides science to see what would be the subject of focus.
No, the mind is a result of the brain, not equal to it. Is a fire equal to the sticks its on? But a fire must have a medium to burn and cannot exist without oxygen. Once you start a flame, does the flame not spread to the other sticks? You have to understand that neuronal activity results in a picture, and then your adjustment based on that picture is more neuronal activity. The computer you use is completely run on electrical gates that turn on and off. And yet from that, you're able to interact with and change what you see on the screen. Don't make the mistake of assuming that complex events cannot come from the build up of many simple things.
Quoting MoK
I wouldn't call that the opposite, but how philosophy contributes to science. You cannot contribute to modern day science without first learning and understanding it.
Why leads you (or anyone) to say that we know enough of either (physical or mental) to conclude that they can't include each other?
Nothing I've said contradicts that. What I'm questioning is that the physicalist framework and, more generally, empiricist philosophy (the principle that all knowledge is acquired through experience) provides an adequate account of its basis. I'm arguing that the relationship of ideas is real in its own right independently of physical processes. 'The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to themand exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray' ~ Review of Thomas Nagel 'Mind and Cosmos'. Whereas it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood, when it is not. It explains the tendency to believe that whatever is real must be physical or based on the physical. But as I keep saying, what we consider to be physical also involves judgement (which is why physics is constantly evolving.) Causation is not only bottom-up.
Quoting Relativist
Many will say that arithmetic is a natural function of the mind, leading to the ability to count and form abstract concepts. The abilities of the Caledonian Crow are often referred to in this context. But the fact is, were human minds not able to form and grasp foundational concepts, such as 'equals', it would be impossible for us to learn and practice arithmetic, let alone mathematics. It is an ability the human mind alone has.
Quoting Relativist
Note again the passage I quoted earlier.
Quoting Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order: How the Mind Creates the Features & Structure of All Things, and Why this Insight Transforms Physics (p. 6)
My argument is, the basis of the physicalism that you're advocating can be traced back to Descartes' dualism. As the above says, what we consider 'physical' is precisely that 'which acts in opposition to our will and constrains our actions.' Mind is then depicted as 'res cogitans', the 'thinking subject' which is purportedly not extended in space and time. Over the ensuing centuries, the dualist model was retained, but the idea of res cogitans withered away, especially because science and engineering was able to accomplish so much with reference only to the so-called 'extended properties' of matter.
This is the 'cartesian division' which underlies so much of modern culture - it is, as John Vervaeke says, part of our 'cultural grammar'. Pinter's final chapter refers to information theory, semiotics, and other scientific developments that call the primacy of the physical into question.
Quoting Relativist
That is not an adequate account of the power of reason. Mathematical regularities and symmetries are far more than repetitive patterns. Reason has enabled us to estimate the age and size of the Universe. Don't sell yourself short ;-)
Ok, mistake on my part.
Quoting Relativist
I didn't mean to insult you at all. I am very sorry if my words hurt your feelings but I didn't intend to do so. When I ask you what is the experience you answer that as a set of processes in the brain. Please call a set of processes in the brain another thing since the experience refers to another phenomenon I tried my best to explain it to you but you constantly denied it. When I discuss whether Rock experience as well, then you changed experience in the case of the brain to mental experience. The physical processes are governed by the laws of physics whether it is in a brain or a rock. What makes a brain different from a rock is the composition and arrangement of physical, so one is neuroplastic and another solid. And now we are discussing awareness. I think I was clear with what I mean by awareness by now. I mean the opposite of darkness where the physical processes go into the dark. We can distinguish between the state of anesthesia and awareness, in the first case we are not aware of anything at all while in the second we are not only aware of things but we can also report things.
Quoting Relativist
Thanks for the clarification. I hope that this discussion will be fruitful for both of us, mate!
Quoting Relativist
I didn't ask for examples of cases that we are not aware of things. I was trying to reach an agreement that what awareness is when we are in a normal state. Anyhow, I am glad that you brought up the example of anesthesia. Have you ever been under anesthesia? If yes, then you realize what I mean by awareness here. Are you aware of anything at all when you are under anesthesia? Sure not. That is what I mean by being unaware. Opposite of the state of unawareness is the state of awareness. So, could we agree that there is a difference between being unaware and aware? To me, awareness refers to a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc.
Quoting Relativist
I already mentioned in OP that the argument is dense and long. I agree that I didn't define the experience, physical, change, etc. in OP. These concepts, such as experience, physical, and change are however well known. I agree that some people may not be familiar with these concepts. The purpose of this thread is to discuss things in depth so we can fill the gap in the knowledge and reach an agreement if that is possible.
Quoting Relativist
That is the part that I disagree. That is true that MoK's brain at time t is related to Mok's brain at time t-1 plus other factors but that does not mean that MoK's brain at time t-1 plus other factors causes MoK's brain at time t. I think there are three issues here: 1) The Hard Problem of consciousness, 2) Epiphenomenalism, and 3) The fact that change in the physical is due to experience (we have to agree with what it is meant by experience or awareness first).
First issue: The Hard Problem of consciousness refers to the problem of how physical that it is intrinsically unconscious could become conscious in certain configurations such as what we find in the brain. By consciousness, I mean a state in which we can have any sort of experience. I think that philosophers of mind agree with this definition.
Second issue: Accepting that we can one day find an answer to the Hard Problem of consciousness, we are still dealing with the problem of epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism in simple words states that consciousness has no causal power when it comes to the real world since the state of the physical at one time defines the state of the physical later. We however observe a fantastic correlation between conscious state and physical. For example, you know for sure that there is a correlation between your thoughts and what you are typing. This is something that physicalism fails to answer. If the state of matter is defined to change by the laws of nature then typing meaningful words should happen on its own and you could have any sort of conscious state which is not related to physical.
Third issue: We know for sure that experience affects physical. For example, if someone punches me in the face then I say Ouch. That means that feeling the pain is the cause of saying Ouch. And not only that. If you asked me whether I was punched in the face because of the inflammation you see on my face, I can report yes, I remember the person, the reason why he punched me, etc. That means that what I experienced is registered in my brain without experience I could not possibly report any of these and I could not say Ouch too. For this, we need to agree on my definition of experience though.
These issues if not more are serious threats to physicalism. My formulation which is a new form of substance dualism answers all issues simply.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind causes the change in the physical. If we accept that physical causes physical then we have to deal with the above-mentioned issues.
Quoting Relativist
I mentioned that in OP. Please see the C2 in the first argument.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind causes physical, and by causing I mean the Mind creates physical.
Quoting Relativist
That is a very good question! The Mind is unchanging. It however experiences the state of physical at now and that is the only thing that the Mind experiences. Let's say, that physical changes by this I mean physical state changes from one state to another state, S1 and S2 respectively. It is the S1 state that dictates what the S2 state should be. The Mind cannot interfere with what the state of S2 should be. The only thing that it does is to experience S1 and cause S2 and for this, the Mind does not need to have any knowledge of what time is.
Quoting Relativist
I discuss the block time, what I call objective time, and subjective time in my second and third arguments. I don't know what you don't understand and what is your issue with it. Please let me know and I would be happy to answer.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind exists within spacetime. Please see my third argument, C3 to be very specific.
Quoting Relativist
The mind exists within spacetime, a 4D block in other words. Things are moving and exist in the Mind.
Quoting Relativist
No, the Mind exists within spacetime. The Mind only experiences things, physical and subjective time, at now because they exist at now.
Could you please define the mind?
Quoting Philosophim
When we are talking about the mind we are also talking about consciousness. If we accept that the neural process is merely a physical process then no room is left for consciousness. Could you deny consciousness and its contribution to how a conscious agent does? If not, how consciousness could be causally efficacious if the laws of physics determine the physical process?
Quoting Philosophim
The computer is a weak emergence. There is no explanatory gap in understanding a computer and how it functions. When it comes to consciousness, there is an explanatory gap, so-called the Hard Problem of consciousness. The problem is related to the fact that how something intrinsically is unconscious, electrons, quarks, atoms, molecules, etc. could become conscious when they form a brain.
Quoting Philosophim
Are you talking about weak or strong emergence here? Weak emergence is possible, but strong emergence is not possible.
That is a version of parallelism. The problem is how physical and mental correlate with each other to such a fantastic precision. Some believe that God made it happen. Some believe that it is a coincidence! etc.
Quoting Manuel
What do you mean?
A mind is a resulting process of sensory inputs and decisions. The mind can be intelligent, unintelligent, conscious, or unconscious.
Quoting MoK
Merely physical? :) Everything is physical MoK. Do you have your consciousness in another room or your head? Is your mind in your head or in your feet? Its tied to a physical location, therefore is physical itself. "Merely" does not diminish the amazing quality of a mind either. Physical reality is amazing.
Quoting MoK
That is because we fully understand a computer. We still have yet to fully understand how the brain works.
Quoting MoK
No, that's not the hard problem at all. The hard problem is figuring out objectively what its like to have a subjective experience. I can objectively be classified as being in pain, but what is it like being in pain subjectively? We can evaluate brain states and objectively determine certain areas of consciousness. How else do you think we created anesthesia?
We also don't fully know what its like to subjectively be a molecule, quark, etc. Including what it is subjectively like to be a computer program like an ai. The hard problem is how do we objectively prove, duplicate, evaluate, and replicate subjective experience for scientific enquiry.
Quoting MoK
I'm not talking about either. Weak or strong doesn't matter.
In all cases I was simply responding to you. In my very first post, I brought up the issue of how "experience" is defined, noting that one COULD define it in a way that included a boulder rolling down the mountain. You later seemed to want to limit the discussion to MENTAL experiences, so at that time I began focusing solely on mental experiences. But you defined mental experiences as non-physical, which precludes physicalism with a definition.
I'm fine with applying different terms to mental experiences (m-experiences) and non-mental experiences (nm-experiences). Let's also define non-physical experiences (np-experiences), because you are claiming that m-experiences=np-experiences. Your burden is to show this is necessarily the case.
My contention is that there are no np-experiences, because physicalism can account for m-experiences just fine. You put forth an argument that entails physicalism being false, so you have the burden to show that it is impossible for physicalism to be true. You would presumably do that by proving there are np-experiences.
Quoting MoK
Agreed. I hope you can recognize that it would have been easier if you had simply said that in the first place, instead of asking.
Quoting MoK
You're deflecting. This part of the discussion dealt with your theory of mind, which I pointed out seemed incoherent.
I anticipate that you're strategy is to make an argument from ignorance: find a reason to reject physicalism, and then conclude "...therefore dualism must be true". No, you have to show you have a superior alternative. An incoherent theory is not superior. You DENY that it's incoherent, but you haven't been able to address my objections.
You seemed to agree that MoK's brain @t1 was caused by (MoK's brain at t0 + other factors). The question is: is the mind one of those other factors. Please answer it. I anticipate that either answer will contradict something you've already said, but we'll see. After you've shown your theory is coherent, then we can further discuss your issues with physicalism.
Quoting Charles Pinter
In this passage, an explicit appeal to a 'nonmaterial component' is made, so it might be useful to look specifically at that remark. The natural question that would follow is: what would a 'nonmaterial component' be? What would you look for or expect? If Pinter is to challenge physicalism, then he must be able to answer that question.
My response is that it's very important how the question is framed. The 'nonmaterial component' is not anything objectively existent. It manifests in our experience as the act of judgement. It is the faculty of the mind which grasps meaning, and also the faculty which is at work in the brain stitching together the unified sense of self-and-world that comprises our sense of reality.
That's why framing the question properly is so important. We assume that what is real is what is objectively the case; what is measurable, objectifiable, able to be represented conceptually or mathematically. So we will naturally say, if this capacity is real, it must be based on the physical, because of the assumption that:
Quoting Philosophim
What is subjective, on the other hand, is assumed to be private, internal and specific to the person. It is what is real 'for you'. Liberal philosophy allows this a kind of inherent worth ('the dignity of the individual') but denies it objective status. (Hence, 'moral relativism'.)
But the capacity of the mind which discerns meaning (i.e. reason) is not strictly personal either, and in that sense, not simply subjective. It is transpersonal, as it is characteristic of any subject of experience, not this or that subject. It is intrinsic to the structure of consciousness, and, therefore, experience.
So: understanding the 'immaterial' is recognition of the mind as the ground of rational intelligence. But that requires a perspective shift, a meta-cognitive insight. The mind is not an object of cognition, so neither is this 'immaterial component' - which is why you keep thinking I'm arguing for absolute skepticism or metaphysics. For us, only what is objective is real, and to deny the primacy of the objective threatens our sense of what is real. That is the perspective shift that is required. We are exclusively oriented to the objective world, the sensory world, such that anything that calls this orientation into question is automatically rejected.
(This is something that Continental philosophy understands, in a way that much Anglo philosophy does not.)
I understand this is a hard argument to grasp - it's a transcendental argument, along Kantian lines. Transcendental arguments are concerned with what must be so, in order for experience to be as it is. They are different to both empirical arguments and scientific arguments. But in this particular context, they're important. Otherwise, confusion ensues, as is evident in this and many other threads about philosophy of mind.
I was responded to your suggesting I had not demonstrated physicalism was coherent, because I hadn't accounted for things like meaning. You felt my previous comment about semantics was insufficient, so I expanded on that.
The rest of your comments seems to be justification for what you believe, not really showing my theory is incoherent. I already explained I'm not trying to prove either that you are wrong, or that physicalism is true.
Quoting Wayfarer
Not one neuroscientist or philosopher of mind makes that claim! Rather, physicalists seek to account for the uncontroversial facts in a way consistent with physicalism. All this can do is show that physicalism is possible. In the context of physicalism, that's sufficient - because every other uncontroversial fact is unarguably a natural fact.
Quoting Wayfarer
So what? Uniqueness doesn't imply physicalism is false.
Quoting Wayfarer
You previously said that referring to "semantics" was inadequate to account for meaning. Then when I went into more detail, it made no difference. I'm not going to indulge you again. I've accounted for basic reason; that's a building block. You seem to expect a complete neurolgical framework, seemingly because "it is commonly believed that the physical basis of mind is understood".
The question is: can you identify any uncontroversial fact about mental activity that you can prove impossible under physicalism?
I have not challenged your view, so there's no need to continue to justify it.
I'm sure I have. But then you say:
Quoting Relativist
In which case, what are we talking about? I'm arguing against physicalist views that your posts are representing, only for you to say 'well, I'm not really advocating them.'
Quoting Relativist
If physicalism claims that propositional content can be equated with a brain-state, then it must be able to provide such a basis. (In fact, I think brain-mind identity views are pretty much superseded nowadays largely on the difficulties that this presents, but it's a difficulty any form of physicalism needs to acknowledge.)
Anyway - thanks for the discussion. I very much appreciate your evenness of tone even if we disagree.
I explained several posts ago:
Quoting Relativist
If you mean, why my arguments against physicalism have failed, I don't believe you have demonstrated that they do, but I'll save you the trouble of starting over.
I am aware of that. However, I have a problem with it because, to me, physical processes, whether they occur in your brain or a stone, are governed by the laws of physics. Objects however have different properties these properties are the result of the composition and arrangement of physical in objects.
Quoting Relativist
I didn't define mental experience at all. That is your definition. I just defined experience. I agree that the experience or awareness precludes physicalism given my definition of experience. See below.
Quoting Relativist
There is only one sort of physical process and that is governed by laws of physics.
Quoting Relativist
I cannot agree with your definition of np-experience, m-experience, and p-experience since to me there is only one sort of experience that I equate to awareness. I am not claiming that m-experience=np-experience so there is no burden on me.
Quoting Relativist
I equate experience to awareness. It was your misuse of terms that caused us all trouble. You define experience as the process in physical. The experience as I mentioned is related to another phenomenon that has a clear definition in the philosophy of the mind.
Quoting Relativist
Cool. So we finally agree on awareness (presence of experience) and unawareness (absence of experience). How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism considering the basic ingredients of any objects, electrons, quarks, etc. are unaware?
Quoting Relativist
I am not evading at all. I am talking about problems that cannot be addressed in physicalism. Could you address them? Yes or no? If yes, please address the problems. If not, that is you who are ignoring the mentioned problems. By the way, I developed another argument against physicalism last night. You can find the argument here. Please feel free to discuss the argument in the related thread.
Quoting Relativist
Please see above.
Quoting Relativist
MoK's brain t1 was not caused by MoK's brain at t0 + other factors. Please see above.
I am following your posts and reading them carefully. I think we can agree that experience is a phenomenon that cannot be explained within physicalism. Therefore, there exists a mind with the capacity to experience. I however don't think that thinking is a faculty of the mind.
What is sensory input to you?
Quoting Philosophim
You are talking about consciousness here. How consciousness is possible if we accept that only the physical exists and the physical intrinsically unconscious?
Quoting Philosophim
See above.
Quoting Philosophim
The Hard Problem of consciousness is the philosophical question of how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience.
Quoting Philosophim
That only means that there is a correlation between neural processes in the brain and experience. The correlation does not necessarily mean that the neural processes are the cause of experience.
Quoting Philosophim
According to physicalism physical process is governed by the laws of physics. Within physicalism physical does not experience anything at all. That is why the Hard Problem of consciousness becomes relevant. Are you saying that electrons, quarks, etc. can have experience? How something can be an object and subject at the same time?
Things like sights and sounds.
Quoting MoK
Because the physical is obviously capable of being conscious. You are conscious and physical. Therefore the physical can be conscious. To say the opposite is absurd. :)
Quoting MoK
But why? Because we have no way of objectively classifying subjective experience. Its important you understand the why behind that statement and not interpret it as if subjective experience isn't the result of physical processes.
Quoting MoK
Decades of brain science and anasthesia would beg to differ. That's like saying, "When I walk I move, but that's just a correlation with my legs and mobility."
Quoting MoK
I don't ascribe to physicalism or any other ism. Those are summaries of certain ideas that allow simple digests of concepts. They are not ideas in themselves, and should never be ascribed to in themselves.
Quoting MoK
I am saying we cannot currently know. That's the hard problem. What is it objectively like to be a quark? Is it like something to be a quark? What is it like to be you? Is it like something to be you? They are both the exact same problem for the exact same reason.
Quoting MoK
We don't know exactly how, but we know it can. That's because each of us are subjects and objects. There is this strange insistence from people that there must be something else when we are the most clear evidence that an object can be a subject.
Why do you think mind cannot be matter or the opposite? This needs to be argued for, not asserted. If the argument holds, then we can talk about the issue in a more productive manner.
Quoting MoK
So your "proof" that physicalism is false is based on the assumption that physicalism is false. Circular reasoning.
You may believe physicalism is false because you can't imagine how it can account for some phenomenon, but that is not a proof. I don't care what you believe, so I have no burden to explain or defend physicalism. I know physicalism to be coherent and to be more explanatorially complete than alternatives, and this is sufficient basis for me to reject your argument. I have no burden to prove this to you. You assumed a burden by posting an argument that you presumably think should have the power to persuade. If your argument depends on your unproven assumption that physicalism is false, you should add that as a premise to your argument.
Quoting MoK
You asked me this:
Quoting MoK
That's what I did. The definitions refer to concepts. Accepting the definitions doesn't commit you to agreeing the concept applies to anything in reality. The difference among the 3 concepts are the nature of our disagreement. Based on those 3 concepts, our disagreement is about whether m-experiences are np-experiences or p-experiences. The definition you gave entails ASSUMING m-experiences are np-experiences. If you don't accept the burden to prove this, then your argument fails because it is circular.
Quoting MoK
I didn't misuse terms. I made it clear in my first post that the definition of experience was relevant, and I subsequently rejected your definition because it assumed, not proved, that experiences were non-physical. The discussion did get confusing because we hadn't agreed to a definition. I've addressed this by defining the 3 concepts. If you aren't willing to accept the possibility that m-experiences are p-experiences, then the discussion is at an end because your reasoning is circular.
I'll clarify one point: to say m-experiences are p-experiences means that m-experiences are due to physical processes, and thus consistent with physicalism. I'm not reifying an abstract description. You are greatly mistaken if you think physicalist philosopher's of mind would accept your definition.
Quoting MoK
Functionally. Compare it to the function of a car: the parts of the car cannot function individually as a car. It is their arrangement that produces the function.
Our brains hold memories. Beliefs are memories that dispose us to behave a certain way. Awareness is the development of short term beliefs about some state of affairs or activity, caused by our sensory input.
Quoting MoK
You're ignoring the context of this part of the discussion. You had given an incoherent account of the mind-body relationship. This is fatal to your argument. You presented this argument in your op, which gives you the burden to defend it. If you can't show that account is coherent, you've failed - irrespective of whether or not physicalism is true.
Quoting MoK
So you aren't denying that you're making an argument from ignorance.
Quoting MoK
[B]Then what caused MoK's brain at t1? [/b] There was no explanation "above". Give me an account of all the causal factors (that's what I was doing with my statement,"MoK's brain t1 was caused by [MoK's brain at t0 + other factors].
I am sure you are familiar with the concept of anesthesia. How physical which is intrinsically conscious could possibly become unconscious?
Quoting Philosophim
Which one do you pick: 1) Physical is not conscious and becomes conscious as a result of neurobiological activity in the brain or 2) Physical is intrinsically conscious? In the first case we are dealing with the Hard Problem of consciousness and in the second case, we have anesthesia that cannot be explained.
Quoting Philosophim
You believe in anesthesia and at the same time think that physical is intrinsically conscious. Don't you see a contradiction in this statement?
Quoting Philosophim
But you said that physical is conscious. Therefore, quarks, electrons, etc. must be conscious as well.
Quoting Philosophim
But the object and subject cannot be the same thing. We have physical and experience of physical. These two are not identical and refer to two different things.
Because we have physical and experience of physical. These two are not identical. Physical exists whether you experience it or not. We have certain experiences when our subject of focus is on an object though. Therefore, the physical and the experience of the physical are not identical. What is the mind is subject to the understanding that the physical and the experience of the physical are not identical.
Quoting Manuel
Let's see if we can agree on the difference between the physical and the experience of the physical.
No, I am arguing that physicalism is false because it cannot explain awareness/experience and that is not the only problem that physicalism suffers from.
Quoting Relativist
If you think that physicalism is not false then you have to deal with the Hard problem of consciousness, epiphenomenalism, and other problems that I discussed in detail but you didn't reply to it. You cannot resolve these problems. Could you?
Quoting Relativist
You misused terms. Experience refers to a phenomenon that has a very clear definition in the philosophy of the mind, namely my definition.
Quoting Relativist
I don't agree that there is p-experience or m-experience even if I grant you that experience is a set of processes. There is only one sort of process in the physical governed by the laws of nature whether the physical is a brain or a rock.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, there are philosophers of the mind who even deny consciousness/awareness/experience.
Quoting Relativist
Now you are confusing weak and strong emergence here.
Quoting Relativist
No, we already agreed on the definition of awareness which is a state in which we are conscious of mental activities, such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. The awareness is used for the case that we know certain things as well but please let's focus on the first definition otherwise we get nowhere.
Quoting Relativist
I am not ignoring the context at all. I brought the problems that cannot be explained within physicalism but my version of substance dualism.
Quoting Relativist
It is not incoherent at all. Our discussion in OP deviated from the point that we didn't agree on the definition of experience. I am happy to replace experience with awareness and see whether you can find a flaw in my argument.
Quoting Relativist
What is your problem with my argument? I think the discussion regarding the problems of physicalism is relevant because cause and effect in physicalism are horizontal whereas in my case the cause and effect is vertical. Horizontal causation cannot explain many phenomena whereas vertical causation can, basically P2 in the first argument.
Quoting Relativist
Sure not. My argument is sound and valid. Please read it and let me know if you have any problems with the premises and conclusions. For now, let's focus on the first argument. You need to replace experience with awareness if you are not happy with my definition of experience.
Quoting Relativist
I already explained that to you two times if not more. The Mind causes MoK's brain at t1 given the fact that it experiences MoK's brain at t0 plus other factors.
:up:
Why is experience not physical? I agree that things "outside the mind" - outside consciousness itself are physical things and hence mediated through experience. What I don't quite get is why experience is not physical?
Because physical by definition refers to stuff that exists in the world, such as a chair, a cup, etc. The experience however is defined as a conscious event that contains information. For example, when you look at a rose you have certain experiences, like the redness of the rose, its form, etc. The rose itself however is physical. So experience cannot be physical given the definition of physical and experience.
Might I add that one can easily portray sensory experience as physical, in that it can be understood in terms of physical stimuli and physiological responses. We possess five primary senses - touch, sight, hearing, smell and taste - and they can be understood through cognitive science and physiology. What I think @MoK is getting at, is what David Chalmers describes as the problem of consciousness (usually called 'the hard problem') - that even though all of these processes can be described in physical terms, the experience of them - what it is like to see red, smell a rose, hear a sound - is not so amenable to physical description, because it has an experiential quality.
[quote=Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, David Chalmers;https://consc.net/papers/facing.html]The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.[/quote]
Personally, I think the solution lies in the problem, which is that physical science has always bracketed out or excluded the subject, as I've presented in another thread. I hope I'm correct in saying that this is what MoK is driving at, as the 'hard problem' has been mentioned previously. So that while experiential states have a physical aspect, the subjective experience can't be completely explained in physical terms.
Definition? I mean there is standard use "physical thing", sure, that usually means something we can touch.
But in epistemology it means "physical stuff", the stuff of the world. The mind is a part of the world, the part we know with most confidence, but I don't see the necessity of saying that physical has to be stuff you can touch.
Quoting Wayfarer
As you know, calling it the hard problem is misleading, because it suggests every other problem is easy. So free will is easy, brain science is easy, physics is easy, sociology is easy, but we know that's not true.
Free will is a really hard problem. As was motion for most of the great 17th century philosopher/scientists. We never understood motion, we just proceeded to do theories about it without understanding it.
I think you can say that it is a hard problem, yes, but not the only one.
If by physical, you mean physicSal, then of course, the qualitative character is not described by physics or chemistry. But if you are biologist or an architect, you bet you are going to use qualitative character to explain the phenomena.
Chalmers was contrasting his "hard problem of consciousness" with what he called "the easy problem of consciousness": finding the places in the brain that correspond to various subjective experiences. This, as we know, is indeed getting easier.
"Cannot" implies it is impossible. That's a strong claim that needs to be supported with a proof. Provide it using only mutually acceptable premises.
The reality is that you simply can't imagine how physicalism could account for awareness and m-experience. You're committing the fallacy argument from incredulity, also referred to as "argument from lack of imagination". This is the underlying problem with what you're doing, and it entails reversing the burden of proof - that I must prove to you that physicalism CAN account for something. I will accept that burden if I choose to try and make a persuasive argument for physicalism. But this is your thread, your argument, and your burden.
Quoting MoK
I will deal with those if I choose to argue physicalism is true. In this thread, you have the burden of showing you have a coherent theory, since you put forth a proof.
Quoting MoK
In philosophy, "experiences" correspond to what I've defined as m-experiences. It most certainly does not entail being non-physical. Here's an extract from the definition of experience in the Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy:
[i]Experience: In philosophy,experience is generally what we perceive by the senses (sensory experience), what we learn from others, or whatever comes from external sources or from inner reflection....in philosophy, the relation between experience as a state of consciousness and independent objects of experience becomes a focus of debate. There must be something given
in experience, yet the status of the given is very controversial. Different answers respectively ground
positions such as realism, idealism, and skepticism. The different ways of understanding the given also
involve different ways of understanding the notion of sense-data. There is also debate about the relation between experience and theory.[/i]
There is no part of this that is inconsistent with physicalism. Further proof that your wrong: over 52% of phillosphers "accept or lean toward" physicalism. See this 2020 survey of philosophers. A 2009 survey had similar results
This should give you some pause in thinking physicalism is so obviously false.
Quoting MoK
I defined m-experience as mental experience. If you don't believe there are mental experiences then your entire line of argument is dissolved.
Quoting MoK
Non-sequitur, and you're ignoring that I answered your question. I regret indulging your reversal of your burden of proof.
Quoting MoK
I was indulging you by giving a physicalist ACCOUNT of awareness. The account is consistent with the defintion of awareness.
I've now concluded that I shall stop indulging you. I've given you enough to know that physicalists can account for things you didn't think possible. If you are reasonable, you'll now understand why I say you're making a fallacious argument from incredulity.
Quoting MoK
But you also made this seemingly contradictory statement:
Quoting MoK
Mind would qualify as "other factors". Explain this apparent contradiction. I'll defer re-asking the other related questions until you reconcile this.
So is "experience, or subjectivity" embodied or disembodied? Seems to me easily answerable.
If embodied (i.e. mine/yours), then "experience, or subjectivity" is physical (i.e. affected by my/your interactions with our respective local environments).
If, however, "experience, or subjectivity" is disembodied, then how do we know soundly demonstrate this? I don't see how we can ...
Quoting Philosophim
:100:
This assumes that the only way to be "mine" or "yours" is to be embodied, doesn't it?
Moreover, a mind can be affected by our interactions with the local environment without itself being part of that environment, surely. This is what the supervenience concept is trying to get at, I think. We can postulate a one-for-one mapping between brain and mind/subjectivity without also postulating causality.
Yes.
He didn't say it was. In fact, the paper is called 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness'. It only came to be called THE hard problem later.
Very well said! The Hard Problem of consciousness is not the only problem that physicalism suffers from. For example, we also have the problem of Epiphenomenalism. We are sure that our mental activities correlate with physical activities. For example, I can explain my thoughts by typing the words. So the typing is due to having certain thoughts. This is however a vertical causation which is different from horizontal causation which physicalists believe that physical change according to it. There is a problem of memorization of events as well. Our experiences are stored in the brain and that also requires vertical causation. For all these reasons I think that vertical causation is a correct view to explain reality rather than horizontal causation. That is the material that supports P2 in the first argument.
Please let's put the mind aside until we reach an agreement that experience and physical refer to two different phenomena. Within physicalism, the physical is believed to change on its own based on the laws of physics without any need for experience. Given this, I think we can agree that the experience is not physical since physicalism cannot accommodate experience as a physical thing. The existence of experience and mental phenomena challenged physicalists for a long time. Some physicalists even deny the existence of experience and mental phenomena!
Then please read on the Hard Problem of consciousness. The problem to me is related to a belief that the strong emergence is possible. By this, I mean that a system can have a property that is not a function of the properties of parts or it is not reducible to the properties of parts. I have an argument against strong emergence. I am planning to open a new thread on the topic of strong emergence but I am very busy now so I leave this to the early future when I am done with my current threads. Anyhow if we accept that the Hard Problem of consciousness is not a problem and one day we can resolve it we are still left with the problem of Epiphenomenalism which I already discussed with you and you didn't provide any input on it. There are other problems too that I discussed with you.
Quoting Relativist
Then please read the OP and let me know what you think of it. The proof is there.
Quoting Relativist
What is perception here? It is not defined. The rest does not provide anything significant that helps us to understand what experience is. Anyhow, I think we agree on the definition of awareness so let's start from that. See below.
Quoting Relativist
Physicalists are wrong. The fact that the majority of philosophers believe in physicalism does not prove anything.
Quoting Relativist
Please let's stick to my definition of awareness as I put too much effort into convincing you that it is a correct definition. Physicalism cannot explain the awareness. This is related to the Hard Problem of consciousness. The consciousness is a strong emergence. The strong emergence is impossible (I have an argument against strong emergence). Therefore consciousness is not a strong emergence.
Quoting Relativist
I simply disagree.
Quoting Relativist
No, it is not contrary at all. MoK's brain at t1 is due to MoK's brain + other factors at t0 but the MoK's brain at t1 was not caused by MoK's brain + other factors at t0. MoK's brain at t1 was caused by the Mind after experiencing MoK's brain + other factors at t0.
Quoting Relativist
There is no contradiction. See above.
Quoting Relativist
You need to read about the strong and weak emergence to see that the example of the car is a weak emergence whereas consciousness is a strong emergence.
Now this is a problem, not an explanation. I'm only trying to suggest that "being disembodied" doesn't have to mean being a ghost, or a ghost in the machine. We should use the most charitable interpretations possible when we try to understand why this problem isn't dissolved by physicalism (sorry, Dan Dennett!).
It seem worth noting that a scientifically informed physicalism explains MoK's incredulity.
With the understanding that MoK's intuitions are a function of the training of the neural networks in MoK's brain, and that MoK clearly hasn't done any deep investigation into physical causality, it is unsurprising that MoK's intutions result in incredulity as they do.
You had asked, "How could you accommodate awareness in physicalism?" My answer: "functionally". I'm defending physicalism, which can either be reductive physicalism or non-reductive. The former entails epistemological emergence, the latter allows for ontological emergence.
The relevant points are:
1) I answered your question;
2) the burden is on you to prove physicalism is false;
3) an argument from lack of imagination is a fallacy.
Quoting wonderer1
Then please provide a solution to the Hard Problem of consciousness. Please explain how the mental could have causal power on the physical considering the problem of Epiphenomenalsim.
Quoting wonderer1
Couldn't you wonder that it could be you who doesn't have the proper knowledge to comprehend the MoK's argument?
I was not talking about the functionality of the brain which in fact can be explained by the laws of physics. I was talking about the awareness that as we agreed is a state of being conscious of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, etc. You gave the example of the car but a car is a weak emergence whereas awareness is a strong one. If you cannot understand the difference between the two then I cannot help you. It is due to you to study the topic of weak and strong emergence.
Quoting Relativist
I think all sorts of physicalism are false. Please see above.
Quoting Relativist
You certainly didn't. See my first comment.
No. You're reversing the burden of proof. Provide a formal proof that physicalism is impossible, with clearly stated premises.
Quoting MoK
OK.
[I]P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change[/i]
Physical THINGS exist and engage in physical ACTIVITIES. Anything that changes is no longer the same thing (including any nonphysical objects that may exist). But your statement makes more sense if we treat objects as having both essential and contingent properties. Change would then entail the object's set of contingent properties changing.
"Experience" can refer to an act, or to the effect of an act. An act occurs; it is not an existent. SoI conclude you're referring to the effect: the memory.
I can't go further in your argument until you confirm or correct my interpretation.
Quoting MoK
It implies that it is highly unlikely that physicalism is provably false.
Quoting MoK
Prove it.
Quoting MoK
Then it's true that (MoK's brain at t1) is caused by (Mok's brain at t0 + other factors), because "other factors" includes mind's experience of Mok's brain at t0.
Quoting MoK
I know you weren't talking about functionalism, but it IS the answer to your question - and to many other objections to physicalism. It means you can't simplistically deny physicalism on the basis that mental phenomena aren't exhibited by simple objects (rocks; particles). You need to consider functional entities.
Quoting MoK
Then let's agree to disagree. It can neither be proven nor disproven. We each draw our conclusions about it on subjective grounds. Your fundamental error is in thinking your subjective grounds are objective facts.
I cannot prove it to you unless you understand the difference between the weak and strong emergence. Therefore, it is due to you that study emergence first.
Quoting Relativist
Sure. Anything that changes is no longer the same thing. And sure, physical are subject to change since they have a set of properties.
Quoting Relativist
Please replace experience with awareness since you are not happy with my definition of experience. Again, by awareness, I mean being conscious of thoughts, feelings, perceptions, etc.
Quoting Relativist
It is. Think of the example of Galileo Galilei!
Quoting Relativist
Please read on the weak and strong emergence first.
Quoting Relativist
No, MoK's brain is directly caused by the Mind and not by MoK's brain in former time.
I do know the difference. Proceed with your proof.
Quoting MoK
Rephrase your argument accordingly.
Quoting MoK
Are you saying the Mind recreates MoK's brain ex nihilo at every instant of time, rather than effecting a change to MoK's brain?!
If so, then why did you bring up the example of a car that is a weak emergence?
Quoting Relativist
I am talking about the emergence of awareness which is a strong emergence.
Quoting Relativist
Cool. Let's agree to disagree.
Because it was an example of a functional entity.
Quoting MoK
Prove it.
Quoting MoK
Sure. I hope you can now recognize that your argument depends on assumptions that reasonable people can disagree about. Such is the problem with trying to prove God's existence.
The emergence of a car: Weak or strong? The emergence of awareness: Weak or strong?
Quoting Relativist
I don't need to rephrase my argument. All I need to accept is that physical and awareness/experience are subject to change.
Quoting Relativist
I already mentioned that physical including MoK's brain does not exist in the future. Therefore, physical must be created to allow a change in physical. And by creation, I don't mean the creation ex nihilo. The Mind in fact experiences physical in time first to create/cause physical later.
But I was talking about the emergence of awareness which is a strong emergence.
Quoting Relativist
So you think it is a weak emergence?
Under reductive physicalism: both are weak. Are you accepting that non-reductive physicalism has no problems?
Quoting MoK
You asked me to comment on your Op argument. I did. I established that the 1st premise is ambiguous. If you want further analysis, remove the ambiguity. Up to you.
Quoting MoK
If not ex nihilo, then what is brain at t1 created FROM? If you say "brain at t0" then we're back to (brain at t0 plus other factors) causes (brain at t1), because brain at t0 is a material cause.
Then reductive physicalism is false since it does not realize that the emergence of awareness is strong.
Quoting Relativist
I am saying that non-reductive physicalism has serious problems to deal with. That is not only the emergence of consciousness but also how consciousness could have causal power when the state of the physical is determined to change based on the laws of physics.
Quoting Relativist
Thanks for reading my argument and commenting on it.
Quoting Relativist
I already agree that change in physical is because physical has properties. To establish the argument I however only need to accept that physical and awareness/experience exist and they are subject to change. Please read more. Your criticisms as always are welcome.
Quoting Relativist
The creation ex nihilo refers to creation when there is nothing at all but the creator, then the act of creation, and then something plus the creator. Here, I am not talking about the creation ex nihilo then. There is however an act of creation. But this act is related to the experience of the former state of physical first. So, the Mind experiences physical in the state of S1 and then creates physical in another state, S2, later.
So you don't have a problem with non-reductive physicalsim?
Quoting MoK
I lean toward reductive physicalism. If it could be established that there is actual ontological emergence, I would accept non-reductive physicalism.
No, not unless you remove the ambiguity. If I were to do it myself and identify another problem, you could blame it on my misinterpretation.
Quoting MoK
You didn't answer my question: If not ex nihilo, then what is brain at t1 created FROM?
If you say "brain at t0" then we're back to (brain at t0 plus other factors) causes (brain at t1), because brain at t0 is a material cause.
I'm not surprised that you interpreted my comments as an attack, but no one can be an expert on everything. So I'd say it is more like I pointed out that you are human and your misconceptions are understandable.
Quoting MoK
Sure I can wonder, but you demonstrate throughout this thread that you don't have much understanding of phyisical causality. I, on the other hand, am a 62 year old electrical engineer making my living on the basis of my expertise in understanding physical causality.
Can you provide any reason for me to think that your intuitions regarding this topic are better than mine?
I do have problems with non-reductive physicalism as well. I generally have a problem with physicalism which is a sort of monism whether reductive or non-reductive.
Quoting Relativist
I don't think that strong emergence is possible at all so I won't buy non-reductive physicalsim.
Ok, here is the first premise: P1) Physical and awareness/experience exist and they are subject to change (these changes are because physical and awareness/experience have certain properties).
Quoting Relativist
I did. I explained the creation ex nihilo. Did you get it? And the Mind creates MoK's brain at time t1. The Mind has the ability to cause/create but that requires the experience of the physical first.
Yes, no human can be an expert on everything. I however don't think I have any misconceptions about the subject of this thread.
Quoting wonderer1
I do understand physical causality but I think that physical causality (what I call horizontal causality) is false. I discuss this partly in another thread and partly here.
Quoting wonderer1
I am a retired physicist too. :smile:
Quoting wonderer1
Yes, I already mentioned the problems of physicalism in this thread that you ignored. I also have another thread on physical causality.
Your evasiveness is frustrating. If brain at t1 was not created ex nihilo, then it was created FROM something. What is that something? Answering "not ex nihilo" is not an answer.
You seem to be unwilling to admit you were wrong when you denied
(Brain@t0 + other factors) causes (brain@t1).
It was not created from something. The Mind has the ability to cause/create physical. The creation ex nihilo however refers to God who created the universe from nothing. I am not talking about God and creation ex nihilo here.
Then it was created from nothing, which means ex nihilo. See this.
I disagree with your semantic jugglery here, J. I may come back to this "problem" when I have more time later.
I differentiate between God and the Mind.
So if God creates from nothing, it's ex nihilo. When mind creates from nothing, it isn't. This is ludicrous.
Quoting Relativist
The act of creation ex nihilo is impossible. This is off-topic but I discussed it in this thread.
Quoting Relativist
The act of creation of the physical which is due to the Mind requires experiences of the physical in the former state. No experience so no creation.
Quoting Relativist
It seems ludicrous to you because you don't understand it.
Quoting MoK Here's what you said:
Quoting MoK
To which I responded: "Then it was created from nothing". You haven't reconciled this, you just rejected using the term "ex nihilo". The Latin translation is irrelevant.
Quoting MoK
You deny that experiences are physical, so experiences cannot be a material cause. A "material cause " simply means pre-existing material.
It's ludicrous to deny that brain at t0 is the pre-existing material. But you chose to make that ridiculous claim to rationalize denying that (brain at t0 + other factors) causes (brain at t1).
Do you not understand the difference between material cause and efficient cause?
Could we please put the creation ex nihilo aside since it is unrelated to our discussion?
Quoting Relativist
I mentioned in the OP that the Mind experiences physical. No physical, no experience, no causation/creation, no change.
Quoting Relativist
Sure.
Quoting Relativist
I didn't deny that. I illustrated this to you several times. The brain at t0 is required so the Mind can experience it. The Mind then immediately causes/creates the brain at t1.
Quoting Relativist
Sure I know the difference. I however don't think that an efficient cause is possible without the Mind.
Yes, you did. Here:
Quoting MoK
As I mentioned many times, the Mind requires the experience of the physical at one point of time to cause/create the physical later. The Mind does not have access to the physical and only experiences it. Therefore, the Mind causes/creates the physical from nothing.
Click on this website, then enter: from nothing
Then respond with the answer it gives you.
Please read this carefully. By the way, what about your analysis of the argument?
Show that you can have an honest. 2-way exchange, by doing what I asked:
Quoting MoK
Click on this website, then enter: from nothing
Then respond with the answer it gives you.
The translation is Ex nihilo nihil, the Google transition is however Ex nihilo.
You're omitting the last word (the verb) of this traditional statement. The full statement is "ex nihilo nihil fit." This translates to "nothing comes from nothing".
I never brought up that statement. All I did was to try and confirm that you were saying the brain at t1 came "ex nihilo" (=from nothing). You caused confusing by saying the brain at t1 was "created from nothing" but that it was not "created 'ex nihilo'. Which is a contradiction.
So you think the brain at t1 was created ex nihilo/from nothing. But when I said "it's ludicrous to deny that brain at t0 is the pre-existing material", you responded:
Quoting MoK
But you DID deny it, because you said the mind at t1 was created from nothing. Seems like another contradiction.
Was (brain at t0) a material cause of (brain at t1) or not?
I did what you asked me!
Quoting Relativist
As I mentioned several times, the Mind cannot create without experiencing physical. So there is a physical that the Mind experiences at time t0. The Mind however does not have direct access to the physical therefore It must have the ability to create the physical at time t1. This creation is from nothing by this to be very specific I mean that the Mind just creates the physical yet I have to stress that this creation requires the experience of the physical. So, this act of creation from nothing is different from the traditional use of the act of creation from nothing which relates to the act that God performed. What is the difference? In the case of the Mind, the Mind needs to experience physical whereas in the case of God, God does it without any need for experience of physical.
Quoting Relativist
Please see above.
Quoting Relativist
The brain at time t0 does not cause the brain at t1.
The brain at t0 is composed of a set of matter arranged in a particular way. Nearly everyone would agree that this material continues to exist at t1, possibly in a different arrangement, and this constitutes the brain at t1.
Do you agree?
Yes, the brain continues to exist but this is due to a vertical causation rather than horizontal one.
If the matter composing the brain at t0 is the same matter that composes the brain at t1, then that matter is, by definition, the material cause of the brain at t1. You said you understood what is meant by "material cause", so you should agree. Please confirm.
No, the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1. I think I was clear when I said that this causation is vertical rather than horizontal.
[I]"The brain at t0 is composed of a set of matter arranged in a particular way. Nearly everyone would agree that this material continues to exist at t1, possibly in a different arrangement, and this constitutes the brain at t1."[/i]
Did you change your mind?
I understand the usual monopoly on the term "physical", that's Dennett and the Churchlands. But there are others, like Galen Strawson (without panpsychism which I don't subscribe to) or even going further back Joseph Priestley, developing Locke's thought, that says that matter has powers inconceivable to me - like motion without contact. We cannot conceive it, but it must be true, because that's what theories show (Newton's theories, which he himself was in utter disbelief in).
If matter can produce effect like motion we cannot understand, why would we limit nature in supposing that it cannot combine matter such that it can be conscious?
Incidentally, Schopenhauer (a Kantian) says the very same thing.
If you take physical to mean whatever physics says, the point needs no discussion, for it is silly to argue.
But if you take physical to mean natural, then the physical is everything there is. The mental is the domain of the physical we know the best.
He doesn't say it's a really hard problem? That leads to the natural reading that it is an especially hard problem. I would grant it with one crucial caveat. If mind coming from matter is incomprehensible, why is that harder than not intuitively understanding how gravity could possibly work absent direct contact between bodies?
At bottom most of these things are very hard, incomprehensibly so. Why is consciousness specifically harder than motion without contact? I sympathize with you in disdaining many aspects of Dennett and others, but I don't see why they should be engaged with in this topic. It's not worth refuting, because it is so silly.
Quoting J
Some problems fit into science. Others are much harder. When it comes to the study of the will, we know almost nothing, no clue how the "strings are pulled".
The more complex a phenomenon is, the harder is to study in great depth. And the insights gained are arguably less surprising than what we compared to the consequences of the simpler sciences, like physics.
It's an especially hard problem for the generally-accepted forms of scientific naturalism, as they assume at the outset that whatever is real must be tractable in objective terms. The whole essay is a rhetorical argument against those assumptions.
Interestingly, in another thread, we're discussing Husserl's critique of naturalism, which actually says something rather similar. [quote=Routledge Introduction to Phenomenology]In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sensethis would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effectbut rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousnesss foundational, disclosive role.[/quote]
As I mentioned, "Yes, the brain continues to exist but this is due to a vertical causation rather than a horizontal one."
What is in motion that you cannot understand?
Quoting Manuel
I think the main problem is that something cannot be object and subject at the same time. That is why I distinguish between experience and physical as separate things. Whether the Hard Problem of consciousness can be resolved is another issue.
Anyhow, even if we agree that consciousness results from the arrangement of matter in a specific form, such as the brain, we still have difficulty explaining how conscious phenomena, such as thoughts, feelings, etc., could have causal power. This difficulty is because the physical move is based on the laws of physics so there is no room left for the mental to contribute.
Quoting Manuel
Why is it silly? We know that physics is true.
Quoting Manuel
What is mental to you?
I am not happy to use "efficient cause" here since it requires the existence of a material cause. The Mind causes/creates physical. The Mind however needs the experience of the physical in the former time since it does not have direct access to the physical.
The explain what this means:
Quoting MoK
I already mentioned it several times. The brain exists at time t0 and it is experienced by the Mind. The Mind then causes the brain at time t1. So by "the brain continues" I mean that the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1 but the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1.
Some may assume that. It need not be accepted in these very terms. Naturalism can be taken as the view that all that exists is natural and no more.
The issue then, if such naturalism is not convincing, is to say why consciousness is either not natural or supernatural. The latter option is very questionable.
I don't see why one should take a view that consciousness is not a phenomenon of nature. Unless there are theological or metaphysical issues that must necessarily arise.
Quoting MoK
Not me, anybody - including Newton. How can there be motion without direct contact? We don't have this intuition at all. We assume that the only way a body can move is if another body contacts it.
Quoting MoK
Ah yes. That's a good problem. It's utterly mystifying, way beyond theoretical understanding. Interestingly, according to quantum physics the universe is probabilistic, not deterministic. But classical physics is not deterministic either, as is proved by Norton's dome.
But probabilistic is not the same as willing at all.
The mental merely contributes the evidence for the theories that are used to supposedly prove that we have no free will, or that there is nothing but particles. It's a very poor approach to thinking about nature.
Quoting MoK
To deny consciousness, as Dennett does. If accepted, we have no reasons to suppose physics is true, as our evidence comes through experience of empirical phenomena.
Quoting MoK
Personal experience or "occurrent experiential episodes", as Strawson puts the issue.
.
In this statement:
[I]"The brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1"[/i]
"The brain" is a particular that exists at both t0 and t1, but in a different state.
But this statement:
[I]"the brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1"[/i]
suggests the brain at t0 is a different particular than the brain at t1.
Which is it? Is it a different particular or the same particular?
If it's the same one, what makes it the same, given that it is made of different matter?
An object whose motion is subject to change does so because it experiences a force. This force is due to the existence of a field, a gravitational field for example.
Quoting Manuel
To me, the De BroglieBohm interpretation is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics since it is paradox-free. The universe evolves deterministically in this interpretation though.
Quoting Manuel
That is just a thought experiment. It seems paradoxical because it assumes that one can put a particle exactly at the top of the dome. This is however not possible since one in reality cannot put a particle on the exact point at the top of the dome.
Quoting Manuel
Correct.
Quoting Manuel
Correct.
Quoting Manuel
Physics is true in the sense that explains the changes in the physical world. It is however incorrect when it assumes that the only things that exist are physical. That is why I endorse a new version of substance dualism in which not only physical changes are explained but also mental phenomena are considered as well.
Quoting Manuel
Correct.
By this, I don't mean that the brain is the same thing as I stressed later "The brain at time t0 is not the same matter as the brain at time t1". By going from one state to another state I mean there is a brain in one state and there is another brain in another state later.
Quoting Relativist
See above.
Quoting Relativist
Different particular.
Quoting Relativist
It is not the same matter. The states of the brain are however related.
Then this statement is worded incorrectly:
Quoting MoK
Nothing goes from one state to another, because that entails existing in both states.
You often word your statements in ways that are contrary to your paradigm, as you did here. This creates contradictions, that you never acknowledge. Instead, you criticize me for misunderstanding, misinterpreting, or ignoring something else.
Are we on the same page? :-)
I already elaborated on what I mean by the motion of the brain from one point to another point. That is all that matters. Haven't you ever elaborated on something which is the subject of discussion?
It matters that you make contradictory statements. I've been questioning whether or not you have a coherent account at all. Since you justify it with contradictory statements, it appears that you do not. If you want to rescue your theory, you need to present it with a coherent account (i.e. without contradicting yourself).
What is the thing that you do not understand? Did you understand everything I said? My theory as it is represented in the OP is valid.
What is it that YOU don't understand about what I said previously?:
Quoting Relativist
Your statement "the brain goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1" contradicts your view of identity.
How do you word it considering that you understand what I said so far?
You should word all your statements in a way that doesn't entail contradictions.
So you cannot? Can you?
Illustration: Consider a married bachelor. If he divorces and marries, is he married or a bachelor? He can't be both.
All I am saying is that the Mind experiences the physical, let's call it P1, at time t1, and creates another physical, let's call it P2, at time t2 later! Do you have any problem understanding this?
- how you account for identity over time: what makes you the same person your were yesterday.
- what are particulars/existents/objects, in terms consistent with the above.
- how you account for causation, in general.
- how the mind fits into your general account of causation.
- the ontological nature of time.
Your descriptions of all these should not entail any contradictions.
No, I don't need to describe all these items since a few of them are off-topic. We need to first agree on the OP.
Quoting Relativist
Off-topic. I will however answer that later when we agree on the OP.
Quoting Relativist
The object/physical is the substance which is the object of experience and causation. The Mind is a substance that experiences and causes the physical. The Mind is Omnipresent in spacetime therefore it does not change so it is the same particular. The physical however is caused so it is different particular at different points in time.
Quoting Relativist
There is only vertical causation. If you are asking how a person can cause something then I am not going to answer that in this thread since it is off-topic.
Quoting Relativist
I already explained that in the case of the Mind. The rest, see above, is off-topic hence I am not going to answer that in this thread.
Quoting Relativist
Please read the OP, the second and third arguments.
It's relevant to the contradiction you demonstrated in this thread and the other:" the brain (or electron) goes from one state at time t0 to another state at time t1"
You treated the brain/electron as a persisting object, but you also indicate it's not the same brain/electron. If an electron and brain lacks a persistent identity, then how can YOU have one? I presume you believe yourself to continue existing day to day, but I doubt you can make sense of that. If you can, it seems that it should apply to electrons and brains.
Quoting MoK
You seem to be suggesting that all causation is accounted for by the mind. There are no laws of nature, just the action of an unchanging mind. I wonder how an unchanging (inert) entity experiences anything - it can't learn, it can't react. This is more consistent with a B-theory of time (block time), but you say you're a presentist.
These are the reasons I brought up those "off-topic" issues. If you have these big-picture issues in mind when making your statements, you could avoid contradicting yourself.
In regards to the OP, I don't need to discuss how the intrinsic properties of the physical are preserved. I also don't need to discuss the laws of nature here. Regarding time, I think that there are three types of time: 1) Objective time (B-theory of time or block universe), 2) Subjective time (growing block universe), and 3) Psychological time (what we experience which is the byproduct of the processes in the brain). I will address how the intrinsic properties of the physical are preserved once we agree on the OP. Do you agree with the OP?
Yes. But the point is that we have no intuition as to how this is possible. That was Newton's famous "it is inconceivable to me" quote was all about.
Quoting MoK
That's personal preference, I have no issues with you choosing Bohmian interpretations as opposed to many worlds or relational interpretations. There's no evidence for any of them though, so we should not make arguments concerning freedom on the will on these things.
Quoting MoK
Suppose that for the reasons you gave, that it is not possible in practice to do this experiment, then somehow, classical physics is deterministic. How does that say anything about free will? Sure, we are creatures of nature, but it's safe to assume that the laws of nature do not have imagination, yet no one doubts we do.
Quoting MoK
We are part of the physical world.
Saying that the mental is outside the physical world is like saying there is a distinction to be made between cows and animals. I think you'd need to say what is it about the physical that cannot lead to the mental, necessarily? Once the necessity is established or defended, there is little to do but accept it.
Quoting MoK
I didn't ask about intrinsic properties being preserved, I asked about how identity is preserved. It's relevant to your first premise:
P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
You said a brain at t1 has been caused to exist ex nihilo, so nothing has changed, and it appears that NOTHING is actually subject to change in your view. Change is what occurs to an object that persists over time.
Quoting MoK
I'm a law-realist: I believe laws of nature exist, and these account for causation. You have not suggested the brain is unique, so I infer that all causation is of the same nature: the mind creates all objects anew at each instant of time. If so, then there are no laws of nature - there's just the practices of this mind. If I'm right, that you deny the existence of actual laws of nature, then that is yet another reason for me to reject your claims.
Now consider your next "P1":
Quoting MoK
This depends on a specific ontology of time. My view is that time is a relation between events; it is not an existent. Only existents change, and they can only change if there's some object that persists across time that CAN change.
So it seems that your arguments depend on some specific assumptions. It fails as a proof because I don't accept your assumptions. So you don't really have a "proof" of anything. The question remains as to whether or not you even have a coherent framework. Since you haven't been able to explain it without contradicting yourself, it appears to me that you do not.
So you are asking the big Why!
Quoting Manuel
It is not a matter of personal preference or taste. Bohmian interpretation is paradox-free so it is the correct interpretation.
Quoting Manuel
Concerning free will, we need to agree on one thing only: The options are real. The options are however mental rather than physical. Any mental is however the byproduct of physical processes in a brain for example. Then, the important problem is how we could have mental experiences where therein options are real while the the physical processes are deterministic. I think the solution to this problem is that we are dealing with neural processes. So I think the result of neural processes in the brain can lead to the existence of options as mental phenomena. Think of a situation in which you are in a maze. Although the neural processes are deterministic in your brain they can give rise to a mental representation in which options are real when you reach a fork. We know for sure that options are real when we reach a fork in a maze so what is left is to understand how neural processes in your brain give rise to the experience of options.
Quoting Manuel
Please see the above.
Quoting Manuel
No, I think we already agree that experience which is a mental phenomenon can not be considered to be physical. We also agree that the mental has causal power as well. That is all I need to make my argument.
Quoting Manuel
What I am arguing here is that experience and physical are subject to change, which is P1 in the first argument in the OP, and the experience is due to physical and the change in physical is due to experience, which is P2 in the first argument in the OP. Once we agree on P1 and P2, then the rest of the argument follows naturally. What I am defending here is a new version of substance dualism that not only resolves the Hard Problem of consciousness but also resolves the problem of Epiphenomenalism as well.
Then, you need to tell me what you mean by identity. Although the brain looks the same at different moments in time, it changes constantly because the particles that construct it move constantly.
Quoting Relativist
Could you answer why the physical obeys the laws of nature?
Quoting Relativist
I wanted to open a new thread on the topic of time but since you asked then I answer you here. Any change requires subjective time. Consider a change in the state of something, X to Y, where X and Y are two states that define the change. X and Y cannot lay on the same point since otherwise these states occur simultaneously and there cannot be any change. Therefore, X and Y must lay on different points of a variable, let's call these points tx and ty. ty, however, comes after tx to allow X to come after Y. This variable is called subjective time.
Obviously you think the mind is prebirth. Nothing to argue here with that.
It's like saying I have a phantom penis the size of a whale that noone can see or verify...it was prebirth too.
It was an uncaused cause.
We are going in a circle until people understand that the OP is correct!
Show it to me.
Fucking absurd really...
If you could make a logical argument for a mind outside the body then you've done the one thing that all greater minds than you could not do... create a logical argument for God. Consequently no logical arguments for God exist.
And you're nowhere close.
Put your argument up at a university. Do it.
Where are your objections that I didn't answer?
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I did it. Please read the OP.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I am not going to discuss God here since it is off-topic.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I am done with my argument for the Mind. I haven't changed it yet so feel free to attack it.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
People here have academic education in different disciplines.
They're there, what you can't see them? They're an uncaused cause, you gotta find em bro...
Lmao... no.
Fact is you're proselytizing an illogical argument for God because of your lacking faith in God... hence the need of an argument for God.
I spend my time reading all your posts and my answers again. I think to be fair I answered all your objections. If you think otherwise, please go through our discussion and tell me where I failed to provide a proper answer to your objections.
Faith in God requires belief without reason-based thought (which you still dont have)
A logical argument for God is an attempt to provide reason-based thought.
Therefore using reason-based thought for God is necessarily a showing of a lack of faith in God.
..
You NEED the argument to BE... because you have NO FAITH in your beliefs...
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
What do you mean by "You NEED the argument to BE..."?
And if you try to argue, God is everything... I really hope you do cause then we get really fun fallacies to throw at you with the basis that God is now physical mind and experience all as 1... which then goes back to my initial argument here...which you so vehemently denied
I don't want to strip you of your beliefs or faith. That's the thing as to why I'm even frustrated with you. You refuse to accept after everyone here has given you good reasons to doubt your bad reasoning. Reasoning you don't even need as it defeats the purpose of faith.
Ever heard of Einstein's definition of insanity?
I am not talking about God here! Did you read my responses to your objections? If not there is no point in pursuing further!
Same difference. Realm of 0 evidence.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I am not talking about minds here but the Mind. I might open a new thread in the future to discuss different sorts of minds like conscious and subconscious minds. This is off-topic so I am not going to discuss it here!
The mind is a substance that exists within spacetime. Please read my first, second, and third arguments for further illustration.
So there are disembodied minds floating about in our 3d space... where are they? (Mind before Body)
Or are they only found after the birth of a body?
I can't follow your argument it's like an ironmaiden on my mental faculties...
But that could be cause I don't really understand what you're trying to say in plain words...
Or is the mind like "mana"? How mana is this pre body substance?
The Mind, the subject of focus of this thread, is Omnipresent in spacetime as I argued in the OP. And yes, other minds are floating in space. They are in the place where your body resides.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
They have existed since the beginning of time.
By the way, do you agree with the OP? Why do you bring something unrelated to the OP? I am not going to discuss off-topic with you anymore unless I see that you agree with OP!
So they require the body to interact with reality? That's why it creates physical?
Why would the mind need to create a body if it already exists?
Curious mostly.
How could you judge my OP as a poor form of reasoning? Do you understand it? If yes we are on the same page. Otherwise, you cannot say that it is a poor form of reasoning.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I cannot explain it to you if you cannot tell me where you lack understanding.
Yes. Even the Mind requires physical otherwise It cannot experience anything therefore It cannot cause anything at all.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
What do you mean by "it" here?
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I said that minds have existed since the beginning of time not bodies. Bodies are physical therefore they are the object of experience and causation/creation all the time.
I discussed my view (perdurance) earlier. Here's an article in the Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Quoting MoK
Because they instantiate universals. Laws are relations among universals. (See: this).
Quoting MoK
This seems to be saying time entails an order, but it doesn't answer my question. Is time an existent? Is it a relation? Is it a property?
Why do you call it "subjective? Is it not objectively real? Is this just reference to special relativity?
My view is that time is fundamentally a relation between states of affairs. An event is a state of affairs (a point of time).
Quoting Relativist
I am not saying that time is needed for order. I am saying that time is required for any change. That is the Mind that keeps things in order.
Quoting Relativist
Subjective time exists and it is the object of experience and causation by the Mind. Please read my second argument.
Quoting Relativist
No.
Quoting Relativist
No.
Quoting Relativist
Because the Mind and only the Mind experiences it.
Quoting Relativist
It exists, so in this sense, it is real.
Quoting Relativist
This is something that I am currently thinking about. So I cannot give a clear answer to you. I have to refresh my memory of special and general relativity which I read in good depth 30 years ago. I don't remember the details right now. I believe that subjective time is the time in Einstein's special and general relativity though since I don't have any other candidate for it.
Quoting Relativist
To me, subjective time accommodates different states of affairs.
Do you believe in ghosts? :wink:
Quoting MoK
Thought you were saying you made an argument for God. Because I thought you made it as a parallel to say this this thus that (about God).
It wasn't a big why. It was admittance of the intrinsic unintelligibly of the world. And what was considered problematic by Descartes, Newton, Huygens, Locke, etc., was motion. That's way simpler that consciousness.
But it is unintelligible to us. We simply proceed to do science through theories, and we have dropped the expectation that the world will ever make (intuitive) sense to us. And as with motion, so with consciousness, as John Locke (certainly no pushover) astutely observed:
"Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being...should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought... For, since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon?"
Substitute "God" for "Nature."
We don't understand why gravity works as it does, but we know that it does work without material contact, through Newton's theory of gravitation.
We don't understand why matter could think, but we know that thinking depends on matter, as shown by the fact that no person lacking a brain can think.
Quoting MoK
I suspect some physicists might disagree. But we can put that aside.
Quoting MoK
But how can you say physical processes are deterministic? Some show regularity, others show randomness, and we see exceptions to rules quite frequently.
Free will is the ability to do or not to do something. That so called "physical processes" happen before we are aware of them only shows that most of our mental activity happens at an unconscious level, what we decide to do with that, is up to us. We can act on an urge or not.
Quoting MoK
You have asserted that the mental cannot be physical. There is no argument given as to why this has to be so. It's a semantic argument that "the mental cannot be physical, because mental phenomena are not physical phenomena".
But that does not solve a simple question: why can't mental stuff be physical stuff?
Seeing and hearing are extremely different from each other, but we don't assume these are metaphysically distinct things. We treat them as different sensations, even though, again, they are very different. So why should we assume that the mental is more radically different from the physical than seeing is from hearing?
If we can't give a reason why, then we are likely carving out a mistaken distinction.
Ok.
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I am discussing the Mind here. What does it have to do with Eternal Recurrence?
Quoting DifferentiatingEgg
I am not making an argument for the existence of God here.
Or maybe the world including the Mind is intelligible.
Quoting Manuel
Physical processes are deterministic once we agree that Bohmian's interpretation is the correct interpretation.
Quoting Manuel
Free will is the ability to choose between options. The conscious mind becomes aware of options and this is due to physical processes that happen in the brain.
Quoting Manuel
No, I said accepting the definition of physical and experience they cannot be the same thing since the object and the subject cannot be the same thing.
Quoting Manuel
The object and the subject cannot be the same thing.
Ok, let's focus on your definition. Accepting that the the brain is made of parts then we say that brain A is identical to brain B IFF their parts have the same intrinsical and relational properties. In this sense, the brain at t0 is not identical to the brain at t1 since the relational properties of the parts of the brain are subject to change all the time.
Quoting Relativist
The laws of physics to the best of our understanding are not universal. The standard model contains three forces from four forces in nature. It is a quantum theory of three forces. The string theory is a theory of the last force so-called gravity as well as other forces. We still don't know, the proper theory that explains our world and physical laws since there are many many theories in string theory. The number of theories is estimated to be [math]10^{500}[/math]. That means that the laws of physics are not universal but it is only one instance from many many possible instances.
Correct, it's not identical, but there is a causal relation between consecutive temporal parts. No other object in spacetime has this unique series of temporal parts.
You agree that object identity does not endure in time, so you need to somehow account for the intuition that are the same person you were yesterday. Perdurance seems the best option, but you lack a causal relation between temporal parts, since you attribute causation to a universal "Mind".
Quoting MoK
Laws of physics do not necessarily correspond to the actual laws of nature. They can be localized instances of actual law - compare Newton's law of gravity to general relativity.
They may also be approximations (compare standard chemistry to the more fundamental quantum chemistry).
Quoting MoK
Not knowing what the actual laws of nature ARE, does not imply there aren't actual, immutable laws of nature underlying everything. The sought-after "theory of everything" depends on it.
Correct.
Quoting Relativist
I think you are talking about personality here. Our personalities are partly due to our genes and partly due to what we have experienced. I studied psychology a little but I can tell that different parts of the brain play different roles when it comes to personality. To my understanding, some parts of the brain are hard-wired because of our genes and some are not and change depending on our experiences. Therefore, I think that we are not the same person to some extent as yesterday since a part of us is subject to change.
Quoting Relativist
The theory of everything is a unified theory of four forces, namely electromagnetic force, strong nuclear force, weak nuclear force, and gravity. The theory of everything is not universal though since we know from string theory that the laws of physics are one instance among many many other instances. Our universe could be a different universe in the sense that there could be different forces and particles.
Under a theory of everything (TOE), the hypothetical different forces and particles would be local manifestations of that TOE. The TOE would be the fundamental law.
Quoting MoK
No, I'm talking about personal identity over time. It appears you deny that you are the same person you were yesterday.
Your claims about different parts of the brain relating to personality, and the role of genetics are inconsistent with your claim that the brain at t1 was created ex nihilo.
What do you mean by this?
Quoting Relativist
No, as I explained there is no such thing as universal/fundamental laws. The theory of everything applies to particles and forces in our universe. We still don't know why we have such a physical that moves according to such the laws of physics. As I demonstrated our universe could be different by this I mean it could have other sorts of particles and forces.
Quoting Relativist
I said, "Therefore, I think that we are not the same person to some extent as yesterday since a part of us is subject to change." I know for sure that my mood changes from day to day so in this sense I change over time. I am generally a very patient person though and I think that is part of my genetics so in this sense, I don't change over time.
Quoting Relativist
Let's consider an electron, for example. An electron has some intrinsic properties, such as mass, spin, and charge, and some extrinsic properties, such as location. The intrinsic properties are preserved by time whereas the extrinsic properties are subject to change. These properties can be explained in terms of the vibration of the string. So the intrinsic properties of an electron are not subject to change since they are related to the specific mode of vibration of the string which is not subject to change over time whereas the location of an electron is subject to change and that is related to another mode of vibration of the string which is subject to change over time. I think that the Mind experiences these modes of vibration of the string as a result creates another string at different points in time. The content of the experience of the Mind determines whether something, different modes of vibration of the string, is going to change or not. Once we understand an electron and its motion, we can understand a brain since the brain is made of electrons and quarks.
You're sidestepping the issue. You need to explain to what extent you are the same person, and how you account for this, given that MoK begins to exist ex nihilo at every instant of time.
Quoting MoK
You believe in ontological emergence, which I deny. Ontological emergence is contrary to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The PSR entails reductive physicalism. Reductive physicalism entails a fundamental basis for the laws of physics, and all possible alternative laws of physics.
Quoting MoK
You're contradicting yourself again: perpetual creation of everything ex nihilo entails no preservation of properties.
Each morning that I wake up, I, my conscious mind, am feeded by several types of information from my subconscious mind. This information includes different sorts of perceptions of my surroundings and my body. I also become self-aware and that is due to the activity of the conscious mind. It is through self-awareness that I can know that I am a person. When it comes to the question of whether I am the same person as yesterday, then I need to be informed by the subconscious mind since all memories of my past experiences are stored in the subconscious mind.
Regarding the causation of my brain and how it is preserved please see below.
Quoting Relativist
Not at all. I don't think that ontological emergence is possible at all and I am not talking about it here.
Quoting Relativist
If you accept there are possible alternative laws of physics then it follows that our universe could be different therefore the laws of physics are not universal.
Quoting Relativist
It does since the act of causation is supported by experience. If there was no experience then we would have a problem with how the intrinsic properties of parts of the brain are preserved. I already commented on how the intrinsic properties of an electron are preserved. The intrinsic properties of an electron are nothing but the specific mode of vibration of a string. The Mind experiences the string and its vibration without it, it would not be possible to create another string later that has the same mode of vibration.
I distinguished between the laws of nature (which are ontological) and laws of physics (epistemological; best guesses based on available data). Newton's law of gravity (which implied instantaneous action at a distance) is (or was) a law of physics - and was never a law of nature.
So there may be different laws of physics (what we would have guessed at) but they would be due to the same, fundamental laws of nature - assuming reductionism (as I do).
On this semantical account, you would apparently deny there are laws of nature, because all causation is "vertical"- a consequence of the universal mind. You could accept "laws" of physics as instrumentalist descriptions of observed behavior, but you have to be open to the universal mind choosing to operate differently
Quoting MoK
That universal mind is remembering the properties and creating them afresh. That is not an ontological preservation; it is a duplication.
Quoting MoK
This is inconsistent with your claim that the universal mind recreates your brain ex nihilo at every instant.
You still haven't explained what YOU are. You just began to exist, ex nihilo.
I don't understand your distinction between the laws of nature and the laws of physics here. To me, the laws of physics refer to regularities in physical processes only whereas the laws of nature encompass all regularities including biological, chemical, etc. processes as well. I think that physical processes are fundamental and can explain biological, chemical, etc. processes though. What I am trying to say here is that the laws of physics are not universal because there are an infinite number of different candidates available.
Quoting Relativist
You have to explain what you mean by the laws of nature then. Could you give an example of it?
Quoting Relativist
I cannot deny the laws of nature as I don't understand what it is yet.
Quoting Relativist
That is possible if we accept that the Mind has the capacity to decide. One however can only decide when there are options available for the decision. The options are the realization of two states in which both states are accessible. If you have no option then you have to deal with your only option and act accordingly.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, it is a duplication. That is what I mean by causation/creation.
Quoting Relativist
What am I? I am a person with a body and at least two minds (with a small "m" rather than a capital "M"). A mind is a substance that exists in space, opposite to the Mind that is Omnipresent in space. There are at least two minds in MOK, one I call the subconscious mind and another one the conscious mind. I cannot tell what the subconscious mind experiences since I don't have access to its mental contents. I can only talk about the conscious mind and its experiences. The conscious mind perceives many ideas, such as memorized thoughts, psychological time, perception of a simulation of reality, etc. from the subconscious mind. It has very little memory so-called working memory which is registered in a part of the brain temporarily. The main duty of the conscious mind is to construct new thoughts with the help of the part of the brain that it has access to. The conscious mind does not directly produce thoughts though. The thoughts are the byproduct of neurobiological activity in a part of the brain. The conscious mind just perceives thoughts. It however can decide when there is a conflict of interests. For example, you might have two different thoughts and you are not sure how to proceed because of the conflict of thoughts. That is when the conscious mind comes into play and decides which thought to be considered and which thought to be discarded. Both thoughts are however registered in the subconscious mind for further analysis in the future. It is through the constant exchange of information between the subconscious mind and conscious mind that we can develop coherent thoughts, write a sentence, learn new activities, etc.
"Law of nature" = an aspect of physical reality; an aspect of the way the world actually is (whether we know it or not)
"Law of physics" = a theory (developed by physicists). It corresponds to a law of nature if it is true.
F=G*(m1*m2)/r^2 is a law of physics. It was assumed to be true for many years. Strictly speaking, it is not exactly true, so it is not a law of nature.
General relativity is a law of physics that seems to be true; if so then it is a law of nature.
Quoting MoK
Therefore, as I said, properties are not "preserved", as you had said. Instead, they are duplicated. So you were wrong when you said: "The intrinsic properties are preserved by time"
Quoting MoK
You just now came into existence, having been vertically caused by the Mind. There's a "you" that came into existence 1 minute ago, 5 days ago, and even one nanosecond ago. Nothing is preserved from one moment to the next
Nothing connects all these "you's". Nothing accounts for a preserved identity, since there just a continuous series of MoKs who come into existence ex nihilo with no causal relation between them.
The current you is analogous to the projected image of a single frame of a film. One frame doesn't cause the next; there's just an illusion of motion.
Quoting MoK
You assume a mind is choosing among the "choices".
A reductive physicalist believes the observed laws of physics are manifestations of more fundamental law. Consider string theory: it can account for 10^500 3-dimensional "brane universes", each with a different "physics", but all are accounted for by the string theory.
Ok, I got what you mean with the laws of nature. If so, then there are an infinite number of the laws of nature.
Quoting Relativist
I have already explained this twice. The string's specific vibration mode defines the related particle's intrinsic properties. The Mind experiences this mode of vibration and, as a result, creates another copy of the string with the same mode of vibration at another point in space. Therefore, the intrinsic properties of the particle are preserved.
Quoting Relativist
The intrinsic properties of my parts are preserved as I discuss above. The relational properties of my parts are subject to change all the time and that is necessary since otherwise I could not have biological properties which parts are changing and other parts unchanging.
Quoting Relativist
I just said that the Mind experiences and causes. How did we end up with such a universe with these specific laws of physics? I don't know and I don't think anybody knows that.
Quoting Relativist
Correct. But string theory is only one theory among many other possible theories since in string theory one assumes that the fundamental entity is a string but that fundamental entity could have any geometrical form.
What accounts for this being possible? IMO, something must exist to account for non-actual possibilities. The alternative is to assume everything that is logically possible, is actually (metaphysically) possible.
Quoting MoK
And I've explained multiple times that this entails an absence of continuity. Duplication is not the same thing as preservation.
You have still not accounted for identity over time. Even if we pretend duplication = preservation, you haven't identified what makes brain at t1 the same as the brain at t0. Per your account, they are not identical. The same is true for MoK's body as a whole: it's constantly changing, so it's properties are changing - so it's not strictly identical from one instant to the next.
Quoting MoK
Either the Mind is making a choice, or it is random. Why call this object a "mind" if it isn't making choices?
Quoting MoK
Not if reductive physicalism is true. You deny this, but you still need to account for the contingency: what makes those other possibilities possible?
Within string theory, a string has infinite modes of vibration available. Each mode is related to specific particles and forces, in other words, to specific laws of nature.
Quoting Relativist
That is beyond the scope of string theory. You cannot find an answer to that in string theory. In string theory, any specific vibration of the string is related to a specific particle and force, hence specific laws of physics.
Quoting Relativist
Our universe is vast and infinite in space. The laws of physics may be different in different regions of it. The multiverse although it is hypothetical could also be true so we could have different universes with different laws of physics.
Quoting Relativist
The act of causation is such that the new particle is created at time t1 in the vicinity of the former particle that exists at time t0 so continuity is preserved.
Quoting Relativist
The duplication is such that the intrinsic properties of a particle are held.
Quoting Relativist
I discussed this in depth. You can find my explanation here and here. The brain is not identical in the different instant of time since the relational properties of its parts are changing all the time.
Quoting Relativist
I don't understand how that could be a relevant objection to what I am arguing here, the OP. We know by fact that the relational properties of parts of a person change all the time even if we endorse physicalism. So, that is a valid question for physicalists as well. Do you have any answer to the question you posed yourself? Anyhow, I addressed your questions to the best I could.
Quoting Relativist
I am trying to be minimalistic in my definition of the Mind. If I realize that there is a phenomenon that cannot be addressed with the current definition then I change the definition.
Quoting Relativist
What does reductive physicalism have to do with string theory?
Quoting Relativist
I am saying that each vibrational mode is related to a possible particle and force. Why we have such physical laws rather than another one is beyond the scope of string theory.
This treats strings as fundamental, consistent with reductive physicalism. Quoting MoK
But all these "laws of physics" are a consequence of the fundamental laws of strings.
Quoting MoK
There is no particle-particle continuity. Each particle is brand new, with no history and no future.
Quoting MoK
Quoting MoK
Makes no sense. The particle at t0 has properties; this particle (with its properties) is annihilated a t1. A new particle exists at t1 that has the same properties, but it's not the same particle.
Every electron in the universe has the same intrinsic properties. So when a specific electron at t0 is replaced by a "duplicate" at t1, what maked this particular electron the same identity? See my second picture and description, below.
Quoting MoK
Neither of those posts define what constitutes an identity over time. For example, you said:, "I think that we are not the same person to some extent as yesterday since a part of us is subject to change."
This does not define what IS the same- what aspects of yesterday's person make it the same person today? You referred to genetics, but your genes mutate over time. You are not geneticall identical to infant MoK.
All you claims are just vague allusions. The most common bases are: 1) essentialism - which associates an identity with an essence (a subset of properties that are necessary and sufficient for constituting an individual identity); 2) perdurance: an identity consisting of a connected series of temporal parts.
Because you embrace identity of the indiscernibles, you don't have the essentialist option. So you need some form of perdurantism, but you need to define what connects the temporal parts. The problem is that you have no direct causal connection between temporal parts. Here's a depiction of what you seem to be claiming with your "vertical causation":
The mind is creating electron/brain/body at each instant of time, with no direct connection between the "temporal parts". There's an indirect connection through mind, but the mind is simultaneously recreating every electron/brain/body. Let's focus on electrons: there's a universe full of electrons coming into existence at each instant of time. Here's a depiction of 3 electrons (electX,electY, electZ):
ElectX@t0->mind->ElectX@t1 is indistinquishable from
ElectX@t0->mind->ElectY@t1
Quoting MoK
As I discussed above, string theory is consistent with reductive physicalism
Correct. But strings are not the only fundamental entity. The string is a one-dimensional Brane. In principle, you can have a d-dimensional Brane which moves in D-dimensional spacetime, where D>d.
Quoting Relativist
Correct.
Quoting Relativist
There is. I already illustrated it. A stationary electron is a vibrating string, let's call this vibration V1. The string related to a moving electron has another vibration mode due to the motion of the electron, let's call this mode of vibration V2. The Mind experiences both vibrations of the string, V1 and V2, at time t0 and as a result, causes another string at time t1 at a position that is dictated by V2 while keeping V1 the same. The history of the string is held in the subjective time. Its future depends on V2 and the position of the string in the future. So the process of motion of the string is continuous.
Quoting Relativist
It makes sense if you accept that the Mind experiences the string with V1 and causes another string later with the same mode of vibration namely V1. And the string is not annihilated in my theory but just created in the immediate future. So the history of the string is preserved in the subjective time.
Quoting Relativist
It is V1.
Quoting Relativist
It could be essentialism. For example, look at this.
Quoting Relativist
I already mentioned that a part of our brain is hardwired which means it does not change over time. The other part is subject to change always. It is due to this part of the brain that we can memorize new things over time, basically most of our past experiences. The memories however are held in synapses. You might find this article interesting, especially the section about memory.
Quoting Relativist
The Mind as I discussed above keeps continuity in motion of each electron, quark, etc. Therefore, It keeps continuity in the motion of any object.
Quoting Relativist
Electrons are distinguishable to the Mind since each electron has a specific location in space.
Great! You at last agree that reductive physicalism is possible.
Quoting MoK
Rewrite this while Incorporating the mind's "vertical causality.
Quoting MoK
OK, that gives a continuity for electrons consistent with a form of perdurantism. But that's a particle, a simple object. Now consider a complex organism, like MoK. There's not a fixed set of particles that comprise comprise you, so you can't base it on particle continuity. I suggest you accept perdurantism for this, instead of essentialism - it would be more consistent.
Sure I agree with this. :wink:
Quoting Relativist
I don't understand what you want me to do. I explicitly mentioned that the Mind experiences and causes a string. By this, I certainly mean vertical causation.
Quoting Relativist
An object that is made of parts also can be explained and its motion is continuous as well. First, think of an object that is at rest for the sake of simplicity. Its parts are in constant motion and these motions are continuous as I discussed earlier. But parts of the object move in such a way that they persist to exist in the location of the object, let's call these motions M1={m1,m2,...}, where m1 is the motion of the first part, m2 is the motion of the second part, etc. Now we can discuss a moving object. The difference between a moving object and a static object is that parts of the static object have motion M1 only whereas the parts of a moving object have another motion M2. So, the motions of parts of a moving object are N=M1+M2 such that N={n1,n2,...} where n1=m1+M2 is the motion of the first part, n2=m2+M2 is the motion of the second part, etc. I have to say that the object in different instants of time is not the same even if it is at rest since its parts are in constant motion. The object just seems to be the same.